J-S51011-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DAVON D. WILLIAMS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1961 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 23, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0005056-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 18, 2019

Davon D. Williams appeals from the August 23, 2018 judgment of 

sentence entered after the trial court, sitting as factfinder, convicted him of 

possession of heroin with intent to deliver (“PWID”) and possession of drug 

paraphernalia.1 On appeal, he argues the court erred in refusing to suppress 

evidence gained during a traffic stop. He contends his right to be free of 

unreasonable searches was violated when the police officer searched the 

vehicle his girlfriend (“the driver”) was driving based on three circumstances: 

(1) a smell of marijuana, (2) conflicting stories from Williams and the driver

regarding their destination, and (3) the driver did not know where her oneyear-old child was. We affirm.

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1 See 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30) and (32) respectively.
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Just before midnight on a late summer night, Pennsylvania State 

Trooper David Long was in a stationary position observing traffic on Interstate 

81. He initiated a traffic stop of Williams’s girlfriend’s vehicle when he 

observed that its taillights were not on. He asked the driver to operate her 

headlights and confirmed that the taillights were in fact operational.

Williams concedes, for purposes of this appeal, that Trooper Long’s 

decision to stop the vehicle was appropriate under the law. See Appellant’s 

Brief, at 19. Therefore, the crux of this appeal concerns what happened after 

the initial stop.

While conversing with the driver, Trooper Long noticed a smell of 

marijuana emanating from the vehicle. As per his habit, Trooper Long 

summoned his partner, Trooper Travis Martin, to confirm the odor of 

marijuana. 

Trooper Martin agreed that an odor of marijuana was present in the 

vehicle, and the troopers informed Williams and the driver that they were 

going to search the car based on this observation. While frisking Williams, 

Trooper Martin observed marijuana residue on Williams’s shirt. Williams 

admitted to having smoked marijuana earlier in the evening, but denied that 

he had done it in the vehicle.

Trooper Martin’s systematic search of the passenger compartment of 

the vehicle did not reveal any contraband. When he searched the trunk, 

however, he discovered a duffel bag underneath a baby stroller. The duffel 
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bag contained 10,005 bags of heroin. The Troopers placed Williams under 

arrest and discovered a marijuana grinder in his pocket.

The trial court conducted a hearing on Appellant's 

motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the vehicle search. Trooper 

Long testified and the dashboard camera from his cruiser was admitted into 

evidence. After the trial court denied relief, the parties proceeded to a bench 

trial. The trial court found Williams guilty and imposed sentence. This 

timely appeal followed.

Williams raises a single issue for our review, arguing that the evidence 

recovered from the search of the trunk should have been suppressed:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 

SUPPRESS ALL EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE STATE POLICE 

ILLEGALLY EXTENDED THE DETENTION OF THE VEHICLE, 

ITS DRIVER AND APPELLANT (THE PASSENGER) AND THEN 

SEARCHED THE ENTIRE VEHICLE, INCLUDING THE TRUNK 

AND CLOSED BAG INSIDE, WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE 

OR SEARCH WARRANT BASED PRIMARILY ON THE ODOR 

OF BURNT MARIJUANA, ALL OF WHICH VIOLATED HIS 

STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?

Appellant’s Brief, at 5.

We review a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion to 

determine whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. See Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 

2007). Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, 

we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the 
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evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context 

of the record as a whole. See id. 

Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the 

record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if 

the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. See id. In contrast, the 

suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, 

and our duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law 

to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the suppression court are subject 

to plenary review. See Commonwealth v. McClellan, 178 A.3d 874, 880–

81 (Pa. Super. 2018). 

Ordinarily, our scope of review is limited to the suppression hearing 

transcript. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 2013). In his brief, counsel for 

Williams asks this Court to also consider the evidence adduced at the bench 

trial, which included the testimony of Trooper Martin; only Trooper Long 

testified at the suppression hearing. Williams is correct that L.J. provides for 

an exception when a party explicitly moves to augment the suppression record 

with evidence from a subsequent trial. See id., at 1088 n.17. Here, Williams 

explicitly moved for reconsideration of the suppression motion in light of 

Trooper Martin’s trial testimony. See Post-Sentence Motion, 8/31/18, at ¶ 19. 

The court did not address this request when it denied the post-sentence 

motion.
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The Commonwealth contends that we may not review Trooper Martin’s 

trial testimony. It argues that even under the exception contained in footnote 

17 of L.J., the evidence sought to be added to the suppression record must 

have been “previously unavailable.” See id., at 1088 n.17. Since defense 

counsel explicitly declined to call Trooper Martin at the close of the suppression 

hearing, see N.T., 4/18/18, at 63, the Commonwealth believes his trial 

testimony was available for the suppression hearing. See Commonwealth’s 

Brief, at 9 (unpaginated).

We conclude it is not necessary to confront the issue of availability in 

this case. Even if we include Trooper Martin’s trial testimony in our review, we 

do not find that the suppression court erred in refusing to suppress the heroin 

found in the trunk of the vehicle. 

As noted above, Williams concedes the legality of the initial traffic stop. 

He presents two separate arguments regarding the subsequent search. First, 

he argues that Trooper Long did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to 

prolong the traffic stop. 

A law enforcement officer may detain an individual, and extend a vehicle 

stop, in order to conduct an investigation if that officer reasonably suspects 

that the individual is engaging in criminal conduct. See Commonwealth v. 

Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004). Our Supreme Court has noted that 

“if there is a legitimate stop for a traffic violation (based on probable cause), 

additional suspicion may arise before the initial stop's purpose has been 
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fulfilled; then, detention may be permissible to investigate the new 

suspicions.” Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 115 n.5 (Pa. 2008) 

(citations omitted). 

In order to determine whether a law enforcement officer had reasonable

suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. In re D.M.,

781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001). In making this determination, we must

give due weight to the specific reasonable inferences the law enforcement

officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. See

Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (Pa. 1999).

The totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an

examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal

conduct. Rather, “[e]ven a combination of innocent facts, when taken

together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.” Id. As our 

Supreme Court reasoned in Cook, while “certain facts, taken alone, do not 

establish reasonable suspicion ... a combination of these facts may establish 

reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 677. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court 

recognized in In Interest of A.A., 195 A.3d 896 (Pa. 2018), “the odor of 

marijuana alone, particularly in a moving vehicle, is sufficient to support at 

least reasonable suspicion, if not the more stringent requirement of probable 

cause” that an individual is involved in criminal activity. Id. at 904.

Here, Trooper Long testified that while he was talking to the driver, he 

“detected an odor of marijuana” from inside the vehicle. N.T., 4/18/18, at 10. 
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This observation provided a sufficient basis to allow Trooper Long to conclude 

he had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred in the vehicle.

Appellant next argues that the troopers did not have probable cause to 

search the trunk of the vehicle. Our Supreme Court has adopted the federal 

automobile exception, which permits police to conduct a warrantless search 

of a vehicle if police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains 

evidence of criminal activity; no exigency beyond the inherent mobility of a 

motor vehicle is required. See Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855, 

865 n.11 (Pa. 2018). The level of probable cause necessary for warrantless 

searches of automobiles is the same as that required to obtain a search 

warrant. Commonwealth v. Lechner, 685 A.2d 1014, 1016 (1996); see 

also Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 104 (Pa. 2014).

Probable cause does not demand the certainty we associate with 

formal trials. Rather, a determination of probable cause requires 

only that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates a fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in 

a particular place. [T]he evidence required to establish probable 

cause for a warrantless search must be more than a mere 

suspicion or a good faith belief on the part of the police officer.

Commonwealth v. Scott, 210 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that an odor may be 

sufficient to establish probable cause. Commonwealth v. Stoner, 344 A.2d 

633, 635 (Pa. Super. 1975) (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 

102, 85 S.Ct. 741 (1965)). “In Stoner, we analogized a ‘plain smell’ concept 
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with that of plain view and held that where an officer is justified in being where 

he is, his detection of the odor of marijuana is sufficient to establish probable 

cause.” Commonwealth v. Stainbrook, 471 A.2d 1223, 1225 (Pa. Super. 

1984) (citations omitted).

Once again, Trooper Long testified that he detected the odor of 

marijuana in the car. N.T. 4/18/18, at 10. The driver told him that she was 

driving to Harrisburg to pick up her one-year-old son. See id., at 27-28. 

However, the driver did not know exactly where her son was in Harrisburg. 

See id. Furthermore, Williams informed the troopers that he and the driver 

were on their way to Pittsburgh to pick up their son. See id., at 28. Under 

these circumstances, we conclude the troopers had probable cause to search 

the vehicle for marijuana.

Williams asserts that none of these circumstances are individually 

sufficient to establish probable cause. Williams’s argument contravenes our 

standard of review. We do not consider each circumstance in isolation. Rather, 

we consider the totality of the circumstances. So, even assuming that Williams 

is correct that none of these circumstances are sufficient on their own, we 

conclude they are sufficient taken together as a whole.

Williams contends that, even if the troopers had probable cause to 

search the passenger compartment of the vehicle for marijuana, they did not 

have probable cause to search the trunk. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 

798, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982), the Supreme Court of the United States held 
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that, “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it 

justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may 

conceal the object of the search.” Id. at 825, 102 S.Ct. at 2173. Thus, “[t]he 

scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the 

nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is

defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable

cause to believe that it may be found.” Id. at 824, 102 S.Ct. at 2172. The

Ross decision has been frequently cited by the courts of this Commonwealth.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Epoca, 668 A.2d 578, 582 (Pa. Super. 1995)

(noting that when police have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime

is located in a lawfully stopped vehicle, they are empowered to search every

part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search).

Therefore, under Ross, once Troopers Long and Martin developed 

probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, the scope of 

the search was not limited to the main compartment, but extended to every 

part of the vehicle that could possibly conceal the object of the search. See

id. Since Trooper Long was unable to determine the origin of the marijuana 

odor, a search of the entire car, including the trunk, was warranted.

Williams argues that under Commonwealth v. Scott, 210 A.3d 359 

(Pa. Super. 2019), the troopers did not have probable cause to search the 

trunk of the vehicle. To the contrary, this Court in Scott conceded, “that if a 

police officer possesses probable cause to search a motor vehicle, he may then 
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conduct a search of the trunk compartment without seeking to obtain probable 

cause relative to the particularized area.” See id., at 364. However, the Scott

majority affirmed the suppression of a firearm found in the trunk of the vehicle 

because the still smoking marijuana blunt found in the passenger 

compartment was an obvious cause of the odor of marijuana emanating from 

the passenger compartment. See id.

Williams asserts that Trooper Martin’s trial testimony established an 

obvious source for the odor of marijuana. Trooper Martin testified that 

Williams’s clothes smelled of marijuana, and contained marijuana residue. 

See N.T. 4/18/18, at 59. Williams contends that given this obvious source of 

marijuana odor, the troopers had no probable cause to continue searching the 

car for marijuana.

We disagree. Trooper Martin’s testimony indicates that he only smelled 

the marijuana odor on Williams when he was performing a frisk. This is not 

equivalent to the still smoking marijuana blunt found in Scott. Trooper Martin 

did not testify that he detected the odor in Williams’s clothing before frisking 

him. Nor did Trooper Martin testify that the odor emanating from the clothing 

was strong or lingering.

Just as significantly, we note that Scott involved review of an order 

suppressing evidence. As a result, the Scott panel was required to review the 

evidence of record in a light most favorable to the defendant. Here, we are 
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reviewing an order denying suppression. As noted previously, we must review 

the evidence of record here in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth.

Under these circumstances, we conclude Scott is distinguishable. 

Reviewing the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the suppression court was entitled to find that there was no 

obvious source found in the passenger compartment for the odor of marijuana. 

The troopers were therefore justified in searching the trunk.

In summary, the evidence presented to the trial court justified (1) the 

validity of the initial traffic stop, (2) the extension of the stop which was based 

on the requisite reasonable suspicion, and (3) the warrantless search of the 

vehicle. The investigation into the trunk did not exceed the permissible 

bounds of the search. We therefore reject Appellant's claim that the trial court 

failed to suppress the evidence of the contents of the duffel bag. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/18/2019