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LESSONS FROM FORT HOOD: IMPROVING OUR 

ABILITY TO CONNECT THE DOTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 14, 2012 

Serial No. 112–118 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILLY LONG, Missouri, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

DR. R. NICK PALARINO, Staff Director 

DIANA BERGWIN, Subcommittee Clerk 

TAMLA SCOTT, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, 

and Management: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Investigations, and Management: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Mr. Douglas E. Winter, Deputy Chair, The William H. Webster Commission: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

Ms. Ishrad Manji, Director, Moral Courage Project, New York University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

Mr. Michael E. Leiter, Former Director of the National Counterterrorism 

Center: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 23 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 25 

PANEL II 

Mr. Kshemendra Paul, Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 42 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 43 

FOR THE RECORD 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, 

and Management: 

Statement of William H. Webster, Chair, The William H. Webster Commission ..................................................................................................................... 28 

(1) 

LESSONS FROM FORT HOOD: IMPROVING 

OUR ABILITY TO CONNECT THE DOTS 

Friday, September 14, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND

MANAGEMENT, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:12 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul 

[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul, Duncan, Keating, and Davis. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The committee will come to order. 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine information sharing 

across relevant intelligence and law enforcement agencies, specifically as it pertains to the report issued by the Webster Commission, which focused on the Fort Hood attack. As I mentioned, Mr. 

Winter, let me applaud you for your great work, and Mr. Webster, 

on that report. 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

Before we begin today’s hearing, we should pay tribute to our 

brave diplomats who serve our Nation abroad. Unfortunately, one 

of our ambassadors, Chris Stevens, and three of his colleagues 

were killed on Tuesday, the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks 

on the United States. These events and others should remind every 

American that we are a Nation under siege and must remain vigilant, doing all that we can to uncover and take action against terrorist plots, whether the danger confronts us here in the United 

States or abroad. 

In June 2009, FBI Director Robert Mueller acknowledged the immense challenge facing the Bureau, stating, ‘‘It is not sufficient for 

us as an organization to respond to a terrorist attack after it has 

occurred. It is important for us as an organization to develop the 

intelligence to anticipate a terrorist attack, developing intelligence, 

developing facts. In the past, we looked at collecting facts for the 

courtroom. We now have to think of ourselves as gathering facts 

and painting a picture of a particular threat, understanding the 

risk and moving to reduce that risk.’’ I couldn’t agree more with 

the Director’s statement. 

Then on November 5, 2009, a gunman walked into the Soldier 

Readiness Center at Fort Hood, Texas, and shouted the classic 

jihadist term ‘‘Allahu Akbar’’ and opened fire on unarmed soldiers 

and civilians. He killed 13 and wounded 42 others. This was the 

most horrific terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11. 
2 

Today, we will examine the facts of the Fort Hood case as we 

know them to better understand how these facts that seem so obviously alarming now were so missed by seasoned professionals and 

to understand how the FBI and intelligence community as a whole 

can benefit from the lessons learned from this tragedy at Fort 

Hood. 

The suspect in the Fort Hood shooting is Major Nidal Hasan, a 

commissioned officer in the United States Army, who openly communicated with the Muslim cleric and No. 2 terrorist Anwar alAwlaki. Hasan characterized himself as a soldier of Allah and who 

was assigned the task of counseling our soldiers coming home from 

the battlefield. 

Let’s step back in time and examine the facts. 

On May 31, 2009, Hasan sent one of several emails to al-Awlaki, 

one of the ones that I found most disturbing. The email read in 

part, ‘‘I heard a speaker defending suicide bombings as permissible. 

He contends that suicide is permissible in certain cases. He defines 

suicide as one who purposely takes his own life but insists that the 

important issue is your intention. Then he compares this to a soldier who sneaks into an enemy camp during dinner and detonates 

his suicide vest to prevent an attack that is known to be planned 

the following day. The suicide bomber’s intention is to kill numerous soldiers to prevent the attack to save his fellow people the following day. He is successful. His intention was to save his people, 

his fellow soldiers, and the strategy was to sacrifice his life. This 

logic seems to make sense to me,’’ says Mr. Hasan. 

This email telegraphs almost precisely what happened that fateful day. This email was in the hands of the FBI before the attack. 

In another email to Anwar al-Awlaki, Hasan asked, ‘‘Please keep 

me in your Rolodex in case you find me useful, and please feel free 

to call me collect.’’ 

So in December, 2008, the FBI’s San Diego field office intercepted two emails from Hasan and al-Awlaki and identified the 

email as a product of interest. Over the course of the next several 

months, the San Diego field office and the Washington field office 

would exchange emails about how aggressively to investigate the 

Hasan lead. 

In June 2009, Washington sent the following email to San Diego: 

‘‘Given the context of his military and medical research and the 

content of his, to date, unanswered email messages from al-Awlaki, 

WFO does not currently assess Hasan to be involved in terrorist activities.’’ 

The FBI agent in San Diego described Washington’s inquiry into 

Major Hasan as ‘‘slim.’’ 

The case was dropped until November 5, when the media began 

circulating reports of the massacre. At that time, the San Diego 

agents knew exactly who the perpetrator was, saying, ‘‘You know 

who that is. That’s our boy.’’ 

Years before the FBI knew of Nidal Hasan, the Army major was 

being noticed by his superiors and colleagues at Walter Reed Army 

Medical Center, where he was a resident in the psychiatric program being trained to care for soldiers coming home from war. Two 

fellow officers described Hasan as a, ‘‘ticking time bomb.’’ 
3 

During his medical residency and post-residency fellowship, 

Hasan demonstrated evidence of violent extremism. On several occasions he presented sympathetic views towards a radical Islam 

view and wrote papers defending Osama bin Laden, actions that 

enraged his classmates and professors. Yet no action was taken. Instead, Major Hasan was rewarded for his work and promoted. 

His officer evaluation reports state, ‘‘Among the better disaster 

and psychiatry fellows to have completed the master of public 

health at the Uniformed Services University. He has a keen interest in Islamic culture and faith and has shown capacity to contribute to our psychological understanding of Islamic nationalism 

and how it may relate to events of National security and Army interest in the Middle East and Asia.’’ 

These officer evaluation reports were inaccurate. These were all 

flags, none of which were acted upon. So many flags in this case. 

These reports did not present the facts about Hasan’s character. In 

reality, Hasan was barely a competent psychiatrist, whose radical 

views alarmed his colleagues; and the irony to me is this is the 

very man who was to counsel our soldiers coming back from the 

field of battle. 

In the Hasan case, both the FBI and DOD had important pieces 

to the puzzle that, if put together, maybe just could have possibly 

saved the lives of 12 soldiers and one civilian. 

I want to personally express my sympathy to those impacted by 

the terrorist attack at Fort Hood. We should treat those who died 

and who were wounded as brave Americans and award each of 

them a Purple Heart medal. 

When I spoke with the victims’ families at the Fort Hood memorial service, I saw first-hand the outrage and loss they felt, and I 

wanted to help them find answers. But I want these answers to 

serve as a catalyst to effect change and improve our intelligence 

community as a whole so we can stop these attacks before they 

occur. We have had great successes. We do look forward to hearing 

from the witnesses’ testimonies to understand what went wrong in 

this case and how we can prevent such a tragedy from occurring 

in the future. 

With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman 

from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating. 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

SEPTEMBER 14, 2012 

Before we begin today’s hearing we should pay tribute to our brave diplomats who 

serve our Nation abroad. Unfortunately one of Ambassadors, Christopher Stevens, 

and three of his colleagues were killed on Wednesday, the eleventh anniversary of 

the 9/11 attacks on the United States. These events, and others, should remind 

every American that we are a Nation under siege and must remain vigilant doing 

all we can to uncover and take action against terrorists, whether the danger confronts us here in the United States or abroad. 

In June 2009, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert Mueller acknowledged the immense challenges facing the Bureau stating: 

‘‘The stages we are going through now I call mind-set changes. By mind-set I mean 

understanding that it is not sufficient for us as an organization to respond to a terrorist attack after it has occurred. It is important for us as an organization to develop the intelligence to anticipate a terrorist attack. Developing intelligence is developing facts. In the past we looked at collecting facts for the courtroom. We now 
4 

have to think of ourselves as gathering facts and painting a picture of a particular 

threat, understanding the risk and moving to reduce that risk.’’ 

On November 5, 2009, a gunman walked into the Soldier Readiness Center at 

Fort Hood, Texas, shouted ‘‘Allah Akbar,’’ and opened fire on unarmed personnel. 

He killed 13 and wounded 42 others. This was the most horrific terrorist attack on 

U.S. soil since 9/11. 

Today we will examine the facts of the Fort Hood case as we now know them— 

to better understand how these facts that seem so obviously alarming now were 

missed by seasoned professionals—and to understand how the FBI and intelligence 

community as a whole can benefit from the lessons learned from the tragedy at Fort 

Hood. 

The suspect in the Fort Hood shootings is Major Nidal Malik Hasan, a commissioned officer in the United States Army, who openly communicated with the terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, who characterized himself as a soldier of Allah, and who 

was assigned the task of counseling our soldiers coming home from the battlefield. 

Let’s step back in time and examine the facts. On May 31, 2009, Hasan sent one 

of several emails to the radicalized Muslim cleric Anwar al-Alwaki. The email read: 

‘‘I heard a speaker defending suicide bombings as permissible . . . He contends 

that suicide is permissible in certain cases . . . He defines suicide as one who purposely takes his own life but insists that the important issue is your intention...

Then he compares this to a soldier who sneaks into an enemy camp during dinner 

and detonates his suicide vest to prevent an attack that is known to be planned the 

following day. The suicide bomber’s intention is to kill numerous soldiers to prevent 

the attack to save his fellow people the following day. He is successful. His intention 

was to save his people/fellow soldiers and the strategy was to sacrifice his life. The 

logic seems to make sense to me . . . ’’ 
5 

In another email to al-Awlaki, Hasan asks to ‘‘Please keep me in your Rolodex 

in case you find me useful and feel free to call me collect.’’ 

In December 2008, the FBI San Diego Field Office intercepted two emails from 

Hasan to al-Awlaki and identified the email as ‘‘Product of Interest.’’ The lead was 

sent to the Washington field office because Hasan resided in the area. Over the 

course of the next several months the San Diego field office and the Washington 

field office would exchange emails about how aggressively to investigate the Hasan 

lead. In June 2009, the Washington field office sent the following email to the San 

Diego field office: 

‘‘Due to [redacted] HASAN’S email contact with AULAQI, HASAN was not contacted, nor were his command officials. Given the context of his military/medical research and the content of his, to date unanswered [from AULAQI] email messages, 

WFO does not currently assess HASAN to be involved in terrorist activities.’’ 
6 

The FBI agent in San Diego described Washington’s inquiry into Hasan ‘‘slim’’. 

The case was dropped until on November 5 when the media began circulating reports of the massacre—the San Diego agents knew immediately saying, ‘‘you know 

who that is, that’s our boy.’’ 

Years before the FBI knew of Nidal Hasan the Army Major was being noticed by 

his superiors and colleagues at Walter Reed Army Medical Center where he was a 

resident in the psychiatric program being trained to care for soldiers coming home 

from war. Two fellow officers described Hasan as a ‘‘ticking time bomb’’. During his 

medical residency and post-residency fellowship Hasan demonstrated evidence of 

violent extremism. On several occasions, he presented sympathetic views towards 

radical Islam and wrote papers defending Osama bin Laden—actions that enraged 

his classmates and professors. Yet no action was taken. 

Instead, Major Hasan was rewarded for his work and promoted. His officer evaluation reports state: 

‘‘ . . . among the better disaster and psychiatry fellows to have completed the Master of Public Health at the Uniformed Services University’’ 

‘‘ . . . keen interest in Islamic culture and faith and has shown capacity to contribute to our psychological understanding of Islamic nationalism and how it may 

relate to event of National security and Army interest in the Middle East and Asia.’’ 
7 

These officer evaluation reports were inaccurate. They did not present the facts 

about Hasan’s character. In reality, Hasan was barely a competent psychiatrist 

whose radical views alarmed his colleagues. 

In the Hasan case, both the FBI and DOD had important pieces to the puzzle that 

if put together could have developed the picture more accurately and in my opinion, 

would’ve prompted a more thorough inquiry. Of course, we don’t know if that 

could’ve changed the events at Fort Hood but we should strive to improve, for the 

victims and their families. 

I want to personally express my sympathy to those impacted by the terrorist attack at Fort Hood. We should treat those who died and were wounded as brave 

Americans and award each a Purple Heart Medal. 

When I spoke with the victims’ families at the Fort Hood Memorial service, I saw 

first-hand the outrage and loss they felt and I want to help them find answers. But 

I want the answers to serve as a catalyst to affect change and improve our intelligence community as a whole so we can stop these attacks before they occur. 

We look forward to hearing the witness testimonies to better understand what 

went wrong and how we can prevent such tragedies in the future. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As we all pause to think of the families of the four Americans 

who were lost just this week in Libya and keep their families in 

our prayers and thoughts, it is significant that we come here today 

in dedication to find every piece of information we can find that 

will determine how better to keep the Americans that serve us so 

well safe as they try to keep us safe. So with that, Mr. Chairman, 

I thank you for holding today’s hearing. 

Three years ago, on November 5, 2009, the Nation was shocked 

by the mass shooting that occurred at the Army Deployment Center located at Fort Hood, Texas. During the shooting, 13 lives were 

lost, 43 individuals were wounded, and the lives of so many others 

were forever changed. 

It later became evident that the warning signs existed well before the tragedy and should have, at a minimum, been further investigated. Both the FBI and the Department of Defense had 
8 

knowledge of Major Hasan’s potential as a threat to homeland security. 

The actions leading up to the massacre by Major Nidal Malik 

Hasan, the sole suspect in the murders, should have unequivocally 

sparked a greater concern on the part of officials. Yet dots were not 

connected, information was not shared, and the lack of formal policies and protocols led to a colossal breakdown in communication. 

In December, 2009, at the direction of the FBI director, the Webster Commission was created to examine the events that occurred 

before and after the shootings. The Final Report of the William H. 

Webster Commission on the FBI, Counterterrorism Intelligence, 

and the Events at Fort Hood Texas, which represent the work of 

the Commission, was released in July 2012. 

The crucial recommendation mirrored in both the Webster Commission’s report and the 9/11 Commission’s report focused on the 

importance of information sharing to our Nation’s security and the 

need to do away with a culture of territorialism that existed between the various levels of Federal, State, and local authorities. As 

a former Massachusetts district attorney myself, I was once at the 

bottom rung of the information-sharing ladder and understand the 

consequences of inadequate lines of communication. For this reason, my first legislative measure signed into law was an amendment to the intelligence authorization that encouraged Federal authorities to utilize fusion centers and enlist all of the intelligence 

capabilities, including that of law enforcement, to secure our homeland. 

Since then, I have been following the progress of the recommendations set forth in the 9/11 Commission, and now the Webster Commission, in regard to intelligence sharing and am pleased 

that the administration has indicated that effective information 

sharing and access throughout the Government is a top priority. 

This all being said, I am interested in hearing from both our witness panels today on their thoughts and their own recommendations. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Keating follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER WILLIAM KEATING

SEPTEMBER 14, 2012 

Three years ago, on November 5, 2009, the Nation was shocked by the mass 

shooting that occurred at the Army deployment center located at Ft. Hood, Texas. 

During the shooting, 13 lives were lost, 43 individuals were wounded, and the lives 

of so many others were forever changed. It later became evident that warning signs 

existed well before this tragedy and should have, at a minimum, been further investigated. 

Both the FBI and the DOD had knowledge of Major Hasan’s potential as a threat 

to homeland security. The actions leading up to the massacre by Major Nidal Malik 

Hasan—the sole suspect in the murders—should have unequivocally sparked greater concern. 

Yet, dots were not connected, information was not shared, and the lack of formal 

policies and protocols led to a colossal breakdown in communication. 

In December 2009, at the direction of the FBI Director, the Webster Commission 

was created to examine the events occurring before and after the shootings. 

The Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission on the FBI, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas which represents the work 

of the Commission was released in July 2012. 
9 

The crucial recommendation mirrored in both the Webster Commission’s report 

and the 9/11 Commission’s report focused on the importance of information-sharing 

to our Nation’s security and need to do away with the culture of territorialism that 

existed between the various levels of Federal, State, and local authorities. 

As a former Massachusetts District Attorney, I was once on the bottom rung of 

the information-sharing ladder and understand the consequences of inadequate lines 

of communication. 

For this reason, my first legislative measure that was signed into law was an 

amendment to the Intelligence Authorization that encouraged Federal authorities to 

utilize fusion centers and enlist all of the intelligence capabilities—including that 

of law enforcement—to secure our homeland. 

Since then I have been following the progress of the recommendations set forth 

by the 9/11 Commission, and now the Webster Commission, in regard to intelligence-sharing and am pleased that the administration has indicated that effective 

information sharing and access throughout the Government is a top priority. This 

all being said, I am interested to hear from both witness panels today on their 

thoughts and their own recommendations. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the Ranking Member. Members are reminded that additional statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

SEPTEMBER 14, 2012 

Three days ago, we marked the eleventh anniversary of the September 11, 2001 

terrorist attacks. 

That tragedy left us with a number of valuable lessons. As the 9/11 Commission 

found, Government agencies charged with collecting intelligence and law enforcement data did not ‘‘connect the dots’’ that could have revealed that attacks of the 

proportion launched on 9/11 were under way. 

Since that time, the importance of horizontal information sharing among Federal 

agencies and vertical information sharing from Federal agencies to State, local, and 

Tribal entities has been weaved into our homeland security efforts. 

However, on November 5, 2009, the tragic events that occurred at the Army base 

located in Fort Hood, Texas, once again revealed that the failure to connect the dots 

can lead to disastrous results. 

On that day, 13 people lost their lives and 43 individuals were wounded at the 

hand of a single gunman who was on the separate radars of the FBI and the DOD. 

Unfortunately, that information was not coordinated. 

In some of the reports and the rhetoric following the Ft. Hood shooting, there 

were claims that the failure to connect the dots was based on ‘‘political correctness.’’ 

I strongly disagree. The information-sharing challenges that we faced then and 

continue to face now are more grounded in protecting turf than being timid. 

To conclude that the source of the missteps was based on the religion of the perpetrator takes us backwards and takes our eyes off the ball. 

Instead, our focus should be on ensuring that communication systems, information technology, training, and protocols are improved Government-wide. 

And most importantly, removing stovepipes. 

The Fort Hood shooting occurred nearly 3 years ago. Fortunately, since that time, 

information sharing has improved and we have the death of Osama bin Laden, the 

conviction of the New York City subway bomber, and other success stories as proof 

of this joint effort. 

Mr. MCCAUL. We are pleased to have a very distinguished panel 

of witnesses here today, and I would like to introduce them. 

First, we have Mr. Douglas Winter. He is Deputy Chair and Editor-in-Chief of the William Webster Commission. He is a counsel 

and former partner in the law firm of Bryan Cave, where he is the 

head of the firm’s electronic discovery unit. He served as law clerk 

to Judge William Webster on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th 

Circuit. Also served as a captain in the U.S. Army and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General school. 
10 

Second, we have Ms. Irshad Manji. She is the Director of Moral 

Courage Project at New York University’s Wagner Research Center 

for Leadership in Action. As Director, she equips students to become global citizens by speaking truth to power in their communities. As a reformist Muslim, Ms. Manji has written multiple 

books on the trends that are changing the world of Islam. 

It is so great to have you here today. Thank you for being here. 

Finally, I would say my colleague and friend from Department of 

Justice, Mr. Leiter. Michael Leiter is the Senior Counsel to the 

Chief Executive Officer of Palantir Technologies and the former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. 

It is great to have you here today as well, Mr. Leiter. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Winter for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS E. WINTER, DEPUTY CHAIR, THE 

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER COMMISSION 

Mr. WINTER. Thank you. 

Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, 

and Members of the subcommittee. I am joined today by Adrian 

Steel, the commissioner who was responsible as governing authorities liaison with the Department of Justice and the FBI, and also 

staff member George Murphy. 

It is impossible in the time allotted to describe the lengthy and 

detailed investigation that is set forth in the final report. Director 

Mueller’s terms of reference were extraordinary in scope. 

The factual background, as you know, is intricate and complex. 

There is no simple calculus of cause and effect here. The mistakes 

and shortcomings we identified were the products of cascading sets 

of circumstances that range from a lack of policy guidance, training, and adequate technology to a misleading set of Army personnel 

records and an error in interpreting an abbreviation. 

My written statement sets forth an overview of our analysis and 

our findings. Today, I will devote a review of the recommendations 

to help underscore the lessons of Fort Hood. 

The FBI has concurred in the principles underlying each of our 

18 recommendations and in almost every instance has implemented or is implementing a responsive measure. We recommended that the FBI adopt seven policies to formalize FBI practices that were not followed in the Hasan matter or that would 

help assure information sharing in similar circumstances. The recommended policies concerned the counterterrorism command-andcontrol hierarchy at the FBI, restrictions on counterterrorism leads 

assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Force officers, and clearinghouse 

procedures for counterterrorism investigations and assessments of 

law enforcement personnel and other Government personnel. 

When Judge Webster was sworn in as director of the FBI, there 

were three analysts at the FBI. Today, the FBI relies on a cadre 

of more than 3,000 intelligence analysts with established career 

paths. We applauded the FBI’s success in embedding analysts, creating fusion cells, and other analysis-driven initiatives. We recommended further integration of analysts into FBI operational 

groups. 

A crucial lesson of Fort Hood is the ever-changing diversity and 

complexity of communications technologies and the impact of the 
11 

ever-growing amount of electronic information on the FBI’s ability 

to identify and combat terrorism. These change the ways in which 

the FBI will in the future need to acquire, store, review, manage, 

disseminate, and act on intelligence. 

We recommended that the FBI expedite and seek expanded funding for enterprise data management programs, with an emphasis 

on aggregating its primary investigative databases, collecting and 

storing data as a separate service from applications, and developing shared storage solutions across the U.S. intelligence community. 

We recommended that the FBI seek funding for acquisition of 

new hardware for its DWS–EDMS database system, which lacks 

the infrastructure to fulfill system demands and also lacks a live 

disaster recovery backup. 

Only two people, an FBI agent and an analyst, were charged 

with reviewing information in the al-Awlaki investigation. The 

crushing volume of information they confronted, the limited technology, and other factors forced those two people to review the 18 

Hasan-al-Awlaki communications in a day-to-day context with 

20,000 other items of electronic information they reviewed. 

We recommended that the FBI evaluate and acquire information 

technology that was automated and advanced that would assist 

personnel in reviewing and managing data. 

We also recommended that the FBI implement managed information review protocols for these types of large data collections. 

That would allow for case-specific review of the type that occurred 

in the al-Awlaki investigation, as well as strategic review by different review teams. 

An important reminder of Fort Hood is that Congress, the Justice Department, and the FBI must assure that the FBI’s governing 

authorities strike an appropriate balance between protecting civil 

liberties and privacy interests and detecting and deterring threats 

like those posed by Major Hasan. We recommended, among other 

things, that the FBI should increase internal compliance reviews 

and audits and that its existing governing authorities should remain in effect. 

Training, we learned, is crucial, particularly in the task force 

context, where you have a diverse number of Federal, State, local, 

and Tribal agencies. The DCIS agent who conducted the Hasan assessment in the Washington field office did not even know that the 

DWS–EDMS database existed, leading him, and in turn his FBI 

supervisor, to believe that there were only two communications between Hasan and al-Awlaki. We recommended that the FBI require 

task force officers to complete database and computer training before they join the Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

In closing, I want to note that the final report focuses on what 

went wrong. But throughout our investigation we were witness to 

all that was right about the FBI. We saw patriotism, professionalism, dedication, and long hours of work in a context of constant threats and limited resources. Agents, analysts, and task 

force officers are confronted with decisions every day whose consequences may be life or death. These personnel need better policy 

guidance to know what is expected of them, better technology, re-
12 

sources, and training to navigate the ever-expanding flow of intelligence information. They also deserve our gratitude. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Winter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS E. WINTER

SEPTEMBER 14, 2012 

I first want to express, on behalf of Judge William H. Webster and my fellow 

Commissioners, our profound sympathy for the victims of the Fort Hood tragedy, 

their loved ones, families, and friends. Their loss is unimaginable. It is also America’s loss. 

I also want to acknowledge the honor and privilege of working with Judge Webster. He is one of America’s most distinguished public servants—a former U.S. Navy 

officer, U.S. Attorney, U.S. District Judge, U.S. Circuit Judge, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He 

is also an inspiration, a mentor, and a friend. 

In January 2010, Judge Webster asked me to join his independent investigation 

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At that time, we discussed the extraordinary 

scope of the Terms of Reference set out by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III. We 

did not know then that our assignment would evolve and expand. We knew only 

the essential factual background, which I now describe. 

BACKGROUND

On December 17, 2008, U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan visited the website 

of radical Islamic cleric Anwar Nasser al-Awlaki (sometimes spelled ‘‘Awlaki’’). He 

sent a message to al-Awlaki. He sent another on January 1, 2009. The FBI Joint 

Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in the San Diego Field Office, which led the FBI investigation of al-Awlaki, acquired the messages. An FBI Special Agent (SD–Agent) and 

Analyst (SD–Analyst) reviewed the messages. Concerned by the content of the first 

message and implications that the sender was a U.S. military officer, SD–Agent set 

leads to the JTTF in the Washington, DC, Field Office (WFO) and to FBI Headquarters on January 7, 2009. 

Fifty days later, a WFO Supervisory Special Agent (WFO–SSA) read the lead and 

assigned it to a Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) Special Agent who 

served on the JTTF (WFO–TFO). Ninety days later, on May 27, 2009, WFO–TFO 

conducted an investigative assessment of Hasan, who worked as a psychiatrist at 

Walter Reed Army Medical Center. WFO–TFO queried certain FBI and Department 

of Defense (DoD) databases and reviewed the limited set of Army personnel records 

available to him. In the mean time, San Diego had acquired and reviewed 12 additional messages and emails from Hasan to al-Awlaki and two emails from al-Awlaki 

to Hasan. San Diego did not connect these communications to the lead. 

WFO–TFO did not know about or review these additional communications. WFO’s 

assessment concluded that Hasan was not ‘‘involved in terrorist activities.’’ San 

Diego advised WFO that its assessment was ‘‘slim.’’ Neither JTTF took further action. Hasan sent his last message to al-Awlaki on June 16, 2009. al-Awlaki did not 

respond. 

In July 2009, the Army assigned Hasan to Fort Hood, Texas. In October 2009, 

the Army notified Hasan that he would be deployed to Afghanistan. On November 

5, 2009, Hasan entered the Fort Hood deployment center carrying two handguns. 

He shouted ‘‘Allahu Akbar!’’—Arabic for ‘‘God is great!’’—and opened fire, killing 12 

U.S. soldiers and one DoD employee, and injuring as many as 43 others. 

This bare-bones summation veils an intricate and complex factual background. 

The FBI conducted an internal investigation of how San Diego and WFO handled 

the Hasan-al-Awlaki communications. The FBI took specific steps to improve its 

ability to deter and detect threats like Hasan. Director Mueller determined that an 

additional, independent investigation of the FBI’s actions was appropriate. 

THE WEBSTER COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATION

Judge Webster’s written statement provides the subcommittee with an overview 

of our lengthy and detailed investigation, our findings, and our recommendations as 

set forth in the Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission on the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, 

Texas on November 5, 2009. 
13 

To fulfill Director Mueller’s Terms of Reference, the Commission conducted inquiries into violent radicalization; the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force Program; the 

FBI’s governing authorities; the FBI’s information technology and document review 

infrastructure; the FBI’s investigation of al-Awlaki; the FBI’s assessment of Hasan; 

and the FBI’s pre- and post-Fort Hood data holdings on Hasan. 

Our analysis of the FBI’s actions addressed knowledge and information sharing; 

ownership of the Hasan lead; WFO’s assessment of Hasan; the FBI’s information 

technology and review workflow; and training. Director Mueller also asked us to assess the FBI’s remedial actions in the aftermath of the shootings, and to analyze 

whether the FBI’s governing authorities strike an appropriate balance between protecting individual privacy rights and civil liberties and detecting and deterring 

threats such as that posed by Hasan. The investigation did not probe the shootings, 

which are the subject of a U.S. Army-led inquiry and military criminal proceeding 

against Hasan. 

Director Mueller promised, and the FBI provided, full cooperation and support. No 

request was denied. No question went unanswered. The Commission had personal 

contact with more than 100 FBI Agents, Analysts, and Task Force Officers assigned 

to investigate al-Qaeda and other organizations linked with violent Islamic extremism. We spent many days in interviews, briefings, operational meetings, and conversations with personnel from at least 7 different Field Offices/JTTFs, FBI Headquarters, and the National Counterterrorism Center. We conducted a lengthy ‘‘no 

limits’’ field visit with a WFO counterterrorism unit of our choice that was not involved in the Hasan matter. We had direct access to the FBI’s computer systems 

and to all personnel involved in the events at issue. 

The Commission found shortcomings in FBI policy guidance, technology, information review protocols, and training. I summarize our analysis here. I caution the 

reader, however, against reaching conclusions based solely on this summary, which 

lacks the factual and analytical context of the Final Report. I also emphasize that 

we could not base our analysis on what we learned about Hasan or al-Awlaki on 

and after November 5, 2009. Our review was based on information known or available to the FBI at the time the actions were taken in the context of the FBI’s thenexisting policies and procedures, operational capabilities, and technological environment. Finally, we recognized our limited ability to predict what might have happened if different policies or procedures were in effect or personnel had made different decisions or taken different actions. We chose not to speculate. We examined 

instead the reasonableness of what did happen, in order to identify and recommend, 

when appropriate, better and corrective policies and procedures for the future. 

ANALYSIS OF FBI ACTIONS

I. Knowledge and Information Sharing 

A. The FBI’s Understanding of Violent Radicalization 

The FBI’s understanding of violent radicalization is consistent with the contemporary views of the psychiatric community. Before the events at issue, the FBI had 

provided training on its radicalization model to Agents, Analysts, and Task Force 

Officers, including all personnel involved in the Hasan assessment. That training 

has expanded in the aftermath of the Fort Hood shootings. 

B. The FBI’s Knowledge About Anwar al-Awlaki 

In early 2009, the FBI knew Anwar al-Awlaki as an English-speaking, anti-American, radical Islamic cleric and the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation. 

San Diego believed that al-Awlaki was developing ambitions beyond radicalization. 

WFO viewed him as merely inspirational. The FBI’s full understanding of alAwlaki’s operational ambitions developed only after the attempted bombing of 

Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas day 2009. 

C. The FBI’s Knowledge About Nidal Malik Hasan 

Our searches of the FBI’s data holdings confirmed that San Diego’s lead contained 

all of the FBI’s actionable knowledge about Hasan as of January 7, 2009. The FBI’s 

knowledge grew, or should have grown, over the next 5 months as San Diego acquired and reviewed 14 further messages from Hasan to al-Awlaki and two emails 

from al-Awlaki to Hasan. That knowledge also grew, or should have grown, as WFO 

conducted its assessment of Hasan on May 27, 2009, and San Diego reviewed that 

assessment in June 2009. 

D. Information Sharing 

The FBI did not share the Hasan information with any DoD employees other than 

DCIS and NCIS personnel assigned to the San Diego and WFO JTTFs. 
14 

Notice of the Hasan Assessment.—Prior to Fort Hood, FBI Field Offices informally 

shared information with DoD on a regular basis about counterterrorism assessments 

or investigations of members of the U.S. military, DoD civilian personnel, and others 

with known access to DoD facilities. However, there was no formal procedure or requirement to advise DoD about these assessments and investigations. 

When San Diego set the lead to WFO, the FBI did not know whether the sender 

of the messages was a U.S. Army officer. In conducting its assessment of Hasan, 

WFO identified Hasan as a military officer but decided not to contact his chain of 

command. WFO’s assessment concluded that Hasan was not involved in terrorist activities. Under these circumstances, the failure of either JTTF to advise DoD about 

the assessment was not unreasonable. However, the absence of a formal policy on 

notifying DoD of assessments or investigations of its personnel was unreasonable. 

The Decision Not to Issue an Intelligence Information Report.—FBI policy is to 

share intelligence when dissemination has the potential to protect the United States 

against threats to National security or improve the effectiveness of law enforcement. 

San Diego decided not to issue an Intelligence Information Report (IIR) to DoD and 

other U.S. intelligence community members because of a mistake in interpreting 

Hasan’s Defense Employee Interactive Data System (DEIDS) record. A DCIS Agent 

assigned to the San Diego JTTF (SD–TFO3) read the DEIDS abbreviation ‘‘Comm 

Officer’’ to mean ‘‘Communications Officer’’ rather than ‘‘Commissioned Officer.’’ 

SD–Agent, who led the al-Awlaki investigation, thus believed that, if the sender was 

in fact Hasan, he might have access to IIRs. To protect the al-Awlaki investigation, 

he decided not to issue an IIR. 

SD–TFO3’s misinterpretation of the DEIDS record was understandable; others 

had made the same mistake. WFO’s response to San Diego corrected this mistake 

and identified Hasan as an Army physician. Given WFO’s identification of Hasan 

and its assessment that he was not involved in terrorist activities, San Diego had 

no reason to revisit the question of issuing an IIR. 

II.Ownership of the Lead 

The FBI’s operational actions suffered from a lack of clear ownership of the Hasan 

lead. After setting the lead, San Diego believed that WFO was responsible for 

Hasan. WFO acted as if San Diego were responsible. The confusion resulted from 

the nature of Discretionary Action leads, a lack of policy guidance, the differing investigative interests of San Diego and WFO, a lack of priority, a misguided sense 

of professional courtesy, undue deference to military TFOs, and an inversion of the 

chain of command. 

A. FBI Policy and Practice 

In 2009, no FBI written policy established ownership of interoffice leads. In FBI 

practice, the receiving office was responsible for taking action in response to the 

lead and determining what, if any, additional investigative steps were warranted. 

B. The Leads 

San Diego’s primary purpose in conducting the al-Awlaki investigation was to 

gather and, when appropriate, disseminate intelligence about him. The ‘‘trip wire’’ 

effect of the investigation in identifying other persons of potential interest was, in 

SD–Agent’s words, a ‘‘fringe benefit.’’ 

SD–Agent set a Routine Discretionary Action lead to WFO and an InformationOnly lead to FBI Headquarters that included Hasan’s messages. The messages contained no suggestion of imminent violence and no overt threat. Because the lead did 

not demand action within 24 hours, FBI policy required SD–Agent to set a Routine 

lead. Because FBI practice was to give the receiving office discretion in assessing 

potential threats in its Area of Responsibility, the lead was ‘‘[f]or action as deemed 

appropriate.’’ 

The decision to set a Routine Discretionary Action lead was reasonable under the 

circumstances and existing policies. The follow-up, however, was not adequate. 

C. The Response 

San Diego set the lead on January 7, 2009. At that time, there was no formal 

policy guidance on the assignment or resolution of Routine leads. The timing of assignments depended on the practice of the receiving supervisor. 

At WFO, the receiving Supervisory Special Agent (WFO–SSA) did not read and 

assign the lead until February 25, 2009, nearly 50 days after the lead was set. 

No formal FBI policy set a deadline for the completion of work on Routine leads. 

Because file reviews occur on a quarterly basis, informal FBI policy required personnel to complete work on Routine leads within 90 days of assignment. 

WFO–SSA assigned the lead to a DCIS Agent detailed to the JTTF (WFO–TFO). 

WFO–TFO waited 90 days—until May 27, 2009, the day his work on the lead was 
15 

supposed to be completed—to read it and take action. The 90-day delay in even 

reading the lead, let alone taking action, was unreasonable. That delay may have 

affected the shape, scope, and outcome of WFO’s assessment of Hasan, which took 

place in 4 hours on that 90th day. 

Five months passed before WFO responded to San Diego’s lead. The delay pushed 

Hasan further from the minds of SD–Agent and SD–Analyst, and may have contributed to their failure to connect other Hasan communications with the lead. 

D. The Impasse 

Although the lead identified a potential threat in the Washington, DC, area, 

WFO–SSA and WFO–TFO treated Hasan as part of San Diego’s investigation of alAwlaki. This perspective appears to inform their apprehension about interviewing 

Hasan and conducting a more expansive assessment without first checking with San 

Diego. Yet WFO declined to take further action even after San Diego criticized the 

assessment as ‘‘slim,’’ and instead offered to ‘‘re-assess’’ if San Diego, ‘‘request[ed] 

any specific action.’’ 

E. Deference to Military Task Force Officers 

SD–Agent engaged DCIS and NCIS Task Force Officers (TFOs) in San Diego in 

researching Hasan’s military status and deciding whether to circulate an IIR. Those 

actions were reasonable and prudent. Interagency synergy is a prime reason for the 

JTTF Program. 

That synergy weakens, however, when TFOs assume sole responsibility for investigating members of their own departments or agencies. WFO–SSA’s assignment of 

the lead to WFO–TFO had practical advantages. As a DCIS Agent, WFO–TFO had 

access to DoD resources and databases that were not available to the FBI. He also 

had an insider’s knowledge of DoD practices and procedures that could prove vital 

to an assessment of a service member. However, he also brought the subjectivity of 

an insider to the assessment. That subjectivity may have caused undue deference 

to the Army chain of command and undue concern about the potential impact of an 

interview on Hasan’s military career, which appear to have driven the decision not 

to interview Hasan or contact his superiors. 

F. An Inverted Chain of Command 

The JTTF synergy also weakens when the FBI looks to TFOs to resolve disputes 

between offices. Here, after SD–Agent reviewed WFO’s response to the lead, he 

asked SD–TFO3 to contact WFO–TFO, DCIS Agent to DCIS Agent. 

SD–Agent should have called WFO–SSA. If they could not resolve matters, SD– 

Agent should have raised the dispute up the FBI chain of command to his supervisor, who could have reviewed the matter and contacted WFO–SSA’s supervisor. If 

disagreement continued, the supervisors could have turned to FBI Headquarters for 

resolution. This is how the FBI has routinely handled interoffice disputes and disagreements, but only as a matter of unofficial policy. 

G. The Lack of Formal Policies 

The lack of formal policy guidance defining ownership of this lead and requiring 

elevation of interoffice disputes caused or contributed to a situation in which two 

JTTFs effectively disowned responsibility for the lead—each believing that the other 

office was responsible. That belief affected, in turn, each JTTF’s sense of priority 

when it came to the assessment, the search for additional Hasan-al-Awlaki communications, and how the conflict between the offices should be resolved. 

III. The Assessment 

WFO–SSA and WFO–TFO erred in the process they followed to conclude that 

Hasan’s communications with al-Awlaki were benign and acceptable. They also 

erred in failing to search the database in which electronic communications were 

stored, if only to determine whether al-Awlaki had replied to Hasan’s messages. 

Their assessment of Hasan was belated, incomplete, and rushed, primarily because 

of their workload; the lack of formal policy setting deadlines for the assignment and 

completion of Routine counterterrorism assessments; WFO–TFO’s lack of knowledge 

about and training on DWS–EDMS; the limited DoD personnel records available to 

WFO–TFO and other DoD TFOs; and the delay in assigning and working on the 

lead, which placed artificial time constraints on the assessment. 

A. The Records Check 

WFO–TFO assessed Hasan using the limited Army Electronic Personnel File that 

WFO–TFO had authority to access. Those records praised Hasan’s research on 

Islam and the impact of beliefs and culture on military service, and showed that 

he held a security clearance and had been promoted to Major weeks earlier. WFO– 
16 

TFO thus believed—and WFO–SSA agreed—that the Army encouraged Hasan’s research and would approve of his communications with al-Awlaki. 

Based on this simple records check, those conclusions may have been reasonable. 

Hasan’s two messages solicited Islamic opinions. He made no attempt to disguise 

his identity and used an email address that revealed his proper name. 

The Army records available to WFO–TFO did not present a complete or accurate 

picture of Hasan. Indeed, their contents were misleading. WFO–TFO—and, in turn, 

the FBI—did not have access to the disturbing contents of Hasan’s personal files 

at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the Uniformed Services University of 

Health Sciences. 

Despite the Army’s interest in Hasan’s research, his communications with an inspirational and potentially operational radicalizer under FBI investigation deserved 

scrutiny beyond a simple records check. Regardless of the contents of his Electronic 

Personnel File, the lead warranted a closer look at Hasan. 

B. The Decision Not to Interview Hasan 

The decision not to interview Hasan was flawed. WFO–TFO and WFO–SSA believed that an interview could jeopardize the al-Awlaki investigation by revealing 

the FBI’s access to Hasan’s messages. This explanation is not persuasive. FBI 

Agents talk to subjects and assess threat levels every day without explaining the 

source of their knowledge. 

WFO–TFO and WFO–SSA also concluded, from the records check, that Hasan 

was not ‘‘involved in terrorist activities.’’ As a result, they believed that an interview 

and contact with Hasan’s chain of command might jeopardize his military career, 

contrary to the FBI’s ‘‘least intrusive means’’ requirement. Under that requirement, 

an investigative technique (for example, a records check or interview) may be used 

if it is the least intrusive feasible means of securing the desired information in a 

manner that provides confidence in the information’s accuracy. 

The fact that messages to a radical imam appear to be benign academic inquiries 

does not answer the question of whether Hasan was a threat. The ‘‘least intrusive 

means’’ requirement did not prohibit further inquiry into that question, but would 

require a careful balancing of the competing interests of assessing a potential threat 

and minimizing potential harm to the subject of the assessment. 

Moreover, when San Diego expressed doubts about WFO’s assessment, the calculus of the least intrusive means requirement should have changed. The next-least 

intrusive means (for example, an interview) could have been used to resolve any 

doubts about the messages and provide more confidence in the accuracy of the information supporting WFO’s conclusion. 

C. The Failure to Search for Additional Messages 

WFO–TFO did not even know that DWS–EDMS, the database in which the 

Hasan-al-Awlaki communications were stored, existed until after the Fort Hood 

shootings. As a result, WFO–TFO searched only databases known to him and did 

not find any of the later messages. After receiving WFO’s assessment, which stated 

incorrectly that WFO had searched all FBI databases, San Diego did not search 

DWS–EDMS for additional messages acquired during the intervening 5 months. 

The failure to search for additional messages appears to have had significant 

ramifications. That search, if performed on May 27, 2009, the date of WFO’s assessment, would have returned 12 additional communications from Hasan and alAwlaki’s two emails to Hasan. Although none of the messages contained a suggestion of imminent violence or an overt threat, the additional messages could have undermined the assumption that Hasan had contacted al-Awlaki simply to research 

Islam. 

The failure to search for additional messages resulted primarily from the FBI’s 

failure to provide TFOs with training on DWS–EDMS and other FBI databases, the 

search and information management limitations of DWS–EDMS, the lack of ownership of the Hasan lead, the lack (at that time) of a baseline collection plan, and the 

absence of the type of initiative that Agents, Analysis, and TFOs should be encouraged to take, particularly when confronted with dissonant information or an interoffice dispute. 

D. Workload and the Lack of Formal Policies 

The nearly 50-day delay in the assignment of the lead and the 90-day delay in 

taking action on the lead suggest that WFO–SSA and WFO–TFO were overburdened. That underscores the importance of formal policy direction that allows personnel to understand, prioritize, and manage their workloads. 

The absence of formal policy guidance setting deadlines for assignment and resolution of Routine counterterrorism leads and establishing a baseline for information 
17 

to be collected in counterterrorism assessments caused or contributed to an assessment of Hasan that was belated, incomplete, and rushed. 

IV. Information Technology and Review 

A crucial lesson of Fort Hood is that the information age presents new and complex counterterrorism challenges for the FBI. Diverse and ever-growing waves of 

electronic information confront its law enforcement and intelligence-gathering activities. Emerging technologies demand changes in the ways that the FBI acquires, 

stores, reviews, organizes, manages, disseminates, and acts on intelligence. 

The actions of the Agents, Analysts, and Task Force Officers who handled the 

Hasan information cannot be judged fairly or accurately without an understanding 

of their working environment—and, in particular, their technological environment. 

Our investigation revealed that the FBI’s information technology and review protocols were, then and now, less than adequate for fulfilling the FBI’s role as the premier U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agency combating domestic terror. 

A. Information Technology Limitations 

DWS–EDMS, the primary database under review, is a capable tool that lacks the 

modern hardware infrastructure needed to fulfill and preserve its crucial 

functionality. The relatively aged server configuration for DWS–EDMS and its everincreasing data storage demands, coupled with ever-increasing use, create issues 

that we witnessed in our hands-on use of the system. DWS–EDMS also lacks a 

‘‘live’’ or ‘‘failover’’ disaster recovery backup. 

B. Information Review Workflow 

In examining San Diego’s review of the information acquired in the al-Awlaki investigation, we identified serious concerns about the available technology and two 

interrelated concerns about human actions: Questionable decisions in reviewing certain communications and the failure to relate subsequent messages to the lead. 

The DWS–EDMS collection presented, in SD–Analyst’s words, a ‘‘crushing volume’’ of information. We were unable to assess the reasonableness of San Diego’s 

review decisions and tracking of messages outside the context of the nearly 20,000 

other al-Awlaki-related electronic documents that SD–Agent and SD–Analyst reviewed prior to Hasan’s final message on June 16, 2009. 

We found, however, that the FBI’s information technology and document review 

workflow did not assure that all information would be identified and managed correctly and effectively in DWS–EDMS because of a confluence of factors: (1) The humanity of the reviewers; (2) the nature of language; (3) the ‘‘crushing volume’’ of the 

al-Awlaki information; (4) the workload; (5) limited training on the databases and 

search and management tools; (6) antiquated and slow computer technology and infrastructure; (7) inadequate data management tools; (8) the inability to relate DWS– 

EDMS data easily, if at all, to data in other FBI stores; and (9) the absence of a 

managed quality control regime for review of strategic collections. 

The Final Report discusses each of these factors in detail (see Chapters 4–6 and 

11). The confluence of these diverse human and technological factors forced SD– 

Agent and SD–Analyst to review, using a linear, forward-looking workflow, each of 

the Hasan-al-Awlaki communications in isolation as 18 of the nearly 8,000 electronic documents that they reviewed between December 18, 2008, and June 16, 

2009, the dates of Hasan’s first and last messages to al-Awlaki. That workflow encouraged anticipatory review, analysis, and identification of products, but discouraged reflection, connectivity, and retrospective review and analysis. The operational 

and technological context in which SD–Agent and SD–Analyst worked, not their actions as reviewers, was unreasonable. 

C. Data Aggregation 

FBI Agents, Analysts, and Task Force Officers regularly consult many databases 

in the performance of their duties. In 2009, with few exceptions, users accessed each 

database using a discrete interface, password, and search engine. Our investigation 

found that planning for enterprise data aggregation, and consolidating and conforming the contents of these diverse databases, are vital to the FBI’s ability to respond to the threat of terrorism. 

ASSESSMENT OF FBI REMEDIAL ACTIONS

At Director Mueller’s request, Part Three of the Final Report assessed the 

changes to FBI policies, operations, and technology that resulted from its own internal review and subsequent events. We applaud these steps, which are outlined in 

Exhibit B. 
18 

ANALYSIS OF THE FBI’S GOVERNING AUTHORITIES

A. Existing Authorities 

After an extensive review of the FBI’s governing authorities (see Chapter 3), we 

asked representatives of Congressional oversight staff (the Majority and Minority 

staffs of the Senate and House Judiciary and Intelligence Committees) and public 

interest groups (the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Enterprise 

Institute) to identify their concerns abut the impact of the governing authorities on 

privacy rights and civil liberties. 

Part Four of the Final Report assesses those concerns. We concluded that existing 

authorities balance the FBI’s responsibility to detect and deter terrorism with protection of individual privacy rights and civil liberties. We believe, however, that the 

FBI should monitor and report on its use of investigative techniques that raise concern through the Office of Inspection and Compliance, Inspection Division, and National Security Division. The FBI should modify or abandon policies and protocols 

that prove unacceptably harmful to privacy rights or civil liberties. 

B. Additional Authorities 

We interviewed a broad range of FBI personnel involved in counterterrorism 

work; former FBI and other U.S. intelligence community personnel; and members 

of the Majority and Minority staff of the Congressional Judiciary and Intelligence 

Committees. Although we received a number of recommendations, we identified, but 

took no position on, two legislative actions that the FBI could propose to improve 

its ability to deter and detect terrorist threats. 

The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.—The FBI believes that 

amending the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) 

(1994), 47 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., is an immediate priority. Congress enacted CALEA 

to assure that law enforcement obtains prompt and effective access to communications services when conducting a lawful electronic surveillance. The statute recognizes that surveillance may be difficult, if not impossible, absent an existing level 

of capability and capacity on the part of communications service providers. The 

threat to our National security—increasingly explicit in FBI investigations—is that 

service providers using new technologies often lack that capability and capacity. 

Administrative Subpoena Authority.—The FBI’s counterterrorism authorities are 

not as robust, definitive, and consistent as its law enforcement authorities. The FBI 

has the authority to issue administrative subpoenas in narcotics, child-abuse, and 

child-exploitation investigations, but not in counterterrorism investigations. This inconsistency is noteworthy, although we recognize that counterterrorism investigations may implicate potential risks to civil liberties and privacy interests in ways 

that traditional law enforcement investigations do not. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

We made 18 formal recommendations for corrective and enhancing measures on 

matters ranging from FBI policies and operations to information systems infrastructure, review protocols, and training. Exhibit A summarizes those recommendations. 

We also assessed whether any administrative action should be taken against any 

employee involved in this matter, and we concluded that administrative action was 

not appropriate. 

We recognize that the FBI has continued to evolve as an intelligence and law enforcement agency in the aftermath of Fort Hood and in furtherance of internal and 

external recommendations that followed, including the Special Report of the Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (February 3, 2011). To 

the extent our Recommendations may parallel or implicate actions and initiatives 

proposed internally or by others, they should not be read to suggest that the FBI 

has not been diligent in pursuing those actions and initiatives, but to underscore 

their importance. 

CONCLUSION

In the words of our Final Report: ‘‘We conclude that, working in the context of 

the FBI’s governing authorities and policies, operational capabilities, and the technological environment of the time, FBI and Joint Terrorism Task Force personnel 

who handled relevant counterterrorism intelligence information made mistakes. We 

do not find, and do not suggest, that these mistakes resulted from intentional misconduct or the disregard of duties. Indeed, we find that each Special Agent, Intelligence Analyst, and Task Force Officer who handled the [intelligence] information 

acted with good intent. We do not find, and do not believe, that anyone is solely 

responsible for mistakes in handling the information. We do not believe it would be 
19 

fair to hold these dedicated personnel, who work in a context of constant threats 

and limited resources, responsible for the tragedy at Fort Hood.’’ We concluded instead that ‘‘these individuals need better policy guidance to know what is expected 

of them in performing their duties, and better technology, review protocols, and 

training to navigate the ever-expanding flow of intelligence information.’’ We also 

concluded that the FBI should continue to focus on compliance monitoring and the 

oversight of authorized investigative techniques that may affect privacy rights and 

civil liberties. 

EXHIBIT A 

SUMMARY OF WEBSTER COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

Policies 

A.1: A Formal Policy on Counterterrorism Command-and-Control Hierarchy 

A.2: A Formal Policy on the Ownership of Counterterrorism Leads 

A.3: A Formal Policy on Elevated Review of Interoffice Disagreements in Counterterrorism Contexts 

A.4: A Formal Policy on the Assignment and Completion of Routine Counterterrorism Leads 

A.5: A Formal Policy on Counterterrorism Leads Assigned to JTTF Task Force Officers 

A.6: A Formal Policy on the FBI Clearinghouse Process for Counterterrorism Assessments and Investigation of Law Enforcement Personnel 

A.7: A Formal Policy on the FBI Clearinghouse Process for Counterterrorism Assessment and Investigation of Other Government Personnel 

Operations 

B.1: Continued Integration of Intelligence Analysts into Operations 

Information Technology and Review 

C.1: Expedite Enterprise Data Management Projects 

C.2: Expand and Enhance the Data Integration and Visualization System 

C.3: Acquire Modern and Expanded Hardware for DWS–EDMS 

C.4: Acquire Advanced Information Search, Filtering, Retrieval, and Management 

Technologies 

C.5: Adopt Managed Information Review Protocols for Strategic Collections and 

OtherLarge-Scale Data Collections 

Governing Authorities 

D.1: Increase Office of Integrity and Compliance (OIC) and Inspection Division Compliance Reviews and Audits 

D.2: Assure Strict Adherence to Policies That Ensure Security for Information That 

Lacks Current Investigative Value 

D.3: The FBI’s National Security letter, Section 215 Business Record, Roving Wiretap, and ‘‘Lone Wolf’’ Authorities Should Remain in Effect 

D.4: Update Attorney General Guidelines Affecting Extra-Territorial Operations 

Training 

E.1: Train Task Force Officers on FBI Databases Before They Join Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces 

EXHIBIT B 

SUMMARY OF FBI REMEDIAL ACTIONS

Information Sharing 

(1) FBI–DoD Clearinghouse Process for Counterterrorism Assessments and Investigations of Military Personnel 

(2) Consolidation of FBI–DoD Memoranda of Understanding on Information Sharing, Operational Coordination, and Investigative Responsibilities 

Operations 

(1) Discontinuance of ‘‘Discretionary Action Leads’’ 

(2) Counterterrorism Baseline Collection Plan 

(3) Triggers for Assessments/Investigations 

(4) Decisions to Close Certain Investigations of DoD Personnel 

(5) Identification and Designation of Strategic Collections 
20 

Technology 

(1) Automatic Linking of Email Data 

(2) Automatic Flagging of Certain Email Data 

(3) Flagging DWS–EDMS Activity Across Cases 

(4) Workload Reduction Tools 

(5) DWS–EDMS September 2011 Release 

Training 

(1) Virtual Academy 

(2) Classroom Training 

(3) Database Training 

THE WILLIAM H. WEBSTER COMMISSION ON THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION, COUNTERTERRORISM INTELLIGENCE, AND THE 

EVENTS AT FORT HOOD, TEXAS, ON NOVEMBER 5, 2009 

The Honorable William H. Webster, Chair 

COMMISSIONERS

Douglas E. Winter, (BRYAN CAVE LLP), Deputy Chair and Editor-in-Chief 

Adrian L. Steel, Jr., (MAYER BROWN LLP), Governing Authorities Liaison 

William M. Baker, (former FBI Assistant Director, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE 

DIVISION) 

Russell J. Bruemmer, (WILMER HALE) 

Kenneth L. Wainstein, (CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP) 

ADJUTANT

Stephen J. Cox, (APACHE CORPORATION) 

ASSOCIATES

George F. Murphy, (BRYAN CAVE LLP) 

Margaret-Rose Sales, (MAYER BROWN LLP) 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Winter. 

The Chairman now recognizes Professor Manji for her testimony. 

STATEMENT OF ISHRAD MANJI, DIRECTOR, MORAL COURAGE 

PROJECT, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 

Ms. MANJI. Thank you. 

Good morning. My name is Irshad Manji, and I am here in my 

capacity as founder and director of the Moral Courage Project. 

Before I formally begin, allow me also to express my sympathy 

to those, both American and not, who have been victimized by this 

week’s violence in Libya, Egypt, and now Yemen. 

Housed in the Wagner School of Public Service, the Moral Courage Project teaches people worldwide to speak up when others, 

frankly, want to shut them up. We are motivated not just to break 

silences but also to combat the abuse of power, in other words the 

corruption, that comes from the fear of speaking out. This means 

understanding why silences develop in the first place, which brings 

me to the question that concerns our hearing. 

Let me be clear: I do not know if one or more FBI officers intentionally withheld information about Major Nidal Malik Hasan. But 

personal experiences leave me skeptical about whether the standard bearers of National security are willing to share vital information, whether with the public or with each other. 

I will give you a couple of examples in a moment. First, let me 

address why I would have personal experiences on this front. The 

reason is I am a devoted Muslim who loves God; and, because I 
21 

love God, I speak up whenever anybody uses Islam to violate all 

of our God-given liberties and human rights. 

As refugees from East Africa, my family and I settled on the 

West Coast of Canada; and there I grew up attending two types of 

schools, the multi-racial, multi-faith public school, and then every 

Saturday, for several hours at a stretch, the Islamic religious 

school, the madrassa. 

At madrassa, I asked candid questions. For instance, why can’t 

Muslims take Jews and Christians as friends? At the age of 14, 

having asked one too many of these questions, I got booted out of 

the madrassa. But as I have had to assure my mortified mother 

more than once, leaving madrassa does not mean leaving Allah. 

I decided to study Islam on my own and discovered that there 

is an Islamic tradition of questioning, of reinterpreting, and even 

of dissenting with the clerics. It is this tradition that empowers me 

to reconcile my faith with freedom. All of which puts me and my 

team on the receiving end of death threats and actual violence not 

just in Muslim-majority countries but also in this part of the world. 

That is why I have first-hand experience with some of the inner 

workings of National security. That is how I have come to observe 

the censorship that plagues many good people, people to whom we 

do owe gratitude and whose mission is to protect the public. 

In my remaining time, I would like to share two stories. Although the first takes place in Canada, of which I remain a citizen, 

it foreshadows the second story, which takes place in the United 

States, where I now live and work. 

In June, 2006, Canadian police arrested young Muslims for plotting to blow up Parliament and behead the Prime Minister. The 

Toronto 17, as they came to be known, called their campaign Operation Badr, B-a-d-r, Badr. Operation Badr is a tribute to the battle 

of Badr, the first decisive military victory by Prophet Mohammed. 

Now, police knew that religious symbolism helped inspire the Toronto 17. Still, at the press briefing to announce those arrests, police did not mention the words Muslim or Islam. 

At their second meeting with the press, police boasted, bragged 

about avoiding the words Muslim and Islam, again despite knowing 

that Operation Badr had been organized in the name of Islam. 

Three months later, at a police conference, I raised my concern 

about the silence. After my plea for honesty, several law enforcement insiders, independent of each other, confided to me that the 

lawyers prevented these authorities from publicly uttering the 

words Muslim and Islam. 

As for my experiences in the United States, here is a concrete 

one. In 2009, I received media calls about David Headley, a U.S. 

citizen who helped plan the terrorist attacks on Bombay in 2008, 

in other words, the year before. Apparently, Mr. Headley had 

named me among his targets, too. Journalists wanted to know how 

that made me feel. You can guess my response. 

What made me feel worse, though, was that these media calls 

came in a full day before any National security officials got in 

touch. Somehow, somewhere their chain of communication had broken down. 

The research on institutional silos and silence suggests multiple 

forces at play. But the antidote to all of these forces is moral cour-
22 

age, the willingness to speak up when others want to shut you 

down. 

I thank you for this invitation and, unlike my madrassa teacher, 

I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Manji follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF IRSHAD MANJI

SEPTEMBER 14, 2012 

My name is Irshad Manji. I am here in my capacity as founder and director of 

the Moral Courage Project at New York University. 

Housed in the Wagner School of Public Service, the Moral Courage Project teaches 

people worldwide to speak up when others want to shut them up. We are motivated 

not just to break silences, but also to combat the abuse of power—the corruption— 

that comes from the fear of speaking out. 

This means understanding why silences develop in the first place, which brings 

me to the question that concerns our hearing. 

Let me be clear: I do not know if one or more FBI officers intentionally withheld 

information about Major Nidal Malik Hasan. But personal experiences leave me 

skeptical about whether the standard-bearers of National security are willing to 

share vital information, whether with the public or with each other. 

I will give you a couple of examples in a moment. First, allow me to address why 

I would have personal experiences on this front. The reason is: I am a devoted Muslim who loves God, and because I love God, I speak up whenever Muslims use Islam 

to violate our God-given liberty and human rights. 

As refugees from East Africa, my family and I settled on the West Coast of Canada. There, I grew up attending two types of schools—the multi-racial, multi-faith 

public school and then, every Saturday, for several hours at a stretch, the Islamic 

religious school (madressa). At madressa, I asked candid questions. For instance, 

why can’t Muslims take Jews and Christians as friends? 

At the age of 14, having asked one too many of these questions, I got booted out 

of madressa. But as I had to assure my mortified mother—more than once—leaving 

madressa does not mean leaving Allah. 

I decided to study Islam on my own, and discovered that there is an Islamic tradition of questioning, re-interpreting, and even dissenting with the clerics. It is this 

tradition that empowers me to reconcile my faith with freedom. 

All of which puts me and my team on the receiving end of death threats—and 

actual violence—not just in Muslim-majority countries, but also in this part of the 

world. That is why I have first-hand experience with some of the inner workings 

of National security. 

And that is how I have come to observe the censorship that plagues many good 

people whose mission is to protect the public. 

In my remaining time, I would like to share two stories. Although the first takes 

place in Canada, of which I remain a citizen, it foreshadows the second story, which 

takes place in the United States, where I now work and live. 

In June 2006, Canadian police arrested young Muslims for plotting to blow up 

Parliament and behead the Prime Minister. The ‘‘Toronto 17,’’ as they came to be 

known, called their campaign, Operation Badr. This title is a tribute to the Battle 

of Badr, the first decisive military victory by Prophet Muhammad. 

Police knew that religious symbolism helped inspire the Toronto 17. Still, at the 

press briefing to announce those arrests, police did not mention the words ‘‘Muslim’’ 

or ‘‘Islam.’’ 

At their second meeting with the press, police boasted about avoiding the words 

‘‘Muslim’’ and ‘‘Islam’’—again, despite knowing that Operation Badr had been organized in the name of Islam. 

Three months later, at a police conference, I raised my concern about this silence. 

After my plea for honesty, several law enforcement insiders, independent of each 

other, confided to me that lawyers prevented authorities from publicly uttering the 

words ‘‘Muslim’’ and ‘‘Islam.’’ 

As for my experiences in the United States, here is a concrete one: In 2009, I received media calls about David Headley, a U.S. citizen who helped plan the terrorist 

attacks on Bombay the year before. Apparently, Mr. Headley had named me among 

his targets. Journalists wanted to know how that made me feel. You can guess my 

response. 
23 

What made me feel worse was that these media calls came in a full day before 

any National security officials got in touch. Somehow, somewhere, their chain of 

communication had broken down. 

The research on institutional silos—and silence—suggests multiple forces at play. 

But the antidote to all of these forces is moral courage: The willingness to speak 

up when others want to shut you up. 

I thank you for this invitation and, unlike my madressa teacher, I welcome your 

questions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Professor, and we appreciate your courage. Thank you for being here. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Leiter. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. LEITER, FORMER DIRECTOR OF 

THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 

Mr. LEITER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, it is a pleasure to be back. This is my first appearance before the Congress 

outside of the Executive branch, and I have to say the freedom is 

rather invigorating. 

Today, I am actually appearing as a member of the Homeland 

Security Project at the Bipartisan Policy Center. That is the followon organization to the 9/11 Commission, led which the very distinguished and talented Governor Tom Kean and Congressman Lee 

Hamilton. Although, of course, also my comments are really based 

on my time, over 4 years, as the head of the National Counterterrorism Center, as well as serving in the Navy and the Department 

of Justice. 

Now, rather than spending my 5 minutes now going over extensively where I think improvements have been made, I would like 

to focus most of my comments on where I think there are still challenges that the Congress and the Executive branch faces over the 

next several years. But I do want to highlight, because you are focused on a failure—Congressman McCaul, you obviously noted the 

successes, and there really have been many, and many of these 

successes we simply take for granted today: The fact that we have 

a single, consolidated watch list at the National Counterterrorism 

Center; the fact that we have analysts and information systems 

from a variety of organizations all in one place; the fact that we 

have 104 Joint Terrorism Task Forces and fusion centers. 

These are all—none of this is to say that the problems are solved, 

but this is to say that the improvements are quite tremendous. The 

tragedy of the 13 brave Americans who were lost at Fort Hood can 

never be eliminated. 

All that being said, that we have avoided large-scale terrorist attacks in the United States and a total of 14 individuals have been 

killed in the United States in the past 11 years is, in my view, 

nothing short of remarkable. Tragic that every one of those lives 

was lost but a record which I do think that the Congress and the 

U.S. Government and our allies can in fact be proud of. 

Now, having accepted that not everything is right, I would offer 

two caveats before I go into the areas where I think they can be 

improved. 

First, I think the Congress and the Executive branch must be 

very careful not to conflate all information-sharing problems as 

being the same. There is real sophistication in this. What happened 

on Christmas day, an intelligence failure, was one type of informa-
24 

tion challenge; and it is a very different challenge from what happened at Fort Hood. I say that because I think it is important to, 

as I say, get under the hood, examine these with some specificity. 

Second, I think this committee knows this well, but we have to 

continue to remember that information sharing is not always unmitigated good. We need look no father than WikiLeaks to remember that, as we share information, we must also do it in a way that 

not only protects privacy and civil liberties but protects the security 

of that information. 

I believe these two things can be reconciled, but we cannot forget 

that there are dangers as well. 

Very quickly, where do I see some opportunities and need for improvement? I will divide it into five basic areas: Legal, policy, budgetary, personnel, and technology. 

First, on the legal front, I am a recovered lawyer, but I will say 

there is probably no area in which I work in National security 

where the legal landscape is a myriad of complicated, conflicting 

statutes, and it is extremely difficult to ever know how information 

can or cannot be shared. The burden that that puts on operators 

and analysts, not to mention lawyers, is tremendous. 

Although I think the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, 

serves some very valuable purposes both for collection and for protection of civil liberties, anything that Congress can do to simplify 

that law, especially in an era of rapidly-changing technology, would 

be critically important. 

Second, on the policy front, I think it is important that the Congress and the Executive branch work together to move legal policies—pardon me, move information-sharing policies in a far more 

rapid way than they move today. I think as a general matter—and 

I say this having served in a Republican and Democratic administration. I think as a general matter administrations have gotten 

these policies right about how information should be shared, but 

the pace at which these discussions occur borders on the Biblical. 

In an era of rapidly-evolving terrorist threats we cannot allow 

these discussions to go on endlessly. The Congress must demand 

that the Executive branch rapidly adopt policies, like the Attorney 

General guidelines, to ensure there is effective information sharing 

once laws are passed. 

On the budgetary front, this committee knows quite well the 

pressures that all of National security and State and local governments will face in the coming years. We have spent an enormous 

amount of money building Joint Terrorism Task Forces and State 

and local fusion centers. In my view, although these have done 

quite well, as we enter a more austere budgetary period the Congress will have to look quite closely at how we can rationalize and 

truly create a National system and not simply a patchwork of entities. 

Very quickly on the last two points, personnel and technology, I 

think part of the failure at Fort Hood was undoubtedly a thorough 

understanding among some well-intentioned agents and officers 

about what were signs and symptoms of radicalization in the population. This sort of training must be continued; and, of course, 

training on the tools that people already have must be increased. 
25 

Last, but not least, technology can help us here. We all know 

that technology is not a panacea. But basic technological tools 

which flag information for people allow uncorrelated information to 

be shown to a variety of individuals, information to be shared 

across security regimes amongst the FBI, National Counterterrorism, Department of Defense, and the like are absolutely critical. 

So it is not simply two agents looking at an email trying to decide 

whether or not an individual is radicalized, but we are actually 

taking full advantage of the larger National security community. 

Technology exists to do that today. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions. It is very 

good to be back. I want to simply close on joining you on your notes 

of condolences for the loss that we saw in Libya, the losses that we 

see every day in Afghanistan, and the losses that we suffered in 

Fort Hood. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leiter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. LEITER

SEPTEMBER 14, 2012 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, Members of the subcommittee: I am pleased 

to have the opportunity to appear before you today. This subcommittee has been at 

the center of ensuring that needed reform is taking place in our Government. I am 

deeply grateful to you for your sustained leadership in that effort. The subject of 

today’s hearing, ‘‘Lessons from Fort Hood: Why Can’t We Connect the Dots to Protect the Homeland?’’ is of critical importance to National security. 

Today, I appear in my capacity as a Task Force Member of the Bipartisan Policy 

Center’s Homeland Security Project, a successor to the 9/11 Commission. Drawing 

on a strong roster of National security professionals, the HSP works as an independent, bipartisan group to monitor the implementation of the 9/11 Commission’s 

recommendations and address other emerging National security issues. 

HSP includes the following membership: 

• Governor Thomas H. Kean, Former Governor of New Jersey; Chairman of the 

9/11 Commission; and Co-Chair of the Homeland Security Project; 

• The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, Former Congressman from Indiana; ViceChair of the 9/11 Commission; and Co-Chair of the Homeland Security Project; 

• Peter Bergen, Director, National Security Studies Program at the New America 

Foundation; 

• Christopher Carney, Former Congressman from Pennsylvania and Chair of the 

U.S. House Homeland Security Oversight Committee; 

• Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D., Founding Co-Director of the George J. Kostas Research Institute for Homeland Security and Professor of Political Science at 

Northeastern University; 

• Dr. John Gannon, Former Deputy Director of the CIA for Intelligence; 

• Dan Glickman, Senior Fellow, Former Secretary of Agriculture; Former Chairman of the U.S. House Intelligence Committee; 

• Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Director, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University; 

• Michael P. Jackson, Chairman and CEO, VidSys, Inc. and Former Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 

• Ellen Laipson, President and CEO of the Stimson Center and member of the 

President’s Intelligence Advisory Board; 

• Michael E. Leiter, Senior Counselor to the Chief Executive Officer, Palantir 

Technologies and Former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center; 

• Edwin Meese III, Former U.S. Attorney General, Ronald Reagan Distinguished 

Fellow in Public Policy and Chairman of the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation; 

• Erroll G. Southers, Former Chief of Homeland Security and Intelligence for the 

Los Angeles Airports Police Department; and Associate Director of the National 

Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events at the University 

of Southern California; 
26 

• Richard L. Thornburgh, Former U.S. Attorney General and Governor of Pennsylvania; 

• Frances Townsend, Former Homeland Security Advisor and Deputy National 

Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism; 

• Jim Turner, Former Congressman from Texas and Ranking Member of the U.S. 

House Homeland Security Committee. 

My HSP colleagues and I believe the depth of this group’s experience on National 

security issues can be of assistance to you and the Executive branch and we look 

forward to continuing to work with you. 

I will also draw on my experience as former Director of the National Counterterrorist Center (NCTC), a post I stepped down from 1 year ago. While I will address 

certain aspects of deficiencies in information sharing surrounding the Fort Hood 

shootings, I believe I can best help the subcommittee by sharing my views about 

how well the Government is sharing information generally. While my testimony is 

in part based on my work with the HSP, it does not necessarily reflect the views 

of my HSP Board Member colleagues. 

Now, exactly 11 years after the tragic 9/11 attacks, and 8 years since The 9/11 

Commission Report, is an appropriate time to take stock of how well our Government is sharing information. 

OVERVIEW

The 9/11 Commission documented major failures of National security-related 

agencies to share vital terrorist-related information in the months and years before 

the 9/11 attacks. In the pre-9/11 period, legal, policy, and cultural barriers among 

agencies created serious impediments to information sharing. The Commission made 

a number of specific recommendations to improve information sharing across our 

Government and regarded it imperative that all levels of Government make improvements. 

Information sharing within the Federal Government, and among Federal, State, 

local, and Tribal authorities, and with allies, while not perfect, has been considerably improved since 9/11. The level of cooperation among all levels of government 

is higher than ever. State and local officials have a far greater understanding not 

only of the threat and how to respond to it but also of their communities and those 

who may be at risk of radicalization. The formation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was a major step toward improved information sharing. 

When the follow-on organization to the Commission issued grades and reviews in 

late 2005 and subsequently, it cited the creation of NCTC and its performance as 

a success in National security reform. Although I am admittedly biased on this 

point, I certainly agree that NCTC has played and continues to play a critical information-sharing role. 

NCTC’s information-sharing responsibilities are extremely broad and encompass 

items that many now take as a given—even though 10 years ago they were nonexistent. For example, NCTC’s maintenance of a consolidated watch list that is 

available to local police during a car stop, foreign service officers checking a visa 

application, and homeland security professionals at a border, ensure that a critical 

information-sharing gap from 9/11 is filled. Similarly, NCTC’s three-times daily 

video conferences ensure that every element of the U.S. Government knows what 

threats are on the radar. In addition the presence of analysts from more than 20 

organizations at NCTC, sitting side-by-side, and sharing information countless times 

a day is a radical (and positive) shift from 2001. Finally, the Interagency Threat 

Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) provides greater information sharing 

between State and local officials and the whole of the U.S. Counterterrorism Community. In short, when it comes to information sharing the U.S. Government has 

moved forward in leaps and bounds. 

This improvement is, of course, not just because of NCTC but because of an equally concerted effort by the FBI, DHS, and others. Most notably there are now 104 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces throughout the Nation, and 72 Fusion Centers in 

which Federal, State, local, and Tribal authorities investigate terrorism leads and 

share information. Since 2004, DHS has provided more than $340 million in funding 

to the Fusion Centers. Information sharing with the private sector has also become 

routine and is an important part of our defenses. 

Despite these improvements, there is no doubt that weaknesses exist—although 

I frankly believe we must be careful not to equate more recent information-sharing 

failures with those of the past. Information sharing is no more monolithic than any 

other complex issue or business process. Although information sharing is a good 

headline, when considering information sharing successes and failures we have to 
27 

‘‘look under the hood’’ to see what is really going on, lest we fix things that weren’t 

the problem in the first place. 

While the mechanisms are in place for better information sharing, the fact is that 

we missed opportunities to stop the Christmas day bomber from boarding Northwest 

Flight 253, as well as opportunities to intervene before the Fort Hood shootings. In 

my view each of these represents a different challenge. 

With respect to the first, information regarding the bomber was shared and 

shared widely. In the simplest of terms, the issue was not that people didn’t have 

the data, but instead that they had too much data—and policy issues existed about 

what steps should be taken based on that data. With respect to the second, relevant 

information was not sufficiently recognized as such and passed to other operators, 

and FBI information technology hampered the connection of key data. 

An enormous amount of intelligence information constantly pours into our National security system. Sifting through it, synthesizing it, making sense of it, and 

making sure it receives the necessary attention is a backbreaking challenge, one 

that requires attentive management and testing to determine where the flaws are 

and how to fix them. It also requires the latest software and technology to ensure 

that searches dive into all databases so that no pertinent information on an inquiry 

fails to be captured. That technology exists and is available today it simply needs 

to be widely deployed. 

Of course, we should not view information sharing as an unmitigated good—or at 

least not as a good that does not require attendant modifications to other aspects 

of intelligence and homeland security as it advances. There is no greater illustration 

of this than the tragedy of WikiLeaks, which has disclosed to the world—both our 

adversaries and friends—sensitive information about our intelligence and policies. 

This publication of sensitive Government documents has harmed our Government’s 

ability to conduct its affairs and has had serious consequences for our National security. 

In my view WikiLeaks demonstrates why as we share information we must also 

increase our ability to control the information that is shared and take special care 

to control the wholesale movement of sensitive information off of protected networks. It is not new that those who wish to harm the Nation will attempt to steal 

our secrets; it is new that with the spread of electronic information they can steal 

petabytes rather than mere pages of documents. 

STILL A NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

Where, then, can improvements still be made? We offer some suggestions along 

the traditional lines of correction: Legal, policy, budgetary, personnel, and technology. 

With respect to the first, legal, we must recognize that the Constitution and 

countless statutes govern the mosaic that is information sharing. In my experiences 

at NCTC, statutes ranging from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to 

the Violence Against Women’s Act drove what could and could not be shared. If 

there was one statute that was most at issue, however, it was FISA. In my view 

although FISA obviously provides critical protection of U.S. persons’ privacy, it also 

makes for an exceedingly complex decision-making process within the intelligence 

community. Any way in which we can simplify this statute while maintaining protections would be invaluable for both collectors and analysts. 

On the policy front, I believe it is important that we accelerate the review and 

adoption of Executive branch implementation guidelines for any information sharing-related policies. In my view the Executive branch has done an admirable job getting to the right polices in cases like the Attorney General Guidelines for various 

elements like NCTC, but the time required to adopt such policies borders on the 

Biblical. Yes there are difficult issues that must be addressed, but these issues are 

too important to allow the process to drag on as it most usually does. 

Also on the policy front—but directly related to the budgetary—we remain concerned that FBI and DHS information-sharing efforts with State and local governments lack full cohesion. With declining budgetary resources, it strikes us as important to determine the best way to spend the marginal on DHS-sponsored fusion centers—where today the FBI has more people in place than does DHS. The U.S. Government must, 11 years after 9/11, ensure that respective Departmental foci are 

consistent with the reality of long-standing intergovernmental relationships and onthe-ground presence. I believe that the FBI’s new responsibility as domestic DNI 

representatives is a very positive step in that direction. 

Nowhere will budget play a bigger role in information sharing than State and 

local fusion centers, which are facing wide and deep budgetary challenges. In addition, budgetary issues will be faced in the context of protecting information from 
28 

leaks (which is required to enable information sharing), training for personnel on 

advanced analytic tools that enable information sharing, and having sufficient personnel to collect and exploit information so it can be shared effectively. 

On the personnel front, many agencies must continue to train personnel to ensure 

that they know what information is relevant and hence what must be shared. In 

particular, the FBI needs to—as it generally has in the past—prioritize enhancing 

the status of its analysts and ensuring that analysis drives operations. Similarly, 

DHS must continue to improve its analytic cadre and move away from contract personnel. All analysts and operators must continue to receive high-quality training on 

issues like radicalization, to recognize signs of danger. 

Finally, on the technology front, we continue to face a relative maze of Government information systems of significantly varying capability. We cannot be so naive 

to say that one big database of information can be created: This is neither technically feasible nor wise as it relates to protection of information and privacy. That 

being said, we must ensure that operators and analysts have advanced technology 

that allow them to make connections in disparate data sets, share their knowledge 

across organizations, and keep information secure. And perhaps most importantly, 

the Congress must continue to closely monitor Government information technology 

reforms as the bipartisan Executive branch record on this front is less than inspiring. 

CONCLUSION

In sum, up until now the Government’s counterterrorism capability has grown 

with much energy and devotion, but it has done so while flush with resources. The 

Nation’s current fiscal situation means we have to be smarter in how we use our 

resources so that we get the maximum bang for our counterterrorism buck and can 

stay one step ahead of the ever-changing terrorist threat. 

Our terrorist adversaries and the tactics and techniques they employ are evolving 

rapidly. We will see new attempts, and likely successful attacks. One of our major 

deficiencies before the 9/11 attacks was that our National security agencies were not 

changing at the accelerated rate required by a new and different kind of enemy. We 

must not make that mistake again. Sharing information rapidly is a major comparative advantage we have over terrorists. We must regularly review how we are doing 

and move quickly to address any problems, fill any gaps that arise. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify, and for this subcommittee’s leadership on 

these critical issues. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I appreciate those comments, Mr. Leiter. Thank 

you for being here again; and I look forward to hearing the answers 

to my questions in a more open format, without the constraints of 

the Federal Government on top of you. 

So with that, I would like to enter into the record a statement 

from the Honorable William Webster, the chair of the Webster 

Commission. 

Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

[The statement of Mr. Webster follows:] 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, CHAIR, THE WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

COMMISSION

SEPTEMBER 14, 2012 

On December 17, 2009, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert S. 

Mueller III asked me to conduct an independent investigation of the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation’s handling of counterterrorism intelligence before and after the tragic shootings at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009. The FBI had conducted an 

internal investigation in the immediate aftermath of the shootings and had implemented procedural, operational, and technological improvements. Director Mueller 

believed, however, that an objective, independent review was critical to understanding the FBI’s actions and assessing the potential for further improvements. 

I agreed to what proved to be a complex and lengthy assignment. The Terms of 

Reference were extraordinary in scope. Director Mueller requested not only a full 

investigation of the manner in which the FBI and its Joint Terrorism Task Forces 

handled and acted on counterterrorism intelligence before and after the shootings, 

but also a review and assessment of the FBI’s governing authorities and the FBI’s 

remedial measures in the aftermath of Fort Hood—with a particular focus on 
29 

whether existing laws and policies strike an appropriate balance between protecting 

individual privacy rights and civil liberties and detecting and deterring threats. 

That broad mandate was complicated, and its importance underscored, by subsequent terror-related events. The investigation did not probe the shootings, which are 

the subject of a U.S. Army-led inquiry and military criminal proceeding against 

Major Nidal Hasan. 

In discharging my duties, I asked five distinguished citizens—seasoned investigators and legal specialists—to volunteer their time to serve as Commissioners: William M. Baker, Russell J. Bruemmer, Adrian L Steel, Jr., Kenneth L. Wainstein, 

and Douglas E. Winter. They were assisted by Stephen J. Cox, George Murphy, and 

Margaret-Rose Sales. Their contributions of time and energy were substantial, adding to the already significant demands of their work in the private sector. Their 

commitment to this investigation and the resulting report was an act of selfless patriotism. 

The Commission took its responsibilities seriously. My colleagues and I pursued 

the sensitive, complex matters under review with diligence and care. The investigation was meticulous. Our discussions were vigorous. The Commissioners asked questions and expressed their perspectives, concerns, and opinions with candor. Although we disagreed from time to time during the course of our investigation, we 

were unanimous in our factual findings, our analysis of the FBI’s actions, our recommendations, and every other aspect of the Final Report. 

When I agreed to undertake this project, Director Mueller promised the FBI’s full 

cooperation and support. That promise was fulfilled. The FBI and Department of 

Justice provided the Commission with more than 100 formal and informal interviews, meetings, and briefings; more than 10,000 pages of documents; and direct access to FBI computer systems. To obtain a broad range of perspectives, the Commission also consulted with outside experts on counterterrorism and intelligence operations, information technology, and Islamic radicalism; public interest groups that 

promote civil liberties and privacy interests; and staff from Congressional committees with FBI oversight responsibilities. The input of more than 300 persons and 

hundreds of documents informs the Final Report. 

On July 12, 2012, after a completing the 21⁄2-year investigation, we delivered the 

Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission on the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas on November 5, 2009, to Director Mueller. As you have seen, the Final Report exceeds 150 

single-spaced pages in length and includes 18 formal recommendations for corrective 

and enhancing measures. 

Director Mueller asked me to examine, among other things, ‘‘whether the actions 

taken by the FBI were reasonable under the circumstances known at the time.’’ Our 

analysis of those actions could not proceed from what we later learned about Nidal 

Malik Hasan or Anwar Nasser al-Awlaki. Hindsight has uses, but it is not an appropriate tool for assessing the reasonableness and adequacy of actions taken without 

its benefit. Our review was based on information known or available to the FBI at 

the time the actions were taken. 

We also recognized that reasonableness must be measured in the context of the 

FBI’s governing authorities and policies, operational capabilities, and the technological environment of the time. For example, as discussed in the Final Report, the 

FBI’s governing authorities limit its ability to disseminate information acquired 

using the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§1801 et seq., 

and require Agents and Task Force Officers to use the ‘‘least intrusive means’’ in 

conducting assessments and investigations. As a further example, the FBI’s thenexisting information technology and document review workflow did not assure that 

potentially relevant intelligence would be identified, correlated, and assessed in a 

strategic context. 

Finally, we recognized our limited ability to predict what might have happened 

if different policies or procedures were in effect or personnel had made different decisions or taken different actions. We chose not to speculate. We examined instead 

the reasonableness of what did happen, in order to identify and recommend, when 

appropriate, better and corrective policies and practices for the future. 

The Final Report did not hesitate to identify shortcomings when we found them. 

In its words: ‘‘We conclude that, working in the context of the FBI’s governing authorities and policies, operational capabilities, and the technological environment of 

the time, FBI and Joint Terrorism Task Force personnel who handled relevant 

counterterrorism intelligence information made mistakes. We do not find, and do 

not suggest, that these mistakes resulted from intentional misconduct or the disregard of duties. Indeed, we find that each Special Agent, Intelligence Analyst, and 

Task Force Officer who handled the [intelligence] information acted with good intent. We do not find, and do not believe, that anyone is solely responsible for mis-
30 

takes in handling the information. We do not believe it would be fair to hold these 

dedicated personnel, who work in a context of constant threats and limited resources, responsible for the tragedy at Fort Hood.’’ 

We concluded instead that ‘‘these individuals need better policy guidance to know 

what is expected of them in performing their duties, and better technology, review 

protocols, and training to navigate the ever-expanding flow of intelligence information.’’ We also concluded that the FBI should continue to focus on compliance monitoring and the oversight of authorized investigative techniques that may affect privacy rights and civil liberties. 

The Commission found shortcomings in FBI policy guidance, technology, information review protocols, and training. We made 18 important recommendations for corrective and enhancing measures in those areas and about the FBI’s governing authorities. We also identified, but took no position on, two legislative actions that the 

FBI could propose to improve its ability to deter and detect terrorist threats. Finally, we assessed whether administrative action should be taken against any employee involved in this matter, and we concluded that administrative action was not 

appropriate. 

The FBI has agreed with the principles underlying all 18 of our recommendations. 

In most cases, the FBI has taken action to implement the recommendations based 

a combination of the Commission’s work, its own internal review of the Fort Hood 

shootings, and the report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs. 

I appreciate the subcommittee’s interest in the lessons of Fort Hood. Those lessons 

are not specific to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but resonate throughout the 

law enforcement and intelligence communities. The Final Report provides insights 

into the arduous mission of the FBI and other agencies in combating the threat of 

terrorism, whether domestic or international. 

Throughout our investigation, we witnessed the ever-increasing challenge that 

electronic communications pose to the FBI’s efforts to identify and avert potentially 

destructive activity. Although our Report reviews the specifics of one tragic event, 

it also speaks to transcendent issues that are crucial to our ability to combat terrorism in the electronic age. 

We did recommend corrective and enhancing measures, but nothing said in the 

Final Report is intended to cast doubt on the dedication and professionalism of the 

men and women who serve our Nation in combating terror and crime. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I want to just show, not for any reason other 

than—this was taken the day of the memorial service at Fort Hood, 

and you can see—I was standing here—you can see the boots, the 

rifles, the helmets. It really gives you a graphic picture of what 

really happened that day. 

[The information follows:] 
31 

Mr. MCCAUL. You can see one of these soldiers on crutches. I 

asked him, ‘‘What did he say when he shot you?’’ ‘‘Congressman, 

he said ‘Allahu Akbar,’ ’’ God is great, the classic jihadist terminology. 

At that moment, I realized that this was not a workplace violence incident, that this was something more, that this was in fact 

an act of terrorism. I was criticized at the time for saying that. I 

think history will judge that as a correct assessment of what happened on that fateful day. 

Mr. Leiter, I want to start with you, because you headed the 

NCTC. You are really the expert at connecting the dots, and you 

did perform a masterful job while you were there. 

You and I worked with Joint Terrorism Task Forces. They have 

an enormous challenge, an enormous amount of data that comes 

through, and many of which, if you miss one thread of evidence, 

you can be held accountable by Members of Congress like myself 

at a later hearing. 

But these emails, the 18 emails that took place, when we were 

briefed by senior intelligence officials—and they wouldn’t give us 

the content, they would just simply say—the only word I can use 

is downplay the significance of these emails. Finally, when the good 

work of the Webster report revealed these emails publicly, we all 

had a chance to actually read the content. 

The one that I described in my opening statement on May 31, 

2009, Major Hasan, he almost seems to be telegraphing exactly 

what he is getting ready to do, almost asking for permission from 

al-Awlaki in Yemen, is it okay for a suicide bomber to kill soldiers 

and innocent civilians in the cause to protect our fellow brothers? 

You know, you and I have worked in law enforcement. This is 

one of 18. The other one, ‘‘keep me on your Rolodex,’’ you know, to 

me, this is a huge flag. 

It was a big deal in San Diego. The San Diego Joint Terrorism 

Task Force thought, wow, there is something wrong going on here. 

We need to start—let’s send a lead to WFO. Let’s have them investigate. 

The response from WFO is astounding, that, well, we don’t really 

see a terrorist threat here; and they basically shut down this investigation until 5 months later when Major Hasan kills 13 people, 12 

soldiers. 

There is a Department of Defense official on the Joint Terrorism 

Task Force, and yet that official didn’t contact Fort Hood. Maybe 

it is the legal restrictions that you are talking about. If so, we need 

to change that. 

There were so many flags not only between the FBI two offices— 

and I really commend the San Diego office for their courage and 

bravery of trying to get to the bottom of this. I fault the WFO office 

for not following up on this. In the military, the way they passed 

this guy along, knowing he is proselytizing radical Islam with a 

business card: Soldier of Allah. He is enraging his colleagues. What 

do they do? They don’t want to deal with the problem. They want 

to pass him along, promote him, send him down to Fort Hood. 

So many flags in this case. The dots were identified, but they 

weren’t shared. How did this happen? 
32 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, I will say that I agree with you that 

it did not take long, from my perspective, to know that this was 

an act of terrorism. In fact, the National Counterterrorism Center 

within a week of the event entered this into its world-wide database of terrorist events based on preliminary reports. That was not 

a conclusive legal judgment but certainly all the indications were 

that this was terrorism. 

I think in terms of the information that was not shared, you had 

a breakdown along so many different angles. The San Diego team 

I think did do a very good job; and I would defer to Mr. Winter, 

of course, who knows these details better than I, but they were not 

even aware of all of the emails. They were not aware of the Department of Defense information. WFO was not aware of much of that. 

It was handed to an officer who, frankly, from an outsider’s perspective, I think didn’t have a really strong understanding of the 

signs of radicalization. 

Now, the two points I would make quickly in defense of how this 

evolved is: No. 1, we do have to put ourselves back in 2009 to recall 

who Anwar al-Awlaki was then versus who he is perceived to be 

today. In 2011, 2012, we understood him to be an operational leader in a way that in 2009 we did not. That is not an excuse, but 

it is some color. 

The second piece is, from my perspective, Congressman, the idea 

that people would not go talk to him I do not understand. I do believe that if that information were shared with a broader group 

who understood radicalization there would have been increased 

pressure from headquarters to make that happen; and that would 

have led to, I believe, a better outcome. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I couldn’t agree with you more. 

I talked to the commanding officer at Fort Hood. Wouldn’t you 

have liked to have known this? I understand FISA complications. 

I understand you want to shake down somebody. They could have 

at least watched him, put him under some sort of surveillance. Just 

maybe that would have stopped what happened. 

My time is limited. I do want to go to Mr. Winter. 

Eighteen emails, WFO only has two emails. Some technology 

breakdown occurs where they are not even aware—they can’t even 

access, they didn’t even know how to access to get these remaining 

emails. I have to say, Mr. Leiter, I mean, you as a former Justice 

Department official like myself, this May 31 email, if you read this, 

would that concern you? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, I look at one email and I look at the 

body of the emails and to me they are clear indicators of an individual who has been radicalized. Whether or not he has been mobilized to take action, that is a hard call—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. But when he is asking permission to perform a suicide bombing mission against soldiers and civilians at a dinner to 

protect his fellow—— 

Mr. LEITER. That is why I said, Congressman, I would want 

somebody to go out and interview this guy, who has clearly been 

radicalized. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think that is what should have happened in this 

case. 

Mr. Winter, what happened here? 
33 

Mr. WINTER. The decisions made in WFO were based on a cascading set of circumstances. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Your microphone? 

Mr. WINTER. I am sorry. Is that better? 

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes. 

Mr. WINTER. The decisions made at WFO were the result of truly 

a cascading set of circumstances. San Diego sent this lead based on 

the first two emails that were acquired from Hasan to al-Awlaki. 

There was no FBI policy on the assignment of these types of leads 

or on taking action on these types of leads. 

The supervisor of WFO waited 50 days after the arrival of the 

lead to read it and to assign it. He assigned it to a DCIS agent who 

was a task force officer. 

That agent waited 90 days from then to read it and to act on it. 

Under informal FBI practice, agents had 90 days to work on leads, 

either to elevate them into an investigation or to close them down. 

So this agent read that lead and acted on it on the last day under 

that FBI practice and, indeed, conducted this assessment in 4 

hours on that day. 

So it was rushed. There was that pressure that was created by 

their workload and these late assignments. 

He consulted U.S. Army electronic personnel files on Major 

Hasan. That was the entirety of what he as a DCIS agent could 

have access to from the JTTF. That meant he received a brief and 

highly misleading set of personnel records that indicated that 

Major Hasan had a security clearance, he had been promoted to 

major only 10 days earlier, and his supervisors praised him thoroughly. The only negative in those 80-some pages, I believe, was 

that he had failed his PT test. 

Mr. MCCAUL. They praised him. 

Mr. WINTER. They praised his research on Islam in the military. 

Now, Hasan had used his real name in communicating with alAwlaki, so had not tried to render himself anonymous. The DCIS 

agent concluded, based on that, that this was part of Hasan’s research on Islam in the military and that the Army approved of it. 

At the same time, there was no FBI policy on what is called a 

baseline collection plan. That policy was instituted in September, 

2009, after this investigation but before the Fort Hood shootings. 

That created a minimum of what agents are meant to collect when 

conducting an assessment. If that plan had been in effect then, this 

agent would have been required to consult the DWS–EDMS system, which is a computer database on which all of the messages 

from Hasan to al-Awlaki and vice versa were stored. Thus, he 

would have known of that, and he would have been required to 

search it. 

But he had not been trained on that database. He didn’t even 

know it existed. So, what he believed, after searching FBI databases, was that there were only two emails, that they were sent in 

December, 2008 and January, 2009, which was 5 months prior, and 

that al-Awlaki had not responded. Based on that, he concluded and 

his supervisor concluded that Hasan was not involved in, ‘‘terrorist 

activities.’’ 

Now, did that resolve the question of whether or not Hasan was 

a threat? We didn’t believe so. We felt that this decision-making 
34 

process was flawed and that they should have considered and conducted an interview of Hasan based solely on the information they 

had at that time. 

But I am not defending the decision; I am explaining it. You can 

understand how reasonably these men could have been led down 

this path by the combination of all these circumstances, some of 

which were self-imposed, others of which were the result of the 

lack of policy, others that were the result of an inability to gain access to those records that Walter Reed, for example, had. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think those problems need to be fixed. But I will 

ask you this question. I believe that gross errors were made in this 

matter that resulted in 13 people being killed, 12 soldiers. Should 

anybody be held accountable within the Federal Government? 

Mr. WINTER. On our review—we were specifically asked by Director Mueller to assess whether any disciplinary action should be 

taken against any of the personnel involved. Although we found 

that mistakes were made, we found that these individuals acted 

with good intent, they acted mostly reasonably under the circumstances, and that they were not individually responsible for 

some of the decisions that occurred because of the lack of policy direction, for example. 

One of the reasons we advocated the seven policies that we recommended was that if those policies had been in place, and similar 

procedures, then actions like this would violate them and individuals would be directly responsible and subject to discipline. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Is it your understanding these policies are in place 

now? 

Mr. WINTER. Almost all of the policies are in place. They are 

not—some of them are being coordinated into a single policy, the 

command-and-control hierarchy, for example. 

Mr. MCCAUL. My time is kind of running short. 

On the Center report, they indicated the San Diego office calls 

WFO; and the response back is: Look, we don’t want to damage his 

stellar career, and something to the effect of this is a politically 

sensitive matter. 

That was not corroborated by the WFO office. Is that correct? 

Mr. WINTER. That is correct. 

Mr. MCCAUL. But, according to San Diego, that conversation took 

place. 

Mr. WINTER. Well, the first part that you discussed is corroborated, that WFO advised San Diego twice that they did not believe 

an interview of Hasan was appropriate because it would damage 

him in terms of his position in the military. The chain of command 

would not take it lightly. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I do think that the American people and the families and the victims deserve that somebody in this Government be 

held accountable for what happened. 

Professor, I want to ask you real briefly, with my limited time 

left, you spoke very eloquently of your experience of the fear of 

speaking out. Within the Department of Defense, you know, we 

have this individual that various of his colleagues are seeing these 

warning signs popping up. They call him a ticking time bomb. He 

is proselytizing radical Islam, talking about Osama bin Laden, having business cards that say Soldier of Allah. I mean, so many indi-
35 

cators are there, and then no one wants to speak out. There is a 

fear of retribution within the Army, and he is just sort of passed 

along. Is this a case where political correctness was more important or overshadowed National security? 

Ms. MANJI. It sure sounds like that—if you can hear me, it sure 

sounds like that. 

Thank you. 

It sure sounds like that, Congressman. Frankly, I think it would 

be fairer to ask if political correctness also crept into the FBI. 

For example, we have spent the last several minutes talking 

about how somebody at the San Diego office of the FBI had a troubling lead, passed it on to the Washington field office, after which 

it went nowhere. One of the questions I have, as I am listening to 

these other testimonies, is why did the San Diego officer not stand 

up when it became clear to him or her that an obviously unsettling 

lead was not going to be acted upon? 

Now, one can argue that, well, it is obvious why people don’t 

stand up in general, because doing so invites complication in your 

life. Life is complicated enough, thank you very much. 

But this is where I believe we can actually learn something 

about a mechanism that the Department of State has put into 

place, and that is a mechanism called the dissent channel. It was 

actually introduced just after the Vietnam war, whereby foreign 

policy officers, when they see that the chain of command is going 

to be resisting their dissent with groupthink, with the settled consensus that has been accepted for too long within the cozy confines 

of that department, they can actually use this dissent channel to 

explain why somebody higher up needs to hear a counter argument. They do not have to get permission from their higher-ups in 

order to be heard through this channel. 

I don’t think that that exists either at the Department of Defense 

or at the FBI, but it is something well worth investigating whether 

it works, as it did, by the way, in the lead-up to the Yugoslav— 

to the Balkan genocide. It was, one could argue that that was the 

reason, because at the time Secretary of State Eagleburger heard 

a dissenting voice through that channel and realized that the 

United States must intervene. 

It was through that that I think we can learn a little bit more 

about how dissent can be institutionalized so that it is constructive 

rather than chaotic. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. Excellent point. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think you have 

done a good job of looking historically at this. 

I want to come at this at a different angle, maybe ask Mr. Leiter 

first. I have heard about the policies. I have heard about some of 

the changes. Could this, under the same set of circumstances, happen today? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, you would end up with a slightly different set of facts. It wouldn’t quite fit the policies that you put in 

place, but I think that there remain holes. 

Mr. KEATING. Forget the policy, just the circumstances. 
36 

Mr. LEITER. I think it is less—the more it looks like this circumstance, the less likely it is going to occur. But could something 

like this fall through the cracks? Absolutely. 

I still believe that there is information that is not being shared 

effectively and, quite often, that information is about U.S. persons, 

which is appropriately the most protected set of information; and 

the Congress and the Executive branch must ensure that that information is effectively shared. So, as the professor very ably said, 

you can get second and third opinions and you aren’t simply forced 

to take the views of one operator or one analyst about whether or 

not someone is a threat. 

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Winter, could this still happen today? 

Mr. WINTER. Absolutely. I agree with Mr. Leiter, the closer the 

circumstances to those of the Hasan matter the less likely it is to 

happen because of the policy changes, because of the higher sensitivity to these types of issues. 

For example, however, two of our recommendations concern the 

FBI putting into place a clearinghouse process by which—which it 

currently has with DOD—by which it advises DOD through headquarters and through the National Joint Terrorism Task Force 

about investigations of DOD personnel in the military. We recommended that similar clearinghouse procedures be adopted for 

law enforcement agencies, whose Members may have equal if not 

greater access to weapons and intelligence than military members 

and also as to other departments of the Federal Government. 

So that if someone at the State Department is under investigation there is a mechanism in place for the investigating officers to 

move that not only up the FBI chain of command but also move 

it to the State Department chain of command and their investigators so that all the individuals can work together to detect and 

deter the potential for terrorism. 

However, obviously, outside of Government hierarchies, the possibilities for individuals like Major Hasan to take these kinds of actions exist; and it is difficult for the FBI to have constant knowledge of the whereabouts and intent of those types of individuals. 

Mr. KEATING. One thing that—I wasn’t going to ask this, but you 

sparked this interest. I have asked it of General Barry McCaffrey 

before. That initial information, getting to whether it is local or 

State officials usually, how is that inhibited by not having a comprehensive immigration policy in the State? If people see things, if 

people want to come forward, how are they going to come forward 

if they are going to effectively make themselves criminals? How 

weak is that in the initial information? 

Mr. WINTER. That is something that is slightly beyond my pay 

grade, sir. I would try to answer in this fashion, however. 

The FBI has in place what is known as an eGuardian system, 

which is an electronic version of its Guardian system, by which individuals who bring information to local law enforcement agencies, 

let’s say, even anonymously, tips and the like, can be forwarded on 

immediately and promptly by electronic means and acted on by 

FBI agent reviewers and analysts, I should say, within a very short 

period of time. 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman? 

Mr. KEATING. Assuming they did that. 
37 

Yes, Mr. Leiter. 

Mr. LEITER. I think interaction with immigrant communities is 

critical. In the counterterrorism context, obviously what we are 

most focused on is American Muslim communities, which may or 

may not be immigrant communities. But engagement by the FBI, 

the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration, a wide range 

of agencies and State and local officials with American Muslim 

communities is absolutely critical to occur not just for law enforcement intelligence but for good Government and engagement. 

I will say that Congress has an important role in that regard, 

that when the FBI does engage these Muslim communities that 

they are not immediately second-guessed about which Muslims 

they talk to. It is very important for them to have wide engagement to understand these communities and potentially identify individuals who have been radicalized. In my view, the Congress has 

to give the Executive branch reasonable room to maneuver to do 

that engagement to find problem areas. 

Ms. MANJI. May I add something of my own in this regard? 

Mr. KEATING. Just briefly, yes. 

Ms. MANJI. Sure. 

Of course, engagement with communities of all kinds is necessary for good governance. The problem is that, too often, especially in this country, we stumble over ourselves to try to identify 

who are the moderates and who are the extremists. I would argue 

to you gentlemen that this is the wrong distinction. 

The better distinction to make, if you want to really get at the 

heart of the matter, is who are the moderates and who are the 

reformists. Moderates, for example, don’t much differ from extremists in that moderates are so consumed with what they perceive to 

be Western imperialism, Israel, America, so forth, that they have 

distracted themselves from dealing with the imperialism within 

their communities, those clerics, those imams, and even those supposedly secular civil leaders who insist that good Muslims remain 

silent when crimes such as honor killings happen within their communities. 

So we need to ensure that we get the framing here right if you 

are actually going to hear people who are willing to step forward. 

But they are not going to be willing to step forward, Congressman, 

unless they know that you have got their back. Because they know 

what backlash is coming their way by virtue of having opened their 

mouths. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. Thank you. 

I just want to get back to the process itself, too. 

One of the things that you said, Mr. Leiter, that concerned me, 

is—because we hear it all the time in this committee in particular 

in different shapes and forms—but you used the word the necessity 

of having a National system versus a patchwork system. To me, we 

could have the greatest information in the world coming forth. If 

we don’t have a way to process that on a National basis—can you 

really talk more specifically about what you meant when you said 

that? I mean, how far along—— 

You know, all of DHS is patchwork, as far as I am concerned. 

It is amazing that we haven’t gone past jurisdictional issues and 
38 

done some of these things yet. But, to me, that has to get fixed 

first. 

Now, I know we have budgetary issues in front of us. But if that 

is not fixed and that is not a priority, what good does all this gathering of information, what good is it? 

So when you said that, you know, I think that is a priority that 

we have to have. What budgetary issues are confronting that and 

what actual technology issues or interaction issues with different 

levels of intelligence? Expound on that. 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, absolutely. We obviously, as both you 

and the Chairman know well as attorneys, we live in a very Federated system. As we built up these State and local fusion centers 

with hundreds of millions of dollars, that information is being collected at the local level and, to some extent, shared with Department of Homeland Security and the FBI through the JTTFs. But 

what we have not done is created a system where you can actually 

effectively compare that information across State and local fusion 

centers, across JTTFs. 

Now, I think the FBI took a very, very valuable step in the past 

year, which is to move toward a regionalized structure. Because I 

don’t believe that you can have any system with 104 JTTFs and 

50-plus fusion centers and actually see correlations quite effectively. So a regionalized intelligence structure, where you have I 

believe it is six or eight regions that are looking at the various 

State and local fusion centers and JTTFs and seeing where there 

is suspicious activity or where there is a FISA intercept of import. 

Then having those cases managed by the FBI headquarters, in coordination with DHS, that starts to look like a system. 

As you see that and as that information is shared within the 

Federal family, with the National Counterterrorism Center, with 

Homeland Security, who is specializing on borders, using their collection resources, and ICE and Customs and Border Protection, you 

start to understand how you can close these gaps and, as you so 

eloquently stated at the beginning of your questions, try to avoid 

this from happening in the future. 

As budgets go down, weaving this together will be more difficult. 

But absolutely the technology exists today to make sure that some 

of those less understandable correlations are seen both at the State 

level, at the local level, and ultimately at the Federal level for some 

of these cases. 

Mr. KEATING. Just a last quick question of yourself and Mr. Winter. Would you say that is among the top priorities right there in 

having that occur? 

Mr. LEITER. Yes. 

Mr. WINTER. I absolutely agree. That was the first of our information technology recommendations to the FBI, enterprise data 

management. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank the Ranking Member. 

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan, is recognized. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for this very 

timely hearing. 

You know, the State Department had warnings at least 48 hours 

in advance of the 9/11 attacks that happened this week, yet they 
39 

did not go in lockdown in certain embassies where the threats 

were. The reason I say that is a lot of times we are given very, very 

clear signals, staring us in the face, and we fail to act on those. 

Or many times we lean back on political correctness. As Professor Manji pointed out, the religious symbolism, the Operation 

Badr, they didn’t even want to discuss the real ideology behind a 

certain terrorist attack, the fact that we have here in America 

taken to calling the Fort Hood a case of workplace violence, yet we 

will call what happens in Wisconsin an act of domestic terrorism. 

I am alarmed and really want to raise awareness here in this 

committee of some of the things that I hear going on within our 

Pentagon and within the military, where servicemen and women 

are discouraged from pointing out things that they see such as 

what happened at Fort Hood with SOA on the card, and just signals that are very clear for people that are going through their 

daily routine that should raise a red flag for us. But yet they are 

scared they are going to be labeled as an Islamophobe. 

I think when we have hearings within this committee addressing 

Fort Hood or addressing the radicalization of Muslim youth, it is 

not an address of Islam, it is more of an address of an ideology that 

is really encouraging folks that practice Islam as a religion to embrace a certain set of ideals and ideological values that lean more 

toward the attacks that we see. I think that is what happened. 

Major Hasan was caught up in that. 

But, as Americans, we can’t be afraid to speak out. I want to 

thank the professor for having the courage, the moral courage to 

speak about those differences—that is what I heard today—about 

the difference between Islam and your practice of the Islamic religion, but also the fact that, you know, there are some folks that 

do practice that religion who have gone in another direction in another part of their life in their political ideology and what their 

world vision is. 

So one thing I want to ask all of you is, following the findings 

and recommendations of the Webster report on the Fort Hood attacks, how would you categorize the attack that occurred at Fort 

Hood? Mr. Winter. 

Mr. WINTER. We discussed this question at length. I speak for 

the Commission and our unanimous view. Our view was that we 

saw evidence but we did not have the opportunity to investigate on 

a criminal basis, as the U.S. military is doing, and so we don’t 

know—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask this question a different way. Workplace violence or domestic terrorism? 

Mr. WINTER. I have heard that, both of those characterizations. 

We refused to reach a finding on that. I have to say the reason is 

that we don’t have the evidence sufficient to know. We don’t know 

what kind of standard Department of Defense is applying. 

Certainly our investigation was not into Department of Defense 

activities; and it was not into the criminal investigation itself, 

which was to a great degree hands-off to us because the military 

is pursuing that criminal case against Major Hasan. So we were 

unable to reach a decision on those issues. We do believe and really 

would like to see justice done for the victims, their families. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I am going to end this dance. 
40 

Professor Manji. 

Ms. MANJI. Domestic terrorism, home-grown. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Leiter. 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, the analysts at NCTC within a week, 

as I said, deemed it to qualify as an act of international terrorism 

under our statute that we use. It was a subgovernmental group, 

political violence. We called it terrorism then; I call it terrorism 

today. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. I want to refer back to the Chairman’s opening statement. The men and women that stood at Fort Hood at that 

ceremony, ones that were wounded in that attack, the families of 

the victims of that attack will tell you to this day this was an act 

of domestic terrorism in the war against terrorism. I think we as 

America need to set aside political correctness and really be able 

to discuss the real threats, existential threats to our way of life. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Davis, is recognized. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and I certainly 

want to thank the witnesses for their participation and especially 

for their insights and their answers. 

I was thinking that, you know, we can always know what happened because we have the information. It is obviously far more 

difficult to determine why it happened or the causes that may have 

generated or caused it to take place. 

Mr. Winter, let me ask you, if I could, you indicated that policies 

are that investigators and agents have 90 days to work on leads 

and that sometimes individuals have more call for activity than 

time or there is not enough personnel, there are so many leads and 

trying to follow up on all of them. Are there thresholds that will 

jump out at you? I mean, if you are reviewing tips and information 

and allegations, that a person can just kind of see that this appears 

to be over the line and we need to try and check it out as quickly 

as we can? 

Mr. WINTER. Yes, there is a significant amount of training on 

many different levels on how to deal with tips, information, intelligence of different kinds. Here the San Diego agents recognized 

that the messages deserved some form of action. Under FBI policies that then existed, they could set what was called a routine discretionary action lead because it was not—there was no indication 

of anything imminent, something that required a 24-hour or 48- 

hour response. That meant it was a routine lead, which would be 

resolved in the ordinary course of business. It also meant that the 

WFO would exercise its discretion on how to handle the lead. 

The 90-day period that was in existence was an informal FBI 

practice at that time. We have, of course, recommended that the 

FBI establish periods within which leads must be acted upon. The 

FBI in turn has also eliminated these discretionary action leads 

and has required action on all leads that are sent out from other 

offices. 

Mr. DAVIS. Let me ask each one of you if you think that we do 

as well as we possibly could in making assessments of individuals 

when they are going to be placed in certain kinds of positions rel-
41 

ative to evaluation as people seek employment, as people take assignments and have access to certain kinds of opportunities. Do we 

assess their personalities or do we glean enough information where 

it gives a comfort level in terms of where they are and what they 

might be doing? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, I will answer on two pieces. 

First, I think we probably all as bosses have interviewed someone, given them a job. They had glowing recommendations, and 

then they come and work for you and the performance ain’t so 

glowing. So this is a pretty broad problem. Obviously, the manifestation in this situation is absolutely tragic. 

The second piece, though, more specific to terrorism, is the FBI 

does have an incredibly difficult job of distinguishing those people 

who were radicalized and have radicalized views and those who become mobilized and actually take a terrorist action. Again, that is 

why you want people to go out and interview them and try to make 

that determination. 

But, frankly, the FBI, with all its resources, if you used everyone 

in the Federal Government, they couldn’t watch everyone who was 

just, ‘‘radicalized.’’ They have got to prioritize. Making that determination is very hard before the fact and looks very, very easy 

after the tragedy. 

Mr. DAVIS. Or even people who might seek to become members 

of the FBI to be in a position to carry out their ultimate aim. 

So all I am really seeking is opinion. I know that it is tough trying to deal with motivation all of the time. I mean, if we could answer that, we would be in very good shape. 

Ms. MANJI. Congressman, if you will allow me one quick intervention, I have written exactly about this question of what to ask 

in order to conclude within the Muslim communities of this country 

where people stand on the continuum of reform, moderation, extremism; and I would be very pleased to submit to the committee the 

specific questions that I recommend be asked. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the gentleman. 

Just let me close by—first, let me thank you for this excellent 

testimony. I agree with you, Mr. Leiter, that the FBI, JTTFs have 

an enormous challenge. So much information is coming through, 

and you miss one thread and then you are held accountable. 

I think this case, though, I would make the argument is a little 

different. You have got a major on a base, Fort Hood, who is talking to a cleric, who there was some evidence may even have had 

ties to the 9/11 hijackers, for God’s sake, and he is really rising in 

stature to becoming the No. 2 in the world, next to bin Laden. 

I think, unfortunately, WFO only gets two emails. They don’t get 

the May 31 email that clearly outlines what his intentions are and 

what he is planning to do. 

You are right, Professor, San Diego has it, though; and they have 

DOD employees on these task forces. You know, why didn’t one of 

those at least contact Fort Hood? Why didn’t anybody contact Fort 

Hood and say, you know what, there is an issue here? You got a 

problem. You got a guy that could actually kill somebody, you 

know. 
42 

I don’t think any of you really have the answer to that. I don’t 

have the answer to that. It is just unfortunate that it didn’t happen 

in this case. 

So with that, again, we thank you for your brilliant insight and 

your excellent testimony; and I will dismiss this panel, move onto 

Panel No. 2. Thank you. 

[Off the record for a few minutes.] 

Mr. MCCAUL. Our Government witness requested to be on a separate panel all by himself. 

Let me introduce Mr. Kshemendra Paul, who is the program 

manager for the Information Sharing Environment at the Office of 

the Director of National Intelligence. As program manager, Mr. 

Paul has Government-wide authority to plan, oversee the buildout, 

and manage use of Information Sharing Environment. He also cochairs the White House’s Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Paul for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF KSHEMENDRA PAUL, PROGRAM MANAGER, INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. PAUL. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to 

testify today. 

My is Kshemendra Paul. I am the program manager for the Information Sharing Environment. By training and profession, I am 

an information technologist. Formerly, I was the chief architect of 

the Federal Government. 

My office works with mission partners—Federal, State, local, 

Tribal, private sector, and internationally. Together, our focus is on 

the improvement of the management, discovery, fusing, sharing, 

delivery of, and collaboration around terrorism-related information. 

The role of my office is planning, oversight, and management. 

We span a variety of communities—law enforcement, homeland security, defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence. 

As my office and our partners continue to implement responsible 

information-sharing practices, we reflect on the progress we have 

made across the Nation, as well as recognizing that work remains. 

In January, Director Clapper spoke of a National responsibility 

to share information. He encapsulated our vision. He said, and I 

quote, ‘‘The right data, anytime, anyplace, usable by any authorized recipient, preventable only by law and policy and not technology and protected by a comprehensive regime of accountability.’’ 

This week, we marked the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist 

attacks. The National security community has achieved numerous 

successes. As they pertain to my office, these include improving 

interoperability of our sensitive but unclassified networks, enhancing the capabilities of the fusion centers, State and local fusion centers, expanding the mission application and the impact of the Nation-wide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, strengthening 

industry and Government adoption of our interoperability and 

standards framework, including the National information exchange 

model, and, finally, integrating our non-Federal stakeholders, in 

particular State and local law enforcement, into the National policy 
43 

conversation through the interagency policy committee you mentioned. 

But we are not without challenges. These include the continuously evolving threat environment, the tsunami of data faced by 

my mission partners, and the constrained fiscal environment. 

My office continues to convene partners and lead efforts in responsible information-sharing innovation. This is a journey. The 

evolution of the threats against us, the integration of our resources, 

and the efficient use of technology require constant vigilance and 

leadership. The threats to our safety do not stop at jurisdictional 

or agency boundaries. Our information shouldn’t either. 

Three core ideas are the drivers of the mission of my office. We 

are grounded by an enduring purpose to advance responsible information sharing to further the counterterrorism and homeland security missions. We are focused on responsible information sharing to 

enable decisions to prevent harm to the American people. Finally, 

we are building capacity for responsible information sharing across 

our mission partners at all levels of Government. 

We are also strengthening protections for privacy, civil rights, 

and civil liberties. This work makes us stronger. 

Let me elaborate. Every fusion center in our country has a privacy policy as comprehensive as Presidential privacy guidelines. 

The bulk of Federal departments are in the same position, and we 

are well on the way to finishing the job here in Washington. This 

means that when citizens see something and say something, when 

police officers submit reports to fusion centers and Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces, when analysts work to connect the dots, the work proceeds across agencies and levels of government in a standardized 

and efficient manner that handles information appropriately and 

responsibly. 

Gaps, challenges, and opportunities for improvement exist. We 

have traction, a clear and compelling value proposition, and a way 

forward to continue to accelerate responsible information sharing. 

You have our comprehensive annual report; and, for the record, it 

is located on our website, ISE.gov. 

In summary, I believe there is no higher priority in the nexus between National security and public safety than responsible information sharing. 

On a personal note today, as we talk about the attacks at Fort 

Hood and also reflect on recent events overseas, I just want to say 

that my thoughts and prayers go out to the victims and their families. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you for the opportunity 

to be here, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Paul follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KSHEMENDRA PAUL

SEPTEMBER 14, 2012 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, I am Kshemendra Paul, the program manager for the Information 

Sharing Environment (ISE). We are the National office for responsible information 

sharing. The ISE provides analysts, operators, and investigators with information 

needed to enhance National security. These analysts, operators and investigators 
44 

1http://csis.org/files/attachments/120126linfolsharinglclapperltranscript.pdf. 

come from a variety of communities—law enforcement, homeland security, intelligence, defense, and foreign affairs—and may work for Federal, State, local, Tribal, 

or territorial governments, or in the private sector or our international partners. 

The PM–ISE works with ISE mission partners to improve the management, discovery, fusing, sharing, delivery of, and collaboration around terrorism-related information. The primary focus is any mission process, anywhere in the United States, 

that is intended or is likely to have a material impact on detecting, preventing, disrupting, responding to, or mitigating terrorist activity. The PM–ISE facilitates the 

development of the ISE by bringing together mission partners and aligning business 

processes, standards and architecture, security and access controls, privacy protections, and best practices. 

STATEMENT

As PM–ISE and our mission partners continue to implement responsible information-sharing practices, we reflect on the tremendous progress made toward our goal, 

while recognizing that significant work still needs to be done. In January, Director 

of National Intelligence James R. Clapper spoke of the National responsibility to 

share information—‘‘the right data, any time, any place, usable by any authorized 

recipient, preventable only by law or policy and not technology, and protected by a 

comprehensive regimen of accountability.’’1 As the office responsible for organizing 

and implementing responsible information-sharing practices Nation-wide, we are 

proud of the progress we have made strengthening National security while also honoring and protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. 

We have become much better at using our inherent strengths to make the American people safer. Our federated democracy means that we have committed law enforcement, public safety, and intelligence professionals working at the Federal, 

State, local, and Tribal levels; they are also working closely with partners in the 

private sector to protect our Nation’s infrastructure. We have carved out a strong 

role for governance through our leadership role in the White House’s Information 

Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee. Our robust and innovative private sector contributes significantly to the work of the ISE. And we are championing 

a standards-based approach to defining Government requirements for responsible 

information sharing that will enable greater interoperability across our Government’s networks while offering a greater potential for cost savings. 

This week we marked the eleventh anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The 

National security community has achieved numerous successes since 2001, including 

progress towards improving: Interoperability of our sensitive but unclassified computer networks, capabilities of our fusion centers, and mission impact of our Nationwide suspicious activity reporting practices. The PMISE has enhanced our National 

security by: Advancing these initiatives, brokering solutions between organizations 

with different missions, convening partners from inside and outside the Government, and leading improvements in responsible information sharing through policy, 

governance, and strategy. 

The PM–ISE is committed to continuing to convene partners and lead efforts in 

innovation. We understand that this is a continuing journey. The evolution of the 

threats against us, the integration of our resources, and the efficient use of technology to move our responsible information sharing agendas forward requires constant vigilance and leadership. 

Three core ideas are the drivers of PM–ISE’s mission. We are: 

• Grounded by an enduring purpose to advance responsible information sharing 

to further the counterterrorism and homeland security missions. We must stay 

focused on the fact that we are sharing information in order to keep the American people safe. 

• Leading a transformation from information ownership to information stewardship in order to improve Nation-wide decision making. We must treat information held by the Government as a National asset: This means it must be used, 

and reused, to benefit the American people. Information must be protected and 

cultivated to ensure that we get the maximum value from it. At the same time, 

strong protections for the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of the American 

people must be safeguarded. 

• Promoting partnerships across Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments, 

and the private sector, as well as internationally. By building organizational capacity at every level, we will share information more securely and effectively. 

The threats to our safety do not stop at jurisdictional borders; our information 

must not either. 
45 

2Guidelines to Ensure that the Information Privacy and Other Legal Rights of Americans are 

Protected in the Development and Use of the Information Sharing Environment (‘‘ISE Privacy 

Guidelines’’) (November 2006) available at http://ise.gov/sites/default/files/ 

PrivacyGuidelines20061204l1.pdf. 

We have also strengthened privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections by 

developing privacy guidelines, on behalf of the President, and supporting Federal, 

State, and local agencies as they develop privacy policies that are at least as comprehensive as the ISE privacy guidelines.2 This means that when citizens see something and say something, and when police officers submit reports to their local fusion centers, they all know that the information will be handled appropriately. It 

means that when analysts conduct their evaluations, they will proceed in a manner 

based on agreed-upon definitions of behaviors that are indicative of terrorist activity, and that their investigations will not be based on race or religion. It means that 

the American people can know that their Government is committed to protecting 

their privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, as well as their security. 

While we focus on the accomplishments and the progress to date on numerous 

fronts, we maintain a sense of urgency about tackling the work that remains to be 

done. The biggest challenges facing the ISE are the continuously evolving threat environment, the tsunami of new data, and a constrained fiscal environment. As the 

ISE grows and its work deepens and expands, we need to continue to assess and 

adjust for current realities—allowing us to be well-positioned for dealing with future 

threats and exploiting opportunities. 

These challenges and opportunities present a framework within which to rethink 

the ISE and our approach to responsible information sharing. We see great potential 

in leveraging our advances and building from the terrorism-related mission to more 

broadly support information-led public sector transformation. Recognition of the enduring value of the ISE lies in the ceaseless needs of the mission and the variety 

of continued successes that have been spawned by our work. The 2012 ISE Annual 

Report to the Congress showcases many of these accomplishments and lays out our 

way forward. While gaps, challenges, and opportunities for improvement are present 

and described, we have established traction, developed a clear and compelling value 

proposition, and identified a way forward. 

We are fulfilling the mission set out before us, and we are enhancing our National 

security through responsible information sharing. We will continue to fulfill this 

mission and to identify and meet new challenges as they arise. 

More information about the Information Sharing Environment and the office of 

the Program Manager is available at ISE.gov. 

SUMMARY

I believe there is no higher priority for our National security than the issue of 

information sharing. Congress has provided us the mandate through legislation; the 

President has provided us the leadership and further guidelines; we continue the 

work of transforming our information-sharing environment into one that works 

more effectively for all. 

Thousands of men and women work tirelessly to protect this Nation from terrorist 

threats. It is important for us to provide them and other decision makers with the 

best possible information to do their job to protect the people and interests of the 

United States against another terrorist attack. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to provide this subcommittee with information on the activities of the Program Manager’s Office and look forward to 

your questions. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Paul, and thank you for recognizing the importance of information sharing, fusion centers. 

Mr. Keating, my Ranking Member, we both worked with fusion 

centers. Sometimes they are given a bit of a bad name, and I think 

that privacy protection piece is important to preserve the integrity 

of the work that they are doing and to make sure that privacy interests are protected. 

So, with that, I again want to focus back to what this hearing 

is all about, and that is Fort Hood. 

Now, my question may go outside of your expertise or ability to 

comment. But, again, in this case I think you had a huge breakdown in information sharing, not only between the FBI within 
46 

itself but also with the Department of Defense. If you can speak 

to these issues, I would like to know how to fix this. 

First, you have got an agent sitting at WFO who sits on this 

matter for the maximum amount of time possible, looks at the lead 

on the very last day. I understand the FBI is swamped. They have 

a lot on their plate. But when you have a major at Fort Hood who 

is the subject matter, I think that would take a little higher priority. But they wait until the very last day and within 4 hours 

make an analysis based upon two of 18 emails because this analyst 

doesn’t know how to access the database that would give him the 

other 16 emails, one of which, as I mentioned previously, telegraphs what he is getting ready to do. So you have got that breakdown. 

Then, you know, finally, within these task forces you actually 

have Department of Defense representatives. Why on either side, 

both from Washington or San Diego, in your opinion—and maybe 

you can’t speak to this—but why didn’t one of those DoD representatives on the JTTFs contact Fort Hood and say, you got a problem? 

Mr. PAUL. Commenting on the specific operational aspects of Fort 

Hood are a little bit outside of my lane. 

But what I would like to come to is some of the comments that 

were discussed on the earlier panel that relate to this question, 

things like doing a better job of enterprise data management. That 

was a key recommendation coming out of the Webster Commission. 

It is a key focus of my office, all right. There is a recognition, this 

goes back to the 9/11 Commission, a series of seminal reports from 

the Markle Foundation that is codified in the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act. It is really the mandate for my office. It is to drive a better job of enterprise data management so 

we can knit together all the different aspects of National and public security to keep the American people safe. 

I mean, think about 800,000 police officers in this country. The 

bulk of law enforcement is State and local, 18,000 police departments. Knitting that together into a coherent National architecture 

requires a focus on common processes, policies, and data standards. 

We have had success with that, actually. I mentioned in my 

opening comments about the National information exchange model. 

What is not widely understood is that originated with State and 

local law enforcement. It is actually a State and local innovation 

that we have adopted at the Federal level as the basis for our 

counterterrorism data sharing enterprise. 

So I think, you know, the focus on knitting together all these different components into a coherent architecture really is the key. 

Mr. MCCAUL. You know, as somebody who has worked on the 

FISA applications, I understand the restrictions when a FISA is 

out there, like in this particular case with Mr. al-Awlaki. I think 

there is so much apprehension when you get in the FISA world and 

so many restrictions, legal restrictions, that that may have been 

counterproductive and may have gotten in the way of these Department of Defense employees or officials sharing this information 

with Fort Hood, which is something that the Ranking Member and 

I would like to maybe look at jointly as to if we have to reform it 

or somehow just have some sort of reporting language that would 

clarify that that can be shared. 
47 

I can’t imagine why, if the Federal Government has this information within its hands, it can’t share it with the United States 

Army, United States military, you know, on one of its bases. To me, 

that is just incomprehensible. 

So I thank you for your testimony. 

With that, I recognize the Ranking Member. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Leiter and Mr. Winter had said that although the chances 

would have been less likely, the circumstance, this tragedy at Fort 

Hood could indeed occur again today. Could you reflect on your 

thinking whether it could occur today? 

Also, what would you give for your recommendations to try and 

not have—the greatest legacy we can give to these families that 

have lost loved ones are—I think the greatest legacy is that this 

wouldn’t happen again to another American. Could you comment 

on what you think in that regard? 

Mr. PAUL. It is difficult to answer a hypothetical about the specific events that occurred at Fort Hood. But what I will say, and 

I will highlight the Nation-wide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, you know, one of the things that we are really successful 

on with this initiative is being able to bring together a lot of different voices across levels of government, and outside the Government, to identify a process for doing suspicious activity reporting 

that addressed privacy, civil liberties concerns, but also operational 

effectiveness. Through that process, we were able to identify 16 behaviors reasonably indicative of terrorism-related activity or preoperational criminal planning. So that functional standard is in 

place Nationally now. 

You know, coming back to the question about policy or things 

like that, when we started that journey a lot of folks were concerned that we wouldn’t be able to rationalize how folks looked at 

these kinds of issues because of the levels of government and the 

privacy issues. But we were able to work through those successfully, all right. So I think there is a model there, and I go back to 

that as—— 

To answer your question about, you know: What is the highest 

priority? From where I sit, accelerating responsible informationsharing practices, as championed by my office, you know, is a real 

part of the answer in terms of dealing with the enterprise data 

management issues that were highlighted, dealing with the jurisdictional issues, dealing with the cultural issues, I think just accelerating the work. 

Mr. KEATING. The other thing that Mr. Leiter mentioned is, 

when we were talking about a patchwork system versus a National 

system, he referred to having six regional areas perhaps as an approach that would be effective. What do you think in terms of that? 

Because I do think the more you have it under one roof, so to 

speak, even though it might be an IT roof, the more that is there 

the better off we are. His reference to having six regional areas as 

sort of a better step than we have now in this patchwork quilt, do 

you think that would be effective as well? I mean, you are dealing 

with getting the same message, but the process by which it is reviewed and shared is the issue, too.@ 
48 

Mr. PAUL. You know, the Information Sharing Environment by 

design, by statute is a distributed and decentralized environment 

that interconnects existing systems. So the focus we have is on 

interoperability but not just at the technical level. It is not about 

pipes and things like that. That is an important component, but it 

is more. It is interoperability at the policy level, the business process level. So we think it is key to keep that focus on interoperability so that you can seamlessly share the information. 

Now, the FBI approach on regionalization, that is a focus on coordinating Federal activity, which I think is a good thing. It is 

something we have heard from our State and local partners. It is 

something that we are working through the different governance 

structures. 

Mr. KEATING. I will just ask you this, too. We had a hearing in 

Houston, actually, on the Port of Houston and security. One of the 

things that came out of that was the need for the first line, the 

need for local police to be there and to be really one of the most 

important flash points in terms of information. 

I must tell you, it is just my feeling, that of all the areas, we are 

talking about all the higher governmental areas, Department of 

Defense, FBI, I just don’t see enough effort or enough success at 

that local level, the front line. Sometimes that information can be 

just the catalyst to spring the network of information that really 

will tell us something. What are your recommendations to really do 

a better job at the local level of having them be part of that information network? 

I know there is agencies that don’t want to go down to that level 

for fear that some of that information might be breached. But the 

other side of that is, without sharing that information at the local 

level, you could really lose probably the most important information that you could have in front of you in the most time-sensitive 

way. 

Mr. PAUL. You know, we have had some success as a Government with the National network of fusion centers and their increasing maturity. Those efforts are led by DHS with close involvement from FBI—integral involvement from FBI, and DOJ, and 

other Federal agencies. 

I talked about the SAR initiative before. Three hundred thousand 

police officers in this country have been trained. It is the first time 

that I know of where these police officers have been through the 

same training. It was around the behaviors I mentioned earlier. 

So there is some success that way. It’s at risk right now because 

of the fiscal situation, right? 

This goes to—you know, to answer your question, when I talk to 

my State and local stakeholders, that comes back loud and clear. 

When you look across that landscape, 18,000 police departments, 

90 percent of which have 50 or fewer sworn officers, there is a real 

concern about the smaller departments, which make up the bulk 

of law enforcement, how to integrate them in the National architecture. So a focus of our office and working with our stakeholders is 

to look at solutions like regionalization, you know, that is controlled by States, or State-wide information-sharing environments, 

or co-location. All right. There is a variety of different approaches, 

and they are talked about in the annual report. 
49 

But I think thoughtful solutions like that to help bring people together to have a common information infrastructure are a key part 

of dealing with this financial issue as well as knitting together the 

smaller departments into a National architecture. 

Mr. KEATING. So, just to be clear, you are hearing from the local 

stakeholders that they are saying that if there was, for instance, 

Federal money that could go to that kind of training, then they 

would be more apt to participate and then be a part of this, you 

think, from their vantage point? 

Mr. PAUL. When I talk to the State and locals and the Federal, 

there is a key focus on making sure that as we have these investments today, right, in the fusion centers and in other initiatives 

that we are looking at making them as effective as possible by expanding the usage of them with the smaller agencies and also looking at, over time, other priority crimes, other priority threats that 

allow then the business case to be made more effectively for these 

and to develop support for them. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Paul, thank you for your work. Your vision and your goal for 

information sharing that will help prevent future attacks on this 

country and just help law enforcement in general and mine are 

similar, are shared, really. So I thank you for the work. 

In subsequent hearings or past hearings, we have talked with all 

the agencies, DHS, State, about information sharing between those 

agencies. Some of the things that I have learned is that if someone—and I will use the case of maybe a visa overstay, and DHS 

was looking into someone who may or may not overstay their visa 

and investigate the background of that person. Sometimes they 

have to come out of one database or system and actually log into 

another and come out of that system and actually log into another. 

I even heard that an MS–DOS-type program or database is still 

being used. I hadn’t even heard the word DOS in so many years 

that that kind of caught me by surprise. 

But they are all passwords, entry level. So instead of having one 

password or one biometric system where one person could enter 

one time and get in all the databases that they need, they are having to remember all the different passwords. That gets frustrating, 

and they end up not doing a complete search because of the frustration level. 

So I just share that with you, because I think you need to know 

that. That is what I am hearing from people that currently work 

in the different levels of government. 

In your prepared statement, you talked about the transformation 

of information ownership to information stewardship, which I think 

that is a very valid point. Do you believe we have reached that 

point of information stewardship? In my experience, there are still 

holdouts today, 11 years after 9/11, 3 years after Fort Hood, where 

folks refuse to partner or share their information. They still consider they have got ownership of that, and they really don’t want 

to share it for whatever reason, whether they want to hold themselves up to their superiors as the person in the know or the person 

that has the ability to move up in the ranks. We see that in the 
50 

private sector as well. How do we overcome that? Are we overcoming that? What do you foresee in the future? 

Mr. PAUL. Thank you. That is a focus of the work of my office, 

and I appreciate you mentioning the stewardship focus. It has 

taken us a long time as a Government to develop the siloed structures, the programmatic structures, and we have lots of policies 

around information that is based on classes of information and that 

is specific to agencies or bureaus. 

The vision that I talked about that Director Clapper talked about 

is more focused on policy around classes of decisions. The Markle 

Foundation called it an authorized use standard. It is a big job to 

look at the body of policy we have and how do we transition it to 

making decisions about information sharing, discoverability, and 

things like that based on the classes of decisions. It requires the 

technical infrastructure, right, with networks that are secure, 

where identity management works across these networks, across 

different organizations, across different levels of government, 

where we have more consistency in how we implement policy in the 

computer systems. 

This is a lot of work. It is a big journey in front of us. 

We have had some successes. You know, one that I will mention 

is related to the watch list that Mr. Leiter was talking about earlier is a success. When somebody gets stopped by State and local 

law enforcement and there is a hit on the watch list, we have a 

process now where that information gets back to the local fusion 

centers and the Joint Terrorism Task Forces in a timely manner. 

All right. So that is important again to bring in State and local law 

enforcement into having that situational awareness of what is 

going on in their communities. 

So there is more processes, more work to do, but it is a valid 

point, and it is where we are headed is the stewardship focuses. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I applaud the fusion centers. I see it as the first 

platform, as long as those platforms are integrated to talk to the 

higher platforms, so that the higher-up authorities have the ability 

to go to one platform and be able to Google, so to speak—to use 

that term not necessarily, that company—but your name and find 

out everything that someone at a decision-making level needs to 

know about you. So I applaud your work. 

I appreciate this committee, the questions that have been raised 

here. Mr. Chairman, I really don’t have anything else. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Davis, is recognized. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, 

Mr. Paul, for your testimony. 

Government-wide there have been challenges to the development 

of unclassified and classified systems of information sharing. In 

particular, DHS has had problems in the past developing and deploying these information-sharing systems. 

Let me ask you, how will the recent round of cuts to the budget 

impact development of some of these systems? How can we make 

sure that they are developed and get to the State and local and 

Tribal governments that need them? 

Mr. PAUL. It is difficult for me to comment on the cuts specific 

to DHS, but I do want to highlight that DHS, with their classified 
51 

network, the HSDN system, has connectivity out to the fusion centers, and they have been making some stellar progress with the 

HSIN system, Homeland Security Information Network. 

We are also doing a lot of work to drive interoperability across 

DHS’s HSIN system, FBI’s LEO—Law Enforcement Online—the 

IntelLink system out of the intelligence community, and also the 

grant-funded, State-owned Ris.Net. 

So that is a core initiative of the office, is to have interoperability. Our philosophy—there is no wrong door. When you are in 

a fusion center, working in a police department, line law enforcement, you can get into these systems and find the information. 

We have made progress, as I talked about in the Annual Report, 

but I don’t want to overstate that. There is still a lot of work to 

do there. 

We do think that having consistent standards and architecture 

and working with industry to make sure that we are not building 

systems and then trying to interconnect them in a one-off manner, 

that kind of a jerry-rigged approach is not the right way. The right 

way is to have a consistent architecture that is used across these 

different systems and by our State and local partners and work 

with industry and standards organizations to make sure that, you 

know, identity management is done in a consistent, best practices 

way, that we are implementing access-based authorization and controls that people can discover information. I think that it is a challenge, there is more work to do, but we have made some substantial progress. 

I do want to highlight that key to making this progress is the 

fact that we have integrated our State and local stakeholders into 

our governance structures. We do that both—in a variety of ways, 

but in particular we focus on working with professional associations. That gives us a big ability to help drive culture change, because it is bottoms-up, and it is inclusive. 

Mr. DAVIS. Let me ask you, it is my understanding that the 

eGuardian system set up by the FBI is a major part of the National 

Suspicious Activity Reporting, or SAR, Initiative and is the main 

way that State and local law enforcement can share information on 

suspicious activities with one another and with the Federal Government. How helpful has this system and has SARs in general 

been for Federal counterterrorism efforts? Can you give an estimate of how many State and local law enforcement SARs have led 

to Federal counterterrorism investigations? 

Mr. PAUL. The Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative is 

foundational to our domestic counterterrorism activities. It is a critical integral part. There is approximately 20—maybe a little bit 

more now—I can give you the precise numbers after the hearing— 

in the suspicious activity reports that have been vetted to the functional standards that my office has published. There is something 

on the order of 40,000 searches in what is called a Shared Space. 

That is the electronic pool, if you like, that the fusion centers and 

the Joint Terrorism Task Forces and other participants in the ISE 

use to share this information. 

Numerous cases have been opened by the FBI. I believe those 

numbers are for official use only, so I would like to respond for the 

record or in a different way for those numbers. 
52 

You know, the eGuardian system is one of two technologies. The 

other is what is called Shared Space. They are interoperable. The 

important thing is they work within the functional standard, and 

there is a common process for how the information flows from the 

citizenry, from industry, critical infrastructure, key resource sectors, to local law enforcement, to the fusion centers, and the Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces, shared for analytic purposes. 

Mr. DAVIS. I would just suspect that the number—or that there 

would be some serious increase in the reporting of suspicious activity. 

Mr. PAUL. There is a substantial number, a substantial number 

of investigations that are across this Nation related to suspicious 

activity reporting, either directly out of the SAR system or SARlike activity. It is foundational. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. 

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Paul, let me thank you for your testimony as well. 

I just want to conclude by saying that we have representatives 

of the victims and their family members here today at this hearing, 

and I think the Federal Government deserves—or should give an 

apology, a formal apology as to what happened, and should call this 

what it actually was. It was an act of terrorism, and I do believe 

that the families of the victims need to be compensated adequately 

and given our deepest respect. As for this Member of Congress and 

this committee, you have my assurance that we will do everything 

we can to make sure that that happens. 

So, with that, the hearing record will be open for 10 days. 

Without objection, this committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:01 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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