alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 191 (Thursday, October 2, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 51650]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-26084]



[[Page 51650]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. RP97-287-006]


El Paso Natural Gas Company; Notice of Proposed Changes in FERC 
Gas Tariff

September 26, 1997.
    Take notice that on September 23, 1997, El Paso Natural Gas Company 
(El Paso) tendered for filing to become part of its FERC Gas Tariff, 
Second Revised Volume No. 1-A, the following tariff sheets to become 
effective October 23, 1997:

Fourth Revised Sheet No. 102
First Revised Sheet No. 113A
Fifth Revised Sheet No. 214
First Revised Sheet No. 312
Third Revised Sheet No. 349
Fourth Revised Sheet No. 350

    El Paso states that the above tariff sheets are being filed to 
remove the rate cap from El Paso's limited negotiated rate option for 
Rate Schedule FT-1 service pursuant to El Paso's Settlement filed at 
Docket No. RP95-363-000, et al., and the Commission's Policy Statement 
at Docket Nos. RM95-6-000, et al. Further, the filing makes negotiated 
rates available to interruptible transportation service under Rate 
Schedule IT-1 pursuant to the Policy Statement.
    Any person desiring to protest said filing should file a protest 
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Section 385.211 of the 
Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such protests must be filed in 
accordance with Section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. 
Protests will be considered by the Commission in determining the 
appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants 
parties to the proceeding. Copies of this filing are on file with the 
Commission and are available for public inspection in the Public 
Reference Room.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-26084 Filed 10-1-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 97-929 

________________________________________________________________________ 

CULTURAL PROPERTY 

 Memorandum of Understanding 

Between the 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

and GUATEMALA 

Signed at Washington September 29, 1997 

with 

Appendix 

and 

Agreement Extending the Memorandum of Understanding 

Effected by Exchange of Notes at 

Washington September 20 and 23, 2002 

and 

Agreement Extending and Amending 

the Memorandum of Understanding, as Extended 

Effected by Exchange of Notes at 

Guatemala August 23 and 24, 2007 
 

NOTE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

 Pursuant to Public Law 89—497, approved July 8, 1966 

(80 Stat. 271; 1 U.S.C. 113)—

“. . .the Treaties and Other International Acts Series issued 

under the authority of the Secretary of State shall be competent 

 evidence . . . of the treaties, international agreements other than 

treaties, and proclamations by the President of such treaties and 

international agreements other than treaties, as the case may be, 

therein contained, in all the courts of law and equity and of maritime 

jurisdiction, and in all the tribunals and public offices of the 

United States, and of the several States, without any further proof 

or authentication thereof.” 
 

 GUATEMALA 

 Cultural Property 

Memorandum of understanding signed at Washington 

 September 29, 1997; 

Entered into force September 29, 1997. 

With appendix. 

And agreement extending the memorandum of understanding. 

Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 

 September 20 and 23, 2002; 

Entered into force September 23, 2002. 

And agreement extending and amending the memorandum of 

 understanding, as extended. 

Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala 

 August 23 and 24, 2007; 

Entered into force August 24, 2007. 











NOTE: Appendix done in English only.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN EARL LESTER, )

)

Petitioner, )

) Civil Action No. 06-2 Erie

v. )

)

JAMES F. SHERMAN, WARDEN, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This habeas corpus action was received by the Clerk of Court on January 4,

2006, and was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter for

report and recommendation in accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1), and Rules 72.1.3 and 72.1.4 of the Local Rules for Magistrates.

 The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 12], filed on

August 4, 2006, recommended that Petitioner’s Petition be denied, and that a certificate

of appealability be denied. The parties were allowed ten (10) days from the date of

service to file objections. Service was made on Petitioner by certified mail and on

Respondent. No objections were filed. After de novo review of the motion and

documents in the case, together with the Report and Recommendation, the following

order is entered:

AND NOW, this 16th day of August, 2006;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus is DENIED and a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

The Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 12] of Magistrate Judge Baxter, filed

on August 4, 2006, is adopted as the opinion of the Court.

 s/ Sean J. McLaughlin

United States District Judge

cm: All parties of record

Susan Paradise Baxter, U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 1:06-cv-00002-SJM-SPB Document 13 Filed 08/16/06 Page 1 of 1
**Exhibit
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**


**OF**


**THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**








In
      connection with the annual report on Form 10-K of Microfield
      Group, Inc. (t he
      "Company") for the twelve months ended December 30, 2006, as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Covered Report"),
      I,
      the principal financial officer of the Company, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as
      adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, hereby
      certify that:





The
      Covered Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





The
      information contained in the Covered Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





IN
      WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this certificate as of this 15th day of
      March 2007 .





/s/RANDALL
                R. REEDRandall
                R. ReedChief
                Financial Officer
PRIVATE LAW 106–1—AUGUST 2, 1999 113 STAT. 1

Private Law 106–1

106th Congress

An Act

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to transfer to John R. and Margaret J.

Lowe of Big Horn County, Wyoming, certain land so as to correct an error

in the patent issued to their predecessors in interest.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TRANSFER OF LOWE FAMILY PROPERTY.

(a) CONVEYANCE.—Subject to valid existing rights, the Secretary

of the Interior is directed to issue, without consideration, a quitclaim

deed to John R. and Margaret J. Lowe of Big Horn County,

Wyoming, to the land described in subsection (b): Provided, That

all minerals underlying such land are hereby reserved to the United

States.

(b) LAND DESCRIPTION.—The land referred to in subsection

(a) is the approximately 40-acre parcel located in the SW1⁄4SE1⁄4

of Section 11, Township 51 North, Range 96 West, 6th Principal

Meridian, Wyoming.

Aug. 2, 1999

[S. 361]
Case 1:04-cv-00372-MBC   Document 11   Filed 09/19/05   Page 1 of 5

Case 1:04-cv-00372-MBC   Document 11   Filed 09/19/05   Page 2 of 5

Case 1:04-cv-00372-MBC   Document 11   Filed 09/19/05   Page 3 of 5

Case 1:04-cv-00372-MBC   Document 11   Filed 09/19/05   Page 4 of 5

Case 1:04-cv-00372-MBC   Document 11   Filed 09/19/05   Page 5 of 5

    -       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2014-03-10T18:31:09-0400
      - US GPO, Washington, DC 20401
      - Superintendent of Documents
      - GPO attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by GPO
Page 1 of 1

 

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TRACEY WEIDOW, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

 v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY, 

 

 Defendant. 

CASE NO. 4:15-cv-00765- GBC 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE COHN 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

APPEAL, AFFIRMING THE 

DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER, 

AND CLOSING THE CASE 

Doc. 1, 10, 11, 18, 20, 23 

 ORDER

In accordance with the accompanying memorandum, IT IS HEREBY 

ORDERED THAT: 

1. This appeal is DENIED, as the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence; 

2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner and 

against Plaintiff as set forth in the following paragraph; 

3. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Tracey L. 

Weidow supplemental security income is affirmed; and 

4. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. 

Dated: October 7, 2016 s/Gerald B. Cohn 

 GERALD B. COHN 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 4:15-cv-00765-GBC Document 30 Filed 10/07/16 Page 1 of 1
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.38

 
                      AMENDED AND RESTATED TERM-LINE NOTE
                      -----------------------------------

$15,000,000                                                    February 22, 1999


     FOR VALUE RECEIVED, MATRIX FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION, an Arizona
corporation ("Borrower"), promises to pay to the order of BANK ONE, TEXAS, N.A.
("Lender"), that portion of the principal amount of $15,000,000 that may from
time to time be disbursed and outstanding under this note together with
interest.

     This note is a "Term-Line Note" under the Amended and Restated Loan
Agreement (as renewed, extended, amended, or restated, the "Loan Agreement")
dated as of January 31, 1997, between Borrower, Lender, certain other Lenders,
and Bank One, Texas, N.A., as Agent for Lenders.  All of the defined terms in
the Loan Agreement have the same meanings when used -- unless otherwise defined
-- in this note.

     This note incorporates by reference the principal and interest payment
terms in the Loan Agreement for this note, including, without limitation, the
final maturity.  Principal and interest are payable to the holder of this note
through Agent at either (a) its offices at 1717 Main Street, Dallas, Texas
75201, or (b) at any other address so designated by Agent in written notice to
Borrower.

     This note incorporates by reference all other provisions in the Loan
Agreement applicable to this note -- such as provisions for disbursements of
principal, applicable-interest rates before and after Default, voluntary and
mandatory prepayments, acceleration of maturity, exercise of Rights, payment of
attorneys' fees, court costs, and other costs of collection, certain waivers by
Borrower and other obligors, assurances and security, choice of Texas and United
States federal Law, usury savings, and other matters applicable to Loan
Documents under the Loan Agreement.

     This note is an amendment, restatement, renewal, extension, modification
of, consolidation of, and substitution for, the existing Term-Line Notes (as the
same may have been amended and replaced to the date hereof, the "Former Notes"),
which Former Notes were executed and delivered pursuant to the  Loan Agreement.


                              MATRIX FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION, as
                              Borrower


                              By            /s/
                                 ----------------------------------------------
                                   George R. Bender, President



                                                             Amended Exhibit A-5
                                                             -------------------
WITHDRAWN 3

- 6

- 14 

### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10

- 12

- 00302

- CV

TODD PHILLIPPI , Appellant

v.

CITI RESIDENTIAL LEN DING, INC., ET AL , Appellee

From the County Court at Law Ellis County, Texas Trial Court No. C

- 08

- 3657

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On October 16, 2013, the Clerk of the Court sent the following letter to Appellant:
The required filing and fax fees of $20 for your faxed Motion to Extend Time to File Appellant’s Brief filed on September 24, 2013 are PAST DUE

. See T EX

. R. A PP . P. 5; Appendix to T EX

. R. A PP

. P ., Order Regarding Fees (Amended Aug. 28, 2007, eff. Sept. 1, 2007). S ee also 10 TH T EX

. A PP

. (W ACO ) L OC

. R. 5; T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . §§ 51.207(b); 51.208 (West Supp. 2012); § 51.941(a) (West 2005).
Unless you are exempt, you must: (1) file an indigence affidavit as provided by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1 ; or (2) pay the required filing and fax fees. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 5, 20.1. If you fail either to file an indigence affidavit or to pay the filing and fax fees within 14 daysPhillippi v. Citi Residential Lending, Inc. Page 2

after the date of this letter, the motion will be dismissed without further notification. See T EX

. R

. A PP

. P

. 5

. You also owe an additional $20 for two previous f ax fees that are PAST DUE

. Fees may be paid by check or money order, payable to the “Tenth Court of Appeals.”
On November 8, 2013, Appellant paid the required filing and fax fees of $20 for his
Motion to Extend Time to File Appellant’s Brief; however, Appellant continue d to owe
$20 for required fax fees that were past due

. On November 27, 2013, the Clerk of the Court sent a letter to Appellant
reminding him of the foregoing. Appellant was also informed that unless he is exempt,
he must: (1) file an i ndigence affidavit as provided by Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 20.1; or (2) pay the required filing and fax fees. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 5, 20.1.
Appellant was also notified that if he failed to file an indigence affidavit or to pay the
required filing and fax fees within fourteen days after the date of th e letter, this appeal
may be dismissed without further notification. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 5, 42.3(c).

More than f ourteen days have passed since the November 27 letter, and
Appellant has not file d an indigence affidavit or paid the required filing and fax fees;
accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 5, 42.3(c).

REX D. DAVIS JusticePhillippi v. Citi Residential Lending, Inc. Page 3

Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins A ppeal dismissed Opinion delivered and filed January 9 , 2014 [CV06]
#### Edward C. MELKUN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

*No.*70-545.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Feb. 17, 1971.

*146Walter R. Talley, Public Defender, and W. Daniel Kearney, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Warren H. Petersen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lakeland, for appellee.

PIERCE, Chief Judge.

Appellant Edward C. Melkun appeals to this Court from a judgment of conviction entered against him by the Pinellas County Circuit Court.

On February 19, 1970, Melkun was informed against for the offense of unlawfully receiving and concealing a described motorcycle, belonging to another person, knowing the same to have been recently stolen. Upon plea of not guilty, he was tried by jury which, on May 18, 1970, returned a verdict of guilty. In due course he was adjudged guilty and sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment in the State Prison. It is from this judgment and sentence that Melkun appeals to this Court.

The only point urged here for reversal is the insufficiency of the evidence to convict. But we have examined the record thoroughly and find the evidence to be overwhelmingly sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict. The tracks of the stolen motorcycle were traced to Melkun’s garage where it was found. Melkun told the investigating officer the motorcycle was brought to his garage by “two guys” and that “he thought it was strange that they brought it there, and he thought it might have been stolen” or, to use his exact words at the time he “thought it might have been hot.” Melkun testified in his own behalf and in many important respects reiterated what he told the officer originally. The evidence was ample to convict.

In addition, the record here reflects no order denying Melkun’s motion for new trial filed after verdict. Such motion for new trial has been held to be essential for an appellate Court to review the issue of sufficiency of evidence to convict. State v. Owens, Fla.1970, 233 So.2d 389; State v. Contreras, Fla.1969, 227 So.2d 306.

Melkun makes the anomalous contention here that the cited cases require only, as a condition prerequisite to consideration of sufficiency of the evidence upon appeal, the *filing*of the motion for new trial and not necessarily the entry of any order upon the motion. Melkun contends that because he filed such motion for new trial the sufficiency of evidence to convict is available for consideration by this Court even though no order apparently was entered on the motion. Such contention is clearly untenable. The obvious reason for requiring filing of such motion for new trial as an essential prerequisite to consideration of the sufficiency of evidence on appeal is to enable the trial Court to consider and weigh the evidence in the calmness of the after-verdict and if found in any material respect deficient to set it aside and have further *147proceedings in the case if necessary. This could not be done if the trial Court never ruled on the motion.

The judgment appealed is therefore—

Affirmed.

HOBSON and McNULTY, JJ„ concur.
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 20

- 10283 Summary Calendar

**United States of America,**
Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus
**Robert Earl Ramseur,**
Defendant

— Appellant

**.**

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:16

- CR

- 65

- 1

Before **Higginbotham, Jones, and Costa,** Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** * Robert Earl Ramseur appeals the $141,419.04 restitution award imposed on remand from United States v. Ramseur , 793 F. App’x 245 (5th Cir. 2019), pursuant to his conviction for willfully assist ing the preparation of false income tax returns . The district c ourt originally ordered $399,400 in

* Pursuant to **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47. 5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED December 3, 2020 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 20-10283 Document: 00515659589 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/03/2020No. 20

- 10283

2 restitution, but we held that included amounts beyond the tax returns for which he was convicted and failed to account for tax payments made by some of Ramseur’s’ clients on returns that were the basis for his convictions. See id . at 249. Ramseur now challenges the new, reduced restitution order on the ground that it exceeds the Internal Revenue Service’s actual loss from the offenses of conviction

. The issue whether a restitution award is illegal is reviewed de novo , and the amount of the restitution award is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Arledge , 553 F.3d 881, 89 7 (5th Cir. 2008). The amount of a victim’s restitution award must be tied to only the loss that directly resulted from the of fense of conviction; the gain to the defendant on account of his illegal conduct is not relevant to the calculation of the restitution award. Id

. at 899. Citing United States v. Tawil , 40 F. App’x 531 (9th Cir. 2002), Ramseur argues that the restitution award should be reduced by $24,113 that was erroneously deposited by the IRS into the accounts of three taxpayers against whom the IRS has not sought a refund. Tawil , which is factually distinguishable, is not persuasive because there was no evidence in t hat case that the defendants’ scheme caused the full amount of the loss at issue

. See 40 F. App’x at 533 , 535

. In contrast, Ramseur’s act s of conviction caused the entire $141,419.04 loss to the IRS , regardless of the amount he personally receive d or from which he benefit ted. See Arledge , 553 F.3d at 899. The restitution award therefore is neither illegal nor an abuse of discretion. See id . at 89 7

- 99

. **AFFIRMED**

. Case: 20-10283 Document: 00515659589 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/03/2020
Exhibit 23

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos. 333-111466, 333-111467, 333-111469 and 333-116114 on Form S-8 and Registration
Statement No. 333-122215 on Form S-3 of our reports relating to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedules of The DIRECTV Group, Inc. (which report expresses an
unqualified opinion and includes an explanatory paragraph regarding the Company's adoption of Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48,Accounting for
Uncertainty in Income Taxesan interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109and Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158, Employers' Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other
Postretirement Planan amendment of FASB Statements No. 87, 88, 106 and 132 (R))and on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting dated February 25, 2008, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of The DIRECTV Group, Inc. for the year ended December 31,
2007.

/s/
DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Los
Angeles, California
February 25, 2008

---



QuickLinks
255 La. 817

#### Lee J. GARY v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 50441.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 3, 1970.

In re: Travelers Insurance Company applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Calcasieu. 230 So.2d 606.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, the result is correct.
From: "Briggman, Kimberly A." 

To: DioxinInteragency@EPA 

Date: 03/29/2010 01:58 PM 

Subject: Dioxin Interagency Draft Report Comments 

Hi, 

 

Please find a few comments below for your consideration regarding the Dioxin Interagency Draft Report 

in the context of openness and transparency. My apologies for not sending these in on Friday. 

 

1. What was the public response to the Nov. 2008 Federal Register notice requesting 

submission of new/missing dioxin studies? No where in the draft report does it state the 

response. 

2. Has EPA funded any of the studies it cites or has included in the literature survey? For 

openness and transparency, it would be helpful to know if any preferential treatment (or not) 

was being given to such studies. 

 

Best, 

Kimberly 

_ _ _

Kimberly Briggman, Ph.D. 

Senior Policy Analyst- Physical Sciences & Engineering 

Office of Science and Technology Policy 

Executive Office of the President