UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BERTDELL SHAW,

 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

VETFORCE, INC. PENNSYLVANIA, 

 

 Defendant. 

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-CV-01868 

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is a Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Defendant Vetforce, Inc. Pennsylvania (“Defendant”). (Doc. 

19). This action was commenced by the filing of a complaint (“Complaint”) on November 8, 

2023, by Bertdell Shaw (“Plaintiff”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges claims of hostile work 

environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964. (Doc. 1). Defendant now asserts persistent unresponsiveness and noncompliance 

with discovery against Plaintiff’s attorney. For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion for 

sanctions will be GRANTED, and the Complaint DISMISSED without prejudice. (Doc. 

19). 

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following factual summary is taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and Defendant’s 

brief in support of its motion for sanctions. (Doc. 1; Doc. 20). On or around July 19, 2022, 

Plaintiff became employed with Defendant as a Transporter. (Doc. 1, ¶ 9). As the only Black 

individual employed by Defendant in his assigned office, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to 

harassment and discrimination in the workplace based on his race. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 12-23, 33-43). 

Plaintiff further alleges he was investigated and subsequently terminated for formally 

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complaining about racism in the workplace and the harassment he suffered by Defendant’s 

employees. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 68-69).

After repeated attempts to cooperate with Plaintiff’s counsel, Defendant now seeks 

sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees and/or dismissal. According to Defendant, this motion 

comes in response to Plaintiff’s attorney’s repeated failures to produce initial disclosures, 

respond to document requests, and complete depositions. (Doc. 20, at 2-6). Specifically at 

issue is counsel’s repeated failures to comply with discovery requests over the course of five 

months, from January 24, 2024, to June 12, 2024. (Doc. 20, at 6).

The relevant timeline of events is as follows: On both January 12, 2024, and February 

4, 2024, Defendant’s counsel e-mailed Plaintiff’s counsel to check on status of initial 

disclosures and received no response. (Doc. 20, at 2). Defendant’s counsel attempted to 

contact Plaintiff’s counsel again via both e-mail and overnight mail on March 14, March 18, 

and March 19, 2024. (Doc. 20, at 2). Around this time, Defendant’s counsel learned that 

Plaintiff’s counsel was no longer employed at his former law firm. (Doc. 20, at 2). 

Accordingly, Defendant’s counsel contacted Plaintiff’s counsel at a new email address 

provided by his former firm. (Doc. 20, at 2). 

Plaintiff’s counsel finally responded to Defendant’s counsel on March 21, 2024, at 1:32 

AM. (Doc. 20, at 2). In this communication, Plaintiff’s counsel cancelled a deposition 

scheduled for that day. (Doc. 20, at 2). Defendant’s counsel called Plaintiff’s counsel later 

that morning to reschedule the cancelled deposition to March 28, 2024. (Doc. 20, at 2). At 

this time, Defendant’s counsel also resent requests for interrogatories, document production, 

and initial disclosures. (Doc. 20, at 3). On March 28, 2024, the date of the rescheduled 

deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel once again cancelled the deposition just before it was scheduled 

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to occur because he was not prepared. (Doc. 20, at 3). Plaintiff’s counsel then untimely 

responded to interrogatories on April 4, 2024, one day late, and the deposition took place as 

rescheduled for a second time on April 5, 2024. (Doc. 20, at 3).

Defendant’s counsel requested initial disclosures and document production again on 

April 21, 2024, but received no response. (Doc. 20, at 4). On April 30, 2024, the discovery 

deadline in this case expired. (Doc. 20, at 4). The Court scheduled a telephone discovery 

conference with the parties for May 22, 2024, but upon joining the call, Defendant’s counsel 

learned from the Court that Plaintiff’s counsel was in trial and unavailable for the call. (Doc. 

20, at 4). The parties rescheduled the discovery conference with the Court for June 5, 2024. 

On June 5, 2024, during the call, Plaintiff’s counsel admitted he had never met his client in 

person, nor had he ever seen or been in possession of certain materials at issue. (Doc. 20, at 

5). Plaintiff’s counsel told Defendant’s counsel he would find out if the materials existed and 

would then provide discovery responses to Defendant’s counsel by June 7, 2024. (Doc. 20, at 

5). Plaintiff’s counsel failed to do so.

On June 12, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed Defendant’s counsel, acknowledging 

his failure to produce documents, and invited Defendant’s counsel to schedule a call for that 

afternoon. (Doc. 20, at 5). Defendant’s counsel was not available for the call, however, and 

once again requested initial disclosures be provided by the end of the day. (Doc. 20, at 5). No 

requested documents or initial disclosures were received that evening. (Doc. 20, at 6). 

Defendant filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 37 on June 13, 2024, along with its 

brief in support. (Doc. 19; Doc. 20). Plaintiff’s counsel has not filed a brief in opposition, 

despite a Court order requiring him to do so, and the time for filing has passed. The Court 

held oral argument on the motion on July 1, 2024. Plaintiff’s counsel failed to appear. During 

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the argument, Defendant’s counsel notified the Court that Plaintiff’s counsel provided initial 

disclosures to him the day after the present motion was filed. However, the disclosures contain 

minimal details and are riddled with mistakes, including listing Defendant’s counsel as a 

witness for Plaintiff and referring to Plaintiff as a woman. Defendant’s counsel submitted 

letters to the court on multiple occasions detailing the disputes herein. (Doc. 20, at 3-4). The 

motion for sanctions is ripe for disposition. (Doc. 19; Doc. 20). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A district court has the inherent power to sanction parties appearing before it for 

refusing to comply with its orders and to control litigation before the court.” Glime v. 

Susquehanna Valley Pre-Owned Sales & Serv., No. 4:21-CV-01499, 2022 WL 19005562, at *1 

(M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2022). Because of this, “[t]he decision to impose sanctions for discovery 

violations and any determination as to what sanctions are appropriate are matters generally 

entrusted to the discretion of the district court.” Deville v. Givaudan Fragrances Corp., 419 F. 

App’x 201, 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 

538 (3d Cir.2007)). While much discretion is given to the judiciary when imposing sanctions, 

the Court “must make factual findings that are sufficient to support its conclusions of law.” 

Naviant Mktg. Sols., Inc. v. Larry Tucker, Inc., 339 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2003). Rule 26 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the general rules governing discovery, while Rule 

37 includes sanctions available for failure to comply with discovery requests.

“Dismissal [as a sanction] under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 is [also] a matter for the discretion 

of the district court.” Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc., v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 691 

(3d Cir.1988) (citing Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976)

(per curium)). The sanction of dismissal, however, “is disfavored absent the most egregious 

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circumstances.” U.S. v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 161 (3d Cir.2003) (citing 

Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867–68 (3d Cir.1984). Where the proposed 

sanctions include dismissal, entry of default judgment, or the preclusion of claims or defenses, 

the exercise of that discretion is governed by six factors originally enumerated by the Third 

Circuit Court of Appeals in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 747 F.2d 863; Knoll v. City 

of Allentown, 707 F.3d 406, 409–10 (3d Cir.2013).

Parties are required to respond to requests for initial disclosure within 14 days of a 

Rule 26(f) conference unless otherwise stipulated in a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Parties 

also must respond to interrogatories and requests for production of documents within 30 days.

Fed. R. Civ. P. (33)(b)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A). If discovery attempts render themselves 

fruitless, a party may request discovery sanctions pursuant to the Federal Rules. Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), permits sanctions as follows:

(1) If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by 

Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness 

to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure 

was substantially justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of this 

sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard:

(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s

fees, caused by the failure;

(B) may inform the jury of the party’s failure; and

(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders 

listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).

Billman v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 620 F. Supp. 3d 215, 220 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P 37(c)(1)). 

Rule 37(d) similarly permits sanctions when “if a party fails, after being served with 

proper notice, to appear for that person’s deposition.” Beale v. Wetzel, No. CV 13-15ERIE, 

2016 WL 11478174, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(A)(i)), report 

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and recommendation adopted, No. CV 13-15 ERIE, 2016 WL 6573854 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2016). 

Rule 37(c) and 37(d) both allow for any type of sanction listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-

(vi), which includes “dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part.” Kim v. Columbia 

Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs., No. 4:15-CV-02331, 2016 WL 8257721 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2016)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi)), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Kim v. 

Columbia Cnty. Child. & Youth Serv., No. 4:15-CV-2331, 2017 WL 621231 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 

2017). The Third Circuit has also noted that district courts may “impose on an attorney those 

expenses, including attorneys’ fees, caused by an unjustified failure to comply with discovery 

orders or pretrial orders.” Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 262 (3d Cir. 2008). 

Rule 37(e) governs “the applicability of sanctions for spoliation of electronically stored 

information” and “applies when “[1] electronically stored information that [2] should have 

been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation [3] is lost [4] because a party failed 

to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and [5] it cannot be restored or replaced through 

additional discovery.” Davis v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 2:16-CV-2401, 2017 WL 

11723674, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)), opinion clarified, 

No. CV 16-2401, 2018 WL 11484946 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2018). Courts may only order 

“measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.” Davis, 2017 WL 11723674, at *2

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)). 

III. DISCUSSION

Where the proposed sanctions include dismissal, the Court’s exercise of its discretion 

is governed by six factors, known as the Poulis factors, laid out by the Third Circuit Court of 

Appeals in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 747 F.2d 863; see Knoll, 707 F.3d at 409–10; 

see, e.g., Hernandez v. Palakovich, 293 F. App’x 890, 896 (3d Cir. 2008) (requiring a district court 

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to apply the Poulis factors even when the dismissal was without prejudice because all sanctions 

orders depriving a party of the right to proceed warrant a Poulis analysis) (citing Comdyne I, 

Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1148 (3d Cir.1990)). These factors are as follows:

(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the 

adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to 

discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or 

the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other 

than dismissal[, default judgment, or preclusion or claims or defenses], which 

entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the 

claim or defense.

Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.

“In balancing the Poulis factors, there is no ‘magic formula’ or ‘mechanical calculation’

to determine how they are considered.” Miles v. Elliot, No. 94–4669, 2011 WL 857320, at *4 

(E.D. Pa. Mar.10, 2011) (citing Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (3d Cir.2008). “Although each factor 

need not be satisfied for the trial court to dismiss a claim [or entry of default], any and all 

doubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits.” Wirerope Works, Inc. 

v. Travelers Excess & Surplus Lines Co., No. 07–169, 2008 WL 2073375, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 

2008) (citing Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir.2003); Hicks v. Feeney, 850 

F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir.1988); Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir.2002), Adams 

v. Trustees of the N.J. Brewery Emps. Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir.1994)). 

Examples of cases where default judgment was entered or a case was dismissed include: Nat’l 

Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., which reversed the Third Circuit in holding that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint under Rule 37 where the 

district court found that a plaintiff demonstrated “flagrant bad faith” amounting to a “callous 

disregard” of his responsibilities, 427 U.S. at 643; Mindek v. Rigatti, which upheld the district 

court’s entry of default judgment where a litigant “flagrantly” violated court orders, 964 F.2d 

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1369 (3d. Cir. 1992); and Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co., which held that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding damages evidence at trial where a 

plaintiff repeatedly failed to comply with discovery orders and produced unsupported 

damages evidence one week before trial, 843 F.2d at 691.

Regarding the first Poulis factor, Defendant concedes, and this Court agrees, that the 

personal responsibility factor weighs against dismissal. (Doc. 20, at 9). The Supreme Court 

has held that “it is not unjust to the client to dismiss his case because of his counsel’s 

‘unexcused conduct.’” Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 923 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing 

Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962)). However, the Third Circuit has 

“‘increasingly emphasized visiting sanctions directly on the delinquent lawyer, rather than on 

a client who is not actually at fault.’” Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 133 (citing Carter v. Albert Einstein 

Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 807 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Matter of MacMeekin, 722 F.2d 32, 35 (3d 

Cir. 1983). Plaintiff’s counsel has cancelled depositions at the last minute and ignored Court 

orders and document requests. (Doc. 20, at 2-3, 10). Importantly, as Defendant notes, “it is 

not clear that Plaintiff [himself] has been recalcitrant” or has had any role in his counsel’s 

unresponsiveness. (Doc. 20, at 10). Because the Plaintiff’s opportunity to litigate is at stake 

due to no fault of his own but of his attorney’s, this factor weighs against dismissal.

The second Poulis factor, prejudice to the moving party, Defendant argues, and this 

Court agrees, weighs in favor of dismissal. A finding of prejudice does not require 

“irremediable harm.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222. Rather, “the burden imposed by impeding a 

party’s ability to [effectively prepare] a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently 

prejudicial.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222. Indeed, “it is quite sufficient if he does nothing, knowing 

that until something is done there will be no trial.” Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 32 F.R.D. 

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375, 377 (E. D. Pa. 1961). Here, Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to comply with discovery 

requests, to respond to Court orders and attend discovery conferences, or to file his brief in 

opposition to Defendant’s motion for sanctions impedes Defendant’s ability to prepare a trial 

strategy, or, as Defendant notes, adequately assess the strength of the claims against it. (Doc. 

20, at 11). Plaintiff’s inactions, coupled with the significant time and resources expended by 

Defendant in litigating this action, have created an unnecessary stalemate, which prevents 

Defendant from moving forward with this litigation and renders the time and resources 

expended by Defendant largely unproductive. Defendant is unable to prepare for trial at this 

point. Accordingly, the second Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

Defendant contends, and the Court agrees, that the third Poulis factor, the history of 

dilatoriness, also weighs in favor of dismissal. Normally, repeated delays, rather than conduct 

that occurs one or two times, demonstrate a history of dilatoriness. Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 

135 (citing Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 261). A history of responsible conduct by the litigant can weigh 

against dismissal. Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 135. Here, however, Plaintiff’s counsel has failed to 

provide initial disclosures for over five months. (Doc. 20, at 6). He has cancelled a scheduled 

deposition on two occasions, each at the last minute and without explanation further than 

unpreparedness, and has failed to respond to emails on multiple occasions. (Doc. 20, at 2-3). 

Additionally, as Defendant notes, Plaintiff’s counsel has been sanctioned for this conduct in 

other matters. (Doc. 20, at 12-13). All these events considered together suggest a pattern of 

dilatoriness that weighs in favor of dismissal. 

Defendant argues, and this Court is persuaded, that Plaintiff did not necessarily act in 

bad faith, but did act willfully. Thus, the fourth factor weighs in favor of dismissal. The fourth 

factor, willfulness or bad faith, requires the court to consider whether the plaintiff’s conduct 

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reflects mere inadvertence or negligence, or rather “strategic,” “intentional” or “self-serving”

behavior. Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. “Under this factor, the District Court must consider whether 

the conduct was the type of willful or contumacious behavior which [can be] characterized as 

flagrant bad faith.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262. “A lengthy delay reflects inexcusable negligent 

behavior, but that behavior alone does not rise to the level of willfulness or bad faith.”

Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 135 (internal quotation omitted). Repeated failure to produce 

discovery documents or abide by Court orders cannot be considered a simple “lack of due 

diligence” or an “honest mistake.” See, e.g., Raphael v. Holder, No. CIV. 3:CV-09-1300, 2010 

WL 181743, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2010) (finding an attorney’s repeated disregard for rules 

and orders in the discovery context reflect intention). Defendant admits that while he likely 

cannot show that Plaintiff has acted in bad faith, he can show willfulness since Plaintiff has 

on numerous occasions flagrantly ignored the promises he made to Defendant and the Court 

regarding producing documents, attending meetings, and meeting deadlines. (Doc. 20, at 11). 

It is more likely this behavior is negligent than it is strategic. Defendant has not raised, nor 

can this Court think of any reason, that the delays here would give Plaintiff a strategic 

advantage. Regardless, at this point, Plaintiff’s consistent failure to respond to Court orders, 

including his failure to submit a brief in opposition to the present motion or appear for oral 

argument, suggests some amount of intention, rather than mistake. See Raphael, 2010 WL 

181743, at *1 (finding the fourth Poulis factor of willfulness or bad faith weighs in favor of 

dismissal when repeated disregard for rules and orders “are not accidental or inadvertent but 

instead reflect an intentional disregard for the [c]ourt’s instructions.”). The fourth factor, bad 

faith, is a difficult determination to make here, but this Court finds it weighs against dismissal. 

Defendant argues that the fifth Poulis factor, the effectiveness of alternative sanctions, 

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weighs in favor of dismissal. This Court agrees, even in consideration of the strong 

presumption against sanctions that decide the issues of a case. See Ali v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954, 

958 (3d Cir. 1986) (“although sanctions are a necessary part of any court system ... dismissals 

with prejudice or defaults are drastic sanctions, termed ‘extreme’ by the Supreme Court)

(quoting Poulis, 747 F.2d at 861-68) (internal citations omitted). Defendant notes that other 

Rule 37 sanctions such as striking pleadings or precluding evidence not already disclosed 

would be equivalent to dismissal given Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to respond at all to requests 

for initial disclosures or document production. (Doc. 20, at 12). Additionally, Defendant 

argues, a stay would further prejudice Defendant, who would like to resolve the matter 

swiftly. (Doc. 20, at 12). Finally, contempt, Defendant argues, would not be a viable 

alternative because it would not succeed in deterring future actors from engaging in conduct 

like this. (Doc. 20, at 12). Notably, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s counsel has been 

sanctioned for this behavior in several other cases. (Doc. 20, at 12-13); see, e.g., Katz v. Beebe 

Healthcare et al., Case No. 22-625 (WCB) (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2024); McNulty v. The Middle East 

Forum, Case No. 19-cv-05029-AB (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2020); Barbounis v. The Middle East 

Forum, Case No. 19-cv-05030 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2020). When traditional attempts to focus an 

attorney’s attention on a matter, such as court orders, fail, the fifth factor weighs in favor of 

dismissal. See Raphael, 2010 WL 181743, at *1 (finding other sanctions ineffective when 

“traditional attempts” such as orders have been unsuccessful). Here, this Court has repeatedly 

rescheduled conferences and ordered Plaintiff’s attorney to submit filings, comply with 

discovery, and appear for argument. These efforts have been unsuccessful. The fifth Poulis

factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

Finally, Defendant admits, and this Court agrees, that the final Poulis factor, the 

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meritoriousness of Plaintiff’s claims, weighs against dismissal. The Court does not have the 

benefit of a motion for summary judgment before it and is unable to make a determination as 

to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Therefore, this factor weighs against sanctions. Moeck v. 

Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., No. 3:13-CV-1305, 2014 WL 4446679, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 

2014). 

To reiterate, when weighing the Poulis factors, there is no “magic formula” or 

“mechanical calculation” that automatically warrants dismissal for failure to prosecute. 

Briscoe, 538 F.3d 252 at 263. Quite the contrary, the Court is guided by the Third Circuit’s 

admonition that “no single Poulis factor is dispositive,” and that “not all of the Poulis factors 

need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 964 F.2d at 

1373. Here, on balance, the Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal of this action without 

prejudice. This allows Plaintiff to attempt to seek new counsel and refile his claims with 

another attorney’s assistance.

The Court takes seriously the negligence and poor conduct of Plaintiff’s counsel. 

Attorney’s fees can be an appropriate sanction, with or without a finding of bad faith, when 

a party is prejudiced by another party’s conduct, and there has been significant inconvenience 

and expenses incurred. See Tracinda, 502 F.3d at 240 (The Court was found to be within its 

discretion to impose monetary sanctions despite a lack of bad faith or intentional misconduct 

by the non-complying party due to “the inconvenience and expense” of a party’s tardily

produced notes). Defendant has been inconvenienced by and expended extra hours of work

requesting documents, resending interrogatories, preparing this motion, and even traveling, 

preparing for, and attending oral argument on July 1, 2024, when Plaintiff’s counsel failed to

appear. As such, the Court finds the sanction of fees on Plaintiff’s counsel is appropriate. See 

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Tracinda, 502 F.3d at 240. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for sanctions is GRANTED. (Doc. 

19). The Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. (Doc. 1). 

An appropriate Order follows.

 BY THE COURT:

Dated: July 8, 2024 s / Karoline Mehalchick 

 KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge

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