MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Mark Small

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of:

A.D. and C.D. (Minor Children)

and

Ch.D. (Mother) and Cl.D. 

(Father),

Appellants-Respondents,

v.

December 7, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

84A05-1504-JT-157

Appeal from the Vigo Circuit 

Court

The Honorable David R. Bolk, 

Judge

The Honorable Daniel W. Kelly, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause Nos.

84D09-1407-JT-713 and -714

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Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Ch.D. (“Mother”) and Cl.D. (“Father”) (collectively “the Parents”) appeal the 

trial court’s involuntary termination of their parental rights to their minor 

children, A.D. and C.D. (collectively “the Children”). In the midst of the 

termination evidentiary proceedings, the Parents informed the trial court that 

they wished to stop the proceedings and concede to the termination of their 

respective parental rights. Although the Parents indicated that they would 

prefer a voluntary termination of their rights, when the trial court indicated that 

the termination would remain involuntary as alleged in the petition to 

terminate, the Parents assured the court that they still wanted their parental 

rights terminated. The Parents’ sole contention on appeal is that the trial court 

abused its discretion when it granted the involuntary, rather than voluntary, 

termination of their parental rights. Finding no abuse of discretion or reversible 

error, we affirm.

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Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 24, 2013, the trial court authorized the emergency removal of sevenyear-old A.D. and five-year-old C.D. from the Parents’ care after Father made 

allegations that Mother was sexually abusing A.D. Following an investigation, 

neglect and sexual abuse allegations against both Mother and Father regarding 

the Children were substantiated. On May 26, 2013, the Vigo County 

Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed its petition alleging that the 

Children were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). The trial court

subsequently held a factfinding hearing and adjudicated the children as CHINS 

upon stipulation by the Parents. Thereafter, the court held a dispositional 

hearing and entered its decree requiring the Parents to participate in services.

[3] After Parents made no progress in remedying the conditions that resulted in the 

Children’s removal from the home, DCS filed its petition to involuntarily 

terminate the Parents’ parental rights. A termination hearing was scheduled 

and began on December 15, 2014. DCS presented ten witnesses and fourteen 

exhibits. At the conclusion of the day, the trial court continued the remainder 

of the hearing to January 29, 2015. The DCS still had the testimony of one 

witness to present, and the Parents had not yet presented their case. 

[4] On January 27, 2015, two days prior to the continued termination hearing, the 

trial court held a CHINS permanency hearing. At the outset of the hearing, the 

Parents’ counsel informed the trial court that “they would just like their 

[parental] rights terminated today” instead of coming back to court to finish the 

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termination hearing. Jan. Tr. at 4. 1

 Counsel stated, “I think that they would 

prefer it to be voluntary but it[’]

s my understanding that because how far into the 

Fact Finding Trial we were ... I explained to them that I thought it was going to 

be too late but that I would ask.” Id. Because DCS filed the original petition 

for involuntary termination, the trial court asked DCS its position on the issue. 

DCS indicated, “We are not inclined to grant the Voluntary.” Id. at 5. In light 

of this position, the trial court addressed the Parents and asked them if they still 

wanted to “go ahead and have it terminated.” Id. Mother responded, “We 

want it done today, please.” Id. Likewise, Father stated, “So we want it over 

with.” Id. The trial court granted the Parents’ request to cancel further 

proceedings and concluded the hearing. On March 13, 2015, the trial court 

entered detailed findings of fact, conclusions thereon, and an order terminating 

the Parents’ parental rights.2

 This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[5] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re 

I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010). However, parental rights are “not 

absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining the 

1 Although the Parents had separate public defenders who were present at the permanency hearing, Father’s 

counsel spoke on behalf of both Parents.

2

 We do not specifically mention the trial court’s detailed findings and conclusions here because the Parents 

do not challenge those findings and conclusions, or the underlying evidentiary support, on appeal. However, 

we must acknowledge that the trial court’s findings indicate that these children were subjected to sexual 

abuse and neglect of the most horrendous nature at the hands of the Parents.

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proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Accordingly, parental rights may be terminated when the parents are 

unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. Id. “Because the 

ultimate purpose of the law is to protect the child, the parent-child relationship 

will give way when it is no longer in the child’s interest to maintain this 

relationship.” In re M.N., 27 N.E.3d 1116, 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citation 

omitted), trans. denied.

[6] The Parents concede that their parental rights should have been terminated;

they simply challenge whether the termination should have been considered

involuntary or voluntary. We begin by noting that the voluntary termination of 

parental rights and the involuntary termination of parental rights are different 

dispositions governed by separate statutory provisions. See Ind. Code § 31-35-1-

4 (voluntary termination); Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 (involuntary termination). 

Here, DCS petitioned for the involuntary termination of the Parents’ parental 

rights pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4 and the termination 

evidentiary hearing began and proceeded on that basis. Nevertheless, the 

Parents baldly assert that they had “a concomitant right to seek voluntary 

termination of their parental rights” in the midst of the termination proceeding. 

Appellants’ Br. at 6.

[7] We note that the Parents cite no authority, and we are unaware of any, to 

support their assertion of this concomitant right. Moreover, the Parents fail to 

provide cogent argument or reasoning to support their contention that the trial 

court was obligated to convert the involuntary termination proceeding that was

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already underway into a voluntary termination proceeding merely because they

preferred it to be so. Accordingly, the Parents have waived our review of their

argument. See A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 n.4 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (failure to support arguments with cogent reasoning results 

in waiver on appeal), trans. denied; see also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) 

(requiring each contention be supported by cogent reasoning and citations).

[8] Waiver notwithstanding, we find no abuse of discretion or reversible error. Our 

review of the record reveals that more than a month after DCS presented ample 

substantive evidence in support of its petition to involuntarily terminate the 

Parents’ parental rights, the Parents decided that, rather than presenting their 

respective cases in opposition, they would instead effectively admit to the 

allegations in the petition in order to get the termination “over with” and to get 

“on with [their] business.” Jan. Tr. at 5. At no time did the Parents file or 

request leave to file a petition for voluntary termination, nor did they condition 

their concession to the termination of parental rights on DCS amending its 

original petition. Indeed, despite their voiced preference that the termination be 

considered voluntary, the Parents assured the trial court that they wished to 

terminate even after DCS indicated that it would not amend the involuntary 

petition. It was only after receiving the Parents’ assurances that the trial court 

proceeded to involuntarily terminate their rights. Therefore, the Parents have 

invited the alleged error of which they now complain. Error invited by the 

complaining party is not reversible error. C.T. v. Marion Cnty. Dept. of Child 

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Servs., 896 N.E.2d 571, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied (2009). The trial 

court’s involuntary termination of parental rights is affirmed.

[9] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.

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