IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MICHAEL NELSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

MORISSA REDICK, 

 Defendant. 

 No. 4:23-CV-00945 

 (Chief Judge Brann) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

AUGUST 22, 2023 

 Plaintiff Michael Nelson is a serial pro se litigant who is well known to this 

Court. He is currently incarcerated at SCI Somerset but filed the instant pro se

Section 19831

 action concerning allegedly deficient medical care at SCI Mahanoy. 

Because Nelson fails to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, the Court will 

dismiss his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) but will grant him 

leave to amend. 

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se

prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.2

 One 

1

 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional 

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves 

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. 

v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002). 

2

 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

Case 4:23-cv-00945-MWB-MP Document 8 Filed 08/22/23 Page 1 of 9
2 

basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted[.]”3

 This language closely tracks Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to 

screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as 

they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).4

 

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire 

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to 

offer evidence to support the claims.”5

 The court must accept as true the factual 

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff.6

 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of 

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, 

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to 

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these 

documents.7

3

 Id. § 1915A(b)(1). 

4

 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien 

v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential); 

cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 

5

 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 

1996). 

6

 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). 

7

 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). 

Case 4:23-cv-00945-MWB-MP Document 8 Filed 08/22/23 Page 2 of 9
3 

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a 

three-step inquiry.8

 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] 

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”9

 Second, the court should distinguish wellpleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal 

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be 

disregarded.10 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations 

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”11 

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”12

 Because Nelson proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed 

and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”13 This is particularly true 

when the pro se litigant, like Nelson, is incarcerated.14

II. DISCUSSION 

 Nelson alleges that, on the evening of October 27, 2022 (between 6:00 p.m. 

and 8:00 p.m.), he gave a written sick-call request to nurse Morissa Redick, who 

8 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). 

9

 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)). 

10 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). 

11 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). 

12 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. 

13 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted). 

14 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). 

Case 4:23-cv-00945-MWB-MP Document 8 Filed 08/22/23 Page 3 of 9
4 

was dispensing evening medications to inmates.15 Nelson avers that he made this 

sick-call request because he was “in a great deal of pain,” although he does not 

specify the reason for the pain or provide any other information regarding his 

physical ailment.16 Nelson states that he initially gave the sick-call request to a 

correctional officer, who then handed it to Redick and Redick “placed it in her 

hand[-]held basket.”17

 The following morning, Nelson recalls that a nurse practitioner made sickcall rounds between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. but he was not seen by her.18 Nelson 

asserts that “[i]t was then discovered” that Redick had failed to submit his sick-call 

request from the previous evening.19 Nelson further alleges that, due to his pain, 

he “covered his cell door and threaten[ed] Correctional Officers with having [to] 

administer” pepper spray into his cell “if he was not seen by medical.”20 This 

tactic apparently produced the desired result, as Nelson states that he was removed 

from his cell (sometime between 8:45 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.) to be treated by 

medical.21 

15 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 7-8. 

16 Id. ¶ 9. 

17 Id. ¶ 8. 

18 Id. ¶ 10. 

19 Id. ¶ 11. 

20 Id. ¶ 12. 

21 Id. ¶ 13. 

Case 4:23-cv-00945-MWB-MP Document 8 Filed 08/22/23 Page 4 of 9
5 

 Nelson asserts a single claim of Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs.22 He sues Redick in her individual capacity and seeks $5 

million in damages.23 However, Nelson’s allegations fail to plausibly state a 

medical deliberate indifference claim. 

A. Alleged Eighth Amendment Violation 

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires 

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has 

incarcerated.”24 To state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim 

regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly plead “(i) a serious 

medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate 

indifference to that need.”25 A serious medical need is “one that has been 

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay 

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”26 

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional 

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of 

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, 

or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of 

22 Id. ¶ 1. 

23 Id. ¶ 6. In his opening paragraph, Nelson asserts that he is seeking “compensatory, punitive, 

injunctive and declaratory relief,” (see Doc. 1 ¶ 1), but he does not elaborate on any of these 

claims beyond stating that he is seeking “$5,000,000.00.” 

24 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). 

25 Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). 

26 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). 

Case 4:23-cv-00945-MWB-MP Document 8 Filed 08/22/23 Page 5 of 9
6 

injury.27 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard, 

requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”28 Claims 

sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.29 

Simply put, Nelson’s allegations against Redick do not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation. First, Nelson has not plausibly alleged a serious medical 

need. He claims that he was experiencing “a great deal of pain,” but he does not 

explain what was causing his pain or provide any diagnosis or treatment that he 

subsequently received. A mere allegation that he was experiencing pain does not 

qualify as being “diagnosed by a physician” with a serious medical need or that the 

medical issue was “so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the 

necessity for a doctor’s attention.”30 

Even assuming, arguendo, that Nelson identified a serious medical need, he 

has not plausibly alleged deliberate indifference by Redick. He asserts only that he 

gave Redick a written sick-call request on the evening of October 27 and that she 

failed “to submit” that request (presumably to the appropriate superior or filing 

system), so he was not seen by the nurse the next morning. This single allegation 

does not reflect deliberate indifference or “unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

27 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 

at 346). 

28 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted). 

29 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. 

30 Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347. 

Case 4:23-cv-00945-MWB-MP Document 8 Filed 08/22/23 Page 6 of 9
7 

pain.”31 The are numerous reasons why Redick may not have submitted the 

request slip, e.g., that she forgot or misplaced it. Nelson also admits that he was 

seen approximately one to two hours after the nurse practitioner made her morning 

rounds, so this is not the type of case where an inmate’s repeated requests for 

treatment are chronically ignored. An hour or two delay in treatment for an 

unspecified medical issue that is not an immediate threat to life or health (unlike, 

for instance, a stroke or heart attack) simply does not evince constitutionally 

deficient medical care.32

Furthermore, Nelson does not allege that Redick was aware of his physical 

distress or knew that he had a pressing need for medical attention.33 All that can be 

ascertained from the complaint is that Redick received a written sick-call request 

from Nelson and placed it into the basket she was carrying. However, it is well 

known that prisoners submit sick-call requests for a variety of reasons and not all 

31 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (citation omitted). 

32 See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that inmate’s one-day delay 

between signing up for sick call and being seen by a nurse, despite claiming he was in 

“excruciating pain,” did not amount to deliberate indifference); Parker v. Mulderig, No. 92-

CV-2645, 1993 WL 44275, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 1993) (“[Plaintiff] avers he suffered pain 

in the four or five hours between the time he first sought care from [a guard] and the time he 

obtained medical attention [ ]. This delay, however, is constitutionally negligible. The ability 

to obtain immediate medical care on demand is a luxury enjoyed by few outside prison walls. 

Prisoners can expect no more. While delay in access to medical care can amount to cruel and 

unusual punishment, a few hours wait for medical care for an illness or condition that does not 

constitute an immediate threat to life or health is not evidence of a deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs.” (alterations in original) (quoting Felders v. Miller, 776 F. Supp. 424, 

427 (N.D. Ind. 1991))). 

33 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 494 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that certain 

medical issues “unlike, for example, broken legs or bullet wounds, do not clearly manifest 

themselves in ways that are obvious and ascertainable to a lay person”). 

Case 4:23-cv-00945-MWB-MP Document 8 Filed 08/22/23 Page 7 of 9
8 

of them qualify as serious medical needs. Thus, it cannot be said that Redick acted 

“with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner”34

when there is no allegation that Redick was aware of a serious medical need or 

substantial risk of harm to Nelson. 

Nelson’s Eighth Amendment claim, therefore, fails at both elements. 

Dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) is required. 

B. Leave to Amend 

 Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless 

amendment would be inequitable or futile.”35 Because it is conceivable that 

Nelson could cure his pleading deficiencies, the Court will permit him to file an 

amended complaint—in accordance with this Memorandum—in the event that he 

can aver facts that would plausibly state a constitutional violation. 

 Alternatively, Nelson may also opt to stand on his current pleadings. If 

Nelson chooses this option, he must promptly indicate in writing that he is 

choosing to stand on his complaint and the Court will then enter a final order of 

dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).36 

 

34 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). 

35 Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114. 

36 See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2019). 

Case 4:23-cv-00945-MWB-MP Document 8 Filed 08/22/23 Page 8 of 9
9 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Nelson’s complaint pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted. Nelson may file an amended complaint in accordance with this 

Memorandum or he may choose to stand on his initial pleading. An appropriate 

Order follows. 

 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 Chief United States District Judge 

Case 4:23-cv-00945-MWB-MP Document 8 Filed 08/22/23 Page 9 of 9