Supreme Court

No. 2022-42-Appeal.

(PC 12-6232)

Jordan Nissensohn, Administrator of 

the Estate of Michael Nissensohn

:

v. :

CharterCARE Home Health Services 

a/k/a Roger Williams Medical 

Center, et al.

:

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-3258 or Email 

opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov of any typographical or 

other formal errors in order that corrections may be made 

before the opinion is published.
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Supreme Court

No. 2022-42-Appeal.

(PC 12-6232)

Jordan Nissensohn, Administrator of 

the Estate of Michael Nissensohn

:

v. :

CharterCARE Home Health Services 

a/k/a Roger Williams Medical 

Center, et al.

:

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

O P I N I O N

Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. The plaintiff, Jordan Nissensohn, 

Administrator of the Estate of Michael Nissensohn,1 appeals from a judgment of the 

Superior Court entered in favor of the defendants, University Medical Group 

(UMG), Alan Epstein, M.D., and Steven Sepe, M.D. (collectively the UMG 

defendants), granting summary judgment in their favor. The plaintiff asserts that the 

Superior Court erred by finding that: (1) the plaintiff did not engage in protected 

conduct under the Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (RIWPA), G.L. 

1 Michael Nissensohn, M.D., litigated this case until his death in March 2023. This 

Court granted a motion to substitute Jordan Nissensohn, Administrator of the Estate 

of Dr. Nissensohn, as the appellant on August 23, 2023. Throughout this opinion, 

we refer to Dr. Nissensohn and Jordan Nissensohn, Administrator of the Estate of 

Dr. Nissensohn, interchangeably as plaintiff. No disrespect is intended. 
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1956 chapter 50 of title 28; (2) Dr. Epstein and UMG’s allegedly defamatory 

statements were substantially true or were made outside of the statute of limitations; 

(3) teaching was not covered by the plain language of the plaintiff’s employment 

agreement; (4) the breach-of-contract claim was preempted by the Payment of 

Wages Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 14 of title 28; (5) the plaintiff failed to establish his 

claim for tortious interference with contractual relations; (6) Dr. Epstein’s alleged 

interference was not causally connected to the plaintiff’s failure to set up a new 

practice; and (7) the plaintiff did not provide sufficient nonhearsay evidence to 

support his conversion claim. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the 

judgment of the Superior Court. 

Facts and Travel

The plaintiff, Michael Nissensohn, M.D., began working for UMG as a 

gastroenterologist in 2003. His employment was governed by a Physician 

Employment Agreement with UMG. Pursuant to the agreement, plaintiff was 

“employed on a full-time basis actively to practice medicine, provide medical 

education and/or conduct biomedical research on behalf of [UMG] * * *.” He was 

required to devote “[forty] hours per week of clinical patient hours inclusive of 

teaching and administrative activities.” 

During plaintiff’s tenure, he was supervised by Dr. Epstein, the head of the 

gastroenterology division. The plaintiff shared teaching responsibilities with the 
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other doctors in gastroenterology. To offset the burden of these responsibilities, Dr. 

Epstein secured administrative money from the hospital each year with the 

understanding that the gastroenterology doctors would split this so-called “teaching

money” between the four of them. Nevertheless, from “almost day one,” plaintiff 

took issue with the discrepancies between the amount of “teaching money” that Dr. 

Epstein promised and the amount that plaintiff actually received.

The plaintiff further clashed with Dr. Epstein when he requested a brief leave 

of absence from work. The plaintiff was depressed and told Dr. Epstein that, “[i]f I 

don’t get better, I am going to McLean Hospital.”2

 Subsequently, a rumor spread 

that plaintiff had attempted suicide and had been involuntarily committed to McLean 

Hospital.3

 The plaintiff was informed that the rumor originated in the UMG 

endoscopy unit. At this time, plaintiff suspected that Dr. Epstein was in an 

inappropriate relationship with the head endoscopy nurse, Audrey Kennedy. 

Accordingly, believing that Dr. Epstein shared information regarding plaintiff’s 

mental health with Ms. Kennedy, plaintiff confronted Dr. Epstein. According to 

plaintiff, Dr. Epstein confirmed that he was the source of the information.

At some point during his tenure, plaintiff obtained a permit to carry a 

concealed weapon. The plaintiff began showing doctors and other employees his 

2 McLean Hospital is a mental health facility within Mass General Brigham. 3 The plaintiff denied that these rumors were true; nevertheless, it was undisputed 

that these rumors existed. 
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shooting targets “to spur interest in the sport.” He also began carrying his firearm 

into the hospital. Some UMG employees knew that plaintiff brought his firearm to 

work, but Dr. Epstein and Dr. Sepe, the Chief of Medicine, were not aware of that 

fact. 

In February 2012, plaintiff met with Kenneth Belcher, the hospital CEO, and 

Dr. Sepe to discuss his unhappiness with Dr. Epstein. The plaintiff reported Dr. 

Epstein’s disclosure of his mental health information, anger issues, inappropriate 

relationship with Ms. Kennedy, and inconsistent promises regarding “teaching 

money.” Mr. Belcher agreed that Dr. Epstein’s behavior was inappropriate and that 

plaintiff should have a follow-up meeting with Dr. Sepe. 

On March 29, 2012, plaintiff met with Dr. Sepe and Dr. Epstein. They 

discussed plaintiff’s issues with Dr. Epstein. The meeting was productive, and 

plaintiff believed the matter was resolved. However, the next day, Jodi Siegelman, 

a physician’s assistant, who was supervised by plaintiff and Dr. Epstein, reported an 

incident regarding plaintiff. She reported to Merritt Brown, CEO of UMG, that 

about two weeks earlier, plaintiff “came into [her] office, showed [her] three 

carboard bulls eye targets with shots clearly fired into them and claimed that these 

were depictions of Dr. Epstein, including how they were supposed to be [his] head, 

heart, and eyes.” 
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The plaintiff conceded that he may have shown Ms. Siegelman a target, but 

he denied telling her that the display depicted Dr. Epstein. Ms. Siegelman told her 

mother and another physician’s assistant about the alleged incident. She hesitated 

to relate the incident to anyone else because she was new at UMG, but she eventually 

told Karen Romano, the office manager. Ms. Romano subsequently informed Dr. 

Epstein.

Doctor Epstein immediately went to Ms. Siegelman and asked her to explain 

what happened, promising her that it would not impact her job. That same day, Ms. 

Siegelman sent her report to Mr. Brown, and Dr. Epstein informed Dr. Sepe of the 

incident. Doctor Sepe contacted the hospital and met that afternoon with Dr. 

Epstein, Mr. Brown, the hospital human resources department, and the hospital’s 

attorney to discuss the Siegelman report. After the director of human resources 

informed Mr. Belcher of the situation, he called the Providence Police Department 

and was advised that the hospital should take the report seriously. The police wanted 

to speak with plaintiff as soon as possible and agreed to approach him during his 

next scheduled shift, the following Tuesday. 

The next Tuesday, April 3, 2012, plaintiff arrived at work and went straight 

to the endoscopy suite. He had his loaded firearm with him. At approximately 8:00 

a.m., plaintiff was told that there was an emergency and that Mr. Belcher needed to 
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see him. He stowed his firearm in his briefcase, put the briefcase under the desk, 

and went to the lobby. 

When plaintiff entered the lobby, two police officers approached him and 

asked him if he was Dr. Nissensohn. When he said yes, the officers pushed him 

against the wall, spread his legs, and conducted a pat-down. During the pat-down, 

the officers found an empty holster. They asked him if he was carrying a firearm, 

and plaintiff responded no. The plaintiff directed the officers to remove his wallet 

so that they could see his permit. He falsely informed the officers that his firearm 

was locked in his car.

The officers took plaintiff to an office where Mr. Belcher, Dr. Sepe, and 

members of the human resources department were waiting. The officers asked 

plaintiff again if he had a firearm, which he again denied. The plaintiff was informed 

that the hospital had a no-firearm policy, and, at some point, one of the officers left 

to search plaintiff’s endoscopy suite for the firearm. The officer discovered 

plaintiff’s loaded firearm in his briefcase in his office and returned to the meeting. 

Mr. Belcher informed plaintiff that he was not allowed to return to his patients, and 

the officers escorted him off the premises. Later that day, Dr. Sepe sent plaintiff a 

letter informing him that UMG was placing him on paid administrative leave. 

Doctor Sepe further instructed plaintiff to contact the Physicians Health Program to 
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set up an appointment. While plaintiff was on leave, Dr. Epstein performed 

plaintiff’s scheduled procedures and billed plaintiff’s patients directly. 

The next day, plaintiff was served with a no-trespass order. He subsequently 

sent Mr. Brown an email asking him to lift the order. The plaintiff wanted the return 

of some personal items, including a laptop, which he had left in his office. However, 

plaintiff testified that, when his attorney went to retrieve his laptop, his attorney was 

informed that he was not allowed to have it back. However, after some delay, the 

laptop was returned. 

The plaintiff maintained that during his leave, he kept receiving requests from 

Dr. Sepe for further psychological evaluations. He met with three forensic 

psychiatrists and a psychologist. Despite his compliance, the letters that plaintiff 

received in response were “unpleasant” and were interpreted by plaintiff as “being 

indicative that they were going to terminate” his employment. Two weeks after the 

April 3 incident, the human resources manager informed plaintiff that his leave was 

being extended. Subsequently, plaintiff resigned.

The plaintiff’s resignation letter provided that he would “resume and continue 

[his] practice at 50 Summerfield Street, Fall [R]iver, Massachusetts.” The Fall River 

address was a temporary drop-off location where patients could send their records. 

His patients were informed of his new mailing address should they wish to make 

contact. However, several patients emailed plaintiff representing that they had 
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received conflicting information about his whereabouts. Specifically, they stated 

that UMG or Dr. Epstein informed them that plaintiff was on administrative leave, 

that he was no longer affiliated with UMG, or that he had gone back to Fall River. 

The plaintiff did not reply to his patients’ emails because he was “too upset to 

respond * * *.” He subsequently decided to “never get up and running again because 

of the trauma from [the] whole thing.” 

On December 4, 2012, plaintiff filed his original complaint against the UMG 

defendants as well as CharterCARE Home Health Services a/k/a Roger Williams 

Medical Center; CharterCARE Health Partners, and Mr. Belcher (collectively the 

hospital defendants). On October 16, 2017, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. 

The amended complaint asserted eight counts: (1) intentional infliction of emotional 

distress against the hospital defendants; (2) defamation against Dr. Epstein; (3) 

defamation against UMG; (4) breach-of-contract against UMG; (5) tortious 

interference with prospective business relations and contractual relations against Dr. 

Epstein; (6) false imprisonment against the hospital defendants; (7) conversion 

against CharterCARE Home Health Services a/k/a Roger Williams Medical Center, 

CharterCARE Health Partners, and UMG; and (8) constructive discharge/violations 

of the RIWPA against UMG.4

4 The amended complaint contained two additional claims: one for breach-ofcontract arising out of UMG’s failure to pay plaintiff for patient care and another for 

constructive discharge and violations of the RIWPA. Although plaintiff asserted a 
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Thereafter, the UMG defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In a 

subsequent bench decision, the trial justice granted the UMG defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment as to each remaining count of plaintiff’s amended complaint.5

 

The trial justice granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s defamation claims 

because some of the alleged defamatory statements were made outside of the statute 

of limitations and the remaining statements were substantially true or were protected 

by a qualified privilege. Summary judgment as to plaintiff’s breach-of-contract 

claim was granted because plaintiff’s teaching duties were voluntary and because 

plaintiff’s claim for unpaid wages was required to be brought under the Payment of 

Wages Act. Therefore, his claim, although styled as one for breach-of-contract, was 

barred by the applicable statute of limitations pursuant to § 28-14-19.2(g) and § 28-

14-20(a). The trial justice found that plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference with 

prospective business relations failed because he did not demonstrate that Dr. 

Epstein’s comments to plaintiff’s former patients were causally connected to 

plaintiff’s failure to resume his practice. 

breach-of-contract claim against UMG as part of his original complaint, the original 

claim was solely for UMG’s failure to compensate him for teaching money. When 

plaintiff amended his complaint, he added another claim based on UMG’s failure to 

compensate him for patient care. 

5 Concurrent with the UMG defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the hospital 

defendants filed their own motion for summary judgment. However, before the trial 

justice ruled on the hospital defendants’ motion, they reached a settlement agreement

with plaintiff, leaving only the UMG defendants’ motion to be decided.
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Summary judgment was granted as to plaintiff’s conversion claim because 

plaintiff provided no competent evidence that he, or his attorney, had demanded his 

laptop’s return. The trial justice granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s RIWPA 

claim because plaintiff testified that he believed he was reporting Dr. Epstein for 

unethical, but not unlawful, conduct. The trial justice reasoned that the RIWPA 

requires a reporter to hold a good-faith belief that the conduct said reporter is 

reporting is illegal. Because plaintiff did not hold such a belief, he was not protected 

by the RIWPA. Final judgment entered in favor of the UMG defendants on October 

21, 2021. The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. 

Standard of Review

“This Court reviews a decision granting a party’s motion for summary 

judgment de novo.” Citizens Bank, N.A. v. Palermo, 247 A.3d 131, 133 (R.I. 2021) 

(quoting Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc., 212 A.3d 594, 598 

(R.I. 2019)). We assess the matter “from the vantage point of the trial justice[,] 

* * * view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and 

if we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm * * *.” Id. (quoting 

Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 598). “Although summary judgment is recognized as an 

extreme remedy, * * * to avoid summary judgment the burden is on the nonmoving 
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party to produce competent evidence that proves the existence of a disputed issue of 

material fact.” Id. (quoting Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 598).

Discussion

RIWPA

The plaintiff argues that the trial justice erred in finding that he did not engage 

in protected conduct under the RIWPA because, in his view, he reported actual 

violations of the law. The plaintiff asserts that, under the plain language of § 28-50-

3(4), an employee is protected from retaliation if they report a violation of the law 

that they reasonably know has occurred. He contends that the statute does not 

require the employee to know which law was violated to be afforded protection. The 

plaintiff argues that to hold otherwise would undermine the purpose of the RIWPA 

because laypeople do not see things in terms of illegal or legal, but rather right or 

wrong.

In response, the UMG defendants argue that plaintiff did not engage in 

protected conduct because he did not believe that Dr. Epstein’s conduct was 

unlawful. Instead, plaintiff believed that the conduct was unethical. They further 

argue that, even if we were to accept plaintiff’s interpretation of the RIWPA, he did 

not engage in protected conduct because he did not report actual violations of the 

law. 
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“This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo.” Balmuth 

v. Dolce for Town of Portsmouth, 182 A.3d 576, 580 (R.I. 2018). “If a statute is 

clear and unambiguous, ‘we must interpret the statute literally and must give the 

words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.’” Athena Providence Place 

v. Pare, 262 A.3d 679, 681 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Balmuth, 182 A.3d at 580). 

The RIWPA provides in pertinent part: 

“An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise 

discriminate against an employee regarding the 

employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or 

privileges of employment:

“* * *

“Because the employee reports verbally or in 

writing to the employer or to the employee’s 

supervisor a violation, which the employee knows 

or reasonably believes has occurred or is about to 

occur, of a law or regulation or rule promulgated 

under the laws of this state, a political subdivision 

of this state, or the United States, unless the 

employee knows or has reason to know that the 

report is false.” Section 28-50-3. 

The clear and unambiguous language of the statute provides that an employee is 

protected when he reports a violation of a law, regulation, or rule that he “knows or 

reasonably believes has occurred * * *.” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the 

employee need only have knowledge, or a reasonable belief, that conduct that 

violates the law has occurred, rather than knowledge that the conduct is actually 
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illegal. See id. Nevertheless, plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that he engaged 

in such protected conduct. 

The plaintiff argues that he reported violations of the law because (a) Dr. 

Epstein’s anger issues “would eventually lead to a hostile work environment claim”; 

(b) adultery is still a crime; (c) the disclosure of protected health information violated 

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA); and (d) failing to 

pay an employee violates “Rhode Island’s Wage and Hour” laws. 

The plaintiff did not report to his supervisors that Dr. Epstein was engaged in 

“illicit sexual intercourse” while married. See G.L. 1956 § 11-6-2. Instead, he 

reported to Mr. Belcher and Dr. Sepe that Dr. Epstein was in an “inappropriately 

close relationship” with Ms. Kennedy. Moreover, plaintiff has not provided this 

Court with any meaningful discussion, analysis, or citations to explain how the 

remainder of his reports amounted to reports of “a violation * * * of a law or 

regulation or rule promulgated under the laws of this state, a political subdivision of 

this state, or the United States * * *.” Section 28-50-3. He failed to explain how Dr. 

Epstein’s reported “anger issues” violated any state or federal employment laws.6

6 Notably, although plaintiff argues that he was reporting conduct that might lead to 

a hostile work environment claim, such claims are typically dependent on 

membership in a protected class, rather than simply being subject to a supervisor’s 

anger issues. See 14A C.J.S. Civil Rights § 224 (Nov. 2023 Update); see also

DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13, 22 (R.I. 2005) (noting that in order 

to prove a gender-based hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must prove 

membership in a protected class). 
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He provided no explanation as to how Dr. Epstein’s purported lying about obtaining 

$25,000 in “teaching money,” when Dr. Sepe conveyed that Dr. Epstein had in fact 

obtained $13,000, violates any of “Rhode Island’s Wage and Hour” laws. Further, 

he has not explained how Dr. Epstein’s disclosing to Ms. Kennedy, a fellow health 

care provider, that plaintiff was depressed and thinking about going to McLean 

Hospital violated HIPAA. 

Much time at oral argument was devoted to the alleged HIPAA violation. 

Nevertheless, plaintiff did not articulate how Dr. Epstein’s conduct violated HIPAA. 

Instead, he rested on the conclusory assertion that Dr. Epstein’s conduct “was in 

violation of [HIPAA],” and his personal belief that HIPAA applies to information 

disclosed to physicians in their capacity as administrators, rather than as health care 

professionals. Without further explanation as to how the disclosure violates any of 

HIPAA’s broad and sweeping regulations, we must consider this issue waived.7

Horton v. Portsmouth Police Department, 22 A.3d 1115, 1130 (R.I. 2011). 

“[S]imply stating an issue for appellate review, without a meaningful discussion 

thereof or legal briefing of the issues, does not assist the Court in focusing on the 

legal questions raised, and therefore constitutes a waiver of that issue.” Terzian v. 

Lombardi, 180 A.3d 555, 558 (R.I. 2018) (quoting Horton, 22 A.3d at 1130). “Nor 

7 The plaintiff’s argument that this conduct was in violation of the Rhode Island 

analogue to HIPAA was never raised below and is therefore waived. See Bouchard 

v. Clark, 581 A.2d 715, 716 (R.I. 1990).
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may the requesting party now advance new theories or raise new issues in order to 

secure a reversal of the lower court’s determination.” Nedder v. Rhode Island 

Hospital Trust National Bank, 459 A.2d 960, 963 (R.I. 1983) (brackets omitted) 

(quoting Ludwig v. Kowal, 419 A.2d 297, 302 (R.I. 1980)). 

The plaintiff’s arguments distort the evidence in a retrospective attempt to 

mold the facts into an RIWPA claim. Accordingly, plaintiff failed to provide 

evidence that he engaged in protected conduct under the RIWPA; as such, the trial 

justice did not err in granting summary judgment as to plaintiff’s RIWPA claim. 

Having determined that plaintiff failed to engage in protected conduct, we need not 

address his arguments as to constructive discharge and causation. 

Defamation

Next, plaintiff argues that the trial justice erred in finding that he failed to 

establish his defamation claims against Dr. Epstein and UMG. However, plaintiff’s 

defamation claim abated at his death. “At common law, causes of action for slander 

and for libel do not survive the death of either the wrongdoer or the person injured 

by the wrongdoer.” 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 79 (Oct. 2023 

Update); see Young v. Aylesworth, 35 R.I. 259, 262, 86 A. 555, 556 (1913); see also

Cant v. Bartlett, 440 A.2d 388, 392-93 (Md. 1982); Bissette v. University of 

Mississippi Medical Center, 282 So.3d 507, 519 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019); Village of 

Oakwood v. Makar, 463 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983). Therefore, plaintiff’s 
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defamation claim can survive, if at all, only by virtue of the survival statute. Young, 

35 R.I. at 262, 86 A. at 556. Our survival statute provides in pertinent part: 

“In addition to the causes of action and actions which at 

common law survive the death of the plaintiff or defendant

therein, the following causes of action or actions shall also 

survive.

“* * *

“(3) Causes of action and actions for damages to the 

person or to real and personal estate.” General Laws 

1956 § 9-1-6. 

The phrase “damages to the person * * * [does] not extend to torts not directly 

affecting the person, but only the feelings and reputation.”8 Young, 35 R.I. at 262, 

86 A. at 556. Accordingly, plaintiff’s defamation claim does not survive his death 

and is abated. Id. at 262-65, 86 A. at 556-57.

8 Other jurisdictions interpreting their own survival statutes have taken a contrary 

view and determined that any distinction between damages for emotional distress 

and physical injury is arbitrary. Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441, 444-45 (Pa. 1975); 

see Canino v. New York News, Inc., 475 A.2d 528, 531-32 (N.J. 1984). However, 

we clearly expressed our view in Young v. Aylesworth, 35 R.I. 259, 86 A. 555 (1913),

when we determined whether a claim for conspiracy to defame survived the death 

of a defendant. Young, 35 R.I. at 262-63, 86 A. at 555-56. In Young, this Court held 

that the plaintiff’s claim was not a claim for “damages to the person” because we 

interpreted that phrase as referring to bodily or physical injury rather than damages 

to feelings and reputation. Id. at 262, 86 A. at 556. For that reason, we held that the 

plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy to defame could survive only if the plaintiff alleged 

that the tort directly damaged her estate itself under the “damages to * * * personal 

estate” language of the survival statute. Id. at 262-63, 86 A. at 556-57. Because the 

plaintiff was claiming injury to her reputation and because she failed to allege a 

direct injury to her personal estate, her claim did not survive. Id. at 262-65, 86 A. 

556-57. 
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Breach-of-Contract

The plaintiff next argues that the trial justice erred in determining that he 

failed to establish his claims for breach-of-contract. The plaintiff asserted two 

breach-of-contract claims: one based on UMG’s failure to pay him “teaching 

money” and one based on its failure to compensate him for patient care. We shall 

first address the latter. 

The plaintiff argues that the trial justice erred in finding that his breach-ofcontract claim arising from UMG’s failure to compensate him for patient care should 

have been brought under the Payment of Wages Act. He contends that he need not 

have brought his claim under the Payment of Wages Act because the remedies 

provided by this act were cumulative, rather than exclusive of his timely claim for 

breach-of-contract. Alternatively, plaintiff argues that his breach-of-contract claim 

relates back to his original complaint.

The UMG defendants note that plaintiff alleged for the first time in his 2017 

amended complaint that UMG breached his employment contract by failing to pay 

him for patient care. Accordingly, they argue that this claim for lost wages is barred 

by the three-year statute of limitations established by the Payment of Wages Act. 

Ordinarily, the ten-year statute of limitations applicable to “all civil actions” is 

applied to breach-of-contract claims. Bisbano v. Strine Printing Company, Inc., 135 

A.3d 1202, 1209 (R.I. 2016) (quoting § 9-1-13(a)). The generally applicable statute 
- 18 -

of limitations provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise specially provided, all civil 

actions shall be commenced within ten (10) years next after the cause of action shall 

accrue, and not after.” Section 9-1-13(a). By contrast, civil actions brought to 

recover wages under the Payment of Wages Act must be filed “within three (3) years 

after the cause of action accrued.” Section 28-14-19.2(g). The generally applicable 

statute of limitations applies “[e]xcept as otherwise specially provided.” Section 9-

1-13(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we have previously held that the more 

specific three-year limitations period contained in the Payment of Wages Act applies 

to breach-of-contract claims that are, in substance, claims brought under this act. 

Bisbano, 135 A.3d at 1209-10.

The Payment of Wages Act provides that “[a]ny employee or former 

employee * * * aggrieved by the failure to pay wages and/or benefits or 

misclassification in violation of chapter 12 of this title and/or this chapter may file a 

civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction to obtain relief.” Section 28-14-

19.2(a). This act defines “wages” as “all amounts at which the labor or service 

rendered is recompensed, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, 

piece, commission basis, or other method of calculating the amount.” Section 28-

14-1(4). 

Although plaintiff styled his claim for unpaid wages as one for breach-ofcontract, his claim arises from UMG’s failure to pay him “monies for services 
- 19 -

rendered as a full-time employee of UMG in the months leading up to his resignation 

on April 24, 2012.” Accordingly, his claim is one for failure to pay wages in 

violation of the Payment of Wages Act, and the three-year statute of limitations 

contained in § 28-14-19.2(g) is controlling. Bisbano, 135 A.3d at 1209; see §§ 28-

14-1(4), 28-14-19.2(a). The plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim arising out of the 

failure to compensate him for patient care was not raised until he filed the amended 

complaint in 2017. Consequently, the claim was clearly filed more than three years 

after UMG allegedly failed to pay him for services rendered in 2012. Moreover, 

plaintiff failed to raise any argument that his patient services breach-of-contract 

claim relates back to the filing of his original complaint below, and it is therefore 

waived. Bouchard v. Clark, 581 A.2d 715, 716 (R.I. 1990). Accordingly, we discern 

no error in the trial justice’s grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff’s breach-ofcontract claim arising out of UMG’s failure to compensate him for patient care. 

The plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim based upon UMG’s failure to pay him 

for teaching duties, however, was filed on December 4, 2012, as part of his original 

complaint. Summary judgment was granted as to that claim because plaintiff 

testified that his teaching duties were voluntary rather than a requirement of his 

employment. The plaintiff argues that the trial justice erred because under his 

employment agreement, he was required to work “[forty] hours per week of clinical 

patient hours inclusive of teaching and administrative activities.” The UMG 
- 20 -

defendants contend that UMG was not contractually required to compensate plaintiff 

for teaching because this obligation appears in the “scheduling” section of the 

agreement. They further argue that Dr. Epstein’s promise to pay plaintiff teaching 

money was not an enforceable contract because Dr. Epstein made it after plaintiff 

started teaching.

“In a breach-of-contract claim, the plaintiff must prove both the existence and 

breach of a contract, and that the defendant’s breach thereof caused the plaintiff’s 

damages.” Fogarty v. Palumbo, 163 A.3d 526, 541 (R.I. 2017). Even assuming that 

teaching was a requirement under plaintiff’s employment agreement, he did not 

provide evidence of a breach of the written agreement. Instead, plaintiff testified 

that Dr. Epstein had breached a “verbal[]” promise to provide plaintiff with 

“teaching money”—the additional administrative money that Dr. Epstein obtained 

from the hospital each year to offset the burden of teaching. This verbal promise is 

not by itself enforceable because the undisputed facts show that Dr. Epstein made 

that promise after plaintiff started teaching. 

Under the preexisting duty rule, “an agreement modifying a contract is not 

supported by consideration if one of the parties to the agreement does or promises 

to do something that he is legally obligated to do * * *.” Angel v. Murray, 113 R.I. 

482, 489, 322 A.2d 630, 634 (1974). Such a modification will be enforceable only 

when “(1) the promise modifying the original contract was made before the contract 
- 21 -

was fully performed on either side, (2) the underlying circumstances which 

prompted the modification were unanticipated by the parties, and (3) the 

modification is fair and equitable.” Id. at 494-95, 322 A.2d at 637. 

Doctor Epstein promised plaintiff additional teaching money after plaintiff 

entered into the employment agreement. Therefore, even assuming that teaching 

was one of plaintiff’s contractual responsibilities, Dr. Epstein’s promise to provide 

plaintiff with additional “teaching money” was not supported by consideration. See

Angel, 113 R.I. at 493-95, 322 A.2d at 636-37. The trial justice did not err by 

granting the UMG defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s 

“teaching money” breach-of-contract claim. 

Tortious Interference

Next, plaintiff argues that the trial justice erred in finding that he did not 

establish his claims for tortious interference with contractual relations. Furthermore, 

plaintiff argues that Dr. Epstein was a “stranger” to plaintiff’s employment contract 

because he acted in his individual capacity. In response, the UMG defendants argue 

that Dr. Epstein was not a “stranger” to plaintiff’s employment agreement and that, 

therefore, he cannot be liable for tortiously interfering with it. They further note that 

plaintiff has offered no evidence to show that Dr. Epstein’s interference was in his 

own interests.
- 22 -

“To prevail on a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations, a 

plaintiff must show ‘(1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged wrongdoer’s 

knowledge of the contract; (3) his [or her] intentional interference; and (4) damages 

resulting therefrom.’” Tidewater Realty, LLC v. State, 942 A.2d 986, 993 (R.I. 2008) 

(quoting Smith Development Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 211, 308 

A.2d 477, 482 (1973)). “[T]o establish a prima facie case of intentional interference 

with contract, aggrieved parties must allege and prove not only that the putative 

tortfeasors intended to do harm to the contract but that they did so without the benefit 

of any legally recognized privilege or other justification.” Belliveau Building 

Corporation v. O’Coin, 763 A.2d 622, 627 (R.I. 2000). 

Although the parties vigorously contest Dr. Epstein’s status as a “stranger” to 

the employment agreement, we need not reach this issue because plaintiff did not 

provide any evidence that Dr. Epstein intended to do harm to plaintiff’s contract, 

which is an essential element of his claim. See Doe v. Brown University, 253 A.3d 

389, 398 (R.I. 2021) (dismissing the plaintiff’s intentional interference claim 

because the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant’s actions were an intentional 

interference with her contract). The plaintiff argues that Dr. Epstein tortiously 

interfered with plaintiff’s employment contract by withholding “teaching money” 

and by taking over plaintiff’s procedures while he was on leave, thereby 

“misappropriating accounts receivable.” However, plaintiff offers no explanation as 
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to how these actions were intended to harm plaintiff’s employment contract with 

UMG. Further, plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Epstein interfered by “advis[ing] 

[plaintiff’s] patients that he was no longer available to care for them, [and] * * * that 

Dr. Epstein, himself, would take over their care” is unavailing. Based on the 

undisputed facts, this alleged interference occurred on May 20, 2012, after plaintiff 

resigned. Accordingly, there was no longer an employment contract with which Dr. 

Epstein could interfere.

The plaintiff argues that the circumstantial evidence surrounding Ms. 

Siegelman’s report could create an inference that Dr. Epstein coerced her to fabricate 

the report that interfered with plaintiff’s employment contract, but he made no such 

arguments to the trial justice. Therefore, this argument is waived on appeal, and we 

find no error in the trial justice’s grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim 

for tortious interference with contractual relations. Nedder, 459 A.2d at 962-63. 

Additionally, plaintiff contends that Dr. Epstein tortiously interfered with his 

prospective business relations with patients because he inaccurately advised patients 

that plaintiff was no longer practicing and allegedly orchestrated the April 3, 2012 

police investigation. In response, the UMG defendants argue that Dr. Epstein could 

not have interfered with plaintiff’s prospective business relationships because he 

never resumed the practice of medicine, so there were no prospective business 

relationships with which to interfere. Furthermore, they argue that plaintiff cannot 
- 24 -

show that but for Dr. Epstein’s alleged interference, plaintiff would have set up his 

practice in Fall River because plaintiff testified that he decided not to practice due 

to the trauma he associated with hospital administration.

“The elements required to establish a claim for intentional interference with 

prospective economic relations ‘are identical to those required for a claim based on 

intentional interference with contractual relations, except for the requirement in the 

latter that an actual contract exists.’” Lomastro v. Iacovelli, 126 A.3d 470, 474 (R.I. 

2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting Avilla v. Newport Grand Jai Alai LLC, 935 A.2d 

91, 98 (R.I. 2007)). Therefore, the plaintiff must show both “an intentional act of 

interference * * * [and] proof that the interference caused the harm sustained * * *.” 

Burke v. Gregg, 55 A.3d 212, 222 (R.I. 2012) (quoting L.A. Ray Realty v. Town 

Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202, 207 (R.I. 1997)). In order to show causation, 

the plaintiff must show “either that but for the interference there would have been a 

relationship or that it is reasonably probable that but for the interference the 

relationship would have been established.” Id. at 222 (quoting L.A. Ray Realty, 698 

A.2d at 207). 

The plaintiff has provided no evidence that but for Dr. Epstein “inaccurately 

advising client[s] that [plaintiff] was no longer practicing[,]” plaintiff would have 

continued his practice in Fall River. Instead, plaintiff’s undisputed testimony 

established that he did not resume practice “because of the trauma from this whole 
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thing.” Despite Dr. Epstein’s alleged interference, patients still emailed plaintiff to 

inquire when he would resume practice, but plaintiff never replied because he was 

“too upset to respond * * *.” Therefore, it is not reasonably probable that plaintiff 

would have resumed practice but for Dr. Epstein informing plaintiff’s patients that 

he was no longer practicing. Burke, 55 A.3d at 222. 

The plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Epstein coerced Ms. Siegelman to write the 

report and took advantage of the hospital’s no-gun policy by setting up Dr. Epstein 

similarly fails. There is no evidence that Dr. Epstein “orchestrat[ed]” the police patdown and subsequent interrogation because he did not know that plaintiff would 

bring his weapon to work, then lie about it when the police and the hospital 

administration investigated Ms. Siegelman’s report. As such, we deem no error in 

the trial justice’s grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim for tortious 

interference with prospective business relationships. 

Conversion

Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial justice incorrectly concluded that he did 

not establish his claim for conversion because the trial justice improperly weighed 

evidence in determining that there was no nonhearsay testimony to support 

plaintiff’s claim. For their part, the UMG defendants argue that summary judgment 

was appropriate because plaintiff failed to offer nonhearsay evidence that he made a 

demand for his personal laptop.
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“It is well-established that a demand and refusal are usually required before 

an action for conversion can be brought against the possessor of a chattel who has 

rightfully obtained possession from one not its owner.” Fuscellaro v. Industrial 

National Corporation, 117 R.I. 558, 561, 368 A.2d 1227, 1230 (1977). In such a 

case, the plaintiff’s demand for the chattel and the defendant’s refusal to surrender 

it are prima facie proof of conversion. Goodbody & Co., Inc. v. Parente, 116 R.I. 

437, 440, 358 A.2d 32, 34 (1976). 

The trial justice found that the plaintiff failed to provide any nonhearsay 

evidence to prove his demand and refusal and thus granted summary judgment as to 

the plaintiff’s conversion claim. Nevertheless, on appeal, the plaintiff relies upon 

the same evidence that the trial justice determined to be hearsay. In the absence of 

any argument as to why disregarding the plaintiff’s evidence was in error, we see no 

reason to set aside the decision of the trial justice. Nuzzo v. Nuzzo Campion Stone 

Enterprises, Inc., 137 A.3d 711, 717 (R.I. 2016). Accordingly, we shall not disturb 

the trial justice’s grant of summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s conversion claim. 

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 

The papers shall be returned to the Superior Court. 
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case

Jordan Nissensohn, Administrator of the Estate of 

Michael Nissensohn v. CharterCARE Home Health 

Services a/k/a Roger Williams Medical Center, et al.

Case Number No. 2022-42-Appeal.

(PC 12-6232)

Date Opinion Filed January 16, 2024

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and 

Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata 

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court 

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Richard D. Raspallo

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiff:

James A. Ruggieri, Esq. 

For Defendant: 

Jessica Schacher Jewell, Esq.