[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 179 (Tuesday, September 16, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48677-48679]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-24570]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323]


Pacific Gas and Electric Company; Notice of Consideration of 
Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. 
DPR-80 and DPR-82 issued to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the 
licensee) for operation of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 
2, located in San Luis Obispo County, California.
    The proposed amendments would approve a modification to the Diablo 
Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Units 1 and 2 auxiliary saltwater (ASW) 
system to bypass approximately 800 feet of Unit 1 and 200 feet of Unit 
2 Class 1 ASW pipe, a portion of which is buried below sea level in the 
tidal zone outside the intake structure. Upgraded flow meter and 
temperature instrumentation will be included. The project includes 
approximately 450 feet (both Units) of new pipe inside the intake 
structure, and 1,400 feet of new buried pipe between the intake and 
selected tie-in points in the existing pipe. This modification was 
completed on Unit 1 during the refueling outage completed this year.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The auxiliary saltwater (ASW) system is not identified as the 
cause, or involved in the initiating event of, any Final Safety 
Analysis Report (FSAR) analyzed accidents. Thus, activities 
addressed herein will not increase the probability of occurrence of 
any FSAR evaluated accident.
    During the construction of the ASW bypass piping, the integrity 
and performance of the ultimate heat sink will not be affected, nor 
will the ability of any safety-related system, structure, or 
component (SSC) to perform their function be compromised. Approved, 
written procedures are used during construction to assure the 
functioning of these SSCs (e.g., heavy load procedures, security 
procedures, tie-in procedures). The system unavailability due to 
construction is managed in accordance with Technical Specification 
(TS) limiting conditions for operation (LCO).
    The ASW system is a moderate energy system. Since the bypass 
modification does not significantly change the operating parameters 
of the system, there is no change in the Medium Energy Line Break 
(MELB) analysis methodology for this system, and no increase in the 
probability of occurrence of a pipe crack. The ASW pipes are 
required to mitigate consequences of FSAR analyzed accidents.
    The initial work for the ASW bypass project involved 
installation of Design Class I removable spool pieces in the 
existing ASW piping. The spool pieces removed were modified and 
reinserted into the existing ASW piping. The modifications to the 
spool pieces did not affect their flow characteristics or structural 
integrity. Therefore, the removable spool pieces did not cause ASW 
operating parameters to exceed their design basis, did not change 
any system interfaces, had no impact on ASW system capability to 
perform its function, and did not change the system's operation.
    The work for this project was performed in a series of steps. 
For each step, the added work scope was incorporated in a design 
change package revision and a revised safety evaluation was 
performed.
    The tie-in of the piping to the ASW system is done during 
separate system clearances during a refueling outage for each train; 
one train will remain in service during the outage at all times. The 
cross-tie between the two Units will be available during the work.
    When all the work associated with the ASW bypass project is 
completed, including pipe and pipe support installation, structural 
modifications, and external protective features, the ASW system will 
perform its safety function as described in the FSAR. The flow in 
ASW pipes will not be significantly affected by this work. Per 
Mechanical Calculation M-988, the increase in head loss for bypass 
piping is not significant; the design basis flow is maintained with 
a margin and there is no significant effect on the Component Cooling 
Water (CCW) heat removal capacity.
    The newly installed piping has been designed to withstand the 
appropriate design basis seismic loading and to withstand the 
effects of external events including flooding, tsunami, and 
tornadoes. The newly installed piping and associated support 
components have been evaluated, and where appropriate, designed to 
withstand system interactions including pipe breaks, internal 
flooding, seismic interaction, internally generated missiles, and 
fires.
    Since the ASW system design bases parameters are maintained and 
the newly configured piping has been evaluated and designed to meet 
established licensing basis considerations, the consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated in the FSAR are not increased.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.

[[Page 48678]]

    b. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    The design and installation sequence for bypass pipes and 
connection to the Unit 1 ASW system were developed and sequenced so 
as not to affect the integrity of the pressure boundary or Paraliner 
of operating ASW trains.
    Removable spool pieces were installed during Unit 1 seventh 
refueling outage (1R7). Plant procedures and proper sequencing of 
removal of the removable spool pieces and installation of tie-ins of 
bypass pipes will ensure adequate ASW is available for supporting 
the refueling and plant shutdown requirements. Tie-ins of Unit 1 
bypass pipes will be done during separate system clearances during a 
refueling outage for each train; one train will remain in service 
during the outage at all times. The cross-tie between the two Units 
will be available during the work.
    Piping layout and supports, design features for natural events, 
and evaluations and design features for systems interaction assure 
that the integrity of the ASW system for each unit is maintained.
    The conservative analyses used in the piping design indicates 
there is a potential for soil liquefaction in some areas during 
certain seismic events (Hosgri earthquake). Liquefaction of soil is 
not considered in the licensing basis for the plant. Analyses using 
more recent methods indicate that actual settlements will be much 
less than predicted by the analyses used in the design, and that the 
piping will maintain its integrity.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    c. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety.
    TS 3.7.4.1 and 3.7.12, pertinent to the ASW system, are 
applicable for Modes 1 (Power Operation), 2 (Startup), 3 (Hot 
Standby), and 4 (Hot Shutdown). The installation of the Unit 1 ASW 
removable spool pieces were done during the 1R7 outage. During the 
refueling outage, the ASW trains were made inoperable one at a time 
for installation of a spool piece and were sequenced and scheduled 
to support TS 3.4.1.4.1 and 3.4.1.4.2 for residual heat removal 
(RHR) in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), and TS 3.9.8.1 and 3.9.8.2 for RHR 
in Mode 6 (Refueling) as applicable. Modification of two existing 
supports for Unit 2 Pipe 687 was done when the line was out-of-
service during the Unit 2 seventh refueling outage. Tie-ins will 
occur during a refueling outage and during separate system 
clearances. The cross-tie between the two Units will be available 
during the work.
    The TS basis for the ASW system is to provide sufficient cooling 
capacity for the continued operation of safety-related equipment 
during normal and accident conditions (TS Bases 3/4.7.4). This 
equates to providing sufficient cooling water for the CCW heat 
exchangers (HXs) to ensure CCW design basis temperature limits are 
not exceeded. Although the change in ASW pipe routing causes an 
increase in the pressure drop in the ASW piping, and therefore a 
decrease in ASW flow by approximately 3 percent (352 gpm), the 
design and licensing basis requirements of the ASW system will 
continue to be met.
    Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) M-26, ``ASW Flow Monitoring,'' 
demonstrates that the ASW system provides adequate cooling to the 
CCW HX. The STP measures the ASW flow and then subtracts instrument 
inaccuracy and corrects for potential variations in tide level and 
CCW HX differential pressure (dP). The corrected ASW flow and 
temperature are then compared to the acceptance criteria. The 
acceptance criteria in STP M-26 have not changed as a result of the 
bypass project.
    There will not be a safety significant issue associated with the 
reduction in flow caused by the bypass. As part of the ASW bypass 
project, ASW flow and temperature instruments are being replaced 
with more accurate instruments. In addition, the correction factors 
which are used to account for variations in tide level and HX dP 
were found to be very conservative and have been corrected. As a 
result of these changes, the corrections to the measured ASW flow 
will be smaller. Based on Calculation M-988, the required 
corrections to the flow will decrease by more than the reduction in 
flow caused by the bypass. In addition, the current STP results show 
that flow margin exists.
    Therefore, none of the proposed changes involves a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications 
Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and 
page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also 
be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. 
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By October 16, 1997, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the California Polytechnic State University, 
Robert El Kennedy Library, Government Documents and Maps Department, 
San Luis Obispo, California 93407. If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the

[[Page 48679]]

petitioner's right under the Act to be made party to the proceeding; 
(2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or 
other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any 
order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's 
interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of 
the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to 
intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene 
or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without 
requesting leave of the Board up to 15 days prior to the first 
prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended 
petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Christopher J. Warner, Esq., Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company, P.O. Box 7442, San Francisco, California 
94210, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714 (a)(1) (i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated August 26, 1997, which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the California Polytechnic State University, 
Robert E. Kennedy Library, Government Documents and Maps Department, 
San Luis Obispo, California 93407.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day of September 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William H. Bateman,
Director, Project Directorate IV-2, Division of Reactor Projects III/
IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-24570 Filed 9-15-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P