UA 

23 

.A4711 

1992 

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FEBRUARY 

1992 

AN!NUAL 

RE ORT 

to the 

PRESI E T ·nd-'the ·· 

CONG1RESS 

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j Dick Cheney 

1 Secretary of Defense 

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Part III Defense Components 

NAVAL FORCES 

may not always be as accessible as they were in the 

Persian Gulf, and the United States could well have to 

rely on carriers to project the bulk of tactical air power 

in some future contingencies. Thus, while the Department will reduce the aircraft carrier force to 13 carriers 

by the end of FY 1997, it will continue to take steps to 

improve the power projection capabilities that the force 

provides. 

Complementing aircraft carriers in the power projection role are MEFs. Marine amphibious assault forces 

are an integral part of naval power projection forces. 

They provide an important sea-based capability for responding to contingencies and for augmenting naval 

battle groups in combined arms operations. While upcoming retirements of older amphibious ships will reduce lift capability to 2.5 MEBs, the Department will 

continue procurement of selected assault ships in order 

to maintain a 2.5-MEB lift capability into the next 

century. These ships will support forward deployments 

of amphibious ready groups/Marine expeditionary units 

for crisis response and humanitarian and special operations, sustaining these unique capabilities as an integral 

part of naval power projection forces. 

Surface combatants can project significant power 

with Tomahawk cruise missiles, providing a versatile 

supplement to carrier air wings and amphibious forces. 

Equipped with a vast array of defensive systems, modern surface combatants also protect aircraft carriers and 

amphibious and support ships from air and submarine 

threats. The vital DDG-51 program will provide highly 

capable surface combatants to meet near-term mission 

requirements. 

The attack submarine force will be reduced by 15 

percent by 1997. This reduction can be safely accomplished because of the dramatic changes that have taken 

piace in the Soviet threat and world situation. As part of 

our response to these changes, the SSN-21 Seawolf 

program has been canceled. The lead ship, SSN-21, is 

now under construction. Not withstanding the decision 

to terminate the program, the Department's intent is to 

complete this ship. The contract for the second ship is 

currently the subject of litigation. Recoverable funds for 

this unit and a third FY 1992 ship will be included as a 

rescission proposal in the amended FY 1993 budget. In 

the near term, the nuclear submarine industrial base will 

be maintained at a reduced level by completing the 

SSN-688-class and Trident submarines already under 

construction, and through refueling and overhauling 

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existing submarines. The United States must maintain 

the capability to carry out antisubmarine warfare 

(ASW), strike warfare, mining, and special operations 

in the context of future threats and contingencies. Accordingly, the Department is looking at options for a 

new lower-cost attack submarine that could provide 

these capabilities, in light of other forces that will be 

available. Plans for specific new systems have not yet 

been fully defined, however. 

Of all the lessons learned in Operation DESERT 

STORM, the most important for naval forces may have 

been in the area of mine countermeasures. The employment of amphibious forces in future operations may well 

depend on the adoption of more effective countermeasures against enemy mines, including shallow-water 

mines. This remains a major concern for the Department. The FY 1993 defense program continues procurement of glass-reinforced plastic (GRP) coastal mine 

hunters (MHCs). The value of these ships was amply 

demonstrated in the Persian Gulf, where the greater 

magnetic signatures of current U.S. wooden ships made 

them less effective in mine clearance operations than 

their European counterparts. The signature of the new 

MHC-class ships is expected to be comparable to that 

of the vessels employed by our Coalition partners. The 

Navy also is investigating the feasibility of lowering the 

magnetic signature of its new MCM-1 mine countermeasures ships, the first of which was employed in 

Operation DESERT STORM. 

Based on needs identified in reviewing Operation 

DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Navy and Marine 

Corps have begun a program to examine technologies 

and provide countermeasures against the full range of 

naval mines. Further improvements in mine warfare will 

come through the consolidation of command structures, 

acquisition of improved systems, and the adoption of 

more rigorous training programs. 

Freedom of Navigation Operational Assertions 

The President's United States Oceans Policy Statement of March 10, 1983, states "The United States 

will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight 

rights and freedoms in a worldwide basis in a manner 

that is consistent with the balance of interests 

reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The 

United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the 

rights and freedoms of the international community in 

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navigation and overflight and other re1ated high seas 

uses." 

When nations appear to acquiesce in excessive maritime claims and fail to exercise their rights actively in 

the face of constraints on international navigation and 

overflight, those claims and constraints may, over time, 

come to be considered to have been accepted by the 

international community as reflecting the practice of 

nations and as binding upon all users of the seas and 

superjacent airspace. Consequently, it is incumbent 

upon maritime nations, such as the United States, to 

protest through diplomatic channels all excessive claims 

of coastal or island nations, and to exercise their 

navigation and overflight rights in the face of such 

claims. The United States has accepted this responsibility as an element of its national policy, and the Department of Defense conducts an active program of 

Freedom of Navigation operational assertions. 

Freedom of Navigation assertions were conducted 

against the following countries for the listed excessive maritime claims during the year from October 

1, 1990, to September 30, 1991. Countries are listed 

alphabetically. 

Country 

Angola 

Benin 

Excessive Claim Challenged 

20 nautical miles (nm) territorial 

sea. 

200 nm territorial sea. 

Burma 

Cameroon 

Denmark 

Dominican 

Republic 

Ecuador 

Haiti 

Liberia 

Nicaragua 

Peru 

Sierra Leone 

Syria 

Summary 

Part III Defense Components 

NAVAL FORCES 

Prior permission for warships to 

enter 12 nm territorial sea. 

50 nm territorial sea. 

Excessive straight baselines. 

Excessive straight baselines. 

200 om territorial sea. 

Excessive straight baselines. 

200 om territorial sea. 

200 om territorial sea. 25 nm 

security zone. Clearance required 

for overflight of 200 nm territorial 

sea. 

200 nm territorial sea. 

200 om territorial sea. 

35 om territorial sea. 

The changes envisioned for our naval forces in the 

years ahead respond to the requirements of an evolving 

international security environment. Qualitative upgrades of these forces are vital if they are to retain 

essential capabilities as their overall numbers are reduced. Strong U.S. maritime forces have been a constant 

element of this nation's defense posture, and the 

amended FY 1993 budget and defense program ensure 

that they will remain so in the future. 

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