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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LOUIS V. SANTORIELLO, : Civil Action No. 4:13-CV-02448

:

:

Plaintiff, : (Judge Brann)

:

v. :

:

JAMES P. BRIDY, :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

August 19, 2015

Pending before this Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by 

Defendant James P. Bridy. The motion seeks judgment on Plaintiff Louis V. 

Santoriello’s partition action because of his belief that Plaintiff has waived his 

right to assert an ownership interest in the property at issue. Though Defendant 

has not filed a reply brief, the time for filing has passed and the motion is now ripe 

for disposition. In accordance with the following reasoning, Defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves a partition action involving a 186 acre parcel of land in 

Northumberland County known as “Boyer’s Knob.” In September 1986, the parcel 

was deeded to Defendant and his brother, Edward A. Bridy through their mother’s 

estate. On October 27, 2009, Edward Bridy sent a letter to Defendant in which he 

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advised him that “all future cash distribution due and owing to Edward A. Bridy as 

a result of his fifty-percent (50%) fee simple interest in the 186 acre parcel of land . 

. . should be made payable to Louis Santoriello. . . .” Subsequently, Edward Bridy 

conveyed his interest in “Boyer’s Knob” to Plaintiff’s son, John Santoriello, 

through a Quit Claim Deed recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds of 

Northumberland County on January 26, 2010. In March of that year a second deed 

was filed to confirm this transfer.

On April 22, 2010, Plaintiff sent to Defendant a letter which he alleges to be 

in response to Edward Bridy’s October 27, 2009 correspondence. In that letter, 

Plaintiff stated, “As to Edward Bridy’s letter to you dated October 27, 2009 

requesting that ‘future cash distributions’ from the Boyer’s Knob property be made 

payable to me, I hereby acknowledge that the letter and assignment are invalid and 

I claim no rights in the past, present or future to the referenced property or any 

income, draws or distributions related to that property.” 

Two years later, on September 28, 2012, a deed was filed by John 

Santoriello which transferred his interest in the Boyer’s Knob property to Plaintiff. 

On October 7, 2012, Plaintiff sent an email to Defendant in which he advised 

Defendant of the transfer, stating, “Jamie, The Pennsylvania property is totally 

changed into my name only.” The instant action followed in April 2013.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” where it “might affect 

the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” where “the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury,” giving credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant and 

making all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, “could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” Id. 

The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a “genuine issue” is on the 

party moving for summary judgment. In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 237 (3d Cir. 

2003) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (Brennan, J., 

dissenting)). The moving party may satisfy this burden by either (i) submitting 

affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s 

claim; or (ii) demonstrating to the Court that the nonmoving party’s evidence is 

insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case. Id. at 

331. 

Where the moving party’s motion is properly supported, the nonmoving 

party, to avoid summary judgment in his opponent’s favor, must answer by setting 

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forth “genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact 

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 250. For movants and nonmovants alike, the assertion “that a fact cannot 

be or is genuinely disputed must” be supported by “materials in the record” that go 

beyond mere allegations, or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish 

the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot 

produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–50. 

“When opposing summary judgment, the non-movant may not rest upon 

mere allegations, but rather must ‘identify those facts of record which would 

contradict the facts identified by the movant.’” Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v. 

Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2003). Furthermore, “[i]f a 

party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address 

another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . 

consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

In deciding the merits of a party’s motion for summary judgment, the 

Court’s role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but 

to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 

Credibility determinations are the province of the factfinder, not the district court. 

BWM, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Although 

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the Court may consider any materials in the record, it need only consider those 

materials cited. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that Plaintiff waived his right to assert an ownership 

interest in the property at issue by virtue of his April 2010 letter which Defendant 

contends contained an express declaration that relinquished all of Plaintiff’s rights 

to the property in the past, present and future. Plaintiff responds that this letter was 

written in response to what Plaintiff believed to be an invalid assignment and that 

the property has since been validly transferred to him. The letter, he contends, was 

only intended to waive his rights based on the invalid assignment, not the legal 

transfer of property that has since occurred.

This Court agrees with the Plaintiff. A legal waiver is defined as the “act of 

intentionally relinquishing or abandoning some known right, claim or privilege. 

To constitute a waiver of legal right, there must be a clear, unequivocal and 

decisive act of the party with knowledge of such right and an evident purpose to 

surrender it. Waiver is essentially a matter of intention.” Zivari v. Willis, 611 A.2d 

293, 295 (Pa.Super. 1992) (quoting Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 186 A.2d 399, 401 

(Pa. 1962)). 

Here, Plaintiff clearly waived his rights to the Boyer’s Knob property in the 

past, present and future stemming from Edward Bridy’s October 27, 2009 

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assignment. However, there is no indication that he intentionally and 

unequivocally waived his rights to the property stemming from the subsequent 

legal conveyance on September 28, 2012. Consequently, summary judgment is 

denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing reasoning, Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment is denied.

BY THE COURT:

/s Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

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