FILED 


DEC 8, 2015 


In the Office of the Clerk of Court 


W A State Court of Appeals, Division III 


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 


DIVISION THREE 


STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) 

) No. 32827-9-111 

Respondent, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

DAVID PRESTON WOOD, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

) 

Appellant. ) 

KORSMO, 1. - David Wood (DW) appeals from a juvenile court decision 

adjudicating him guilty on two counts ofsecond degree assault, contending that his 

confession to a detective was not voluntary. Finding no error, we affirm. 

FACTS 

Mr. Wood, 17, and his girlfriend, JL, 16, were the parents oftwo month old PL. 

On June 2, 2014, PL had what appeared to be a seizure and was taken to Kadlec Hospital. 

Authorities there eventually alerted police that the injured child, who suffered from 

multiple skull fractures, was not an accident victim. 

Mr. Wood accompanied his son to the hospital and stayed the night until the next 

day when he had to leave to work a shift at the Subway sandwich shop, a position he had 

held for two weeks. Mr. Wood had a ninth grade education. He returned to the hospital 
No. 32827·9-II1 

State v. Wood 

about 9:00 p.m. A police officer was waiting to speak about the child's injuries. Mr. 

Wood first consulted with the child's doctor and learned that PL had injured legs and 

head trauma. The officer knocked on the door and asked if Mr. Wood was willing to go 

to the police station. He agreed and rode in the front seat of a patrol car on the short trip 

to the station. 

When he first arrived at the police station around 9:30 p.m., he was placed in one 

room, and then around 10:00 moved to an interrogation room. Before he was moved to 

this second room, he could hear JL crying outside the door. Once in the second room, 

Detective Robert Benson eventually met him and asked if it their interview could be 

recorded; Mr. Wood consented. The interview began at 10:45 p.m.! Ex. 182 at 22:45:12. 

The contents and conduct of the interview are detailed at some length in view of the issue 

presented. 

Prior to questioning, Detective Benson told Mr. Wood that he was not under 

arrest, but did read Mr. Wood his Miranda3 rights, including the juvenile rights. Ex. Cat 

2-3. Mr. Wood indicated that he understood his rights, and that "ya" he did want to talk. 

Detective Benson stated that if Wood was too tired, or needed water or to go to the 

! The time-stamp appears to be faster than the time stated by the detective's 

telephone by about eight minutes. 

2 Exhibit 18 is the video, while Exhibit C is the transcript of the video. 

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 

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No. 32827-9-III 

State v. Wood 

bathroom, to let him know and he would be accommodated. At the outset, Mr. Wood 

admitted to being tired, and the two joked that if one of them fell asleep during the 

interview the other should wake up the sleeper. 

During the first hour of questioning, the detective asked general questions, trying 

to get a timeline. Wood described what had happened the previous night with the seizure 

as well as his and JL's usual routine with the baby. During the first part of this hour, JL 

was being questioned in the adjacent room. DW later testified that he could hear her 

crying in the next room. The detective could hear only muffled conversations from the 

next room, but about 10-20 minutes into the interview he texted the other officer to move 

JL to a different room away from DW On the recording, the only time crying is audible 

is around 10:59 pm. Ex. 18 at 22:58:57-22:59:06. Immediately after the crying, I 

Detective Benson pulls out his cell phone and uses it briefly. Id. at 22:59:35. After an 

hour, the detective asked if anything was needed. Mr. Wood requested some water and ! 

t the detective returned with some seven minutes later. 

The detective then left for 45 minutes. Ex. 18 at 23:52:05-00:37:40. Mr. Wood I 

spent some of that time with his head down and his arms crossed, possibly asleep. At one 

point, the lights shut off and another officer came in to explain that he needs to move to 

tum them back on. Ex. C at 17. When the officer entered the room, DW stood up and 

gathered his stuff as if to leave. However, the officer told Mr. Wood that he is "almost 

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No. 32827-9-III 

State v. Wood 

done" and asks him to "just hang tight." Id. When asked, "do I stay hereT' the officer 

responds "Ya." It is 12:27 a.m. at this point. 

Detective Benson returned briefly at 12:37 a.m. He asked Mr. Wood ifhe needs 

"any more water or anything." Ex. C at 18. DW said he was good and the detective then 

told him that it'll be about five more minutes. DW says that's fine. Detective Benson 

returns 19 minutes later. Ex. 18 at 00:56:57. 

The second round of questioning begins at 12:57 a.m. At first it involved more 

background and questioning regarding the care of PL, but eventually the detective 

focused on Mr. Wood. He asked him to demonstrate how he held PL when they were 

trying to help the child poop. The detective then challenged DW's explanation by telling 

him what JL said. The detective also showed DW where the doctor said the child's legs 

were broken within the last couple of days. The detective then described one of the 

baby's skull fractures. He also told DW that there were other, older injuries to the skull. 

The questioning begins to culminate at 1 :25 a.m. See Ex. 18 at 01 :25: 10. With 

some deletions, the questioning prior to the confession is included below: 

DET: If you were investigating this case, D[]. 

SUSP:Mhmm. 

DET: What are you thinking? 

SUP: Urn ... 

DET: If you're sittin' in my shoes, and I've got a baby with five different 

injuries and potentially four injuries to the brain over a period of 

time. 

SUSP: I would think that there was abuse. 

DET: Who's abusing [P.L.]? 

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No. 32827-9-III 

State v. Wood 

SUSP:I don't know. That's definitely not [J.L.] and it's not me 'cause I'm 

not - I - I and I know it's not her dad so I don't ... 

DET: I mean you're the only three. 

SUSP:Ya I know. 

DET: Do you know who King Solomon is? 

SUSP:Kind of. I know he's [sic] in the bible. 

DET: Ya considered the wisest man on earth. 

SUSP:Ya I didn't know that. 

DET: Va. I had to deal with a dilemma like that [sic] once. I mean it's 

either you, [1.L.] ... 

SUSP: Or her dad. 

DET: Or her dad right? 

SUSP:Ya. 

DET: I'm thinkin' it's probably not the dad 'cause dad doesn't have a lot 

of contact with the baby right? 

SUSP:Ya. 

[...] 

Det: So If you're in my shoes and I know the baby's being abused and 

it's being abused by one maybe both of you, right? 

SUSP:Mhmm. 

DET: Urn would you allow [P.L.] to go back into that environment? 

SUSP: That's a tough question. [ ...] 

DET: Right. How do you think we're gonna' find out for sure what caused 

those injuries? 

SUSP:I don't know. Probably either if one of us did [sic], one of us 

confesses or I don't know. 

DET: Ya I would agree. We know this for a fact that those five injuries 

are non-accidental. 

·SUSP:Mhmm. 

DET: Do you know what that means? 

SUSP: That they were done on purpose? 

DET: Ya there wasn't an accident. Accident meaning you know baby's 

trying to crawl, trying to get up on something and falls over. That's 

what I'm talking about an accident ok. Urn do you think the person 

who caused these injuries to [P.L.] deserves a second chance? 

SUSP: *Pause* Hm *Pause* that's a hard question. 

DET: Why is it a hard question? 

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No. 32827-9-III 

State v. Wood 

SUSP: 'Cause [ ...] depending [ ...] on who it is and who was doing it, why 

they did it [ ...] Until he proved himself that he was worthy enough 

to be able to see him again. I would say no but until then no. 

[...] 

DET: You think that the person would have to come clean? 

SUSP:Ya. 

DET: Tell everything that happened. So what you're telling me is that the 

person would truly have to be sorry. 

SUSP:Ya. 

DET: Right. 

SUSP:Ya. 

DET: I mean I don't think anybody ever wakes up and ... 

SUSP: Decides they want to abuse a baby? 

DET: Right. 

SUSP:Ya. 

DET: I mean I don't think that happens unless you're a truly evil sadistic 

person right? 

SUSP:Ya. 

DET: I don't think you're a truly evil sadistic person urn so person would 

have to be truly sorry and not only promise not to do it again but 

somehow prove that they weren't going to do that again. 

SUSP:Mhmm. 

[...] 

SUSP: I have a question. 


DET: Va. 


SUSP: Would you go to jail? 


DET: What do you mean? 


SUSP: If. .. ok. 


*Pause* 

DET: You got something to tell me D[]? 


SUSP: Ya I do. 


DET: This is how I get this out ifyou're sorry. 


Ex. C at 25-27. At this point, it is 1 :36 a.m. 

Mr. Wood then confessed. Ex. C at 27 ("I'm the one who did it."). The detective 

had him describe exactly how he did it; the explanation took about twenty-five minutes. 

6 

No. 32827-9-111 

State v. Wood 

Ex 18 at 01 :37:05-01 :51 :00. Detective Benson then left once more, asking again ifDW 

needed water or anything; DW requested more water. 

The detective returned eight minutes later with a piece of paper, and asked DW to 

write-out a statement and an apology letter to his son. Id. at 29-30. Shortly thereafter, he 

left again and returned with the cup of water. Ex. 18 at 02:04:56. DW spent forty 

minutes working on the statement and letter. Ex. 18 at 02:02:46-02:43:49. At around 

2:45 a.m., Detective Benson returns and says they are going to transport him to "juvi'." 

Id. at 02:48:22. The video ends with DW still sitting in the room at 2:48 a.m. Id. at 

02:48:40. 

The day after the interrogation, Mr. Wood met with his caseworker. In her 

presence, he retracted his confession: "I have admitted to all of the injuries, even the ones 

I didn't do to my son." Report of Proceedings at 102. 

The State charged Mr. Wood in Juvenile Court with two counts of second degree 

assault. A CrR 3.5 hearing was held concerning the admissibility of the confession. The 

court heard testimony and reviewed a transcript of the interrogation and the video itself. 

Ultimately, the court ruled that the confession was voluntary and admissible. 

The matter proceeded to bench trial. JL testified that she did not harm PL. DW 

testified that he had twice lashed out against the child, but denied the remainder of the 

behavior related in his confession. Mr. Wood was adjudicated guilty on both charges. 

7 

No. 32827-9-111 

State v. Wood 

The court declared a manifest injustice upwards and committed Mr. Wood until age 21. 

He promptly appealed to this court. 

ANALYSIS 

The sole issue presented by this appeal concerns whether the confession was 

voluntary. Mr. Wood contends that it was not and asks that his confession be suppressed 

and the convictions reversed and dismissed. Mr. Wood challenges both his waiver of his 

Miranda rights and the overall voluntariness of the confession based on his youth, tired 

t 

! 

i

, 

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condition, the length of the interrogation process, and allegedly coercive questioning. 

We agree with the trial court that the confession was voluntary and affirm the 

convictions. 

Established precedent guides our consideration of these arguments. Miranda 

requires that prior to conducting a custodial interrogation, police must first advise a 

suspect (1) of his right to remain silent and provide notice that anything said to the police 

might be used against him, (2) of the right to consult with an attorney prior to answering 

any questions and have the attorney present for questioning, (3) that counsel will be 

appointed for him if desired, and (4) that he can end questioning at any time. Miranda, 

384 U.S. at 444. The United States Supreme Court extended the protections of Miranda 

to juveniles in In re Application ofGault, 387 U.S. 1,42-57, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 

527 (1967). The court did not require any additional juvenile-specific language be added 

8 

No. 32827-9-111 

State v. Wood 

to supplement the rights identified in Miranda, although it noted that "there may well be 

some differences in technique." Id. at 55. 

"Whether a juvenile has knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights is 

determined by a 'totality-of-the-circumstances' approach." State v. Jones, 95 Wn.2d 616, 

625,628 P.2d 472 (1981) (quoting Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S. Ct. 2560, 

61 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1979». 

[This approach] permits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry into all the 

circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of 

the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and 

into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the 

nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving 

those rights. 

Id. (quoting Fare, 442 U.S. at 725). However, where a trial court has determined that a 

Miranda waiver was voluntary, appellate courts will not disturb the finding if the record 

reflects substantial evidence by which the court could have reached that conclusion. 

State v. Ng, 110 Wn.2d 32,37, 750 P.2d 632 (1988). 

In addition to whether a defendant properly waived his or her right to remain 

silent, a confession can still be involuntary due to the process by which it was obtained. 

Massey v. Rhay, 76 Wn.2d 78, 79, 455 P.2d 367 (1969) (confession coerced by police is 

not admissible). Courts also apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine if an 

individual knowingly and voluntarily confessed or instead confessed as product ofpolice 

9 

No. 32827-9-III 

State v. Wood 

coercIon. State v. Unga, 165 Wn.2d 95, 101, 196 P.3d 645 (2008). The totality-of-thecircumstances test also applies to juveniles. Id. at 103. 

Under that test, a confession induced by threats or promises that overbear the 

defendant's will constitutes coercion and must be excluded. Id. at 101-102. In addition 

to the previously noted factors, a court also considers factors relating to the interrogation 

itself, including its length, location, and continuity. Id. at 101, 103 (including both 

general factors and juvenile factors). An appellate court reviews a trial court's finding 

that the confession was voluntary and not coercive for substantial evidence. State v. 

Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 133,942 P.2d 363 (1997). 

There was substantial evidence that the waiver of Miranda rights at 10:45 p.m. 

was knowing and voluntary. Mr. Wood had returned to the hospital after work, spoke 

with the doctor, and then agreed to speak with officers at the police station. While he 

cites to evidence showing that he slept later in the evening, nothing suggests that he was 

that tired three hours earlier or that he did not understand what he was doing when he 

waived his rights. The trial court viewed the videotape of the interview and could assess 

Mr. Wood's condition at the time of the waiver. Substantial evidence supports the 

determination that Mr. Wood validly waived his constitutional rights. 

For support of his coercion claim, Mr. Wood argues that juveniles are less mature 

and less capable of resisting interrogation, that he was fatigued and isolated during a 

lengthy interrogation that lasted until 2:40 a.m., that JL also was being interrogated, and 

10 

No. 32827-9-III 

State v. Wood 

that the detective threatened not to return PL to a parent's custody without a 

determination who had harmed the child.4 Like the trial court, we do not agree with all of 

Mr. Wood's contentions here. Juvenile maturity, the defendant's fatigue, and the fact 

that he knew JL also was being questioned were considered part of the circumstances by 

the trial court. With the exception of fatigue, none of those factors suggested police 

coercion was taking place. The trial court aptly noted that while the interview took place 

over a lengthy period oftime, there were long periods of time when no questioning was 

taking place while the officers consulted with each other and with the medical doctor. 

Indeed, there was nothing accusatory about the interview until the second session was 

underway. This was not an extended interrogation designed to challenge or break a 

defendant's story. Instead, it was a slow build up that revealed the relevant information 

about the incident that gave the detective a basis to elicit a confession. 

We likewise agree with the trial judge that the detective did not employ any 

threats. Pointing out that the adult occupants of the house where the baby lived were 

suspects and that the baby was not going to be returned until it could be determined who 

harmed the child did not constitute a threat. It was a simple and logical statement of the 

problem facing the police, who then asked Mr. Wood's help resolving it. 

4 To this end, appellant assigns error to five findings of fact that he contends were 

not supported by substantial evidence. We address those challenges indirectly in the 

course ofthe remaining analysis. 

11 

No. 32827-9-III 

State v. Wood 

This case has many factual similarities to Unga. That case dealt with a 16 Y2 year 

old juvenile with a ninth grade education who was interrogated by police for a brief 

period. 165 Wn.2d at 108-109. While the interrogation was only about 30 minutes, there 

was some suggestion of a promise from the officer not to charge the youth. Id. at 107, 

109. Unga was given Miranda warnings, and the court noted that no evidence suggested 

he did not understand the consequences of waiving his rights. Id. at 108. The court 

found that the confession was voluntary and not the product of coercion from the 

promise. Id. at 113. The court specifically noted that there was no evidence to suggest 

the officer "used a threatening tone, raised his voice, badgered Unga, attempted to 

intimidate him, or engaged in other similar tactics." Id. at 109. The court also put weight 

on the brevity of the interrogation, and the fact that there were not multiple rounds of 

questioning. Id. 

While this case did not involve a brief interrogation, it also was less confrontational 

and there was no suggestion of any promises such as occurred there. Like Unga, there 

was a valid waiver of Miranda rights. As in Unga, DW had a ninth grade education, was 

given his Miranda warnings, appeared to understand his rights, and agreed to talk anyway. 

Further, the video showed that Detective Benson never used a threatening tone, raised his 

voice, badgered, or attempted to intimidate DW In fact, the detective told DW that he was 

not under arrest and they could stop if he got too tired. The detective also offered to get 

him anything he needed including water on more than one occasion. Finally, Detective 

12 

No. 32827-9-II1 

State v. Wood 

Benson's questions here appear to have led DW to want to confess. "[S]o long as that 

decision is a product of the suspect's own balancing of competing considerations, the 

confession is voluntary." Unga, 165 Wn.2d at 102 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 

598, 605 (3d Cir. 1986). 

Considering the totality ofthe circumstances, we agree that substantial evidence 

supported the trial court's determination that the confession was voluntarily given. Most 

certainly, it was not the product of coercion. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial 

court did not err in admitting the defendant's confession at trial. 

The judgment is affirmed. 

A majority ofthe panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 


WE CONCUR: 

~tU~, C-C+-

Siddoway, C.J. -0 

Lawrence-Berrey, 

13