NO. 4-01-1039

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

		Plaintiff-Appellant,

		v.

MARK D. JOHNSON,

		Defendant-Appellee.	)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)	Appeal from

Circuit Court of

McLean County

No. 01CF711

Honorable

Harold J. Frobish,

Judge Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

		PREZSIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of

the court:

		In June 2001, a grand jury indicted defendant, Mark D.

Johnson, an Illinois attorney, on four counts of bribery (720

ILCS 5/33-1(a) (West 2000)).  In November 2001, the trial court

granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.  The State

appeals, arguing the trial court erred in concluding the bribery

statute is unconstitutional as applied to defendant.  We reverse

and remand.

		I. BACKGROUND

		Count I of the indictment alleges that on or about

February 14, 2001, through March 31, 2001, defendant committed

the offense of bribery:

		"in that he knowingly and with the intent to

influence the performance of an act related

to the employment or function of a public

employee, specifically, deputy circuit clerk

Tina Benedetto, the defendant tendered to

Tina Benedetto $150.00 in United States cur rency, which she was not authorized by law to accept, to provide him with bond forms of

those individuals arrested for the offense of

driving under the influence, and other traf

fic offenses."

The remaining counts of the indictment were similar, except that

the time periods differed and the amounts allegedly tendered were

$200.

		In October 2001, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment.  In a supporting memorandum, defendant stated

that he approached Benedetto, a full-time employee in the traffic

division of the McLean County circuit clerk's office, to hire her

to provide him with copies of bond sheets containing the names

and addresses of those charged with driving under the influence. 

Defendant argued that prosecution would deprive him of due

process because the bribery statute is so vague as applied in

this case that he had no way of knowing at the time of his

conduct that it was illegal.

		In November 2001, the trial court held a hearing on

defendant's motion.  Defense counsel argued that the bond forms

were public information, and the assistant State's Attorney

responded that the information that defendant obtained was not

readily accessible without specific identifying information until

a case number is assigned.  The trial court determined that the

bribery statute contemplated the public official's action being

more than a ministerial act to which defendant was already entitled, i.e., providing information from bond sheets.  The trial court dismissed the indictment.  This appeal followed.

	II. ANALYSIS

	A. Vagueness

		The State argues that the trial court erred in dismiss

ing the indictment after concluding the bribery statute is

unconstitutional as applied to defendant.  We review this issue de novo.  People v. Blaylock, 311 Ill. App. 3d 399, 404, 723 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (2000).

		Where, as here, a statute challenged as void-for- vagueness does not impinge on first amendment rights, "due

process is satisfied if *** the statute's prohibitions are

sufficiently definite, when measured by common understanding and

practices, to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning

as to what conduct is prohibited."  People v. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 109, 113, 745 N.E.2d 548, 551 (2001).  The validity of the law must be judged in light of the particular facts at hand and not

hypothetical situations.  Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d at 112-13, 745 N.E.2d at 551.

		The bribery statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case because defendant received adequate notice of the statute's proscription.  The statute

plainly prohibits the tender of property to any public employee who is not authorized to accept it, with intent to influence the

performance of any act related to his or her employment or function, regardless of the amount of discretion vested in the employee.

			"With intent to influence the perfor

mance of any act related to the employment or

function of any public officer, public em

ployee, juror or witness, he promises or

tenders to that person any property or per

sonal advantage which he is not authorized by

law to accept."  720 ILCS 5/33-1(a) (West

2000).

The trial court erred in dismissing the indictment on vagueness

grounds.

	B. Official Duty

		As a ground for affirming the trial court's dismissal

of the indictment, defendant contends he did not influence the

performance of any act related to the employment or function of a

public employee because (1) no legal duty or official act was

presently before the public employee and (2) defendant sought to

obtain only public information to which he was already entitled. 

We disagree.

		The indictment did allege an intent to influence the performance of an act related to the function of a deputy circuit

clerk, i.e., providing copies of court records.  The reproduction service performed by a circuit clerk's office is tangential to

its duty to maintain the court's records.  Lee v. Pucinski, 267 Ill. App. 3d 489, 494, 642 N.E.2d 769, 773 (1994).  Although the bond sheets were public records subject to free access for

inspection (705 ILCS 105/16(6) (West 2000)), defendant was not entitled to reproduction without paying a fee for that service. 

705 ILCS 105/27.1(q), 27.1a(k)(5), 27.2(k)(5), 27.2a(k)(5) (West

2000) (effective until June 1, 2002).  The indictment alleges

bribery even if defendant paid Benedetto to perform a duty that defendant was legally entitled to have performed.  See In re Fleischman, 135 Ill. 2d 488, 496, 553 N.E.2d 352, 355 (1990).

	C. Corrupt Intent

		Defendant next claims that he did not have a corrupt

intent, and he intended only to implement an economic way of

obtaining public information.  However, in People v. Bergbreiter, 97 Ill. App. 2d 429, 432-33, 240 N.E.2d 230, 231-32 (1968), the

appellate court rejected the defendant's argument that a bribery

indictment was insufficient because it failed to allege a corrupt

intent, which was an element under the pre-1961 version of the

bribery statute (1959 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, pars. 78-81).

		The present indictment is sufficient because it charges the offense of bribery in the words of the current statute (720

ILCS 5/33-1(a) (West 2000)), which particularizes the offense and does not require a "corrupt" intent.  See People v. Carroll, 258 Ill. App. 3d 371, 376, 630 N.E.2d 1337, 1340 (1994) (an indict

ment that charges an offense in the language of the statute is

sufficient, if the words of the statute particularize the offense

so that an accused is apprised, with reasonable certainty, of the

precise offense).

	D. Not Authorized To Accept

		Defendant finally asserts that Benedetto was not forbidden by law from accepting outside employment.  However,

McLean County ordinance code section 10.73 provides, in relevant

part:

		"No employee of the [Ec]ounty shall directly

or indirectly receive or agree to receive any

compensation, gift, reward[,] or gratuity

from any source except McLean County, for any

matter or proceeding connected with or re

lated to the duties of such employees."  McLean County Code §10.73 (2001).

Therefore, Benedetto was not authorized to accept compensation from defendant for any matter related to her duties as deputy

circuit clerk, including providing copies of court records.  Defendant's knowledge of this prohibition is not an element of

the offense of bribery, and it need not be alleged in the indict

ment.  See People v. Brandstetter, 103 Ill. App. 3d 259, 267-68, 430 N.E.2d 731, 737-38 (1982).

  		III. CONCLUSION

		For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s

judgment and remand for further proceedings.

		Reversed and remanded.

		RTURNER and APPLETON, JJ>., concur.