The HONORABLE JOHN F. NANGLE, Senior United States *

District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by

designation.

 The HONORABLE GEORGE H. HOWARD, Jr., United States 1

District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

____________________

No. 95-2893

____________________

Diane Buchanna, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United

* States District Court

 v. * for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas.

Diehl Machine, Inc., *

*

Appellant. *

____________________

Submitted: April 12, 1996

 Filed: October 15, 1996

____________________

Before BEAM, Circuit Judge, MURPHY, Circuit Judge, and NANGLE, Senior

District Judge.*

____________________

NANGLE, Senior District Judge.

 The appellant-defendant appeals from a judgment of $350,000.00 entered

against it on a jury verdict. Appellant contends that the judgment should

be reversed because the trial court erred in denying its motion for

1

judgment as a matter of law, the trial court erred when it allowed the

introduction of certain industry standards into evidence at trial and the

trial court erred by creating an appearance of partiality for the

plaintiff. We affirm.
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I.

 Diane Buchanna was a saw operator for Bassett Wood Products. In 1992,

Buchanna had been a saw operator for 18 years and had worked with the same

saw for approximately 12 years. The saw she worked with was a Model SL52

industrial straight line ripsaw manufactured by appellant Diehl in 1968.

The saw has a 15 horsepower motor and a 14 inch blade and is used to cut

a board in half length-wise. All of the blade of the saw, except the top

three inches, was enclosed by a metal guard called a sawpit. In addition

to guarding the blade, the sawpit served as a sawdust receptacle. A metal

door accessed the sawpit and the blade was 12 inches from the door. When

the door is opened, or the power is turned off, the motor shuts down but

it takes four to five minutes for the blade to coast to a stop. A central

vacuum system, not provided by the manufacturer, was used to remove sawdust

from several machines including the ripsaw. After its manufacture, but

several years before the incident occurred in this case, Diehl provided a

number of warning labels that were affixed to the saw.

 On December 14, 1992, Buchanna returned from a work break and decided

to clean the sawdust out of the sawpit. As she had been instructed by her

supervisor, she turned off the saw and then used a piece of wood to stop

the blade so that she did not have to wait for it to coast to a stop.

Thinking that the blade had stopped, she reached into the sawpit with her

left hand to clean out the sawdust. She came into contact with the

spinning blade and injured her hand. Her small finger had to be amputated

and her hand reconstructed. After plaintiff's injury, her employer

installed a T bar outside the sawpit door so that the door could not be

opened if the blade, and the T bar, were spinning.

 On January 14, 1994, plaintiff filed this diversity products liability

action against Diehl alleging theories of strict
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liability and negligence. The case was tried to a jury for three days.

At trial, Buchanna's expert witness, a failure analyst, testified that the

saw was inherently dangerous, and therefore defective, because the sawpit

door could be opened while the blade was spinning, because the saw clogged

up with debris on a regular basis, and because the lighting at the sawpit

door was inadequate for a person to see if the blade was still spinning.

During the cross-examination of Buchanna, defense counsel attempted to

impeach her with deposition testimony concerning the use of both her hands

upon her return to work after the accident. The court allowed Buchanna's

counsel to voir dire her in front of the jury, and followed up with

questions of its own, to clarify plaintiff's testimony on this point.

During Diehl's case-in-chief, Diehl's president testified that the saw met

all applicable industry standards and that the use of a piece of wood to

stop the blade was safe. Plaintiff, over defendant's objection, introduced

American National Standards Institute ("ANSI") standards, approved after

the manufacture of the saw, to impeach the president's testimony. At the

conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a general verdict for plaintiff

for $350,000.00. Diehl moved for judgment as a matter of law, both at the

conclusion of Buchanna's case and at the close of evidence. The court

denied the motion and this appeal was taken.

II.

 A denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law is reviewed de

novo applying the same standard as the trial court. Kaplon v. Howmedica,

Inc., 83 F.3d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1996). Judgment entered on a jury verdict

should be affirmed, if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the appellee, reasonable persons could differ as to the proper conclusion.

Rademaker v. State of Nebraska, 906 F.2d 1309, 1311 (8th Cir. 1990).

Arkansas law applies in this diversity action and its interpretation is

reviewed de novo. Kaplon, 83 F.3d at 266.
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 Diehl asserts that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate on

Buchanna's strict liability claim because she failed to present substantial

evidence that the saw was defective rendering it unreasonably dangerous.

Under Arkansas law, a manufacturer is subject to strict liability if the

product is supplied in a defective condition which renders it unreasonably

dangerous and that defective condition was the proximate cause of the harm.

Ark. Code Ann. § 4-86-102(a)(1987). Unreasonably dangerous is defined

by statute in Arkansas:

"Unreasonably dangerous" means that a product is dangerous to

an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the

ordinary and reasonable . . . user who. . . . uses the product,

assuming the ordinary knowledge of the community or of similar

. . . users . . . as to its characteristics, propensities,

risks, dangers, and proper and improper uses, as well as any

special knowledge possessed by the particular . . . user . . .

or which he or she was required to possess.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-116-102 (1987). We find that Buchanna presented

substantial evidence that the saw was defective and unreasonably dangerous.

 Buchanna's evidence that the saw was defective rendering it

unreasonably dangerous was primarily supplied by Buchanna's expert, Robert

Evans. Evans testified that the saw was inherently dangerous, and

therefore defective, mainly because the sawpit door could be opened while

the blade was spinning. He also criticized the fact that the saw clogged

up with debris on a regular basis and that the lighting at the sawpit door

was inadequate for a person to see if the blade was still spinning. Diehl

contends that Evans' opinions are not substantial evidence because he "was

completely ignorant of the field in which he testified and thus had no

basis for his claims". Appellant's brief at 16-17.

 Under Arkansas law, "[a] properly qualified expert's opinion

constitutes substantial evidence unless it is shown that the
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expert's opinion is without reasonable basis". Ford Motor Co. v. Massey,

855 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Ark. 1993). Diehl cannot argue that Evans was not

properly qualified because Diehl did not object to the approval of Evans

as an expert by the district court. Trial Transcript at 157. Moreover,

there was a reasonable basis for Evans' opinions. Evans testified that he

relied on his knowledge, education and background in forming his opinion.

Id. at 129. Evans further testified that in forming his opinion, he relied

on the operating and maintenance manuals for the machine, the deposition

testimony of Buchanna and Diehl's plant manager, photographs of the saw,

industry standards and regulations, and drawings of the machine. Id. at

129-30. Diehl had an opportunity to cross-examine Evans to try to show

that his opinion had a questionable basis. Such an opportunity was all

that was required and the jury was entitled to credit Evans' testimony if

it so chose. See Massey, 855 S.W.2d at 899, 900 (stating that if crossexamination shows expert testimony to have weak or questionable basis that

goes to weight and credibility of testimony).

 Buchanna also contends that two subsequent remedial measures -Diehl's

providing of warning labels after manufacture and Bassett's installation

of the mechanical interlock device (the T bar) - provide substantial

evidence to support the jury's verdict. Federal Rule of Evidence 407 does

not require the exclusion of subsequent remedial measures in strict

liability cases. See Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378, 1386 (8th Cir.

1991)(holding that evidence of subsequent remedial measure in support of

strict liability claim was not precluded by Rule 407). Moreover, these

subsequent remedial measures were relevant to show that a different design

or warning would have prevented the harm and that it was feasible to

include this design or warning before the product was sold. See Robbins

v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association, 552 F.2d 788, 794, 794 n.5

(8th Cir. 1977). Thus, these measures also constitute evidence supporting

the jury's verdict as to the strict liability claim.
 Although Buchanna alleged both negligent design and 2

negligent failure to warn claims, the negligent design claim

appears to have been the primary claim at trial and is the

negligence claim addressed on appeal by the parties.

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 In addition to its criticism of Evans' opinions, Diehl contends that

there was not substantial evidence that the saw was defective and

unreasonably dangerous because Buchanna had worked with the saw for 12

years, had read the safety instructions, was aware of the warning labels

on the saw, and knew not to stick her hand in the sawpit door until the

blade had stopped spinning. Both Buchanna and Diehl agree that, under

Arkansas law, the open and obvious danger rule is not a bar to recovery for

a strict liability claim. See Lockley, 933 F.2d at 1383. As it was

entitled to do under the law, the jury heard the evidence on this issue and

found for Buchanna regardless of any open or obvious danger.

 Diehl further contends that Buchanna was required to prove that the

machine contained a danger other than that danger posed by all ripsaws.

Diehl relies on French v. Grove Manufacturing Co., 656 F.2d 295 (8th Cir.

1981), for this proposition. In French, the Court held that a jury

instruction that required plaintiff to prove that the product "contains

some danger other than those all cranes pose, which danger was not and

would not reasonably be appreciated by an ordinarily prudent person" was

not exceedingly clear but was not in error. Id. at 299. This holding does

not mean that Arkansas plaintiffs in strict liability cases are required

to show a difference between the alleged defective product and all other

similar products in every case. Rather, under the Arkansas Products

Liability Act, it is evidence that may be considered by the trier of fact.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-116-104(a)(2)(1987). 

Diehl also asserts that its motion for judgment as a matter of law

should have been granted because Buchanna failed to produce substantial

evidence that Diehl was negligent in its design of the saw. The Court

2

disagrees. In Arkansas, an inference of negligence
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arises when a product is shown to be unreasonably dangerous. International

Harvester Co. v. Land, 354 S.W.2d 13, 18 (Ark. 1962). Contrary to Diehl's

argument, Buchanna showed that Diehl owed her a duty of care by showing

their relationship as manufacturer and user of the saw. As discussed

above, Evans' expert testimony supports the jury's finding of unreasonable

dangerousness. In addition, although subsequent remedial measures are

generally excluded by Rule 407 in negligence claims (as the warning labels

supplied by Diehl after manufacture would be here), Bassett's installation

of the mechanical interlock device would also support the jury's finding

of negligence in this case. There is an exception to Rule 407 for

subsequent remedial measures undertaken by third parties "because the

policy goal of encouraging remediation would not necessarily be furthered

by exclusion of such evidence". O'Dell v. Hercules, Inc., 904 F.2d 1194,

1204 (8th Cir. 1990); see also 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger,

Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 407[01] at 407-11 (1994)("Because the controlling

ground for excluding evidence has been the promotion of the policy of

encouraging people to take safety precautions, remedial measures carried

out by persons not party to the suit are not covered.")(footnotes omitted).

 Diehl's argument that other evidence, including compliance with

applicable industry standards in place at the time of manufacture and

evidence that the saw was as safe as other saws manufactured in 1968, shows

that judgment as a matter of law should have been granted is not

persuasive. Rather, such evidence merely shows that the jury had competing

evidence from which to choose. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-116-105(a) and

16-116-104(a)(1987). A reasonable jury could have come to the conclusion

that Diehl was negligent in its design of the saw. Therefore, the trial

court did not err in denying Diehl's motion for judgment as a matter of

law.
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III.

 Diehl's second argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in

allowing Buchanna to introduce industry standards promulgated after the saw

was manufactured. A district court's admission of evidence over objection

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Whitetail, 956

F.2d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 1992). As noted above, Diehl's president, Robert

Rozman, who was also chairman of the ANSI committee on wood working

machines, was called to testify in Diehl's case-in-chief. He was certified

as an expert in standards and state of the art for the wood industry.

Trial Transcript at 361. Mr. Rozman testified that the saw in question met

all applicable industry standards in 1968. Id. at 362. He also testified

that stopping the machine with a piece of wood was not an unsafe practice.

Id. at 388.

 Buchanna contends that she introduced parts of the subsequently

approved ANSI standards to impeach Rozman's credibility in two ways.

First, Buchanna contends that in response to Rozman's criticism of the

mechanical interlock device, Buchanna asked if anything could have been

added to the machine to make it safer. Id. at 386. When Rozman responded

that devices to electronically stop the motor were available in the 1980's,

Buchanna introduced an ANSI standard, approved in 1978, that mentioned

electronic brakes. Id. at 389. Second, Buchanna had Rozman read part of

a 1978 standard applying to radial arm saws which stated that stopping

blade rotation with a piece of wood should be prohibited. Id.

 Diehl contends that admission of the irrelevant subsequent standards

was unfairly prejudicial because it implied that Diehl failed to meet the

industry standard of applying a blade brake and the error was compounded

by the fact that the standard applied to radial arm saws rather than

industrial straight line ripsaws. Diehl relies on White v. Clark Equipment

Co., 553 S.W.2d 280 (Ark.
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1977), to contend that the evidence was irrelevant and should not have been

admitted. In White, a man was fatally injured when a trailer moved away

from a warehouse dock as he was backing a forklift out of the trailer. The

forklift he was driving fell backwards on him. The trailer manufacturer

was one of the defendants that the wife of the deceased sued in the

wrongful death action. The trial court refused to admit a United States

Department of Transportation regulation promulgated after the manufacture

of the trailer and after the accident occurred. On appeal, the court held

that the evidence had no relevance to the question of whether the

manufacturer had exercised ordinary care in its design and manufacture of

the trailer. Id. at 281. The court further held that the probative value

of the subsequent regulation in impeaching the manufacturer's expert

witness was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id.

 In this case, the relevance and the prejudicial effect of this

evidence are close questions, especially given the question of whether this

standard applied to industrial ripsaws or only to radial arm saws. Diehl

had an opportunity to address these issues on Mr. Rozman's re-direct

examination, however. See Trial Transcript at 396. Therefore, we cannot

say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.

Even if admission of this evidence were an abuse of discretion, we

find that it was harmless error pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

61 because, viewed in context of the entire trial, its admission did not

affect Diehl's substantial rights. Moreover, as discussed above,

substantial evidence other than the subsequent standards supported the

jury's verdict in this case. See Brown v. LaCreek Electric Association,

Inc., 939 F.2d 623, 625 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding exclusion of evidence was

harmless error because substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict).

IV.
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 Diehl's third argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by

suggesting and allowing Buchanna's counsel to voir dire her on her

cross-examination and making clarifying comments of its own in the presence

of the jury. Diehl contends that this conduct created an appearance of

partiality by the court toward the plaintiff. Because Diehl did not object

to the court's actions at trial, the judgment may be reversed on this

ground only if it is found to be plain error. Mitchell v. Kirk, 20 F.3d

936, 937 (8th Cir. 1994). Plain error is an error that "almost surely

affected the outcome of the case". Champagne v. United States, 40 F.3d

946, 947 (8th Cir. 1994)(quoting Angelo v. Armstrong World Industries,

Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 961 (10th Cir. 1993)). Having reviewed the relevant

portion of the transcript, we conclude that the trial court's actions did

not affect the outcome of the case and, thus, did not constitute plain

error.

V.

 In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying

Diehl's motion for judgment as a matter of law, did not err in admitting

the subsequent industry standards and did not commit plain error by

creating an appearance of partiality toward the plaintiff. Accordingly,

we affirm the judgment of the district court.

BEAM, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

 Use of evidence of the modification of the saw by Diehl's customer,

Bassett, the modification occurring at least twelve years after sale of the

saw and the commencement of its use, as proof of a design defect existing

at the time of earlier sale, was prejudicial error. Thus, I would reverse

the case and remand the matter for a new trial.

 As noted by the court, the saw was manufactured in 1968 and
 Only the Tenth Circuit has embraced the reasoning in 3

Robbins and then only partially. Nine other circuits have

squarely rejected Robbins and exclude proof of subsequent

remedial measures when offered as substantive evidence of a

defect in a product. See Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d

1518, 1522 (1st Cir. 1991); In re Joint E. Dist. and S. Dist.

Asbestos Litig. v. Armstrong World Indus., 995 F.2d 343, 345-46

(2d Cir. 1993); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 9670 (1982); Kelly v. Crown Equip.

Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1275 (3d Cir. 1992); Werner v. Upjohn Co.,

628 F.2d 848, 856-58 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080

(1981); Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883,

886-89 (5th Cir. 1983); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk

Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 232-33 (6th Cir. 1980);

Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468-70 (7th Cir.

1984); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 636-37, modified, 805

F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986); Wood v. Morbark Indus., 70 F.3d 1201,

1206-07 (11th Cir. 1995). Further, the Judicial Conference of

the United States has now recommended to the Supreme Court that

Rule 407 be amended to specifically extend the exclusionary

effect of the Rule to proof of "a defect in a product, a defect

in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction,"

thus, directly overruling Robbins when and if the change is

ultimately adopted by the Court and Congress. Report of the

Judicial Conference Cormnittee on Rules of Practice and

Procedure, September 1996.

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was sold to Buchanna's employer at least twelve years (and probably many

additional years) prior to 1992, the year of the accident. After the

accident, and without Diehl's knowledge, Buchanna's employer extended a

shaft through the clean-out door and created a whirling T-bar arrangement

designed to prohibit opening the door while the saw blade was in motion.

 This, Buchanna contends and the court agrees, was a "subsequent

remedial measure" admissible as substantive evidence of a defect in the saw

under this circuit's analysis of Federal Rule of Evidence 407. See Robbins

v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793-95 (8th Cir.

1977). Federal Rule of Evidence 407 is, however, in no way applicable to 3

a modification made by a customer of the manufacturer, especially when the

alteration is made many years after the sale of the product and without the

manufacturer's knowledge. The admissibility, or not, of this evidence is

governed by Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and
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403. The question is: are the facts relevant and, if relevant, are they

or are they not unfairly prejudicial? In this case, evidence of this poorly

conceived and dangerous customer modification was barely, if at all,

relevant and clearly inadmissible according to any reasonable test under

Rule 403.

 Rule 407 is a rule of exclusion and not inclusion and it so states.

The Rule clearly deals with the conduct of a tortfeasor or defendant

manufacturer or seller, not a third person not a party to the litigation.

Indeed, as the advisory note to the Rule states, the policy underlying the

Rule is to promote measures that will lead to safer products even when a

defendant believes he or she is not guilty of culpable conduct. As noted

in Weinstein's Evidence:

[b]ecause the controlling ground for excluding [subsequent

remedial] evidence has been the promotion of the policy of

encouraging people to take safety precautions, remedial

measures carried out by persons not party to the suit are not

covered [by Rule 407]. Since the person taking the remedial

measures is not affected by having the evidence admitted as an

admission of fault, the admissibility of the evidence should be

governed bythe general relevancy requirements of Rules 401-403

rather than Rule 407.

2 Jack B. Weinstein, et al., Weinstein's Evidence § 407[01] at 407-11

(1992).

 The court cites O'Dell v. Hercules. Inc., 904 F.2d 1194, 1204 (8th

Cir. 1990) for the proposition that subsequent measures by a third party

are an exception to the exclusionary force of Rule 407. O'Dell, if not in

error on the point, is wholly inapposite to this case. First, since the

evidence at issue in O'Dell was excluded and not admitted under an

exception to Rule 407, the statement from O'Dell is pure obiter dictum.

Id. at 1203. Second, the statement, citing as its source Farner v. Paccar,

Inc., 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977), is an incorrect analysis of the holding

in Farner. While the Farnar court parrots (and overstates) Robbins, the

essential holding was that Rule 407 was inapplicable to a determination of
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the admissibility of this type of evidence. The court correctly held that

the third-party modification "was not barred by Fed. R. Evid. 407." Farner

562 F.2d at 528. But, as pointed out in Weinstein, the evidence was

admissible because it was relevant to one or more of the issues in the

litigation not because Farner was a products liability case unaffected by

exclusions contained in Rule 407. Id. ("We . . . conclude that the evidence

of . . . [third party's] subsequent installation of safety chains, was

relevant to the issue of [Paccar's] defective design.") Id. Relevance

under Rule 402 (not admissibility under Rule 407) is the question to be

considered in this appeal.

 Thus, the post-1992 modification of the saw by Bassett was not made

admissible by Rule 407. Evidence of Bassett's alteration should have been

admissible only if it provided relevant proof of a defect in Diehl's 1968

design. It did not and the evidence should have been excluded.

Accordingly, I dissent. 

A true copy.

 Attest:

CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH CIRCUIT.