### FILED DEC. 9,2014 In the Office ofthe ClerkofCourt W A State CourtofAppeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 31272-1-II1 Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) ETHAND. YORK, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. ) KORSMO,J.

- Ethan York challenges hisjuvenile court adjudications for first degree malicious mischiefandreckless endangerment onthe basis that the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence his statements to the investigating detective. We conclude that the trial court correctly determinedthat the statements were notthe subject ofcustodial interrogation and affirm the adjudications. FACTS Two Spokane County Sheriffs Deputies, working under the sheriffs contract with the City ofSpokane Valley, responded at high speeds to a report ofa large fight in progress in the city. The first deputy's vehicle hit some objectbut continued downthe road, while the second deputy's vehicle hit a different object, went into a spin, and ultimately overturned, injuring the deputy. An investigation determinedthat tree branches and a log had beenplaced onthe street. The log had causedthe accident.



### ! t

# INo. 31272-1-II1 State 

### v. York
Detectives investigating the incidentreceived a tip that Curtis Whittikind andhis cousin, Ethan York, were responsible for the accident. The detectives spoke with Whittikind who told them howto find Mr. York. Detective Welton and Deputy Moser wenttothe home ofErin Carlson, the mother ofMr. York's girl friend. Ethan York was living at the Carlsonhome atthe time. Ms. Carlson invitedthe two investigators into the home to speak with York about a criminal investigation. Mr. York and his girl friend came up from the basement and sat on a couch in the living room with the detective. Ms. Carlson stood inthe doorway to the living room while Deputy Moser stood in the foyer. Welton told Yorkthathe was investigating "a crime" and had spoken to Whittikind, who had "spilled it to me." Mr. Yorkbecame glum. Detective Welton encouraged York to speak, but did not question him. Mr. York admitted his involvement with "puttingthings inthe road" and wrote a statementto that effect. The statement was admitted at the adjudication afterthejuvenile court concluded it was notthe product ofa custodial interrogation. The statement was the sole evidence connectingMr. York to the incident. The courtconcludedthatMr. York had committed both ofthe charged offenses. Mr. Yorkthen timely appealed to this court.



### , 

# l , 

### I 

# I 2
, 

## i**~**

### No. 31272-1-III 

### State v. 

### York
ANALYSIS The sole issue presented in this appeal is a contention that the court erredby concluding Mr. 

### York's statements were not the products ofacustodial interrogation. Well settled law confirms thatthe trialjudge correctly assessedthe situation. Priorto conducting a custodial interrogation, an officer must first advise the suspect ofhis rights regardingthe interrogation. 

### Miranda v. 

### Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. 

### Ed. 2d 694 (1966). A defendant is in custody for purposes of 

### Miranda when his freedom ofaction is curtailedto the degree associated with a formal arrest. 

### Berkemer v. 

### McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. 

### Ed. 2d 317 (1984). I 

### Interrogation is "express questioning or its functional equivalent" by police. 

### RhodeIslandv. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01,100 S. Ct. 1682,64 L. 

### Ed. 2d 297 (1980). The "functional equivalent" ofquestioning involves behaviorthat police should know is "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminatingresponse." 

### Id. at 302. The United States Supreme Court extended the protections of

### Miranda tojuveniles in 

### In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,42-57, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. 

### Ed. 2d 527 (1967). However, juveniles are not extended additional 

### Miranda-type protections. 

### Id. at 55; 

### State v. 

### Miller,

165 Wn. App. 385, 389, 267 P.3d 524 (2011), 

### review denied, 173 Wn.2d 1035 (2012).

I 

### In 

### Berkemer, the court concluded that routine roadside seizure and questioning did not amountto custodial interrogation. 468 U.S. at 440. 3No. 31272-1-111 State v. York Here, thejuvenile court determined that Mr. York was not in custody and was not subject to interrogation since he was simply encouragedto tell his story. We agree with the determination that Mr. York was not in custody and, therefore, need not address his argumentthatthe interview was the functional equivalent ofinterrogation. BecauseMiranda "custody" is equated with a formal arrest, questioning thattakes place inpublic or private environments outside ofpolice control frequently is not considered "custodial." For example,juveniles questioned in Spokane's Riverfront Park
were not "in custody." State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210,95 P.3d 345 (2004). An adult questioned in the course ofa search ofher apartment was not in custody in State v. RosasMiranda, 176 Wn. App. 773, 309 P.3d 728 (2013). Ajuvenile rape suspect questioned in his own home in his mother's presence was not found to be "incustody" in State v. SJ. W, 149 Wn. App. 912, 206 P.3d 355 (2009). Similarly here, Mr. York was not in custody while he sat with his girl friend on the couch inthe living room ofthe house where he was residing. There were no hallmarks of
a formal arrest that could have turned this conversation into a custodial setting. 2 The juvenile court correctly concluded that Mr. York was not in custody.

2 This courthas even concluded that advising a suspectthat he was under arrest and placing him in apatrol car did not constitute an arrest because he was not deprived ofhis telephone. See State v. Radka, 120 Wn. App. 43, 83 P.3d 1038 (2004). 4No. 31272-1-111 State v. York
The adjudications are affirmed. A majority ofthe panel has determinedthis opinion will notbe printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuantto RCW 2.06.040.

# ~J**~rsmo,J.** WE CONCUR:

Siddoway, C.J.

­

531272-1-111 FEARING, 1. (concurring) - 1concur in the affirmation ofEthan York's conviction, although I disagree that the same standard applied to an adult necessarily applies to whether a minorhas undergone a custodial interrogation. That question should await another day. In UnitedStates v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 1.Ed. 2d497 (1980), the United States Supreme Court establishedthe test for what constitutes a seizure, which test Washington courts employ today. See State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d 656,663,222 P.3d 92 (2009). A seizure occurs when, "in view ofall ofthe circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believedthat he
was not free to leave." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; accordHarrington, 167 Wn.2d at 663; State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689,695,92 P.3d 202 (2004). Stated differently, a police contactconstitutes a seizure only if, under the totality ofthe circumstances, a reasonableperson would not have felt free to leave, "terminate the encounter, refuse to
answer the officer's question, or otherwise go about his business." State v. Thorn, 129 Wn.2d 347, 353, 917 P.2d 108, overruledon othergrounds byState v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 62 P.3d489 (2003). Whether a reasonable person would believe he was

### No. 31272-1-III State v. York- concurring
detained depends on theparticular, objective facts surrounding the encounter. State v. Ellwood, 52 Wn. App. 70, 73,757 P.2d 547 (1988). Since the courts use a reasonable person standard, the test ofwhether aperson considers himselforherselfdetained is the same no matterthe citizen's race, sex, mental acuity, and social background. Nevertheless, neitherthe United States Supreme Court
northe Washington Supreme Courthas analyzed whether the reasonable person standard changes when thepolice contact is with a minor. In State v. Heritage, ourhigh court expressly declined "to decide whether the age ofthe suspect can ever be taken into account for purposes ofthe Miranda custody requirement." 152 Wn.2d 210,219,95 P.3d 345 (2004). Psychological literature teaches that people feel compelled to comply with authority figures, particularly law enforcement. This compulsion may be stronger with youth. Because oflimited experience andjudgment, children cannot sign legally binding contracts or bring lawsuits. RCW 26.28.015; Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.8., 148 Wn. App. 205,214, 199 P.3d 1010 (2009), reversedon othergrounds, Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.8., 171 Wn.2d 695, 257 P.3d 570 (2011). Washington law tolls the statute oflimitations for personal injury to minors, since they generally lack the understanding, knowledge and
resources to effectively assert their rights. DeYoungv. ProvidenceMed. etr., 136 Wn.2d 136, 146,960P.2d 919 (1998). The capacity ofaminor, including a 16-year-old boy, for

2No. 31272-1-III 

### State v. 

### York- concurring negligence or fault in torts is a question offact based on the child's age, intelligence, and maturity. 

### Brown v. 

### Derry, 10 Wn. App. 459, 463,518 P.2d 251 (1974). In his appellate brief, Ethan York observed that he recently turned 16 years old when the officers spoke to him, "sohis youthfulness and naivety must be taken into account." Br. Appellant at 11. Yorkprovided no authority for this argument. This court does notreview errors alleged but not argued, briefed, or supported with citation to authority. RAP 10.3(a)(6);

### Avellaneda v. 

### State, 167 Wn. App. 474, 485 n.5, 273 P.3d 477 (2012).

# ~ 

# - :J, 

# Fert::Tf'

3