UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4364

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

RANDY BAKER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., 

District Judge. (3:01-cr-00045-MOC-1; 3:01-cr-00145-MOC-1)

Submitted: November 27, 2012 Decided: November 30, 2012

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Henderson Hill, Director, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal 

Defender, Douglas E. Roberts, Staff Attorney, FEDERAL DEFENDERS 

OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Randy Baker appeals the district court’s order 

revoking his two concurrent terms of supervised release and 

imposing concurrent sentences of twenty-two months’ and ten 

months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

certifying that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal but 

questioning whether the district court imposed a plainly 

unreasonable sentence. Baker was notified of his right to file 

a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so. The Government 

has declined to file a response brief. We affirm.

A district court possesses broad discretion to impose 

a sentence revoking a defendant’s supervised release term. 

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). 

We will affirm a sentence imposed upon revocation if it is 

within the statutory maximum and not “plainly unreasonable.” 

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). 

In making this determination, we first consider whether the 

sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id. at 

438. A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the 

district court considered the Chapter Seven policy statements 

and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-40. The 

district court need not explain its reasons for imposing a 
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revocation sentence in as much detail as in imposing an original 

sentence, but “it still must provide a statement of reasons for 

the sentence it imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). A revocation sentence is 

substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper 

basis for concluding that the defendant should receive the 

sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d 

at 440.

Here, the terms of imprisonment imposed by the court 

do not exceed the statutory maximums applicable to each offense. 

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a), 3583(e)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 

2012). The district court considered the advisory range, 

§ 3553(a) factors, and arguments posed by both parties. While 

the court did not “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every 

subsection,” it was not required to do so. United States v. 

Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The court adequately explained its rationale 

and grounded the sentence imposed in proper bases, including 

Baker’s repeated pattern of supervised release violations, the 

incarceration he had already served due to prior revocations, 

and its conclusion that Baker had proven unsupervisable. Thus, 

our review of the record reveals that Baker’s sentence is not 

unreasonable, let alone plainly so.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for review. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This 

court requires that counsel inform Baker, in writing, of the 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Baker requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Baker.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED