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TURKEY AT A CROSSROADS: WHAT DO THE

GEZI PARK PROTESTS MEAN FOR DEMOCRACY

IN THE REGION?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 26, 2013

Serial No. 113–38

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D., Beyer family fellow, director, Turkish Research Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ..................................... 5

The Honorable James F. Jeffrey, Philip Solondz distinguished visiting fellow, 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (former American Ambassador to Turkey) ................................................................................................... 12

Kadir Ustun, Ph.D., research director, Foundation for Political, Economic, 

and Social Research (SETA) ................................................................................ 17

Hillel Fradkin, Ph.D., director, Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future 

of the Muslim World, Hudson Institute ............................................................. 27

Mr. Kadri Gursel, contributing writer to Al-Monitor ........................................... 35

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 9

The Honorable James F. Jeffrey: Prepared statement ......................................... 14

Kadir Ustun, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .............................................................. 19

Hillel Fradkin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 29

Mr. Kadri Gursel: Prepared statement .................................................................. 38

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 60

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 61

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 62

(1)

TURKEY AT A CROSSROADS: WHAT DO THE 

GEZI PARK PROTESTS MEAN FOR 

DEMOCRACY IN THE REGION? 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I call to order this hearing of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats. Today’s topic is ‘‘Turkey at the Crossroads.’’ What do these protests 

mean for democracy in the region and what does it mean for Turkey? 

After I and the ranking member Keating each take 5 minutes to 

make opening statements. Each member present will have 1 

minute for opening remarks, alternating between majority and minority members. And, without objection, all members will have 5 

days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous material for 

the record subject to length and limitation rules. Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

Turkey is a NATO ally whose strategic and geographic location 

is as important as ever. And I remember during the Cold War 

when Turkey was absolutely essential to the security of the United 

States and, yes, the peace of the world. 

Over the past decade, the orientation of Turkish foreign policy 

under Prime Minister Erdogan has been troubling. Its shift in 

alignment away from our friends in the Middle East and toward 

Syria and Iran has increased tensions in the region. The policy, 

called ‘‘No Troubles With Neighbors,’’ has been applied to the new 

engagements with Syria and Iran, but the opposite has taken place 

with Israel. 

Erdogan embraces Hamas leadership, for example, for its seizure 

of power in Gaza and the Iranian leadership for its ‘‘right to a nuclear program.’’ He has supported the infamous Gaza flotilla that 

tried to rum supplies to the Hamas terrorists. The Syrian civil war 

has caused Prime Minister Erdogan to move backwards toward the 

West and face the menace of an Iranian Hezbollah intervention. 

As requested, the U.S. and NATO have deployed Patriot air defense systems in Turkey. So all of this is having its impact. The 

2

Turks are Sunni Muslims and have a natural sympathy for the 

Sunni rebels in Syria who are fighting a dictatorship rooted in a 

minority cult associated with Shia Islam. Yet, sympathy has not 

kept Erdogan’s policy of supported the rebels and accepting refugees from being controversial at home at least. 

If the Obama administration is serious about increasing U.S. aid 

to the rebels, it will have to work with Turkey, as it has been 

doing. But who exactly are the Turks supporting in this? What 

type of people are we talking about? Are the people that are being 

helped by Turkey in the Syrian conflict people who—do they hate 

the United States? And how reliable a partner do we have now in 

Turkey if they are indeed allying themselves with these anti-American elements? 

Mass protests over local issues have shaken the Erdogan administration. And its resort to a harsh crackdown on dissidents helps 

spread popular anger. And let us note that up until now, we have 

seen and I have personally seen Turkey as an example of what I 

would say moderate Islam in a changing world. And some of the 

crackdown that we have seen and, of course, this situation in Syria 

and some of these other alliances leaves some serious questions, 

which is the reason why we are having this hearing today. 

Of course, cracking down on demonstrators leads to worse situations, as we have found out in the West. And Prime Minister 

Erdogan’s loyalists have, of course, unfortunately—this is not true 

of the Prime Minister himself, I am sure—resorted to wild conspiracy theories, blaming the Jewish lobby and the American Enterprise Institute for the demonstrations taking place in their own 

country. The Prime Minister himself has referred to the interest 

rates lobby, which is or at least can be easily translated as a slur 

against Jews. Such tactics call into question the character of the 

ruling party of Turkey. And when I say ‘‘call into question,’’ it 

doesn’t answer it, but it calls into questions. And that is why we 

are having this hearing today, to explore some of those questions 

and find out, maybe calm some of the fears or perhaps maybe reconfirm from some of the other fears that we have had. 

There have been reports that anti-semitic textbooks have been 

adopted in public schools in the last 10 years and that Hitler’s 

‘‘Mein Kampf’’ has become some kind of a best seller. This is not 

a sign of a healthy democracy. And yesterday it was reported that 

in the capital of Ankara, police raised some 30 residential addresses to arrest protestors at home, going well beyond just confronting 

demonstrators in the streets in order to maintain public order. 

The European Union has postponed talks on Turkey’s request for 

membership until at least October because of the concerns. And, 

most strongly, these concerns are being voiced by Germany. And 

they will, of course, when these talks resume, at that point, the situation could have calmed down in Turkey. And we would be able 

to find out the true nature of what is happening. 

Our hearing will look at whether Turkey can meet the challenges 

that face it at home and abroad and are what challenges are being 

faced by the Erdogan Government itself and what are the potential 

impacts on these challenges in the way they are met on the interests and values of the people of the United States. 

3

To help us answer these questions, we have a distinguished 

panel, including a veteran diplomat, experts on Turkish society and 

history and on Islam, and a journalist who has been covering the 

protests on the ground. What we do not have is anyone from the 

State Department. And we requested that State send someone. But 

their response was that the Department wanted to ‘‘keep its public 

powder dry.’’ So maybe they are trying to assess the situation as 

well. And so what the Obama administration thinks of events and 

how it will react will remain a mystery, perhaps to them as well 

as us. 

And let me just close by saying this. This hearing is not intended 

to be a ‘‘beat up Turkey’’ hearing. We actually have some very serious questions and concerns about what is going on, the direction 

of the country. As I say, in the not-so-distant past, I looked at Turkey as perhaps a great example of modern Islamic Government and 

how it could do good things and can be relied on to promote 

progress and peace and stability. 

Now, after the events and what has been going on, what are 

some of the things that have been disclosed, where there are serious questions. And today I hope to have those questions answered. 

And now I would turn to our ranking member for whatever opening statement you would like to make for as long as you would like 

to make it. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings today. 

Turkey has been a U.S. ally in an incredibly rough neighborhood 

for many decades now. For this reason, the political stability and 

economic strength of Turkey is a matter of importance to many 

American policymakers, analysts, and business people. The membership of Turkey in the Group of 20 along with its growing trade 

partnerships throughout the region are positive developments, not 

only for Turkey but also for U.S. national interests. 

Further, the recent news of enhanced prospects for normalization 

of relationships between Israel and Turkey as well as the long 

overdue peace accord with the Kurds is welcomed. However, it is 

domestic politics that have now taken center stage in Turkey. The 

electoral dominance of Prime Minister Erdogan’s AK Party for 

more than a decade has led to the emergence of a seemingly oneparty state. Other parties have little-to-no ability to influence decision-making, and that has left many Turks feeling threatened, 

frustrated, and powerless. These feelings are exacerbated by the 

Prime Minister’s self-acknowledged majoritarian philosophy, namely that a government elected with a parliamentary majority has no 

post-election obligation to consult the governed. 

However what most caught the eye of this subcommittee and the 

world has been the Prime Minister’s seeming sanctioning of brute 

force by the police against peaceful protesters. In the last few 

weeks, five people have died. Some 4,900-plus protesters have been 

detained and 4,000 people were injured. 

There are countless reports of arrests of doctors treating injured 

bystanders, young adults using social media to express their frustrations, and lawyers attempting to defend the fragile rule of law. 

Further, the rhetoric of the Turkish Government has inflamed the 

situation, as the Prime Minister publicly praises the police and reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:14 Aug 21, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\062613\81694 HFA PsN: SHIRL
4

peatedly distinguishes between those that support him and those 

who do not. 

For this reason, I am pleased that President Obama, Vice President Biden, and Secretary Kerry have made responsible statements 

calling the Turkish Government to account, and I commend them 

for that. I will speak for myself when I say that following years of 

mostly astute governance in Turkey, the Turkish Government’s response to the recent protests came not only as a disappointment 

but as a surprise, frankly. 

As we sit here today, the protests continue on, with the Turkish 

Interior Ministry reporting at least 2.5 million protesters over the 

past 3-plus weeks. In fact, these numbers and the sheer diversity 

of the protesters represent hope for the emergence of a vibrant, politically engaged generation of Turks that embrace pluralism. If so, 

the energy of these demonstrations could well become the basis for 

a re-invigorated, dynamic democracy. That is not a development 

Mr. Erdogan should fear but, rather, he should welcome. 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ perspectives on this developing situation and thank especially those who have traveled 

from Turkey to share their views here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back my time. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And Mr. Duncan has 

an opening statement as well. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, as a friend of Turkey, I appreciate you holding these hearings on what the protests 

mean for democracy in the region. 

I remember just 2 short years ago, you and I were in Turkey observing the parliamentary elections in June 2011 if my memory 

serves me correctly. So watching the political dynamics going on in 

Turkey right now is something that is interesting to me. And I enjoyed a conversation I had this morning about these very issues. 

And I look forward to a follow-up on that. 

And, with that, I will yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for that opening statement. And let us just note that 2 years ago, there was that election. We were there. And everyone was deeply impressed that Turkey was having an honest and open and free election and how people were engaged and involved. And that was a very impressive 

sight for those of us who knew what turmoil was going on in the 

rest of the area. And now, of course, today we have a different vision of what is happening in Turkey. So that is why we need to 

discuss it. 

We have five very knowledgeable witnesses with us today that 

can help us in this discussion. James Jeffrey served as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 2008 to 2010. Prior to that appointment, he 

had served as deputy chief of mission from 2004 to 2005 in Iraq. 

And he returned and served as Secretary of State Condoleezza 

Rice’s special adviser in Iraq. And so what we have with Mr. Jeffrey is a very—you know, how do you say?—very experienced man. 

And, also, I seem to remember that you were in Iraq when I got 

kicked out of Iraq that last time. I will let that sit. 

We also have Dr. Hillel Fradkin. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, if I may add, I was with you on that 

trip. And we were kicked out of Iraq, too, Ambassador. 

5

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, may I say I was not with you? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Dr. Hillel Fradkin, a senior fellow 

at the Hudson Institute and directs its Center on Islam, Democracy 

and the Future of the Muslim World. He cofounded and co-edits the 

Journal on current trends in Islamic Etiology, the leading journal 

devoted to the study of contemporary Islam. And we appreciate 

him being with us today. 

We have with us Kadir Ustun. He is the research director of the 

SETA Foundation here in Washington and assistant editor of Insight Turkey, the foundation’s academic journal. Mr. Ustun holds 

a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies from 

Columbia University, where he was also taught at that university. 

Kadri Gursel is a contributing writer for Al-Monitor’s Turkey 

Pulse and has written a column for the Turkish Daily Milliyet. And 

he has done that since 2007. He focuses primarily on Turkish foreign policy, the Kurdish question, and Turkey’s evolving political 

Islam. He has joined the Milliyet Publishing Group in 1997 after 

working as a correspondent. 

And since 1995, he was kidnapped by the Kurdish PKK insurgents. And I am sure that that is a tale he has recounted in a book. 

We should all maybe take a look at that. It sounds like an exciting 

adventure in your life, perhaps one that you don’t think back on 

quite fondly. And the name of his book is, ‘‘Those of the Mountains.’’

We also have with us Soner—and I am going to see if I can pronounce this. Could you help me with that? 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Cagaptay. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Cagaptay. And he is the Beyer family fellow 

and director of Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He earned his Ph.D. in history from Yale 

University and has taught courses on the Middle East at Yale, 

Princeton, Georgetown, and Smith College. And he has also served 

as chair of the Turkey Advanced Area Studies Program for the 

State Department’s Foreign Service Institute. 

Thank you all for being with us. Did I miss somebody? Okay. 

And you will be our first witness. Thank you, Bill, for getting me 

straight on that. So we will start there. And then each of you 

would be given a 5-minutes to present some testimony. We would 

appreciate if you would keep it around 5 minutes. And then we will 

follow up by questions. And I would appreciate, as I say, appreciate 

keeping it to about 5 minutes. 

If you have more extensive remarks in that, they will be placed 

into the record at this point in the hearing. Thank you very much. 

And you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF SONER CAGAPTAY, PH.D., BEYER FAMILY FELLOW, DIRECTOR, TURKISH RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE 

WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee, for giving me the opportunity to testify today on the recent protests in Turkey, what they mean for democracy in Turkey, 

the country’s neighborhood, and for U.S. policy. The following is a 

6

summary of my prepared remarks, which I will submit for the written record. 

Turkey, as you said, is an important country. It is a NATO member state. It is a key ally for the United States. Situated between 

Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean, Europe, and the 

Middle East, it is vital to U.S. interests across those regions. Take 

for instance, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Turkey is the only country that 

borders these three nations and is vital for U.S. policy toward these 

countries. That is why I think it is important for us to look at the 

recent domestic developments in Turkey because, according to 

some analysts, the recent protests that have rocked Istanbul and 

other cities for almost a month represent what is probably the biggest challenge that the governing Justice and Development Party 

in Ankara has faced since it came to government in 2002. So what 

do these protests mean for Turkey’s stability, for democracy in Turkey, for Turkey’s region and the Middle East, and obviously for 

U.S. policy? 

I will start with Turkey’s dramatic transformation under the 

AKP. Since this party came to power in 2002, Turkey has become, 

thanks to AKP’s sound economic policies, a wealthy country with 

a majority middle class society. This is a first in Turkish history. 

As a result of this transformation, Turkey has joined the prestigious members of G–20 club of nations. And it has also become 

a powerhouse in the Middle East. As a result of this dramatic 

transformation, the country, as I said earlier, has become a majority middle class society. And, ironically I think, the protests show 

that the AKP is perhaps a victim of its own success. 

The middle class that the party’s policies have created is now 

committed to individual freedoms and is taking issue with the governing party’s style of governance and its attempts at political 

domination. 

This suggests that the often-cited modernization theory that as 

countries develop and become more prosperous, they become better 

democracies, is being validated in Turkey. We are seeing the rise 

of a middle class that demands respect for individual freedoms, 

freedoms of expression, assembly, media, and association, as well 

as minority and individual rights. I think, in a nutshell, this is 

what encapsulates the developments in Turkey. 

Allow me now to look at, Mr. Chairman, what I think the developments do not constitute. I don’t think the developments constitute yet another episode of the Arab Spring. Turkey did not experience the proverbial winter, political winter. The country was 

and is a democracy. So the Arab Spring analogy does not quite 

apply. 

Nor do the protests suggest a significant weakening of the AKP. 

By most measures, about half of the country’s population still supports the governing party. The protests are also not about a manifestation of the secularist Islamist divide that has for so long dominated Turkish politics. Although most of the protestors are secular, 

their demands are not about secularism, per se. They are about the 

quality of democracy and demand for liberal values. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe that these demonstrations present a new 

dynamic in Turkish politics. The members of the protest movement, roughly representing one half of the Turkish electorate, have 

7

found strength in numbers. They have also found out that they can 

continue and sustain their demonstrations, thanks to the organizing force of social media technologies. These are indeed new. 

This is indeed a new dynamic in Turkish politics in the sense that 

the protests represent Turkey’s first massive, grassroots political 

movement that is likely to sustain itself. 

This new form of political force in Turkish politics could obviously complicate Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s political agenda. Among those issues I would like to cite is Turkey’s Syria policy, 

which you have looked at, Mr. Chairman. Although most Turks do 

not support Bashar al-Assad, many are also unnerved by Ankara’s 

policy, which they think has exposed Turkey to increased risks and 

costs. 

Take, for instance, a recent attack, a error attack, unfortunate 

attack, on the Turkish town of Reyhanli that killed 51 people that 

took place in May. This is the worst attack Turkey has suffered in 

modern history. Accordingly, I think this persistent opposition is 

likely to move Ankara to a position of leading from behind in Syria. 

Turkey’s relationship with the U.S., I don’t think, will suffer 

much from the unrest. Ankara values its relationship with Washington. And I think that the rapport Prime Minister Erdogan 

shares with President Obama is going to help resolve any wrinkles 

that will arise from Washington’s criticism of Ankara’s conduct. 

Still the issue remains. Turkey is divided deeply between the supporters and opponents of the governing party. And the recent protests may have deepened this chasm further. 

Secular, middle class, liberal Turks are demanding respect for 

freedom of the press, expression, association, and assembly as well 

as a voice on environmental policy and urban space. I think the 

Turkish leadership should take comfort in the fact that the demonstrations are not directly against AKP. Rather, they are for individual rights and better democracy. 

The leadership should also avoid giving credit to widespread conspiracy theories that the demonstrations are driven by ‘‘outside 

forces.’’ Millions of people have demonstrated in over 78 Turkish 

cities over the course of the month. This is clearly an indigenous 

Turkish movement, and the country’s government would be better 

served to listen to it, embracing democracy. In this regard, I think 

Brazil is a case in point. 

Mr. Chairman, I think at this point, at this juncture, the way 

forward for Turkey overlaps with U.S. policy and U.S. interests in 

the Middle East. Turkey has become an economic power in the region. It has become a soft power nation. And it wants to be a leader 

in the Middle East. And Ankara wants Washington to treat it as 

such. I would say that as far as U.S. policymakers are concerned, 

Turkey can become a leader in the Middle East only if it shines as 

an example of liberal democracy. 

To this end, the Turkish Government and people would be wellserved to embrace broad individual liberties, including freedoms of 

assembly, association, media, and expression. At the moment, Turkey is attempting to draft its first civilian-made constitution. And 

this presents Ankara and all the Turks with a unique opportunity 

to do so, recognize those liberties, and doing so without restrictions. 

8

What is good for Turkey is also good for the Middle East and the 

United States, Mr. Chairman. Turkey can overcome its political 

tensions by adopting a constitution that respects individual freedoms and recognizes its diversity. This would also mark an important milestone for the country’s desire to become a source of inspiration for other Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East. 

Only if Turkey seizes the opportunity, it can become a partner 

Washington can be proud to have in the region. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the take-away of today’s conversation and our message to our ally, Turkey, the country’s citizens, 

and its neighbors should be the following. Democracy is not just 

about the right to be equal. It is also about protecting the right to 

be different. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cagaptay follows:]

9


81694b-1.eps

Statement of Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D. 

Beyer Family Fellow, Director, Turkish Reseal'Ch Program 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats: 

"Turkey at a Crossroads: 'Vhat do the Gezi Park Protests Mean for Democracy ill tile 

Region" 

Wednesday, .Tune 26, 2013 

Thank you, Me Chairman and members of the Committee for giving me the opportunity to 

testify 011 the recent protests in Turkey and their implications for democracy ill Turkey and its 

neighborhood. The following is a SlIlllma.ry of my prepared remarks. 

Jilrkey. a NATO member slale, is an important cOImlry/or the (.lniled Stales. Situated between 

the Caucasus, the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Europe, Turkey is vital to t:.S. interests 

across these regions. Take for instance, Tran, Iraq and Syria. Turkey is the only country that 

horders these three nations, and is vital for U.S. policy tmvards these countries 

According to some analysts, the recent protests that rocked Istanbul and other Turkish cities pose 

the greatest the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has faced in over a 

decade in power. do the protests mean for stahility and democracy in Turkey, and for 

democracy in the Middle East? 

Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP has Im,'Jlemenl"a 

grown Turkey's economy alld!acililaled ifs m"m,0el'slllf) 

other market growth stories, Turkish 

and the COUIIIIY info a the/irsl lime ill ils 

Yet, the recent protests show that the j\KP has, perhaps, become a victim of its own success. 

lhe middle class which has f'rOIJ'II as a result 

illdil'idualfreedom.l al1d il is 1I01f' challel1f'ing the 

01 polilica/ dominalioll. 

economic policies is conlfnilled fa 

style o!f.;overnal1ce Gild its a/tempis 

All this suggests that modernization theory -- the idea that economic development leads to more 

democracy -- is being validated in Turkey. As countries become middle class, they lend to 

become irreversibly diverse, developing the bedrock for democratic governance, including 

consensual politics and respect for individual and minority rights. 

The deve!opmcllts in Turkey do 110t cOllstitute an episode of the "Arah Spring" Turkey did not 

experience a proverbial political winter. The country is and remains a democracy. 
10


81694b-2.eps

Nor do fhe profe.\'/.\' SII?,?,CI'! a si?,flijicafll of Ihe AKP. By most measures, about 50 

percent of Turks continue to support the party. prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 

has organized a number of rallies to bring his own supporters into the streets as a counterweight 

to the Gezi protests, These pro-government demonstrations have produced a turnout comparable 

to the anti -government marches across Istanbul. 

Nor are the demol1slraliol1s yet another manifeslalion of Ihe secularisl-lslamisl cleam?,e that has 

defined many of Turkey's political battles in recent years, Although most of the are 

scwlar, their rallies are not aboul secularism per se, but rather about the quality 

democracy and a demand for liberal values, 

AIr, ('hairman, r helieve that these demonstrations presem a l1ew dynamic ill Turkish politics, 

Members of the protest movement, roughly representing one hal f of the country that does no! 

support the AKP, have discovered that they have in numbers, They have also 

found out they can sustain their demonstrations, largely to social media technologies. 

Indeed, the protests represent Turkey's tlrst massive, grassroots political movement. In the past, 

grassroots movements never reached a massive scale. Conversely, while Turkey has \vitncssed 

several1arge anti-government protests, such as the rallies of2007, these demonstrations were 

organized in a top-down fashion and were linked to the military. 

This new form of grassroots and liberal opposition politics could complicate Turkish Prime 

Minister Erdogan's political agenda, Should he, for instance, decide to proceed with transforming 

the country's parliamentary democracy into a presidential system, he may face highly effective 

backlash. Meanwhile, Turkish President Abdullah Gul has already positioned hirnselCas a 

nonpartisan figure, supporting the protestors' right to assemble and stating that -'democracy is not 

just winning elections," 

77lc /lew opposirion is also likely to shape Tlrrk,~)' Syria polic)'. Alrhougll most Turks do not 

support Basilar aI-Assad, they are unnerved by Ankara's policy toward the regime, which they 

believe has exposed Turkey to increased risks and costs. On May 11,2013 the Turkish border 

town ofReyhanli suffered a devastating terror attack which claimed the lives of 51 people. This 

attack followed months of periodic cross-border shelling from Syria and worries about terrorist 

infiltration into Turkey's urban centers. Accordingly, facing a new and persistent opposition on 

the streets, Ankara will move toward a more measured position ofJeading from behind in Syria. 

In contrast, Turkey's relationship with the Linited States is unlikely to suffer much from the 

unrest Ankara values its relationship with Washille,>ton and the strong rapport that Prime 

Minister Erdogan shares with President Ooama will help resolve any wrinkles that arise from 

U.S. criticism of Ankara's conduct. 

Still, the issue remains, Mr. Chairman, Turkey is divided almost evenly between supporters and 

opponents of the governing AKP. Recent protests may have deepened this chasm further. 

The secular, middle class and liberal voters are demanding respect for freedom of the press, 

expression, association, and assembly, as well as a voice on environmental policy and urban 

space. In this regard, the Turkish leadership should take comfort in the fact that, notwithstanding 

2 
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marginal violent groups that have penetrated some of the protests, the demons/ret/ions are no/ 

directly against the AKP, hut ratherfor individual rights and hetter democracy. The Turkish 

leadership should also avoid giving credit to widespread conspiracy theories which allege that 

the demonstrations are driven by "outside forces" Over a million Turks have demonstrated in 

over 78 Turkish cities over the course of the past month. This is clearly an indigenous Turkish 

movement, and the country's government would be better served to listen to it, embracing 

democracy. In this regard, Brazil is a case in point. 

Mr Chairman, Turkey's way forward at this juncture overlaps with U.S. interests in the Middle 

East. Having become an economic motor and soft power nation in the region, Turkey sees itself 

as a Middle East leader And Ankara wants Washington to treat it as such. As far as U.S. 

policymakers are concerned, Turkey can become a leader in the Middle [;;ast only ifit shines as 

WI example of liberal democracy. 

To this end, the Turkish government and people would do 'well to embrace broad individual 

liherties, includingfreedoms ofassemhly, association, media, and expression. At the moment, 

Turkey is attempting to draft its first civilian-made constitution. This presents Ankara with a 

unique opportunity to recognize these liberties, and do so without restrictions. 

It would be in the interests of all Turks if the new constitution also addressed Turkey's political 

fault lines, providing for constitutionally-mandated gender equality, as well as freedom of 

religion and freedom from religion, so that religious, conservative, secular and liberal Turks 

alike can feel welcome in the new Turkey. 

Commitment to liberal democracy would also provide Turkey with much needed stability. 

Turkey grows because it attracts investment, and international investors are drawn to the Istanbul 

Borsa (stock market) because Turkey is seen as a rare island of stability surrounded by unstable 

countries. Ankara cannot afford to lose this critical advantage. 

What is goodfor Turkey is also goodfor the Middle [;;ast al1djor the United States. Turkey can 

overcome its political tensions by adopting a constitution that respects individual freedoms and 

recognizes its diversity. This would also mark an important milestone on the path to becoming a 

source of inspiration for other countries in the Middle East. If Turkey seizes this opportunity, it 

can become the partner Washington can be proud to have in the region. 

Mr. Chairman, the takeaway oftoday's conversation, and our message to our ally Turkey, to the 

country's citizens and its neighbors should be the following: democracy is not just about the 

right to be equal; it is also about protecting the right to be different. 
12

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much for that very 

thoughtful testimony. 

And I would like to now turn to Ambassador Jeffrey for some 

thoughts from him. The last witness was fairly optimistic for the 

long run. And we are very interested in your views on this. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES F. JEFFREY, PHILIP 

SOLONDZ DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY (FORMER 

AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY) 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Keating. It is a pleasure to be here today. I will submit my longer 

statement for the record and just summarize a certain number of 

points. 

First of all, my colleague at the Washington Institute, Soner 

Cagaptay, has laid out, I think, a very accurate and optimistic but, 

again, realistic view of how we should go forward and how Turkey 

will probably go forward. I will just touch on a few domestic issues 

that I would like to highlight and then get to what the U.S. should 

do and some of the implications for the region. 

First of all, I do think that this does demonstrate that there is 

a large fissure in Turkish society between two relatively large 

groups. And this is being fought out on various levels. But that is 

okay because that is how democratic countries evolve. And we have 

seen this in East Asia. We have seen this in central and Southern 

America. Many of you have gone on visits to these countries as 

they are moving forward. And they do this step by step. This is 

what is happening in Turkey. 

The concern that we all have with the reaction of the government 

is, first of all, as came out in a statement from the White House 

just yesterday after President Obama called Prime Minister 

Erdogan, is the concern about the violence of the reaction of the authorities against the demonstrators and the concern about freedom 

of expression, freedom of demonstration, and freedom of media. All 

of these have been called into question to one or another degree by 

some of the statements and actions by the government. And that 

is of concern. But, in particular, the polarization of those people 

who are opposed to the government is troubling. 

From our standpoint, looking from the outside, first of all, Mr. 

Chairman, this is not going to lead to the overthrow or the fall of 

the Erdogan Government, certainly not before the elections of 2015. 

And I think the government is still maintaining probably a majority. But what it does portend is trouble for a country that is integrated ever more into the advanced world with its trade, with its 

diplomatic and military relationships and NATO with the European Union and so forth, and a country that needs good relations 

with the outside, be it tourism, be it again its trade. 

Some of that has already suffered because of the demonstrations. 

There are other aspects of that, including the recent decisions by 

the Federal Reserve, but the stock market did fall dramatically. 

The lira has also fallen against the dollar. And there is some indication that tourism in foreign direct investment may be challenged. 

But, more importantly, the majority can rule in Turkey, like in 

any other country. It can issue orders to the police. It can pass 

13

laws. But it cannot control the minority. And in the end, there has 

to be some kind of relationship between those people who are not 

part of the governing coalition and the governing coalition to have 

stability in any country. We dealt with this in our own constitutional process in the Eighteenth Century between those in favor of 

a majority rule and those in favor of minority rights. Turkey is 

going to have to go through this. 

It is a democracy. For the moment, I think we can trust in the 

Turkish people to work their way through this. But meanwhile 

what should we do? And what is the attitude of the U.S. Government? 

Obviously, coming from a diplomatic background, I like to do diplomatic talks private, rather than in public, but there is a role for 

public discourse as well, both from the government and from institutions like the Congress, speaking out about our values when we 

see them being challenged. But, nonetheless, where the United 

States can help the most because we do have a good relationship 

with the Erdogan Government is in private conversations. And that 

is apparently exactly what President Obama did yesterday in his 

conversation: Coach the Turks on our view of why continued clashes in Turkey are not good for Turkey’s future, are not good for Turkey’s economy, and are not good for Turkey’s role in the region. 

And that is the thing I want to leave with, Mr. Chairman. This 

region is in a worse condition than I have seen it in many decades 

for many reasons, including some decisions we perhaps made. But 

at the end of the day, if we are going to find a way forward with 

Syria, with Iraq, and with Iran, as my colleague and as you people 

have pointed out, we are going to have to use our good relations 

with Turkey. We are going to have to cooperate and coordinate 

fully with Turkey. And that requires some kind of relationship with 

this government. That means that we have to be cautious in what 

we say publicly. We can be more open privately. And we will be 

more effective. 

I think that is the way the administration is going, but I hope 

it continues on this, not ignoring the problems but putting them in 

the context of an extremely dangerous and big agenda that we 

have in the region right now, sir. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jeffrey follows:]

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TESTIMONY: TURKEY AT A CROSSROADS: WHAT DO THE GEZI PARK 

PROTESTS MEAN FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE REGION, JUNE 26TH, 2013 

BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS 

Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Philip Solondz Distinguished Visiting Fellow, 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

The demonstrations that broke out in Gezi Park and Taksim Square in Istanbul in 

late May represent the biggest challenge to PM Erdogan's AK Party rule in the 11 

years the party has been in power. That said, the demonstrations do not indicate a 

serious erosion of support for the Prime Minister and his Party, although his 

popularity has dropped somewhat in recent polls. Thus it is highly unlikely that the 

demonstrations will lead to the toppling of the AK government, or early elections, 

now scheduled for 2015. 

But what the demonstrations, and the government's reaction to them, do show is 

that Turkey is increasingly split into two quite different political groupings, and that 

the government might be contributing to further polarization of the society. This is 

the situation of greatest concern to those of us who have worked with and follow 

Turkey closely. Any government has the right to restore order, and at least some of 

the demonstrators came from violent, radical backgrounds, while blocking a major 

traffic center in one of the world's biggest cities for weeks is not something that any 

government will allow to go on indefinitely. 

But what has troubled both observers, including me, and the US government, is the 

at times seemingly indiscriminate force used against peaceful demonstrators, 

including those in the park as well as those blocking Taksim Square. Perhaps even 

more troubling is the attitude of some, but not all, of the government leaders. These 

leaders, including the Prime Minister, have generally demonized all of the 

demonstrators, despite the PM's meeting with a delegation of them, and adopting a 

reasonable position on resolving the park question. 

But the language used against the demonstrators, and both the police as well as legal 

actions directed against them, call into question the government's commitment to 

free speech and assembly, to the principle of proportionality, and, at bottom, to the 

democratic principle that minorities cannot simply be ignored. 

When ignored, they are likely to challenge not just the government, ultimately in 

elections, but quite possibly the very foundations of the state, creating instability 

and potentially chaos. Concern about this has led to a 20% drop in the stock 

market, as well as the value of the Turkish Lira, along with indications of a drop in 
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tourism and FDI. Turkey will recover from these immediate effects, but the longterm effects of a deep fissure in society on the country's stability, and thus ability to 

maintain a high-tech, 'First World' economy driven by exports, could be very 

negative. 

But as long as Turkey is a democracy, we have to have faith in both the Turkish 

people and its leadership that Turkey can work its way through this apparent 

dichotomy between majority power and minority rights, and reestablish its enviable 

stability, upon which its equally enviable economic growth is based. Specifically, 

Turkey faces not only parliamentary elections in 2015, but potentially much more 

important votes in 2014-for a new President, and in a referendum for a 

constitution to replace the 1980s one approved under military rule. PM Erdogan 

has long hoped to use the 2014 ballots to become President of a different, far more 

Presidential democracy. His position on the fissures within his society, and the 

effect of those fissures on Turkey's development, will likely have a key impact on 

these votes. 

WHAT SHOULD THE US DO 

The US has spoken out repeatedly, but has been restrained in its reaction. That is a 

good decision on the part of the US, although not everyone will agree with it. While 

we have to speak out, and in the case of Turkey have spoken out, to defend our 

values and concept of democracy and freedom, we also have to consider the context. 

First, Turkey, again, is a democracy, and the people have the right to pass judgment 

on all that has been said and done related to the demonstrations. It is wise to await 

that judgment. Second, publicly condemning Turkey and PM Erdogan would be 

strongly counter-productive. It will not push the Turkish government to tailor its 

response. Turkey has long lived with strong American criticism of one or another 

aspect of its domestic policies. 

Moreover, the US does not have a strong standing within the Turkish population. 

According to the Pew Survey, despite massive US public diplomacy efforts, 

educational programs, and close policy coordination, favorable attitudes towards 

the US in Turkey have dropped from roughly 23-30% through most ofthe 2002-5 

period to between 9-17% in the past six years; this is, with limited competition from 

Pakistan, the lowest favorability rating in any significant country around the globe. 

Ifwe make the demonstrations about us, about the outsiders, or otherwise follow 

the tact that many in Europe seem to be adopting, we will undercut the chance for 

voices and opinions favoring compromise and reconciliation to gain ground. 

Obviously, were Turkey to take a serious turn away from participatory democracy, 

this approach would not work, but we have seen no such turn. 
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Third, we have only limited leverage with Turkey; no development aid to speak of, 

trade is relatively small in comparative terms, and our massive defense sales are at 

least as much in our interest as in Turkey's. 

Finally, and in my mind most importantly, we need good relations with Turkey to 

deal with the dangers that beset the region. We have not seen the region in so 

much turmoil and insecurity in decades. Regional stability, the survival of regimes, 

the security ofthe oil trade, and even the overall structure of US-led international 

security are at risk. We need to coordinate closely with Turkey on all three of the 

most pressing problems-the Syrian civil war, the threat of division in Iraq, and the 

Iranian nuclear file. The last thing the US needs, in the midst of this, is a major row 

with one of our few key allies sufficiently strong and stable to actually assist us. 

Having said that, it is important that the US, as a friend, counsel the Turkish 

government, behind closed doors, without threat, but forcefully, about the long-term 

effects of continued government poliCies and attitudes of the sort we have seen. 

Aside from the erosion of democratic values such poliCies and attitudes encourage, 

Turkey's international image, for political competency and as an example of Middle 

Eastern democracy, as well as at least some aspects of its economic success, and the 

social stability that reinforces both its image and economy, will all be placed at risk. 

This is bad for Turkey, bad for the United States, and bad for regional stability. 
17

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

And I think we would go to Mr. Ustun now. 

STATEMENT OF KADIR USTUN, PH.D., RESEARCH DIRECTOR, 

FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL RESEARCH (SETA) 

Mr. USTUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for inviting me to speak at this hearing. I have already submitted my testimony. And I will only highlight some of the points 

discussed there in detail. 

Today, what we see in Turkey is the growing pains of democracy. 

The crux of the issue is somewhat paradoxical. We have the most 

successful and reformist political party in power for more than a 

decade. However, there are certain segments of the society who are 

frustrated with some policies but cannot express their discontent 

through the regular channels of formal politics because of the absence of a viable opposition. 

The basic dynamics of the protests are fundamentally different 

from the Arab revolutions where there was no meaningful representation of the popular will. The challenge will be for Turkey to 

accommodate the legitimate demands and aspirations of many 

Turkish youths. If it succeeds, Turkish democracy will be even 

stronger in the years ahead and serve as a democratic inspiration 

for the broader region. 

The protests can be likened to Occupy Wall Street movement, 

rather than the Arab revolutions. The disproportionate use of force 

by the police against a small group of protestors occupying the Gezi 

Park quickly snowballed into much larger protests. Protests are 

much more similar to those in the West and in the U.S. 

Three major groups have participated in these protests. The biggest one has been the middle and upper class urbanites angry 

about the Gezi Park redevelopment project and certain policies. 

These policies resulted in the divisive controversies similar to those 

over stem cell research, abortion, and gun control in the U.S. and 

Europe. 

The second most significant group is the young CHP supporters 

and the ultranationalist wing of the party. Young people are increasingly disenchanted by the political system as they see no hope 

of challenging the dominant ruling party in the absence of a strong 

leadership. The CHP is split on how to approach the government’s 

initiative to resolve the Kurdish question. Discontent created by 

the lack of representation and the Kurdish settlement process as 

well as the Syria policy is a major motivator for this group of demonstrators. 

The last group is the marginal leftist groups, some of which are 

illegal organizations implicated in various terrorist attacks, including the bombing attack on the U.S. Embassy in Ankara in February. The government tried to make a distinction among these 

three groups. We can discuss how successful that was. And it 

promised to listen to the legitimate demands of the protestors 

about the Gezi Park. But the Prime Minister’s harshest words were 

directed against the third group, which engaged in violence and 

vandalism. 

18

The Prime Minister met the protestors in person, at a long, 4-

hour, meeting and announced that the government would respect 

the current court injunction blocking the project. If the court decides to remove the injunction, the government will sold a referendum. However, the protestors announced that they would continue to occupy the park and hold demonstrations, resulting in further police action. 

As its efforts to reach out and provide an apology to peaceful 

protestors proved insufficient, the government viewed the continuation of protests as ill-intentioned. The government argues that the 

marginal groups and CHP members are orchestrating a campaign 

to undermine the democratically elected government by taking to 

the streets, hence the government’s repeated references to the ballot box as the ultimate jury. It doesn’t refer to a majoritarian understanding of democracy but, rather, a past where extrapolitical 

powers could wield influence over the elected governments. 

The protests have resulted in a lively debate throughout the political spectrum about basic rights and freedoms and what an advanced democracy should look like. Turkey’s takeoff over the past 

decade created a new generation of young people, who are much 

more educated, economically comfortable, and increasingly 

globalized. Their aspirations, frustrations, and discontent cannot 

fully be expressed in the political scene through the existing opposition parties. The AK Party will need to engage this segment of 

the protestors. 

The same goes for the CHP. The struggle between the hard-line 

ultranationalists and the moderates is pulling the party apart. The 

CHP will have to transform itself into a center-left party or it will 

find itself fighting the wars of a bygone era. The U.S.-Turkey relationship is important, not only for bilateral relations, but also for 

stability and peace in the broader Middle East. Turkey has a critical relevance for the U.S. foreign policy issues, including withdrawal from Afghanistan, stability in Iraq, resolving the Iranian 

nuclear issue, and ending the Syrian conflict, as well as achieving 

peace between Israel and Palestine. 

Turkey has proven time and again it is a dynamic democracy 

with a vibrant civil society, despite its flaws and imperfections. The 

debate today is not on whether to have democracy but on how to 

create a better one that embraces all segments of the society. That 

is testament to the country’s commitment to democratic ideals and 

the rule of law. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ustun follows:]

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Turkey at a Crossroads: What do the Gezi Park Protests Mean for Democracy in the 

Region? 

Statement for the Record 

Kadir U stun, Ph.D. 

Research Director 

SETA Foundation at Washington DC 

June 26,2013 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging 

Threats 

Mr. Chainnan and members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me to 

speak at this hearing on the implications of Turkey's Gezi Park protests for democracy in 

the region. 

Today, what we see in Turkey is the "growing pains" of democracy. The crux of the issue 

is somewhat paradoxical. We have the most successful and reformist political party in 

power for more than a decade. However, there are certain segments of the society who 

are frustrated with some policies but cannot express their discontent through the regular 

channels offormal politics due to the absence of a viable opposition. The challenge will 

be to accommodate the legitimate demands and aspirations of many Turkish youths. If it 

succeeds, Turkish democracy will be even stronger in the years ahead. Turkey's ability to 

serve as a democratic inspiration for the broader region will strengthen in the future. 

The AK Party Decade 

The AK Party came to power under very difficult conditions, as the Turkish economy 

was in shambles in the wake of the 200l economic crisis. Kurdistan Workers' Party's 

(PKK) leader (kalan's capture in 1999 led to a relatively calm period until 2004 but there 

was no resolution of the Kurdish question in sight. There was political disarray among 

political parties as a result of ineffective coalition governments under the military's 

domination of the political scene. The human rights situation and democratic metrics 

were dismal, noted by many governmental and non-governmental reports published in the 

US and the EU. 

The AK Party defined itself as a conservative democratic party similar to Christian 

Democrats in Europe. The government set out to reenergize the country's EU bid, which 

resulted in Turkey'S formal candidacy 50 years after its first application to be part of the 

Union. EU funds flowed into the country and the negotiation process resulted in 

structural changes with implications for the civil-military balance, economic stability, 

education and social refonns among others. Many taboo subjects from the Kurdish 

question to minority rights started to be discussed openly. Lifting of marshal law in 

eastern part of Turkey and virtual elimination of torture are only some of the 

improvements on the human rights front. 
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Economic achievements have made Turkey the 16th largest economy and a G20 member. 

The Turkish economy's growth rates have been second only to China on average over the 

past 10 years. Turkey has increased its business ties with most of its trading partners 

through visa liberalization and easy export policies. Turkey recently paid off its debt to 

the IMP, which had bailed out Turkey in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis. The current 

account deficit remains a challenge but the country continues to make substantial 

investments in its economy, while trying to take advantage of its young yet steadily aging 

population. 

Political and economic achievements were accompanied by an increasingly pro-active, 

self-confident, and engagement-oriented foreign policy. Turkish foreign policy had 

traditionally viewed its neighbors with suspicion, trying to undermine Turkey's unity by 

manipulating the PKK Instead of "turning its back," the AK Party sought to engage all 

its neighbors, including Greece and more recently Annenia with varying degrees of 

success. Turkey's high-level engagement with Syria was put to good use in Turkey's 

previous efforts to broker a peace deal between Israel and Syria. However, the Cast Lead 

operation by Israel on Gaza resulted in Turkey's reaction and condemnation. Whenever 

Turkey interpreted Israel's actions as heavy-handed and destabilizing for the regional 

peace and security, it condemned them under various governments prior to and including 

under the AK Party rule. 

Political relations between Turkey and Israel gradually deteriorated. When Hamas won 

the elections in 2005 in Palestine, it was not allowed to participate in fonnal politics. The 

Turkish government saw this as unfair treatment of a democratically elected political 

movement. Turkey's souring relations with Israel culminated in the infamous flotilla 

(Mavi Marmara) incident, where the Israeli commandoes intercepted and raided an 

international aid flotilla destined for Gaza, resulting in the deaths of 8 Turkish and 1 

Turkish-American citizens. Israel refused to deliver Turkey's demand for an apology but 

President Obama's recent efforts produced an Israeli apology. One of the significant 

consequences of the weakening of Turkish-Israeli relations is that the US-Turkey 

relations are much less dependent on the course of Turkish-Israeli relations. Today, both 

Turkey and the US compartmentalize their relations with Israel. 

2010 was a critical year in US-Turkey relations because of the flotilla incident and 

Turkey's "no" vote on Iran sanctions at the UN Security Council. Turkey, along with 

Brazil, had just brokered the Tehran Declaration with President Obama's previous 

encouragement but the US argued that the deal was flawed. Both the flotilla incident and 

the Iran sanctions vote were damaging to the US-Turkey relations. However, there was 

an important change in 2011 when Turkey's decision to host the radar as part of NATO's 

missile defense system convinced many that Turkey's western vocation was solid. 

Moreover, Turkey's clear stance on the side of the Arab populations rising against 

authoritarian rulers since early 2012 was critical in its broadly positive reception in the 

Arab world. Turkey was perceived as a democratic Muslim-majority country with a 

strong economy, democratic institutions, and soft power. The US policymakers came to 

value Turkey's positive role in the regional earthquake that was dubbed the "Arab Spring." 

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Challenges Ahead for Turkish Democracy 

Political and economic achievements under the AK Party resulted in a much better 

democracy overall, especially when compared to the 1990s. There are, however, 

challenges Turkey needs to tackle especially if it wants to become a regional player. 

Turkey has an ambitious goal to become one of the top ten economies of the world by 

2023, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Turkish Republic. Turkey's aspiration 

to become a regional player is closely tied to its economic rise similar to other emerging 

nations such as the BRTe countries. The Turkish economy has a lot of experience and 

quality standards due to its long-standing trade ties with Europe. Tt is a sufficiently 

diverse economy highly dependent (Turkey imports around 75 percent of its energy) on 

foreign oil and gas resources. Sustaining economic growth, reducing energy dependency, 

weathering the global economic crisis, and managing its current account deficit are some 

of the economic challenges Turkey faces. 

On the political front, the most pressing issue is the resolution of the Kurdish question. 

The government is engaged in a "settlement process" to end the more than 30 years of 

contlict with the PKK, which has claimed more than 40,000 lives. The "settlement 

process" is the continuation of the 2009 "democratic opening" when the Turkish 

government set out to tackle the Kurdish question. Following a series of reforms allowing 

the expression and use of the Kurdish language, the government convinced the military 

establishment that the problem could not be resolved through military means only. This is 

a policy endorsed by the US administration. 

The Turkish government adopted a two-pronged approach: it would continue to respond 

to the PKK. militarily but it would also negotiate with the parliamentarians of the Kurdish 

political party. In early 2013, Prime Minister Erdogan announced that the "relevant 

branches" of the government (Turkish intelligence) were conducting talks with the 

imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah (')calan. In his Kurdish new year's message 

(Newroz), Ocalan declared the end of the armed struggle and the beginning of the 

political struggle only. 

Once the PKIZ militants withdraw from Turkey, the government will move to address 

Kurdish demands (dubbed "normalization"). The government initiated the so-called 

"People of Wisdom" initiative (group of intellectuals, journalists, and activists have been 

visiting all cities in Turkey) to reach out to the public and listen to their perspectives on 

the resolution of the Kurdish question. The reports produced at the end of this public 

diplomacy campaign will help guide government actions on the issue. So far, the 

"settlement process" has gone relatively smoothly despite provocations, such as the 

assassination of a high-level PKK leader in Europe, to halt it. If the government is able to 

end the conflict, this will have a tremendous impact on Turkey's democratization and 

regional stabilization. 

However, the current anti-democratic laws, such as the Anti-Terror Law, constitute a true 

impediment to the enlargement of political and personal freedoms. For example, 

"praising" a terrorist organization has been a crime under the Anti-Terror Law. With the 

3 
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recent passage of the 4th refonn package recently, praising or propagating for terrorist 

organizations will no longer be considered a crime unless it constitutes an imminent 

threat or incites violence. 

The AK Party government has worked to increase religious rights and freedoms for the 

minorities at unprecedented levels. Through several "openings," the AK Party 

government has sought to engage religious minorities such as Christians and sectarian 

minorities such as Alevi citizens. Religious minority issues have traditionally been 

couched in a narrowly nationalistic discourse, which meant that religious minorities were 

seen as outside the national identity and at times even as agents of outside influences. 

By adopting a language of rights and freedoms for everyone, including religious people 

in general, the AK Party government has sought to support the inclusion of religious 

minorities by the broader society. The return of previously confiscated property and the 

reopening ofvarious churches for worship (such as the opening of the restored Akhtamar 

Church in Van) are among some of the policies the government pursued to reach out to 

Turkey's religious minorities. It will be crucially important for the government to 

continue such efforts and accommodate the demands of these groups for the sake of 

religious pluralism and democratic consolidation. 

Alevis in Turkey have historically been a disadvantaged group largely due to 

misunderstandings and ignorance about their culture. As members of a sect within Islam, 

Alevis ditIer from other sects not on the basis of theology but mostly in cultural tenTIs. 

The government has made gestures to the Alevi community (for example, the Prime 

Minister's apology for the Dersim massacre in 1937 and 1938) but it will need to engage 

them more consistently and directly to incorporate their legitimate demands in the new 

system. Currently, the most pressing issue for the Alevi community is the status of their 

houses of gathering (Cemevis) and recognition of their cultural identity. Alevi leaders 

regularly express frustration with the People's Republican Party's (CHP) unwillingness 

to address removal of articles from the constitution that ban dervish lodges and shrines. 

The need for a fully civilian constitution has been the most agreed upon item in Turkish 

politics over the past several decades. However, successive efforts have failed and 

governments had to settle for minor amendments. The most consequential changes to the 

constitution happened with the constitutional referendum of 20 10, which abolished 

articles that protected coup stagers. The changes paved the way for the prosecution of 

military personnel involved in coups to be tried in civilian courts instead of military 

courts only. The referendum (passed by 58 percent favorable and 42 percent unfavorable 

votes) also entailed reform of the judiciary (civilian involvement in high court 

appointments through the parliament), afforded economic and social rights (collective 

bargaining rights for government employees), and strengthened individual freedoms (the 

establishment of the ombudsman) Forging a truly civilian constitution will be critical to 

consolidation of democracy in Turkey. 

The ensuing plethora of court cases against military personnel suspected of coup plotting 

received a lot of international attention due to long trial proceedings among other 

4 
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problems. In fact, the prime minister himself complained about the shortage of high-level 

military personnel due to ongoing trials. The long trials and outdated judicial processes 

meant delays in the speedy delivery of justice. Turkey has introduced several judicial 

reform bills but there is still much to improve in the judicial system. 

The current government is also trying to reenergize its EU bid, which remains crucial for 

democratic consolidation. Yesterday's news on opening a new chapter on regional 

cooperation is welcome news. Many EU chapters remain closed due to Europe's 

economic problems and "cold feet" about Turkey's membership. However, various 

Turkish ministries continue to implement structural adjustments to be ready when the 

chapters are opened in the future. Both the President Gill and the government officials 

repeatedly call on European leaders to revitalize Turkey's accession talks, as they 

continue to see it as a strategic goal despite the increasingly diminishing public support 

for membership. 

Gezi Park Protests 

Gezi Park protests can be likened to "Occupy Wall Street" movement rather than the 

Arab revolutions. The disproportionate use of force by the police against a small group of 

protestors occupying the Gezi Park quickly snowballed into much larger protests against 

the government. Mostly young groups frustrated with some government policies joined in 

the protests. Protests are much more akin to those in Spain, Greece, Britain, France, and 

the US 

Three major groups have participated in the protests. The biggest group has been 

composed of middle and upper middle class urbanites angry not only about Gezi Park 

redevelopment project but also about certain policies adopted by the government, such as 

the regulations on the sale of alcohol (similar regulations exist in the US and Europe). 

Some of these policies resulted in divisive controversies similar to those over stem-cell 

research, abortion, and gun control debate in the US and Europe. 

The second most significant group has been from among young CHP supporters and the 

ultranationalist wing of the party. The youths are increasingly disenchanted by the 

political system, as they see no hope of challenging the dominant ruling party in the 

absence of a strong leadership. CHP is split on how to approach the government's 

initiative to resolve the Kurdish question. Discontent created by the lack of representation 

and the Kurdish "settlement process" is a major motivator for this group of demonstrators. 

The last group is composed of some marginal leftist groups, some of which are illegal 

organizations implicated in various terrorist attacks (DHKP-C members were indicted to 

have attacked the US embassy in Ankara). The government tried to make a distinction 

between these three groups, promising to listen to the legitimate demands about Gezi 

Park. The prime minister's harshest words were directed against the third group, which 

engaged in violence and vandalism (rocks, knives, Molotov cocktails, fireworks, and 

guns were used by some protestors), but the distinction and the nuance was lost in 

translation. 

5 
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Having met the protestors in person in a 4.5 hour long meeting, the Prime Minister 

announced that the government would respect the current court injunction blocking the 

redevelopment project. If the court decided to remove the injunction, the government 

promised that it would hold a plebiscite. Protestors, in return, announced that they would 

continue to occupy the park and hold demonstrations, which resulted in further police 

action to clear the park and Taksim Square. The prime minister's rhetoric has sharpened 

after the protestors' refusal to end the protests. 

The government perceives the continuation of protests, despite its efforts to reach out to 

them and a government apology to the peaceful protestors, as ill intentioned. Thus, the 

AK Party decided to hold rallies around the country under the theme, "Respect for the 

Democratic Will," reportedly attracting more than a million AK Party supporters in 

Istanbul alone. The government argues that the marginal groups and CHP members are 

orchestrating a campaign to undermine the democratically elected government by taking 

to the streets, hence the government's repeated references to the "ballot box" as the 

ultimate jury. High attendance at nationwide AK Party meetings demonstrate that the 

government may emerge out of this episode with an even stronger victory in the local 

elections scheduled for March 2014. 

The Gezi Park protests have resulted in a lively debate throughout the political spectrum 

about basic rights and freedoms as well as what an advanced democracy should look like. 

The basic dynamics of the protests are fundamentally ditJerent from the Arab revolutions 

where there was no meaningful representation of the popular will. Political representation 

is actually very high in the current makeup of the Turkish parliament (96 percent of the 

votes are represented) but the absence of a viable opposition frustrates disenchanted 

youths. 

Turkey's takeoff over the past decade created a new generation of youths, who are much 

more educated, economically comfortable, and increasingly globalized. They have only 

known AK Party governments in their adult lives. Whatever aspirations, frustrations, and 

discontent they may have cannot adequately be expressed in the political scene through 

the opposition parties. One of the biggest challenges for the AK Party is to engage this 

segment of the protestors. 

The same goes for the CHP, which is in fact at a crossroads. The struggle between the 

hardline ultranationalists and the moderates is pulling the party apart. CHP will have to 

transform itself to a center-left party and reach out to these youths or it will find itself 

fighting the wars of a bygone era. The ultranationalist wing is currently the strongest 

faction within the party and it regularly employs an anti-Western and anti-imperialist 

rhetoric. It continues to oppose any changes to the "unchangeable articles" of the 1980 

constitution. The party also criticized the stationing of the NATO radar in Turkey and 

parliamentarians paid several visits to Syrian President Assad. The party backtracked on 

its initial support for the "settlement process" in resolving the Kurdish question. Such a 

posture prevents the main opposition party from breaking from its ultranationalist wing 

and incorporating young people who are disillusioned with the old politics. 

6 
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81694e-7.eps

Future of US-Turkey Relations 

Turkey's relations with the United States over the last decade witnessed wild swings and 

shifts. Turkey's past decade under the AK Party coincided with the US invasion ofIraq, 

the financial meltdown in the US (which transformed into a global economic crisis) as 

well as a relative decline of US stature in the world. This period also overlapped with 

dramatic changes in the Middle East, as the ousting oflongstanding authoritarian leaders 

led to the emergence of a generation of new leaders across the Arab world. Today, a new 

Turkey as a regional power is faced with a new US effort to reconsider its role in the 

region and around the globe. 

The US-Turkey relationship is probably in the best shape it has been in recent memory. 

President Obama' s first overseas visit was to Turkey and it was welcome news to the 

Turkish public and policymakers. President Obama called the US-Turkey relationship a 

"model partnership," signaling a new US approach to Turkey. Obama's first term 

witnessed serious challenges, threatening to damage this vision. However, the special 

personal rapport between President Obama and the Prime Minister Erdogan helped 

American and Turkish policymakers overcome and respect their differences. 

When the revolutions and turmoil were unleashed throughout the Middle East in early 

2011, Turkey emerged once again as a stabilizing force. When the revolution spread to 

Syria, Turkey was confronted with the most serious challenge of the Arab Spring. Turkey 

spearheaded etIorts to convince the Assad regime to accommodate the people's demands 

to avoid the violent quagmire we have witnessed ever since. Turkey's dIorts proved 

insuUicient as the Syrian regime saw it as an existential tight for its own survival. The 

most recent decision of the "Friends of Syria" to provide the opposition with arms is 

welcome yet insuUicient progress from the Turkish perspective. Turkey will continue to 

ask the international community to help the Syrian opposition and address the 

humanitarian situation. 

The sectarian tensions are increasing in the region as a result of the Syrian conflict. 

Turkey is one of the few powers that can pursue a non-sectarian policy although it is 

increasingly seen as a Sunni power despite its deeply entrenched secular politics. As we 

have seen in the recent spread of violence to Lebanon, sectarian violence continues to 

threaten regional stability and may define the next decade, especially if the Syrian 

contlict continues to burn. The US and Turkey have a common interest in reducing the 

sectarian implications and spillover effects of the conflict, which has already drawn Iraq, 

Saudi Arabia, and Iran into a proxy war. 

Turkey's "settlement process" has the potential to contribute to regional stability, as PKK 

activities along the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria threatened security over the 

past decades. Kurdish political movement seems to have given up any secessionist 

demands, which will push Turkey to deepen its relations with Kurds throughout the 

region, as it has with the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq. 

The current negotiations between the US and Europe on a transatlantic free trade 

agreement have the potential to further deepen US-Turkey ties. Turkey has been a 

7 
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signatory to the Customs Union agreement with the EU without first achieving 

membership status. It has benefited from the agreement in increasing its competitiveness 

but the European businesses have been the main beneficiaries. If the US and Turkey can 

embark on free trade agreement talks, this will further improve relations between the two 

countries and strengthen the transatlantic alliance. 

The US and Turkey have strong common interests. Their cooperation is important not 

only for bilateral relations but also for stability and peace in the broader Middle East. 

Turkey has critical relevance for the US foreign policy goals, including withdrawal from 

Afghanistan, stability in Iraq, resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, ending the Syrian 

conflict, and achieving peace between Israel and Palestine among others. 

Turkey has proven time and again that it is a dynamic democracy with a vibrant civil 

society despite its t1aws and imperfections. The debate today in Turkey is not on whether 

or not to have democracy but on how to create a better democracy that embraces all 

segments of the society. This in itself is a testimony to the country's commitment to 

democratic ideals and the rule oflaw. 

8 
27

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you for that very thoughtful testimony. 

And, Mr. Fradkin, please? 

STATEMENT OF HILLEL FRADKIN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER 

ON ISLAM, DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM 

WORLD, HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Mr. FRADKIN. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Keating, 

honorable members, let me begin by thanking you for the opportunity to testify today. The topic, ‘‘Turkey at a Crossroads: What 

Do the Gezi Park Protests Mean for Democracy in the Region?’’ is 

a most important one. And I am, therefore, very honored to have 

been invited to offer a response to this and the related questions 

cited in the invitation. 

The latter largely focus on the meaning of these events for the 

prospects of Turkish democracy itself. And all of these questions 

are indeed related because it has been hoped that the fact of Turkish democracy and its successful operation would serve as a model 

for democratic development in other parts of the Middle East region. This has been especially true since the advent of the so-called 

Arab Spring and the overthrow of authoritarian regimes. It has 

also been especially true since the rise to rule of Turkish Prime 

Minister Tayyip Erdogan and his AKP party for the latter, as I 

think both the chairman and the ranking member indicated, appear to offer a model for the successful navigation of the tensions 

between democracy and Islam. 

I have submitted more extensive and formal remarks, but what 

follows is a summary. 

So what does Gezi Park mean? Alas, from the perspective of both 

Turkish democracy and broader regional hopes, the events surrounding Gezi Park are discouraging. This is because Gezi Park 

has brought to a head a crisis in the course of Turkish democracy. 

This crisis has been brewing for some time and has entailed a variety of particular issues and disputes. But the crisis is broader and 

deeper because it is about democracy as such, what it is and what 

it should be. 

Gezi Park reveals that Turkey has not resolved this dispute for 

itself, at least not yet. And, for that reason, it is hardly in a position to serve as a model for others. Still less is this is the case since 

the position of Prime Minister Erdogan, his party, and his government concerning the meaning of democracy, at least as enunciated 

recently, is a defective one, both from the point of view of Turkey 

and other states in the region. 

This has become clear in the aftermath of Gezi Park through 

both the words and actions of Prime Minister Erdogan, his colleagues, and supporters. In brief, he has insisted on what one may 

call—and I think the chairman already did call—a majoritarian understanding of democracy. 

Erdogan claims no more than a majority of 51 percent, a figure 

derived from the last elections. Still, he claims that this gives him 

the right to do as he pleases. For him, this is true for the additional reason that he claims to have made a great success of Turkey over the past decade and, therefore, knows what is best for 

Turkey now and in the future. All the more should he be free to 

28

do as he thinks best, but what about the large number of the Turkish public who apparently did not vote for him nor support him? 

Since Gezi Park, Erdogan has given a very large number of speeches, which provide his understanding of them. They are, according 

to him, terrorists and traitors in league with foreign enemies. 

‘‘Their malevolent intent is to hold Turkey down and back’’—these 

are direct quotes—from the still greater Turkish future Erdogan intends to build. He has promised in meaning tones to uncover these 

alleged plots and punish all of those responsible, employing the full 

powers of the state. If that violates the strict rule of law, so be it. 

And I want to stress the rhetoric of Prime Minister Erdogan has 

been really ferocious. Gezi Park was from the beginning an instance of this view. Much has been made of the force and violence 

used to suppress the original small band of tree-loving demonstrators. And this is important. It was what prompted many more people to come to Taksim Square, which led to still more force and violence. 

But it is also important to note that the original demonstrators 

were attempting to block what was, in fact, an illegal act. The 

question of Gezi Park was actually in litigation. And a Turkish 

court had issued a stay on all work there. Still, Erdogan went 

ahead. 

In part, the Gezi Park protests were in objection to this kind of 

high-handed and lawless behavior, which has become all too frequent in recent years. But Erdogan is, in part, right. The protestors 

also object to his vision of the Turkish future. And they think they 

should at least have a say in the matter. This is hardly surprising 

for it appears that what Erdogan has in mind is a kind of refounding of the Turkish republic. 

He is very attached to the year 2023, when it will celebrate its 

100th anniversary, a refounding which entails, somehow or other, 

a revival of its pre-republican past, morally, religiously and politically. This pre-republican past—it is obviously Ottoman past—was 

not notably democrat but, rather, was based on the will of the rulers. Thus, to many I think people in Turkey, Erdogan’s behavior 

and vision appear to be all of peace. 

Let me turn to the questions external to domestic, Turkey’s domestic, politics, the regional questions, and end with that. Concerning the region, it is easy to see that the implications are not 

promising. The region and especially the Arab countries have an altogether too rich and deep experience of the politics of will, of an 

authoritarian will. 

What it needs, what it has needed, what it still needs is some 

model of consensual democratic politics with some due accommodation of religious sensibilities. For a while, it seemed and was hoped 

that Turkey could provide that, but that is hardly the case today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, members of the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fradkin follows:]

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US House of Representatives 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

Hearing: Turkey at a Crossroads: What do the Gezi Park Protests 

Mean for Democracy in the Region? 

June 26, 2013 

Testimony of Dr. Hillel Fradkin, 

Senior Fellow and Director, Center on Islam, Democracy and the 

Future ofthe Muslim World 

Hudson Institute 

Honorable Ladies and Gentlemen. Let me begin by thanking 

you for the invitation to speak to you today. The topic - Turkey at a 

Crossroads: What do the Gezi Park Protests Mean for Democracy in 

the Region? - is a most important and urgent one. I am, therefore, 

most honored to have been invited to offer a response to this and 

the related questions cited in the invitation. The latter largely 

focus on the meaning of these events for the prospects of Turkish 

democracy itself. These questions are indeed related because it 

has been hoped that the fact of Turkish democracy and its 

successful operation would serve as a model for democratic 

development in other parts of the Middle East region. This has 

been especially true since the advent of the so-called Arab Spring 

and the overthrow of authoritarian regimes. It has also been 

especially true since the rise to rule of Turkish Prime Minister and 

his AKP party which appeared to offer a model for the successful 

navigation of the tensions between democracy and Islam. 

So what does Gezi Park mean? Alas from the perspective of 

both Turkish democracy and broader regional hopes the events 

surrounding Gezi Park are discouraging - especially the behavior 

ofthe Turkish government. Prime Minister Erdogan has insisted 

that he is acting democratically and enunciated what he means by 

that. It means according to him the rule ofthe will ofthe majority 

as represented by him - no matter how great or small that majority 

may be. Erdogan himself repeatedly refers to his own majority as 

that of 51 % of the public - having in mind the support he gained in 
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the last election. Perhaps remarkably, he seems to have little 

concern that nearly as many people do not support him or his 

party as do. Having majority support and a still greater majority of 

the legislative seats - through the peculiarities of the Turkish 

election system - Erdogan insists that his will must be done. 

Indeed he often complains that the structure of the Turkish 

government thwarts his will and has proposed changes to the 

constitution which would remove checks to the highest authority. 

Moreover, he has verbally attacked his opponents in very strong, 

contemptuous, menacing and even slanderous terms. They are he 

says terrorists in league with foreign conspirators who are thereby 

committing treason. Their aim is to bring Turkey down - a Turkey 

which has been a glorious success under his rule. This Erdogan 

declares he will not permit and he promises to use the full force of 

the state to uncover and punish the traitorous conspirators and 

terrorists. 

It must be said that Erdogan's definition of democracy does 

cover a certain kind. But it is certainly not that kind of democracy 

known as liberal democracy. At least some of his opponents are 

seeking that kind of democracy and object to his efforts to stifle it. 

How did this situation come to pass and what was the role of 

Gezi Park? Let me observe that Erdogan's mode of rule has 

changed over time. At the beginning and for quite some years, 

Erdogan enjoyed beyond his substantial base constituency a quite 

diverse group of supporters - including people who eventually 

went to Gezi Park and Taksim Square to protest. Such people 

appreciated his ostensible efforts to remedy undemocratic 

features of previous governments - including the heavy role of the 

military. 

But it now appears that this kind of political alliance was 

merely tactical rather than the articulation of a common 

democratic vision in which the whole Turkish public could share in 

some important degree. In April of this year, the matter was put 

rather clearly and bluntly by Aziz Babuscu, the chairman of the 

istanbul AKP party organization. He said, "Those with whom we 

were stakeholders throughout the past 10 years will not be our 
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stakeholders in the coming decade .... Let us say the liberals, in one 

way or another, were stakeholders in this process, but the future is 

a process of construction. This construction era will not be as they 

[liberals] wish. Hence, they [liberals] will no longer be with us .... 

The Turkey that we will construct, the future that we will bring 

about, is not going to be a future that they will be able to accept." 

In this context what do the Gezi Park protests mean? Simply 

put, that the non-AKP stakeholders have gotten Babuscu's message 

and that they object. It is likely that they will continue to object 

even though it is unclear what vehicle they might find to express 

their opposition. At all events, Erdogan has managed to turn 

Turkish democracy and politics more and more into a simple 

contest of wills, a contest he means to win, by force if necessary. 

That too proved to be involved in Babuscu's message. Indeed it 

was Erdogan's original use of force to evict the very small number 

of original Gezi Park protestors that produced the explosion in 

Taksim square and ultimately in many other public squares 

around Turkey. 

It might seem that Gezi Park as such and the issue it most 

immediately entailed - the preservation of its trees - was 

incidental to the larger struggle going on within Turkish politics 

and society and served merely to strike the match to a fuse. In part 

this is correct. After all it was preceded by discontent with other 

actions taken by Erdogan as well as his way of speaking to the 

public. But it is perhaps not entirely incidental or accidental that 

Gezi Park produced an explosion. It is at least the case that the 

immediate issue did, in Babuscu's phrase, involve construction -

literally so - the building of a building. This is not simply 

surprising - Erdogan has dedicated himself to a massive building 

program in Istanbul not to mention elsewhere. This had already 

occasioned complaints. But the building in question in Gezi Park is 

also striking in its own right - it will be the reconstruction of an 

Otttoman era barracks which once stood in Taksim Square. The 

history of this building has symbolic significance. For in 1909 the 

Ottoman troops in this barracks launched a failed coup to overturn 

constitutional concessions made by the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph. 

In Erdogan's vision "constructing the future" seems to mean the 
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renewal ofthe past - a past which was not notably democratic. In 

keeping with that spirit, Erdogan's assault on Gezi Park was not 

only, as so many said, disproportionate but unlawful. For the 

question of the building was in litigation and there existed a 

Turkish court stay order against any government action. It was the 

latter that brought the Gezi Park protestors to the park. Erdogan 

was not merely assaulting their beloved trees but the rule of law. 

More and more over the years Erdogan seems to act as if the 

law is what he says it is. 

This arbitrariness is one source of the opposition to his rule. 

The other is the vision which it appears to serve. That 

appears to be a refounding ofthe Turkish Republic through a 

revival of its pre-Republican past, morally, religiously and 

politically. Erdogan has placed special emphasis on 3 upcoming 

dates - 2023,2053, 2071. Each is an important anniversary. The 

first 2023 is the 100th anniversary ofthe Turkish Republic. The 

second 2053 is the 600th anniversary ofthe Ottoman conquest of 

Constantinople and the end of the Byzantine Empire; the third is 

the 1000th anniversary of the Battle of Manzikert and the victory of 

the Seljuk Turks over the Byzantines. It led to the Turkish 

conquest of Anatolia. 

At the first, Erdogan hopes to preside as still ruler of Turkey. 

But he cannot in 2053; still less in 2071. But he has spoken 

fulsomely of forming new and more pious generations who will be 

his living legacy in those latter days. 

It is fair to say that a fair portion ofthe public does not share 

this vision and at events don't see what it has to do with building a 

healthy democracy. 

What is the bearing ofthese events for the other two large 

questions which were posed: First what may be their impact on 

democracy in the region? Second, what are their potential 

implications for Turkish American relations? 
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81694a-5.eps

About the first - the impact on the region - it is easy to see 

that the implications are not promising. The region and especially 

the Arab countries have an altogether too rich and deep experience 

of the politics of will - of authoritarian will. What it needs is some 

model of consensual democratic politics with some due 

accommodation of religious sensibilities. For a while it seemed 

and was hoped that Turkey could provide that. But that is hardly 

the case today. Indeed some in Turkey and the region now argue 

that Erdogan's use of force has weakened his moral authority in 

the region, for example in situations like Syria. Another case, thus 

far less extreme, is Egypt. There both sides to the civil and political 

conflict, the Muslim Brotherhood government and its opponents, 

seem to have embraced the model of the politics of will, of 

majoritarian will, and each is willing to override democratic and 

constitutional forms. Turkey's recent political experience can 

hardly serve to moderate the parties. 

As for Turkish American relations there now exists a serious 

problem. To be sure we have very deep and long relations with 

Turkey, both bilateral and within the context of NATO. These will 

no doubt continue. But in recent years our relations were put on a 

new and more ambitious footing. In 2009, Pres. Obama gave a 

speech in Ankara, his first in a Muslim capital, which looked 

forward to a special American relationship with Turkey. It was one 

in which Turkey, especially and even necessarily under the 

leadership of Erdogan, would play the leading role in the Middle 

East, both in its own behalf and ours. This was in part because 

Turkey had "unique insights into a whole host of regional and 

strategic challenges that we may face." It was also in part because 

Erdogan had been uniquely skillful in building a new Turkish 

politics, both domestically and internationally. The latter was the 

result of the new Turkish foreign policy which newly situated 

Turkey in the Muslim Middle East as an expressly Muslim power. 

Erdogan was the master of his own house and therefore poised to 

be master of the region. 

Over the past two years and especially since the outbreak of 

the Syrian Civil War there has been much reason to doubt 

Erdogan's mastery ofthe Middle East. So much so is this the case, 
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81694a-6.eps

that Erdogan's recent visit to the US was aimed at persuading us to 

lift the burden of leadership from him. 

Of course, he is still master of his own house but it is an 

increasingly troubled house. In addition to matters already cited, 

the Gezi Park events have liberated disputes about a whole host of 

additional issues - for example Turkish policy in Syria and the 

resolution ofthe Kurdish issue. Erdogan's electoral strength 

remains substantial but he now has a much more complicated task 

of domestic navigation. One might hope that these new difficulties 

might chasten and moderate Erdogan. So far, however, there is 

little sign of this. 

But perhaps this might be abetted by the US. The US still 

seems to have or at least should have a good deal of credit with 

Erdogan given the great respect he has been shown. And it is clear 

that he still harbors a great interest in the closeness of his relations 

with the US and Pres. Obama. It is noteworthy that since Gezi Park 

he and his colleagues have attacked many outside parties but not 

the US. So perhaps he may be open to some friendly advice. It is 

certainly true that he and the prospects of regional democracy 

could use it. But such advice to be truly useful requires less 

deference and more candor than has been his experience of us in 

the past. 

Thank you for your kind attention. 
35

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you for that testimony. 

And, Mr. Gursel? 

STATEMENT OF MR. KADRI GURSEL, CONTRIBUTING WRITER 

TO AL-MONITOR 

Mr. GURSEL. Respected members of the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and 

Emerging Threats, I thank you for the opportunity to share my observations and thoughts on the meaning of the protest movement 

that started as a reaction to a police action on May 31. 

So my observations go a bit beyond those of a veteran journalist. 

They are also personal as I live very close to the epicenter of the 

protests at Taksim Square. I myself suffered from the gas that police used so generously on the demonstrators. 

The first question that must be answered here is what actually 

happened in Istanbul on May 31 and June and how to explain it. 

The shortest way to define it would be that it was a social eruption 

or social explosion. 

The excessively harsh police intervention against a few hundred 

protesters in the early hours of May 31 was the final move that led 

to this explosion. 

How did the events swell and reach the point of an explosion? 

And here is a short list of factors that contributed to the eruption. 

First of all, the inability of the mainstream media, which was 

under stiff government pressure to carry out its basic mission of informing the public and keeping tabs on the government; on the 

other hand, working on the line, the growing importance of the 

internet media and especially that of al-monitor.com, where I am 

a contributing writer, to contest this unabashed censorship by providing Turkish writers of different perspectives a forum to share 

their views in both Turkish and English. 

The independence of the judiciary has been discarded as a result 

of the accumulation of power never before seen during periods of 

civilian rule in Turkey, which is the second factor. Most of the public feels the judiciary has been politicized and that ways to seek 

justice has been blocked. 

The third one, arbitrary and prolonged political detentions further decreased confidence in the justice system. 

The fourth is the role of religion in basic education has greatly 

increased, particularly in the last year, alienating many of Turkey’s 

Alawites and secular citizens. 

The fifth is over the last few months, authorities became intolerant of even minor protests and resorted to police violence to disperse them systematically. 

The sixth is Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s advice to women at every opportunity, it seems, on how many children they should have and how they should give birth has fostered 

the perception of interference in personal lives. 

Finally, the government imposed alcohol bans in May under the 

label of ‘‘regulating alcohol,’’ causing a sizable part of society to feel 

that the government was intervening in their lifestyles and freedoms. 

To keep this short list, which is a very short list, we must also 

add the Prime Minister’s habit of using offensive language to deniVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:14 Aug 21, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\062613\81694 HFA PsN: SHIRL
36

grate the cultures and lifestyles of those who are not counted as 

his constituents. 

It was Prime Minister Erdogan’s policies and the pressure he 

brought to bear on the public with his narratives that led to this 

social explosion. 

How then to analyze the sociopolitical chemistry of this explosion? The uprising was a spontaneous popular movement without 

an organization and leadership. The lead actor in this movement 

is the well-educated, urbanized young generation labeled by the 

Turkish media as ‘‘the ’90s generation.’’ Most of these young people 

place themselves outside of established politics. According to polls, 

they cite restrictions on their freedoms, Erdogan’s 

authoritarianism, and police brutality as the main reasons behind 

their taking to streets. What they demand most is their freedoms 

and ending the violations of their rights. 

To sum up, this is a new secular urban middle class’ rebellion 

against Erdogan’s rule. In sum, the social movement that began at 

Gezi Park discussed finding ways to defend their freedoms politically, now actually. This discussion is continuing in various formats 

today. 

Since June 17, activists have been engaged in standstill protests 

in acts of passive disobedience. Every evening they organize synchronized forums in various Istanbul parks where free debate takes 

place. 

The enrichment of the culture of democracy and spreading it to 

the masses where it will take root is a priceless and never-beforeseen civil society movement. For civil society to take its due place 

as a key actor in the struggle for democracy is a sign of maturity 

and a healthy society. 

Naturally, as I tried to explain at the beginning, this civil-social 

movement is a reaction of anger and resentment against Erdogan 

Government’s Islamic conservatism, its policies that are 

sidestepping democratic freedoms in Turkey. 

Prime Minister Erdogan’s policies of societal polarization did not 

cost anything until May 31. But from now on, Mr. Erdogan will pay 

something for his policies of polarization. That price will be instability. 

The social explosion in Turkey and government pressures that 

followed simply washed out the paradigm of the Turkey model 

based on the rule of the Justice and Development Party. This was 

advocated as a model for the Middle East and was accompanied by 

the term ‘‘Muslim democracy,’’ even though it was not applicable. 

AKP rule now has two roads to choose from. It has come to a 

junction. 

It can finally take the steps needed for Turkey to become a real 

libertarian, pluralist, participatory and secular democracy and, as 

such, redefine the Turkey model, but correctly this time, or it can 

continue to drag Turkey toward an Islamic, authoritarian and oppressive regime. If AKP officials opt for the latter, they can’t advance their cause without suppressing civil society. A more oppressive and more authoritarian regime cannot maintain stability in 

Turkey. 

To finalize, it is impossible to give an unequivocal answer to a 

question frequently asked nowadays, whether a military coup is 

37

among the risks to be face should Turkey destabilize even further. 

With the purges of 2010–2012, the ability of the military to stage 

coups has been made extraordinarily difficult. The military has 

been totally excluded from politics. 

Thank you for your attention. And thank you for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gursel follows:]

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Testimony before the 

United States House of Representatives 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

Hearing on Turkey at a Crossroads: What do the Gezi Park Protests Mean for Democracy in 

the Region? 

By Kadri Gursel 

Contributing Writer, AI-Monitor.com 

June 26, 2013 

Respected members of the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs subcommittee on 

Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats: 

I thank you for the opportunity to share my observations and thoughts on the meaning of the 

protest movement that started as a reaction to a police action on May 31 against civil society 

activists who were camping out to protest the cutting down of trees in Gezi Park in Istanbul's 

Taksim district.. The protests throughout Turkey. I will be addressing the impact of these 

protests on today's Turkey, and their future possible effects. 

My observations go a bit beyond those of a veteran journalist. They are also personal as I live 

very close to the epicenter of the protests at Taksim Square. I myself suffered from the gas 

that police used so generously on the demonstrators. 

The first question that must be answered here is what actually happened in Istanbul on May 31 

and June 1, and how to explain it. 

The shortest way to define it would be that it was a "social eruption" or "social explosion." 

The excessively harsh police intervention against a few hundred protesters in the early hours of 

May 31 was the final move that led to this explosion. As soon the police assault was reported 

over social media, tens of thousands of people converged on the park, in Taksim Square, and 

the surrounding Beyoglu district of Istanbul. When the ensuing clashes between the people and 

the police could not be contained on June 1, the police were ordered to withdraw from Taksim 

Square. 

How did the events swell and reach the point of an explosion? 

Here is a short list of factors that contributed to the eruption: 

The inability of the mainstream media - which was under stiff government pressure -

to carry out its basic mission of informing the public and keeping tabs on the 

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www.ai-monitor.com 
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government. Its replacement of basic news reporting instincts with unabashed selfcensorship has led a significant segment of the public to think that its right to be 

informed has been sidelined. 

I should add here a quick note that AI-Monitor.com, where I am a contributing writer, 

has been a leader in independent digital media in Turkey, providing Turkish writers of 

different perspectives a forum to share their views in both Turkish and English. 

Instead of getting the separation of powers we were hoping for after the 2010 

referendum, there has been a consolidation of power never before seen during periods 

of civilian rule in Turkey. The independence of the judiciary has been discarded. Most of 

the public feels the judiciary has been politicized and that access to justice has been 

blocked. 

Arbitrary and prolonged political detentions further decreased confidence in the justice 

system. 

The role of religion in basic education has greatly increased, particularly in the last year, 

alienating many ofTurkey's Alevi and secular citizens. 

Over the last few months, authorities became intolerant of even minor protests and 

resorted to police violence to disperse them. 

The discrimination and marginalization applied to Alevis became systematic. Alevis, 

Turkish Alawites, an offshoot of Shia Islam, are believed to constitute 10 to 15 percent 

of Turkey's population. 

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's advice to women, at every opportunity, it seems, 

on how many children they should have and how they should give birth has fostered the 

perception of interference in personal lives. 

Finally, although Turkey doesn't have a social problem called alcoholism, the 

government - acting as if there were such a problem - imposed alcohol bans in May 

under the label of "regulating alcohol," causing a sizable part of society to feel that the 

government was intervening in their lifestyles and freedoms. 

To keep this short list, we must also add the prime minister's habit of using offensive language 

to denigrate the cultures and lifestyles of those who are not counted as his constituents. 

It was Prime Minister Erdogan's policies and the pressure he brought to bear on the public with 

his narratives that led to this social explosion. 

The inability of the political establishment and parliamentary opposition to offer hope to 

admonished and oppressed segments of society also helped facilitate this social eruption. 
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81694c-3.eps

How then to analyze the sociopolitical chemistry of this explosion? 

The uprising was a spontaneous popular movement without an organization and 

leadership. The lead actor in this movement is the well-educated, urbanized young generation 

labeled by the Turkish media as "the '90s generation." Most of these young people place 

themselves outside of established politics. According to polls, they cite restrictions on their 

freedoms, Erdogan's authoritarianism, and police brutality as the main reasons behind their 

taking to streets. What they demand most is their freedoms and ending the violations of their 

rights. 

The difference between them and earlier rebellious generations is that this time, their parents 

are behind them. They are for peaceful demonstrations, humor and nonviolence. They keep 

themselves informed and communicate by social media, led by Twitter. 

One of their common denominators is a preference for political secularism and their rejection 

of political conservatism. No valid findings could be unearthed to show that their 

understanding of secularism resembles the authoritarian secularism of Kemalist Turkey. 

Some minor leftist organizations, which have a tradition of resistance and milita ncy, gave 

support to this social movement and were able to mobilize in the streets because of their 

organizational faculties. But none of them had the power, the political culture or the ideology 

to take this civilian social movement hostage and manipulate it. 

In sum, the social movement that began at Gezi Park - in the 15 days of the protesters' tent 

camp until they were dispersed by the police - discussed finding ways to defend their 

freedoms politically. This discussion is continuing in various formats today. 

Since June 17, activists have been engaged in stand-still protests in acts of passive 

disobedience. Every evening they organize synchronized forums in various Istanbul parks where 

free debate takes place. 

This enrichment of the culture of democracy and spreading it to the masses where it will take 

root is a priceless and never-before-seen civil society movement. For civil society to take its 

due place as a key actor in the struggle for democracy is a sign of maturity and a healthy 

society. 

Naturally, as I tried to explain at the beginning, this civil-social movement is a reaction to the 

anger and resentment of the Erdogan government's Islamic conservatism, its policies that -

however you look at them - are sidestepping hard-earned democratic freedoms in Turkey. 

This social explosion makes it imperative for us to examine why it happened and what is means 

for the Turkey of today - and tomorrow. 
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Prime Minister Erdogan's policies of societal polarization did not cost anything until May 31. But 

from now on, the government will pay something for its policies of dividing the society on 

Islamist/secular and Sunni/Alevi fault lines. That price will be instability. 

The social explosion in Turkey and government pressures that followed simply washed out the 

paradigm of the "Turkey model" based on the rule of the Justice and Development Party, also 

known as the AKP. This was advocated as a model for the Middle East and was accompanied by 

the term "Muslim democracy," even though it was not applicable. 

AKP rule now has two roads to choose from. It has come to a junction. 

It can - with or without Erdogan - finally take the steps needed for Turkey to become a real 

libertarian, pluralist, participatory and secular democracy and as such redefine the "Turkey 

model" (but correctly this time), or it can continue to drag Turkey toward an Islamic, 

authoritarian and oppressive regime. If AKP officials opt for the latter, they can't advance their 

cause without suppressing civil society. A more oppressive and more authoritarian regime 

cannot maintain stability in Turkey. 

One of the prerequisites of stability is the sound management of the peace process with the 

Kurds. If Turkey abandons democracy, that won't be possible. 

It is impossible to give an unequivocal answer to a question frequently asked nowadays: 

whether a military coup is among the risks to be faced should Turkey destabilize even further. 

With the purges of 2010-2012, the ability of the military to stage coups has been made 

extraordinarily difficult. The military has been totally excluded from politics. 

The progress of the Turkish economy has to be observed closely. 2014 and 2015 are election 

years, bringing to mind the possibility that this authoritarian leader may be stiffly challenged at 

the ballot box should he persist with his decisions and choices that are taking Turkey on a nondemocratic path. 

Thank you for your attentions and for this opportunity. 
42

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for your thoughtful 

testimony and for the testimony of all of our witnesses today. I am 

going to take a little poll. Maybe you could just tell me. Before this 

upheaval happened and this violence started in the park, before 

the police weighed in with their billy clubs and ignited something, 

did you believe that there was a tension and a seething underneath 

the surface in Turkey that was of the magnitude that we have seen 

manifest itself since that ignition point? Did you think that this 

could happen? Just give me a yes or no. Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRADKIN. Yes. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Not the timing. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What is that now? 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Yes, but not the timing. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Go ahead. 

Mr. GURSEL. Yes for the resentment, no for the timing. 

Mr. USTUN. Yes with some objections. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, my gosh. All right. Thank you for that. 

I will have to tell you I didn’t. So you guys are a lot smarter over 

there than those of us are up here. That is why we are having you 

testify. 

I really saw—perhaps it was an illusion, and perhaps it was not. 

It seemed to me that we had a demonstration of Islamic democratic 

government that was reasonable and could again serve as a model 

and was reaching out to its own people in the democratic process. 

I always looked at, for example, the fact that women before—and 

correct me if I am wrong—were not permitted to wear head scarves 

when the old military, pro military, regime was in. And freedom is 

when a woman has the right to wear a head scarf but also the 

right not to wear a head scarf. And if the new government or if the 

Erdogan Government would then move to the point that it was 

mandating that, well, then it would begin, as you were mentioning, 

traipsing on the fundamental freedoms of the people. 

Was this alcohol restriction—I have heard one example of that. 

Were there other restrictions that I have missed that were being 

again over the line where you would say that freedom aligned that 

the Erdogan administration was having other than restricting alcohol is because of someone’s religious beliefs, that Islam does not believe in that? So were there other restrictions that we are causing 

the people to be upset, whoever has an answer for that? Mr. Ambassador, any——

Ambassador JEFFREY. Simply to say in our own country, sir, as 

you know, we prohibited alcohol for many years. As an imbiber of 

alcohol, I am personally not in favor of that, but I just want to 

show how complicated democracy is as it rubs up against what people see as their personal freedoms. And, thus, I would segregate 

this from religion in general or the specific religion of Islam and 

simply state that this struggle between authoritarian thought processes, even with a majority government and minority rights, we 

have seen all over the world in many different kinds of countries 

as countries, including many of our allies, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, evolved. And that is what we are seeing. 

43

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, did we see, in this regime, for the last 

10 years, was there a violation of people’s freedom of speech, for 

example? Mr. Ustun, why don’t we go with——

Mr. USTUN. Yes. There are no laws that were passed about restricting freedom of speech in Turkey. And there is a very harsh 

criticism of the government in newspapers and TVs and everywhere. There have been concerns about media issues, but there are 

structural problems that date back to the ’90s and before where the 

relationship between sort of big media conglomerates and businesses, those kinds of relationships make the media, sort of journalists’ lives a little more difficult because they have to kind of sort 

of go along with what the bosses want. In the past, they would call 

on the military to intervene. But today they are doing other things. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Does anyone else have an observation about 

freedom of speech under this administration? Yes, sir? And then we 

will go with you. 

Mr. USTUN. Let me defer to the Turkish journalist. 

Mr. GURSEL. Okay. Well, let me give you an example on that. 

Since 2008, I don’t remember having read any news story covering 

government corruption in the mainstream media, since 2008. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. No, because they have eliminated 

all government corruption there? 

Mr. GURSEL. So does it mean that in Turkey, there is no corruption? I don’t believe. I don’t think so. And then the main instinct 

replaced the instinct of news in the desk, news desk, is the censorship. And it was proven on the night of May 31, when there was 

the events in Istanbul’s streets. A few hundred meters away, TV 

channels were broadcasting. One TV channel was broadcasting a 

live debate about schizophrenia. And the other one was, well, 

broadcasting a serial document on England——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let’s just note for the record that——

Mr. GURSEL [continuing]. Dropping the formal——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just note for the record I did ask for 

some recommendations from the Turkish Embassy. And they were 

very gracious in recommending at least one witness for us today. 

And I appreciate that very much, who they thought would be adding to the discussion. And that witness has added to the discussion. 

Are there journalists in jail right now? And then I will have one 

more question and then go to my ranking member. Are there journalists in jail right now in Turkey? Yes? 

Mr. GURSEL. May I again answer this question, please, because 

I am IPI National Committee chairman, and I am a press freedom 

activist also? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Mr. GURSEL. There are more than 60 journalists now in jail in 

Turkey. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Say that again. 

Mr. GURSEL. Sixty journalists. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sixty? 

Mr. GURSEL. More than 60. And they are mostly pro Kurdish 

journalists. They are mostly pro Kurdish journalists. And there is 

a discussion on them. Maybe Mr. Ustun can answer. I don’t know. 

But there are, according to OECD and other international organizations defending freedom of the press, more than 60 journalists. 

44

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Dr. Ustun? 

Mr. USTUN. I had this in my testimony as well. We have enacted 

an anti-terror law in Turkey. Because of the terror environment, 

we have a law that makes it difficult to further democratization. 

The judicial system is so archaic. And this anti-terror law, basically 

if you are praising the PKK organization, then you could be subject 

to detention and jail time. 

But this was changed very recently. The reform package passed 

in the Parliament, which basically makes the praising of the PKK 

organization not a crime. So, going forward, that is going to help. 

But, as Gursel was saying, there are a lot of small-time journalists. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am going over my time here. 

Mr. USTUN. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Ambassador, do you have something very 

quickly to answer to that? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. No. As our colleagues have said, it has 

been a tension. There is a great deal of information out there in 

Turkey that is available to the citizens. And there have been restrictions. Many of these restrictions date well before the AKP, as 

we have heard. The AKP has eliminated some of them and has, 

particularly recently, raised new questions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we have to put it in an historical perspective. 

I will now turn to my ranking member. I am sorry I am over but 

as many questions as long as you want. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would just like to ask each of you, each of you individually, to 

comment on this. I want you to cite for me, if you could, specific, 

specific instances of outside influence with the demonstrations at 

Gezi Park. And I will start with Ambassador Jeffrey and maybe go 

right across there. I want to see if this collective group here, so 

knowledgeable on these issues, can cite one specific example of that 

outside influence and who they are. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. By my definition of outside influence, 

there was none. By the definition of some——

Mr. KEATING. But yours. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I will stop there. 

Mr. FRADKIN. None, Congressman. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Absolutely none whatsoever. 

Mr. GURSEL. I repeat. Absolutely not. 

Mr. USTUN. Yes. The third group I talked about, DHKP–C, involved in the attack on the U.S. Embassy, involved in the Reyhanli 

attack, these are connected to the Assad regime in Syria. 

Mr. KEATING. And they were active participants in the——

Mr. USTUN. Yes. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes, Mr. Gursel? 

Mr. GURSEL. Thank you. 

I have to object because every day I have been on the place, on 

the square, in the square, Taksim Square. I observed very closely 

the tension of the political groups existing in the resistance. I think 

the hard core of the resistance is the uncoordinated, unorganized 

middle class new generation of the secular modern urban middle 

class. 

Mr. KEATING. Dr. Ustun? 

45

Mr. GURSEL. The second group, you know, are the members of 

some organizations. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. Thank you. 

Dr. Ustun——

Mr. USTUN. PKK was there. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes. Okay. 

Mr. USTUN. Other socialist groups were there. But personally I 

didn’t notice any banner or——

Mr. KEATING. I just wanted to go back for a second——

Mr. USTUN [continuing]. Anything representing DHKP–C. 

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. If I could. Doctor, that group you said, 

they are domestic, aren’t they? So when you say they are——

Mr. GURSEL. They have historically been supported by the Syrian 

regime, just like the PKK in the past. But their big, huge banner 

was on the Ataturk Cultural Center while CNN was broadcasting 

live. And in the background, you could see DHKP–C’s and 

Abdullah Ocalan’s pictures up there. 

Technically PKK and the government are talking, but PKK is 

still technically an illegal organization in Turkey. 

Mr. KEATING. A domestic group? 

Mr. USTUN. Yes. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay. That is what I wanted to know. Thank you. 

Mr. USTUN. With foreign ties. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

I have another question, just to get a little more sense of Gezi 

Park and what happened there. I would like to ask Mr. Gursel just 

to describe, if he could, who are the protestors who were there. 

Were they diverse ethnic groups? Did they have different political 

backgrounds? Were they mostly men or women? Are they violent 

or harassing toward those who didn’t support their views? 

We just saw here what we saw on television. I just wanted to get 

a sense from you as someone firsthand. You know, could you describe, who are those people? 

Mr. GURSEL. Well, at the hard core of the resistance, at Gezi 

Park, those people were the youngsters coming out from their 

homes to protest and to resist what was going on for their liberties 

and for their future, for themselves. And it is typically a middle 

class movement, but others, there were some other groups which 

in the past have used violence as a political tool, such as PKK, 

maybe other groups. But there were also many, many groups that 

were in unease with the government, like, for example, feminists, 

like anarchists, like anti-capitalists, Muslims, or environmentalists, 

who opposed staunchly the policies of government. 

But in Gezi Park, there weren’t any incidents reported. I didn’t 

hear anything happened between those groups. There was a growing dialogue between them. And it still continues, and even the 

Kemalists. There were Kemalists with the heavy burden of the 

Kemalist Republican past. There also they have engaged political 

dialogue with other groups. And they have also accepted the existence of Mr. Erdogan’s posters on the square——

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

Mr. GURSEL [continuing]. At the end of the day. 

Mr. KEATING. Answer this if you want when I ask the group just 

another question, if I could. There were some reports that the 

46

Turkish Government response to the protests were not completely 

uniform and some voices within the AK Party were encouraging cooperation and calm. And, at least according to some preliminary 

statements, however, once the Prime Minister returned from his 

travels, he used force against those protestors. Does this represent 

like a miscommunication within the party, a misreporting, or was 

there indeed, to your knowledge, some difference of opinion as to 

how to approach this within the party itself? 

And do you see these—if there are, indeed, those differences, 

what would be the implications going forward? I would throw it 

open to anyone. Ambassador Jeffrey? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. There certainly was. For example, both 

President Gul and Deputy Prime Minister Arinc at one point came 

out, apologized, and urged restraint on the part of the authorities 

toward the demonstrators and some understanding of them. But it 

goes further than that. 

Even Prime Minister Erdogan when he returned, his original position was to take a moderate stance. He invited in and spent 

hours talking to representatives of the demonstrators. He then announced that he would adhere to the decision of the court to stay 

the tearing down of Gezi Park and that if in the end, the court decided the state could go forward with it, he would not do so until 

there would be a referendum on that. 

This was on Friday, a week ago Friday. And then the next day, 

he had a change in position. And he used force against the demonstrators, not only in Taksim Square, which is a major vehicle artery, but also in Gezi Park itself. 

So I think that there is a back and forth within the government 

that I find in some perverse way encouraging because it shows that 

people are trying to figure out, how do we deal with at least a large 

minority that disagrees with us on fundamental issues. And this is 

how democracies stumble forward. 

Mr. KEATING. Anyone else? Dr. Ustun? 

Mr. USTUN. The first couple of days, there was definitely a management, crisis management, issue. But, Ambassador, what he is 

mentioning is correct. What happened on Sunday, however, when 

the police left the square, Taksim Square, and moved out of that 

area, moved to Dolma Bagche, where the Prime Minister’s office is 

there. These organized illegal groups tried to storm this office as 

well as they tried to do it simultaneously in Ankara. Once that was 

done, the Prime Minister decided these people are not there for the 

park, but they are organizing sort of uprising or what—they’re trying to inflame the situation and hijack the protests. So that’s why 

you saw a hard-line attitude afterwards. 

And there was a lot of disinformation, incredible amount of 

disinformation about people being hurt, getting killed. According to 

one journalist’s Twitter account, you could count 20 people dead in 

the first day. So there was a lot of inflammatory information flow. 

And the main news channels reported it around the clock, but they 

did not do live broadcasts from the area. 

But by the second day, things were out of control. And then later 

on, the things really grew. People reacted to this. And there are all 

these different diverse groups that Gursel was talking about. 

47

Mr. KEATING. Yes. My time is over, too. So if one of the remaining panelists could just answer that same question, that would 

be——

Mr. FRADKIN. I certainly agree with Ambassador Jeffrey that 

there was this kind of tension and disagreement. The difficulty it 

seems to me now is that since Prime Minister Erdogan came back, 

changed his position, since that time, he has done everything he 

can to reassert his view of things in this very large number of 

speeches he is giving and to insist on a very perverse interpretation 

of the events which took place. 

One example that struck me, during the events in Taksim, people naturally sought help for their injuries or for having been 

gassed. A group went into a mosque solely for the purpose of finding a secure place to be treated. 

Prime Minister Erdogan has described this as essentially an assault on the mosque. He claims that people ran in there with beers 

to desecrate the mosque. He claims that they bothered female worshippers, that they walked in there with shoes. The imam of the 

mosque has declared this to be absolutely false publicly. But Prime 

Minister Erdogan returns to this over and over again in his speeches about in a way——

Mr. KEATING. If I could interrupt? The purpose of the hearing is 

not to litigate those individual issues but——

Mr. FRADKIN. No, no. I meant——

Mr. KEATING. I wanted to thank all of you. I am just way over 

my time. 

Mr. FRADKIN. Okay. 

Mr. KEATING. But I did get the sense of all of you. And I do think 

this kind of discussion is helpful. It has been helpful to the U.S. 

in their history to look back at themselves and have an open discourse about these things. 

And you are such an important ally, Turkey is, that, you know, 

I hope that kind of introspective view, painful as it can be at times, 

is helpful. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Lowenthal, I believe, is next. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Well, thank you for educating us. I am wondering, you know, a little bit more about the balance that is going 

on in Turkey between secularism and more Islamic beliefs and 

what that dynamic is like and especially within the AKP Party 

itself. 

Can you explain to us just where—for our interpretation, it 

seems to have been drifted more away from a secular. And, yet, I 

would like to understand, what is going on within the AKP Party 

itself. Are they experiencing this? And are there forces to pull it in 

both directions within the party itself? Yes? 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Congressman Lowenthal. I think it is 

a great question. It allows us to delve into the current polarization 

of Turkish society along this——

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Yes. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY [continuing]. Dividing line. Let me take the government’s alcohol policy, on which there was a question earlier 

from the chairman as well. Turkey is a Muslim-majority country. 

And consumption of alcohol is considered a sin by some Muslims. 

48

So the regulation of consumption and sale of alcohol, therefore, 

blurs the lines between government and religion in a Muslim-majority country. It is not just a health care or social policy issue. It 

is an issue about the separation of religion and government. 

Therefore, the limitation of sale of alcohol, denial of alcohol licenses to stores and businesses I think represents a blurring of 

that line. I think for many Turks who would not consider the consumption of alcohol as a sin or do not care that it is a sin, this is 

a government legislating what should be considered a sin by some 

into what should be a crime. 

And I think that is a dividing line that has been, unfortunately, 

activated in the last few years because of some of the legislation 

passed by the government. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Others? This is for all the panel. 

Mr. USTUN. The party is a conservative democratic party. So it 

pursues a conservative agenda. There is no doubt about that. 

If secularism moved away from something, it moved away from 

the French style toward more U.S. style, where you tolerate all 

sorts of religions and religious beliefs. The party is a very diverse 

party. It received 50 percent of the votes of countries. So this is a 

very diverse country. There is a discussion within the party. There 

is no doubt about that. 

When it comes to alcohol regulations, though, the restrictions are 

based on World Health Organization suggestions. They didn’t come 

up with them themselves. And they are actually less restrictive 

than those implied in this country, in the United States. 

And it basically regulates the—you used to be able to send your 

teenage son to buy alcohol for yourself. And they would sell alcohol 

in the night hours. So there are regulations adopted on those 

issues, but they didn’t come up with those regulations themselves. 

They are based on E.U. and World Health Organization guidelines. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Mr. Gursel? 

Mr. GURSEL. Thank you. 

Well, according to OECD figures, in Turkey, the pure alcohol consumption per person, per adult person, per year is only 1.5 liters. 

And Turkey is the least alcohol-consuming country in the OECD 

while the average is 10.5. And these measures are really overstretching measures. And then it colors the perception of advancing 

of an Islamic agenda by an important person of the public. 

And then also the Prime Minister defended the so-called alcohol 

regulation by Islamic references also one time. And then according 

to the transformation of the political Islam, well, I adopted—this 

party is neo-Islamist, but now to be a neoist, in my opinion, you 

should preserve the secular system while being against the secularization of the society. But now the system is becoming more or 

less under the heavy pressure of an Islamic or Islamist agenda 

coming under the pressure for about 1 year or more under the 

heavy-handed approaches of Mr. Erdogan. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Dr. Fradkin? 

Mr. FRADKIN. I think some of these things appear from outside 

as relatively small impositions or restrictions, as was talked about 

earlier. And, in fact, they are, partly for the reason that was just 

mentioned. Very few Turks are drinkers. 

49

But there seems to be a desire on the part of the government and 

the party to make a particular point of this and express itself in 

other points as well; for example, lately a campaign directed 

against couples kissing in public. 

So the sense is that there is kind of a censoriousness about some 

of the regulations and some of the rhetoric that associates with 

them. 

And the other part of it is a large building program that has 

been undertaken by the government, especially to build more and 

more mosques and especially a giant mosque, which will be on the 

Asian side of the Bosphorus. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Ambassador? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. It is a very, very good question, Mr. Congressman. It is also one that gets us all on thin ice. And, as you 

can see, we have gotten different views here, all of which I agree 

with, even though in some respects, they are contradictory because 

the subject is contradictory. I will try, without getting into, I hope, 

trouble, to explain this very quickly but in a little bit of context. 

The United States view of secularism is a very interesting one 

because we are, by and large, a religious country that has very 

strong barriers, usually not crossed, about keeping religion out of 

the political system for a variety of reasons, including the many 

different kinds of religions we have. 

In Turkey, there is a from both sides—the secular side took a 

very—it was mentioned earlier, but it is an important point. The 

French form of laicite, or secularism, which is quite aggressive, in 

France against the Catholic Church 200 years ago with the revolution—and some of these ideas have passed won. In Turkey, this is 

manifest by the head scarf ban that was in effect for many years. 

And we are seeing a sort of mirror image of this with some of the 

actions by the current government. 

In both cases, what is seemingly missing is respect for the private sphere of people, be they religious or be they non-religious, be 

they followers of religious precepts or be they not too concerned 

about them. 

There has been a consistent trend, regardless of the government, 

over a long period of time to challenge the right of people to do 

this. We see this now. We saw it 20 years ago. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And we now turn to 

Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Chairman, thank you and to Ranking Member 

Keating. Let me first say that I actually come to this hearing today 

with democracy very heavy on my mind. I talk about the democracy here in the United States. I will admit outright that it is from 

this prism of democracy that I know best and its evolution and that 

I approach the question of this hearing post, is Turkey at a crossroads, what do recent protests mean for democracy in the region, 

the democracy, our democracy, here in the United States after 

more than 200 years is still working toward perfection. 

Yesterday the United States Supreme Court issued a ruling that 

gutted one of our Nation’s landmark civil rights: The Voting Rights 

Act. That ruling was devastating to communities in this country 

who have been fighting attempts to suppress their right to vote. 

50

Discouraging pain of the past and present de jure and de facto 

racism came rushing at those of us who lived through it and fight 

for it now. Sadly, that is and was the America that I have known. 

On the other hand, today the Supreme Court issued rulings that 

bring our Nation significantly closer to our aspirations of equality 

and our society. The point is we are indeed still an evolving country. 

This hearing about Turkey, the legacy of our evolution is instructive here, I believe. Contrary to what some have suggested, I believe that the protests in Turkey are a sign of the strengthening 

of the democratic engagement of civil society. Protestors have 

power. And they are demonstrating that they know how to use it. 

It is my hope for Turkey, as it is for America, that we are judged 

by our positive steps toward a better society, rather than the mistakes we have made along the way, for, surely, the United States 

has made mistakes also. 

I don’t want to be judged as a country by those mistakes. I want 

to be judged by the positiveness. It is also my hope that my colleagues encourage the Government of Turkey to embrace positive 

deepening of its democracy, as were most evident in the early steps 

of the current governing party. Those early steps should not be 

overlooked, nor forgotten by this committee or members of the 

United States Congress, a balancing of power of the military and 

major economic reforms toward advancing to E.U. accession talks, 

in my estimation, with no small fear. 

The future of the E.U. accession talks have already been affected 

by the ongoing protests. But I believe both Turkey and the E.U. 

would lose if the accession talks remained blocked. 

So I have great hopes for the future of Turkey. With that, I want 

to just focus on that for a second and ask questions, I guess, to Dr. 

Ustun and to both Mr. Gursel and I will hear from the Ambassadors also. And I don’t mind if everybody peeks in. The success 

of the U.S. administration’s—and many Members of Congress have 

long supported Turkey’s accession to the E.U. And at times, however, the United States pressure on E.U. actors regarding Turkey’s 

membership prospects have generated tension. 

How important is Turkey’s potential accession and continuing 

the accession process amid current difficulties in Turkey and E.U. 

relationships? And what, if anything, can and should the United 

States do to continue to promote Turkey’s E.U. accession? 

Mr. USTUN. I think Turkey is very grateful to the U.S. for the 

support it gives on E.U. membership. And it has proceeded strongly. And many reforms passed in Turkey, thanks to your E.U. support and funds and everything like that. 

But E.U.’s internal problems and internal questioning of whether 

Islam is sort of—Turkey as an Islamic country could actually be in 

the E.U., has raised questions. That question is now much bigger 

for the E.U. And E.U.’s internal economic problems now created 

sort of several E.U.’s, if you will. So those kinds of problems are 

preventing progress on that front, but Turkey still considers it as 

a strategic goal. The President mentioned that, the Prime Minister, 

and all of that. 

Yesterday’s news about the opening of the regional policy chapter 

was very good news on that front. And Germany has criticized the 

51

handling of these protests. But I think we will move forward there. 

So I am more hopeful that there have been serious problems because the E.U. stalled Turkey on those accounts. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let’s just go across. And then I will be done. 

Mr. GURSEL. The recent events, incidents in Istanbul and all over 

Turkey proved again that the E.U., that for Turkey, there is no alternative to E.U. perspective. The E.U. perspective is still the anchor for a sustainable democracy to establish the creative sustainable democracy for Turkey, even though there was no E.U. flag 

during the protest, et cetera. 

But that doesn’t change the reality. The stalemate must be overcome. And to overcome the stalemate, maybe the U.S. can play a 

facilitating role beginning from the Cyprus question, which blocks 

our way, our E.U. perspective. And the pressure over the government from the society and from other actors to pursue. And to stick 

with the E.U. perspective is very important at the moment. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Congressman Meeks. I also think 

that Turkey’s E.U. accession is of incredible value to Turks and 

also to the United States. And I think U.S. support for Turkey’s accession has made that process possible. If not for that, Turkey 

would not be where it is today. 

I don’t think Turkey’s need for the E.U. is any more on the economic front. The country has grown in leaps and bounds in the last 

decade. And Europe has not. And the Turks don’t any more feel 

that Europe is the gauge of prosperity. But Europe is the gate to 

liberal democracy and I think for the following reason: Turkey has, 

roughly speaking, two disparate halves. 

As Ambassador Jeffrey stated, the country’s model of secularism 

has switched from one to the other. Turkey used to subscribe to the 

European model of secularism, which basically meant freedom from 

religion in government and education. Now they move to the American model, which is freedom of religion in government and education. 

For many countries, I think one or other model works. For Turkey, you need both. This country has people of different religious 

persuasions and convictions and practices, although it is mostly 

Muslim. At the same time, I think Turkey needs, for instance, a 

constitution. That would provide freedom of religion and freedom 

from religion so that secular, conservative, liberal Turks would all 

feel welcome in this new country. And the only way it can get there 

is through the anchor of the European Union, which would be the 

soft power force to push for political liberalization so that the country’s two disparate halves could feel that they could live together. 

And the road to that goes through a new constitution. And the path 

of that goes through the country’s prized goal of European Union 

accession. So I think E.U. is the anchor of political liberalization 

in Turkey. 

Mr. FRADKIN. Like my colleagues, I think that it would be a very 

good idea. It was a good idea in the past. And it would be a good 

idea at present. And if the United States can move that forward, 

that would be all to the good. But it seems extremely unlikely 

under the present circumstances. 

On the one hand, what happened in Turkey has given those opponents of accession in the E.U. an excuse for denying, stopping 

52

the process, which has now stopped until October. And, on the 

other hand, it has created for premise for everyone Europe a kind 

of a punching bag, which he has been using regularly in order to 

appeal to his supporters. 

So neither side looks like they want to actually get together at 

the moment. And it is hard to see how they would be brought, that 

would be brought forward under the present circumstances. Maybe 

if things calm down or the other possibility is it seems to me what 

was mentioned earlier, that the eruption of Gezi Park is the eruption to which you referred, the eruption of civil society. 

And if that civil society becomes stronger and if, as appears to 

be the case, it really does yearn for the kinds of political forums 

that are characteristic of the E.U., then it is more likely that it 

would go forward. But then it would have a clear base within Turkish politics and perhaps overcome European objections. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. First, the E.U. accession process itself and 

eventually entry is a very good thing for Turkey. Secondly, as 

someone who has lived even longer in Europe than in Turkey, it 

is a good thing for European. Turkey geographically, at least part 

of the country, by the ethnic composition of much of its population, 

by its history, is part of the European realm. It is economically now 

a powerhouse that would help the European Union in many respects. So what is the problem? 

And certainly it isn’t that Turkey is all that different. It has a 

very strong orientation toward Europe. There are millions of Turks 

in Germany and so forth. I think this is a very important process. 

The American Government supports it. We get in trouble all the 

time with the Europeans by making these recommendations. 

I think we earned the right from 1941 to 1989 and beyond to give 

advice to our friends and allies. They can not listen to us if they 

want. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And we ask unanimous consent Mr. Connolly 

be given the rights as a ex-officio member of the committee to proceed with his 5 minutes of questions. Hearing no objection, so ordered. Mr. Connolly, you may proceed. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank goodness Mr. Meeks couldn’t hear that 

last part there about objections. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I wanted to be here today as the co-chairman of the Congressional Caucus of Turkey. And I really thank you and the ranking member for your graciousness in allowing me to participate. 

First of all, Ambassador Jeffrey, I hear a fellow New Englander. 

Where are you from? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Saugus, Mass. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Saugus? Okay. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Just north of Boston. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I can talk that way, too, if I have to. [Laughter.] 

But I don’t normally. 

To make a point, I think, to follow up on some of the points you 

were making, Mr. Ambassador, if one looked at the United States 

from 1965 through, say, 1968, very turbulent period in this country, there were riots in most major urban areas of America during 

that time period, were there not? You may want to verbally acknowledge, Mr. Ambassador. 

53

Ambassador JEFFREY. There were. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And in 1968, was there not a major conflagration 

in the City of Chicago during the pendency of a major party convention to try to determine the next President of the United States 

to have a state that subsequently was referred to by a formal commission as a police riot? Is that not true? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. That is true. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Could one construe fairly that with those turbulent years and those very difficult and in some cases terrible 

events, that somehow that proved that America was not up to its 

democratic ideals or, indeed, its democratic institutions were false? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. As one who was very involved in that period, I would say it proved that, a) there were great fissures in 

American society at that time and that we worked through them 

in different ways that proceeded on through the ’70s and that we 

emerged from it a stronger democracy. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think you have just put your finger right on it. 

I think that is the question, not that there are difficulties in a 

country, not that there are in some cases sometimes violent demonstrations in a democracy, though they are to be avoided if we 

can. 

But what does the country do with that dissent? Does it make 

it stronger or does it, in fact, force it or encourage it to fall back 

on autocratic processes that hinder democratization? It seems to 

me that is the existential moment for Turkey right now. I wonder 

if you could enlighten us because I have heard sort of contrary 

messages coming from the Turkish Government. 

Initially, Prime Minister Erdogan reacted pretty harshly to the 

very fact that there were any demonstrations and called demonstrators names. But then other members of his government, the 

President himself, and I think you pointed out or somebody pointed 

out a Deputy Minister—actually, there were noises about apologies 

for the overreaction of police and a statement of respect for the sincerity of the demonstrators. 

There was hope after those statements that Prime Minister 

Erdogan returned to Ankara, that his words might echo some of 

that conciliatory rhetoric. They seem not to. I wonder, Ambassador 

Jeffrey, if you could help us a little bit sort of divine what are we 

to conclude from these mixed messages coming from officials of the 

Turkish Government with respect to the import of these demonstrations. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I would yield to some of the people here 

who know the country better than I, but I would say that we have 

another example. Just yesterday not only did President Obama 

speak with the Prime Minister, but the U.S. statement issued after 

it, the Prime Minister also described a situation in Turkey. The 

two leaders discussed the importance of nonviolence and of the 

rights to free expression of assembly and of free press. Such statements usually, to one or another degree, jointly not only do they 

reflect the truth, but they usually reflect a certain understanding, 

at least, if not agreement, before it goes out. So I would take this 

as another step, moving back. 

54

Again, we get to your first question, sir, which is this is a very 

tumultuous movement, I think forward. I could be wrong, but I 

would like to ask the others. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Certainly. Do other members of the panel wish 

to comment? 

Mr. FRADKIN. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, Dr. Fradkin and Dr. Cagaptay? 

Mr. FRADKIN. I think that, you know, it is very useful to draw 

the analogy that you did or the comparison anyway. And it certainly could be the case that the kinds of results or progress in 

democratic life will result from this explosion. The obstacles to it, 

it seems to me, are a couple. One was referred to earlier by some 

of my colleagues, I think, in particular, Mr. Gursel, that we had 

the benefit in the ’60s, which I remember extremely well, of certain 

institutions and also the rotation of the parties, which permitted 

people to sort of say how they wanted to go in the future and also 

to restrain the passions that are characteristic of democratic life. 

The question is whether Turkey has the conditions for the restraint 

of those passions or a means for expressing them in its political 

life. I am not saying it doesn’t, but this is certainly new. And it is 

not clear that it does. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Congressman Connolly. I agree with 

my friend and colleague Ambassador Jeffrey that this is Turkey 

moving forward for the following reasons. It has become in the last 

decade, largely thanks to sound economic policies implemented by 

the AKP Government a majority middle class society for the first 

time in history. 

By the end of this decade, about 80 percent of Turks will be classified as middle class. What is more important, Turkey is about to 

attain universal literacy. And this will be first ever for a large 

Muslim-majority country in human history. 

These two developments are irreversible. They represent a society that has become too mature, too middle class, too literate, too 

connected to the world to fit into a one-size-fits-all straitjacket conservatism. That is why I think you are seeing an outburst of anger 

on the streets, as some of my panelists have indicated, but I think 

what you are seeing is beyond that anger. 

What was interesting, in Istanbul the last month is that, first, 

you had a pretty significant pro-environmental movement that 

tried to save a park from being converted into a shopping mall. 

People care for the trees. That would not have been the case in 

Turkey 10 years ago. That is a product of a decade of growth and 

prosperity and middle class values: Respect for the environment. 

That has been born out of the AKP success. 

What is more important is that when the police cracked down on 

the pro-environment sit-in, in the middle of the night, at 2 o’clock 

a.m. in the morning, hundreds of thousands of people came onto 

the streets to defend the rights of those other people to protest. I 

think that is a sign of maturity. It indicates that people are saying, 

‘‘I may not agree with what they are doing, but they have the right 

to assembly and free speech.’’

And I think that represents a way forward for the country because the country is arriving at a point of a large middle class 

which demands respect for individual freedoms, including freedom 

55

of assembly, association, media expression, and respect for individual space, as well as the environment. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Before we proceed—my time is up. And it is entirely up to the chairman whether he wishes to allow additional 

comments. I thank the chair. 

Mr. GURSEL. Well, I think in Turkey, where there are no real 

checks and balances, no effective or efficient opposition, no free 

press, at the end of the day, I can say this social explosion shakes 

the dynamics or the statistics of the government, political status of 

the government, and shows the government their limits. And then 

it must be understood. 

The limits for Mr. Erdogan’s power has been drawn in Taksim 

on the 1st of June. And then these people, now they are continuing 

to their social movement without the support of the extremist 

groups in parks, at their homes, and in many parts of the social 

life. They are stripped from them. 

And then these people, the middle class, the urban, secular middle class, as Mr. Cagaptay has said, they are connected to the 

words. And at this age, where there is this highly educated, the 

new middle class term of—I mean, I use the term to remark that 

they are the wage earners. And they are very skilled people. I 

mean, they are the potential owners of the E.U. project of Turkey 

if the project is offered to them in a convincing way because the 

project now, actually, is in the deep freeze. 

And then this is—and at this age, to finalize, social engineering 

is impossible. This is one last message that this government or Mr. 

Erdogan himself has to get from the social explosion. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And, to top it off, Dr. Ustun? 

Mr. USTUN. Mr. Chairman, your earlier question, did you expect 

it, and I said, ‘‘Yes, with some objections.’’ The reason was that 

there is a context to all of this. AK Party has had all of these successes at the ballot box. And now it is trying to tackle the sort of 

burning issues, such as the Kurdish question and new civilian constitution. These have also created discontent. There are people who 

are not happy about the Kurdish settlement process, and they are 

not sure what is happening and et cetera. 

But the tension was there. So we could tell that this tension had 

to come out somehow. And, also, there is discontent about the serial policy. 

But the reason the language changed over time and you hear 

mixed messages is that evolution of the protests. Don’t forget the 

Prime Minister met with the protestors in two different meetings. 

And he said that ‘‘I understand your concerns.’’

And the government issued an apology as well. But he was directing his comments about groups who want to occupy the park, 

not just protest, but occupy and then continuously protest whenever they wanted. So there he had to draw the line and say, ‘‘There 

is the rule of law. And you have to abide by the rules.’’

Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

I think we have had some very thought-provoking testimony 

today. Just a few thoughts in closing. There were some expressions 

of optimism that I noted, even from the beginning, where we talked 

about the development of a middle class in Turkey that—perhaps 

56

these demonstrations reflect the development of a middle class 

who—you know, I ain’t going to take it anymore or something that 

could lead, as we talked about, to an actual greater demand of the 

population for democratic principles and respect for their rights. 

And we heard that expression from Mr. Meeks as well. And so Mr. 

Meeks was sort of mirroring that testimony about a strong middle 

class. 

We would hope that Turkey uses this episode of turmoil as a vehicle to move closer, rather than further away from democratic government. And because, as Mr. Connolly pointed out, we have had 

instances like this in the United States. And some of the turmoil 

that we have gone through has helped us make decisions that 

needed to be made. And we needed to change direction. And so turmoil is either going to be assigned as a growing pain, which is an 

indication of past progress, or it could be seen also that past 

progress is in jeopardy. So we will be watching this very closely. 

And one last thought is that years ago, when I was a young man, 

I found myself in Istanbul. And I was staying in a 50-cent-a-night 

hotel, I might add. And it was quite an experience. And I decided 

that I wanted to swim between Europe and Asia. And, in fact, the 

real truth of the matter was I decided I was going to do that because I knew it would impress women and I needed all the leverage I could get. 

What happens is I went down. I found a spot that looked like it 

was the closest between the areas there between Europe and Asia 

and the Bosphorus there. And I started to sort of get my—I had 

my swimming suit underneath my pants there. And I started getting ready to jump in. And I was 20 years old then. And a young 

fellow about 5, 6 years older than me, a Turkish young man, came 

up to me and said, ‘‘What are you doing?’’

I said, ‘‘Well, I am going to swim between Europe and Asia.’’

And he said, ‘‘Are you out of your mind?’’

And I said, ‘‘No.’’

He says, ‘‘You know, this is very treacherous water here. You 

know,’’ he says, ‘‘I’ll tell you what. My friend and I will row beside 

you in our little boat.’’ They had a little rowboat there. Thank God, 

they did. I tell you, I would have panicked three-fourths of the way 

because it is really cold. And the water is very treacherous there. 

There are whirlpools and things. And knowing that they were rowing beside me gave me the confidence to keep going. And I actually 

made the journey between Europe and Asia. 

And I will just say this, that we should remember that during 

the Cold War and during that experience that I had with myself 

right there, it couldn’t have been better a situation than to have 

a strong Turkish person as my friend right next to me. And that 

is the way we should look in the future as well. We need to have 

the Turkish people beside us as friends. And friends give advice to 

one another. 

And our advice now is to try to reconcile any differences that you 

have that have been brought up by this turmoil and use the turmoil that we have experienced in Turkey as a means to make 

things better, rather than as a means to attack one’s enemies. And 

if we do that, Turkey will end up a stronger country for it. And the 

United States will be better off as well because we will have Turks 

57

right next to us rowing the boat to make sure that we are safe. So 

thank you all very much. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(59)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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81694n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Europe, Enrasia, and Emerging Threats 

Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Chairman 

June 25,2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe, 

Eurasia, and Emerging Threats in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Otlice Building (and available on 

the Committee website at w"''y,j'oI~ig[le,fJ);ir".hQtl}ggo,,) 

DATE 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, June 26, 2013 

2:00 p.m. 

Turkey at a Crossroads: What do the Gezi Park Protests Mean for Democracy in 

the Region? 

Hillel Fradkin, PhD. 

Director 

Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World 

Hudson Institute 

Soner Cagaptay, PhD. 

Beyer Family Fellow 

Director, Turkish Research Program 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

Me. Kadri Gursel 

Contributing Writer to AI-Monitor 

The Honorable James F. Jeffrey 

Philip Solondz Distinb'Uished Visiting Fellow 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

(Former American Amhassador to 'illl'key) 

KadirUstun, Ph.D. 

Research Director 

Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA) 
61

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81694m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFJ<'AlRS 

MINUTES OP Sl JRCOMMITTEE ON ____ --'b:::'::"·o::cr':.c"c.:b:::'''--'I'":::si'''a,..:":::III:..:fb:::'/I:::'''-'l'g:::iI''',g--=',::'/'0:"':::":::' ____ HEARING 

nay Wel[nesciav n"te. ___ -'6"'12"'6'!!..'1,,13"-_~Uoom_----'1"'1J..7"-2"'R!!!H"'O!L:B"'-_ 

Starting Time 2·18 mn Ending Time 4:02 pllt 

Recesses L-to -l L-to--YL-to._l L-to __ lL-to __ )( __ lo __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

C}wimul1I Dana Rvllrabacher 

Check tlTl oflhe jolfnwing ilIat ({}JP{ll: 

Open Session [2] 

Executive (dosed) Session 0 Televised ill 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

F.lectl'Onically Recorded (t.ped) [2] 

Stenographic Reenl'd [2] 

Turkey at a Crossroads: fl'llat do the Gezi ParI, Protests Melin for Demucrtlcy in tile Rexioll? 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Rauking Jllcmbcl' WiTliam l(elltillg, Rep. G"egOJ'y Meeks, Rep, SteveSfockllwlI, Rep • .Jeff nu"c"". amI Rep. 

A fall LOlVe1lfltal. 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with all * tltiwy are 110t membe,." otfull cOlllmittee.) 

Rep. GenJ' Connolly 

HEARING WITNESSES: Sal.Ne as meeting notice attached? Yes m No 0 

(If "/10", please fist below and mc:?ude title. agel1ey, department, or organizatwn.) 

S'I ATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submiflul jnr tire record.) 

Prep.red Statement I!f Hillel 1',.",/ldll, PhD. 

Prepare" Statement ~f'Sollel' Cat?aptay, Ph.D. 

Prepared S{(rtement of 111/'. Kadri Gllr.<el 

Prepared Statement of The Honorable Jmnt·,· F. Jeffrey 

Prepared Statement of Kadll' US/lin, Ph.D. 

Prepared Statement afRep. Ge1'1Y Connolly 

TIMESCHCl>tJLIWTOIU,CONVJ<:NB () (\ 

;,rIME ADJOURI\"F.D 4:02 pm ----,,~ . L /r\-~ 

suhc01I:;;;-;::~~-=-- \J 
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81694f.eps

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly (VA-11) 

EE&ET Subcommittee Hearing: Turkey at a Crossroads: What do the Ge21 Park Protests Mean for 

Democracy in the Region? 

Wednesday 6/26/13 

2pm 

Th"nk you to Mr. Rohrabacher and Mr. Keating for having me at this hearing. I am not a Member of the 

Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats subcommittee, but I appreciate your willingness to let me 

participate. 

It has been nearly a month since the clashes in Turkey began. What started as a protest against the 

construction of replica Ottoman military barracks in Istanbul has morphed into volatile protests against 

Prime Minister Erdogan. Several protestors and at least one police officer have died. The consequences 

may be long-term for Turkey-most recently, Germany blocked the next step in Turkey's European 

Union accession talks over the Turkish Government's reaction to the dissent. Peaceful freedom of 

assembly is an important right for any democratic country, dod expression of dissent is a ht'althy part 

of democracy. Turkey's role as an ally is not in question here. That s"id, " pe"ccful resolution to this 

ongoing dispute would go far in shOWing the world that T(lrkey truly is a mature democracy worthy of a 

riSing star on the global stage. 

The protestors are not a monolith. According to AI-Monitor, the prote.stors have myriad grievances: 

The protesters in Turkey are angry. Angry about the peaceful protesters at Gezi Park being 

attacked by the police with pepper spray, tear gas and water cannons. Angry because of a 

law passed the preceding week that forbids the purchase of alcohol in shops after 10 pm. 

Angry about a new bridge in Istanbul being named after an Ottoman sultan responsible for 

the slaughter of 30,000 Alevis, who comprise roughly 15% ofTurkey's population today. 

They arc now also angry about the brutal way in which the police reacted to the Taksim and 

Gezi protesters. Several people told AI-Monitor that plainclothes police officers with iron 

bars had been seen destroying property. They were recognizable by their blue hats. An 

older man lamented, "Democratic states don't have tactics like this."" 

As friends of Turkey watch these events unfold, it is important to remember that "II d<!mocratic 

countries have protests. We, the United States, have had protests turn Violent. That said, when 

protests result in the loss of life, it is in everyone's interest to come to the table and work out the 

issues. 

Ultimately, the ballot box is a powerful way for the population of a democratic country to voice its 

views. As friends of Turkey continue to watch the events in Taksim Square unfold, a peaceful 

resolution that takes into account dissenting views would be a great way for Turkey to show its 

democratic character. Maintenance ofthe status quo neither benefits Turkey nor its standing in the 

world. With that, I welcome our panelists to weigh in on the issue. 

### 

1 Koert Dubecr!, "Is Taksim the Turkish Tahrir?" AI Monitor, 3 June 2013.