IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PRESTON CATCHINGS, )

Plaintiff )

) C.A. No. 04-353 Erie

vs. ) District Judge McLaughlin

) Magistrate Judge Baxter

LT. STATES, et al., )

Defendants. )

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

I. RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

[Document # 12] be granted.

It is further recommended that the remainder of this action be dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) due to Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim

against them.

II. REPORT

A. Introduction

Pro se Plaintiff Preston Catchings, an inmate incarcerated within the State Correctional

system, filed this action on November 19, 2004, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges

that on November 11, 2004, while he was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at

Albion, he was subjected to a cell search and strip search and that he was injured during the

searches. Plaintiff further alleges that his subsequent requests for medical treatment were

ignored. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied his legal mail (from this Court in

another pending case). As relief, Plaintiff requests monetary compensation.

Presently before this Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff’s claims stemming from the November 11, 2004 cell search and resulting

denial of medical treatment should be dismissed because he has failed to exhaust his

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administrative remedies. Inexplicably, Defendants do not move for summary judgment as to 

Plaintiff’s access to courts claim. Plaintiff has filed an Brief in Opposition.

B. The Standards of Review

1. Pro Se Pleadings

Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim

if it appears “<beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief.’” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521(1972) quoting

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state

a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should be done so despite failure to cite

proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or

litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982);

United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969)(petition prepared

by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”); Smith

v. U.S. District Court, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C.Cir. 1992); Freeman v. Department of Corrections,

949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe

all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d

Cir.1997). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)(discussing Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir.

1990)(same).

2. Motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted

if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(e) further provides that when

a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, “an adverse party may not rest upon the

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mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if

appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.” Id. 

A district court may grant summary judgment for the defendant when the plaintiff has

failed to present any genuine issues of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Krouse v.

American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997). The moving party has the initial

burden of proving to the district court the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving

party’s claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Country Floors, Inc. v.

Partnership Composed of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir. 1990). Further,

“[R]ule 56 enables a party contending that there is no genuine dispute as to a specific, essential

fact <to demand at least one sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process of litigation

continues.’” Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) quoting

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 

The burden then shifts to the non-movant to come forward with specific facts showing a

genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986);

Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460-461 (3d Cir. 1989)(the nonmovant must present affirmative evidence - more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance -

which supports each element of his claim to defeat a properly presented motion for summary

judgment). The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show specific facts by

affidavit or by information contained in the filed documents (i.e., depositions, answers to

interrogatories and admissions) to meet his burden of proving elements essential to his claim. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Country Floors, 930 F.2d at 1061.

A material fact is a fact whose resolution will affect the outcome of the case under

applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Although the court

must resolve any doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of fact against the party moving for

summary judgment, Rule 56 “does not allow a party resisting the motion to rely merely upon

bare assertions, conclusory allegation or suspicions.” Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v.

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1 Title 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) provides: “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that--(B) the action or appeal--(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief.”

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DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982). Summary judgment is only precluded if the

dispute about a material fact is “genuine,” i.e., if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-249. 

3. Failure to state a claim under the PLRA 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that: 

(a) Screening - The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in

any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil

action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or

officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

(b) Grounds for dismissal– On review, the court shall identify cognizable

claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the

complaint– (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, not only is a court permitted to sua sponte dismiss

a complaint which fails to state a claim, but is required to do so. Nieves v. Dragovich, 1997 WL

698490, at *8 (E.D. Pa. 1997)(“Under provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act codified at 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), the district courts are required, either

on the motion of a party or sua sponte, to dismiss any claims made by an inmate that are

frivolous or fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”).

The PLRA also amended the statutory provisions with respect to actions brought by

prisoners who are proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)1. Under this

provision as well, not only is a court permitted to sua sponte dismiss a complaint which fails to

state a claim, but it is required to do so by mandatory language. See, e.g., Keener v.

Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 128 F.3d 143, 145 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as “the PLRA provision mandating sua sponte dismissal of in forma

pauperis actions that are frivolous or fail to state a claim.”). In performing a court’s mandated

function of sua sponte reviewing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and under § 1915A to

determine if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a federal district court

applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). See, e.g., Tucker v. Angelone, 954 F. Supp. 134, 135 (E.D. Va. 1977) (“Under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) the courts are directed to dismiss any

claims made by inmates that ‘fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted’”.).

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all the well-pleaded allegations of the

complaint must be accepted as true. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Langford v. City

of Atlantic City, 235 F.3d 845, 847 (3d Cir. 2000). The motion cannot be granted unless the

court is satisfied “that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). See also

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will

prevail at the end but whether he should be entitled to offer evidence in support of his claim. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 419 U.S. 232 (1974). However,

a court need not credit a complaint's “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions” when deciding a

motion to dismiss. Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)

citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d

Cir.1997). Therefore, in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the

complaint must only set forth sufficient information to suggest that there is some recognized

legal theory upon which relief can be granted. See Swierkiewicz. 

The court’s obligation to dismiss a complaint under the PLRA is not excused even after

the defendants have filed a dispositive motion if it appears that the complaint fails to state a

claim based upon grounds not raised by the defendants in their motion to dismiss. See, e.g.,

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000); Palay v. United States, 125 F.Supp.2d

855, 860 (N.D. Ill. 2000).

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2 Importantly, a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies does not

deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 69 n.4 (3d

Cir. 2000) (“...[W]e agree with the clear majority of courts that § 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional

requirement, such that failure to comply with the section would deprive federal courts of subject

matter jurisdiction.”). 

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C. The Exhaustion Requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

Defendants argue as the sole basis for their motion for summary judgment that the case

should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in

accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), provides: 

no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title ... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prisons, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

Id. (italics added). The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA") prohibits an inmate

from bringing a civil rights suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional conduct by prison

officials until after the inmate has exhausted available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a) (2001); Oliver v. Moore, 2005 WL 1988996, at * 2 (3d Cir. Aug 18, 2005). “The

PLRA was enacted with a two-fold purpose: to limit the number of prison condition lawsuits

then flooding the courts and to return control over prison policies and decision-making to local

prison officials.” DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 2004) citing Porter v. Nussle, 534

U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002).

The requirements that an inmate exhaust administrative remedies applies to all inmate

suits regarding prison life, including those that involve general circumstances as well as

particular episodes. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). See also Concepcion v. Morton, 306

F.3d 1347 (3d Cir. 2002) (for history of exhaustion requirement). Administrative exhaustion

must be completed prior to the filing of an action. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144

(1992). Thus, federal courts are barred from hearing a claim if a plaintiff has failed to exhaust

all the available remedies. Grimsley v. Rodriquez, 113 F.3d 1246 (Table), 1997 WL 2356136

(Unpublished Opinion) (10th Cir. May 8, 1997).2 A plaintiff need not affirmatively plead

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3 There is an emerging split of authority among the Circuits on this issue. Compare

Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2004), and Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286

F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002), with Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2003).

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exhaustion, but exhaustion is an affirmative defense which is waived if not properly presented

by a defendant. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “no provision of the

PLRA requires pleading exhaustion with particularity,” while construing the PLRA

requirements in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A.,

534 U.S. 506 (2002)). 

The exhaustion requirement is not a technicality, rather it is federal law which federal

district courts are required to follow. Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 73 (by using language “no action shall

be brought,” Congress has “clearly required exhaustion”). There is no “futility” exception to the

administrative exhaustion requirement. Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2002)

citing Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 78. 

D. The Procedural Default Component

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explicitly held that the

exhaustion requirement of the PLRA includes a procedural default component, by analogizing it

to the exhaustion doctrine (with its corollary procedural default component) in the habeas

context. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 228-229 (3d Cir. June 18, 2004).3 The Circuit

explained:

We believe that Congress's policy objectives will be served by interpreting §

1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement to include a procedural default component.

Based on our earlier discussion of the PLRA's legislative history, [...] Congress

seems to have had three interrelated objectives relevant to our inquiry here: (1) to

return control of the inmate grievance process to prison administrators; (2) to

encourage development of an administrative record, and perhaps settlements,

within the inmate grievance process; and (3) to reduce the burden on the federal

courts by erecting barriers to frivolous prisoner lawsuits. Each of these goals is

better served by interpreting § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion language to include a

procedural default component than by interpreting it merely to require

termination of all administrative grievance proceedings.

Id. Having concluded that the PLRA includes a procedural default component, the Court then

indicated that “prison grievance procedures supply the yardstick for measuring procedural

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 Plaintiff filed his initial grievance and an appeal to the Warden, however, his final

appeal to the Office of the Chief Hearing Examiner was rejected on January 10, 2005, for

technical reasons (the failure to provide copies of the underlying grievance and appeals). 

Document # 12, Exhibit B.

5

 The record presently before this Court is not clear as to when exactly the grievance was

filed. Plaintiff did pursue an appeal of the denial of the initial grievance to the Warden which

was finally rejected on March 15, 2005. Document # 12, Exhibit A.

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default.” Id. at 231.

E. Exhaustion and Procedural Default applied

 No analysis of exhaustion may be made absent an understanding of the administrative

process available to state inmates. The DC-ADM 804 grievance system, available to state

prisoners, consists of three separate stages. First, the prisoner is required to timely submit a

written grievance for review by the facility manager or the regional grievance coordinator, who

responds in writing. Second, the inmate must timely submit a written appeal to intermediate

review, and again the inmate receives a written response. Finally, the inmate must submit a

timely appeal to the Central Office Review Committee, and the inmate will receive a final

determination in writing. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 293 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997), aff’d.

532 U.S. 731 (2001). This process may take several weeks, if not months.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants have provided evidence

detailing Plaintiff’s attempts at exhaustion. In Grievance # 102053 filed on November 17, 2004,

Plaintiff complained of the physical mistreatment by several guards during the searches. 

Document # 12, Exhibit B.4 In Grievance # 107264, Plaintiff complains about the denial of

medical treatment following the November 11th injuries.5 Id. at Exhibit A.

Pursuant to the case law interpreting the PLRA, the exhaustion of available

administrative remedies is a prerequisite to the filing of a federal lawsuit. Oliver; Nyhuis. In

this case, Plaintiff complains of events which occurred on November 11, 2004 and Plaintiff filed

this lawsuit on November 19, 2004. Plaintiff could not have exhausted his administrative

remedies before the filing of this lawsuit. Therefore, summary judgment should be granted in

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 This Court notes that Plaintiff’s pleadings are difficult to decipher. To the extent that

this pro se Plaintiff is attempting to raise any other claim, such should be denied for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies. 

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favor of Defendants on these claims.

Defendants have not addressed the access to courts claim. However, the same

exhaustion analysis applies. The withholding of legal mail of which Plaintiff complains

allegedly occurred on November 14, 2005. Plaintiff could have not exhausted his administrative

remedies before the filing of this lawsuit on November 19, 2005. Therefore, this claim should

be dismissed pursuant to this Court’s authority under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A, and 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(c) for failure to state a claim.6

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court respectfully recommends that Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment [Document # 12] be granted.

It is further recommended that the remainder of this action be dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) due to Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim

against them.

In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Local

Rule 72.1.4 B, the parties are allowed ten (10) days from the date of service to file written

objections to this report. Any party opposing the objections shall have seven (7) days from the

date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to timely file objections may constitute a

waiver of any appellate rights. 

S/ Susan Paradise Baxter

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: September 30, 2005

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