U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

27–562 2018

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–59] 

U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY IN SOUTH ASIA 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 3, 2017 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA–PORTER, New Hampshire 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

JIMMY PANETTA, California 

JEN STEWART, Staff Director 

JENNIFER BIRD, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ..... 5 

Mattis, Hon. James N., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense ...... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 60 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ ............................................................... 59 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 65 

Mr. Moulton ...................................................................................................... 67 

Ms. Rosen .......................................................................................................... 68 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 66 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 65 

(1) 

U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY IN SOUTH ASIA 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Tuesday, October 3, 2017. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:03 p.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ Thornberry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

The committee welcomes the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff today for a hearing on Afghanistan 

and South Asia. The Secretary had previously indicated that he 

would be back to discuss the administration’s approach to this region once it was decided, and that is the topic for today. 

I understand that there are many issues facing the Department 

and this committee, but in the interest of time and focus, I want 

to encourage members to confine their questions to today’s subject. 

United States officially launched Operation Enduring Freedom 

on October 7th, 2001, just about exactly 16 years ago. 

Approximately 2,400 American service members have lost their 

lives in the Afghanistan conflict. Another 20,000 or so have been 

wounded. As this administration formulates its policies, the American people and Members of Congress have some basic questions, 

questions such as, does American national security still warrant 

our military presence in Afghanistan? Do we have a strategy to 

succeed or one to avoid failure? How is this administration’s approach different from previous approaches? And can we ever be 

successful in the face of Afghan corruption and Pakistan’s duplicity? 

Both Secretary Mattis and General Dunford have considerable 

personal experience with this conflict, and I believe that they are 

as authoritative as anyone in helping provide answers to our questions and to chart the way forward. But these fundamental issues 

do need to be discussed openly for the American people and for 

those who have sacrificed over the last 16 years. That is the reason 

we are here today. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 59.] 
2 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I think the chairman raised all of the questions that need 

to be raised. This is obviously a very, very difficult part of the 

world. We clearly have national security interests in how Afghanistan is governed, and Pakistan as well, going back to 2001, when 

the then Afghanistan government led by the Taliban allowed Al 

Qaeda to have safe haven to plot and plan terrorist attacks against 

the U.S., including 9/11. Making sure that we don’t return to those 

days is clearly in our national security interests. 

But what is not as clear is how we do that, and what the cost 

is of our current effort. Afghanistan is a very difficult place to govern. And I think one of the things that concerns most members of 

this committee and most people in the country is we understand 

that it is a fragile situation. We have been hearing that for, as the 

chairman mentioned, 16 years. 

If we are there for another 20, I envision that whoever is sitting 

in those seats at that point would be having the same conversation, 

and I think that is my one big question, how do we get to the point 

where we can reduce our commitment in Afghanistan so that it is 

not an open-ended commitment and a blank check? 

The President said that in his remarks when he rolled out his 

strategy, that it wasn’t going to be open-ended, it wasn’t going to 

be a blank check. Absent from that was what that meant and how 

we would go about achieving that very worthy goal. And I think 

that is my biggest question. 

And the second question to that would be while granting that 

there are risks in pulling out, there are obviously risks in staying 

there. So, what happens under the two different scenarios? Because 

it would be great if we were able to bring our troops home and 

commit our resources elsewhere. And the longer we stay there, the 

less it looks like it is going to move us towards the positive outcome that we want. 

So, are we envisioning just a prolonged stalemate where we figure we cannot leave, because if we do it will get worse? Or do we 

actually think we can get to the point where we go beyond prolonged stalemate and get to a more positive outcome, which is simply—you know, paraphrasing one of the questions the chairman 

asked. But those are the questions I think I am most interested in. 

I appreciate both of our witnesses being here, and obviously their 

tremendous service to our country. 

With that, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 60.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Again, Mr. Secretary, General Dunford, thank 

you all for being here. We will turn the floor over to you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MATTIS, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary MATTIS. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member 

Smith, distinguished members of the committee, I appear before 

you following the tragic event in Las Vegas. The Department of De-
3 

fense is staying closely linked with the intelligence community, and 

we remain alert to law enforcement’s assessment of events. 

You on this committee are keenly aware of the complex and volatile security environment our country faces today. Russia continues 

to invest in a full range of capabilities designed to limit our ability 

to project power, erode U.S. influence and undermine NATO’s 

[North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s] transatlantic alliance. 

China is focused on limiting our ability to project power as well, 

and weakening our position in the Indo-Pacific region, even as we 

work to find common ground in confronting North Korea’s provocative actions. 

The international community, as reflected by the two latest 

unanimous Security Council sanctions resolutions, is focused on the 

destabilizing threat posed by North Korea and Kim Jong-un’s 

relentless pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. The 

Defense Department supports fully Secretary Tillerson’s efforts to 

find a diplomatic solution, but remains focused on defense of the 

United States and our allies, per President Trump’s orders. 

In the Middle East, Iran continues to project malign influence 

across the region. While we continue to make gains against the terrorist enemy in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, in Afghanistan we have 

faced a difficult 16 years. General Nicholson, our NATO and 

United States field commander, with troops from 39 nations has 

blunted the terrorists’ offensive moves in Afghanistan. 

NATO’s strengths and support of the improving Afghan security 

forces and disarray among various enemy groups have caused the 

Taliban to expend resources, constrain their movements, and limit 

the Taliban’s ability to conduct major offensives. Beginning last 

month, and for the first time in this long fight, all six Afghan military corps are engaged in offensive operations. 

During these recent months, there have been fewer civilian casualties as a result of coalition operations, although regrettably, 

Taliban high-profile attacks on civilians continue to murder the innocent. While the Taliban still attempts to seize district or provincial centers before the end of this fighting season, they have generally been forced into decentralized, small-scale ambushes and the 

use of improvised explosive devices. 

Importantly, the rate of Afghan National Security Force casualties has reduced from last year. 

As you know, I just returned last week from a trip to India and 

Afghanistan and can report that General Nicholson and the NATO 

team are holding the line. Forecasts of a significant Taliban offensive remain unfulfilled. Violence and progress do coexist in Afghanistan, but the uncertainty in the region and the NATO campaign 

have been replaced by certainty due to the implementation of 

President Trump’s new South Asia strategy. 

This strategy has been welcomed almost uniformly by leaders in 

the South Asia region as well as the 39 countries contributing 

troops to the NATO-led campaign. 

We must always remember we are in Afghanistan to make America safer and ensure that South Asia cannot be used to plot net 

transnational attacks against the U.S. homeland or our partners 

and allies. Our goal is a stable and secure South Asia. A political 
4 

settlement in Afghanistan is only possible if the Taliban rejects 

support of or conduct of terrorism. 

Based on the intelligence community analysis and my own evaluation, I am convinced we would absent ourselves from this region 

to our ultimate peril. Our new conditions-based approach has set 

the stage for regional and Afghanistan national change. Our new 

strategy, vigorously reviewed and approved by President Trump is, 

quote ‘‘R4+S’’ unquote. Which stands for regionalize it, realign it, 

reinforce it, and reconciliation, coupled with sustaining it. 

The first ‘R,’ to regionalize it, recognizes challenges exist beyond 

Afghanistan and adopts a geographic framework with a holistic 

comprehensive view. India, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and China were 

considered at the outset, rather than focusing only on Afghanistan 

and then introducing external variables late in our strategic design. My visit last week to India was in part to thank them for 

their continued generous development support in Afghanistan. 

We also discussed ways to expand our collaboration to improve 

long-term regional stability and security. We will firmly address 

Pakistan’s role. NATO’s demands need to be heard and embraced 

in Islamabad. 

The second ‘R,’ to realign, signifies that we were shifting our 

main effort to align more advisors who can provide training and 

advisory support at the battalion and brigade level. The fighting 

will continue to be carried out by our Afghan partners, but our advisors will accompany tactical units to advise and bring NATO support to bear when needed. 

Make no mistake, this is combat duty for our troops, but the Afghan forces remain in the lead for the fighting. 

We have now approximately 11,000 troops in Afghanistan, alongside 6,800 from NATO and coalition partners and 320,000 Afghan 

National Security Forces. From these numbers, you can see the Afghan forces remain the main effort and we are supporting them not 

supplanting or substituting our troops for theirs. 

The third ‘R’ is reinforce, and that is seen in our addition of over 

3,000 U.S. troops arriving in the coming months to extend NATO’s 

advisory effort to Afghan troops that are currently without. NATO 

Secretary General Stoltenberg and I together toured Afghanistan 

last week, sending a message of the NATO coalition’s unity. He is 

also reaching out to our allies to increase their troop levels. 

In light of our new strategy, 15 nations have signaled that they 

will increase their support. Again, certainty now having replaced 

uncertainty, we are looking to our partners to provide more troop 

and financial support. 

The last ‘R’ is reconcile, and that is the desired outcome from our 

military operations, convincing our foes that the coalition is committed to a conditions-based outcome, we intend to drive fence-sitters and those who will see that we are not quitting this fight, to 

reconcile with the Afghan national government. Our goal is a stabilized Afghanistan achieved through an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned 

peace process. 

War is principally a matter of will, and the international community is now making clear that it will stand alongside the Afghans 

committed to this fight. As we have shifted to a conditions-based 

strategy, not time-based or troop number-focused, ambiguity has 
5 

been removed. The elements of this strategy are a tangible demonstration of our resolve. All this will be carried out by, with, and 

through our Afghan partners and within the coalition framework 

ensuring this campaign is politically, fiscally, and militarily sustainable. 

Our Afghan partners, who continue to take the lead, fight most 

effectively where NATO and partner advisors are alongside them. 

As President Ghani said to the United Nations General Assembly 

in New York, ‘‘Afghans are determined to fight. No one should mistake our will to defend our country.’’ 

I am heartened and impressed by the international reception to 

our strategy. I am confident we will see heightened levels of support from our allies and partners in the months ahead. As NATO 

Secretary General Stoltenberg said last week in Kabul, this is 

about making sure that Afghanistan does not once again become a 

safe haven for international terrorists. And the best way of doing 

that is to enable the Afghans to have defense security forces which 

are strong enough to do that. 

We are already starting to see the psychological impact of this 

new strategy, both militarily in the field as well as through President Ghani and the Afghan government’s commitment to reform. 

President Ghani recognizes that fighting corruption and accelerating institutional reform across government are critical to success. The recently launched U.S.-Afghan Compact, outlining more 

than 200 measurable benchmarks for reform, demonstrates our 

shared emphasis on these goals. 

Our South Asia strategy reinforces to the Taliban that the only 

path to peace and political legitimacy is through a negotiated settlement. It is time for the Taliban to be forced to recognize they 

cannot kill their way to power, nor can they provide refuge or support to transnational terrorists who intend to do us harm. 

I want to close by recognizing the need to maintain the closest 

possible dialog with Congress and specifically with this committee. 

This committee has long appreciated that the defense caps mandated in the Budget Control Act [BCA] imposed the greatest inhibitor to our defense. Without relief from the BCA caps, our air, land, 

and sea fleets will continue to erode, our path to modernization will 

be shortchanged, and our technological competitive advantage lost. 

I trust I will have your support for lifting the defense spending 

caps as we address today’s complex and increasingly volatile national security environment. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Dunford. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, 

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DUNFORD. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member 

Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to join Secretary Mattis in providing an update on the 

South Asia strategy. 

In recent months, our commander in Afghanistan, General Nicholson, described the current condition in the country as a stalemate. Secretary Mattis has testified that we are not winning. And 
6 

members of this committee have made similar statements. This situation has developed since the NATO mission in Afghanistan 

transitioned to an advisory effort. 

Since 2015, we have advised and accompanied Afghan special operations units at the tactical level, but our advisory effort for conventional forces has generally been limited to the Afghan army 

corps and institutional level. We also reduced the aviation, artillery, and intelligence support provided to the Afghan forces. This 

construct did not provide Afghan conventional forces with the support they needed to succeed in combat operations. 

My military assessment is that we drew down our advisory effort 

and combat support for the Afghan forces too far and too fast. As 

a result, the Taliban expanded territorial and population control 

and inflicted significant casualties on the Afghan army and police, 

while we lost campaign momentum. Last spring, Secretary Mattis 

directed the Department to conduct a detailed failure analysis to 

identify the root causes for the lack of progress in Afghanistan and 

he directed we provide targeted solutions. 

Informed by these findings, our commanders developed, and Secretary Mattis approved, a new operational approach to break the 

stalemate and bolster Afghan capabilities. The new approach supports the President’s broader strategy by expanding our advisory 

efforts to the tactical level, increasing the combat support we provide to our Afghan partners and enhancing authorities. 

We believe these adjustments will improve the ability of the Afghans to conduct offensive operations, defend critical terrain, and 

reduce Afghan casualties. The emphasis is on providing effective 

support to the over 300,000 Afghans we have trained and equipped, 

so they can secure their own country. 

Going forward, we will support President Ghani’s efforts to reorganize the Afghan forces, which will expand special operations 

units while at the same time reducing less effective units. We will 

also continue to develop a capable, sustainable Afghan air force. 

And finally, we will enhance and expand our own counterterrorism 

operations in the region. 

By next spring, this approach will have our most senior capable 

and operational experienced leaders advising at the decisive point 

in Afghan operations. Their efforts will be fully enabled by the support and the authorities they need to take the fight to the enemy— 

that is specifically for the Afghans to take the fight to the enemy. 

As we implement the strategy, we are also tackling corruption, 

the single greatest roadblock to progress. In my judgment, our military objectives for this new strategy are clear and they are achievable. 

The first is we defeat ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and 

Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and we ensure other terrorist groups are 

unable to launch attacks against the homeland, U.S. citizens, or 

our allies. We are going to further develop Afghan forces that are 

capable of managing the residual violence with limited international support. 

We will support President Ghani’s effort to ensure that key population and economic centers are secure, and we will provide an enduring counterterrorism partnership with Afghanistan to protect 

our shared interests in South Asia. 
7 

As Secretary Tillerson has recently outlined, this entire effort is 

intended to put pressure on the Taliban and have them understand 

they will not win a battlefield victory, so they will enter an Afghanled peace process to end the conflict. 

And with that, Chairman, I am ready to take questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate it, sir. 

I guess I want to—just basically have one question. A former 

military commander in Afghanistan directed me to this editorial 

written by former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Ronald Newman. It appeared in the Washington Post on August 9th. The first 

paragraph says in theory, U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has been to 

train an Afghan army that can fight Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and 

the Islamic State, and then largely to withdraw. After 16 years, it 

is not surprising that many people think that strategy has failed. 

In fact, it hasn’t really been tried. 

And then he goes through a brief history of our efforts, or lack 

of efforts, of deadlines, of not meeting commitments and so forth 

and concludes by saying that much of the rush to failure has been 

Washington driven. 

And so, I guess I would like each of you to comment on the extent to which the lack of stability in approach, the lack of stability 

in commitment, the lack of stability in funding, as we begin the 

ninth consecutive year under a CR [continuing resolution], to what 

extent those Washington driven aspects have contributed to Afghanistan not being as successful so far as we would like it to be. 

Secretary MATTIS. Chairman, war is primarily a matter of willpower and what we have to demonstrate, based on where the situation is at this time, is an implacable will that the international 

community—and that means America first among all of them, is 

going to stand by this effort. And that has to do with standing by 

certain policies, standing by the Afghan military, standing by budgets that give predictability so we keep our own military strong. 

It is all part of setting a cohesive framework within which we 

can achieve tangible results and not face what Ranking Member 

Smith rightly is concerned with, a prolonged stalemate. When you 

set timelines, you are telling the enemy what you will not do—we 

will not fight past a certain day. When you set troop caps, you are 

saying what you won’t do. 

And I believe right now, the most important thing is to let the 

enemy know they are not going to win, and that is because we now 

have over 300,000 Afghan forces in the field that through some 

very severe fighting have earned our support, as we try to drag this 

toward an end of this war, toward reconciliation. 

Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, you and many members of the 

committee have visited Afghanistan multiple times and I know in 

each of the visits one of the issues that has been raised is hedging 

behavior, hedging behavior by the Taliban, hedging behavior by regional actors, in particular Pakistan. 

One of the primary drivers of that hedging behavior, which was 

inhibiting us in actually making progress in a campaign, was a 

lack of certainty and a lack of confidence that the U.S. commitment, the international coalition commitment would be enduring, 

and particularly for probably 4 or 5 straight years, there was al-
8 

ways a sense, and it has been described as kind of the Y2K effect 

in Afghanistan—it was always a sense that when December came, 

the coalition would depart. 

I think one of the most significant changes in the strategy with 

conditions-based is it leverages the center of gravity, the source of 

strength in Afghanistan which is the confidence of the Afghan people and the confidence of the Afghan forces. 

And on the flip side, it actually undermines the confidence in the 

Taliban because they are not really trying to deal with us or wait 

us out. As Secretary Mattis said, it is a clash of wills. They now 

realize that the 300,000 Afghan soldiers and police that have been 

built, they are going to have the support they need to defeat the 

Taliban and to bring the Taliban to the peace table. 

So, I think that is probably, in my judgment, how the hedging 

behavior back here in Washington, lack of clarity has affected the 

campaign. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Just sort of following up on that question, I think 

you—right we have had timelines. We have had troop caps. We 

have also consistently exceeded those troop caps and consistently 

gone beyond those timelines. So, if the Taliban were actually paying attention, at some point, they would come not to rely on those 

timelines or those troop caps. 

And I guess what you have outlined is kind of what we have all 

been hoping for 16 years, is if we just stay there long enough, in 

great enough numbers, Afghanistan will eventually be able to defend itself, and we won’t have to be there anymore. 

I think the lack of confidence in that, and I hope that that editorial that was written is correct, comes from more than just the 

lack of commitment, it is the complications of the terrain, what 

does reconciliation look like? When do the Taliban come to the 

table? 

And like I said, what I think we are really looking for is some 

confidence—let’s say that we do it conditions-based and we do all 

the stuff—for how long? And I am not looking for a 1 year, 2 year— 

you know, 2 years, 12 months exactly, but what are the factors that 

give you confidence that we won’t be in the scenario that I just described? That even if we do this more open-ended commitment that 

we won’t be having the same conversation 20 years from now? 

Because this is not Afghanistan’s first time at this. As everyone 

knows, people have come and gone from Afghanistan for a very 

long time. And I get the feeling that as far as the Taliban are concerned, we can come in and say we are going to be there for 50 

years, and they say fine, we will be there for 51. 

So what is the confidence you have that this change can address 

not just whatever shortcomings might have been in previous administration strategies, but the reality of Afghanistan and Pakistan? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, we—the men and women in 

this world live by hope. They hope tomorrow is going to be better. 

The Taliban could hope repeatedly that whether we overstayed 

what timeline we gave ourselves, we had still said we are leaving 

as soon as we can. What we are saying now is there is going to 
9 

be an end to the war. It is going to end because we don’t want the 

threat to America. We don’t want the threat to our allies. And the 

best way to do that, as Secretary General Stoltenberg put it, make 

certain the Afghans have a force that can deal with this internally. 

Certainly, it is going to take our mentors. What reconciliation 

looks like goes back some years in terms of the conditions. But it 

is Afghan-led. It involves the Taliban rejecting terrorism and supporting people who have attacked this country. It involves them to 

quit killing—to stop killing the Afghan people and live by the constitution. That is a pretty low bar if they choose to rejoin the political process. 

If they don’t, we are going to make it extremely uncomfortable 

for them by training, advising, assisting the Afghan forces. And I 

think what we don’t want is some transient success. So we have 

pushed this forward in a way, in an implacable way, because that 

is the surest way to end this faster, rather than stringing it 

along—if that addresses your question. 

Mr. SMITH. It does to some degree. And I understand that my 

question is unanswerable past a certain point. We don’t know, you 

know, what it is going to take to really break the Taliban, but that 

does put us in the position. 

I guess, put it just one different way. When the President says 

no blank check, no open-ended commitment, what does that mean? 

Where does the check stop? Where does the commitment stop? 

Secretary MATTIS. One point is, sir, that Secretary General 

Stoltenberg when he was getting off the plane when we came out 

of theater, said he is going back to Brussels to build more support. 

In other words, we are going to have more people aligned with us 

in terms of financial and troop contributions because of our—the 

certainty we have replaced the uncertainty with. 

It also means that we are going to see a declining use of American mentors as this army gets up on the step. We simply cut back 

too soon. We pulled the training wheels off the bike before it was 

fully ready to be balanced and move against the Taliban. This was 

a concern from our intelligence agency when we pulled all of our 

forces down to the level they were at. And so we are going to have 

to make up for it, and we have to inherit where it lies now. 

But it is not an unending commitment. You will see a degrading 

number of American forces, a declining number of American forces, 

as you see an improving capability on the part of the Afghan forces 

conditions-based. 

Mr. SMITH. Understood. And I know that Congressman Jones is 

next, and he will drill down on this in much greater degree than 

I did, so I will let that go. And the only other question I have, and 

it is largely rhetorical, but I would nonetheless like your response. 

You mentioned at the conclusion of your remarks the budget caps 

that the Defense Department faces and the CRs that have been 

presented to you have been one of the factors that have made it 

difficult to maintain a consistency of commitment to Afghanistan. 

If we were to reduce revenue by $1.5 trillion over the course of 

10 years, would that not make it just a little bit more difficult to 

provide the Department of Defense the money that it needs to do 

what it needs to get done? 
10 

Secretary MATTIS. Chairman, probably someone with better financial background than myself could give a better answer. I 

would just say that as I understand the process right now it is to 

reduce the taxes to build the economy and the growth is going to 

accrue more government revenue. But this is not an area that I 

would call one of my expertise. 

Mr. SMITH. Fair enough—and I know that is the hope. There is 

no credible economist—even conservative economists say that that 

is absurd under our current scenario, that somehow if you cut 

taxes dramatically for everybody you are going to magically wind 

up with more money. 

If the top rate was, like, 90 percent or we had a capital gains 

rate of like 66 percent and we were cutting it down from there, but 

cutting it from where we are at to right now, making a commitment to our national security and reducing the revenue by at least 

$1.5 trillion over 10 years is, I think, significantly inconsistent, and 

that is a point that I will return to at other hearings. 

I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Smith. And we are going 

to proceed—Chairman Thornberry has gone to the floor to vote so 

that the committee can continue meeting and then soon as he returns obviously we are going to proceed. 

And at this time, we now have Mr. Jones of North Carolina. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and Mr. Secretary and 

General, thank you as well. 

I wrote to President Trump on July 18th asking him to please 

come to Congress and ask us to have a debate on a new AUMF [authorization for use of military force]. Now here is a sentence from 

one of his tweets that I would like to read: ‘‘Let’s get out of Afghanistan. Our troops are being killed by the Afghanis we train and we 

waste billions there. Nonsense. Rebuild the United States of America.’’ That is his tweet, not mine. 

In addition, that brings me to this, General Mattis, in a Politico 

article in August of this year titled ‘‘Trump Administration Opposes Effort to Rein in War Powers,’’ they quote in this sentence 

as you—not quoting you, but it makes reference to you: ‘‘That 

stance appears to contradict comments by Mattis, who has endorsed passage of a new AUMF to govern the war against ISIS. 

Mattis chastised Congress at a March Senate hearing, testifying 

that he has not understood why the Congress hasn’t come forward 

to at least debate on AUMF.’’ Well, that is the fault of our leadership under Paul Ryan, to be honest with you. He could ask that 

we have a debate but he doesn’t do it. 

My two questions—that is one, if you will just write that down. 

The other one is going to be as quick as well. The waste, fraud, and 

abuse in Afghanistan—we have spent over $1 trillion. You talked 

about the soldiers and Marines who have been killed—thank you 

for remembering and sharing the 2,300/2,400, or Mac Thornberry 

did—over 20,000 wounded. 

We have been paying ghost soldiers to help the Americans over 

there. They don’t even know who they are, but we have spent billions and billions of dollars. DOD [Department of Defense] paid $6 

million to buy nine goats. We don’t know where the goats are, by 

the way, but that is DOD spending that money. 
11 

That is why the position on sequestration, I somewhat agree with 

you. I didn’t vote for it but in all fairness we keep wasting the taxpayers’ money. As Mr. Trump said, not only in that one sentence, 

but he said it 30 times, and I have all 30 of his quotes. 

The one that really of all the waste, fraud, and abuse that have 

just about shocked the people of the Third District of North Carolina, the home of Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point, was the one 

that the U.S. Department of Defense signed a contract with a British firm called New Century Consulting, where we paid them $50 

million to train Afghans to be intel officers. 

Out of that they bought seven luxury cars. The firm in Britain 

bought seven luxury cars—an Aston Martin, a Bentley, Porsches, 

and four other luxury cars. Plus, they paid their wives—talking 

about the executives—$400,000 each. 

Go back to the AUMF and then I want to ask you this—who on 

your staff is responsible for reporting to you about all this waste, 

fraud, and abuse that John Sopko has done a great job of informing 

Congress and the American people, and it keeps going on and on. 

It has got to stop because it is going to hurt the Nation, which is $20 trillion in debt, and it is hurting our military. But how can 

you justify—not you personally—how can we justify spending more 

and more money when we can’t account for the waste, fraud, and 

abuse in Afghanistan? 

So, there are my two questions, and I appreciate your answers. 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, we cannot justify wasting any 

money, and I am committed to finding who is responsible every 

time we find a case like this, holding them accountable and preventing it in the future. And I need to look into this New Century 

Consulting piece, and I will be getting back to you on this in detail, 

because I don’t believe you can waste government money. 

One of the things we are doing to make certain there are no 

more ghost soldiers—and by the way President Ghani has embraced it now because he is working on his ghost teachers—granted, not something we are putting money into. But he has got the 

same problem in his education system—because we are biometrically enrolling every one of them. And if necessary I will use U.S. 

paymasters, but we are not going to hand the money over and hope 

it gets to the right places in terms of fighting this war. 

The biometrics alone will remove a lot of this problem, because 

the only way to be entered is to be there. So the ghost soldier piece 

will be more a matter of monitoring their continued status than it 

will be having corruption introduced at the beginning. 

This comes out of the chairman’s failure analysis that I directed 

him to do and what do we do about the kind of things you rightly 

bring up to us here today. But we are not going to continue that. 

And as far as the AUMF goes, my point is that we need the unity 

of the American government and with the Congress involved that 

brings the unity of the American people to this fight. And I recognize we have to win your trust and your confidence on this. And 

the fact that the Department of Defense is big notwithstanding I 

intend to do that. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Jones. We now proceed to Mr. 

Larsen of Washington State. 
12 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A couple questions. First off, with regards to the regionalization 

or ‘R’ in the new strategy—in 2004 the administration at the time 

designated Pakistan as a non-NATO ally, making Pakistan eligible 

for certain preferences, especially with regards to the support of its 

military. 

Given that one of the points that you have made and the President has made about the administration taking a harder line towards Pakistan regarding support of the Taliban, are you ready 

now to revoke Pakistan’s non-NATO ally status? If yes, can you 

give us the reasons, and if not, why not? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, what we are doing right now is 

we are aligning what Department of Treasury, Department of Defense, the intelligence community, Department of State, say, this is 

what we must ask Pakistan to do to change its behavior. At the 

same time, we are aligning that with NATO so we have 39 other 

nations that will also be reinforcing this. 

As you know, I just visited New Delhi about the situation they 

face on their border. There are a number of ways, based on a very 

recent visit by the Pakistan chief of army staff to Kabul, about 3 

days ago, that we can help Pakistan to see its way forward to do 

what is in its own best interest. 

We will do this in a holistic, integrated way; holistic means 

whole of government and integrated with our allies and that is 

across South Asia. This strategy is not exclusive. In other words, 

any nation that wants to fight back against terrorism and reduce 

this threat to all nations is more than welcome. 

It is not exclusive with Pakistan, it is inclusive, and that is why 

we started with a regionalized strategy. As we move this forward, 

we are going to have to find common ground with Pakistan. And, 

as you know, the international community does not stand for terrorism. So there are decisions Pakistan must make. They have lost 

more troops than probably any other fighting terrorists. 

So on the one hand, we have the problems of havens and other 

things that we have all registered. And yet, at the same time, they 

have actually been fighting the terrorists. We have got to get this 

aligned regionally and solve this problem. And we have options to 

deliver—— 

Mr. LARSEN. And if I could just note in 16-plus years I have probably shared the frustrations of many on this committee about Pakistan as well as the limited number of successes that we have had 

with Pakistan. 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. 

Mr. LARSEN. Is revocation of non-NATO allies status on that list 

of possibles? 

Secretary MATTIS. I am sure it will be. 

Mr. LARSEN. General Dunford, you just came back from China, 

visited one border, the Chinese-North Korean border, but there is 

a 90-kilometer border between China and Afghanistan. It is not 

very easy to get to, but it does exist. Did you have any discussions 

with China on the regionalization issue and what role they can 

play—it can play? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, at really a minimum—that trip 

was really focused on North Korea—had a few sidebar conversa-
13 

tions on Afghanistan. Clearly China has, you know, there are many 

areas where our interests diverge. There are some interest areas 

where they converge and I think counterterrorism is one of those 

areas where our interests converge, particularly in Afghanistan. 

And I have certainly suggested to the Chinese interlocutors that 

they could play a more productive role, particularly in development 

and assisting with the counterterrorism effort on the border. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Gentlelady from Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I would like to go on record to thank Secretary Mattis and 

General Dunford. It is good to see both of you again today, and I 

will take a moment to express my appreciation to you and the Department of Defense for providing the security to the people of 

Guam from North Korea, and we do appreciate the Department’s 

efforts to have the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] 

battery protecting the people of Guam. Thank you very much. 

My expectation is that today’s hearing is one of the first steps in 

drawing out what an Afghanistan strategy that the administration 

puts out would look like. 

Secretary Mattis, at your recent speech at the Air Force Association conference, you stressed the importance of not only listening 

to our allies, but be willing to be persuaded by them. 

So can you point out to me pieces of this strategy where the administration and the Department of Defense have been persuaded 

by our allies, or would solicit input from the international community? 

And what portions of the strategy do our allies and partners 

have concerns with? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, right now I would just tell 

you that to be willing to be persuaded, the allies were 100 percent 

persuaded by our approach to drive towards reconciliation. 

It has received near universal agreement. I say near because I 

haven’t talked to all of them. But during the—while we were putting this strategy together, I have met three times with various 

groups of allies; from the Defeat ISIS group, because of the similarities in the counterterrorism campaign, and with the Ministers of 

Defence, there in Brussels—the NATO ministers, as well as in the 

Pacific when I was at the Shangri-La Dialogue where I talked to 

many of my counterparts there. 

They made it very clear that they believe that this enemy had 

to be defeated in Afghanistan, or whether it was in Europe or in 

the Pacific, we were going to see a wider spread. 

So, I think this is why we have seen such—such support, frankly, 

from across our allies since we have rolled it out. From Brussels 

and the NATO nations to New Delhi in India, certainly in Kabul 

where even the housing prices are going up, based on the confidence—this is an objective measure we watch very closely for 

what is going on there. 

So we have seen the input. We have heard the input. And it has 

been incorporated into what we have. And we are getting good 

feedback, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, I am happy to hear 

that. 
14 

And gentlemen, when do you expect the new strategy to produce 

positive results? What tools and process do you have in place to assess progress toward the stated end goal? 

I am aware that the strategy will not have predetermined timelines, but I am interested in the Department of Defense’s plan to 

monitor progress toward the condition-based goals that have been 

set. 

Either one of you. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, Congresswoman, we have, in a U.S.-Afghan Compact agreement with President Ghani’s government, we 

have over 200 specific benchmarks, as we attempt to quantify to 

the degree we can—you can’t quantify everything, but quantify 

where we can, the progress we are making. 

Furthermore, we have polling going on to see how we are doing 

with the hearts and minds of the people. 

Additionally, we have a separate—by the Joint Chiefs of Staff we 

have a separate assessment that will be going on as we look at our 

own benchmarks that we intend to meet; numbers of units that are 

mentored, this sort of thing. 

But in order to be output oriented, it is going to take a little 

time. That said, I was struck by the degree of confidence I saw, politically and militarily, in Afghanistan among our coalition troops 

and among the Afghan leadership, military and political, as a result of this strategy. 

So I think the psychological impact is beginning to be felt. The 

Taliban have been unsuccessful in what they have been attempting 

to do, to take a provincial and district center. They are still trying, 

as we speak here today. But also, they are starting to fight among 

themselves due to a loss of some key leadership. And because they 

are just not getting along with each other, under the increasing 

pressure that the Afghan forces are placed on. Anything else, 

Chairman, to add? 

Ms. BORDALLO. General. 

General DUNFORD. I think we will have a pretty good sense for 

the strategy next summer, as our advisory effort is revised, and we 

implement the full advisory effort that is informed by the failure 

analysis that we spoke about earlier. Next summer’s performance 

by the Afghan force will be one indicator. 

There is also a very important event taking place in Afghanistan 

next year, which is the elections. You know, I think the—we will 

see the Afghan’s ability to perform the security function associated 

with the elections as being a very good indicator as well. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, General, and I yield back, 

Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To both of you, we are 

deeply grateful for your service, and for the kind of in-depth analysis you do on all of these issues to present to the President. 

I have a couple questions. Director Coats, the Director of the National Intelligence, recently testified to Congress, in which he said 

‘‘The intelligence community assesses that the political and security situation in Afghanistan will almost certainly deteriorate 

through 2018, even with a modest increase in military assistance 

by the United States and its partners.’’ 
15 

General Dunford, you and the Secretary plan for only a modest 

increase in military assistance. If the intelligence community assesses that won’t make any difference, then how can you defend 

sending thousands more troops, and how can we ask our allies to 

do the same? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, I think that is a fair question, and I think what the intel community has done is provided 

a snapshot in time. I don’t think the intel community has assessed 

several things. One is the revised organizational construct of the 

Afghan forces. They are making some significant changes. 

I don’t think the intel community has factored in the change, the 

advisory assist effort, and the increased combat support that U.S. 

and coalition forces are providing to the Afghans. I don’t think the 

intel community has adequately assessed the impact of a conditions-based strategy on the confidence of the Afghan people, the 

confidence of the Afghan security forces, or the behavior of other 

regional actors. 

So Congresswoman, I—you know, again, this is a very difficult 

endeavor. The one thing I am sure of is that the strategy will keep 

the American people safe by preventing Al Qaeda and ISIS from 

conducting attacks on the homeland. But I also believe it has a 

good prospect of allowing the Afghan security forces to get to the 

point where they can secure their country on their own. 

Ms. SPEIER. Do you agree with me that we will have a presence 

in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, each of you? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, I will take that question 

first. Here is what I would say. In South Asia as a whole, we have 

vital national interests, and I believe those vital national interests 

are enduring. And I believe we will have a diplomatic, an economic, 

and some military presence in the region for a long period of time. 

I do believe that the military element of our strategy will decrease over time to a sustainable level. What we are attempting to 

do in our overall campaign against terrorism is ensure that working by, with, and through local partners, we get to the point where 

we have a politically, a militarily and a fiscally sustainable strategy from West Africa, Southeast Asia. In Afghanistan, I look at— 

in that context. 

So while I do think there will be U.S. influence and U.S. presence for some time to come, I don’t think there will be a large footprint of U.S. forces for a long period of time to come. 

Ms. SPEIER. So to be fair to the American people, we should 

make it clear to them that we are not leaving Afghanistan. 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, we should only leave a region—again, if you look at our strategies being diplomatic, economic, and military, if we didn’t have enduring vital national interests, and I believe we do, and so I think there has to be some presence and some influence. Again albeit in different form over time, 

but there has to be some U.S. presence in the region in order for 

us to advance our interests in the region. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Secretary, do you have any comments on that? 

Secretary MATTIS. I would agree with the chairman. We have a 

number going in now. It is going to make the Afghan military more 

capable. As they prove themselves and build their own capability 

as the enemy diminishes, certainly our numbers would be coming 
16 

down in a commensurate way, conditions-based as the President 

said. 

Ms. SPEIER. So what does a diplomatic solution there look like? 

How do we bring the parties together? And what would that look 

like? 

Secretary MATTIS. First, we have to remove from the Taliban a 

sense that they don’t have to negotiate this, and how they can 

achieve what they want through violence. Once they get that 

through their head, then we are going to peel off some of them. 

And you already see this happening where there is an atomization 

of the Taliban going on because they have lost some key leaders. 

And the ones who have stepped up, frankly, have not been as good. 

It has made in some way the reconciliation—political reconciliation a little harder because some of the people we are dealing with 

may not represent this new fragmented Taliban. But eventually 

the weakening of the Taliban should put us in a position where 

some of them say, ‘‘That is it; I am not going to keep this up.’’ Others of them say, ‘‘We are willing to negotiate.’’ 

What does the negotiation look like? They stop killing people and 

stop supporting the terrorists who attacked this town and New 

York City. And at that point, if they are willing to live by the constitution, President Ghani has made clear that they can come back 

in. You have already seen parts of it actually come over, you know, 

come over to Ghani’s side. 

So it is starting and it is not tidy, but it is ongoing now. And that 

is what you will see continue to move forward as we block them 

militarily from having a chance for victory on the battlefield. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, it looks like it is going to be maybe 

another 5 minutes or so before other members come back. I could 

pepper you with questions, but maybe I won’t. You have had—you 

have been testifying a lot today. 

So what I think we will do is invite our witnesses to the anteroom and the committee will stand in recess for approximately 5 

to 6 minutes. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We appreciate 

you all’s patience with our voting schedule. Chair recognizes the 

gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Secretary Mattis 

and General Dunford, I want to thank you on behalf of our military 

service members, military families, veterans. There is such a reassurance with your service and so greatly appreciated your dedication and your persistence on behalf of victory as we are proceeding 

in the global war on terrorism. 

As the grateful dad of an Afghanistan veteran, one of the primary concerns that I would like each of you to address is the—are 

the rules of engagement in Afghanistan. During the previous administration, I introduced a resolution calling for a revision to the 

existing rules of engagement under Operation Resolute Support in 

Afghanistan in an effort to succeed in the complex environment 

combatant commander’s face. What is the status of the new rules 

of engagement for U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan? 
17 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, the old rules included both rules—under 

rules of engagement and operating principles, included a requirement for proximity of the enemy to be engaged by our air forces. 

President Trump has told me that I have the authority to change 

that. So I have removed proximity, and that in itself opens the 

enemy, wherever they are found, to the NATO air support, under 

the NATO OPLAN [operations plan]. So the first thing is, we have 

unleashed that. At the same time, we have had a reduction in the 

number of deaths by innocent people as a result of coalition operations, not Taliban. 

And my point is, we will always take every humanly possible 

step to protect the innocent, but the rules themselves permit the 

engaged forces to bring air support and artillery support in. Furthermore, by extending the who—which units are being advised it 

means that many Afghan army units that never had advisors and 

had a very convoluted way to get at that air support—it wasn’t a 

rule of engagement problem, but it was organizational problem; 

that has been removed as well. If that addresses your concerns. 

Mr. WILSON. It does and I truly appreciate the complex situation 

of organizational end rules and you addressing it, and again, it is 

reassuring as a parent. And then Mr. Secretary we all want to succeed in Afghanistan and you clearly illuminated, or identified the 

situation and that is that we need to eliminate safe havens for terrorists abroad to defend American families at home. 

At the same time, I support your efforts for more troops, but we 

have increased deployments meaning fewer ready units at home for 

unforeseen contingencies. Sadly, we have also had the recent extended loss of two destroyers, the Fitzgerald and McCain and the 

necessary support for devastating hurricanes. The strain on the 

military is ever-increasing. What can we in Congress do to help you 

face the multiple threats that are facing our country? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman Wilson, I think the most important thing is that we get budget predictability and certainty because without that we cannot take the—adjust our forces and get 

predictability into our budgets that permits us to gain the best 

bang for the buck, to put it bluntly. We are going into the ninth 

year with a continuing resolution. 

As you know, I cannot make new starts under that. Even if the 

cyber domain or the space domain require that we do new things 

we have not had to do before to maintain our competitive edge. So 

the most important thing, I believe, is to make certain that the 

Congress act together to relieve us of the Budget Control Act cap, 

the defense caps, and we get predictability in our funding. 

Mr. WILSON. And I am really grateful for the leadership of 

Speaker Paul Ryan and Chairman Diane Black. We are trying to 

address that. And additionally, Mr. Secretary, as the former cochair of the India Caucus, I appreciate your visit last week to New 

Delhi. Under the new strategy, how will our defense relationship 

with India change, and keeping that in mind, how can we balance 

our cooperation with India as we have a situation where Pakistan 

has a level of resentment? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, the question you are bringing up is exactly why I was in New Delhi last week where Prime Minister 

Modi and their national security advisor, the minister of defense, 
18 

welcomed me. I would tell you that India is on the move. The economy is picking up. 

But most importantly in my portfolio, we now have a strategic 

convergence of two natural partners, the two largest democracies 

in the world. And India has been generous over many years with 

Afghanistan. They have been the victim of terrorism, so I don’t 

need to go there and talk about the terrorist threat with them. 

We have many areas where we are natural partners with one another. And we are deepening and broadening the military-to-military relationship with them. But it is not an exclusive—it is not an 

exclusive strategy, exclusive of anyone. Any nation that wants to 

be part of this—the counterterror effort and this stability effort in 

South Asia, can sign up. 

Pakistan need not think this is exclusive of them. It is open to 

any nation that wants to move against terrorism and remove this 

threat to all civilized nations. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, thank you for being 

here. Thank you for your service to our country. 

In President Trump’s August 21st speech, the President stated 

that he had lifted restrictions placed on our warfighters and the expanded targeting authorities. And I know you understand that this 

is obviously—it is critical that Congress be kept apprised of the 

operational outcome as a result of these changes so that we can 

continue to conduct the appropriate level of oversight. 

Can you more clearly define for me what are these restrictions 

that have been lifted? And which authorities have been extended? 

And which results have you seen—what results have you seen 

since these changes were made thus far? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, the NATO OPLAN had certain—had certain objectives in mind. It is organized to bring the Afghan army 

into a stronger position. And in some cases we were not giving that 

army the high ground. In other words, having fought in the mountains, it is a very uncomfortable feeling when the enemy is above 

you. 

We did not give the young Afghan boys the sense that they had 

the high ground when they were fighting against this enemy, that 

the NATO air support could have given them. Today, I can bring 

that air support to them. We have got to reorganize our advisors 

because those units with NATO and American advisors win, and 

those without them often do not win. So we are going to spread the 

number of units with advisors. We are going to bring that air support to bear. 

And specifically, we are no longer bound by the need for proximity to our forces. In other words, wherever we find the enemy, 

we can put the pressure from the air support on them. It used to 

be we had to basically be in contact with that enemy. At the same 

time, we do not want this to be misinterpreted into a laissez-faire 

use of fire support when we are fighting wars where the enemy intentionally hides among innocents. 
19 

It is still very much aligned with our effort to do everything humanly possible to prevent the death or injury of innocent people, 

women and children, villages, this sort of thing. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there other restrictions that we should know 

about that you can identify now? 

Secretary MATTIS. The other restrictions usually are basically in 

now being able to bring this fire support to bear where we could 

not before, whether it be proximity or we were not with those 

units. Remember, we were only advising under the old—under 

what I inherited, down to the corps level. We are now going down 

to the brigade level and the next level down, the kandak, or what 

you and I call the battalion level. These are the forces that actually 

move against the enemy. 

You will notice the commando forces and special forces who consistently win against the Taliban also have—they also have NATO 

and U.S. advisors with them. Our failure analysis made very clear 

why we had the problem with the other forces. We are going to 

solve that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Secretary Mattis, while the Afghan 

government is certainly determined to maintain security and stability, it is obvious that they are also contending with the clash of 

cultures in the region necessitating a coalition of our partner nations to address regional security challenges. 

So I understand that you were just in India or you spoke about that with Congressman Wilson, where they pledged $3 billion for 

development projects to train Afghan officers as well as additional 

naval cooperation. 

So how will this expanded engagement enhance security in the 

region? 

How do you intend to leverage relationships like this to develop 

a more effective coalition strategy that will inject a level of legitimacy and confidence between the Afghan government, its people, 

and its regional partners? 

And, similarly, something that caught my attention in the President’s speech with respect to Pakistan, how do you intend to persuade Pakistan to take more action to eliminate cooperation, support, and refuge for the Taliban in the Haqqani network? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I am—let me take the second question 

first. On Pakistan, what you are going to see is 39 nations all in 

the NATO campaign working together to lay out what it is we need 

Pakistan to do as well as in the U.S. Government—Secretary of 

Treasury, Secretary of State, the intelligence community, Defense 

Department, and we lay out what it is we need Pakistan to do and 

then we are going to use a whole-of-government international effort 

to align the, basically, the benefits and the penalties if those things 

are not done. 

Pakistan, again, has lost more troops in this fight against terrorists than nearly any country out there. And yet at the same time, 

as you know, there has been some parsing out where some terrorists have been allowed safe havens. We are out to change that behavior and do it very firmly. 

Based on a visit 3 days ago by the chief of army staff of Pakistan 

to Kabul, we actually have, for the first time, a sense of some optimism out of the Afghan government. So I am from—I am in a 
20 

show-me stage right now, but we intend to work through international partners diplomatically, economically, and work together 

to make the change that actually impacts in best interest. 

As far as gaining confidence there with the Afghan people and 

their military and how do we make this work, I am going to ask 

the chairman to say a few words on this, but the bottom line is, 

sir, that if you look at what we call a loya jirga, which is the largest political assemblage under their culture, it is overwhelming 

how much of the population wants the NATO alliance to stick with 

them. 

And so, when you add to that the countries like India which are 

trying to provide more generous—they have been very generous, 

but even more development support, there are ways to build the 

confidence of a people that have been tormented ever since the Soviet invasion by violence. 

Chairman, if you have something. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, the one thing we always said 

was that the most important thing that we were delivering to the 

Afghan people was some hope for the future, and a conditionsbased approach gives them that. 

In recent polling, about 80 percent of the people reject the 

Taliban. About 70 percent plus have confidence in the Afghan security forces, and roughly those same numbers as Secretary Mattis 

alluded to, roughly those same numbers welcome a coalition presence. 

So, I think that the commitment that the international community, because this isn’t just a strategy about the United States, 

there are 39 other nations, and NATO has the same approach, a 

conditions-based approach. I think that is having a profound effect 

on the psychology of the Afghan people. Which again, we always 

felt was a source of strength in the campaign. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you both. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, thank you for 

your very solid and extraordinary leadership. I think the Nation is 

very fortunate that you have accepted these assignments. A lot of 

my questions have already been asked and answered, but I want 

to go back just to what a couple of my colleagues have said previously about Pakistan. 

So, I know that they are demonstrating, at least rhetorically, the 

right approach and willing—expressing the willingness to help, but 

we have seen this before. And we have been disappointed and 

sometimes they do a little bit and make it sound like it is a lot. 

What—in this, I recognize we are also in an open setting, what 

can you tell us about if we find that this is a false start again that 

we can do to pressure them to more cooperate? Because I think it 

is pretty obvious without them we have a much more difficult time 

in Afghanistan. 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, the reason we did a regional approach in 

the beginning was so we didn’t try to start with Afghanistan, put 

together a great plan and say, well now we have got to add in these 

kind of variables. We started with India to Iran. We looked up into 

Central Asia and down into Pakistan and came at Afghanistan as 

a geographically centralized problem, but informed by the others. 
21 

I think that there is an increasingly level of discontent in the 

world with any country that supports terrorism for any reason. I 

mean, it has taken a while for some countries to come onboard or 

you look at what Secretary Tillerson has put together in terms of 

the Defeat ISIS Coalition, 69 countries right now plus the Arab 

League, European Union, NATO, INTERPOL [International Criminal Police Organization]. 

When you think of that number of countries it is clear that what 

ISIS has done has created its own antibodies. And by doing that, 

there is more of a concern about the spread of terrorism. So as we 

work this problem with Pakistan, as Pakistan has moved actually 

against the border areas here in the last 6 months, losing a lot of 

troops and pushing against some of the border passes to give access 

into Afghanistan, I think that we are in a position now where we 

can be more compelling. But, this is going to be one step at a time. 

We are going to remain, basically, focused on this effort. 

We are not going to back off and it will start with assistant secretaries coming out of Washington and the national security staff 

members going into Pakistan soon followed by the Secretary of 

State. I will go in and we have Secretary General Stoltenberg’s 

very clear support for this in his advocacy as the Secretary General 

of NATO. 

So we are going to continue to build this up in an international 

way with a whole of U.S. Government argument for the Pakistanis 

to work in their own best interest and ours. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Secretary Mattis. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for 

being here. 

At the outset I just want to, sort of, endorse Mr. Jones’s comments that, I too, feel that we as a full body of Congress should 

have the opportunity to debate an authorization for use of military 

force. It has been too many years, I feel. I have been here 10 years 

and we have been having these hearings over and over and over 

again, and we have many new Members of Congress as well. 

So, with the new administration a new effort, not necessarily is 

different, but nevertheless, a new effort I feel, we need the chance 

to debate this and recommit or not to what you are doing. 

But I also wanted to just address, again, the regional approach 

that you are taking—and we have had some conversation about 

Pakistan but there has also been reporting that Russia is engaged 

in finding ways to support the Taliban; Iran as well. And I would 

just like your thoughts on how that is complicating your efforts 

there. 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, any effort to support a violent group— 

a terrorist group like the Taliban, until they renounce terrorism, 

support for them is not in Russia’s best interest, not in Iran’s best 

interest. Certainly not in Afghanistan people’s best interest and it 

is contrary to the NATO campaign and the international agreements under the U.N. [United Nations] that put us there in the 

first place, that authorized us to be there. 

So, I think that this is very difficult to discern why they would 

do something that is not in their best interest. I am not ready to 
22 

say precisely what it is. I want to see more evidence about how 

deep the support is. 

It is just hard to believe—Iran has had their diplomats killed by 

Taliban. Russia certainly has had enough problems coming out of 

terrorism in South-Central Asia, so this doesn’t make sense, but 

then the world doesn’t always make sense. We will figure it out 

and we will illuminate it where it is necessary in order to try to 

get a change in behavior. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And yet, you have seen some evidence of it without 

really wanting to go—without fully having a sense of to what level 

it goes. 

Secretary MATTIS. We have seen some, ma’am. It is—I need more 

definition on what is coming out of Russia—I can’t figure it out. It 

doesn’t make sense. But we are looking at it very carefully. 

Out of Iran it has always been a low level of intermittent support 

for Taliban; mostly financial, some weapons. It is Iran doing what 

it usually does, in terms of trying to create chaos. 

Ms. TSONGAS. General Dunford, would you like to comment? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, what we have seen, just to 

be clear, because you have talked about support. I think we have 

clear indications of communications. I think with regard to the Iranians there is no question that there is a degree of support, as well 

as communications. With the Russians, I don’t think we have specificity on support to the Taliban. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. That was my only question. I yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mattis, it is good to see you again and thank you for 

being here. 

I too, like the other members, want to thank you for your work 

since you have been Secretary. You have been very diligent in ensuring that this committee is informed working directly with the 

members of the committee, but even beyond that you have with the 

classified briefings that you have held for the whole House, made 

certain that other Members hear your message. 

That helps us because what we learn in this committee, in these 

hearings, we take out to other Members but you are taking your 

message directly which has included repealing sequestration, the 

effects of CRs, and I want to appreciate that you have done that 

because it is making a big difference. 

So, I want to thank you for being here today also. And I want 

to ask you a question concerning the drug trade in Afghanistan. 

According to a 2016 survey concerning opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan, the cultivation in Afghanistan in 2016 increased by 10 percent. All regions, except the southern region, experienced an increase in opium poppy cultivation last year. 

Additionally, aside from a drop between 2014 and 2015, the data 

shows a steady growth in opium poppy cultivation between 1994 

and 2016. 

If you look at the historical levels from 2001 to where we are 

today it has roughly doubled. So, we have seen that it was less 

than half before 2001. I know that that is unacceptable. I am certain you believe it is unacceptable, and it has a direct impact on 
23 

counterterrorism, as you know, because it includes funding. Counternarcotics efforts lessen the funds that are available to terrorists. 

It also breeds corruption in both the Afghan government and in the 

Afghan military. 

And we know how to address this. We address the crops, we address distribution, we address labs, we address funding—basically 

the infrastructure for the narcotic trade. 

So, in looking at your new additional strategy in South Asia, how 

do you see this strategy including an effort to affect the opiate narcotic trade? 

Secretary MATTIS. It is a great question. Both the counterfinance aspects of the strategy and the counter-corruption are 

linked directly to the counternarcotics campaign. We will—we 

watched as we drew down too fast, too early. We watched the 

Taliban surge. As the Taliban surged, we watched the poppy surge 

right along with it. There is no surprise here—the intelligence community had warned us about this, so it is exactly what we were 

told would happen. 

As we look at this we are going to go after the counternarcotics 

refineries, the transportation nodes, the bazaars as they call them, 

where they are bartered. And the reason is that is where the 

Taliban actually accrues their taxation cash off of the trade. It is 

not from the little guy down there who is farming this hearty crop 

of poppies. 

And so, we are going to look at where does it help the Taliban 

and fight it from that direction rather than going pretty much in 

a big way just after the farmers themselves. So, there is a way to 

cut this thing and reduce it by targeting the right locations and the 

right nodes in the drug trade that will also undercut the Taliban’s 

fundraising. 

Mr. TURNER. General, we have dealt with this issue a lot and 

there have been times where we have had some success. In looking 

at this issue the committee is very aware of the fact that there are 

impediments as to how we are structured. Are there things interagency, interdepartment, funding issues that we need to address to 

ensure that the Secretary’s new strategy is implemented? What do 

you see as your impediments? 

General DUNFORD. Are you talking now more broadly, Congressman, or just with regard to the drug problem? 

Mr. TURNER. You get the assignment, but you don’t have all the 

authorities. Where are areas where there is difficulty for you in 

trying to achieve, through the DOD structure, a reduction in narcotic production? And how can we help you? 

General DUNFORD. I think having the right numbers of drug enforcement agents to advise the Afghan forces—they have got a 

major crimes task force there. And so, law enforcement officials 

that can help advise and grow the capacity of the Afghans to both 

arrest, protect evidence, and prosecute has been something that 

has showed good value in the past and also making sure the justice 

system continues to mature as well. 

Mr. TURNER. Sorry, my mic was off. Secretary Mattis, anything 

you would like to add to that on the tools that you would need? I 

do know that you have difficulty—interagency, interdepartment, 

and structurally in trying to achieve these goals. 
24 

Secretary MATTIS. You know, sir, because it touches the Taliban 

and the counter-finance effort, is something that we are very much 

invested in and integrated. I don’t sense that I have any missing 

authorities here, but if I find them, I will come up and see you and 

tell you what I need. I have made a note of it, I need to look at 

it. So far, I have not heard that, but I haven’t asked a specific 

question. I need to do so before I answer you. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mattis, you said a couple of times during this hearing 

that war is a matter of will and that the Taliban have to understand that there is an implacable will on our side to continue this 

fight and to see it through until we achieve our goals. Convince me 

that our will is more implacable than theirs going forward. 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, of course, I am not alone in this fight, 

sir. I have just come out and seen our troops in the field, including 

the troops of other countries. I have no doubt we have the troops 

with the willingness to endure danger and discomfort in defense of 

this country, and this town, and New York City that were attacked 

by terrorists operating out of this very area that we are fighting 

in. 

But I think you bring up a good point and it goes back to something mentioned earlier about AUMF. I think there has got to be— 

the U.S. Congress has got to embrace this as our fight. We are all 

in this and we—I am eager to hear any criticisms of strategy, 

changes in the operation, open the door, have you go in, look at it. 

To me, if what you go in and see or what our inspector finds there 

isn’t something you admire, then I need to change it. 

But one thing, I have dealt with this kind of enemy since 1979. 

I do not patronize them. When they say girls don’t go to school, you 

are not going to talk them out of it. They didn’t rationally arrive 

at that point and we are going to have to confront this the way 

free—generations of Americans have confronted other threats. 

Whether it be militarism, fascism, or communism, we are going 

have to confront it for our time. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Let me ask you a follow-up question that—you 

talked about some of our goals. The primary one, I think, being 

that Afghanistan never again be used to plan or carry out attacks 

against the United States of America. We want those stakeholders, 

like the Taliban, to work within the national government and the 

political process. 

You also said that the Taliban have to understand they cannot 

kill their way to power. I think you would also agree, we probably 

cannot kill our way towards these goals and conditions. So, therefore, what is going to have to happen for the Taliban to accept our 

conditions, short of us killing all of them? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, I think Congressman, it has got to be 

they recognize they are not going to gain power at the point of a 

gun and that the Afghan security forces are capable of defeating 

them. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, if I could just add in there, and 

we talk about will, I think the Secretary just touched on something 

that is important. It is not the Taliban will just against U.S. and 
25 

coalition will. It is the Taliban will against the Afghans and the Afghan forces in particular. In the last year, the Afghan forces had 

16,000 soldiers killed and they stayed in the fight. They have 

proved incredibly resilient. 

Sure, they have had battlefield shortfalls and we know what they 

are and our failure analysis indentified those, and the plan that we 

have proposed is designed specifically to address where there are 

tactical gaps in their capability, down at the small unit level, and 

particularly, the ability to deliver fires. 

But I think at the end of the day, this is a clash of wills. It is 

a clash of wills between the Afghan people and some small portion 

of the Afghan people that actually want to resort to violence to advance their political objectives. And I think with support to the Afghan forces and the Afghan people, I am confident that their will 

will actually endure longer than Taliban will. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. But with all due respect, General, it is not just 

the Afghan government and a small minority; it is the Afghan government, a trillion dollars in U.S. taxpayer support, tens of thousands of U.S. service members, NATO allies, the support monetarily and militarily from those countries as well, and we are in our 

16th year with no end in sight. 

And I am having a very hard time understanding and being able 

to explain to my constituents what the game-changer is that I am 

hearing today that will make this different going forward. And I 

mean no disrespect—— 

General DUNFORD. No, no. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. But I am just not hearing it. I think this war has 

suffered from a lack of oversight and a lack of questions asked, and 

so I am asking you this question. 

General DUNFORD. Sure, I think it is a fair question. I think it 

is a fair question to debate why this is different and why we should 

stay after 16 years. 

I will certainly tell you from a military perspective why I recommended we stay was, we looked carefully at the 20 groups that 

are international terrorist groups, 20 of the 90 we recognize around 

the world, and the consequences of not keeping pressure on them. 

So that was number one. 

In terms of what is different, people talk about 16 years—for 14 

years of those 16 years, we were in the lead and we were in the 

fight. Over the past 2 years, it has been the Afghan forces that 

were in the lead and in the fight. They didn’t have adequate force 

capabilities to be able to deal with the Taliban. 

This doesn’t address 16 years of us being in the fight; this addresses 2 years of the Taliban fighting legitimate Afghan security 

forces. And this plan is designed to fill the capability gaps that 

have been identified as a result of the 2 years of casualties and setbacks that they have suffered. 

I think that is really important, is that this is designed to be fiscally, militarily, and politically sustainable over time. It will require a U.S. presence increase in the short term, but in the long 

term this is about leveraging the 300,000 Afghan forces that we 

have grown over the course of 16 years, but just inadequately supported here for over the last 2. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you. 
26 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for what you 

do to protect our country and our allies. 

I believe the President is to be commended when he in his recent 

speech talked about Pakistan and how Pakistan needs to be more 

consistent in its promoting stability in the region. And, Secretary 

Mattis, you addressed that very strongly in your comments earlier. 

And I would just like to follow up on that a little bit. What can 

we do if Pakistan does not follow through and be a better promoter 

of promoting stability? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, we have an enormously powerful number 

of options there. Right now I would like to think we will be successful, but you have—you asked a very good question, because we 

don’t want a transient or temporary change, but and then, you 

know, they—things go back the bad way. 

But I think that right now with the growing consensus against 

terrorism, they will find themselves diplomatically isolated. They 

will find themselves economically in increasing trouble, as countries that are damaged by this terrorism coming out of there say 

enough is enough and take steps. 

There is an awful lot of advantage to Pakistan of coming online 

with the international community, and I think that we have to stay 

focused there, but the penalties are just as significant as the advantages if they choose to go a different direction. 

But for right now, we need to try one more time to make this 

strategy work with them, by, with, and through the Pakistanis. 

And if our best efforts fail, President Trump is prepared to take 

whatever steps are necessary. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And, for either one of you, how will or how should 

our defense relationship with India change? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I was in India last week and was very 

well received by Prime Minister Modi, by his minister of defence, 

his national security advisor. We have a strategic convergence right 

now between the two—the world’s two biggest democracies, and 

this is probably a once in a generation opportunity to with shared 

interests to deepen and to broaden our defense relationship, but 

also our economic relationship, I think our political relationship 

can be tightened together. 

They are a force for stability in South Asia. They are a force for 

stability in the Indo-Pacific region. They are a nation coming into 

their own, economically, as a great nation, as they have steady 

growth rates going on right now. 

And I think there is an opportunity here that we have not experienced in decades to tie us together in terms of a broadened level 

of cooperation and a natural alignment with each other’s interest. 

Mr. LAMBORN. As a follow-on to that, do you have anything that 

you are ready today to announce or designate specifically, that we 

will be doing that we haven’t done in that past with India? 

Secretary MATTIS. There are a number of things in motion right 

now, sir, and decisions, I think, will be coming very soon. We are 

both working to turn these big words into pragmatic realities and 

because I see both sides working together on it I am optimistic. It 

is not like we have to go over there and convince them that terrorism is a threat. 
27 

They have felt what has happened there. We have not had to 

convince them that we don’t have nefarious designs on the IndoPacific area. We are two democracies that we can work together on 

this. There are some things we are doing in terms of their support 

in Afghanistan. 

Development funding, they have been very generous for many 

years and they have achieved a degree of affection from the Afghan 

people as a result. They intend to continue this effort and broaden 

it. Furthermore, they are providing training for Afghan military officers and NCOs [noncommissioned officers] at their schools. 

They are willing to do rehabilitation of Soviet-era equipment 

until we are able to replace it with American. That will take years 

in order to do it properly and all. So, they need to maintain what 

they have now. Helicopters, for example. 

Furthermore, they have been providing and will continue to provide training for Afghani army doctors and medics in the field, so 

that the army is able to take casualties and better sustain themselves; that sort of thing. 

So that it is really a very holistic approach that India’s taking. 

You will notice I left off boots on the ground because of the complexity that that would bring to Pakistan. We are trying to make 

this an inclusive strategy and we don’t want them to get a sense 

that they are vulnerable to any Indian Army people from their 

western flank. That is not necessary. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mattis, I wanted to specifically ask you about the State 

Department and the USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] programs in Afghanistan now. 

And how do funding cuts to the department as proposed by the 

administration affect the overall mission there? I know that you in 

the past that you have been very outspoken about the importance 

of diplomacy and other programs in support of the mission. 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, right now what we are trying to 

do is get a lot more development aid from the international community. This is separate and distinct from what we are doing to lower 

the demand on the American taxpayer where we are paying an 

awful lot of the military piece of this. 

We are also trying to raise money, by the way, from our allies 

to carry more of the commitment on the military side. But I am 

not—I am not certain what the cuts are as far as AID’s budget for 

Afghanistan. I can get back to you. I will go to State Department, 

to USAID and determine that, and come back to you with an informed answer, sir. 

Mr. VEASEY. Okay. Well, thank you very much. 

I also wanted to ask you about Special Inspector General John 

Sopko. He said in March that with a new administration and a new 

Congress that it is a good idea, an opportune time to reevaluate 

our efforts in Afghanistan and find out what is working and what 

is not. 

Now, one smart first step would be to do what SIGAR [Special 

Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction] recommended 

years ago, which is for each of the three major agencies in the re-
28 

construction effort—State, USAID, and DOD—‘‘to rack and stack 

their top- and worse-performing projects so they know where to invest further and where to cut those losses.’’ That was his quote. 

And I didn’t know if you agreed with that proposal? And if so, 

has it been implemented yet in any way in crafting a South Asia 

strategy? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do agree with what he said about what is 

working and what is not. We have done a failure analysis that has 

tracked—that has delved into this issue. Right now, before I have 

the chairman talk with his background as a NATO commander 

there in Afghanistan, I will just tell you that when I heard that 

the budget was being reduced for AID, Secretary Tillerson and I 

sat down together the next day. 

We spoke about how we would align DOD and DOS [Department 

of State] at the high level to determine what were priorities, without any violation of our funding lines; make certain we were talking to each other; that we aligned our foreign policy effort, DOD 

reinforcing State Department, with a very strong partnership to 

make sure we are getting—we probably should have been doing 

this anyway—but make certain what we are doing was collaborative with one another in any part of the world we were both operating in. 

But let me pass this over to the chairman. He has got some information on Afghanistan. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think to your broader question which is did the SIGAR’s report inform our strategy moving 

forward. The SIGAR actually partnered with us. When Secretary 

Mattis directed us to do a failure analysis, to go back and look at 

what has worked and what hasn’t worked in Afghanistan, one of 

the key partners—we brought in a number of outside agencies— 

one of the key partners we brought in, and I had Mr. Sopko in my 

office, and then he had representatives on our team. 

So when we did the failure analysis, it was very much involved— 

very much informed by the work that the SIGAR had done over the 

past few years, not only with regard to projects, as you have talked 

about, but they have done some good work on resource transparency and accountability. They did some good work on what 

worked and what didn’t work in our advisory effort. They did some 

good work on what worked and didn’t work in terms of collaboration between State Department and the Department of Defense. 

And so I think that I feel confident in saying that SIGAR’s work 

as well as some of the other literature that is out there that talks 

about what has worked and what hasn’t worked in Afghanistan is 

very much a part of the recommendations that we made to Secretary Mattis and the President. 

Mr. VEASEY. And General, or Chairman also on that one, the 

July SIGAR report indicates a 21 percent increase in security incidents from last quarter of March to May 2017, and a 2 percent increase from the same period last year. What does this uptick in the 

security incidents tell us about the security situation overall? And 

how are we shaping our strategy going forward in light of these 

particular figures? 

If you can answer that quickly. Time has—— 
29 

General DUNFORD. Sure—sure, Congressman. I would just tell 

you that I don’t think any of us are satisfied with where security 

in Afghanistan has been in 2016 and 2017, although so far 2017 

is slightly better than 2016. And the reason why we believe those 

incidents have occurred is the Afghan forces haven’t had the 

wherewithal to accomplish their mission. 

So we have focused on those areas where they have fallen short 

of the mark, specifically the ability to deliver aviation support and 

provide advisors at the right level in their formations. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mattis and Chairman Dunford, thanks again for joining us today. Thanks so much for your service. 

Secretary Mattis, I wanted to refer to the U.S. defense strategy 

on the war in Afghanistan. The President noted in his August 21st 

address that India continues to be a very important strategic and 

economic partner. And I certainly agree with that. I had the opportunity days after to visit with the foreign secretary in India, the 

defense secretary, chief of naval operations. 

I know that you just returned from the region there, speaking 

with President Modi and others, and that your effort and your direction there in dealing with India is going to be steady engagement, which I think is spot-on. And I am all in favor of making 

sure we do joint naval exercises, that we continue expanded defense trade. 

But in relation to what is happening in the region, I am more 

concerned about a stable Afghanistan and securing the hard-fought 

gains that we have had there. And I know that you noted that in 

reference to terrorist safe havens there in the region, that as global 

leaders India and the United States resolve to work together to 

eradicate this scourge. 

And I am fully in agreement with that, but I want to get your 

perspective. What do you think that India can do specifically to 

help root out or to help reduce terrorist safe havens in that region? 

You talked about their engagement in putting dollars into Afghanistan, but what can they do in a broader sense in helping with the 

terrorist safe havens that are happening throughout the region? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, India has an outsized role to 

play because of its size, I think because it is as raucous a democracy as we are, frankly. It gives people hope that their voices can 

be heard, that economic opportunity can be passed broadly in a society, not to a corrupt few. And I think their example alone is important. It is why we are looking at this strategic convergence as 

an opportunity for steady engagement, so we have to do pragmatic 

things together. 

I think in this regard, if there is any way for Pakistan and India 

to open their border to trade at great economic advantage to both 

of those countries, it would be a big help across the region. Because 

stability can follow economics as much as stability enables economics. And so I would hope that we will eventually see that happen. 

I believe India wants that to happen, but it is very hard to do that 

if your concern is that you open the border to one thing and you 

get something else. 
30 

So there has got to be some trust-building between those two nations. But I think that would probably be—in South Asia, one of 

the key enablers to getting trade going back and forth across all 

those borders—Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you. 

Chairman Dunford, I wanted to follow up along the same lines 

of terrorist safe havens, and you talked about the new Afghanistan 

strategy calls for expanding authority for U.S. forces to target terrorists and the criminal networks that operate in Afghanistan. And 

the President said that he agreed and said that we ought to have 

a policy to make sure that there is nowhere to hide and no place 

that is beyond the reach of American might and American arms. 

I wanted to get you to elaborate a little more. I know you talked 

some about this—about what you see the expanded authority specifically needing to be, and what it means in a combat sense. And 

give us maybe some examples there about what is not happening 

now, but what could happen under expanded authority in how the 

train, advise, and assist role happens now versus what it would be 

in the future. 

And have you seen any positive changes that are resulting from 

this transition through this change? And will there be any more 

changes that you think will be implemented, or will be necessary 

to be implemented? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, let me start with the TAA 

[train, advise, and assist] changes, because I think this is one of 

the more significant ones. We were providing advisors only with Afghan conventional forces only at the corps level. That is the general 

officer level, largest formation. Those are not the organizations that 

are actually in the fight everyday. 

So two levels down below is where the decisive action is taking 

place, and we didn’t have any advisors there. And so even though 

we had some aviation capabilities, some intelligence, surveillance, 

reconnaissance capability, it wasn’t being delivered to those Afghan 

units that were actually most relevant in the fight. So—because we 

didn’t have the authority to put advisors down to that level. 

So one of the more significant changes in authorities is the level 

at which we advise and assist. And that has and will make it— 

make us more effective. 

Also, just broadly speaking, without going into rules of engagement in an unclassified venue, there are no individuals, there are 

no groups that threaten the Afghan government, threaten U.S. 

forces, threaten our mission, or threaten the coalition that General 

Nicholson does not have the authority to prosecute. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

This question is for Secretary Mattis. In your opinion is Iran 

compliant with the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]? 

Secretary MATTIS. I believe that they fundamentally are. There 

have been certainly some areas where they were not temporarily 

in that regard. But overall, our intelligence community believes 

that they have been compliant. And the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] also says so. 
31 

Mr. GALLEGO. Just a follow-up question to answer, General 

Mattis. Would you—will you be recommending to President Trump 

that we continue working—are working through the JCPOA to contain Iran’s nuclear capability? 

Secretary MATTIS. We are working that right now. There are— 

if you look—we have two different issues. One is the JCPOA and 

one is what Congress has passed, and those two are distinct but 

integral with each other. As you look at what the Congress has laid 

out at a somewhat different definition of what is in our best interest, and therein lies, I think, the need for us to look at these distinct but integral issues the way the President has directed. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Secretary Mattis. If there is going to 

be any change in the status of our participation in JCPOA especially when—if it involves the interpretation of what we, in Congress, pass in terms of sanctions against Iran outside the JCPOA, 

will you come back and inform and talk to us? Because I believe 

many of us voted for Iran sanctions outside of the JCPOA with the 

understanding that they were not going to be linked. 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, I think that this would probably be most 

appropriate by the Secretary of State, and I would follow him up 

here. I think that our diplomacy and the President and the Secretary of State, I think have the lead on that. But once a decision 

is made and I will be in on the decision, I will give input of course. 

I will be—always willing to come up and talk in hearing or in private. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General Dunford, Mr. Chairman. When we look 

back on the history of the Vietnam War in, I think in August of 

1969, President Nixon orders a Vietnamization program in sort of 

a phased withdraw as the army of South Vietnam gains capability. 

And then they couldn’t—he couldn’t, in 1972, bring the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table. So he did, I think it was Operation Linebacker II, which was a massive bombing campaign, late 

1972 of North Vietnam. He brought them to the table, negotiated 

peace agreement that extricated the United States from the war in 

Vietnam. 

If I look at Afghanistan today, I think that there actually is a 

better end state because I think that the Taliban come from the 

Pashtun ethnic group. And I think that there are areas in Afghanistan where the—particularly in rural Pashtun areas where they 

prefer the Taliban to the government of Kabul. 

But like the North Vietnamese, the Taliban don’t feel that they 

have—they feel like they are making gains. And so there is no need 

to come to the negotiating table. And so I understand this new 

strategy is designed to increase pressure to bring them to the negotiating table. At least that would be a by-product of it. 

So—but I don’t—so what I see is the change of the rules of engagement, when you talk about air support, which is vital. But— 

and we are plussing up with 3,000 troops. Is that going to bring 

the Taliban to the negotiating table? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, in the past we have not had 300—over 

300,000 troops who are for all of their challenges have stood in the 
32 

field and kept the Taliban from doing what they intended to do, 

even today, which is take the provincial and district centers. 

So we now have the advantage of that experience—more experienced force. But we have got to get the advisors down to a level 

where they bring NATO air support, NATO intel support, and 

NATO artillery—and broadened artillery support to them. So you 

know, time will tell, Congressman. 

But I think too, again, this strategy is four R’s, regionalize it 

first. Make certain we are dealing with the safe havens and the 

broader issues, get more support. It is to realign our forces along 

these lines so they get down to the tactical level. It is to reinforce 

them with enough that they can get down to that level and make 

a difference. And then it is reconciliation. 

But there is also an S. It is 4Rs plus S. Sustain this effort. Because if we are willing to sustain the effort—I still remember being 

up here on Capitol Hill, sitting behind Dr. Perry when he testified 

that it was never going to end the fighting, the killing, on the Dalmatian coast of Bosnia, Kosovo. 

The international community stuck with that effort. And how 

many times have we read in the newspaper about the murder of 

innocent people in Kosovo and Bosnia. Do we still have a couple 

hundred troops there as part of the international effort? Yes, we 

do. 

But the international community, if it sticks with this, if it sustains this, I am confident can throw the enemy on the back foot 

and give the Afghan people a chance to pull it together. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Dunford or Secretary Mattis, if I understand right, the significant change in the rules of engagement in 

the prior administration, that—I guess, that unless, in terms of the 

Taliban, you said that, I think, Secretary Mattis, you referenced 

contact, being in contact with the Taliban. But unless the Taliban 

showed harmful intent to U.S. forces, we didn’t engage them. And 

I think that was modified towards the end of the last administration. 

If there were—if a provincial capital were falling, then, in fact, 

they could be engaged. And so, if I understand a fundamental 

change in the rules of engagement, it is that if—that the—clearly 

the Taliban are an existential threat to the Afghan government 

that we are there to support. And if in fact, Afghan security forces 

in and of themselves are in contact with the Taliban, then we will 

provide close air support when reasonable. Is that a correct interpretation of the current rules of engagement? 

Secretary MATTIS. Not complete—yes, at one time, sir, we could 

not help the Afghan forces unless they were in extremis. And I was 

not here then, and I don’t know why it happened. And then eventually that was rescinded, but they still had to be in proximity. They 

basically had to be in contact. 

Today, wherever we find them, the terrorists, anyone who is trying to throw the NATO plan off, trying to attack the Afghan people, 

the Afghan government, then we can go after them. 

Mr. COFFMAN. To remove the Taliban? 

Secretary MATTIS. Always with the caveat that we want to make 

every effort to not kill women and children, and innocent people. 

Chairman, if you want to comment on that? 
33 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, just to, I mean, I think just to 

reinforce the point, there are two things that have changed. We in 

the past were only providing advice, you know, again at that senior 

level and then, Afghan special operations forces. So the only aviation support that we could provide was when we had actually advisors that could—that actually could control that air support. 

So the large number of Afghan conventional forces, the preponderance of those 300,000 forces we have spoken about, they could 

not receive close air support because we didn’t have advisors. That 

is the big difference. 

And then, the other thing that has changed is that now, again, 

any individual or any group that threatens the Afghan government, 

our mission, coalition forces, or U.S. forces, obviously, can be engaged. 

And the conditions aren’t specific to, as Secretary Mattis has alluded to, a specific engagement at a specific time. So if they are 

at an assembly area, they are in a training camp and we know that 

they are an enemy and they are going to threaten the Afghan government, our mission, or our people, General Nicholson has the 

wherewithal, the flexibility to make that decision. It is his level, is 

where the authority is. And that is a fundamental difference. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And gentlemen, thank you so much for your continued service to 

the country. We have a lot of renewed confidence with you in your 

positions. But confidence is really my key question here. 

And it comes back to a question we have heard a few times, and 

we heard from Senator McCain on the other side of the Hill, which 

is, how really will this be different? We have talked about some of 

the details. But as we have discussed on this committee before, at 

the end of the day, there has to be a political solution. 

The Afghan army, 300,000, however many—it doesn’t mean 

much if Afghan politics fall apart. Afghan politics have fallen apart 

several times. How is the political effort different, this time 

around? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, having just returned, I noticed 

sitting across the table from me in my meetings were new commanders and new ministers of interior and defense, proven people. 

People that the NATO officers said, we have fought with these 

guys, it is great to have them in place. 

When you go down to the corps level commanders, these are all 

proven young officers who have grown up in this fight. They are 

not holdovers, not kept around from past wars. There is also an effort underway right now to remove many of the officers who are 

over the hill and replace them, give the young officers an opportunity to come up to levels they have demonstrated they can handle this fight. 

That can only reflect a political reality because of the nature of 

that society right now. As you know, it is a society that has been 

shaken apart since the time of the Soviet invasion. It is also a 

group that now recognizes they basically have one last shot at this. 

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Secretary, you have detailed, and the chairman as well, how bringing our advisors down to a lower level will 

help on the military front. It sounds like the same thing is needed 
34 

on the political front. How confident—and I see a lot of nodding 

heads. How confident are you that our State Department can do 

that? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, it is not only our State Department. The NATO Special Civilian Representative—SCR there and 

his deputy and the other diplomats in the town of our framework— 

NATO Framework Nations, but also for example India, they are all 

working along these lines. 

Mr. MOULTON. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. But how confident are you that our State Department can provide that support? 

Secretary MATTIS. I am confident we get varsity people out there. 

Ambassador Bass is coming out of Turkey, this—— 

Mr. MOULTON. A lot of positions are unfilled right now. We just 

eliminated the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Is that helping, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary MATTIS. It—that has no effect on the intent that you 

are trying to highlight here. That is where the Ambassador and his 

staff, that is who does the yeoman—the heavy lifting of that kind 

of job. We also have other military—U.S. military officers in their 

ministries to build bridges across to each—the various ministry. 

We try to get the political concentration of effort—unity of effort 

that we need. 

Mr. MOULTON. So, Mr. Secretary, are we actually pushing advisors farther down in the same way that we were doing on the military side of things? 

Secretary MATTIS. I am confident we will be. We currently are 

doing that with NATO officers inside the ministry of interior, ministry of defense, and the intel agencies. As far as the other ones go, 

I believe—let me ask the chairman. He has been there as the commander on the ground in the past. But I will tell you that I have 

seen a new level of collaboration between Chief Executive Abdullah 

and President Ghani than I have seen in the past. 

Mr. MOULTON. The bar is pretty low, but I appreciate that. Mr. 

Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I mean, I think it is a fair 

question. And in—as part of the strategy, the State Department is 

tasked with coming up with a more robust approach. I would reemphasize one point and then talk about one that is aspirational. 

When we knew moving forward we were going to have a new strategy, we needed strong leadership in Kabul. Ambassador Bass actually was carefully hand-selected. He is coming out of Turkey. He 

has been there for 3 years. He has got an incredible background 

experience in Afghanistan. 

And many of us—many of us spoke to him and encouraged him 

to accept this service, which is really what he has done. He has accepted this service in Kabul for 3 years. So it starts at the top, and 

I think we have the right diplomat that is going over to Kabul. 

With regard to your other question, has the advisory effort on the 

political level been pushed down to where it needs to be? Not yet. 

And that has to be done in order for us to be successful and I know 

that is what Secretary Tillerson’s intent is. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Hartzler. 
35 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen. 

We are so glad that you are at the helm at this important time 

in our Nation’s history, and in the life of Afghanistan. 

I am so encouraged by a lot of the changes that you are instigating. I think it makes so much sense to have the strategy be condition-based, not just time-based or number-based. 

And I have also been encouraged by what you shared earlier 

about making sure that every dollar that goes there is invested 

wisely. 

Our Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee held a hearing 

recently dealing with the allegation that the Afghanistans bought 

and perhaps wasted $28 million dealing with their camouflage they 

chose for their uniforms. 

And I was so encouraged at your memo, Mr. Secretary, afterwards, you know, directing that we bring to light the wasteful practices and make sure that everything is looked at and there is no 

waste. 

So I am going to ask the question about another area, and that 

deals with just the assessment of the Afghan security forces. General Dunford, you had mentioned, and of course we talked about 

300,000 troops there now and a lot of changes are taking place. 

When I was in Afghanistan in 2011, I was struck by what I 

learned there about the difference in perceptions and the expectations of our military when we first went over there at the level of 

their education, level of their abilities, and we thought we were 

going to begin training at this point, but the reality was we had 

to go back here because of even the literacy rate was such that we 

had to start teaching them basic literacy before we could get them 

to this point and move forward. 

And you said we are going to expand the air force as far as close 

air support. Could you just give a general assessment of where you 

think they are in their capabilities? Where is their literacy rate 

now? Where are the shortfalls in their capabilities? Where are they 

in building the air force and the close air support that we feel like 

they need? 

General DUNFORD. Sure, Congresswoman. Let me start at the air 

force. So when you were there in 2011, I think they had a couple 

of small helicopters, MD–530s. They had some residual Mi-17s and 

they had a total of five Mi-3s. On any given day they might have 

been able to get one in the air. 

Today, they’ve fielded 20 fixed-wing A–29 aircraft. They have 

fielded, I think on the order of about 20 MD–530s, which is small 

attack helicopters, with the plan to increase more. And we are in 

the process of transitioning from Mi-17s to UH–60s. 

The first four UH–60s were delivered this month. The first two 

attack versions of the UH–60 will be delivered in January. And 

then between now and the next 7 years we will completely transition to a UH–60 model helicopter, which combined with the fixedwing aircraft, the A–29 as well as the MD–530. 

And then there is one other aircraft that is a smaller, light aircraft that conducts reconnaissance called the C–208. 
36 

So they have got a pretty robust air force that is growing right 

now. The most promising area of the air force has been the special 

mission wing, which supports their special operations. 

And I can tell you from personal experience that the profiles that 

those pilots are flying are as sophisticated as the profiles that we 

typically fly on a routine basis. You know, and again, that is the 

result of many, many years of training. And this is the cream of 

the crop, there is no doubt. But there is some room for promise in 

the Afghan air force. 

I think it is important, when you talk about lessons learned in 

2011, in having an accurate assessment of Afghan capability, one 

of the things that the Secretary has directed is that our advisors 

are going to be the most mature, most competent, most experienced 

individuals we have. 

And so what you will see are people that have actually been over 

there before and going back again on a repeated basis. So I would 

expect the advisors that will go in in 2018 will be people who have 

had experience in Afghanistan in the past. And so we will be starting from a known point in terms of their appreciation of culture, 

strengths and weaknesses, and so forth, and be better advisors. 

One area that I think is significantly different in 2011 is leadership. And you know, in 2011 we were still dealing with the residual 

of a Soviet-informed army, that type of leadership. 

This summer alone, as a result of President Ghani’s decisions, 

the average age of the corps commanders was reduced 10 years between last spring and right now. He replaced five of the six corps 

commanders. 

And so we really are now dealing with a group of individuals 

that have been trained, organized, and equipped and influenced by 

U.S. and coalition forces for over a decade. 

The young lieutenants and captains that you met in 2011, those 

are now the kandak commanders and the brigade commanders. 

And so, that is something that takes a long time. We say it takes 

25 years to grow a division commander. It takes a long time. But 

the investment that we have made, bringing the Afghans to our 

schools and training them over years, now are starting to result in 

leaders being in the right place. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. That is very encouraging. Thank you. I yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mattis, 

General Dunford, thank you for being here. 

Secretary Mattis, you talked about the new strategy, the R4+S. 

Is that strategy that you also buy into? Right. Is that something 

you support? The R4+S? 

Secretary MATTIS. Absolutely. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So can you tell me—I understood your description of what regionalizing is, but can you tell me what reconciliation means? 

Secretary MATTIS. I can, Representative. What it means is that 

the Taliban decide to stop killing their fellow countrymen and 

women and sit down, as some of the small groups have, and start 

working with the Afghan government. They have got grievances, 

then bring them up through the normal processes that countries 
37 

have to resolve grievances, but no need for violence, no need to support transnational terrorists. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So is this sort of linear? In other words, do we 

have to go through each of the Rs to get to the S, which is the sustained? 

Secretary MATTIS. No—no, it is not. It is a great question. We 

are going to fight and talk at the same time. Already some groups 

have broken with the Taliban. 

Furthermore, because the Taliban has lost some key leadership, 

there is internal fighting going on now, which distracts them from 

working against the Afghan government and against our NATO 

forces, our Afghan forces. 

So this is not going to happen in a sequential, linear way. There 

will be—some of them will peel off early. Some will fight to the rugged end. But the bottom line is we will fight and talk at the same 

time. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So is realign talking about the others, not just— 

you are not talking about our troops. When you talk about realign, 

you are talking about realigning, like the other terrorist organizations or other groups? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, ma’am. We are talking on the realignment—realigning our forces to the main effort of bringing NATO 

support to the Afghan forces that have not had advisors before, and 

ensuring that the Afghan forces are made more capable to provide 

for their own defense. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So the reinforce component of R–3, I think you 

said, is that the United States to reinforce by having more troops? 

Secretary MATTIS. We will bring in more troops to extend the advisors to the other units that the chairman was saying are not 

right now getting advisors. But it is also Secretary Stoltenberg and 

myself going to other NATO and partner nations—NATO being the 

nations there in Europe; partners being ones like Georgia, Australia—and have them pick up more of the advisory duty, align 

more of their troops to advisor duty as well. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So though we may not have more boots on the 

ground, so to speak, we do anticipate having more of our advisors 

or NATO advisors in Afghanistan in the future. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, ma’am. There will be more boots on the 

ground. I mean, we are reinforcing. It is not to take over the fighting. It is not to supplant or substitute for the Afghan soldiers. It 

is to make certain that units that never had immediate access to 

NATO air support, intelligence support, this sort of thing, will now 

have it, making them more effective at fighting. But we are not 

taking over the fighting. We are enabling them. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So, in your testimony, Mr. Secretary, you spoke 

a lot about the Taliban and how the—the basically lack of a better 

description, how the Taliban was such—doing everything so bad 

and it was an evil entity. Yet in the testimony of the general, he 

talks about defeating ISIS and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and to ensure other terrorist groups are unable to launch attacks. 

And then he ends with something I think you are talking about 

when you talk about reconciliation. And that Secretary Tillerson 

has recently outlined this entire effort is intended to put pressure 

on the Taliban and have them understand that they will not win 
38 

in the battlefield victory, so they will enter an Afghan-led peace 

process to end the conflict. 

Is that the ultimate goal, that we will do away with ISIS and we 

will do away with Al Qaeda, but the Taliban is viewed almost like 

our future partner or the partner in peace in Afghanistan? 

Secretary MATTIS. As you know, ma’am, the Taliban embraced Al 

Qaeda, supported them, and refused to break with them even after 

they attacked New York City and Washington, DC. So we go after 

the Taliban as providing the structure, so to speak, that other 

transnational groups have in fact used to conduct international attacks. I mean, you know what Al Qaeda has done. You know what 

ISIS has done; Haqqani in the area. 

But the bottom line is we are going to go after Al Qaeda. We are 

going to go after ISIS. And if the Taliban wants to break with them 

and stop killing people and rejoin the political process, then we see 

reconciliation as the way we will end this war. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thanks for 

being here today. 

General Dunford, you mentioned the A–29 mission. I am proud 

to tell you that that is Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta, Georgia, 

in my district. We are happy to have that mission there. I hope you 

will continue to expand it. I know that that mission is being utilized for other countries as well as Afghanistan, so thank you for 

your support of that and mentioning it. 

You have talked briefly about this with General Coffman and 

Wittman and some others, but on page 3 of your testimony, you 

talk about the decisive point in moving—or the new approach that 

will have our most senior, capable, and operationally experienced 

leaders advising at the decisive point in Afghan operations. 

Can you speak to—can you give any specific examples of where 

that has—that has made the difference? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Congressman. When we went 

through the failure analysis, the one thing that we identified was 

Afghan units that had coalition or U.S. advisors almost invariably 

were successful. So we have had—we call it persistent embedded, 

meaning they live and eat and they fight with the Afghan forces 

in support while they are fighting. And that is what the case was 

with special operations forces. So that has worked very well. 

We have not had a commensurate effort with Afghan conventional forces. So when we talk about the decisive point, we are talking about continuing to make sure that at the lowest tactical level, 

this battalion-like organization of about 1,000 in the conventional 

forces, we actually have persistent embedded advisors that are— 

that is advisors that are there when they are actually in the fight. 

And it has worked with special operations. It has worked in our 

previous experience before we drew down the force before 2014, 

when we had a fairly robust advisory effort with Afghan forces. 

And I was in Afghanistan during that period of time. They were 

successful. 

Again, why were they successful? We facilitated delivery of aviation support. That was number one. And we continue to help them 
39 

develop their tactics, techniques, and procedures, and ability to 

plan, and help them mature their logistics. 

All of which takes time. And so they are—they are more improved than they were in 2014, but I think they still need advisors 

at that level when they are in the fight. So I think we do have a 

pretty—a pretty good body of evidence that indicates this will make 

a difference. 

Mr. SCOTT. If I may before I yield the remainder of my time, I 

know that one of the—one of the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance] platforms that we used in that area—moving 

target indicators, the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack 

Radar System]. Up to and until a few weeks ago, I would say I was 

proud to support the Air Force in the recapitalization of that program. I continue to believe that we need to recapitalize that program. 

I have concerns about the Air Force’s commitment to that mission at this stage. I look forward to working with both of you to 

make sure that we maintain the capabilities that the JSTARS platform gives us. And I hope that—I hope that the two of you can support the continued recapitalization of that program. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield the remainder of my 

time. 

Gentlemen, I have a tremendous amount of respect for both of 

you. Thanks for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carbajal. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, more than 24,000 U.S. 

troops have been lost; more than 20,000 wounded, all with the 

price tag of over $800 billion. I know both of you are all too familiar with these numbers. 

After 16 years, you are asking the American people to endure 

more, more loss of life, more money, and without an expiration 

date. And for what? 

Secretary Mattis, I believe in the strength and the capability of 

our military. I believe we have the most powerful military in the 

world today. However, I do not know if we have the will to fight 

this war to the end. Because I don’t think there will ever be an end 

to this fight against terror. 

This is not a war that can only be fought with troops. We are 

fighting against not one, but a number of worldwide networks. The 

American people are tired, our troops are tired, and our allies are 

tired. I believe the American people deserve to know why additional troops are being sent back to Afghanistan. 

Secretary Mattis, you have to understand, I have to be able to 

go back to my district and explain to my constituents why they are 

sending their sons and daughters to Afghanistan once again. 

Secretary Mattis, would you say we know who our enemy is? 

Reading over the ‘‘lessons learned report’’ by the inspector general 

report for Afghanistan reconstruction, it doesn’t seem we knew ourselves or the enemy. For example, we were wasting precious taxpayer money imposing advanced technology to an illiterate and uneducated population without the appropriate training, expecting 

them to be prepared to fight. 
40 

According to—in the same report, the U.S. underappreciated key 

strategic-level threats, including the will and ability of the Taliban 

to continue to fight, sustained popular support for the Taliban in 

Afghanistan, insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan, eroding Afghan government legitimacy, and corruption in the Afghan National Defense 

and Security Forces. 

Essentially, we didn’t know our enemy. Have you considered the 

strategic-level threats this time around? And if so what are they? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, I believe the strategic-level 

threats are the ones we experienced most directly on 9/11. Problems in these kinds of areas do not stay in those areas. They—in 

a globalized world they come out. 

So, the question I always ask myself before I walk into the President’s office, if I am going to recommend that we deploy American 

troops where they can be killed is, does this contribution, does this 

commitment of our forces—contributing our forces to this fight contribute sufficiently to the well-being of the American people? We 

could lose people as a result. It has got to pass that standard. 

I think we do know very well who this enemy is. He is an enemy 

that doesn’t wear a uniform. He hides behind women and children. 

I recognize the difficulty of taking the country further into this 

war. 

I first landed in Afghanistan in November 16 years ago, so I recognize the challenges you bring up about keeping the American 

people motivated and understanding of what this fight is all about. 

I believe it is necessary to defend what we believe in and to protect 

the freedoms we have so the next generation can enjoy them. 

I don’t believe we can ignore this. I think if we leave this region, 

we leave it at our peril, and I think we have a lot of people—even 

with all the confusion about our strategy over the last several years 

when we kept talking about, we are leaving, we are leaving, 39 nations out of 50 still stuck with us, I think hoping against hope we 

would come up with what they are now encouraged by, which is 

this strategy. 

So we are not alone in this would be one of the first messages 

I would bring to your constituents, Congressman. With all respect 

to your constituents, they need to know we are not alone in this 

fight. 

Is it tough? Was the society of the Afghan people completely 

shaken apart, torn apart by the Soviet invasion? Did that open the 

door for then what happened here in terms of the society I think 

you aptly described? Yes. But we deal with the ball where it lies 

right now, sir. We can’t wish it away. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gaetz. 

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mattis, I had recent occasion to visit with some of my 

constituents who have been serving in this theater when they returned home at Walter Reed, and I promised them that I would 

share with you their complete confidence in the President and their 

complete confidence in your leadership of the Department of Defense. 

They were injured in a green-on-blue circumstance in which they 

were attempting to give training, advice, and assistance to the Af-
41 

ghan forces. Can you speak to any new strategy that we have—any 

new tactics that we have to ensure that folks who are there rendering assistance on how to perform the mission don’t then put 

themselves in an unnecessarily vulnerable situation? 

Secretary MATTIS. This is probably one of the most difficult aspects of this war. We all recognize that treachery has been part of 

warfare since the beginning of time, but this aspect is especially 

difficult for us to understand or to embrace, and it certainly undercuts the sense of commitment, if this is what is going to happen. 

So, let’s get down to what are we doing about it. There is a very 

invasive counterintelligence program in which we vet the people 

that we are going to be training. Numerous people have been dismissed from the service—from the Afghan service because of it. We 

also maintain a guardian program where you have guards on our 

people who are giving classes in the event the counterintelligence 

program, like all of them, can’t be perfect—we assume that. 

We also have a very strong support element there in the Afghan 

government. They recognize that nothing is more corrosive to the 

support of the American and the democratic people from Europe 

and other democracies that are part of our 39 nations than this 

sort of treachery. 

So, it has got our attention. The Taliban continue to try to infiltrate their way into the Afghan units, and we have been relatively 

successful at stopping them. 

But, chairman, if there is anything I have not answered, you go 

ahead, please. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman the only thing I would say we 

had a very high incidence of these in 2012 and 2013. In fact, at a 

point where I think it is fair to say it threatened the campaign. 

And the measures that Secretary Mattis outlined were measures 

that have now matured over time—the counterintelligence effort, 

the training of our people to detect changes in behavior of the people that they are training with. 

But the thing I believe is the most significant that I would just 

reemphasize, as Secretary Mattis highlighted, is the Afghan leadership owns this problem and they recognize that. They know that 

our ability to continue to provide the kind of training and support 

they need is based on them making sure that we—our people are 

secure. So, while we provide our own—what the Secretary describes as guardian angels, we also rely on the Afghan forces to 

create an environment within which we can get our mission done. 

In my judgment, the Afghan leaders jumped in and the reason 

why we do have some incidents—and one is significant in the 

young folks that you have visited up at Walter Reed are suffering 

the consequences of that, but we have driven the level of these 

types of incidents down to a very low level. And we should recognize it for what it is—it is an enemy tactic designed to erode our 

will, and we have got to deal with it as such. 

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you. And I absolutely appreciate the extent to 

which we have highlighted this as a priority with the Afghan government, because that is where we will likely get the intelligence 

that we need to minimize this risk. 

Another area of feedback we have gotten frequently is that the 

deployment cycles that people are on can create circumstances 
42 

where someone goes and has a great relationship with a tribal 

leader, a partner, but then they are out, a new person is in. And 

that this confidence that you have spoken of throughout your testimony today can be eroded by some of those cycles. 

Are there—is there any tactical change to that going forward in 

this new strategy? 

Secretary MATTIS. We are trying—Congressman, we are trying to 

bring troops back on repeat tours. Now, that is—but that is more 

of a corporate memory than a personal relationship. And we recognize this challenge. At the same time, we need to keep our troops 

fresh. It is very wearing, as you know, to be in a combat zone 

where you keep your guard up all the time. 

And somehow we have to sustain this, and we have a military 

that has got a pretty wide portfolio right now in terms of threats 

around the world. So we are trying to maintain a more veteran approach going back in. We are trying to do the kind of things that 

mean we are putting people into areas that they understand inherently, even if they don’t know that specific village. 

In some cases, we are able to get that kind of return actually to 

the same area again, but that is going to be very challenging as 

we go forward. So it is more how do we train our forces for it and 

how do we do the counterintelligence piece that allows for us to be 

dealing with people who want to work with us. 

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your—making yourselves available to 

the House Armed Services Committee. Several weeks ago, President Trump outlined in very sketchy format a three-pronged strategy to Afghanistan. And I would like to ask you about two of those. 

One is the time-based to condition-based approach, and the other 

is to appoint advisors down to brigade level. 

So starting with the first, and this is a preparatory question. 

Does the condition-based approach envision or contemplate—and I 

am not asking for a time; I am asking for does it contemplate a 

state where we withdraw all U.S. forces? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, it does not. It implies bringing people, the 

number of people we have there down based on the standing-up of 

more capability and the maturing of the Afghan forces. There could 

be American advisors there 10 years from now, maybe a handful 

compared to today. 

Mr. BROWN. Okay—follow-up. So while the military goal, as I understand it, is to provide that time and space for the Afghan government, the Afghan army to establish itself so it can provide for 

its own security, what are the nonmilitary efforts to address the 

corruption and poor leadership, the eroding security, the economic 

stagnation, the minimal foreign investment, and the soaring unemployment—all of which contribute to a climate in which the Taliban 

and other extremist groups can recruit and then conduct their activities? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, the corruption is, to our way of 

thinking, a strategic vulnerability that has to be addressed. President Ghani has got—has signed with us a compact of what we are 

going to do about it. It has to do with control of money. It has to 
43 

do with who they put into position. There is accountability. They 

just put a three-star general in jail, to show you that this is going 

to the very top. It is not like it is only the little guy who is being 

scooped up. 

There is an accountability there that is going to shift the opportunity for this into a penalty box, not an opportunity. We are going 

to change that. 

I think on the eroding security, the offensive actions by the 

enemy have now been pretty much blunted. They are down to isolated ambushes and IEDs [improvised explosive devices]. Some of 

the IEDs are large, high-profile IEDs. But they have been unable 

to sustain the kind of offensives they had last year where they 

were able to move in large groups. They get in large groups now, 

they understand our rules have changed and we are going to take 

them out. 

So they have had to fragment and disaggregate more, which 

means they can’t take over the district and provincial centers that 

our press was full of stories how they were proclaiming what they 

were going to do this year. They have been unable. They have been 

unfulfilled what they said they were going to do. 

It is not that they are not dangerous. I mean, it is not that we 

are not going to have to increase the security there for the Afghan 

people. We will. 

As far as investment goes, you will see India, for example, picking up a larger bit of investment. We are going to other nations 

about the development investments to try to get them to do more. 

And so far we have had some success in this. We will see it actually go into action probably by sometime late this winter, start seeing it. 

But we are addressing each of these efforts that you have laid 

out with benchmarks so that we as much as possible can quantify 

the progress. We may not be able to quantify everything about it. 

Some of it is subjective, but we are trying to quantify what we are 

doing in each case so that we do not have an assumption that 

things are going to turn out well. We are going to have to make 

it turn out well. 

Mr. BROWN. If I could just use the rest of my time to make this 

statement. I visited with Ambassador Llorens. And while he has 

got the largest embassy in the world, they are camped out in 

Kabul. You have asked for 4,000-plus more soldiers. They are going 

to go to the brigade level. You are already stretched too thin with 

advisors. You are going to go two levels down. You will be stretched 

that much further. 

He is not going to get the force protection that he needs. And 

while I understand the President’s concern about nation-building or 

trying to build Western-style institutions, nobody can help reestablish civil institutions and a regional economy better than the 

United States. Our military is the best in training foreign militaries, and it is our State Department, our USAID that does diplomacy and development better than any other nation. 

So I would like—I had hoped that we could see more U.S. involvement in that nonmilitary effort. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bacon. 
44 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you both for being here. Thank you for your 

leadership. Our country is blessed to have you. 

General Dunford, you commanded forces in Afghanistan in 2014. 

How has your thinking evolved since then, seen from your new perspective? 

General DUNFORD. You know, to be honest with you, Congressman, to some extent we are going back to the future here a little 

bit. When we did the evaluation in 2013 and 2014 about what 

would be need in a post-2014 environment, we identified the advisory effort that would be necessary for the Afghans to be successful. We talked about the capability gaps, to include the aviation 

gap we have talked about here today; the logistics sustainability 

that wasn’t yet in place; the intelligence capabilities they would 

need. 

And then we made a decision to lift off and provide support at 

the corps level and the institutional level. So, we are now having 

a conversation that is not dissimilar from the conversation we had 

in 2000, 2013, and 2014 which was, to be successful, we need to 

have advisors, the right kind of advisors, at the right place, and we 

had to have sufficient aviation capability until the Afghan air force 

came online. 

So, I am not sure my thinking has changed significantly so 

much, Congressman, as we actually now—and it is rare that we 

do—but we actually now have an opportunity to do something 

today, that—is the right thing. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. You may have touched on this, but with 

the votes, walking in and out, let me just clarify a point. It is often 

read that we think the Taliban have nominal control of roughly 40 

percent of Afghanistan. Is that about an accurate number? 

General DUNFORD. I think what General Nicholson talks about, 

Congressman, is the government clearly in control of somewhere 

between 60 and 70 percent, 10 percent is approximately contested. 

So I think it is a bit less than—than what you described. But I 

think that is probably less important than the populated areas—— 

Mr. BACON. Right. 

General DUNFORD. And focus on that. And I think in that regard, 

the government is probably closer to 70 percent. And what the goal 

is for President Ghani is to get to at least 80 percent of the key 

populated areas in 4 years, which I believe is attainable. 

Mr. BACON. That is better than what I was reading, so that is 

good—good to hear. Secretary Mattis, what would be your assessment if we pulled out of Afghanistan, as some want us to do. What 

do you think would happen within, say 2 years? 

Secretary MATTIS. If we pulled out completely? 

Mr. BACON. Yes, Sir. 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, I think we would benefit the Taliban 

greatly. And the Taliban have shown that they will permit transnational terrorists. So ergo, basically what we saw on 9/11, I think 

we could anticipate happening again. 

Mr. BACON. Absolutely. The Taliban were allied with Al Qaeda. 

Would you say they are still allied with Al Qaeda? I know the Taliban had been allied with Al Qaeda, or the—the close ties. I think 

it is fair to say they still have those close ties. 
45 

Secretary MATTIS. Oh, absolutely. We have encouraged them to 

break those ties. Our argument, when we went in, was with Al 

Qaeda. We encouraged them then to break with Al Qaeda. We 

didn’t—they were not a transnational terrorist group, the Taliban 

themselves. But they would refuse to do so. And so, they chose to 

fight. 

Mr. BACON. One last question. I think our emphasis seems to be 

on counterinsurgency, also training the Afghan forces. What would 

you say is the percentage of investment or effort that is being put 

on nation-building versus the counterinsurgency and training aspects? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, sir, if nation-building is writ large, certainly having security forces, and intelligence forces, and police 

forces help. They set the conditions for a nation to find its footing. 

They set the conditions for families to raise children, to have—to 

bring in—to go to farms, to go to jobs, you know, bring jobs in. So 

in that regard, we are setting the conditions for the Afghans to 

build a nation. 

In that regard, there is what is called the donor nations. And 

those—everything, they have met several times over the years. 

They raised money for Afghanistan and countries like Japan and 

Afghanistan, so many more—United Kingdom, bring the money in 

for targeted efforts, whether it be to build a road or in order to get 

products to market before they spoil, that sort of thing. We are setting the conditions—— 

Mr. BACON. Right. 

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. For that sort of thing with the 

military campaign, the security campaign we are putting together 

here. 

Mr. BACON. Well, thank you very much. And before I yield, I just 

say I share your assessment. If we pulled out, we would be back 

in 2 or 3 years, having to take out the Taliban and Al Qaeda and 

it would be a worse fight. So I applaud the President’s strategy, 

your strategy to win this and to keep Taliban and Al Qaeda out 

of power. So thank you. 

Secretary MATTIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Panetta. 

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chairman, thank you for being here. I appreciate that. I appreciate your opportunity—the opportunity to address you, and hear from you, and obviously appreciate your candor 

on these issues. 

General Dunford, you mentioned counterterrorism in the region, 

in what you are doing. I was wondering, how much of this is being 

responded to with special operations forces? Obviously right now, 

we have about—from what I have read, about 8,000 in the world. 

And what I am hearing over and over is that the forces are 

stretched too thin. 

Is that true and is that affecting our ability to deal with counterterrorism in Afghanistan? And are we still using the element of— 

the strategy that I saw, there in 2007 and 2008, where we were 

finding, fixing, finishing, and exploiting, is that still being utilized? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, the last part of your question 

is, yes. That methodology is still the same methodology that we use 
46 

to go after the enemy from a CT [counterterrorism] perspective. 

And I would say we have sufficient special operations forces to do 

the mission today. 

But the issue you raise is a concern, that we are running them 

too hard and in some cases, maybe, are there missions that they 

are performing that could be done by other forces. And the Secretary, about 4 or 5 months ago, right after he came into office, 

asked us to make sure that as we were doing Global Force Management, meaning every day looking at the requirements of the combatant commanders, number one, we made sure that only if something required special operations forces, would they go to that 

force. And then, we looked to backfill certain assignments that 

were being filled by special operations forces with other capabilities. And for example, this advisory effort, the vast majority of the 

advisors that will be going in is a result of the plan that has been 

approved by the Secretary—our conventional forces, the Army and 

the Marine Corps will provide conventional forces to be able to provide that advisory effort. 

Because we are sensitive to the fact that special operations forces 

are critical, not only to the counterterrorism fight but also to the 

Russia, China, Iran, North Korea fight as well. And getting the balance right, not only from a day-to-day engagement perspective, but 

making sure that they can train against the full range of missions 

that special operations require is something that we are very sensitive to, Congressman. 

Mr. PANETTA. Understood. When—back in 2007, 2008 we were— 

well the FATA, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas were, to 

me, seemed kind of like the Wild West. And I remember the town 

of Wanna, in I think it was South Waziristan, kind of reminded me 

of the town of Tombstone. Is it still like that and can we be assured 

that Pakistan is going to be able to patrol and control those areas 

when it comes to breeding grounds for terrorists? 

Secretary MATTIS. As you know, Congressman, the Federally Administered Tribal Area, the North-West Frontier has a long history 

of discontent—would be a polite way of describing it. But I would 

also say that since the partition, it is called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas for a reason. In other words, it is not a state. 

And you understand that it has been an area that has been very 

hard for Pakistan to maintain the same kind of control as it has 

down in the settled areas, for example. But that said, they have 

been running some very strong operations up there. They have lost, 

as you know, many of their own troops in this fight. 

And they have just completed one set of operations that moved 

against the border on several lines of effort. And those obviously 

had some of the effect of pushing people over into Afghanistan— 

enemy over there. 

So 3 days ago, the chief of army staff from Pakistan flew into 

Kabul, and this is the first time I have heard of a visit actually creating some degree of optimism. And so we will see. There is reason 

for us to say there is a new day here. But it is too early for me 

to come in front of this committee and pronounce that with confidence. 

I will fly in to Islamabad soon, after the Secretary of State is 

done, so as the lead for our foreign policy, I will fly in, and we will 
47 

continue to try to work with them cross-border operations against 

what can only be described as our common enemy. And we will see 

if we can make this work this time. 

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you. Gentlemen, thank you. Mr. Chairman, 

I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Banks. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mattis, General 

Dunford, thank you for being here. 

As an Afghanistan war veteran myself, I represent tens of thousands of Americans who have served there that want to know that 

our service and sacrifice meant something. 

And that is why, Secretary Mattis, I applaud your work and the 

change of course in Afghanistan. That is why your change in strategy recently brought me great hope and optimism that we will turn 

the tide and fight the war to win it, rather than fight 14 separate 

1-year wars that have resulted in what we see today. 

I want to focus first, for a moment, on the specific mission of 

CSTC–A [Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan], 

and the over $70 billion that we have spent in ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] funding. And I know we have talked already 

about the wasted money on uniforms, but every week a different 

story piles up in a stack of stories that you can find by googling 

waste in Afghanistan. 

From the headlines that I brought with me today, 43 percent of 

America’s military weapons unaccounted for, Afghan forces lost 

$700 million in U.S. ammo, U.S. unsure if Afghan intel service 

even works despite half a billion dollars in aid, $28 million wasted 

on Afghan uniforms, wasted money on payroll, wasted money on 

construction. You get the point. The list goes on and on. And these 

aren’t stories from 10 years ago; these are stories from the last couple of years. 

So my first question is what—I know you have already talked 

about the general—the lessons learned. But what are we putting 

in place within the structure of CSTC–A? What type of process are 

we creating to raise the level of accountability on this investment 

that we are making in the Afghan National Police and the Afghan 

military? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, that is a great question. About 

2012, maybe it was even as early as 2011, in order to develop Afghan capacity, we started to move money to a, what we called on 

budget, meaning we gave the money to the Afghans for them to 

manage. At one point, I think we had well over 70 percent of the 

money that we were giving to the Afghan forces that was on budget. 

We have actually walked that back. Now less than 25 percent of 

the money is actually administered by the Afghan government; 75 

percent is administered through us. And for that 25 percent, we 

have put in some rigorous conditionality—you talk about the lessons learned—rigorous conditionality to make sure that we have 

transparency. 

And President Ghani, unlike his predecessor, has allowed us to 

get into the ministries where the money is being administered, 

check the books, be able to do an audit just as we would for, you 

know, on our own accounts. And I am confident in telling you this, 
48 

that the $4 billion-plus that we provide to the Afghan security 

forces every year, our commander will have in CSTC–A, as his executive organization, will have visibility. 

And I expect to be able to come back up to you and talk to you 

about the transparency and accountability that we have over those 

resources. 

So we have learned some lessons, but I think one of the more significant ones is that we are now delivering capability and equipment, and they are not—they weren’t quite ready for—to execute 

the entire budget and have the kind of same standards that you 

suggest—— 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, General. As a follow-up to that, how do 

we know, today more than ever, after supplying 14 years of weapons and ammunition, vehicles, uniforms, that we are giving the Afghans what they need and not what they want? 

General DUNFORD. Well, I think that is a constant process of refinement. But here is what I want to tell you—is the glimmers of 

hope. You know, we bought Stryker vehicles—those are being employed right now, and they actually have provided a competitive 

advantage to the Afghan forces over over their counterparts. 

The aviation enterprise, actually, is a success story, and I think 

you—I don’t know if you have been back recently, but I would 

hope, when you go back, you can see the Afghan air force in particular. So we delivered an A–29—it is an aircraft that is relatively 

simple to learn, simple to fly. As one of the Congressmen mentioned—that we bring the pilots back to Moody Air Force Base— 

they are going back, and they are being able to sustain that effort. 

So I believe, right now, that the lessons learned over the last few 

years have highlighted for us what equipment works, what equipment doesn’t work. And to be honest with you, we do need to improve the accountability of equipment, the maintenance procedures, 

and so forth. That is an area that the advisory effort is designed 

to address, as well. 

Mr. BANKS. I have 30 seconds left. I wish I had 30 minutes. 

But when we talk about rule of law in Afghanistan, it seems to 

me that one of the greatest inhibitors to rule of law is Vice President Dostum. What are we doing to prevent him from continuing 

to wreak havoc on the security—or on the rule of law situation in 

Afghanistan, as he returns to country and returns to his position? 

Secretary MATTIS. I think the most important thing is we are reinforcing the positive elements in the country, and not leaving 

them to deal with these kinds of issues that Dostum represents on 

their own. 

This is—we are looking at bringing in gendarmerie kind of police 

trainers—not from the U.S., but from those countries that maintain 

gendarmes, so that the police themselves are more capable of carrying out the rule of law. 

It—you have got to have the right kind of police force. Then you 

need to have the right kind of courts. And again, there is nothing 

easy about it because of what happened to that society, what it has 

been through. But I think that the right thing to do is to reinforce 

the positive side and keep working against those who are disruptive. 
49 

And right now, we obviously are trying to work by, with, and 

through the Afghan government on it. But we register loud and 

clear the concern that that is, in terms of trying to get the rule of 

law, reduce the corruption, and get this country on the right track 

so we can draw down what we are doing and leave them more on 

their own. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you. Yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Suozzi. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General Dunford, thank you so much, again, for 

your service. You inspire tremendous confidence. 

I traveled to Afghanistan in April of this year, and at the time, 

General Nicholson was making his request or—and logically supporting his idea that we should increase the number of troops by 

3,000. And I publicly supported that effort with the understanding, 

though, that those troops would be used for force protection and to 

replace private contractors. 

Are the troops being used for those purposes, or are they being 

used to implement this strategy of moving down lower into the brigades? 

Secretary MATTIS. Both, Congressman, both. Obviously, some 

will be in force protection of those advisors that are out there. And 

certainly, we are going to make certain that, where we can bring 

in an Army unit coherent, rather than breaking it up and bringing 

in high-paid contractors—that was forced by the troop cap, and I 

am not condemning anyone who did it in the past, but it is not the 

way we want to go. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

So the problem of ungoverned areas—there is a problem on the 

Afghani side in Nangarhar province and other places where the 

troops would not take offensive action, as they more or less wait 

at checkpoints, and the Afghan army would do that. 

And there is a problem on the Pakistani side. I met with the 

Pakistani ambassador about 4 months ago, and they said that they 

were starting to do more efforts in their ungoverned areas. You 

have affirmed that today. 

And you said earlier in your testimony that all six corps are currently in offensive actions. Does that mean that they are now moving beyond their checkpoints and that they are moving out into 

these ungoverned areas? 

Secretary MATTIS. It does. But let me be very specific—it means 

that in each of the corps areas they have offensives under way; 

that doesn’t mean everyone is doing that. In some cases, they are 

simply holding their own, holding the district centers, but there are 

offensive actions in each area—in each corps area right now. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Are we encouraging them to move into the ungoverned areas on their side of the border? 

Secretary MATTIS. Principally we are encouraging them to hold 

and protect the populated areas, but at the same time—I was just 

in Nangarhar last Thursday, and they certainly have offensive actions underway in Nangarhar. And as you know, that is right along 

the border there. 

Mr. SUOZZI. And another major initiative was to get our Air 

Force to train their air force how to coordinate better with their 
50 

military—with their army and their air force to coordinate better 

with each other. Is that happening? I will ask General Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, it absolutely is. You know, we 

have talked a lot today about the advisors at the brigade and the 

kandak level. We have an equally robust effort with the Afghan air 

force, where our very best and brightest airmen are over there 

training with them as well. 

And the key is—you just hit on really, I think one of the key 

points we wanted to make today—is that the ability of the Afghan 

ground forces to integrate the Afghan air force is a key link. 

And because we haven’t had advisors down there at the level 

where that kind of coordination takes place, they haven’t matured 

as fast as we want. One of the primary outcomes that we expect 

from our changed advisory posture is the Afghans being more effective in the ability to what we call integrate combined arms; that 

is, the artillery and air support they need to be successful in their 

maneuver. 

Mr. SUOZZI. One thing—this is a separate question—I think that 

most Americans don’t appreciate the difference between these 

transnational terrorists that operate out of Afghanistan that we are 

trying to constantly disrupt and the Taliban and how that is a completely different type of terrorist organization that is more focused 

on regional impact. Have the rules of engagement changed for the 

Taliban as part of this change in rules of engagement? Or have 

they only changed for the multinational terrorist organizations? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, when we—the authority that 

has been passed down to the commander by the President is that 

any individual or any group that threatens the Afghan government, 

threatens our mission, threatens U.S. forces. or threatens the coalition can be engaged. So, it is based on their behavior and what 

they are doing as opposed to what group they are a part of. 

Mr. SUOZZI. So, our special forces will seek out members of the 

Taliban if we believe they are engaged in terrorist activities? 

General DUNFORD. Our special operations forces will seek out 

groups or individuals that are actually threatening the mission or 

our people. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We have now gone through all of the members who were here at 

the gavel, and we have already held the Secretary and the chairman longer than we had intended. 

So, what I want to do to wind up is see if the remaining members have one 15-second question that we have not addressed yet— 

and I want to get them all out together and then give the Secretary 

and the chairman a chance to wind this up. 

Ms. Cheney, did you have something that we have not yet 

touched on? 

You do? Okay, 15 seconds. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank 

both of you for being here, and thanks for allowing us to conduct 

our oversight obligations, but mostly thank you for reminding us 

that we have our own constitutional obligation, and that is to support, raise, maintain our Armed Forces. 
51 

And as often as you can this notion of the BCA, the extent to 

which the BCA is damaging us, we are in a position where I am 

completely dismayed as a new Member of Congress, at the extent 

to which there is agreement about the damage of the BCA and 

then people walk away and don’t do anything about it. 

And as we come up again to December 8th it is going to be crucial that we take this on. I can assure you both this is something 

we take seriously. We cannot fulfill our constitutional obligations 

with the BCA in place, and I want to thank you for raising it; 

thank you very much for being here today. 

That is it, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. It was great. It was a little more than 15 seconds, but it was good. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And really quickly, my question was partly how do we avoid empowering the factions that grow up out of the voids that are often 

created as the government begins to, you know, take hold? 

And are we at a point that we cannot use quantity as much as 

a metric but quality? And I am thinking about some of the work 

that has been done not just in the Afghan military but also among 

the women who are being trained for the Afghan police and for 

other jobs? Because they seem to have more capability than they 

are allowed to utilize. That takes security, but I am wondering 

where we are going with that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard, did you have—— 

Ms. GABBARD. Briefly, so much of what has been discussed today 

and the justification for our continued open-ended presence in Afghanistan centers around preventing it from being a safe haven for 

terrorists who launch attacks against us. 

The issue is that there is a long list of countries around the 

world who fall under this category of being a physical safe haven. 

What to speak of the phenomena of the internet now making it so 

that a physical safe haven is not even required for a terrorist to 

plan and launch an attack on us or on our interests or allies. 

So, my question is a big one, and maybe you can follow up with 

me—but how do you justify the expenditure, the open-ended presence, this forever war in Afghanistan given the global threat that 

we are facing both physically and electronically? 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Murphy. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Just very quickly, in President Trump’s speech in 

August he stated that one of the core pillars of his salvation strategy is to take a more aggressive approach towards managing our 

relationship with Pakistan. Specifically, he said, ‘‘We have been 

paying Pakistan billions and billions of dollars. At the same time 

they are housing the very terrorists that we are fighting, but that 

will have to change, and that will change immediately.’’ 

I think it is fair to say that our relationship with Pakistan is 

complicated, and I think it is important that we understand what 

Pakistan is doing and what they are not doing as it relates to our 

relationship. And that is why I am planning on introducing some 

legislation that would get the intel community to account for that. 

It was an idea that was proposed in the 2009 Af-Pak policy review. 
52 

But my question for you today is what tools does DOD currently 

have at its disposal to calibrate our security relationship with Pakistan and compel them to act in a way that is helpful rather than 

harmful to the United States? 

The CHAIRMAN. And Mr. Khanna. 

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Very briefly—I don’t know if you had a chance to see the Saudi 

ambassador’s op-ed in the New York Times this morning. It would 

be the definition of propaganda and fake news. If we are going to 

be involved in Yemen against Al Qaeda, that makes complete 

sense, but could you assure the committee and the American people 

that we will not aid in any way the Saudi Arabia—Saudi Arabia 

in its war against the Houthis and in its gross human rights violations? 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all for agreeing to do that. 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, let me, Chairman, take a first stab at 

this and then bring the chairman in wherever he believes I missed 

something or has more. As far as the buildup of factions in Afghanistan as we get rid of terrorists in certain areas, so long as those 

factions become ones that are part of the political process, we will 

not get choosy about which ideas can come forward. That is for the 

Afghan people to sort out. 

But I think, too, that we have seen enough progress in some 

parts of Afghanistan and the younger people are different based 

upon the education that is now reaching boys and girls, which is 

a big change. And I think that we will see the Afghan people choosing better which factions—hopefully political factions, they can support. 

On quality versus quantity, we are also carrying that theme forward. In that regard, if a unit is—cannot fight well, if we find 

there are too many ghost soldiers, there is no requirement for that 

unit to be maintained on the rolls. Take the good soldiers who are 

in it, transfer them to an effective leader, an effective unit, and go 

with quality not quantity. 

About the women who are serving and they continue to go 

through the training, obviously there is a cultural aspect to their 

service. That is a reality everywhere in the world. Every nation has 

its own culture. But at the same time, we would not be having 

even the discussion about women serving or reducing the number 

of Afghan units to only the quality ones if we were meeting here 

10 years ago. So it is somewhat a challenge for us, but it is a good 

challenge to have as we go forward here. 

On the havens and the concern there, the reason we shifted to 

a ‘‘by, with, and through’’ global approach to terrorism is exactly 

what you bring up. We could eventually pour our troops into so 

many ungoverned spaces, so many havens that we wouldn’t have 

enough troops to go around. 

So the way we invest our troops is, and I can show this to you 

in private—it is classified for obvious reasons. I can show you what 

it is we do for every troop invested, how many coalition troops do 

we have in North Africa with us, how many African troops do we 

have. If you go to Somalia, I can tell you what is going on there. 

If we go to the Korean Peninsula, I can show you what 28,000 or 
53 

whatever it is U.S. troops bring in terms of the 3 million-man 

South Korean army. 

So what we are looking at as we look broadly across the world, 

how do we deal with the geographic havens in a way that we do 

things by, with, and through others. 

Now on—you make a very good point about the virtual havens, 

about the internet and this sort of thing. Different problem set, 

needs a different response. And in that one, I think education is 

one of the most bulwarks against this taking over young people’s 

hopes and dreams, and turning them into what we have seen in 

various places. 

I would just tell you that exchange programs, USAID efforts to 

keep libraries open, virtual libraries open, as we promote ourselves 

and take our own side in this fight. But I think it has got to be 

addressed differently and perhaps that is not where the military 

should have the lead. That is addressed separately. 

On the Pakistan relations and what tools do we have, we have 

diplomatic tools, diplomatic isolation by more and more nations 

that are growing—excuse me, joining together with Secretary 

Tillerson’s Defeat ISIS campaign. 

That, ma’am, is 69 different nations joined together to fight ISIS 

from all around the world, plus Arab League, NATO, European 

Union, and INTERPOL so that we can trace these foreign fighters 

as they try to go home or try to move across boundaries, this sort 

of thing. 

All of this shows an increasing alliance against terrorism, and 

any nation that would then support it or be seen to providing havens would be running afoul of basically the most powerful economically and diplomatic, militarily powerful nation in the world. 

We also have economic tools from loan guarantees and working 

with other countries on what access people have with certain banking tools and this sort of thing. 

As far as Yemen goes, we are engaged in antiterrorism campaigns only right now and where we work with the others, it is to 

reduce civilian causalities and it is to try to drive this or draw this 

into the U.N.-brokered peace negotiation to end the civil war there 

between the Houthis and the U.N.-recognized and Saudi-supported 

Hadi government. 

Miss anything? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Secretary, I think you gave a very comprehensive answer to each of those questions. 

Secretary MATTIS. We are all tired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me—Mr. Secretary, let me just add one thing 

back to Ms. Cheney’s point and it is really how we started, talking 

about stability. Stability of commitment and stability of funding— 

in addition to stability, adequacy is also necessary for funding. 

Many of us were very pleased to see the President at the U.N. endorse the level of funding that has already passed the House authorization, the House appropriation, and the Senate authorization 

bill. 

Working together, I think it is essential that we get that across 

the finish line so that whether you are the Taliban or the Russians 

or the Chinese or whoever, you know that we are going to stand 

up and defend ourselves with adequate resources to do so. That is 
54 

a key part of our mission as well as working with you, so I appreciate that. 

Thank you all for being here. I think this was very helpful. The 

hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 3, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 3, 2017 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

OCTOBER 3, 2017 

(65) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I am encouraged that in his August 21st speech, the President 

seemed to arrive at the same conclusion many of us had previously reached—that, 

quote, ‘‘the consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable and unacceptable,’’ end 

quote—however, we are still light on details as to what makes this new strategy 

in Afghanistan and Asia so new, and we have seen nothing on paper. So what are 

the metrics you intend to use to define success or failure in Afghanistan moving forward, and what conditions will need to be met before considering a withdrawal of 

troops? Will this alter any rules of engagement in order to meet these metrics more 

swiftly? 

Secretary MATTIS. The new South Asia Strategy is different than past approaches 

to Afghanistan in several important ways. One important difference is that the Department is not tied to arbitrary timelines for withdrawals. Our presence in Afghanistan is based on conditions on the ground. Another important difference is that we 

have a willing and increasingly capable partner in Afghanistan that is leading this 

fight. Our overarching goals in Afghanistan, which we expect Afghanistan to work 

towards to maintain our support—the conditions we will be measuring against—are 

as follows: terrorist groups cannot exploit sanctuaries in Afghanistan to plan and 

stage attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens, or our allies and partners 

overseas; the Afghan government counters corruption and is viewed as a legitimate 

government by its citizens; the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 

(ANDSF) continue to professionalize and reduce corruption; the ANDSF secures 

more of the Afghan population and territory; regional actors support a stable Afghanistan; and the Afghan and Pakistani governments work together to secure the 

border. We seek a comprehensive political settlement that includes relevant parties, 

including the Taliban. We will adjust our personnel numbers as needed to help realize these goals. The Department is developing a framework to assess the effectiveness of the new strategy. This framework will help us understand progress and communicate to a number of audiences. The Department takes its responsibility to the 

U.S. public and Congress very seriously, and when possible to measure progress in 

tangible, quantifiable terms, we will do so. It is important to note, however, that 

many aspects of the strategy, including political stability, reconciliation, and our relationship with regional countries will be very difficult, if not impossible, to measure 

in real time. We will endeavor to provide you with the most accurate information. 

Regarding rules of engagement, I have already approved expanded authorities that 

allow for more tactical-level support to the ANDSF. The new authorities also remove 

certain restrictions that made it difficult for our military personnel to engage the 

enemy. Expanded authorities and more flexible U.S. advisory efforts will help the 

ANDSF increase pressure on militants and drive them towards a durable political 

settlement. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. This question is not related to Afghanistan, but I want to take this 

opportunity with both of you here to ask you to please respond for the record. And, 

given that I have yet to receive any answers to my questions for the record from 

when you were both here in June, I ask that you be prompt with your response. 

On Sunday, the Washington Post reported on the case of Air Force Colonel Ronald 

Jobo, who sexually harassed and assaulted a female civilian subordinate. Colonel 

Jobo repeatedly said he wanted to have sex with her, tracked her movements and 

sent her recordings of him masturbating in the shower. Twice, he trapped her in 

the office, grabbed her arms and forcibly tried to kiss her. There is documentation 

to substantiate all of these charges, including texts, videos, and a photo of the 

bruises Jobo left on the woman’s arm. Colonel Jobo admitted to all of this. 

However, Lieutenant General John Thompson, the senior officer in Jobo’s chain 

of command, decided against charging Jobo with abusive sexual contact, or any 

crime at all. Instead, General Thompson imposed nonjudicial punishment, allowing 

Jobo to retire at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, and will continue to collect a mili-
66 

tary pension for the rest of his life. The Air Force tried to keep all this secret until 

the case was leaked to the media. 

I want to know how a decision was made that non-judicial punishment was an 

appropriate remedy for such a clear-cut case of sexual harassment and physical assault. 

Secretary MATTIS. I share your concern that appropriate justice is applied to cases 

of sexual harassment. The Secretary of the Air Force has ordered a review of this 

case and she will provide you an update upon completion. 

Ms. SPEIER. This question is not related to Afghanistan, but I want to take this 

opportunity with both of you here to ask you to please respond for the record. And, 

given that I have yet to receive any answers to my questions for the record from 

when you were both here in June, I ask that you be prompt with your response. 

On Sunday, the Washington Post reported on the case of Air Force Colonel Ronald 

Jobo, who sexually harassed and assaulted a female civilian subordinate. Colonel 

Jobo repeatedly said he wanted to have sex with her, tracked her movements and 

sent her recordings of him masturbating in the shower. Twice, he trapped her in 

the office, grabbed her arms and forcibly tried to kiss her. There is documentation 

to substantiate all of these charges, including texts, videos, and a photo of the 

bruises Jobo left on the woman’s arm. Colonel Jobo admitted to all of this. 

However, Lieutenant General John Thompson, the senior officer in Jobo’s chain 

of command, decided against charging Jobo with abusive sexual contact, or any 

crime at all. Instead, General Thompson imposed nonjudicial punishment, allowing 

Jobo to retire at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, and will continue to collect a military pension for the rest of his life. The Air Force tried to keep all this secret until 

the case was leaked to the media. 

I want to know how a decision was made that non-judicial punishment was an 

appropriate remedy for such a clear-cut case of sexual harassment and physical assault. 

General DUNFORD. The Joint Force is steadfast in its commitment to properly investigate and address all reports of sexual harassment and other misconduct—regardless of the rank or status of the offender or victim. Commanders have the legal 

and moral duty to hold their Service members accountable for their actions. With 

the advice of their staff judge advocates, commanders determine how to most appropriately address misconduct by considering the relevant circumstances and unique 

facts of each case. Detailed information on this case may be obtained from the Air 

Force as the Services are best positioned to provide specifics concerning their members’ misconduct and the procedures and decisions associated with addressing such 

misconduct. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. The USAF briefed Congress earlier this summer indicating the Joint 

Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Recap program was on schedule for award and funded. 

Now, within 6 months of that briefing, the USAF is now saying the program does 

not support future warfighting needs and new alternative approaches to the mission 

need to be studied? I do not understand how the USAF has conducted an Analysis 

of Alternatives (AOA) and multiple studies since 2009 that validated the program 

approach and now at the 11th hour, plan to do another study to yet again evaluate 

alternatives. Please explain the logic of this action. 

Secretary MATTIS. The Air Force continually assesses the evolving threat environments our adversaries present, and the risks these increasingly complex environments pose to current and future Programs of Record. These environments threaten 

our ability to provide battlespace awareness required in the highly contested operational environments of 2030 and beyond in the manner which we have in the past. 

To ensure the Joint Surveillance Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Recapitalization 

program is a prudent way forward, the Air Force is reviewing alternative approaches for providing Ground Moving Target Indicator and Battle Management 

Command and Control that could be more effective in highly contested environments. The source selection for an Engineering and Manufacturing Development for 

a follow-on contract to JSTARS is ongoing. If it is determined that JSTARS Recapitalization is the best way forward, source selection, which began in March 2017, is 

projected to be completed by the end of Fiscal Year 2018. 

Mr. SCOTT. The USAF has been telling Congress that JSTARS Recap is a priority 

with validated Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) requirements with 

less than 5% of airborne Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) mission requirements from the COCOMS being fulfilled and yet, the USAF is now floating the idea 
67 

of cancelling the Recap program? I would like to understand the logic behind this 

decision, why it is happening at this point in this program, and how using the alternative assets General Holmes, the commander of Air Combat Command (ACC), alluded to in his statements will satisfy COCOM needs and increase meeting the validated JROC requirements. 

Secretary MATTIS and General DUNFORD. Concerns about the value of Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Recapitalization in a changing threat environment have motivated the Air Force to reassess its investment priorities. The 

Combatant Commands and Joint Staff are reviewing potential capabilities and alternatives under consideration by the Air Force. 

Mr. SCOTT. For the last 5 years, the USAF has asked us to support this critical 

national mission area and we have done just that, but now they are saying it is no 

longer needed due to the new threat? Please explain to us how other assets support 

the USAF 2030 roadmap if the JSTARS Recap weapon system is not survivable in 

that environment? Is it your view that the United States will need to replace every 

weapon system in the USAF inventory, to include Compass Call cross-deck and E– 

2 Hawkeye aircraft, because of this new threat over the next 10 years? If yes, what 

is the DOD strategy to execute this? 

Secretary MATTIS and General DUNFORD. The unique capabilities and roles of any 

individual system mean that any decisions about Joint Surveillance Target Attack 

Radar System Recapitalization would not necessarily be applicable to other platforms. Our potential adversaries’ intent to deny our access to their battlespace requires us to carefully study the right mix of capabilities for command and control 

of our forces in the future. 

Mr. SCOTT. The USAF has discussed using an alternative mix of manned and unmanned assets to perform the E–8C mission in lieu of pursuing JSTARS Recap. Do 

the COCOMS or the Joint Staff concur with this assessment and strategy? 

General DUNFORD. The Combatant Commands and Joint Staff will assess the ability of alternative architectures to meet joint requirements as these alternatives mature. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON 

Mr. MOULTON. Chairman Dunford indicated in his answer to Congressman 

Moulton’s question as to whether State Department political engagements with Afghan governmental and tribal leaders are being ‘‘pushed down to lower levels’’ commensurate with our military advise and assist mission—he replied ‘‘not yet.’’ What 

aspects of the Joint effort can be better resourced to leverage collaboration between 

DOD and State Department efforts on ensuring Afghan governmental institutions 

are able to govern, provide citizen security, and eliminate corruption? 

Secretary MATTIS. The President’s South Asia Strategy is a whole-of-government 

effort. The Department of Defense, Department of State, the United States Agency 

for International Development (USAID) and other departments and agencies must 

be appropriately authorized and resourced to implement the new strategy. U.S. implementation efforts include: supporting Afghan government efforts to promote economic development, health, and education; combatting corruption and the narcotics 

trade; and strengthening the Afghan government’s capacity to deliver public services. I defer to the Department of State and USAID on their specific resource requirements and their approach to support grass roots political engagements. Resolute Support and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul are working closely with each other 

and with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior in a process known as the 

‘‘Kabul Compact.’’ The Compact, completed in August 2017, establishes a series of 

benchmarks to monitor and measure Afghan progress in four main areas: governance, economic development, the peace process, and security. We have made it clear 

to the Afghans that they must weed out corrupt officials from the military and government, and President Ghani has recently launched very promising anti-corruption 

reforms. We have also begun a new phase of the fight against the Taliban by going 

after their narcotics trade, which directly funds their insurgency. 

Mr. MOULTON. In response to a question from Congressman Moulton, Secretary 

Mattis stated that the administration’s elimination of the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/RAP) has ‘‘not impacted’’ regional political engagement—yet this office was specifically designed to better coordinate wholeof-government efforts. What office or high-level official is charged with executing the 

regional political strategy the Trump White House and Secretary Mattis have outlined? How can the State Department and Defense Departments be best resourced 

and positioned to advance this regional political dialogue? 
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Secretary MATTIS. There is no single office or official in charge of implementing 

the South Asia Strategy. The strategy flows from the White House down to all relevant stakeholders, and we endeavor at every level to make sure our whole of government efforts are synchronized. With the dissolution of the Special Representative 

for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) office, the Assistant Secretary of State for 

South and Central Asian Affairs assumed the SRAP’s function, and the departments 

work together to implement the South Asia Strategy. I cannot speak to resourcing 

the State Department, but I have previously noted that it is imperative that Congress pass a budget and not rely on continuing resolutions. It is difficult for any 

Department or Secretary to carry out our shared mission without proper and predictable funding. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN 

Ms. ROSEN. Secretary Mattis, what is the status of reconciliation efforts with the 

Taliban and how does that status affect the security environment in Afghanistan 

and the Afghan unity government? 

Secretary MATTIS. Reconciliation is a State Department-led effort the Defense Department supports. The security environment in Afghanistan is improving as we 

continue to train, advise, and assist the Ministries of Defense and Interior. As the 

Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) get stronger and more capable, the Taliban will realize they cannot wait us out, and they cannot escape the 

pressure of the ANDSF. The ultimate goal of our military efforts is to force the 

Taliban to recognize it cannot win on the battlefield, and must turn instead towards 

a negotiated political settlement with the Afghan government. We remain committed to maintain the unity of the government of Afghanistan as we drive towards 

an ultimate peace settlement. 

Ms. ROSEN. Secretary Mattis, what specific demands will the United States make 

of Pakistan? Why do we expect Pakistan to change behavior now, after 16 years of 

conflict in Afghanistan? 

Secretary MATTIS. The United States desires a pragmatic partnership with Pakistan that serves our mutual interests; however, Pakistan must change its behavior. 

The Department considers a variety of tools, including diplomatic and economic 

means, to expand our cooperation where our interests converge and to advance our 

interests in areas of divergence. Our approach to Pakistan is designed to demonstrate to Pakistan where its interests converge with the interests of the international community. 

Ms. ROSEN. Secretary Mattis, our new strategy in Afghanistan will no longer include nation building. Will the U.S. continue to provide diplomatic and foreign aid 

support to help bring about a political solution to the conflict, in order to facilitate 

conditions that would allow for a responsible U.S. military withdrawal to be possible? 

Secretary MATTIS. The United States is in Afghanistan to make the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens, and our allies and partners safer, not to nation build. As the 

President stated in his August 21 address, a fundamental pillar of the new South 

Asia Strategy is the integration of all instruments of U.S. power—diplomatic, economic, and military—toward a successful outcome. Therefore, the strategy does include the use of diplomacy in support of a political settlement and foreign aid to 

facilitate economic growth and decrease Afghanistan’s reliance on donor assistance. 

I defer to the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development for 

details on these efforts. The Defense Department is responsible for training, advising, and assisting the Afghan forces, as well as for a small amount of 

counterterrorism missions, all designed to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table 

with the Afghan government. 

Ms. ROSEN. General Dunford, a recent SIGAR publication on U.S. efforts to train 

the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces painted a bleak picture of our 

ability to build a sustainable and capable force. Are you confident that the United 

States is making progress toward building a capable force in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. I’m confident our efforts will drive progress building Afghan 

capacity to provide security in their country. We continue to see improvement in 

many areas of the Afghan forces, notably the Afghan Special Security Forces and 

the Afghan Air Force. Our previous efforts helped build the foundation to enhance 

Afghan capability to provide security for their country. The new South Asia Strategy 

accelerates those efforts, aligns them with President Ghani’s Roadmap, and ensures 

synergy with our broader regional objectives. We will support President Ghani’s 

doubling of the Afghan Special Security Forces, aligning our efforts with this expansion and providing robust tactical level advising to their forces, exploiting the 
69 

unique capability Special Forces bring to the fight. We will also support President 

Ghani’s efforts to expand and modernize the Afghan Air Force. A sustainable Afghan Air Force that can integrate with Afghan National Army ground operations 

is a critical component of Afghan stabilization efforts and our long-term strategy. 

It will take time to fully mature this capability, but our efforts with the Afghan Air 

Force are already contributing on the battlefield, to include increased special mission wing support to counter-narcotics and counterterrorism missions as part of the 

summer 2017 campaign. Morale remains high and Afghan Air Force attrition is consistently less than 1 percent of the force. By the end of 2020, their fleet will consist 

of over 200 aircraft. In parallel, Afghan maintenance capability continues to mature, 

and this year they were able to maintain their Mi-17s and C–208s with limited to 

no coalition or contract logistics support. The SIGAR report noted introduction of 

the A–29 aircraft and associated pilot training as an example where the United 

States had succeeded. We’re expecting similar success with the introduction of the 

UH–60 Blackhawk, the first of which arrived in September and are already being 

used to train Afghan aircrews in Afghanistan. 

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