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i 

79–492 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–4] 

PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE 

NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: 

TECHNOLOGICAL, GEOPOLITICAL, 

AND ECONOMIC TRENDS AFFECTING 

THE DEFENSE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING 

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 13, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

KEVIN GATES, Professional Staff Member 

TIM MCCLEES, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, February 13, 2013, Perspectives on the Future National Security 

Environment: Technological, Geopolitical, and Economic Trends Affecting 

the Defense Strategic Guidance .......................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, February 13, 2013 .............................................................................. 37 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2013 

PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, GEOPOLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC TRENDS 

AFFECTING THE DEFENSE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities 9 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities ...................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Berteau, David J., Senior Vice President and Director, International Security 

Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................ 7 

Hoffman, Francis G., Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, National Defense University ................................................................ 2 

Lewellyn, Dr. Mark T., Director, National Security Analysis Department, 

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory ................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Berteau, David J. .............................................................................................. 73 

Hoffman, Francis G. ......................................................................................... 41 

Lewellyn, Dr. Mark T. ...................................................................................... 58 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Nugent ........................................................................................................ 91 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 95 

(1) 

PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE NATIONAL SECURITY 

ENVIRONMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, GEOPOLITICAL, 

AND ECONOMIC TRENDS AFFECTING THE DEFENSE 

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND

CAPABILITIES, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 13, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The hearing will come to order. I think Mr. 

Langevin is on his way, but we have been asked to go ahead and 

get started. So let me just take a moment to welcome our members, 

witnesses, and guests to the first hearing of the 113th Congress for 

the newly renamed Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging 

Threats and Capabilities. I think this added portion of our responsibilities dealing with military intelligence oversight is a perfect fit 

with this subcommittee’s charge to look ahead at national security 

challenges facing our Nation in the future. 

And I am particularly pleased, and I can say this since he is not 

here, that I have the opportunity to continue to work with Mr. 

Langevin. Both of us being on the Intelligence Committee as well 

as this committee I think is a real asset to fulfilling those new responsibilities. 

Today we start our hearings with a broad look at global trends 

that may affect our national security. Recently the National Intelligence Council released publicly its latest installment of their 

Global Trends publication, which received a fair amount of attention in the press, and it seems to me that our witnesses today have 

valuable but also varied perspectives to help stimulate our thinking 

about the challenges that our country faces in the future. And 

again, that is exactly what this subcommittee has been asked to 

look at. 

Unless the gentleman from Georgia would like to make an opening statement, I can reserve until Mr. Langevin comes and let him 

do it when he arrives. It is up to you all. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I would like the opportunity, but I think it is best 

to wait for Mr. Langevin. 
2 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. I will let him make whatever statement 

he wants to and then his questions. 

So anyway, again, thank you all very much for being here. Let 

me now turn to our witnesses. They include Mr. Frank Hoffman, 

senior research fellow at National Defense University; Dr. Mark 

Lewellyn, director, National Security Analysis Division at Johns 

Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory; and Mr. David 

Berteau, senior vice president, director of the International Security Program for CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

Again, thank you all for being here. Without objection, your full 

statement, written statements will be made part of the record, and 

at this time we would be delighted for you to summarize or offer 

such other comments as you would like. 

Mr. Hoffman. 

STATEMENT OF FRANCIS G. HOFFMAN, SENIOR RESEARCH 

FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members. It 

is great to be here today, an honor to appear for you, this subcommittee, once again. It has been a long time. I am also very honored to be here with two very prominent experts who are longstanding old friends of mine. 

I would like to offer a much broader statement than my written 

statement, which was reflective of my previous work and keeping 

with where I think you want to go today with this particular committee. So I would like to talk about broader trends beyond the current defense guidance. 

There is a pernicious concept floating around Washington, D.C., 

right now that the tides of war are receding and that the United 

States can retrench without risk. There is what I call a new peace 

theory floating around town, reflected in prominent journals and 

think tanks here in town. Recently one commentator from a think 

tank here in Washington said that, ‘‘There is no single causal factor at work, but all point in one direction. We are nearing a point 

in history when it is possible to say that war as we know it has 

disappeared.’’ 

That is a bold and very dangerous statement and one I do not 

agree with. Great progress has been made in the last decade, but 

the notion of a dramatic change in human nature or a significant 

shift outweigh 2,000 years of recorded history is tenuous at best. 

I have spent 35 years in the Department of Defense, most of my 

career looking forward, casting headlights out with some distance 

to gain some foresight about the future, and I see things through 

a much darker lens than that. I think the new peace theory crowd 

is confusing correlation of data with causation. 

Now, there are five reasons to be satisfied today about our current security situation if one is just looking backwards over the last 

10 years. These five include our current status as a world superpower, applying our stability and leadership to the world. There is 

a consensus on a Western model based upon rule of law, economic 

prosperity on a capitalistic model and a representative government. 
3 

That also includes globalization’s shared and equal economic 

progress. 

Since 1991 we have enjoyed a lack of major power competition. 

We have had extensive peacekeeping support from the international community, to include the UN [United Nations], that has 

been very helpful. And, fifth, there is a growth and a continued 

contribution from the conflict resolution community, the IOs [international organizations], the PVOs [private volunteer organizations] 

and the NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], that has been 

very useful. And these five conditions clearly cause positive assessments looking back over the last 10 years. 

But the Emerging Threats Subcommittee, and this committee 

has a reputation for not driving by a rearview mirror, you are required to look forward, as some of us are in the Pentagon, and 

there is a number of reasons looking at things from a future tense 

that should make people have some pause. And the first one is, 

most significant I think for you and for this Congress, is the perceived hegemonic retrenchment of the United States due to some 

perceived decline in our capabilities or interest in sustaining our 

position in the world. 

The second reason is the rise of emerging powers. History suggests some caution when new emergent, non-status-quo powers 

arise and create disequilibrium by seeking to restore either their 

previous status or some perceived slights. I won’t have to mention 

which state I am referring to. 

The third reason is continued or reduced international support. 

I suspect that over the next decade we are going to see a degree 

of peace support fatigue or simply a lack of domestic support for 

many allies and other agencies that have been very useful in 

allying with us and keeping instability down. 

The fourth reason is, and I am someone who is spending a lot 

of time in Europe these days working on my education, but there 

is a lot of discussion about the decay or the dissolution of important alliances to us and important alliance partners. I am particularly concerned about NATO’s [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 

self-disarmament. It is a group of states that has been allied with 

us for a long period of time to great effect, but they are going to 

be older, poorer, and less inclined to work with us in the future, 

and that should be a pause for concern. 

My fifth source of concern is proxy wars. These can be very catalytic in terms of conflicts. They are not intended to, but they can 

produce a major war out of what is supposed to be a smaller conflict. And there is new forms of conflict which this committee is 

very, very aware of in the cyber world in which attribution of the 

attacker is very hard to identify, and that can create new forms of 

conflict and also then catalytically lead to a more conventional kind 

of conflict if we perceive the attack to have been directed and attributable. 

Number six, resource conflicts. I think energy, water, food, rare 

materials, most of the time there is a body of evidence that suggests these do not lead to conflicts, but they certainly can create 

the tinder box for conflicts. I see actions in the South China Sea 

by China and its efforts to secure energy resources and raw earth 

assets as something to be taken seriously in this regard. 
4 

There is an issue of demographic decline or demographic change 

in many states around the world. We used to worry about youth 

bulges, having very high numbers of young people in states in Africa and Asia that were unemployed or in the Middle East that 

might lead to destabilizing things. I think we now instead of youth 

bulges also have to worry about graying bulges in some areas, particularly in Southern Europe, where there are large numbers of 

people who are going to be pensionless, underemployed or unemployed for long periods of time. That will produce more disillusionment and more angry people than I think we have seen in the past 

that will lead to political instability and also allies who are more 

insular in their orientation rather than in exporting security. 

Eighth is the most obvious, is divided religions and religious extremism. The continued sacred rage coming from Islam is going to 

make internal fights. I think the Arab Spring has a lot of hope in 

it, but it is also going to produce some illiberal democracies, and 

we will see some other forms of government emerge out of that. 

And I am particularly concerned, of course, about Egypt, among 

other areas. We are creating a lot of fertile ground for Al Qaeda 

and its affiliated movements to take root in some places, and we 

are not going to be happy with the results. 

Number nine, disintegration of socio-economic stability. Again, I 

am particularly concerned about southern Europe and northern Africa, there is a great deal of distress, dissent, and discord there 

from economic instability. We need to consider the conditions in 

which the new normal in southern Europe where unemployment, 

the new norm might be peaking out and stabilizing at 25 percent, 

is not going to be allies and states that are going to be exporting 

security for us or working with us in other places. 

And finally, my last, my 10th point is the democratization of 

means of conflict. Again, the diffusion of technology in lethal and 

nonlethal forms is something that is creating not—I don’t go as far 

as Thomas Friedman with super-empowered networks or superpowered individuals, but we should think of super-empowered networks with means of mass disruption that can hit us in many, 

many different ways. 

So for those reasons, those 10 conclusions make my lens look a 

little bit darker than some of the other people in the community 

here in Washington, D.C. 

Plato had it right. Only the dead have seen the end of war. We 

may not face another bloody century like the last, which was pretty 

bad, but the world remains a very dangerous place, and I know 

General Dempsey has stressed to you in the past. Trends suggest 

that the next decade is not going to be as placid as the last 10 or 

20 were, and many of us don’t think that the last decade was that 

great. 

There are folks whose real agenda is cutting defense, not contributing to our security, and you need to consider that in looking at 

their evidence. We have to be prepared for a much more broadening array of actors and challenges rather than one singular one 

that is very, very deep and of great challenge to us. We have to 

be ready for a broad spectrum of conflicts that range from purely 

irregular and terrorist at one end to perhaps rising powers with 

conventional capabilities at the other, and then all the messy in the 
5 

middle that my statement talked about, the converging of low-end 

threats with high-end capabilities, producing hybrid threats. 

This committee’s charge is at the cusp at what is emerging in the 

national security arena and what is going to no doubt I think generate the greatest threats and the risk to our prosperity and security in the next decade. It is a sobering responsibility. I am glad 

to be able to help you with that to the greatest degree I can. Thank 

you for the opportunity to discuss these challenges. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hoffman can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Dr. Lewellyn. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MARK T. LEWELLYN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY 

Dr. LEWELLYN. Congressman, I look forward to provide my views 

that will shape the national security environment looking out to 

2030 and how that might affect the path set by the 2012 defense 

strategic guidance. The opinions stated are my own. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Excuse me, Dr. Lewellyn, would you pull the 

mike a little closer or something, we are having—— 

Dr. LEWELLYN. Good, sorry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Oh, that is much better. Thank you. 

Dr. LEWELLYN. Thank you. 

So I was saying I look forward to giving you my opinion on how 

the path set by the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance will affect 

things. The opinions I state are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory or its sponsors. 

Will this strategy get the military capability we need in the near 

term, especially in the context of declining funding for defense? The 

strategy attempts to be comprehensive. However, there are some 

areas where we may be falling short, and we must think through 

an integrated response to address them. 

The strategy identifies a range of missions that U.S. forces need 

to address with the resources that are available and the threat environment in which the missions must be executed. Much of our 

technical effort focuses on improving the capabilities of the sensor, 

weapon, communications, cyber, and space systems that will be 

used to address the emerging threats. Our work indicates there are 

gaps in the capabilities we need to defeat emerging threats identified in the strategy, particularly the anti-access/area-denial threats 

posed by Iran and China. 

Kinetic weapons we are developing to counter threats launched 

against our forces, while capable, should be supplemented by nonkinetic systems to ensure we can deal effectively with large coordinated attacks. Nonkinetic means to defeat these threats include 

netted electronic warfare systems, integrated cyber-attack capability, lasers and other directed energy systems. In addition, we 

should explore creative uses of existing weapons to counter threat 

systems. We must also continue to explore ways to use electromagnetic weapons with their promise of large magazines of relative 

inexpensive bullets to counter threat kinetic weapons. 
6 

Maintaining our access to space is a real issue, and we must pursue viable backups to counter attacks on our satellite communications networks close to denied areas and quickly reconstitute the 

capability they provide. This includes the need to identify methods 

to operate in environments where the global positioning system, 

GPS, is denied. 

We have an edge in the capability of our submarine force relative 

to potential threats, and we must work to maintain it. The ambiguity posed by the unseen presence of a capable submarine can be 

leveraged to our advantage. Exploring ways to operate unmanned 

systems autonomously will allow the proven capability of these systems to be used in new ways. 

Finally, we must ensure that our Special Operations Forces have 

the technology they need to perform their critical missions. While 

we work to improve the ability of our systems to defeat those of the 

threat in war, we must also consider how we can better use these 

systems to deter potential threats and win without fighting, much 

as we did during the Cold War. In China, the United States has 

a competitor with a coordinated strategy for achieving its national 

objectives without needing to resort to war. In other words, to win 

through shaping and deterrence, as evidenced by its development 

of anti-access/area-denial capabilities. 

To deter China effectively, the U.S. must employ an effective 

countervailing strategy informed by an understanding of the implications of divergent U.S. and Chinese perspectives. We must include an understanding of these differing views as we operate our 

current forces and as we develop, test, and employ new capabilities 

to ensure that the messages we want to send to China are received 

as we intend. The message China sent by demonstrating its ability 

to shoot down a satellite several years ago was received clearly by 

us. 

So what does this mean for Congress? You should ensure that 

our intelligence collection efforts remain strong and that as a government we encourage openness and transparency, drawing on insights gained from social media and other information technologies. 

Information is critical, and there is already evidence that in the 

cyber world operations may be shifting beyond deterrence into 

more direct competition. We must ensure that our cyber forces are 

equipped with the appropriate technologies and rules of engagement to win. 

You should support the development of warfighting capabilities 

that contribute to deterrence, such as the aforementioned efforts to 

supplement our kinetic systems by developing complementary, nonkinetic means to defeat threats. These include netted electronic 

warfare systems, integrated cyber attack capability, lasers, and 

other directed energy systems as well as electromagnetic weapons. 

In addition, we need to maintain our edge in submarine warfare, 

cyber operations, and special operations capability, and because 

communications and intelligence are critical for deterrence, we 

must work to maintain our access to space and identify ways to improve resilience in our space systems. 

A vibrant research and development base will be critical to supporting these efforts, and I want to comment briefly on how reductions in funding for this base can be made reversible. It is impor-
7 

tant for each research and development organization to identify its 

core competencies and protect them when funding reductions occur. 

More important perhaps for us is to maintain a robust science, 

technology, engineering, and mathematics education program, or 

STEM program, to ensure a continual refresh of thinking about defense from the brightest minds of our next generation. I personally 

benefited from the National Defense Education Act when I was in 

high school back in the 1960s. 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide my comments. I am 

prepared to address any questions you may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lewellyn can be found in the Appendix on page 58.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Berteau. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID J. BERTEAU, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

AND DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. BERTEAU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mister, as we say it in 

south Louisiana, Langevin, which is a more Cajun way of pronouncing it than they do in Rhode Island, I suspect, members of 

the committee. It is a high privilege to be here today, and I am 

very grateful to you. 

It is also nice to be in this room and to read Article I, Section 

8 and the plaque that sits in front of us as witnesses. I teach three 

times a year a graduate class in Congress and national security 

policy, and virtually every session of every class comes back to that 

one sentence in the Constitution, so it is a privilege to be sitting 

here and reminding of that. 

It is also a great privilege to be in this room and look at the men 

whose pictures are on the walls around us here and realize the contributions that this committee has made to the success of national 

security over my entire lifetime. 

I have submitted a written statement, as you have indicated it 

is in the record in its entirety. I won’t repeat some of the things 

that are in there, and I would like to emphasize just a couple of 

points so we can get to the questions, if you will. 

You spent the whole morning and a good chunk of the afternoon 

actually on a lot of the budget and sequestration and economic-related issues, and I will be happy to get back to those during the 

questions if you want, but there are a couple of key points that I 

would like to make. 

One is in the charts in my statement, and I will refer here to 

chart 2, the second chart, is the result of a recent study—I am 

sorry, I have got my charts out of order here. It is actually chart 

5. In addition to all the challenges that DOD [Department of Defense] faces with sequestration, with the problems of the continuing 

resolution, with the future impact of post-sequestration caps from 

the Budget Control Act, there is an internal cost growth problem 

in DOD, and that internal cost growth is illustrated here on this 

chart. 

We have just completed a project at CSIS [Center for Strategic 

and International Studies], and we put our public briefing out last 

week. We are going to put a report out later this month, and I will 
8 

be glad to provide it to the subcommittee because I think you will 

want to take a look at it, but it basically tracks the internal cost 

growth of both military pay and benefits, including health care, 

and of the operation and maintenance account, and the degree to 

which that cost growth independent of the sequestration or the 

budget caps will by the beginning of the next decade essentially 

drive out all opportunity for investment costs, for R&D [research 

and development], and for procurement. And absent either a dramatic increase in military spending or a dramatic reduction in force 

structure and personnel, unless those costs are brought under control, they are going to basically squeeze out investment, and it will 

be hard to sustain and maintain our edge, if you will, under those 

circumstances. Be glad to go into that a little bit further. 

The second point that I would like to make is on figure 7, contract obligations for R&D. We do at CSIS annual reports on contract spending across the Federal Government, and we do a specific 

report on DOD. You know that this is, we are now in the middle 

of our fourth drawdown in the last 60 years, post-Korea, post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, and today. I hate to call it post-BCA [Budget 

Control Act] because that doesn’t quite have the same ring, if you 

will. But one of the very big differences between the buildup that 

we have had over the previous decade and previous buildups is in 

R&D spending, and this probably applies to science and technology 

across the board. In previous buildups R&D spending tends to go 

up faster than the overall increase in DOD spending, and that creates a technology reservoir, if you will, from which we can draw as 

we are drawing down and invest in periods of decline. 

That did not occur in the decade of the aughts, where R&D 

spending both as a percent of DOD’s budget and as a percent of 

total contract dollars actually went down, and that is what this 

chart depicts. We were at 15 percent in the late 1990s, we are 

down to only 10 percent not of the budget, but of contract spending, 

of money spent under contract. Now, this is unclassified R&D, it 

does not include classified contracts, but the trend is the same for 

the classified contracts as well. I just can’t reflect the data in an 

unclassified document. 

What that says is we have not invested in the future in the way 

we typically do during a buildup. That is going to make it harder 

during the drawdown. And I think for the S&T [science and technology] responsibilities of this subcommittee it is something that 

will require some particular attention as we go forward as well. 

Let me focus on my last of my comments, if you will, on what 

does all this mean, what does it mean for industry, what does it 

mean for innovation? Industry itself relies upon the Defense Department for demand signals. Typically those demand signals come 

from the budget and they come from the Future Year Defense Program. One of the great strengths of the Defense Department is its 

ability to do fiscally disciplined long-term programming and then 

to use that as the baseline for execution. Obviously we modify it 

each year, this committee pays a lot of attention to that Future 

Year Defense Program to look at whether the investments being 

made today will be sustained over time. 

We haven’t had a good fiscally disciplined FYDP [Future Years 

Defense Program] in a long time. We have been in two wars, we 
9 

have had supplementals and overseas contingency operations accounts to pay for anything you couldn’t fund in the base budget, 

and frankly we have lost some of the internal skills in DOD to do 

this and some of the processes. It is critical that those get restored. 

Industry does need those just as much as you do because that is 

their demand signals. That tells them where to invest, what kind 

of skills to hire, what kind of workforce to retain, what kind of 

technologies to be developing. Right now they are pretty much left 

guessing. One of the most important things that could be done, obviously there are benefits from dealing with sequestration and 

Budget Control Act from an impact on readiness, but there is also 

a big benefit from the long-term investment in industry in helping 

them where to go. 

Similarly with innovation, what we have seen is a historic shift 

in the development of technology for national security. We have relied for 60 or 70 years on new technology developed for national security, under DOD contract by defense contractors; DOD gets first 

dibs at it. That is changing, and it is changing not only because we 

are not investing as much as previous data show, but it is also 

changing because where innovation is occurring now is often in the 

global commercial market, not in the domestic national security 

market, and we need to do a better job of both identifying those 

kinds of technology developments, and this is everything from communications and data management and sensors and data fusion to 

nanomaterials and 3D [three dimensional] printing and a whole 

host of other technologies that DOD is paying attention to but is 

not the driver. 

And we also are about to wrap up and will also have ready later 

this winter and will be glad to provide to the committee some recommendations that CSIS is making on how DOD could do a better 

job both identifying and ultimately taking advantage of global commercial technology developments around the world. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks and I will 

be happy to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Berteau can be found in the Appendix on page 73.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. And I appreciate all the comments 

that all three of you made. Lots of food for thought and interesting 

points to pursue. But at this point I will yield for any statement 

and any questions the distinguished ranking member would like to 

make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I take this opportunity to welcome our witnesses. I apologize that I had run late. 

I was tied up in another meeting, as often happens around here, 

but I am looking forward to your testimony and to getting to the 

question and answers. 

But, Mr. Chairman, since this is our first subcommittee of the 

113th Congress, I will start by saying how much I look forward to 

working with you. I enjoyed looking with you in the last Congress 
10 

and look forward to working with you in this as well. And I want 

to also start by again welcoming our newest Members to Congress 

and particularly to the subcommittee. I look forward to working 

with these gentlemen and ladies as well, and look forward also to 

our strong—their strong participation and valued input as we do 

our part in shaping our Nation’s defense strategy. 

As this subcommittee is charged with overseeing the Department’s authorities and investments that are primarily focused on 

addressing asymmetric threats as well as developing promising capabilities to address these varied and complex challenges, I am 

sure that our first hearing will spur some thoughts about, among 

our members, regarding the future national security environment 

and how we should best prioritize our defense resources against the 

backdrop of fiscal pressures and other concerns. 

So over the past decade we have rightly vested in short-term deliverable-based acquisitions and related research, and we will continue to provide near-term capabilities to deter and defeat our adversaries. However, as we will hear today, we must appropriately 

prepare for future challenges. The Department of Defense, and our 

interagency and international partners, confront a broad range of 

challenges including cyber warfare; terrorism; weapons of mass destruction; homeland defense; space; anti-access/area-denial; instability; and humanitarian operations. 

So I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses on how 

best to shift our current short-term emphasis, particularly in innovation, to one that might provide long-term benefits to our national 

security. 

As many of our past members know, I am always particularly interested in hearing your thoughts on advancing our cyber defense 

strategy and capabilities, which is going to become increasingly important as we go forward and will be more widely used and relied 

upon, as well as the advancements of potentially game-changing 

technologies such as directed energy, autonomous unmanned systems, and electromagnetic rail guns to name a few, some of which 

you have already mentioned in your testimony here today. 

So I also see that some of you are affiliated with universities, 

and I believe the members of this subcommittee would benefit from 

any comments you might have regarding the health of our innovative pipeline, particularly addressing science and technology future 

workforce needs of the Department. 

So with that, I again welcome our witnesses. And Mr. Chairman, 

look forward to working with you. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank the gentleman. And I said the same 

thing, but I got to say it before you got here. So would you like to 

go ahead and question the witnesses? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I will yield to you first, Chairman, and then I will 

go. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I was just going to yield to other members unless you want to. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That is okay, then I will yield. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much. 

And this is my first subcommittee meeting on HASC [House 

Armed Services Committee], so I appreciate our panel being here, 
11 

and always interesting to hear your take in regards to where we 

are intelligence-wise and the other. 

But to Mr. Hoffman, and this relates to Pakistan. You know, 

India is on track to have an economy, I believe, 16 times that of 

Pakistan. And so the question—I have multiple questions, but one 

is, how do we expect Pakistan to react to that in the climate that 

they are in, and do you think they are going to promote a broader 

terrorist activity to try to counter India’s growing power as it relates to financially? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Sir, I am not an Asian expert or a South Asian 

expert, but do have that kind of asset in my office. I can get you 

a more specific answer. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 91.] 

Mr. HOFFMAN. But in general I believe that Pakistan will continue doing what they have been doing for the last several years, 

is a much more severe acceleration of their nuclear deterrent. The 

scale in terms of size, population, and economic clout of India is 

very daunting to Pakistan, and their idea of their national narrative is, you know, that they are overwhelmed, and it gives them 

a justification to invest in nuclear materials. They will still also 

support on their perimeters the kind of alliances and proxy forces 

that they have had in the past, which are largely, you know, terroristic in nature. 

Mr. NUGENT. I understand that is not your subject area, but 

what is the take in regards to, will Pakistan work with us, do you 

think, as relates to trying to move to a more free market economy 

which may, in fact, then counter India’s strength? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I think they are trying to. I think, you know, the 

ports, the activity in Karachi and the southern half, it definitely 

would benefit from economic development, exports and imports, 

and that would be an approach to take with them. But I think that 

the overwhelming national narrative and the scale of their relationship with India is still going to lean them towards retaining something that is the ultimate high ground for them, nuclear or some 

other means. 

Mr. NUGENT. Obviously, I mean, with the Taliban and as it relates to Afghanistan and where they, you know, where they are positioned with Pakistan, it is concerning, to say the least, in regards 

to where they move forward, particularly as they move forward 

with the Taliban. 

But to Mr. Berteau, you know, we heard a lot today earlier in 

the HASC meeting reference to what is going to happen with sequestration and obviously with the CR [continuing resolution]. But 

how do we prioritize as it relates to prioritizing and maintaining 

partnerships around the world? You know, we train with other organizations, and it sounds like we are going to be cutting back our 

training and our ability to reach out and help. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Mr. Nugent, that question really hits at the core 

of I think the impact of both sequestration and the disconnects between budget requirements and the continuing resolution, but it 

extends well beyond fiscal year 2013 as well. 

I would actually start with your Pakistan-India question because 

I think one of the lesser understood elements of that is the eco-
12 

nomic growth and the potential value and the need for the U.S. to 

be both aligning itself with and actually investing intellectually 

and sometimes from a capital point of view. One of the unsung benefits of the way in which we have been evolving the economic strategy in Afghanistan over the last couple years is to take advantage 

of Indian investment in Afghanistan to bring the Pakistanis into a 

better economic relationship, not cross-border, but in a regional 

sense, and things like the TAPI pipeline, the Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline, goes a long way towards creating 

some of that economic integration that is very difficult to do. This 

is obviously outside the realm of the Defense Department in terms 

of its requirements, but it is clearly part of the broader geopolitical 

and geostrategic framework. 

When we took a look last year at the pivot to Asia and what the 

Pacific would respond, and CSIS did a report, I was co-director of 

it, that was submitted to the Congress, we testified before another 

subcommittee of this committee last year, one of the real things we 

looked at was kind of the lower end of that spectrum, engagement 

with countries, using training, using opportunities in humanitarian 

assistance and disaster recovery, using the Pacific Command augmentation teams from Special Operations Forces, et cetera, to build 

that engagement at a low level, but across 30 countries in the region to create more of a dynamic, and training and exercise money 

is a critical piece of that. It is pretty small in the overall defense 

budget perspective, but it is critical not to let that slip away, and 

yet under sequestration clearly it will. 

The difficulty, and you heard this from Dr. Carter and General 

Dempsey and the rest earlier today, is that as it is being implemented, sequestration does not permit for the allocation of those 

priorities. I would submit that they need that flexibility. One of the 

ways in which the Congress, however, can give them that flexibility 

is with an actual appropriations bill for the rest of the fiscal year 

as opposed to a CR, but even if there is a CR, at least substantial 

reprogramming and transfer authority within it. Even so, the question of what priorities you would apply, which is really the basis 

of your issue, remains somewhat unanswered from that point of 

view. 

Mr. NUGENT. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. Thank you 

very much. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is a somewhat philosophical discussion we are having today, 

and I will get a little philosophical. Heaven and hell, aspects of 

human nature, high side, low side, every human being has it. It is 

easy to dwell on that low side, which is fighting, cussing, trying to 

conquer, control, greed, those kinds of conditions. There are other 

conditions of living that are much higher: Altruism, compassion, 

mercy, spirit to see everyone be happy. Some would say that that 

is a utopian ideal that will never happen, and I agree that it will 

never happen, and it certainly will never happen if we don’t work 

towards it. 

And so for the peaceniks and others who see nothing but peace 

and happiness, we need that group, and we also need the group 
13 

that sees nothing but danger ahead, and both of those groups need 

to look at the situation, try to do so through the same lens, and 

maybe we can find somewhere in the middle where we can start 

making good, rational decisions about defense and security in our 

Nation, emerging threats. That means that the threats are there, 

and they are always going to be there, but they change. 

And so what kind of changes can we make in our defense strategy to keep us from having to go to war? And so I think maybe 

we could be reaching a point where we are moving away from the 

hard power solutions to the soft power solutions. As people get 

more educated and as we trade with each other more, we have less 

time for fighting. And that doesn’t mean we don’t need to be prepared for the fight. 

And so I actually think that we should always be willing to expand our thinking about how to address the threats that we see 

emerging, and soft power has to be, although it is not within the 

domain of this particular committee, perhaps we should pay more 

attention to it, perhaps there is a need for not income revenue, 

shifting away from hard power assets such as nuclear weaponry 

into things that will be more likely to happen, like cyber threats, 

and you know. 

So we have got to—I think what our tendency has been to do is 

with respect to defense is we plan ahead 20, 30 years, we build out, 

but we never do address the fact that the time has changed and 

as there are new threats, do we need to continue doing what we 

have been doing? Do we need as many personnel? Do we need that 

many boots on the ground in light of the threats that we are likely 

to face and the way that is most smart to address those threats? 

So I would just challenge my colleagues to look at things not as 

they have been but as how we want them to be. If we don’t try to 

shape the world in a more peaceful way, then it will never get to 

that point. So with that I will say that I very much enjoy service 

on this committee, on this subcommittee, I enjoy my services on 

Armed Services. I think this is one of the most bipartisan committees in Congress, and I enjoy serving on it, look forward to future 

service. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. First question is 

this, Mr. Hoffman, you alluded to this when you talked about think 

tank folks, really smart people, Ph.D.s, Secretaries of Defense of 

the past, I would say, too, who have said that we are not going to 

be in a big air war again, we are not going to be in any more 

pitched naval battles, we are never going to have any peer-to-peer 

anything anymore, warfare has changed. 

I guess my question to you is, where is that school of thought 

coming from? And I don’t want to be disrespectful of those previous 

Secretaries or those super smart Harvard Ph.D.s that have said 

this kind of stuff, but how could you be so, in my opinion, naive 

and shortsighted that you look back a few thousand years and 

think that human nature has really transformed in the last 50 to 

where you are not going to have it anymore? I am just curious, 

where do you see that coming from? 
14 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter. A lot of people put a lot 

of hope in the better angels of our nature. They aspire to and seek 

and want to see us move forward to enjoy the prosperity that our 

hard investments in security have created for ourselves. 

There is a very strong statistical case in work by Joshua Goldstein, Steve Pinker, and others in the literature right now that suggests that both the number of conflicts and the number of lethality 

or casualties in conflict has statistically been going down for some 

period of time. There is actually a factual basis for that. One can 

quibble, and I have, I am doing research right now for the chairman on, you know, how good some of those statistics are, but there 

is a general trend line. If you take World War I and World War 

II out of this thing, war is not a normal phenomenon. It does not 

always occur. It creates these big disequilibriums, and if you can 

invest smartly and avoid one, you would be very wise to do so. 

The causality for why these lines have been going down, I believe 

we, this body, has created with the investments and the sacrifice 

that our Armed Forces have created for ourselves over the last 10 

or 20 years. But what I think is some people want a policy aim, 

and they are backing the data in to support what they want. They 

want to reduce defense spending. They don’t understand that that 

defense spending has actually created the security conditions and 

the reduced number of wars and the reduced lethality of these 

wars in our favor. And they don’t seek to sustain that. 

Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask you, though, if you look pre-Cold War 

you have got a few engagements in the last 100 years. If you look 

post-Cold War you have dozens of engagements, but the lethality 

has gone down, but the number of events has gone up. So we aren’t 

having—there aren’t fewer hot spots than there were in the 1960s 

or 1970s, there is more, but there is much less lethality in the wars 

in Iraq and Afghanistan than there were in World War II, Korea, 

World War I. Would you agree with that or no? Do you see the 

number of events going down? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. The data for the number of events has gone down, 

but they are generalized from global statistics, from numbers of 

conflict in Asia and Africa in which United States had no interest 

whatsoever. If conflicts go from, say, 100 a year down to 5, and all 

5 of them deal with treaty partners or very close friends of the 

United States, then I still have a cause for concern. 

So the overgeneralization of statistics from a mass number of 

global things that we never heard about and didn’t care about, and 

if the only conflicts we care about are off Taiwan, the South China 

Sea, Korea, the Middle East, Iran or Israel, then we have cause for 

concern. So my problem is people are overgeneralizing global statistics, and they are not getting down to the meat and specifics of 

threats to friends and interests of the United States. And they are 

wrong. We need to continue to invest in security, but smartly, and 

we need a comprehensive approach that both prevents and deters 

conflict. 

Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask the other witnesses, too, a totally separate question. Do you see a point in which technology and its ubiquity, and as the cost of technology gets lower and lower, it is offsetting our personnel problem at any point? Is there a tipping point 

where you can say we don’t need as many people, we don’t need 
15 

as many hospitals on base, we don’t need as many day care centers 

because we have the ability to strike nonkinetically, we have the 

ability to deter with other means besides manpower? And if you see 

that, is there an actual tipping point there or do you think it is always going to take one and the other kind of hand in hand where 

you have the choice between going kinetic or nonkinetic or using 

high technology stuff versus stabbing people in the face when you 

have to go door to door? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Mr. Hunter, let me take a first crack at that. First 

of all, with respect to are we having more hot spots now than before, from the U.S. perspective clearly yes, but I think one of the 

biggest differences—and I think it permeates this whole discussion—during the Cold War there were parts of the world we could 

ignore. We and the Soviets essentially had agreed we will leave 

those guys to sort their own thing out, it is not part of our fight. 

Today there is no part of the world we can ignore. The nature of 

a failed state, the nature of a vacuum in governance, the nature 

of a vacuum in economics creates both an intelligence threat and 

an opportunity for bad guys that is something we can no longer ignore. 

Part of that is because of the spread of technology. But your 

point on can we trade technology for human beings, that is actually 

been what we have been doing really for the last 30 or 40 years. 

It clearly has a point in the curve where that will slow down. I 

don’t think we yet know for the advanced unmanned systems that 

we have in place today what the long-term tail requirements are 

to support and sustain those, and you may trade military personnel 

but not necessarily cost and investment, if you will, in terms of the 

long-term ability to sustain and support that operation. 

Ultimately I think it still needs to be a blend. I mean, time and 

again we see that the human being in the loop is critical to mission 

success at whatever level, squad, all the way up to theater. And I 

don’t think we will ever bypass that part of the product. I don’t 

know if Mark has anything to add to that. 

Dr. LEWELLYN. I would say it is a matter of looking at over time 

what mix we need. When you fire a kinetic weapon, it blows something up, you can see the effect. With some of the nonkinetic weapons you don’t really know what effect you have had until either the 

weapon from the other side doesn’t show up or it misbehaves. So 

we need to have a spectrum of responses now and look for a costeffective mix. 

In terms of costs, one thing I have been personally struggling 

with over the last several years is figuring out how much a pound, 

for want of a better term, a pound of cyber costs. You know how 

many people it takes to man a weapon system and support it. To 

get the level of cyber defense and attack capability we need, how 

many people do we need? How do we do that equation? I think we 

are very immature in that area in terms of understanding the personnel needs in that area, and we need to do more to do that over 

time. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Could I add on to that? 

Mr. HUNTER. I am so far past my time. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. If you have something to add to that. 
16 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Just add something. Mr. Hunter and I share a 

background with bad haircuts and running clubs and stuff like 

that, so I have to disassociate myself from any implication that I 

might think that technology is the solution to a lot. We think of 

warfare, unfortunately, in stovepipes called air, sea, land kind of 

domains, and we associate either institutions or technologies with 

those. 

To me the most decisive domain, the most important aspect of 

the conflict spectrum is a human domain that cuts across all those, 

and that would be my principal investment area, and technology is 

not going to be—is always an enabler in the right context, employed properly with judgment, and that judgment comes from investment we have made in commanders and people who are working in that battle space that understand that. But the human domain is the most decisive domain. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

being here. And perhaps just going along with that line, Mr. Hoffman, and if that is the case, would you say—how would you characterize our ability to organize ourselves and have a military strategy around that? Is that where we are? It seems to me we are kind 

of far from there, and how do we get there if you think that is appropriate? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, I think our strategy in the past, at least in 

my time of service and in the Department of the Navy, has been 

to understand that we need to recruit, sustain, educate—where I 

now work in an educational facility—retain and take care of the 

All-Volunteer Force. And in the Defense Strategic Guidance, I am 

surprised, you know, there is an element in there in which sustaining the All-Volunteer Force and treasuring that in the modern 

sense is an important part of the strategy. Keeping that sustainable is, you know, is an issue because of the cost that it has derived. 

But I think there is a recognition in the strategy and the building and the Services that, you know, the quality of the force is important, the investments in the human domain is important, but 

all these investments are going to be prioritized and pressurized in 

the next few years, both on the civilian side and in the military 

side. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is that well organized to fight the hybrid wars that 

we have now? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I believe we are organized to fight the hybrid 

wars. The SOF [Special Operations Forces] community has made 

a lot of developments over the last few decades, or at least the last 

decade, which also needs to be sustained and examined relative to 

the future. We have other investments, though, on the nonkinetic 

and the cyber community, do we have the right workforce and how 

do we sustain that workforce? We have done research at NDU [National Defense University] on what does that mean in the Cyber 

Command, what aspect of that needs to be in the military and 

what needs to be civilianized. You can get a very nice clearance for 

a military officer with 20 years in the Air Force or the Marine 
17 

Corps, but some of the people we need in the cyber community are 

like some of my daughters or some of the boyfriends that come into 

my house that have—that wear jewelry in places that I don’t attach, you know, things, and they are different. How you bring that 

into the community, too, and sustain that so you have a very capable force? That might be an area to explore. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Mr. Berteau, would you like to comment on that? I 

mean, you seem to suggest that perhaps at least the way we organize our new defense strategy doesn’t necessarily comport with 

what we are doing right now. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Thank you, Congresswoman Davis. I think it is a 

little bit hard to tell. You know, the redone strategic guidance 

issued January a year ago was driven by the $487 billion over the 

10-year period that came out from the first tranche of Budget Control Act cuts, and it was clearly, by the comments of DOD afterwards, it was pretty close to the thin edge of what was sustainable 

against those dollars, right? Because no sooner had it come out 

then you had generals and DOD senior civilians saying if you cut 

further we are going to have to rewrite the strategy. 

Well, it is not a very robust strategy if you have to rewrite it 

every time the number of dollars goes down a little bit. So you have 

to say to yourself perhaps we need a slightly less fragile strategy. 

But if it was at the thin edge then we haven’t really tested it, because what DOD did is they said we built the 2013 budget consistent with that strategy. But if you look at the issues, most of 

them were shoved into 2014 and beyond. We haven’t yet seen that 

2014 budget or the Future Year Defense Program associated with 

it, but right now the number that that is built to is not the number 

that is consistent with the cap of the Budget Control Act. It is $50 

billion too high, or $45 billion if you believe the latest reports. 

It is awful hard to assess the disconnects or even lay out priorities when you don’t have enough money to fund the basic piece of 

it. But what is distressing is those priorities have not come into 

play in the sequestration debate. There has been no argument back 

that says forget this everybody takes the same percentage, let us 

prioritize and put that in place through a priority process. Nobody 

has made that argument. It is hard to tell whether it is because 

we don’t know the answers or because it is just caught up in a 

much broader net and DOD is just part of that trap, if you will. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Dr. Lewellyn, did you want to comment as well? 

How do we fix this? 

Dr. LEWELLYN. I think, you know, flexibility is the key. I have 

spent a lot of my career working with Navy and Marine Corps, and 

they are very much into task organization and flexibility. So I 

think the more we can get away from standard ways and units of 

approaching things the better. In my own line of work in research 

and development, I think sharing and collaboration is being facilitated by information technology. I am amazed at the amount of 

ideas that pass around among the younger folks that work for me. 

One of the big problems I see, however, is sharing across classification boundaries, looking hard at what needs to be classified, 

what doesn’t, so we can get the brightest minds working on the 

hard problems, and that is a challenge we have to struggle with. 
18 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will come back. Thank 

you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Dr. Heck. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here this afternoon. 

And, Mr. Hoffman, in your opening statement you referenced 

our, the United States’ hegemonic position that we now hold across 

the globe and the fact that we have really no near competitor. In 

today’s earlier full committee, you know, we heard about the potential impacts of sequestration and those indiscriminate cuts, and 

Chairman McKeon stated in his questioning that his concern, and 

I believe rightfully so, is that as we make these cuts we may see 

a decrease in our standing not just amongst potential adversaries, 

but also amongst our allies as showing a sign of weakness. 

The question is, my question is, where does that, where does sequestration, where will it have an impact on those emerging 

threats? 

What types of threats may emerge due to the fact that we go into 

sequestration and there is this potential perceived weakness now 

of the United States in the loss of our hegemonic position? And 

short of actually replacing the sequester, on which capabilities do 

we concentrate our remaining resources to best deter those emerging threats? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Until you got to the last thing, I thought I could 

answer the question. The impact of sequestration at a strategic 

level is a torpedoing, I believe, of the perception that America is 

interested and willing to lead. That literature in Tokyo, in Australia and in London, where I do VTCs [video teleconferences] or 

have visited in the last year, is commonly now referred to in white 

papers, that America either doesn’t want to lead, doesn’t have the 

will and the wallet to lead, even though the relative power balance 

for us is we are in a rather significantly advantageous position 

right now, particularly in the measures that we add—you know, 

how much money we are spending into defense—which doesn’t necessarily always equate to an output that is equal to the same thing. 

But we focus on numbers like 535, 555, 575, and we think that 

equates to something, and generally it does, but maybe not in regions and other places where people are measuring things. 

The Chinese have their own way of measuring aggregate national power, and they put other tangibles and intangibles into 

that. They may perceive it. But in Australia and the government 

in Japan, this idea that we are not able to come to an agreement 

on the spending and the spending priorities and put our house in 

order has already undercut us. And they talk about it in papers 

and they talk about whether or not they need to be intimidated or 

appease China in compensation for that the conventional deterrent 

that we are offering, that extended deterrence, is somehow weakened. 

And the other impact on sequestration is, I think in both 2013 

or 2014, we are going to torpedo the industrial base. It is far too 

fragile. I spent 2 years as a political appointee in the Department 

of the Navy working on naval industrial base and investments, and 

I think we will hurt ourselves in that sense. And it can be rebuilt, 
19 

but it is far easier to crash it than it is to rebuild it over a period 

of time. 

So the impact on the threats is not really the threats, it is our 

allies and our perceived perception of who and what we are in the 

world. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Could I piggyback on that just a little, Dr. Heck? 

You raised the question of potential enemies or adversaries showing that America is weak because we can’t even get our own act 

together, if you will. And I think that is a legitimate concern. You 

know, the whispering that says, you see, you really can’t trust the 

United States. They are going to pull back. They are going to leave. 

They are not going to be here. 

Dr. Kissinger in his seminal book on China recently said ultimately all of those nations in the region that are not seriously already our allies really only want two things: Don’t make us choose, 

but don’t leave. And anything that creates a signal that we are 

leaving opens a vacuum, if you will. But it is equally true for our 

allies and partners who won’t sustain what they have. 

Mr. Hunter asked earlier about partnership capacity. And we 

spent a lot, in fact this subcommittee has spent some time on 

building partnership capacity and looking at the questions. But a 

lot of that is at the low end of the spectrum, which is where the 

threat is. There is also partnership capacity we already have in 

high abundance with our serious allies, with Japan, with the Republic of Korea, with the United Kingdom, with France, with 

NATO. We need to sustain that partnership capacity as well. And 

whatever we do sends signals to them that it is okay for them to 

do it as well. 

You know, we have done some look at European defense spending, and of course, as you all know, it has been coming down dramatically and it is going to drop even further. But for the first decade of this century, European defense spending dropped but spending per soldier actually went up. Their technology investment was 

sustained, if you will. Why? Because their force structure actually 

came down faster than their spending did. 

They protected their investment in research and development, 

whereas we use it as a bill payer right off the top of the bat. Those 

are the kinds of signals that are not only important internally, but 

are important externally and globally as well. 

Dr. LEWELLYN. I would just add to that, that I think looking 

more over the long trend getting past sequester with defense funding coming down, the R&D community needs to look smartly at 

how we are investing our skills and capabilities, looking across 

mission areas about what is common technically across them to 

make sure we maximize the commonality. And that is the way I 

would answer your question and deal with the science and technical community and our allied countries so we convey to them 

that, hey, we are thinking this problem through smartly and we 

are going to come out the other end as good a position as we can 

be. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Carson, would you like to ask questions? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
20 

It is becoming increasingly clear that our offensive use of cyberspace is pretty much a growing threat. While there are sophisticated computer systems getting cheaper each and every day, it is 

pretty easy to imagine that some countries or even terrorist organizations would lack the resources and knowledge to really conduct 

serious cyber attacks. As we develop increasingly sophisticated 

countermeasures, do you believe that we will continue to see cyber 

threats from around the world or will they be pretty much contained to sophisticated governments like China? 

Dr. LEWELLYN. I think there is certainly a sophisticated end, you 

know, states can organize a lot more capability. That doesn’t mean 

I dismiss so-called lone actors. I think we are still getting a handle 

in some areas on the vulnerability over all of over systems. There 

are industrial control systems on Navy ships that were bought before the days that we worried about cyber attack, and understanding those vulnerabilities, which the Navy is starting to do, is 

important. 

So I think there is work we need to do. We need to be careful 

about the information we put out to share, to understand the vulnerability of that information, and be more sensitive to the way 

cyber has infiltrated into all of our lives, both personal and from 

the Government perspective and military perspective. So I am not 

quite at the stage where I think it is going to be something that 

we are going to have to worry about for some time. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Mr. Carson, in many ways the cyber threat is the 

ultimate of asymmetric threats, but it is a very scalable asymmetric threat and can quickly become a symmetric threat, if you 

will, because the vulnerabilities that we have continue to increase 

almost at the same rate as in fact our ability to defend against and 

respond to the threats of those vulnerabilities. 

My own view—and this is not sustained by any particular research but by long-term observation of it—is that the various roles 

of the parts of the Government still remain to be resolved a bit. 

You know, the President’s Executive Order that he announced last 

night in the State of the Union that we got to read publicly yesterday takes some modest steps in this direction, but clearly a lot 

more is needed, and the role of the Congress in providing that more 

is quite powerful. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I had an interesting discussion with a person on the plane ride 

home last week. And he is a third-generation Latino, had relatives 

along the southern border, and we had a lot of discussion about 

many topics, but certainly one of them is the rise in narcoterrorism 

on the border. And I see, Mr. Hoffman, that in your testimony you 

mention that as one of the threats and the challenge of the gangs 

you say as a disruptive force inside America and in Mexico portend 

greater problems down the road. And certainly we are starting to 

see more and more of it in our neck of the woods. 

So could you describe more in detail the challenges that you 

think might be faced with the Mexico scenario, from technical, intelligence, manpower, and others, and how might the U.S. deal 

with it? 
21 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Excellent question. It is a little more speculative 

aspect of my statement, but I didn’t like the trends over the last 

number of years. More sophisticated forms of attacks. More planning of ambushes. More overt acts of terrorism against police. Ambushes against American officials. Body armor-piercing ammunition. The acceleration of learning curve on detonation means of 

forms of IEDs [improvised explosive devices] in Mexico have been 

going up. These are not good trends. So it is in the higher end of 

the narcoterrorism category, not yet merging and converging with 

kind of the conventional capabilities and the irregular tactics of the 

hybrid threat, but it is on the trend line to get there. 

There are a few open source indicators with Middle Eastern 

sources, to include Hezbollah’s interest in Latin America and Mexico,that would offer more learning curve increases that bother me 

as a concern. I don’t have any validated intelligence on those whatsoever. When Admiral McRaven and maybe Judge Webster are 

here at the HASC with their Intel overview it might be a question 

to pull out in both classified and unclassified sessions. 

But I have had some visits with Southern Command when Admiral Stavridis was down there as well, and the development of submarines. The sub kind of thing is, when we are talking about state 

level capabilities being employed by narco-organizations is sort of 

a hybrid capability that we are starting to see. 

So you see this emerging. It is still somewhat speculative in my 

mind. But we are now seeing this kind of activity, and the gross 

acts of violent terrorism to clearly, if not eradicate, just make some 

of the Mexican government irrelevant in certain areas is a source 

of concern. 

What has been going on with our intelligence sharing and the 

training from both, I think, SOF and the FBI [Federal Bureau of 

Investigation], there has, you know, there has been assistance 

down there that is building partnership capacity that is perhaps on 

the low end, as David suggested, but it probably has a significant 

impact. The casualty totals from Mexico, you know, the lowest is 

30, the highest is 60,000 dead. This kind of puts to shame the statistics that people are using in Foreign Affairs and big journals 

right now to suggest that the world is getting rather placid. Those 

people don’t count in the total. They are not considered to have 

been casualties in a combatant conflict, but clearly these elements, 

the nonstate actors in Mexico, who are doing this deliberately. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. It is devastating. And you are right, I think a 

lot of people don’t think about there is at least 35,000 that I have 

heard, casualties, there. And I mean this is just south of us. This 

is a war going on. 

But I missed the first part of the hearing. So could you clarify 

what you just said about submarines? Who is—— 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Again I am trying to separate my time in the Department of the Navy with the clearances I had in this particular 

session, in this particular format. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. You are saying the drug cartels down there are 

building a submarine? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, ma’am. I think the total number of captured 

submarines now is somewhere between 9 and 12. 

Mr. BERTEAU. That number is not for public. 
22 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I have seen photographs of several that we have 

and one of them is in fact framed and positioned in front of Southern Command’s headquarters. Admiral Stavridis mounted one of 

these submarines in front of his command post. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. In my 24 seconds I have left, what can we do 

in the United States to counter this? What would you advise? I see 

you talked about the intelligence sharing. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Intelligence sharing. I believe there is terrorist financing and network analysis that is probably useful to the Mexican authorities. The training. They have done much themselves. 

They have been rather courageous in facing up to some of this. 

There has been a lot of intimidation. It is very violent. It is very 

sophisticated. It is the other southern states in Latin America that 

have more of the submarine problem where the drug cartels are 

sourcing the cocaine from for trips up into the United States. And 

military assets and intelligence is necessary to help defeat that. 

JIATF–South [Joint Interagency Task Force–South] is part of that, 

which is an interagency, more of a comprehensive approach. Mixing 

law enforcement and military assets together is probably the solution. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Which makes it even more disturbing that 

under sequestration the Navy says they are going to pull all the 

ships out of Central and South America. And so you have got these 

drug runners with these submarines or semi-submersibles, various 

things, bringing drugs up and we are not going to have any ships 

there. 

Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the panel 

being here. 

Broader question. Assuming American interest protecting our 

cherished way of life and a flourishing form of life, thriving economy, in your research, in your reflection, in your perhaps modeling, 

might there be other strategic approaches beyond the one that we 

have certainly been engaged in since the Second World War, initially to confront communism and then since that time with regard 

to hegemony and our presumed responsibilities and roles attendant 

thereof? Are there other approaches that you have contemplated 

beyond, say, combatant commands with responsibilities throughout 

the globe and forward military ground forces? Might there be other 

approaches that would secure our way of life and advance our economy? 

Mr. BERTEAU. If I could, Mr. Gibson, start one minute on that 

and then ask my colleagues here on the panel to comment. Mr. 

Johnson raised earlier the idea of soft power. We looked at CSIS 

about six years ago at something called smart power, which is really an amalgam, if you will, how do you integrate better across the 

Government all of the capabilities, not just the military and kinetic 

capabilities or even the intel capabilities. 

I think that the question that Dr. Heck raised about the role of 

technology in coming into play here, the question that Mrs. 

Hartzler raised about narcoterrorism, points out to a host of seams, 

if you will, that are inside. And the chairman alluded to the con-
23 

sequence of sequestration will actually exacerbate those disconnects, if you will. 

It is a hard thing for the executive branch to work together in 

a national security establishment, even in good times when everybody has a lot of money. In bad times, when everybody is trying 

to protect their money, they tend to hunker down around their core 

business and not worry so much about everybody else. 

So what you need is a scheme, if you will, that will let you rise 

above the core competencies. It is much easier for you, because you 

can be on one committee and another committee and cross jurisdictions pretty quickly that way. It is much harder for them. And I 

think that the difficulties are exacerbated in a time of sequestration and budget uncertainty. 

I will leave these guys to come up with solutions. 

Dr. LEWELLYN. I am reminded of a couple of years ago, when the 

Navy had an advertising slogan called, ‘‘the Navy, a global force for 

good,’’ that emphasized its role in providing relief in situations 

after bad weather, tsunamis, protecting the sea lanes to encourage 

trade, providing a framework of international agreement and law 

so that economies can flourish. And I think that fundamental mission of alliances and strengthening and supporting economic 

growth short of war, part of the shaping and deterrence that I 

talked about in my statement, are critical. And, you know, certainly cheaper than fighting a lot of wars both in terms of cost of 

weapons and lives. So I think we need to focus on that, the soft 

power or smart power going forward. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I have been working on a grand strategy approach 

to try to think through I think what is our need for a balanced and 

sustainable grand strategy, and I have argued for something called 

forward partnership. It is in the current issue of Orbis and the 

January issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings, and the reason 

it is in the Naval Institute Proceedings is it privileges naval forces. 

I would declare victory in World War II and would declare victory 

in the Korean War at this point in time and probably bring back 

more ground force structure from overseas and maybe reduce that 

and take a total force perspective on what our ground force requirements are. 

We have a million-man land Army today, plus a 250,000-man 

Marine Corps when you bring in the Reserve into the picture. So 

I believe we have just postured ourselves differently and we need 

to stop doing some things we have been doing. And I would use the 

naval forces and SOF to generate the degree of engagement and 

partnership that is forward. That I think we should do, but it is 

going to have to be less static, less vulnerably positioned in one 

fixed place, and we need more freedom of action to move around 

the world from crisis to crisis, because we are not going to populate 

every crisis with brigades or Marine forces, and then leave them 

there for a decade or more. 

So we need some more freedom of action, and the strategy of forward partnership is my solution, which I can provide for the 

record. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you. I would be very interested in taking a 

look at the article. My staff will probably pull it for me, though. 

But thank you for those thoughtful comments. 
24 

What comes to mind is, you know, we certainly saw the rise of 

China’s involvement in Africa, and our response was I would say 

pretty typical. I am not so sure it was effective. We created another 

combatant command for it. And I wonder if we might be better 

served leading with the State Department, certainly using assets 

from across the Federal Government, to be sure. But when we constantly lead with forward military presence, I wonder if we are not 

fully achieving what it is we are trying to do and incurring the cost 

that evidently is difficult for us. 

Mr. BERTEAU. The question, the core of the question you raise, 

sir, is at its heart, what is the boundary of what is DOD’s mission 

and what is the military’s mission here? And if there is one important lesson from the last 10 or 15 years, it is that DOD thinks it 

knows where those boundaries are. But when the Nation needs 

more in something else and it turns around and looks, okay, where 

else in the Federal Government is this capability, and it turns out 

it is not there, then the choice is either let the military do it or 

have it not be done. And the military will say every time, send me, 

I will get it done to the best of my ability. That is what happens. 

We do need to look at that from a broader perspective. We need 

to fund it and prioritize the resources so that capability is there, 

and we need to make sure that at the national level that kind of 

capability is in place. That is a hard thing to do. The Congress has 

pushed for that a number of times. Twenty-seven years ago this 

committee took the lead on creating jointness inside DOD through 

the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. However, that 

is all under one Cabinet officer, and that starts in Title X with subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. It is pretty hard to look at the Federal Government and start 

with that same sentence, because if you say subject to the authority and direction and control of, ultimately we know who it is. It 

is the President. But to organize and sustain that at a lower level 

bureaucratically, institutionally, is a much tougher question. And 

ultimately we turn back to DOD and DOD gets it done. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me back up from Mr. Gibson’s question I 

guess one level. And I suspect I know Mr. Hoffman’s answer to this 

because of the article he just referenced. But I guess one question 

is, do we need a strategy? A lot of what you all have talked about 

is the incredible amount of uncertainty in the world today. And I 

think everybody can agree we are not going to be able to predict, 

you know, this conflict or this situation. And my perception is that 

largely we lurch from crisis to crisis, making decisions as we go. 

My perception is we didn’t do that in the Cold War. There was at 

least an outline of a strategy that was generally followed. 

And so I don’t know, Mr. Hoffman, do we need a kind of larger 

national strategy in such an uncertain world? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Why? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Emphatically. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Why? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. You need to communicate to the American people 

what treasure they are putting up and why to sell it and make it 

sustainable. You need to shape the instruments of national power 

relative to those that are either soft, medium, or hard. You need 
25 

to articulate to future aggressors what those capabilities are and 

you need to sustain them over a period of time. 

I don’t know any way of doing that without a strategy. I had prepared a statement—there is a book I particularly like by an author 

named Rumelt, which Mr. Marshall in the building and Dr. 

Krepinevich also likes, Good Strategy/Bad Strategy [Good Strategy/Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why it Matters], and it has 

got a couple good lines in there. But particularly this idea that 

strategy is not a dog’s breakfast of everything you want to do just 

piled up. It is focused effort, prioritized resources, which are tradeoffs. I am not comfortable with some of the tradeoffs in my own 

strategy. One takes an Army below 500,000 and we start absorbing 

risk. The Marine Corps goes down to a certain level in the 175s, 

and for every 5, 10K, we start absorbing risk. But we are also absorbing risk by continuing to borrow the amount of money we are 

borrowing. Very soon we will have interest debt payments that exceed the Department of Defense’s TOA [total obligation authority]. 

That is the ultimate limitation of strategic action, being constricted 

by ourselves over time, because we are going to pay off old decisions and choices and tradeoffs that we weren’t really willing to 

make. 

When it gets down into force planning and strategy, Professor 

Colin Gray in Europe, one of my mentors in life, said there are only 

two principles: Prudence and adaptability. And we need to be very 

prudent about the risks that we are absorbing and very conscious 

about those, and maybe perhaps adaptable is a better term than 

flexibility. Flexibility is a force that can do a lot of things, you are 

trading off some readiness. But adaptable is somebody that can 

learn faster than the opponent. It is a football-soccer—or a soccer 

fullback that finds himself in a football game playing fullback and 

actually can learn the position fast. And that is the challenge we 

had in 2003 to 2007 in Iraq. We might have been flexible but we 

weren’t adaptable. We didn’t learn fast enough. But I believe a 

strategy is essential. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Do you all have comments on that? 

Dr. LEWELLYN. I would just add, I think, you know, I have spent 

my career in the business of trying to help the Government develop 

things the private sector isn’t developing on their own. And so I 

think you need a strategy to guide defense Government investment 

in technologies that wouldn’t naturally flow from the private sector 

in the dealings in the marketplace. And so to the extent that it is 

important to develop capabilities unique to the Government, you 

need a strategy to guide that. And to the extent it is interlocked 

with a diplomatic strategy so we take advantage of both soft and 

hard power, I think that is good. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Mr. Chairman, I have a predisposition that is in 

line with the idea that maybe we don’t need a strategy. I am ultimately a resources and management guy, and it is my belief and 

my observation over 35 years that resources drive strategy way 

more than strategy drives resources. But ultimately much of the 

debate we have about where we are going to take our national security establishment, and particularly the technology investments 

for that, is a fight between the past and the future. And in that 

fight, the past is much more powerful than the future. It has all 
26 

the champions, it has all the advocates, it has all the four-stars. 

They are all lined up. And the strategy is the best hope that the 

future has to be able to stand up in that fight and make it more 

of a fair fight. And so I tend to lean back toward, yes, we probably 

we do need a strategy, even though ultimately it is the budget that 

matters. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Interesting perspective. By the way, I was on 

that smart power commission 6 years ago, which I think was very 

helpful, look at having this full array of tools. The Government is 

not very well positioned to use them all. 

Dr. Lewellyn, I wanted to get back to some things that you 

talked about at the beginning. And I know this is an interest Mr. 

Langevin and I certainly share about nonkinetic weapons of various kinds. And you mentioned them. 

I would be interested in your evaluation of how well we are pursuing those things. Mr. Berteau talked about that a lot of innovation these days is coming from the global commercial sector, not 

from Government contracts. You know, I kind of wonder how that 

applies to development of lasers and the other kinds of nonkinetic 

sorts of things that you referenced. So kind of give me an evaluation of how we are doing in pursuing those things. 

Dr. LEWELLYN. My sense that the effort put into those areas is 

greatly increased over the past few years as emerging threats in 

the A2/AD, or anti-access/area-denial area, have grown. A lot more 

cooperation in research between the Services and their research establishments and reaching out into the private sector to address 

those things. So I see a lot more effort going into those areas. One 

of the complicating factors is a lot of the capability is covered by 

fairly strict classification guidelines, and overcoming those and 

working within those guidelines is one of the challenges, I think. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, is another challenge what Mr. Berteau 

just said: The past is fighting the future. The past is all about kinetics. They have got an advantage. And aren’t there real issues 

of just in competing for increasingly scarce dollars about what 

some people will consider pie-in-the-sky sorts of stuff? 

Dr. LEWELLYN. My own view is that dealing with some of the 

emerging threats strictly with kinetics is prohibitively expensive. 

And so to deal credibly with the threats people are seeing, I think 

you need the mix of capability. You need to be able to take advantage of all the tools that are out there. Some of them are unproven 

yet in the real world, and so we need to be sensitive to, you know, 

backup capability, as I mentioned. One of the great advantages of 

kinetic systems is you can immediately see their results. And so developing our abilities to understand how effective we have been 

quickly will be part of developing some of these new systems and 

tools. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Hoffman. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, sir, I think you put your finger on something. 

In the business literature we refer to this as bringing about disruptive change, and the barriers to entry culturally, psychologically, 

the metrics that are available. In my time during the DON [Department of the Navy] trying to bring around the electromagnetic 

railgun, to kind of scale the power system is something that basic 

technology can be developed in the civilian world. But the things 
27 

that we really need in the Department of the Navy for the scale 

of that kind of system, the power generation of 30 million joules or 

something to launch something, once that technology comes about 

it is going to go have to be induced by Government because of the 

scale. But there are some great savings and great strategic utility. 

But it is very hard to bring that about. The same thing goes on 

with the UCLASS [Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike] with the Department of the Navy trying to bring 

unmanned systems. We have existing programs in the F–35 [Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter], and we have a future. We have a fair 

idea what the cost of capability is going to be over time, and we 

have a program, and we have all the pieces in place, and we have 

another potential. And when do we shift over from 100%/0% to 

some mix of manned and unmanned aircraft is a hard thing for 

military cultures and institutions to bring about. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Mr. Chairman, could I add one sentence to that? 

I recognize the time constraint here. For many of these if we don’t 

figure out how to take advantage of them and incorporate them, 

somebody else will. And we need to take into our calculus and our 

calculation as well, because otherwise we will be on the losing end 

of the asymmetric advantage if we are not careful. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, and actually that is what I wanted to 

ask you. So economies that are more controlled than ours, do they 

have an advantage in developing some of these nonkinetic systems, 

as an example? 

Mr. BERTEAU. I think there is an advantage. And, you know, you 

look at the Chinese economy, which has been a remarkable story 

of economic growth and distribution internally. But much of it has 

been essentially copying what others have done. I mean, if you look 

at the ratio of new patents per country, if you will, you know, 

China still trails far behind. But they are very good at taking what 

is developed elsewhere and manifesting it and magnifying it considerably. And I think they will continue to get better at that, if 

you will. 

Clearly our relationship with China from a geostrategic point is 

way more complicated than we can go into in the context of this 

hearing. And I think we are still looking for the recipe book of how 

do we get a decent meal out of this? But nonetheless we have to 

recognize that they can bring critical mass to bear on these kinds 

of tasks, if you will, in a way that a free market economy often will 

not do, because it is not just driven by market opportunities, it is 

be driven by a longer-term view. 

Mr. LANVEGIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And to our witnesses again, thank you. This has been a fascinating discussion. And I would like to maybe turn back again to 

the discussion we were having about soft power and where we target our resources. And one of the reasons why I thoroughly enjoy 

serving on the Intelligence Committee and also serving here—and 

I am very pleased that the committee has decided to roll the intelligence portfolio into this subcommittee—is that good intelligence is 

always going to be the pointy tip of the spear. You know where to 

put your resources, you know where the enemies are, you know 

where your adversaries are, you know where to focus your resources. And that in and of itself becomes a force multiplier. 
28 

So what I want to know is how do we get better at predicting 

and therefore targeting, you know, where the problems are before 

they arise? It astounds to me that we haven’t gotten better at that. 

In particular, you look at Mali, for example. The enemy there, the 

universe of the enemy there, if you will, is in the hundreds. You 

know, we are not talking about tens of thousands of enemy combatants. It is in the hundreds. And yet you have a nation-state like 

France has to, you know, come in with overwhelming power and 

rout out the, you know, the enemy there. 

It just seems it is such a disproportionate way to use resources, 

if you will. If we could have gotten better at predicting that something like Mali would have arisen, a lot of these things could be 

avoided. So how do we get better at that and where do we target 

our resources in terms of developing that soft power capability so 

it is both predictive, but also responsive? 

Mr. BERTEAU. This is a question we have been wrestling with literally ever since the commission completed its work in 2007 and 

CSIS issued their report. A lot of effort was focused on an organizational structure, if you will. How do you get a national security infrastructure in line that will wrestle with these questions? But that 

almost falls into the category of you have got a different tree but 

you have the same monkeys. The same problem, if you will, are 

still there. Changing the tree doesn’t remove the problems. 

Ultimately I think it comes back to an integration across the 

branches of the Federal Government, and that is both on the executive branch side, where that is very difficult, where every institution is required to take care of itself, and on the legislative side, 

where there are champions for each of those and the structure on 

the legislative side is set that way. 

The Intelligence Community actually offers an opportunity to offset that, and the creation of the Director of National Intelligence, 

and that infrastructure, if you will, both to focus the sharing opportunities and to make sure that resource are allocated to the most 

significant threats or payoffs was a very positive step in that direction. It is a long ways away from being successfully implemented, 

but it is a core enabler, if you will, to move forward in that regard. 

You probably need the equivalent infrastructure in other areas of 

that enabling capability. 

You are right about Mali. It is not only—only a handful of people. They didn’t sneak up on anybody. I mean, we saw them coming 

for years and we knew what was going to happen, we knew what 

happened when it happened. And yet it takes—prevention would 

have been far easier, if you will, than the cure now has turned out 

to be. The issue seems to be can we do that for everywhere for everyone? And the answer to that is: Probably not. So then how do 

we choose amongst those? 

We don’t have a good structure in place to do that, either inside 

the executive branch today or on the Hill for that matter. And 

again the Intelligence Committee is about the only place where 

those things come together, but the reach from there to the solutions is bounded by the institutional structures that are in place. 

I will have to think harder on that question. I mean, I think I 

have actually helped you define the problem better than helping 
29 

you answer it here this morning—or this afternoon. I apologize for 

that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I appreciate your thoughts. 

Anybody else want to comment. 

Dr. LEWELLYN. I would agree that organization is the issue. And 

this is illustrated by a story I recently heard during a military operation. I heard from someone that they got some very useful information from a former—from a naval officer who had student 

friends from a former involvement with an overseas university who 

was getting compiled Twitter feeds from the country of interest, 

and it was leading in the intelligence by several hours. So, again, 

taking advantage of all the information that is out there, it is an 

organizational issue, I think is something we all have to struggle 

with and understand how we can do that in a Government context 

and take advantage of all the information that is available to help 

us. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Very quickly, I am not sure that the solution is 

technological in nature. It is about investing in people, relationships, understanding foreign cultures, and understanding at a level 

of detail which I don’t think we had in that particular case. And 

I am always very concerned when I hear the word ‘‘predictive’’ and 

strategy is based upon some sort of a forecast and some kind of a 

logic. But the reason some of these people end up where they end 

up is not because we didn’t predict, it is because they are human 

on the other side, and we are in a competitive relationship and 

they have gone where we are not or where their greatest advantage 

is. I don’t know if we can anticipate that interaction all the time 

over a long time. But we can make some forecasts about technologies and investments and move the ball down the field. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Could I add one thing to that? The budget cycle 

that we provide resources is so long and slow. The review board 

that the Secretary of State put in place after the Benghazi incident 

made a whole host of recommendations and they were presented up 

here some months back. One of them was to create a fund that 

would be available for the 20 most at-risk embassies and consulates so that we could rush security to those when it came time. 

But if the look at the lead time to put that funding into the budget, 

for September of 2012, when the Benghazi attack occurred, it 

would have had to have been in the 2012 budget, which the State 

Department started putting together in the summer of 2010. So in 

2010, somebody would have had to say, okay, let’s look at Libya. 

Well, next year there will be an uprising, Gadhafi will fall, we will 

be moving in, we will have a consulate in Benghazi, and it will be 

at high risk, and therefore we have to put the money in the budget 

right now. 

Can you imagine them putting that money? Can you imagine 

OMB [Office of Management and Budget] actually approving it? 

And can you imagine the Appropriations Committee leaving it in 

there? We have a real disconnect between the cycle time from 

building the resources and the necessity to respond quickly and 

with agility to evolving dynamics, and that is something that we 

are going to have to wrestle with very clearly. That is much more 

than an organizational question as well. It is really a very fundamental process question. 
30 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Let me turn to another area that I spend a lot 

of time on. That is on the cybersecurity issue. And obviously that 

is—it is an issue that is going to be with us to stay for the foreseeable future and it is going to become more and more challenging 

and important as we go forward. 

So the Pentagon right now is in the process of what could be a 

major shift in how they are organized and how they defend and 

also dealing with offensive and exploitation, as well as other 

things. So how do we rightsize our cyber force, if you will, and our 

cyber strategy? Obviously, the Pentagon hasn’t quite figured that 

out either, although they are getting there and it is starting to coalesce, if you will, around a structure. But we are not completely 

where we need to be. 

And in addition to that, as we saw on the news lately—and this 

is something that Mac and I have—the Chairman and I have studied for a while—that we don’t nearly have the right personnel, 

enough of the right personnel in the right places in terms of what 

we actually need. 

Mr. BERTEAU. It is very instructive to look back at Secretary Panetta’s speech last October in New York, which was a sea change 

in the way that the Defense Department was publicly characterizing both its thinking about cybersecurity—he used the cyber 

Pearl Harbor, et cetera, example—but more importantly about how 

he saw and how the Department saw its role in this process. Because that statement very clearly said we have wrestling with 

the—I am paraphrasing—we have been wrestling with the question 

of, is it DOD’s job to defend DOD or is it DOD’s job to defend 

America? And Secretary Panetta came out clearly and publicly 

stated it is our job to defend America. That was the first time that 

DOD had publicly laid that out. 

The implications of that for the kinds of structure you need, for 

the kinds of capability you need, for the kinds of people you need, 

for the kinds of funding you need are still being sorted out. Whether they are going to be reflected in the fiscal year 2014 budget that 

ultimately finds its way up here remains to be seen. The impact 

of sequestration just on personnel alone, just as the economy is 

starting to come back we are going to take all of the people we 

have been struggling to rebuild the workforce that got gutted in the 

previous drawdown and have finally started to get it back up, not 

just in cyber but elsewhere, and now we are going to say to these 

folks, well, take a day off a week without pay but keep doing 100 

percent of your work, just with 80 percent of your pay and then we 

will get back to you. Anybody who has got a better opportunity to 

go work this somewhere else is clearly going to at least consider 

that opportunity more strongly than they did before. 

Dr. LEWELLYN. As I said earlier, I have been struggling personally from an intellectual level about how to figure out how you resource cyber? How much do you need for a pound of cyber? I think 

one of the key issues Mr. Hoffman alluded to is what is the right 

mix of private sector, Government civilians, Government contractors, and military folks to deal with some of this stuff once you sort 

out what the missions are going to be and what the responsibilities 

are, as Mr. Berteau talked to. 
31 

So I think—it is not a very satisfying answer—but I think we 

need to do a lot more work at how we want to sort out those responsibilities and the amount of money it is going to cost to do so. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Sir, Mr. Thornberry and I worked on this particular problem more than a decade ago, kind of struggling with 

this during the Clinton administration, whether or not certain 

tasks belonged in the Commerce Department or the FBI. The Clinton administration had gone with the law enforcement model and 

most of the constituencies in telecommunications, banking, finance, 

and the computer companies didn’t want to participate at that 

time. 

I don’t know if we have gotten to the recognition in the country 

yet that the character and nature of the threat is so severe that 

this is something we want the Pentagon to do beyond the military 

sphere, so defending itself. That is a larger strategic issue of what 

is important to the country and what political values and traditions 

we want to adapt perhaps to a new reality. 

A decade ago I would have been resisting. I resisted the FBI 

model of the Clinton administration and we tried to create something else I don’t think has emerged with the right level of 

robustness. Most of that comes, however, from the American population and business leaders who are not interested in the Pentagon 

running airports, running ports, or running networks necessarily. 

That is a huge strategic issue. 

For the committee, however, getting the right size and the structure of the organization, what needs to be a joint entity and what 

needs to be repeated, and what I have seen is the proliferation of 

cyber commands in the Services, that is a macro-level mission 

issue, a Key West II kind of issue that I think does merit, just inside the Department of Defense and your committee, some serious 

consideration, and from that you will get the right size and the 

right population mix from that. 

But that is an important thing to take on. I don’t have an answer 

for you. I just noticed that we have been standing up something 

that I don’t know can stand up to a management and strategy review right now. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, on that point, I think this is an area where 

you all could make major contributions in helping us to answer 

these questions of what does the right size of a cyber force and 

strategy actually look like. And hopefully we can continue our discussion. 

With that I will yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Gibson, do you have any other questions? 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

While I have you, I am just curious your response on a few 

things here. China. Given their economy, given their current investments in national security, do you think they are on a trajectory to be aggressive and bellicose towards their neighbors? And 

how do you think they view the debt that we have to them in relation to any of this? 

Mr. BERTEAU. We did take a hard look at that in the study we 

did on the Pacific and the pivot to Asia last year, and I will be 

happy to provide you with that report, if you will. 
32 

Many of the focuses were aimed at DOD, but obviously we had 

to look at China as a big part of that. 

The U.S. has an enormous opportunity today across the Pacific 

Rim, in part because China overplayed its hand pretty heavily in 

2009, 2010, 2011. It gave the opportunity for a number of countries 

to encourage more U.S. engagement and more U.S. interaction with 

them, if you will. We need to be careful, though, that we don’t build 

the strategy on the assumption that China will always be more 

heavy-handed than we are, because we can’t necessarily count on 

them to play that out over time. So there is a rare opportunity for 

us as a country to take advantage of building better relationships 

with partners across the region. 

But I think the question of the future trajectory of China is really one that is not predetermined by either the amount of money 

they are spending—which is huge, they have quadrupled their defense spending over the last 10 years, which has no country in the 

world has done, and they are on a path to continue building that 

up. They are a long ways away from being able to be seen as a peer 

competitor to the U.S., but within the region in which they operate 

that is not necessarily the standard that they have to aspire to. 

But it is far from inevitable that that is the outcome that we are 

going to play. 

We became convinced—I certainly became convinced—I mean, I 

am a cold warrior in the way I think about things because that is 

the world I grew up in and it is what I was trained in, and it took 

me a while realize that the old strategy that we applied to the Soviet Union is not going to work with China, you know, and in the 

long run the whole world may be worse off if we attempt to do that 

as well as the region itself. But what we replace that with is still 

evolving, if you will. How do we behave in such a way that it encourages China to become a viable participant in a global economy, 

which is clearly in their interest in the long run but may not be 

in the interest of the leadership in the short run, is a challenge we 

haven’t begun to sort out yet. 

There is a very strong military side to it, though. Every morning 

when the Chinese wake up and they ask themselves the question, 

is today the day that we should go confront the U.S., we want them 

every day to answer that question, not today. And that is an important part of the equation that I think we have to sustain all the 

way through the process. 

Dr. LEWELLYN. As someone who focuses on science and engineering, I like empirical things, okay, and one of the empirical things 

about China is something that Mr. Hoffman mentioned, namely the 

demographics, their aging society and the economic strain that it 

is going to put on them. So I think in the long term I am not clear 

where China is going in terms of their ability to put money at the 

rate they have so far into defense. 

To echo what Mr. Berteau has said, I think going forward we 

need to maintain our edge, but we need to be very sensitive about 

how the way we use our military force in the area is understood 

by China. We don’t want to do anything in terms of a test of a system or reaction in some way that we don’t understand that they 

might not see it as, I wouldn’t say benign, but nonthreatening to 

them, if it is not aimed at them. 
33 

So I think there is a community of people looking hard at how 

the leadership in China thinks and how the people react to that 

leadership and we need to be sensitive to that going forward. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. It is a crucial issue to try to get our hands 

around. Again, I am not an Asian expert; I am more of a generalist. 

But it is important to point out that this is not a monolithic entity, 

that there are factions in there. The way the military is acting visa`-vis policy elites or the ruling class is somewhat different. This is 

a command economy that we are dealing with. 

I find military modernization to be significant, but not overly 

concerned. I think as David pointed out, a peer standard is not necessarily the standard. The investments seem to be smart. They 

seem to be niched. They seem to be deliberately asymmetric, not, 

you know, out of complete whack. 

Dr. Lewellyn’s comment, he has got some good comments in 

there about strategic culture, I am not sure we understand or have 

invested enough to the same degree we did for those of us who 

were Cold War warriors. We thought we understood the Soviet 

Union and we had Russiantologists. I work with a China center at 

NDU that was created by the Congress and we work at that, but 

it is a small shop. It is worthy of thinking through. 

My one caution with them, in thinking about them—and David 

pointed out they have been a good strategist for us, they have created more problems for themselves and have brought more of our 

allies towards us, so that is a really good deal—but they got so aggressive when their economy was one-third of the size of ours, and 

it is now in the 40s going to about 50 percent, and depends on 

where we are 5 or 10 years from now. If they got that aggressive 

when they were one-third, what is it going to be like when they are 

at half and two-thirds? And this gets to the comments you see in 

the Japanese literature and the Australian white papers. Those 

kind of trend lines and the crossover points are being watched by 

people in the Pacific and it raises concerns to them. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Hoffman, going back to the work you have 

done on hybrid warfare, it seems to me there is a trend toward 

states using hybrid tactics, maybe through others or employing others. The country may get organized crime to do their bidding or, 

you know, that sort of thing. Not direct state action, but kind of 

working in and through others, using a variety of tactics. Do you 

think that is a trend that is happening and will we see more of it? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I do believe it is a trend. I do believe we are going 

to see more of it. But a lot of it is going to come from the bottom 

coming up. Smaller actors are finding lethal means cheaper, more 

lethal and more effective for them. So that is kind of bringing the 

lethality up to what used to be the low end of the conflict spectrum, 

so Mexico, Latin America, Hezbollah, these other kinds of actors. 

But I do believe that states are sending some of this technology 

to the level. So I see things converging, the nonstate actors getting 

state-like capabilities because of just the lower cost and the proliferation, and then the Hezbollah, particularly the Iranian export 

of this and the use of proxy forces by people like in Iran the Quds 

Force. This is their art form. And they make things like EFP [explosively formed projectile] or they make the tactics and the train-
34 

ing to bear. So when it shows up in Venezuela or shows up in Latin 

America or Mexico I have a cause for concern. 

This is one of the issues with the work in the QDR [Quadrennial 

Defense Review] and the DSG [Defense Strategic Guidance], is the 

conversation in the Pentagon is that threats are diverging, we have 

low-end threats and we have high-end threats. And my perspective 

is the opposite. We have a convergence in the middle, which is why 

my statement says—and RAND concurs with me—we need to mind 

the middle. This is where the future is going in terms of more frequency than we thought of in the past. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. And kind of springing from there, Mr. 

Berteau, you talked about CSIS’ work on internal cost growth within the military. So X number of people are costing us more and 

more, someday there won’t be anything left for investment. And yet 

we have to look at this full array of challenges. How are we going 

to—I don’t know, this is, I guess, the too difficult question to ask, 

but you just have to think, how do we get from here to there with 

the limited amount of investments and this battle between the 

past, the future, all of that? 

Mr. BERTEAU. And that convergence of both state and nonstate. 

Nowhere is that probably going to be more evident than in the 

realm of cyber, where in fact not only is it already sort of overlapping, but we have our biggest challenge is identifying and characterizing the source of the activity when it occurs and tracking it 

back to anybody. 

In terms of how do we get our arms around this, you know, it 

is pretty easy to sit here and say we should be able to defend 

America pretty darned well for $500 billion a year. And ultimately 

if you started from the ground up and built the Defense Department to be able to respond to all these threats, you probably 

wouldn’t build the Department that you have today. So the real 

question is, how do we evolve to what we need to have from where 

we are right now? I characterize that as a battle of the past and 

the future, but it is really more complicated than that. That sounds 

way too binary, if you will. 

I think it comes down to incentives. Where are the incentives 

lined up that reinforce behavior that strengthens the status quo, or 

that focuses on looking backwards, if you will, versus the incentives 

that realigns towards strengthening the agility and the flexibility 

to deal across the future? 

One of the powerful forces of Goldwater-Nichols was it changed 

the incentive structure, and it changed it at every level, from the 

individual promotion all the way to the institutional alignments 

and so on. I haven’t manifested that in kind of a portfolio of solutions, but we have been spending some time wrestling with that 

question of, how do you structure incentives? It would go all the 

way from the 6.1 basic research at the universities and how do you 

structure an inventive that will sustain and maintain that capacity 

independent of return on investment kinds of figures, all the way 

up to the broader institutional levels of how do you incentivize the 

State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, 

the Defense Department, the Treasury Department, the Justice Department to cooperate more together in that global interaction, if 

you will, at the lower end of the spectrum? 
35 

So I think those incentive structures are the key, and it is what 

we are going to try to focus our research on in the coming months. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I think that is something that all of us 

can work together on. Kind of back to money for just a second, regardless of how sequestration and the CR come out, we are going 

to having tight defense budgets as far as the eye can see. And yet 

we can still have this internal cost growth that you are talking 

about, we have this full array of challenges that are kind of converging, and we have this need to put money into the future. And 

to me that means we are going to have to figure out ways to get 

more defense out of the dollars we spend. I think the full committee is going to be doing a variety of things in the future looking 

at that. And needless to say, we need all the help we can get in 

trying to sort through the right incentives. A lot of times passing 

a law doesn’t get the job done. It determines the culture and the 

incentives that go within that culture to really be successful. 

So, anyway, I think that is it. Thank you all very much for your 

testimony and for your statements. It has been very helpful and a 

good way for this subcommittee to start. So thank you. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 13, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 13, 2013 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 13, 2013 

(91) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. NUGENT 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Sir, as I understand the context behind your question, given the 

disparity in relative national power between Pakistan and India, what do we expect 

Pakistan to do? 

As I noted before the committee, I would expect Pakistan to continue its nuclear 

modernization program. By most expert accounts it is the fastest growing nuclear 

weapons stockpile in the world, but admittedly, this is coming from a smaller baseline than the major nuclear powers. Nuclear weapons have been and will continue 

to be Pakistan’s principal strategic deterrent against what its military-intelligence 

leadership views as an existential threat from its larger neighbor. 

At the same time I would expect Pakistan’s military to continue developing a 

broader range of capabilities to address the proximity and potency of an internal 

militant threat that has already caused it to move a large amount of its conventional military forces structure away from India and into its western border territories. While Pakistan’s civilian leadership periodically labeled the internal threat 

as the nation’s most severe, it remains unclear whether Pakistan’s senior military 

and intelligence leaders view the problem similarly. Nonetheless, I expect Pakistan’s 

military will continue to improve its training and operations against military groups 

in the west who formally oppose the state while retaining as much capacity as it 

possibly can to counter India. 

I do not expect Pakistan’s military-intelligence leadership will extend or expand 

its longstanding practice of employing proxy forces or terrorist activities against 

those neighbors it feels threatening. I am not aware of any evidence that Pakistan’s 

security agencies have broken its links or financial support to select militant groups 

it believes provide to the defense of Pakistan in some manner but have been labeled 

as terrorist organizations. I would expect that Pakistan’s military-intelligence leadership will continue to use all the tools it has to keep India off balance and safeguard its interests inside Afghanistan. [See page ??.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 13, 2013 

(95) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. 1) I would like to know from your perspective, do you feel the Nation 

is currently facing a threat from an EMP attack? Do you feel that the Nation is prepared to address this threat? And if not, how would you address mitigating this 

threat. Further, do you feel the threat is grave enough to be reflected in our National Strategic Guidance? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Sir, an EMP attack is an example of the sort of asymmetric approach we can anticipate from states or reasonably well-resourced nonstate actors. 

I believe that the most likely contingencies would be overseas rather than a massive 

attack in the homeland. Such attacks should be anticipated by our combatant commands and the Services in their preparations and in the hardening and redundancy 

of our various military C2 or ISR systems. 

Such attacks could be large scale in nature, by a country that detonates a nuclearlike system in the atmosphere to attempt to negate our intelligence and communications links that confer such an advantage to us. I could also imagine more tactical 

EMP devices being used near bases where U.S. forces are operating or providing 

ground-based missiles defenses to disrupt our access into a region at ports or airfields or to try to weaken our support to a coalition member or partner nation. 

National guidance should reflect the nature of this threat consistent with its probability and consequence among all other contingencies. Both the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security should consider this threat grave 

enough to incorporate into planning and acquisition requirements. Because of this 

threat and other cyber threats, the ability to operate under degraded C2 levels after 

an EMP attack is something we can and should train for. Enhancing network system resiliency is a must. 

Mr. FRANKS. 2) I would like to know from your perspective, do you feel the Nation 

is currently facing a threat from an EMP attack? Do you feel that the Nation is prepared to address this threat? And if not, how would you address mitigating this 

threat. Further, do you feel the threat is grave enough to be reflected in our National Strategic Guidance? 

Dr. LEWELLYN. In principle, EMP (electromagnetic pulse) attacks could arise in 

two cases. First, a nuclear conflict between regional powers could affect U.S. military forces and U.S. citizens, allies, and commercial interests in the area. Second, 

a nuclear attack aimed at U.S. forces or territory would have a direct effect on military forces or the homeland. The EMP effects of a nuclear detonation could damage 

electronic and other equipment including satellites, mobile and line communications, 

consumer electronics, and power distribution systems. The magnitude of damage 

from EMP would depend on the altitude of a nuclear weapon when it detonates, its 

yield, the distance of the area of interest from the weapon at detonation, any intervening geographical features such as mountains, the local strength of the Earth’s 

magnetic field, and the level of protection or hardening from EMP of potentially vulnerable equipment. I believe the likelihood of such attacks is small and is mitigated 

by our deterrence posture to include missile defense. 

Although not attacks per se, geomagnetic storms resulting from solar activity can 

cause effects similar to those resulting from a nuclear detonation. Solar activity occurs in cycles, and we have seen an increase in solar activity over the past year. 

Prior to this increase, the most recent significant activity occurred in 1989 when a 

severe geomagnetic storm caused the collapse of a Canadian power grid. This predates the tremendous increase in the use of smart phones, tablets, and other electronic devices we see today, and it’s likely that a storm of similar magnitude in the 

future would have some effect on these systems. 

In my view, the Nation is not prepared fully to address this threat. Our military 

forces are working to harden critical systems against the effects of EMP. Some systems developed originally during the Cold War retain some level of hardening. However, the aforementioned proliferation of modern electronics—especially in systems 

using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology poses a problem. Some militarized 

COTS have some hardening and/or reside in metal ship hulls, for example, that provide some degree of protection. Nevertheless, I do not believe we have a full understanding of the vulnerabilities of these systems to EMP attacks of various mag-
96 

nitudes. We need to develop this understanding and improve the resiliency of these 

systems. At the same time, we should plan for alternative concepts of operation for 

cases when the use of all or some of these systems is denied. In addition, we should 

work to keep our deterrence posture strong to include our missile defense capability. 

The Strategic Guidance includes countering weapons of mass destruction and 

maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent among the primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces. EMP would be just one of the effects resulting from 

a nuclear conflict between regional powers or a direct nuclear attack on the U.S. 

forces or the homeland. For this reason, I believe countering EMP threat can be considered as a component of these primary missions. 

Mr. FRANKS. 3) I would like to know from your perspective, do you feel the Nation 

is currently facing a threat from an EMP attack? Do you feel that the Nation is prepared to address this threat? And if not, how would you address mitigating this 

threat. Further, do you feel the threat is grave enough to be reflected in our National Strategic Guidance? 

Mr. BERTEAU. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

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