alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**AD Economic Evaluation**



### Docket No . FAA - 20 08 - 0442 Directorate ID : 20 07 - SW - 24 - AD Helicopter Model: Various Sikorsky- Manufactured Transport and Restricted Category Helicopters Number of Helicopters (U.S. Operators): 60 Heli copters in the US Registry . Reason : The actions of this AD are intended to prevent main rotor shaft (MRS) structural failure, loss of power to the main rotor, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter . Costs : Parts per Helicopter $ 44,753 to replac e an MRS Labor per Helicopter ( At 

### $ 8 5 /work - hour , it would take 2.2 work - hours for the nondestructive inspection (NDI) plus a $50 consumable cost and 2.2 work - hours to replace an MRS ) $ 237 for the NDI $237 to replace an MRS

Other (Explain) Total Cos t per Helicopter $ 474 Total US Fleet Cost $ 14,420 for the NDI and $44,940 to replace an MRS. Executive Order 12866 : Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action?” Yes ( ) No (  ) DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures : Is the AD significant? Yes ( ) Explain Below No (  ) Regulatory Flexibility Act : Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? Yes ( ) No (  ) Project Engineer : Jeffrey Lee
256 La. 74

#### CADDO PARISH POLICE JURY v. J. B. LANCASTER et al.

No. 50532.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 25, 1970.

In re: Caddo Parish Police Jury applying for certiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Caddo. 232 So.2d 781.

Writ denied. There is no error of law in the judgment.
#### James Elliott ARNOLD v. STATE.

6 Div. 17.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 20, 1977.

ON REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

The order, judgment and opinion entered by the Court of Criminal Appeals on October 25, 1977, are hereby set aside.

The Supreme Court of Alabama in *Ex parte State, In re Arnold v. State,*353 So.2d 524, September 16, 1977, determined that the admission of the telephone conversation into evidence between the appellant and the alleged accomplice was not error.

However, this same opinion did determine that the admission into evidence of the act of driving the automobile was erroneous, and this cause is hereby reversed and remanded on authority of *Ex parte State, In re Arnold v. State,*supra.

Application for rehearing overruled.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

All the Judges concur.
No. 99-10159.

No. 99-10221.

#### Gavis et al. *v.*Hood, Warden; and Grier et al. *v.*Hood, Warden.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 1211.
Exhibit 10.35



FIRST AMENDMENT TO CONVERTIBLE PROMISSORY NOTE



This First Amendment to Convertible Promissory Note (the First Amendment) is entered into as of June 22, 2004,
between TULLYS COFFEE CORPORATION (Borrower) and KWM INVESTMENTS, LLC, a Washington limited liability company (Lender).



RECITALS



A. Borrower has previously executed and delivered to Lender that certain Convertible Promissory Note dated December 14, 2000, in the original face amount
of $3,000,000.00 (the Note). Capitalized terms used in this First Amendment that are not defined herein have the meanings assigned to such terms in the Note.



B. Borrower and Lender have agreed to modify the terms of the Note, as more particularly set forth below.



NOW, THEREFORE, for valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of
which hereby are acknowledged, the parties to this First Amendment agree as follows:



1. Maturity Date. The Note hereby is modified and amended to extend the Maturity Date from January 2, 2005 until August 1, 2005. Accordingly, the term Maturity Date as defined in Section 1 of the
Note is hereby modified and amended to refer to August 1, 2005. The entire principal balance of the Loan together with all accrued interest as provided for in Section 2 of this First Amendment shall be paid by Borrower to Lender in a single payment
on or before August 1, 2005.



2. Warrants; Interest
Rate. Effective as of January 1, 2005, (i) Borrower shall discontinue issuing Warrants to Lender in lieu of interest as provided for in the Note, and (ii) the Loan shall accrue interest on the outstanding principal balance of the Loan at a rate
of twelve percent (12%) per annum.



3. Other Terms
Unchanged. Except as expressly modified or amended by this First Amendment, all of the terms and conditions of the Note remain in full force and effect.



ORAL AGREEMENTS OR ORAL COMMITMENTS TO LOAN MONEY, EXTEND CREDIT, OR TO FORBEAR FROM ENFORCING REPAYMENT OF A DEBT ARE NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER WASHINGTON
LAW.



|                           |  |                                        |  |    |  |                               
|-------------------------- |  | -------------------------------------- |  | -- |  | ------------------------------
|BORROWER                   |  | LENDER                                
|                           | 
|TULLYS COFFEE CORPORATION |  | KWM INVESTMENTS, LLC                  
|                           |  |                                        | 
|By                         |  | /s/ Kristopher S. Galvin               |  | By |  | /s/ Dennis Weibling           
|                           |  | Kristopher S. Galvin, its Executive VP |  |    |  | Dennis Weibling, its President
#### Michael A. PESSARO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-445.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 24, 1970.

Kenneth A. Studstill, of Twyford & Studstill, Titusville, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and J. Terrell Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Spinelli v. United States, 1969, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637; Aguilar v. Texas, 1964, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723; United States v. Rich, 5 Cir. 1969, 407 F.2d 934; United States v. Aldrete, 5 Cir. 1969, 414 F.2d 238; State v. Jones, Fla.1967, 204 So.2d 515; and F.S.1967, Section 40.43, F.S.A.

CROSS, C, J., and McCAIN and OWEN, JJ., concur.
#### In the Interest of E.M., a child.

No. 77-2601.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 30, 1978.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Joy B. Shearer, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Victor 0. Mead, Asst. Public Defender, Orlando, for appellee.

MOORE, Judge.

In this appeal by the state we are called upon to decide the effect of the filing of an amended petition for delinquency more than thirty days from the date the original complaint was referred to the intake office.

A timely complaint alleging burglary of a structure and trespass was filed on September 21, 1977 with the Division of Youth Services. Thereafter, and within the time prescribed by statute and rule, a petition *428alleging delinquency by reason of trespass was filed with the court. On October 24, 1977, more than thirty days subsequent to the filing of the complaint, an amended petition alleging delinquency on the basis of the burglary was filed with the court. The trespass and burglary are both based upon the same factual situation. Respondent successfully argued before the trial court that the filing of an amended petition acted to vitiate the original petition, and since the amended petition was filed more than thirty days subsequent to the filing of the complaint it should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 8.110(e), Fla.R.Juv.P. (1977). We disagree with the ruling of the trial court and reverse.

In our opinion, this case is controlled by Rule 8.110(c) which provides:

> “At any time prior to the adjudicatory hearing an amended petition may be filed or the petition may be amended on motion. Amendments shall be freely permitted in the interest of justice and the welfare of the child. A continuance may be granted upon motion and a showing that the amendment prejudices or materially affects any party.”

In the case sub judice no motion for continuance was requested nor was there any showing that the amended petition prejudiced or materially affected the respondent. It is true, as suggested by respondent, that the crime of trespass (a misdemeanor) is different from the crime of burglary (a felony). Unlike criminal law, however, the petition in juvenile proceedings merely alleges an act of delinquency and although it is necessary to prove the substantive behavior, the final result is an adjudication of delinquency and not conviction of a crime.

Respondent relies upon *Wilcox v. State,*248 So.2d 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), a decision of this Court involving the filing of an amended information which was subsequently withdrawn. We find the *Wilcox*case factually distinguishable, not only because it was a criminal case but also because the amended information was withdrawn and the state attempted to prosecute the defendant on the original information.

As the filing of an amended petition is permissible at any time prior to the adjudicatory hearing pursuant to Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.110(c), the trial court’s dismissal of the petition in this case must be and is reversed with instructions to reinstate the amended petition for further proceedings pursuant thereto.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ANSTEAD and DAUKSCH, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                     Exhibit 3.6

                   AMENDEMENT TO CERTIFICATE OF DESIGNATIONS,
                           PREFERENCES AND LIMITATIONS
                                       OF
                            SERIES A PREFERRED STOCK
                                       OF
                           ENCORE MEDICAL CORPORATION

         Encore Medical Corporation (the "Corporation"), a corporation organized
and existing under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware DOES
HEREBY CERTIFY:

         FIRST:   The original Certificate of Incorporation of the Corporation
was filed with the Secretary of State of Delaware on March 21, 1995, and was
subsequently amended on March 25, 1997.

         SECOND:  The original Certificate of Designations, Preferences and
Limitations of Series A Preferred Stock of the Corporation ("Certificate of
Designations") was filed with the Secretary of State of Delaware on June 7,
2001.

         THIRD:   This Amendment to the Certificate of Designations has been
duly adopted in accordance with the provisions of Section 242 of the General
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware by the board of directors of the
Corporation and approved by a majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote
thereon.

         FOURTH:  The Certificate of Designations shall be amended as follows

              1.  Amending Section A. by increasing the maximum number of
authorized shares of Series A Preferred Stock from one hundred thirty-five
thousand (135,000) shares to two hundred twenty-five (225,000) shares,
unless and until such number is changed in accordance with applicable law and
the Certificate of Designations.

              2.  Amending Section C.3(b) by deleting it in its entirety and
inserting the following in its place:

         (b)  Automatic Conversion. Each share of Series A Preferred Stock shall
              --------------------
     automatically be converted into shares of Common Stock at the Conversion
     Rate at the time in effect for such Series A Preferred Stock if, after
     November 15, 2003, the Corporation's average closing share price for Common
     Stock as reported on NASDAQ for at least twenty (20) consecutive trading
     days exceeds three (3) times the Conversion Price.

         FIFTH:   Except as amended hereby, the Certificate of Designations
otherwise remains unchanged and is in full force and effect.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Encore Medical Corporation has caused this
Amendment to Certificate of Designations, Preferences and Limitations of Series
A Preferred Stock to be signed by its Secretary this 8th day of February, 2002.

                                    ENCORE MEDICAL CORPORATION

                                    By: /s/ Harry L. Zimmerman, Secretary
                                        ---------------------------------
                                        Harry L. Zimmerman, Secretary
----

Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Empyrean Holdings, Inc.., a Nevadacorporation (the "Company"), on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ending June 30, 2005as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, RobertL. Lee, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to Sect. 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Sect. 1350), that to my knowledge: 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. 

 

 

***/s/ Robert L. Lee               ***

Robert L. Lee, President

 

Dated: August 22, 2005          

----
<Page>

                                                                     Exhibit 4.3


                              NOTATION OF GUARANTEE

                  For value received, each Guarantor (which term includes any
successor Person under the Indenture) has, jointly and severally,
unconditionally guaranteed, to the extent set forth in the Indenture and subject
to the provisions in the Indenture dated as of December 19, 2001 (the
"INDENTURE") among Wheeling Island Gaming, Inc., the other Guarantors (as
defined in the Indenture) and U.S. Bank, N.A., as trustee (the "TRUSTEE") (a)
the due and punctual payment of the principal of, the premium (if any) on, and
the interest on, the Notes (as defined in the Indenture), whether at maturity,
by acceleration, redemption or otherwise, the due and punctual payment of
interest on overdue principal and premium and, to the extent permitted by law,
interest, and the due and punctual performance of all other obligations of the
Company to the Holders or the Trustee all in accordance with the terms of the
Indenture; and (b) in case of any extension of time of payment or renewal of any
Notes or any of such other obligations, that the same will be promptly paid in
full when due or performed in accordance with the terms of the extension or
renewal, whether at stated maturity, by acceleration or otherwise. The
obligations of the Guarantors to the Holders of Notes and to the Trustee
pursuant to the Subsidiary Guarantee and the Indenture are expressly set forth
in Article Ten of the Indenture and reference is hereby made to the Indenture
for the precise terms of the Subsidiary Guarantee. Each Holder of a Note, by
accepting the same, agrees to and shall be bound by such provisions.

                                           WHEELING LAND DEVELOPMENT CORP.


                                           By:
                                               -------------------------------
                                                Name:  Ronald A. Sultemeier
                                                Title: President
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001077319
<NAME> PANGEA PETROLEUM CORP.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   39,949
<ALLOWANCES>                                   286,898
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               142,939
<PP&E>                                         134,245
<DEPRECIATION>                                  21,722
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 482,842
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          181,200
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        25,635
<OTHER-SE>                                     276,007
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   482,842
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  232,628
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (17,597)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (214,515)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (214,515)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.01)


</TABLE>
#### Charles Ralph CHARIOTT and Robert Lewis Fixel, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 68-875, 68-876.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Sept. 16, 1969.

Ellis Rubin, Miami Beach, for appellants.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Melvin Grossman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

SWANN, Judge.

The defendants below, Chariott and Fixel, appeal from their convictions and sentences for possession of narcotics to-wit marijuana. Their appeals have been consolidated.

They challenge the legality of their arrests asserting that there was insufficient probable cause for the arrest; they challenge the search of an automobile and seizure of a cigar box containing marijuana on the grounds that the search and seizure were illegal and improper and finally they challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain their convictions.

The testimony of the arresting officers was conflicting but was resolved by the trial judge adversely to the defendants. The evidence in the record is sufficient to sustain the finding of probable cause for the arrest of these defendants without a warrant and for the search of the automobile and the seizure of the marijuana found therein.

We reach a different conclusion, however, after considering the sufficiency of *360the evidence introduced to convict these defendants.

The evidence introduced proved that Chariott was driving a car owned by a third party and loaned to Chariott. A search of the car resulted in the seizure of a cigar box containing material that appeared to be marijuana from under the driver’s seat. Chariott was also wearing a little leather bag on a leather string around his neck which contained small pieces of tobacco-like material suspected by the of- ' ficers to be marijuana. The testimony reveals that tests by a chemist verified that the materials were marijuana.

We, therefore, find sufficient, competent evidence to sustain the conviction and sentence of Chariott.

The record reveals no marijuana was found on the person of Fixel. The marijuana discovered in the car in which he was a passenger was in a cigar box under the seat of the driver, Chariott, and the car was owned by a third person. There was no proof that Fixel knew of the presence of the marijuana in the car or that he had any control or right of possession to either the car or narcotics. In other words, there was insufficient proof of scienter or knowledge on the part of Fixel to prove that he was in possession or control of narcotics or of the automobile.

The conviction and sentence of Fixel be and the same is, therefore, reversed. See Frank v. State of Florida, Fla.App.1967, 199 So.2d 117 and Markman v. State of Florida, Fla.App.1968, 210 So.2d 486.

The judgment and sentence of Chariott is affirmed. The judgment and sentence of Fixel is reversed and remanded for the entry of an order discharging the defendant, Fixel, from the cause.

It is so ordered.
### Water resources of the Sycamore Creek watershed, Maricopa County, Arizona

By: B. W. ThomsenHerbert H. Schumann

                            https://doi.org/10.3133/wsp1861

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#### Abstract

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#### Warren E. FORBES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. K-511.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.

May 6, 1969.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Robert Cox et al., * From the 32nd District Court

of Mitchell County,

Trial Court No. 16643.

Vs. No. 11-18-00215-CV * October 16, 2020

Helena Chemical Company, * Opinion by Wright, S.C.J.

(Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.,

sitting by assignment)

(Willson, J., not participating)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is 

error in the judgment below. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court 

insofar as it rendered a take-nothing judgment against Appellants; however, we 

affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to Appellants’ claims for mental 

anguish and punitive damages. We remand the cause to the trial court for further 

proceedings not inconsistent with this court’s opinion. The costs incurred by 

reason of this appeal are taxed one-half against Appellants and one-half against 

Appellee.