IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 00-10071

_____________________

PIZZA HUT, INC.,

Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee,

versus

PAPA JOHN’S INTERNATIONAL, INC.;

PAPA JOHN’S USA, INC.,

Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellants.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas, Dallas

_________________________________________________________________ September 19, 2000

Before POLITZ, JOLLY, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents a false advertising claim under section

43(a) of the Lanham Act, resulting in a jury verdict for the

plaintiff, Pizza Hut. At the center of this appeal is Papa John’s

four word slogan “Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.”

The appellant, Papa John’s International Inc. (“Papa John’s”),

argues that the slogan “cannot and does not violate the Lanham Act”

because it is “not a misrepresentation of fact.” The appellee,

Pizza Hut, Inc., argues that the slogan, when viewed in the context

of Papa John’s overall advertising campaign, conveys a false2

statement of fact actionable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.

The district court, after evaluating the jury’s responses to a

series of special i nterrogatories and denying Papa John’s motion

for judgment as a matter of law, entered judgment for Pizza Hut

stating:

When the ‘Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.’ slogan is

considered in light of the entirety of Papa John’s postMay 1997 advertising which violated provisions of the

Lanham Act and in the context in which it was juxtaposed

with the false and misleading statements contai ned in

Papa John’s print and broadcast media advertising, the

slogan itself became tainted to the extent that its

continued use should be enjoined.

We conclude that (1) the slogan, standing alone, is not an

objectifiable statement of fact upon which consumers would be

justified in relying, and thus not actionable under section 43(a);

and (2) while the slogan, when utilized in connection with some of

the post-May 1997 comparative advertising--specifically, the sauce

and dough campaigns--conveyed objectifiable and misleading facts,

Pizza Hut has failed to adduce any evidence demonstrating that the

facts conveyed by the slogan were material to th e purchasing

decisions of the consumers to which the slogan was directed. Thus,

the district court erred in denying Papa John’s motion for judgment

as a matter of law. We therefore reverse the judgment of the

district court denying Papa John’s motion for judgment as a matter

o f law, vacate its final judgment, and remand the c ase to the

district court for entry of judgment for Papa John’s.3 I

A

Pizza Hut is a wholly owne d subsidiary of Tricon Global

Restaurants. With over 7000 restaurants (both company and

franchisee-owned), Pizza Hut is the largest pizza chain in the

United States. In 1984, John Schnatter founded Papa John’s Pizza

in the back of his father’s tavern. Papa John’s has grown to over

2050 locations, making it the third largest pizza chain in the

United States.

In May 1995, Papa John’s adopted a new slogan: “Better

Ingredients. Better Pizza.” In 1996, Papa John’s filed for a

federal trademark registration for this slogan with the United

States Patent & Trademark Office (“PTO”). Its application for

registration was ultimately granted by the PTO. Since 1995, Papa

John’s has invested over $300 million building customer goodwill in

its trademark “Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.” The slogan has

appeared on millions of signs, shirts, menus, pizza boxes, napkins

and other items, and has regularly appeared as the “tag line” at

the end of Papa John’s radi o and television ads, or with the

company logo in printed advertising.

On May 1, 1997, Pizza Hut launched its “Totally New Pizza”

campaign. This campaign was the culmination of “Operation

Lightning Bolt,” a nine-month, $50 million project in which Pizza4

Hut declared “war” on poor quality pizza. From the deck of a World

War II aircraft carrier, Pizza Hut’s president, David Novak,

declared “war” on “skimpy, low quality pizza.” National ads aired

during this campaign touted the “better ta ste” of Pizza Hut’s

pizza, and “dared” anyone to find a “better pizza.”

In early May 1997, Papa John’s launched its first national ad

campaign. The campaign was directed towards Pizza Hut, and its

“Totally New Pizza” campaign. In a pair of TV ads featuring Pizza

Hut’s co-founder Frank Carney, Carney touted the superiority of

Papa John’s pizza over Pizza Hut’s pizza. Although Carney had left

the pizza business in the 1980’s, h e returned as a franchisee of

Papa John’s because he liked the taste of Papa John’s pizza better

than any other pizza on the market. The ad campaign was remarkably

successful. During May 1997, Papa John’s sales increased 11.7

percent ove r May 1996 sales, while Pizza Hut’s sales were down 8

percent.

On the heels of the success of the Carney ads, in February

1998, Papa John’s launched a second series of ads touting the

results of a taste test in which consumers were ask ed to compare

Papa John’s a nd Pizza Hut’s pizzas. In the ads, Papa John’s

boasted that it “won big time” in taste tests. The ads were a

response to Pizza Hut’s “dare” to find a “better pizza.” The taste

test showed that consumers preferred Papa John’s traditional crust5

pizzas over Pizza Hut’s comparable pizzas by a 16-point margin (58%

to 42%). Additionally, consumers preferred Papa John’s thin crust

pizzas by a fourteen-point margin (57% to 43%).

Following the taste test ads, Papa John’s ran a series of ads

comparing specific ingredients used in its pizzas with those used

by its “competitors.” During the course of these ads, Papa John’s

touted the superiority of its sauce and its dough. During the

sauce campaign, Papa John’s asserted that its sauce was made from

“fresh, vine-ripened tomatoes,” which were canned through a process

called “fresh pack,” while its competitors--including Pizza Hut--

make their sauce from remanufactured tomato paste. During the

dough campaign, Papa John’s stated that i t used “clear filtered

water” to make its pizza dough, while the “biggest chain” uses

“whatever comes out of the tap.” Additionally, Papa John’s

asserted that it gives its yeast “several days to work its magic,”

while “some folks” use “frozen dough or dough made the same day.”

At or near the close of each of these ads, Papa John’s punctuated

its ingredient comparisons with the slogan “Bet ter Ingredients.

Better Pizza.”

Pizza Hut does not appear to contest the truthfulness of the

underlying factual assertions made by Papa John’s in the course of

these ads. Pizza Hut argues, however, that its own independent

taste tests and other “scientif ic evidence” establishes that6

filtered water makes no difference in pizza dough, that there is no

“taste” difference between Papa John’s “fresh-pack” sauce and Pizza

Hut’s “remanufactured” sauce, and that fresh dough is not superior

to frozen dough. In response to Pizza Hut’s “scientific evidence,”

Papa John’s asserts that “each of these ‘claims’ involves a matter

of common sense choice (fresh versus frozen, canned vegetables and

fruit versus remanufactured paste, and filtered versus unfiltered

water) about which individual consumers can and do form preferences

every day without ‘scientific’ or ‘expert’ assistance.”

In November 1997, Pizza Hut filed a complaint regarding Papa

John’s “Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.” advertising campaign

with the National Advertising Division of the Better Business

Bureau, an industry self-regulatory body. This complaint, however,

did not produce satisfactory results for Pizza Hut.

B

On Aug ust 12, 1998, Pizza Hut filed a civil action in the

Unit ed States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

charging Papa John’s with false advertising in violation of Section

43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act. The suit sought relief based on the

above-described TV ad campaigns, as well as on some 249 print ads.

On March 10, 1999, Pizza Hut fi led an amended complaint. Papa

John’s answered the complaints by denying that its advertising and

slogan violated the Lanham Act. Additionally, Papa John’s asserted1 Although Papa John’s did not object to the submission of the

issue of Lanham Act liability to the jury via special

interrogatories, it did object to the district court’s refusal to

submit special interrogatories on the essential elements of

materiality and inju ry. Specifically, Papa John’s submitted the

following proposed jury interrogatories: (1) “Do you find that

any false or misleading description or representation of fact in

Papa John’ s Slogan ‘Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.’ a re

material in that the y are likely to influence the purchasing

decisions of prospective purc hasers of pizza ? ” (emphasis added);

and (2) “Do you find that any facts or misleading descriptions or

representations of fact in Papa John’s Slogan ‘Better Ingredients.

Better Pizza.’ are likely to cause injury or damage to Pizza Hut in

terms of declining sales or loss of good will?” The district

court, without issuing written reasons, denied Papa John’s request

for specia l jury interrogatories on these two elements of Pizza

Hut’s prima facie case.

7 a counterclaim, charging Pizza Hut with engaging in false

advertising. The parties consented to a jury trial before a United

S tates magistrate judge. The parties further agreed that the

liability issues were to be decided by the jury, while the

equitable injunction claim and damages awar d were within the

province of the court.

The trial began on October 26, 1999, and continued for over

three weeks. At the close of Pizza Hut’s case, and at the close of

all evidence, Papa John’s moved for a judgment as a matter of law.

The motions were denied each time. The district court, without

objection, submitte d the liability issue to the jury through

special interrogatories. 1 The special issues submitted to the jury

related to (1) the slogan and (2) over Papa John’s objection,

certain classes of groups of advertisements referred to as “sauce2 Specifically, the j u ry answered “Yes” to each of the

following interrogator ies: (1) Did you find that Papa John’s

“Better Ingredients. Better Pizza” slogan is false or misleading,

and was a false or misleading description or representation of fact

which deceived or was likely to deceive a substantial number of the

consumers to whom the slogan was directed; (2) Did you find that

Papa John’s “sauce” claims are false or misleading, and was a false

or misleading description or representation of fact which deceived

or was likely to deceive a substantial number of the consumers to

whom the slogan was directed; and (3) Did you find that Papa John’s

“dough” claims are false or misleading, and was a false or

misleading description or representation of fact which deceived or

was likely to deceive a substantial number of the consumers to whom

the slogan was directed? Although the jury was specifically asked

whether the advertiseme nts were likely to deceive consumers, the

interrogatories failed to ask whether the deception created by

these advertisements was material to the consumers to which the ads

were directed--that is, whether consumers actually rel ied on the

misrepresentations in making purchasing decisions.

3 Specifically, the jury answered “No” to the following

interrogatories: (1) Did you find that Papa John’s “taste test”

commercials are a false or misleading description or representation

of fact which deceived or was likely to deceive a substantial

number of the consumers to whom the slogan was directed; and (2)

Did you find that Papa John’s “ingredients” claims are false or

misleading? The “ingredients” ads found not to be false or

8 claims,” “dough cla ims,” “taste test claims,” and “ingredients

claims.”

On November 17, 1999, the jury returned its responses to the

special issues finding that Papa John’s slogan, and its “sauce

claims” and “dough claims” were false or misleading and deceptive

or likely to deceive consumers. 2 The jury also determined that

Papa John’s “taste test” ads were not deceptive or likely to

deceive consumers, and that Papa John’s “ingredients claims” were

not false or misleading. 3 As to Papa John’s counterclaims againstmisleading did not include any of the “sauce” or “dough” ads.

4 Pizza Hut has n ot sought to appeal the jury’s verdict

regarding its advertising.

9 Pizza Hut, t he jury found that two of the three Pizza Hut

television ads at issue were false or misleading and deceptive or

likely to deceive consumers. 4

On January 3, 2000, the trial court, based upon the jury’s

verdict and the evidence presented by the parties in support of

injunctive relief and on the issue of damages, entered a Final

Judgment and issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order. The court

concluded that the “Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.” slogan was

“consistent wit h the legal definition of non-actionable puffery”

from its introduction in 1995 until May 1997. However, the slogan

“became tainted

. . . in light of the entirety of Papa John’s postMay 1997 adve rtising.” Based on this conclusion, the magistrate

judge permanently enjoined Papa John’s from “using any slogan in

the future that constitutes a recognizable variation of the phrase

“Better Ing redients. Better Pizza.” or which uses the adjective

“Better” to modify the terms “ingredients” and/or “pizza.”

Additionally, the court enjoined Papa John’s from identifying Frank

C arney as a co-founder of Pizza Hut, “unless such advertising

includes a voice-over, printed statement or a superimposed message

which states that Frank Carney has not been affiliated with Pizza10

Hut since 1980,” and enjoined the dissemination of any advertising

that was produced or disseminated prior to the date of this

judgment and that explicitly or implicitly states or suggested that

“Papa John’s component is superior to the same component of Pizza

Hut’s pizzas.” Finally, the court enjoined Papa John’s from

“explicitly or implicitly claim[ing] that a component of Papa

John’s pizza is superior to the same component of Pizza Hut’s

unless the superiority claim is supported by either (1)

scientifically demonstrated attributes of superiority or (2) taste

test surveys.” Additionally, the injunction required that if the

claim is supported by taste test surveys, the advertising shall

include a pri nted statement, voice-over or “super,” whichever is

appropriate, stating the localities where the tests were conducted,

the inclusive dates on which the surveys were performed, and the

specific pizza products that were tested. The court also awarded

Pizza Hut $467,619.75 in damages for having to run corrective ads.

On January 20, 2000, Papa John’s filed a notice of appeal with

our court . On January 26, we granted Papa John’s motion to stay

the district court’s injunction pending appeal.

II

We review the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment

as a matter of law de novo applying the same standards as the

district court. S ee Ensley v. Cody Resources, Inc.

, 171 F.3d 315,11

319 (5th Cir. 1999)(citing Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of Austin

, 138

F.3d 1036, 1042 (5th Cir. 1998)); N ero v. Industrial Molding

Corp.

, 167 F.3d 921 , 925 (5th Cir. 1999). In ruling on a motion

for judgment as a matter of law, we will consider all of the

evidence- -not just the evidence that supports the non-movant’s

case--but in the light most favorable to the non-movant. I d. The

granting of a judgment as a matter of law will be appropriate “if,

after a party has been fully heard by the jury on an issue, ‘there

is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to

[find] for that party with respect to that issue.’” R utherford v.

Harris County, Texas , 197 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1999)(quoting

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., v. Pendleton Detectives of Miss., Inc.

, 182

F.3d 376, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1999))(emphasis added).

Thu s, for purposes of this appeal, we will review the

evidence, in the most favorable light to Pizza Hut, to determine

if, as a matter of law, it is sufficient to support a claim of

false advertising under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.

III

A

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125,

provides in relevant part:

Any person who

. . . in commercial advertising or

promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,

quality, or geographic origin of his or another person’s

goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be12

liable in a civil action by any person who believes that

he or she is likely to be damaged by such act.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (West 1999). We have interpreted this

sect ion of the Lanham Act as providing “protection against a

‘myriad of deceptive commercial practices,’ including false

advertising or promotion.” S even-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.

, 86 F.3d

1379, 1387 (5th Cir. 1996)(quoting Resource Developers v. Statue of

Liberty-Ellis Island Found. , 926 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1991)).

A prima facie case of false advertising under section 43(a)

requires the plaintiff to establish:

(1) A false or misleading statement of fact about a

product;

(2) Such statement either deceived, or had the capacity

to deceive a substantial segment of potential

consumers;

(3) The deception is material, in that it is likely to

influence the consumer’s purchasing decision;

(4) The product is in interstate commerce; and

(5) The plaintif f has been or is likely to be injured

as a result of the statement at issue.

See Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber

, 893 F.2d 1488, 1500 (5th

Cir. 1990); Coo k, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern Cal.

Collection Serv. Inc.

, 911 F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir. 1990); 4 J.

Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy o n Trademarks and Unfair Competition,

§ 27:24 (4th ed. 1996). The failure to prove the existence of any

element of the prima facie case is fatal to the plaintiff’s claim.

Id.

B5 When construing the allegedly false or misleading statement

to determine if it is actionable u nder section 43(a), the

statement must be vie wed in the light of the overall context in

which it appears. S ee Avis

, 782 F.2d at 385; S outhland

, 108 F.3d

at 1139. “Fundamental to any task of interpretation is the

principle that text must yield to context.” A vis

, 782 F.2d at

385. Context will often help to determine whether the statement at

issue is so overblown and exaggerated that no reasonable consumer

would likely rely upon it. As the court in F e deral Express

Corporation v. United States Postal Services , 40 F.Supp. 2d 943

(W.D. Tenn. 1999), noted:

On its face, [the statement at issue] does not seem to be

the type of vague, general exaggeration which no

reasonable person would rely upon in making a purchasing

decision. Nevertheless, the determination of whether an

advertising statement should be deemed puffery is driven

by the context in which the statement is made. Where the

context of an advertising statement may lend greater

specificity to an otherwise vague representation, the

court should not succumb to the temptation to hastily

rule a phrase to be unactionable under the Lanham Act.

Id. at 956.

13 The law governing false advertising claims under section 43(a)

of the Lanham Act is well settled. In order to obtain monetary

damages or equitable relief in the form of an injunction, “a

plaintiff mu st demonstrate that the commercial advertisement or

promotion is either literally false, or that [if the advertisement

is not literally false,] it is likely to mislead and confuse

consumers.” S even-Up

, 86 F.3d at 1390 (citing McNeil-P.C.C., Inc.

v . Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. , 938 F.2d 1544, 1548-49 (2d Cir.

1991)); see also Johnson & Johnson v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.

, 960

F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1992). 5 If the state ment is shown to be14

misleading, the plaintiff must also introduce evidence of the

statement’s impact on con sumers, referred to as materiality.

American Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians and Surgeons v.

American Bd. of Podiatric Surgery, Inc.

, 185 F.3d 606, 614 (6th

Cir. 1999).

(1)

(a)

Essential to any claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act

is a determination of whether the challenged statement is one of

fact--actionable under section 43(a)--or one of general opinion--

not actionable under section 43(a). Bald assertions of superiority

or general statements of opinion cannot form the basis of Lanham

Act liability. S ee Presidio Enters., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Distrib.

Corp. , 784 F.2d 674, 685 (5th Cir. 1986); Groden v. Random House,

Inc.

, 61 F.3d 1045, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995)(citing Restatement (Third)

of Unfair Competition § 3 (1993)). Rather the statements at issue

must be a “specific and measurable claim, capable of being proved

false or of being reasonably interpreted as a statement of

objective fact.” Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title

Ins. Co.

, 173 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999); see also American

Council , 185 F.3d at 614(stating that “a Lanham Act claim must be

based upon a statement of fact, not of opinion”). As noted by our

court in Presidio : “[A] statement of fact is one that (1) admits15

of being adjudged true or false in a way that (2) admits of

empirical ver ification.” P residio

, 784 F.2d at 679; see also

Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co. , 108 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th

Cir. 1997)(stating that in order to constitute a statement of fact,

a stateme nt must make “a specific and measurable advertisement

claim of product superiority”).

(b)

One form of non-actionable statements of general opinion under

section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has been referred to as “puffery.”

Puffery has been discussed at some length by other circuits. The

Third Circuit has described “puffing” as “advertising that is not

deceptive for no one would rely on its exaggerated claims.” U.S.

Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia

, 898 F.2d

914 (3d Cir. 1990). Similarly, the Ni nth Circuit has defined

“puffing” as “exaggerated advertising, blustering and boasting upon

which no reasonable buyer would rely and is not actionable under

43(a ).” S outhland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co.

, 108 F.3d 1134,

1145 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on

Trademarks and Unfair Competition §27.04[4][d] (3d ed. 1994)); see

also Cook

, 911 F.2d at 246 (stating that “[p]uffing has been

described by most courts as involving outrageous generalized6 In the same vein, the Second Circuit has observed that

“statements of opinion are generally not the basis for Lanham Act

liability.” G roden v. Random House , 61 F.3d 1045, 1051 (2d Cir.

1995). When a statement is “obviously a statement of opinion,” it

cannot “reasonably be seen as stating or implying provable facts.”

Id. “The Lanham Act does not prohibit false statements generally.

It prohibits only false or misleading des cription or false or

misleading representations of fact made about one’s own or

another’s goods or services.” Id. at 1052.

7 McCarty on Trademarks goes on to state: “[V]ague advertising

claims that one’s product is ‘better’ than that of competitors’ can

be dismissed as mere puffing that is not actionable as false

advertisin g.” 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and

Unfair Competition § 27:38 (4th ed. 1997).

16 statements, not making specific claims, that are so exaggerated as

to preclude reliance by consumers”). 6

These definitions o f puffery are consistent with the

definitions provided by the leading commentaries in trademark law.

A leading authority on unfair competition has defined “puffery” as

an “exaggerated advertising, blustering, and boasting upon which no

reasonable buyer would rely,” or “a general claim of superi ority

over a comparative product that is so vague, it would be understood

as a mere expression of opinion.” 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy

on Trademark and Unfair Competition § 27.38 (4th ed. 1996). 7

Similarly, Prosser and Keeton on Torts defines “puffing” as “a

seller’s privilege to lie his head off, so long as he says nothing

specific, on the theory that no reasonable man would believe him,

or that no reasonable man would be influenced by such talk.”17

W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts

§ 109, at 757 (5th ed. 1984).

Drawing guidance from the writings of our sister circuits and

the leading commentators, we think that non-actionable “puffe ry”

comes in at least two possible forms: (1) an exaggerated,

blustering, and boasting statement upon which no reasonable buyer

would be justified in relying; or (2) a general claim of

superiority over comparable products that is so vague that it can

be understood as nothing more than a mere expression of opinion.

(2)

(a)

With respect to materiality, when t he statements of fact at

issue are shown to be literally false, the plaintiff need not

introduce evidence on the issue of the impact the statements had on

consumers. See Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp. , 977 F.2d 57,

62 (2d Cir. 1992); A vila v. Rubin

, 84 F.3d 222, 227 (7th C ir.

1996). In such a circumstance, the court will assume that the

statement s actually misled consumers. S ee American Council

, 185

F.3d at 614; Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. GAC Int’l, Inc. , 862 F.2d

975, 977 (2d Cir. 1988); U-Haul Inter’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc.

, 793

F.2d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 1986). On the other hand, if the

statements at issue are either ambiguous or true but misleading,

the plaintiff must present evidence of actu al deception. S ee18

American Council , 185 F.3d at 616; S mithkline

, 960 F.2d at 297

(stating that when a “plaintiff’s theory of recovery is premised

upon a claim of implied falsehood, a plaintiff must demonstrate, by

extrinsic evidence, that the challenged commercials tend to mislead

or confuse”); Avila , 84 F.3d at 227. The plaintiff may not rely

on the judge or t he jury to determine, “based solely upon his or

her own intuitive reaction, whether the adv ertisement is

deceptive.” S mithkline

, 960 F.2d at 297. Instead, proof of actual

deception requires proof that “consumers were actually deceived by

the defendant’s ambiguous or true-but-misleading statements.”

American Council , 185 F.3d at 616; see also Avis Rent A Car Sys.,

Inc. v. Hertz Corp.

, 782 F.2d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1986)(stating that

the plaintiff’s claim fails due to its failure to introduce

evidence establishing that the public was actually deceived by the

statements at issue).

(b)

The type of evidence needed to prove materiality also varies

depending on what type of recovery the plaintiff seeks. Plaintiffs

looking to recover monetary damages for false or misleading

advertising that is not literally false must prove actual

deception. S ee Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Ind.

, 204 F.3d

683, 690 (6th Cir. 2000); Resource Developers

, 926 F.2d at 139.

Plaintiffs attempting to prove actual deception have to produce19

evidence of actual consumer reaction to the challenged advertising

or surveys showing that a substantial number of consumers were

actually misled by the advertise ments. S ee, e.g.

, PPX Enters.,

Inc. v. Autofidelity Enters., Inc.

, 818 F.2d 266, 271 (2d Cir.

1987) (“Actual consumer confusion often is demonstrated through the

use of direct evidence, e.g., testimony from members of the buying

public, as well as through circumstantial evidence, e.g., consumer

surveys or consumer reaction tests.”).

Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief must prove that

defendant’s representations “have a tendency to deceive consumers.”

Balance Dynamics

, 204 F.3d 683 at 690. See also Resource

Developers

, 926 F.2d at 139; Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. American

Simmental Assoc.

, 178 F.3d 1035, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 1999); B lack

Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc. , 633 F.2d 746, 753 (8th

Cir. 1980); 4 McCarty on Trademark and Unfair Competition § 27:36

(4th ed.). Although this standard requires less proof than actual

deception, plaintiffs must still produce evidence that the

advertisement tends to deceive consumers. S ee Coca-Cola Co. v.

Tropicana Prod., Inc.

, 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting

that when seeking a preliminary injunction barring an advertisement

that is implicitly false, “its tendency to violate the Lanham Act

by misleading, confusing or deceiving should be t ested by public

reaction”). To prove a tendency to deceive, plaintiffs need to20

show that at least some consumers were confus ed by the

advertisements. See, e.g.

, American Council , 185 F.3d at 618

(“Although plaintiff need not present consumer surveys or testimony

demonstrating actual deception, it must present evidence of some

sort demonstrating that consumers were misled.”)

IV

We turn now to consider the case bef ore us. Reduced to its

essence, the question is whether the evidence, viewed in the most

favorable light to Pizza Hut, established that Papa John’s slogan

“Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.” is misleading and violative of

section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. In making this determination, we

will first consider the slogan “Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.”

standing alone to determine if it is a statement of fact capable of

deceiving a substantial segment of the consuming public to which it

was directed. Second, we will determine whether the evidence

supports the district court’s conclusion that after May 1997, the

slogan was tainted, and therefore actionable, as a result of its

use in a series of ads comparing specific ingredients used by Papa

John’s with the ingredients used by its “competitors.”

A

The jury concluded that the slogan itself was a “false or

misleading” statement of fact, and the district court enjoined its

further use. Papa John’s argues, however, that this statement21

“quite simply is not a statement of fact, [but] rather, a statement

o f belief or opinion, and an argumentative one at that.” Papa

John’s asserts that because “a statement of fact is either true or

false, it is susceptible to being proved or disproved. A statement

of opinion or belief, on the other hand, conveys the speaker’s

state of mind, and even though it may be used to attempt to

persuade the listener, it is a subjective communication that may be

accepted or rejected, but not proven true or false.” Papa John’s

contends that its slogan “Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.” falls

into the latter category, and because the phrases “better

ingredients” and “better pizza” are not subject to quantifiable

measures, the slogan is non-actionable puffery.

We will therefore consider whether the slogan standing alone

constitutes a statement of fact under the Lanham Act. Bisecting

the slogan “Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.,” it is clear that

the assertion by Papa John’s that it makes a “Better Pizza.” is a

general statement of opinion regarding the superiority of its

product over all others. This simple statement, “Better Pizza.,”

epitomizes the exaggerated advertising, blustering, and boasting by

a manufacturer upon which no consumer would reasonably rely. S ee,

e.g.

, In re Boston Beer Co.

, 198 F.3d 1370, 1 372 (Fed. Cir.

1999)(stating that the phrase “The Best Beer in America” was “trade

puffery” and that such a general claim of superiority “should be8 It should be noted that Pizza Hut uses the slogan “The Best

Pizza U nder One Roof.” Similarly, other nationwide pizza chains

employ slogans touting their pizza as the “best”: (1) Domino’s

Pizza uses the slogan “Nobody Delivers Better.”; (2) Danato’s uses

the slogan “Best Piz za on the Block.”; (3) Mr. Gatti’s uses the

slogan “Best Pizza in Town: Honest!; and (4) Pizza Inn uses the

slogans “Best Pizza Ever.” and “The Best Tasting Pizza.”

22 freely available to all competitors in any given field to refer to

their product s or services”); A tari Corp v. 3D0 Co.

, 1994 WL

723601, *2 (N.D. Ca l. 1994)(stating that a manufacturer’s slogan

that its product was “the most advanced home gaming system in the

universe” was non-actionable puffery); N ikkal Indus., Ltd. v.

Salton, Inc. , 735 F. Supp. 1227, 1234 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)(stating

that a manufacturers claim that its ice cream maker was “better”

than competition ice cream makers is no n -actionable puffery).

Consequently, i t appears indisputable that Papa John’s assertion

“Better Pizza.” is non-actionable puffery. 8

Moving next to consider separately the phrase “Better

Ingre dients.,” the same conclusion holds true. Like “Better

Pizza.,” it is typical puffery. The word “better,” when used in

t his context is unquantifiable. What makes one food ingredient

“better” than another comparable ingredient, without further

description, is wholly a matter of individual taste or preference

not subject to scientific quantification. Indeed, it is difficult

to think of any product, or any component of any product, to which23

the term “better,” without more, is quantifiable. As our court

stated in Presidio :

The law recognizes that a vendor is allowed some latitude

in claiming merits of his wares by way of an opinion

rather than an absolute guarantee, so long as he hews to

the line of rectitude in matters of fact. Opinions are

not only the lifestyle of democracy, they are the brag in

advertising that has made for the wide dissemination of

products that other wise would never have reached the

households of our citizens. If we were to accept the

thesis set forth by the appellees, [that all statements

by advertisers were statements of fact actionable under

the Lanham Act,] the advertising industry would have to

be liquidated in short order.

Presidio

, 784 F.2d at 685. Thus, it is equally clear that Papa

John’s assertion that it uses “Better Ingredients.” is one of

opinion not actionable under the Lanham Act.

Finally, turning to the combination of the two non-actionable

phrases as the slogan “Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.,” we fail

to see how the mere joining of these two statements of opinion

could create an actionab le statement of fact. Each half of the

slogan amounts to little more than an exaggerated opinion of

superiori ty that no consumer would be justified in relying upon.

It has not been explained convincingly to us how the combination of

the two phrases, without more, changes the essential nature of each

phrase so as to make it actionable. We assume that “Better

Ingredients.” modifies “Better Pizza.” and consequently gives some

expanded meaning to the phrase “Better Pizza,” i.e., our pizza is24

better because our ingredients are better. Nevertheless, the

phrase fails to give “Better Pizza.” any more quantifiable meaning.

Stated diff erently, the adjective that continues to describe

“pizza” is “better,” a term that remains unquantifiable, especially

when applied to the sense of taste. Consequently, the slogan as a

whole is a statement of non-actionable opinion. Thus, there is no

legally suffici ent basis to support the jury’s finding that the

slogan standing alone is a “false or misleading” statement of fact.25 B

We next will consider whether the use of the slogan “Better

Ingredients. Better Pizza.” in connection with a series of

comparative ads found by the jury to be misleading--specifically,

ads comparing Papa John’s sauce and dough with the sauce and dough

of its competitors--“tainted” the statement of opinion and made it

misleading under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Before reaching

the ultimate question of whether the slogan is actionable under the

Lanham Act, we will first examine the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the jury’s conclusion that the comparison ads were

misleading.

(1)

After the jury returned its verdict, Papa John’s filed a postverdict motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 for a

judgment as a matter of law. In denying Papa John’s motion, the

district court, while apparently recognizing that the slogan

“Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.” standing alone is nonactionable puffery under the Lanham Act, concluded that after May

1997, the slogan was transformed as a result of its u s e in

connection with a series of ads that the jury found misleading.

These ads had compared specific ingredients used b y Papa John’s9 In its memorandum opinion addressing Papa John’s post-verdict

Rule 50 motion, the court stated:

Although Papa Jo hn’s started in May 1995 with a slogan

which was essentially ambiguous and self-laudatory,

consistent with the legal definition of non-actionable

puffery, Papa John’s deliberately and intentionally

exploited its slogan as a centerpiece of its subsequent

advertising campaign after May 1997 which falsely

portrayed Papa Johns’s tomato sauce and pizza dough as

being superior to the sauce and dough components used in

Pizza Hut’s pizza products. When the “Better

Ingredients. Better Pizza.” slogan is considered in

light of the entirety of Papa John’s post-May 1997

advertising which violated the provisions of the Lanham

Act and in the context in which it was juxtaposed with

the false and misleading statements contained i n Papa

John’s print and broadcast media advertising, the slogan

itself became tainted to the extent that it s continued

use should be enjoined.

26 with the ingredients used by its competitors. 9 In essence, the

district court held that the comparison ads in which the slogan

appeared as the tag line gave objective, quantifiable, and factspecific meaning to the slogan. Consequently, the court concluded

that the slogan was misleading and actionable under section 43(a)

of the Lanham Act and enjoined its further use.

(2)

We are obligated to accept the findings of the jury unless the

facts point so overwhelmingly in favor of one party that no

reasonable person could arrive at a different conclusion. S ee

Scottish Heritable Trust v. Peat Marwick Main & Co. , 81 F.3d 606,

610 (5th Cir. 1996). In examining the record evidence, we must27

view it the way that is most favorable to upholding the verdict.

See Hiltgen v. Sumrall , 47 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995). Viewed

in this light, it is clear that there is sufficient evidence to

support the jury’s conclusion that the sauce and dough ads were

misleading statements of fact actionable under the Lanham Act.

Turning first to the sauce ads, the evidence establishes that

despite the dif ferences in the methods used to produce their

competing sauces: (1) the primary ingredient in both Pizza Hut and

Papa John’s sauce is vine-ripened tomatoes; (2) at the point that

the competing sauces are placed on the pizza, just prior to putting

the pies into the oven for cooking, the consistency and water

content of the sauces are essentially identical; and (3) as noted

by the district court, at no time “prior to the clo se of the

liability phase of trial was any credible evidence presented [by

Papa John’s] t o demonstrate the existence of demonstrable

differences” in the competing sauces. Consequently, the district

court was correct in concluding that: “Without any scientific

support or properly conducted taste preference test, by the written

and/or oral negative connot ations conveyed that pizza made from

tomato paste concentrate is inferior to the ‘fresh pack’ method

used by Papa John’s, its sauce advertisements conveyed an

impression which is misleading. . . .” Turning our focus to the

dough ads, while the evidence clearly established that Papa John’s1 0 The testimony of Pizza Hut’s expert, Dr. Faubion, established

that although consumers stated a preference for fresh dough rather

than frozen dough, w hen taste tests were conducted, respondents

were unable to distinguish between pizza made on fresh as opposed

to frozen dough.

28 and Pizza Hut employ different methods in making their pizza dough,

again, the evidence established that there is no quantifiable

difference between pizza dough produced through the “cold or slowf ermentation method” (used by Papa John’s), or the “frozen do ugh

method” (used by Pizza Hut). 10 Further, although there is some

evidence indicating that the texture of the dough used by Papa

John’s and Pizza Hut is slightly different, this difference is not

related to the manufacturing process used to produce the dough.

Instead, it is due to a difference in the wheat used to make the

dough. Finally, with respect to the differences in the pizza dough

resulting from the use of filtered water as opposed to tap water,

the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that there is

no quantifiable difference between dough produced with tap water,

as opposed to dough produced with filtered water.

We should note again that Pizza Hut does not contest the

truthfulness of the underlying factual assertions made by P apa

John’s in the course of the sauce and dough ads. Pizza Hut

concedes that it uses “remanufactured” tomato s auce to make its

pizza sauce, while Papa John’s uses “fresh-pack.” Further, in

regard to the dough, Pizza Hut concedes the truth of the assertion29

that it uses tap water in making its pizza dough, which is often

frozen, while Papa John’s uses filtered water to make its dough,

which is fresh--never frozen. Consequently, because Pizza Hut does

n ot contest the factual basis of Papa John’s factual assertio ns,

such assertions cannot be found to be factually false, but only

impliedly false or misleading.

Thus, we conclude by saying that although the ads were true

about the ingredients Papa John’s used, it is clear that there was

sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury’s conclusion

that Pa pa John’s sauce and dough ads were misleading--but not

false--in their sug gestion that Papa John’s ingredients were

superior.

(3)

Thus, having concluded that the record supports a finding that

the sauce and dough ads are misleading statements of fact, we must

now determine whether the district court was correct in concluding

that the use of the slogan “Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.” in

conjunction with these misleading ads gave quantifiable meaning to

the slogan making a general statement of opinion misleading within

the meaning of the Lanham Act.

In support of the district court’s conclusion that the slogan

was transformed, Pizza Hut argues that “in construing any

advertising statement, the statement must be considered i n the30

overall context in which it appears.” Building on the foundation

of this basic legal principle, see Avis

, 782 F.2d at 385, Pizza Hut

argues that “[t]he context in which Papa John’s slogan must be

viewed is the 2 1⁄2 year campaign during which its advertising served

as ‘chapters’ to demonstrate the truth of the ‘Better Ingredients.

Better Pizza.’ book.” Pizza Hut argues, that because Papa John’s

gave consumers specific facts supporting its assertion that its

sauce and dough are “better”--specific facts that the evid ence,

when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, are

irrelevant in making a better pizza--Papa John’s statement of

opinion that it made a “Better Pizza” became misleading. In

essence, Pizza Hut argues, that by using the slogan “Better

Ingredients. Better Pizza.” in combination with the ads comparing

Papa John’s sauce and dough with the sauce and dough of its

competitions, Papa John’s gave quantifiable meaning to the word

“Better” rendering it actionable under section 43(a) of the Lanham

Act.

We agree that the message communicated by the slogan “Better

Ingredients. Better Pizza.” is expanded and given additional

meaning when it is used as the tag line in the misleading sauce and

dough ads. The slogan, when used in combination with the

comparison ads, gives consumers two fact-specific reasons why Papa

John’s ingredients are “better. ” Consequently, a reasonable1 1 The judgment of the district court enjoining the future use

by Papa John’s of the slogan “Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.”

did not simply bar Papa John’s use of the slogan in future ads

comparing its sauce and dough with that of its competitors.

Rather, the injunction permanently enjoined any future use of the

slogan “in associ a tion with the sale, promotion and/or

identification of pizza products sold under the Papa John’s name.”

Further, the injunction precluded Papa John’s from using the

“a djective ‘better’ to modify the terms ‘ingredients’ and/or

‘pizza.’” While it is clear that the jury did not make any finding

to support such a broad injunction, and Pizza Hut offered no survey

evidence indicating how potential consumers viewed the slogan, the

district court concluded that the evidence established that

Papa John’s deliberately and intentionally exploited its

slogan as a centerpiece of its subsequent adver tising

campaign after May 1997 which falsely portrayed Papa

John’s tomato sauce and pizza dough as being superior to

the sauce an d dough components used in Pizza Hut’s

products.

. . . [Thus,] the slogan itself became tainted

to the extent that its continued use should be enjoined.

Our review of the record convinces us that there is simply no

31 consumer would understand the slogan, w hen considered in the

context of the comparison ads

, as conveying the following message:

Papa John’s uses “better ingredi ents,” which produces a “better

pizza” because Papa John’s uses “fresh-pack” tomatoes, fresh dough,

and filtered water. In short, Papa John’s has given definition to

the word “better.” Thus, when the slogan is used in this context,

it is no longer mere opinion, but rather takes on the

characteristics of a statement of fact. When used in the context

of the sauce and dough ads, the slogan is misleading for the same

reasons we have earlier discussed in connection with the sauce and

dough ads. 11evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that the slogan

was irreparably tainted as a result of its u se in the misleading

comparison sauce and dough ads. At issue in this case were some

249 print ads and 29 television commercials. After a thorough

review of the record, we liberally construe eight print ads to be

sauce ads, six print ads to be dough ads, and six print ads to be

both sauce and dough ads. Further, we liberally construe nine

television commercials to be sauce ads and two television

commercials to be dough ads. Consequently, out of a total of 278

print and television ads, the slogan appeared in only 31 ads that

could be liberally construed to be misleading sauce or dough ads.

We find si mply no evidence, survey or otherwise, to support

the district court’s conclusion that the advertisements that the

jury found misleading--ads that constituted only a small fraction

of Papa John’s use of the slogan--somehow had become encoded in the

minds of consumers such that the mention of the slogan reflectively

brought to mind the misleading statements conveyed by the sauce and

dough ads. Thus, based on the record before us, Pizza Hut has

failed to offer sufficient evidence to support the district court’s

conclusion that the slogan had become forever “tainted” by its use

as the tag line in the handful of misleading comparison ads.

32 (4)

Concluding that when the slogan was u sed as the tag line in

the sauce and dough ads it became misleading, we must now determine

whether reasonable consumers would have a tendency to rely on this

misleading statement of fact in making their purchasing decisions.

We conclude that Pizza Hut has failed to adduce evidence

establishing that the misleading statement of fact conveyed by the

ads and the slogan was material to the consumers to which the

slogan was directed. Consequently, because such evidence of

materiality is necessary to establish liability under the Lanham1 2 Since Pizza Hut sought only equitable relief and no monetary

damages, it was required to offer evidence sufficient to establish

that the claims made by Papa John’s had the “ t endency to dec eive

consumers ,” rather than evidence indicating that the claims made by

Papa John’s actually deceived consumers

. A merican Council

, 185

F.3d at 606; see also Balance Dynamics , 204 F.3d at 690 (emphasis

added).

33 Act, the district court erred in denying Papa John’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law.

As previously discussed, none of the underlying facts

supporting P apa John’s claims of ingredient superiority made in

connection with the slogan were literally false. Consequently, in

order to satisfy its prima facie case, Pizza Hut was required to

submit evidence establishing that the impliedly false or misleading

statements were material to, that is, they had a tendency to

influence the purchasing decisions of, the consumers to which they

were directed. 12 S ee American Council

, 185 F.3d at 614 ( stating

that “a plaintiff relying upon statements that are literally true

yet misleading cannot obtain relief by arguing how consumers could

react; it must show how consumers actually do react”); Smithkline

,

960 F.2d at 298; S andoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc.

,

902 F.2d 22 2, 228-29 (3d Cir. 1990); A vis

, 782 F.2d at 386; see

also 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair

Competition, § 27:35 (4th ed. 1997)(stating that the “[p]laintiff

must make some showing that the defendant’s misrepresentation was

‘material’ in the sense that it would have some effect on1 3 In Johnson & Johnson v. Smithkl ine Beecham Corp. , 960 F.2d

294 (2d Cir. 1992), the Second Circuit discussed this requirement

in some detail:

Where, as here, a plaintiff’s theory of recovery is

premised upon a claim of implied falsehood, a plaintiff

must demonstrate, by extrinsic evidence, that the

challenged commercials tend to mislead or confuse

consumers. It is not for the judge to determine, based

solely upon his or her own intuitive reaction whether the

advertisement is deceptive. Rather, as we have

reiterated in the past, ‘the question in such cases is--

what does the person to whom the advertisement is

addressed find to be the message?’ That is, what does

the public perceive the message to be.

The answer to this question is pivotal because,

w here the advertisement is literally true, it is often

the only measure by which a court can determine whether

a commercial’s net communicative effect is misleading.

Thus, the success of a plaintiff’s implied falsity claim

usually turns on the persuasiveness of a consumer survey.

Id. at 287-98.

34 consumers’ purchasing decision”). 13 We conclude that the evidence

proffered by Pizza Hut fails to make an adequate showing.

In its appellate brief and during the course of oral argument,

Pizza Hut directs our attention to three items of evidence in the

record that it asserts establishes material ity to consumers.

First, Pizza Hut points to the results of a survey conducted by an

“independent expert” (Dr. Dupont) regarding the use of the slogan

“Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.” as written on Papa John’s

pizza box (t he box survey). The results of the box survey,1 4 Pizza Hut has not sought review on appeal of the district

c ourt’s ruling that the results of the box survey were

inadmissible.

35 however, were excluded by the district court. 14 Consequently, these

survey results provide no basis for the jury’s finding.

Second, Pizza Hut points to two additional surveys conducted

by Dr. Dupont that attempted to measure consumer perception of Papa

John’s “taste test” ads. This survey evidence, however, fails to

address Pizza Hut’s claim of materiality with respect to the

slogan. Moreover, the jury rejected Pizza Hut’s claims of

deception with regard to Papa John’s “taste test” ads--the very ads

at issue in these surveys.

Finally, Pizza Hut attempts to rely on Papa John’s own

tracking studies and on the alleged subjective inten t of Papa

John’s executives “to create a perception that Papa John’s in fact

uses better ingredients” to demonstrate materiality. Although Papa

John’s 1998 Awareness, Usage & Attitude Tracking Study showed that

48% of the respondents believe that “Papa John’s has better

ingredients than other national pizza chains,” the study failed to

indicate whether the conclusions resulted from the advertisements

at issue, or from personal eating experiences, or from a

combination of both. Consequently, the results of this study are

not reliable or probative to test whether the slogan was material.

Further, Pizza Hut provides no precedent, and we are aware of none,1 5 It is unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the district

court committed reversib le error when it refused to submit Papa

John’s proposed special j u ry interrogatories on the essential

Lanham Act elements of materiality and injury. See supra note 2.

However, given our clear precedent that once a case is submitted to

the jury via special interrogatories, “the judge must submit all

material issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence,” the

correctness of the district court’s refusal to submit instructions

on these two essential issues is doubtful. Simien v. S.S. Kresge

Co. , 566 F.2d 551, (5th Cir. 1978); see also Huddleston v. Herman

& MacLean

, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’d in part and rev’d in

part on other grounds , 459 U.S. 375 (1983); N ance v. Gulf Oil

Corp.

, 817 F.2d 1176, 1180-81 (5th Cir. 1987); 9A Wright and

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2506 173-79 (1995)(stating

that “all material factual issues should be covered by the

questions submitted to enable a verdict to be rendered on the

entire dispute on the basis of the jury’s response”).

36 that stands for the proposition that the subjective intent of the

defendant’s corporate executives to convey a particular message is

evidence of the fact that consumers in fact relied on the message

to make their purchases. Thus, this evidence does not address the

ultimate issue of materiality.

In short, Pizza Hut has failed to offer probative evidence on

whether the misleading facts conveyed by Papa John’s throug h its

slogan were material to consumers: that is to say, there is no

evidence demonstrating that the slogan had the tendency to deceive

consumers so as to affect their purchasing decisions. S ee American

Council , 185 F.3d at 614; Blue Dane , 178 F.3d at 1042-43; Sandoz

Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc. , 902 F.2d 222, 228-29 (3d

Cir. 1990). Thus, the district court erred in denying Papa John’s

motion for judgment as a matter of law. 15Additi onally, we note that the district court erred in

requiring Papa John’s to modify the Carney ads and the taste test

ads. The Carney ads were removed from the jury’s consideration by

Pizza Hut, and the jury expressly concluded that the taste test ads

were not actionable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Thus,

the district court, lacking the necessary factual predicate, abused

its discretion in ordering Papa John’s to modify these ads.

37 V

In sum, we hold that the slogan “Better Ingredients. Better

Pizza.” standing al one is not an objectifiable statement of fact

upon which consumers would be justified in relying. Thus, it does

not constitute a false or misleading statement of fact actionable

under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.

Additionally, while the slogan, when appearing in the context

of some of the post-May 1997 comparative advertising--specifically,

the sauce and dough campaigns--was given objectifiable meaning and

thus became misleading and actionable, Pizza Hut has failed to

adduce sufficient evidence establishing that the misleading facts

conveyed by the slogan were material to the consumers to which it

was directed. Thus, Pizza Hut failed to produce evidence of a

Lanham Act violation, and the district court erred in denying Papa

John’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Therefore, the judgment o f the district court denying Papa

John’s motion for judgment as a matter of law is REVERSED; the

final jud gment of the district court is VACATED; and the case is

REMANDED for entry of judgment for Papa John’s.38 REVERSED, VACATED, and

REMANDED with instructions.