Middle East Studies

at the Marine Corps University

MES Monographs • No. 5 September 2013

Finding a Measured Response

to Iran’s Activities

Bradley N. Fultz
Middle East Studies 

Monograph Series

As part of its mission to broaden U.S. Marine Corps access to

information and analysis through publishing, Middle East Studies at

Marine Corps University (MES) has established different

mechanisms to disseminate relevant publications, including a

Monograph Series. The aim of the MES Monograph Series is to

publish original research papers on a wide variety of subjects

pertaining to the Middle East and South and Central Asia. The focus

of the Monograph Series is on timely subjects with strategic

relevance to current and future concerns of the U.S. Professional

Military Education community.

This fifth issue of the MES Monograph Series features a paper by

Major Bradley N. Fultz (USMC) on finding measured responses that

the United States can employ to engage the Islamic Republic of Iran

based on the tit for tat strategy of game theory. Major Fultz finished

this paper while attached to MES as part of the AFPAK Hands

program in 2012-2013. 

The MES Monograph Series will be available both in print and electronically through the MES website at www.mcu.usmc.mil under the

“Middle East” tab as well as on Facebook at middleeaststudies.mcu.

For information on obtaining print copies, please contact Mr. Adam

C. Seitz, Senior Associate at MES, at seitzac@grc.usmcu.edu,

telephone number (703) 432-5260. 

We welcome comments from readers on the content of the series as

well as recommendations for future monograph topics.

Amin Tarzi

Director, Middle East Studies

Marine Corps University

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the

Department of Defense, the U.S. Marine Corps, or Marine Corps

University.
Finding a Measured Response to Iran’s Activities

by Bradley N. Fultz

“Carrot and Stick” is the current diplomatic approach used by the U.S. Department of State regarding Iran.

The term carrot and stick does not translate well in Persian. In fact, it portrays the image of a master

standing in front of a donkey using carrots as a reward for appropriate behavior, and beatings when the

donkey steps out of line as to teach a memorable lesson. For it is the donkey that is not smart enough to

understand commands, nuance, altruism, and balance. Reward and punishment motivate the donkey to bend

to its masters will. This is an offensive image in the mind of the Iranians, the descendants of the rich and

advanced Persian culture. Cultural sensitivities aside, is the carrot and stick approach the proper one when

dealing with the Iranians? It is not the carrot and stick analogy with all its simplicity that is most applicable,

but tit for tat. Both sides have loosely followed tit for tat since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. What do the

events of the past thirty-three years in which the U.S. and Iran have squared off in what David Crist titles a

“Twilight War” teach us about dealing with Iran tactically, operationally and strategically? 1 Is it appropriate to bend to Iranian will while respecting Tehran’s interests and expect altruistic policies to be reciprocated

accordingly? Are the interests of the United States and Iran so wholly opposed that any divergence from

Realpolitik will be viewed as weakness ultimately compromising U.S. interests? As the drums of war with

Iran beat in cyclical patterns within policy circles in Washington, it is important to include the lessons of the

past in application of strategic and tactical decisions of the future. 

This monograph analyzes a significant number of recent incidents between the U.S. and the Islamic

Republic. Basis for the analysis is the tit for tat model (taken from Game theory as described below). The

independent variable is the character of confrontation and the dependent variable is the nature of responses

between the two actors. Due to a slew of reasons and conflicting interests that will be outlined, disagreements

between the U.S. and Iran are a near certainty. It is the nature of responses however that will shape future

conduct. The tit for tat model provides the most effective foundation for determining and predicting the

appropriate nature of response. Use of force in encounters vis-à-vis Iran will be examined, and the

consequences of backing down in comparison to meeting threats with aggressive responses will be analyzed.

In other cases, government rhetoric and responses to it will be considered. The work will provide ideas for

consideration vice direct policy driven recommendations. 

Tit for Tat, otherwise known as equivalent retaliation was initially introduced as a gaming strategy to solve

the Prisoners Dilemma in Robert Axelrod’s book, The Evolution of Cooperation. In his study based on

computer gaming models, Axelrod concluded tit for tat provided the most beneficial outcome when

“coping in an environment of mutual power.”2 Axelrod concludes that what makes tit for tat so successful

is its combination of “being nice, retaliatory, forgiving, and clear.”3 Tit for tat does not have solely negative

or positive connotations. The model begins with a placating move and then responds according to its

Measured Response 1
adversary on every subsequent interaction. Therefore, tit for tat models begin with cooperation, are

immediately forgiving, and ignore previous interactions, regardless of how negative they may be. In the

same sense, a negative behavior is responded to in kind, every time. Furthermore, the model is clear and

understandable, making long-term cooperation more likely. The gaming model was proven as effective as

it was simple in multiple tests pitted against a wide variety of other computer models.4 But the world is not

a computer and intra-state relationships are not games. 

International relations cannot be based solely on computer gaming models. Other stressors and influencers

affect even the simplest of decisions in foreign policy, domestic constraints being primary amongst them.

Contrary to the gaming model, reciprocity has varied values, meaning that responses to a defection of

behavioral norms vary depending on their severity, and as Peter Munson states, “memories matter.”5 Each

actor will rate the severity of a cooperative or antagonistic behavior based on their own interpretation of the

situation. What is an appropriate response to Iranian antagonism? Is a softer, perhaps more altruistic counter

to aggression apt to invite reciprocity, or encourage further belligerence? The analysis provides historical

background to appropriate and inappropriate responses to Iranian actions and accompanying consequences

to those respective decisions, all within the tit for tat framework.

Based on recent history and thirty-three years of tactical and operational level decision-making by the

Iranian regime, one can find consistencies in behaviors when facing confrontation. Victory in a

confrontation is not solely defined by holding physical ground, but holds a more modern interpretation of

also coercing the adversary to bend to ones will. The axiom of “war is politics carried out by other means”

is certainly applicable in this research.6 Iran is apt to make decisions based on the Realist model of interstate

relations meaning simply that Tehran is most likely to act in self-interest viewing any interactions with the

United States as a zero sum game. Iran will be skeptical in pursuing moral or altruistic objectives in this

relationship and will continue to antagonize perceived and real threats until faced with harsh responses

making the confrontation no longer advantageous.7 Historically Tehran has backed down from encounters

when opposed strongly and has searched for alternative or indirect ways to deescalate the given situation.

History also shows Iran rarely compromises its ends, but adeptly adjusts its means. For a breakthrough in

cooperation to occur; if a breakthrough is even possible, the United States must make public spectacles of

moderation and allow Iran to look the diplomatic victor. That may not be what is best for America, or its

allies however. An Iran unchained by international pressure could quickly become a menace in the region

and throughout the world. 

Modern relations between Iran and the United States trace back to 1945 when President Franklin D.

Roosevelt met with Saudi King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud to create the Arab-American Oil Company, marking

the official beginning of U.S. oil interests in the region. Key events since include the 1946 U.S. stand against

Soviet troops remaining in Iran, the 1948 creation of the State of Israel, the 1953 CIA backed ousting of

Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, and the marriage of convenience between the United States

and the Shah of Iran in the years between 1953 and 1978.8 All mark as foundations for the relationship

between the two nations. Although the seeds of dissent are rooted, (especially on the Iranian side) it is the

admittance of the Shah of Iran into the United States for medical treatment and the subsequent sacking of

the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in late 1979 which marks the turning point of official and government hostility

between the two states. The sacking of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran is the point in history where legitimate

grievances of the past were finally exposed within the international arena. This event also serves as the

launch point of this monograph. 

2 Bradley N. Fultz
Incidents of confrontation between the United States and the Islamic Republic: 1978-2012

Hostage taking and U.S. response

On 4 November 1979 Islamist youths stormed and occupied the U.S. Embassy in Tehran taking sixty-six

American citizens and diplomats hostage in the process. This ordeal enflamed by revolutionary zeal was

adopted by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and lasted 444 days until 20 January 1981. The fifthy-two

remaining hostages were freed the day Ronald Reagan was inaugurated President of the United States. The

Iran Hostage crisis should not be looked at in a vacuum, but in the context of other events of the time.

International events of the era clearly show the severity of world affairs and sober the pessimists of today.

In the months between February and December of 1979 a number of substantial circumstances collided.

The Shah of Iran was replaced by Ayatollah Khomeini concluding one of the most dramatic revolutions in

the history of the world, Iran isolated itself internationally through the sacking of the U.S. Embassy, the

Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan immediately to Iran’s east, and finally in September of 1980 the Iraqi

Army invaded Iran. 

During the Iran hostage crisis one military engagement was attempted. A daring poorly timed and planned

special operations mission named Operation Eagle Claw, which resulted in the crashing of a U.S. helicopter into a refueling jet in the middle of the Iranian desert. The mission was aborted and eight U.S. service

personnel were killed. The events surrounding the hostage crisis were a debacle, a public humiliation and

ultimately contributed to the downfall of the Carter Administration. The failure of the Eagle Claw mission

scored a major victory for the new Islamic regime and likely “prolonged the crisis... as the witnessing of yet

another American humiliation reinforced the determination” of Iran.9 Operation Eagle Claw was not the sole

attempt to free the hostages. The U.S. used economic sanctions, international isolation, and attempted

diplomacy to reestablish relations with the Iranian regime and get the hostages released. No outside

stressors attempted motivated the revolutionary government to release the hostages. The attack on the

embassy and subsequent hostage taking was viewed domestically as a justified response to over twenty-five

years of American intervention in Iran, a clear message to the West that Iran was no longer a puppet and

would be treated as an independent and strong equal.10 Tehran’s greatest concern during the revolution was

its legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian people. The hostage taking energized the base of the regimes

support, united the country and consolidated power during this weakened time.11 By August of 1980, less than

a year following the hostage taking Ayatollah Khomeini gave the instructions to find a solution to the hostage

crisis because “it was no longer in Iran’s interest to prolong it.”12 A month later, when Iraq invaded into the

Iranian oil-rich province of Khuzestan, the hostages had become a true burden. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq

replaced the hostages as the required unifying villain.13

There are two primary lessons from this ordeal. First, the relative international indifference to the September 1980 Iraqi invasion into Khuzestan indicated a form of isolation detrimental to regime survival. Secondly,

the hostages were no longer serving the purpose of uniting the nation under the new government. Adversely,

the hostages were becoming a hindrance and justification for the world to ignore the Iraqi violation of the

internationally recognized Algiers Accord.14 It came down to calculation of threats and pragmatic interests

for the revolutionary regime. In retrospect, the Carter Administration has taken significant criticism for not

acting more firmly with the Iranians in the wake of the hostage crisis. U.S. calculation prevented action

against the Iranians as long as they controlled the hostages. This paralyzed a military response. The U.S.

could not invade for fear the hostages would be killed. On the other hand it was exactly this weak and

predictable reaction that allowed Tehran to dictate how the crisis would play out. The inaction of the United

States likely set the stage for future antagonistic behaviors by the Iranians towards U.S. interests in the

region. An aggressive move on behalf of the Carter Administration would have certainly forced the

Measured Response 3
Iranians to alter their own estimations, if not in 1980 than in future encounters. The needed aggressive move

that arrived with no coordination with the U.S., came from the Iraqi army, who themselves were looking to

gain advantage from the Iranian weakened and divided situation.

U.S. Support for Iraq during Iran-Iraq War

On 22 September 1980, six months of skirmishes between neighbors climaxed when twenty-two Iraqi Army

divisions crossed into Iran reclaiming disputed territory. Iraq’s stated political objective was the desire to

expand control and gain access to Persian Gulf resources, but also realize the Saddam Hussein’s selfidentified goal of leader of the Arab world.15 The widely held belief in Tehran, and an insight into the

Iranian conspiracy laden psyche, was that President Jimmy Carter and the United States were behind the

attack. Silence by the United Nations in the face of blatant disregard for international law further confirmed

the invasion was merely affront by the United States and the duplicitous international body to destroy the

Islamic Republic.16

Although still debated in academic circles it appears President Carter never gave Iraq the proverbial “Green

Light” to invade Iran.17 In fact it is actually laughable to believe the United States, which did not even

maintain an interests section in Baghdad at the time, would have had the influence or authority to do such

a thing. The narrative usually trumps truth and the belief the United States in an act of revenge for the overthrowing of the Shah, the taking of hostages at the embassy, and in order to reclaim influence in Iran coerced

Iraq to invade. Iran demonized the attack and championed its struggle against the meddling West. Privately

however, there must have been concern in Tehran. On 20 January 1981, four months after the Iraqi invasion

began, all remaining American hostages were released from Iranian custody.18

The momentum of the Iraqi invasion halted by 1982 and a pervading fear took hold in Washington that an

Iranian counter attack might force the Iraqi army to fold and consequently Saddam Hussein would fall from

power leaving Iranian regional dominance unchecked.19 A collapsing Iraqi government would require the

United States to commit ground forces to the region or face a massive shift regarding oil policy in the Gulf.

Like in 1979, the international context of 1982 must be considered. The Soviets were in Afghanistan, Israel’s

invasion into Lebanon was stalling, Shia militias in southern Lebanon were gaining strength under guidance

from Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) mentors, and the Sunni monarchs were threatened from the

growing Iranian menace. 

Between 1981 and 1982 diplomatic correspondence between Washington and Tehran consisted of little more

than verbal assaults. In the summer of 1982 though the exchanges escalated and U.S. policy motivated

Iranian action. As the Iranians threatened the strategically significant Basra, the White House removed Iraq

as a state sponsor of terrorism and began providing intelligence to the Iraqi Army. It is unclear as to exactly

how much the Iranians knew regarding this intelligence sharing agreement, but the Iranians responded.20 On

6 June of the same year the Israel Defense Forces invaded into Southern Lebanon in pursuit of Palestinian

fighters. Shortly thereafter, the lead element of what would eventually become an 800 strong detachment of

IRGC members landed in Damascus with the mission of organizing a proxy movement among the Lebanese

Shia to resist the Israelis and perceived Western led modern day colonialism in Lebanon.21 The two

unrelated events provided operating space for revolutionary Iran to expand its interests and the opportunity

to respond to American provocations of supporting Saddam Hussein. 

The Conflict Expands: Beirut, Lebanon

On 23 October 1983, Lebanese Shia militants trained, armed and funded by Iran drove a truck laden with

explosives into the U.S. Marine Barracks at the Beirut airport killing 241 U.S. service personnel. The attack

4 Bradley N. Fultz
was directed by the Iranian government, “the Iranians were always in charge of the IJO [Islamic Jihad

Organization—group that later became Hezbollah], using it to establish a beachhead in Lebanon. Every

attack, car bombing, kidnapping and assassination carried out by ... [the IJO] was approved by the IRGC,

which in turn was approved by Iran’s Supreme Leader.”22 The bombing of the Marine Barracks was no

exception. U.S. intelligence intercepts show the Iranian ambassador to Beirut was aware of the scheme and

“Ayatollah Khomeini likely gave final approval for the attack.”23 Although harsh rhetoric emanating from

Tehran was continuous, the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in April of 1983, the bombing of the Marine

Barracks six months later, and the attack on the U.S. Embassy annex in September 1984 were indeed direct

reactions to increasing assistance for Iraqi military forces. Shortly following the Marine Barracks bombing,

a similar attack on the French peacekeepers headquarters resulted in the death of fifty-eight French

paratroopers. It confirmed the link of support for Iraq as the Iranians were responding to French aircraft

sales to the Iraqi government.24 The day of the attack should not be considered insignificant either. 23

October 1983 was the four-year anniversary of the Shah’s arrival in the United States for cancer treatment,

the event that triggered the takeover of the embassy in the first place. 

Bombing hardened structures was not the sole Iranian method to strike American interests in Lebanon. Shia

proxies in the Levant proved beneficial in kidnapping as well. Kidnapping not only struck fear in the hearts

of Westerners operating around the world, but the handsome ransoms paid to secure a hostages release was

a lucrative business venture. Under the direction of the IRGC, U.S. CIA station chief to Beirut, William F.

Buckley was kidnapped on 16 March 1984 and tortured horrifically at the hands of Hezbollah, ultimately

leading to his death.25 It is believed the station chief was kidnapped as part of a movement to resist Western

presence in Lebanon, and be traded for Hezbollah operatives imprisoned in Kuwait.26 Without a doubt the

masterminds of the attack were in Iran.27 The incident kicked off one of the most bizarre and embarrassing

tales in the history of the United States. 

Arms for Hostages (The Iran-Contra Affair)

The United States supplied weapons and parts needed by the Iranians to Israel who in turn shipped those

weapons to Tehran. The money exchanged to Israel for the weapons was returned to the United States. This

money was used to fund Contra rebels in Nicaragua fighting the Communist, Cuba-friendly Sandinista

government. All of this took place with the knowledge of President Reagan, without Congressional oversight,

and in violation of the laws of the United States. Not surprisingly, the whole circus got leaked to the press

and resulted in numerous firings, resignations, and nearly the impeachment of the President. The question

here is why this happened, and how was it perceived in the context of tit for tat with the Iranians? The United

States was betraying allies and ignoring domestic laws in order to do business with fundamentalists in

Tehran. Why? 

Two primary factors explain American reasoning during the highly controversial Arms for Hostages’ deal.

First, President Reagan was adamant about getting hostages in Beirut freed, especially CIA station chief

Buckley. U.S. diplomats paraded as hostages in Tehran were still fresh in the minds of the American voter,

and the consequences to President Carter’s legacy were clear. Secondly, the Reagan Administration believed

a moderate element with influence in Tehran existed. Behind the scenes negotiations allegedly potentially

lead to a reopening of the relationship with Iran. Although this second argument is still disputed as to whether

a true motivation or not, the idea of rapprochement in the Persian Gulf was likely an attractive development

for anti-Soviet hawks in Washington.28

Ultimately the Iran-Contra/Arms for Hostages deal collapsed into a total fiasco. It was a black eye on the

face of the Administration and had negative effects on U.S. foreign policy to the Middle East for the next

Measured Response 5
several years. The key learning point is when the United States attempted to negotiate with the Iranians

from a position of weakness it lost big. Much like during the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis, had some

decisions been made differently the dynamic of the negotiations would have likely changed. The question

asked by the Administration was justifiably how to best free our hostages? But the question should have been

how to make the cost of taking and holding American hostages higher than it is worth? What did Iran gain

from having American hostages? They gained direct access to weapons from the United States to include

TOW anti-tank missiles and other high-end munitions along with needed parts to maintain aging hardware.29

The White House also took incredible domestic risks by authorizing such transactions. What were the costs?

The Iranians essentially lost nothing. Ultimately it was Shia groups in Lebanon conducting the bombings

and kidnappings. The ability to deflect accountability while also gaining from negotiations made the entire

ordeal in Tehran’s benefit.30 A pragmatic analysis shows clearly that releasing the hostages would have

countered Iranian interests. 

Between 1983 and 1986 Iranian proxies in Lebanon conducted three major attacks and numerous minor

tactical level kinetic actions against the United States. Additionally, multiple U.S. citizens to include the

President of the American University in Beirut and the CIA station chief were kidnapped, the latter being

tortured to death. The response from the Reagan administration was weak and likely invited increasingly

provocative Iranian behavior. Despite evidence of Iranian support, knowledge of Qods Force locations

inside of Lebanon, and a French government hopeful to avenge the attack on its own troops, the United

States failed to respond to the truck bombings of U.S. diplomatic missions and the Marine Barracks.31 Also,

negotiating to get hostages back allowed the Iranians to dictate the tempo of the relationship. This futile

attempt at striking a bargain with the Islamic Republic was doomed from the start, and the U.S. received

nothing but a lot of bad press and congressional investigations. This lesson should never be forgotten. 

How the Ayatollah Khomeini viewed the U.S. response or lack thereof is still unknown. The Reagan

Administration was aware of Iranian coordination and planning in the attacks on U.S. installations and the

kidnapping of U.S. persons. Two enduring lessons emerge from Lebanon in the 1980’s. First, the IRGC

found ways to strike the United States without being accountable, maintained deniability, and made kinetic

response very difficult. Second, by operating in this gray area between not doing anything and conducting

attacks that would invite U.S. reprisals the Iranians deftly exploited a weak spot in U.S. policy.

Indecisiveness regarding military retaliation likely encouraged further belligerence that in both the short

and long term has been detrimental to the interests of the United States and its allies. It was the actions of a

small proxy organization that forced the Marines out of Beirut and provided a lot of maneuver space for

Hezbollah, who today maintain a strong presence in the Lebanese government. Iran was never held

accountable for its support of Hezbollah, nor for the attacks on U.S. personnel and installations. Towards

the end of the decade however, Iran over played its hand and directly threatened U.S. oil interests leading

to direct confrontations between naval forces in the Persian Gulf. 

The Tanker War

The Tanker War, starting in 1984, began as a series of naval altercations between Iranian and Iraqi forces

mostly focused on attacking merchant shipping supporting their respective adversaries operations. In 1986

and 1987 in response to Kuwait’s financial and political support for Iraq, Iranian naval forces began to

target Kuwaiti flagged shipping transiting the Persian Gulf. Kuwait looking to protect its merchant ships

requested Kuwaiti tankers transiting the Gulf fly the U.S. flag therefore protecting them from Iranian attacks.

Playing both sides, Kuwait concurrently asked the Soviet Union for similar protections. This not only

ensured safeguarding of Kuwaiti shipping but also introduced Cold War competition into the Gulf. The

Soviet Union seeing an opportunity to get a military presence in the Gulf accepted while bureaucratic hold

6 Bradley N. Fultz
ups slowed the approval process in the United States. With the flagging of Kuwaiti ships by superpowers,

Iran did not hesitate to invoke violent and threatening rhetoric, which it was also willing to back up, albeit

temporarily. 

In January of 1987 Soviet warships under agreement with the Kuwaiti government entered the Persian Gulf

to commence escort operations of Kuwaiti flagged ships. On 6 May of the same year, Iranian speedboats

patrolling the Persian Gulf attacked the Soviet merchant ship Ivan Korotyev. Ten days later the Soviet frigate

Marshal Zhukove struck an Iranian emplaced mine while conducting transit through international waters.

Soviets responded by stating they would retaliate to any attacks and further added “the Soviet Union reserved

the right to act according to international law if provocative actions with regards to Soviet ships were

repeated.”32 The Soviets also sent a message by flying nearly fifty warplanes into Iranian airspace.33 One

Soviet diplomat stated “this was a field warning to the Iranians who were told later that Moscow would not

allow another incident of this type, even if it meant direct Soviet military intervention.”34

After the reality of witnessing Soviet warships in the Gulf sunk in, the U.S. quickly untangled its own

bureaucratic hurdles and approved escort operations. The first mission titled “Earnest Will” occurred on 21

July 1987 involved the re-flagging and escort of Kuwaiti oil tankers as they transited the Persian Gulf from

the Straits of Hormuz to Kuwait. Upon the much publicized launch of the initial convoy, Iranian F-4’s strafed

the skies at 10,000 feet above the ships pattern, not tailing off back into Iranian air space until being locked

on by the U.S. Navy’s anti-aircraft radars.35 The U.S. flagged tanker and her U.S. Naval escort convoy sailed

without incident through the “Silkworm envelope,” an area garnering the most significant amount of U.S.

attention due to the close proximity of U.S. ships to missile launch sites containing recently purchased

Chinese Silkworm missiles.36 The launching of a Silkworm at a U.S. warship or U.S. flagged tanker would

have most certainly met a strong response from the United States, consequently bringing America deeper

into the Iran-Iraq War.37 The Iranians, presumably not wishing to antagonize an escalation opted to lay mines

in the northern Persian Gulf instead. The giant tanker, Bridgeton, under U.S. naval escort struck one of these

Iranian laid mines, but was able to limp into its Kuwaiti destination without loss of life. The “Bridgeton

Incident” was viewed as an embarrassment to the United States Navy. The escort operations developed

amongst heated domestic political debate as to the benefit versus the risks of undergoing such military

adventures.38 The attack was a calculated measure by the Iranians to strike in a way that would force a

reconsideration of the mission. The U.S. did not respond to the mining incident claiming that only if

American lives were lost would retaliation take place, a decision that would receive further scrutiny and have

further implications.39

The weeks following the Bridgeton incident, Iranian actions became more bellicose. IRGC naval exercises

in the Gulf accompanied threatening rhetoric such as: “the Persian Gulf is the burial place of Reagan.”40 On

1 August, Iran clandestinely sent approximately 275 armed IRGC members into Saudi Arabia with orders

to disrupt the Hajj celebration and instigate an uprising against the Saudi royal family. Intelligence intercepts

tipped the authorities to the plot and awaiting Saudi security forces killed nearly 300 Iranians. On 10

August a Panamanian tanker struck a mine off the port of Khor Fakkan, U.A.E., outside of the Persian Gulf

and east of the Straits of Hormuz. Days later a Swedish vessel struck an Iranian laid mine in the same area

killing the captain and four crew- members. The two mine attacks indicated Iran’s desire to expand its

engagement area by mining outside the Straits and using the Straits themselves as the key terrain to protect.

From a tactical perspective, it was the outer layer of a traditional defense in depth. The short-term tactical

victory however, became a strategic blunder. Directly attacking neutral vessels operating in international

waters was not popular in European capitals. The mining outside of the Straits along with the attempted

disruption of the Hajj shifted international opinion strongly against the Iranian regime. European nations

responded by dispatching desperately needed mine sweeping ships along with naval vessels to conduct

Measured Response 7
required escort duties. Iran needlessly isolated itself diplomatically and responded by backing off its

mine-laying efforts considerably. 

In this case, Iran antagonized until there was a significant strategic loss ultimately resulting in the

expansion of opposing nations. The American question was: how to stop Iran from mining? The question

should have been: how to create painful consequences for laying mines in the Persian Gulf? In this case,

international opinion shifting against Iran was sufficient. Mining to the east of the Straits was not only a

strategic miscalculation as world opinion turned against the regime, but also an operational mistake,

enabling Western mine sweeping equipment into the Gulf.

The tactical pause following the international condemnation provided needed time for U.S. Navy intelligence

personnel to reevaluate the best counter measures available to mine warfare. New assets were introduced in

theater, namely special operations MH-6 and AH-6 night capable Little Bird helicopters. Improved

intelligence targeting Iranian mine laying capabilities, combined with the flexibility of the Little Birds

provided a considerable advantage for the United States. On 18 September 1987, the Iranian naval vessel,

Iran Ajr was spotted loading mines in port at Bandar Abbas. Its intent was to mine the primary channel

directly entering Bahrain.41 Little Bird helicopters vectored to gain up-close surveillance of the ship

observed its drifting into international waters. Upon the detection of mines on board and subsequent minelaying by the crewmembers, the helicopters conducted numerous attack runs, killing three and capturing

twenty-six along with the ship itself, which was eventually sunk in the middle of the Gulf. The Iran Ajr

incident was condemned broadly by the Iranian government with a mix of wild threatening statements

regarding an American attack on a peaceful cargo ship. “Iran’s response will not be restricted to the Gulf,”

claimed President and future Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, privately however there must have been some

soul searching taking place.42 The occurrence was an absolute tactical victory for the United States. Iran

ceased to emplace mines in the Gulf for the next six months.43

The U.S. Navy took advantage of the pause in enemy activity by establishing mobile sea bases in the Gulf,

one of which was placed a mere twenty nautical miles from the strategically vital, Iranian Farsi Island. The

more aggressive U.S. presence antagonized an Iranian reaction. On 8 October 1987 while engaging in air

patrols, Special Operations Little Birds identified a small Iranian presence staging for further actions in the

vicinity of the sea base. The Little Birds took fire from the Iranians and quickly responded destroying the

two patrol ships and an Iranian Boghammer warship.44 Iranian reinforcements withdrew prior to confronting

the Little Birds and the single U.S. patrol boat in the vicinity of the engagement. The Little Birds

coincidentally stumbled upon a major naval operation intended to attack the Saudi mainland. The IRGC

command assumed the U.S. had been tipped off and American and Saudi forces were waiting in ambush and

recalled the force back to the Iranian mainland.45

After mine laying endeavors and surprise attacks failed the Iranians adopted a new tactic to resist the

Americans. On 16 and 17 October 1987 the IRGC launched Silkworm missile into the port of Kuwait

striking a Liberian tanker and the U.S. flagged ship, the Sea Isle City. The ship was already in port, which

made lawful retaliation a bit foggy due to the regulations of the escort mission. From one perspective the

ship was in Kuwait, and not being escorted by the U.S. Navy, on the other hand, it was a U.S. flagged ship.46

The Iranians found a gray area between full antagonism and placation, a common behavioral theme that

continues to endure. The response however, would leave little doubt about U.S. willingness to act in the

Persian Gulf. 

Unwilling to allow the missile launch to go without reprisal, the U.S. conducted Operation Nimble Archer

on 19 October targeting Rashdat oil platform, located in international waters southeast of Qatar. U.S. Navy

8 Bradley N. Fultz
ships with air support assaulted and destroyed the three-platform complex. The attack conducted to answer

the Iranian Silkworm strikes, was viewed as a mild response in the region.47 Days later the Iranians launched

another Silkworm at the Kuwaiti Sea Island export terminal halting oil exports from there while under

repair. The U.S. did not counter this strike, and ten days after the export terminal was repaired in

November, the facility was struck again. 

Despite the missile strikes in Kuwait, Iranian resistance to the transit mission slowed through the beginning

of 1988. Improved defenses of forward areas and increased surveillance activities all while maintaining the

escort mission strengthened the American operations. In addition to the low-level conflict in the Gulf, the

Iranians were on their heels in the fight with the Iraqis. Saddam Hussein had begun to employ chemical

munitions on the front lines as well as bomb Iranian cities. Both atrocities went relatively ignored by the

international community. Additionally the Iranian economy was in the midst of a three year recession. The

situation was growing dire for Tehran. On 14 April 1988 as the USS Roberts was transiting off the northern

coast of Qatar conducting escort operations as part of Earnest Will the ship struck a powerful Iranian mine,

nearly sinking the ship. The American reply would be the first and only major naval battle between Iran and

the United States. 

The United States reacted swiftly and fiercely to the Roberts attack and struck Iranian facilities and naval

power in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Navy organized a plan to seize and destroy two Iranian platforms and

one Iranian frigate, withholding from hitting the Iranian mainland but effectively slowing the Iranians

ability to conduct operations. Coordinated offensives on the morning of 18 April destroyed the two intended

Iranian platforms and actions throughout the day resulted in the annihilation of three Iranian frigates.

Operation Praying Mantis killed nearly sixty and wounded over one-hundred Iranian sailors.48

Coincidentally the Iraqi Army simultaneously launched a full-scale assault using chemical munitions to

retake al-Faw peninsula. In response, the Iranians attacked civilian platforms in the Gulf linked to U.S.

business interests, but no direct counter attack aimed at American combatants followed. The Iranians

received the worst in all engagements. The U.S. Navy, despite losing one helicopter, which crashed into the

water killing the two pilots, was completely overwhelming. 

Throughout the course of the escort mission, The United States indicated to the Iranian regime that use of

Silkworm missiles would be considered a “serious provocation,” threatening to escalate the military conflict

in the Gulf, and a declaration of war.49 The Iranians never launched the Silkworm at U.S. Navy vessels for

fear of retaliation. Or did they? During Operation Praying Mantis, the USS Gary patrolling in the northern

Persian Gulf and the USS Jack Williams operating hundreds of miles to the south nearly simultaneously

reported taking incoming Silkworm missiles. In both instances, there was an impact in the distance. A later

Pentagon report found the claims of Silkworm launches to be untrue, and blamed faulty radar reads.

Controversy and contention as to whether Silkworms were actually fired exists. Accounts from reporters

onboard the USS Jack Williams claim Silkworm missiles were indeed inbound during Praying Mantis.50 Lee

Allen Zatarian’s book The Tanker War makes a convincing argument relating to a Pentagon cover-up while

not desiring to respond to a Silkworm attack on U.S. ships. Expanding the conflict was politically

unpopular and opposed by the Reagan Administration.51 David Crist in his account of the Tanker War in his

book The Twilight War claims the reports released from the Pentagon were accurate and during the fog of

war amidst the activities of 18 April, the sailors and officers of the USS Jack Williams and USS Gary were

mistaken in identifying the incoming missiles to be Silkworms.52 In the context of Iranian decision making

and the willingness to escalate the conflict in a tit for tat manner the debate surrounding the launching of

Silkworm missiles is perhaps worth reexamining. 

On 19 April the United States braced for a busy and kinetic day, but despite the predictions of a massive

Measured Response 9
Iranian response, nothing happened. In fact, Iranian attacks completely ceased for nearly a month. A full

twenty-percent of Iranian capability had been destroyed as well as fifty-percent of its most effective Saamclass Frigates in a single day. The simultaneous advancement of Iraqi forces on al-Faw peninsula cannot

be underestimated in analysis. Although U.S. documentation shows the two operations were merely a

fortunate coincidence, the Iranian perception was that the U.S. Navy and the Iraqi ground forces each

coordinated their respective attacks to coincide and deliver a massive strike against the Iranians.53 Tehran

assessed the harmonized offensives confirmed the United States was clearly working to defeat Iran,

opposed to maintaining open shipping lanes as the mandate in the Gulf had been vocalized. This

coordination played a great deal into Iranian calculation. The Iranians believed they were not simply

resisting the Iraqi invader, but also the United States. This placed the regime against difficult odds indeed.

The lack of an Iranian response in the month following Praying Mantis can be at least partially attributed to

this strategic calculation. Iran’s interests and abilities to endure suffering would once again be evaluated, as

the Tanker War came to a climax a few months later. 

On 3 July 1988, while in the midst of a scuffle with IRGC swarming small boats, the USS Vincennes

misidentified a civilian aircraft; Iran Air flight 655, as an Iranian F-14. The details of the highly

controversial incident are out of the scope of this paper, but the event resulted in a U.S. Navy warship

shooting down a civilian airliner and killing all 290 passengers and crew aboard. Pragmatic people have

pragmatic interpretations of events and although the U.S. led investigation claimed the shoot down was a

tragic error, Iranian leadership claimed the assault was done purposely. According to Iranian calculations the

shooting was such a brutal step and incredible violation of international norms of behavior it scared the

Iranians and drove Ayatollah Khomeini to drink from the “poison challis” by accepting UN Resolution

598.54 Although the true reason for the acceptance of the Resolution by Ayatollah Khomeini is officially

unknown, it is likely the offensives of an Iraqi Army using chemical munitions and bombing cities combined

with the United States willing to shoot down civilian airplanes deemed an existential threat to the regime.

Regardless of the reasons, thirteen days following the shoot down of Iran Air flight 655 a cease-fire was

accepted, and on 20 August peace broke out in the Persian Gulf. 

Lessons from the Tanker War

What are the lessons of the Tanker War? The year-long naval engagement occurring between the initial

Earnest Will convoy on 21 July 1987 and the shooting down of Iran Air in July of 1988 provides some good

insights how Iran fights and reacts to U.S. operations. It must of course be understood that U.S. actions are

interpreted by the Iranians in a way that we have little control over, as the narrative will be shaped by the

regime in Tehran. The Iranians rejected the escort operations from the beginning and challenged the U.S.

Navy immediately upon commencing the convoy operations when the tanker Bridgeton struck a mine on 24

July 1987. The reluctance by the Americans to respond invited more aggressive behavior until the Iran Ajr

incident where the U.S. engaged and destroyed Iranian mine-laying capabilities. Instead of completely

halting attacks the IRGC simply shifted tactics in constant search of gaps in the American posture. Iran first

had two failed attacks on the Saudi mainland, and then fired Silkworm missiles at Kuwait. As attacking

U.S. allies in the Gulf failed to draw a strong American response; Tehran once again escalated by striking

the USS Roberts with a mine. Operation Praying Mantis followed and was the only time the IRGC Navy

bore a large brunt of U.S. naval Power. The wildcard in analysis is the use of Silkworm missiles against U.S.

warships. Faced with dual offensives from the Iraqi Army on al-Faw and the large naval battle in the Gulf,

the Iranians played their hand and disputably launched the most powerful weapon in the inventory. A clear

signal as to how desperate the situation was being viewed from Tehran. The shoot down of Iran Air 655 in

July 1988 combined with improved Iraqi technologies, the use of chemical munitions, an economy in

shambles and a weakening of support for the regime forced the Ayatollah Khomeini to finally capitulate. In

10 Bradley N. Fultz
a sense of tit for tat, failing to respond boldly to initial Iranian aggressiveness simply asked for more

problems. Although American attacks were met with harsh rhetoric, temporary inaction actually ensued.

Following tactical setbacks, the IRGC leadership investigated and sought other opportunities to strike the

Americans, which eventually happened. This displays a mature and pragmatic self-evaluation process

unlikely to repeat or reinforce tactical failures. Operation Praying Mantis was an escalation that

significantly threatened the Iranian Navy. Even following the large loss that Iran suffered on 18 April,

following a temporary pause in activities, small boat attacks did actually continue until the cease fire was

officially implemented in August. 

The Next Phase

1989 introduced a new era for not only the world, but also U.S.-Iran relations. President George H.W. Bush

followed President Reagan, Ayatollah Khomeini passed away in June, the pragmatic Ali Akbar Rafsanjani

became President of Iran, and the Soviet Union pulled its troops out of Afghanistan. The disputes between

the U.S. and Iran went into relative dormancy in relation to the past decade despite persistence of certain

issues, such as remaining American hostages in Lebanon. Despite certain differences between the countries,

it seems the tit for tat nature of the relationship began to moderate. The shock waves both sides felt from

international events of the time provided limited maneuverability for a reset in relations. 

President Bush began his period in office with a conciliatory message of “goodwill begets goodwill,”

meaning that in exchange for Iranian assistance in freeing American hostages held in Lebanon, the United

States would be willing to soften its stance, and reconsider sanctions against the regime.55 Iran was

proportionally muted if not slightly supportive regarding the U.S. liberation of Kuwait and American

hostages were finally released from Lebanon in December of 1991. There was no reciprocal act of goodwill

from the Americans however. Iranian support for terrorism and spoiling efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian

Peace Process justified the lack of goodwill from the Americans side.56 In what was perceived as diplomatic

slights, the tit for tat would emerge again, but in a less visible manner. 

The Gulf War in January of 1991 was a shot across the Iranian bow making clear that conventionally

competing with the United States on land or at sea was not an option. Consequently, the next decade of

conflict was played out via proxies using asymmetric tactics to achieve strategic objectives. Tehran was

certainly hesitant to confront the U.S. force on force, but adept at finding gaps and seams in American

policies as well as defenses. Iran shifted tactics, adopting techniques the military felt it could be most

successful at conducting; proxy War, subversive acts, and terrorism. These policies redefined and renewed

exchanges between the two countries.

The relationship for the remainder of the decade can best be described as strategic level movements by the

United States, countered by proxy and asymmetry by the Iranians. The tit for tat was played out at high

levels and in a sense the goodwill stated by President Bush in 1990, did receive a certain degree of

goodwill from the pragmatic Rafsanjani, who had his own hardliner elements to contend with domestically.57

During the Clinton administration, Iranian President Rafsanjani made some significant steps to initiate an

improvement in relations between the two countries. Rafsanjani offered Conoco gas company access to the

Iranian natural energy sector in 1996, a deal which was rejected by anti-Iran hawks in Congress. Pragmatic

outreach was further restrained by IRGC Qods Force assassinations in Europe and bombings in Argentina.

Such attacks lead to increased economic sanctions by the Clinton Administration in 1995.58 Simultaneously

Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Newt Gingrich announced an increased eighteen-million

dollar investment in covert activities to undermine the regime in Iran. The affront of rebuking on the oil

deal while announcing an increase in funding to undermine the Iranian regime was viewed as a direct threat

Measured Response 11
to Tehran.59 The steps lead to a shift in Iranian policy and return to aggressive activities. 

Iran first responded much as they did in the Tanker War nine years earlier, by attacking U.S. allies in the

region. An Iranian trained Shia group in Bahrain was arrested in the summer of 1996 for planning to

assassinate the Emir of that country and on 25 June 1996 a truck bomb exploded near a U.S. Air Force

dormitory at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing nineteen American service men and women, while

wounding 372. The terrorist attack was blamed on Hezbollah but received support and final approval from

the Supreme Leader via the IRGC.60 The response from the Clinton Administration was minimal, limited to

spy games in third countries. The U.S. again, with its eyes on the prize of attempting to normalize relations

failed to respond to a terrorist attack. In this exceptional case however, it might have done some good as

moderate forces swept into power in Iran. 

May of 1997 marked the arrival of the new Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and his “dialogue of the

civilizations” proposal.61 Under the tempered leader the U.S. hoped tensions between the two nations would

de-escalate and eventually normalize. The relationship moderated over the next four years with significant

outreach taken. Then Secretary of State Madeline Albright went as far as any American leader ever has in

stating a near apology to Iran for the U.S. role in the overthrowing of Mohammad Mosaddeq back in 1953,

and President Clinton made overly conciliatory messages as his term came near an end in the hope of a

diplomatic breakthrough.62

Lessons of the 1990’s

The decade of the 1990’s was tame in comparison to the heightened tensions of the 80’s, with a relatively

small number of altercations. Although engagements were limited, tit for tat continued, and contrary to the

decade prior were disagreements and conflict occurred at the tactical as well as the strategic level, the 90’s

operated purely in the strategic realm. Diplomacy and proxies replaced naval altercations attacking the

interests of the opponent. Goodwill attempts in the early portion of the decade never materialized. Some

scholars claim many parts of this decade as a lost opportunity for either side at rapprochement.63 Although

the belief does indeed hold merit, it ignores the overlying interests of both countries. The United States in

the 1990’s was the sole global superpower unchallenged by any other actor in the system. Although

terrorism was an issue, it never escalated to the point it would in the following decade. The United States

did not see any reason to limit sanctions on Iran due to Iranian lack of support for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace

Process, and its terror activities abroad. The goodwill of getting American hostages released in Lebanon

was not reciprocal. When the U.S. rejected an economic overture from Rafsanjani and announced increases

in covert funding to overthrow the regime, Tehran reacted violently by attacking U.S. personnel at Khobar

Towers. The U.S. never responded to this atrocity in kind, which in retrospect may have been a good

decision. The key lesson learned of the decade is that despite outreach by the Clinton Administration towards

the end of his term, Iran did not and could not moderate its aggressive stance immediately. Iran not only

wants the U.S. as an outside villain, but needs the U.S. to be a hawkish adversary. Henry Kissinger stated

that Iran must decide if it is a cause or a nation.64 An aggressive United States justifies the revolution and

indeed the existence of the Islamic Republic, therefore reinforcing the cause. Iran, for its own interest will

behave in a tit for tat manner until striking the United States becomes too painful to endure, which at that

time, will cease belligerent activity until Tehran identifies another angle to strike. This cycle has continued

since 1979 and is the basis for the tit for tat analysis. 

A New Century: Same Result

George W. Bush’s 2001 arrival in the Oval Office maintained the positive narrative regarding Iran. Despite

12 Bradley N. Fultz
the outgoing policy of his father’s administration in 1992 which saw Iran as “impervious to gestures of

kindness and unlikely to succumb to moderating influences,” and concluded that “Iran’s strategy remained

fixed on driving the U.S. out of the Gulf, expanding their influence throughout the region, and derailing the

peace process.”65 Eight years following the perspective from the elder President Bush, necessity compelled

pragmatic policy discussions. Debate during the initial months of the Bush Administration considered

policy changes, which involved the “relaxation of sanctions, acceptance of an Iranian civilian atomic

program and the adoption of phased engagement.”66 These softening approaches of course came on the heels

of the Clinton Administration’s policies which did not respond kinetically to the Khobar Towers attack,

Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s considerably conciliatory statement and other normalizing steps

towards the end of Clinton’s presidency.67 Tit for tat was occurring. The moderate approach met

moderating responses, and Iran had some domestic flexibility to placate on U.S. demands. The attacks of 11

September 2001 and the pragmatic response from Tehran continued the cooling trend in rhetoric and action

between the two nations. Mutual interests reigned as Iranians assisted the United States in Afghanistan and

initially at least, in Iraq.68 The immediate months following the 9/11 attacks provided glimmers of

rapprochement possibilities between Washington and Tehran. The terrorist attacks, for better or worse,

changed the entire debate surrounding foreign policy in Washington however. The “with us or against us”

paradigm embraced by the Bush Administration echoed policies of a prior generation when all decisions were

made within the context of a bipolar world with the Soviet Union. Now all solutions would be considered

in the context of the Global War on Terror. The first decade of the 21st century began with a small window

of opportunity for the tit for tat relationship to produce conciliatory policies. However political realities,

promotion of an idealized grand strategy vice nuanced arrangements, and colliding interests once again

resulted in continued stalemate and harsh rhetoric. 

The U.S. Invades Afghanistan

Shortly following the attacks of 9/11 small teams began to flow into northern Afghanistan in order to

organize, support, and augment the resistance to the Taliban and drive the Pashtun dominated government

from Kabul. After years of U.S. softening narratives, Iran assisted the American effort in Afghanistan.

Following overt symbols of sympathy with the American people following 9/11, Tehran offered concrete

assistance to the U.S. effort to unseat the Taliban and establish a new government in Afghanistan.69

Accourding to Mohsen Milani, “Iranian military advisors rubbed shoulders with U.S. military personnel in

the Northern Alliance areas,” as both governments supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces.

Milani further adds that “Tehran even said it would give sanctuary for distressed U.S. military personnel

inside its territory,” and “also allowed the United States to transport humanitarian goods to Afghanistan

through Iranian land [the port at Chah Bahar]. Iran reportedly suggested the best targets for U.S. bombers.”70

There was also substantial diplomatic assistance in creating a stable government in Kabul. In December of

2001, the Bonn Conference selected Hamid Karzai as the leader of the new government. The Iranians helped

convince the opposition to support Karzai, a difficult feat, and also insisted on democratic elections.71 The

cooperation in Afghanistan however, ended abruptly the next month. 

The “Axis of Evil speech” given by President Bush on 29 January 2002 marked a shift in Iranian assistance

to the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. The accusatory and threatening tone from the American President during

his annual State of the Union address drew harsh criticism from Tehran and in response, the Iranians stopped

attending peace talks in Geneva.72 Although the speech is used to justify Iranian intransigence, it is not clear

the speech itself directly caused the Iranian change of behavior. A pragmatic analysis of U.S. intentions by

the Iranians likely concluded that a policy opposing the United States was needed to slow down the

emerging existential threat. The Iranians may have seen themselves as soon to be the next target of the

United States and decided to resist through asymmetric means. Regardless, if one believes the argument

Measured Response 13
that the Iranians slowed support for the U.S. in Afghanistan as a response to the offending State of the Union

address, or out of pure pragmatic interests, most agree the speech marked a certain shift in the Iranian

approach towards the Americans following 9/11. 

The U.S. Invades Iraq

Following the quick fall of the Taliban, seeming invincibility of the United States military, and impending

attack on Saddam Hussein, the Iranian government explored opportunities to once again involve themselves

in U.S. decision making. Axis of Evil or not, the Iranians wanted to reopen talks with Washington as the

drums of war with Iraq grew louder.73

A heated debate occurred in Washington surrounding what the Iranian response to a U.S. attack on Saddam

Hussein’s Iraq would be. Although no official planning team existed, deliberation swirled with experts

weighing in on both sides regarding Iran’s potential reaction. Iranian diplomats proposed mutual

cooperation to the White House to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The Iranian proposition stated that in

“return for Iran’s assistance, Washington would publically advocate for normalized relations.”74 An offer the

White House demurred, instead rationalizing that following a swift and victorious assault into Baghdad,

Tehran would feel threatened thereby motivated to reconsider its policies of supporting terrorism, and

developing nuclear weapons.75 In the end, according to the logic, the United States would get the behavior

it wanted, and would not compromise core interests by entering into negotiations with the Iranians. 

The second diplomatic snub in less than twelve months certainly changed the equation in Tehran. Opposed

to viewing the assault as the removal of the hated Saddam Hussein, the narrative grew that it was simply a

warm-up for regime change in Tehran. The hawks in Iran gained the upper-hand vis-à-vis the reformist

camp and the IRGC was directed to begin planning a resistance to the U.S. occupation in Iraq, while setting

the stage for an Iran-friendly regime in Baghdad.76

In the spring of 2003 U.S. forces swept north from Kuwait capturing Baghdad in less than three weeks. The

speed and effectiveness of the operation quickly put the Iranians in a dilemma. American military forces

surrounded Iran while an emboldened hawkish U.S. regime published rhetoric discussing a regime change

agenda, potentially using military force.77 Iran’s response was twofold. First, the beginning phases of a plan

to undermine the U.S. effort by creating proxy forces amongst the disenfranchised Shia went into effect.

Simultaneously, a disputed final attempt at normalization of the long contentious relationship took place

shortly following the fall of Baghdad.

The Guldimann Memo

The Swiss Embassy in Tehran maintains an interests section for the United States and Iran and has done so

since shortly after the Revolution. It serves as the representative for U.S. interests in Iran, but its functions

are primarily administrative. In early May of 2003 a letter arrived at the U.S. Department of State via the

Swiss Ambassador in Tehran. The letter claimed the Supreme Leader was prepared to negotiate on all issues

and laid out requirements that would enable Iran to go forward with rapprochement while also addressing

American concerns. The letter, referred to as “The Guldimann Memo,” after Swiss Ambassador Tim

Guldimann, has since sparked a significant and important debate. One side argues the Bush administration

in all its hubris and fervor of post-invasion success lost the opportunity to negotiate with Tehran on all

issues from a position of significant strength. This argument claims that after seeing the Taliban fall so

quickly, and more importantly, U.S. troops in Baghdad weeks after the invasion began, Iran was compelled

to negotiate on American demands.78

14 Bradley N. Fultz
A second argument and the one ultimately adopted by the Bush Administration claims the memo was not

even authentic. An over-zealous Swiss diplomat serving out his last days in Tehran created the memo in a

last ditch effort; either to achieve a final peace, or to solidify his own legacy. The administration believed

Guldimann created the letter via dialogue with non-influential Iranians to get peace talks moving.79

Regardless which argument one believes, the Bush Administration did not deem the cable authentic and

ignored it. This was the third diplomatic slight in two years and was likely interpreted in Tehran that the U.S.

would quickly be setting their sights on regime change in the Islamic Republic as some American pundits

were advocating for.80 Barbara Slavin claimed “the overture was never seriously considered by the Bush

Administration, then in a triumphalist mood over Iraq.”81 This slight opened the gates for Qods Force

activities in Iraq, which would take years for the Americans to effectively counter. 

An additional question within the context of events of the Guldimann Memo; accepting it was indeed

authentic and endorsed by legitimate decision makers in Tehran, is if the letter was merely a delaying

tactic? At the very moment the cable was being delivered, IRGC-Qods forces officers were flowing money

and arms into the Shia areas of Iraq. The Iranian plan for the Lebanization of Iraqi Shia to resist the Americans began as early as September of 2002, even before the invasion took place.82 The interfering Iranian strategy was clear to U.S. officials by 1 May 2003, prior to receipt of the memo. At this time the U.S.

administration believed at least fifty Qods Force officers were organizing targeted Shia groups into proxy

forces set to do Iran’s bidding at a later date.83 The firebrand Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr visited Iran in May

of 2003, and slightly over a year later, Qods Force operators were advising the fighters of the Mahdi Army

confronting U.S. Marines in Najaf.84 Parallel to ongoing diplomatic talks, the Iranians were also preparing

a post- Saddam force that would serve the interests of Tehran. The two-faced policies made perfect sense from

Iran’s perspective. On one hand prepare to destabilize the American efforts while creating a friendly

environment for future activities in Iraq and simultaneously, maintain open dialogue to perhaps shape and

influence decision making in Washington. 

In the years following the Iraq invasion, the Bush Administration continued to publicize threatening

rhetoric and U.S. Congress ultimately passed the Iran Freedom Support Act which provided increased

funding for promotion of democracy and U.S. broadcasting in Iran.85 In response, Iran maintained and even

increased its support for proxies in Iraq. This was of course no surprise to those at Department of Defense

or anyone else involved with the war. Officials on numerous occasions presented evidence of Iran

providing arms, munitions, training, and direction to Shia militias. Iranian made Explosively Formed

Projectiles (EFP’s) smuggled into southern Iraq killed 140 coalition troops in 2006 alone.86 In 2007,

Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen revealed that Iran’s Qods Force were

coordinating throughout southern and eastern Iraq with insurgents, providing arms, training, and financing.

The higher-level tactical instruction took place in Iran. To better streamline and coordinate training and

operations the Ramazan Corps was reinforced and maintained geographical areas of responsibility. Iranian

backed militias were not only a threat to U.S. forces, but began to challenge the legitimacy of the new Iraqi

government as well.87

By late 2006, the United States had had enough of Iranian munitions killing American soldiers in Iraq and

decided to take action. A series of special operations raids on known Qods Force and other Iran related

facilities led to the detention of numerous high-ranking officers and netted droves of intelligence further

implicating the Iranians in conducting belligerent activities.88 The actions slowed Iranian operations as high

level Qods Force officers began to get rolled up, but Iranian interference never completely ceased.89 Shia

groups continued to gain influence throughout the south of the country and Sunnis were ethnically cleansed

out of mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad. In the latter half of 2007, U.S. surge forces were primarily

Measured Response 15
occupied with chasing Shia militia fighters trained and supported by Iran. Despite overwhelming evidence,

a claim that Tehran continued to deny.90 Finally in March of 2008, Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki sent forces

to the southern port city of Basra to confront and defeat Iranian backed Shia militias that had over taken the

city. It was not until this, Iraqi-led and U.S. enabled offensive took place that the Iranian activities slowed,

forcing Tehran to recommit to soft power and providing assistance in stabilizing in Iraq.91 The backlash

from Maliki and the leadership in Baghdad threatened Iranian interests in Iraq, which relied heavily on

popular support from the Shia population. The Iranian interference, as it became increasingly publicized, was

leading to a new narrative, where opposed to the coalition, Iranian backed militias were being blamed by the

Iraqi people for the increasing levels of violence and instability.92 This new narrative, combined with

military and diplomatic pressure convinced the Iranians to slow their kinetic activities, albeit temporarily. 

Analyzing the post 9/11 era

Tit for tat defined the first decade of the 21st Century between the adversarial nations. Diplomatic

maneuvers, public statements, policy speeches, proxies conducting irregular activities, special operation

raids, and nuclear negotiations all contributed to the relationship. The full spectrum witnessed displays of

how adept either side has become at countering the other.

The end of the Clinton presidency coincided with Iranian moderate president Mohammad Khatami’s

administration. Consequently, the aggression of the past became slightly tempered and following the attacks

on 9/11, both sides justified cooperation in the name of mutual interests. Iran responded to the crisis by

providing support to the American efforts in Afghanistan. This assistance however, was countered by the

antagonistic “Axis of Evil” speech, which marked an ending in Tehran’s cooperation in Afghanistan. Roughly

ten months later, in September of 2002, the Iranians once again reached out diplomatically to the Americans

as the debate surrounding an attack into Iraq became more heated, but it was too late. By that time, Iran was

firmly placed amongst a grouping of countries supporting terrorism. Indeed Iran maintained support for

both Hamas and Hezbollah, and was believed to be pursuing a nuclear weapons program. For these two

reasons, the Bush Administration was unwilling to yield in the declared “Freedom Agenda.”93 For a second

time, the tit for tat cycle was broken and Iranian outreach was rebuffed. The timing of this failed outreach

coincides with the earliest reported period of Iranian irregulars beginning to strengthen networks and

prepare Iraqi Shia for a future American occupation. Following the attack into Iraq and the quick capture of

Baghdad, the Guldimann memo was delivered to the U.S. Department of State. Although the authenticity

of the letter is debated, this was potentially a third diplomatic outreach in two years. The memo was

ignored, and the IRGC-Qods Force operations in Iraq expanded and intensified. Shia militias supported by

Iran intensified attacks on the American occupiers, threatened the legitimacy of the undeveloped Iraqi

government, and openly challenged and infiltrated the immature Iraqi security forces. After years of

fumbling, 2007 marked the year that U.S. Special Operations units began to target Iranian facilitation nodes

operating in Iraq. There was even debate considering strikes into Iran in order to send a message to Tehran

to cease interference. The combination of the special operation raids targeting Iranian leadership, an Iraqi

led offensive into the Iranian proxy heartland of Basra, and an assault into northern Sadr City finally forced

the Iranians to slow operations in Iraq. This was in fact a repeat of the 1987 incident discussed above when

the IRGC mined international waters and struck neutral shipping outside of the Gulf. That blunder gave the

appearance Iran was a menace and a clear aggressor. It motivated European nations to send mine sweeping

equipment to the Gulf and isolated Tehran. Twenty years later the same story played itself out. Iran over

played its hand, was about to get hurt diplomatically by losing the support of the Iraqi Shia community and

tactically by attracting the unwanted attention of U.S. Special Operations. Again, the strength of force,

combined with the threat of diplomatic catastrophe tempered Iranian actions. 

16 Bradley N. Fultz
In addition to a tit for tat assessment of U.S.-Iranian exchanges, an evaluation of the deftness of the

Iranians to operate in the gray areas warrants credit. Iranian resistance via proxy abated the Americans

leaving space to pursue Iranian interests, but never antagonistic enough to draw a full-scale response.

Although backing an insurgency in Iraq, the Supreme Leader wisely respected the power of the U.S.

military. Understanding the U.S. was mostly concerned about nuclear weapons and support to al-Qaeda,

Iran appeased and “in the fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.”94 Iran also made strong

statements denying support or any official connections to al-Qaeda.95 Simultaneously, Iran began sending

fighters to establish a proxy force fighting in the interests of Iran. Once the Iranian efforts at diplomacy and

negotiation failed, the tit for tat relationship continued at the tactical level. The lessons of the Tanker War,

and the mistakes made during the Reagan Administration had to be relearned to relieve pressure on

American forces. Unfortunately in took nearly three years and hundreds of lives for this to occur. One

incident narrated by David Crist took place in the spring of 2003 in the Shatt al-Arab provides insight: It

depicts a U.S. Navy SEAL unit ordered to back down from an aggressive IRGC naval patrol operating in

neutral waters. No response came at a later date.96 This and similar incidents in these tit for tat engagements

display weakness, and result in Iranian escalation. The Americans waited years for a measured answer that

would force the Iranians to rethink hostilities. The lesson from Iranian interference in the Iraq War is the same

as it was in the Tanker War; policy cannot strive to placate the Iranians so they stop a certain behavior. The

question must be how to reciprocate to Iranian hostile behavior making it so painful, that the negatives of

their actions outweigh the positives. 

The Saga Continues

In January of 2009 newly elected U.S. President Barack Obama extended a “velvet glove” and spoke directly

to the Iranian government in his New Year’s message. President Obama on two occasions spoke directly to

Iran’s leadership and additionally stated: “The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to takes its

rightful place in the community of nations.”97 Accompanying the friendly rhetoric were some ideas for

compromise on the nuclear issue.98 For once, it was an expert move on behalf of an American

administration vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic. The statement, along with others from the White House in

2009 and 2010 gave the impression to the international community the United States rejected the hawkish

behaviors of the past and was ready for a reset in relations with not only Tehran, but the Middle East writ

large. The peace overtures were rescinded following the brutal crackdown on Green Movement protestors

in the summer of 2009 on the streets of Tehran.99 The Obama Administration conducted the proper analysis

and determined the regimes critical vulnerability laid not inside of Iran, nor in Washington, but at the United

Nations where economic sanctions are negotiated. The most recent strategic moves by the United States to

intensify and increase sanctions has damaged the Iranian economy significantly, and isolated Tehran

diplomatically.100 A glimpse at the past thirty-three years indicates Iran will respond by attempting to delay

the severity of sanctions, identify the gray area in the policy and resist American behavior without

motivating a strong response. 

Strategic level negotiations surrounding the Iranian nuclear program have come to the fore in recent years.

Missile launches and military exercises carried out by both sides in the vicinity of the Straits of Hormuz are

clear messages of the existing brinkmanship. Additionally, public statements of potential openings between

the two nations have come and gone. Both sides, for various reasons, have been unable to respond sufficiently

to the others diplomatic overtures. The United States continues to push for an increasing and severing of

sanctions, while Iran attempts to delay, and respond to these measures. Assassinations and computer viruses

mysteriously target the Iranian nuclear program. Over the past four years, sanctions have been continuously

strengthened by the Obama Administration. Iran’s response thus far has been a lot of rhetoric and bluster

Measured Response 17
combined with some incredibly amateurish assassination attempts in Bulgaria, Georgia, Washington D.C.,

New Delhi, and Bangkok.101 Despite this, the nuclear program continues to develop.102 If a stronger, more

effective response will follow is still to be determined. 

Conclusion

Carrot and Stick vs. Tit for Tat: The carrot and stick approach does not prove to be effective, as goodwill

does not always invite goodwill, simply because goodwill is ill defined and not always in the best interest

of either nation. However, the tit for tat model provides a lucid reflection of the past thirty-three years. More

importantly it provides a model and pattern for assessing future behaviors and decisions made in Tehran. At

this point antagonism is near certain to occur between the two nation-states, it is measured and proper

responses that will determine whether future disagreements will be solved in the diplomatic or kinetic realm. 

Beginning with the hostage taking at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and continuing today as sanctions

increasingly strangle the Iranian economy, the tit for tat model endures. The lessons learned are numerous

but perhaps the most telling and dramatic incident provides ultimate insight into Iranian decision-making and

priorities. The Iranian nation was horrified and shocked the moment Iran Air 655 fell out of the sky killing

the 290 civilian passengers aboard. Then speaker of the parliament Hashemi Rafsanjani claimed the

shooting down of a civilian airliner was a “turning point” in Tehran’s calculations showing the United States

was prepared to conduct “immense crimes” to stop Iran from achieving its objectives.103 Within weeks, Iran

signed the UN brokered cease-fire agreement ending the Iran-Iraq war after eight long and bloody years.

Although the incident was indeed a tragic mistake, few in Iran actually believed the shoot down was

accidental. The reaction of the Iranians to finally end the fighting only occurred following the disaster. In

Iranian calculations the atrocity was an indication of the lengths Washington was willing to go to defeat the

Islamic Republic. The fighting up until that point was made to change the behavior of the Iranians.

Shooting down airliners is a precursor to destroying the regime. Clearly, the attack foreshadowed an existential threat. 

What are the lessons learned? This monograph attempts to show that to force a change, a reciprocal answer

countering both positive and negative behaviors is required. The Islamic Republic has historically backed

down in the face of overwhelming threats, and the past displays instances of Iran succumbing at all levels

of pressure, from tactical to strategic. First, at the tactical level the seizure of oilrigs in the Gulf, and the

arrest of Qods Force agents in Baghdad forced a shift in policy. At the operational level when the U.S. Navy

delivered a one-day wake up call to the IRGC Navy as part of Operation Praying Mantis Iranian minelaying policies changed. The results of tit for tat are most obvious at the strategic level, i.e.: the signing of

the UN Resolution in 1988 when facing an increasingly hostile U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf and Iraqi

advancements on al-Faw Peninsula; the moderate rhetoric from the Iranians following both the first and

second Gulf Wars; President Khatami’s cooperative stances following Clinton era equanimity; and Tehran

reaffirming its commitment to assisting the government in Iraq after Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki surged

forces into Basra. All of these examples illustrate that reciprocation is a valuable tool that ultimately begets

positive and predictable results. 

Contrary to the hard-fisted approach outlined above, when the U.S. has displayed weakness, it has paid

dearly. President Jimmy Carter’s hesitation during the hostage crisis merely extended the ordeal and

solidified the legitimacy of the revolution. The failure to reciprocate to the bombing of the Marine barracks

in Lebanon simply invited more Iranian interference in that country’s civil war. Negotiations for hostages

18 Bradley N. Fultz
19

in Lebanon promoted more hostage taking. More recently, the long and clumsy delay in responding to Qods

Force attacks in Iraq allowed subversive activities to grow stronger. The only exception is the constraint

used following the Khobar Towers attack. As a rule of thumb however, when the U.S. failed to adhere to tit

for tat, it has lost. 

Ultimately, the Iranians are not very much interested in our carrots and not paying much attention to our

sticks until they threaten an issue the regime views as a priority. We must remember the words of Ayatollah

Khomeini in 1988: “Dear God, witness that we do not reconcile ourselves to either the American or Soviet

governments, and that we regard friendly relations with these superpowers and other great powers in this

world to be contrary to the fundamental principles of our Islamic faith.”104 Considering this core belief that,

according to Ayatollah Khomeini, the foundational principles of Islam reject friendly relations with the

United States, it is difficult to imagine Iran doing anything we want them to do, unless they are forced into

doing it. 

What does this tell us as we try to go forward attempting to make the proper decisions strategically,

operationally and tactically vis-à-vis Iran? The question commanders and intelligence professionals must

constantly strive to answer is what do the Iranians want? What are the priorities of the Islamic Republic?

Which of these priorities oppose American interests? How do we make achieving the identified conflicting

priorities more painful than it is worth? How does Iran define existential and priority threats, understanding

they can be economic, political, psychological, military or a combination of all? 

The final discussion point will be about the potential Iranian nuclear weapons program. Although a full

analysis of the ongoing negotiations is beyond this monograph it is worth mentioning the historical context

these nuclear negotiations occur in. If Iran believes a nuclear energy program is a fundamental right and the

regime is willing to accept economic sanctions, than the United States must be willing to escalate sanctions

and maintain the threat of military force in order to stop the program, which is believed to be for military

purposes. The precedence outlined above shows the United States must be willing to present an existential

threat to the Iranian regime if Tehran decides to continue its pursuit of the program. It is likely an effective

threat exists somewhere in between current sanctions and military invasion. Where that point is exactly is

still unknown. 

The Iranians are a savvy, pragmatic, adaptable foe, and history proves Tehran as adept at finding loopholes

and gray areas in U.S. policies constantly striving to achieve its own objectives while not drawing too fierce

of a response. Despite short-term victories, a pragmatic look at geopolitics indicates Iran has fallen

considerably in the past thirty-three years compared to its pre-Revolution international standing. Currently,

Iran is internationally isolated, under severe and broadening sanctions, viewed as diplomatically

irresponsible, shunned in many parts of the world, economically pressured, has a decreasing level of exports,

faces rising inflation of its currency, and is surrounded militarily. The United States has a massive military

presence in the Persian Gulf, and every bellicose statement emitting from someone in Tehran simply

justifies more military aid to Iran’s foes, and more diplomatic pressure from the international community.

In many ways the regime is being choked, and weakened every day. It is not altruistic policies that got us to

this point; in fact there is no place for altruism in such a relationship. Carrots and Sticks need not apply. The

United States increases pressure by gaining an advantage in each small tit for tat exchange that has defined

the Iran–U.S. dynamic since the inception of the Islamic Republic.

----------

Measured Response
20

Notes:

1 David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (New York: Penguin Books, 2012).

2 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984) 40.

3 Ibid. 54.

4 Ibid, 27-54. 

5 Peter Munson, War, Welfare, and Democracy: Rethinking America’s Quest for the End of History (Washington: Potomac Books,

2013), 89.

6 Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans., On War of Carl Von Clausewitz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 80-81. 

7 This is a very loose definition of Realism falling under other more complex over-arching explanations. The definition attempts to

capture the spirit of Realism while maintaining its simplicity. See Kenneth Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York:

Routledge, 2008); and William Wohlforth, “Realism” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit

and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 131-147. 

8 In August of 1953 the CIA orchestrated a military coup in Tehran to overthrow and arrest the Prime Minister Mohammad

Mosaddeq. This event was seen as the point in which the U.S. betrayed the Iranian people and fundamentally altered a government

to solve the Iranian oil nationalization crisis in its own interest. It also is the backdrop for decades of mistrust for the United States

by the Iranian people. 

9 Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2006), 44.

10 James Blight et al., Becoming Enemies: US-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War 1979-1988 (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield,

2012), 35-37; and Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004),

155.

11 John Limbert, Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the Ghosts of History (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 103-

107.

12 Ibid, 114. 

13 Blight et al., Becoming Enemies, 86; and Limbert, Negotiating with Iran, 115.

14 The 1975 Algiers Agreement, also referred to as the Algiers Accord, was an internationally recognized agreement between Iran

and Iraq to settle border disputes over the Shatt al-Arab and Khuzestan.

15 Claudia Wright, “Implications of the Iraq-Iran War,” Foreign Affairs 59:2 (Winter 1980), 278-279, http://www.proquest.com/.

16 “Iran Says U.N. Ignored War After Iraqis Attacked in 1980,” The New York Times, Oct 13, 1982, http://www.proquest.com/.

17 Blight et al., Becoming Enemies, 63-69.

18 Ibid 63.

19 Phillip Taubman, “Iran, Iraq, and The U.S.; News Analysis,” The New York Times, Jul 14, 1982, http://www.proquest.com/.

20 Bernard Gwertzman, “Iraq Gets Reports from U.S. for Use in War with Iran,” The New York Times, Dec 16, 1986, http://www.proquest.com/.

21 Crist, Twilight War, 122; and Robert Baer, The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (New York: Crown

Publishers, 2009), 64-65.

22 Baer, The Devil We Know, 64-65.

Bradley N. Fultz
23 Crist, Twilight War, 134.

24 Ibid, 134.

25 Terry Anderson, Den of Lions: Memoirs of Seven Years (New York: Balantine Books, 1993), 54.

26 Susan Kerr Van de Ven, One Family’s Response to Terrorism: A Daughter’s Memoir (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008),

66-67.

27 Blight et al., Becoming Enemies, 137. 

28 Crist, Twilight War, 186-202. Crist provides numerous examples of how debate in the White House did include discussion around

moderate elements in the Iranian regime and the desire to strengthen their hand in domestic dealings vis-à-vis the extreme wings of

those ruling in Tehran, while also setting the foundation for improved relations. Former CIA member Thomas Twetten, an intimate

participant in the dealings claims that “the first, last, and only objective of Reagan himself was to free the hostages.”

29 The TOW anti-tank missile was vital in Iran being able to stop Iraqi tanks. It was likely the most needed weapon in the arsenal to

defeat the Iraqi Army. 

30 Karim Sadjapour, “The Prince of Persia: Machiavelli’s got nothing on Iran’s Supreme Leader,” Foreign Policy Online, July 21,

2011. The idea that Iran’s leadership is able to deflect responsibility of any wrong doings has been a mainstay of the regime since

inception. This article cited compares Machiavellian policies and the behaviors of the Supreme Leader today, I would include that

this behavior goes back to the Revolution in 1979 and the IRGC-Hezbollah relationship is a prime example of this. 

31 Anthony Cordesman and Adam Seitz, Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race? (Santa

Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2009), 76. The Qods Force is a special arm of the IRGC that carries out unconventional

warfare outside of Iran primarily using foreign proxies.

32 Carol Saivetz, The Soviet Union and the Gulf in the 1980’s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 29; and Adam Tarock, The

Superpowers Involvement in the Iran-Iraq War (Commack: Nova Science Publishers, 1998), 144.

33 Adam Tarock, The Superpowers Involvement in the Iran-Iraq War, 144.

34 “A Soviet Show of Force in Iran,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 6, 1987, 6.

35 Lee Allen Zatarain, America’s First Clash with Iran, The Tanker War 1987-1988 (Havertown: Casemate Publishers, 2008), 66.

36 P.E. Tyler, “U.S.-Protected Kuwaiti Tankers Reach Halfway Point; Iran Declares Cargo ‘Prohibited goods,’” The Washington

Post, Jul 24, 1987, http://www.proquest.com/.

37 David Crist, “Gulf of Conflict: “A History of U.S.-Iranian Conflict at Sea,” Policy Focus #95 (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Studies, June 2009), 10.

38 “Reflagged Tanker Crippled by Mine, no U.S. Response, no Injuries, Ship Limps to Safe Port,” The Los Angeles Times, July 24,

1987, http://www.proquest.com/. 

39 Lou Cannon, “White House Vows to Continue Gulf Escorts,” The Washington Post, http://www.proquest.com/. 

40 Loren Jenkins, “Iran Concluded Naval Exercises; Tehran Reports Antiship Missile Test, Practice Ramming by Boats,” The

Washington Post, Aug 8, 1987, A-13.

41 Crist, Twilight War, 293.

42 Russell Watson and Jahon Barry, “A U.S. Ambush in the Gulf,” Newsweek, Oct 5, 1987, 24.

43 Zatarian, America’s First Clash with Iran, 121-124.

44 The Iranian Boghammer is an Iranian patrol boat modified with weapons systems allowing it to conduct attacks. 

Measured Response 21
45 Crist, Twilight War, 308-310.

46 John Kifner, “U.S. Flag Tanker Struck by Missile in Kuwaiti Waters; First Direct Raid,” The New York Times, Oct 17, 1987,

http://www.proquest.com/. 

47 Zatarian, America’s First Clash with Iran, 169.

48 Crist, Twilight War, 356.

49 Peter Grier, “If Iran fired Silkworms, will US Feel Need to escalate?” The Christian Science Monitor, April 20, 1988; and

Norman Black, “Iran did not use Silkworm Missiles Against US Ships, Sources Say,” Associated Press, April 27 1988; and Crist,

“Gulf of Conflict,” 10.

50 Grier. “If Iran fired Silkworms.” 

51 Zatarian, America’s First Clash with Iran, 261-289. In this chapter the author uses multiple interviews with crew members of the

two ships in question, he also looks at the trajectory of the rounds. In his book The Twilight War David Crist uses official Pentagon

reporting.

52 Crist, Twilight War, 352; and author interview with David Crist, November 20, 2012.

53 Blight et al., Becoming Enemies, 9 and 161-163.

54 Ibid, Becoming Enemies, 345-347. Quoted text from a transcript of Ayatollah Khomeini, “Letter to the Iranian People Regarding

the End of the War.” July 16, 1988. 

55 Richard Haas, “The George H.W. Bush Administration,” in The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington:

United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 137. 

56 Giandomenico Picco, Man without a Gun: One Diplomats Secret Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End a War

(New York: Times Books, 1999), 3-7. 

57 Picco, Man without a Gun, 6.

58 President Bill Clinton, “Executive Order 12959, Trade and Investment Ban, May 6, 1995,” in U.S.-Iranian Relations: An

Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws and Regulations (Washington: Atlantic Council, February 2010), 97-98. 

59 “Iran: Internal Divisions,” OxResearch Daily Brief Service, Jan 24, 1996, 1-1, http://www.proquest.com/.

60 “Federal Grand Jury Indicts 14 in 1996 Khobar Towers Bombing,” NPR’s All Things Considered, Jun 21, 2001, http://www.proquest.com/. 

61 Fabio Petito, “The Global Political Discourse of Dialogue Among Civilizations: Mohammad Khatami and Vaclav Havel,” Global

Change, Peace & Security 19, 2, 103-126, http://www.proquest.com/.

62 Donette Murray, U.S. Foreign Policy and Iran: American-Iranian Relations since the Islamic Revolution (New York: Routledge,

2010), 114-115.

63 Barbara Slavin, “U.S.-Iran Relations: Catalog of Missed Opportunities.” (Paper prepared for the American Foreign Policy

Project, June 12, 2008), http://americanforeignpolicy.org/; and John Limbert, “America and Iran: Endless Enemies,” Lecture

Marine Corps University 28 Feb, 2011, Audio Recording from Middle East Studies Iran Lecture Series, https://www.mcu.usmc.mil/. 

64 Stephen Graubard, “Lunch with the FT: Henry Kissinger,” Financial Times, May 24-25, 2008, http://www.henryakissinger.com/.

65 Murray, U.S. Foreign Policy and Iran, 94.

66 Ibid, 119. 

22 Bradley N. Fultz
67 Madeline Albright, “Remarks by Secretary of State Madeline K Albright on American-Iranian Relations,” U.S. Department of

State, March 17, 2000. http://www.parstimes.com/. 

68 Limbert, Negotiating with Iran, 163-165.

69 Pollack, Persian Puzzle, 346.

70 Mohsen Milani, “Iran and Afghanistan,” The Iran Primer Power, Politics, and US Policy, ed. Robin Wright (Washington: United

States Institute of Peace, 2010), 157. 

71 Stephen Hadley, “The George W. Bush Administration,” The Iran Primer, 143; and James Dobbins, “Engaging Iran,” 204;

Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 346-348; and Murray, U.S. Foreign Policy and Iran, 146.

72 Pollack, Persian Puzzle, 352-353.

73 Crist, Twilight War, 455.

74 Ibid, 457.

75 Ibid, 442-455.

76 Daniel Heradstveit and Matthew Bonham, “What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran,” The Middle East Journal, 61:3

(Summer 2007), 421-440.

77 Guy Dinmore, “Bush Pressed to Pursue ‘Regime Change’ in Iran,” The Financial Times, Jun 18, 2003, http://www.proquest.com/.

78 Slavin, “U.S.-Iran Relations: Catalog of Missed Opportunities.” 

79 Hadley, “The George W. Bush Administration,” 143; Michael Rubin, “The Guldimann Memorandum: The Iranian “Roadmap”

Wasn’t a Roadmap and Wasn’t Iranian,” The Weekly Standard, Oct 22, 2007, http://www.meforum.org/. 

80 Pollack, Persian Puzzle, 359.

81 Rubin, “The Guldimann Memorandum.” 

82 Michael Ware, “Inside Iran’s Secret War for Iraq,” Time, Aug 15, 2005, http://www.time.com/. 

83 Crist, Twilight War, 470.

84 Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, From George Bush to Barack Obama

(New York: Pantheon Books, 2012), 101.

85 President George W. Bush, “Text of President Bush’s 2005 State of the Union Address,” The Washington Post, Feb 2, 2005,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/; and 109th Congress, “Iran Freedom Support Act September 30, 2006,” in U.S.-Iranian Relations:

An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws, and Regulations (Washington: Atlantic Council, February 2010), 133-137. 

86 Crist, Twilight War, 512.

87 Will Fulton, Ariel Farrar-Wellman, and Robert Frasco, “Iraq-Iran Relations,” AEI Iran Tracker, August 5, 2011,

http://www.irantracker.org/; Crist, Twilight War, 518-537; and Bill Roggio, “Iran’s Ramazan Corps and the Ratlines into Iraq,” The

Long War Journal, Dec 5, 2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/. 

88 Gordon and Trainor, Endgame, 325.

89 Crist, Twilight War, 537.

90 Ned Parker, “U.S. Targets Shiite Militants; As many as 32 People are Killed in Sadr City, Meanwhile, Maliki visits Iranian

leaders,” The Los Angeles Times, Aug 9, 2007, A4. 

Measured Response 23
91 Tina Sussman, “The Conflict in Iraq: Cooperation Agreement; Turkish Airstrikes; Iraq-Iran talks on security ‘positive’; Baghdad

officials say Tehran, alleged to aid militias, has promised to boost cooperation with the Government,” The Los Angeles Times, May,

4 2008, http://www.latimes.com; and Gordon and Trainor, Endgame, 515.

92 “U.S. Backed Offensive Weakens Basra Militias,” National Public Radio Morning Edition, Washington D.C., May 20, 2008,

http://www.npr.org/. 

93 R Wolffe, “U.S. Names Iran as Chief State Sponsor of Terror,” Financial Times. May 22, 2002, http://www.proquest.com/.

94 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities.” National Intelligence Estimate,

November, 2007. 

95 “Report of Talks with Al Qaeda Denied by Iran.” New York Times, Jan 2, 2002, http://www.proquest.com/; and Guy Dinmore, “Iran

poised to Send Home Terrorist Suspects,” FT.Com, Feb 12, 2002 http://www.proquest.com/.

96 Crist, Twilight War, 464-465.

97 President Barack Obama, “Videotaped Remarks by the President in Celebration of Nowruz,” The White House Office of the Press

Secretary, March 20, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/.

98 John Limbert, “The Obama Administration,” in The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington: United States

Institute of Peace, 2010), 146-148.

99 “Obama Offer is Denounced by Ayatollah,” The New York Times, Mar 22, 2010, http://www.proquest.com/.

100 “Iran: Economy lacks long-term solution to sanctions,” United Kingdom: Oxford Analytica Ltd. 2012, http://www.proquest.com/.

101 K Dilanian, P Richter, and B Bennett, “FBI Says Iran Plotted D.C. Attack; Bomb Plan to Kill the Saudi Ambassador is a

Radical Escalation of Hostility, Officials Say,” The Los Angeles Times, Oct 12, 2011, http://www.proquest.com/; and “Thailand:

Iranian Suspects Charged Over Blast,” Global Information Network, Feb 15, 2012, http://www.proquest.com/.

102 “Little progress in latest talks between IAEA, Iran. United States” Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc. 2012,

http://www.proquest.com/.

103 Zatarian, Tanker War, 386.

104 Blight et al., Becoming Enemies, 346-347. 

24 Bradley N. Fultz
Major Brad Fultz, USMC, is a member of the AF/PAK Hands Program currently

working at Marine Corps University. A Foreign Area Officer, he holds a Master's Degree in

National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School.

About the Author

The author would like to thank Dr. Amin Tarzi for his tremendous leadership, mentorship,

and guidance along with Adam Seitz for his unparalleled support while writing this

monograph. 

Acknowledgements
Middle East Studies

at the Marine Corps University

The June 2013 presidential election in Iran accompanies a broad optimistic tone for rapprochement

in the long standing contested relationship between the United States and Tehran. Despite the

change in presidency, however, over three decades of historic precedence endure while mistrust and

frustration between the two nations run deep. With detailed analysis of the numerous diplomatic,

economic, and military engagements between the countries, Major Brad Fultz (USMC) provides

insight into the story behind the headlines, furnishing the reader with a snapshot of the various

events since 1979 that have combined to create the problematic situation between Tehran and

Washington. Major Fultz traces the past thirty-three years of U.S.-Iran relations following an

action/counter-action theme and proposes a policy paradigm for engaging the Islamic Republic in

the future. 

Finding a Measured Response to Iran’s Activities

Bradley N. Fultz

MES Monographs • No. 5 September 2013