J-S61004-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.M.O IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF R.C., FATHER

No. 774 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered April 1, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 83915

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2015

Appellant, R.C. (“Father”), appeals from the order involuntarily 

terminating his parental rights to his natural child, A.M.O, born in December 

2004. Father argues that K.E., A.M.O.’s mother (“Mother”), actively 

prevented him from establishing a relationship with A.M.O. Additionally, 

Father’s court appointed counsel, Peter David Maynard, Esq., has filed a 

petition to withdraw as counsel on this appeal. After careful review, we 

affirm the order terminating Father’s parental rights, and grant Attorney 

Maynard permission to withdraw. 

In conjunction with a petition to have her husband adopt A.M.O., 

Mother filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s rights on October 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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20, 2014. Mother alleged that Father had last seen A.M.O. in 2005, when 

A.M.O. was six months old. Furthermore, Mother alleged that Father had 

never sent A.M.O. any gifts or other tokens of his affection, and that Father 

had never sought any form of custody or visitation with A.M.O.

At the hearing on Mother’s petition, Father requested a continuance to 

obtain counsel. After appointing counsel to represent Father, the orphans’ 

court held a hearing on the petition. At the hearing, Mother testified that 

while Father was present for A.M.O’s birth, there were only two incidences of 

contact with Father during A.M.O.’s life, both occurring before A.M.O. turned 

one year old. Furthermore, Mother testified that despite A.M.O.’s frequent 

visits with Father’s mother during A.M.O.’s early years, Father made no 

attempt to cultivate a relationship with A.M.O.

Father testified that he was present when A.M.O. was born, but did 

not identify any other instances of interaction with A.M.O. See N.T., 

Hearing, 4/1/15, at 35-36. Father admitted that he had never filed an 

action for partial custody, despite having experience with custody litigation 

regarding his other children. See id., at 39-40. Father did not even look in 

the phone book to initiate communication with Mother and A.M.O. See id., 

at 44. Father stated that the last time he had seen A.M.O. that the child 

was in diapers and a stroller. See id., at 51.

At the close of the hearing, the court entered an order terminating 

Father’s parental rights to A.M.O. The court found that Father had failed to 
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satisfy his affirmative obligation to act in A.M.O.’s best interests as he had 

“sat on his parental rights for over a decade[.]” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

6/10/15, at 8. The court thus concluded that Father had evidenced a settled 

purpose of relinquishing his parental claim to A.M.O. by failing to perform 

parental duties for over a period of six months. Furthermore, the trial court 

found that termination suited the best interests of A.M.O., as it cleared the 

path for adoption by Mother’s husband, with whom he already lived. This 

timely appeal followed. 

Attorney Maynard has requested to withdraw and has submitted an 

Anders brief in support thereof contending that Father’s appeal is frivolous. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has articulated the procedure to be 

followed when court-appointed counsel seeks to withdraw from representing 

an appellant on direct appeal.

[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed 

counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a 

summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to 

the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel 

arguably believes supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s 

reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel 

should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case 

law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that 

the appeal is frivolous. 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).

Attorney Maynard has substantially complied with all of the 

requirements of Anders as articulated in Santiago. Additionally, Attorney 

Maynard confirms that he sent a copy of the Anders brief as well as a letter 
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explaining to Father that he has the right to proceed pro se or the right to 

retain new counsel. Attorney Maynard has forwarded a copy of the letter to 

this Court. See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 5990, 594 (Pa. 

Super. 2010); Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748 (Pa. Super. 

2005).

We now proceed to examine the issues counsel sets forth in the 

Anders brief.1 See Appellant’s Brief, at 3. 

While Father has organized his issues as separate challenges, they 

both ultimately resolve to but a single issue: whether the trial court was 

legally justified in terminating Father’s parental rights. We review this 

appeal according to the following standard.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

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1

Father has not filed a response to Attorney Maynard’s petition to withdraw. 
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Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the 

parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). 

Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511). The burden is on the petitioner, in this case Mother, to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for 

seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. See In re R.N.J., 985 

A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Instantly, the court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(1) and (b). We need only agree with the court on 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), in addition to Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the 

termination of parental rights.2 See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

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2

Father has never challenged whether termination suited A.M.O.’s best 

interests, and therefore, there is no issue on this appeal regarding the 

application of Section 2511(b). “Appellant contends that despite the lack of 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Super. 2004) (en banc). We conclude that the trial court properly 

terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), which 

provide as follows:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1).

The court’s findings are amply supported by Father’s own testimony. 

Father has never pursued a relationship with A.M.O., who is now 10 years 

old. Father admitted that he has had no contact in all those years, and yet 

never filed a legal request for visitation, let alone partial custody, despite 

having filed for custody of his other children. The decision to terminate 

Father’s parental rights was neither an abuse of discretion nor an error of 

law.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

any type of current relationship whatsoever between Father and child that a 

termination of his parental rights would be detrimental, if not to the child, at 

least to Father.” Appellant’s Brief, at 10; see N.T., Trial, 4/1/15, at 48 

(admitting that A.M.O. is in a stable home and that it would be against 

A.M.O.’s interests to award Father custody). In any event, given A.M.O.’s 

stated preference and the report of A.M.O.’s guardian ad litem, we conclude 

that the trial court did not err in finding that termination of Father’s parental 

rights was in A.M.O.’s best interest.
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After examining the issue contained in the Anders brief and after 

undertaking our independent review of the record, we concur with counsel’s 

assessment that the appeal is wholly frivolous. We therefore grant Attorney 

Maynard’s petition to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s order terminating 

parental rights.

Order affirmed. Petition to Withdraw as Counsel granted. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/13/2015