Aviation Operations

U.S. Marine Corps

MCWP 3-2

Distribution Statement A: approvcd for public release; distribution is unlimited

PCN 143 000019 00
To Our Readers

Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes that

will improve it. Recommendations may be sent directly to Commanding General, Marine

Corps Combat Development Command, Doctrine Division (C 42), 3300 Russell Road, Suite

318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021 or by fax to 703-784-2917 (DSN 278-2917) or by E-mail to

morgannc@mccdc.usmc.mil. Recommendations should include the following information:

• Location of change

Publication number and title

Current page number

Paragraph number (if applicable)

Line number

Figure or table number (if applicable) • Nature of change

Add, delete

Proposed new text, preferably double-spaced and typewritten

• Justification and/or source of change

Additional copies: A printed copy of this publication may be obtained from Marine Corps

Logistics Base, Albany, GA 3 1704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBu1 5600, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from the Doctrine Division, MCCDC, world wide web home page which is found at the following universal

reference locator: http://www.doctrine.usmc.mil.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is

used, both men and women are included.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

9 May 2000

FOREWORD

Aviation is an integral part of the naval expeditionary air-ground team—it extends the MAGTF's operational reach and flexibility and expands its warfighting power. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-2, Aviation

Operations, applies the warfighting philosophy in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCD?) 1, Warfig/iting, to Marine aviation operations. It is the link between higher order doctrine and the tactics, techniques, and procedures

contained in other Marine aviation doctrinal publications. This publication establishes the doctrinal basis for the planning and execution of aviation opera

tions and provides the philosophy for employment of Marine aviation ii thc

prosecution of war and other operations in support of the Marine Corps' mission

as the nation's expeditionary force in readiness.

This publication is intended primarily for commanders and staff officers who

are responsible for the planning and execution of aviation operations. Nonetheless, it should be read by all Marines who are supported by or involved in the execution of aviation operations. It is also intended for other doctrine centers, joint

and multinational staffs, professional military educational activities, and any

other activity that requires an understanding of Marine aviation. It explains U.S.

Marine Corps aviation capabilities and how the Marine air-ground task force

(MAGTF) exploits these capabilities, both operationally and tactically. It does

not discuss the specifics of unit-level tactics and procedures; e.g., air-to-air combat tactics, how to conduct a helicopterbome operation, or how to attack any

particular target. Rather, this publication applies maneuver warfare concepts to

Marine aviation operations, especially in aviation's role as an integrated combat

arm of the MAGTF.

As with all Marine Corps doctrinal publications, this publication is authoritative

in nature but requires judgment in application. It supersedes Fleet Marine Force

Manual (FMFM) 5-1, Organization and Function of Marine Aviation.
Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

J. E. RHODES

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding General

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

DISTRIBUTION: 143 00001900
Aviation Operations

Table of Contents

Page

Chapter 1 The Role of Marine Aviation

1001 The Evolution of Marine Aviation: Adapting to Meet the Threat 1-2

1002 Marine Aviation and the Levels of War 1-5

Chapter 2 The Missions, Functions, and Organization of Marine Aviation

2001 Functions of Marine Aviation 2-1

2002 Marine Aviation Organization 2-6

2003 Aviation Combat Element Task Organization 2-14

Chapter 3 The Role of Aviation in Combined-Arms Force Operations

3001 The Six Warfighting Functions 3-1

3002 The Operational Environment 3-2

3003 Organizational Adaptability 3-3

3004 Marine Aviation and Maneuver Warfare 3-4

3005 The ACE in Maneuver Warfare 3-11

3006 Aviation in Offensive and Defensive Operations 3-12

3007 Aviation in Security Operations 3-13

3008 Aviation in Military Operations Other Than War 3-14

Chapter 4 Command and Control of Marine Aviation Operations

4001 Command Relationships 4-1

4002 Aviation Combat Element Command and Support Relationships 4-2

4003 Marine Aviation Command Relationships in a Joint Force 4-4

4004 Other Command Authorities 4-6

4005 The Marine Air Command and Control System 4-7

Chapter 5 Aviation Planning

5001 The Commander's Role in Planning 5-1

5002 Staff Organization for Aviation Planning 5-2

5003 Planning Cycles 5-4

5004 Aviation Planning as an Element of MAGTF Planning 5-5

5005 The Air Tasking Cycle 5-7

Chapter 6 Aviation Logistics

6001 Strategic Aviation Logistics and Aviation Ground Support 6-1

6002 Operational Aviation Logistics and Aviation Ground Support 6-1

6003 Tactical Aviation Logistics and Aviation Ground Support 6-4
MCWP 3-2

Chapter 7 Marine Aviation in Navy, Joint, and Multinational Operations

7001 Navy Fleet Operational Support 7-1

7002 Joint Operations 7-1

7003 Multinational Operations 7-3

Chapter 8 Emerging Concepts

8001 Operational Maneuver From the Sea 8-i

8002 Ship-to-Objective Maneuver 8-2

8003 Sustained Operations Ashore 8-3

8004 MPF2OlOandBeyond 8-3

Appendices

A Marine Aviation Organization A-i

B Glossaiy B-i

C References and Related Publications C-i
Chapter 1

The Role of Marine Aviation

"Today [aviation] is the dominant factor in war. It may not win a. war by itself alone, but without it no major war can be won." 1 —Adm Arthur Radford

Marine forces are general purpose forces and traditionally come "from the sea" with limited organic fire support and mobility, assets. As such,

Marine forces rely heavily on the fires, fire support, and mobility provided by Marine aviation.

Marine aviation is an integral part of the Marine

air-ground task force (MAGTF). It provides the

MAGTF with a complete spectrum of operational

capabilities and is a flexible instrument of the

MAGTF's combat power. The aviation combat

element (ACE) is a powerful and versatile part. of

the MAGTF's combined-arms team, complementing the MAGTF's ground combat element

(GCE) and combat service support element

(CSSE), while functioning in consonance with the

Marine Corps' doctrinal philosophy of maneuver

warfare.

Marine aviation provides the MAGTF with the

operational flexibility it needs to accomplish its

mission across the range of military operations. It

extends the operational reach of the MAGTF and

enables it to accomplish operational objectives

designed to achieve strategic goals. The MAGTF

uses the strategic and operational mobility afforded by the sea to employ its integrated air arm and

to exert a powerful influence in most geographic

areas of potential national concern. Since most

ground- and ship-based fires have a limited range

and ground-based mobility systems are limited by

speed, range, and the terrain, the MAGTF's ACE

allows the MAGTF commander to conduct the

deep fight. The ACE affords the MAGTF the ability to deliver fires, facilitate integrated command

and control, enhance mobility and maneuver, provide force protection, sustain combat power, and

collect intelligence.

Marine aviation's expeditionary character sets it

apart from all other aviation organizations. The

ACE's role is to project combat power, conduct

air operations, and contribute to battlespace dominance in support of the MAGTF's mission, and it

organizes, trains, and equips for that role. Marine

aviation can operate from amphibious platforms,

forward operating bases (FOBs), forward expeditionary land bases, carriers (as an integral part of

carrier air groups), or any combination thereof.

The MAGTF's single-battle concept exploits the

combined-arms nature of MAGTF operations. It

allows the MAGTF commander to fight a single

battle with an integrated, task-organized force of

ground, aviation, and logistic forces. Based on

this concept, operations performed by Marine aviation are rarely undertaken in isolation since its

greatest value is in its integrated contribution to

the MAGTF's overall mission. It is designed to

function most effectively as an integral part of the

MAGTF and cannot be separated without a significant loss of capability. Marine aviation provides enhanced mobility and close fires for units

in contact and augments ground and naval indirect fires. Marine aviation also gives a Marine expeditionary force (MEF), which would otherwise

be a light infantry force, the operational reach of a

corps-level force.

Marine aviation performs a variety of roles and

tasks in support of national objectives. This can

include fulfilling missions outside Marine aviation's traditional MAGTF, naval expeditionary

force, and joint force roles. Examples of Marine

aviation being used in nontraditional roles include

providing direct support to the President; providing aviation detachments for independent duty

such as the Marines attached to the joint force air
1-2 MCWP 3-2

component commander (JFACC) in Aviano, Italy, in support of operations in Bosnia; providing

forces for counterdrug operations such as the

ground-based air search radars teams deployed to

support Operation Nimbus; and participating in

disaster relief operations such as Homestead,

Florida after itwas struck by Hurricane Andrew.

Marine aviation provides the MAGTF with six

specific functions: antiair warfare (AAW), offensive air support (OAS), assault support, air reconnaissance, electronic warfare (EW), and control of

aircraft and missiles. These six functions are discussed in chapter 2.

1001. The Evolution of Marine

Aviation: Adapting to Meet the

Threat

The Marine Corps' contribution to national security is due largely to the ability of Marines to

identify and adapt to the nation's strategic and

tactical needs, often before those needs are widely

recognized. As the Navy transitioned from sail to

steam during the era of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the

Marine Corps developed a concept for seizure and

defense of advanced bases that would extend the

fleet's reach worldwide. In 1912, the Marine

Corps recognized the potential contribution of

aviation to its emerging Advanced Base Force

Concept. Less than a year later, Marine aviation

participated in its first maneuvers off Guantanamo, Cuba. Marihe pilots performed scouting and

reconnaissance missions and dropped aerial

bombs to support the fleet. Thiswas the beginning of the evolution of Marine aviation that

would eventually evolve into today's six functions of Marine aviation.

In January 1914, an all-Marine aviation force

functioned in conjunction with Marine ground

forces of the Advanced Base Brigade during annual fleet exercises. This was the first demonstration of what would become the Marine Corps'

integrated combined-arms approach to warfare.

During World War I, Marine pilots received their

first combat experience when they scored their

first air-to-air victories, flew bombing missions,

and conducted the first aerial resupply drop.

These successfully integrated Marine air-ground

operations proved that aviation could provide coordinated, direct support of Marine ground forces.

Marine operations in Nicaragua (1927—1 933) produced the first practical air-ground integration

and coordination techniques. Marine aviation was

able to inflict heavy casualties on massed Sandinista forces by using bombs and machine guns. As

a result of these attacks, Sandinista forces never

massed again and were less of a threat to Marine

forces. Marine aviation also conducted air reconnaissance, close air support (CAS), deep air support (DAS), aerial logistic support, and combat

aerial evacuation against the Sandinistas. In 1932,

Marine aviation experimented with the use of autogyros to. support combat operations. However,

at that stage of rotary-wing aircraft development,

the rotary-wing aircraft was deemed ineffective

because of its limited payload. But this experimentation set the stage for the helicopter's future

development as a means of mobility for both

troops and logistics.

Meanwhile, world events indicated the likelihood

of a major naval war in the Pacific. Accordingly,

the Marine Corps developed amphibious warfare

techniques that laid the foundation for U.S. and

Allied amphibious triumphs in World War II.

These techniques were published in the Tentative

Landing Operations Manual (TLOM) in July

1935. Concurrent with the development of the

TLOM was the formal recognition and integration

of Marine aviation as a part of the Marine Corps'

operating forces. On December 8, 1933, the Fleet

Marine Force (FMF) was created and aviation

was formally incorporated into the FMF's organization. Marine aviation went on to play a key role

in operations throughout World War II, particularly in providing CAS to amphibious forces.

During World War II, in the early months of

1942, the U.S. committed six carriers to the Pacific. By November, all but one of them had been

sunk or put out of action. Marines on Guadalcanal
Aviation Operations 1-3

then focused on securing and improving a captured Japanese airstrip, later dubbed Henderson

Field. From this "unsinkable" aircraft carrier, Marine, Navy, and Army' Air Corps pilots launched

numerous counterattacks against the enemy and

provided a shield against Japanese forces attempting to dislodge our foothold on the island. Tactics

used during these operations became the model

for aviation support of ground and naval forces

throughout the Pacific island-hopping campaign

and, ultimately, led to the success of operations in

the Pacific.

Following World War II, Marines focused on the

helicopter's potential utility. The first Marine Experimental Helicopter Squadron-i was established at Quantico, Virginia. Its purpose was to

conduct experiments, develop doctrine, and develop tactics for vertical envelopment using helicopters. The experiments produced tactics and

doctrine, but the helicopter's lift capacity in 1948

and 1949 was still limited to about 1,500 pounds.

This experimentation resulted in the creation of

the Shepherd Board and the establishment of minimum lift requirements for Marine troop transport

helicopters.

As helicopter lift capabilities advanced so did the

use of these aircraft. During the Korean War, helicopters were used extensively in combat operations. In July 1950, Marine Aircraft Group-33

(MAG-33) deployed with the Marine Corps' First

Provisional Brigade to Korea. One of MAG-33's

squadrons, Marine Observation Squadron-6

(Fixed-Wing) (VMO-6), was composed of fixedwing observation aircraft and four helicopters.

VMO-6 used its helicopters primarily for the rescue of downed pilots, and it developed tactics

(e.g., the use of armed escorts) that are still used

today during pilot rescue operations. In Septem

ber 1951, the Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 conducted the first Marine Corps vertical

envelopment in combat, which was based on the

vertical envelopment doctrine and tactics developed at Quantico, Virginia during the 1940s.

Marine aviation's tradition of providing effective

CAS with its fixed-wing aircraft was also significantly enhanced during the Korean War as it flew

jets into combat for the first time on December

10, 1950. During March and April of 1951, one

squadron maintained 10-minute standby alerts,

with four pilots in the cockpits of their aircraft.

This allowed the unit to respond to urgent calls

for CAS frpm the tactical air command center

(TACC) via the direct air support center (DASC).

As a result, a more responsive CAS system was

established that allowed the use of airborne, alert

aircrews that were briefed as they approached the

target.

Radar systems that were effective at night were

also installed on some aircraft, such as the F-7F

Tigercat, during the Korean War. Radar capabilities allowed commanders to designate some

squadrons to fly only at night, thereby enhancing

the squadron's effectiveness while minimizing its

vulnerability. These night-flying pilots were normally under the control of a forward air controller

(FAC), an employment method that was later

used extensively in the Vietnam War.

Another advancement during the Korean War was

the establishment of Marine Photographic Squadron 1 on February 25, 1952. This squadron flew

F2H-2P Banshees, which were specially modified

with a long nose to accommodate several reconnaissance cameras. These were the first Marine

aircraft specifically dedicated to reconnaissance.

The aerial photographs provided by this unit were

invaluable aids to intelligence and targeting.

During the post-Korean and pre-Vietnam period,

the Marine Corps continued to develop doctrine

and tactics for the employment of both fixed-wing

and rotary-wing aircraft; In 1962, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 was deployed to

South Vietnam to provide mobility support to the

South Vietnamese army, which was conducting

operations south of Saigon. These operations provided invaluable experience to the Marine Corps

in the conduct of helicopterborne operations. On

the basis of these experiences, helicopters were

fitted with door-mounted, M-60 machine guns,

which enabled helicopters to return fire while

landing in hot landing zones. The need for an aerial escort to protect the helicopters and prepare a

landing zone was also recognized. Initially, this
1-4 MCWP 3-2

role was filled by slow-flying, fixed-wing fighter

aircraft. Later, the UH-1B Huey helicopter gunship was developed to meet this need and was

fielded in Vietnam in 1963. The need for greater

firepower and for armor to protect critical areas of

the helicopter were also identified. The UH-1B

provided escort and fire support for helicopterborne operations untjl the AH-1G Cobra was

fielded in 1967.

Command and control of aircraft improved during

the Vietnam War. Radar information was manually plotted during the first several years of the war,

then a computer-based aircraft command and control system (Marine Corp tactical data system

[MTDS]) was deployed to Vietnam. It provided

the first automated aircraft command and control

system for Marine aviation that was compatible

with the Navy's command and control system.

During the Vietnam War, Marine aviation developed the foundations for the doctrine, tactics, and

equipment used today. At the conclusion of the

Vietnam War, Marine aviation had developed and.

demonstrated the capability to conduct OAS,

assault support, air reconnaissance, EW (incluciing the ability to counter modern air defenses),

control of aircraft and missiles, and AAW. Rotary-wing aviation concentrated on improvements

in lift capability, mobility, and helicopter fire support techniques. Fixed-wing aviation focused on

improvements in turbojet engine technology and

aircraft design. These improvements led to a new

generation of aircraft that were faster and more

maneuverable, and which could carry a wide variety of new and improved munitions. One of the

most significant aspects of this new technology,

which was to have a profound impact on both aircraft design and AAW doctrine, was the introduction of the guided missile. Unlike the Korean

War, when air-to-air combat and air defense was

fought with essentially the same weapons and tactics as was used in World War II, the Vietnam air

war was fought with the guided missile. By the

end of the war, missile technology and employment dominated both friendly and enemy AAW

doctrine and accounted for a majority of our airto-air combat victories.

Full-scale Marine participation in Vietnam began

in 1965. The doctrine and tactics for helicopterborne operations, which were refined while supporting the South Vietnamese army, provided a

sound basis on which Marines continued to build.

The UH-1B gunships that deployed to Vietnam in

1963 were replaced by AH-1G attack helicopters

in 1967 and two-engined AH-1J Sea Cobra in

1969. The CH-53A Sea Stallion and the CH-46

Sea Knight were introduced in 1966 and provided

a significant improvement to lift capacity and the

ability to conduct helicopterborne assaults and resupply operations.

In July 1965, Marine Composite Reconnaissance

Squadron 1 (Fixed-Wing) arrived in Vietnam.

This unit was equipped with the EF-1OB Sky

Knight, an electronic countermeasures platform.

The EF-1OB was flown extensively during the

next 2 years and provided effective protection

against Soviet-built and -supplied surface-to-air

missiles (SAM5). Late in 1966, a newer, more capable aircraft (the EA-6A Intruder) replaced the

EF-1OB. Also in 1966, the Marine Corps introduced the RF-4B Phantom, which was a reconnaissance version of the F4 Phantom. The RF-4B

provided a significant jump in combat capability.

It replaced the RF-8A Crusader, initially deployed

to Vietnam, and was the first Marine aircraft capable of acquiring imagery at night.

Through the late seventies, the eighties, and into

the nineties, as the U.S. modernized its forces, the

Marine Corps continued its legacy of innovation.

From vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL)

aircraft to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV5) to

precision-guided munitions, the Marine Corps

continued to be a leader in adapting new technology to warfighting. The Marine Corps developed

a warfighting concept that emphasized smaller

expeditionary forces that used speed, tempo, and

seamless air-ground integration as force multipliers, known as maneuver warfare. This concept

proved highly successful against Iraqi forces during the Persian Gulf War.

This concept resulted in a Marine air-ground

team, referred to as a MAGTF, that has had a profound impact on the nation's ability to respond to
Aviation Operations 1-5

crises and conflicts. The MAGTF is the Marine

Corps' principal organization for all military operations. It is composed of forces task-organized

under a single commander to accomplish a specific mission. These forces are functionally grouped

into four core elements: a command element

(CE), an aviation combat element (ACE), a

ground combat element (GCE), and a combat service support element (CSSE). The MAGTF's

flexible organizational structure allows for other

Service or foreign military force(s) to be assigned

or attached to it. The four core elements are not

formal commands. The number, size, and type of

forces that comprise each element is mission dependent. The ACE is task-organized to provide

the specific capabilities required of Marine aviation to support the MAGTF. The ACE is not subordinate to the GCE; it is a co-equal combat arm

of the MAGTF that provides the mobility, flexibility, coordination, and firepower required to

successfully employ maneuver warfare.

An important part of the development of Marine

aviation has been the concurrent development of

the role of Marine aviation reserve forces. Since

1935, the Reserves have not only played an

important role in conflicts but have often led the

way in the development of aviation concepts and

doctrine. The Reserves are organized, equipped,

and trained as an integral part of Marine aviation.

Marine aviation reserve units can provide the full

spectrum of aviation support functions and mdi—

vidual aviation units to reinforce an ACE.

The end of the Cold War brought with it a period

of crises and conflicts of increasing number, frequency, and variety, and the Marine Corps provides the National Command Authorities with the

capability to rapidly respond to crises wherever

they may occur. Crisis response requires a full

spectrum of military capabilities, including forcible entry and military operations other than war

(MOOTW). Defense of national interests requires

an expeditionary crisis response force that is specifically organized, trained, and equipped to

quickly project military power overseas. This rapid-response, general-purpose force must maintain

itself in a continuous state of readiness and it must

be prepared to adapt to a broad range of operating

environments on short nOtice. It must possess a

strategic mobility that allows it projection wherever it is required. By virtue of its naval character,

expeditionary nature, and combined-arms organization, the MAGTF, with its ACE, is capable of

responding to these requirements.

The ever-chaiging world security environment

requires that Marine aviation continually anticipate and adapt to new challenges. Employing new

technology .with existing doctrine will not always

provide the required operational capabilities.

Constant refinement of aviation doctrine and a

continuous exploration of innovative ideas are

necessary. This proactiveapproach has been the

hallmark of Marine aviation.

1002. Marine Aviation and the

Levels of War

War is fought at three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Although Marine aviation is designed primarily as a tactical instrument, it can

make significant contributions at all three levels.

a. The Strategic Level of War

In contrast to tactics, which is the art of winning

engagements and battles, military strategy is the

art of winning wars. Strategy is implemented by

combatant commanders and is always joint in nature. The MAGTF makes a strategic contribution

when it is used as an element of national power to

accomplish national policy objectives. Since

Marine aviation is bonded to the MAGTF by mission, organizations and employment, its strategic

contributiOns are normally encompassed within

the MAGTF support it provides. For example, a

sea-based MAGTF strategically positioned near a

world "hot spot" may be the ideal force to indicate U.S. political concern or resolve on a volatile

issue. If the strategic objective is to show a U.S.

presence in the area, Marine aviation operations.

become a visible show of force without physically

landing U;S. troops ashore. In this case, Marine

aviation's contribution to the strategic objective

would be dominant, but it is still performed in
1-6 MCWP 3-2

support of the MAGTF's mission and not considered an independent action.

Marine aviation's naval expeditionary character

makes it a force of choice whenever political considerations preclude a deliberate build up of forces and their supporting infrastructure ashore.

Marine aviation also has the collateral mission of

participating as an integral component of naval

aviation as directed by fleet commanders. Marine

aviation has, in some cases, been tasked to conduct operations while not part of a MAGTF, this

is the exception rather than the rule. For example,

Marine aviation has been used against targets of

strategic value in an air strike launched from a

Navy aircraft carrier as part of a joint force. Another example is the use of Marine aviation assets

in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. Both examples are exceptions to the normal doctrinal employment of Marine aviation. Marine aviation is,

first and foremost, an integral component of the

MAGTF.

b. The Operationa' Level of War

The operational level of war links tactical results

to strategic aims. The operational use of aviation

relates to campaigning. Aviation at the operational level of war shapes events by deciding when,

where, and under what conditions to engage the

enemy in battle. At the operational level, the

MAGTF commander uses aviation against targets

of operational significance. These targets consist

of enemy capabilities or resources whose destruction or neutralization are important to the prosecution of the campaign.

Marine aviation participates at the tactical and operational levels as part of a MAGTF. Doctrinally,

this is Marine aviation's primary mission: to participate as the air component of the MAGTF in

the seizure of advanced naval bases and to conduct land operations as may be essential for the

prosecution of a naval operation. The capabilities

provided by aviation allow the MAGTF commander to generate operational capability quickly

at or near the location of any conflict. Aviation

provides the resiliency and flexibility required .to

respond appropriately to developing situations by

either expanding or reducing U.S. military presence as directed by the theater commander.

In most operations, the MAGTF serves as part of

a joint task force (JTF) under the command of a

joint force commander (JFC). Joint Publication

(JP) 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),

establishes the doctrine, principles, and policies

of a joint force. Marine aviation supports joint

force operations as an integral part of the

MAGTF. This ensures that the MAGTF retains its

unique capability to generate combined-arms

combat power. The MAGTF commander will retain operational control (OPCON) of the ACE

during all joint operations. Any sorties in excess

of the MAGTF's direct support requirements are

normally made available to the JFC. The JFC uses

the MAGTF's excess sorties to support other

components of the joint force in pursuit of overall

campaign objectives. The MAGTF commander

also makes sorties available to the JFACC for air

defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range

reconnaissance. See JP 3-56.1, Command and

Control for Joint Air Operations, and JP 3-09,

Doctrine for Joint Fire Support for detailed information on command and control of joint air and

fire support operations.

The capabilities of aviation, including its speed,

range, and mobility, easily translate to the operational level of war. Because Marine aviation has

significant range, the MAGTF commander can

use air interdiction to strike deep within the enemy's rear areas and air reconnaissance to gather

needed information. Air defense sorties can protect the MAGTF as well as contribute to the protection of a joint force, all of which are significant

contributions to the JFC's operational goals.

The implications of an action taken at one level of

war seldom remain confined to that level. Actions

taken at the operational level may influence other

actions across all three levels of conflict. This

overlap between the operational and tactical levels of war must be understood if we are to maximize opportunities for success.
Aviation Operations 1-7

c. The Tactical Level of War

Operational goals give purpose to tactical actions.

In turn, tactical actions may influence operational

goals. The tactical-operational relationship is important when deciding the best way to employ

aviation because aviation is uniquely capable of

having an immediate impact at both the tactical

and operational levels of war.

Success at the operational level can promote success at the tactical level. The employment of aviation at the operational level during Operation

Desert Storm served to disrupt Iraqi command

and control, degrade defenses, and demoralize

troops. The success of Operation Desert Storm's

operational goals contributed to tactical successes

during the ground operations phase.

Success at the tactical level can foster success at

the operational level; however, success at the tactical level can prove indecisive unless linked to

operational goals. Aviation can play a significant

role in turning a tactical success into an operational decision. This is illustrated by Allied efforts in

the South Pacific during World War II.

Beginning in the Solomon Islands with Guadalcanal in 1942, naval aviation played a major role in

the destruction of the best elements of the Japanese naval air forces. Defending their major base

at Rabaul on the island of New Britain against Allied air attacks, the. Japanese committed and lost

all of their fully-trained naval air units, including

those that survived the Battle of Midway. They also committed and lost a portion of their besttrained army air units. Subsequently, the Japanese

never fully recovered from these losses.

The advantage gained by defeating a large portion

of Japan's best-trained combat pilots in Guadalcanal and New Britain would prove vital to continu-.

ing Allied operations. The onslaught against

Rabaul by Allied aircraft, over half of which were

flown by Marine aviators, prevented Japanese aircraft from prohibitively interfering with American

landings in the Solomons area, most notably at

Cape Gloucester. The continued pressure of naval

aviation against Rabaul eventually caused the

withdrawal of Japanese aircraft from the island

fortress. The combined effect of the tactical successes in the Solomons degraded Japan's combat

power and the Allies were able to bypass Rabaul,

an operational maneuver that isolated about

100,000 Japanese.

Operation Overlord, the great amphibious landing

in Normandy during World War II, is an example

of how the operational use of aviation determined

the conditions of engagement. The operational

role of aviation in Operation Overlord was to ensure that the enemy forces attacking the beachhead did not increase at a more rapid rate than the

Allied forces defending it and extending it. Three

air attacks were conducted on targets hundreds of

miles from the contested ground and were timed

to disrupt Nazi attempts to reinforce units engaged in Normandy. Allied aviation successfully

delayed the movement of German reserves that

could have countered the Allied landing. Operationally, the German army remained paralyzed.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel reported in his June

10, 1944 dispatch that practically all traffic on

roads, tracks, and in open country was pinned

down by powerful fighter-bomber and bomber

formations. As a result, the movement of German

troops on the battlefield was almost completely

paralyzed, while the Allies maneuvered freely.

The Gulf War contains recent examples of tactical

events that impacted the operational level of war.

During the first 6 months of Operation Desert

Shield, 1st Marine Division spent a great deal of

time scrutinizing the 8-year Iran-Iraq war. Planners learned that Iraqi artillery was very effective

in trapping Iranian soldiers in confined areas

called firesacks, where thousands of Iranians perished. The firesack, like our engagement area, is

an area along an enemy avenue of approach intended to contain and destroy an enemy force

with the massed fires of all available weapons.

Studies of the two obstacle belts in Kuwait and

the positioning of more than 1,200 Iraqi artillery

pieces behind those obstacle belts indicated that

when the Marines attacked, the Iraqis meant to

trap them, in at least tWo firesacks. Marine planners also recognized that their available aviation

ordnance was not sufficient to destroy the Iraqi
1-8 MCWP 3-2

artillery during the first phase of Operation Desert

Storm. Therefore, planners designed a series of

combined-arms raids to defeat the Iraqis' plan before they even attacked into Kuwait.

Operation Desert Storm kicked off on January 17,

1991. On January 19th, Marine aircraft conducted

their first raid. Coalition forces were going to

move an artillery battery, escorted by a light armored infantry company, close to the Kuwaiti

border at night. A Marine EA-6B Prowler EW aircraft was to be stationed inside Saudi Arabian airspace to jam the Iraqis' radars until after the entire

artillery battery had fired on a designated target.

As the artillery battery started to withdraw, EA6B aircraft would stop jamming just long enough

for the Iraqis to detect the battery's movement before it began jamming again. The intent was to

cause the Iraqi artillery to respond to Marine indirect fires. Once the Iraqis began firing, a Marine

forward air controller (airborne) (FAC[A]) in a

Marine F/A-18 Hornet detected the Iraqis' muzzle

flashes and directed a flight of Marine F/A-18s to

roll in on the firing Iraqi artillery.

The plan's goal was to convince Iraqi artillerymen not to man their artillery pieces for fear that

every time they did so Marine aircraft would attack them. By the third week in February, after a

series of these raids, the plan's goal was achieved.

UAVs showed Iraqi artillerymen abandoning their

howitzers as Marine aircraft began attacking their

positions.

These successful raids at the tactical level had

dramatic effect at the operational level. The fear

of an attack from aviation assets made Iraqi artillery ineffective in the final phase of the war. This

undoubtedly saved many lives and contributed to

the strategic success of Operation Desert Storm.

Another Gulf War example of the impact of aviation at the operational level took place the night of

January 29, 1991. During the night, several battalion-sized Iraqi units attacked Coalition forces in

and around the border town of Khafji. The Iraqis

surprised the Coalition forces and occupied the

town. However, Arab ground forces belonging to

the Coalition quickly counterattacked and, with

the aid of CAS, regained possession of Khafji 2

days later. This purely tactical event is, only part

of the story. The night before the recapture of

Khafji, farther to the north, Saddam Hussein

amassed more than two divisions of armor and

mechanized infantry to join the fight for the town.

Because of technological advancements, the night

no longer provided its traditional sanctuary. Within minutes, the joint surveillance, and target attack radar system (JSTARS) discovered the Iraqi

force and began employing Coalition aircraft

against it. Using precision-guided weapons, air

strikes continued throughout the night and devastated the two divisions. They never reached their

desired objective, and by morning, they were retreating in total disarray.

The Battle of Khafji was important for the Coalition. Tactically, the Pan-Arab forces defeated the

Iraqis in a pitched battle, launching a difficult

night counterattack against enemy armor. Operationally, the destruction inflicted on two Iraqi divisions by Coalition aircraft convinced the Iraqis

that any force that left its defenses to conduct a

mobile operation would be decimated. During the

remainder of the war, the Iraqis never again attempted an offensive operation. The operational

result was a paralyzed military force that was unable to interfere with Coalition maneuver operations.
Chapter 2

The Missions, Functions, and

Organization of Marine Aviation

"Marine aviation units are an integral element of an air-ground combat

system. They are not merely joined at the top when the time comes to fight.

They are fully integrated from top to bottom, and they train that way fulltime. "2

—Gen Carl E. Mundy

Marine Corps aviation is organized, trained, and

equipped to provide a task-organized ACE for

any size MAGTF. The ACE is not a formal command. The term "ACE" categorizes the functionality of specific forces within the MAGTF. For

any MAGTF, the ACE is composed of task-organized Marine aviation forces under a single commander. The ACE commander is the MAGTF

commander's principal advisor and subject matter

expert on all aviation activities.

The ACE must be prepared to support MAGTF

expeditionary operations from both sea-based and

shore-based facilities. The ACE's primary mission is to support the MAGTF during all phases of

expeditionary operations as well as during sustained operations ashore.

2001. Functions of Marine

Aviation

The tasks of Marine aviation fall into six functional areas (see fig. 2-1 on page 2-2): offensive

air support, antiair warfare, assault support, air reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and control of

aircraft and missiles. Planners initially consider

the functional area, not the means (i.e., particular

weapons systems), when analyzing the fundamental requirements of accomplishing any given objective.

a. Offensive Air Support

OAS involves air operations that are conducted

against enemy installations, facilities, and personnel in order to directly assist in the attainment of

MAGTF objectives by destroying enemy resources or isolating enemy military forces. Its primary

support of the warfighting functions is to provide

fires and force protection through CAS and DAS.

The application of OAS can sometimes be decisive by directly or indirectly affecting an enemy's

center of gravity. OAS allows the commander to

influence the battle by projecting firepower to

shape events in time and space. It also allows the

commander to shape the battlespace by delaying

enemy reinforcements, degrading critical enemy

functions, and manipulating enemy perceptions,

which ultimately results in protection of the force.

Marine fighter/attack squadrons (VMFAs),

Marine fighter attack (all weather) squadrons

(VMFA[AW]s), Marine attack squadrons

(VMAs), Marine light/attack helicopter squadrons

(HMLAs), and Marine unmanned aerial vehicle

squadrons (VMU) provide OAS during OAS missions. OAS includes two categories: CAS and

DAS.

(1) CAS. CAS is an air action performed by

fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly

forces. CAS requires detailed integration of each

air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces.

(2) DAS. DAS is an air action against enemy targets at such a distance from friendly forces that

detailed integration of each mission with fire and

movement of friendly forces is not required.

Close coordination of the fire and maneuver of

friendly forces is a qualifying factor for a DAS
2-2 MCWP 3-2

Air

Reconnaissance

Assault

Support

• Combat Assault Transport

• Air Delivery

• Aerial Refueling

• Air Evacuation

• Tactical Recovery of Aircraft

and Personnel (TRAP)

• Air Logistical Support

• Battlefield Illumination

AAW

• Offensive Antiair Warfare

(OAAW)

• Air Defense

-Active Air Defense

-Passive Air Defense

• Visual Reconnaissance

• Multisensor Imagery

Reconnaissance

• Electronic Reconnaissance

• CAS

• DAS

-Air Interdiction

-Armed Reconnaissance

Control of

Aircraft and

Missiles

• Air Direction

• Air Control

-Airspace Management

-Airspace Control

f

EW

• Electronic Attack (EA)

• Electronic Protection (EP)

• Electronic Warfare Support (ES)

Figure 2-1. The Six Functions of Marine Aviation.

mission. DAS missions are flown on either side of

the fire support coordination line. These missions

include air interdiction and armed reconnaissance.

(a) Air Interdiction Operations. An air interdiction operation destroys, neutralizes, or delays

the enemy's military potential before it can be

brought to bear effectively against friendly forces.

This type of operation is a response to a known

target that is briefed in advance.

(b) Armed Reconnaissance Missions. An

armed reconnaissance mission finds and attacks

targets of opportunity (i.e., enemy materiel, personnel, facilities) in assigned areas. This type of

operation is a response to targets that are not

known or briefed in advance.

b. Antiair Warfare

AAW is the actions used to destroy or reduce the

enemy air and missile threat to an acceptable 1evel. It includes such measures as the use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface-to-air

and air-to-air missiles, and electronic attack and

the destruction of an air or missile threat both before and after it is launched. Other measures used

to minimize the effects of hostile air action are

cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic), and mobility. The primary

purpose of AAW is to gain and maintain whatever

degree of air superiority is required; this permits

the conduct of operations without prohibitive interference by opposing air and missile forces.

AAW's other purpose is force protection.

AAW uses both offensive and defensive means to

accomplish its objectives and to directly support

the warfighting functions of fires and force protection. Self-defense against enemy air is a task

for all rotary-wing aircraft. Additionally, the lowaltitude air defense (LAAD) battalion, VMFA,

VMFA(AW), VMA, and HMLA are all specifically tasked to perform AAW. The Marine air

Aviation :#III:

I

OAS
Aviation Operations

control squadron (MACS) provides personnel and

equipment for the operation of the tactical air operations center (TAOC). The TAOC's mission is

to detect, identify, and control the interception of

hostile aircraft and missiles.

(1) Oftensive Antlair Warfare. Offensive antiair warfare (OAAW) are operations conducted

against enemy air assets and air defense systems

before they can be launched or assume an attacking role. OAAW operations in or near the objective area consist mainly of air attacks that destroy

or neutralize hostile aircraft, airfields, radar, air

defense systems, and supporting areas. OAAW

also includes attacks against enemy theater missile operations and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Offensive counterair [OCA] is

the joint term for an operation that destroys, disrupts, or limits enemy air power as close to its

source as possible.

(2) Air Defense. Air defense includes all defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the Earth's atmosphere

or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of an enemy attack. Air defense involves both active and

passive measures.

(a) Active Air Defense. Active air defense includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, supporting weapons (i.e., weapons not primarily used

in an air defense role), and EW. The approved joint

term for this is defensive counterair (DCA).

(b) Passive Air Defense. Passive air defense

includes all measures other than active defense

that are taken to minimize the effectiveness of

hostile air action. These measures include the use

of protective construction, concealment, camouflage, deception, dispersion, cover, and electronic

protection. Passive air defense is a command responsibility of every unit commander.

c. Assault Support

Assault support contributes to the warfighting

functions of maneuver and logistics. Maneuver

warfare demands rapid, flexible maneuverability

to achieve a decision. Assault support uses aircraft to provide tactical mobility and logistic support to the MAGTF for the movement of highpriority personnel and cargo within the immediate

area of operations (or the evacuation of personnel

and cargo). It also uses Marine aerial refueler

transport squadrons (VMGRs) to provide in-flight

refueling. Specific assault support tasks are discussed in the following subparagraphs. See

MCWP 3-24, Assault Support, for additional information.

(1), Combat Assault Transport. Combat assault transport provides mobility and logistic support to the MAGTF. It is used to deploy forces

efficiently in offensive maneuver warfare, bypass

obstacles, or quickly redeploy forces. Combat assault support allows the MAGTF commander to

build up his forces rapidly at a specific time and

location.

() Air Delivery. Air delivery is the transportation of equipment and supplies to FOBs or remote

areas. Delivery can be accomplished with helicopters or loads can be air dropped from fixedwing aircraft such as the KC-130. Air drops are

normally used when surface or helicopter transports cannot be used because of range, closed

lines of communications, a lack of adequate airfields, a prohibitive ground tactical situation, high

tonnage, or reduced response time.

(3) Aerial Refueling. Aerial refueling allows

MAGTF aircraft, both fixed- and rotary-wing, to

conduct flight-ferrying operations, extend time on

station, and extend mission range.

(4) Air Evacuation. Air evacuation is the transportation of personnel and equipment from FOBs

or remote areas. This includes flights from areas

of operations to secure rear areas, medical evacuations, and extraction of forces. Transport helicopters and fixed-wing transport aircraft perform

air evacuations.

(5) Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Person nel. The tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) is performed by an assigned and

briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft.
2-4 MCWP 3-2

TRAP is a subcomponent of combat search and

rescue (CSAR) and/or joint combat search and

rescue (JCSAR) missions, but it is only executed

once the location of survivors is confirmed. It

does not involve dedicating aircraft assets to locating survivors. Tactical recovery occurs once

the general location of survivors is confirmed. A

TRAP mission may include personnel to conduct

a local ground search if required. Marine Corps

tactical aircraft are not nonnlly equipped to conduct the search portion of CSAR or the over water

portion of search and rescue missions. The composition of a tactical recovery mission may vary

from a single aircraft and aircrew to an assault

support Iission package that consists of multiple

fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft with an onboard compliment of security, ground search, and

medical personnel.

(6) AIr Logistical Support. Air logistical support operations are conducted by fixed-wing aircraft and provide assault support of MAGTF

forces on the ground. Air logistical support delivers troops, equipment, and supplies to areas beyond helicopter range and lift capability or when

surface transportation is slow or unavailable.

(7) Battlefield Illumination. Battlefield illumination can be provided by both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. Illumination may be visible to

the naked eye or invisible (i.e., visible only with

night vision equipment). Battlefield illumination

can last for a few minutes or several hours.

d. Air Reconnaissance

Air reconnaissance employs visual observation

and/or sensors in aerial vehicles to acquire intelligence information. It supports the intelligence

warfighting function and is employed tactically,

operationally, and strategically. The three types of

air reconnaissance are visual, multisensor imagery, and electronic. All aircraft units constantly

perform visual air reconnaissance. The Marine

tactical electronic warfare squadron (VMAQ),

VMU, VMA, VMFA, VMFA(AW), HMLA, and

other air reconnaissance platforms can be

equipped with sensors to conduct other than visual reconnaissance. For additional information, see

MCWP 2-11 MAGTF Intelligence Collection,

and MCWP 2-15.4, Imagery Intelligence, for

more infOrmation.

(1) Visual Reconnaissance. Visual reconnaissance may be conducted by any airborne platform. It consists of an observer or pilot visually

searching a route, point, or area. Visual aerial reconnaissance is frequently used in support of the

delivery of offensive fires such as artillery support, naval surface fire support, or CAS.

(2) Multisensor Imagery Reconnaissance.

Multisensor imagery reconnaissance includes

photography from standard cameras, photograph

and radar imagery from the advanced tactical

aerial reconnaissance system (ATARS), and infrared imagery. Multisensor imagery reconnaissance is used tO detect and pinpoint the location of

enemy installations, facilities, and concentrations

of forces. It is also used to support terrain analysis.

(3) Electronic Reconnaissance. Electronic

reconnaissance is used to detect, locate, identify,

and evaluate enemy electromagnetic radiation.

Electronic reconnaissance is performed with passive interception equipment that recovers signals

and determines signal direction, source, and characteristics. It gathers data that, when processed into intelligence, is used to update the electronic

order of battle and technical intelligence.

e. Electronic Warfare

EW is any military action involving the use of

electromagnetic and directed energy to control the

electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.

EW supports the warfighting functions of fires,

command and control, and intelligence through

the three major subdivisions:, electronic attack,

electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. Only the VMAQ is specifically equipped to

perform all aspects of EW.

(1) Electronic Attack. Electronic attack is that

division of EW that involves the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation

weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equip-
Aviation Operations 2-5

ment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or

destroying enemy combat capability.

(2) Electronic Protection. Electronic protection involves the actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from the effects of

friendly or enemy employment of EW that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.

(3) Electronic Warfare Support. Electronic

warfare support is tasked by or under the direct

control of an operational commander. It involves

the actions needed to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentionally and unintentionally radiated electromagnetic energy for

the purpose of immediate threat recognition.

f. Control of Aircraft and Missiles

The control of aircraft and missiles integrates the

other five functions of Marine aviation by providing the commander with the ability to exercise

command and control authority over Marine aviation assets. It enhances unity Of effort and disseminates a common situational awareness. It

involves the integrated employment of facilities,

equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel. It also allows the ACE commander to plan

operations and to direct and control aircraft and

missiles to support accomplishment of the

MAGTF's mission. The control of aircraft and

missiles supports the warfighting function of

command and control. The ACE commander

maintains centralized command, while control is

decentralized and executed through the Marine air

command and control system (MACCS), which is

described in chapter 4.

The Marine air control group (MACG) is responsible for providing, staffing, operating, and maintaming the principal MACCS agencies. These

agencies include the TACC, TAOC with the early

warning/control (EW/C) center, Marine air traffic

control detachment (MATCD), DASC, and the

direct air support center (airborne) (DASC[A]).

All Marine aircraft have the capability to provide

some form of airborne coordination and control

during assault support missions, and HMLAs and

VMFA(AW)s can provide FAC(A) or tactical air

coordinator (airborne) (TAC[A}) services supporting the MACCS. The methods of aviation

control are depicted in figure 2-2 and discussed in

the following paragraphs.

(1) Air Direction. Air direction is the authority

to regulate the employment of air resources (including both aircraft and surface-to-air weapons)

to maintain a balance between their availability

and the priorities assigned for their use. The purpose of air direction is to achieve a balance between the MAGTF's finite aviation resources and

the accomplishment of the ACE's mission.

(2) Air Control. Air control is the authority to

direct the physical maneuver of aircraft in flight

or to direct an aircraft or surface-to-air weapons

unit to engage a specific target. Air control includes airspace management and airspace control.

Air Control

Airspace Airspace

Control Management

Figure 2-2. Categories of Air Control.

Airspace Fire Support Air Defense

Control Coordination Control

Measures Measures Measures
2-6 MCWP 3-2

(a) Airspace Management. Airspace manage.

ment is the coordination, integration, and regulation of the use of airspace based on defined

dimensions. Commanders use airspace management to optimize the available airspace and to allow the maximum freedom consistent with the

degree of acceptable operational risk. The

MACCS provides the ACE commander with the

ability to conduct airspace management.

(b) Airspace Control. Airspace control is the

authority to direct the maneuver of aircraft so that

the best use is made of assigned airspace. Airspace control provides for the coordination, integration, and regulation of the use of a defined

airspace. It also provides for the identification of

all airspace users. The authority to exercise airspace control is inherent to the commander whose

unit is responsible for particular blocks of airspace, types of missions, or types of aircraft. Airspace control does not include measures to

approve, disapprove, deny, or delay air operations. MACCS agencies accomplish airspace control through the use of positive control, procedural

control, or a combination of the two. Positive control is a method of airspace control that relies on

positive identification, tracking, and direction of

aircraft within an airspace. It is conducted with

electronic means by an agency with the appropriate authority and responsibility. Procedural control is a method of airspace control based on a

combination of previously agreed and promulgated orders and procedures.

2002. Marine Aviation

Organization

Administratively, Marine aviation is organized into three active duty and one reserve Marine aircraft wings (MAW5). MAWs are designed to

provide units in support of MAGTF or other operations. Each MAW has a unique organizational

structure (see app. A and fig. 2-3). The MAW

may be reinforced with assets from other MAWs

to provide the necessary assets to meet mission

requirements. It is organized into a MAW headquarters, several Marine aircraft groups (MAG5),

a MACG, and a Marine wing support group

(MWSG).

The wing headquarters and subordinate groups

are task-organized based on the assigned mission.

When the MAW is deployed as the ACE for a

MEF, the MAW headquarters becomes the ACE's

command element. Each group consists of specialized squadrons and/or battalions that perform

one or more of the six functions of Marine aviation. The MACG contains the bulk of the MAW's

command and control assets. The MWSG contains the personnel and equipment that are necessary to provide direct aviation ground support to

the MAW. The MAW is capable of performing all

six functions of Marine aviation. Through task organization, a wing can provide deployable detachments that are capable of accomplishing any or all

Marine aviation functions. Aviation organizations

smaller than a wing normally task-organize to

provide orly a specific portion of the six aviation

functions.

The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the MAW's subordinate units and how

they relate to the functions of aviation. Table 2-1

contains a summary of aviation units and corresponding functions. MCRP 5-12D, Organization

of Marine Corps Forces, contains a detailed discussion.

a. Marine Air Control Group

The MACG coordinates all aspects of air command and control, air reconnaissance, and air defense within the MAW. When deployed as part of

the MAGTF ACE, it provides the command and

staff functions for the MACG commander and coordinates the employment of aviation command

and control equipment, facilities, and personnel in

support of the ACE.

MAW

HQ

MAG] GHMACG [iiSG1

Figure 2-3. Notional Marine Aircraft Wing.
Aviation Operations

Table 2-1. Marine Aviation Units and Functions.

Type of Aviation

Unit AAW

Assault

Support OAS EW

. Air

Reconnaissance

Control of

Aircraft and

Missiles

MAW X X X X X X

MACG Support Support Support Support Support X

MTACS TACC

MASS DASC DASC DASC DASC

MACS TAOC

ATC

ATC TAOC

ATC

ATC

• TAOCATC

TAOC

ATC

LAAD •X Support Support X

MWCS . Communications

MWSG Support Support Support Support Support Support

MAG (VFNA) X X' X X X Support

MALS (fixed wing) Support Support Support Support Support Support

VMGR Support X Support Support Support DASC(A)

VMAQ Support Support Support X X Support

VMU Support Support Support Support X Support

VMFA X Escort X Support X Support

VMFA (AW) X Escort X Support X FAC(A)/TAC(A)

VMA X Escort X Support X Support

MAG NH) X X X Support X Support

VMM Self-defense X - Support Support Support Airborne control

and coordination

MALS (rotary-wing) Support Support Support Support Support Support

HMH (CH-53D) Self-defense X Support Support Support Airborne control

and coordination

HMH (CH-53E) Self-defense X Support Support Support Airborne control

and coordination

HMM Self-defense X

. Support Support Support Airborne controland coordination

HMLA Utility Self-defense X Support Support Support Airborne control

and coordination

HMLA Attack X X X Support X Airborne control

arid coordination

X—The unit performs that function of Marine aviatiQn as part of its primary mission. However, all Marine aircraft are specifically designed to be multi-mission capable and provide significant support for multiple functions.

Support—The unit provides general support for that function in varying degrees based on equipment capabilities and the

situation.

Specifically indicated support (armed reconnaissance, DASC, escort, etc.)—Many units perform a specific type of

support for one or more of the six functions of Marine aviation. The ability to provide this type of support is often dependent on equipment and/or aircraft mission configuration or specialized personnel training, and it must be specifically

requested. For MACG units, the MACCS agency provided by the unit is indicated.
2-8 MCWP 3-2

The major task performed by the MACG is planning and coordinating the support of the command and control function of Marine aviation.

The MACG ensures that its subordinate squadrons and battalions are organized, supplied, and

prepared to execute the MACCS' mission.

(1) Marine Tactical Air Command

Squadron. The Marine tactical air command

squadron (MTACS) provides equipment,

maintenance, and operations for the TACC of the

ACE. It equips, operates, and maintains the

majority of the manning for the current operations

section of the TACC. It also provides and

maintains a facility for the TACC future operations

and future planning sections and installs and

maintains associated automated systems. As a

result of the recent merger of the Marine wing

headquarters squadron (MWHS) into the MTACS,

MTACS will also provide administrative, logistic,

and supply support (including the wing commander's mess) for the Marine wiig headquarters.

The MTACS's major task is to provide the command post for the ACE commander. This involves

the planning and coordination of air operations,

deployment and employment issues, and logistic

and supply support.

(2) Marine Air Contro' Squadron. The

MACS provides air surveillance, control of aircraft and surface-to-air weapons for AAW, continuous all weather radar and nonradar air traffic

control (ATC) services, and airspace management

in support of a MAGTF.

The MACS provides deployable detachments that

are capable of air surveillance, airspace management, and control of aircraft and SAM5 for AAW

in support of the MAGTF. It also provides deployable detachments that can provide ATC services at existing or expeditionary airfields (EAF5)

and remote area landing sites.

(3) Marine Wing Communications

Squadron. The MWCS provides expeditionary

communications for the ACE of a MEF, including

the phased deployment of task-organized

elements thereof.

The MWCS provides some of the ACE's major

communications support, including planning and

engineering. The squadron also provides operational systems control centers, digital backbone

communications support, tactical automated

switching and telephone services, electronic message distribution, external single-channel radio

and radio retransmission communications, wide

area network (WAN) and deployed local area network (LAN) servers, and support of cryptographic sites.

(4) Marine Air Support Squadron. A Marine

air support squadron (MASS) provides DASC capabilities for control and coordination of fixedwing and rotary-wing aircraft operating in direct

support of MAGTF5. The MASS's major tasks include conducting operational planning for

MAGTF direct air support operations; receiving,

coordinating, and processing immediate requests

for air support; providing equipment, facilities,

and personnel for operation of air support elements; and maintaining continuous control of direct air support while displacing.

(5) Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion. The

mission of the LAAD battalion is to provide

close-in, low altitude surface-to-air weapons fires

in defense of the MAGTF. LAAD battalions defend forward combat areas, maneuver forces, vital

areas, installations, and/or units engaged in special or independent operations. Major tasks of the

LAAD battalion include—

• Providing support of subordinate batteries.

• Maintaining a primary capability as a highly mobile, vehicle-mounted, and man-portable surface-to-air weapons component of the MAGTF.

• Providing surface-to-air weapons support for

units engaged in special and/or independent operations.

• Providing for the separate deployment of subordinate batteries and platoons to accommodate

special tactical situations and task organizations.

(6) Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Squadron. The VMU operates and maintains a

UAV system in order to provide unmanned aerial

reconnaissance support to the MAGTF via the

ACE TACC. VMU tasks include—
Aviation Operations

• Conducting reconnaissance, surveillance, and

target acquisition.

• Performing airborne surveillance of designated

target areas, MAGTF areas of interest and/or

influence,and other areas as directed.

• Performing airborne surveillance for search and

rescue and TRAP.

• Performing reconnaissance of helicopter approach and retirement lanes in support of vertical assaults.

• Providing real-time target information to the

DASC and fire support coordination center

(FSCC).

• Providing information, to assist in adjusting indirect-fire weapons and to support and facilitate DAS and air interdiction.

• Collecting battle damage assessments (BDAs).

b. Marine Aircraft Group

The MAO provides the staff support necessary for

the effective command of subordinate squadrons

of the MAG. The MAG is usually composed of

functionally similar aircraft squadrons and their

support units. Table 2-2 delineates the types of

squadrons and aircraft present in a MAG.

Table 2-2. MAG Squadrons and Aircraft.

Squadron Type Aircraft Type # of Squadrons1 # of Primary Aircraft

VMA AV-8B 7 16

VMFA F/A-i 8A/C 12 12

VMFA(AW) F/A-18D 6 12

VMAO EA-6B 4 5

VMGR KC-130 5 12

VMAT AV-8 Training 1 30

VMFAT F/A-18 Training 1 12 F/A-i 8AJC

17 F/A-18D

VMFT Aggressor Squadron

F-S

1 1 1 F-SE

1 F-SF

VMGRT KC-130 Training 1 8

VMU UAV 2 5

HMH CH-53E 6 16

HMH3 CH-53D 5 8

HMM CH-46E 18 12

HMLA UH-1N

AH-1W

10 9UH-1N

12AH-1W

HMT

HMMT(T)

Helicopter Training HMM(T)

1 CH-46E

1 CH-53E

1 CH-53D

1 UH-1N/AH-1W

18 CH-46E

1SCH-53E

6 CH-53D

14UH-1N

2OAH-1W

VMM MV-22 TBD 12

VMMT MV-22 Training 1 TBD

1 The total number of squadrons, including reserve units

2 The primary aircraft authorization for each squadron is a fixed number. However, the actual number of aircraft in a squadron varies based on production timelines, scheduled depot-level maintenance cycles, aircraft transfers, etc.

Although CH-53D squadrons have retained their HMH designation, they are considered medium lift like a CH-46E squadron, instead of heavy lift hke a cH-53 squadron.
2-10

The MAG is the smallest aviation unit that is designed to conduct operations with no outside assistance except access to a source of supply.

MAGs normally contain either fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft in order to streamline logistic

support requirements. MAGs can be task-organized to include any combination of fixed-wing

and rotary-wing aircraft, as well as other supporting units. A MAG can also be task-organized into

an ACE for a particular mission in order to provide one or more aviation functions to a MAGTF.

When it is deployed as a MAGTF's ACE, the

MAG headquarters becomes the tactical command element for the ACE. Currently, there are

two types of MAGs within the MAW: the fixedwing MAO (MAG VF/VA) and the rotary-wing

MAG (MAG VH).

The primary mission of a MAG (VF/VA) is to

provide AAW and OAS support for MAGTF operations from a variety of main bases, FOBs, and

aircraft carriers. The MAG may consist of any

combination of VMAs, VMFAs, VMFA(AW)s,

VMGRs, VMAQs, or Marine aviation logistics

squadrons (MALS5) (fixed wing). It also usually

contains one or more training squadrons.

The primary mission of the MAG VH is to provide assault support for MAGTF operations in

any location or environment required. The MAG

VH may include any combination of HMLAs,

Marine medium helicopter squadrons (HMMs),

Marine heavy helicopter squadrons (HMH5),

MALS, and one or more training squadrons. As

the MV-22 is introduced into the fleet, all HMMs

and most of the CH53D squadrons will eventually

transition to Marine medium tilt-rotor squadrons

(VMM5).

(1) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron

(Fixed-Wing/Rotary-Wing). The MALS provides aviation logistic support, guidance, and direction to MAG squadrons on behalf of the

commanding officer. It also provides logistic support for Navy-funded equipment in the supporting

MWSS, MACS, and Marine wing mobile calibration complex. There is normally one MALS in

each MAG VH and MAG VF/VA. The MALS

provides—

• Intermediate-level maintenance for aircraft and

aeronautical equipment.

• Aviation supply support for aircraft.

• Class V(A) ordnance and ammunition logistic

support.

• Coordination with the MWSG, the MACG, the

MAW calibration complex, and other supporting Navy and Marine Corps activities and/or

agencies in planning for the support required to

execute the Marine Aviation Logistic Support

Program (MALSP).

• Maintaining the capability to deploy and provide MALSP support packages.

(2) Marine AeraI Refueler Transport

Squadron. The VMGR's primary tasks are to

provide tactical aerial refueling service to Marine

aviation units and to serve as an aircraft platform

for the DASC(A). Other tasks include assault air

transpot for air-landed and air-delivered personnel, supplies, and equipment; ground refueling

service to aircraft when other suitable means of

aircraft refueling are not available; and air transport service for the evacuation of casualties and

noncombatants. The VMGR maintains an all

weather capability and the ability to operate from

a variety of bases.

(3) Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare

Squadron. The VMAQ conducts airborne EW

in support of Fleet Marine Force (FMF) operations to meet the EW and air reconnaissance functions of Marine aviation. Major tasks include—

• Conducting airborne electronic attack and EW

support operations.

• Conducting electronic attack in support of

MAGTF training.

• Processing and providing mission data on EW

missions for updating and maintaining an electronic order of battle.

• Maintaining the capability of operating from

aircraft carriers, advance bases, and EAFs.

MCWP 3-2
Aviation Operations 2-11

• Maintaining the capability to operate during

darkness and under all weather conditions.

• Maintaining the capability to deploy or conduct

extended-range operations that require aerial

refueling.

(4) Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron. The

VMFA intercepts and destroys enemy aircraft under all weather condjtions and attacks and destroys surface targets.

Note: In this puLlication, the term all weather is

used to indicate that the aircraft can perform a/l

or part of its primary mission in all "types" of

weather, not all "extremes" of weather. This Capability is linked more to the type of equipment on

board the aircraft, than to the effect of the weather on the aircraft. For example, all Marine aircraft are designed with the capability to fly in fog,

rain, sleet, snow, etc. However, only aircraft

equipped with special sensors like radar can realistically perform their mission without visual references. The term adverse weather is used to

indicate that, while the weather is bad, a visual

reference can still be maintained.

VMFA tasks include—

• Intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft.

• Maintaining the capability to attack and destroy

surface targets.

• Providing escort of friendly aircraft under all

types of weather conditions.

• Maintaining the capability to deploy and operate from aircraft carriers and advance bases.

• Conducting day and night CILS under all types

of weather conditions.

• Maintaining the capability to deploy or conduct

extended-range operations by using aerial refueling.

• Maintain the capability to conduct SEAD operations.

(5) Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack

Squadron; The VMFA(AW) attacks and

destroys surface targets under. adverse weather

conditions during both day and night operations;

conducts multisensor imagery reconnaissance;

provides supporting arms coordination; and

intercepts and destroys enemy aircraft under all

types of weather conditions. VMFA(AW) tasks

include—

• Conducting day and night CAS under adverse

weather conditions.

• Conducting day and night DAS under all

weather conditions, including armed reconnaissance, radar search and attack, air interdiction,

and strikes against enemy installations.

• Conducting multisensor imagery reconnaissance, this includes pre-strike and post strike

target damage assessment and visual reconnaissance.

• Conducting day and night supporting arms coordination, including forward air control airborne, tactical air coordination airborne, and

artillery and/or naval gunfire (NGF) spotting.

Intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft.

Maintaining the capability to operate from aircraft carriers, advance bases, and EAFs.

• Maintaining the capability to deploy or conduct

extended-range operations by using aerial refueling.

• Maintaining the capability to conduct SEAD

operations.

(6) Marine Attack Squadron. The VMA

attacks and destroys surface targets under day and

night visual meteorological conditions. It also

provides helicopter escort. VMA's major tasks

include—

• Conducting CAS, armed reconnaissance, air interdiction, and strikes against enemy installations.

• Conducting air defense operations.

• Maintaining the capability to operate during

darkness and under instrument flight conditions.

• Maintaining the capability of deployment or

extended operations by employing aerial refueling.

• Maintaining the capability to operate from

aboard carriers, other suitable seagoing platforms, EAFs, and remote tactical landing sites.

• Conducting armed escort missions in support

of assault support operations.

•
2-12 MCWP 3-2

(7) Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron

(CH-53D). The HMH (CH-53D) supports the assault support function of Marine aviation by providing assault helicopter transport of heavy

weapons, equipment, and supplies during amphibious operations and subsequent operations

ashore. CH-53D squadrons have retained their

HMH designation, but only CH-53E squadrons

are now considered to be capable of heavy lift.

The CH-53D is now considered a medium lift helicopter, like the CH-46E. The main tasks for the

CH-53D include—

Providing combat assault transport of heavy

weapons, equipment, and supplies.

Providing combat assault transport of troops.

Conducting tactical retrieval and recovery operations for downed aircraft, equipment, and

personnel.

• Conducting assault support for evacuation operations and other maritime special operations.

• Providing support for mobile FARPs.

• Maintaining the capability to operate from amphibious shipping, other floating bases, and

austere shore bases.

• Maintaining the capability to operate at night,

in adverse weather conditions, and under instrument flight conditions at extended ranges.

(8) Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron

(CH-53E). The HMH (CH-53E) provides assault

helicopter transport of heavy weapons, equipment, and supplies during amphibious operations

and subsequent operations ashore. The main tasks

for the CH-53E include—

• Providing combat assault transport of heavy

weapons, equipment, and supplies.

• Providing combat assault transport of troops.

Conducting tactical retrieval and recovery operations for downed aircraft, equipment, and

personnel.

• Conducting assault support for evacuation operations and other maritime special operations.

• Providing support for mobile forward arming

and refueling points (FARP5).

• Maintaining the capability to operate from amphibious shipping, other floating bases, and

austere shore bases.

• Maintaining the capability to operate at night,

in adverse weather conditions, and under instrument flight conditions at extended ranges.

• Maintaining the capability to deploy and conduct extended range operations by employing

aerial refueling.

(9) Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron.

The HMM provides assault transport of combat

troops in the initial assault waves and follow-on

stages of amphibious operations and subsequent

operations ashore. HMM's major tasks include—

• Providing combat assault troop transport.

• Providing combat assault transport of supplies

and equipment.

• Conducting assault support for evacuation operations and other maritime special operations.

• Providing support for mobile FARPs.

• Maintaining the capability to operate from amphibious shipping, other floating bases, and

austere shore bases.

• Maintaining the capability to operate at night,

in adverse weather conditions, and under instrument flight conditions at extended ranges.

• Augmenting local search and rescue assets and

provide aeromedical evacuation of causalities.

Tactical HMMs will begin replacing the CH-46E

and CH-53D helicopters with the MV-22 tilt-rotor

aircraft beginning in fiscal year 2003.

(10) Marine Medium Tilt-Rotor Squadron.

The Marine medium tilt-rotor squadron (VMM)

provides transportation of combat troops, supplies, and equipment across the spectrum of expeditionary operations. VMM's primary function is

to provide combat assault troop transport. It also

provides combat assault transport of supplies and

equipment, as a secondary function. Other VMM

tasks include—

• Conducting combat assault support for evacuation operations and other maritime special operations.

• Providing support for forward arming and refueling points.

• Providing airborne command and control for

assault support operations.

I•
Aviation Operations 2-13

• Maintaining a self-defense capability for air-to

air and ground-to-air threats.

• Maintaining the capability to operate from naval ships and expeditionary airfields.

• Maintain the capability to operate at night, in

adverse weather, and under instrument flight

conditions from extended ranges.

• Maintain the capability for deployment and/or

extended range operations employing aerial refueling.

• Augmenting local search and rescue assets.

• Providing aeromedical evacuation of casualties

from the field to suitable medical facilities or

other aeromedical aircraft.

• Performing organizational maintenance on assigned aircraft in all environmental conditions.

(11) Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Squadron. The HMLA provides combat utility helicopter support, attack helicopter fire support, and fire

support coordination during amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore. The primary tasks of utility helicopters include—

• Providing an airborne command and control

platform for command elements.

• Providing armed escort for assault support operations.

• Providing combat assault transport of troops,

supplies, and equipment.

• Providing airborne control and coordination for

assault support operations.

• Augmenting local search and rescue assets and

provide aeromedical evacuation of casualties.

• Conducting combat assault and assault support

for evacuation operations and other maritime

special operations. • Controlling, coordinating, and providing terminal control for supporting arms, including

CAS, artillery, mortars, and NGF.

• Providing fire support and security for forward

and rear area forces.

• Maintaining the capability to operate from amphibious shipping, other floating bases, and

austere shore bases.

• Maintaining the capability to operate at night,

in adverse weather conditions, and under instrument flight conditions at extended ranges.

The primary tasks of attack helicoptets include—

• Providing fire support and security for forward

and rear area forces.

• Conducting point-target and/or antiarmor operations.

• Conducting anti-helicopter operations.

• Providing armed escort, control, and coordination for assault support operations.

• Controlling, coordinating, and providing terminal control for supporting arms, including

CAS, artillery, mortars, and NGF.

• Conducting armed and visual reconnaissance.

• Maintaining the capability to operate from amphibious shipping, other floating bases, and

austere shore bases.

• Maintaining the capability to operate at night,

in adverse weather conditions, and under instrument flight conditions at extended ranges.

(12) MarIne Wing Support Group. The

MWSG's mission is to provide aviation ground

support for the MAW and to provide command

and control, administration, supply, and logistic

support assets to subordinate units performing

aviation ground support for Marine aviation. The

MWSG's primary task is to provide the capability

to establish and maintain airfields and FOBs, and

their associated aviation ground support requirements, for the conduct of ACE operations in support of the MAGTF.

(13) Marine Wing Support Squadron. The

Marine wing support squadron's (MWSS's) mission is to provide for all essential aviation ground

support requirements for. a designated fixed-wing

or rotary-wing component of an ACE. The

MWSS also provides aviation ground support for

all supporting or attached units of the MACG.

The MWSS's primary tasks include providing—

• Internal airfield communications.

• Weather forecasting and services.

• Aircraft crash, fire, and rescue services.

• Structural fire fighting services.

• Aircraft and ground equipment refueling.

• Essential engineering services.

• Motor transport operations internal to the ACE.

• Messing facilities.
2-14 MCWP 3-2

• Organic nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities.

• Routine and emergency sick call services.

• Security and law enforcement services.

• Air base command functions.

See MCWP 3-21.1, Aviation Ground Support,

and MCWP 3-35.7, MAGTF Meteorology and

Oceanography [METOC] Support, for additional

information.

2003. Aviation Combat Element

Task Organization

An ACE is the core element of a MAGTF that is

task-organized to conduct aviation operations. It

provides all or a portion of the six functions of

Marine aviation. The ACE is usually composed of

an aviation unit headquarters and various other

aviation units or their detachments. It can vary in

size from a small aviation detachment of specifically required aircraft to one or more MAWs. The

ACE may contain other Service or foreign miiitary forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF.

The ACE itself is not a formal command.

The ACE is task-organized to contribute to battiespace dominance in support of the MAGTF's

mission, project combat power, and conduct air

operations. The ACE is task-organized to support

the MAGTF based on the MAGTF commander's

mission and his estimate of the aviation capabilities required to accomplish that mission. The

MAGTF commander presents these requirements

to the Marine Service component commander,

and the selection of actual aviation units or detachments is determined by the tasked wing commander(s). Selected assets are task-organized to

meet the MAGTF commander's requirements.

The ACE is normally built around an existing aircraft unit (squadron, group, or wing) reinforced as

necessary with the appropriate command and control, combat, combat support, and combat service

support (CSS) (including aviation logistic) units

and detachments. In creating an ACE, the operational requirements of the mission, capabilities

and limitations of specific units and equipment,

and the availability of units determine the choice

of units, type of equipment, and source location.

Marine aviation forms the ACE of the three standing MEF5. However, this is merely the starting

point for constructing the ACE for a MEF in time

of war. For actual deployment, the ACE would be

reinforced with units and/or detachments from the

other two active duty MAWs and the Reserves. If

providing the ACE to a Marine expeditionary unit

(special operations capable) (MEU [SOC]), the

ACE will usually be sourced from a single MAW.

Satisfying the MAGTF commander's aviation requirements is paramount. However, the identification of specific units for assignment to the ACE is

driven by many factors in addition to the aviation

functions required to support the MAGTF mission. Some of these factors are as follows:

• Mode of deployment (amphibious shipping,

strategic airlift or sealift, aircraft carriers, selfdeployment, or a combination).

• Mode of operations (from aircraft carriers and!

or amphibious ships, FOBs, EAFs, or a combination).

MAW

HQ

I I I

MAG MACG MWSG FW/RW

Figure 2-4. Notional MEF (ACE).

HMM

SQDN(REIN)

HM(.A

Det

MACG MWSS

Det Det

LS

Det

VMGR

Det

Figure 2-5. Notional MEU ACE.
Aviation Operations 2-15

• Availability of supporting infrastructure (runways, shelters, electricity, and fuel).

• Special qualif'ing criteria, training requirements and/or, operational experience.

• Length and responsiveness of logistic support

determines sustainability.

• Replenishment rate of consumables, specifically aviation fuel and ordnance.

• Anticipated missions and expected intensity of

flight operations.

The MEF ACE can be built around one or more

MAWs, or any portion of the MAW, that fulfills

the required functions of Marine aviation. It may

consist of one or more MAGs (fixed-wing or rotary-wing), a MACG, and a MWSG. The MAW also provides task-organized forces for smaller

MAGTFs, such as a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) and special purpose MAGTFs

(SPMAGTFs). See figures 2-4 for a notional MEF

and 2-5 for a notional MEU ACE.

The MEU ACE normally consists of a reinforced

helicopter squadron that includes attack aircraft

and two fixed-wing assault support aircraft (the

latter are based in the continental United States).

The notional MEF ACE is task-organized to provide assault support, low-level air defense, CAS,

and airborne command and control. It includes a

MACG detachment, MWSS detachment, fixedwing MALS detachment, and rotary-wing MALS

detachment.

SPMAGTFs, are organized, trained, and equipped with narrowly focused capabilities. Each

SPMAGTF is designed to accomplish a specific

mission, often of limited scope and duration. This

special purpose force may be any size but is normally small (the size of a MEU). It may contain

other Service or foreign military forces assigned

or attached to the MAGTF. The ACE composition

for a SPMAGTF varies, but normally it is the size

of a MEU ACE or smaller. For example, a

SPMAGTF ACE may be created to operate and

fly missions in support of host nation forces out of

an EAF. In such a case, the SPMAGTF might

consist predominantly of Marine aviation units

supported by only a small security and logistic

force. In other cases, the SPMAGTF ACE may

represent a relatively small portion of the force.

Since the ACE is formed around an aviation headquarters, it will only contain one senior aviation

unit. In the case of a MEF, the wing that comprises the ACE will be task-organized with units from

a single wing and/or reinforced with as many

groups and squadrons from other wings as are required to support the MAGTF's mission. For

MEFs with multiple divisions in the GCE, the

ACE may require the combined assets and personnel of several wings in order to meet this requirement. However, these assets and personnel

remain under one ACE commander. This single

ACE commander concept is essential to Marine

aviation's doctrinal philosophy of centralized

command and decentralized control (discussed in

detail in chap. 4).

The ACE may be employed from ships or forward

expeditionary land bases and can readily transition between sea and land bases without loss of

capability. It has the capability to conduct command and control across the battlespace. The

ACE is one of the two arms of the MAGTF specifically designed to conduct combat operations.

(reverse blank)

Chapter 3

The Role of Aviation in

Combined-Arms Force Operations

"On our drive to Manila, I depended solely on [Marine Aircraft Groups 24

and 32] to protect my left flank against possible... counterattack. I

can say without reservation that the Marine dive bombers are one of the

most flexible outfits that I have seen in this war. They will try anything

once, and. . . I have found... that anything they try usually pans out in

their favor. [They] have kept the enemy on the turn. They have kept him underground and have enabled troops to move up with fewer casualties and

with greater speed. I cannot say enough in praise of these men of the dive

bombers.. . for the job they have done in giving my men close ground support in this operation.

"

—MajGen Verne D. Mudge

The essential difference between Marine aviation

and other aviation forces is that Marine aviation is

designed to operate as an integral part of a combined-arms organization. Due to Marine Corps

ground forces expeditionary nature and their limited indirect fire assets, ground forces rely heavily

on the ACE to provide fire support in both close

and deep operations. Therefore, the MAGTF must

retain control of its aviation assets. But Marine

aviation provides much more than just tactical

fires in support of ground maneuver. It also provides the MAGTF commander with long-range

fires (including electronic fires), intelligence collection, enhanced mobility, and force protection.

It may also serve as the MAGTF's main effort.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the six

warfighting functions; discusses the operational

environment; moves to a discussion of a number

of key maneuver warfare ideas; then examines the

role that aviation may play in conventional offensive and/or defensive operations, security operations, and MOOTW, as discussed in MCDP-1,

Warfighting.

3001. The Six Warfighting

Functions

Marine aviation provides a significant contribution to each of the warfighting functions during

all phases of an operation. The warfighting functions are discussed in more detail in MCDP 1-2,

Campaigning, and MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps

Planning Process.

a. Command and Control

Command and control is the exercise of authority

and direction by the commander over assigned

forces in the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Command and control functions are performed through organization of personnel,

procedures, equipment, communications, and facilities by the commander and staff to plan, direct,

coordinate, and control forces and operations in

the accomplishment of the mission. Aviation's

EW capabilities and control of aircraft and missiles contribute to this warfighting function.
3-2 MCWP 3-2

b. Maneuver

Maneuver refers to the employment ofground or

aviation forces in order to gain a relative advantage over a threat by achieving a tactical, operational, or strategic objective. The advantage can

be positional, temporal, or psychological. In conjunction with fires, maneuver generates tempo

and combat power in the battlespace to overwhelm the threat. Mobility operations are inherent

in maneuver. Mobility operations enhance the

command's ability to move forces and supplies

within the area of operations. Deception operations are integral to maneuver and usually involve

elements of the other warfighting functions.

Marine aviation elements may, in some cases,

function as maneuver elements themselves. In any

case, any scheme of maneuver will have aviation

aspects, particularly in assault support and OAS.

c. Fires

Fires include the organization, planning, coordination, and employment of all lethal and nonlethal

attack systems that are available for use against

threat resources and capabilities. This includes all

sea-, air-, and land-based fire systems; the application of special operations capable forces; and

psychological operations to achieve specified results. AAW, OAS, EW, and the control of aircraft

and missiles are aviation functions that contribute

to this warfighting function.

d. Intelligence

Intelligence is the actions taken to collect information, process and analyze it to determine its relevance, and disseminate it to commanders in a

timely manner to support decisionmaking. Intelligence constantly evaluates three of the environmental elements (infrastructure, threat, and

noncombatants) of the battlespace. Intelligence

focuses on revealing threat capabilities, dispositions, and intentions. It enables the commander to

anticipate the threat's actions and reactions and

promote tempo. Timely intelligence is imperative

in developing an effective plan. Air reconnaissance and aviation EW capabilities are major contributors to this warfighting function.

e. Logistics

Logistics encompasses all activities required to

move and sustain military forces. The components of logistics include supplies, maintenance,

transportation, general engineering, and health

services. Aviation assault support is an important

aspect of combat logistics.

f. Force Protection

Force protection is the protection of the fighting

potential of the command so that the commander

can conduct decisive actions at a chosen time and

place. It is the most difficult of the warfighting

functions to execute because it requires the efforts

of every member of the command. It involves

both active and passive measures taken by the

command that include individual protective measures, camouflage, hardening of facilities and

vehicles, operational security procedures, dispersion, counterreconnaissance operations, counterintelligence operations, and preventive health

efforts by medical and dental personnel. The synchronization of countermobility efforts, fires, and

maneuver results in the generation of combat

power and a tempo that overwhelms the threat's

capability to interfere with friendly mission accomplishment. All aviation functions, especially

AAW and air reconnaissance, can contribute to

force protection.

3002. The Operational

Environment

Marine aviation is capable of operating in any environment and across the range of military operations. The challenge is to be equally prepared to

operate in high- or mid-intensity combat scenarios against a technologically advanced and highly

capable threat. Marine aviation must also operate

against less advanced but numerically superior

foes; in urban warfare; against diffused, ambiguous threats in undeveloped areas; and in adverse

environmental conditions resulting from natural

and/or manmade catastrophes, including nuclear,

biological, chemical, or ecological events. Marine

aviation may serve as either the main or supporting effort in offensive or defensive conventional
Aviation Operations 3-3

warfare, security operations, or MOOTW.

MOOTW can include everything from counterinsurgency to disaster relief and other humanitarian

operations.

3003. Organizational

Adaptability

Given the uncertainties that are inherent in the operational environment, the greatest single requirement for Marine aviation is adaptability. The

ACE can be task-organized to meet the MAGTF's

needs. All ACE operations are conducted as part

of an overall MAGTF air-ground concept of operations that is focused on the enemy. Aviation

brings a degree of versatility, range, and agility

not possessed by other elements of the MAGTF.

It is not, however, a substitute for any bthet' element of the MAGTF; its unique capabilities complement the other MAGTF elements' capabilities.

For example, aviation under ideal circumstances

may provide the MAGTF commander with longrange, 24-hour, all weather firepower to shape the

battlespace and to exploit enemy critical vulnerabilities that are beyond the reach of other elements of the MAGTF. It enhances the operational

and tactical mobility of the GCE by providing the

capability to conduct vertical assaults as part of a

ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM) or during

sustained operations ashore. Aviation units can

maneuver both rapidly and simultaneously

throughout the battlespace, thereby enabling the

commander to rapidly concentrate combat.power

at decisive points, anywhere and at any time, to

set the stage for decisive action. The ACE also

provides air defense for the MAGTF as part of the

MAGTF force protection effort. The ACE's flexibility ensures that aviation combat and logistic capabilities are always available to the MAGTF.

Marine aviation is a highly visible asset. It provides the commander with options that are equally adaptable to combat and to MOOTW. Marine

multirole aircraft provide a formidable capability

that is useful across the range of military operations. MAGTF helicopters that carry combatready Marines into a hostile landing zone are the

same platforms that evacuate noncombatants from

life-threatening danger. Fixed-wing assault support aircraft can deliver thousands of pounds of

supplies to support ground operations or thousands of pounds of food for humanitarian assistance. Multirole fighter/attack aircraft can gain air

superiority in combat or patrol a no-fly zone to

support peace enforcement operations.

Similarly, Marine aviation command and control

agencies can function in many diverse roles and

environments. The ACE MACCS can facilitate

command and control in joint and combined aviation operations such as direction of interceptor

aircraft, countering missile threats to the joint or

combined force, or tracking aircraft in support of

counterdrug operations.

Marine aviation forces can operate outside the

MAGTF in support of joint or combined operations. Fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft conducting flight operations near a country's

coastline demonstrate military presence through

the effective use of show of force operations. For

example, in Bosnia Operations Deny Flight and

Joint Endeavor created conditions under which all

warring factions agreed to the cessation of hostilities and a monitored separation. Both operations

stand as examples of the powerful presence that

aviation can provide in efforts to establish and

maintain peace.

Marine aviation is not constrained by the challenges of poor infrastructure and restrictive terrain. The ability to operate from austere sites,

along with the reach, mobility, and sustainment

provided by fixed-wing or rotary-wing transport

aircraft, can overcome obstacles commonly encountered in humanitarian assistance operations.

These capabilities are particularly beneficial when

providing humanitarian relief services. Marine

ATC units can establish ATC capabilities if they

have been disrupted or destroyed or if none previously existed. The damage resulting from natural

disasters may span tens of thousands of square

miles. Damage to roads and other transportation

infrastructure may hamper disaster relief efforts.

Aviation's ability to operate in such areas, to sustain delivery efforts until the local infrastructure
3-4 MCWP 3-2

is restored, and to respond rapidly to crisis situations can be crucial to success in disaster relief.

One of the key features of a Marine's expeditionary nature is the ability to expand, contract, and

change the balance and focus of Marine forces.

Because many crises are sudden and require a

rapid response, the initial force arriving at the

scene of a developing crisis is rarely sufficient to

conduct decisive operations. The ability to

respond effectively to such crises demands the

ability to restructure an expeditionary force after

its introduction into the theater without sacrificing

continuity in operational capability. The ACE's

modular structure allows rapid expansion into a

larger force by adding the needed forces to each

of the existing subordinate units. Similarly,

should the situation require a lesser force or a different balance of capabilities, the ACE is easily

redesigned to suit the situation. This flexibility in

size and force includes the ability to expand into a

joint or combined force.

3004. Marine Aviation and

Maneuver Warfare

The Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy emphasizes an integrated combined-arms approach

that employs rapid, flexible maneuver. Maneuver

warfare seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion

through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions. These actions create a turbulent and

rapidly deteriorating situation for the enemy. The

Marine Corps implements the maneuver warfare

concept through air-ground teams—MAGTFs.

These teams execute mission-type orders and

maneuver in time and space, in combination with

the application of fires, to create positional or

temporal advantages over the enemy. Inherent in

maneuver warfare is the need for speed in order to

seize the initiative, dictate the terms of action, and

keep the enemy off balance. Marine aviation

plays a crucial role in the MAGTF's ability to

conduct maneuver warfare by contributing taskorganized ACEs that are specifically designed to

provide the MAGTF with the necessary mobility,

flexibility, force protection, and fires. The following subparagraphs discuss ways in which the

maneuver warfare concept relates to the employment of Marine aviation.

a. Orienting on the Enemy

Orienting on the enemy is fundamental to maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare attacks the enemy

"system." The enemy system is whatever constitutes the entity confronting us within our particular sphere. For a pilot, it might be the combination

of air defense radars, surface-to-air missiles, and

enemy aircraft that must be penetrated to reach

the target. For an electronic warfare specialist, it

might be the enemy's command and control network. For a MEF commander, it might be all the

major combat formations within an area of operation as well as their supporting command and

control, logistic, and intelligence organizations.

Economy demands that the MAGTF focus its efforts toward some object or factor of decisive importance to achieve the greatest effect at the least

cost. Therefore, planners must understand both

the sources of the enemy's strength and where the

enemy is vulnerable.

We call a key source of strength a "center of gravity." It represents something without which the

enemy cannot function. In broad terms, centers of

gravity are the characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its

freedom of action, physical strength, or will to

fight. In practice, planners must distinguish between a strategic center of gravity and an operational center of gravity. A strategic center of

gravity is an objective whose seizure, destruction,

or neutralization will have a profound impact on

the enemy leadership's will or ability to continue

the struggle. It may be something tangible, like a

political leader, a particular military force, or a

capital city, or it may be intangible, like a popular

• belief in a cause or faith in eventual victory. An

operational center of gravity, on the other hand, is

normally an element of the enemy's armed forces.

It is that concentration of the enemy's military

power that is most dangerous to us or the one that

stands between us and the accomplishment of our

mission. The degree of danger that a force poses

may depend on its size or particular capabilities,

its location relative to ourselves, or the particular
Aviation Operations 3.5

skill or enterprise of its leader. MCDP 1-2 contains detailed information on centers of gravity

and critical vulnerabilities.

Often we cannot attack enemy strengths directly

because they are too well protected. Rather, we

seek to attack a weakness that allows us to strike

at the enemy's center of gravity indirectly, pitting

our power against its weakness. A vulnerability

cannot be critical unless it undermines a key

strength. It also must be something that we are capable of attacking effectively.

However, even critical vulnerabilities may not be

easy to attack. We may have to design a progressive sequence of actions that expose, create, or

isolate a vulnerability that creates, over time, an

opportunity to strike the decisive blow. An example would be to peel away the enemy's air defenses in order to permit a successful air attack on key

command and control facilities. These facilities

become the critical vulnerability that allow us to

disable or destroy the enemy's air force, which is

one of its centers of gravity.

In supporting the maneuver warfare tenet of orienting on the enemy, Marine aviation operations

draw on both the center of gravity and critical vulnerability concepts. Aviation expands the operational reach of the MAGTF, potentially exposing

a wide range of the enemy's potential critical vulnerabilities to attack. At the same time, it contributes greatly to the protection of friendly centers of

gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Just as we pursue our enemy's critical vulnerabilities, we should

expect the enemy to pursue ours. The ACE can

play a proactive role in identifying those aspects

of the enemy defense that are vulnerable to attack

by air. The ACE is also responsible for planning

air defense for the MAGTF and ensuring that the

MAGTF's assets are not exposed to enemy aviation.

b. Philosophy of Command

Our philosophy of command must support the

way we fight. First and foremost, to generate the

tempo of operations we desire and to best cope

with the uncertainty, fluidity, and disorder of

combat, command and control must be decentralized. Marine aviation adheres to the MAGTF's

maneuver warfare philosophy of centralized command and decentralized control. Typically, the

ACE is commanded by a single commander located in the TACC, who then delegates the control of

aviation assets to the subordinate agencies of the

MACCS involved in the execution of operations.

c. Decisive Actions

Decisive actions on the battlefield are those actions that most directly and expeditiously lead to

the imposition of our will on the enemy by destruction of its forces and capability to wage warfare or the destruction of the enemy's will to

resist. By concentrating our efforts and assets on

actions that have a maximum impact on the enemy, we can minimize the number of decisive engagements required to attain victory.

It is possible for aviation forces to provide the decisive action in a battle. Normally, however, aviation forces are but one of several forces in the

MAGTF that together conduct decisive actions.

The MAGTF fights as a combined-arms team

where the actions of the whole are greater than the

sum of the actions of the individual parts. The

MAGTF is more likely to be decisive (e.g., accomplish its mission) when it is employed as a

whole, rather than employing its major subordinate elements sequentially, separately, or piecemeal. It does not rely on any one element alone to

achieve a decisive action. Marine aviation makes

its greatest contribution to MAGTF decisive action when the individual actions of aviation forces

are integrated with those of the MAGTF's other

elements.

d. Shaping Action

To influence an action to our advantage, we must

project our thoughts forward in time and space.

Since war is inherently disorderly and we cannot

expect to dictate its terms with any sort of precision, we attempt to shape the general conditions

of war. We shape the battlespace to create situations of advantage. Shaping actions are intended

to render the enemy vulnerable to attack, facilitate

the maneuver of friendly forces, and dictate the
3-6 MCWP 3-2

time and place for decisive battle. Shaping operations occur at all levels of war.

Aviation contributes to the MAGTF's shaping efforts in several ways. Aviation can make the enemy react against its will. It can impede or prevent

the enemy from moving when it must. Aviation

can hinder or prevent the massing of enemy forces and equipment by delaying the arrival of those

forces, compelling enemy commanders to commit

their forces piecemeal, and denying the enemy the

supplies it needs to remain operational. Aviation

can diminish the enemy's physical capabilities,

upset its plan, and stifle its initiative. Aviation also helps shape the battlespace through the operational range and mobility that it provides Marine

ground forces. The option for vertical insertion of

ground forces adds yet another dimension to the

ground commander's maneuver options.

Shaping actions, by all elements of the MAGTF,

are also used to maximize aviation capabilities.

Special operations forces can identify, disrupt, or

destroy portions of the enemy's air defense system. Enemy aircraft can be destroyed on the

ground through OAAW. Ground forces can seize

an airfield needed as a FOB to extend the reach of

aviation. CSS units can ensure the uninterrupted

supply of fuel and ammunition at FARPs to enhance aviation responsiveness. The combined

shaping efforts of all elements provide aviation

with the freedom of action necessary to conduct

successful air operations.

The MAGTF commander uses organic ACE aviation to set the course of operations in support of

the JFC's campaign plan well in advance of the

GCE's close combat operations. Successful

MAGTF shaping maximizes aviation's ability to

provide continuous, uninterrupted air support; delay enemy reinforcements through interdiction;

degrade critical enemy functions or capabilities

such as command and control, OAS, or logistics;

and manipulate the enemy's perceptions.

The most important shaping operation performed

by aviation is to gain air superiority. Air superiority is the degree of dominance in the air battle of

one force over another that permits the conduct of

operations by the former and its related land, sea,

and air forces at a given time and place without

prohibitive interference by the opposing force.

Successful MAGTF operations are contingent on

the ability to operate freely within the battlespace

and to deny the enemy freedom of action. The

ACE's ability to shape both the close and deep

battlespace, provide potent and responsive firepower and enhance mobility are key contributions

to the MAGTF's achievement of battlespace

dominance.

Air superiority is essential to the conduct of all

functions of Marine aviation and therefore weighs

heavily in creating conditions for successful aviation operations. Theater-wide air superiority cannot always be achieved immediately. At times, it

may be necessary only to achieve local air superiority in order to facilitate a particular phase of a

campaign.

Control of the air must be a priority for the entire

MAGTF—not just the ACE. Air superiority extends beyond the realm of air-to-air combat. It requires the combined efforts of the MAGTF to

neutralize or destroy enemy air defenses, airfields,

and air command and control facilities. Once air

superiority is achieved, aviation is free to provide

effective support to the MAGTF.

This is also true for a joint force, where MAGTF

actions, at least initially, will be integrated into

the joint force's goal of achieving a degree of air

superiority. One of the most important aspects of

the initial air operations phase of Operation

Desert Storm (January 17 to February 23, 1991)

was to gain and maintain air superiority. The effectiveness of this action was illustrated by the

fact that at no time during the subsequent ground

operations phase (February 24 to 27, 1991) did

Iraqi aviation possess either the capability or the

will to interfere with our actions. Aviation operations seldom achieve a decisive result alone, but

the advantage that air superiority provides in the

conduct of MAGTF or joint operations is significant.

Although Marine aviation is designed largely for

tactical operations, air superiority provides pro-
Aviation Operations

found operational and strategic benefits. During

the island-hopping campaign of World War II, naval aviation's ability to attack virtually anywhere

compelled the Japanese to spread their combat

forces to defend everywhere (e.g., the concept of

divide and conquer). It forced the Japanese to man

literally hundreds of outposts. Thinly spread, the

Japanese military proved unable to mass forces to

withstand the combined might of U.S. air, land,

and sea forces. This placed the Japanese on the

defensive, created an opportunity to turn the

course of the war in the Pacific, and achieved a

decision.

e. Decisionmaking

Decisionmaking is essential to the conduct of war

since all actions are the result of decisions or of

nondecisions. Warfare, by its very nature, is

fraught with uncertainty. Uncertainty is exacerbated by the lack of time—a critical factor and a

fundamental constraint in effective decisionmaking. The commander must always balance the value of gaining more information to mitigate

uncertainty against the need to shorten the decisionmaking process.

Decisionmaking may be an intuitive process

based on experience, particularly when time is extremely constrained. This will likely be the case at

lower command echelons and in fluid, uncertain

situations like those in an ATC center or in the

cockpit. Alternatively, decisionmaking may be a

more analytical process that is based on comparing several options. This will more likely be the

case at higher echelons or in deliberate planning

situations found in the future planning cell of the

TACC, where the planning horizon is longer.

In execution, decisionmaking becomes a timecompetitive process, and timeliness of decisions

becomes essential to generating tempo. Tempo is

the use of time as a weapon, and it is a critical

consideration for the ACE commander. Being

able to consistently generate a tempo of operations that the enemy cannot handle is crucial to

the conduct of maneuver warfare. However, the

highest tempo of operations, of which a force is

capable, is not normally sustainable over extended periods.

Two levels of operational activity exist for aviation: sustained and surge. Sustained operations

match the regeneration capabilities of the system

(maintenance,.manpower, and supply) to the utilization rate, thus achieving tempo that maintains a

steady state. Surge operations can temporarily increase tempo in order to take advantage of battle-.

field opportunities. However, surge rates are

obtained at the expense of all or a portion of the

regenerative capability. Aviation units operating

at a sustained rate can maintain a specific tempo

of operations for an extended period of time.

These same units operating at the surge rate can

maintain a heightened tempo, but only for a limited period. The ACE commander must employ an

appropriate mix of sustained and surge operations

to control the operational tempo and maintain momentum without exhausting assets before the culminating point is reached.

f. Mission Tactics

MCDP 1 and MCDP 6, Command and Control,

both emphasize a command and control philosophy based on mission orders and mission tactics.

This approach to command and control lies at the

heart of maneuver warfare. Under this approach,

seniors assign missions and explain their underlying intent but allow subordinates as much latitude

as possible in the manner of accomplishment. It is

the assignment of a subordinate a mission without

specifying how the mission must be accomplished.

Mission tactics works in conjunction with aviation's philosophy of centralized command and

decentralized control. It allows the senior commander to focus On higher-level concerns rather

than the details of subordinate execution and

serves as a contract between senior and subordinate commanders. The senior prescribes the method of execution only to the degree needed for

coordination. The pace, complexity, and uncertainty of modern warfare necessitate this decentralization of control. The actual degree to which

control is decentralized depends on the unique requirements of the specific situation. In some instances detailed and highly centralized control

(e.g., ATC) is required. Centralized planning may

be employed to enhance unity of effort and to
3-8 MCWP3-2

concentrate resources on an identified main effort.

However, whenever possible, decentralized control is used to increase the speed and agility of the

MAGTF—including its aviation arm.

Once the mission and plan have been prepared

and briefed by the commander and the staff, subordinates are expected to exercise their initiative

based on their understanding of the commander's

intent. Aviation groups supply the aircraft and

crews to meet the air tasking order (ATO) or air

plan. They execute the assigned mission with the

latitude necessary to accomplish it. MACCS

agencies execute the plan for command and control without interference from the commander.

Mission tactics are fundamental to Marine aviation operations and provide the flexibility necessary to adapt to rapidly changing situations and

exploit fleeting opportunities.

g. Commander's Intent

There are two parts to any mission: the task to be

accomplished and the reason or intent behind it.

The task describes the action to be taken, and the

intent describes the purpose of the action. The intent is part of every mission and is established by

the commander assigning it. The commander's intent, clearly stated, enables unity of effort while

decentralizing command and control. Once the

mission is assigned, the commander develops' a

vision of how the operation should unfold in order

to achieve the desired goal. This vision is shared

with subordinates and includes the commander's

intent. In the absence of detailed instructions,

which are often unavailable in the midst of uncertainty and rapid changes in the battlespace, the intent provides the purpose and direction. The

commander's intent is a device used at all command echelons within the MAGTF to enable subordinates to take the initiative. The MAGTF

commander provides his intent to the ACE commander, the ACE commander provides his intent

to his group commanders, and group commanders

provide their intent to their squadron commanders. Prior to launching any aviation sortie, the

mission commander, flight leaders, and individual

pilots review the commander's intent and analyze

how it applies to a particular mission so they will

be prepared to take the initiative as the situation

dictates.

h. Main Effort

The main effort is the designated subordinate unit

whose mission is most critical to overall mission

success. Commanders design an operation carefully so that success by the main effort facilitates

the success of the entire force. The main effort receives priority for support of any kind, and all

other units support the main effort. Unlike commander's intent, which is a harmonizing device

for subordinate initiative, the main effort is a unifying device that concentrates the MAGTF's efforts on the most important goal. Support of the

main effort becomes an overriding factor in all

decisions. When the MAGTF commander designates an element (ACE, GCE, or CSSE) of the

MAGTF as the main effort, the other elements assume a supporting role. Thus, the main effort is

the supported unit (one element of the MAGTF),

while the supporting effort is provided by the supporting units (other elements of the MAGTF).

The ability to shift the emphasis or to change the

main effort from one element to another provides

the MAGTF commander with flexibility. Any element of the MAGTF can be designated as the

main effort. But, typically, only the ACE or GCE

(or any portion thereof) with their inherent capability to maneuver and fire is designated as the

main effort during combat operations. Since

MOOTW encompasses a wide spectrum of operations, any of the three MAGTF elements (ACE,

GCE, or CSSE) can be designated as the main effort. The ACE provides the MAGTF commander

with firepower, flexibility, mobility, force protection, sustainability, and command and control,

whether it is designated as the main effort or as

the supporting effort.

Within the ACE, the concept of main effort is critical to the decisions made in the planning and executioñ of all aviation operations. With the ACE

as the main effort, both the GCE and CSSE provide full support to ensure the success of the

ACE. For example, the MAGTF commander

might designate the ACE as the main effort when

his operation plan or the JFC's campaign plan requires air superiority. In this case, the GCE and
Aviation Operations

CSSE could provide suppression of enemy air defenses or security for a FOB, or they could give

priority in fuel and ammunition transportation to

aviation units.

When the ACE is not the MAGTF's main effort,

it assumes a supporting role. The ACE commander focuses all internal ACE resources (maintenance, manpower, supply, etc.) on the aviation

functions and capabilities needed to support the

MAGTF's main effort. The ACE commander

may still designate a main effort within the ACE

to achieve maximum ACE support to the

MAGTF's main effort.

i. Surfaces and Gaps

Surfaces are enemy strengths, also referred to as

hard spots. Gaps are enemy weaknesses, also referred to as soft spots. We avoid enemy strengths

and focus our efforts against the enemy's weaknesses. Whenever possible, we exploit existing

gaps or we create gaps as needed. Surfaces and

gaps are a tactical application of the operational

concept of finding and attacking a center of gravity through a critical vulnerability. Surfaces and

gaps can be, but are not always, centers of gravity

or critical vulnerabilities. The commander strives

to match the MAGTF's strength against the enemy's weakness.

Because of the fluid nature of war, gaps will rarely be permanent and will usually be fleeting. To

exploit them requires flexibility and speed. The

characteristics of Marine aviation make it ideally

suited to temporarily fill gaps or to create gaps

where none exist. Marine aviation's ability to rapidly and accurately concentrate firepower in a

small area can be effective in creating gaps, and

its continuous and aggressive aviation reconnaissance can seek out existing gaps. Once gaps are

located, exploitation by fast-moving, mobile forces is critical. Aviation units can prevent enemy

forces from closing the gap or they can be used to

exploit the gap with assault support forces.

Exploitation usually occurs at a gap and extends

the destruction of the enemy by maintaining continuous offensive pressure. Exploitation destroys

the enemy's cohesion. In a classic demonstration

of maneuver warfare, the commander aims to render the enemy incapable of effectively resisting

by shattering his moral, mental, and physical cohesion and his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole. Marine aviation offers the

commander the speed and flexibility needed to

support exploitation in a number of ways. It can

provide direct air support to the main effort to

prevent enemy,forces from disengaging, withdrawing, reconstituting, or reinforcing. It can also

support a committed reserve, either with firepower or mobility, at the moment when the opportunity for exploitation is realized. As enemy cohesion

breaks down, the exploitation may develop into a

pursuit.

The pursuit seeks to annihilate the enemy force

once resistance has completely broken down. The

condition of the enemy may determine whether an

exploitation becomes a pursuit. The opportunity

to conduct a pursuit is often fleeting and must be

seized quickly by the commander. An effective

pursuit requires the integrated efforts of the

MAGTF's combat arms. During a pursuit, a direct-pressure force must have sufficient combat

power to maintain pressure on the enemy. An encircling force must have continuous fire support

and greater mobility than the enemy. The ability

of aviation to move quickly to destroy enemy

forces and deny them routes of escape makes aviation particularly valuable as an encircling force

in the pursuit. The main effort may shift to the

ACE during the pursuit to maintain pressure on

the enemy or to destroy the enemy's will to resist.

j. Combined Arms

Ten years after the first combat use of aircraft, the

Italian air power theorist, Giulio Douhet, recognized the need to focus all combat forces toward

one common goal. Douhet believed that the use of

military ground, naval, and aerial forces in war

should be focused on a single outcome—to win.

Douhet cautioned that the best results can be obtained only by a proper apportioning of ground,

naval, and aerial forces. To attain maximum effectiveness, these forces must be coordinated and

in harmony with one another. These three forces
3-10 MCWP3-2

should function as ingredients (or factors) that

produce a single product.

Douhet was speaking of combined arms. The

MAGTF is the epitome of a combined-arms organization that focuses all combat forces on one

common goal. Within the Marine Corps, combined-arms warfare is the full integration of various arms in such a way that to counteract one, the

enemy must make itself more vulnerable to another. We present the enemy with more than one

problem—a dilemma in which any action he takes

makes him vulnerable to attack.

We accomplish combined arms through the tactics and techniques we use at the lower levels and

through task organization at higher levels. In so

doing, we take advantage of the complementary

characteristics of different types of units and enhance our mobility and firepower. Firepower and

mobility are complementary. Firepower aids mobility by causing the destruction and chaos necessary to render the enemy helpless to oppose our

movement. Mobility enhances firepower by placing the attacker in a position where the target can

be more accurately and effectively engaged. In

combat, firepower and mobility are inseparable

parts of a larger whole.

Firepower damages or threatens to damage enemy

personnel, facilities, and equipment. Firepower

sometimes fulfills the purpose of the mission—to

destroy an enemy force or keep it from using a

certain resource. Firepower aids our movement;

e.g., using an air attack to destroy an enemy emplacement whose fires have immobilized our

ground force. The benefits of firepower are not

limited to physical destruction, but include the

fear and mental chaos that firepower produces in

the enemy. The appropriate application of firepower can have wide-ranging effects, from destruction to intimidation, to outright submission,

to surrender. Operation Desert Storm is an example of the integrated application of aviation firepower in combined arms and its ability to

condition and mold the enemy mentally. The innovative application of firepower and mobility in

Operation Desert Storm created conditions for

success that allowed coalition forces to exploit the

enemy's loss of will and means to fight.

Combining the effects of all combat resources is

essential in achieving a decision. For example,

consider the outcomes of Operation Strangle versus Operation Diadem. The difference in the outcomes illustrates the difference in effectiveness

between aviation acting alone and aviation acting

as part of a combined-arms team to achieve a decisive action.

Conducted in the spring of 1944, Operation

Strangle was designed by the Allies to use

aviation alone to destroy and disrupt German

resupply efforts in Italy. Allied aviation assets were used to interdict railway systems

that delivered supplies to the Germans. Unfortunately, without an Allied ground operation that supported the air effort, the German

troops had a low supply expenditure rate and

were actually able to stockpile resources during Operation Strangle.

Operation Diadem was conducted immediately following Operation Strangle. With the

ground forces designated as the main effort,

aviation supported the ground effort by interdicting targets in the German rear areas. The

combined ground and aviation efforts soundly broke the German resolve and allowed the

Allies to liberate Rome.

Within the ACE, the combined-arms concept is

applied to the tailoring of mission packages to ensure that each has the appropriate mix of mutually

supporting aviation capabilities, is focused on a

common goal, and are guided by the commander's intent. The actual make-up of mission packages varies significantly and is usually situation

dependent. For example, an assault support mission package may include transport helicopters;

attack helicopters; fixed-wing AAW, EW, and attack aircraft; and command and control aircraft

that represent all six functions of Marine aviation.

Success in battle requires the integration of many

disparate efforts. Effective action in any one effort is rarely decisive in and of itself. However,
Aviation Operations 3-1 1 

Table 3-1. Functions of Aviation in Support of Warfighting Functions. 

the overall effect is greater when all efforts are 

combined and coordinated toward a single goal. 

The Marine Corps achieves this combined-arms 

synergy by organizing and coordinating all of 

these efforts into six warfighting functions: command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, 

logistics, and force protection. The six functions 

(i.e., capabilities) of Marine aviation are integrated and provide a significant contribution to each 

of these warfighting functions. Table 3-1 aligns 

the six functions of Marine aviation with the six 

warfighting functions. This alignment is a necessary first step in redefining the six functions of 

Marine aviation in terms applicable to emerging 

doctrinal concepts. 

3005. The ACE in Maneuver 

Warfare 

A maneuver element is a distinct force that uses 

both fire and movement in engaging the enemy to 

generate and exploit an advantage over it as a 

means of achieving a specific objective. Using the 

Marine aviation forces of the ACE as a maneuver 

element provides a wide range of possibilities for 

mission accomplishment. It also increases the 

number of courses of action (COAs) available to 

the MAGTF commander. Marine aviation forces 

can provide essential fires in support of ground 

maneuver elements, assault support aviation can 

vastly enhance ground forces' mobility and maneuverability, or Marine aviation forces can also 

be used purely or predominantly as a maneuver 

element. Aviation leaders and planners should be 

familiar with the variety of roles that combat forces can play in maneuver and think imaginatively 

about ways in which aviation can contribute. 

Opportunities to employ and commit the ACE 

will depend on the nature of the enemy, the terrain, and the situation. By employing the ACE or 

its forces as a maneuver element, the MAGTF 

commander can fully capitalize on a force's 

range, speed, and agility. In that role, aviation can 

provide the main effort, provide a supporting effort, or serve as part of the MAGTF reserve. 

Some tactical tasks andor missions in which aviation units or forces may be able to perform as a 

maneuver element are listed below: 

Envelopment (single, double, vertical). 

Block. 

Rupture. 

Spoiling attack. 

Counterattack. 

Feint. 

Demonstration. 

Diversion. 

Reconnaissance. 

Raid. 

Exploitation. 

Pursuit. 

Fix. 

Screen. 
3-12 MCWP 3-2

• Guard.

• Cover.

Note: While aviation forces are capable of performing the tasks and/or missions listed above,

they will seldom execute them alone. Marine

Corps doctrine dictates that Marine forces operate as a combined-arms team, and most tasks and/

or missions will be conducted with a variety of integrate4 mutually supporting forces.

3006. Aviation in Oftensive and

Defensive Operations

The six functions of Marine aviation each play a

significant role in both offensive and defensive

operations. Because aviation inherently assumes

an offensive role, it supports either offensive or

defensive operations in exactly the same way.

Aviation can continue offensive operations while

the GCE is conducting defensive operations. The

ACE commander apportions aviation assets as

needed to best support the concept of operations

and its assigned tasks and missions while remaining consistent with the MAGTF commander's intent.

a. Offensive Operations

The MAGTF conducts four types of offensive operations: movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. It uses five forms of maneuver

to effect offensive operations:

• A frontal attack can create a gap through which

the attacking force can conduct a penetration.

Aviation forces use fires to create gaps in the

enemy's front or to prevent or delay enemy reinforcements reaching the front lines.

• A penetration is accomplished by concentrating overwhelmingly superior combat power on

a narrow front and in depth in order to rupture

the enemy's position and widen the gap. Mechanized and aviation forces are used to rupture

the enemy's position and exploit the rupture.

• A flanking attack is directed at the flank of an

enemy. A supporting effort engages the enemy's front with fire and maneuver, while the

main effort maneuvers to attack the enemy's

flank. Aviation forces support the main and

supporting efforts as needed.

• An envelopment uses attacking forces to bypass

the enemy's principal defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemy's rear. The operational reach and speed of aviation forces make

them an ideal force to conduct envelopments.

• A turning movement uses attacking forces to

pass around or over the enemy's principal defensive positions to secure objects deep in the

enemy's rear. Aviation forces may serve as fixing forces or conduct the exploitation and pursuit in a turning movement.

In today's nonlinear battlespace, it is likely that

several combinations of different types of operations and forms of maneuver will occur simultaneously. The ACE, with an area of operations that

matches that of the entire MAGTF, must carefully

allocate its assets to ensure a focus of effort that is

responsive to the constantly changing situation.

Depending on the circumstances, the ACE can

support all forms of maneuver. Whether aviation

provides the main or a supporting effort, its contribution with the six functions of Marine aviation

in all types of offensive operations is significant.

The ACE commander ensures that the focus of

aviation remains commensurate with the MAGTF

commander's priorities.

b. Defensive Operations

Defensive operations represent a coordinated effort to defeat the enemy and prevent it from

achieving its objective. The purpose of defensive

operations is to cause an enemy attack to fail and

to achieve specific objectives, such as gaining

time. These operations act as a prelude to offensive operations or serve to protect friendly forces

and centers of gravity. An effective defense is

never passive. Commanders at every level seek

every opportunity to seize the initiative and shift

to the offensive. The ACE is no less dynamic in

defensive operations than in offensive operations,

and it continuously seeks to create and exploit opportunities in order to defeat the enemy. The two

fundamental types of defense are mobile defense

and position defense. Commanders will rarely use

one type or the other exclusively.
Aviation Operations 3-13

(1) Mobile Defense. A mobile defense is the

defense of an area or position in which maneuver

is used together with fire and terrain to seize the

initiative from the enemy. A mobile defense focuses on the destruction ofthe enemy by permitting him to advance into positions that expose him

to counterattack by a strong, mobile reserve. Minimal force is placed forward to canalize, delay,

disrupt, and deceive the enemy as to the actual location of our defenses. By retaining the mobile

forces until the critical time and place are identified, the commander can then focus combat power in violent and rapid counterattacks throughout

the depth of the battlespace. Marine aviation provides vital support to all defending forces and

may serve as the main or only counterattack force.

(2) Position Defense. A position defense

(sometimes referred to as an area defense) places

the bulk of the defending force in selected tactical

positions (where the decisive battle will be

fought). It denies the enemy critical terrain or facilities. A position defense focuses on the retention of terrain by absorbing the enemy into a

series of interlocked positions from which he can

be destroyed, largely by a combination of fire and

maneuver. Principal reliance is placed on the ability ofthe forces in the defended positions to maintain their positions and to control the terrain

between them. Marine aviation can provide the

fires necessary for this form of defense.

3007. Aviation in Security

Operations

Security is an aspect of all operations, whether offensive, defensive, or retrograde. Security operations are assigned missions. They involve the

measures taken by a unit to protect itself against

all acts that might impair its effectiveness. There

are three types of security missions: screen,

guard, and cover. Each of these missions entails

placing a force between the enemy and our main

force. As part of a task-organized security force,

Marine aviation can provide various functional

capabilities that extend a security mission's reach,

responsiveness, and effectiveness. Depending on

the nature of the enemy, weather, and terrain,

fixed-wing and/or rotary-wing aircraft may be

able to perform the security mission by themselves. However, most security operations include

a mutually. supporting mix of forces.

a. Screen

A screen observes, identifies, and reports information. It fights only in self-protection and—

• Provides early warning of enemy approach.

• Gains and maintains enemy contact and reports

enemy activity.

• Conducts counterreconnaissance within its capabilities.

• Impedes and harasses the enemy within its capabilities.

A screen provides only surveillance and early

warning of enemy action, not physical protection.

It can be employed as an economy-of-force measure in a low-risk area because it provides security on a broad frontage with limited assets. Marine

aviation combat forces are ideally suited to performing a screen because of the large areas to be

screened during rapid and deep offensive operations. However, the cost in resources over time is

a factor. For example, a screen consisting of one

section of fighter and/or attack aircraft may require commitment of an entire squadron plus supporting aircraft (e.g., to provide EW and target

acquisition) to ensure 24-hour coverage. Also,

surveillance from the air has certain limitations

and the enemy may have the ability to conceal its

forces and facilities from aerial observation.

b. Guard

A guard protects the main force from attack, direct fire, and ground observation by engaging the

enemy in order to gain time while also observing

and reporting information. It also—

• Provides early warning of enemy approach.

• Provides maneuver space to the front, flanks, or

rear of the force.

• Screens, attacks, defends, or delays (within its

capabilities) to protect the force.

An advance guard provides early warning, develops the situation, and provides time and maneuver
3-14 MCWP 3-2

space for an attacking force. A flank guard operates to the flank of a moving or stationary force to

protect it from enemy ground observation, direct

fire, and surprise attack. A flank guard must protect the entire depth of the main force's flank. A

rear guard protects the rear of the column from

hostile forces. It attacks, defends, and delays as

necessary. The commander may order the guard

to hold for a specified period of time. Marine aviation's reconnaissance capabilities, speed, range,

firepower, and mobility make it ideal for a guard

mission.

c. Cover

A covering force operates apart from the main

force to intercept, engage, delay, disorganize, and

deceive the enemy before it can attack the main

body. It prevents surprise during the advance. It

also—

• Gains and maintains contact with the enemy.

• Denies the enemy information about the size,

strength, composition, and intention of the

main force.

• Conducts counterreconnaissance and destroys

enemy security forces.

• Develops the situation to determine enemy dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses.

Aviation forces assets may provide covering forces because of their speed, range, reconnaissance,

and communications capabilities. A cover

screens, guards, attacks, defends, and delays as

necessary to accomplish its mission. It is a selfcontained maneuver force that operates beyond

the range of friendly artillery positioned with the

main force. A covering force may be task-organized (including infantry and aviation forces, artillery, and combat service support) to operate

independently. The cover mission may be expressed in terms of time or enemy disposition

(e.g., delay the enemy for 3 hours before battle

handover or delay the enemy until the advance

guard is defeated).

3008. Aviation in Military

Operations Other Than War

MOOTW involves the use of military forces in

situations other than large-scale, sustained military operations. MOOTW focuses on deterring

war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic

crises. As in war, MOOTW's goals are to achieve

national objectives as quickly as possible and to

conclude operations on terms that are favorable to

the United States and its allies. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat

operations and may occur during either peacetime

or war. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Militaiy Operations Other Than War, lists the following 16

types of MOOTW:

• Arms control.

• Combatting terrorism.

• Department of Defense support to counterdrug

operations.

• Enforcement of sanctions andlor maritime intercept operations.

• Enforcing exclusion zones.

• Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.

• Humanitarian assistance.

• Military support to civil authorities.

• Nation assistance or support to counterinsurgency, which includes—

• Security assistance. • Foreign internal defense. • Humanitarian and civic assistance.

• Noncombatant evacuation operations (NE Os).

• Peace operations, which include—

• Peace enforcement. • Peacekeeping. • Operations in support of diplomatic efforts

(which include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building).

• Protection of shipping.

• Recovery operations.

• Show of force operations.

• Strikes and raids.

• Support to insurgency.
Aviation Operations 3-15

NEOs involve the protection and subsequent removal of noncombatants from potentially hostile

or dangerous situations. Like raids, NEOs involve

the swift insertion of a force, the temporary occupation of objectives, and a planned withdrawal. It

is the most frequently conducted MOOTW by

Marine forces. Marine aviation is a critical resource in the conduct of NEOs.

Marine aviation is versatile enough to deliver security forces to a remote area, evacuate threatened

noncombatants, conduct rapid force withdrawal,

and provide covering and supporting fires

throughout. Its speed and mobility generate tempo, often allowing friendly forces to act before

opponents can react. The inherent flexibility and

capabilities of aviation, coupled with the forward

presence of the MAGTF, make Marine aviation

an ideal asset for MOOTW. For example, during

January 1991, while conducting training for Operation Desert Storm off the coast of Oman, the 4th

Marine Expeditionary Brigade received orders to

conduct a NEO in Mogadishu, Somalia. While elements of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

were steaming from Oman to Somalia, MAGTF

aircraft were launched to begin the NEO. Thereby

demonstrating Marine aviation's flexibility to

rapidly transition from combat to MOOTW.

Another important consideration is the ACE's logistic capabilities. The ACE's logistic capabilities

will sometimes prove far more important than

firepower in a MOOTW. On April 29, 1991, a cyclone killed more than 130,000 people in Bangladesh. The country's entire infrastructure along

the Bay of Bengal was destroyed, leaving an estimated 3 million people homeless. Operation Sea

Angel provided MAG-50 helicopters that were

loaded with supplies, food, water, water-making

facilities, medicine and medical units, communications and liaison teams, area air reconnaissance,

and basic air transportation. By the time the amphibious task force departed Bangladesh on May

29th, Marine aircraft had flown 1,167 helicopter

sorties in 1,114 flight hours, moved 5,485 passengers, and delivered close to 700 tons of relief supplies.

(reverse blank)

Chapter 4

Command and Control of

Marine Aviation Operations

"The lines of communication are part of that unity. They link the army to

its base, and must be considered. . . its arteries.

These arteries, then must not be permanently cut, nor must they be too long

or dfJIcult to use.

—Carl von Clausewitz

The ultimate objective of command and control is

to effect the conduct of military action. Command

and control includes activities such as gathering

and analyzing information, making decisions,

organizing resources, planning, communicating

instructions and other information, monitoring

results, and supervising execution. The principal

objectives of the MACCS are to enhance unity of

effort, integrate elements of the command and

control system, and help maintain the commander's situational awareness. The MACCS facilitates these objectives by providing the command

and control architecture to integrate and execute

aviation operations. It uses both mission control

and detailed control, with emphasis on mission

control. The MACCS supports the MAGTF philosophy of centralized command and decentralized control.

4001. Command Relationships

Command relationships consist of the interrelated

responsibilities between commanders as well as

the authority of commanders in the chain of command. The JFC organizes forces as needed to accomplish the assigned mission. The organization

provides for unity of effort, centralized planning,

and decentralized execution. The JFC establishes

subordinate commands, establishes appropriate

command and support relationships, and assigns

responsibilities. Command relationships may differ from one operation to another; therefore, they

require clear definition in directives issued at the

JTF level.

As clearly stated in JP 0-2, forces, not command

relationships, are transferred between commands.

When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise

over those forces must be specified by the JFC.

Therefore, when forces are assigned from one

command to another (which is relatively permanent), the combatant commander will exercise

combatant command (command authority) and

the subordinate JFC will exercise OPCON or tactical control (TACON) over assigned forces.

When forces are attached from one command to

another (which is relatively temporary), the JFC

will exercise OPCON or TACON, as specified,

over the attached forces. These same rules apply

to forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF.

The following subparagraphs briefly describe relevant command relationships. For more details,

see JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

a. Operational Control

OPCON is the authority to perform the functions

of command over subordinate forces that involve

organizing and employing commands and forces,

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.
4-2 MCWP3-2

b. Tactical Control

TACON is the command authority over assigned

or attached forces or commands, or over a military capability or force made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually,

local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or

tasks assigned. A Marine aviation unit can be under TACON of another component commander in

a joint force even though the Marine component

commander retains command.

c. Support

Support relationships are established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders

when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Establishing

supported and supporting relationships between

components is a useful option that is needed to accomplish varying tasks. Each subordinate element

of the joint force can support or be supported by

other elements. Unless limited by the establishing

directive, the commander of the supported force

will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets

or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for

coordination and efficiency. The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the

needs of the supported commander and to fulfill

those needs within existing capabilities. At the

same time, the supporting commander must stay

consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

MCWP 6-2, MAGTF Command and Control, describes four categories of support: general, direct,

mutual, and close. General support is the action

that is given to the supported force as a whole

rather than to a particular subdivision thereof

(e.g, the ACE in general support of the entire

MAGTF). Direct support is a mission that requires a force to support another specific force

and authorizes it to directly answer the supported

force's request for assistance (e.g., an attack

squadron in direct support of one subordinate unit

of the GCE). Mutual support is the action that

units render each other because of their assigned

tasks, their positions relative to each other, and

their inherent capabilities. Close support is the action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported

force. This close proximity requires detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action

with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force (e.g., aviation units providing CAS to

units in contact).

4002. Aviation Combat Element

Command and Support

Relationships

Central to the concept of employment for the

ACE is the philosophy of centralized command

and decentralized control. The commander needs

to plan, direct, and coordinate all aspects of aviation employment for the MAGTF (i.e., centralized

command). The ACE commander also wants to

optimize the flexibility, versatility, and responsiveness of aviation by allowing control of assets

to be conducted by subordinate agencies. These

subordinate agencies are both responsive to the

commander and in touch with the changing dynamics of the battle (i.e., decentralized control).

Plans and orders are brief and general. Execution

depends on the sound judgment of well-trained

subordinates, their initiative, and their understanding of the commander's intent. This style of

command and control supports rapid decisionmaking in a time-constrained environment. It allows the ACE to maintain a high operational

tempo. The tasks that must be accomplished by

centralized command are as follows:

• Planning aviation operations.

• Planning use of the battlespace.

• Planning and coordinating the availability of

aircraft, crews, ordnance, fuel, and facilities.

• Coordinating Marine aviation with joint and

multinational aviation operations and resources.

• Tasking Marine aviation.

• Directing and coordinating the employment of

Marine aviation.
Aviation Operations

Tasks that the ACE commander expects the

MACCS to perform through decentralized control

include the following:

• Executing aviation operations through the six

functions of Marine aviation.

• Providing air and missile defense to friendly

units within the operating area.

• Managing and controlling the air portion of the

MAGTF battlespace.

• Coordinating with joint and multinational air

control agencies.

• Executing the MAGTF ATO or air plan.

• Providing timely and accurate information to

the subordinate commanders to support tactical

decisions.

a. General Support

The command support relationship established for

the ACE by the MAGTF commander is almost always in general support of the MAGTF. This

command relationship supports the philosophy of

centralized command and decentralized control

(see fig. 4-1). Since availability of aviation assets

for mission tasking rarely meets the demand, the

MAGTF commander keeps the ACE in general

support of the MAGTF. This allows Marine aviation to fight or to provide support throughout the

MAGTF area of operations and allows the most

efficient and effective allocation of aircraft to the

MAGTF. This process is orchestrated through the

air tasking cycle, allowing flexible and prioritized

tasking. By using and completing the air tasking

cycle, planners can ensure that finite aviation assets are allocated to achieve maximum effect with

correct prioritization based on the main effort.

The ACE will be assigned the role of general support and supports the MAGTF commander's main

effort. The general support command relationship

is a formal relationship that is established between the MAGTF and ACE commanders. This

relationship provides the ACE commander the

most flexible, efficient, and effective means of

apportionments allocation, and prioritization of all

aviation assets in support of the MAGTF. The

ACE commander retains centralized command

over the subordinate units, including establishing

the priority of their efforts. This prevents supporting aviation units from dealing directly with various GCE and CSS agencies. Sorties allocation

will be promulgated through the ATO cycle to requesting units. The ACE commander exercises

decentralized control of these sorties through the

MACCS. For example, a GCE or CSSE unit will

submit requests for immediate air support through

the DASC or preplanned air support requests to

the TACC. The ACE commander maintains flexibility in how and when to fill those requests as

long as the MAGTF commander's apportionment

and prioritization guidance is met.

A/c = Aircraft

A/S = Assault Support

AS(A) = Assault Support coordinator (Airborne)

Figure does not display all control agencies or executors.

Figure 4-1. Centralized Command and Decentralized Control.
MCWP 3-2

b. Direct Support

Direct support is a mission requiring a force to

support another specific force and authorizing it

to answer directly the supported force's request

for assistance. This support relationship is rarely

established by the MAGTF commander for aviation units due to the scarcity of fixed-wing and rotary-wing assets. The ACE will normally be in

general support of the MAGTF. With the designation of an aviation unit to the direct support role

comes the requirement to establish direct liaison,

direct communications to receive critical information, coordination of local security, and logistic

support from the supported unit.

The MAGTF commander will rarely establish a

direct support relationship between the ACE,

GCE or CSSE. If a direct suport relationship exists, it is not a command support relationship that

is designated between higher, lower, and adjacent

echelon commanders within the MAGTF. These

types of support relationships usually exist only

within the context of mission tasking, where individual sorties are allocated for a specific MAGTF

unit conducting a particular mission (usually of

short duration). Since these sorties do not represent the ACE's subordinate units, the ACE's general support command relationship does not

change. When ACE units are assigned these types

of command support relationships, they will, in

most cases, be aviation ground units.

An ACE unit assigned a direct support role is immediately responsive to the needs of the supported unit. It furnishes continuous support to that

unit and coordinates its operations to complement

the concept of operations of the supported unit.

The direct support role creates a one-to-one relationship between supporting and supported units.

The higher headquarters of the supporting and

supported units becomes involved only on a "by

exception" basis. However, each unit must keep

its higher headquarters informed of its operations

and plans. Examples include an attack squadron

in direct support of one subordinate unit of the

GCE, a helicopter section in direct support of a

maneuver battalion, or a LAAD battery in direct

support of an infantry battalion.

Note. Mutual and close support relationships are

not usually established within the MAGTF context; however, LAAD units may find themselves in

such relationships during joint or multinational

operations.

4003. Marine Aviation Command

Relationships in a Joint Force

Within a joint force, JFCs may establish support

relationships to enhance unity of effort for given

operational tasks, emphasize or clarify priorities,

provide a subordinate with an additional capability, or combine the effects of similar assets. Aviation is often placed in a supporting relationship

but can be either the supported or supporting

force. The JFC can organize and conduct operations through Service component commanders,

functional component commanders, or a combination of the two.

a. Service Components

Conducting operations through Service components has certain advantages, including clear and

uncomplicated command lines. This relationship

is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate preserving the organizational

integrity of Service forces. These conditions apply when most of the required functions in a particular dimension are unique to a single-Service

force or when Service force capabilities or responsibilities do not significantly overlap.

When the JFC conducts joint operations through

Service component commanders, the Marine

Corps component commander and the other Service component commanders have OPCON and

ADCON of their assigned Service forces (see fig.

4-2). Marine aviation forces under this command

relationship follow the normal MAGTF chain-ofcommand relationship. All Marine forces, including aviation assets, come under the command of

the Marine Corps component commander. To facilitate operations, the JFC may also establish a

support relationship between Service components. In this case, the Marine Corps component

commander may provide aviation assets in a support relationship such as general or direct support.
Aviation Operations - -y-.,

Clear command relationships must be established

when the JFC centralizes direction and control of

certain functions or types of joint operations

under functional component commanders. In joint

operations, each Service has its own aviation

element and the JFC may appoint a joint force air

component commander (JFACC) (see JP 3-56.1

for a detailed discussion on the JFACC). The JFC

may, because of the interrelationship of the

functions, choose to assign the responsibilities of

JFACC, area air defense commander (AADC),

and airspace control authority (ACA) to the same

person, but not always. The JFC. establishes

command relationships that will most effectively

accomplish the campaign plan's objectives.

Figure 4-2. Joint Operations Conducted Through

Service Components.

b. Functional Components

A JFC may also conduct operations through functional components and/or employ them to coordinate selected functions. Functional components

can be appropriate when forces from two or more

military departments must operate in the same dimension or medium or the assigned mission

breaks down into distinct functional aspects.

The JFC must designate the military capability

that will be made available for tasking by the

functional component commander and the

appropriate command relationship(s) that the

functional component commander will exercise.

For example, a JFACC is normally delegated

TACON of the sorties or other available military

capabilities. The command and control of Marine

Corps aviation is specifically covered by Joint

Pub 0-2 (see below). The MAGTF commander

will make available to the JFC, for tasking

through the JFACC, sorties in excess of MAGTF

direct support requirements.

—Joint Pub 0-2, UnfIed Action Armed Forces (UNAFF)

Combant Commander

2JTF Commander

3OPCON and ADCON

The MAGTF con-unander will retain operational control of organic air assets. The primary

mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element.

During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF

mission. The MAGTF commander wifi make sorties available to the joint force commander,

for tasking through the joint force air component conunander, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirement will be provided to the joint force commander for tasking through the joint force

air component commander for the support of other components of the joint force or the joint

force as a whole. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the geographic combatant

or joint force commander in the exercise of operational control to assign missions, redirect

efforts (e.g., the reapportionment and/or reallocation of any Marine Air-Ground Task Force

(MAGTF) TACAIR sorties when it has been determined by the joint force commander that

they are required for higher priority missions), and direct coordination among the subordinate commanders to ensure unity of effort in accomplishment of the overall mission, or to

maintain integrity of the force.5
4-6 MCWP 3-2

Note: Sorties provided for air defense (DCA),

long-range interdiction and air reconnaissance,

and EW are not "excess" sorties. These sorties

provide a distinct contribution to the overall joint

force effort and will be covered in the A TO. The

JFC must exercise integrated control of air defense, long-range reconnaissance, and interdiction aspects of the joint operation or theater

campaign.

The Marine Corps component commander retains

command of those Marine Corps forces and capabilities not designated by the JFC for tasking by

functional component commanders. The JFACC

will normally not have TACON of Marine aviation units, but will have TACON of Marine aviation sorties provided to the JFC for tasking. The

Marine Corps component commander advises

functional component commanders on the most

effective use of Marine Corps aviation sorties that

are made available. Marine aviation sorties are

then designated as under TACON of the functional component commander for operational matters.

All Marine Corps forces respond to the Marine

Corps component commander for administrative

and logistic support. The JFC may also establish a

Figure 4-3. Joint Operations Conducted Through

Functional Components

support relationship between components to facilitate operations (see fig. 4-3).

Forward-deployed naval forces (including Marine

Corps forces) are usually the first conventional

forces to arrive in an austere theater or area of operations during expeditionary operations. The Marine

Corps component commander's inherent capability

to command and control Marine Corps forces (and

attached or assigned forces of other Services or nations) allows command and control of a functional

component. The Marine Corps component commander may serve as a functional component commander. The JFC can designate the Marine Corps

component commander as the joint force maritime

component commander (JFMCC), joint force land

component commander (JFLCC), or JFACC. If the

Marine Corps component commander is assigned

as the JFACC, the command and control agency

(the joint air operations center [JAOC]) is provided

by the MACCS. Figure 4-4 shows the command

relations for a JFACC.

4004. Other Command

Authorities

Administrative control (ADCON) is the direction

or exercise of authority over subordinate or other

organizations in respect to administration and

support. It includes the organization of Service

forces, control of resources and equipment,

-Combatant Command

(Command Authority)

Combant Commander 2 JF Commander

3OPCON and ADCON

Figure 4-4. Command Relations for Joint Force

Air Component Commander
Aviation Operations 4-7

readiness, mobilization, personnel management,

unit logistics, individual and unit training,

demobilization, discipline, and any other matters

not included in the operational missions of

subordinate or other organizations. ADCON

normally occurs in conjunction with OPCON.

However, a specialized aviation unit could be

separated from its parent unit for a significant

amount of time, thereby requiring that ADCON

be given to another headquarters.

4005. The Marine Air Command

and Control System

The MACCS consists of various air command

and control agencies that provide the ACE commander with the ability to monitor, supervise, and

influence the application of Marine aviation's six

functions (see fig. 4-5). The ACE commander

uses the MACCS to plan and direct ACE operations and to employ aviation assets in a responsive, timely, and effective manner. The MACCS

provides facilities to control aircraft and missiles

as well as to establish links with joint, multinational, other Services, and civil air command and

control systems. Another function of the MACCS

is to advise the MAGTF commander and JFC on

Figure 4-5. Marine Air.Command and Control

System Organization.

the application and employment of Marine aviation. The design of the MACCS allows the ACE

commander to conduct centralized planning and

optimize the use of limited resources. At the same

time, the MACCS allows the subordinate commanders of the ACE to execute the plan in a decentralized manner. The MACCS provides the

capability to conduct airspace command and control and deconflict aviation assets through centralized planning of airspace control procedures. It

exercises air direction and decentralized execution of the airspace control plan through its subordinate agencies.

a. Air Direction

Air direction is a form of aircraft control used by

the MACCS. It is the authority to regulate the employment of air resources by balancing an air resource's availability against its assigned priorities

and missions.

b. Air Control

Air control is a form of aircraft control used by

the MACCS. Air control is the authority to direct

the physical maneuver of aircraft in flight or to direct an aircraft or surface-to-air weapons unit to

engage a specific target. Air control is composed

of airspace control and terminal control. Airspace

control directs the maneuver of aircraft to use the

available airspace effectively. It is made up of

positive control and procedural control. Terminal

control directs the delivery of ordnance, cargo, or

personnel by aircraft to a specific geographic location or target. MCWP 3-25.3, Marine Air Command and Control System Handbook, contains

detailed discussions and defmitions on the various

forms of aircraft control.

c. Airspace Management

Airspace management is distinct from airspace

control. Airspace management is the coordination, integration, and regulation of airspace usage

in a defined dimension that results in the optimal

use of available space. The MACCS uses effective airspace management to maximize freedom

of use within the airspace while remaining consistent with the level of operational risk that is acceptable to the commander.

Coordination

Command
4-8 MCWP 3-2

d. Marine Air Control Group

The MACG establishes, operates, and maintains

the MACCS. The MACG contains subordinate

units that provide the major agencies of the

MACCS (see fig. 4-6). MEU support is provided

to the ACE through task-organized MACG detachments. These detachments typically consist of

a MASS, a MACS, a LAAD Stinger Section, and

a MWCS. The MACG normally consists of the

following:

• MACG headquarters.

• MTACS. •

•

•

•

•

MAS S.

MACS.

LAAD battalion.

MWCS.

VMU.

e. Tactical Air Command Center

The principal air command agency for the ACE is

the TACC. It provides the command post from

which the ACE commander and staff plan, supervise, coordinate, and execute all current and future MAGTF air operations, including deep

operations. The TACC integrates these functions

with the MAGTF command element through linkage with the MAGTF FFCC and combat operations center (COC). The TACC is operated and

maintained by personnel from the MTACS, with

augmentation from the ACE staff and the MACG.

Although the TACC is primarily a command facility, it will also control the execution of deep

operations from the deep battle cell in current operations. It provides the capabilities necessary to

integrate, coordinate, and direct air operations in

support of the MAGTF. The TACC interfaces

with the other ACE command and control agencies, other MAGTF elements, and external civil

and military air control organizations. Its primary

interface with the MAGTF command element is

through the force fires coordination center

(FFCC) at the MEF level and the FSCC at levels

below the MEF. The TACC's primary external interfaces are with the U.S. Army's tactical operations center (TOC), the U.S. Navy's tactical air

control center (also called the TACC), and the

U.S. Air Force's airfield operations center (AOC).

If another Service component commander has

been designated as the JFACC, then that commander's respective operations center will become the joint air operations center (JAOC). At

that time, the JAOC becomes the TACC's primary external interface. In addition to serving as the

ACE command post, the TACC provides the capabilities necessary for the ACE commander to

serve as the JFACC, at which time the TACC will

become the JAOC. Detailed information on the

TACC can be found in MCWP 3-25.4, Tactical

Air Command Center Handbook.

f. Direct Air Support Center

The DASC is the principal MACCS air control

agency responsible for the direction of air operations directly supporting ground forces. It processes and coordinates requests for immediate air

support and coordinates air missions requiring integration with ground forces and other supporting

arms. The DASC is usually the first principal

MACCS agency ashore. It functions in a decentralized mode, but is subordinate to and directly

supervised by the TACC. MCWP 3-25.5, Direct

Air Support Center Handbook, contains detailed

information on the DASC. Figure 4-6. Notional Marine Air Control

Group Organization.
Aviation Operations 4-9

The DASC is established by the MASS and processes immediate requests for air support, coordinates aircraft employment with other supporting

arms, and manages terminal control assets such as

FAC(A) and assault support coordinator (airborne) (ASC[A]) in the support of ground forces.

It will provide procedural control of assigned aircraft, UAVs, and itinerant aircraft transiting

through its assigned area. The DASC can employ

a DASC(A) aboard a KC-130 that will provide

extended line of sight communications with low

flying aircraft. In amphibious operations, the

DASC normally lands in the same scheduled or

on-call wave as the senior FSCC phased ashore.

The DASC will normally be collocated or electronically linked with the senior FSCC within the

GCE. In a MEF operation that consists of multiple

maneuver elements (divisions) within the GCE,

the MEF commander may assume the role of

GCE commander and require the MEF FFCC to

also function as the senior FSCC of the GCE. In

this instance, the DASC may be located with the

MEF FFCC or the senior GCE FSCC in order to

centralize management of CAS and assault support between the GCE maneuver elements (divisions) and to support the MAGTF commander's

intent. DASC support of a multi-division GCE requires the assets and personnel from more than

one MASS. In the multi-division GCE, there will

be a DASC employed at the senior FSCC of the

GCE and a DASC or air support element (ASE)

for each division's FSCC. The circumstances that

may require an ASE to be employed at the division level will be dictated by operational necessity, although ASEs are normally only employed

with a MEU. These subordinate DASCs or ASEs

provide the necessary links to the MACCS in order to request and coordinate direct air support.

The size and composition of each DASC and ASE

varies and can be expanded or reduced as the current situation requires and assets are available.

Only the DASC and ASE have the capability to

provide procedural control for aircraft operating

in its area of responsibility.

The DASC has several employment options available, including an airborne configuration in a KC130. MASS assets are tailored to provide support

based on the mission. A MEF could require a task

organization that uses the assets of more than one

MASS. At the MEU level, a MASS detachment

would be task-organized as an ASE and would

have a reduced capability due to its size. The size

and capability of the MEF's DASC depends on

the number of units that will be requesting air

support and the number of aircraft executing air

support missions. The DASC maintains communications connectivity with the other MACCS

agencies, the FSCC, the FFCC, aircraft under its

control, and joint and other Services' air support

organizations. The DASC also requires connectivity with forward-based air assets to request a

launch in support of ground forces.

The DASC operates through several air control

organizations (see MCWP 3-25.3 for detailed information). These air control organizations are

discussed in the following subparagraphs.

(1) Tactical Air Control Party. A tactical air

control party (TACP) is a subordinate operational

component of a tactical air control system. It provides air liaison to land forces and provides for

the control of aircraft. In the Marine Corps,

TACPs are organic to infantry divisions, regiments, and battalions. TACPs establish and maintain facilities for liaison and communications

between parent units and airspace control agencies, inform and advise the ground unit commander on the employment of supporting aircraft, and

request 'and control air support. The TACP is an

agency of the MACCS, but administratively it is

not part of the MACG. It is located within the

GCE and provides ground commanders with the

means to access direct air support.

(2) Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne). A

TAC(A) is an officer who coordinates, from an

aircraft, the action of combat aircraft engaged in

close support of ground or sea forces. Within the

MACCS, the TAC(A) is a naval aviator and/or

naval flight officer. The TAC(A) is the senior air

coordinator and has air authority over all aircraft

operating in an assigned area. The TAC(A)'s primary mission is to act as an airborne extension of

the DASC, TACC, and/or FSCC. The TAC(A)

contributes to coordination among TACPs,
4-10 MCWP 3-2

FAC(A)s, and the fire direction of artillery and

naval gunfire.

(3) Forward Air Controller (Airborne). A

FAC(A) is a specifically trained and qualified aviation officer who exercises control from the air of

aircraft engaged in close air support of ground

troops. The FAC(A) is normally an airborne extension of the TACP. Within the Marine Corps,

the FAC(A) is a naval aviator and/or naval flight

officer who is specifically trained, qualified, and

designated to perform air reconnaissance and surveillance, conduct terminal control of aircraft engaged in OAS operations, control artillery and

naval surface fire support missions, act as a radio

relay, and control landing zone preparations.

(4) Assault Support Coordinator (Airborne). An ASC(A) is an aviator who coordinates, from an aircraft, the movement of aviation

assets during assault support operations. The

ASC(A) is an experienced aviator with extensive

knowledge of the MACCS who acts as an airborne extension of the DASC. This individual assists in providing situational awareness to the

assault force, relays requests to the DASC, exercises launch authority for immediate and on-call

missions, coordinates with the TAC(A), and provides routing recommendations to the air mission

commander.

(5) Helicopter Support Team. A helicopter

support team (HST) is a task organization formed

and equipped for employment in a landing zone to

facilitate the landing and movement of helicopterborne troops, equipment, and supplies, and to

evacuate selected casualties and enemy prisoners

of war. Within the Marine Corps, HSTs are

sourced from the force service support group

(FSSG), specifically, the landing support company of the support battalion.

g. Tactical Air Operations Center

The TAOC is responsible for airspace control and

management. It provides the ACE with real-time

surveillance of assigned airspace; the capability to

detect, identify, and control the interception of

hostile aircraft and missiles; and the direction,

positive control, and navigational assistance for

friendly aircraft. The TAOC collects and displays

information from its own sensors, other Marine

Corps sources, and external sources that can be

used to enhance the ability of the TACC to prosecute the ACE's support of deep operations.

Although collocated with the TAOC, the

SAAWC is not an air command and control agency. He serves as an extension of the TACC, focusing on air defense planning and management. The

SAAWC is the MAGTF's air defense battle manager. The SAAWC manages and coordinates all

active defense weapons within an assigned sector,

plans air defense operations, manages air defense

resources, supervises the employment of air defense assets, and coordinates with higher and adjacent air agencies and activities.

The MACS provides the equipment and personnel

need to operate the TAOC. MACS personnel assigned to the TAOC use specialized information

systems, sensors, and dedicated communications

links to search the MEF's airspace and to coordinate air defense. The TAOC controls friendly aircraft in the interception of hostile aircraft and

assists missile units in locating and destroying

hostile aircraft. Information gained through radar

assets and tactical digital information links is

transmitted to the TACC to update the air picture

for the ACE commander. The TAOC also interfaces with the Air Force air operations center and

its control and reporting center to coordinate joint

air defense efforts.

The TAOC is movable, but not mobile. It is located in the rear of the MEF area of operations. The

TAOC, with its organic sensors, is located to best

facilitate surveillance coverage of the MAGTF

sector. A MEF will normally deploy with one reinforced MACS that is task-organized to operate

and maintain the TAOC. Normally, a MEU has

no requirement for a TAOC, but an early warning

and control capability may be task-organized as

part of a SPMAGTF if required. For additional

MACS information, see MCWP 3-25.6, Marine

Sector Antiair Warfare Coordinator Handbook,

and MCWP 3-25.7, Tactical Air Operations Center Handbook.
Aviation Operations 4-11

h. Marine Air Traffic Control

Detachments

The MATCD is the primary terminal ATC organization within the MACCS. It is organized and

equipped to satisfy the ATC requirements for

EAFs and FOBs. The detachment provides airspace control, management, and surveillance for

its designated sector or area of responsibility.

MATCD services include all-weather radar approach and departure control, en route ATC services within assigned controlled airspace,

precision and instrument approaches, control tower operations, and tactical air navigation. Additionally, the MATCD contributes to the overall air

surveillance effort. It coordinates air defense activities within designated base defense zones by

assisting in the detection of hostile aircraft for

LAAD Stinger teams assigned to airbase defense.

The detachment serves as the MAGTF's liaison

with host-nation, national, and international civil

ATC agencies.

ATC detachments are components of the MACS.

The MACS usually has four ATC detachments.

All four detachments would be required to support a MEF operation in which f6ur EAFs and up

to four other air facilities or sites could be established. Large radar systems, support equipment,

and shelters are used to provide MEF-level support. Deployment options include a mobile team

capability. The mobile team is task-organized to

provide an initial rapid response capability for the

establishment and control of tactical landing

zones. At the MEU level, the MACG detachment

contains a task-organized MATCD mobile team.

More detailed information on the MATCD can be

found in MCWP 3-25.8, Marine Air Traffic Control Detachment Handbook.

i. Low Altitude Air Defense

The LAAD battalion provides close-in, low-altitude, surface-to-air weapons fires in defense of

forward combat elements, vital areas, and installations. It also provides surface-to-air weapons

support for units engaged in special or independent operations. The battalion uses man-portable

Stinger missiles and a pedestal-mounted vehicular

version (Avenger) that furnishes a shoot-on-themove capability. LAAD units provide early warning to other elements of the MACCS through appropriate communications nets.

The LAAD battalion establishes a COC from

which the battalion commander exercises overall

command and control of battalion operations. The

LAAD battalion COC is usually collocated with

the SAAWC facility at the TAOC to receive cueing and increase situational awareness. The battalion comprises two batteries, with three platoons

per battery and three sections per platoon. A section, which is the smallest employable LAAD element, has five Stinger teams. These may employ

either the man-portable Stinger or the vehiclemounted Avenger system. A MEF is normally

supported by the entire battalion and a MEU is

normally supported by one reinforced section.

LAAD units are routinely task-organized to support various contingencies.

When the LAAD operates in general support of

the MAGTF, its collocation with the TAOC is desirable to facilitate integration into the overall

MEF air defense effort and to provide access to

the air defense picture. When the LAAD operates

in direct support of the GCE, its collocation with

the DASC is a more effective location to receive

the air defense picture and cueing from MACCS

sensors. When information from other MACCS

sensors is not available, the section employs a

lightweight, short-range organic radar to detect

aircraft and cue Stinger teams.

The LAAD battalion provides the MAGTF's only

organic surface-to-air defense. Marine Corps

forces have no organic means of ground-launched

medium- or high-altitude air defense or theater

missile defense, which was formerly provided by

the Hawk missile system. The MAGTF depends

on naval or another Services support to provide

those requirements. More detailed information on

the LAAD battalion can be foUnd in MCWP

3.25.10, Low Altitude Air Defense Handbook.
4-12 MCWP 3-2

j. Marine Wing Communications

Squadron

The MWCS provides communications for the

ACE. It is not an agency of the MACCS, but the

MWCS provides the backbone for ACE communications. It is responsible for the installation,

maintenance, and operation of two distinct communications structures. These communications

structures provide the ACE commander with the

means to direct the efforts of subordinate commanders and provide connectivity among the subelements of the MACCS.

The MWCS installs, operates, and maintains expeditionary communications for the ACE, including the phased deployment of task-organized

elements. It provides digital backbone communications support; tactical automated switching and

telephone services; electronic message distribution; single-channel radio communications; and

WAN, deployed LAN, and server support. The

headquarters and one detachment normally depioy and collocate with the ACE headquarters.

When required, personnel and equipment from

operational platoons are used to support the integration of MACCS agencies as well as support

the ACE headquarters. At the MEU level, the

MACG detachment consists of a task-organized

MWCS communications team. More detailed information on the MWCS can be found in MCWP

3-25.9, Marine Air Command and Control Systems Communications Handbook.
Chapter 5

Aviation Planning

"A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next

week. "6

—Gen George S. Patton, Jr.

Planning is a continuous, anticipatory, interactive,

and cyclic process. There are many planning cycles that take place within the context of the force

commander's overall planning, decision, execution and assessment (PDE&A) cycle. Some of the

cycles that relate to aviation planning are shown

in figure 5-1. However, these planning cycles are

not conducted separately, but collectively, and often simultaneously. They are inevitably linked together, with the inputs and outputs of each cycle

interacting with other cycles on a continuous basis. All of these processes support the overall goal

of producing a plan—a vital tool used to prosecute a campaign.

The process of planning is of utmost importance

because it drives operations. Planning cannot be

done to or for an organization; it must be done by

it. Any commander or organization affected by a

plan should have the opportunity to contribute to

the planning process. This provides users an understanding of how and why the plan was constructed and provides an opportunity to affect

how the commander will accomplish the assigned

mission.

Figure 5-1. Linked Planning Cycles.

There are two major aspects of aviation planning:

support of the operation plan (OPLAN) and/or

fragmentary order (FRAGO) development and

production of a daily ATO. Both allocate aviation

assets, munitions, and support. Marine Corps operations and their requisite OPLANs are mission

focused, intent driven, and event and/or condition

based. ATO production is a continuous cycle

based on assets and time. Aviation planning is the

translation of the MAGTF commander's eventand/or condition-based plan into a time-based

plan of action for the ACE.

This chapter describes the ways in which aviation

planning reflects and interacts with other cycles

and planning concepts tO produce the force's

overall operation order. It addresses the cyclical

process that produces the ATO or air plan.

MCWP 5-11.1, MAGTFAviation Planning, contains a detailed discussion on all aspects of aviation planning, which culminate into an ATO or air

plan.

5001. The Commander's Role in

Planning

The commander—whether the JFC, amphibious

task force (ATF) commander, or MAGTF commander—is responsible for providing top-down

planning guidance. Detailed aviation planning

must embody the supported commander's overall

intent and concept of operations. The ACE commander is the MAGTF commander's chief aviation expert and advisor and must simultaneously

participate in the aviation planning process at

three levels: within the ACE, within the MAGTF

command element, and at the naval or joint force
5-2 MCWP 3-2

headquarters (if any). The ACE commander directs the ACE staff in the execution of the aviation planning process. The ACE commander's

inputs are key to the development of Marine aviation planning documents. The ACE battlestaff assists the ACE commander in executing duties by

providing specialized expertise and advice. The

ACE battlestaff (see fig. 5-2) consists of the chief

of staff, the principal staff officers (i.e., G-1, G-2,

G-3, G-4, G-6, and aviation logistics division

[ALD] representative), and special staff officers

(e.g., staff judge advocate, surgeon, chaplain) required by the situation or the ACE commander.

The ACE commander's responsibilities include—

• Acting as the MAGTF commander's principal

Marine aviation advisor.

• Advising and assisting the MAGTF commander and staff in developing the overall concept

for the employment of aviation in support of

the MAGTF.

• Coordinating air operations with the GCE and

the CSSE.

• Coordinating with the naval expeditionary

force and joint task force as necessary.

• Developing the MAGTF ATO or air plan and!

or Marine input to the joint ATO through the

air tasking cycle.

5002. Staff Organization for

Aviation Planning

From the TACC, the ACE commander conducts

future operations planning and current operations

monitoring. Each Marine aviation function (OAS,

AAW, assault support, air reconnaissance, EW,

and control of aircraft and missiles) has representatives in the TACC. The future operations section produces the air plan, ATO, or Marine input

to the joint ATO. The current operations section

manages the execution of the air plan or ATO.

The G-3 or a senior G-3 representative serves as

the senior watch officer within the current operations section. Key inputs to overall aviation planning are developed by the relevant organizations.

The TACC is organized as a fully integrated facility to promote the intra- and inter-staff coordination necessary for responsive and synchronized

MAGTF air operations. The TACC enables the

ACE staff to align functionally and organizationally with the MAGTF staff (see figs. 5-3 and 5-4).

This facilitates inter-staff coordination, which is

critical for effective planning and execution of

MAGTF air operations. See MCWP 3-25.4 for

detailed information on TACC organization and

functioning.

L G1 G-2 G.3

_____________

G-6 AID Special Stafr

* As required

Figure 5-2. The ACE Battlestaff.
Aviation Operations 5-3 

Figure - 5-3. TACC Organizations and Command Relationships 

to the ACE Battlestaff. 

G-3 G -3 1 Current Ops Future Ops 

ACE 

I I L I 

Executes current Plans next major 

OPORDIFRAGO subordinate command 

mission change 

(OPORDIFRAGO) 

G-3 

TACC 

Current Ops 

Executes current 

AT0 and 

OPORDIFRAGO 

G -3 

TACC 1 

Future Ops 

Plans next ATO(s) 

and ACE subordinate 

unit mission change 

(OPORDIFRAGO) 

G-5 

Future Plans 

I 

Plans next MEF 

mission change 

(OPLANICONPLAN) 

ACE Staff 8 

Future Plans 

Plans next ACE 

mission change 

and develo~s ACE 

estimates and support 

plans 

Figure 5-4. MEF-ACE Staff Alignment. 
MCWP 3-2

5003. Planning Cycles

All aviation planning takes place within the planning cycles of larger organizations: the JTF, the

ATF, and the MAGTF. Planners at those levels

will require inputs from aviation elements at each

phase of their own planning, and their planning

products will drive aviation planning. Moving

from the general to the specific, key planning cycles and planning concepts include the following:

a. The Planning, Decision, Execution,

and Assessment Cycle

The commander and staff use the PDE&A cycle

to plan operations, make accurate and timely decisions, direct the effective execution of operations,

and assess the results of those operations. It is a

series of continuous, interrelated processes that

frame military operations.

The PDE&A cycle is a continuous cycle—from

initial receipt of the mission through mission accomplishment. It is both time- and event-driven.

It supports the commander's effort to assimilate

information in the chaotic environment of war to

increase tempo through timely and decisive action. For example, the ATO is critical to planning

and executing operations and is produced in a cycle that requires timely input from subordinates.

Planning the next operation also requires a constant flow of information from current operations.

b. Integrated Planning Through the

Warfighting Functions

The integrated approach to planning provides a

functional approach that is systematic, coordinated, and thorough. It is based on the six warfighting functions: command and control, maneuver,

fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection.

The warfighting functions encompass all activities in the battlespace.

Focusing on warfighting functions instead of specific arms or organizations allows the commander

to fully integrate all actions into supporting the

mission of the force as a whole. This helps the

force achieve focus and unity of effort across all

organizational lines. For example, the GCE does

not concern itself solely with maneuver, nor does

the ACE concern itself solely with fires. Rather,

each organization considers how it can contribute

to each warfighting function in order to accomplish the force's overall mission. When all warfighting functions are focused to accomplish the

desired strategic objective in the shortest time

possible and with minimal casualties, the

MAGTF can obtain maximum impact. The key to

integrated planning within the command is the

use of representatives for each warfighting function on the planning staff and between commands

the warfighting functions are represented by liaison officers.

c. The Marine Corps Planning

Process

Within the PDE&A cycle, specific MAGTF operations and supporting aviation operations are

planned by using the standard framework of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available (METT-T) and the

cyclical, six-step Marine Corps Planning Process

(MCPP) (see fig. 5-5). MCWP 5-1 discusses the

MCPP in detail.

Mission Analysis

I,

Course of Action

Development

Course of Action

War Game

Course of Action

Comparison and

Decision

Orders

Development

Tran:ition

Figure 5-5. Marine Corps Planning Process.
Aviation Operations 5-5

The MCPP provides a logical and orderly method

for planning operations. Each successive step in

the process is linked. The output from one step

becomes the input for the next. Interactions

among various planning steps allow a concurrent,

coordinated effort that maintains flexibility,

makes efficient use of available time, and facilitates continuous information sharing. Aviation

planning uses the MCPP and adjusts it as necessary to address the specific requirements associated with the planning and execution of air

operations. By applying the MCPP to ACE planning, the tenets of the MCPP (single-battle concept, top-down planning and integrated planning)

are also incorporated into ACE operations. The

following subparagraphs provide a brief description of the six steps of the MCPP.

(1) Mission Analysis. Mission analysis is the

first step in planning. The purpose of mission

analysis is to review and analyze orders, guidance, and other information provided by higher

headquarters and to produce a unit mission statement. Mission analysis drives the MCPP. The aviation commander will advise the commander on

the aviation implications of the mission assigned.

(2) Course of Action Development. During

COA development, planners use the mission

statement (which includes higher headquarters'

tasking and intent), commander's intent, and

commander's planning guidance to develop several COAs. Each prospective COA is examined to

ensure that it is suitable, feasible, different, acceptable, and complete with respect to the current

and anticipated situation, the mission, and the

commander's intent. In accordance with the commander's guidance, approved COAs are developed in greater detail. Each fully developed COA

will include a concept of air employment.

(3) Course of Action War Games. During

COA war games, each friendly COA is examined

against selected threat COAs. This analysis involves a detailed assessment of each COA as it

pertains to the threat and the environment. COA

war games assist the planners in identifying

strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and

asset shortfalls for each friendly COA. It is also

used to identify braaches and potential sequels

that may require additional planning. Short of actually executing the COA, COA war games provide the most reliable basis for understanding and

improving each COA. For the war game of each

COA, aviation planners must supply an estimate

of supportability. The format for the aviation estimate of supportability can be found in MCRP

5-11 .1 A, Aviation Planning Documents.

(4) Course of Action Comparison and Decision. In COA comparison and decision, the commander evaluates all friendly COAs against

established criteria. The COAs are then evaluated

against each other. The commander selects the COA

deemed most likely to accomplish the mission.

(5) Orders Development. During orders development, the staff takes the commander's COA

decision, intent, and guidance and develops orders to direct the actions of the unit. Orders serve

as the principal means by which the commander

expresses his decision, intent, and guidance. Aviation planners produce an operations order and

participate in the preparation of many other higher level orders.

(6) Transition. Transition is the orderly hand

over of a plan or order as it is passed to those

tasked with execution of the operation. It provides

mission executors with the situational awareness

and rationale for key decisions that are necessary

to ensure a coherent shift from planning to execution. For aviation units, transition occurs at the

aviation confirmation brief, during which the aviation plan is fully briefed to the commander, the

staff, and key participants.

5004. Aviation Planning as an

Element of MAGTF Planning

Aviation planning is conducted concurrently and

in coordination with other MAGTF planning by

using the steps of the MCPP and integrating the

functions of aviation into the warfighting functions. While the MAGTF command element is

planning overall MAGTF operations, the ACE
5-6 MCWP3-2

commander and staff are concurrently planning

air operations in support of the MAGTF and coordinating with other elements of the MAGTF to

determine their aviation support requirements.

This concurrent, parallel approach to planning is

possible through the use of mission-type orders, a

clear understanding of the MAGTF commander's

intent, and close and continuous liaison among

the MAGTF command element, ACE, GCE, and

CSSE and external organizations. Concurrent,

parallel planning provides aviation planners with

the time necessary to execute the air tasking cycle

while enhancing the tempo of MAGTF operations. This form of planning also ensures that

ACE operations are focused on attainment of

MAGTF objectives in concert with the MAGTF

commander's concept of operations.

a. Aviation Planning and the

Operation Order

Because aviation contributes to so many of the

warfighting functions, aviation planners must prOvide input to the overall MAGTF operation order

in many areas, including intelligence, operations,

and logistic annexes. For example, the operations order, Annex C, contains an appendix on

fire support that contains a tab on the air fire plan.

MCWP 5-1 provides the full structure of an operation order. Details on the aviation operations annex can also be found in MCWP 5-11.1 and

MCRP 5-1 l.1A.

Aviation planners produce numerous subordinate

plans and documents, such as the airspace control

plan (ACP) and the ATO. Annex W incorporates

the aviation concept of operations (see MCWP 5-1

for an example) and may include any or all of the

following appendixes (most of which include several subordinate tabs):

• Appendix 1, Air Defense/Antiair Warfare.

• Appendix 2, Offensive Air Support.

• Appendix 3, Assault Support.

• Appendix 4, Reconnaissance and Surveillance

Plan.

• Appendix 5, Supplementary Air Operations.

• Appendix 6, Aircraft Armament.

• Appendix 7, Air Control.

• Appendix 8, Air. Communications.

• Appendix 9, Air Movement Plan/Flight Ferry.

• Appendix 10; Aircraft Schedules.

• Appendix 11, Air Tasking.

This information may be included in Appendix 17

(Aviation Operations) to Annex C (Operations) of

the MAGTF operations Order for smaller scale

operations such as MEUs or (SP) MAGTFs.

b. The Air Tasking Order

The JFACC or the ACE commander generates the

ATO (MCRP 5-11.1 A contains the ATO format).

The ATO is used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and

control agencies the targets and specific missions

of projected sorties, capabilities, and forces. It

normally provides both general instructions and

specific instructions, including call signs, targets,

and controlling agencies (see JP 3-56.1). The

ATO may include the airspace control order or

the airspace control order may be issued separate

ly. It also includes special instructions that provide amplifying notes, important details, and

changes. The ATO, airspace control order, and

special instructions provide operational and tactical direction at appropriate levels of detail. The

level of detail should be very explicit when forces

operate from different bases or when multi-component and/or composite missions are tasked. In

contrast, less detail is required when missions are

tasked to a single component or base. See JP 3-52,

Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat

Zone, for further discussion.

Each .ATO covers a 24-hour period. There are usually four ATOs at any given time. They include—

• The ATO undergoing assessment (yesterday's

plan).

• The ATO in execution (today's plan), which is

monitored by the current operations staff.

• The ATO in production (tomorrow's plan).

• The ATO in planning (the following day's

plan) by the future operations staff.

Because input to the joint ATO must be provided

3 to 4 days in advance, the ATO can represent

only a starting point for daily flight operations. It

is impractical to predict every need in advance.
Aviation Operations - .7

The MAGTF commander must have the flexibility to launch or to divert any aircraft as necessary

to complete the mission, even if this requires

short-notice deviations from the ATO.

In accordance with the character of maneuver

warfare, the ATO must be flexible enough to

change with the needs of the force as the situation

changes. It is not a rigid constraint on operational

flexibility. Because the ATO represents a great

deal of necessary coordination and deconfliction

of air assets and airspace, necessary deviations

from the ATO should be well justified and relevant headquarters should be informed as quickly

and as fully as possible. The JFC directs how

changes are made to the ATO.

During Navy and Marine Corps operations afloat,

an ATO may not exist, rather a consolidated flight

schedule or ship's air plan is used. All squadron

flight schedules are consolidated with thç needs

of the MAGTF, ship, amphibious ready group

(ARG), or carrier battle group (CVBG) at an air

board. The air board works on current and future

plans for air support. The results are published as

the ship, ARG, or CVBG air plan. The air board

also provides the input for the joint ATO.

Most, if not all, missions involving squadron

flight schedules and air plans will appear on thc

joint ATO. This includes all MAGTF fixed-wing,

rotary-wing, and UAV flights that operate within

the JTF's airspace. This is necessary in order to

coordinate airspace and minimize risk of fratricide. Those flights which may or may not be included in the joint ATO are usually routine

helicopter functional check flights or ship-to-ship

or ship-to-shore logistic flights. These routine

fights have a negligent effect on airspace coordination and have been pre-approved and/or coordinated to be conducted on a regular basis.

Ships (particularly aircraft carriers) may also operate outside of the JTF's airspace. Missions that

do not enter JTF airspace will not appear on the

joint ATO. Nonetheless, every mission that is

submitted and approved for the joint ATO must

appear on squadron flight schedules and the

MAGTF, ship, ARG, or CVBG air plan.

5005. The Air Tasking Cycle

The air tasking cycle (see fig. 5-6) is the key tool

used by aviation planners to plan air operations

that support the MAGTF's mission and produce

the MAGTF ATO or air plan. The six-phase

MAGTF air tasking cycle is compatible with the

six-phase joint air tasking cycle. The six phases of

ACE

Commander

Figure 5-6. MAGTF Six-Phase Air Tasking Cycle.

All

Levels

o,iiinder

ACE

Staff

Phase IV

ACE Commander

ATO/Air Plan!

SpecIal Instructions
5-8 MCWP 3-2

the air tasking cycle are command aviation guidance, target/air support mission development, allocation and allotment, tasking, force execution,

and combat assessment. JP 3-56.1 addresses the

joint air tasking cycle. JP 3-09 and MCWP 3-42.1

address the targeting cycle.

a. Command Aviation Guidance

The MAGTF air tasking cycle begins when the

commander assigns a mission to the ACE commander. The MAGTF commander provides guidance through mission orders, clearly conveying

the mission intent and designating the MAGTF

main effort. In preparing this guidance, the

MAGTF commander will normally consult with

subordinate commanders to assess the results of

the warfighting effort to date and to discuss future

OPLANs. This provides subordinate commanders

with an opportunity to introduce recommendations, describe their ability to support other elements, and list support requirements.

The commander's guidance and objectives identify targeting priorities, procedures, joint fire support coordinating measures, rules of engagement,

and a definition of direct support sorties. The development of the concept of fires and targeting

guidance is the responsibility of the MAGTF

force fires coordinator and is based on the commander's intent and input from the major subordinate element commanders.

The MAGTF commander's uses the recommendations of the ACE commander and staff and the

MAGTF force fires coordinator to make apportionment decisions. These decisions identify the - - total level of effort that should be dedicated to

aviation tasks in order to accomplish the assigned mission. As the battle progresses, the

MAGTF commander revises apportionment decisions to meet the requirements of the current situation. Apportionment is usually expressed as a

percentage of the total aviation effort and helps

to ensure the efficient use of limited aviation resources. If the MAGTF is part of a joint force,

the MAGTF mission statement may include the

JFC's apportionment guidance for Marine aviation if Marine sorties are to be provided to the

joint force. The following is an example of the

MAGTF commander's apportionment for an amphibious assault operation:

Pre-Assault Operations

• DAS, AAW, or SEAD sorties = 70% (a

portion of these will go to the joint effort).

• CAS sorties = 0%.

• Assault support sorties = 10%.

• EW sorties = 10%.

• Command and control = 5%.

• Excess sorties (any type) = 5% (will go to

the joint effort).

During the Initial Assault

• DAS, AAW, or SEAD sorties = 10% (a

portion of these will go to the joint effort).

• CAS sorties = 30%.

• Assault support sorties = 45%.

• EW sorties = 5%.

• Command and control = 10%.

• Excess sorties (any type) = 0% (there may

be no excess sorties available).

Note: Excess sorties are those sorties available

for tasking, but are not needed by the MAGTF.

Sorties provided for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance are not

excess sorties and will be provided up front to the

JFC as required. These sorties provide a distinct

contribution to the overall joint force effort. The

JFC must exercise integrated control of air defense, long-range reconnaissance, and interdiction aspects of the joint operation or theater

campaign. Excess sorties are in addition to these

sorties (see JP 3-56.1 for more details).

b. Target/Air Support Mission

Development

The specific objectives described by the commander are used to focus specific target and air

support mission development. All potential targets and air support requests are processed

through the appropriate staff sections, which will

identify, prioritize, and select specific targets/air

support missions that meet the commander's objectives. and guidance and support the concept of

operations.
Aviation Operations 5.9

Overall target planning is the responsibility of the

MAGTF force fires coordinator. The ACE commander and staff assist in this effort and provide

essential guidance in the evaluation and selection

of aviation targets. Targets are selected from joint

target lists (if any), requests from all elements of

the MAGTF, intelligence recommendations, EW

inputs, and current intelligence assessments.

Air support mission development (including those

missions involving the attack of targets) is also an

essential component of this phase of the ATO

development cycle. Air support mission requests

are generated, evaluated, and prioritized in the

same manner as targets. Since all of these missions require the allocation of ACE assets and

those assets are usually finite, the ACE commander and staff play a central role in their evaluation.

The MAGTF commander will ultimately approve

the prioritizatiOn of both the target list and the air

support mission list.

In accordance with the commander's objectives

and component targeting/air support mission requirements, the ACE staff develops air OPLANs

to employ all available and appropriate capabilities and forces. The end product of this phase of

the ATO cycle is a MAGTF prioritized list of targets and air support missions.

c. Allocation and Allotment

After receiving the commander's apportionment

directive and understanding the targeting/air support mission requirements, the ACE commander

allocates the planned effort. Allocation (air) is the

translation of the air apportionment decision into

the total numbers of sorties (by aircraft type)

available for each operation or task. Allocation

(air) includes the submission of all air support requests (OAS, IDAS, AAW, assault support, and

command and control) to the MAGTF FSCC and!

or air center. When all air support requests have

been received, the ACE commander presents the

allocation request to the MAGTF commander.

Once the allocation request has been approved,

the allocated sorties are distributed, or allotted, to

support the MAGTF and its elements. Allotment

decisions allow MAGTF elements to plan and coordinate the integration of sorties into their fire

and maneuver efforts. The GCE and CSSE commanders determine the appropriate distribution of

these sorties.

d.. Tasking

Tasking is the process of translating allocation

and allotment decisions into an ATO or air plan

and then passing the tasks to the units involved.

The MAGTF ATO or air plan assigns missions

and mission support responsibilities to specific

squadrons.

If a Marine headquarters is designated as the

ACA and/or JFACC, ATO interoperability with

other Services depends to some degree on the

Contingency Theater Automated Planning System

(CTAPS). CTAPS is a hardware and software

system composed of a variable number of workstations on a LAN that are linked with geographically remote terminals. The focus of CTAPS is

the ATO that tasks operational units to fly specified combat and combat support missions and to

maintain aircraft and aircrews at specified alert

states. CTAPS functions are currently scheduled

to be replaced by modules of the U.S. Air Force's

Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS) program. TBMCS is an umbrella program

that assimilates the ATO's production, dissemination and execution that currently resident in

CTAPS. Additionally, TBMCS contains software

modules that automate the DASC and theater missile defense planning functions. TBMCS is intended to resolve those problems of compatibility

and interoperability associated with CTAPS. TBMCS links the organizational levels of command

with automated tools as they relate to air operations, creating the functional capabilities for planning, intelligence, and operational execution.

Ultimately, TBMCS will receive, display, and integrate a common space, air, ground, and maritime situation for all forces.

e. Force Execution

Aircraft squadrons assign individual aircrews and

aircraft to specific mission numbers and issue

squadron flight schedules once they receive the

ATO or air plan. Actual mission planning and coordination with the MAGTF command element,
5-10 MCWP 3-2

ACE, GCE, and CSSE staffs are performed by the

designated mission commander. Task-organized

flights of aircraft then execute the assigned missions. During execution, the ACE commander exercises command and control of aviation forces

through the MACCS, including the dynamic retasking of assets to meet the changing situation.

f. Combat Assessment

Effective campaign planning and execution require a continuing evaluation of the impact of

combat operations on the overall campaign. Combat assessment is focused at the MAGTF level;

however, it is done (in varying degrees) at all levels. Normally, the ACE G-3/S-3, assisted by the

G-2/S-2, is responsible for coordinating combat

assessment of ACE missions. The G-3/S-3's assessment is forwarded to the MAGTF staff for

further evaluation.

Combat assessment evaluates a combat operation's effectiveness in achieving command objectives. The ACE staff continually evaluates the

results of air operations and provides these evaluations to the MAGTF commander for consolidation and overall evaluation of current operations.

Combat assessment assesses the effects, relative

to friendly objectives and strategy, of both specific air support missions and air operations in general against the specific targets attacked, whole

target systems, and remaining enemy warfighting

capabilities. It should include BDA, munitions effects assessment, and reattack recommendations.

It must take into consideration the capabilities,

forces, munitions, and attack timing employed.

Assessors should weigh future enemy COAs and

remaining enemy combat capabilities against established targeting/air support mission priorities

to determine future objectives and reattack recommendations. The ACE staff assessment is forwarded to the force commander to determine

overall mission success and to recommend changes regarding COAs. Combat assessment marks

the end of the air tasking cycle, but it also provides the inputs for the next air tasking cycle and

subsequent command guidance, target/air support

mission development, allocation and allotment,

tasking, force execution, and combat assessment.
Chapter 6

Aviation Logistics

"I. don 't know what the hell this 'logistics' is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of It.

—Adm Ernest J. King

ACE commanders and logisticians must plan and

execute both aviation ground support operations

conducted by the MWSS and aviation logistics

operations conducted by the MALS. The MALS

provides aviation-peculiar logistic support and the

MWSS provides aviation ground support (EAF,

aircraft rescue and fire fighting, etc.) as well as

ground-common combat service support. A CSS

detachment from the CSSE provides ground-common logistic support beyond the capability of

ACE's organic CSS units. These logistic operations must sustain the ACE, which in turn provides worldwide expeditionary support to the

MAGTF. Direct support for naval aviation (Navy

and Marine) is sourced and funded by the Navy,

therefore components of the ACE use two sets of

procedures for supply and maintenance operations: aviation logistic functions are prescribed by

naval publications and aviation ground support

logistic functions are prescribed by Marine Corps

publications.

6001. Strategic Aviation

Logistics and Aviation Ground

Support

Within the Marine Corps, the Deputy Chief of

Staff for Aviation is responsible for planning and

coordinating staff activities for all matters relative

to the organization, equipment, manpower, training, and support of Marine Corps aviation units

and installations, including all aviation logistic

and/or aviation ground support matters. Since

Marine Corps aviation is an integral part of naval

aviation, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation (a

Marine Corps designation) is also designated as a

OPNAV (N88M) (the Navy equivalent). This

makes the Marine Corps' Deputy Chief of Staff

for Aviation equal to the Navy's Head, Air Warfare Division OPNAV (N88). In this capacity, the

Deputy Chief of Staff is responsible to the Chief

of Naval Operations to ensure that Marine Corps

aviation is in consonance with the overall naval

aviation program.

Within Headquarters Marine Corps the Department of Aviation, Aviation Logistics Support

Branch is responsible for the equipping, supporting, and maintaining of aircraft and aviation units

and installations across the logistic spectrum. The

Aviation Logistics Support Branch coordinates

with the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV)

staff and numerous Naval Systems Commands to

plan needed aviation logistic support of Marine

Corps forces. Specifically, it plans the aviation logistic and aviation ground logistic support in matters of policy, management, procurement, supply,

and distribution of materiel (including the acquisition, planning, programming, construction,

management, maintenance, and disposition of real

estate and facilities).

6002. Operational Aviation

Logistics and Aviation Ground

Support

The MAGTF's power-projection capability is

based on its ability to move rapidly to and operate

freely within an objective area anywhere in the

world. To maintain this power-projection capability, the MAGTF requires responsive air support

during all phases of its operations. To provide responsiveness in austere expeditionary environments, Marine aviation must consider basing
6-2 MCWP3-2

options and available logistic support. Marine a

viva ti on basing selections must consider versatility, capability, vulnerability, footprint, and sustainability regardless of whether it operates from

the sea or from shore-based airfields located close

to or in the area of operations.

a. Seabasing

Aviation logistic operations from aircraft carriers,

aviation-capable amphibious ships, and aviation

logistics support ships (TAVB5) can eliminate the

need to establish vulnerable, relatively immobile

support facilities ashore. This reduces footprints

ashore and translates into greater freedom of maneuver and operational flexibility and a lessened

vulnerability for the ACE. Seabasing of Marine

aviation also eliminates the political problems associated with obtaining host nation permission to

use airfields and facilities. However, the operational situation may be such that the limited space

and facilities aboard ship are overtaxed or the distance from the ship to the operating area is great.

In those cases, aviation forces may require a FOB

and retain as much of the aviation logistic support

as possible at sea.

b. Forward Operating Bases

When it is necessary to meet operational demands, the ACE can operate from shore-based,

FOBs. A FOB is any airfield used to support tactical operations without establishing full, support

facilities ashore. FOBs include main air bases, air

facilities, air sites, and air points. FOBs increase

responsiveness by decreasing the distances between the aviation base and the supported unit.

Whenever possible, shore-based ACE operations

exploit existing facilities in the area of operations.

Host government airfields are used when available and tactically acceptable. Abandoned or captured airfields are also used to reduce construction

and infrastructure requirements. If existing airfields are not adequate or suitable, roads and highways may be used to provide austere runways.

Finally, if facilities are inadequate or nonexistent,

Navy and Marine units can be utilized to build an

EAF. The MALS/MWSS uses task-organized

support packages (see para. 6002c) to provide aviation logistics and aviation ground support for

FOBs. ATC support is provided by task-organized MATCD or mobile teams resident within

the MACG or MACS (see chap. 4).

(1) Expeditionary Airfields. EAFs are portable airfields that can be constructed, used, dismantled, and moved to another site for reuse.

They are constructed on-site by the MWSS and

Navy mobile construction battalions. The EAF

can be used to support the full range of FOBs,

from small austere sites to large main bases. The

EAF system is unique and flexible. It permits Marine aviation to operate from captured or damaged

runways, parking lots, or roads and to establish

bases where none previously existed. This flexibility allows the ACE to adjust to an ever-changing operational situation. The development of

EAF technologies and the storage of these assets

on maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships

have reduced the U.S. deployment time to any

theater of operations in the world from 9 or 10

weeks to 2 or 3 weeks.

(2) Forward Arming and Refueling Points.

Since existing air bases or air facilities may not

exist in a dynamic, nonlinear battlespace, the

ACE commander can deploy a FARP to provide

the required aviation support. It is temporary and,

it is established for a specific mission. A FARP is

sometimes referred to as a laager point.

A FARP permits combat aircraft to rapidly and simultaneously refuel and rearm from a forward location. It provides the fuel and ammunition

necessary for employment of aviation maneuver

units in combat. To reduce response time and

maximize aviation's capabilities, the FARP is positioned as close to the objective area as the tactical situation allows.

(3) Austere Forward Operating Sites. In

some situations, particularly when operating in

underdeveloped areas of the world, Marine aviation forces may be forced to use extremely austere

sites as bases for aviation operations. Such sites

possess a minimal ground support capability.

They may be nothing more than a jungle clearing

that is large and firm enough to support helicopter

or V/STOL operations, or they may be a stretch of
Aviation Operations 6-3

highway that is sufficient to accommodate fixedwing aircraft.

c. The Marine Aviation Logistics

Support Program

Navy-funded aircraft logistic support is provided

under MALSP and administered and maintained

by the MALS. MALSP, together with TAVB and

assets prepositioned aboard MPF ships, provides

the supporting MALS the ability to support either

fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft of the ACE.

While the MEU ACE is embarked aboard an aircapable ship (e.g., LHA, LHD), aviation logistics

is the responsibility of the aircraft intermediate

maintenance department (AIMD) and the ship's

supply department rather than the MALS. While

Marine Corps aircraft squadrons operate from a

carrier, they receive aviation logistic support from

the AIMD and the carrier's supply department.

Maintenance and supply personnel from both the

MALS and Marine Corps aircraft squadrons augment the ship's AIMD and supply department.

MALSP provides flexible and effective aviation

logistic support to the deployed MAGTF ACE. It

enables ACE logisticians to rapidly and efficiently identify, marshal, and deploy aviation logistic

elements needed to support a task-organized mix

of ACE aircraft.

By structuring aviation logistic support into force

modules, MALSP provides credible and replenishable sustainment packages while reducing lift

requirements and force closure times. Required

aviation logistic elements (personnel, spares, support equipment, and mobile facilities) are formed

into specific support packages that are retained

within every MALS. Specific support packages

consist of fly-in support packages (FISPs), contingency support packages (CSPs), and follow-on

support packages (FOSPs). They are sized and

tailored to meet the aviation logistic requirements

of each type, model, and series aircraft. These

packages are used in a "building block" fashion to

maintain aircraft availability during every phase

of an operation.

FISPs are considered enabling packages. They

provide the organizational-level spare parts (remove and replace) that allow Marine aircraft to

begin flight operations immediately upon arrival

in theater. FJSPs are airlifted to the operating site

as part of the fly-in echelon (FIE). When combined with aviation support equipment and class

V(A) ammunition transported aboard MPF ships

or flight ferry aircraft, FISPs provide the critical

aviation support required for 30 days of combat

flying. If flight operations are too extensive in

scope or duration (i.e., longer than 30 days), the

next building blocks, CSPs, are transported into

theater. CSPs augment FISPs by adding the common and peculiar aviation logistics needed for

sustained aviation maintenance, supply, and ordnance operations. CSPs integrate the support

equipment, mobile facilities, spares, and personnel to sustain deployed aircraft for up to 90 days.

FOSPs are the final MALSP building block. A

FOSP provides the support that the FISP and CSP

do not provide. It provides ACE aircraft with the

same support that is would receive in garrison and

includes first degree engine repair.

Training squadron allowances are built to support

a 30-day endurance period at peacetime flying

hours. It consists of separate, aviation logistics

support items added to the allowances of a garrison MAO. Training squadron allowance items are

separate, from contingency support packages so

that during times of extended expeditionary operations, CONUS-based training squadrons will retain the necessary aviation logistic elements that

will enable them to continue training operations.

d. Aviation Logistics Support Ship

The TAVB's primary mission is to provide dedicated sealift for movement of I-level aviation logistic support for use in the rapid deployment of a

MAGTF ACE. It is designed to transport critical

I-level maintenance and supply assets to a forward operating area as part of a MEF-sized

MAGTF contingency. The TAVB's primary concept of operations is to support MPF operations,

but it can also be tasked to support an amphibious

operation. Traditionally, an amphibious operation exerts a forcible entry into an objective area,
6-4 MCWP 3-2

however a TAVB requires an unopposed entry into an objective area (similar to an entry required

for a MPF) before offloading the MALS and its

composited contingency support packages ashore.

If the embarked MALS is phased ashore, the

TAVB can be used to perform a secondary mission of serving as a strategic sealift asset that is

controlled by the commander in chief.

To enhance MALS responsiveness, one ship

(USS Wright, TAVB 3) is berthed on the east

coast (Baltimore, MD) and another ship (USS

Curtiss, TAVB 4) is berthed on the west coast

(Port Hueneme, CA). On notification of movement, the TAVB is expected to arrive in the objective area within 30 days to marry with

supported aircraft squadrons, personnel, and aviation logistic assets already in theater. Both ships

can be configured to provide I-level support operations while underway, in stream, or pierside. In

consonance with the operational concept and if

conditions permit, The MALS can be transferred

ashore upon arrival.

e. Maritime Prepositioning Force

Aircraft that are part of an ACE can be supported

in combination by one, or more, of the three MPS

squadrons. Each MPF squadron contains the following operational and logistic support assets:

class V(A) munitions, 0-level and limited I-level

aircraft support equipment, EAF matting and airfield lighting, and ground common CSS assets for

utilization by the supporting MWSS. These assets

are required to support the notional MPF ACE

aircraft mix as defined by MCBuI 3501, Maritime

Prepositioning Force (MPF) Marine Air-Ground

Task Force (MAGTF) Force List. See MCWP

3.32, MPF Operations, for more information.

6003. Tactical Aviation Logistics

andAviation Ground Support

Logistic support for the ACE may be categorized

as either aviation logistics, aviation ground support (e.g., EAF, aircraft rescue and fire fighting),

or combat service support. Aviation ground support and combat service support are primarily

funded by the Marine Corps. Aviation logistics

(aviation-peculiar) is primarily funded by the Navy. The following subparagraphs provide an overview of the unique tactical aspects of aviation

logistic support of the ACE. See MCWP 3-21.1,

Aviation Ground Support, and MCWP 3-2 1.2,

Aviation Logistics, for an in-depth discussion of

aviation ground support,

a. Aviation-Peculiar Logistic Support

Each MALS is organized to provide a core group

of supervisory and support personnel that, when

augmented by aircraft-specific maintenance personnel from aircraft squadrons, provide an intermediate maintenance capability for either fixedwing or rotary-wing aircraft. Aircraft squadrons

are responsible for organizational-level maintenance. The following comprise the core capabilities ofa MALS:

• Provide intermediate-level (I-level) maintenance for aircraft and aeronautical equipment

of all supported units, when authorized, perform first degree repair on specific engines.

• Provide aviation supply support for aircraft and

Navy-funded equipment to all supported units.

• Provide class V(A) ammunition logistic support to ACE squadrons. This support encompasses the requisitioning, storage, handling,

assembly, transportation, inventory reporting of

class V(A) ammunition, and planning for and

operating an ammunition issue point at expeditionary sites.

• Interpret, implement, audit, inspect, and provide oversight for the MAO commanding officer for all policies and procedures relating to the

administration and management of operations

and maintenance, Navy (less TAD) funds, aviation supply, aircraft maintenance, cryogenics,

aircraft ordnance, avionics, and data processing

for all units within the MAG and the ACE.

• Coordinate with the MWSG, MWSS, MACO,

and other supporting Navy and Marine Corps

activities in planning for the support required to

execute aviation logistics.

• Screen and inspect nonservicable aeronautical

equipment and material for testing and repair,

shipment to another repair facility, or disposal.
Aviation Operations

• Maintain the capability to deploy and to provide MALSP packages as integral units or as

tailored aviation logistic elements assigned to

another MALS to support aircraft assigned to a

host MAG, MALS, or ACE.:

• Conduct individual and unit training to qualify

organic and supported squadron personnel for

performance of assigned missions and tasks.

• Provide data processing support to facilitate execution of aviation supply, maintenance, and

Navy-funded financial functions of the MAG

and ACE.

b. Aviation Ground Support.

The MWSS provides aviation ground support and

CSS functions for airfield operations. Specific

services include EAF, explosive ordnance disposal, weather services, military police support, engineering support, materials handling equipment,

motor transportation, intra-airfield communication, aircraft rescue and fire fighting, utilities support and maintenance, field messing, medical

support, and aircraft and ground vehicle refueling.

The MWSS routinely performs the camp commandant functions and provides the nucleus for

rear area security and air base defense. MWSSs

are designed to support either fixed-wing or rotary-wing operations; however, a single MWSS can

be task-organized to simultaneously support

fixed-wing and rotary-wing operations.

c. Combat Service Support

Detachment

A CSSD from the CSSE provides additional combat service support to the ACE. CSSD capabilities

include—

• Transporting fuel, ordnance, and other supplies

required by the ACE from the point of entry in

the MAGTF area of operations to the EAF site

for distribution by a MWSS and/or MALS.

• Performing third echelon maintenance on engineer, motor transport, and communications

equipment that is supported by the Marine

Corps and operated by the ACE.

• Providing postal, disbursing, exchange, legal,

civil affairs, and graves registration services.

• Providing supply, general engineering, health

services, and other support that cannot be satisfied by a MWSS.

CSSDs will be formed from the CSSE to provide

the required support based on specific support requirements that are determined, requested, and

coordinated by the ACE G-4/S-4.

(reverse blank)

—Cohn L. Powell

The Marine Corps' most significant contribution

to a Navy, joint, or multinational operation is the

MAGTF. Marine aviation is normally committed

as the MAGTF's ACE, but individual units may

also be assigned to support other operations.

These units may function as an integral part of a

Navy carrier force, or they may provide specific

functions (e.g., EW) in general support of a JTF in

joint or combined operations.

7001. Navy Fleet Operational

Support

The primary mission of Marine aviation is to particip ate as the air component of the MAGTF in

the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases

and to conduct land operations that are essential

for the prosecution of a naval campaign. A collateral mission for Marine aviation is to participate

as an integral component of naval aviation in the

execution of other Navy functions as fleet commanders direct. In this role, they normally become part of the Navy component of ajoint force.

In either case, Marine aviation assets are part of

an integral force and are not normally separated

from that force.

7002. Joint Operations

Joint operations are military actions conducted by

joint forces or Service forces in relationships

(e.g., support, coordinating authority) that of

themselves do not create joint forces. Joint operations are conducted in support of the JFC's campaign and the commander in chief's theater

campaign plan.

The MAGTF has a unique, self-contained air

ground capability. However, Marines must be

prepared to become a self-sustaining, contributing

part of joint operations ashore under the command of a JFC. A JFC synchronizes the actions of

air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces

to achieve strategic and operational objectives

through integrated, joint campaigns and major operations. Their goal is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily to

involve all forces or to involve all forces equally,

The job of planning and tasking Marine aviation

to support the MAGTF commander becomes

more complex when operating in a joint environment. MAGTF planners and operators must understand the MAGTF planning and operating

Chapter 7

Marine Aviation in Navy, Joint,

and Multinational Operations

"When a team takes to the field, individual specialists come together to

achieve a team win.

But they all must also believe that they are part of a team, a joint team, that

fights together to win.

This is our histoiy, this is our tradition, this is our future. "8
7-2 MCWP3-2

environment, the joint planning and operating environment, and how the two interface (see chap. 4

for more information).

The JFC organizes forces to best accomplish the

assigned mission: along Service lines conducting

operations through Service component commanders, along functional lines (air, ground, etc.) cOnducting operations through functional component

commanders, or a combination of the two approaches and assigning functional commands to

the Service component that is best prepared to

control each function. Examples of functional

component commanders include the joint force

air component commander (JFACC), joint force

land component commander (JFLCC), and joint

force maritime component commander (JFMCC).

The JFC can also use other functional commanders, such as the AADC, joint special operations

forces commander, and joint force information

warfare commander.

Normally collocated with the JFC, the JFACC

functions as a coordinator of the JTF's aviation resources to deliver direct support to certain components while exploiting the flexibility of air

operations to achieve campaign objectives. The

JFACC recommends apportionment of the joint air

effort to the JFC for approval or revision and translates the JFC's apportionment decision into sortie

allocation. The JFACC determines allocation by

mission, but individual components assign missions to specific units. The JFACC is also responsible for tasking available component air sorties for

support of the joint campaign, normally through

the ATO. Tasking is done at the JFACC level for

joint targets and missions and at the MAGTF level

for Marine Corps targets and missions. There is a

single ATO for all joint air operations.

The MAGTF's expeditionary nature, coupled

with Marine aviation and its associated command

and control capabilities, allows the Marine component commander to function as the JFACC in

small-scale operations. The Marine component

commander may also initially serve as the JFACC

at the early stages of a larger conflict. As forces

continue to build up in theater, the JFC normally

designates the commander with the preponderance of aviation assets and the ability to command

and control all aviation assets as the JFACC.

In joint operations, the JFC normally tasks the

MAGTF commander to provide certain types of

sorties for tasking through the JFACC. But the

MAGTF commander retains OPCON of all

MAGTF ACE assets. This tasking normally includes sorties for air defense (DCA), long range

air interdiction and air reconnaissance, and EW.

It is important to understand that the MAGTF

commander will retain operational control of organic air assets (TACAIR) during joint operations. This entire policy is outlined in chapter 4,

page 5, and described in more detail in JP 0-2,

UNAAF. This policy will allow the MAGTF

commander to meet the needs of the JFC while

maintaining the tactical and operational integrity

of the MAGTF component. Key to this arrangement is the premise outlined in JP 3-0, Doctrine

for Joint Operations, which states: "The JFC (and

CINCs) should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they are

designed." Further, JP 3-56.1 states that one of the

most important aspects of this guidance is the requirement for an air capable component to "provide the JFACC a description of their direct

support plan (DSP) to allow for coordination and

deconfliction of targeting efforts between each

component and the JFC staff and agencies."

The DSP is crucial in clarifying to the JFC at the

outset of the joint campaign what the Commander

Marine Corps Forces (COMMARFOR) requires to

sustain Marine Corps operations in support of the

joint campaign plan. It should comprise the following key elements as stated by the COMMARFOR:

• His intent to retain OPCON of his aviation capability/forces;

• That all Marine sorties should be made available to the JFC for tasking by the JFACC in

support of the JFC's overall objectives and

campaign plan prior to assignment of ground

combat responsibilities since the MARFOR requires no direct support sorties or shaping operations during this period. This includes long

range air interdiction and air reconnaissance,
Aviation Operations 7-3

electronic warfare and air defense (defensive

counter air) sorties when required by the JFC;

• His intent to use organic aviation assets in direct support of his forces in order to accomplish

his JFC-assigned mission in the designated

MARFOR area of operations (AO). Critical

DSP sub elements to this are:

His intent to consolidate, deconflict, prioritize and nominate targets to the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) to be

included on the joint integrated prioritized

targeting list (JIPTL). • Provide a MAGTF generated direct support

ATO to merge with the JTF joint ATO via

CTAPS/TBMCS. • Allocate sorties in excess of COMMARFOR's direct support requirements to the JFC

for tasking by the JFACC for use in execution of joint operations.

• Recommend to the JFACC, if designated as

the ACA/AADC, airspace control measures

(ACM) that enhance integrated command

and control in COMMARFOR's AO/areas of

responsibility. This includes establishing the

MACCS within the MARFOR's AO to provide airspace control functions in the MARFOR's airspace control sectors as designated

by the ACA. These details must be incorporated in the air control plan (ACP) and coordinated with the ACA to ensure consistency

with JTF airspace control guidance, directives and procedures. COMMARFOR will

forward all ACM requests to the ACA via

the MARFOR liaison team at the JFACC.

Normally, any sorties in excess of MAGTF direct

support requirements are also made available to

the JFC. The JFACC uses MAGTF sorties to support the JFC's campaign objectives, often through

support to other components of the joint force. In

turn, the MAGTF commander can also request

aviation support from the JFC when organic Marine aviation assets do not meet the MAGTF's

aviation requirements. See MCWP 3-25.4 and JP

3-56.1 for a discussion of the contingency theater

automated planning system, which governs the

development of the ATO.

Note: Sorties provided for long-range interdiction, air defense, and long-range reconnaissance

are not "excess" sorties. These sorties provide a

distinct contribution to the overalijoint force effort and will be covered in the ATO. The JFC

must exercise integrated control of air defense,

long-range reconnaissance, and interdiction aspects of the joint operation or theater campaign.

7003. Multinational Operations

U.S. military operations are often conducted in

cooperation with the armed forces of other nations in pursuit of common objectives. Multinational operations, both those that include combat

and those thatdo not, are conducted within the

structure of either an alliance or a coalition. An alliance is created by formal agreements among two

or more nations in pursuit of broad, long-term objectives. Some alliances (e.g., NATO) have detailed interoperability arrangements, protocols,

and procedures. A coalition is an temporary arrangement among two or more nations for a specific purpose. There is no universal doctrine for

coalition warfare; protocols and operating agreements are designed to suit the circumstances.

Technically, only alliance operations are combined operations, but in common usage the word

"combined" is often used to describe any multinational operation.

Joint operations that are part of an alliance or coalition require close cooperation among all forces.

Well-managed combined operations can serve to

mutually reinforce strengths, reduce vulnerabilities, and provide legitimacy. Effectively planned

and executed multinational operations should, in

addition to achieving common objectives, facilitate

unity of effort without diminishing U.S. freedom of

action. Multinational operations should also preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support.

Each multinational operation is unique. Planning

and the conduct of operations vary with the international situation and the perspectives, motives,

and values of the operations's members. Whereas

alliance members typically have similar political
and economic systems and common long-term

goals, coalitions often bring together very diverse

elements and cultures for a limited period of time.

Typically, if coalition members perceive their

membership and participation to be advancing

their individual interests, the coalition remains intact. If their objectives or priorities diverge, the

coalition may break down. Therefore, military

leaders of member nations must emphasize common objectives as well as mutual support. Following, contributing, and supporting are important

roles in multinational operations, therefore, the

MAGTF is prepared to operate within the framework of an alliance or coalition that is led by a nation other than the United States.

The inherent flexibility of the Marine Corps'

combined-arms doctrine, maneuver warfare philosophy, expeditionary nature, and versatile command and control system create a MAGTF that is

well-prepared for the complexities of coalition

warfare. Of great concern to the MAGTF, and to

the ACE in particular, will be the problems of

force protection, command and control of vastly

dissimilar units, and the avoidance of fratricide.

7-4 MCWP 3-2
Chapter 8

Emerging Concepts

"In brief the whole future of warfare appears to me to lie in the employment of mobile armies, relatively small but of high quality, and rendered

distinctly more effective by the addition of aircraft.

—Gen. Hans von Seeckt

Operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) is

both the operational foundation and the capstone

of the Marine Corps' concept of operations for the

future. From this foundation flows supporting

concepts such as ship-to-objective maneuver, sustained operations ashore, MPF 2010 and beyond,

and the Marine aviation concept paper, MAGTF

Aviation and Operational Maneuver From the

Sea. These concepts define the Marine Corps',

and therefore Marine aviation's, future role in

terms of capabilities, operational employment,

and joint relationships. These concepts also reflect the Marine Corps' understanding of and

commitment to maneuver warfare.

All of these concepts rely heavily on seabasing.

The Marine Corps and the Navy currently conduct OMFTS and seabasing operations, but not to

the degree outlined in recent concept papers. Although Marine aviation has a long tradition of

ship-based operations, future, large-scale seabased Marine aviation operations will be far more

complex and demanding. If the Marine Corps and

Navy are to conduct OMFTS as it is now envisioned, they will require substantial advances in

aircraft, ships, command and control systems, and

logistic capabilities, as well as organizational and

doctrinal refinements to meet the proposed capabilities. This chapter explores the key new concepts and their implications for Marine aviation.

8001. Operational Maneuver

From the Sea

The Marine Corps' capstone operational concept

of OMFTS was published in January 1996. It was

built on the foundation provided in . . From the

Sea" and "Forward - - . From the Sea. This concept encompasses more than how Marines will

conduct power projection operations in the 21st

century, it is a naval concept developed by the

Marine Corps and designed to be executed in concert with the Navy. OMFTS places unprecedented

emphasis on operations in the world's littorals,

demands greater integration of naval operations in

maneuver warfare, and capitalizes on a naval

forces' ability to use the sea as a maneuver space.

It is, in fact, a marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare. The philosophy of maneuver warfare provides an understanding of the

dynamic nature of military conflict and the requirement for skillful operations at a high tempo.

The underlying ideas of naval warfare reflect the

advantages inherent in seaborne movement and

seabased logistics. OMFTS requires enhanced

battlespace mobility, intelligence, command and

control, fire support, and sustainment. It enables

forward-deployed forces to provide the appropriate response to events throughout the range of

military operations.

A key element in OMFTS is the seabasing of

command and control, logistics, and most fire

support functions. The seabasing of command and

control greatly reduces the force's vulnerability

and footprint ashore. By reducing logistic requirements ashore and relying heavily on naval surface

fires and aviation fires, ground forces are permitted greater mobility. Seabased fire support enhances and complements the effectiveness of

ground-based fire support. Seabased forces enable

commanders to providing CSS assets to fighting

units without being distracted by the rear area security concerns inherent in shore-based logistic
8-2 MCWP 3-2

operations. Seabasing thus allows the ATF to put

the "teeth" ashore while leaving the support "tail"

afloat, significantly enhancing the flexibility and

tempo of land maneuver operations.

Marine aviation plays a vital part in OMFTS.

From staging areas over the horizon, aviation will

provide responsive and sustained fires and logistic support directly into objective areas ashore.

The concept of seabased aviation is not a new

one. Marines have used helicopters to resupply

ground forces since fielding the helicopter in the

early 1950's. ACE aircraft have always been

based on and supported by the ships of the amphibious ready group. In OMFTS, however, ACE

aircraft will depart from over the horizon, with the

assault support forces embarked, and proceed to

objective area landing zones deep inland. The

main differences are the sizes of the assault forces

to be lifted, the distances to be transited, and the

magnitude of the operations to be executed. The

MV-22 tilt-rotor will provide the speed, endurance, combat radius, payload, and survivability

needed to permit true maneuver warfare from the

sea on a scale that supports the OMFTS concept.

8002. Ship-to-Objective

Maneuver

OMFTS requires new tactical concepts for amphibious operations. Historically, amphibious operations have been constrained by the requirement

to establish a lodgment ashore and by reliance on

Navy command and control during the assault.

Although amphibious-based vertical assault has

been a MAGTF maneuver technique for more

than 30 years, amphibious operations have not exploited the full potential of maneuver warfare.

STOM takes advantage of emerging mobility and

command and control systems to maneuver landing forces in their tactical array from the moment

they depart their ships in order to project a combined-arms force by air and surface means directly against inland objectives. True STOM is not.

aimed at seizing a beach. Its goal is to thrust corn-..

bat units ashore at their decisive place, in their

fighting formations, and in sufficient strength to

ensure mission accomplishment. Landing forces

will engage enemy units only as necessary to

achieve the freedom of action required to accomplish operational objectives. STOM replaces the

preponderous ship-to-shore movement of current

amphibious warfare with true amphibious maneuver.

Although STOM's focus is on the operational objectives ashore, the sea becomes an essential maneuver space for the landing force to generate the

tempo-it needs to exploit enemy weaknesses.

STOM provides the opportunity to achieve tacticalas well as operational surprise, which has been

hard to obtain in past amphibious operations. operations will progress with a speed and flexibility

of maneuver that will deny the enemy warning

and reaction time. Vulnerabilities will be exploited before they are corrected, opportunities seized

before they vanish, and traps sprung before they

are discovered. Tactical flexibility that is combined with reliable intelligence will allow the

landing force to bypass, render irrelevant, or unhinge and collapse the enemy's defensive measures. Opposing forces will not be able to react effectively or in time.

STOM operations will rely on highly capable

multi-role aircraft with assault support assets that

are capable of much longer ranges and greater

combat payloads. These operations will also require a substantially improved aviation command

and control system. Control of aircraft and missiles in this environment will require greatly enhanced information integration, coordination, and

execution.

Command, control, communications, computers,

and intelligence will become even more critical as

traditional lines of coordination become less distinct and/or overlap in the widely dispersed, dynamic, and fluid operations of tomorrow. In a

nonlinear battlespace, advanced command and

control and information systems and the shared

situational awareness that they create among

Marine leaders will have an increasingly profound impact on all operations. Accurate, realtime information will enhance weapon accuracy,

aircraft survivability, friendly maneuver, and all
Aviation Operations a a

aspects of force protection. It will also reduce the

possibility of fratricide.

The Common Aviation Command and Control

System (CAC2S) will integrate the functions of

aviation command and control into an interoperable naval system that supports OMFTS. In conjunction with organic sensors and weapons

systems, CAC2S will bring Marine aviation command and control fully on line with other joint

command and control systems and support

MACCS missions with a suite of scalable modules. CAC2S components are specifically designed to be operated in an expeditionary mode,

thereby providing the equipment to support any

operational contingency.

8003. Sustained Operations

Ashore

Although the MAGTF will continue to possess

the capability to conduct initial forcible entry

through OMFTS, the MAGTF's full potential lies

in its capability to function as an operational maneuver element for the JFC in sustained operations ashore. The employment, organization, and

basing of the MAGTF will be responsive to the

requirements of the JFC and to specific circumstances within the area of operations. The

MAGTF of the future will provide the JFC with

an agile, versatile, and responsive force that is

able to strike directly at operational centers of

gravity or critical vulnerabilities, Therefore, the

MAGTF will be one of the JFC's principal tools

for conducting decisive maneuver. In sustained

operations ashore, the MAGTF will be primarily

seabased, but some elements of the MAGTF will

go ashore to create or exploit an operational advantage, achieve greater integration with Army or

Air Force components, or provide increased depth

in aviation support or sustainment.

Future basing options during sustained operations

ashore must support both fixed-wing and rotarywing tactical aircraft with a mobile, self-deploying capability. This will significantly reduce deck

cycles and transit time from amphibious shipping

to an inland objective area. Reduction of refueling

and rearming times is as critical as minimizing

flight time from bases to the objective area. The

time that ground personnel can save refueling and

rearming will equate to greater responsiveness

and increased aircraft time on station, which supports the MAGTF over the entire objective area.

To support OMFTS, the MAGTF must continue

to use FOBs to increase its depth of support and

sustainment of aviation forces ashore. The purpose of the FOB is to decrease response time and

to minimize turnaround time in support of sustained operations ashore. EAF operations are key

to the Marine Corps' ability to establish FOBs in

austere locations ashore. FARP operations can

further extend the reach and responsiveness of

aviation forces and can be run from an expeditionary FOB. The introduction of short takeoff

and vertical landing aircraft, with their ability to

operate from shorter runways, will reduce the

need for conventional runways and their associated arresting equipment. These aircraft must be designed to operate from any combination of

expeditionary fields, existing runways, hard surface roads, or sea based.

8004. MPF 2010 and Beyond

OMFTS requires a more robust ability to conduct

in-stream offloading and to accommodate various

levels of combat loading than currently exist. Existing techro1ogies must be exploited and new

technologies pursued that will permit the next

generation MPF to contribute to operational employment of MAGTFs across the full range of operations, including the rapid reinforcement of

forward-deployed amphibious forces. MPF 2010

and Beyond is the concept under which the next

generation MPFs will contribute to forward presence and power projection. These capabilities will

remain central to U.S. deterrence and conflict res-.

olution strategies. MPF 2010 and Beyond will

provide indefinite sustainment by serving as a

seabased conduit for logistic support. This support will flow from bases located in the United

States or overseas via the seabase provided by

MPF 2010 and Beyond then on to Marine units

conducting operations at sea or ashore. This may
be accomplished as part of a larger, seabased logistic effort that includes not only MPSs, but also

TAVBs, hospital ships, and offshore petroleum

distribution systems.

Future MPSs will not have a true forcible entry

capability, but they will be able to reinforce the

striking power of an ATF. Future MPFs will participate in OMFTS by using selective offloading

capabilities to reinforce the assault echelon of an

ATF. MPSs will be multipurpose and will provide

facilities for the tactical employment of assault

support aircraft, surface assault craft, advanced

assault amphibious vehicle, and the ships' own

organic lighterage. The ships' communications

systems will be fully compatible with the tactical

command and control architecture of the ATF.

This will allow access to the advanced capabilities and shared situational awareness of future

command and control systems.

8-4 MCWP 3-2
Appendix A

Marine Aviation Organization

MAG-14 I Cherry Point,l NC ]

Headquarters

2d MAW

Cherry Point, NC

_______

I I I I MAG-26 MAG-29 MAG-31 MACG-28 MWSG-27 1

New River, New River, Beaufort, Cherry Point, Cherry Point,

NC NC SC NC NC

Figure A-2. 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.

Aviation Support

Element

kaneohe Bay, HI

Figure A-i. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
A-2 MCWP 3-2

Headquarters

4th MAW

New Orleans, LA

MAG-49

Willow Grove,

PA

MACG-48

FtSherldan, IL

and

Great Lakes, Ml

Figure A-4. 4th Marine Aircraft Wing.

Figure A-3. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing.

MAG-46

Miramar,

CA

MAG-42

Marietta,

GA

I MAG.41

Fort Worth, LTX

MWSG.47

Selfiidge ANGB,

Clemens, Ml
Appendix B

Glossary

Section I. Acronyms and Abbreviations

AADC area air defense commander

AAW antiair warfare

ACA airspace control authority

ACE aviation combat element

ACP airspace control plan

ADCON administrative control

AIMD aircraft intermediate

maintenance department

ALD aviation logistics division

AOC airfield operations center

ARG amphibious ready group

ASC(A) assault support

coordinator (airborne)

ASE air support element

ATARS advanced tactical airborne

reconnaissance system

ATC air traffic control

ATF amphibious task force

ATO air tasking order

BDA battle damage assessment

CAC2S Common Aviation Command and

Control System

CAS close air support

CE command element

COA course of action

COC combat operations center

CONUS continental United States

CSAR combat search and rescue

CSP contingency support package

CSS combat service support

CSSE combat service support element

CTAPS Contingency Theater Automated

Planning System

CVBG carrier battle group

DAS deep air support

DASC direct air support center

DCA defensive counterair

EA electronic attack

EAF expeditionary airfield

EP electronic protection

ES electronic warfare support

EW electronic warfare

EW/C early warning/control

FAC forward air controller

FAC(A) forward air controller (airborne)

FARP forward arming and refueling point

FFCC force fires coordination center

FIE fly-in echelon

FISP fly-in support package

FMF Fleet Marine Force

FOB forward operating base

FOSP follow-on support package

FRAGO fragmentary order

FREST Fleet replacement

enlisted student training

FSCC fire support coordination center

FSSG force service support group

GCE ground combat element

HMH Marine heavy helicopter squadron

HMLA Marine light/attack

helicopter squadron

HMM Marine medium helicopter squadron

HST helicopter support team

JAOC joint air operations center

JCSAR joint combat search and rescue

JFACC joint force air

component commander

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land

component commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component

commander
B-2 MCWP3-2

JP . joint publication

JSTARS joint surveillance, target attack

radar system

JTF joint task force

LAAD low-altitude air defense

LAN local area network

LHA general purpose amphibious

assault ship

LHD multipurpose amphibious

assault ship (with internal dock)

MACCS Marine air command

and control system

MACG Marine air control group

MACS Marine air control squadron

MAG Marine aircraft group

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force

MAG VP/VA fixed-wing MAG

MAG VH rotary-wing MAG

MALS Marine aviation logistics squadron

MALSP Marine Aviation Logistic

Support Program

MASS Marine air support squadron

MATCD Marine air traffic control detachment

MAW Marine aircraft wing

MCDP Marine Corps doctrinal publication

MCPP Marine Corps Planning Process

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication

MEF Marine expeditionary force

METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and

weather, troops and support

available—time available

MEU Marine expeditionary unit

MEU(SOC) Marine expeditionary unit

(special operations capable)

MOOTW military operations other than war

MPF maritime prepositioning force

MPS maritime prepositioning ships

MTACS Marine tactical air

command squadron

MWCS Marine wing

communications squadron

MWHS Marine wing

headquarters squadron

MWSG Marine wing support group

MWSS Marine wing support squadron

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDP naval doctrine publication

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation

NGF naval gunfire

OAAW offensive antiair warfare

OAS offensive air support

OCA offensive counterair

OMFTS operational maneuver from the sea

OPCON operational control

OPLAN operation plan

PDE&A planning, decision, execution,

and assessment

SAAWC sector antiair warfare coordinator

SAM surface-to-air missile

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses

SPMAGTF special purpose MAGTF

STOM ship-to-objective maneuver

TAC(A) tactical air coordinator (airborne)

TACC tactical air command center

TACON tactical control

TACP tactical air control party

TAOC tactical air operations center

TAVB aviation logistics support ship

TBMCS Theater Battle

Management Core System

TOC tactical operations center

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces

VMA Marine attack squadron

VMAQ Marine tactical electronic

warfare squadron

VMAT Marine attack training squadron

VMFA Marine fighter/attack squadron

VMFA(AW) Marine fighter/attack

(all weather) squadron

VMPAT Marine figher/ attack

training squadron

VMGR Marine aerial refueler

transport squadron

VMGRT Marine aerial refueler transport

training squadron

VMM Marine medium tilt-rotor squadron

VMMT Marine medium tilt-rotor

training squadron
Aviation Operations B-3

VMO-6 . Marine Observation Squadron

(Fixed-Wing)-6

VMU Marine unmanned aerial

vehicle squadron

V/STOL vertical/short takeoff and landing

WAN wide area network

Section II. Definitions

aviation combat element—The core element of

a Marine air-ground task force that is task-organized to conduct aviation operations. The aviation

combat element provides all or a portion of the six

functions of Marine aviation necessary to accomplish the Marine air-ground task force's mission.

These functions are antiair warfare, offensive air

support, assault support, electronic warfare, air reconnaissance, and control of aircraft and missiles.

The aviation combat element is usually composed

of an aviation unit headquarters and various other

aviation units or their detachments. It can vary in

size from a small aviation detachment of specifically required aircraft to one or more Marine aircraft wings. The aviation combat element may

contain other Service or foreign military forces

assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task

force. The aviation combat element itself is not a

formal command. Also called ACE. (approved

for next edition of MCRP 5-12C)

air board—In Navy/Marine Corps operations, all

squadron flight schedules are consolidated with

the needs of the MAGTF/ship/ARG/CVBG at an

air board. The air board meets every day in the

SACC. It works on current and future plans for air

support. The results are published as the ship!

ARG/CVBG air plan. The air board also provides

the input for the joint ATO. (proposed definition

for MCRP 5-12C)

air superiority—That degree of dominance in

the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and

its related land, sea and air forces at a given time

and place without prohibitive interference by the

opposing force. (JP 1-02)

air tasking cycle—The cyclical planning process

that Marine aviation planners use to plan air operations in support of the MAGTF mission and to

produce the MAGTF ATO or air plan. The six

phases of the MAGTF air tasking cycle are command aviation guidance, target/air support mission development, allocation and allotment,

tasking, force execution, and combat assessment.

(The parallel six-phase joint air tasking cycle is

described in JP 3-56.1.) (proposed definition for

MCRP 5-12C)

allocation (air)—The translation of the air apportionment decision into total numbers of sorties by

aircraft type available for each operation or task.

(JP 1-02)

allotment—The temporary change of assignment

of tactical air forces between subordinate commands. The authority to allot is vested in the commander having combatant command (command

authority).

apportionment—In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among

competing requirements. Specific apportionments

(e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces

for planning, etc. (JP 1-02) See also allocation

(air); apportionment (air). (JP 1-02)

apportionment (air)—The determination and assignment of the total expected air effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted

to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time. (JP 1-02)
B-4 MCWP 3-2

base defense zone—An air defense zone established around an air base and limited to the engagement envelope of short-range air defense

weapons systems defending that base. Base defense zones have specific entry, exit, and identification, friend or foe procedures established. (JP

1-02)

battlespace—All aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum

which encompass the area of influence and area

of interest. (MCRP 5-12C)

battlespace dominance—The degree of control

over the dimensions of the battlespace which ensures friendly freedom of action and denies ene- my freedom of action. It permits force

sustainment and application of power projection

to accomplish the full range of potential operational and tactical missions. It includes all actions

conducted against enemy capabilities to influence

future operations. (MCRP 5-12C)

carrier battle group—A standing naval task

group consisting of a battle group command and

control element organized and trained to command naval, joint and combined operations. It

consists of an aircraft carrier with embarked air

wing, surface combatants, submarines, and other

assigned forces with organic combat logistics, operating as a cohesive, task-organized unit to

achieve battlespace dominance over designated

areas both ashore and afloat and to project power

ashore. Also called a CVBG. (Navy proposal for

revision of JP 1-02)

centers of gravity—Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force

derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or

will to fight. (JP 1-02)

close operations—Military actions conducted to

project power decisively against enemy forces

which pose an immediate or near term threat to

the success of current battles or engagements.

These military actions are conducted by committed forces and their readily available tactical reserves, using maneuver and combined arms.

(MCRP 5-12C)

coalition force—A force composed of military

elements of nations that have formed a temporary

alliance for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02)

combined arms—The full integration of combat

arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another.

(MCRP 5-12C)

critical vulnerability—An aspect of a center of

gravity that if exploited will do the most significant damage to an adversary's ability to resist. A

vulnerability cannot be critical unless it undermines a key strength. (MCRP 5-12C)

deep operations—Military actions conducted

against enemy capabilities which pose a potential

threat to friendly forces. These military actions

are designed to isolate, shape, and dominate the

battlespace and influence future operations.

(MCRP 5-12C)

flight ferry—The self-deployment of aircraft

from one station to another. Although conduct of

the movement is administrative in character, its

purpose may be operational.

force sustainment—Capabilities, equipment, and

operations that ensure continuity, freedom of action, logistic support, and command and control.

(MCRP 5-12C)

joint force—A general term applied to a force

composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single commander authorized to

exercise operational control. (JP 1-02)

joint, force air component commander—The

joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has

the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to

ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of

the overall mission. The joint force commander

will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component

commander's responsibilities will be assigned by
Aviation Operations B-5

the joint force commander (normally these would

include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint

force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service

component commanders and other assigned or

supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint

force commander apportionment of air sorties to

various missions or geographic areas. Also called

JFACC. (JP 1-02)

main effort—The designated subordinate unit

whose mission at a given point in time is most

critical to overall mission success. It is usually

weighted with the preponderance of combat power and is directed against a center of gravity

through a critical vulnerability. (MCRP 5-12C)

maneuver warfare—A warfighting philosophy

that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through

a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot

cope. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine air-ground task force—The Marine

Corps principal organization, for all missions

across the range of military operations, composed

of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly to a contingency

anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the

Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four core elements: a command element, an aviation combat element, a

ground combat element, and a combat service

support element. The four core elements are categories of forces, not formal commands. The basic

structure of the Marine air-ground task force never varies, though the number, size, and type of

Marine Corps units comprising each of its four elements will always be mission dependent. The

flexibility of the organizational structure allows

for one or more subordinate MAGTFs, other Service and/or foreign military forces, to be assigned

or attached. Also called MAGTF. (approved for

next edition of MCRP 5-12C)

operational level of war—The level of war at

which campaigns and major operations are

planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish

strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and

strategy by establishing operational objectives

needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to

bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space

than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are

exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (JP 1-

02)

power projection—The application of measured,

precise offensive military force at a chosen time

and place, using maneuver and combined arms

against enemy forces. (MCRP 5-12C)

rear operations—Military actions conducted to

support and permit force sustainment and to provide security for such actions. (MCRP 5-12C)

rules of engagement—Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United

States forces will initiate and/or continue combat

engagement with other forces encountered. Also

called ROE. (JP 1-02)

sortie—In air operations, an operational flight by

one aircraft. (JP 1-02)

special purpose Marine air-ground task

force—A Marine air-ground task force organized,

trained and equipped with narrowly focused capabilities. It is designed to accomplish a specific

mission, often of limited scope and duration. It

may be any size, but normally it is a relatively

small force—the size of a Marine expeditionary

unit or smaller. It may contain other Service or

foreign military forces assigned or attached to the

Marine air-ground task force. Also called

SPMAGTF.
strategic level of war—The level of war at which

a nation, often as a member of a group of nations,

determines national or multinational (alliance or

coalition) security objectives and guidance, and

develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military

objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and

assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans

or theater war plans to achieve these objectives;

and provide military forces and other capabilities

in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02)

tactical level of war—The level of war at which

battles and engagements are planned and executed

to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of

combat elements in relation to each other and to

the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02)

B-6 MCWP 3-2
Appendix C

References and Related Publications

Joint Publications (JPs)

0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

2-0 Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations

2-01.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to

Targeting (under development)

3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

3-04.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Shipboard Helicopter Operations

3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

3-09 Doctrine for Joint Fire Support

3-09.3 JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)

3-50.2 Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue

3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone

3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

Naval Doctrinal Publications (NDPs)

1 Naval Warfare

3 Naval Operations

4 Naval Logistics

Marine Corps Publications

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDP5)

1 Warfighting

1-1 Strategy

1-2 Campaigning

1-3 Tactics

2 Intelligence

3 Expeditionary Operations

4 Logistics

5 Planning

6 Command and Control
C-2 MCWP3-2

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

0-1 Marine Corps Operations (under development)

0-1 .1 Componency

2-1 Intelligence Operations

2-11 MAGTF Intelligence Collection (under development)

2-15.4 Imagery Intelligence (under development)

3-16 Fire Support Coordination (under development)

3-21.1 Aviation Ground Support (under development)

3-22 Anitair Warfare

3-22.1 Multi-Service Procedure for Antiradiation Missile Employment in a Joint

Environment (ARM-J)

3-23.1 Close Air Support

3-24 Assault Support

3-24.1 Helicopter Operating Procedures for Air-Capable Ships

3-25 Control of Aircraft and Missiles

3-25.1 Integrated Combat Airspace C2 (ICAC 2) Manual (under development)

3-25.2 Multi-Service Procedures for Theater Air-Ground Systems (TAGS)

3-25.3 Marine Air Command and Control System Handbook

3-25.4 Marine Tactical Air Command Center Handbook

3-25.5 Direct Air Support Center Handbook

3-25.6 Marine Sector Antiair Warfare Coordinator Handbook

3-25.7 Tactical Air Operations Center Handbook

3-25.8 Marine Air Traffic Control Detachment Handbook

3-25.9 Marine Air Command and Control Systems Communications Handbook (under development)

3-25.10 Low Altitude Air Defense Handbook

3-25.11 Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Gunner's Handbook (under development)

3-35.7 MAGTF Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC) Support

4-11.7 MAGTF Supply Operations

5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process

5-11.1 MAGTF Aviation Planning (under development)

6-2 MAGTF Command and Control (under development)

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRP5)

3-22A Multi-Service Procedures for EA-6B Employment in the Joint Environment

(J-PROWLER)

3-23A Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations

3-25A Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control (JATC)

3-25B Multi-Service Air-Air, Air-Surface, and Surface-Air Brevity Codes

5-11.1 A Aviation Planning Documents (under development)

5-12A Operational Terms and Graphics

5-1 2C Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms

5-12D Organization of Marine Corps Forces

Marine Corps Bulletin (MCBuI)

3501 Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Force List
Aviation Operations C-3

Miscellaneous

From the Sea

Forward. From the Sea

MAGTF Aviation and Operational Maneuver From the Sea

Notes

1. Robert Debs Hem!, Jr., Col, USMC, Ret., Dictionary of Military and Naval

Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1978) p. 6.

2. Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, "Reflections on the Corps. . . Marine Tactical Aviation," Marine Corps Gazette (May 1992) p. 15.

3. FMFRP 12-34-IV, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War

II: Western Pacific Opeations (August 1989) p. 347.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1976) p. 345.

5. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) p. IV-4.

6. George S. Patton, Jr. WarAslKnewlt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947) p. 354.

7. Hem!, p.175.

4 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 2000 — 467 - 171 I 20308