NATIONAL OCEANIC 

AND ATMOSPHERIC 

ADMINISTRATION 

Audit of the Joint Polar Satellite 

System: Continuing Progress in 

Establishing Capabilities, 

Schedules, and Costs Is Needed 

to Mitigate Data Gaps 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 

SEPTEMBER 27, 2012 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Audit and Evaluation 

For Public Release 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Office of Inspector General 

Washington, D.C. 20230 

September 27, 20 12 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. jane Lubchenco 

Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere 

FROM: Allen Crawley c: 

Assistant Inspector

and IT Security 

SUBJECT: 	 Audit ofjoint Polar Satellite System: Continuing Progress in Establishing 

Capabilities, Schedules, and Costs Is Needed to Mitigate Data Gaps 

Final Report No. OIG-12-038-A 

Attached is our final audit report on the continuing development of the Joint Polar Satellite 

System OPSS). This audit continued our oversight ofJPSS since its inception. Our objectives 

were to (I) assess the adequacy of JPSS formulation activities-including the development of 

requirements (capabilities), schedule, and cost baselines-and (2) monitor the program's efforts 

to maintain continuity of polar satellite data. 

To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed NOAA and NASA managers and staff within the 

program, the NOAA Office of the Chief Financial Officer, the Center for Satellite Applications 

and Research, and the National Centers for Environmental Prediction. We reviewed program 

and budget documentation and attended multiple JPSS program management reviews. 

We concluded that while progress has been made, the program's capabilities, schedule, and 

cost baselines remain uncertain. NOAA has not articulated an acquisition strategy for the JPSS2 spacecraft, and JPSS-3 and JPSS-4 satellites (including instruments), for which contractual and 

technical decisions must be made in the coming year. The program is revising ground system 

requirements, which may result in more efficient processing of environmental data records. 

Delay in formally establishing the program's governance structure and inadequate staffing may 

have prolonged program formulation activities. And NOAA should assess proposed legislation's 

potential impact to program capabilities, schedule, and cost. 

NOAA does not have a policy that ensures consistent and reliable cost estimating for its major 

system acquisitions. When examining NOAA's process for estimatingJPSS life-cycle costs, we 

found that a clearly defined program and a more mature cost-estimating process are needed. 

The program's revised cost estimate, derived to meet a life-cycle cost cap and artificially 

flattened funding profile, is not consistent with typical space acquisitions. An independent cost 

estimate is needed to assess whether the program is executable under these constraints. 

For our second objective, we concluded that ground system work and other efforts to 

operationalize Suomi NPP data have had mixed results thus far. Despite technical anomalies, 

the program sufficiently validated a key data record so that it could be used for operational 

weather forecasting within 7 months of Suomi NPP's launch, although other data records 

cannot be used operationally until December 20 13. An ongoing dispute over the management 
of calibration and validation of data records requires further attention. Finally, we have refined 

our assessment of the expected data gap between Suomi NPP and JPSS-1. 

In responding to the draft audit report, NOAA concurred with all of our recommendations. 

We have summarized NOAA's response and made minor edits to the report, where 

appropriate, based on NOAA's suggestions. The final report will appear on OIG's website 

pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. 

In accordance with Department Administrative Order 213-5, please provide us with your 

action plan within 60 days of the date of this memorandum. The plan should outline the actions 

you propose to take to address each audit finding and recommendation. 

We would like to extend our thanks to NOAA for the courtesies shown our staff during our 

fieldwork. Please direct any inquiries regarding this report to me at (202) 482-1855 or Fred 

Meny, Director, Satellites and Weather Systems, at (202) 482-1931. 

Attachment 

cc: Dr. Kathryn D. Sullivan, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Observation 

and Prediction 

Dr. David Titley, Deputy Under Secretary for Operations 

Mary E. Kicza, Assistant Administrator for Satellite and Information Services 

Geovette E. Washington, Deputy General Counsel, Department of Commerce 

Mack Cato, Director, Office of Audit and Information Management 
 

 

Report In Brief 

SEPTEMBER 27, 2012 

Background 

NOAA, in partnership with NASA, is 

acquiring and developing the next 

generation of polar-orbiting satellites 

for its Joint Polar Satellite System 

(JPSS). JPSS components currently 

envisioned for the system comprise 

the Suomi National Polar-orbiting 

Partnership (Suomi NPP), JPSS-1, 

JPSS-2, and two free flyer satellites. 

NASA launched Suomi NPP on 

October 28, 2011. JPSS satellites will 

provide data for weather prediction 

and climate research. The free flyer 

satellites will also collect and locate 

environmental data, as well as detect 

and relay signals from emergency 

search and rescue beacons. Suomi 

NPP is a research and risk-reduction 

satellite; however, because of program delays in launching JPSS-1, 

NOAA must rely on Suomi NPP for 

key data used in weather forecasting. 

We are predicting a 10–16-month 

gap in weather forecasting data 

between the end of Suomi NPP’s 

design life and the time when JPSS 

data will be operational. 

Why We Did This Review 

In our September 2011 report, 

Challenges Must Be Met to Minimize 

Gaps in Polar Environmental Satellite 

Data, we addressed the need for 

JPSS baseline capabilities, costs, and 

schedule to be finalized, because 

uncertain baselines translate to 

uncertain budget requirements. In 

this audit, we further examined the 

determination of program requirements and NOAA’s process for 

estimating the program’s life-cycle 

cost. Our objectives were to 

(1) assess the adequacy of JPSS 

formulation activities and (2) 

monitor the program’s efforts to 

maintain continuity of polar satellite 

data. 

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC 

ADMINISTRATION 

Audit of the Joint Polar Satellite System: Continuing Progress in 

Establishing Capabilities, Schedules, and Costs Is Needed to 

Mitigate Data Gaps 

OIG-12-038-A 

WHAT WE FOUND 

NOAA must clearly define JPSS capabilities, schedule, and cost. By defining the 

program and refining its cost-estimating process, NOAA can ensure that the 

estimate for JPSS is reliable; the program’s artificially flattened budget profile 

needs to be independently validated. Also, Suomi NPP data validation and ground 

system improvements are needed for operational use. Finally, a 10–16-month gap 

between Suomi NPP and JPSS-1 operational data is expected. 

WHAT WE RECOMMEND 

The Deputy Secretary for Operations should ensure that 

1. Sufficient resources and attention are given to finalizing JPSS high-level 

requirements and completing system definition. 

2. The program’s acquisition strategy for JPSS-3 and JPSS-4 is determined, 

documented, and shared with the Department, OMB, and Congress. 

3. The National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service 

(NESDIS) and the JPSS program quantify cost savings while determining how 

to efficiently process environmental data records. 

4. NESDIS determines whether an enterprise approach to developing and 

maintaining data products from its environmental satellites could achieve 

economies of scale. 

5. Sufficient resources and attention are given to permanently filling key 

management positions. 

6. A policy that requires major system acquisition programs to adhere to costestimating best practices is developed. 

7. Cost-estimating best practices are more closely adhered to in the JPSS 

program and other major system acquisitions. 

8. An independent cost estimate adequately tests the viability of the program’s 

funding profile. 

9. Stakeholders are sufficiently informed of unplanned schedule and capability 

trade-offs, if needed, to meet surges in effort necessary for launches. 
 

 


 


 


 

	 
 

	 
 


 

	 


 

	 


 

	 
 


 

	 
 


 

	 
 


 

	 


 

	 
 


 

	 
 

	 
 


 

	 
 


 

	 


 


 

	 
 


 

	 
 


 

	 
 


 


 


 


 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Contents
 

Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................1
 

Findings and Recommendations ....................................................................................................................4
 

I.	 NOAA Must Clearly Define JPSS Capabilities, Schedule, and Cost ........................................4
 

A.	 JPSS requirements have been unstable since the restructure of NPOESS, changing the
 

basis of program cost estimates....................................................................................................5
 

B.	 Changing requirements and acquisition strategies increase cost and schedule risk and 

challenge program management....................................................................................................6
 

C.	 Requirement changes may also result in more efficient processing and distribution of 

data.......................................................................................................................................................7
 

D.	 Delayed governance structure, planning, and staffing may have prolonged program
 

formulation.........................................................................................................................................8
 

E.	 Proposed legislation that would restructure the program requires an assessment of
 

capabilities, schedule, and cost impacts .......................................................................................9
 

II.	 A Clearly Defined Program and a More Mature Process Are Needed to Ensure a
 

Reliable JPSS Cost Estimate ..............................................................................................................9
 

A.	 Clearly defining the program is the most significant challenge to developing a reliable 

life-cycle cost estimate for JPSS.................................................................................................. 10
 

B.	 Aspects of JPSS cost estimating require attention as the program formally baselines
 

costs.................................................................................................................................................. 11
 

III.	 NOAA Should Address Concerns with Revised Cost Estimate........................................... 13
 

IV.	 Suomi NPP Data Validation and Ground System Improvements Needed for Operational
 

Use ...................................................................................................................................................... 14
 

A.	 Degradation of Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite sensor delayed Suomi NPP
 

commissioning ................................................................................................................................ 15
 

B.	 Deferred ground system work, sensor data record discrepancies, and a planned 

modernization of NCEP’s supercomputer system will result in unforeseen delay in
 

operational use of Suomi NPP data........................................................................................... 16
 

C.	 Ground system risks realized early in life of Suomi NPP must be mitigated for
 

operational use of data ................................................................................................................. 16
 

D.	 Calibration and validation activities needed to operationalize data present management
 

challenges......................................................................................................................................... 17
 

V.	 Assessment of Expected Data Gap Between Suomi NPP and JPSS-1.................................. 18
 

Recommendations..................................................................................................................................... 20
 

Summary of Agency Response and OIG Comments............................................................................. 21
 

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology................................................................................ 22
 

Appendix B: Agency Response ................................................................................................................... 24
 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Introduction
 

NOAA, in partnership with NASA, is acquiring and developing the next generation of polarorbiting operational environmental satellites for its Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS). The 

satellites will cross the earth’s equator in the early afternoon, an important time for sampling 

atmospheric conditions.

1 Formed in 2010 as a result of the restructuring of the National Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), the JPSS program comprises 

related projects that are intended to meet NOAA’s mission needs and fulfill agreements with 

international partners. A Defense program intended to fulfill some NPOESS requirements, the 

Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), has since been canceled. 

Figure 1. Simplified Schematic Composition of the Joint Polar Satellite System 

Note: NESDIS is NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service. 

Source: OIG adaptation of JPSS program schematic 

Figure 1 is a simplified schematic of JPSS as currently envisioned. NOAA will command and 

control the satellites from its mission management center, with communications transmitted 

and data received via separate ground (antenna) stations. Once received on the ground, mission 

data travel via a network infrastructure to the ground system’s data processing segment, which 

produces weather and climate products from the data. JPSS satellites (JPSS-1 and JPSS-2) will 

host instruments that provide environmental data used in weather prediction and climate 

research. The JPSS ground system, started under the NPOESS program, currently supports a 

1 The early afternoon polar orbit covers the peak of midday heating and thus provides critical data for modeling 

the physics of the atmosphere. Department of Defense and European satellites provide atmospheric data from the 

mid-morning. Defense satellites provide data from the early morning. Together, these satellites provide data for 

NOAA forecast models that are generally refreshed at 6-hour intervals over the entire globe. 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 


 


 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

risk-reduction satellite—Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (discussed below)—by 

providing command, control, and communications and science data processing. The ground 

system will be upgraded to support the JPSS satellites. Data from satellites owned and operated 

by other agencies and international partners will also be processed and distributed. Additional 

plans call for “free flyer” satellites to host a climate sensor and instruments that collect and 

locate in situ environmental data, as well as detect and relay signals from emergency search and 

rescue beacons. 

JPSS development follows NASA program management standards and practices.

2 The program 

is formally in the first major phase of the NASA program life cycle, formulation, the goal of 

which is to establish a cost-effective program that is demonstrably capable of meeting agency 

and mission goals and objectives. After successfully meeting formulation criteria, the program 

gains approval to proceed to the implementation phase, to execute the program and constituent 

projects while ensuring the program continues to contribute to agency goals and objectives 

within funding constraints. Practically speaking, however, JPSS is currently in both formulation 

and implementation phases, given that the program is a restructuring of NPOESS and its ground 

system is already built and operating the recently launched Suomi NPP satellite, and processing 

data. In addition, development of instruments for the first JPSS satellite, JPSS-1, is well under 

way. 

In our September 2011 report, Audit of the Joint Polar Satellite System: Challenges Must Be Met to 

Minimize Gaps in Polar Environmental Satellite Data,

3 we addressed the need for JPSS baseline 

capabilities, costs, and schedule to be finalized, noting that uncertain baselines translated to 

uncertain budget requirements. This was particularly problematic given the fiscal environment 

and Congress’s need for clear definitions of programs as it makes funding decisions. In this 

audit, we further examined the determination of program requirements and NOAA’s process 

for estimating the program’s life-cycle cost. 

Our report also examined preparations for the launch of the NPOESS Preparatory Project 

satellite, now known as Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (Suomi NPP),

4 a research 

and risk-reduction satellite intended to continue NASA’s Earth Observing System (EOS) 

measurements and demonstrate the next generation of polar-orbiting operational 

environmental sensors (which will fly on JPSS satellites).5 Due to NPOESS program delays and 

the aging of NOAA’s current constellation of polar-orbiting operational environmental satellites 

(and NASA’s EOS), however, NOAA must rely on Suomi NPP for key data used in operational 

weather forecasting. NASA successfully launched Suomi NPP on October 28, 2011. After 

commissioning the satellite and its instruments, NASA transferred operation of the satellite to 

2 NASA, March 2007. Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements, NPR 7120.5D (including NASA 

Interim Directive 7120-97). Washington, D.C.: NASA. 3 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, September 2011. Audit of the Joint Polar Satellite 

System: Challenges Must Be Met to Minimize Gaps in Polar Environmental Satellite Data, OIG-11-034-A.
 

Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce OIG.

4 On January 25, 2012, NASA renamed the satellite in honor of the late Verner E. Suomi, a pioneer in satellite
 

meteorology.

5 Research satellites demonstrate new technologies that, if successful, can be used in operational satellites. JPSS 

operational satellites are designed for a longer mission life and will be built to more robust engineering standards
 

than Suomi NPP’s research mission.
 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 2 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

the JPSS program, which must complete calibration and validation6 of Suomi NPP data records 

and add robustness to its ground system. The program is also incorporating lessons learned 

from Suomi NPP’s development as it develops its operational-grade satellites, JPSS-1 and JPSS-2, 

which will host nearly the same suite of instruments as Suomi NPP and are currently slated for 

launches in 2017 and 2022, respectively. 

This audit continued our oversight of JPSS since its inception.7 Our objectives were to (1) 

assess the adequacy of JPSS formulation activities, including the development of requirements 

(capabilities), schedule, and cost baselines, and (2) monitor the program’s efforts to maintain 

continuity of polar satellite data. 

We concluded that while progress has been made, the program’s capabilities, schedule, and 

cost baselines remain uncertain. NOAA has not articulated an acquisition strategy for the JPSS2 spacecraft, and JPSS-3 and JPSS-4 satellites (including instruments), for which contractual and 

technical decisions must be made in the coming year. The program is revising ground system 

requirements and this may result in more efficient processing of environmental data records. 

Delay in formally establishing the program’s governance structure and inadequate staffing may 

have prolonged program formulation activities. And NOAA should assess proposed legislation’s 

potential impact to program capabilities, schedule, and cost. 

NOAA does not have a policy that ensures consistent and reliable cost estimating for its major 

system acquisitions. When examining NOAA’s process for estimating JPSS life-cycle costs, we 

found that a clearly defined program and a more mature cost-estimating process are needed. 

The program’s revised cost estimate, derived to meet a life-cycle cost cap and artificially 

flattened funding profile, is not consistent with typical space acquisitions. An independent cost 

estimate is needed to assess whether the program is executable under these constraints. 

For our second objective, we concluded that ground system work and other efforts to 

operationalize Suomi NPP data have had mixed results thus far. Despite technical anomalies, 

the program sufficiently validated a key data record so that it could be used for operational 

weather forecasting within 7 months of Suomi NPP’s launch, although other data records 

cannot be used operationally until December 2013. An ongoing dispute over the management 

of calibration and validation of data records requires further attention. Finally, we have refined 

our assessment of the expected data gap between Suomi NPP and JPSS-1. We reiterate our 

prior recommendations relevant to these issues. 

6 Calibration is the quantification of a sensor’s performance in relation to a traceable standard. Validation is the
 

assessment of data product quality using independent data sources of known quality.

7 See also our interim report of the September 2011 audit: Memorandum to the Under Secretary for Oceans and 

Atmosphere, June 10, 2011 (OIG-11-029-M).
 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 


 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Findings and Recommendations 

I. NOAA Must Clearly Define JPSS Capabilities, Schedule, and Cost 

In September 2011, after a lengthy process,

8 NOAA’s Deputy Under Secretary for 

Operations formally approved preliminary high-level requirements for JPSS (its full-scope 

program) and a cost estimate was subsequently validated. However, during a February 2012 

submission to the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2013, the Department and NOAA 

informed Congress of potential changes to those requirements—including removing 

environmental sensors and reducing the timeliness of satellite data—in order to reduce the 

program’s life-cycle cost. NOAA officials told us that during the budget formulation process 

the decision was made, with both the Department and Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB), to cap the program’s life-cycle cost at $12.9 billion and even out the program’s 

year-over-year funding profile, to bring stability to JPSS budget requests. 

The proposed $12.9 billion life-cycle cost cap was not derived from a rigorous cost 

estimate at the time it was submitted for the FY 2013 President’s Budget. Rather, the 

program had spent much of 2011 developing a cost estimate for its full-scope program, 

totaling $14.7 billion. An independent cost estimate, using somewhat different assumptions, 

concluded that program costs would total $16.1 billion. NOAA subsequently revised its 

cost estimate to determine the optimal capabilities and schedule that could be delivered 

under the $12.9 billion cap. 

The JPSS program completed its system requirements review, to evaluate whether its 

requirements were properly formulated and the program’s estimated cost and schedule 

were credible, in late May 2012. As part of the review, the program presented the $12.9 

billion revised estimate to the program’s standing review board,

9 along with its 

determination of the optimal capabilities and schedule that it could deliver under the cost 

cap. (According to the program, the estimate supports most of the capabilities NOAA 

intended for the program, although data latency—the time period from satellite observation 

until data is delivered to users—will not be as short as initially planned and there was an 

additional 3-month delay in the scheduled launch date of JPSS-1.) A successfully completed 

system requirements review was a prerequisite to Key Decision Point 0 (July 20, 2012), 

from which the Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere determined that the program 

should proceed with system definition activities. After a system definition review, the 

program reaches Key Decision Point 1 (scheduled for July 2013), when it is expected to 

have completed formulation activities and developed an acceptable plan (projects are 

feasible and risks acceptable) for implementation. From this point, the program commits to 

being measured against its approved capabilities, schedule, and cost baselines. 

8 See OIG-11-034-A for a discussion of requirements delay under finding II, part C: “JPSS Program’s Baseline
 

Capabilities, Costs, and Schedule Need to Be Finalized.” 9 The standing review board is responsible for conducting independent reviews (life cycle and special) of a
 

program/project and providing objective, expert judgments to the convening authorities.
 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 4 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

	 


 


 


 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

A.	 JPSS requirements have been unstable since the restructure of NPOESS, changing the basis of 

program cost estimates 

While unstable requirements can be typical of programs in the formulation phase, in prior 

reporting we have noted that decisions on capabilities, schedule, and costs were needed.

10 

NOAA’s burden of what were previously NPOESS requirements has increased due to the 

cancellation of DWSS. Also, according to program staff, some of the NPOESS requirements 

have become outdated, and a reassessment of those requirements in light of current 

needs—as well as fiscal constraints—is necessary. The JPSS program will not formally 

commit to a program baseline until after Key Decision Point 1, currently planned for July 

2013, nearly 3.5 years after the White House decision to restructure NPOESS. 

Before and after leadership approved the program’s preliminary high-level requirements in 

September 2011, funding and other considerations repeatedly spurred NOAA to adjust 

what the JPSS program would actually provide to its users. These changes in capabilities 

have had ramifications for the life-cycle cost estimates reported by the program. 

Table 1: JPSS Cost Estimates and Major Assumptions 

Satellites 

Cost (in billions) 

Life cycle (from FY2009 

and prior) 

JPSS satellite launch 

readiness dates 

Suomi NPP,c 

JPSS-1, JPSS-2 

2009 Initial Estimate 

(for FY 2011 PBa) 

$11.9 

2024 

JPSS-1: FY 2015 

JPSS-2: FY 2018 

Suomi NPP,c 

JPSS-1, JPSS-2 , 

and five free flyers 

2011 Estimateb 

$14.7–$16.1 

2028 

JPSS-1: Q1d FY 2017 

JPSS-2: Q2 FY 2021f 

Suomi NPP,c 

JPSS-1, JPSS-2, 

and two free flyers 

2012 Estimate 

(for FY 2013 PB) 

$12.9 

2028 

JPSS-1: Q2e FY 2017 

JPSS-2: Q1 FY2022e 

a

President’s Budget. bCost figures for 2011 represent the program office and independent cost estimates, 

respectively. c

JPSS costs include some development and all operational costs for Suomi NPP. dFirst quarter.
 e

Second quarter. fWhile JPSS-2 is planned to be launch-ready by Q1 FY 2022, its actual launch date is to be 

determined.
 

Source: OIG analysis of data from JPSS program.
 

As an example, NOAA’s initial cost estimate, submitted for the FY 2011 President’s Budget, 

was $11.9 billion. NOAA indicated that this estimate had an eighty percent confidence level 

(an assessment of risk and uncertainty), which an independent review team had 

recommended for its predecessor program to be adequately funded. This initial cost 

estimate included five Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensors, no 

10 Commerce OIG, Audit of the Joint Polar Satellite System and interim report. See also U.S. Government 

Accounting Office, May 2010. Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address Risks 

That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data, GAO-10-558. Washington, D.C.: GAO. 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 5 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

	 


 


 


 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

accommodation for a key climate sensor and other instruments,11 and a life cycle through 

FY 2024. Subsequent cost estimates have included three VIIRS sensors (for Suomi NPP, 

JPSS-1, and JPSS-2), and the life cycle has been extended 4 years to FY 2028. The program 

has added requirements to launch a climate and other sensors on smaller, free flyer 

satellites. In addition, climate sensors originally funded outside of the program (although 

within NOAA’s overall budget) have been added to the JPSS budget. Table 1 contains the 

history of JPSS cost estimates developed thus far and their major assumptions of program 

content and schedules. 

NOAA is currently reviewing and prioritizing requirements to complete program 

formulation; final decisions on changes to requirements are targeted for November 2012. In 

the absence of finalized requirements, NOAA has been providing NASA direction letters 

for anticipated system requirements and design decisions. Still, NASA has reported that late 

development of the requirements baseline is an issue that could impact launch readiness 

dates for both JPSS-1 and the free flyer satellites. 

B.	 Changing requirements and acquisition strategies increase cost and schedule risk and challenge 

program management 

The JPSS program has reported the changing requirements baseline as a program risk that 

could delay the readiness of the JPSS ground system and the JPSS-1 launch date. NASA’s 

JPSS acquisition program also has warned of launch delays for both JPSS-1 and the free flyers 

and has indicated difficulty with making informed decisions. Before the FY 2013 President’s 

Budget and the program’s system requirements review had been completed, contracts were 

not reflective of the program’s planned capabilities, schedule, and funding profiles. A lack of 

technical (capabilities), schedule, and cost baselines leaves managers without adequate 

means to assess contractor and overall program performance. 

Ground system requirements. Although JPSS completed its program-level system requirements 

review in May, a project-level review of its ground segment requirements, originally 

scheduled in advance of the program-level review, was delayed until late August. The 

program has been studying options for revising its ground system architecture, which was 

originally conceived under NPOESS and, because of custom interfaces and tightly coupled 

hardware and software,12 makes interoperability and interfacing with partner institutions 

more difficult. The program’s goal is to move toward a more open, adaptable, standardized 

architecture that will allow the program to save costs by interfacing with international and 

other partners for mission data. One such example of this approach, already under way, is 

the program’s efforts to use data from a Japanese satellite, GCOM-W,13 which launched 

May 18, 2012. In addition, requirements for the ground system’s support for Defense 

partners have changed as a result of Defense’s own fiscal constraints and the cancellation of 

DWSS. 

11 The Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) will measure the variability in the sun's total output. It will continue
 

measurements of NASA’s Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment research mission. The other instruments are 

Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking (SARSAT), and Argos Data Collection System (ADCS). 12 Tightly coupled hardware and software components are linked together and dependent on each other.
 13 Global Change Observation Mission 1st

–Water.
 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 6 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Free flyer requirements. Further, design decisions for the free flyer project are pending. 

Program staff members are deciding how best to meet the requirements for the different 

instruments for which the free flyer project is responsible.14 One such decision pertains to 

the ground system(s) that the instruments will require to meet their security needs. The 

free flyers are currently budgeted to have a ground system provided by an institutional 

partner. But higher security requirements could instead require services from the JPSS 

ground segment, likely at greater cost. 

Acquisition strategy for JPSS-2. The program plans to decide whether to competitively award a 

contract for the JPSS-2 spacecraft by December, according to status reports. (The program 

has chosen to sole-source contracts for JPSS-2 instruments.) 

Acquisition strategy beyond JPSS-2. Finally, life-cycle cost and documented program plans are 

limited to JPSS-1 and JPSS-2. Although decisions need to be made soon to support the 

procurement and development of JPSS-3 and JPSS-4, NOAA has not included either satellite 

in its FY 2012 or FY 2013 budget justification. NOAA should ensure that stakeholders are 

aware of any impact that the development and acquisition of these satellites will have on the 

JPSS program. 

C. Requirement changes may also result in more efficient processing and distribution of data 

NOAA’s JPSS program is looking for ways to more efficiently deliver its required 

capabilities. As currently defined, JPSS high-level requirements call for the ground system to 

convert raw data records (RDRs) first into sensor data records (SDRs) and then into 

environmental data records (EDRs), by applying algorithms (in the form of software code). 

The additional processing for EDRs (outlined in bold in figure 2) may be more efficiently 

performed in a downstream NOAA system, separate from JPSS, known as NPOESS Data 

Exploitation (NDE–dashed outline in figure). Because of legacy NPOESS specifications and 

design decisions, the JPSS data processing segment, built for Suomi NPP, does not produce 

EDRs in a format compatible with National Weather Service (NWS) systems. The NDE 

system reformats JPSS data records for NOAA users. NDE also creates NOAA-unique 

products from the data, in some cases combining data from other sources. In addition, NDE 

separately produces some EDRs from JPSS sensor data. JPSS program leaders are examining 

whether NDE can process EDRs more efficiently and therefore provide an opportunity to 

reduce the complexity and cost of the JPSS ground system. 

Unfortunately, program leadership has not yet been able to quantify the potential cost 

savings. It is expected that the program would fund the NDE program for the additional 

processing, although it does not fund NDE for current processing. We believe more could 

be done to determine cost savings. 

Additionally, we believe NOAA should determine whether an enterprise approach to 

developing and maintaining data products from its environmental satellites could achieve 

14 The three instruments planned for free flyers are the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS), Search and Rescue 

Satellite-Aided Tracking (SARSAT), and Argos Data Collection System (ADCS). 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 7 
 

 

 

 

Space Satellite 

Observations 

Ground 

Users 

(Uncalibrated sensor data) 

(Calibrated sensor data) 

(Geophysical parameters) 

Decode Satellite 

Data 

Convert 

RDRs to SDRs 

Convert 

SDRs to EDRs 

RDRs 

SDRs 

EDRs 

JPSS 

Archive 

External Systems 

NDE 

• Tailor Records for 

NWS Users 

• Create Unique Products 

• Convert SDR to EDR 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

economies of scale and complement other efforts to modernize National Environmental 

Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS) system architecture. Users would likely 

benefit from data product standardization and new products. 

Figure 2. Processing Flow of JPSS Satellite Data Records 

Source: OIG adapted from program documentation. 

D. Delayed governance structure, planning, and staffing may have prolonged program formulation 

NOAA and NASA leadership approved the JPSS Management Control Plan—which 

documents their agreement on the roles and responsibilities, the governance structure, and 

program authorities for JPSS—in early February 2012, or 2 years into the life of the 

program. Preliminary NOAA and NASA program plans were produced in time for the 

program’s May 2012 system requirements review. At that review, the program’s standing 

review board commented on what seemed a complex governance structure but ultimately 

concluded that it was working. 

The program has had key staff in acting, rather than permanent, capacities for extended 

periods of time. A permanent NOAA JPSS director began work in September 2011. 

NOAA’s Deputy Under Secretary for Operations—who is deemed the final authority for 

the program’s high-level requirements, schedule, and budget submissions—retired in 

January 2012 and was not permanently replaced until July. This interim period included the 

FY 2013 President’s Budget submission and other decisions on high-level requirements. In 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 8 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

	 

	 


 


 


 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

June 2012, the acting NESDIS Deputy Assistant Administrator for Systems, serving on a 

detail from NASA since May 2011, left NOAA to return to NASA. Now vacant, this 

position serves as the single NOAA source of strategic direction and programmatic 

guidance to NASA, according to the agencies’ management control plan for the program. 

Several other key positions within NESDIS and the program are filled by detailed employees 

in acting rather than permanent capacities. NOAA has attributed the delays in establishing 

JPSS’ governance and permanently staffing key positions, in part, to funding shortages in FYs 

2010 and 2011. 

E.	 Proposed legislation that would restructure the program requires an assessment of capabilities, 

schedule, and cost impacts 

The Senate Appropriations Committee bill for FY 201315 includes a provision that would 

transfer funding and responsibility for procurement of NOAA’s operational satellites to 

NASA, instituting a new management structure for JPSS. However, OMB has not yet issued 

an official Statement of Administration Policy to Congress on the matter. NOAA will need 

to complete an assessment of its potential impact to the program’s capabilities, schedule, 

and cost, should this provision become law. 

II.	 A Clearly Defined Program and a More Mature Process Are Needed to 

Ensure a Reliable JPSS Cost Estimate 

NOAA does not have a policy to effect consistent and reliable cost estimates for its major 

system acquisition programs. NOAA officials told us that in 2011 the agency followed the 

same practices developing the JPSS cost estimate that it had used for the Geostationary 

Operational Environmental Satellite-R Series program (another major system acquisition), 

although the officials had not documented and could not clearly articulate the overall 

methodology. We conducted a best practice16 assessment of NOAA’s activities undertaken 

in 2011 to develop a JPSS life-cycle cost estimate. During our fieldwork, in early 2012, the 

program was in the process of revising its estimate to conform to the $12.9 billion life-cycle 

cost cap. Because that activity was ongoing and involved pre-decisional information, we did 

not review it as part of this audit. However, our findings related to the program’s 2011 

cost-estimating activities should provide guidance for improving the reliability of the JPSS 

life-cycle cost estimate as it is updated for Key Decision Point I. 

Figure 3 depicts the steps in a best practice cost-estimating process and our evaluation of 

NOAA’s process for JPSS, with the most significant challenge outlined in bold and other 

areas that require attention indicated with dashed outlines. 

15 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013, S. 2323, 112th Cong. (2012); see also
 

Senate Report 112-158 (discussing Committee rationale for transfer to NASA). 16 U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 2009. GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices
 

for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP. Washington, D.C.: GAO.
 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 9 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

	 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Figure 3. Evaluation of NOAA’s Cost Estimating Process for JPSS 

Initiation and Research 

Define the estimate's 

purpose 

Develop the estimating plan 

Key: 

Assessment 

Define the program 

Determine the estimating 

structure 

Identify ground rules and 

assumptions 

Obtain the data 

Develop point estimate and 

compare to an independent 

cost estimate 

Significant challenge 

Analysis 

Conduct sensitivity analysis 

Conduct risk and 

uncertainty analysis 

Document the estimate 

Requires attention 

Presentation 

Present to management for 

approval 

Update the estimate to 

reflect actual costs/changes 

Generally consistent with 

best practice 

Source: OIG analysis of NOAA cost-estimating activities against GAO-defined best practices. 

A.	 Clearly defining the program is the most significant challenge to developing a reliable life-cycle 

cost estimate for JPSS 

Define the program. As described in finding I, the program content and scope of the 

estimates NOAA has reported have varied greatly. While defining the program is one goal 

of the formulation phase of a program life cycle, some JPSS component projects are actually 

at more mature phases than the overall program. All of the instruments for JPSS-1, for 

example, are more than 60 percent built, and nearly all NPOESS contracts have been 

transitioned to NASA and definitized, indicating agreement on the work to be performed 

and the cost. This provides cost analysts with data from which to construct elements of the 

estimate. But due to the potential for requirements or system design changes (particularly 

for the ground and free flyer segments), uncertainty in some of those costs remains. 

Clear requirements are needed to adequately define the program in a Cost Analysis 

Requirements Description (CARD). This document serves as the technical baseline of the 

program and can include the acquisition strategy, technical definition, characteristics, system 

design features, and technologies. The more completely defined a program is, the fewer 

assumptions cost analysts must make, leading to a more reliable cost estimate. In 2011, the 

JPSS CARD was constructed in what program officials described as a compressed time 

frame, beginning in March and concluding in June. As we reported in September 2011, the 

CARD was completed without an approved set of high-level requirements. 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 10 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

B. Aspects of JPSS cost estimating require attention as the program formally baselines costs 

The following aspects of cost estimating require management attention to ensure the 

program has a reliable cost estimate in time for its next programmatic milestone: Key 

Decision Point 1, in July 2013. 

Develop the estimating plan. The JPSS program office estimate developed in 2011 was done 

without a written cost-estimating plan. Both program officials and the cost-estimating 

contractor described an ad hoc approach in which certain activities were rushed and 

documentation was lacking. Instead of providing specific cost-estimating activities and a 

schedule, a draft copy of an estimating plan completed in February 2012 comprised a 

general list of methodologies, standards, and guidelines. 

Determine the estimating structure. One such standard—also a best practice—requires the 

use of a product-oriented work breakdown structure in estimating the cost of program 

elements.17 Establishing a product-oriented cost structure allows a program to track cost 

and schedule by defining deliverables, such as hardware or software components. The 

program can then more effectively identify elements that are causing a cost or schedule 

variance and thereby more efficiently mitigate the cause of the variance. While the program 

provided dictionaries of both product-oriented and functional work breakdown structures, 

its cost estimate was aligned with the functional structure. 

Further, the JPSS cost estimate structure was not sufficiently detailed and did not always 

match the defined functional work breakdown structure. Best practice and the program’s 

standard call for at least three levels of cost elements and four to five levels for certain highrisk cost elements. Yet, the program office estimate included just one line item, based on 

contract values, for JPSS sensors, whose development accounted for significant cost 

overruns under NPOESS. The estimate did not break out costs for design, development, 

fabrication, assembly and test of the instruments. Neither did the estimate conform to the 

program’s defined functional work breakdown structure, which includes two elements for 

its instrument costs: one for each instrument contract and a second element for 

management and support related to each instrument. The program office estimate, 

however, did not include the instrument-specific management and support cost element. 

Instead, those costs were aggregated under “labor” elements for all instruments. As such, 

the 2011 estimate obscured costs of some of the program’s defined functional cost 

elements. 

Identify ground rules and assumptions. The basis of estimates should be clearly documented. In 

general, we found that a clear accounting of all ground rules, assumptions, and drivers 

forming the basis of JPSS estimates was lacking. While a set of ground rules and assumptions 

was documented in the program’s CARD, the actual ground rules and assumptions that 

formed the basis of the program office and independent cost estimates differed. For 

example, the CARD projected a life cycle to FY 2024, while the program office and 

independent cost estimates projected a life cycle to FY 2028. And while both the CARD 

17 U.S. Department of Defense, October 2011. Work Breakdown Structures for Defense Materiel Items, MIL STD881C. Arlington, VA: DoD. 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 11 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

and the independent cost estimate assumed that contracts for JPSS-2 instruments and 

spacecraft would be competitively awarded, the assumption for the program office estimate 

was that instrument contracts would be sole-sourced. This difference was recognized in the 

reconciliation of the two estimates, but generally the basis of these estimates should be the 

same, to provide a more valid comparison. 

Further, NASA’s cost estimate for its acquisition program, which was the source of much of 

the program office estimate’s data, was based on significantly different assumptions about 

the scope of the program, including the number of JPSS satellites. NASA assumed four 

instead of two (i.e., JPSS-1, JPSS-2, JPSS-3, and JPSS-4). This was presumably because NASA’s 

estimate was initiated before the JPSS CARD was complete but may also indicate 

miscommunication between the agencies.

18 As a result of the different assumptions, 

NOAA’s cost analysts had to adjust certain cost elements and remove costs for the two 

additional satellites assumed by NASA. Still, at least one cost element in NOAA’s estimate, 

for program management, was not detailed with the lower level cost elements, obscuring 

the adjustments made by the cost analysts. 

Obtain the data. In some cases, the NOAA and independent cost analysts had difficulty 

collecting quality historical and other data that could be used for developing the estimates. 

The independent cost-estimating team was critical of the CARD’s lack of technical details 

for the ground system and told us that it struggled to obtain more specifics from the 

program and its ground system contractor. JPSS’ life-cycle cost includes sunk costs19 from 

work completed under the NPOESS program in FY 2010 and prior; NOAA had not 

completed an accounting effort of the sunk costs before it finished the program office 

estimate. NOAA’s cost analysts did not have underlying details from NASA’s cost estimate 

that served as major input to the program office estimate. Further, the cost analysts told us 

that they were not included in NASA meetings and learned of design changes from monthly 

program status review materials. This was echoed by a NASA program official, who 

separately told us that NOAA’s cost analysts did not attend NASA’s technical meetings and 

likely did not have adequate knowledge of design decisions. 

Conduct sensitivity analysis. A sensitivity analysis consists of identifying key cost drivers and 

varying individual parameters to determine which are most sensitive to change. The results 

should include a range of possible costs and a method for performing “what-if” analysis for 

system design decisions. As such, sensitivity analysis is valuable for making informed 

decisions as to the best options for delivering planned capabilities. Sensitivity analyses 

should be well-documented and presented to management for decisions. Yet, the JPSS 

program office estimate developed in 2011 did not include documentation of this best 

practice. 

Document the estimate. A reliable cost estimate is comprehensive and accurate and can be 

easily and clearly traced, replicated, and updated. It should include data sources, the process 

18 In fact, NASA is currently reporting that major contractual and technical decisions pertaining to JPSS-2, JPSS-3,
 

and JPSS-4 must be made in 2012 to support procurement activities starting in 2013. Thus far, the Department and 

NOAA are constraining the scope of JPSS cost estimates to just the first two satellites.

19 Sunk costs are costs that have already been incurred and cannot be recovered.
 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 12 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

	 

	 

	 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

followed, and methods used. Aside from the CARD and a management brief, the JPSS 

program office estimate was supported by limited documentation. The estimate itself 

consisted of a single electronic spreadsheet. Comment fields in the spreadsheet sometimes 

referred to the data source for a given cost element, which in nearly all cases was a NASA 

brief of its own cost estimate for the program. As a whole, documentation for the program 

office estimate did not adequately identify or include data sources, assumptions, methods, 

and decisions basic to the estimate. When we discussed it with them, NOAA’s cost analysts 

acknowledged that the estimate was not documented to an extent consistent with best 

practice. 

III. NOAA Should Address Concerns with Revised Cost Estimate 

The revised program office estimate, supporting a $12.9 billion life-cycle cost, was briefed 

to OMB in early June. The revised estimate indicated that, contrary to proposals made in 

the FY 2013 President’s Budget submission, much of the original program content included 

in its preliminary high-level requirements document could be retained under the cost cap. 

While the revised estimate was not available for review during our fieldwork, NOAA’s JPSS 

Director and Deputy Director gave us an overview of the estimate (with the same 

presentation used to brief OMB) in early August. In advance of Key Decision Point 1, the 

program should address the following concerns about its reliability: 

•	 Despite OMB’s approval of the program’s revised capabilities and schedule, there 

remains a high degree of uncertainty in design requirements of the free flyer project, 

which has the potential to cost significantly more than what is currently budgeted (see 

our discussion of free flyer requirements in finding I). The program is also formulating 

significant design changes for the ground system. And the program is currently revising 

the CARD, which provides the technical baseline needed to properly derive an estimate. 

•	 An independent cost estimate has not validated the revised estimate. 

•	 Intended to bring stability to the appropriation, the revised estimate includes an 

artificially flattened budget profile for FY 2013–FY 2017 at $900 million per year, plus 

the cost of climate sensors previously budgeted in a different NOAA program. As 

depicted in figure 4 and acknowledged by program managers, however, space 

acquisitions typically exhibit peaked funding profiles. In the figure, the 2011 program 

office and independent cost estimate curves demonstrate the surge in resources 

necessary to ensure completion of development, integration, and testing of sensors, 

spacecraft, and launch vehicles; this is much less evident in the revised estimate for the 

FY 2013 President’s Budget. 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 13 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

	 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Figure 4. Budget Profiles (FY 2012–FY 2017) of JPSS Cost Estimates 

(in millions of FY 2010 dollars) 

Source: OIG presentation of program data 

An artificially flattened profile restricts access to needed resources, without which the 

program’s ability to deliver promised capabilities and meet schedules is at risk. As such, 

there is an increased likelihood that the program will need to delay the delivery of 

capabilities postlaunch in order to sufficiently fund the most critical work preparing for 

launch. We have concerns as to whether stakeholders (in particular, users of JPSS data) 

will be adequately informed and prepared for such decisions, should they occur (see, for 

example, finding IV, part B, below). 

IV.	 Suomi NPP Data Validation and Ground System Improvements Needed for 

Operational Use 

As we reported in September 2011, some of Suomi NPP’s key instruments encountered 

technical issues as they were built, and they were launched with significant residual risks. 

Since the October 28, 2011, launch, there have been on-orbit anomalies with Suomi NPP’s 

sensors, including one that prolonged the satellite’s checkout phase by 6 weeks. Issues with 

certain data records and additional constraints from a planned upgrade of supercomputers 

used in numerical weather prediction20 will delay the operational use of those data records 

until December 2013. 

20 Numerical weather prediction models use millions of weather data (for example, temperature, pressure, wind) 

to represent current conditions and make predictions of future states of the atmosphere. 

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

The JPSS program was able to sufficiently validate important sensor data records from the 

Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS), which provides temperature and 

moisture data that significantly contribute to numerical weather prediction. As of May 22, 

2012, or 7 months after Suomi NPP’s launch, ATMS data records were being assimilated 

into NOAA’s global forecast system, which is the foundation for all medium-range (3–7 day) 

forecasts in the United States. 

In March 2012, NASA’s NPP program formally accepted the Suomi NPP satellite from its 

contractor, Ball Aerospace. Then, after a successful operations transfer review, the JPSS 

program accepted responsibility for interim Suomi NPP satellite operations. Approximately 

15 months postlaunch, Suomi NPP satellite operations will be turned over to NOAA’s 

Office of Satellite and Product Operations. While many of the difficulties the program has 

faced are typical for a new satellite system, continued follow-through on actions in response 

to our prior recommendations is needed. 

A.	 Degradation of Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite sensor delayed Suomi NPP 

commissioning 

Approximately 1 month after Suomi NPP’s launch, NASA’s project team discovered that 

VIIRS’s sensitivity in certain spectral bands21 was degrading. As an investigation was 

launched, measures were taken to isolate VIIRS and prevent other Suomi NPP instruments 

from being damaged, essentially halting planned commissioning activities. The investigation 

ultimately delayed Suomi NPP commissioning 6 weeks and, in particular, use of the Crosstrack Infrared Sounder (CrIS). 

The root cause was determined to be tungsten oxide contamination on VIIRS’ mirrors 

stemming from a deviation in the manufacturing process. The degradation correlated with 

solar exposure and affected a limited number of spectral bands detected by VIIRS. While 

continuing, the rate of degradation is predicted to level off, and the quality of the sensor’s 

data is currently expected to exceed specifications even after 7 years of operation. 

Suomi NPP’s VIIRS was built under the NPOESS program, which, as we discussed in our 

September 2011 report, was managed by a contractor with limited government oversight. 

Nevertheless, it is concerning that a sensor with optics such as VIIRS’ was not subjected to 

testing sufficient to have identified the contamination. NASA has taken steps to ensure such 

testing will be done on the next VIIRS sensors (to fly on JPSS-1 and JPSS-2), better 

simulating space environment exposures that are most significant to a very important 

sensor. 

21 Finite segments of wavelengths in the electromagnetic spectrum. 

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

B.	 Deferred ground system work, sensor data record discrepancies, and a planned modernization 

of NCEP’s supercomputer system will result in unforeseen delay in operational use of Suomi 

NPP data 

The Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS) will provide key data—atmospheric temperature, 

moisture, and pressure—that complement ATMS data and will be used in numerical 

weather prediction. As a result of the VIIRS degradation described above, however, the 

flow of CrIS data from the satellite to the ground system was delayed approximately 6 

weeks until mid-January 2012. Additional ground system updates delayed full analysis of CrIS 

sensor data records another week or more. At this point, the program discovered errors in 

the data records that required additional ground system software changes. 

Some of the errors with CrIS data records were the result of ground system work deferred 

until after Suomi NPP’s launch, which we cautioned in our September 2011 report could 

delay operational use of data. An error discovered after initial CrIS data were reviewed— 

incorrect geo-location codes22—prevented the data from being tested by the National 

Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) for use in its numerical weather prediction 

models. Therefore, CrIS data could not be assimilated into NCEP’s operational forecast 

system during its system changes in May 2012. Further, due to planned upgrades to NCEP’s 

supercomputers in 2012–2013 and a subsequent system freeze during the 2013 hurricane 

season, CrIS data cannot be assimilated for operational forecasting until the next available 

window in December 2013. These same factors apply to other Suomi NPP data records 

(from VIIRS and the Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite [OMPS]) that will be used for 

operational weather forecasting. 

NCEP officials told us there also may have been some misunderstanding with the JPSS 

program regarding NCEP’s need for CrIS data as soon as possible. According to the JPSS 

ground segment project manager, the programmatic interface with NCEP was through 

NOAA’s NPOESS Data Exploitation System, which further processes ground system data 

for NOAA users. While the circumstances described above were likely unavoidable, 

together they illustrate a need expressed in a recommendation in the September 2011 

report: NOAA’s Deputy Under Secretary for Operations should coordinate efforts from 

across line offices to minimize the degradation of weather and climate forecasting. 

C.	 Ground system risks realized early in life of Suomi NPP must be mitigated for operational use of 

data 

As discussed in our September 2011 report, the ground system supporting Suomi NPP 

consisted of a single receiving station through which to downlink science data collected by 

the satellite’s instruments. While the ground system’s design may have been appropriate for 

Suomi NPP’s conception as a research mission, we warned that without a secondary, 

geographically distinct receiving station, disruptions to ground equipment could result in 

loss or delay of data, which will soon be needed for operational forecasting. 

22 The latitude and longitude of environmental conditions observed by the sensor and from which the data were 

derived. 

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

After Suomi NPP’s launch, undersea cables connecting the receiving station in Svalbard, 

Norway, with the ground system’s data processing components in the United States were 

cut or otherwise disrupted. Measures were taken to retain data at the receiving station, but 

data processing by the ground system was significantly delayed and would not have been 

useful for operational weather forecasting had it been needed. This spurred the program to 

stand up an emergency secondary receiving station in Fairbanks, Alaska, with spare 

equipment, repurposed for the emergency situation. The secondary downlink station does 

not provide full backup capability, and more work will be required to add sufficiently robust 

capability for operational needs. 

Further, the program plans a stopgap measure for implementing a backup mission 

management center for Suomi NPP, also a recommendation in our September report. 

Longer term, the program plans to build a robust alternate ground system that will provide 

backup mission management and data processing capabilities in time to support JPSS-1. 

D.	 Calibration and validation activities needed to operationalize data present management 

challenges 

As reported in September 2011, the JPSS program has yet to reach agreement with 

NESDIS’s Center for Satellite Applications and Research (STAR) on the management of 

science algorithms and calibration and validation activities needed to operationalize and 

maintain JPSS data products. While STAR scientists are leading program teams responsible 

for calibration and validation of data records, STAR staff report to their own management 

and support JPSS program staff, who manage the overall effort. STAR managers have stated 

they do not have sufficient authority to determine and manage their JPSS-related budget. 

NOAA intended to finalize, by March 2012, a plan to transition management of these 

activities to STAR, which was in response to our recommendation. A final plan has not 

materialized, however, and both STAR and JPSS staff indicate that there is disagreement 

over the timeline for the transition. STAR staff proposed taking over management of 

calibration and validation activities once JPSS turns over operation of the Suomi NPP 

satellite to NOAA’s Office of Satellite Products and Operations, planned for 15 months 

postlaunch (approximately February 2013). JPSS staff believe that the transition will be more 

appropriate once data records and underlying algorithms have reached a more stable phase 

sometime after launch of JPSS-1. In the meantime, work needed to complete calibration and 

validation of data records was getting done. More recently, however, the program reported 

a management dispute with respect to STAR participation in the development of ground 

system requirements and concept of operations needed to operationalize Suomi NPP and 

prepare for JPSS-1, potentially delaying the ground project’s system requirements and 

definition review. The program recently told us that it was hopeful it would reach an 

agreement with STAR without needing to engage NESDIS management to clarify roles and 

responsibilities. 

In response to our September 2011 audit report, NOAA planned to identify resources 

needed to complete all calibration and validation work within 18 months. JPSS staff, 

however, told us that 24 months was the program’s nominal schedule for completing such 

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

activities. The program’s schedule indicated that 22 products will take from 27 to 48 

months postlaunch to reach a stage where their accuracy has been established in a 

systematic and statistically robust way, representing global conditions. Higher priority data 

records—those needed for weather forecasting—will be validated and operationalized 

sooner. 

In addition to prioritizing its schedule of activities, the program has addressed resource 

constraints by canceling NOAA-funded aircraft flights that would have collected 

atmospheric data for comparisons with Suomi NPP data. STAR scientists, who did not know 

of the decision until we asked them, considered the aircraft flights an essential calibration 

and validation activity. Finally, the program continues to negotiate to retain key Northrop 

Grumman expertise that would be lost with the termination of a remaining NPOESS 

contract supporting calibration and validation. 

V. Assessment of Expected Data Gap Between Suomi NPP and JPSS-1 

Over the course of the program to date, we have analyzed Suomi NPP and JPSS schedules 

to assess expected gaps in weather forecast data, a subset of all the environmental data to 

be collected by these satellites’ instruments. In June 2011, we estimated an 18–30-month 

gap between Suomi NPP and JPSS-1, based on the status of the satellites’ development at 

that time. In our September 2011 report, we estimated that the expected gap in useful 

satellite data had improved to between 9 and 21 months, in part due to an improved 

funding outlook for JPSS. Currently, we project a 10–16-month gap between Suomi NPP 

and JPSS-1 operational data (see figure 5). 

In our current analysis, we assume a JPSS-1 launch in March 2017, which is 1 month later 

than what we assumed in our September 2011 assessment. The program is currently 

projecting a JPSS-1 launch in the second quarter of fiscal year 2017, a one-quarter slip from 

its previous estimate. We maintain a conservative outlook by assuming the launch will occur 

near the end of the quarter. 

Our current data gap projection also assumes that 6 to 12 months of postlaunch activity will 

be necessary for JPSS-1 data to be sufficiently calibrated and validated for operational use. 

Given that Suomi NPP’s design life is 5 years, it is possible that the program will not have 

Suomi NPP data to compare with JPSS-1 measurements. In that case, the program would 

need to use other space-borne assets, including any legacy NOAA polar satellites still 

operating (an increasingly remote possibility) and those of other agencies and international 

partners, as well as in situ data. This scenario would tend to extend the time needed to 

calibrate and validate JPSS-1data. 

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Figure 5. Potential Continuity Gaps for Polar-Satellite Operational Forecast Data 

Source: OIG analysis of program data, as of June 6, 2012 

It is also possible that Suomi NPP will continue to operate beyond its design life. NASA’s 

launch of Suomi NPP proved to be very precise, with the result that fuel intended to propel 

the satellite into the proper orbit was conserved. The saved propellant may be used for an 

additional 7 years (a total of 14 years) of orbit maintenance maneuvers and prolong the 

usefulness of Suomi NPP—although the life of its command, control, and communications 

systems and, even more so, its instruments will likely be limiting factors. Further, Suomi 

NPP calibration and validation activities have had some early successes, particularly with the 

assimilation of ATMS data records into operational weather forecasting models. Given that 

JPSS-1 will fly the same instruments, this success favors a shorter postlaunch time period 

before JPSS-1 data may be used operationally. 

In September 2011, we reported on activities within NOAA to use other sources of data to 

mitigate gaps and recommended that NOAA coordinate efforts from across its line offices 

to minimize the degradation of weather and climate forecasting. In response, NOAA 

indicated that it was looking at both foreign and commercial sources of data. However, 

NOAA has not yet fully developed a strategy for evaluating and selecting foreign data 

sources. 

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Recommendations 

To guide JPSS toward successful program implementation, we recommend that the NOAA 

Deputy Under Secretary for Operations ensure that 

1.	 Sufficient resources and attention are given to finalizing JPSS high-level requirements 

and completing system definition. 

2.	 The program’s acquisition strategy for JPSS-3 and JPSS-4 is determined, documented, 

and shared with the Department, OMB, and Congress. 

3.	 NESDIS and the JPSS program quantify cost savings as part of its ongoing effort to 

determine the most efficient approach to processing environmental data records. 

4.	 NESDIS determines whether an enterprise approach to developing and maintaining 

data products from its environmental satellites could achieve economies of scale and 

complement other efforts to modernize its system architecture. 

5.	 Sufficient resources and attention are given to permanently filling key management 

positions. 

To ensure that JPSS and other NOAA major system acquisition program cost estimates are 

reliable, the NOAA Deputy Under Secretary for Operations should 

6.	 Direct the development of a policy that requires major system acquisition programs 

to adhere to cost-estimating best practices. 

7.	 In the interim, ensure that cost-estimating best practices are more closely adhered 

to in the JPSS program and other major system acquisitions. 

To manage risks inherent with JPSS’ anticipated (flat) funding, the NOAA Deputy Under 

Secretary for Operations should ensure that 

8.	 An independent cost estimate adequately tests the viability of the program’s funding 

profile. 

9.	 Stakeholders are sufficiently informed of unplanned schedule and capabilities 

tradeoffs, if needed, to meet surges in effort necessary for launches. 

To use Suomi NPP data in operational forecasting, NOAA should continue actions taken in 

response to our September 2011 audit recommendations. 

To prepare for an expected gap in polar satellite data, NOAA should continue actions taken 

in response to our September 2011 audit recommendations. 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 20 
 

 

 

 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Summary of Agency Response and OIG 

Comments 

In responding to our draft report, NOAA concurred with all of our recommendations. It also 

suggested factual and technical changes and made editorial comments in regard to certain 

aspects of our findings. See appendix B for the complete response. 

We have made minor changes to the report where program documentation substantiated 

NOAA’s recommended changes and the revisions provided a better understanding of the 

issues. Beyond those changes, we offer the following comments on NOAA’s specific responses. 

NOAA asserted that the program’s prolonged formulation activities were attributable to 

“inadequate funding in FY 2011 and FY 2012” rather than the issues with governance structure 

and staffing we describe in the report. However, our discussion of these issues both in this and 

prior reports does acknowledge the funding challenges the program has experienced in FY 

2010 and FY 2011. (In FY 2012, Congress funded JPSS with $924 million compared with its 

$1.07 billion budget request.) 

NOAA suggested that part of our discussion of NOAA’s cost-estimating process in finding II 

“misrepresents the confidence in the cost estimate.” In particular, the agency objected to our 

findings about the differences in ground rules and assumptions between the NASA and NOAA 

cost estimates. Our analysis is supported by both program documentation and information we 

obtained from separate interviews of NOAA and NASA staff. Further, as described in this 

finding, the analysis of NOAA’s cost-estimating process was necessarily limited to its activities 

in 2011. We told NOAA officials at our audit exit conference that it was possible some of the 

issues we identified may become less substantial as the cost estimate was refined in 2012 and 

going forward. 

NOAA indicated that since we issued our draft report, a JPSS acquisition strategy meeting with 

NOAA and NASA leadership was held and NOAA plans to communicate with the 

Administration and Congress on such matters and use the information for future budget 

requests. We look forward to learning more about the strategy in our continuing oversight 

work. 

Finally, NOAA indicated that in our discussion of the management of calibration and validation 

activities (finding IV, part D), our statements concerning the transition of responsibility to STAR 

do not reflect NESDIS management’s view. Elsewhere in the response, NOAA indicates that 

this issue has no impact on the program. We would suggest that NESDIS management has a 

different view from JPSS project managers and that impact, both to JPSS and STAR, is described 

in the report. 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 21 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

	 


 

	 

	 

	 


 

	 

	 

	 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

This audit was initiated in November 2011 as part of our FY 2012 work plan and in conjunction 

with our Top Management Challenges facing the Department of Commerce. Our objectives 

were the following: 

1.	 Assess the adequacy of JPSS formulation activities, including development of 

requirements, schedule, and cost baselines.
 

2.	 Monitor the program's efforts to maintain continuity of polar satellite data from the 

afternoon orbit, specifically activities supporting Suomi NPP on-orbit operations and the 

development of JPSS-l. 

To accomplish our first objective, we interviewed NOAA and NASA program managers and 

staff involved in program formulation, including contractors supporting such efforts. We also 

interviewed the independent cost estimate contractor and staff in NOAA’s Office of the Chief 

Financial Officer, who oversaw the development of the independent cost estimate for JPSS and 

had knowledge pertaining to NOAA’s budget formulation. In addition, we obtained information 

from the Department’s Office of Budget. We examined program activities and documentation 

supporting baseline development and compared them with the following standards and best 

practices: 

•	 NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements (NPR 7120.5D, 

including NASA Interim Directive 7120-97), March 2007 

•	 GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs (GAO-09-3SP), March 2009
 

•	 Department of Defense Standard: Work Breakdown Structures for Defense Materiel 

Items (MIL-STD-881C), October 2011 

To accomplish our second objective, we interviewed JPSS program and project level staff from 

both NOAA and NASA. Our senior satellite analyst attended the American Meteorological 

Society Conference in January 2012, which included presentations from and interactions with 

JPSS program staff and scientists. We interviewed officials and staff from NOAA’s Center for 

Satellite Applications and Research and the National Centers for Environmental Prediction. We 

reviewed and analyzed weekly and monthly program and project status reports and other 

documentation. Our fieldwork also included attending multiple JPSS program management 

reviews: 

•	 monthly NOAA Program Management Councils 

•	 monthly flight and ground system contractors’ program management reviews 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 22 
 

 

 

 

 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

• NPP satellite acceptance review, March 6, 2012 

• NPP operations transfer review, March 7, 2012 

• JPSS program’s system requirements review, May 22–24, 2012 

• JPSS Key Decision Point 0 review, July 20, 2012 

We reviewed internal controls significant within the context of our audit objectives: 

NOAA/NASA satellite acquisition program management policies and practices and program 

schedules (discussed in findings I and II) and program reviews (discussed in finding IV). 

Although we could not independently verify the reliability of all the information we collected, 

we compared it with other available supporting documents to determine data consistency and 

reasonableness. From these efforts, we believe the information we obtained is sufficiently 

reliable for this report. 

We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence that provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We conducted our review from November 2011 through August 2012 under the authority of 

the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Department Organizational Order 10-13. 

We performed fieldwork at the following locations: 

• NOAA headquarters in Silver Spring, Maryland 

• JPSS program office in Lanham, Maryland 

• Raytheon’s facility in Aurora, Colorado 

• Ball Aerospace Technology Corporation’s facility in Boulder, Colorado 

• NCEP headquarters in Camp Springs, Maryland 

• the AMS Conference in New Orleans, Louisiana 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 23 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Appendix B: Agency Response 
 

UNITED SlATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

The Coputy Under Sttcrutary for 

Operatio ns Washington, O.C. 20230 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Allen Crawley 

Assistant Inspector General for Systems Acquisition and IT Security 

FROM: David W. Titley, PhD / AI( J /z_KJ 

NOAA Deputy Under Secretary for Operations 

SUBJECT: Audit of the Joint Polar Satellite System: Continuing 

Progress in &tablishing Capabilities, Sc edu e~~ and 

Costs Is Needed to Mitigate Data Gaps 

Draft OIG Audit Report 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Office of the Inspector General's draft audit 

report evaluating the Joint Polar Satellite System program. Our specific comments on the 

report's findings and recommendations are auached. 

Attachment 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 24 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

Department of Commerce 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

Comments on the Draft OIG Report Entitled, 

"Audit of the Joint Pola1' Satt>llite System: Continuing Progt·ess in Establishing 

Capabilities, Schedules, and Costs is Needed to l\litigate Data Gaps" 

(Draft Report August 29, 2012) 

Gt>neral CommPnts 

The Depat1ment of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 

appreciates the opporttuuty to review the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) draft report 

evaluating: the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program. NOAA respectfully requests that the 

OIG acknO\vledg:e that JPSS exists in multiple stages of development. The oYerall system is still 

in its formulation phase, consistent with space acquisition practices. Decisions required for neartenumissions have been made. and JPSS is executing: to these plans. Planning: for longer-tenu 

decisions (e.g .. related to JPSS-1/2 follo\Y-on missions) is undenYay. and those strategies and 

decisions will be made when needed. 

NOAA believes the draft report highlights important issues. The discussion and negotiations are 

nonnal for a program as complex as JPSS. Clarifications to items that are incomplete or 

misstated are included. 

NOAA Rt>sponse to Recommendations 

To guide JPSS toward successful program implementation, we recommend that the NOAA 

Deputy Under Secretary for Operations ensure that: 

Recommendation 1: "Sufficient resources and attention are given to ftnalizing JPSS highlevel requirements and completing: system de:tinition ... 

NOAA Response: We concur. The original JPSS Level 1 Requirements Document (LlRD) 

was signed in 2010 and the NOAA JPSS Office has been working to update the LlRD since 

Januru.y 2012. This update incmporates all the kno\vn changes to requirements and v>ill serve as 

the system baseline as the Program moves to the System Defmition Revie\v. The draft document 

is cunently in review and approval by the Deputy Under Secretary for Operations is expected in 

November 2012. 

Recommendation 2: "The program's acquisition strategy for JPSS-3 and JPSS-4 is 

detemuned. documented. and shared \Yith the Depatiment. OMB and Congress.'' 

NOAA Response: \Ve concm. huplementation of this recommendation is underway. A joint 

Depa1tment/NOAA and ASA Acquisition Strategy Meeting was held on August 29. 2012. and 

NOAA is plruming: to sha1·e the acquisition strategy with OMB and Congress at a date to yet be 

detemuned. 

Recommendation 3: "NESDIS and the JPSS program quantify cost savings as pat1 of its 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 25 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

ongoing effort to determine the most efficient approach to processing environmental data 

records.'' 

NOAA Response: We concur. Since Spring 2012. JPSS has been conducting an analysis of the 

most efficient way to process the envimnmental data records. As we continue to incorporate 

efficiencies we will quantify cost savings compared to the approach inherited from National 

Polar-orbiting Operational EnYironmental Satellite System IFOESS). This is an ongoing 

process and not a one-time smdy. For example. in the 2012 program office estimate. KOAA 

incorporated many cost-savings into the program. The program will continue to revisit this 

ISSUe. 

Recommendation 4: "NESDIS detennines \Vhether an enterprise approach to developing 

and maintaining data products from its environmental satellites could achieve economies of scale 

and complement other effotts to modemize its system architecture.'' 

NOAA Response: We concur. NESDIS is cmTently assessing approaches to def111eldirect 

Enterprise G-round Services architech1re. NESDIS has set thio;, is as a strategic priority. and io;, 

taking stepo;, to complete this assessment by the second quatter of FY13. 

Recommendation 5: '"Sufficient resources and attention are given to pennanently filling 

key management poo;,itions. 

NOAA Response: We concur. Implementation of this recommendation is already under way. 

As noted in the report. the NESDIS Deputy Assistant Administrator for Systemo;, position is 

vacant. Tllis position am1om1cement is ctm·ently open on USAJobs. with a close date of October 

1. 2012 . Filling this poo;,ition is a priority for NESDIS and NOA.t\. NESDIS is also looking at 

ways to strengthen its cotporate knowledge with the addition of t\vo seruor managers with 

expeltise in Syo;tems Engineering and Grmmd Systems. Witllin the NOAA JPSS Office. the 

Systems Engineer position and at least t\vo additional systems engineering positiono;, are expected 

to be filled by the end of the calendar year. The Budget Officer o;, election hao;, been made, and the 

Budget Officer will start in the NOAA JPSS Office in October. These additional staff will allow 

JPSS adequately plan. manage. and execute the mission. 

To ensure that JPSS and other NOAA major system acquisition program cost estimates are 

reliable. the NOAA Deputy Under Secretary for Operations should: 

Recommendation 6: '"Direct the deYelopment of a policy that requires major system 

acquisition programs to adhere to cost-eo;,timating best practiceo;,.'' 

NOAA Response: We concur. The Government Accotmtability Office (GAO) recently issued a 

rep01t on cost estimating (GA0-1 2-629) and in NOAA'o;, reo;ponse. we indicated that NOAA 

would benefit fi:om Commerce-level policies that ensure that NOAA's procedm·es are consistent 

with other Commerce bureaus' cost estimations. Those efforts are ongoing and NOAA expects 

to comply once the Department of Commerce has io;,sued its guidelines and policy govenling cost 

estimating. 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 26 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

Recommendation 7: "In the interim. ensme that cost-estimating best practices are more 

closely adhered to in the JPSS program and other maj or system acquisitions:' 

NOAA Response: l)le concur. JPSS will continue to use cost-estimating best practices. 

perform lessons leamed before the next cost estimating update. and ensure om cost estimating 

methods are independently reYiewed to verify adherence. For example. the JPSS kicked off the 

development of an update to the Cost Analysis Requirements Docmnents (CARD) in late .Ttme 

20 12. and will be completed and appropriately vetted by late Fall 2 012. The requirements in the 

update \vill sen·e as input for the program estimate and independent cost estimate (ICE) planned 

for late 2012 I early 2013 . The ICE will be led by the Department of Conunerce Cost Analysis 

Division with suppott from the US Air Force Cost Analysis Agency Space Division. The 

updated CARD will reflect the Final Level 1 Requirements Document. as well as improved 

defmition on the ground system as presented during the August Ground System requirements 

and Definition Review (GSRR I GSDR). 

To manage risks inherent with JPSS' anticipated (flat) funding. the NOAA Deputy Under 

Secretary for Operations should ensme that: 

Recommendation 8: "An independent cost estimate adequately tests the viability of 

the pro gram's fimding profile.·· 

NOAA Respome: We concur. An update to the FY 201 1 independent cost estimate (ICE) is 

expected to be completed by March 2013. 

Recommendation 9: " Stakeholders are sufficiently informed of unplanned schedule and 

capabilities tradeoffs. if needed. to meet surges in ef£011 necessary for launches.'' 

NOAA. Response: \Ve concur. The JPSS Office hosts several meetings to ensure that 

stakeholders are up-to-date on the stahts of the program and aware of any changes to JPSS 

capabilities or timelines. First. the Low-Ea11h Orbiting Requirements "Working Group 

(LORWG) meets regularly and is the focal point for the Low-Earth Orbiting Satellite operational 

requirements. The LORWG is presently meeting evety 2-3 \Veeks. Once the Levell 

Requirements Document is completed. the LORWG will meet less often since the meeting 

schedule is lifecycle-stage-dependent. Among their duties is to prepa1·e impact statements 

responding to Low-Ea1th Orbiting satellite technical program changes that could impact 

customer satisfaction. The JPSS Coordination Group meets at least every two months to 

coordinate on the development. operation and sustairnuent of the JPSS (and Suomi NPP) Ground 

System. In addition. the JPSS Gt·otmd DiYision holds quarterly Customer Fonuns with 

teleconferences held in benveen these face -to-face meetings to discuss the program status and 

upcoming events with those '\Vho download and process the JPSS and NPP data. Finally 

tmplanned schedule and capabilities trades are rep011ed monthly at Govemance Council 

meetings. NOAA intends to continue these meetings tlu·ough the acquisition of the JPSS. 

Recommendation 10: "To use Suomi NPP data in operational forecasting. NOAA should 

continue actions taken in response to om September 2011 audit reconunendations.'' 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 27 
NOAA Response: vVe concur. NOAA is ah·eady responding and tracking responses to the 

September 2011 OIG repott . 

Recommendation 11: '·To prepare for an expected gap in pola1· satellite data. OAA should 

continue actions taken in response to our September 2011 audit recommendations.'' 

NOAA Response: We concur. NOAA is ah·eady responding and tracking responses to the 

September 2011 OIG repott . 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 28 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

De-partme-nt of Comme-rce 

~ational Oceanic and Atmosphe-ric Administration 

Comments on the Draft OIG Report Entitled, 

"Audit of the Joint Polat' Satellite System: Continuing Progress in Establishing 

Capabilities, Scheduleo;, and Coo;to; is :\leeded to Mitigate Data Gaps" 

(Draft Re-port August 29~ 2012) 

Recommended Change<; for Factual/Technical Information 

Page 3, first paragraph, second sentence: 

The date noted for JPSS-2 launch. 2022. is a launch readiness date and not a launch date. 

Recommend inset1i.ng '·readiness" after '· ... slated for launch."' 

Page 3, third paragraph, third sentence: 

The prolonged fonuulation activities were mainly a result of inadequate funding in FY 2011 and 

FY 20 12 and not because of a delayed governance structure and inadequate staffmg. We 

recommend that more insight be provided as to why the OIG has charactetized the delays in this 

way or delete the sentence. 

Page 3, fowth paragraph, third sentence: 

JPSS follows the best practices and policies of cost estimating: howenr. the JPSS is not a typical 

system in hvo substantiYe \lvays: a) it is a restmcture of the NPOESS program. which reqnit·ed 

JPSS to in11e1it the elements of that program. and b) the JPSS is comprised of at least 2 different 

kinds of spacecraft with different instnunent manifests. It is not like a typical NASA program 

that generally builds a one-of-a-kind satellite. and it is not like ptior NOAA satellite programs 

where multiple satellites with the same instruments were acquired. 

Page 3, fourth paragraph: 

There is no evidence for the assertion that '·efforts to operationalize Suomi NPP data have had 

mixed results thus far .. , and there is a factual en·or in the sentence that states ··other data records 

\vill not be aYailable for operational use until December 2013."' The operational use of ATMS 

data by the NWS was on a schedule that was faster than any other assimilation of new satellite 

data in the past. and the calibration/validation of all of the data products is progressing well. In 

fact. all of the data products are available now in ··beta·· phase. and some are being used 

operationally now. Calibrati01 validation of the products \Yill continue through the life of the 

program. and there are 40 envi1·oruuental data records created from Suomi NPP data. 

Recommend clarification be added to describe ,,·hat '·mixed results"' is referring to and 

clarification added to describe the status of the data products. 

Page 5, (irst paragraph, fourth sentence: 

Consistent with NPR 7120.5E. NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 

Requirements. program baseline are established at Key Decision Point I. demonstrating 

sufficiency to begin implementation with established content. cost and schedule cOimnitment. 

The aliO\vable duration or period for the fornmlation phase varies across programs to 

accommodate feasibility assessments. risk assessments. buildup of teams/organizations. 

development of operations concept. establishment of high level requirements and success 

criteria. approval of plans. budgets. schedules. coordination and implementation of programs 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 29 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

controls. and other petf onnance criteria. Recommend adding ··which is consistent with NPR 

7120.5E. NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements'' after 

" ... cunentlyplanned for July 2013:' 

Page 5, Table 1: 

Recommend adding Suomi NPP to the row labeled. '·satellites'' in all three colunms became the 

cost includes Suomi NPP. Also. recommend adding a new row labeled. ··instnunents'' to 

indicate that the instrument list has not changed since the 2009 estimate. but only how they 

\Yould be acconm10clated has changed. Page 6, fourth paragraph, first sentence: 

The Ground System Block 1.5 review was delayed. but the Ground System Block 2.0 reYiew was 

accelerated: so the overall result was a faster. more efficient schedule. Recommend clarific ation. 

Page 10, first paragraph, fifth sentence: 

Reconunend adding clarification for '·potential for requirements changes .. , 

Page 12, second paragraph: 

This paragraph contains only a pot1ion of the cost-estimating process. and thus misrepresents the 

confidence in the cost estimate. The fu·st three sentences of the paragraph are patt of the 

estimating process and represent no issues. and the last two sentences are inaccurate in that. 

\Yhile program content may have evolved over time. there \Vas no misconummication bet\Yeen 

d1e agencies. For the 2012 POE. JPSS m ed NASA Planning. Programming. Budgeting. and 

Execution (PPBE) 14. which only had JPSS-2 and JPSS-3.Recommend deletion. 

Page 13, second paragraph, second sentence: 

Recommend deletion of ''contnuy to proposals .. , 

Page 13. third paragraph. first sentence: 

Reconm1end providing clarification of ''the potential to cost significantly more than what is 

ctmently budgeted.'' 

Pasze 17. fifth paragraph: 

This is an example of a description of an issue that has had no impact on the overall JPSS. and is 

patt of a complex satellite acquisition. Reconunend rewriting to clarify that discussions and 

negotiations between NESDIS offices has had no impact on the overall calibration/validation 

activities being completed. 

Editorial Comments 

Page 1, first paragraph o(introduction, a{ter last sentence: 

Add additional sentence. TI1e DOD is cunently assessing requirements for their follow-on to the 

Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. 

Page 1, Figure 1: 

To illustrate the system and intetfaces referenced throughout the presentation. recommend 

inserting the full JPSS Content as depicted below. The figure as shown in the cun·ent clt·aft OIG 

repon does not include the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) and \Vhite Sands 

link. as well as the appropriate references to Calibration/V alidation and Algoritlun Suppoti. The 

OIG simplified this graphic "·ithout providing rationale for the omitted elements. 

FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 30 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

Page 2, second paragraph, fourth sentence: 

The JPSS Program currently has projects that are in all Life Cycle Phases. Reconunend adding 

"and operations., following "both fonuulation and implementation." 

Page 2, fourth paragraph, first sentence: 

Suomi NPP provide5> continuity for both NASA Earth Observing System (EOS) and NOAA 

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES). both of \\"hose data are used 

operationally by the NOAA National Weather Service. Add '·and NOAA's Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellites (POES)'' after '· ... NASA's Eatih Observation System."' 

Also. recommend 5>ubstitution of''observing" for ''observation'' in the definition ofNASA EOS. 

Page 2, fourth paragraph, second sentence: 

Add "and NASA EOS'' after ... .. polar-orbiting operational enviromnental satellite"; .. , 

Page 3, third paragraph and Page 7, third paragraph, second sentence: 

Since the completion of the OIG report_ JPSS has pati icipated in an Acquisition Strategy 

Meeting with senior NOAA and NASA leadership. NO A.A. intends to conununicate its strategy 

for maintaining the continuity of polar-orbiting operational satellite ob5>ervations to the 

Administration and Congress. at a date to yet be determined. as well as use that infonuation for 

fumre budget requests. 

Page 7, first paragraph: 

Need to reword iirst full sentence to ··one such decision pettains to the ground system(s) that the 

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FINAL REPORT NO. OIG-12-038-A 32

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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