IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHAUN ADAMS, :

:

Plaintiff :

:

v. : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-15-467

:

T. BICKERT, ET AL., : (Judge Brann)

:

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

May 12, 2015

Background

Shaun Adams, an inmate presently confined at the State Correctional

Institution, Somerset, Pennsylvania, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has also submitted an in forma pauperis application. 

For the reasons set forth below, Adams’ action will be dismissed, without

prejudice, as legally frivolous pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

1915.

Named as Defendants in the Complaint are three (3) officials at Adams’

former place of confinement, the Smithfield State Correctional Institution,

Huntingdon, Pennsylvania (SCI-Smithfield): Lieutenant Abroshoff; Correctional

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Officers T. Bickert and H. Ersek. Plaintiff states that on or about March 6, 2013

he was escorted by Defendants Bickert and Ersek from the SCI-Smithfield

Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) yard to his cell. Upon arriving at Adams’ cell,

CO Bickert allegedly “yanked on the handcuffs leaving an abrasion on my wrists.” 

Doc. 1, ¶ IV(2). The Complaint adds that Bickert and Ersek refused Plaintiff’s

request for medical attention and Bickert “laughed and walked away smiling.” Id. 

Adams also asserts that the following day he notified prison supervisors of the

alleged incident. As relief, the Complaint seeks compensatory and punitive

damages. 

Discussion 

28 U.S.C. § 1915 imposes obligations on prisoners who file civil actions in

federal court and wish to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, e.g.,

that the full filing fee ultimately must be paid (at least in a non-habeas suit) §

1915(e)(2)provides:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may

have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action

or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief.

A district court may rule that process should not be issued if the complaint is

malicious, presents an indisputably meritless legal theory, or is predicated on clearly

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baseless factual contentions. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989);

Douris v. Middleton Township, 293 Fed. Appx. 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2008). 

Indisputably meritless legal theories are those "in which either it is readily apparent

that the plaintiff's complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or that the defendants are

clearly entitled to immunity from suit ... ." Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d

Cir. 1990) (quoting Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277, 1278 (11th Cir. 1990)). 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has added that "the

plain meaning of 'frivolous' authorizes the dismissal of in forma pauperis claims that

. . . are of little or no weight, value, or importance, not worthy of serious

consideration, or trivial." Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir.

1995). It also has been determined that "the frivolousness determination is a

discretionary one," and trial courts "are in the best position" to determine when an

indigent litigant's complaint is appropriate for summary dismissal. Denton, 504 U.S.

at 33.

Personal Involvement

With respect to the civil rights claims against Lieutenant Abroshoff, civil

rights claims cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior. Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, each named defendant

must be shown, via the complaint's allegations, to have been personally involved in

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the events or occurrences which underlie a claim. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976). As

explained in Rode:

A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs. . . . [P]ersonal involvement

can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of

actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation

or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made

with appropriate particularity. 

Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

Furthermore, prisoners have no constitutionally protected right to a grievance

procedure. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119,

137-38 (1977)(Burger, C.J., concurring) (“I do not suggest that the [grievance]

procedures are constitutionally mandated.”); Speight v. Sims, No. 08-2038, 2008

WL 2600723 at *1 (3d. Cir. Jun 30, 2008)(citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641,

647 (7th Cir. 2001)(“[T]he existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no

liberty interest on a prisoner.”) 

 While prisoners do have a constitutional right to seek redress of their

grievances from the government, that right is the right of access to the courts which

is not compromised by the failure of prison officials to address an inmate’s

grievance. See Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (federal grievance

regulations providing for administrative remedy procedure do not create liberty

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interest in access to that procedure). 

Although the Complaint lists Lieutenant Abroshoff as being a Defendant,

there are no other factual assertions whatsoever set forth regarding said official. As

such, it appears that Plaintiff is attempting to establish liability against said

Defendant based upon either his supervisory capacity or a failure to take action in

response to Plaintiff’s post-incident complaint.

Based upon an application of the standards set forth in Rode, the Complaint to

the extent that it seeks to establish liability against Defendant Abroshoff under a

theory of respondeat superior is subject to dismissal. Likewise, any attempt by

Plaintiff to pursue a claim against Lieutenant Abroshoff based upon the handling of

an administrative grievance or complaint does not support a constitutional claim. 

See also Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 Fed. Appx. 924, 925 (3d Cir.

2005)(involvement in post-incident grievance process not a basis for § 1983

liability); Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F. Supp. 261, 275 (D. D.C. 1995) (because prison

grievance procedure does not confer any substantive constitutional rights upon

prison inmates, the prison officials' failure to comply with grievance procedure is

not actionable). Since there are no viable assertions of personal involvement by

Lieutenant Abroshoff in constitutional misconduct, dismissal will be granted in his

favor.

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Excessive Force

As discussed earlier, Plaintiff alleges that Correctional Officer Bickert

“yanked on the handcuffs leaving an abrasion on my wrists.” Doc. 1, ¶ IV(2). It is

initially noted that there is no allegation that Correctional Officer Ersek exercised

any force against Adams. Accordingly, under the personal involvement requirement

of Rode, a viable claim of excessive force has not been alleged against Ersek. 

A correctional officer's use of force in order to constitute cruel and unusual

punishment, must involve the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Whitley

v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “It is obduracy and wantonness, not

inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize[s] that conduct prohibited by

the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, whether the conduct occurs in

connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or

restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.” Id. 

In a later ruling, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the use of

force may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even if the prisoner does not

sustain "significant" injuries. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). The core

judicial inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Fuentes v.

Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 345 (3d Cir.); Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir.

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2000)(even a de minimis use of force, if repugnant to the conscience of mankind,

may be constitutionally significant). As explained in Fuentes:

Resolution of an Eighth Amendment claim therefore

‘mandate[s] an inquiry into a prison official’s state of

mind.’ Two considerations define that inquiry. We must

first determine if the deprivation was sufficiently serious to

fall within the Eighth Amendment’s zone of protections. 

If not, our inquiry is at an end. However, if the

deprivation is sufficiently serious, we must determine if

the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of

mind. In other words, we must determine if they were

motivated by a desire to inflict unnecessary and wanton

pain. ‘What is necessary to establish an “unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain. . .” varies according to the nature

of the alleged constitutional violation.’

206 F.3d at 344.

In the present case there is no allegation that the purported single yank on the

inmate’s handcuffs was retaliatory. There are also no facts asserted which could

suggest that there was any pre-existing animosity between Adams and Bickert or

that the officer acted with a malicious intent.

It is apparent to this Court that based upon an application of the factors

announced in Brooks and Whitley to the Complaint, there are no facts set forth

which could support a claim that the limited alleged action taken by Defendant

Bickert was an intentional sadistic attempt to inflict harm on Plaintiff. See Wilson

v. Horn, 971 F. Supp. 943, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1997)(a plaintiff must establish that the

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force was applied maliciously and sadistically, instead of in good faith). Moreover,

it appears that the yanking may have been incidental conduct which occurred as

Plaintiff’s handcuffs were being removed following his return to his cell. It is also

noted that although the Complaint indicates that Bickert laughed and walked away,

it is unclear whether that alleged response was in response to the alleged yanking of

the handcuffs or in response to Adams’ request for medical assistance. 

Since the Complaint is devoid of any facts showing that the action purportedly

taken by Defendant Bickert was the result of a malicious intent to inflict harm, a

viable excessive force claim has not been stated.1

Medical Treatment

It is also alleged that Defendants Bickert and Erser denied Plaintiff’s request

to be provided with medical treatment for “an abrasion on my wrists” and scratches. 

Doc. 1, ¶ IV(2). 

The Eighth Amendment “requires prison officials to provide basic medical

treatment to those whom it has incarcerated.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197

(3d Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). In order to establish

an Eighth Amendment medical claim, an inmate must allege acts or omissions by

1 If the Plaintiff can present facts showing that the yanking on his handcuffs

by Bickert was unnecessary and motivated by an intent to cause pain, he may file a

motion for reconsideration within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Memorandum.

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prison officials sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004); Natale v.

Camden Cty. Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). In the context

of medical care, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant was: (1) deliberately

indifferent (the subjective component) to (2) the plaintiff’s serious medical needs

(the objective component). Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987); West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1979). 

A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as

requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize

the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Mines v. Levi, 2009 WL 839011 *7 (E.D. Pa.

March 26, 2009)(quoting Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1023); Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst.

Inmates, 834 F.2d at 347. “[I]f unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain results as

a consequence of denial or delay in the provision of adequate medical care, the

medical need is of the serious nature contemplated by the Eighth Amendment.”

Young v. Kazmerski, 266 Fed. Appx. 191, 193 (3d Cir. 2008)(quoting Monmouth

Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates, 834 F.2d at 347). 

With respect to the serious medical need requirement, it has been recognized

by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that cuts requiring no more than small

bandages are not a serious medical needs covered by the Eighth Amendment. See

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Stankowski v. Farley, 251 Fed. Appx. 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2007). Swollen wrists also

does not constitute not a serious medical need. See Wesson v. Igelsby, 910 F. 2d

278, 284 (5th Cir. 1990). Second, there are no allegations that Plaintiff’s alleged

minor injuries required any medical treatment, or resulted in any type of permanent

or long lasting harm. Moreover, Adams has not come forth with any facts which

could establish that his the scratches and abrasions to his wrists constituted anything

more then temporary discomfort. Based upon the above decisions, the purported

scratches and abrasions to Adams’ wrists as described in the Complaint did not

constitute an obvious serious medical need as required under Estelle and Monmouth

Co. See Price v. Engert, 589 F. Supp.2d 240, 246 (W.D.N.Y. 2008)(wrist and hand

injuries do not satisfy the serious medical need requirement).

Assuming arguendo that the Complaint did satisfy the serious medical need

threshold, with respect to the subjective deliberate indifference component of

Estelle, the proper analysis for deliberate indifference is whether a prison official

“acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994). Based upon a liberal consideration of

Plaintiff’s allegations, there are no facts asserted showing that Adams’ scratches and

abrasions posed a substantial risk of serious harm which was apparent to Bickert and

Ersek and ignored. Accordingly, the subjective deliberate indifference component

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has also not been met. Pursuant to the above discussion, a viable claim of deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs has not been alleged.

Conclusion

Since Plaintiff's pending civil rights claims are"based on an indisputably

meritless legal theory" it will be dismissed, without prejudice, as legally frivolous. 

Wilson, 878 F.2d at 774. An appropriate Order will enter.

BY THE COURT:

 s/ Matthew W. Brann 

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

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