IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–0153

Filed February 24, 2017

Upon the Petition of

JUDITH ANN CHAPMAN,

Appellee,

and Concerning

JOHN KENDALL WILKINSON JR.,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert 

Hutchison, Judge.

A son seeks further review of a court of appeals decision finding 

that he perpetrated elder abuse on his mother. AFFIRMED.

Carmen E. Eichmann of Eichmann Law Firm, Des Moines, for 

appellant.

Judith A. Chapman, Grimes, pro se appellee.
2

WIGGINS, Justice.

The district court found a son committed elder abuse against his 

mother and entered an order against the son. The son appealed. Our 

court of appeals affirmed. The son sought further review. On further 

review, we are letting the court of appeals decision stand as the final 

decision that the district court advised Wilkinson of his right to counsel 

as required by Iowa Code section 235F.5(5). 2014 Iowa Acts ch. 1107, 

§ 5 (codified at Iowa Code 235F.5(5) (2015)). We are also letting the court 

of appeals decision stand as the final decision that under Iowa Code 

sections 235F.1(8) and (14) a person does not need to be a caretaker to 

commit elder abuse because a person standing “in a position of trust or 

confidence with the vulnerable elder” can perpetrate elder abuse. 

Additionally, we are letting the court of appeals decision stand as the 

final decision that sufficient evidence existed to find the mother had a life 

estate in the mobile home. On further review, we affirm the judgment of 

the district court that the mother was a vulnerable elder under section 

235F.1(17). 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Judith Chapman is sixty-nine years old and the mother of three 

adult children. After Chapman’s husband passed away in 2008, she 

moved to Grimes and purchased a mobile home. Thereafter, she put the 

title of the mobile home in her son John Wilkinson Jr.’s name. When 

she transferred the title of the mobile home to her son, she told him, 

“[W]hen I’m dead, it’s yours. It’s your inheritance.” At around the same 

time she put the title to the mobile home in her son’s name, she 

transferred ownership in a duplex to her two daughters.

She continued to live in the mobile home and paid the taxes on it. 

At some point, one of Chapman’s daughters moved into the mobile home 
3

with her. This caused Wilkinson to ask Chapman to pay him $35,000 

for him to give the title of the mobile home back to her. Chapman 

reiterated that the mobile home was to be Wilkinson’s inheritance and 

that he could sell it when she died. Following that discussion, Wilkinson 

posted at least three eviction notices to Chapman and her daughter on 

the door of the mobile home. 

On October 25, 2014, Wilkinson called the Polk County sheriff’s 

office regarding his sister trespassing at the mobile home. Wilkinson 

showed up at the mobile home with two deputies, and after speaking 

with Chapman and her daughter, the deputies informed Wilkinson that it 

was a civil matter. 

On November 4, Chapman filed a petition for relief from elder 

abuse under Iowa Code section 235F.2. She named Wilkinson as the 

defendant and alleged that the nature of the abuse was a “property 

dispute” and that he was “trying to take [her] home before [her] death.” 

On the same day, the district court entered a temporary protective order

and scheduled a hearing on November 13 to determine if it should enter 

a final protective order. On November 5, Wilkinson filed a motion for 

continuance because of a work obligation. The district court granted his 

motion. 

On November 24, the matter proceeded to a final hearing on 

Chapman’s request for an elder abuse protective order against 

Wilkinson. Both parties appeared pro se. At the hearing, Chapman 

testified that she put Wilkinson’s name on the title as his inheritance, 

and she would retain the mobile home as her residence until she died. 

She further testified, “[I]t’s just worrisome. I’m tired of having these 

eviction notices. And I’m just too old for it.” Her daughter who was 

living in the mobile home with her also testified it was known that the 
4

mobile home “would go to [Wilkinson] in inheritance upon [their 

mother’s] death.” 

Additionally, Wilkinson testified Chapman transferred the title into 

his name, brought it to him, and said, “Here’s the title to the trailer. If 

something happens to me, it’s yours. That way there is no dispute who it 

belongs to.” However, Wilkinson also stated he was the “sole proprietor 

owner of that property” and wanted to sell it now. He testified his 

attorney advised him this was an issue of “gifter’s remorse.” The district 

court asked Wilkinson the name of his attorney and if his attorney was 

present in court. Wilkinson stated his attorney was not present, and the 

court replied, “Probably would have been a good idea to have him here 

today.” 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court entered a final 

protective order against Wilkinson, finding that “[he] has financially 

exploited [Chapman] by failing to recognize the life estate she maintained 

in her mobile home at the time she gifted the remainder to him.” The 

district court ordered Wilkinson “shall take no action to infringe upon 

[Chapman’s] life estate in the mobile home.” Wilkinson was further 

prohibited from exercising control over or transferring any “funds, 

benefits, property, resources, belongings, or assets” of Chapman’s. 

Wilkinson was “restrained from abusing, harassing, intimidating, 

molesting, interfering with, or menacing the [v]ulnerable [p]etitioner, or 

attempting to abuse, harass, intimidate, molest, interfere with or menace 

the [p]etitioner.” Wilkinson was also “restrained from entering or 

attempting to enter” the mobile home, and “restrained from exercising 

any powers on behalf of the [p]etitioner through a court-appointed 

guardian, conservator, or guardian ad litem, an attorney in fact, or 

another third party.” 
5

On December 8, Wilkinson orally requested an extension of time to 

file a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) as he had 

recently retained counsel. The court granted the request, allowing 

Wilkinson until December 12 to file the motion. Wilkinson obtained 

counsel and filed a motion to enlarge or amend on December 12. In the 

motion, Wilkinson argued that (1) “the [c]ourt erred in failing to advise 

defendant that he was entitled to counsel and that he was entitled to a 

continuance to secure counsel,” (2) “[p]laintiff is not a ‘vulnerable elder’ 

as defined in Chapter 235F.1(11),” (3) “[d]efendant is not a ‘caretaker’ as 

defined under Chapter 235F.1(2),” and (4) “[t]he [c]ourt erred in finding 

there was ‘life estate’ in the mobile home.” Chapman did not resist the 

motion.

On December 28, the district court denied the motion to enlarge or 

amend its order, granting a final elder abuse protective order against 

Wilkinson. The court rejected each of Wilkinson’s arguments, finding the 

court advised Wilkinson of his right to counsel at the time he appeared 

before the court on November 5 to request a continuance. 

Next, the court stated, “[T]here was no showing that petitioner had 

a mental or physical condition which rendered her incapable of defending 

herself from elder abuse.” The court determined such a finding was 

unnecessary. The court further found Chapman “was unable to defend 

herself from respondent’s financial exploitation because of her age.” In 

reaching this conclusion, the court stated such a finding was sufficient 

under section 235F.1(17) to find elder abuse had occurred.

Third, the court found Wilkinson committed elder abuse by 

financial exploitation as an adult child “who stands in a position of trust 

or confidence” to Chapman under section 235F.1(14)(a) and not as a 
6

“caretaker.” Lastly, the court found there was sufficient evidence to 

establish Chapman retained a life estate in the mobile home. 

Wilkinson filed a notice of appeal. We transferred the case to the 

court of appeals. The court of appeals found the district court advised

Wilkinson of his right to counsel as required by section 235F.5(5). It also 

found a person does not need to be a caretaker to commit elder abuse 

because a person standing “in a position of trust or confidence with the 

vulnerable elder” can perpetrate elder abuse. Iowa Code § 235F.1(8). 

The Code defines a person who “stands in a position of trust or 

confidence” with the vulnerable elder as including an adult child. Id. 

§ 235F.1(14). The court of appeals further found sufficient evidence 

existed to find Chapman had a life estate in the mobile home.

Finally, the court of appeals found the district court had sufficient 

evidence to support its finding that Chapman “was a ‘vulnerable elder’ 

under section 235F.1(17) because she was unable to protect herself from 

financial exploitation due to her age.” Wilkinson filed and we granted his 

application for further review. 

II. Standard of Review.

District courts hear civil domestic abuse cases in equity, and we 

review them de novo. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). 

Because of the similar nature of our elder abuse law and domestic abuse 

law, we also review elder abuse cases de novo. “Under a de novo 

standard of review, we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of 

law or findings of fact, although we do give weight to factual findings, 

particularly when they involve the credibility of witnesses.” In re Estate 

of Warrington, 686 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 2004); see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 

6.904(3)(g). 
7

Finally, if an issue of statutory interpretation arises in our de novo 

review, we review issues of statutory interpretation for correction of 

errors at law. State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Iowa 2006).

III. Issue. 

Although Wilkinson raises numerous issues on appeal, we have 

discretion to review all the issues raised on appeal or in the application 

for further review, or only a portion thereof. Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality 

Egg, L.L.C., 878 N.W.2d 759, 768 (Iowa 2016). In exercising our 

discretion, we choose to review only the issue as to whether, on our de 

novo review, the evidence supports the district court’s finding that 

Chapman “was a ‘vulnerable elder’ under section 235F.1(17) because she 

was unable to protect herself from financial exploitation due to her age.” 

Accordingly, the court of appeals decision will stand as the final decision 

as to the other issues raised by Wilkinson on appeal. 

IV. Discussion and Analysis.

The district court found that due to Chapman’s age alone she was 

unable to protect herself from financial exploitation. The court of 

appeals found sufficient evidence to support this finding. In order for us 

to decide this issue, we must first interpret the applicable statute. 

A. Whether a Person Is a Vulnerable Elder if His or Her Age 

Standing Alone Makes That Person Unable to Protect Himself or 

Herself from Elder Abuse. When interpreting our statutes, our goal is 

to determine legislative intent. Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 

N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004). To determine legislative intent, we look at 

the words the legislature chose when it enacted the statute. RamirezTrujillo, 878 N.W.2d at 770. When the legislature chooses to “act as its 

own lexicographer” by defining statutory terms, we are ordinarily bound 

by its definitions. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 789 
8

N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2010) (quoting State v. Fischer, 785 N.W.2d 697, 

702 (Iowa 2010)). Additionally, we apply the fundamental rule of 

statutory construction that we should not construe a statute to make 

any part of it superfluous. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Iowa Civil Rights 

Comm’n, 522 N.W.2d 82, 86 (Iowa 1994); accord Iowa Auto Dealers Ass’n 

v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 301 N.W.2d 760, 765 (Iowa 1981). Accordingly, 

we “presume the legislature included all parts of the statute for a 

purpose, so we will avoid reading the statute in a way that would make 

any portion of it redundant or irrelevant.” Rojas v. Pine Ridge Farms, 

L.L.C., 779 N.W.2d 223, 231 (Iowa 2010). 

The general assembly enacted Iowa Code chapter 235F in 2014. 

2014 Iowa Acts ch. 1107. This case presents our first opportunity to 

consider Iowa’s elder abuse law. We begin with a review of the relevant 

statutory provisions. 

Under the Code, financial exploitation is a form of elder abuse. 

Iowa Code § 235F.1(5)(a)(4). The Code provides,

“Financial exploitation” relative to a vulnerable elder 

means when a person stands in a position of trust or 

confidence with the vulnerable elder and knowingly and by 

undue influence, deception, coercion, fraud, or extortion, 

obtains control over or otherwise uses or diverts the benefits, 

property, resources, belongings, or assets of the vulnerable 

elder. 

Id. § 235F.1(8).

A “ ‘[v]ulnerable elder’ means a person sixty years of age or older 

who is unable to protect himself or herself from elder abuse as a result of 

age or a mental or physical condition.” Id. § 235F.1(17) (emphasis 

added).

We find the following elements need to be proved by a person 

claiming elder abuse to qualify as a vulnerable elder as defined in section 
9

235F.1(17): (1) The person must be sixty years or older, and (2) is unable 

to protect himself or herself from elder abuse as a result of one of the 

following: (a) age (b) a mental condition, or (c) a physical condition. Id.

The statute makes it clear that if a person is sixty years or older and age 

alone, without a mental or physical condition, makes someone unable to 

protect himself or herself from elder abuse, then that person is a 

vulnerable elder as defined in section 235F.1(17). 

Other states have similar statues allowing a court to find a person 

can be subject to financial exploitation based on his or her age alone,

without proving the person suffers from a mental or physical condition. 

For example, Alabama defines an elderly person as any person over the 

age of sixty. Ala. Code § 13A-6-191(3) (Westlaw current through Act 

2016-485 of the 2016 1st Spec. Sess.). The Alabama Code defines 

financial exploitation as

[t]he use of deception, intimidation, undue influence, force, 

or threat of force to obtain or exert unauthorized control over 

an elderly person’s property with the intent to deprive the 

elderly person of his or her property or the breach of a 

fiduciary duty to an elderly person by the person’s guardian, 

conservator, or agent under a power of attorney which 

results in an unauthorized appropriation, sale, or transfer of 

the elderly person’s property.

Id. § 13A-6-191(5).

Colorado only requires the person to be over seventy years old for 

exploitation. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-6.5-102(3), (10) (West, 

Westlaw current through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.). Connecticut’s statutes are 

similar. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17b-450(1), (7) (West, Westlaw 

current through 2016 Sept. Special Sess.). 

Thus, we believe the legislature intended that if a person’s age 

makes a person unable to protect himself or herself from elder abuse, 

that person is a vulnerable elder as defined by the Code.
10

B. Whether on Our De Novo Review, the Evidence Supports 

the District Court’s Finding that Chapman Was a Vulnerable Elder

Under Section 235F.1(17) Because She Was Unable to Protect 

Herself from Financial Exploitation Due to Her Age. The record made 

below was sparse at best. However, there is crucial testimony relating to 

this issue. First, Chapman put all her property in the names of her 

children and effectively wiped out any net worth she accumulated during 

her lifetime. Second, both parties testified when Chapman gave the title 

of the mobile home to Wilkinson, Chapman was to remain living in the 

home. Third, Chapman lived in the home without any interference from 

Wilkinson for a period of years. Fourth, Wilkinson began posting eviction 

notices to Chapman only after his sister moved in with Chapman. Fifth, 

Wilkinson demanded from Chapman, an unemployed sixty-nine-year-old

woman, a payment of $35,000 for her to remain living in the mobile 

home. Sixth, Chapman testified, “[I]t’s just worrisome. I’m tired of 

having these eviction notices. And I’m just too old for it.” 

The district court viewed the testimony and concluded Chapman’s 

age alone made her a vulnerable elder. In our de novo review, we give 

weight to the district court’s factual findings, particularly when they 

involve the credibility of witnesses. In re Estate of Warrington, 686 

N.W.2d at 202. Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s finding 

and find Chapman’s age made her unable to protect herself from elder 

abuse. She gave all her assets to her children. She was unemployed 

with a fixed income. Wilkinson demanded $35,000 from her to stay in 

the mobile home. At her age, she was unable to pay him. She voiced a 

concern that she was too old to handle the eviction notices Wilkinson 

was giving her. 
11

In summary, Wilkinson took advantage of Chapman due to her age 

and financial condition. This evidence supports a finding Chapman was 

a vulnerable elder. The purpose of the elder abuse statute was to allow 

our elderly population to seek relief from actions such as Wilkinson’s 

without the expense of a more costly and time consuming action that 

others argue are appropriate under the circumstances.

For these reasons, we find Chapman to be a vulnerable elder.

V. Disposition. 

For all the reasons stated in this opinion and the court of appeals 

opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except Mansfield, Waterman, and Zager, JJ., 

who dissent.
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#15–0153, Chapman v. Wilkinson

MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent, essentially for the reasons set forth in the 

well-reasoned dissent filed in the court of appeals. Rather than attempt 

to paraphrase that opinion, I will simply quote it in full, and then add a 

few observations of my own:

The questions presented in this appeal are questions 

of first impression regarding the interpretation and 

construction of this newly-enacted statute. “In determining 

the meaning of statutes, our primary goal is to give effect to 

the intent of the legislature.” State v. Hearn, 797 N.W.2d 

577, 583 (Iowa 2011). “That intent is evidenced by the 

words used in the statute.” Id. “The starting point of 

interpreting a statute is analysis of the language chosen by 

the legislature.” Id.

Chapter 235 allows a “vulnerable elder” to seek relief 

from elder abuse by filing a verified petition in the district 

court. See Iowa Code § 235F.2(1). As a prerequisite to 

obtaining relief, the petitioner must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that “elder abuse” occurred. 

The [C]ode sets forth four categories of elder abuse. As 

relevant here, the [C]ode defines “elder abuse” to include 

“financial exploitation.” Iowa Code § 235F.1(5)(a)(4). 

“ ‘Financial exploitation’ relative to a vulnerable elder means 

when a person stands in a position of trust or confidence 

with the vulnerable elder and knowingly and by undue 

influence, deception, coercion, fraud, or extortion, obtains 

control over or otherwise uses or diverts the benefits, 

property, resources, belongings, or assets of the vulnerable 

elder.” Iowa Code § 235F.1(8). According to the plain 

language of the statute, to prove “financial exploitation,” the 

petitioner must first establish the exploited person is a 

“vulnerable elder.”

The fighting issues in this case are the meaning of 

“vulnerable elder” and the sufficiency of the evidence 

regarding the same. The statute provides a “ ‘[v]ulnerable 

elder’ means a person sixty years of age or older who is 

unable to protect himself or herself from elder abuse as a 

result of age or a mental or physical condition.” Iowa Code 

§ 235F.1(17). The plain language of the statute requires 

proof of three elements. First, the person must be “sixty 

years of age or older.” Second, the person must be “unable 

to protect himself or herself from elder abuse.” Third, the 

person’s inability to protect himself or herself from elder 

abuse must be “as a result of age or a mental or physical 
13

condition.” Only by requiring proof of all three elements, do 

we give effect to all of the words the legislature selected. See 

Iowa Auto Dealers Ass’n v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 301 

N.W.2d 760, 765 (Iowa 1981) (“Moreover, a statute should 

not be construed so as to make any part of it superfluous 

unless no other construction is reasonably possible.”).

The petitioner in this case failed to prove an inability 

to protect herself from elder abuse and failed to prove this 

inability was a result of her age or a mental or physical 

condition. The only thing we can discern from this record is 

the petitioner was sixty-nine years old at the time of the 

hearing. The petitioner did not introduce any evidence into 

the record regarding her ability or inability to protect herself 

from elder abuse. The only reasonable inference that could 

be made from this record, based on the petitioner’s 

description of her living arrangement and the tone of her 

testimony and remarks, is the petitioner is an independent 

woman fully capable of protecting her own interests. The 

petitioner failed to present any evidence regarding her 

mental condition or physical condition. The petitioner also 

failed to present any evidence that her age, mental condition, 

or physical condition in any way impaired her ability to 

protect herself from elder abuse. In sum, the record shows 

only that the petitioner is sixty-nine years of age and that 

she is in a property dispute with her son. That is insufficient 

to establish elder abuse pursuant to chapter 235F.

While there is no controlling case, other jurisdictions 

with similar statutes have concluded the petitioner must 

establish an inability to self-protect caused by some 

statutorily-recognized condition. See, e.g., Estate of Cole, No. 

1CA–CV 12-–0810, 2014 WL 1515730, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

Apr. 17, 2014) (stating it is a “threshold element[ ]” that the 

petitioner prove “the individual suffered from a physical or 

mental impairment that prevented the individual from 

protecting herself from abuse, neglect, or exploitation by 

others”); State v. Maxon, 79 P.3d 202, 207 (Kan. Ct. App. 

2003) (stating “dependent adult” statute required proof the 

victim was unable to protect herself or himself); Doe v. S.C. 

Dep’t of Social Servs., 757 S.E.2d 712, 720 (S.C. 2014) 

(vacating order where “there is no evidence that Doe’s 

advanced age substantially impaired her ability to 

adequately provide for her own care and protection”); Farr v. 

Searles, 910 A.2d 929, 930 (Vt. 2006) (vacating protective 

order where the petitioner failed to establish an infirmity 

impairing her ability to protect herself from abuse, neglect, 

or exploitation).

The requirement that the petitioner present some 

evidence of her inability to protect herself due to a 

statutorily-recognized cause is in accord with the purpose of 

the statute. The intent of this law and related elder abuse 
14

laws is to provide protection for those who may be subject to 

abuse, neglect, or exploitation due to an inability to protect 

themselves. Without requiring proof of the inability to 

protect, the statute would encompass garden-variety legal 

claims that happen to be held by persons over the age of 

sixty. Such a result is overbroad in two respects. It creates 

a cause of action for persons outside the intended scope of 

the statute. It also creates unintended legal exposure for 

persons who happen to be in a dispute with someone over 

the age of sixty but who is not otherwise a “vulnerable elder.”

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. I 

would vacate the final elder abuse protective order and 

remand this matter for dismissal of the petition.

On the law, the court today does not appear to take a different 

view from the court of appeals dissent. That is, the court acknowledges 

that to prove she was a vulnerable elder, Chapman had to establish she 

was unable to protect herself due to her age. The court, however, goes 

on to conclude that Chapman met her burden as a factual matter. Here, 

I disagree.

The court’s opinion lists six items supporting a finding that 

Chapman was a vulnerable elder. However, the first five are just 

background facts. The sixth item is the following testimony: “[I]t’s just 

worrisome. I’m tired of having these eviction notices. And I’m just too 

old for it.”

In my view, Chapman’s colloquialism that she was “too old” to be 

receiving eviction notices falls short of demonstrating that she was 

unable to protect herself because of her age. Chapman’s daughter was 

living with Chapman in the mobile home. When an eviction notice was 

posted stating that Chapman needed to be out by December 1, 2014, 

Chapman short-circuited any forcible entry and detainer proceeding by 

promptly going to court on November 5 seeking relief from “elder abuse.” 

She was never in jeopardy of losing her residence.1

1In fact, after the temporary order was entered, Wilkinson had to ask for a brief 

continuance of the final hearing because of an Iowa National Guard obligation.

 
15

Although Wilkinson had sole legal title to this double-wide mobile 

home, the record here would support a finding that Chapman retained a 

life estate. All this, however, could have been worked out in an 

appropriate title proceeding. Such a proceeding would result in a final 

decree defining legal interests in the property. This would assure that 

the title to the property remained marketable, protect third parties who 

had dealings relating to the property, and also clarify the status of assets 

for Medicaid purposes. See Iowa Code § 249A.53(2)(c) (2015) (providing 

that Medicaid debt may be recovered to the extent of any “retained life 

estates”).2 A temporary injunction would also be available in a title 

proceeding if needed.

Moreover, the label of “elder abuse” can be stigmatizing. Wilkinson 

himself testified to his surprise upon learning that he was being charged 

with elder abuse: “I was floored by that.” This potential for stigma 

provides an additional reason for not expanding the elder abuse law 

unduly. The elder abuse law was written to be, and should remain, a 

cause of action for persons who are unable to protect themselves “as a 

result of age,” and not merely have attained a certain age. For these 

reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and the 

decision of the court of appeals.3

Waterman and Zager, JJ., join this dissent.

2Although we have no such information in the record here, Medicaid planning is 

one reason why the elderly may transfer assets to their relatives. See, e.g., In re Estate 

of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d 493, 494 n.2 (Iowa 2007).

3No issue is presented in this appeal as to whether the “financial exploitation” 

element in the statute has been met. See Iowa Code § 235F.1(8) (defining financial 

exploitation as “when a person stands in a position of trust or confidence with the 

vulnerable elder and knowingly and by undue influence, deception, coercion, fraud, or 

extortion, obtains control over or otherwise uses or diverts the benefits, property, 

resources, belongings, or assets of the vulnerable elder”).