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i 

80–764 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–35] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES HEARING 

ON

OVERSIGHT OF U.S. NAVAL AND U.S. 

AIR FORCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 

IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL 

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 24, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, April 24, 2013, Oversight of U.S. Naval and U.S. Air Force 

Acquisition Programs in the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Budget Request ............................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, April 24, 2013 ..................................................................................... 45 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 2013 

OVERSIGHT OF U.S. NAVAL AND U.S. AIR FORCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 1 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Allardice, Lt Gen Robert R., USAF, Air Mobility Command Vice Commander 

(AMC/CV), U.S. Air Force; and Lt Gen Charles R. Davis, USAF, Military 

Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, 

U.S. Air Force ....................................................................................................... 7 

Stackley, Hon. Sean, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; VADM Allen G. Myers, USN, Deputy Chief Naval 

Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8), U.S. Navy; 

and LtGen Richard P. Mills, USMC, Deputy Commander for Combat Development and Integration, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 

U.S. Marine Corps ............................................................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Allardice, Lt Gen Robert R. ............................................................................. 79 

Davis, Lt Gen Charles R. ................................................................................. 94 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 49 

Stackley, Hon. Sean, joint with VADM Allen G. Myers and LtGen Richard P. Mills .................................................................................................... 52 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Data Tables from Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan 

for the Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2014, Submitted 

by Hon. Sean Stackley .................................................................................. 109 

Estimates of Annual Shipbuilding Costs Under the Navy’s 2013 Plan, 

by the Congressional Budget Office ............................................................ 115 
Page

IV 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 119 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 122 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 120 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 125 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 125 
(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF U.S. NAVAL AND U.S. AIR FORCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 24, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. First of all, I want to welcome all of our members 

and our distinguished panel of experts to today’s hearing that will 

focus on the Administration’s fiscal year 2014 budget request. In 

the decade ahead, I believe we will increasingly lean on our 

seapower and projection forces to underpin our national security 

strategy. 

Our naval forces are deployed around the world, protecting the 

world’s sea lanes and operating forward to deter conflict. Our projection forces are uniquely ready to support a wide range of mobility, strike, and strategic deterrence missions around the globe. 

While I am pleased at the capabilities provided by our forces 

today, the long-term outlook of our defense posture is being challenged. Naval forces embarked on carrier strike groups and amphibious readiness groups routinely deploy 7 to 8 months. 

Because of the Navy’s sustained surge, our nuclear aircraft carriers are depleting their nuclear reactor propulsion units at accelerating rates. Our bomber fleet averages 37 years old, and our venerable tanker fleet averages an even older 48 years. 

While we are meeting the minimal requirements of our ever-retreating national strategy, it is painfully obvious that our future 

readiness is being leveraged to pay for our current requirements. 

The most recent example of the Administration’s direction is the 

30-year shipbuilding plan that was partially submitted on Monday. 

The Administration, once again, proposes the early retirement of 

seven cruisers and two amphibious ships in fiscal year 2015, well 

before the end of their service lives. 

With 31 ships being retired over just the next 2 years, we are 

headed towards a fleet size of 270 battle force ships by fiscal year 

2015. Decline is a choice, and I believe this new plan willingly 

chooses to continue the slow, painful decline of robust American 

seapower. 
2 

The plan also includes a significant increase to the overall ship 

construction budget to accommodate the Ohio class ballistic missile 

submarine replacement. At over $5 billion, these strategic investments in our nuclear triad are essential. 

Our main concern, that during the procurement and construction 

of the Ohio class replacement, the shipbuilding budget will demand an average of $19 billion per year. To fund both this new boat and 

the battle force it will take, either a substantial increase in the 

shipbuilding account or an effort to fund the Ohio class replacement from outside this account. 

I look forward to continuing to work with the Department of the 

Navy to address this funding shortfall. During the Navy Posture 

Hearing earlier this month, military leaders indicated that they 

were pleased at the investment in the ship construction accounts 

and highlighted the dearth of ships in construction when they took 

office. 

To arrest this decline, this Administration embraced the plan 

that includes an aggressive strategy to build a moderately capable 

surface combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship, that adds over 

50 ships over the term of the plan. But unfortunately, the mission 

modules that are integral to support this 20-year seaframe are still 

in research and development, complicating the Navy’s ability to respond to basic mine countermeasures missions and antisubmarine 

missions. 

Just as the fleet is shrinking from the retirement and procurement of less major surface combatants and amphibious ships, we 

are filling these shortfalls with smaller surface combatants and 

support vessels. 

We need to take steps to arrest the decline of our battle force 

fleet. As to the Air Force projection forces, I am pleased that we 

may be initiating the semblance of a credible recapitalization plan. 

With the support of an investment in the KC–46 Tanker Program and strategic emphasis on the Long Range Strike Bomber, I 

believe that the Air Force is on the right path with the right platforms for our Nation’s future. 

I look forward to supporting these continued investments in our 

mobility and projection forces capabilities. 

As to the Marine Corps, I understand the amphibious combat vehicle is the Marine Corps’ top priority for ground force modernization, and the Marines have completed the required analysis of 

alternatives. 

We need to get this program right for the future of the Marine 

Corps, and I look forward to receiving an update on this critical 

program. I would be remiss if I also did not recognize the Navy in 

providing a credible long-term acquisition strategy that uses block 

buy on multiyear procurements to secure steep reductions in overall Naval pricing. 

Not only is this a good strategy for our Nation’s taxpayers, it provides the long-term surety to our industrial base, that will allow 

them to make critical investments for their long-term health. 

My friends, we are at a strategic inflexion point in terms of our 

defense policy. Concurrent with the new strategy being contemplated by this Administration, my fear is that the overall capabilities of our military will continue to atrophy, and our inability 
3 

to be able to operate forward and project power, will embolden regional instability. 

In the end, future defense reductions will be paid for in the lives 

of our service members. I refuse to accept this premise and will do 

everything in my power to arrest further decline from modernizing 

and growing our capabilities. 

Joining us today to discuss the fiscal year 2014 budget request, 

are five distinguished and patriot gentlemen. 

The Honorable Sean Stackley, United States Navy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition. 

Vice Admiral Allen G. Myers, U.S. Navy. He is the Deputy Chief 

of Naval Operations for Integration Capabilities and Resources. 

We have Lieutenant General Richard P. Mills, U.S. Marine 

Corps Deputy Commander for Combat Development and Integration. 

We also have Lieutenant General Charles Davis. He is the Military Assistant of the Air Force for Acquisition. 

And, Lieutenant General Robert R. Allardice, Vice Commander of 

the Air Mobility Command. 

General, we thank you all for being here, and one thing I would 

like to emphasis at the beginning is, I understand two of you are 

going to make actual opening comments and then respond to 

questions. 

This is probably, if not the most bipartisan committee, it is probably one of the most bipartisan committees in Congress. We share 

a common goal in making sure that we are reaching the desired 

strength that we have for our military. We appreciate all of your 

Services here. 

There is no attempt to embarrass any of you with any questions. 

We understand you are speaking for the Department in your respective Services, but it is also our goal to try to make sure we are 

asking the tough questions, so we are putting all the facts on the 

table and moving forward with the kind of oversight we need. 

Our members will try to do that today, but in the end, I want 

to make sure I am going to give each of you an opportunity. If you 

have left anything out or felt you need to change anything or you 

need additional time, I am going to give it to you, so that you can 

make sure you get that on the record. 

And with that, I want to recognize now my good friend and ranking member, Mike McIntyre, from North Carolina, with any remarks he might have. 

Mike? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NORTH CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to all of 

you for your service to our country, and thanks to your families for 

their sacrifice in the great work that you do. 

We know this is a critical time for both the Department of the 

Navy and the Department of the Air Force, and with the combina-
4 

tion of prior cuts and implementation of sequestration, the Navy 

and Air Force are being forced to make tough decisions. 

For the Navy, the budget request, $14.1 billion for shipbuilding 

for eight new construction battle force ships. I was pleased to see 

the Navy was able to include a second Virginia class submarine in 

the budget request because we know maintaining a 2-ship buy per 

year Virginia class submarines is an important part of the Navy’s 

effort to mitigate the submarine shortfall that is predicted in the 

coming years. 

It is our understanding that the Navy is still trying to decide 

whether the next multiyear procurement for destroyers will be a 9- 

ship or 10-ship buy due to the impacts of sequestration. We need 

to hear from the witnesses as to how this subcommittee could be 

of assistance in obtaining that additional ship. 

For the Marine Corps, I know that the development and fielding 

of a new amphibious combat vehicle is one of its top priorities, and 

this budget includes $137 million towards that effort. 

Our subcommittee will be interested in hearing how the Marine 

Corps plans to field this important capability while also avoiding 

the cost growth that led to the cancellation of the Expeditionary 

Fighting Vehicle. 

This budget continues the development of two high-priority initiatives for the Air Force, the new Long Range Strike Bomber and 

the new aerial refueling tank or aircraft. The current age, the average age of the bomber fleet being 37, and the average age of the 

current tanker fleet being 48, we know it is critical that these platforms deliver on-time, and also, in an affordable manner. 

We are concerned very much about sequestration. We certainly 

hope that the witnesses can explain how these cuts are affecting 

your respective Services so that our subcommittee can understand 

the short-term and the long-term impacts, and how we can be of 

the absolute help we want to be to the Navy, to the Marine Corps 

and to the Air Force. 

God bless all of you all for your commitment and sacrifice, and 

thank you for being with us today. 

Mr. FORBES. Mike, thank you for those comments, and Mr. Secretary, I think you are going to lead off for us, and again, we thank 

you and your office for your responsiveness to this committee and 

you have done great work in trying to get us the questions we have 

asked. We appreciate that cooperation, and we look forward to your 

remarks this morning. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND 

ACQUISITION; VADM ALLEN G. MYERS, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF 

NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES 

AND RESOURCES (N8), U.S. NAVY; AND LTGEN RICHARD P. 

MILLS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

Secretary STACKLEY. Thank you, sir. Chairman Forbes, Ranking 

Member McIntyre, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 
5 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, could you use that mike closer to 

your mouth. They can be a little sensitive sometimes. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today, to address the Department of the Navy 

acquisition programs and, with the permission of the subcommittee, I propose to provide a brief statement and submit a separate formal statement for the record. 

Your Navy and Marine Corps team is this Nation’s expeditionary 

force in readiness, a balanced naval, air, and ground force forwarddeployed, forward-engaged, on the ground in Afghanistan; performing maritime security along the world’s vital sea lanes; missile 

defense in Mediterranean and Sea of Japan; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance where needed, as needed; persistence of 

presence at sea with an embarked Marine force ready to move 

ashore. 

They’re conducting antipiracy patrols, global partnership stations, humanitarian assistance in a quietly, reliably on patrol providing strategic deterrence, and all the while, training for the next 

deployment, the next operation, the next crisis, the next contingency. 

The Department of the Navy’s 2014 budget request provides the 

resources needed to meet this full range of missions, and it provides the investment required to execute tomorrow’s mission 

against the future threat. 

But before discussing the 2014 budget request, it is important to 

mark where we are in 2013. The 2013 budget request reshaped our 

shipbuilding, aviation, and tactical vehicle plans to reflect the priorities of the new defense strategy. 

And Congress strongly supported that request. In fact, funding 

was increased for additional ships and aircraft, as well as for operations and modernization of the in-service fleet. Too, the Authorization Act provided multiyear authority for submarines, destroyers, 

and MV–22 [Osprey tiltrotor] aircraft and, with that, stability for 

the industrial base and near $5 billion in savings for the taxpayer. 

However, sequestration more than offset these gains, and we are 

about $11 billion out of balance across operations, maintenance and 

investment. And given the method of applying sequestration and 

our limited ability to reprogram funds to resolve fiscal year 2013 

issues, we need to identify workarounds to each line of the budget 

in order to execute the planned program as best as possible. 

In the end, there will be impacts. Reductions to operations and 

maintenance funding is directly impacting our near-term forward 

presence and our depot maintenance and training, which will affect 

future operational rotations, and the readiness of our nondeployed 

forces will be reduced. 

In our investment accounts which provide for future readiness, 

we are weighing alternatives to mitigate quantity reductions, 

scheduled delays and the cost impacts due to each of our ship, aircraft, and weapons systems programs. 

We will work with your staff as these details unfold, particularly 

as they affect the 2014 budget deliberations. 

The 2014 budget request balances capability and readiness in 

support of the defense strategy while maintaining focus on affordability and the industrial base. Our shipbuilding program is stable 
6 

as we continue to build towards a 300-ship force as defined by the 

Navy’s force structure assessment. 

Submarine, destroyer, Littoral Combat Ship, and mobile landing 

platform construction performance is strong, and these program 

savings have been reinvested to uphold our shipbuilding rates despite downward pressure on the budget. 

In fact, we increased construction in the near term, with the addition of a second Virginia class submarine in 2014 towards that 

program’s 10-built multiyear, and we will work closely with your 

subcommittee to determine how to best overcome the impact of sequestration to likewise award the additional tenth DDG 51 [Arleigh 

Burke class guided missile destroyer] as part of that program’s 

multiyear. 

Two years ago, we reported cost growth on the lead ship of the 

Ford class aircraft carrier program, stemming from development of 

new systems and delays in design and material, all impacting 

production. 

Our efforts to improve on this performance has stemmed cost 

growth on the lead ship but not reversed it. Accordingly, we are requesting cost cap relief and funding to complete CVN 78 [USS Gerald R. Ford supercarrier] in accordance with our previously reported estimate. 

We are attacking these issues on the next carrier, CVN 79 [Ford 

class supercarrier USS John F. Kennedy] and are working with the 

shipbuilder to replan materiel ordering, work flow on fellow ships, 

and needed facility improvements in order to reduce costs of our future carriers. 

Performance in amphibious ship construction is much improved. 

LHA 6 [Landing Helicopter Assault] lessons are rolling into LHA 

7 construction, and the recently delivered LPD 23 [amphibious 

transport dock ship] and LPD 24 are entering the fleet at high levels of quality and completion, and we look for this trend to continue 

as we complete the remaining ships in that class. 

Looking ahead, we are conducting design studies and analysis of 

alternatives for future amphibious and auxiliary ships. LHA 8, the 

future LX(R) to replace the LSD [Landing Ship, Dock] 41/49 class 

and the future oiler T–AO(X), as we consider the workload at our 

shipyards and the vendor base, it is critical that we press forward 

with these ships’ design in order to find opportunities to pool work 

forward affordably as necessary to sustain this critical sector of our 

industrial base. 

I would like to briefly address the Ohio replacement program. 

Requirements are stable and development and early design are on 

schedule to support procurement in 2021. Affordability of the 

Navy’s shipbuilding program during the period of the SSBN construction remains a priority however. 

And while design for affordability is a central tenet of our Ohio 

replacement strategy, meeting our cost objectives will not alone 

bring our shipbuilding, topline, within reach during that program. 

Like our shipbuilding program, the stability in aviation programs 

is provided by mature programs being procured under multiyear 

contracts, the Super Hornet, the MH–60 helicopter, and the MV– 

22 Osprey. To this list, we are requesting authority for multiyear 
7 

procurement of the E–2D [Advanced Hawkeye early warning and 

control] aircraft commencing in 2014. 

When the leading edge of modernization of our maritime patrol 

fleet, our ability to leverage commercial production of the 737 aircraft for the P–8A [Poseidon multimission maritime aircraft] has 

reduced costs and risks for this aircraft which is preparing for its 

first deployment later this year. 

Likewise, the Navy’s MQ–4 Triton aircraft, which is making 

progress towards its first flight later this spring, leverages Global 

Hawk development to provide high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned capability to complement the P–8A. 

The third leg of our balanced new war ground force, Marine 

Corps tactical vehicles, is at the front-end of much needed recapitalization. We brief this committee on our strategy to replace the 

HMMWV [High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle] with a 

more capable, survivable, joint, light, tactical vehicle being procured jointly with the Army. 

And with the termination of the expeditionary fighting vehicle, 

to replace the aging amphibious assault vehicle, with a more capable, more survivable, amphibious combat vehicle that meets thresholds set for affordability. 

The JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle] program remains on 

track with the 2014 budget request, continuing development and 

support of procurement commencing in 2015. 

We are continuing to review, with the Army, the impacts of sequestration on that schedule and we will advise the results upon 

completion of this review. 

The amphibious combat vehicle is as the commandant stated in 

testimony, top Marine Corps priority. In order to ensure we get 

this right, we are conducting a combined requirements definition 

feasibility study spanning the best of Government and industry requirements, design and cost experts. 

Our intent is to bring the best talent and best information together to build on the tremendous body of knowledge we possess 

across all of our vehicle programs and determine how to deliver the 

capability needed by the Marine Corps with high confidence and 

the affordability of the defined requirements. 

We have engaged your staff on the front end of this process and 

will remain engaged as we press to future milestone decisions. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley, Admiral 

Myers, and General Mills can be found in the Appendix on page 

52.] 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, thank you. 

And General, I understand that you are going to make our other 

presentation, and we appreciate your service to our country, and 

thank you for taking time to help us this morning, and I turn the 

floor over to you. 
8 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN ROBERT R. ALLARDICE, USAF, AIR 

MOBILITY COMMAND VICE COMMANDER (AMC/CV), U.S. AIR 

FORCE; AND LT GEN CHARLES R. DAVIS, USAF, MILITARY 

DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General ALLARDICE. Thank you. Chairman Forbes, Ranking 

Member McIntyre, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, with your permission, sir, I will make some brief opening comments and ask that our full written statements be placed 

in the record. 

Sir, thank you for your steadfast support of our airmen as they 

go about the Nation’s work around the world. General Davis and 

I are honored to be joined today by the distinguished members of 

this panel. 

We recognize that we are at our finest when we operate as a true 

joint team and our willingness to work together towards solutions 

to future challenges is absolutely critical. 

It is humbling to be here representing the 134,000 airmen from 

the Active Duty, Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard 

today. Included in that number is nearly 10,000 dedicated civilians 

without whom we could not accomplish our mission. 

When combined with the commercial industry and industry partners, these teams round out our national air transportation capability. We are grateful for the support that this committee provides 

our entire team as we execute our global mission every day. 

The remarkable thing about our air mobility forces, our fellow 

citizens don’t often hear about what they do. We go about quietly 

accomplishing our mission behind the scenes without the Nation 

understanding how dependent they are on rapid power projection. 

Rapid global ability gives us strategic options that no other nation in the world enjoys today. We have seen this play out time and 

again across the full spectrum of operations from humanitarian to 

combat. 

Our fellow U.S. citizens in the Northeast saw this in play last 

fall when a total force team transported utility trucks from California to an Air Reserve base outside of Boston, where they were 

desperately needed in the aftermath of the Superstorm Sandy. 

Halfway around the world, the continuous bomber presence in 

the Pacific, which has proven invaluable in expressing this Nation’s 

will is impossible to happen without the support of the air refueling 

capability that your mobility airmen provide. 

We work very closely with our combatant command, the United 

States Transportation Command to ensure that we are ready to 

provide forces that meet geographic combatant commander requirements. 

Although we inform how those requirements are derived, we ultimately don’t establish them. The fiscal year 2013 NDAA [National 

Defense Authorization Act] directed a mobility capabilities and requirement study, and we fully support that endeavor. 

We support the President’s fiscal year 2014 budget request. This 

budget fully funds the Air Force’s number 1 acquisition program, 

the KC–46A. We are excited about the future of this program as 

it remains on time and on budget. 
9 

This summer when the assembly of the first aircraft is scheduled 

to begin, we will be another step along the path replacing the 

KC–135 [Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft] fleet which you 

have indicated, Mr. Chairman, as 54 years old at this time. 

The fiscal year 2014 request includes funding for the final 11 kits 

to convert our C–5A [Galaxy strategic airlifter] into modern C–5Ms 

[Super Galaxy], resulting in a final fleet of 52 C–5Ms. The 10 

C–5Ms we currently have supporting our global engagement are 

performing absolutely magnificently, and they are a true force 

multiplier. 

We also to continue to recapitalize the C–130 [Hercules tactical 

airlifter] fleet, funding six additional C–130Js, and perhaps, most 

importantly, the fiscal year 2014 request provides a path forward 

to the readiness challenges we are facing as we absorb sequestration into our fiscal year 2013 flying hours and weapons systems 

sustainment. 

Our airmen have responded to sequestration, as they always do, 

with dedication and innovation. We are doing some of the easy 

commonsense things like giving back Blackberries and turning in 

staff cars. 

We are also having to cut our own staffs, and now we are getting 

down to the absolute bone of readiness and sustainability. 

Last year at this time, we were before you with a request to significantly adjust our force structure. We wanted to thank the committee for your willingness to work with the Air Force, and believe, 

that the total force proposal included in the fiscal year 2013 NDAA 

showed our willingness to listen to every stakeholder in the air mobility family. 

We know these changes aren’t just something we talk about here. 

They affect communities that support our airmen, and they affect 

our airmen themselves. 

Although today’s focus will be on the tools we use, it is our airmen that power all these tools. They say goodbye to their families 

and always find a way to get others to the next day. 

Whether it is a combat air drop in Afghanistan, humanitarian 

food and water deliveries in Haiti, or holding the hand of one of 

our injured soldiers from the battlefield during an air medical evacuation flight, your air mobility airmen always answer the Nation’s 

call. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, we thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and we look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Allardice can be found in the 

Appendix on page 79.] 

[The prepared statement of General Davis can be found in the 

Appendix on page 94.] 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. And to all of you, we appreciate 

you being here. The questions that we are going to ask you, we 

need very much to do the oversight that we have to do and to prepare the NDAA markup that is coming our way. 

I am going to ask just an initial question or so to lay a foundation of where we are going, then I am going to defer most of my 

questions until the end of questions, and we just need to be able 

to do the kind of hearing that we need to do to make sure we got 

the record necessary for that markup. 
10 

You have got tremendous expertise on this panel, and I am looking forward to their questions as we go forward. 

This is not an examination for any of you so feel free if you need 

to talk to your staffs or coordinate with one another if I am asking 

the wrong person the question, please someone else chime in. And 

also, if the question is unfair. Just tell me that, and I will try to 

rephrase it. 

And what I want to start with is, kind of a take-off where the 

general just left us. We talked about all the cuts that are taking 

place now with Blackberries and staff and everything that is there, 

but I want to put sequestration on the shelf for just a moment. 

And I want to look at the fact that, according to our numbers and 

everything our staff can show before sequestration, we had about 

$800 billion of cuts the Administration has made over the last 4 

years to our projected 10-year spending. 

Admiral, are our figures right, is that the right figure that took place before sequestration? Was it a cut of about $800 billion over 

the last 4 years in projected figure and, if not, what is the correct 

figure? 

Admiral MYERS. Chairman, I think you are referring to the PB 

12 [President’s Budget 2012] efficiencies that was under Secretary 

Gates, and that was the $487 billion—— 

Mr. FORBES. But according to our staff, the actual cuts that we 

have had over projected spending for the next 10 years, that the 

Department of Defense has had, has been $800 billion in that 

4-year period of time. 

What is the total amount of cuts that were taken prior to sequestration, over a projected reduction in spending, that would take 

place over the next 10-year period of time. Do you know that figure 

or can you get that figure for us? 

Admiral MYERS. That was part of the PB 12 initiative and sub- mission and for the Navy that represented $48 billion. 

Mr. FORBES. But for the whole Department of Defense, because 

I am going to ask everybody that question, do you any of you know 

what that figure—and this is an open book then, $800 billion is 

what our staff has come up with. That is what HASC [House 

Armed Services Committee] says it is, do any of you know what 

that figure actually was before sequestration? 

And so, let me just go down the line then. 

Admiral, what do you think that figure was? 

Admiral MYERS. The PB 12 submission, we were on record talking about $487 billion. 

Mr. FORBES. So you think that the total amount of cuts that the 

Administration has taken to national defense reduction and spending has been $487 billion? 

Admiral MYERS. That was the Department of Defense number. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. The $487 that Admiral Myers cited 

there is also an initiative to identify efficiencies within our budget 

anticipating further pressure on the topline of about $100 billion, 

but with the intention of create those efficiencies and plow them 

back into investments. 

Mr. FORBES. But as you and I both know, because that is what 

the Secretary said when he had his press conference, but they 
11 

didn’t go back into reinvestment, did they? Didn’t they come 

out—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Over time, they got eclipsed by the $487, 

and then subsequently, sequestration. 

Mr. FORBES. So the total figure before sequestration that you believe it was would have been—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Four eighty-seven, and I really want to 

come back to you on the record to—— 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 119.] 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY [continuing]. Verify that number. 

Mr. FORBES. General, what does the Marine Corps think it was? 

General MILLS. I am going to take that question for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 119.] 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Either general for the Air Force? 

General DAVIS. Sir let me—the $487 figure is the one we have 

been working with. I do know also that, as Secretary Stackley mentioned, the Air Force went through its own drill as well with a $30 

billion efficiency wedge across the FYDP [Future Years Defense 

Program] that we had to go find, so we need to get it for the record, 

but I have no doubt that there was other things that may have 

added up to get to that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 120.] 

General ALLARDICE. Sir—— 

Mr. FORBES. Pardon me? 

General ALLARDICE. I will have to take it for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 119.] 

Mr. FORBES. What I would love for you to do is have your staffs 

work with our staffs so we finally get that figure, and one of the 

things that concerns me is, right now, we don’t even know what the 

figure is. 

And that ought to be frightening to us, and the second thing, I 

am going down the line on you, too. Admiral, do you have any 

knowledge that of that $487 or $587, or if it is $800 billion as we 

think it was, during any of that time, did the Navy ever say, ‘‘Too 

many cuts, we shouldn’t be taking this,’’ to your knowledge? 

Before sequestration? 

Admiral MYERS. I think the Navy was on record when we submitted the PB 12, reflecting exactly where those cuts were coming 

from and where they were taken and the pressure it was putting 

on the Department of the Navy. 

And part of that pressure was reflected in the shipbuilding plan 

where we intended to retire the seven cruisers and the two LSDs. 

So I think the that Navy was very forthright in showing where the 

pain was. 

Mr. FORBES. Did you submit any statements that you know of or 

is there any statement—and I don’t expect you to have that information now, but I would like for you to get that back to us because 

I have sat through a lot of hearings, and I never heard the Navy 

make those comments. 
12 

And I could have missed them, but if you would get that back 

for me, I would just love to have that in my hand of where they 

objected. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 119.] 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, do you recall the Navy having ob- jected on that $487 or the $800 billion, the total figure, whatever 

it comes down, anything other than sequestration that the Navy 

ever said, ‘‘This is too much. We shouldn’t have these cuts.’’ 

Publicly. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Publicly. Honestly, sir, what we do is we 

take our requirements, we take the budget and we balance, and 

when our requirements and the budget are out of balance, what we 

do is inform the system of what the impacts are and what the risk 

is. 

Mr. FORBES. Did you ever know that the Navy ever informed the 

system of what those impacts would be, outside of sequestration, 

because again, as I have sat through hearing after hearing, we 

have asked that same question. 

And what we were always told was this, ‘‘These are acceptable 

risks. We are okay with these cuts.’’ 

Do you recall that time when the Navy ever said, ‘‘Too much. We 

shouldn’t have these cuts.’’ 

Secretary STACKLEY. I can’t cite a point where the Navy said, 

‘‘This breaks us.’’ 

Mr. FORBES. Would you do as I asked the admiral and try to find 

that and come back and let us know if there are any such statements that you can put your hand on? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. General, Marine Corps, same thing. 

General MILLS. Sir, I would say that, in various statements before the various congressional committees, the Marine Corps, over 

the past couple of years, has been clear that the reduction in budget was going to affect our manpower numbers, for instance. That 

is—— 

Mr. FORBES. But did they not say, ‘‘These are acceptable risks, 

we can take them.’’ 

General MILLS. As far as I know, yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And if you—if I have missed any, General, if you 

would get back to me on any statements outside of the sequestration, of the cuts the Administration has. When you come back with 

that final number, let me know where the Marine Corps said, ‘‘This 

is too much.’’ 

General MILLS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And, General Davis and Allardice, either one. 

General DAVIS. Sir, I do think there was statements made in the 

previous posture hearings that our Chief and Secretary said that 

that presents risks. 

Mr. FORBES. Before the sequestration? 

General DAVIS. Yes, sir, on the previous budget, and I will caveat 

that with, as we are looking at it now, if we get the ability to take 

the force structure in the areas where we felt we could take the 

risks, much of that did not materialize and was reversed, and so 

that created a new and unique situation for the Air Force. 
13 

The one thing I will say, having work acquisition programs, we 

have some flexibility to try to cover capabilities when we know 

what a cut is. And I will just add for the record, as we look in the 

outyears, the uncertainty of what 2015 and 2016 and beyond looks 

like, probably creates a much greater risk than having a known 

number. 

Mr. FORBES. And granted the unknown is always there, but at 

some point in time, the sheer numbers, and we will talk about in 

just a second, create a problem because that means we turn in 

Blackberries and we turn in staff, and we do all those kinds—— 

General, anything that you remember the Air Force, outside of 

sequestration, of those cuts, when we ultimately determine what 

the number is? 

General ALLARDICE. No sir. To the best of my knowledge, we articulate it in terms of risk and how much risks we are incurring 

but—— 

Mr. FORBES. And let me just tell y’all, every hearing I sat 

through, here is what I was told, ‘‘It is acceptable risk.’’ No one 

ever told us, ‘‘No, no. This is hitting in the wrong——’’ 

Now here is why I want to ask this, and I am going to finish 

with this question and then go to somebody else and come back 

with you. 

As I look at the shipbuilding plan that we are talking about now, 

one, we have reduced the number of ships that we have, overall, 

and a lot of those ships were 2038 before we actually see the ships 

go into our fleet. 

Mr. Secretary or Admiral, you both know, we live by our accountants, you live by your accountants, and the Congressional Budget 

Office is who we have to rely on a lot of times to do our analysis. 

Regardless of whether we take the Congressional Budget Office 

or we take your figures, over the life expectancy of this shipbuilding plan, if we take your figures, we are looking at about 

$16.8 billion average shipbuilding costs, and that doesn’t count the 

refueling. If you add that in, which normally comes out of the shipbuilding account, I think, that is about $18 billion to $19 billion. 

Is that a fair statement? 

Secretary STACKLEY. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. CBO [Congressional Budget Office], of course, would 

differ with your numbers. They would say about $22 billion, but regardless, let’s take your figure. 

The average amount that we have had for shipbuilding in our 

budget, for the last 30 years, and there is no big spikes in this. As 

you know, it has been less $15 billion. 

My question for both of you in making these assumptions, can 

you present to me any evidence at all, a scintilla of evidence, that 

would suggest that we will have those increases in budgets, as we 

move down the road. 

In other words, if you have been getting less than $15 billion for 

30 years, if our curve lines on cuts that y’all just talked about are 

heading down like this, and if our shipbuilding plan is going to depend on us having a huge spike-up in dollars that come in the shipbuilding plan. And that is what we are basing it on. 
14 

Give me the evidence that would suggest to you that we will 

have any additional dollars at all from a fiscal point of view, from 

Congress, to make the shipbuilding plan work. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, let me break this down in a couple of 

parts. 

First, the way we outline the long range shipbuilding plan, we 

break it up into phases or periods. We talk about the near term, 

mid term and long term. And clearly, when you get out to the mid 

term and long term, those projections are—they get more ambiguous because we haven’t defined, exactly, what those platforms will 

be and the capabilities. 

So we don’t place a lot of fidelity on the long term. The near 

term, we believe we have a lot of fidelity in the FYDP plus right 

beyond the FYDP, and so, in terms of our budget projections in the 

FYDP what we see today, we think that is solid, sequestration 

aside. 

The most significant issue in that plan, which I touched on in my 

opening statement regards the impact of recapitalizing our strategic deterrence capability. And clearly—clearly that program 

which in then-year dollars when you consider the R&D [Research 

and Development] investment and the procurement dollars, we are 

talking about $100 million, roughly, over about a 12- to 15-year 

period. 

That dominates the affordability discussion during that period, 

and it doesn’t place a lot of weight, overall, on the 30-year period. 

So that is the most significant—most daunting—challenge that we 

are staring at in terms of our shipbuilding program. 

It is our—as I have stated, while we are focused on affordability, 

we have stabilized the requirements. We are making the progress 

we need to make today. All of our efforts to improve affordability 

of that boat and that programs will not be sufficient to bring our 

shipbuilding requirement during that period down to within our 

historical budget. 

So I cannot point towards evidence. I would have to point back 

to the build-up of the 600 ship Navy, during the 80s, when we last 

saw those levels of shipbuilding investment. 

Mr. FORBES. So then, Mr. Secretary—and I appreciate your candor in this and before I go to Mr. Courtney, I just want to make 

clear that, while we do not have a lot of confidence in the long 

range projections of our fiscal forecasting, of doing that. 

That fiscal forecasting is what will determine whether we get the 

number of ships we need in the Navy. So if we don’t have a lot of 

credibility in that, we also don’t have a lot of credibility that we 

are going to get that number of ships. Fair? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Can’t get the ships unless you get the dollars. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. We have the near term, the mid 

term, which is where the high replacement takes place—— 

Mr. FORBES. There is a chart, and again, I know you have probably seen it, this is a CBO chart, but when we are talking about 

those spike-ups in spending, the spike-ups come after the Administration leaves office essentially for most of these. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 
15 

Mr. FORBES. So what we are saying is to make these projections, 

we are talking about a reality, we are going to have a significant 

turnaround in the dollars that will have to go into ship construction and shipbuilding. Fair? 

Secretary STACKLEY. We need a steady increase, and we have to 

separately or distinctly, address the cost impact associated with recapitalizing—— 

Mr. FORBES. But yet, what we have seen is a constant reduction 

that has taken place in our overall spending for—that is of the last 

4 years. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Not in shipbuilding. You can’t relate 

that—— 

Mr. FORBES. We haven’t seen an increase, have we? 

Secretary STACKLEY. In the last 4 to 5 years, there has been an 

overall increase to our shipbuilding investments. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. I will come back to that. 

Mr. Courtney, I would like to recognize you for 5. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all 

of the witnesses for being here. 

Before I begin, I would actually like to step back for a moment 

and just recognize one of our staff who is leaving us after today’s 

hearing. Lieutenant Commander Phil MacNaughton who is sitting 

behind me and has been with this staff for, I think around 5 years 

or so, has provided amazing advice and expertise to all of us because his lead has been on the Seapower Committee. 

He is leaving to serve his country. He is heading to the Middle 

East and, you know, which just shows what kind of person he is 

in terms of his commitment to public service. 

As a staff member, he is probably one of the few guys who has 

actually piloted some of us in terms of our trips to various places, 

which is about as good as it gets, and again, I would just ask my 

colleagues to recognize Phil’s great work that he has done for the 

committee and wish him safe travels and safe work as he, again, 

steps up his commitment and sacrifice for our country. 

[Applause.] 

Thank you. Mr. Secretary, again, I just wanted to maybe sort of 

bring some of the discussion down to some of the, you know, nittygritty of the last year or so, again, congratulations to both of you 

and Admiral Myers, and all of the witnesses for sort of trying to 

get through this incredibly tumultuous budget environment where, 

I mean, literally, from day-to-day it has been hard to predict what 

this place was going to do. 

And again, this committee, I think, subcommittee, certainly tried 

to work with you last year, particularly, with the DDG and the Virginia class language that came out in the Defense Authorization 

Bill, which again, tried to provide some flexibility for the block contracts that, again, are very close. 

Can you give us an update in terms of where you see the Virginia class block contract negotiations and, you know, maybe what 

we can expect in terms of, you know, some type of announcement 

or agreement? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Well first, sir, I make it a point to not discuss negotiations, particularly at a public hearing. But, you know, 
16 

the program is building on success, so the nature of the negotiations is twofold. 

One is, how do we continue to achieve the savings that Virginia 

has accomplished, literally, through the series of block buys going 

into this multiyear, in order to hit the full savings that we reported 

to Congress, and I have no doubt that we are going to get there. 

And we are going to get there in a timely manner. One of the 

challenges that we have, it is sequestration related, was, we did 

lose some advance procurement funding, which is in a separate 

line, that we are working with the shipbuilder to figure out how 

do we compensate for that loss of AEP because it is critical to our 

schedules, and our schedule execution in the multiyear is critical 

to hitting our savings. 

So that is a detail that we are working. I have no doubt that we 

will pull through that, but there will be some dollars that need to 

be backfilled in 2014, that we will discuss with your staff in that 

regard, and I think they can anticipate that coming. 

So the bottom line is, you know, we are going to plow through 

the details, to get to the 10-boat multiyear. There is some repair 

work to do as a result of sequestration, and we are going to work 

closely with the shipbuilder to minimize the impact of that speed 

bump on the execution. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, again, and I know you well, I mean, just 

certainly keep us informed about where the problem is. I mean, 

Majority Leader Reid and Senator Schumer place were both on the 

floor talking about trying to come up with a package to mitigate 

sequestration. 

So, it seems like there some stirring go around, and frankly, the 

more we can get examples of the harm that it is causing to, again, 

a very promising development in terms of getting an affordable 

contract, that just adds fuel to the argument about why, you know, 

we need to come together in this place and fix this. 

The other question I just wanted to ask, and again, I know a lot 

of other members are bursting here, is LCS [Littoral Combat Ship], 

you know, obviously, if you look at the shipbuilding plan, that is 

a big piece of where the numbers are. 

And I just wondered if you could give us a sort of update, in 

terms of, and obviously there are press reports swirling around 

this, and any information you can share with us this morning, I 

would appreciate. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. And I will probably split part of 

this with Admiral Myers. Let me talk first about the shipbuilding 

side and have Admiral Myers discuss the operational side. 

The shipbuilding, as I discussed in my opening statement, the 

construction is going well. We signed up for the block buy. We are 

midway through the block buy. We are seeing performance at both 

shipyards within our budget projections. 

We are using delivery schedules on that program to balance with 

costs. In other words, we are not going to put a lot of pressure on 

delivery schedule if it creates any cost challenges on the program, 

but overall, between both the LCS 1 version and the LCS 2 version, 

we are seeing a steady rate of improvement in terms of cost performance, operating within our budget, and again, that budget was 
17 

sized to achieve the $2.9 billion savings across the 20 ships of the 

block buy. 

So that part of the program is stable. Again, there is a sequestration impact that we have got to work through. Every line item was 

hit by sequestration. So in the case of LCS execution, sequestration 

has added risks on the budget side, because we had to pull money 

out of everywhere we could without impacting the overall program, 

but when you do that, you add risks, and some of that we might 

be needing to come back to you all to address backfilling. 

The mission module side is in development, and we have three 

mission modules in development. The first one that is going forward, its initial operational capability is the mine countermeasure 

mission module, and that is scheduled for its IOC [Initial Operational Capability] in 2014. 

The elements of the mine countermeasure mission module are 

each doing well. The remote minehunting vehicle, which is central 

to the mission module, went through the reliability growth program. It is far exceeding what the targets were for reliability. 

The sensors that are associated with that mission package are 

performing in accordance with their requirements with one exception where we are at 90 percent of the threshold trying to get the 

rest of way there. 

And then we have a neutralizing system that is meeting its requirement in testing, and we are trying to expand that to address 

other parts of the water column. 

The bottom line to all that is, the mine countermeasure mission 

package is moving smartly through its development schedule; however, IOC in 2014 is now at risk because of sequestration in 2013, 

so the reduction in the Research and Development funds to complete that development and testing, might bump that IOC. 

We are trying to hold onto it, but I can’t give you confidence 

when you take that much of the funding away in the year of execution prior to ROC [Required Operational Capability] that we can 

gracefully recover. 

So that is at risk measured in months, but we see that getting 

across the finish line in the course of 2014 or early 2015. The ships 

and mission packages are timed well in terms of the mix delivering 

to the fleet, and I think I will turn it over at this point, and have 

Admiral Myers address the operational side. 

Admiral MYERS. Thank you for the question. The—we are 

pleased with our LCS, and just to give you a kind of a rundown 

on where we are with the ships. The Freedom, the Independence, 

LCS 2, and the Forth Worth, they are are all conducting either 

testing, maintenance or routine crew proficiency training throughout 2012. 

Freedom operated off the coast of Southern California throughout 

that year, and basically, got herself ready for her deployment to 

Singapore, and I will talk about that in just a second, what we 

hope to gain from that. 

The Independence, we have tested the sea frame and the MCM 

[Mine Countermeasure Module] mission package requirements, and 

she sailed around from the East Coast and is now homeported in 

San Diego. 
18 

The Forth Worth, that is the LCS 3, she has been placed in commission after successful completion of the builders and acceptance 

trials and is currently homeported in San Diego as well, and she 

will be the combat systems ship qualification trials best ship. 

The PCU [Pre-Commissioning Unit] Coronado, LCS 4, continues 

training in preparation for her mid-2013 planned delivery to the 

Navy. 

Now, in terms of Freedom, her arrival at Singapore represents 

the beginning of a proof-of-concept deployment. This is going to 

demonstrate LCS capabilities that are going to allow us to assess 

crew rotation and our maintenance plans. 

The Freedom will conduct maritime security operations, she’ll 

participate in international exhibitions and exercises to highlight 

the U.S. strategic intent in the Southeast Asia region. This will 

also help to reassure our partners, our bilateral and multilateral 

partners, of our commitment in our pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. 

The Navy is going to get valuable insight into the unique capabilities of LCS and what this ship is going to bring to the fleet, into 

their joint military operations and, based on this deployment and 

insights from the proof of concepts that we are going to gain from 

this 8-month deployment, we are going to take that and roll that 

into our lessons learned, and also, continue with the testing and 

the certification of the Freedom and the rest of the LCS class in 

the Navy. 

Like all first of class ships, we continue to assess the ships’ performance. We implement lessons learned, and we make corrections 

where necessary, so we are very pleased and happy to talk about 

the mission packages separately if you want me to do that. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Courtney, thank you for your questions and 

your expertise in this area. And thank you for recognizing Phil and 

his good service to our committee and to our country. 

I would now like to recognize the Chairman of the Readiness 

Subcommittee, an expert on these matters, Congressman Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Secretary Stackley, 

and Vice Admiral Myers, Lieutenant General Mills, Lieutenant 

General Davis and Lieutenant General Allardice, thank you all so 

much for joining us today. We appreciate your service to our Nation and what you do for our sailors, for our marines, and for our 

airmen. We deeply appreciate that. 

I will begin with you, General Mills. You heard both the Chairman and Secretary Stackley mention the amphibious combat vehicle. I wanted to get your focus on where are we with the ACV [Amphibious Combat Vehicle]. 

I wanted to get your perspective, too, on why does the Nation 

need to invest in the ACV, especially based on the austere times 

that we face. 

Also, how is the Marine Corps going to be able to purchase both 

the joint light tactical vehicle and the amphibious combat vehicle, 

again, facing these budget challenges. 

And can you tell me, too, specifically about the target date for 

the IOC, for the ACV? I am very concerned in that looking at the 

past experience with the EFV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle] and 

the timeframe that was well, expired through that process, and 

with it taking nearly 15 years with an old amphibious assault vehi-
19 

cle with the AAV [Assault Amphibious Vehicle] there, timing this 

with this, I think is critical. 

So if you can give us your perspective on those elements of the 

ACV, that would be great. 

General MILLS. Sir, thank you for that question. Thank you for 

the support that you provide the Marines, and the Marines at 

Quantico, in particular, sir, I appreciate it very much. 

I will divide the question up into a couple of parts and I would 

ask Secretary Stackley if he would like to get in on the actual procurement procedure. I think both the JLTV and the ACV are success stories. 

I will start with JLTV and that we have partnered with the 

Army in developing a vehicle which meets both of our needs, and 

both of us have compromised to a bit, but at the end, that produced 

a vehicle that we can afford and that will be successful on the battlefield and give more protection and more mobility to our forces 

as they move around that battlefield based on the current dangers. 

We also feel that we have developed a strategy, a procurement 

strategy which would allow us to buy the JLTV, when it is ready 

to go to the fleet and sufficient numbers to meet our immediate 

needs. 

And then take a break in order to purchase the ACV and then 

come back and finish up our body of JLTVs later on in the program 

after the Army is done there. 

So we feel there is a good strategy there, and we are pushing 

ahead with that very good success story. I have driven in all of 

the—all of the demo models that have been provided to us by industry, and each one of them is—really is quite a vehicle and gives 

you quite capability on the battlefield. 

Regards to the ACV has been testified to numerous places on numerous times. The ACV is, in fact, the Marines’ number 1 ground 

priority, and we are pushing forward to that. And that is also a 

success story. 

Drawing on lessons learned, I think, from the EFV experience, 

we have been able to incorporate that both into our capabilities 

documents as we have produced those, and again, into our acquisition strategy as we develop that. 

The ACV, of course, is going to cover down on the developing gap 

in our capability—our core capability of projecting power ashore 

from our amphibious ships, and that is the initial wave of troops 

going ashore, that they have a self-deployer that provides them 

once they hit the, you know, the water line, the ability to maintain 

the momentum moving ashore to the objective, conduct operations 

on the objective in a protected armored environment and then 

withdraw to the ships, again, in a timely manner. 

We feel that plays to our core capability, the unique capability 

of being able to project combat power ashore from our forward-deployed amphibious forces at a time and place of our own choosing. 

The ACV has been developed over the past 18 months when the 

capability, of course, was determined, we went through and done 

an AoA [Analysis of Alternatives] and that was completed last 

summer. Subsequent to that AoA and the JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council] approval to move forward with the pro-
20 

gram, we look at the ability to also add to the capabilities by adding high water speeds. 

We have gone back to take a look at the feasibility of a selfdeployer that could achieve higher water speed in the A2/AD [AntiAccess/Area-Denial] environment. We have reopened parts of the 

AoA, if you will, just to ensure that the high water speed capability 

is used in that. 

And we are moving along by establishing a work force down at 

Quantico focused on the ACV, a unique work force that I will let 

Mr. Stackley talk to here in a moment. We think that we have a 

real blend of industry, the Department of the Navy personnel and 

the Marines at Quantico, in putting together a team that will give 

us what we need, what we can afford, when we need it. 

The last point that I will make is your discussion point about the 

IOC of the ACV. We are also concerned about that, of course, we 

don’t want a gap to develop for our capability to lesson, so we have 

an AAV sustainability program that is well-funded, in the budget, 

that we will maintain and improve about 400 of our AAVs, which 

will—while they won’t extend the life of those vehicles, they will 

give us more survivability for the Marines inside the vehicles on 

the battlefield. 

We will improve the seating in the back. We are going to improve 

the power train, and we are going to put protection on the floor 

which will protect those Marines from the threat of the IEDs [improvised explosive device] which have developed on today’s battlefield. 

With that, I will ask Mr. Stackley if he has any comments regarding the unique acquisition strategy. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me simply add to what General Mills 

described that, typically, or historically what we have done is we 

would do an AOA. We would develop requirements. They get tossed 

over the fence. We might get a parametric type of estimate accomplished. 

Eventually, we roll that forward and, at some point in time, 

downstream industry gets closely involved, and we are out there 

dealing with proposals and get the proposals back and, quite often, 

we end up with a mismatch between what the requirement was, 

what the real cost is, and what the schedule is. 

And what we are trying to do different here, is do the front end 

of requirements’ definition since we know so much about the AAV, 

the EFV, other combat vehicles, bring industry into the process and 

tighten up the loop between the requirement, the design, and the 

cost. 

So in near real time, you can look at trades between capability, 

affordability and what that might mean in terms of schedule for 

the overall program. We are placing great emphasis on cost realism 

which means getting a mature model. 

It also means using mature technology so we don’t have this 

lengthy, drawn-out development phase for the program. 

So we think we have this exactly right, from MARCORSYSCOM 

[Marine Corps Systems Command], Quantico, PEO [Program Executive Office] land systems all involved, but also, Navy warfare centers and Army personnel are joining the mix. And we brought industry in—we brought in the big defense contractors, but we are 
21 

also opening up third-party participation in this requirements’ definition, feasibility, and cost estimating phase of the program. 

Our intent is to get this put into shape for the 2015 budget as 

it comes over so it has the definition that you all need, and in the 

interim, to open up the door so you all have insight into the how— 

the progress that we are making and how we are going about this 

acquisition. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Now Mr. Kilmer and other valuable members of the 

subcommittee. The gentleman from Washington, I yield 5 minutes. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 

being here. I guess my first question is, and I am not sure if I 

should address it to Admiral Myers or to Secretary Stackley, my 

question is around the impacts of sequestration and how it affects 

life-cycle costing of our vessels. 

I was out at our Naval shipyard—our Puget Sound Naval shipyard in my neck of the woods and heard questions around deferred 

maintenance and how furloughs and the laying off of temporary 

employees might affect, also, the amount of time that maintenance 

happens. 

Someone said, and I don’t know if this is accurate, but the 

amount of time for maintenance—the length of time for maintenance Stennis [USS John C. Stennis] might increase by 4 to 6 

months. 

I am just wondering how, if at all, does that impact acquisition 

strategy and how you look at ongoing costs within the vessel program? 

Admiral MYERS. Okay. I will take the first stab at this, and if 

I can address the impact of our shipyard workers and furloughs, 

the second part of your question and then roll that into the impacts 

of lifecycle and acquisition and turn that over to Mr. Stackley. 

Well first, furloughing of our civilians does impact our ability to 

generate our carriers and submarines in fiscal year 2014, because 

this is the workforce that is actually doing the maintenance, both 

in our ship and aircraft depot maintenance facilities. 

So the lost work that you refer to, Congressman, it creates a 

domino effect to our maintenance schedules that it is going to take 

us a couple of years to dig out of. The Department of Navy is exploring options to minimize these impacts, but when you look 

across 2013, 2014 and 2015, just the impacts of this year, when you 

focus on our carrier readiness, it is going to delay getting carriers 

out of the yards. 

When you talk about submarine readiness, it is also going to impact delays. It is going to extend the duration of—upwards of three 

SSBNs, 3 to 4 months. We have the data that shows, by ship, what 

kind of delays that furloughing these workers would create. 

And there are also impacts to our aviation readiness, upwards of 

60 aircraft and 150 engines would SLEP [undergo Service Life Extension Program] from 2013 into fiscal year 2014. So these are 

going to create readiness challenges for the Department of the 

Navy that we are going to have to reconcile in 2014, 2015, and 

2016. 

And we are going to need the President’s Budget, 2014 submission, which doesn’t account for these kinds of readiness impacts, 
22 

but we are going to need that budget in order to have an approach 

to have the funding levels, and the resources required, to try to reconcile this. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I don’t know if I can improve much upon 

Admiral Myers’ statement other than to describe that, while we are 

doing what we can within the dollars we have and the authority 

we have to reprogram, we are doing what we can to restore the 

funding that we had programmed for maintenance. 

We are going to be limited, and so there will be a deferral of 

maintenance that rolls into the outyears, that will have an impact. 

That is on the maintenance side. 

On the investment side, we are faced with shortages in every investment line, and so we are having to go line by line to determine 

how do we absorb that shortage, and we are trying to balance between the near-term costs, the outyear impacts, the likelihood of 

being able to restore the funding in the outyears to arrive at what 

is the right answer for total costs and total capability. 

And it is not the same in each case. In certain cases, we are holding onto the procurement tightly because if we let that slip, the impacts to jobs, the impact to costs in those programs, will be so high 

that fixing that later will be out of balance. 

And in those cases, we might look at deferring some support 

costs, some spare costs, because that is a dollar-for-dollar restoration. 

In other cases, where we might be on the edge in terms of readiness, we are being very careful to not defer anything associated— 

that might impact on readiness when it comes to support costs and 

spares. And there, we might be taking a hit in terms of the quantity that we procure. 

There definitely will be an impact. It is very difficult to quantify 

today. In our process, we are trying to balance near-term and farterm to arrive at the, you know, the right least-cost impact and 

least impact to the total capability and force. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Kilmer, thank you for that line of question. 

Now I recognize the distinguished gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 

Johnson for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, the Middle 

East eruption a couple of years ago, the Arab Spring, touched many 

nations in the area of your—or in the Gulf Region. 

And one of the nations that has been impacted by that has been 

the island nation of Bahrain, and Bahrain has served as the headquarters for the Fifth Fleet. 

With the disturbance there, civil demonstrations and more people 

being involved, just a great percentage of the population involved 

in the demonstrations, and the kingdom—the king—cracking down 

on that kind of activity, and the residents becoming more and more 

agitated and violence is, perhaps, on the horizon, lots of human 

rights violations going on, some say. 

What do you see as the future for our activities in Bahrain, stationing of the Fifth Fleet there, and have there been any contingency plans put into place or at least developed in the event that 

the situation gets out of hand in Bahrain. 
23 

Admiral MYERS. Congressman, thank you for the question. The 

Navy’s role is to meet our responsibilities to operate forward where 

it matters and be ready when it matters. Having a headquarters 

in Bahrain for our Fifth Fleet, a Naval Central Command Component Commander, is important for the Navy. 

To get to the specifics of your question, in terms of, contingencies 

with relationships that we have with the nation of Bahrain, I 

would need to take that for the record and get back to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 122.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. So what you are saying is that, you cannot answer 

the question as to whether or not there are—there is any contingency planning that is taking place at this time? 

Admiral MYERS. Congressman, I would prefer to take—I can answer the question, but not in this forum. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. 

Admiral MYERS. And I would prefer to take it into a more appropriate forum. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. I understand. 

News reports indicate that the Littoral Combat Ship, which relies heavily on electronic systems, is vulnerable to hacking. Can 

you elaborate on the issue and tell the committee what you are 

doing to ensure that all of our systems, including LCS, are secure? 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, sir. I also heard—got the same report, and 

this is part of a vulnerability assessment that we look at our platforms to make sure that we are confident that they aren’t vulnerable, and if we find any issues or vulnerabilities, then they are reported, assessed, and then ultimately, rectified. 

This vulnerability assessment has been reviewed by the Government industry team, so we are assessing it right now, and where 

there is differences exist from the previously—anything that was 

self-identified—or things that were from the Navy’s or industry’s 

expertise or input. 

What we intend to do is get the Government and the Navy team 

together and put together an implementation team to understand 

what we need to do to mitigate it. Our information assurance 

threats continue to evolve, and so we need to evolve, to counter 

them. 

The specifics of what is in that report is classified, and again, 

that would be something that we would take to a different forum 

to talk about in more detail. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

I believe Mr. Wittman had one short followup question, and I 

will yield to him at this time and come back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask Secretary Stackley, if you can briefly describe the plan that the Navy 

has for the replacement of the T–AO [Tanker] class and LSD class 

ships. I think that is a concern going forward, making sure that we 

are looking at that. Can you give us a little focus on what that plan 

might be? 

And secondly, is there any plan to use some common hull forms 

to look at the hulls that are currently in the inventory using that, 

as well as, systems that are currently on ships to make sure that 
24 

we can maybe gain some time and some efficiencies with using 

those particular elements in design in replacement of the T–AO 

and the LSD class of ships. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. I will 

break it up into two parts, T–AO(X) and then discuss LX(R), but 

there is a lot of common theme here. 

First, a T–AO(X), the Navy is going in this budget, FYDP the 

Navy is proceeding with procuring the T–AO(X) what we would 

call, ‘‘ahead of need.’’ In other words, there is certainly more service life on the in-service fleet oilers; however, we have two issues 

that we are addressing when we go after the T–AO(X). 

First, we are outside of MARPOL regs [Marine Pollution regulations]. We do have an exemption in support of—for national security, but we just view as the responsible thing to do to proceed with 

a more modern fleet oiler and get within MARPOL regs, which 

frankly will improve the T–AO(X)’s access to foreign ports. 

So we have moved that program into a 2016 start and, at this 

point in time, we are doing design studies leading up to the ultimate competition for procurement in 2016. We are, in fact, doing 

everything we can to just leverage mature technologies. 

There is no invention or breakthrough required for T–AO(X). We 

want to leverage commercial design to the extent practical, and we 

are working through those details right now, inside the building, 

inside the process and with industry. 

So I believe that is well on track. I mentioned two points. One 

was to address the MARPOL regs concern, but the other is—I described in my opening statement—industrial-based concerns across 

our amphibious and auxiliary shipbuilding sector, and T–AO(X) fits 

in nicely to address that concern. So we see that as a win-win. 

The other program you described was the LX(R) which is the replacement for the LSD 41/49 class. That class retires in numbers 

in the mid 2020s. Right now, she is scheduled for procurement in 

2000—the LX(R) is scheduled for procurement in 2019, which 

would notionally give her the lead ships’ delivery date about the 

2020 to 2025 timeframe. 

We have advanced procurement that lays in 2018 timeframe, and 

today we are conducting the analysis of alternatives to determine 

exactly what will the LX(R)—what will the—between the requirements and capabilities—what will the LX(R) be? 

In that analysis of alternatives, we are looking at everything 

ranging from clean sheet new design to a modified repeat on the 

existing LSD 41/49 class to foreign design concepts that could fit 

the bill, and also, specifically back to your question, leveraging current shipbuilding programs, specifically the LPD 17 class design, 

but modifying it for the lift fingerprint required by the LSD 41/49 

replacement. 

So the AoA is going through that work today. The ship procurement is out at the end of the FYDP, and in between, we do have 

a concern regarding that sector of our industrial base. 

So the Navy’s press is to keep those design activities on schedule 

and look for opportunities to try to bridge that gap in the industrial 

base and hit the affordability numbers that we need for both of 

those programs. 
25 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Congressman Wittman. 

If I could pick up now and thank you so much for your patience 

in being here. I have a series of questions we need to get on our 

record before we conclude the hearing, and I want to pick back up 

with where I left, and Keith, if you could pass out this chart, 

please. I just want to show you where we get our numbers, so when 

you are back and doing your research, this is from the HASC committee staff which do a very good job. We depend on them to help 

us write our legislation. 

And based on their numbers, what we have, Mr. Secretary and 

Admiral, particularly, you can look over here, the $291 billion figure is essentially what the cost extrapolated out to be when that 

money wasn’t reinvested back, but according to the HASC figures, 

we have $291 billion plus $487 billion. 

So that comes up to about $778 billion of cuts from spending that 

the Administration took long before sequestration. Now, if that figure is inaccurate, we will hold the record open until you get back 

to us. 

But until we get something from you guys or from your staffs, 

we have to work on the assumption that our staff is correct. So, we 

had $778 billion of cuts that took place long before sequestration. 

To the knowledge of this subcommittee and our staffs, we heard 

nothing about these cuts being too much from the Navy, the Marine Corps or the Air Force. If I am wrong on that, we will hold 

the record open until you can get us documentation that shows 

where that was. 

The way that would normally come back over is if it wasn’t expressed in an open hearing like this, you would give us an unfunded requirement list. So Admiral, the first question I have for 

you is, based on this $778 billion figure, or whatever the figure ultimately comes back to, we have received no unfunded requirement 

list from the Navy. 

To your knowledge, did the Navy submit one to us or Secretary 

Stackley, that we just missed somehow and did not get it? 

Admiral MYERS. To my knowledge, there has been no submission, and before I get into that, I want to make sure that I reaffirm 

that the approach that we are taking with the sequestration that 

is, you know, has already been on record, was focusing on the 

must-pay bills, reconciling—— 

Mr. FORBES. And all this was the figures before sequestration. 

Admiral MYERS [continuing]. Right. So to my knowledge, there 

has not yet been a submission for an unfunded—— 

Mr. FORBES. And there hasn’t been one in the last several years 

that you know of, is that correct? 

Admiral MYERS. I would have to get back to you—— 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 119.] 

Mr. FORBES. If you would, if you don’t mind doing that, and I 

don’t want to take up more time than necessary, but I would just 

ask, General, if both—all three generals, if you would do the same 

thing. If I have missed one, if you would get it for us. 
26 

And then, Mr. Secretary, based on the numbers that we have, 

whether we took your numbers or CBO’s numbers, it will require 

us to have a significant uptick in our shipbuilding accounts if we 

are going to meet these numbers by at least 20 percent or more 

over the next several years, if we are going to reach the goals that 

we have in our shipbuilding plan. 

Would that be a fair assessment? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Our report that we submitted last 

year, and you will get the update this year, it shows the funding 

required for a shipbuilding plan, and it is very clear that our funding goes up markedly, beyond the FYDP. 

Mr. FORBES. And I thank you for your work in doing that. Can 

I ask you to address, now, the Ohio replacement program and, particularly, you were kind enough to submit—or Admiral Myers actually, that Secretary Stackley submitted an interim update to the 

30-year shipbuilding plan 2 days ago that indicated a significant 

increase to the ship construction account to support the Ohio class 

replacement. 

And Mr. Secretary, we thank you for your efforts in trying to get 

that to us so that we could have it in a timely manner, but if you 

look, even in the fiscal year 2014 budget request, the public requires over a billion dollars and is expected to ramp up until we 

purchase our first boat in fiscal year 2021, at the cost of over $5.5 

billion. 

And I support, most people on this subcommittee, support what 

you are doing and they support the Ohio class replacement, but 

considering that requirement and to associate it with the Nuclear 

Posture Review, to your knowledge, has the Secretary or your staff 

provided any support for the program as a strategic investment 

over and above the Navy’s topline. 

In other words, what are we going to do when we have that huge 

amount of money. Is it going to all come out of the shipbuilding account, or is there some argument that it might come outside that 

shipbuilding account? 

Admiral MYERS. Mr. Chairman, there is no question that, when 

you look at the mid-term of our 30-year shipbuilding plan that, just 

looking at the numbers and the number of ships, half of our resources are SCN [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy], if you will, 

in a typical year goes to one ship. 

So it is an understatement to say that that is going to challenge 

us. It challenges our shipbuilding account and it challenges us on— 

when you look at that timeframe. 

Now, my leadership has been on the record acknowledging this 

resource challenge that is outside the FYDP, largely due to investment and the requirements associated with the SSBN–X program. 

But when you look at the 30-year shipbuilding plan as a whole, 

and the area that we can—we are most confident about, which is 

the near term, and you look at the FYDP, the next 5 years with 

the delivery of 47 ships and retiring 42 ships, I think that the 

Navy and the shipbuilding plan puts us on a trajectory that takes 

us to 300 in fiscal year 2019, and keeps us around 300 in the 

2020s. 
27 

Mr. FORBES. And I am going to suspend my questions and recognize Congressman Runyan for any questions he might have for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Chairman. My question is for General 

Allardice, specifically, I know I have brought this up a few times, 

but dealing with the CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] program. We 

know—we spend about $244 million shipping cargo on foreign carriers, but as a result of what I think most people would say, overflying our grey tails, if you would, C–5s, C–17s [Globemaster III 

strategic airlifter]. 

The Air Force has had to reprogram 136 million last year to repair the engines in that fleet. First of all, I understand that there 

is a mission readiness that you have to have to, you know, maintain your readiness with that fleet, but there is also—our duty here 

is to make sure that—I think you would agree—that the CRAF 

program is a national security asset. 

But as we don’t use them, we have seen them fall off their ability 

to do their mission because we are not using them and spending, 

also money, on other foreign CRAF services. 

So my question here is really, do we need a legislative fix and 

would AMC [Air Mobility Command] be in the conversation of having a legislative fix to make sure stuff like this—we are doing it 

right to the best and not having kind of an ambiguous kind of, 

maybe we will, maybe we won’t kind of decision at AMC. 

General ALLARDICE. Sure. Thank you and thank you for your 

support. First off, we obviously depend heavily on the CRAF. It is 

part of our total force projecting capability and, in order to execute 

any war plan, we need both the passenger capability and the cargo 

capability that civil reserve air fleet represents. 

So we recognize that our objective today, and we agree with the 

community, we had a meeting last week. We agree that our number 1 objective is to have a grey tail organic fleet and a civil fleet 

that is capable of meeting the national needs in the time of 

emergency. 

So we have that common objective. We understand and agree 

with the community that in order to achieve that objective, we 

have to have a healthy civil fleet. The CRAF fleet, in particular, 

it to parse out the civil augmentation. It is not part of the CRAF. 

So there are objectives that we need to understand collectively 

that exist in the civil side. Honestly, the last 10 years, the civil side 

has enjoyed a significant amount of revenue, and our numbers are 

a little bit higher than what you read. It is somewhere north of $2 

billion over the last 10 years. It went to the civil augmentation 

fleet, not just the CRAF, but civil carriers in general. So a substantial number. 

Where the challenge comes is as you draw down out of Afghanistan, the business goes down, you come to our line—readiness line, 

you know, how do we train and age the organic fleet, how then do 

we also ensure that we have a ready CRAF. 

As you know, sir, we have completed phase one of the CRAF 

study. We are into phase two of the CRAF study right now which, 

we believe, will inform the future CRAF from our perspective and, 

as that comes out, we would obviously share with Congress and 

discuss that. 
28 

With respect to a legislation in the meeting last week, we agreed 

that—both—that we should working with industry to—it is premature today—to say that legislation is required because we don’t 

know what the CRAF study will show as we look forward to CRAF, 

what the readiness line and the requirements are for the CRAF, 

and what that looks like. 

We did agree that we will work with the carriers to—in a collaborative environment—to ensure that we understand, if the policy 

can fix it, we will use policy. If it is a parallel path to have legislation, we will work with them to have the right from our perspective, the right legislation. 

And that is where we are today, is a common agreement that it 

is possible, but we think it is premature today to say that it is absolutely necessary. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Well I think the one thing, and I know Congressman Hunter also has been all over this, the one big thing is the 

number I brought up, you have obviously our CRAF fleet, but we 

have $244 million going to foreign carriers. 

I mean, that is what I think you are going to get a lot of 

pushback, you know, from this committee, can we legislatively fix 

that to make sure this doesn’t happen, you do have to allow some 

wiggle room because, obviously, you know, time and all that and 

availability, sometimes come into play. 

But I think that is one thing that we are going to have to—we 

are going to have to have that discussion because it is our taxpayer 

dollars, you know, and this program is, obviously, as you said it, 

a national security asset, and we want to make sure that we are 

bringing as much of that money back home as possible. 

General ALLARDICE. Sir, we understand that, and we share the 

patriotic tone of that. What is always of great concern is, in the crisis, when, you know, time is everything and we must get something 

to the fight to support the warfighter, and very often, the equipment that you are describing that carried on the non-U.S. flight 

carriers, is equipment that is outsized, that, you know, we can’t— 

we are tapped so we can’t get to it with organic at the time. 

Or we would push to our civil fleet, but they can’t carry it for 

a variety of reasons, they can’t carry the outsized cargo or because 

it is going into a field where they can’t go into because our risks. 

So that is—we recognize what you are saying—we share with our 

partners in the industry, the interest to get there, to get there with 

policy, and we will come forward with our solution. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you for those questions, and I would like to 

recognize my good friend from Rhode Island, but Jim, before I do 

that, if you don’t mind, I would like to recognize another member 

of our staff that is going to be leaving, Tom MacKenzie. 

Tom has just given us great service. He retired from the Navy 

and Tom served on the Senate Armed Services Committee before 

he moved up to the House, and Tom, we just thank you for that 

service and all you have done for this committee and for our country. 

And with that, Jim, I recognize you for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to thank 

all of our witnesses for appearing today and for your great work 
29 

on behalf of our Nation. We certainly appreciate the benefit of your 

testimony and as we work to ensure that our forces have the platforms and capabilities that we need to handle the complex environments of the future. 

Let me say from the outset, along with several others on this 

subcommittee, I have been a staunch supporter of the Model Acquisition Program, a national asset that is the Virginia class submarine program, and we certainly appreciate the Navy’s working 

with our offices to enable the inclusion of a second submarine in 

the fiscal year 2014. 

And I am certainly pleased that there has been strong support 

for the program and its budget, and I look forward to working with 

all of you to ensure the health of the program into the future. 

Let me first, if I could, start with you Secretary Stackley, and 

Vice Admiral Myers. I am particularly interested in how you are 

planning to now, to have the capability to integrate very high energy intensive weapons systems, such as, directed energy weapons, 

high-powered microwaves and electronic warfare systems and rail 

guns in your surface combatants. 

Can you speak to the Navy’s plan to ensure that the ships that 

we are planning for and procuring now, as well as in the future, 

are capable of accepting the power, including loads of such systems 

in the future? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Two parts here. First, there are a 

number of directed energy developments ongoing. You mentioned 

rail gun. There are various laser projects that we have in place, 

and step one is to mature the technology, and that is two part— 

actually, it is three parts. 

One is the basic technology has moved far along, so that is going 

well. The second part is to weaponize it. And that is probably the 

hard part right now, and that is to take—if you were to visit our 

lab at Dahlgren and take a look at the systems that are in development for these directed energy weapons. 

We are making progress on the laboratory floor, but we have got 

to make the leap now to weaponizing them. A simple example with 

the rail gun. The focus right now—we have demonstrated the technology, now what we have got to do is, you have to develop a 

round, you know, that has relative utility for the rail gun. So that 

development is ongoing now. We have to size the weapon that it 

would accommodate our platforms, so that is ongoing now. So we 

are many years away, in the case of the rail gun, from actually installing one on board ship, but we are trying to keep—we are trying to pace that vision to the ability to mature the technology. 

Lasers—we are a little bit further along. You have probably seen 

the videos of the demonstrations that we have done in terms of actually taking out small targets with a relatively small scale laser. 

So then the challenge becomes, how do we scale up that capability 

and, right now, we have got a demonstrator, effectively a demonstrator, on board the Ponce [USS Ponce amphibious transport dock 

ship] on deployment, so it is beyond technology demonstration. 

Now we are getting it in the hands of the fleet to figure out how 

do we best employ that. 

So that is kind of the state of where we are today. To get to the 

rest of your question, which is, how do we ultimately get it to be 
30 

a weapons system out in the fleet, and how do we accommodate 

that on our platform. So that is the next challenge. 

This technology is a—places a high demand on power systems for 

our platforms, and we have—power is precious onboard all of our 

ships and, with the introduction of integrated power systems, first 

on the surface side with the DDG 1000 [Zumwalt class guided missile destroyer], we start to see a technology on the platform side 

that then accommodates the demand of the directed energy. 

So we do not have a clear point in time or program plan that we 

can say, ‘‘On this platform, at this point in time, we will have rail 

gun or laser system that will be fleet ready.’’ But, we are marching 

these all along and parallel to get there. 

So what I would invite is a question for the record where we 

come back and lay out something that represents a roadmap for 

these technologies, how we mature the technologies and then, what 

that means for our platform to host them. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page ?.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That would be helpful. Admiral, do you want to 

comment? 

Admiral MYERS. To complement Secretary Stackley, in order to 

understand and inform what the future requirements need to be 

for our ships and for our warfighting, the Under Secretary of the 

Navy established Navy directed energy steering group. 

And this steering group is going to develop a roadmap, and they 

are going to have near-term over the next 5 years; mid term, over 

the next 5 to 10 years; and then a far-term plan so that that can 

inform our resource decisions, and the way that we approach weapons and weaponizing our ships. 

Also, although this directed energy working group is ongoing, as 

Mr. Stackley pointed out, we are not waiting for the results. We 

have done lots of testing when it comes to lasers, and that goes 

back to 2008, with the assistance of congressional adds [add-ons], 

I might add. 

And then in 2012, the USS Dewey was able to demonstrate the 

utility of a laser weapons systems in terms of what the impacts 

would be against a threat representative of an unmanned aerial 

vehicle. 

So we are continuing the development, but we also need to be 

guided by a steering group and a roadmap that will tell us what 

we think we need and what is in the realm of the possible over the 

next 5, 10 to 15 years. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Well, my time has expired. You have 

other questions that I will submit to the record, and if you could 

respond to those as expeditiously as possible, I would appreciate 

that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. And if I could follow up on the gentleman from 

Rhode Island’s question with you, Secretary Stackley. Obviously, to 

have the roadmap, you have got to have the platforms to put them 

on, and what is the risk of essentially stopping the bill to the DDG 

flight to be. 

You know, that has been the most successful powerful and capable warship afloat in favor of fielding the new AMDR [Air and Mis-
31 

sile Defense Radar] radar in the Flight III destroyer. And we are 

looking at these power systems, you know, we know we can do it 

and put the radar on there, but it kind of limits us down the road 

if we want to do what the congressman was talking about. 

This ship will be procured to 2029, and we know it is going to 

be in service through the 2060s, have we considered putting this 

radar on the LPD 17 or the DDG 1000 hull, and give us the explanations there if you would. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Back in 2009 timeframe, we accomplished what we referred to as, ‘‘hull radar study,’’ which went 

after the need to increase our integrated air and missile defense 

capability. 

At that time, some of the competing concepts were the DDG 1000 

as the platform, the DDG 51 and other platforms, such as, LPD 17. 

What we were trying to get at is a total force solution that would 

look at platforms, but not platforms alone, also, netting links and 

integrating across platforms, radar resource capability plus the kinetic, you know, the weapon, the SM–3 [Standard Missile 3]. 

The results of that study were a couple. First, AMDR was the 

right technology to invest in for the radar upgrade, and that has 

proved itself, that development is going very well. 

Second, to determine how much radar capability do you need at 

the platform level in order to bring the total ballistic missile defense capability up against the threat that was sized in that study. 

And that threat was based on intel [intelligence] reports, and it is 

worth the staff getting an update on that study in those reports, 

to put this in the right context. 

But suffice to say that, the complexity of that threat, and the— 

I call it the ‘‘ray density and the size,’’ was such that we need to 

go more than an order of magnitude beyond what we have today 

in the SPY–1D(V) [S–band Aegis littoral warfare] radar. 

So we measure that radar capability in terms of dBs [decibels] 

above SPY. And the range of capability that we needed at the platform level, was SPY plus 15 dB to SPY plus 30 dB. 

And what that means in terms of size is a SPY plus 15 dB radar, 

is larger than what we have today on the DDG 51. But much of 

that increased capability comes through the AMDR technology. So 

it is slightly larger than what we have today. SPY plus 30, in fact, 

would challenge LPD 17. It is a significant-sized aperture. 

So what we settled on was, we know the DDG 51 is going to be 

central to the BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] role. We know we 

need integrated air missile defense, so we need the AAW [Anti-Air 

Warfare] capability of the 51, and we need it in conjunction with 

the carrier battle groups that it is protecting. 

And we settled on a size that would give us something greater 

than SPY plus 15 capability on the 51 Flight IIIs, for the radar. 

To do that, we have to upgrade the power plant. 

So, we have got the studies going on today, looking at, we have 

got a power plant selected, and now we are looking at the design 

impacts associated with the machinery spaces. It is all—it is engineering work, it is not new discovery. 

So those—to studies are going on the platform to support a 

downstream decision for the 2016 Flight III ship, so we will see 
32 

the—we will get through a milestone decision on the radar that 

says it is ready for production. 

A milestone decision on the ship side that says that the upgrades 

for power and cooling are ready for production, and then we will 

be coming back with the budget to the Defense committees so that 

you all see exactly what the approach is in terms of managing the 

risks, managing the costs, and meeting the requirements on that 

platform. 

Mr. FORBES. And thank you for your analysis as to how you are 

doing that, and our staffs will continue to work your staffs on making sure we understand the direction you want to go with that. 

Just a couple more questions that we need to finish up with. 

Cruisers, I know this is a very sensitive issue. We know, also, that 

the Navy is still assessing the feasibility of the Port Royal, but 

Congress was pretty clear in the fiscal year 2013 NDAA Defense 

Appropriations Bill, that it believes it is essential to maintain our 

Naval fleet through the expected service life of the cruisers. 

We included the appropriate funding for the modernization of 

those assets. A couple questions here, and I don’t mean to be facetious on this: Do we need to do anything else, legislatively, to make 

clear our intent of what Congress wanted to do with the cruisers, 

or do you feel that the Navy at least understands the congressional 

intent of wanting to modernize and put those monies toward the 

modernization of the cruisers? 

Admiral MYERS. Mr. Chairman, first of all, we appreciate Con- gress’ support in the $2.4 billion that was added in the ships’ modernization and operations and sustainment fund—SMOSF [Ship 

Modernization, Operations, and Sustainment Fund]—that enabled 

the Navy to retain the seven cruisers and the two LSDs for fiscal 

years 2013 and 2014. 

Those funds, they expire at the end of the fiscal year 2014. 

The Navy originally had those funds—or had those ships slated 

to retire because of not being able to afford them. Congress gave 

us the money for 2 years, and the Navy intends to operate those 

ships for 2 years and then, in the beginning of fiscal year 2015, our 

intent is to retire those ships. 

Mr. FORBES. So with the money that Congress appropriated to 

modernize them, does the Navy plan to spend that money on modernizing those ships as Congress directed it? 

Admiral MYERS. The plan that the Navy brought to Congress 

was essentially a FYDP plan, a 5-year plan. And in that plan, the 

Navy broke up all the different elements that would be required to 

sustain and modernize those ships. The people, the HM&E [Hull, 

Mechanical, and Electrical], the modernization. 

So with 18 months since the appropriations act, until the time 

that those funds retire, there isn’t enough time to do the planning 

or to procure the modernization that would be required, much less 

the time to install the upgrades, to use that portion of the SMOSF 

funds. 

Mr. FORBES. So, it would be fair to say that, right now, the Navy 

does not intend to use those monies as a appropriated by Congress 

for the modernization of the cruisers? 

Admiral MYERS. The Navy is assessing, but it is challenging 

to—— 
33 

Mr. FORBES. But you have no intention of doing that right now, 

is that correct? 

Admiral MYERS. We do not. It does not appear that we have the 

time to do the planning to procure the parts and then to do the installation, but we are assessing that, and that is something that I 

would like to take for record and get back to you. 

Mr. FORBES. But you haven’t forwarded any long-term lead materials or anything like that and don’t plan to do that in the near 

future. Is that correct? 

Secretary STACKLEY. That is correct, sir. Let me kind of summarize. First, Congress’ intent was very clear, all four defense committees came out strongly with regards to the Navy’s plan to early retire the seven cruisers and the LSDs. 

And the Secretary, and as you know, we are also consistent in 

the testimony last year, and thus far, in the posture hearings that, 

we would like to hold onto these ships. This came down to a difficult budget choices and where to task risks, but the Department 

of the Navy would like to hold on to both the cruisers and the LSDs 

were it not for the total cost of operating plus modernizing. 

The add by Congress in 2013 as Admiral Myers described, it arrived halfway through the year. The dollars effectively expire at 

the end of 2014, and in this window of time, to put $2.4 billion to 

work without the long-term vision in terms of continuing to sustain 

and, actually, accomplish modernization, we can’t get there quickly 

enough. 

Mr. FORBES. And I appreciate that analysis. It is fair analysis 

that may differ with the outcome, but it is a fair analysis. I just 

want you to understand our frustration, which I know you do, 

when you then say these are difficult budget choices, we wanted 

the cruisers, but we see the fact that we were cutting $778 billion, 

and nobody from the Navy said, ‘‘Wait a minute. We really don’t 

want to cut $778 billion. We might want to use some of this to keep 

our cruisers.’’ 

That is what is frustrating, Admiral. 

Admiral MYERS. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add, the Navy does 

intend to operate these ships, maintain and operate these ships, so 

it is not that we are not using any of the $2.4 billion. I want to 

make that clear. It is just the modernization portion that challenges us because the timeframe that we have to use that money. 

Mr. FORBES. And basically, we are foregoing 10 or 12 years of 

service life for the cruisers, fair? 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, that is a fair statement. 

Mr. FORBES. Secretary, just a couple of—air force, wind force, 

and then we will be wrapped up. 

The Ford class carrier. You and I have talked about this, everybody is doing good jobs. We know it is hard work. But the estimated costs of CVN 78 has grown 22.3 percent, at least the numbers that we have since the submission of the fiscal year 2008 

budget and 4.1 percent since the submission of fiscal year 2013 

budget. 

It has been reported that the Administration is considering a legislative proposal to increase the cost cap of CVN 78 that was enacted in the fiscal year 2008 NDAA to $12.8 billion. It is essential 

that we provide better cost controls on the program. 
34 

We have talked about that, I know both sides are trying to work 

on that. Can you just explain to us what steps have been taken to 

better control the costs on the Ford class carrier and what, if anything, we need to do to support you in helping to do that. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. To understand what is being done, 

the controller costs, it is probably best to first understand what has 

been driving the costs. 

CVN 78 is a near-100-percent redesign of the Nimitz class. Not 

just a design but actually the technology and the systems that are 

incorporated in that platform. So there were a large number of development efforts that were ongoing in parallel with the ships’ design phase. 

And we have a matter of concurrency of development efforts that 

were delayed, design efforts that were delayed, all that rolling into 

material procurement that was delayed. All of that going into production of the carrier and accumulating into a significant cost 

growth during the production phase of the carrier. 

So the efforts to contain this are manyfold. One is the design contract itself was rewritten to do a couple of things. One to go after 

things that we could do at that stage of design to reduce costs, and 

also, change the type of contract to drive to a completion contract. 

Government-furnished equipment, there is cost growth associated 

with Government-furnished equipment. A significant part associated with the electronic magnetic—electromagnetic aircraft launching system, and the advanced arresting gear. 

To contain costs on that, we basically put that system into a firm 

fixed price contract by the vendor, and we put—in fact, we assigned 

penalties if the delivery of that system is late. And since that point 

in time, that program has been performing well. 

We are installing a dual-band radar on the carrier which that development, the intent of the CVN 78 was, it would leverage the development of the dual-band radar from the DDG 1000 program, but 

when the DDG 1000 program was truncated, and a part of the effort to reduce the costs on the DDG 1000, the dual-band radar was 

reduced on the 1000 to just single-band, multifunction radar and, 

therefore, the CVN 78 picked up those development and integration 

costs on that program. 

So about half of the cost growth on the carrier is associated with 

those development efforts earlier on. The—another part of the previous adjustment to the cost on the carrier simply associated with 

inflation. 

That contract was awarded in 2008, delivers in 2015, the cost cap 

was set early on, and there was an allowance made for—to account 

for inflation and, in fact, we exercised that allowance in the cost 

cap for inflation, which then brings you to the last piece, which is 

production, which we are wrestling with today. 

It is too late to undo the impact associated with development, 

and we are suffering through the impacts that have trickled into 

the impacts on material procurement, so a lot of cost growth in production of the CVN 78 is disruption caused by late material. 

The shipbuilder has been turning the industrial base upside 

down to do a couple of things. One to get through all of the first 

nautical testing as required for these new systems as quickly as 

possible. 
35 

But second is to find alternative sources where it makes sense 

to improve upon delivery to a shipyard. Those are bearing some 

fruit, but in the end, not enough to overcome the early cost trends. 

So that is why we have predicted, projected about 2 years ago, 

what our estimate of completion would be updated for these 

impacts. 

Two years later, we are continuing to work on changing that 

trend, but there is not enough progress to change the estimate, and 

so, we have to come forward with requests for cost cap to relieve 

the associated funding to go towards completion of the carrier. And 

we have to keep the press on in terms of the remaining production 

and test activities. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, we thank you for the good work you have done 

in doing that, and the contractor. We may have to be talking about 

what kind of milestones we can just get to make sure we are assuring that those costs are being contained so that we can justify that 

to our other members who have to vote on these dollars. 

But thank you for that effort. One last question for the Navy. 

The LCS, I know both of you are familiar with that, we have talked 

about it, I think overall, the development program is doing well. 

Admiral, I understand you have got to do the deployment to see exactly what utilization you are going to have for these vessels. 

But here is the one conceptual question that I have to ask both 

of you to get on the record. We are looking at the fact that this is 

a little bit different because of the modular mission packages, and 

normally when we have a ship that is ready to deploy, and it goes 

and does what it is supposed to do. 

Some of those module mission packages, we are not going to have 

the complete package for probably 5 years down the road. And, at 

that time, we are going to probably have about 25 of the 52 vessels 

already intact, and if they have got a 20-year hull life on them we 

are talking about using, a sizable portion of that hull life before we 

have to fully, the modular mission packages, fully ready to go. 

Can you just kind of deal with that issue, and if you have 

thought through that and what we need to explain that to our 

members. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. First, I would argue that the modular approach to the LCS mission package is the strength of the 

program. And you are correct that the full operational capability 

associated with the three mission packages across the two versions 

of the LCS, doesn’t—that full operational capability doesn’t come 

until late in the FYDP. 

But the incremental approach that we have outlined for that capability is ensuring that as the ships are delivered to the fleet, that 

we are able to marry up the increments of the mission packages 

as the ships are ready for fleet operations. 

So for example, I described at the mine countermeasure mission 

package, IOC, currently scheduled for late 2014, we will work 

through the funding issues, to try to hold on to that schedule. 

But what we are going to field then, will be increment one. And 

increment one will provide a level of capability, equal to or greater 

than, what we have in the fleet today. So it gives us confidence 

that, when we get increment one out there, we can start to deploy 

mine-countermeasure-capable LCSs in the 2015 timeframe. 
36 

But the full capability associated with that mission package we 

will continue to follow in subsequent increments, and that full capability includes filling gaps that we cannot fill today. 

So, rather than hold the program, waiting for the full capability 

of the mission package, we are going to go ahead and field the first 

increment when we got a level of capability equal to or greater 

than what we have today, and as the follow-on technologies are 

ready, we will introduce those in such a fashion it doesn’t disrupt 

the platform or the mission package, which is the way it was 

designed. 

So it is really a strength that we don’t have to go in, rip anything 

out, but as the separate technologies complete their separate testing, they get to be integrated in with the mission package. 

That is the mine countermeasures and following suit on that is 

surface warfare. In fact, the Freedom is deployed today with the 

version of the surface warfare mission package, and we continue to 

improve upon that with subsequent increments, so she is able to 

deploy today, but then, by the 2017/2018 timeframe that you refer 

to, she will, in fact, be further capable in what we are deploying 

today. 

And then the third mission package is the ASW [Anti-Submarine 

Warfare] which probably, rightfully is—we try to array these in accordance with need, and that mission package is under development today, but we are using mature technologies in that case. 

And the issue then becomes integrating them onto the LCS 

platform. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. One question for the Air Force and either 

both of you take this. We are concerned, as you are, with sequestration and its impacts. As to sequestration impacts and the fiscal 

year 2013 and fiscal year 2014 budget assumptions by the Department, that sequestration will somehow be undone, the subcommittee is concerned about the impacts of funding shortfalls related to high priority programs, such as, the KC–46 refueling tanker, and the new Long Range Strike Bomber. 

How will you prioritize these programs within your Service, and 

more importantly, what impact will our national security incur if 

these critical capabilities are delayed? 

General DAVIS. Sir, thank you. Those two programs make up 

three of the top priority programs in the United States Air Force, 

and they comprise about 27 percent of our budget, the bomber, the 

tanker, and the F–35 [Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter] program. 

And so, these are clearly priorities within our budget as we look 

to meet, you know, the new defense strategy which has us looking 

about how we fly in denied areas and into anti-access areas, notably in the Pacific. 

We were grateful for the fact that H.R. 933 [Consolidated and 

Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013] actually funded the 

required level we needed to protect the very valuable fixed-price 

contract on the KC–46, so we see, as General Allardice mentioned 

in his statement, that program going quite well. 

As we looked at the sequestration impacts to the very early 

phases of the Long Range Strike Bomber, the team was able to 

handle that 9 percent or so cut within it is development by kind 
37 

of working around certain issues and being able to structure the 

program just a little differently in the very early phases. 

So they had some flexibility to preserve that. As it moves into 

some of its more important phases in the next year, so that flexibility for another levy somewhere out there, would all but be gone, 

so I think you can understand, that since those are our top three 

programs, those are critical that we protect those in the outyears. 

Mr. FORBES. And I think the programs are going well. You are 

kind enough to give us some good briefings on those, but can you— 

what can you tell us for the record if those programs were delayed, 

how would it impact our national security? 

So we can make sure they are not delayed. 

General DAVIS. Sir, I am going to let—I will let General Allardice 

talk about specifically the tanker, which is in his portfolio. Let me 

talk about the bombers. Every one of you who had mentioned 

something about the age of our bomber fleet was approaching 37- 

plus years. 

Our B–2 [Spirit stealth bomber], which is our newest airplane, 

is already on the verges of 30 years old. I was there when I saw 

that first airplane fly, and that just seems like decades ago. We 

have money, a lot of money, scattered through the POM [Program 

Objective Memorandum] to be able to maintain both—or all of the 

B–1 [Lancer strategic bomber], the B–52 [Stratofortress strategic 

bomber], the B–2, throughout what we hope will be 2040 and 

beyond. 

But it is money that doesn’t provide a new capability. It really, 

if you will, treads water just trying to match the new threat that 

appears on the horizon every day. 

We are reacting to every threat that those bombers are going to 

have to penetrate. We are not leading the fight in that, if you will. 

We are not bringing in the new capability that the threat has to 

react to. We are just surviving diminishing parts. We are surviving 

new threat radar modes. We are surviving new missile technologies, and so, I don’t know how we do that for another three 

decades. 

So that is why the Long Range Strike Bomber is absolutely critical to that. 

Mr. FORBES. And how about the tanker? 

General ALLARDICE. Sir, thank you, and as you indicate, our program is going well today. As a reminder, 54 years, average age, 

today. The tanker the KC–46 will show up in 2017 to start. And 

we will field that over a number of years, and when we end the 

fielding of the KC–46, the KC–135 will be 80 years old. 

As a pilot, flown the 135, loved it to death, the first one I flew 

is the same age as I am. I hope I am alive to fly it when it is 80 

years old. It is hard for me to comprehend, particularly in light, as 

General Davis said, a requirement to go into anti-access/area-denial areas. 

So delaying the program today, which is a firm fixed price, we 

believe we have a very good deal with the contractor. Any delays 

puts that at risk, drives the cost up, per unit cost, up to a level 

that I doubt we would save anything, and we would just be putting 

our force at risk. 

Mr. FORBES. I think Mr. Langevin had a final question, sir? 
38 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Stackley 

and Admiral Myers, given the importance and increasing complexity of cyber-related issues, as our system is getting increasingly 

complex, interconnected, and interdependent, how are you procuring to ensure that systems are able to function in warfighting 

environments, where our data links may be degraded or denied or 

where the networks may be under significant strain from cyber attacks. That is one question. 

The other question I had is, given the potential capabilities of 

unmanned, under sea vehicles promised to provide, will you please 

give us a brief update on the Navy’s plans for these systems? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me start with your second 

question, unmanned vehicles. Clearly, one of the priorities for the 

Secretary of the Navy has been to expand our employment of unmanned vehicles, both the surface and underwater as well as air. 

We have got a number of developments that are ongoing, a number of prototypes that are in operation and, in fact, we have accelerated the deployment of certain capabilities. So for example, we 

employed an underwater surveillance system, its acronym was 

PLUS [Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance], persistent long 

range underwater surveillance, to demonstrate not just the ability 

of technology to capture data, at sea, over long periods of time, but 

actually to employ that in an operationally relevant environment. 

And that has led to continued emphasis for that capability. 

Separately, I described on the discussion on the LCS efforts that 

are going into the mine countermeasure mission package, a central 

element of the MCM mission package, is the remote mine hunting 

system which is a semisubmersible unmanned vehicle, and that is, 

perhaps, our most mature surface or subsurface unmanned vehicle. 

But then, coming around to the submarine program, we are looking at large displacement UUVs [Unmanned Underwater Vehicle] 

and the ability to deploy the LDUUV [Large Diameter Unmanned 

Underwater Vehicle] with the payloads that it would bring to extend the reach and the capability of the submarine. 

So these are three quick snapshots. Double that number in terms 

of what is going on the air side, to bring the maturity to the fight 

in as rapid a fashion as we can through a combination of development and, in certain cases, we are leveraging urgent needs to accelerate the fielding of those capabilities. 

Admiral MYERS. Thank you. And just to complement what Secretary Stackley said, and I will start with the protecting the infrastructure first with cyber and then finish up with our unmanned 

programs. 

Developing a cyber workforce is very important for the Navy. 

And taking that workforce and that approach into our ships and 

protecting our ships, so one example that is in our President’s 

Budget 2014 submit, is the consolidated afloat network and enterprise services gains that is going to be on our next—on our ships 

and with our next-generation network ashore. 

So if this is going to reduce the number of Navy networks and 

applications and it continues to expand the inspection of cyber hygiene with improved results. So we think that at least with the 

training of the people and the backbone that we are going to have 
39 

on our shifts, and the way we are approaching our shore establishments that, we are on the right track. 

When it comes to unmanned systems, we have a number of activities and, as Mr. Stackley correctly highlighted, in a number of 

different areas. I mean, it goes all the way from the X–47B, the 

UCAS [Unmanned Combat Air System] demonstration which goes 

to the USS Bush. 

She has already completed the sea trials when she was on the 

USS Harry S. Truman, and this spring, we will take it to the next 

level. We have the UCLASS program which is by fiscal year 2020. 

We are going to have enhanced reach and persistence that will 

come off of our interior strike groups, and Mr. Stackley already 

highlighted undersea, the large diameter UUV, what we are doing 

there. 

So we continue across the spectrum to advance our unmanned 

systems. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you for your time—— 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you so much for your time today. 

As we mentioned at the outset, this is the transcript that we have 

to use to do our portion of the defense authorization markup, so it 

is very crucial to us, and we thank you for your time. And as I said 

at the beginning, I want to take just a moment now and Admiral 

Myers and Secretary Stackley, I want to begin with you. 

Is there anything that you believe we have mischaracterized 

today or any question that you didn’t to fully respond to, or is there 

something that you think is important to get on the record that we 

need to have on there before we do the markup. 

And Admiral, we will start with you. 

Admiral MYERS. Well, thank you, Chairman. There were a couple 

of questions that were addressed to both Secretary Stackley and 

myself, and Secretary Stackley did a marvelous job of responding, 

but I also wanted to make sure that, as you went to the next question, that I had a chance to—— 

Mr. FORBES. Sure. 

Admiral MYERS [continuing]. Since it was addressed to both of 

us. The first one has to do with the LCS and the mission packages, 

and I concur with everything Secretary Stackley said, but I just 

want to reinforce that, the Navy feels like we have LCS in the mission package procurement and development right. 

When you look at the three different mission packages, the surface, the antisubmarine and combined countermeasure mission 

packages, they each have an initial operations or operable date 

that we intend to field them in the fleet. And with the surface 

package, that is in fiscal year 2014, we intend to procure 24 of 

those. 

With the ASW package, that is going to IOC in 2016, with 16— 

and eventually we will have 16 packages and then with the mine 

countermeasure, it is again in fiscal year 2014, with 24 packages 

and is a program objective. 

Now just looking at the MCM packages, again, like Secretary 

Stackley said, this is an improvement over what we have today. So 

we already—we procured four MCM packages in the increment 

one. Two of them have been delivered, and we are expecting the 

other two later this year. 
40 

This improvement will be succeeded as we develop increased capability that we can modularize and put in eventual increment two, 

increment three and increment four in the future, so we will have 

more and more capable MCM mission packages on our Littoral 

Combat Ships. 

When you look at the procurement rate of the ships and the way 

that we are developing these packages, we think we have it about 

right. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. Mr. Secretary, thank you 

again, and anything—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, I just want to first thank you for your 

support, the committee’s support throughout the past rather difficult budget year. I mean, not too long ago we were staring at the 

prospects of a yearlong continuing resolution, and thankfully, that 

is behind us. 

And as we work through the impact associated with sequestration, you have our commitment to work closely with your staff because, realistically, our adjustments associated with sequestration, 

will directly affect your deliberations on the 2014 budget, and we 

both need to keep those closely coupled so that we end up on the 

backside with the right results. 

Your questions regarding what has happened to the projection of 

the topline over the next decade, we will get back to you on that. 

But the specific question regarding whether or not the Services 

have raised their hand to say we can’t get there from here. 

As you well know, we do balance requirements and budget, and 

one of the things that we have got do under all circumstances is 

articulate what impacts are and what the risks are. And that is 

what we attempt to do year in, year out, as the budget cycle turns, 

first inside the building and then as the budget comes over the Hill 

with the committees, so that you all can do your job, not just in 

terms of oversight, but just like your placard states, just like the 

Constitution states to provide and maintain a Navy, you need those 

insights with regards to what is the impact on national security at 

this budget level, with this program that you have brought forward 

and that is our commitment to you. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, we thank you. 

Nobody knows the long hours all of you pull outside of these 

hearings and we appreciate them and respect you all for it and 

want to work closely with you on that. 

Admiral—I am sorry? 

Admiral MYERS. Is this an opportunity for closing or? 

Mr. FORBES. I tell you what let—— 

Admiral MYERS. Or are you going—— 

Mr. FORBES. No, you go right ahead and do that as part of this 

as we go down the line, so Admiral—— 

Admiral MYERS. Okay, I want to make sure I didn’t miss an 

opportunity. 

Mr. FORBES. No, no, this is yours. 

Admiral MYERS. Okay, well thanks. 

I want to thank Congress for the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act and the 2013 Defense Appropriations Bill. 

Based on our strategies and policies, we are using these funds to 

pay our civilian personnel, must-pay bills, reconcile our fiscal year 
41 

2013 readiness and sustain the operations and maintain those 

ships and airplanes that are priority for forces that are going to deploy for fiscal year 2013 for the rest of the year and prepare for 

the fiscal year 2014 Global Forces Management Allocation Plan, 

the GFMAP. 

We are also using those funds to restore critical base operations 

and renovations. Now, we are still working through the impacts of 

fiscal year 2013 sequestration and we know that sequestration is 

going to impact our fleet and bases in a way that is going to make 

them less ready than we planned for. 

So the funding that has impacted us across the Navy has been 

about 8 percent. This will likely result, when you look at the procurement side, in fewer weapons and aircraft and it is going to increase our ship construction costs and manifest itself in time to 

complete or later initial operating dates. 

I ask for your support for the fiscal year 2014 budget request and 

thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the 613,000 

Navy sailors and civilians operating around the world. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. Secretary, anything else that you have? 

General, you have anchored both of these two groups today. We 

thank you for the great job the Marine Corps always does. You are 

always great leaders and you have done such an admirable job for 

us for so many years, thank you for being here. 

Same question to you, anything we need to get on the record for 

the Marine Corps that you think is important as we go into this 

markup? 

General MILLS. Mr. Chairman, just let me add to the thanks on 

behalf of all your marines for the support that you give and the 

support the entire committee gives to what the Marines do today 

and what we are—have to be doing in the future. 

And just once again, to reemphasize the criticality of the ACV 

program to us and to our core competencies and to the effort that 

we are putting into it to ensure that we meet the affordability options but also to maintain that capability for this Nation in a time 

of crisis. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. Thank you. 

General MILLS. Thank you for the opportunity. 

Mr. FORBES. It is important that we get that on the record so we 

can make sure we are letting our members know that. 

General Davis, once again, thank you and General Allardice for 

all; you have done. My question to you, the same thing, is there 

anything we mischaracterized today that you want to correct or 

any questions that we left out that you think is important to say 

and this is your time to get it on the record. 

General DAVIS. Sir, just a couple of things. 

I want to say first of all, you personally have reached out to 

many of us to ask our inputs on some situations that are going on 

and I want to thank you for that and the committee’s support as 

been mentioned here today. That kind of dialogue is invaluable and 

as Secretary Stackley mentioned, we don’t get through 2014, 2015 

and 2016 and out unless we can continue that open dialogue with 

you and your committee and I appreciate that opportunity. 
42 

We will get back to you as directed on these funding issues. The 

only thing I will add is that in the Air Force, we have seen that 

as we have the ability to use the expert airmen we have to try to 

build a structure to meet whatever number we are given, we believe we have the capability to manage a lot. It is when that capability to shape our force structure with the consent and advice of 

Congress gets taken out of our hands, we have an issue and so, I— 

we need to come back to you with how we have dealt with and how 

our leadership has answered that. 

I also want to thank you through the questions and through the 

answers the very intricate and detailed and exquisite master class 

I had on shipbuilding here today and it gives me great confidence 

that as we expand our CONOPS [concept of operations] with the 

Navy and the Marine Corps and the other Services on air-sea battle that we are going to have some great and capable partners as 

we go through this. 

I do want to mention though that United States Air Force has 

the daunting requirement to be able to move anything around the 

world at any time as General Allardice mentioned and in addition 

to be able to strike any spot on the world at any time and we do 

that through the great support aircraft we have, through the mobility aircraft tankers and also through the long-range bombers that 

are a very key element of power projection which did not get much 

notice here today. 

And I want to mention the fact that we struggle with keeping 

that fleet, as you had noted a couple of times, viable as parts of 

that fleet will reach 80 years old or more before it is replaced, we 

are worried about what the outyear numbers of our budgets will do 

to that and we are going to do everything we can to continue to 

modernize not only the B–2 but the B–1 and the B–52. 

We have significant amounts of our Air Force TOA [Table of Allowance] going into our budgets throughout the FYDP. And as you 

mentioned, the Long Range Strike Bomber has about $380 million 

this year and about $8.8 billion across the FYDP. We are putting 

in excess of around $500 million in the B–52 just to be able to 

bring it into the 20th century so to speak with digital weapons as 

well as data links that can command it and control it in any spot 

of the globe beyond line of sight and that is something that is well 

overdue for that venerable platform. 

Even the B–1, which has proven to be a quite capable, even close 

air support airframe over in Afghanistan which will now turn its 

eyes, if you will, further west, is going to have about $608 million 

put into it over the FYDP to be able to bring integrated capabilities 

to and including data links and improved situation for the pilots. 

But the B–2 again, as I said, just to be able to get it to match 

the threat across the FYDP is going to require about $5 billion. 

That will just bring the capabilities so it can recognize the threats 

that exist out in the denied and anti-access areas. It will give it 

some capability to communicate back and it will give it better capability to receive nuclear command and control messages and that 

is going to be important. 

But as I look at our bomber fleet, we have to remember that, 

again, we put that fleet any place in the world at any time and it 

probably would be worth imagining what went through the minds 
43 

of the North Koreans as those airplanes were over their country 

and they couldn’t do a dadgum thing about it. 

And so, that is why there is so much of the Air Force budget 

going into these airplanes. But I say again, all we have been able 

to do is react to what the threat is and as a student of air power 

and of having been involved in this situation, the last thing you 

want to be as an airman is predictable because that makes you just 

a target. 

And so, that brings us back to the long range strike bomber 

which constantly receives questions about why another bomber if 

these airplanes are going to be around for 40-plus years? That airplane is going to be the beneficiary of 20-plus years of technology 

development on other airframes and other classified programs and 

avionics that exist on F–22s [Raptor fighter jet] and F–35s. And 

that will get us to these areas of the world where we can’t necessarily survive for lengthy periods of time today. It will make us 

be the one that is driving the threat reaction, not driving our budget to fit whatever is going on in that part of the world. 

So I appreciate the support your committee’s giving for that. I do 

see that as being a very key cornerstone of the United States Air 

Force in the future since it is our core mission to strike anywhere 

in the world at any time. So I appreciate the support for that. 

And I thank you for the chance to get in a few comments. 

Mr. FORBES. General, I thank you for those. 

And one of the things I want you to know too is how much we 

respect your Department, it is ability to give us a lot of these detailed questions that we have been doing on shipbuilding, we have 

been doing with you guys but y’all been giving it to us in classified 

settings, you know. But we appreciate that. 

The second thing is if anything history has taught us in the last 

few years, it is so important to have partnerships when we see 

these budget cuts and the sequestration, we can scream about it 

and yell about it but unless we hear you guys coming in here giving us that picture to give to these policymakers, we will continue 

to see these lines. That is why we push so hard to get those pictures of what those risks really are so that we can paint them. 

But thank you for the great work that the Air Force is doing and 

that you personally do. 

General ALLARDICE. Thank you, Chairman, I am honored. 

One point of clarification to follow up with Congressman Runyan 

that the—one of the points with working with the CRAF as we consider legislation or policy is to maintain decision space for the combatant commander. We don’t want to put that at risk and that is 

really a point to reinforce. 

Thank you. 

I really appreciate my brother’s articulation about holding the 

target at risk anywhere in the world. Halfway around the world is 

about 12,500 miles; that is, for the average person, that is like flying coast to coast in the United States four times nonstop. That is 

really hard to do. When we put a B–2 out to fly over Korea and 

say hey take off out of the United States and from the United 

States and go perform that mission. The capability that brings to 

bear is a pretty impressive capability. 
44 

Behind the scenes there are at least four air refuelings one way. 

In order to execute that, we have to have an en-route structure, 

something we don’t hear very much about, little parts around the 

world where we can place our tanker force so that we can deliver 

that capability and then we also have in the airlift business our 

contingency response force which are the men and women that go 

right after and air—seizure to allow us to accelerate the flow of the 

logistics movement. 

My point here is that as we draw down and we start to reposture 

our force because of the new strategy, something we have to really 

be attuned to is that in order to hold targets at risk anywhere in 

the world, we have to have a balanced force throughout the world 

in order to be able to fly 12,500 miles unrefueled to either deliver 

a bomb or a hope package. 

Thank you for your time, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. General Allardice, we thank you for your service 

and let me just tell you, we don’t want you to be predictable and 

we want you to be cutting-edge, we don’t want to lie on our laurels 

and the other thing we all want to be committed to making sure 

of is that our budgets are not driving our strategy but our strategy 

is driving our budget and we all work together, we can get that as 

a nation. 

And with that, I thank you all and we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 24, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 24, 2013 

(49) 

Statement of Hon. J. Randy Forbes 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Seapower and 

Projection Forces 

Hearing on 

Oversight of U.S. Naval and U.S. Air Force 

Acquisition Programs in the Fiscal Year 2014 

National Defense Authorization Budget Request 

April 24, 2013 

I want to welcome all our members and our distinguished panel 

of experts to today’s hearing that will focus on the Administration’s 

Fiscal Year 2014 budget request. 

In the decade ahead I believe we will increasingly lean on our 

Seapower and Projection forces to underpin our national security 

strategy. Our naval forces are deployed around the world, protecting the world’s sea lanes and operating forward to deter conflict. Our projection forces are uniquely ready to support a wide 

range of mobility, strike, and strategic deterrence missions around 

the globe. 

While I am pleased at the capabilities provided by our forces 

today, the long-term outlook of our defense posture is being challenged. Naval forces embarked on Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Readiness Groups routinely deploy 7 to 8 months. Because 

of the Navy’s sustained surge, our nuclear aircraft carriers are depleting their nuclear reactor propulsion units at accelerating rates. 

Our bomber fleet averages 37 years old and our venerable tanker 

fleet averages an even older 48 years. 

While we are meeting the minimum requirements of our ever-retreating national strategy, it is painfully obvious that our future 

readiness is being leveraged to pay for our current requirements. 

The most recent example of the Administration’s direction is the 

30-year shipbuilding plan that was partially submitted on Monday. 

The Administration once again proposes the early retirement of 

seven cruisers and two amphibious ships in fiscal year 2015, well 

before the end of their service lives. With 31 ships being retired 

over just the next 2 years, we are headed towards a fleet size of 

270 battle force ships by FY15. Decline is a choice, and I believe 

this new plan willingly chooses to continue the slow, painful decline of robust American Seapower. 

The plan also includes a significant increase to the overall ship 

construction budget to accommodate the Ohio class ballistic missile 

submarine replacement. At over $5 billion, these strategic investments in our nuclear triad are essential. I remain concerned that 
50 

during the procurement and construction of the Ohio class replacement the shipbuilding budget will demand an average of $19 billion 

per year. To fund both this new boat and the battle force it will 

take either a substantial increase in the shipbuilding account or an 

effort to fund the Ohio class replacement from outside this account. 

I look forward to continuing to work with the Department and the 

Navy to address this funding shortfall. 

During the Navy posture hearing earlier this month, military 

leaders indicated that they were pleased at the investment in the 

ship construction accounts and highlighted the dearth of ships in 

construction when they took office. To arrest this decline, this Administration embraced a plan that includes an aggressive strategy 

to build a moderately capable surface combatant called the Littoral 

Combat Ship that adds over 50 ships over the term of the plan. But 

unfortunately, the mission modules that are integral to support 

this 20-year seaframe are still in the research and development, 

complicating the Navy’s ability to respond to basic mine countermeasure missions and antisubmarine missions. Just as the fleet is 

shrinking from the retirement and procurement of less major surface combatants and amphibious ships, we are filling these shortfalls with smaller surface combatants and support vessels. We need 

to take steps to arrest the decline of our battle force fleet. 

As to the Air Force projection forces, I am pleased that we may 

be initiating the semblance of a credible recapitalization plan. With 

the support of an investment in the KC–46 tanker program and 

strategic emphasis on the Long Range Strike Bomber, I believe 

that the Air Force is on the right path with the right platforms for 

our Nation’s future. I look forward to supporting these continued 

investments in our mobility and projection forces capabilities. 

As to the Marine Corps, I understand the Amphibious Combat 

Vehicle is the Marine Corps top priority for ground force modernization and the Marines have completed the required analysis 

of alternatives. We need to get this program right for the future of 

the Marine Corps and I look forward to receiving an update on this 

critical program. 

I would be remiss if I also did not recognize the Navy in providing a credible long-term acquisition strategy that uses block-buy 

and multiyear procurements to secure steep reductions in overall 

naval pricing. Not only is this a good strategy for our Nation’s taxpayers, it provides the long-term surety to our industrial base that 

will allow them to make critical investments for their long-term 

health. 

My friends, we are at a strategic inflection point in terms of our 

defense policy. Concurrent with the new strategy being contemplated by this Administration, my fear is that the overall capabilities of our military will continue to atrophy and our inability to 

be able to operate forward and project power will embolden regional instability. In the end, further defense reductions will be 

paid for in the lives of our service members. I refuse to accept this 

premise and will do everything in my power to arrest further decline by modernizing and growing our capabilities. 
51 

Joining us today to discuss the fiscal year 2014 budget request 

are five distinguished and patriot gentlemen: 

• Honorable Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

for Research, Development, and Acquisition; 

• Vice Admiral Allen G. Myers, USN, Deputy Chief Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources; 

• Lieutenant General Richard P. Mills, USMC, Deputy Commander for Combat Development and Integration; 

• Lieutenant General Charles Davis, USAF, Military Deputy, 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; and 

• Lieutenant General Robert R. Allardice, USAF, Vice Commander of the Air Mobility Command. 

Gentlemen, thank you all for being here. 
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 24, 2013 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 24, 2013 

(119) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 established caps for 

discretionary spending and reduced funding using two methods. 

The first method immediately reduced discretionary spending by $900 billion 

across the 10-year period from FY 2012 to FY2021. This reduction was divided between ‘‘security’’ and ‘‘non-security’’ functions. The Department of Defense (DOD) 

share was $487 billion. This reduction was included in the President’s Budget submission for FY 2013. 

The second method reduces discretionary spending by $1.2 trillion over 10 years. 

The first step was the creation of a Joint Committee to recommend legislation to 

meet the reduction goal. In the event the Joint Committee did not propose legislation, or Congress failed to pass the recommended legislation, a sequester would take 

place to reduce ‘‘defense’’ and ‘‘non-defense’’ discretionary spending. This reduction 

is being implemented in the FY 2013 budget, but is not included in the President’s 

Budget submission for FY 2014. [See page 10.] 

Admiral MYERS. To my knowledge, Navy leaders have not said ‘‘Too many cuts, 

we shouldn’t be taking this.’’ We have been consistent in describing how senior DOD 

leaders conducted an assessment of the ability of our force to implement the new 

Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). The Navy also assessed the capabilities, training, and the number and type of ships and aircraft required to execute the strategy. 

We determined the force supported by the FY13 and FY14 President’s budget submissions was able to execute the strategy with acceptable risk. [See page 11.] 

Admiral MYERS. The Navy submitted an unfunded requirements list for FY12 to 

the HASC that included $367 million for depot-maintenance work on surface ships 

and $317 million rotary and fixed-wing aircraft spare parts. An unfunded requirements list was not submitted for FY13 because the Navy’s FY13 budget request was 

balanced to requirements and aligned with the new Defense Strategic Guidance. 

[See page 25.] 

General MILLS. On 6 June 2013, the Secretary of Defense submitted the Services’ 

unfunded priorities in a letter to Chairman McKeon; enclosed was a letter from 

General Amos to Chairman McKeon describing the Marine Corps’ unfunded priorities. These unfunded requirements would enable the Marine Corps to meet FY2014 

emergent, priority mission requirements should additional funds above those already requested in the FY2014 President’s Budget be made available. 

The Marine Corps’ unfunded requirements list is composed of four programs: Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force—Crisis Response (SPMAGTF–CR), the 

Marine Security Guard (MSG) program, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), and MarineForces Cyber. SPMAGTF–CR is a new, regionally based Marine Air Ground Task 

Force that provides immediate crisis response capability in support of Geographic 

Combatant Commanders, portions of which have already been deployed to Libya. 

The expansion of the MSG program follows the need for, and Congressional direction to provide, expanded support to U.S. State Department diplomatic missions 

abroad. Restoral of funding for the JSF would buy-back one F–35B aircraft lost as 

a result of sequestration in FY2013 and return the program to pre-sequestration 

procurement levels in FY2014. Additional funding for Marine Forces Cyber would 

allow the Marine Corps to fully support mandated requirements for U.S. Cyber 

Command in FY2014. 

While each of these programs is crucial to the Nation’s defense, it must be reiterated that additional funds for these emergent FY2014 requirements and critical capabilities cannot come at the expense of programs and capabilities resourced 

through the FY2014 President’s Budget Submission. Any changes to that submission would adversely impact operational capability and readiness. [See page 11.] 

General ALLARDICE. Chairman, during the Fiscal Year 2013 Air Force Posture 

Hearings, the Service supported the Fiscal Year 2013 Presidential Budget which included cuts mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011. This act reduced Department of Defense funding by $487 billion over 10 years. As part of those hearings 

we highlighted the Budget Control Act cuts came with increased risk and any fur-
120 

ther cuts or reductions would challenge our ability to maintain readiness and longterm modernization requirements. [See page 11.] 

General DAVIS. During the FY13 AF Posture Hearings, the Service supported the 

FY13PB which included cuts mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011 which 

reduced DOD funding by $487B over 10 years. We highlighted the BCA cuts came 

with increased risk and any further cuts or reductions would challenge our ability 

to maintain readiness and long-term modernization requirements. [See page 11.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Secretary STACKLEY. The development and ship integration of energy-intensive 

systems such as directed energy weapons (DEW) (e.g. high-energy lasers (HEL) and 

High Powered Radio Frequency (HPRF)) and Electromagnetic Railgun (EMRG) 

weapons require careful engineering considerations. Naval shipboard integration 

considerations include space, weight, services (e.g., power, cooling) and stability effects as well as impacts on the combat systems and fire control capabilities and 

interfaces. Continued technical maturity and future shipboard integration will be 

accomplished through a measured approach to the allocation or upgrade of shipboard services and integration of weapon capabilities with interfacing shipboard 

systems. 

The Navy’s near-term focus is on the solid state laser quick reaction capability 

(SSL–QRC) program, which will field a pre-production combat prototype based on 

the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), and the Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL–TM) program. SSL–QRC (LaWS) is planned to deploy to the Persian Gulf 

in 2014 onboard the USS PONCE to demonstrate the ability to meet operational 

gaps in ship self defense missions against armed small boats and unmanned aerial 

vehicle threats. Long-term (beyond the current FYDP) Navy DE plans include the 

development of weaponized HPRF systems operating in the radio frequency spectrum and development of the Free Electron Laser (FEL) that has the potential for 

operations at much higher power levels. 

SSL–TM will help determine the load capacity and most effective means to integrate a HEL on other naval surface combatants, such as DDG–51 and the Littoral 

Combat Ship. The SSL–TM goal is to demonstrate a one hundred to one-hundred 

and fifty (100–150) kilowatt Advanced Development Model (ADM) prototype with 

much greater ranges of effectiveness/lethality suitable for long-term shipboard installation by 2016. The SSL–TM program is expected to address key technical challenges in ruggedized laser subsystems, optics suitable for long-term maritime environmental exposure, and the capability to repeatedly propagate lethal power levels 

to viable targets through difficult maritime atmospheric conditions. The SSL–TM 

prototype will include sufficient maturity to commence an acquisition program of 

record. 

Concurrent with SSL–TM, The Navy will conduct an Analysis of Alternatives 

(AoA) in FY14 on the feasibility and utility of developing a laser-based DEW system. 

This analysis will provide benchmarks for cost, schedule and performance requirements including shipboard integration issues of a shipboard laser weapon system. 

The AoA will also analyze various laser weapon options and assess those options 

against current kinetic weapons for effectiveness, engagement cost, and system lifecycle costs. Laser options will be based on the projected capability of ONR’s SSL– 

TM program and lethality data derived from the SSL-QRC (LaWS) deployment on 

USS PONCE. Based on the results of the AoA, Capability Development Documents 

will be written for systems selected for transition to an Acquisition program for development, testing and then to be installed in the Fleet. 

The Office of Naval Research (ONR) initiated the EMRG Innovative Naval Prototype (INP) in FY05 to explore maturation of electromagnetic technologies. INP 

Phase 1 demonstrated the technical feasibility of the launcher barrel life, industry 

manufacturing of prototypes, single-shot pulsed power and projectile components at 

a relevant energy level to 32MJ. INP Phase 2 (FY12–FY17) will validate the repetition-rate capability of 10 rounds per minute for the barrel and pulsed power including the thermal management and auto loader. INP Phase 2 will produce the tactical 

barrel and repetition rate pulsed power matured to a Technical Readiness Level 

(TRL) of 6, consistent with size, weight and volume required for navy ship 

applications. 

DEWs and electric weapons (e.g. EMRG) generally demand significant electric 

power from the ship’s distribution system. Energy storage systems, including batteries, limit the impact of these large transient loads and provide temporary electrical power beyond the ship’s generating capacity. These energy intensive systems 

also represent significant thermal loads that must be mitigated by the ship’s cooling 
121 

1The NPS TDR is retained in the committee files and can be viewed upon request. 

systems. Some current fleet platforms can support these electric weapons, but none 

without at least some modification. The scope of the modification depends on the 

desired muzzle energy (EMRG) or optical output power (HEL) and operational concept for the weapon (repetition rate, engagement timeline). 

As a result of its current technological progress, the potential to contribute to 

multiple warfighting gaps, and projected shift of cost curve in favor of U.S. defense 

against adversaries, our warfighting analysis justifies continued pursuit of EMRG. 

However, due to the current state of EMRG technology the Navy is still developing 

a roadmap for integrating EMRG for use aboard surface ship combatants. ONR, 

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) staffs have explored potential ship and weapon system integration 

options for EMRG. As a result of these ship studies, Navy is focusing on the most 

viable options, DDG–51 and DDG–1000, due to their greater available space, weight 

and services growth margins. Follow-on studies will concentrate on ship configuration; required power and cooling; and the combat systems interface. Platform integration challenges include the power requirements of a 32MJ EMRG, as well as adequate space and/or weight allowance for batteries and capacitors. 

While very energy-intensive weapons systems are not currently mature enough for 

fielding today on U.S. naval combatants, continued progress on the technologies covered in the Naval DE Roadmap efforts (i.e. HEL, HPRF), and the EMRG effort are 

projected to result in capabilities that can meet future formal requirements. As part 

of the Navy’s Two-Pass Six-Gate review process for major defense acquisition programs, a Gate 6 Configuration Steering Board (CSB) is conducted annually for each 

ship Class. Once a DEW has reached a sufficient level of maturity, the CSB could 

review the candidate technology along with the relevant requirements and cost information to determine if transitioning the capability to an acquisition program and 

incorporation into the ship class is warranted. If inclusion is warranted, the CSB 

would also determine on which hull the candidate technology would be incorporated. 

For technology that provides significant capability increase but also presents a significant installation impact to a ship, the capability benefits and costs will have to 

be weighed with installation occurring during new ship construction to minimize 

cost, if pursued. If the installation impact is less, the technology could be included 

as part of a back fit or post delivery installation. 

On April 29, 2013 the Commander NAVSEA signed the Naval Power Systems 

(NPS) Technology Development Roadmap (TDR). The NPS TDR aligns electric 

power system developments with warfighter needs, including support for DEWs and 

other energy-intensive weapons and sensors for shipboard use, to ensure that future 

Navy ships are capable of accepting the power and cooling loads of such systems 

as they are developed. This roadmap addresses both new construction integration 

and back fit of technologies into ships already in service. While specific in its recommendations, the NPS TDR is designed to adapt to evolving technical requirements from weapons and sensors system developments as well as changes in the 

Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan. The NPS TDR will be updated approximately 

every 2 years. The NPS TDR 1 represents a roadmap for these ship power technologies, how we plan to mature the technologies and then, how these technologies 

can support fielding of energy-intensive systems. 

To incorporate DEWs and other high powered weapons and sensors into ship platforms, the NPS TDR has introduced the concept of an Energy Magazine to provide 

the interface and the required power from the ship’s electrical system to the high 

powered weapons and sensors. The Energy Magazine will initially support nearterm applications such as a HEL on a legacy platform with a 450VAC ship’s power 

interface. As new mission systems become available for ship integration, the Energy 

Magazine can be expanded to accommodate multiple loads by providing the appropriate power conversion and energy storage. A standard set of load interface definitions for future weapons and sensors will enable a competitive open architecture approach for a multifunctional Energy Magazine. 

The Under Secretary of the Navy approved Naval Directed Energy Steering Group 

is currently drafting a near-term (2–5 years) Naval DE roadmap based on the approved Naval DE Vision and DE Strategy to establish strategic goals, guiding principles, mission area priorities, roles and responsibilities, and overarching objectives 

regarding the acquisition and fielding of DEWs across the Navy and Marine Corps. 

This roadmap will also address the way ahead for the platform requirements (power 

and cooling) necessary to support these systems. This roadmap is scheduled for approval in the fall 2013. [See page 29.] 
122 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Admiral MYERS. Fifth Fleet/U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) has 

a robust Continuity of Operations (COOP) program in place to address contingencies 

in Bahrain. COOP contingencies may be triggered by natural disaster, civil unrest, 

terrorist activity, technological degradation, belligerent action, pandemic events or 

any other condition that seriously degrades security or the ability to conduct operations. NAVCENT’s COOP Operation Order (OPORD) is designed to provide the capability to continue mission essential functions without unacceptable interruptions 

during an emergency or disruption. The COOP OPORD includes dispersal of the 

NAVCENT staff with afloat and ashore options and capabilities. NAVCENT routinely exercises the COOP plan to validate and refine pre-programmed responses 

and identify gaps in planning and capabilities. [See page 22.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 24, 2013 

(125) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. The subcommittee understands that the Navy has changed the test 

program for UCAS in fiscal year 2014 and does not plan to conduct unmanned autonomous aerial refueling with the UCAS aircraft. Given this change to the UCAS 

test program, what kind of implications could this have for the follow-on UCLASS 

program if UCAS does not perform autonomous aerial refueling and what kind of 

risk does this add to the UCLASS program? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MYERS. [The information was not available at 

the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. In fiscal year 2014, the Air Force included funds to restart the B– 

52 CONECT program, but only for 28 of 76 total B–52 aircraft. What are Air Force 

plans to modify the remaining fleet of 48 B–52 aircraft in order to maintain a common configuration capability among the fleet as required by law contained in the 

fiscal years 2007 and 2008 NDAAs? 

General ALLARDICE and General DAVIS. The Fiscal Year 2014 President’s Budget 

reinstates the original B–52 CONECT program for a total of 30 B–52s. This includes 

modification of two test aircraft which were funded with prior year funds. The Air 

Force plans to address the remaining 46 aircraft (for a total of 76 aircraft) in future 

budgets. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I’m particularly interested in how you are planning now to have 

the capability to integrate very energy-intensive weapons systems, such as directed 

energy weapons, high-power microwave and electronic warfare systems, and 

railguns into surface combatants. Can you provide the Navy’s plan to ensure that 

the ships we are planning for and procuring now are capable of accepting the power 

and cooling loads of such systems in the future? During the hearing, you outlined 

a roadmap structure for the technologies which will show how the Navy is maturing 

the technologies and then what that means to Naval Platforms. To this end, please 

provide that roadmap. 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MYERS. The development and ship integration 

of energy-intensive systems such as directed energy weapons (DEW) (e.g. high-energy lasers (HEL) and High Powered Radio Frequency (HPRF)) and Electromagnetic 

Railgun (EMRG) weapons require careful engineering considerations. Naval shipboard integration considerations include space, weight, services (e.g., power, cooling) 

and stability effects as well as impacts on the combat systems and fire control capabilities and interfaces. Continued technical maturity and future shipboard integration will be accomplished through a measured approach to the allocation or upgrade 

of shipboard services and integration of weapon capabilities with interfacing shipboard systems. 

DEWs and electric weapons (e.g. EMRG) generally demand significant electric 

power from the ship’s distribution system. Energy storage systems, including batteries, limit the impact of these large transient loads and provide temporary electrical power beyond the ship’s generating capacity. These energy intensive systems 

also represent significant thermal loads that must be mitigated by the ship’s cooling 

systems. Some current fleet platforms can support these electric weapons, but none 

without at least some modification. The scope of the modification depends on the 

desired muzzle energy (EMRG) or optical output power (HEL) and operational concept for the weapon (repetition rate, engagement timeline). 

On April 29, 2013 the Commander NAVSEA signed the Naval Power Systems 

(NPS) Technology Development Roadmap (TDR). The NPS TDR aligns electric 

power system developments with warfighter needs, including support for DEWs and 

other energy-intensive weapons and sensors for shipboard use, to ensure that future 

Navy ships are capable of accepting the power and cooling loads of such systems 

as they are developed. This roadmap addresses both new construction integration 

and back fit of technologies into ships already in service. While specific in its recommendations, the NPS TDR is designed to adapt to evolving technical require-
126 

ments from weapons and sensors system developments as well as changes in the 

Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan. The NPS TDR will be updated approximately 

every 2 years. The NPS TDR, attached, represents a roadmap for these ship power 

technologies, how we plan to mature the technologies and then, how these technologies can support fielding of energy-intensive systems. 

To incorporate DEWs and other high powered weapons and sensors into ship platforms, the NPS TDR has introduced the concept of an Energy Magazine to provide 

the interface and the required power from the ship’s electrical system to the high 

powered weapons and sensors. The Energy Magazine will initially support nearterm applications, such as a HEL on a legacy platform with a 450VAC ship’s power 

interface. As new mission systems become available for ship integration, the Energy 

Magazine can be expanded to accommodate multiple loads by providing the appropriate power conversion and energy storage. A standard set of load interface definitions for future weapons and sensors will enable a competitive open architecture approach for a multifunctional Energy Magazine. 

While very energy-intensive weapons systems are not currently mature enough for 

fielding today on U.S. naval combatants, continued progress on the technologies covered in the Naval DE Roadmap efforts (i.e. HEL, HPRF), and the EMRG effort are 

projected to result in capabilities that can meet future formal requirements. As part 

of the Navy’s Two-Pass Six-Gate review process for major defense acquisition programs, a Gate 6 Configuration Steering Board (CSB) is conducted annually for each 

ship Class. Once a DEW has reached a sufficient level of maturity, the CSB could 

review the candidate technology along with the relevant requirements and cost information to determine if transitioning the capability to an acquisition program and 

incorporation into the ship class is warranted. If inclusion is warranted, the CSB 

would also determine on which hull the candidate technology would be incorporated. 

For technology that provides significant capability increase but also presents a significant installation impact to a ship, the capability benefits and costs will have to 

be weighed with installation occurring during new ship construction to minimize 

cost, if pursued. If the installation impact is less, the technology could be included 

as part of a back fit or post delivery installation. 

The Under Secretary of the Navy approved Naval Directed Energy Steering Group 

is currently drafting a near-term (2–5 years) Naval DE roadmap based on the approved Naval DE Vision and DE Strategy to establish strategic goals, guiding principles, mission area priorities, roles and responsibilities, and overarching objectives 

regarding the acquisition and fielding of DEWs across the Navy and Marine Corps. 

This roadmap will also address the way ahead for the platform requirements (power 

and cooling) necessary to support these systems. This roadmap is scheduled for approval in the fall 2013. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As our systems get increasingly complex, interconnected, and 

interdependent, how are you procuring to ensure that systems are able to function 

in warfighting environments where datalinks may be degraded or denied, or where 

networks may be under significant strain from cyberattacks? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MYERS. The Navy currently trains to operate in 

a communications denied environment. As adversary tactics and capabilities have 

increased in this area, the Navy has adapted its training and acquisition strategies 

to defeat them. 

The Navy incorporates realistic communications denied conditions into major exercises and Fleet training in order to develop capabilities and refine warfighting 

skills and tactics for sustained operations in a communications denied environment. 

Information Dominance (ID) training, to include cyber, Operational Security 

(OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Command and Control in a Denied or 

Degraded Environment (C2D2E) is being integrated into the Fleet Training Continuum (FTC) as well as the Fleet Response Training Plan (FRTP). 

The Department has pursued a resourcing and acquisition strategy to equip the 

Fleet with protected communications to fight through adversary efforts to inhibit 

Fleet communications. The ability to operate in Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) environments, where an adversary seeks to prevent U.S. operations in a specific geographic area using broad-based deterrence via electronic or other means, has been 

a pillar of the Navy Strategic Plan for the past several budget cycles. 

Our investments in the Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services 

(CANES), Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT), Advanced Digital Networking System 

(ADNS) Increment III, Split IP satellite communications, Battle Force Tactical Network–Enhanced (BFTN(e)), Joint Aerial Layer Network (JALN), Advanced Tactical 

Data Links such as Link 16 concurrent multinetting and Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT)—and among others—are enhancing our abilities to operate 

in these environments today. These programs are critical to our capability to oper-
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ate in the contested battlespace of the future as adversary capabilities advance and 

proliferate. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Given the potential capabilities that unmanned undersea vehicles 

promise to provide, please give us a brief update on the Navy’s plans for these 

systems. 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MYERS. Navy is producing a family of capable, 

effective, and interoperable unmanned systems that integrate with manned platforms to provide situational awareness and warfighting advantage to commanders 

at all levels. Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) are a critical component of the 

future Navy Force and contribute to dominance in the undersea domain. Mission 

areas/vehicle systems include: 

Mine Warfare 

• MK18 Mod2: Man-portable system based on a REMUS UUV which collects 

change detection data to operationally detect, classify, and identify bottomed, 

buried, and volume mines 

• Surface Mine Countermeasure UUV/Knifefish: LCS-based vehicle provides 

previously unavailable capability employing Low Frequency Broadband 

(LFBB) synthetic aperture sonar for operations against bottomed and buried 

mines in high-clutter environments 

Oceanography 

• Littoral Battlespace Sensing (LBS) Autonomous Undersea Vehicle (AUV): 

powered vehicles characterizing ocean, bathymetric, and hydrographic properties supporting undersea warfare and safe navigation 

• LBS Gliders gather wave column and ocean data supporting high resolution 

predictive ocean and weather models 

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 

• Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance (PLUS) System 

Æ Effective, adaptive and persistent surveillance of multiple quiet targets 

over large littoral areas 

Æ Composed of a networked system of UUVs consisting of multiple 

REMUSs with sensors, SeaGliders, and a Command and Control (C2) 

station. The C2 station can be located anywhere around the globe. PLUS 

in-water components can be launched and recovered from a variety of 

vessels 

Multi-mission Future Vehicles 

• Large Displacement UUV: 

Æ Reconfigurable for multiple missions via modular payloads 

Æ Will leverage advanced energy sources for very long (>60 day) missions 

and robust autonomy 

Æ Initial increment of capability (Increment 1) contributes to intelligence 

and anti-submarine warfare missions 

Æ Analysis of Alternatives complete to bound capability selection 

Æ Leveraging innovative prototypes for early fleet utility demos begin in 

FY16 

Æ Increment 1 to IOC in the 2020 timeframe. Inventory objective being 

determined 

Æ