IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

IN RE: ) Bankruptcy No. 12-24794-CMB 

 ) 

SARAH E. BRKOVICH, ) Chapter 7 

 Debtor. ) 

 ) 

MILES J. BRKOVICH, ) 

 Movant (Creditor), ) 

 ) Adversary No. 12-2534-CMB 

 vs. ) 

 ) Related to Doc. No. 54, 89 

SARAH E. BRKOVICH, ) 

 Respondent (Debtor). ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 The matters before the Court are two motions for sanctions filed pro se in the abovecaptioned adversary proceeding by Miles J. Brkovich (“Mr. Brkovich”) on June 12, 2015 (“June 

Motion”) and December 1, 2015 (“December Motion”), seeking sanctions against Terence 

O’Halloran, Esq. and William Jeffrey Leonard, Esq.1

 for alleged violations of Fed.R.Bankr.P. 

9011. A hearing was held on the June Motion on October 27, 2015, and post-hearing briefs were 

submitted by the parties. On December 22, 2015, a hearing was held on the December Motion. 

The matters are now ripe for decision.2

 

1

 The caption of the within Memorandum Opinion reflects the parties as identified by Mr. Brkovich in both the June 

Motion and December Motion. The Court notes that although Debtor is named as Respondent to the relevant 

motions, the claims for sanctions set forth therein are against Attorneys O’Halloran and Leonard and not Debtor. 

2

 This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§157 and 1334. This is a core matter and the 

Court will enter final judgment. 

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Procedural History & Background 

 As this Court writes primarily for the benefit of the parties, the Court will not provide 

herein a complete recounting of the extensive factual and procedural history of the litigation 

between Mr. Brkovich; Debtor, Sarah E. Brkovich; Attorney Leonard; and/or Attorney 

O’Halloran, much of which is not relevant to the within matter. 

Debtor, through Attorney Leonard, filed for divorce from Mr. Brkovich in December 

2008, wherein Debtor sought equitable distribution. Mr. Brkovich avers that during the course 

of the divorce proceedings, Attorney Leonard informed Mr. Brkovich’s divorce counsel that if 

Mr. Brkovich pursued equitable distribution of the marital debt, Debtor would file for 

bankruptcy to discharge Debtor’s portion. Attorneys O’Halloran and Leonard maintain that, at 

the time of said representation, it was believed that the debt was non-marital and thus, 

dischargeable. 

After several delays, a Master’s Hearing was set for October 1, 2012, at which 

distribution of the alleged marital debt was to be addressed. On September 27, 2012, Debtor 

filed the underlying bankruptcy case pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Mr. 

Brkovich commenced the above-captioned adversary proceeding against Debtor on December 

21, 2012, by filing a complaint asserting non-dischargeability of a debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 

§§523(a)(5) and (15). Due to Debtor’s bankruptcy filing, the Master’s Hearing was rescheduled 

to July 17, 2013. Mr. Brkovich avers that between the date of the bankruptcy filing and the 

rescheduled Master’s Hearing, Debtor’s mental and financial well-being appeared to have 

deteriorated so significantly as to alter the outcome of the Master’s Hearing. Specifically, he 

contends that due to Debtor’s perceived disability, the Master decreased the amount payable to 

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Mr. Brkovich by Debtor. Mr. Brkovich appealed the outcome of the Master’s Hearing to the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the holding of the lower court. 

An order regarding dischargeability of the debt to Mr. Brkovich was entered by this 

Court in the within adversary proceeding on May 27, 2014. Subsequently, this Court determined 

at the continued status conference held June 3, 2015, that the underlying dischargeability action 

had concluded and directed that the adversary proceeding be closed. 

On June 12, 2015, Mr. Brkovich filed his June Motion against Attorneys O’Halloran and 

Leonard wherein Mr. Brkovich alleges that Attorneys O’Halloran and Leonard violated 

Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9011 by improperly filing Debtor’s bankruptcy petition. Attorneys O’Halloran 

and Leonard filed their individual responses thereto. Subsequently, Mr. Brkovich filed his 

Answer to Debtor’s Response to Movant’s Motion for Sanctions. An evidentiary hearing on the 

June Motion was held on October 27, 2015, at which a briefing deadline was set by the Court for 

December 7, 2015. During the briefing period, Mr. Brkovich filed another motion for sanctions 

on December 1, 2015, and a hearing on said motion was set for December 22, 2015. Due to the 

relatedness of the December Motion to the June Motion, the Court stated in its order scheduling 

the December Motion that no decision would be rendered on the June Motion until the 

conclusion of the December 22, 2015 hearing. Briefs were submitted by Attorney O’Halloran on 

December 4, 2015, and Mr. Brkovich on December 7, 2015. Attorney O’Halloran filed a 

response to the December Motion on December 18, 2015. Also on December 18, 2015, Mr. 

Brkovich filed a response to Attorney O’Halloran’s December 4, 2015 brief alleging defamation.

With this background in mind, the Court considers the applicability of sanctions pursuant 

to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9011. 

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Applicable Standard 

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 states, in part, that: 

 

(b) Representations to the court 

By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later 

advocating) a petition, pleading, written motion, or other paper, an 

attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's 

knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable 

under the circumstances, 

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or 

to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted 

by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 

modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 

(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support 

or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after 

a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 

specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or 

belief. 

Courts within this jurisdiction have previously observed that: 

The primary purpose of Fed.R. Civ.P. 11 is to deter abuses of the judicial 

process. Rule 9011, which owes its origin to Rule 11 of the Federal Civil 

Rules, is intended to discourage the filing of pleadings in the bankruptcy 

practice that are “frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual 

foundation.” In considering violations of Rule 9011, an objective standard 

is to be applied to determine the “reasonableness” of a party's conduct. An 

attorney's subjective good faith belief is no defense under the Rule. An 

improper purpose may be inferred from the consequences of the filing. 

Crawford Square Community v. Turner (In re Turner), 326 B.R. 328, 330-331 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 

2005)(citations omitted). 

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Argument & Analysis 

 In his June Motion, Mr. Brkovich avers that Attorneys Leonard and O’Halloran filed 

Debtor’s bankruptcy petition for an improper purpose, unwarranted by existing law, in violation 

of Rule 9011 in that the intent of said filing was to harass Mr. Brkovich, cause unnecessary 

delay, and increase the cost of litigation. In particular, Mr. Brkovich alleges that Debtor’s 

petition was filed in order to allow Debtor time to establish her disability in advance of the 

Master’s Hearing to determine equitable distribution of the marital debt. In support of his claims, 

Mr. Brkovich argues that the improper purpose is evidenced by the settlement offer presented to 

Mr. Brkovich prior to the Master’s Hearing, the costs incurred by Debtor to file bankruptcy 

versus the amount of debt to be discharged, and his allegation that the Debtor was solvent at the 

time of filing. Further, Mr. Brkovich avers that Debtor understated the value of her clothing on 

Schedule B and incorrectly listed Mr. Brkovich as a co-debtor on Debtor’s schedules, giving rise 

to sanctions. In response, Attorneys O’Halloran and Leonard argue that the sanctions sought by 

Mr. Brkovich for the specified alleged conduct have already been denied by this Court’s May 27, 

2014 Order and further, that the Motion should be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 

9011’s “safe harbor” provision.

 Although raised in Attorney Leonard’s response to the June Motion, neither Attorney 

Leonard nor Attorney O’Halloran argued at the October 27, 2015 hearing that the twenty-one 

day “safe harbor” provision of Rule 9011 mandated the dismissal of the June Motion despite Mr. 

Brkovich’s assertions at the hearing that the provision was inapplicable. Further, Attorney 

O’Halloran did not address the issue in his post-hearing brief. As such, it appears to the Court 

that said defense has been abandoned. Nonetheless, even if Attorneys Leonard and/or 

O’Halloran had sought to enforce the “safe harbor” provision, the Court would have found it 

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inapplicable herein as Mr. Brkovich’s challenge to the filing of the petition itself is excepted 

from the twenty-one day rule under Rule 9011(c)(1)(A).3

 Attorneys Leonard and O’Halloran, 

however, find greater success with their argument that sanctions have already been denied for the 

actions upon which Mr. Brkovich bases his claim for relief. 

On November 8, 2013, Mr. Brkovich filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the within 

adversary proceeding. Among the averments raised in the Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. 

Brkovich argued that Attorney O’Halloran committed an abuse of the Bankruptcy Code, and 

should therefore be sanctioned, by seeking to discharge marital debt. Additionally, within the 

portion of the Motion for Summary Judgment titled “Discussion of Bankruptcy Abuse,” Mr. 

Brkovich alleged that Attorney O’Halloran’s only goal in filing the bankruptcy case was to 

increase his legal fees to Debtor. In his Response to Response to Motion for Summary Judgment 

and Motion for Sanctions filed January 8, 2014, Mr. Brkovich further requested that sanctions be 

imposed upon Attorney Leonard and Attorney O’Halloran for their “theft, dishonesty and 

fraudulent acts relative” to the bankruptcy case including the alleged fraudulent scheduling of the 

debt owed to Mr. Brkovich and theft of Master’s Hearing transcripts. 

With respect to these requests for sanctions, the Order entered by this Court on May 27, 

2014, resolving the Motion for Summary Judgment held that, “[t]o the extent Mr. Brkovich 

requests sanctions against Debtor’s counsel, Mr. Brkovich failed to establish a basis for 

sanctions. Furthermore, any allegations of misconduct by Debtor’s counsel in the State Court 

proceedings are not properly before this Court.” In ruling in this manner, this Court found that 

 

3

 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(c)(1)(A) provides in part that, “[a] motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made 

separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). 

It shall be served as provided in Rule 7004. The motion for sanctions may not be filed with or presented to the court 

unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged 

paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected, except that this 

limitation shall not apply if the conduct alleged is the filing of a petition in violation of subdivision (b). . . .”

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the alleged conduct of Attorneys O’Halloran and Leonard relative to the Debtor’s bankruptcy 

case (i.e. the scheduling of the disputed debt owed to Mr. Brkovich, the alleged filing of the 

bankruptcy case to discharge marital debt, etc.) did not amount to sanctionable conduct, whereas 

the conduct related to the state-court proceedings (i.e. the alleged theft of transcripts) was not 

properly before the Court. No appeal or reconsideration of the May 27, 2014 Order was sought 

by any party. Consequently, the Order is final. 

Given the extremely broad language of Mr. Brkovich’s request for sanctions citing, in 

part, Attorney Leonard’s and Attorney O’Halloran’s “theft, dishonesty and fraudulent acts 

relative to this bankruptcy[,]” it appears that the issue of sanctions for all alleged fraudulent and 

dishonest actions relative to the bankruptcy prior to at least November 8, 2013, has been finally 

decided by this Court.4

 However, to the extent that the issues raised in the June Motion have not 

been addressed by this Court previously, this Court finds that Mr. Brkovich has failed to 

demonstrate a basis for sanctions against either Attorney O’Halloran or Attorney Leonard.5

 The credible testimony by Attorneys O’Halloran and Leonard at the October 27, 2015 

hearing refutes the allegations of misconduct made by Mr. Brkovich and supports a finding that 

Debtor’s bankruptcy case was filed for a proper purpose. As set forth above, Mr. Brkovich avers 

that the improper purpose of Debtor’s bankruptcy filing is evidenced by the timing of the 

 

4

 Mr. Brkovich asserts in his Answer to Debtor’s Response to Movant’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 77) that this 

Court has not officially ruled upon the issue of sanctions since his request for sanctions denied by the May 27, 2014 

Order was not raised by a separate motion as prescribed by Rule 9011. Due to Mr. Brkovich’s pro se status, this 

Court has been lenient with Mr. Brkovich’s failure to strictly adhere to proper procedure. Now, it appears that Mr. 

Brkovich wishes to take advantage of this Court’s leniency and errantly assert his own procedural deficiencies as a 

shield against the res judicata/collateral estoppel effects of the May 27, 2014 Order. However, this Court finds that 

the issue of sanctions for the actions of Debtor’s counsel related to the within bankruptcy case addressed in the May 

27, 2014 Order has been finally decided by this Court. 

5

 In his response to the June Motion, Attorney Leonard raised the issue of whether Rule 9011 sanctions could be 

properly assessed against him in relation to the filing of Debtor’s bankruptcy petition as Attorney Leonard was not 

counsel of record in either Debtor’s bankruptcy case or the within adversary proceeding. Mr. Brkovich avers that 

sanctions are appropriate in this instance as Attorney Leonard appeared before this Court “in Attorney O’Halloran’s 

stead or worked as an advocate for Debtor. . . .” The Court need not resolve this matter as the Court finds that the 

filing of Debtor’s bankruptcy petition and completion of schedules does not give rise to relief under Rule 9011. 

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bankruptcy, the cost to file versus the amount ultimately to be discharged, and Debtor’s alleged 

solvency at the time of filing. 

Specific to timing, Mr. Brkovich avers that the bankruptcy was filed for the purpose of 

obtaining a stay in his state-court divorce proceedings to allow Debtor additional time to develop 

a more sympathetic persona in advance of the Master’s Hearing. Mr. Brkovich argues that the 

timing of the filing (less than a week before the Master’s Hearing) as well as an offer to settle the 

issue of marital debt proposed to Mr. Brkovich by Attorney Leonard, support his argument. In 

particular, Mr. Brkovich focuses on Attorney Leonard’s alleged statement to Mr. Brkovich’s 

counsel that if the issue of marital debt was not dropped in exchange for $1,500.00 (the cost of a 

bankruptcy filing), then Debtor would file for bankruptcy protection. At the hearing, Attorney 

Leonard credibly testified that in contrast to Mr. Brkovich’s allegations, the filing of the 

bankruptcy was not part of a design to give Debtor time to develop a more sympathetic persona 

and both Attorneys O’Halloran and Leonard averred that the purpose of the filing was not to 

delay the state court proceedings. Instead, Attorney O’Halloran, whom Attorney Leonard 

testified he referred Debtor to regarding bankruptcy matters, indicated that the timing of the 

bankruptcy was intended, in part, to aid the Master by limiting the issues to be decided at the 

Master’s Hearing. Further, Attorney Leonard credibly testified that the offer to settle the 

equitable distribution of the marital debt was proposed because, despite Debtor’s belief that the 

debt was non-marital, Debtor thought that it would be easier to pay Mr. Brkovich the $1,500.00 

than to proceed with the Master’s Hearing. Mr. Brkovich offered no credible evidence to counter 

Attorney Leonard’s and/or Attorney O’Halloran’s testimony. 

In addition to the timing of the filing, Mr. Brkovich asserts that the cost of the bankruptcy 

filing when weighed against the benefit ultimately to be realized by Debtor, as well as Debtor’s 

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solvency at the time of filing, support a finding of improper purpose. At the core of this 

argument, Mr. Brkovich avers that since the debt to Mr. Brkovich was determined nondischargeable,6

 the totality of the debts which will ultimately be discharged amount to a lesser 

sum than the costs and fees incurred by the Debtor to file the bankruptcy. Thus, Mr. Brkovich 

alleges that the bankruptcy will not provide an economic benefit to Debtor. At the hearing, 

Attorney O’Halloran credibly testified that as of the time of the bankruptcy filing, the question of 

what amount of Debtor’s disputed debt to Mr. Brkovich was marital was unsettled and that 

Debtor sought to discharge as much debt as possible. Attorney Leonard also credibly testified 

that had the Master concluded that Debtor was responsible for some of the debt it was believed 

that relief would have been available to Debtor by converting to a Chapter 13 case and 

establishing a payment plan. Based on this testimony, the Court finds that given the unsettled 

nature of the debt to Mr. Brkovich, as well as the belief that Debtor would be able to convert to a 

Chapter 13 case, it was reasonable to file the bankruptcy petition based on the information 

available at the time regardless of the ultimate economic benefit to Debtor. Moreover, as to Mr. 

Brkovich’s argument that based on Debtor’s schedules Debtor was solvent at the time of filing, 

Mr. Brkovich himself acknowledges that insolvency is not a prerequisite to bankruptcy. Thus, 

Debtor’s alleged solvency is not determinative of an improper purpose for the bankruptcy filing.7

Also raised in his pleadings, Mr. Brkovich avers that the bankruptcy case was filed for 

the improper purpose of discharging a marital debt. As set forth above, Attorney O’Halloran

credibly testified that as of the date of the petition, it was Debtor’s position that the debt was 

 

6

 The Court notes that ultimately $10,000.00 of the scheduled $112,000.00 disputed debt to Mr. Brkovich was 

determined non-dischargeable. 

7

 This Court makes no determination herein as to whether Debtor was solvent as of the date of her bankruptcy 

petition. 

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non-marital, however the matter had not yet been settled and Debtor sought to discharge as much 

of the disputed debt to Mr. Brkovich as possible. Given the unsettled nature of the debt, the 

credible evidence indicates that Debtor did not file for bankruptcy relief to discharge a debt 

known to be a non-dischargeable marital debt by scheduling her then disputed debt to Mr. 

Brkovich. This reasoning is supported by the testimony of Attorneys Leonard and O’Halloran, 

discussed above, regarding Debtor’s motivations to file her bankruptcy case. 

Aside from improper purpose, Mr. Brkovich argues that sanctions are warranted due to 

alleged inaccuracies in Debtor’s bankruptcy schedules. Upon review of his pleadings, as well as 

his arguments at the hearing held October 27, 2015, Mr. Brkovich identifies such inaccuracies as 

including Debtor’s alleged understatement of the value of clothing on Debtor’s Schedule B; 

incorrect listing of Mr. Brkovich as a co-debtor on certain debts; and erroneous scheduling of 

debts, in whole or in part, including the $2,090.60 debt to Citi Cards and the $112,000.00 debt to 

Mr. Brkovich.8

 In response to these allegations, Attorney O’Halloran testified that he completed 

Debtor’s bankruptcy schedules using the best estimates he had on the values of assets, as well as 

the character and amount of debt, as of the time of the filing based on information gathered from 

Debtor. For his part, Attorney Leonard testified that he did not participate in the completion of 

the schedules. Based on the credible evidence presented, the Court finds that the scheduling of 

assets and liabilities was done in a reasonable manner. 

 

8 Mr. Brkovich argues, in part, that Debtor’s scheduling of the $112,000.00 debt to him is improper as Mr. Brkovich 

forgave all non-marital debt owed to him by Debtor. As evidence of said forgiveness, Mr. Brkovich has provided to 

this Court a copy of a 2012 Form 1099-C “Cancellation of Debt” issued by Mr. Brkovich to Debtor. Upon review, 

the Court notes that the date of the alleged forgiveness, identified on the form as the “Date of identifiable event”, is 

December 31, 2012, three months after Debtor’s September 27, 2012 bankruptcy filing. Since schedules are to 

reflect the liabilities of a debtor as of the date of the petition, even if Mr. Brkovich’s forgiveness is valid and is 

effective as to the debt to Mr. Brkovich listed in Debtor’s schedules, said forgiveness would have no effect on the 

information contained in Debtor’s schedules and is therefore irrelevant to the within motions. See B 6F (Official 

Form 6F)(12/07)(“State the name . . .of all entities holding unsecured claims without priority against the debtor or 

the property of the debtor, as of the date of filing of the petition.”) Accordingly, this Court will make no 

determination as to the validity and/or effectiveness of Mr. Brkovich’s forgiveness of debt. Nor will this Court 

address Mr. Brkovich’s allegation that Attorney O’Halloran defamed Mr. Brkovich in questioning the validity of the 

forgiveness, as said allegation is not a matter for this Court to decide. 

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Mr. Brkovich failed to present any credible evidence sufficient to refute Attorney 

Leonard’s and/or Attorney O’Halloran’s testimony regarding the intended purpose of, and 

manner in which, the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition was filed. Likewise, Mr. Brkovich failed to 

present any credible evidence that Debtor’s bankruptcy case was intended to either harass Mr. 

Brkovich or increase the costs of litigation. Accordingly, the Court finds that the filing of 

Debtor’s bankruptcy petition was for a proper purpose warranted by existing law and that the 

schedules were completed in a reasonable manner. Thus, Mr. Brkovich failed to show that 

sanctions are appropriate under Rule 9011. 

 Following the hearing on the June Motion and during the post-hearing briefing period, 

Mr. Brkovich filed his December Motion wherein he seeks sanctions against Attorneys 

O’Halloran and Leonard for the alleged understatement of the value of Debtor’s clothing on 

Schedule B, as well as the alleged incorrect scheduling of debts to Mr. Brkovich and Citi Card. 

As set forth above, each of these issues has been raised to this Court in prior pleadings and was 

either formally adjudicated by the May 27, 2014 Order and/or litigated at the October 27, 2015 

hearing and resolved herein. Accordingly, no further analysis is needed specific to the December 

Motion as all matters have been thoroughly considered and addressed by this Court. 

In his December Motion, Mr. Brkovich warns that, should he be unsuccessful in his 

motion and Attorneys O’Halloran and/or Leonard fail to correct the alleged defects in Debtor’s 

schedules, he intends to file an adversary proceeding to challenge Debtor’s bankruptcy in its 

entirety. Given the history of the relevant adversary proceeding and bankruptcy case, it appears 

that any such filing would amount to an attempt by Mr. Brkovich to circumvent the res 

judicata/collateral estoppel effects of the order to be issued in conjunction with the within 

Memorandum Opinion denying his motions for sanctions, as well as the May 27, 2014 Order, as 

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part of a continued effort to levy some sort of punishment against Attorneys O’Halloran and/or 

Leonard. Accordingly, the Court cautions Mr. Brkovich against future, potentially abusive filings 

seeking either sanctions against Attorneys O’Halloran and Leonard for matters related to the 

filing of the underlying bankruptcy case and/or a determination that the bankruptcy case itself is 

improper, invalid, fraudulent, abusive, etc. 

Following the filing of Debtor’s petition, Mr. Brkovich sent a letter to this Court 

docketed February 6, 2013, requesting dismissal of the bankruptcy case. The Court set a hearing 

on the letter for March 28, 2013, at which Mr. Brkovich raised the issues of the alleged 

undervaluation of assets and improper scheduling of debts. Accordingly, Mr. Brkovich was 

aware of such claims as of March 28, 2013. At the hearing, and in the Court’s order issued that 

same day,9

 the Court advised Mr. Brkovich that his request for dismissal was not in a proper 

format to obtain relief and that if he wished to seek dismissal, he would need to file a separate 

motion. After discussion, Mr. Brkovich stated multiple times on the record during the March 28, 

2013 hearing, that he did not care if Debtor remained in bankruptcy. Subsequently, despite the 

Court’s oral and written advisement regarding the necessity to file a motion to challenge the 

bankruptcy filing, and in line with his assertions that he did not care if Debtor remained in 

bankruptcy, Mr. Brkovich failed to file a motion to dismiss Debtor’s petition. Likewise, Mr. 

Brkovich failed to file any objection to the bankruptcy schedules although aware of the alleged 

defects he now argues warrant sanctions. In fact, Mr. Brkovich has only formally asserted his 

discord with Debtor’s schedules in his requests for sanctions against Debtor’s counsel suggesting 

that the correction of Debtor’s schedules is not Mr. Brkovich’s primary objective in lodging such 

 

9

 The March 28, 2013 Order provided, in part, that: “It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 

the Letter will not be treated by this Court as a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy case, and no further action with 

respect to the Letter will be taken by this Court. All requests for relief must be made by filing an appropriate 

motion.”

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complaints. This conclusion is further supported by the conditions under which Mr. Brkovich 

asserts that he would file an additional adversary proceeding to challenge Debtor’s bankruptcy 

filing. 

Upon review of Mr. Brkovich’s representations to this Court, Mr. Brkovich’s threat of an 

additional adversary proceeding appears to be conditioned on this Court’s determination 

regarding sanctions as to Attorneys Leonard and O’Halloran. Specifically, Mr. Brkovich has 

indicated that if sanctions are found to be warranted, then he would refrain from filing the 

adversary proceeding thus permitting the bankruptcy case to conclude without objection.10 In 

hedging his intent to file the adversary proceeding in this manner, Mr. Brkovich reinforces the 

perception that the target of any additional proceedings would be Attorneys O’Halloran and/or 

Leonard, and that Mr. Brkovich’s objective is not to rectify Debtor’s alleged improper 

bankruptcy filing. 

In addition to the above, the Court observes that Mr. Brkovich’s multiple claims for 

sanctions appear to be motivated, in part, by a disregard for law and/or procedure. Throughout 

these proceedings, Mr. Brkovich has sought sanctions against Attorneys O’Halloran and/or 

Leonard on multiple occasions in connection with the filing of Debtor’s bankruptcy petition. Mr. 

Brkovich slightly differentiates the bases of each motion/request by focusing on a separate, 

alleged fault of the petition (i.e. improper purpose of discharging a marital debt; improper 

purpose of harassment, delay, and increasing cost of litigation; incorrect scheduling of assets and 

debts) despite all being known to, or at least discoverable by, Mr. Brkovich prior to the filing of 

the first request and all claims deriving from the Debtor’s initial bankruptcy filing. It is the 

Court’s view that filing in this manner suggests that Mr. Brkovich is attempting to improperly 

 

10 Mr. Brkovich stated in his Response to Defamatory Brief filed December 18, 2015, that “Movant will gladly not 

file an adversary proceeding if this Court recognizes the truth in its Order.”

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take multiple bites of the apple in seeking sanctions against Attorneys O’Halloran and Leonard 

for the same action: filing the Debtor’s bankruptcy case; thus evidencing Mr. Brkovich’s 

determination to have some sort of punishment assessed against Attorneys O’Halloran and 

Leonard. 

Moreover, even though this Court has found no fraud in connection with the filing of the 

bankruptcy petition, assuming arguendo that Mr. Brkovich would be able to present a valid 

argument for a bad faith filing based on Debtor’s schedules, the Court would find Mr. 

Brkovich’s claims untimely due to the extended delay in asserting any objection to Debtor’s

schedules and/or bankruptcy case filing. Based upon a review of the docket, the Court notes that 

Debtor’s bankruptcy case appears to be ready for discharge and, but for the continuation of this 

adversary proceeding, closing. Given that this Court rendered a decision regarding 

dischargeability some time ago, discharge could be granted regardless of Mr. Brkovich’s filing 

of the within motions. In fact, it is a mere technicality that a discharge has not already been 

entered due to the procedures followed by the Clerk’s office.

Accordingly, if Mr. Brkovich files an adversary proceeding that this Court finds to be an 

abuse of the judicial process, the Court intends to issue a rule to show cause why the Court 

should not impose sanctions and/or enjoin Mr. Brkovich from any further filings in this case. 

Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Brkovich failed to show that sanctions against Attorneys 

O’Halloran and/or Leonard are warranted pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9011. Mr. Brkovich failed 

to demonstrate that the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition was filed for an improper purpose, such as 

to harass Mr. Brkovich, cause unnecessary delay, increase the costs of litigation, or seek to 

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discharge a non-dischargeable marital debt. Additionally, Mr. Brkovich failed to show that 

Debtor’s schedules were completed in an unreasonable manner or that the bankruptcy filing was 

unwarranted by existing law. Accordingly, Mr. Brkovich’s June Motion and December Motion 

are denied. An appropriate Order will be entered consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. 

Dated: January 19, 2016 /s/Carlota M. Böhm 

Carlota M. Böhm 

United States Bankruptcy Judge 

MAIL TO:

Terence O’Halloran, Esq. 

William Jeffrey Leonard, Esq. 

Miles J. Brkovich FILED

CLERK

U.S. BANKRUPTCY

COURT - 

1/19/16 11:29 am

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