alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
THE CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME
FILED AS PART OF THIS FORM 10-K.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          71,088
<SECURITIES>                                    30,637
<RECEIVABLES>                                   25,387
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,150
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               145,885
<PP&E>                                          48,621
<DEPRECIATION>                                  17,496
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 212,217
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           49,455
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             3
<OTHER-SE>                                     161,892
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   212,217
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               147,348
<CGS>                                            2,836
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   13,487
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               128,934
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,385
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,220
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,679
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,541
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,541
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.25
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.24


</TABLE>
#### Lawrence F. TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. The FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION et al., Respondents.

No. 50803.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 22, 1977.

Albert George Siegel, Miami Beach, for petitioner.

Howard Hadley and Vaughan David Hulse of the Florida Real Estate Commission, Winter Park, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of certiorari reflected apparent jurisdiction in this Court. Certiorari was granted, without argument, based on apparent decisional conflict. Upon further consideration of the matter and review of the record, we have determined that the cited decision presents no direct conflict as required by Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. Therefore, the writ must be and is hereby discharged.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C. J., ENGLAND, SUND-BERG and KARL, JJ., concur.

ADKINS, BOYD and HATCHETT, JJ., dissent.
#### Carl Carey ROBERTS v. STATE.

No. 39003.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 226 So.2d 7.
#### OCCIDENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH CAROLINA, Appellant, v. Charles A. LAZZARO, Appellee.

No. 69-239.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Oct. 21, 1969.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 6, 1969.

*229Shutts & Bowen, and Christopher C. Larimore, Miami, for appellant.

Whitman & Wolfe, Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant insurance company has appealed from a declaratory judgment rendered in a suit filed by the appellee insured. The trial court held that the appellee was entitled to receive total disability benefits under the policy, granted judgment for amounts due to date of the judgment, and provided that the appellee “is to receive all future benefits as provided for in said policy in the amount of $200 per month from the date of this order”.

For the disability involved, the policy by its terms provided for payment of $200 per month for two years. The effective date for the start of such payments was held to be March 25, 1968. The judgment was entered December 4, 1968. Thus the. period for future payments to which the trial court held the insured was entitled would extend to two years from March 25, 1968, in the absence of a showing that such disability terminated sooner.

In 1960, while employed as a police officer by the City of Miami, the insured sustained a back injury. After some weeks of treatment he resumed his duties, and so continued until June of 1966, at which time he underwent an operation for which he was hospitalized until August 29, 1966. Following a period of convalescence he returned to full duty in February of 1967, and during that month applied to the appellant insurance company for a disability policy. Based on such application the policy involved here was issued to him in April of 1967. Approximately one month after issuance of the policy, he applied to the city for retirement for “accidental disability,” based on the 1960 accident. His application was approved and the city retired him on that basis at two thirds pay, in February of 1968.

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in not construing the policy to require a showing by the insured that the disability established was a result of some physical change or impairment occurring after the issuance of the policy, whereas here the disability for which he was retired by the city was caused by his 1960 injury. However, material to this case is a waiver contained in the policy, as follows: “The requirement that conditions resulting in losses for which benefits are payable under this policy must originate after the effective date of this policy is hereby waived;” (with certain stated exceptions not applicable here). That express waiver in the policy deprives the appellant’s argument of any force, and it served to permit, if in fact it did not operate to invite what happened in this instance. The remaining contentions of the appellant have been considered in the light of the record and briefs and are found to be without merit.

Affirmed.
#### William Lloyd BURNS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-109.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 4, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
P. 1 

# OAR Box 1830 Prepped by Ollie Stewart



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<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.43

 
                   AMENDED AND RESTATED WORKING-CAPITAL NOTE
                   -----------------------------------------


$2,500,000                                                     February 22, 1999


     FOR VALUE RECEIVED, MATRIX FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION, an Arizona
corporation ("Borrower"), promises to pay to the order of RESIDENTIAL FUNDING
CORPORATION ("Lender") that portion of the principal amount of $2,500,000 that
may from time to time be disbursed and outstanding under this note together with
interest.

     This note is a "Working-Capital Note" under the Amended and Restated Loan
Agreement (as renewed, extended, amended, or restated, the "Loan Agreement")
dated as of January 31, 1997, between Borrower, Lender, certain other Lenders,
and Bank One, Texas, N.A., as Agent for Lenders.  All of the defined terms in
the Loan Agreement have the same meanings when used -- unless otherwise defined
-- in this note.

     This note incorporates by reference the principal and interest payment
terms in the Loan Agreement for this note, including, without limitation, the
final maturity, which is the Warehouse-Actual-Termination Date.  Principal and
interest are payable to the holder of this note through Agent at either (a) its
offices at 1717 Main Street, Dallas, Texas 75201, or (b) at any other address so
designated by Agent in written notice to Borrower.

     This note incorporates by reference all other provisions in the Loan
Agreement applicable to this note -- such as provisions for disbursements of
principal, applicable-interest rates before and after Default, voluntary and
mandatory prepayments, acceleration of maturity, exercise of Rights, payment of
attorneys' fees, court costs, and other costs of collection, certain waivers by
Borrower and other obligors, assurances and security, choice of Texas and United
States federal Law, usury savings, and other matters applicable to Loan
Documents under the Loan Agreement.

     This note is an amendment, restatement, renewal, extension, modification
of, consolidation of, and substitution for, the existing Receivables Notes (as
the same may have been amended and replaced to the date hereof, the "Former
Notes"), which Former Notes were executed and delivered pursuant to the  Loan
Agreement.


                              MATRIX FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION, as 
                              Borrower


                              By                /s/
                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                   George R. Bender, President
#### AVIS RENT-A-CAR, INC., Petitioner, v. Paul N. NEWMAN, and Mildred Newman, his wife, Ulysses Roberts, and Jim Cook Rambler, Inc., Respondents.

No. 70-317.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 3, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari dismissed.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 11

- 00892

- CR

Amy Lee YARA

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2011CR2906

Honorable Maria Teresa Herr, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE ANGELINI

, JUSTICE ALVAREZ , AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is

AFFIRMED. Appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

SIGNED June 12, 2013.

_____________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS**

 

The Board of Directors and Shareholders 

TranSwitch Corporation: 

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements of TranSwitch Corporation and subsidiaries on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-69005,333-40897, 333-105332, 333-109102 and 333-109571), Form S-4 No. 333-105330 and Form S-8 (Nos. 333-75800, 333-70344, 333-44032, 333-83187, 33-94234 and 333-89798) of our report dated January 20, 2004, with respect to the consolidated balance sheetsof TranSwitch Corporation and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2003 and 2002, and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders’ equity and comprehensive income (loss), and cash flows for each of the years in the three-yearperiod ended December 31, 2003, and the related schedule, which report appears in the December 31, 2003 annual report on Form 10-K of TranSwitch Corporation and subsidiaries. Our report refers to the Company’s change in accounting principle forcomputing depreciation during 2003 and its adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142, *Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets*, during 2002. 

 

/s/    KPMG LLP 

 

Stamford, Connecticut 

March 3, 2004
#### Freddie Lee PITTS and Wilbert Lee v. STATE of Florida.

No. 39147.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 1969.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 19, 1970.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 227 So.2d 880.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

DONNELLE HORSEY, 

 Petitioner, 

 v. 

B. MASON, 

 Respondent. 

 No. 4:24-CV-00825 

 (Chief Judge Brann) 

ORDER

AND NOW, this 12th day of December 2024, in accordance with the 

accompanying Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Petitioner Donnelle Horsey’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED. 

2. A certificate of appealability shall not issue, as Horsey has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, see 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), or that “jurists of reason would find it debatable” 

whether this Court’s procedural rulings are correct, Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

3. Horsey’s motion (Doc. 21) to exceed page limitation is DISMISSED

as moot. 

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case. 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 Chief United States District Judge 

Case 4:24-cv-00825-MWB-MP Document 23 Filed 12/12/24 Page 1 of 1
UAS Specifications:

Model DJI F450 DJI F550 AD8

- HL

Take

- off Weight 1730 grams 2254 grams 5302 grams

Diagonal Width 28 inches 32 inches 45 inches

Height 10 inches 12.5 inches 18 inches

Number of rotors 4 6 8

Autonomous

f light capable Return To Home

Capable Programmable

Flight Capable Programmable

Flight Capable
#### Aron BUKSPAN, Appellant, v. Martin FLAKS, Appellee.

No. 69-197.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Nov. 12, 1969.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 19, 1969.

Carey, Dwyer, Austin, Cole & Sel wood, and Edward A. Perse, Miami, for appellant.

Fuller & Brumer, Bolles, Goodwin, Rys-kamp & Ware, Miami, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

By this appeal, the appellant [defendant in the trial court in a personal injury action] urges error in the failure of the trial judge to give instructions relating to contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. We affirm.

The record shows that the plaintiff was riding as a passenger in an automobile being operated by the twenty-one-year-old defendant1 under a restricted driver’s license.2 At the time of the charge conference, the only evidence that had been adduced relating to the negligence of the driver was the failure to see a posted sign warning of a curve and a reduction in the speed limit. The driver did not see the sign; he was warned immediately by the passenger but, because of the failure to reduce speed, was unable to negotiate the turn which resulted in the accident.

*433We hold that the mere fact of riding with a driver with a restricted permit does not automatically entitle a defendant to instructions on contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. There must be some additional evidence of the defendant’s alleged negligence chargeable to the knowledge of the plaintiff. It is apparent from the record in this cause that, prior to the failure to see the sign, there was no additional evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant and, therefore, error has not been made to appear. Roberts v. Craig, 124 Cal.App.2d 202, 268 P.2d 500, 43 A.L.R.2d 1146; Constantin v. Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Co., La.App.1961, 129 So.2d 269; Chalmers v. Willis, 247 Md. 379, 231 A.2d 70; Joyce v. Quinn, 204 Pa.Super. 580, 205 A.2d 611; Jennings v. Hodges, 80 S.D. 582, 129 N.W.2d 59.

Affirmed.

1

. This case does not involve the guest statute because the passenger was the owner of the vehicle. Hale v. Adams, Fla.App.1960, 117 So.2d 524; Fla.App.1962, 138 So.2d 761; Fla.App.1962, 147 So.2d 165; Heddendorf v. Joyce, Fla.App.1965, 178 So.2d 126.

2

. The restriction required a licensed operator [which the plaintiff was] to be in the vehicle with the restricted driver. McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York, c. 71, § 501(4) (b).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHELLE BRANDON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-55890

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-07420-KK

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Kenly Kiya Kato, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 11, 2020** 

San Francisco, California

Before: GRABER, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Michelle Brandon appeals the district court's judgment remanding the

administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision for further proceedings rather than an

immediate award of benefits. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

FILED

SEP 15 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
and review the district court's decision to remand for further proceedings for abuse

of discretion, Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it remanded for further

administrative proceedings because outstanding issues remain in the record

regarding consultative examiner Dr. Michael Kushner's opinion. See Dominguez v.

Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 408–10 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming district court’s remand for

further proceedings rather than an immediate award of benefits where outstanding

issues, including conflicts between the erroneously rejected opinion and other

record evidence, remain unresolved); Treichler v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 775

F.3d 1090, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s remand for further

proceedings where conflicts and ambiguities between the erroneously rejected

testimony and other record evidence were unresolved). The district court found

(1) that Dr. Kushner’s erroneously discounted opinion was consistent, rather than

inconsistent, with the treatment record and Brandon’s GAF scores, and (2) that it

was not clear from the record whether the ALJ would be required to find Brandon

disabled once this evidence was properly evaluated, in part because no vocational

expert testified. The district court properly concluded that remand was warranted

for the ALJ to “reassess the evidence and provide sufficient reasons supported by

the record” for rejecting Dr. Kushner's opinion. 

2
AFFIRMED.

3
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

BRADLEY C. BIRKENFELD,

Appellant,

v.

KEVIN M. COSTNER,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-2050

[July 28, 2022]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Joseph George Marx, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

502020CA003819MBAJ.

Jack Scarola of Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A., West 

Palm Beach, and David J. Sales, and Daniel R. Hoffman of David J. Sales, 

P.A., Sarasota, for appellant.

Scott N. Wagner and Ilana Drescher of Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & 

Axelrod, LLP, Miami, Martin D. Singer and David B. Jonelis of Lavely & 

Singer, P.C., Los Angeles, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

MAY, DAMOORGIAN and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Exhibit 21.1



Subsidiaries of the Company



|                                     |  |                               
|------------------------------------ |  | ------------------------------
|Entity Name                          |  | State/Country of Incorporation
|ASIC Design Service, Inc.            |  | Delaware                      
|TranSwitch S.A.                      |  | France                        
|Horizon Semiconductors, Inc.         |  | Virginia                      
|Opal Acquisition Corporation         |  | Delaware                      
|Systems On Silicon, Inc.             |  | New Jersey                    
|TranSwitch Asia PTE Ltd.             |  | Singapore                     
|TranSwitch Asia Ltd.                 |  | Hong Kong                     
|TranSwitch II Corp.                  |  | Delaware                      
|TranSwitch III, Inc.                 |  | Delaware                      
|TranSwitch Europe N.V./S.A.          |  | Belgium                       
|TranSwitch India Private Limited     |  | India                         
|TranSwitch International Corp.       |  | Delaware                      
|Lehman Silicon Solutions S.A.        |  | Switzerland                   
|TranSwitch Silicon Valley, Inc.      |  | California                    
|TranSwitch Technologies Canada, Inc. |  | Canada                        
|TX Holdings Inc.                     |  | Delaware