*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 24, 2008*

Decided July 30, 2008

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge     

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐1309

LARRY W. RADER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin.

No. 3:07‐cv‐00709‐bbc

Barbara B. Crabb,

Chief Judge.

ORDER

Larry Rader, proceeding pro se, voluntarily dismissed his negligence claims against

Johnson & Johnson, its subsidiary McNeil PPC, Inc., and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,

under the mistaken impression that doing so was the quickest way for this court to review

the denials of his motions for a default judgment.  Although Rader challenges the district

court’s denials of his motions, he does not have the right to appeal.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08‐1309 Page 2

Rader’s state‐court complaint alleged that his wife died because the defendants

negligently failed to warn of the dangers of ingesting together certain medications.  After

the defendants removed the case to federal court, Rader moved for a default judgment,

believing that the defendants failed to timely answer his complaint.  Judge Shabaz denied

Rader’s motion against Teva and recused himself from the case two days later.  Chief Judge

Crabb then denied Rader’s motion against Johnson & Johnson and McNeil.  The next day,

presumably before Rader became aware of Chief Judge Crabb’s order, Rader moved to

vacate Judge Shabaz’s order and also requested permission to appeal if the motion was

denied.  But before the court ruled on that motion, the parties filed a joint stipulation in

which Rader agreed to dismiss on the merits all claims in his complaint.  The stipulation did

not reserve a right to appeal the denial of Rader’s default motions.  Chief Judge Crabb

approved the stipulation and dismissed the case.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a)(2).

Rader contends that the district court erroneously denied his motions for a default

judgment because, he insists, the defendants’ answers to his complaint were untimely.  But

we cannot consider that argument because Rader voluntarily dismissed his claims against

the defendants.  Plaintiffs normally have “neither the reason nor the right” to appeal after

voluntarily dismissing their claims because they chose to end their lawsuits and have

received the relief they desired.  Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 654 (7th Cir. 2001);

Boland v. Engle, 113 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 1997).  This principle prevents plaintiffs from

manufacturing final decisions to circumvent normal interlocutory rules.  See Boland, 113

F.3d at 714.  The Sixth Circuit allows a plaintiff to appeal a voluntary dismissal if, among

other things, the plaintiff reserves the right to appeal in the stipulation of dismissal.  Laczay

v. Ross Adhesives, 855 F.2d 351, 355 (6th Cir. 1988).  We have not adopted that exception, but

even if we had, it would not apply here because Rader did not reserve his right to appeal in

his stipulation.

In his reply brief Rader contends that he had to dismiss his case in order to appeal

the denials of his default motions.  But Rader misunderstood the effect of his stipulated

dismissal, and, as we concluded in Boland, we cannot allow plaintiffs to circumvent rules for

interlocutory appeals to exploit a perceived tactical advantage.  See 113 F.3d at 714.

Furthermore, although Rader’s mistake may have been the result of his proceeding pro se,

“we have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be

interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”  McNeil v.

United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).  Finally Rader may have avoided this result had he

waited for Chief Judge Crabb’s answer to his request for permission to appeal.  She may

have clarified that an interlocutory appeal on that issue would be inappropriate.

DISMISSED.