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THE END OF REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR? 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS FOR 

REFORM 

ROUNDTABLE 

BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 9, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov 
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

Senate House 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey, Cochairman 

FRANK WOLF, Virginia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina 

TIM WALZ, Minnesota 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

To Be Appointed 

LAWRENCE T. LIU, Staff Director 

PAUL B. PROTIC, Deputy Staff Director 

(II) 
(III) 

CO N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS

Page 

Brown, Hon. Sherrod, a U.S. Senator from Ohio; Chairman, CongressionalExecutive Commission on China ........................................................................ 1 

Belkin, Ira, Executive Director, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, New York University 

School of Law ........................................................................................................ 2 

Lewis, Margaret K., Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School .......... 6 

Li, Xiaorong, Independent Scholar ......................................................................... 8 

Wu, Harry, Founder and Executive Director, Laogai Research Foundation ...... 11 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Belkin, Ira ................................................................................................................ 26 

Lewis, Margaret K. .................................................................................................. 31 

Li, Xiaorong .............................................................................................................. 35 

Wu, Harry ................................................................................................................ 41 

Smith, Hon. Christopher ......................................................................................... 43 

(1) 

THE END OF REEDUCATION THROUGH 

LABOR? RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND 

PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 

THURSDAY, MAY 9, 2013 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA, 

Washington, DC. 

The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 11:03 a.m., 

in room 562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Sherrod 

Brown, Chairman, presiding. 

Also present: Lawrence Liu, Staff Director; Paul Protic, Deputy 

Staff Director; Anna Brettell, Senior Advisor; and Jesse Heatley, 

Senior Research Associate. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SHERROD BROWN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL–EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Chairman BROWN. The Commission will come to order. Thank 

you for joining us, those in the audience and the panelists. I appreciate Ms. Lewis being back with us. She was in our first panel. I 

appreciate your being here. You were on our first panel that day, 

too. Thank you, Ira for joining us. Mr. Wu, thank you for your 30 

years of engagement with us and beyond and the courage you have 

shown as we have moved forward. 

I particularly want to thank the excellent staff of the Commission, starting with Lawrence Liu and the good work he’s done, and 

Jesse Heatley, David Petrick, Jen Salen, Abbey Story, Judy Wright, 

Dee Jackson, and Sarah Mellors. Thank you for the work that you 

do. As you all know, in this place, that’s where most of the work 

is so often done, it is very good staff work. 

I have been involved in this Commission and other ChineseAmerican relations and labor issues and human rights issues for 

a decade and a half or so now, and you can see, I think, on this 

issue we are discussing today, on reeducation through labor camps, 

the work that others have done as there is evidence—there is beginning to be some evidence that China may be looking seriously 

to change their policies, and maybe it is partly an economic issue 

to them, it is partly a human rights issue, it is partly an issue of, 

they are on the world stage more and more prominently and the 

People’s Republic of China, the government, understands that 

being on the world stage and the light that this Commission and 

others have shown on them really does matter in changing behavior. 
2 

So when a number of people sitting on both sides of me, they do 

not seem the type to be discouraged, but I know that we all have 

moments of being discouraged when things seem so sometimes 

black and white, or certainly when issues of justice come up, that 

we really are, this Commission and the four people, or five people 

really, that flank me and the staff behind me really has had a significant impact on behavior there and I am so appreciative of that. 

I want to introduce the four panel members. I can only be here 

for about 20 more minutes, and I apologize for that. None of us put 

quite the time that those of us elected—Chris Smith does a terrific 

job on this. None of us put quite the time we’d like to in this. But 

I will introduce the four panelists and stay for a while, listen to 

their opening statements, and then Mr. Liu will go from there. 

Ira Belkin is executive director of the U.S.-Asia Law Institute at 

the NYU School of Law. He is an accomplished public servant and 

advocate for the rule of law in China. He was a Federal prosecutor 

for 16 years and served two tours at our Embassy in Beijing. He 

is a program officer at the Ford Foundation in Beijing, where his 

grantmaking supported the kinds of institutions that are so important in the rule of law, working to build their legal system and 

strengthen the rights of especially vulnerable groups. 

To my immediate right is Margaret Lewis, Associate Professor of 

Law at Seton Hall, also in New York State. She is a member of 

the Council on Foreign Relations and Affiliated Scholar at NYU’s 

law schools, the U.S.-Asia Law Institute and Public Intellectuals 

Program Fellow with the National Commission on U.S.-China Relations. She has written numerous articles that have appeared in top 

journals. Professor Lewis served as a panelist, as I earlier said, in 

our roundtable, I guess, two years ago, something like 2011. 

To my left is Xiaorong Li. Ms. Li is a longstanding human rights 

advocate and has published numerous articles on diverse subjects 

ranging from ethics to democracy. She is recently a Research Faculty Member near here at the University of Maryland, College 

Park. She shared her expertise before the Commission on a number 

of occasions. 

To my far left is one of my heroes, Harry Wu. Not that you three, 

the rest of you, aren’t, too. But the Founder and Executive Director 

of the Laogai Research Foundation based in Washington, a victim 

of China’s prison labor system. He has devoted his life to advocating for human rights in China. His groundbreaking research 

helped expose the cruelties, perhaps more than any single individual, of the legal system. Thanks to the four of you. 

We will start with Mr. Belkin. 

STATEMENT OF IRA BELKIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, U.S.-ASIA 

LAW INSTITUTE, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 

Mr. BELKIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Distinguished 

members of the Commission and staff, ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s roundtable. I also 

want to take the opportunity to acknowledge the importance of the 

Commission’s work, especially your annual reports and periodic 

roundtables. They have made a great contribution to our understanding of China, as well as to improving human rights and rule 

of law in China. 
3 

Of course, the opinions I express today are my own, but I also 

represent the U.S.-Asia Law Institute at the New York University 

School of Law. I am proud to have Professor Margaret Lewis as an 

alumnae and a non-resident scholar. We do research, we do constructive engagement with China. Our institute was founded by 

Professor Jerome Cohen, who is a mentor to almost everyone in 

this field and a consistent advocate for both human rights, rule of 

law, and engagement with China. 

I have been asked to talk about the overview of reeducation 

through labor, its history, its current use, the debate within China 

about reform, and recommendations for the U.S. Government. That 

is a lot to cover in five to seven minutes, but I’ll do the best I can. 

I have prepared written remarks, but for time’s sake I will just try 

to highlight some of those points. 

The crux of reeducation through labor is that it’s been a system 

of administrative detention with no judicial review, where the police have the authority to send someone to a reeducation through 

labor camp, to incarceration, for up to four years based on a very 

vague set of standards and, again, with no judicial process. 

So although China has made tremendous progress since 1979 in 

improving its criminal law and criminal procedure law, administrative punishments like reeducation through labor provide a way out 

of the formal legal system for citizens to be punished for extensive 

periods of time without much process. 

Historically, the system started in the 1950s during the early 

years of Chairman Mao’s rule, and while it could be criticized at 

that time, at least within the context of the 1950s, the flexibility 

that it provided made some sense within that context. 

At the time, as Chairman Mao famously had said, there are contradictions among the people and contradictions with enemies, and 

reeducation through labor was a way to deal with people who were 

enemies of the state and enemies of the Party. 

The rules that surround reeducation through labor, even to this 

day, reflect that 1950s sense. When we think about China in 2013, 

this seems like a system that is very much out of date. 

The system of reeducation through labor has never had a legislative basis, it’s never been supported by legislation from the National People’s Congress. It has a basis in orders from the State 

Council and regulations from the Ministry of Public Security. These 

go back to 1957. 

The State Council rules were amended in 1979 and again in 

1982, and then the Ministry of Public Security has issued regulations again in 2002 and 2005. I won’t go through the details of 

those; they are in the remarks, and certainly the regulations are 

public. 

In the 1950s, it seemed that reeducation through labor was used 

primarily as a political tool to identify counter-revolutionaries, people who were enemies of the Party, and was a way to incapacitate 

them, incarcerate them, or reform them through labor. 

Over time, the way that reeducation through labor has been used 

and supported has changed and now it is considered to be, by its 

supporters, a way to maintain social stability. It certainly continues to have the flexibility—or one might say arbitrariness—to 

cover a whole range of conduct, basically anything that the police 
4 

would consider to be troublemaking, but it’s been used, from the reports that we’ve seen, for drug addicts, for people involved with 

prostitution, for people involved in minor offenses that do not rise 

to the level of a criminal offense, but also can be used, as I said, 

to suppress political dissent. It has been used against followers of 

Falun Gong as well. 

Over the years there have been many efforts by reformers in 

China to either abolish the system or reform the system and in 

prior years it has come very close to reform, but the reforms have 

never been completely successful. 

Earlier this year in January we heard from Mr. Meng Jianzhu, 

the chair of the Political Legal Committee of the Communist Party, 

which oversees the legal system in China, that reeducation through 

labor should not be used this year. 

There had been rumors circulating that reeducation through 

labor reform was on the agenda of the new leadership and that was 

the first public statement from a high-level leader that we heard 

that, indeed, the system seemed to be being prepared for reform. 

I think that the new leadership deserves credit for taking this on 

and taking it on publicly. 

A few months later, at the press conference after the National 

People’s Congress Premier Li Keqiang, in response to reporters’ 

questions, said that the relevant institutions in China were preparing plans for reform within the year. So it seems like this is a 

moment when reform might happen. Within China there is a diversity of opinions about how the reforms should take place. 

In my written remarks I just highlighted Chinese legal scholars 

who are, I guess, at different ends of the spectrum. One, Liu 

Renwen from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, advocates 

for the abolition of reeducation through labor and he makes a lot 

of the arguments that those in favor of abolition have made. First, 

that reeducation through labor is really an unlawful system under 

Chinese law. 

Under the Chinese legislation law which was passed in 2000, any 

law that limits the freedom or liberty of citizens must be passed 

by the entire National People’s Congress. As I said, the reeducation 

through labor system was never supported by the full legislation of 

the National People’s Congress. He also argues—— 

Chairman BROWN. May I interrupt for one second? 

Mr. BELKIN. Sure. 

Chairman BROWN. Was it spoken about in any kind of defending 

of in any way by prominent leaders of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, by 

Mao and others, or Lin Biao, or anyone defending it or speaking 

about it or was it just ignored? I understand the People’s Congress 

didn’t sanction it, if you will, or make it ‘‘legal.’’ 

Mr. BELKIN. Right. 

Chairman BROWN. Was there any of that? 

Mr. BELKIN. Well, it certainly is part of the system and it’s an 

officially sanctioned system. Many people have defended it, including many legal scholars. But in 2000, China, as part of its efforts 

to establish the rule of law and to use legislation, kind of limited 

itself and said if we’re going to limit people’s liberty we’re going to 

have to do it through legislation. My own view is that they probably had in mind that reeducation through labor would be abol-
5 

ished soon, but in fact it wasn’t. This was in 2000. But it wasn’t 

abolished. 

There are those who argue, including the Ministry of Public Security, that it is lawful under Chinese law. I think those who say 

it is not have the better argument. Certainly the government— 

there is no mechanism under Chinese law for citizens to challenge 

the legality of the system under Chinese law, which is part of the 

problem. 

So it’s not an illegitimate system, it’s not a rogue system. There 

are other forms of detention, like ‘‘black jails,’’ or soft detention, 

that don’t seem to have any regulatory basis at all but are allowed 

to exist. But reeducation through labor, you can find information 

about it on the Ministry of Justice Web site. It is a recognized system. 

I think Chinese leaders would say that China is a country in 

transition, with a legal system in transition. I hope that answers 

your question. I can’t cite specific quotes of the leadership, but 

clearly it’s a system that has been allowed to continue to today. 

So part of the debate in China is the legality of the system. Also, 

under the Chinese Constitution, there are provisions that say no 

one can be deprived of their liberty without a decision by a court. 

China’s Constitution is not self-executing, but scholars are pointing 

to the Constitution as a basis for arguing that the system is illegal. 

They also make the argument that China’s criminal law is now 

well developed. There is also a public safety administrative punishments law. Between the two, there are a whole host of remedies, 

from probationary sentences, fines, 15 days in jail up to a life sentence, and capital punishment. There is no need or space for another administrative system that gives the police a maximum level 

of flexibility. So, those are the arguments for abolition. 

Others say, well, the system could be changed, legislation could 

be passed to give it a legislative basis. Maybe it could be limited 

to two years and there could be a judicial review or a quasi-judicial 

review. 

So even those who will support the system, I think, there’s a consensus that there’s a serious problem with the legal basis for it, the 

process, but there is no judicial review, and the vagueness of the 

standards. 

Those who would say it shouldn’t be abolished are proposing a 

new kind of law, what’s called an Illegal Behavior Corrections Act. 

They say that there is still a need for some system to punish habitual offenders. So that is the current debate in China, which is quite 

lively. It’s been going on for some time. That is a summary of it. 

I will just wrap up with the last point. I was asked to talk about 

recommendations for U.S. Government policymakers. Here, I will 

just make a couple of quick points. There is a limit to what those 

outside of China can do. China is a sovereign nation and will make 

its own decisions and pass its own laws. But I think China, as part 

of the world community, other countries have a right and obligation to hold China to its own standards of establishing the rule of 

law and human rights. 

I would just say, in using the tools that the U.S. Government has 

at its disposal, diplomacy, supporting exchanges, I would just say 

that, number one, we should expand our view. Reeducation through 
6 

labor gets a lot of attention, but as I mentioned there are other 

forms of detention, administrative and otherwise, that should be 

part of the conversation. 

Second, I think we need to be more persistent and more consistent in using all of our tools. We tend to focus on short-term 

goals, understandably. This is the nature of the work in the government, that every time we spend effort and spend money, we 

want to be held accountable for that. But this kind of legal reform 

takes more time and we need to be more persistent and more consistent in our approach. 

I am sure I have used up my time so I will just conclude my remarks. Again, thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Chairman BROWN. We appreciate that. 

Ms. Lewis? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Belkin appears in the appendix.] 

STATEMENT OF MARGARET K. LEWIS, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR 

OF LAW, SETON HALL LAW SCHOOL 

Ms. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to participate in this panel. I would like to thank the staff as well for all 

of their hard work. In fact, I was grading papers on the way down 

here and my students in my China law class regularly cite the 

work of the Commission, so we are very grateful for what you do. 

But with respect to today’s topic I am going to be focusing on the 

reform aspects. In particular, I’ve been asked to talk about how 

Taiwan’s experience might be relevant to this discussion about reeducation through labor, or RTL, in the mainland. I have also provided the Commission with a more detailed written statement. 

Much of my discussion of Taiwan grows out of work that I’ve 

done with Jerry Cohen as part of NYU Law School’s U.S.-Asia Law 

Institute’s project looking at legal reforms that have happened in 

Taiwan over the last 25 years. Today I get to be the optimist—as 

we said, we are optimists up here—and deliver a hopeful story for 

reform based on Taiwan’s experience. 

Taiwan’s form of ‘‘reformatory training,’’ as it was called, was for 

people deemed ‘‘hooligans,’’ or ‘‘liumang’’ in Chinese. It’s not easy 

to translate and capture it fully, but it was a system that was 

gradually reformed in order to restrict police power and offer greater procedural protections. It was ultimately abolished in 2009. 

It was formerly a non-criminal sanction or, as I like to think of 

it, a quasi-criminal sanction like RTL, and it allowed police in Taiwan to lock up these vaguely described hooligans originally for an 

indefinite period of time, and then that was changed to three years 

after the martial law period. 

Chairman BROWN. It was begun under Chang Kai-shek or begun 

during martial law? 

Ms. LEWIS. It was begun under martial law and then it was subsequently altered after martial law ended. So what happened was, 

in the waning years of martial law, you started to see judicial involvement in these decisions that were formerly totally in the 

hands of the police; that finally got momentum going to get rid of 

the law in its entirety. 

So what happened was that you had the constitutional court 

drawing attention to the law, drilling holes in the law. Then when 
7 

Ma Ying-jeou came into office, the executive finally said, ‘‘Well, we 

recommend that this law should be gotten rid of entirely,’’ and the 

legislature did so in 2009 in an unexpected step. We thought that 

first they would just reform the law but instead they decided to 

abolish it entirely. 

Chairman BROWN. This was done under KMT rule? 

Ms. LEWIS. This was done under the KMT. This was under President Ma. Exactly. Although there were reforms going on during the 

time of Chen Shui-Bian as well. But what had happened is that 

criminal justice reforms had progressed in Taiwan, and you increasingly saw the government in Taiwan realizing there was this 

untenable gap between the procedures applied to criminal cases 

and those applied to hooligan cases. 

Similarly, I think now that we’ve got the revised criminal procedure law in the PRC that just took effect in January, increasingly 

we’re seeing there, too, this gap between the procedures that at 

least on paper are offered for people in the criminal system and 

those for people who are undergoing RTL. That gap is becoming 

more apparent. 

But with Taiwan’s experience, how is it relevant? First of all, I 

think it underscores that just having a court involved in the determination is not enough to guarantee that the person facing an RTL 

determination has a fighting chance. We don’t just need more process, we need meaningful process. 

I am certainly not expecting anything resembling the judicial 

independence we have in the United States to blossom overnight 

in China, but nonetheless even some modest judicial review can encourage the police and prosecutors to be more cautious in how they 

use their powers. 

In highlighting how Taiwan’s path might be helpful in charting 

the mainland’s future, I recognize that there are huge differences 

between Taiwan and mainland China at this point. Their histories, 

despite the cultural ties and long historical ties, have diverged 

greatly over the last 60 years. Most glaringly, of course, Taiwan is 

now a vibrant, multi-party democracy. 

Moreover, the PRC does not have a constitutional court akin to 

that in Taiwan, something I think which is a severe impediment 

to reforms. As Ira mentioned, it’s very hard for people in the mainland to find a court where they can even air these grievances because of the limitations on how the Constitution can be used by 

citizens. 

But that said, even though there are differences, I do think that 

Taiwan’s experience is relevant, first in looking at how, even during the martial law era in Taiwan, you started to see these sort of 

embryonic organizations being set up like the court to hear these 

liumang cases. Then, later on as other reforms progressed, those 

institutions were already in place and were able to take on a much 

more important role in the process. 

So maybe immediately you might not see these institutions making a huge difference, but they can put into place something that, 

when there is an opportunity years down the road, can really blossom. 

Moreover, in Taiwan’s experience, one thing they did with 

liumang was separate them into two categories of hooligans. You 
8 

had the less serious ones who were only subject to a probation-like 

sanction, and then the more serious ones actually would be subject 

to incarceration. 

One of the ideas kicking around with RTL reforms is does it have 

to be full incarceration? Is there some way to have some kind of 

less severe sanction, maybe more akin to a probation-like system 

that wouldn’t involve at least the same direct restriction of liberty. 

In light of this background, what steps should U.S. policymakers 

take? I think really that’s the goal here today. I agree with Ira that 

what we can do as the United States is limited. I mean, reform is 

only going to happen when the government in the PRC, and particularly the Ministry of Public Security, is willing to allow reforms 

to happen. But that said, the United States can still serve a coordinating role in introducing both our experience and Taiwan’s experience to people on the mainland. 

Currently, the cross-strait relations are as good as they have 

ever been. It used to be unthinkable that you could have direct contact, particularly amongst government officials, across the strait. 

More and more you’re seeing not just scholars going across the 

strait, but also people in government roles, and they are having 

conversations that are opening up this experience. 

I have also been a part of conversations that involve not just Taiwan and the mainland, but also Hong Kong, the United States, and 

other jurisdictions. I, too, think that our experience with our U.S. 

system—for example, how we have a probation system, how we use 

bail—can assuage some concerns that just because you let people 

out, you don’t have them locked up, they’re going to go and create 

chaos. 

So what this means is I really hope that the U.S. Government 

will continue to support scholarly exchanges. I think that’s an important step just to get the information out there and to make sure 

that there are no misconceptions about how our systems are run. 

I also think that Taiwan is an untapped resource. 

There are wonderful Taiwanese legal scholars, judges, and prosecutors. There are several right now at NYU who have a wealth 

of experience and they speak the same language. There’s some different terminology across the strait, but you can put people in the 

same room from Taiwan and the mainland and I think they can 

have a really helpful discussion. So, thank you. 

Chairman BROWN. Ms. Li, I apologize. Larry will conduct the 

roundtable. But Ms. Li, your comments. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lewis appears in the appendix.] 

STATEMENT OF LI XIAORONG, INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR 

Ms. LI. Thank you, Senator Brown. Thank you, CECC staff and 

Staff Director Lawrence for this opportunity. I also want to thank 

the two previous speakers for laying out the basics about laojiao, 

reeducation through labor [RTL]. It is sobering to be reminded of 

the Taiwan experiences. I think that will help us in thinking 

through this problem. I am very honored to be on the same panel 

with my friend Harry. 

I was asked to talk about some key cases, how these recent cases 

changed the public discourse on RTL. The push for abolishing RTL 

has gained momentum, as everybody has recognized in recent 
9 

months. But I think largely the credit should go to the Chinese citizens for their tireless and long-time push for the abolishing of this 

system. 

Right now, everybody is holding their breath, hoping that this 

year, 2013, will mark a turning point in building the momentum 

for finally abolishing RTL. There are several high-profile individual 

cases that I will discuss, which marked a turning point, because 

they raised so much public outrage. There has since been unprecedented public discussion about RTL problems, and also impressive 

efforts by Chinese citizens to organize and push for the ending of 

RTL. 

This, as we’ve heard, has prompted some officials to start speaking out and finally to echo the longstanding criticisms in civil society and among scholars about the system. 

Of course, we have not said exactly how many people are detained in RTL. The numbers actually are mind-boggling. But the 

problem is that it is really difficult to know exactly how many 

there are. However, in recent months, Chinese officials have provided some numbers. 

For example, according to official data, approximately 170,000 individuals were held in 320 RTL camps. That was a number given 

as of February 2009 at the Universal Periodic Review of China’s 

human rights record by the UN Human Rights Council. 

However, Chinese authorities reportedly stated in 2012 that 

more recently only 60,000 detainees were being held in RTL camps. 

The changing numbers, of course, could be a sign that, under domestic and international pressure, RTL detainees may have been 

transferred to other detention facilities, including some of the other 

administrative detention facilities that Ira mentioned that should 

also be brought into this conversation, for example, the notorious 

‘‘black jails.’’ The ‘‘black jails’’ have completely no legal foundation 

and anybody can be locked in them. They are some sort of makeshift, rented space or government buildings. 

The few RTL cases I am asked to speak about particularly illustrate how arbitrary the decisions are and how much power police 

have to deprive the liberty of individuals without any judicial process. Also, another point I should emphasize is the use of RTL to 

persecute political dissidents, as well as practitioners of Falun 

Gong, and petitioners, who are ordinary people who seek justice by 

going to government officials to complain about grievances. 

One particular case that caused so much public outrage is the 

case of Tang Hui. Tang is the mother of a girl who was raped at 

the age of 11 and then forced into prostitution. Tang Hui wanted 

to have those who committed these criminal acts prosecuted. 

In order to make this happen, she repeatedly filed lawsuits and 

went through, since 2006, many processes. Some of the criminals 

were convicted, but eventually she suspected that some of the key 

criminals were not prosecuted so she staged sit-ins in courtrooms, 

in front of judicial official buildings. For that, she was sent to 

laojiao, RTL, for disrupting social order. 

After she was sent to RTL, her lawyers filed requests for administrative review. Her case got so much attention, even officially controlled media reported on this case. It went viral on the Internet 
10 

and so many netizens posted comments. It was really a great opportunity to expose the problems with RTL. 

Another case many of you are probably aware of is the case of 

Ren Jianyu. Ren Jianyu was a college student who graduated from 

a university and went back to his village in rural China in 

Chongqing. Then he was elected director of the village. Like most 

young people, Ren, in his twenties and educated in college, lived 

part of his life on the Internet. He liked to post or repost comments 

by other people commenting on current events. Some of his comments had to do with official corruption. This was the time under 

Bo Xilai, then the CCP Party Secretary of Chongqing, so Ren was 

detained and sent to RTL for two years. 

Then, of course, we know that Bo Xilai went out of favor. Ren 

was released early. Both his arrest, detention in RTL, and his early 

release, nine months early, reflected the arbitrariness of RTL and 

also the use of RTL to suppress free expression. 

After much public discussion of Tang and Ren’s cases and heavy 

coverage in the official press, participated by lawyers, scholars, and 

ordinary citizens, the pressure finally prompted the talk of change 

in official discourse. 

But then this is not the end of the story. There is the recent disclosure of Masanjia. Masanjia is an RTL camp especially used for 

incarcerating women. Women in Liaoning province and other 

places have been sent there to serve laojiao. 

Last month, appalling abuses of female detainees inside this 

Masanjia labor camp has triggered reports in the Chinese media 

and heated online discussions again, forcing officials to promise an 

investigation into the revelation. 

The source of the information is a diary secretly taken out of the 

camp by a petitioner released in February of this year. The diary 

detailed police arbitrarily detaining and torturing petitioners and 

Falun Gong practitioners at the camp and committing a wide range 

of horrific abuses in the camp. 

I should stress that RTL is not only an arbitrary detention system, it is also the place where torture and cruel treatment are rampantly committed. Interviews with the recently released detainees 

from Masanjia are documented in a documentary film called, ‘‘The 

Women of Masanjia Labor Camp,’’ made by the director Du Bin. 

Part of the film which was released on May 1 is now available on 

YouTube. 

At the same time, another documentary film called ‘‘The Juvenile 

Laborers Confined in Dabao Xiao Laojiao’’ also came out on May 

1 and provided overviews with people who were put in RTL when 

they were as young as 10 years old in the late 1950s. The movie 

is also available on YouTube. 

At this point, Lawrence kindly agreed we would show two or 

three minutes of ‘‘The Women of Masanjia Labor Camp.’’ 

[Whereupon, an excerpt from a video was played.] 

Ms. LI. The upside down image on the screen is intentional because the laojiao camp was built on top of a tomb yard. The point 

was, I am told, that the women lived in hell, worse than the tombs 

where the ghosts lived. You can go search YouTube and continue 

watching, since I am running out of time here. 
11 

I will jump directly to a few suggestions for U.S. lawmakers. I 

understand that what the United States can do is limited but this 

does not discourage us from asking what would be good to do. I 

think the U.S. Congress should strongly urge the Chinese Government to abolish RTL, to steer clear from replacing RTL camps with 

any other extra-legal detention facilities and to free all the detainees from RTL camps and allow them access to justice in holding 

their abusers accountable and seeking redress for damages. 

Such concerns should be raised by the Obama administration at 

its annual Human Rights Dialogue, Legal Expert Dialogue, and 

Economic Strategic Dialogue with China. Congress should consider 

imposing visa bans and asset freezes on Chinese officials involved 

in serious human rights abuses, including torture and arbitrary detention in RTL camps, similar to a recent act passed by Congress 

in December 2012 which places visa bans on and freezes assets of 

Russian officials who committed abuses of human rights. 

Finally, Congress should urge China to revive its rule of law reforms. There can be no meaningful end to RTL or any other forms 

of arbitrary detention in a country where there is little respect for 

the rule of law. Thank you. 

Mr. LIU. Thank you, Ms. Li. 

Now we will go to Harry Wu. Thanks. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Li appears in the appendix.] 

STATEMENT OF HARRY WU, FOUNDER AND EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUNDATION 

Mr. WU. I was literally shocked at a hearing on the reeducation 

through labor because everybody understands atrocity. They need 

repressive systems. Hitler’s Germany needed concentration camp 

systems, the Soviets needed a gulag system. I want to remind you, 

gulag is not a word, it was made by Alexander Solzhenitsyn. After 

21 years, Stalin died. Stalin died in 1953 and the gulag in 1974 finally became a word in the dictionary. 

In 1985, I was in America and I said, what about the laogai? You 

have to know the laogai is a very common word in China. If the 

people are 30, 40, or 50 years old, everybody understands what it 

is. The Chinese never use the words ‘‘imprisonment’’ or ‘‘in jail.’’ 

No, they say laogai. So, where is your father? My father is in 

laogai. Where is my brother? My brother died in the laogai. Twenty-two percent of the population knew the word ‘‘laogai.’’ 

In 1993, I was interviewed by a Washington Post correspondent 

who said, ‘‘Harry, what do you want to do? ’’ I said, ‘‘Well, I hope 

one thing. I hope laogai becomes a word in every dictionary, every 

language.’’ The Chinese, right away, changed the laogai system. 

Stopped using the laogai. They have a Laogai Affairs Department. 

They have laogai detention everywhere and all these laogai camps 

stopped using the word ‘‘prison.’’ There was only one reason. 

They said it was because we have to have a good position in the 

international society, human rights society, to fight. That is the 

reason to stop using the laogai. Now they want to change and stop 

using the laojiao. Did the government give any explanation for it? 

No, we just want to stop it. That’s it. 

Laojiao is a very small part of the laogai system. Since 1949, Soviet experts in China assisted the Chinese judiciary system and se-
12 

curity system and set up the laogai camp systems. The laogai 

camps only started in 1955, 1956, from then until today. So-called 

laojiao camps are for those only charged with light crimes, like 

counterrevolutionaries. 

So for example, I was arrested in 1960. I don’t have papers, don’t 

have a verdict, no court. Even the police came to my classroom and 

said, ‘‘Hey, you have to go with me.’’ I said, ‘‘Where? ’’ He said, 

‘‘Just go to labor camps.’’ So I follow him and I go to the labor 

camps. 

At midnight, the police in the camp says, ‘‘Do you know about 

your sentence? ’’ I said, ‘‘I do not know.’’ He said, ‘‘What do you 

mean? You’re sentenced to life.’’ That simple. I was sentenced to 

life in reeducation through labor. Reeducation through labor, until 

1961, no term, forever. 

Only in 1961 did they change the policies. Okay, everybody have 

a term. The longest one is three years, maybe two years, maybe 

one year, maybe one and a half years. So this is a new procedure 

really set up the reeducation camp until 1961, more than four and 

a half years. 

The government issued and publicized the laojiao policy in October 1957, but way before that in 1955, 1956, there was an abolition 

of the counterrevolutionary movement. In 1950 and 1951, they had 

suppressed the counterrevolutionary movement and the Chinese 

probably executed more than 1 million prisoners. These people socalled were working for pulling down the government. But after a 

couple, five years, we have to abolish these counterrevolutionaries. 

So in 1956, after the movement, many people were selected and 

collected and then they were arrested. Some of them were sentenced, but there are 200,000 people—actually, the government 

cannot sentence these people in the camp, so they created a new 

law, reeducation through labor. 

Who are these people—of the—government or sweep the floor, a 

cleaner of the government, whatever. There’s no crime at all, but 

the government doesn’t trust you. You cannot have a legal job, 

whatever, in society. So 200,000 prisoners is the first group, the 

first wave of the reeducation through labor. At that time, the government had not issued the law yet. 

The second wave of so-called counterrevolutionary—should I 

stop? Okay, I’ll stop. The second group is the so-called counterrevolutionary rightists, because 1.5 million people collected by the 

Communist Government became a rightist. I was 20 years old. I 

was one of the counterrevolutionary rightists. I did nothing. 

I just said a few words about the Soviet Red Army suppressed 

the counterrevolutionary uprising in Budapest. That is my so-called 

crime. So when the police came to the class and pulled out the 

paper and said you were sent to reeducation through labor, sign it, 

I signed it. That’s not a verdict. I don’t know what it said. So this 

was since 1960. 

The third wave of the reeducation policy is peasants. In 1959 to 

the 1960s, many peasants wanted to escape from their villages because of starvation. According to that policy, reeducation through 

labor, the government cannot arrest these peasants. 

The reeducation through labor camps only can set up in the cities, not in the countryside. But the government has additional pa-
13 

pers and said, ‘‘Okay, we have to handle the situation because too 

many peasants right now are running away from their villages and 

get into the camps and become beggars.’’ I can tell you how crowded it was in the reeducation through labor camps. Twenty-four 

hours, divided three times, for a turn to sleep. I don’t want to say 

what is the current situation. 

Some people talk about the torture. It’s very different now. Before 1976, most of them died. Most of the torture in the prison 

camps were not really handled by the police but handled by inmates. For example, in 1965 they ordered all the prisoners to submit—okay. I’ll stop. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wu appears in the appendix.] 

Mr. LIU. Thanks. We just want to make sure we have enough 

time to get to all the questions. 

Once again, thank you to all the panelists for the great job and 

all of the expertise that you bring to the table in sharing both personal first-hand experiences as well as some great research. So, 

thank you very much. 

I know staff maybe have one or two questions, then the way our 

roundtables work is that we ask some questions and then you in 

the audience have an opportunity to also ask questions. We really 

want this to be interactive and sort of an opportunity for folks to 

ask questions and get some information from our great panelists. 

So I have one question that I wanted to ask first to all of the 

panelists. As, I think, Ira, you had talked about in terms of reform 

has been discussed for some time now. This year it looks like 

maybe there’s an opportunity for some real change, but that is unclear. 

But I’m wondering whether or not there are economic interests 

at play here that may be working against reform or may be opposed to reform. I don’t know if these RTL centers—for example, 

are people profiting off of them? If so, is that going to be an obstacle to reform? So I ask all of the panelists that question. Thanks. 

Mr. BELKIN. Lawrence, it’s a great question. As I think a few 

people said, the system is not terribly transparent. It’s very hard 

to know. Certainly I think Chinese Government officials say it’s not 

used for profitmaking, it’s used to educate people in work skills. 

But we just don’t know the answer. 

I do think that reducing the population to 60,000, it seems like 

the government is taking steps to prepare for a big change. You 

would have to think a system that has not long ago housed 100,000 

or 200,000 people, one of the issues is, what do you do with the 

people who are running the camps? So in what I’ve read I haven’t 

seen a lot of discussion about the economic incentives. Unfortunately I don’t have any more details to give you. I don’t know if 

anyone else does. 

Ms. LI. One thing in that documentary film I was struck with 

yesterday when watching it, is that in the diary smuggled out of 

RTL and in the interview with the woman who did it, she talked 

extensively about the work they were forced to do in the camp. The 

women were made to work at least 10 hours a day. Initially they 

worked seven days a week and then they got one day off each 

week. She mentioned that they made garments exported to Italy 

and they made police uniforms and police gadgets, stuff for the 
14 

local police stations. Anyway, quite a lot of the interviews on this 

film were about how long they worked each day and how harsh the 

working conditions were. They were given fixed numbers of tasks 

to finish in a day. If one couldn’t finish them, one got beaten up 

or had to stay up working late into the night. 

I agree, it’s hard to tell whether the economy really counts RTL 

labor or how important the RTL products were for the economy. 

But certainly this is something to look into to see what was produced in those labor camps and where they were exported, if there 

was any kind of economic profit to be made there or whether the 

campaign to abolish RTL should focus on the exports and whether 

some kind of boycott might help. 

Ms. LEWIS. I would just add that I agree: There’s so much we 

don’t know about what’s happening. But the conversations I am 

having with people from the mainland are really about the convenient repressive aspect of RTL. I, too, don’t hear much about economic considerations. 

For Taiwan, before they were abolished, I went to their ‘‘institutes,’’ as they called them, where people would undergo reformatory training. There they would have various kinds of auto shop 

and other classes but it was more put in the guise that this was 

about reforming or reeducating. Though they did sell a few items, 

it seemed more to say, ‘‘Look, we’re reforming these people who are 

these hooligans’’ than about whether the products that they were 

making were actually worth any major dollar amount of concern. 

Mr. LIU. That is very helpful. I have one more question. China 

is coming before the UN Human Rights Council, I believe, later 

this year, the Universal Periodic Review. I am wondering if that 

is—and I may be asking folks to read the tea leaves a little—motivating Chinese officials to want to address this issue before they 

go before the Universal Periodic Review, or whether there may be 

other factors maybe because of the new leadership and wanting to 

start on a new foot that are driving the statements of officials right 

now. 

Ms. LI. Yes. October 22 this year is the date that China will be 

reviewed at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. The Universal Periodic Review on any country takes place once every four 

years. It is such a good opportunity to generate momentum for 

change, I agree. 

Also, next year China will likely come under review by the Committee Against Torture. It’s been five years since the last review, 

and China is late to submit its state report, which means the committee cannot start the process. But perhaps next year. It will be 

another opportunity to generate international pressure. 

Of course, the Chinese Government is good at shifting attention. 

For example, I made a point about ‘‘transferring’’ RTL detainees to 

some facility called ‘‘Illegal Behavior Correction Centers.’’ So authorities could say RTL doesn’t exist anymore, but it goes under a 

different name and the arbitrary detention system continues. So 

that’s something to pay attention to. 

I’ll give you another example; before the last Universal Periodic 

Review, China adopted the National Human Rights Action Plan, 

even though it was not really implemented. The government simply 
15 

claimed that the plan was implemented. There was very little civil 

society participation at any point. 

But again, it’s useful to have such a plan because the citizens 

can hold the government accountable for this action plan and 

present evidence to show that the plan was not met. 

Ms. LEWIS. I agree that it’s important to have international pressure and it shines a spotlight, but it’s not going to be, alone, sufficient. One thing we see is in 1998 China signed the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], but it is still not 

ratified. One of the sticking points is RTL. In the covenant it says 

that people charged with crimes be afforded a fair public hearing 

by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by 

law. That is not happening for RTL. 

Although the PRC Government might say, ‘‘This is administrative, it’s not criminal,’’ just the label that is put on a sanction by 

the government is not sufficient. So I think it is not just about the 

international community saying, ‘‘China, here are some ideals that 

you should live up to because we tell you that you should live up 

to them,’’ but here the Chinese Government itself said it wants to 

ratify the ICCPR, and we are reminding the government that this 

is its own goal. 

Mr. WU. Can I? I think the most important thing is maybe the 

CECC can hold a hearing on the laogai systems. Laojiao reeducation through labor is only a very small part of the laogai system. 

But the whole issue of the laogai system right now is under the 

sleeping, nobody really cares about it. I think this is a basic human 

rights issue. Thank you. 

Mr. BELKIN. Again, a very good question. It’s hard to know exactly what has motivated the leadership to act at this time. I agree 

with what Professor Li has said. The ICCPR has been something 

that’s been part of the human rights conversation in China since 

China signed it, and every couple of years China’s leaders renew 

their commitment to ratify the ICCPR. I think Premier Wen 

Jiabao, within the last couple of years, said China would ratify the 

ICCPR very soon. 

The Human Rights Plan is now—I mean, it would have been unthinkable 20 years ago for China to have a human rights action 

plan. So within the argument about reeducation through labor, 

Chinese scholars are using international human rights norms to 

support their arguments. 

So I don’t know that it’s one particular thing, the date coming 

up for human rights review, but I do think that international 

human rights instruments, human rights advocacy does matter. We 

have seen that in the previous administration. 

In the first year they took serious steps to reform other systems 

of arbitrary detention. It was very interesting and I don’t think 

anyone predicted it, that when this new leadership took office very 

early, or maybe even right before they took office, they put this on 

their agenda. So I think it’s probably the motivation is more domestic than international, but I do think that international human 

rights norms matter. 

Ms. LI. I mean, absolutely. I think even without ratifying the 

ICCPR, there are other international norms that China has already 

ratified, which also apply here. For example, the Convention 
16 

Against Torture, China has not only signed, but ratified. Also, the 

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. That’s one of the special 

procedures. Countries don’t need to sign or ratify any treaties for 

the special procedures to apply to them. As long as they are members of the United Nations, they are subjected to the SPs’ scrutiny 

and review. So the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention had 

ruled that RTL was an arbitrary detention system, and also the 

Committee Against Torture, in its last review on China in 2008, in 

its ‘‘concluding observations’’ suggested to China to reform RTL. 

Both of these UN interventions created a certain pressure on 

China. These are advocacy tools not only for Chinese citizens, but 

for the U.S. Congress and all other concerned stakeholders to use 

to get China further involved in the process and to generate pressure. Thank you. 

Mr. LIU. Great. Thanks a lot. 

I want to introduce at this time to my right the Deputy Staff Director, Paul Protic, who represents our Cochairman, Chris Smith. 

I think he has a question. 

Mr. PROTIC. Thank you, Mr. Liu. 

I want to first say thank you very much to the panelists for coming and for your insightful remarks. I have a followup question to 

Mr. Wu. Are you aware of any prison labor cases where goods that 

are being made in the laogai ended up in U.S. markets—that U.S. 

companies are importing in America? Can you address that? 

Mr. WU. Yes, many of them right here. It goes through the reeducation through labor right now in America. 

Mr. PROTIC. What can the government do about that? Any suggestions on what the government, our government, can do to keep 

that from happening? 

Mr. WU. Right now they live in America. They can testify, no 

problem. I just really hope that Americans are aware that China 

is an atrocious country, they have a suppression machine, the socalled laogai. It’s not only about reeducation through labor. But 

even the Chinese Government cares about reeducation through 

labor. What is the reason they want to stop it? 

They did not tell the truth, how come they set up the reeducation 

camps, from when? Reeducation camps in 1970 entirely stopped 

and Deng Xiaoping reopened it, restarted it because we had so 

many people who wanted to argue about the issue that we cannot 

handle that. This is light crime, light criminal. But the laogai system included Liu Xiaobo, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, who was 

there. This is a big suppression machine. 

We shouldn’t only care about the gulag and concentration camps. 

It’s a very good topic. But it’s over. The Chinese laogai camps are 

still running, they’re still putting people in there. I really hope the 

CECC can run with this issue. It’s a part of the politics issue in 

China. I don’t expect that the United Nations can do anything 

about it. 

What is the United Nations? Did they condemn Chinese publishing control? Did the United Nations condemn execution for 

organ transplants in China? Did the United Nations care about religious freedom in China? Do they care about censorship of the 

Internet? No, they don’t. They only care about these small countries called Iraq, Afghanistan, whatever. But so many violations of 
17 

human rights happen in China, but I’m sorry, they ignore it. That’s 

just my feeling, my personal feeling. Thank you. 

Mr. LIU. Thank you, Mr. Wu. 

I’d like to introduce one of our staff members, Jesse Heatley. He’s 

going to ask a question. But I also wanted to point out that Jesse 

authored a special report on the reeducation through labor system 

and the prospects for reform, and we have copies of that report. 

Our staff helped him out also. It’s meticulously sourced. We hope 

you’ll take a copy with you. It’s a great resource. I’ll turn it over 

to him to ask his question. 

Mr. HEATLEY. Thanks so much, Lawrence. Thank you to the panelists today for sharing their insights on RTL reform. 

I have a quick question. Lawrence had mentioned that there has 

been talk of RTL reform for a number of years. Over the last 30 

years there has been multiple rounds of policy debate. One thing 

that appears to have changed, though, is the emergence of social 

media tools and micro-blogging over the last few years and how 

that’s affected this discussion. I was wondering if the panelists can 

discuss the role of social media tools in reform, and perhaps the 

role of social media and online advocacy for future reforms. 

Just as a note, after the Tang Hui case that was mentioned earlier, there was something around, according to the China Daily, 

700,000 posts about the Tang Hui case. After the Ren Jianyu case, 

there were over a million posts about that case just in the days following. 

After the Masanjia case, there was a swell of support in postings 

on the People’s Daily site and some other sites and they were 

quickly taken down. The government has done a tremendous job to 

try to control this discussion, but the public outrage that we’ve 

seen and the response has been great as well. So I would appreciate it if the panelists could discuss the role of the Internet and 

social media tools in driving this type of reform, and, perhaps, 

similar reforms. Thanks so much. 

Mr. BELKIN. The phenomenon of social media and the role of 

public opinion is a complicated subject. I think that the growth of 

social media in China has coincided with government policy to take 

public opinion into account much more greatly in many different 

areas, sometimes in the advocacy of reforms but sometimes in advocating for particular results in individual cases. 

Sometimes there have been cases where the public opinion has 

advocated for the death penalty in individual cases where the 

death penalty might not have been imposed but for strong public 

opinion. So sometimes it’s easy to see social media as always a 

positive and public opinion as always a positive, but I think the 

picture is more complex. That’s the first point. 

The second point, it is always a puzzle as to why certain cases 

receive public attention. The two cases that were so well described 

by Professor Li, Tang Hui and Ren Jianyu, why did these two cases 

get attention and why did they get attention now? Is it spontaneous? Certainly the response, the overwhelming response, is spontaneous. But were people who were thinking about reeducation 

through labor reform using public opinion to support their position? 

We don’t really know. 
18 

I would say in 2003 when the Sun Zhigang case happened, which 

was an individual case that was a great engine for reform of the 

custody and repatriation system, around the same time there was 

a case of someone in a reeducation through labor camp who also 

died in custody, was reported in a local paper, but information 

about that case never made it to the mass media. 

So I think social media, although complex, is an overall positive 

thing for people to have the chance to express opinion. I think the 

fact is that the Chinese Government very much cares about public 

opinion. 

I’ll just cite another positive example. During the lead-up to the 

Criminal Procedure Law reform in 2012, the government published 

the draft online, solicited public comments. We were told there 

were 80,000 public comments, although the comments themselves 

were never made public. 

But one of the more controversial provisions, Article 73, that allowed for six months of detention at an undisclosed location, there 

were public comments. As a result, the final draft was modified to 

at least require family notice when someone was placed in that 

kind of detention. 

So it’s something we are watching closely and trying to understand, but I think we should try to resist the temptation to say 

that it’s all positive. It would be a very positive thing if things were 

more open and if, when sensitive cases were raised, there wasn’t 

censorship so that the leadership could actually hear public opinion 

on all these issues. 

We recently read in the press that people who are advocating 

that leaders disclose their financial assets have been either put 

under house arrest or charged right in the midst of an anti-corruption campaign. So it’s a very complicated question. 

Ms. LEWIS. I agree. It’s not an unqualified ‘‘good’’ to have Internet use, but overall I think it’s a great thing. Certainly with criminal justice reforms more generally we’ve seen a very positive role 

for public opinion in some ways. 

For example, there was an infamous case, Zhao Zuohai, where a 

man was convicted of murdering a fellow villager after a fight: The 

police had found a headless body. He confessed and he was put in 

prison, and thankfully not executed. The death sentence was reprieved. 

Ten years later, suddenly, the alleged victim comes back, head 

intact and everything and he was not dead. People said, ‘‘Well, why 

did you confess? ’’ Well, because it was beaten out of him. It was 

a coerced confession. That case drew a lot of attention. We see subsequent reforms in the new Criminal Procedure Law. There are 

other cases like that where individual cases have generated attention in a positive way. 

On the flip side you do have this court of public opinion that can 

occur in a very negative way. There’s a lot of false information out 

there in these sort of human flesh search engines where the Internet will say, ‘‘Oh, this is a bad person.’’ 

To the extent that people involved in legal reforms in China are 

trying to emphasize a process that is fair and just, and based on 

evidence—that isn’t just rumor—in some ways the Internet can cut 

against that goal and make it so there’s a lot of rumors flying 
19 

around and people who haven’t had a chance to be judged by a 

court using lawful procedures are finding their lives adversely impacted. 

Mr. BELKIN. If I could just follow up for just a second. I think 

that this situation actually creates an opening for the U.S. Government. My own view is that part of the reason that the Chinese 

Government is allowing public opinion to express itself in the area 

of legal cases and legal reform is they want more public support 

and public legitimacy. 

But allowing public opinion to influence individual case decisions 

is very problematic. I think we actually have a lot of good experience that we can share. We have our own problems and we certainly need to acknowledge them, but in terms of the legitimacy of 

our judicial system and public confidence in the system, I think 

this is where the rule of law can work to enhance social stability. 

So I do think this does create an opportunity for the U.S. Government and for more exchange with China. 

Ms. LI. I agree with what has been said about the mixed benefit 

in this cost-and-benefit analysis about social media. I want to add 

that in a country where media and the press and information on 

the Internet are tightly controlled by the government and the 

cyberspace closely policed by authorities, social media certainly is 

a good thing to level the playing field and give every citizen basically a media to air their views. So in that sense I think the net 

benefit of social media comes out ahead of its limitations and problems. 

I also want to add that, particularly in the RTL case, we can see 

social media has certainly played a positive role. But in all other 

fields of civil society, people are getting organized to protect their 

own rights and social media has been such a valuable and useful 

tool for them. 

I have many stories I could share with you. When, for example, 

a demolition team came to bulldoze a house illegally, activists used 

social media to gather citizens to protect the house, to alert media, 

and to report the incident to police. There have been some success 

stories. In one case, the activists managed to get the police to arrest the demolition members for trespassing. 

Social media has also offered a good venue for citizens to exercise 

their right to free association, which is not possible in China and 

is so tightly controlled. So people get together on the Internet using 

social media to form groups, to organize actions, and to try to generate synergy in order to be more effective. I am an enthusiast for 

social media. 

Mr. LIU. Okay. We have, now, about 15 minutes. I wanted to 

open it up to questions from the audience. In the interest of time, 

please only ask one question and try to be brief. There are two 

microphones, one over here and one to my right, to your left. If you 

would just raise your hand, we’ll bring the mike to you. Also, 

please note that this event is being webcast and transcribed, so if 

you have a question, please raise your hand. 

Tom, go ahead. 

Mr. LUM. Hi. I’m Tom Lum with the Congressional Research 

Service. In the past there used to be two systems, reform through 

labor and reeducation through labor. I think one is laojiao, one is 
20 

laodung. I was just wondering what happened to the other system? 

Are there two systems and what happened to the other one? Thank 

you. 

Mr. WU. Well, China only has one system, the one system socalled reform through labor. Reeducation through labor is a part of 

the reform through labor and only handles these light criminals. 

Mr. BELKIN. I think if we’re focusing on the language that’s used 

in Chinese law, laogai tends to be used to describe a punishment 

under the criminal justice system, where as laojiao, laodung jiao 

yong, reeducation through labor, is an administrative punishment. 

So I understand what Mr. Wu is saying in terms of a whole system, but in terms of the way the language is used, they’re actually 

used to describe different aspects of the overall administrative and 

criminal justice system. 

Mr. LIU. Does that answer your question, Tom? 

Mr. LUM. I think so. 

Mr. LIU. Okay. 

Mr. LUM. I had the impression that reeducation was a wider 

form and there was some other—much harsher. But you’re also 

saying that would be taken care of by the criminal justice system. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LIU. Yes. Okay. Who else has a question? Okay. Over here. 

ANGELA. My name is Angela. I’m a pharmacist and also a Falun 

Gong practitioner. I just wanted to let you know there are two 

Falun Gong practitioners that are the victims in the forced labor 

camp. One is Emily Ma. She was a survivor, and thank goodness 

she is here. She served more than four years in China’s forced 

labor camp. And Yu Zhengjie, she’s also a survivor, too. I think 

Masanjia, those words to us are only words, but I think for those 

two who have served in the forced labor camp, no words can describe and their lives were changed. 

Also, I want to share with you that 18 Falun Gong practitioners, 

females, their clothing was ripped off and they were dumped into 

the male prisoner’s camp and they were raped, raped, raped. One 

even carried a baby from the rapist. So together we hope we can 

do something to stop it. 

Mr. LIU. Thank you. 

Any other questions? 

Ms. BRETTELL. Yes. My name is Anna Brettell and I work for the 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China. I was curious if 

there are public discussions about how to reform the system or 

what the system might look like if reforms do occur. 

Ms. LI. It’s interesting. In fact, in Yunnan province, where, just 

last month, one official said that Yunnan had practically ended 

RTL and from this year on they would no longer send people to 

RTL, but then he talked about what would happen to the people 

normally detained in RTL. He gave a few possibilities. He said the 

prostitutes will be sent to some kind of women’s correction centers 

but will be processed by the judicial system, and then the drug 

users will be sent to drug rehabilitation centers. This has been a 

long debate among not only Chinese legal scholars, but legal scholars in the United States. Some scholars have asked the rhetorical 

question, what would you do with the detainees if you abolish RTL? 

Would you rather put them in jails or go free? But the thinking be-
21 

hind that rhetorical question begs the question: The RTL detainees 

were never tried in court. One cannot assume they were criminals. 

Other scholars have argued that for anybody who had not been 

tried, they should never have been put in RTL so they should be 

freed. If authorities suspect that anybody committed any crime, 

then they should go through the normal judicial criminal procedure 

to convict the person. But of course, there is another concern about 

the problems with the criminal system itself. 

Anyway, this Yunnan official gave some ideas about what to do. 

But the fundamental issue is whether people who were detained in 

RTLs without ever going through any kind of judicial system 

should be freed. 

Ms. LEWIS. I agree in principle that people that have been subject to RTL should be freed because they were not put in with judicial process, but I think in reality the chances of that happening 

are extremely, extremely small. 

More likely what would happen would be a phase-out. Whereas, 

we’re seeing that less people will be put in, and over the course of 

several years the numbers would decrease. Certainly in Taiwan, 

that’s what happened with their system for liumang, where gradually those cases started being channeled through the formal criminal justice system instead of through this separate track. 

By the time that the law was actually abolished there weren’t 

that many people that were locked up as hooligans, so there wasn’t 

the same sort of panic that there was going to be a deterioration 

in social order. But we are going to have to see, I think, a severalyear process, at a minimum. 

Mr. BELKIN. There is wide-ranging debate in China among scholars about whether or not the system should just be abolished. Some 

people say that with the Criminal Law and the Public Safety Administrative Punishments Law, which has a maximum sentence of 

15 days, any criminal offense could be covered, any violation of law 

could be covered. There is no need to have a separate system that 

does not have a judicial process, that does not have very clear 

standards. So that is one point of view that is being expressed 

strongly. 

Others say, ‘‘Well, we can modify the system. We have to change 

the name because it has such a bad reputation. We should have 

some review and we should maybe limit the time period.’’ But I 

want to reiterate the point that although reeducation through labor 

has a terrible reputation, it’s more well-known than many other 

forms of detention. 

When we talk about these issues, whether it’s the U.S. Government or other people who focus on it, I think we have to look at 

the whole system. What we saw in 2003 when shourong qiansong, 

custody and repatriation, was abolished, it appears that the number of people detained in ‘‘black jails’’ increased. 

So for police who are used to having the discretion to punish people this way, it would be almost expected that if they have other 

ways of detaining people, that they would use those as well. So I 

think it’s great that the Commission is focusing on reeducation 

through labor, but I would say we have to widen the scope of focus. 

The same principles would apply. 
22 

As Maggie said, there should be a judicial process. There might 

be some social problems, drug addiction or prostitution, that could 

be dealt with in other ways, but they shouldn’t involve detention. 

If they involve detention, then under Chinese law there should be 

some judicial process. 

Mr. LIU. Thanks. We’ll take one more question. 

Susan? 

Ms. WELD. [Inaudible.]—because after these cases are unwound 

and undone there might be a lot of cases for compensation, not 

huge compensation, but some kind of symbolic compensation as 

happened after the Cultural Revolution. So there is a precedent for 

that. 

I think some of the feeling of injustice, the government is almost 

as equally afraid of a large group of uncontrolled people feeling everything unjust has happened to them. If you could give them a 

feeling they have gotten some bit of justice, maybe the government 

would be less afraid of this unwinding process. What do you think? 

Mr. LIU. Does anyone want to comment on that? 

Ms. LEWIS. There is more recent precedent than the Cultural 

Revolution. In fact, after the Zhao Zuohai case, the case I mentioned with the wrongful conviction, he was given monetary compensation and that got a lot of press. There are news reports about 

that. 

I think it’s important to recognize what terrible things have happened to people and to give monetary compensation, but at the 

same time recognize that sometimes that can act as an impediment 

to reforms because you do not want government officials to say, 

‘‘Oh, because we have to pay money we can’t admit that we were 

wrong.’’ The goal is to try to figure out how to allow for some sort 

of compensation while still not making that end up being more of 

a hurdle than it is meant to be. 

Ms. WELD. [Inaudible.] 

Ms. LEWIS. And there are a lot of other countries who have had 

especially experiences with truth and reconciliation commissions or 

other forms of restorative justice focused on not just money but 

also on how to go about the healing process and moving forward. 

There are international models that could be very helpful. 

Ms. LI. I think some channels are available in China today for 

RTL victims to seek compensation, which is not necessarily monetary, and it could be a piece of paper, issued by authorities, saying 

it was wrong to put a person in RTL. Tang Hui is currently seeking 

compensation for the RTL decision and quite a few former RTL detainees are doing what she is doing. 

There are two such channels. One is called xingzheng fuyi, or administrative review of the decision to send a person to RTL. 

Whether the person is still in RTL or released, she or he can use 

this procedure to seek redress. The other one is suing the police officers or government authorities who made the laojiao decision. 

This kind of lawsuit goes through the criminal system actually. 

Such lawsuits are often blocked by the court. 

Mr. LIU. Okay. Thanks for the great question. 

I wanted to give our panelists a final opportunity to make any 

closing remarks, if you have any. 

[No response]. 
23 

Mr. LIU. You’re good? Okay. 

Thank you once again for your excellent input in helping us in 

the United States and in our government and in Congress understand this issue more. 

I wanted to note for the record that Congressman Smith, our Cochairman, has a statement that will be entered into the record. 

I thank all of you for attending. 

This roundtable is adjourned. 

[The prepared statement of Representative Smith appears in the 

appendix.] 

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m. the roundtable was adjourned.] 

(25) 

A P P E N D I X 
26 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF IRA BELKIN

MAY 9, 2013

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Commission, thank you for the 

invitation to participate in this Roundtable. I would like to acknowledge the importance of the Commission’s efforts to enhance American understanding of China and 

the contributions the Commission has made to the improvement of the Rule of Law 

and human rights situation in China. 

The opinions I express here today are my own but I am also proud to represent 

the U.S.-Asia Law Institute at New York University School of Law. Our Institute 

was founded by Professor Jerome A. Cohen who has been a strong, consistent voice 

for human rights and the Rule of Law and an untiring advocate of engagement with 

China. Our mission is to promote the Rule of Law in Asia and to promote mutual 

understanding between the United States and Asian countries, especially China, on 

legal issues. We do that through constructive engagement, research and exchanges 

with legal experts. Our goal is to be educated observers of Asian legal systems and, 

when appropriate, honest, fair and well-informed critics as well. It is in that spirit 

that I provide these remarks. 

With respect to our topic today, ‘‘The End of Reeducation Through Labor? Recent 

Developments and Prospects for Reform,’’ I am going to focus my remarks on the 

topics I have been asked to cover: to provide an overview of the Reeducation 

Through Labor System (‘‘RTL’’), including its history, the purpose behind RTL, how 

it is currently used, and a summary of the current debate over RTL reform, as well 

as recommendations for U.S. policymakers. 

The institution of RTL has been around for 60 years. Its precise use has shifted 

over time but it seems to be chiefly valued by the government because its flexibility 

allows police to incarcerate individuals and members of groups they consider troublesome without having to go through formal judicial processes. It is currently used 

mainly to detain drug addicts and members of the banned Falun Gong sect, but it 

is also used to detain political dissidents. The new leadership has recently said it 

is reexamining RTL with an eye to reforming it. This is a very welcome development. 

AN OVERVIEW OF REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR

At the outset, allow me to emphasize the importance of today’s discussion. The 

issue of RTL reform is important because what happens in China is important. It 

is important to China’s 1.3 billion citizens, one fifth of the world’s population, and 

it is important to the world because of China’s growing influence in the world. 

RTL allows the police, on their own, to confine someone for one to three years, 

with the possible addition of a fourth year, for any conduct that falls within one of 

six vaguely defined categories of conduct. According to Article 10 of the ‘‘Trial Methods for Reeducation Through Labor,’’ issued by the Ministry of Public Security 

(‘‘MPS’’) and approved by the State Council on January 21, 1982, the following persons may be sent to RTL: 

1. Those counterrevolutionaries and elements who oppose the Chinese Communist Party or Socialism, where their offenses are minor, but do not merit 

criminal punishment; 

2. Those who are members of gangs who commit crimes of murder, robbery, 

rape and arson, but whose acts do not merit criminal punishment; 

3. Those who repeatedly commit minor offenses such as hooliganism, prostitution, theft, or fraud and who do not mend their ways despite repeated admonition but whose acts do not merit criminal punishment; 

4. Those who gather to fight, cause trouble, disturb social order, and instigate 

turmoil but whose acts do not merit criminal punishment; 

5. Those who have a job but repeatedly refuse to work, disrupt labor discipline, complain endlessly, disrupt production order, work order, school and research institute order and the people’s normal life, but whose acts do not merit 

criminal punishment; 

6. Those who instigate others to commit crimes, but whose acts do not merit 

criminal punishment. 

A mere reading of these categories shows how vague and open to abuse they can 

be. One could question the legitimacy of this type of system during any era, but 
27 

1The definition of these categories was modified in Article 9 of the 2002 regulations issued 

by the Ministry of Public Security as follows: 

Persons aged 16 years or older who committed one of the following acts shall be sent to RTL 

in accordance with the law: 

1. Acts of endangering state security that are clearly minor in nature, wherein criminal 

punishment is not yet warranted; 

2. Membership in a criminal gang formed to murder, rob, rape, commit arson, kidnap, set 

explosions, or traffic women and children, wherein criminal punishment is not yet warranted; 

3. Subsequent commission of one the [following] illegal criminal acts, wherein criminal punishment is not yet warranted, either within five years of completing a criminal penalty, sentenced in accordance with the law, [for the one of following acts] or subsequent commission of 

one the [following acts] within three years of being lawfully fined by police or completing administrative detention, custody and education, or RTL issued by police: compulsory indecency; 

humiliating women; indecency with children; group promiscuity; luring juveniles to engage in 

group promiscuity; illegal detention; theft; fraud; forgery or resale of invoices; resale of train or 

boat tickets; forgery of price tags; sale of forged price tags; forcible seizure; group robbery; extortion; swindling; forgery; alteration; trafficking in official documents, credentials, or chops; or the 

harboring, transfer, purchase, or sale of stolen property; 

4. Endangering public safety by creating an atmosphere of terror or causing the public to 

panic; organizing or using a secret society or cult or use of superstition to undermine implementation of national laws; mass brawling; creating a serious disturbance; instigating turmoil; forcing purchases or sales to dominate the market; or disrupting social order through deeply 

engrained bad habits such as bullying, engaging in mischief, or oppressing the masses, wherein 

criminal punishment criminal punishment is not yet warranted; 

5. Deliberate provocations that disrupt the order of production, work, education or research, 

or daily life, as well as rejection or obstruction of state employees’ [efforts] to carry out their 

duties in accordance with the law but without the use of violence or threats; 

6. Instructing others to commit crimes, wherein criminal punishment is not yet warranted; 

7. Introducing or allowing others to engage in prostitution or solicit prostitutes; enticing others to engage in prostitution; gambling or providing conditions for gambling; or producing, reproducing, selling, renting, or disseminating pornography, in which the acts are of a rather serious 

nature but do not yet warrant criminal punishment; 

8. Engaging in prostitution or soliciting prostitutes after being lawfully warned, fined, or 

given administrative detention by the public security authority for engaging in prostitution or 

soliciting prostitutes; 

9. Taking or injecting drugs after having been sent to compulsory drug treatment for addiction to taking or injecting drugs; 

10. Other circumstances for which there is statutory basis for RTL. 

Individuals who have committed offenses of endangering state security, endangering public 

safety, infringement of civil rights, infringement of property, or obstruction of social order management but whom, because the offense was minor in nature, a people’s procuratorate has opted 

not to prosecute or a people’s court has exempted from criminal punishment may be sent to 

RTL, in accordance with the law, where they meet the conditions for RTL. I am grateful to the 

Duihua Foundation for providing links to these 2002 regulations and the 2005 opinion on their 

website, as well as English language translations. The link to those materials at the Duihua 

website is: http://www.duihuaresearch.org/2013/01/police-updated-rtl-rules-in-2005-but.html. 2 A person subject to RTL may challenge the RTL decision in court after the fact through the 

Administrative Litigation Law. Such review may not take place until the individual has served 

a substantial portion of their RTL sentence. 

these ‘‘trial’’ RTL regulations from 1982 read like pages of history. RTL would seem 

to have no place in modern Chinese society in the year 2013. 

Perhaps in recognition of how dated the original rules read, in 2002, the MPS 

issued new regulations, changing the reference to ‘‘counterrevolutionaries and elements who oppose the Chinese Communist Party or Socialism’’ to those who commit 

acts of ‘‘endangering state security.’’ The 2002 regulations also modified the definition of the other categories and expanded the list from six to ten categories but did 

not cure their vagueness.1

Moreover, in terms of process, RTL is still administered solely by the MPS. A decision to incarcerate someone under RTL is made by the MPS without any judicial 

review.2

China has committed itself to establishing a society under the Rule of Law. To 

the extent China maintains the authority to detain individuals outside the formal 

legal system and under such a vague set of standards, with very little in the way 

of due process, such a system undermines China’s own goal of establishing a society 

under the Rule of Law. 

A BRIEF HISTORY OF RTL

The history of the RTL system also suggests that it is long overdue for reform. 

The RTL system was initially created in the 1950’s during the early years of Chairman Mao’s rule and it was used to suppress ‘‘counterrevolutionaries’’ and others 

who the Party determined did not support the new socialist regime in China. As 
28 

such, the maximum level of flexibility, or one could say, arbitrariness, served that 

type of system well. 

Fast forward to 1979, the end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of 

Deng Xiaoping’s policy of Reform and Opening Up. In 1979, China opted to develop 

a formal legal system with predetermined rules and procedures that would limit arbitrariness. Thus, in 1979, China promulgated a new Criminal Law and a new 

Criminal Procedure Law. However, at that time, China maintained the RTL system 

as well. The Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law have been amended repeatedly, each time introducing new procedural protections for individuals. 

Over the years, there have been many efforts by legal reformers to abolish or substantially reform RTL. To date, those efforts have not succeeded. However, the role 

RTL has played during this period of time has shifted away from suppressing 

‘‘counterrevolutionaries’’ to, according to its supporters, ‘‘maintaining social stability.’’ 

As noted above, in 2002, the Ministry of Public Security issued new ‘‘Regulations 

on the Handling of Reeducation Through Labor Cases by Public Security Organs.’’ 

The MPS has the authority to issue departmental regulations and guidance about 

how to implement national rules and regulations provided they do not contradict 

those laws and regulations. Of course, MPS regulations can be changed by the MPS 

at any time and do not have the same status as State Council regulations or National People’s Congress legislation. In the 2002 MPS regulations, the MPS provided 

more details concerning how RTL should be administered. The rules provided for 

RTL hearings in some cases, but excluded from the hearing requirement any cases 

involving drug addicts and ‘those involved in organizing or using a cult to undermine the implementation of national laws,’’ an apparent reference to followers of 

Falun Gong. The MPS also provided for non-custodial RTL in some cases. 

In 2005, China’s National People’s Congress promulgated a Public Safety Administrative Punishments Law, which provides for a maximum punishment of fifteen 

days in jail for minor offenses. This seemed to presage the abolition of RTL because 

RTL’s supporters had claimed it was a more lenient alternative for minor offenses. 

With the Public Safety Administrative Punishments Law providing for a maximum 

punishment of fifteen days detention for minor offenses, RTL’s maximum sentence 

of four years seemed even more out of step with the rest of Chinese law. 

However, in the same year, 2005, the MPS issued an ‘‘Implementation Opinion 

Regarding Further Strengthening and Improvement of Reeducation Through Labor 

Review and Approval Work.’’ The 2005 Opinion provided for police hearings for all 

those subject to RTL, removing the exclusion for drug addicts and cult members, 

expressly limited the maximum RTL sentence to two years and provided that legal 

counsel could participate in RTL proceedings. 

Has Reeducation Through Labor served the purpose of maintaining social stability? The system is not very transparent but it appears that RTL is primarily used 

for involuntary drug rehabilitation for drug addicts, for compulsory reform for those 

engaged in prostitution, and to confine followers of Falun Gong as well as some political dissidents. 

The point is that the standards for RTL are so vague and ambiguous and the decision-making process so lacking in due process and transparency that it seems that 

RTL could be used, or in the view of some, abused, to incarcerate a whole host of 

people the police simply find to be annoying or obnoxious. A system such as this 

can also be used and appears to have been used to stifle the freedom of expression 

and dissent. 

In addition, to the extent that China has made important strides in improving the 

rights protections in its formal criminal justice system, the existence of an alternative, much more flexible and arbitrary police-friendly system like RTL, undermines those reforms. The police can completely avoid the criminal justice system 

and its small but growing protections for individuals’ rights simply by sending someone to RTL. 

CHINESE LEGAL SCHOLARS DEBATE RTL REFORM

Since even before the 18th Party Congress, rumors began to circulate that China’s 

new leaders might take up RTL reform as one of their first tasks after assuming 

power. In January, we learned that Mr. Meng Jianzhu, Chair of the powerful Political-Legal Committee of the Communist Party had directed that the use of RTL be 

terminated this year. On March 17, 2013, after the annual meeting of the National 

People’s Congress, Premier Li Keqiang told a press conference that with respect to 

RTL reform, ‘‘the relevant departments are working intensively to formulate a plan, 

and it may be laid out before the end of this year.’’ 
29 

The leadership’s public support for RTL reform has reopened the public debate 

about RTL and Chinese experts are publicly debating whether it should be abolished 

and whether something should be enacted to replace it. One of the bright spots of 

the debate is the use of legal norms, as expressed in domestic Chinese law and the 

Chinese Constitution, as well as international human rights norms and concepts of 

the Rule of Law to support various arguments. Under all of these norms, RTL falls 

short. Chinese scholars are debating whether providing judicial review, substantially shortening the maximum period of incarceration and changing the name can 

save the system. 

For example, Professor Liu Renwen of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences advocates for the abolition of RTL and argues that all punishments that involve the 

loss of liberty should be handled under the criminal justice system and be subject 

to judicial review. He argues forcefully that RTL is inconsistent with Article 9 of 

the Legislation Law, passed in 2000, because the Legislation Law requires that all 

laws restricting the liberty of citizens be enacted as legislation by the full National 

People’s Congress. He further argues that RTL is inconsistent with the Chinese 

Constitution, apparently referring to Article 37, which provides that ‘‘no citizen may 

be arrested except with the approval or by decision of a people’s procuratorate or 

by decision of a people’s court’’ and ‘‘unlawful detention or deprivation or restriction 

of citizens’ freedom of the person by other means is prohibited.’’ He further argues 

that many punishments permitted by the Criminal Law are less severe than RTL 

and therefore it does not make sense to have an administrative system of punishment that can provide for more severe punishments than the Criminal Law itself. 

On the other hand, Professor Chu Huizhi of Beijing University argues that there 

is still a social need to deal with habitual offenders and he suggests that a new law 

titled: ‘‘Unlawful Behavior Corrections Law’’ be enacted to provide for up to two 

years confinement for habitual drug addicts, those engaged in prostitution as well 

as juveniles who are not subject to criminal prosecution. Professor Chu also proposes that the process be modified to make it a judicial or quasi-judicial process to 

ensure some neutrality in the decision-making process. There are many other opinions that fall somewhere between complete abolition, as advocated by Professor Liu, 

and the type of reform suggested by Professor Chu. 

There does appear to be consensus among Chinese legal scholars that the legal 

basis for RTL is questionable, the lack of judicial review is problematic, and that 

RTL’s vagueness and lack of due process does not comport with China’s own commitment to governance according to law. 

However, while legal scholars will no doubt have input into the decision about 

what to do with RTL, the final decision will be made by political leaders. China’s 

new leaders deserve credit for publicly committing to reforming RTL at a very early 

stage in their administration. They did not have to put this pressure on themselves. 

There are also hopeful signs that the reform may be meaningful. There have been 

reports of local governments issuing rules to stop the use of RTL this year and we 

have also heard reports that the number of people in RTL has been reduced dramatically. It may also be that some of those held in RTL, specifically juveniles, drug 

addicts and those involved in prostitution, may have been sent to other forms of administrative confinement. At this point, it would be mere speculation to predict 

what the final outcome will be. 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS

This brings us to the question of what U.S. policy makers should do. First, let 

me congratulate the Commission on bringing attention to this issue. Bringing these 

issues out in the open and discussing them is always helpful. Second, while there 

are limits to what anyone outside of the Chinese system can do to affect the final 

outcome I do believe there are many positive steps that the U.S. government can 

take. 

Before I go into those, however, I want to suggest that the U.S. government expand the scope of its interest in this issue beyond RTL to encompass all forms of 

extra-legal, extra-judicial detention in China. This would include so-called ‘‘black 

jails’’ used to detain petitioners and ‘‘soft detention (ruanjin)’’ used to keep some 

people deemed to be troublemakers under some form of house arrest. To my knowledge there is no legal basis in legislation or publicly available regulations for either 

of these forms of limitations on the liberty of individuals. 

Moreover, there are other specific forms of administrative confinement and involuntary treatment and education for drug addicts, for those engaged in prostitution 

and for juveniles who are too young to be subject to the juvenile criminal justice 

system. These include custody and education (shourong jiaoyu), used for those involved in prostitution and custody and cultivation (shourong jiaoyang), used for ju-
30 

veniles under the age of 16, who are exempt from criminal punishment. While RTL 

gets most of the attention, I would urge the United States government to also take 

note of these other forms of detention and include them in its efforts to engage with 

the Chinese government. 

What can the United States do? First of all, China is an independent, sovereign 

nation that has the right to make its own decisions and its own laws. However, 

China is also a prominent member of the international community, and, as such, 

engages with the rest of the world through various multilateral and bilateral processes. China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. China 

has ratified many international human rights documents. While China has not yet 

ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits arbitrary detention, China has signed it and has repeatedly committed to ratifying it 

in the near future. 

My own view is that all countries, as well as all individuals have an interest in 

upholding international human rights standards and the Rule of Law and that there 

is a constructive role for sovereign nations to play with regard to human rights and 

the Rule of Law in other countries as well as within their own. We are all imperfect 

and we all benefit from mutual exchange and oversight. 

The first order of business, however, is to get one’s own house in order and lead 

by example. This is not the time or the place to go into how the United States could 

improve its own adherence to international human rights standards and the Rule 

of Law but I think it is fair and appropriate to make that a part of the larger discussion. The better we do at home the more credibility we have overseas. 

Second, the United States government has many tools at its disposal which it can 

use to voice its concerns to the Chinese government, foremost among them the diplomacy conducted on a regular basis by our excellent career diplomats. The government can also raise these issues during the visits of high level officials and members 

of Congress, and at periodic human rights and legal experts’ dialogues, and other 

high level dialogues. Each of these is an opportunity to communicate the United 

States’ concern about these issues. 

Third, the United States can support research to help us understand the actual 

situation in China. The government has provided some support for research but, 

speaking very frankly, support for research is not robust. 

Fourth, the United States government should continue to support expert legal exchanges between non-government actors, including academics, practitioners and students. My own view is that those programs have been highly valuable in enhancing 

mutual understanding and in improving the Rule of Law and human rights situation in China. It is hard to imagine where China would be now had it not welcomed 

the support of the rest of the world, including the United States, or had the rest 

of the world not provided it. 

Every country borrows ideas from other legal systems and China has been very 

active in studying the legal systems of other countries as a way to improve its own 

system. As noted, RTL is a form of arbitrary detention. But the reform of RTL raises 

legitimate questions about how to deal with social problems such as minor offenses, 

drug addiction, prostitution and juvenile delinquency in a fair and effective way. 

These are challenges common to many countries, including the United States, and 

we could all benefit from sharing our experiences and best practices. 

I should say here that U.S. government support for such exchanges is critical. Institutes like the U.S.-Asia Law Institute rely upon grant support, including U.S. 

government grants, to be able to maintain our expertise and to engage constructively and productively with Chinese partners. Without that support it would be difficult, if not impossible, to carry on this work. Our Institute and other organizations 

also commit their own resources to this work but the extent of such work is dependent, in part, on the level of government support. 

The real question though is how to use these tools effectively. To be effective, we 

need to be persistent, consistent and focus on the long term as well as whatever 

short term goals may be within reach. There is a tendency in government to demand 

short term deliverables and outcomes from each meeting, each dialogue and each 

legal reform project. That is understandable from the point of view of accountability 

to taxpayers. However, legal reform and social change do not necessarily work on 

the schedule of diplomats and grant makers. Progress takes time and requires a 

process of exchanging ideas, opening minds to new ways of thinking, and assuring 

policymakers in other countries that improving the rights protection of their citizens 

can enhance social stability rather than undermine it. 

Sometimes, in the pursuit of concrete outcomes that we can claim as successes 

we overemphasize the short term at the expense of persistence, consistency and the 

pursuit of long term goals. Our long term goal should be to help China meet its own 
31 

objectives of creating a society under the Rule of Law and meeting the obligations 

China has undertaken under international human rights instruments. 

In conclusion, I thank you for the opportunity to share these thoughts and I hope 

you will continue to support efforts to improve the Rule of Law and human rights 

protections in China and in the United States. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARGARET K. LEWIS

MAY 9, 2013

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Commission, I am privileged to 

be invited to participate in this roundtable and greatly appreciate the Commission’s 

efforts to improve American understanding of China and the specific issues at hand. 

With respect to our topic today, ‘‘The End of Reeducation Through Labor? Recent 

Developments and Prospects for Reform,’’ I am going to focus my remarks on the 

prospects for reform of reeducation through labor (RTL). In particular, I have been 

asked to discuss Taiwan’s experience in abolishing its RTL analog, how that experience could inform the People Republic of China’s (PRC) own efforts to reform RTL, 

and recommendations for US policymakers. 

Today, I get to be the optimist and deliver the hopeful story for reform. Taiwan’s 

system of reformatory training for people deemed ‘‘hooligans’’ (or ‘‘liumang’’ using 

the Romanization of the Chinese term) was gradually reformed in order to restrict 

police power and to offer greater procedural protections before its ultimate abolition 

in January 2009. Reformatory training was formerly a non-criminal sanction— 

hough more accurately understood as a quasi-criminal sanction—that allowed police 

to lock up vaguely described hooligans for up to three years. 

By way of general background, from shortly after President Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) took refuge on Taiwan in 1949 until the mid1980s, the police wielded tremendous power. Throughout the martial law period, the 

police easily found support for their actions in suppression-friendly laws and regulations. Although outwardly aimed at hooligan behavior such as gang participation 

and gambling activities, the relevant legal framework also proved itself to be expedient for silencing political opponents who did not fit the conventional description 

of hooligans. As with RTL, police unilaterally made the decision to condemn hooligans. The punishment imposed on hooligans at the time was an extraordinarily 

harsh military-administered punishment that could be used to detain perceived 

troublemakers indefinitely. 

Consequently, despite the fact that the KMT had brought with it to Taiwan the 

Republic of China’s 1928 Criminal Procedure Code, police could easily avoid the judicial process required by the Code. Although the KMT’s tight grip on the judiciary 

during the years of martial law virtually guaranteed desired outcomes if it chose 

to invoke the formal criminal process, in many cases—especially politically charged 

ones—it was more convenient to bypass the judicial system by resort to administrative punishments. This experience echoes in the PRC today. 

Following the end of martial law in the late 1980s came a crucial transition in 

Taiwan whereby police powers diminished and judges, prosecutors, and lawyers 

were no longer under tight political control. In contrast to the entrenched police repression in the PRC, the past twenty years have witnessed a startling transformation of Taiwan’s criminal justice system. Perhaps the most immediately notable shift was the transformation of the draconian, military-run punishment into the 

Ministry of Justice’s ‘‘reformatory training,’’ a more conventional form of imprisonment for which judicial approval, albeit truncated, was required in every case and 

incarceration was limited to three years. 

The waning years of martial law in Taiwan had seen the beginnings of judicial 

involvement in decisions that had formerly been left exclusively to the police. Legal 

reforms introduced the use of special ‘‘public security tribunals’’ within the district 

courts to determine whether alleged hooligans should be incarcerated, but those 

courts provided little check both because of daunting procedural barriers to mounting a defense and the courts’ general pro-KMT/police propensity. Even reforms after 

the end of martial law changed little with regard to procedures with, for example, 

the tribunals continuing to rely heavily on secret witnesses. It was not until Taiwan’s constitutional court—the Council of Grand Justices (the Council)—stepped in 

that important changes began to occur. 

In a series of judicial interpretations) the Council increasingly declared unconstitutional portions of the legal regime for dealing with hooligans. In the final interpretation issued in 2008, the Council was persuaded by several constitutional arguments but called for only targeted repeal of unconstitutional provisions rather than 
32 

requiring wholesale repeal of the law. The last interpretation apparently persuaded 

Taiwan’s political elite that the special law aimed at hooligans was proving to be 

more trouble than it was worth. After President Ma Ying-jeou took office in May 

2008 the executive branch recommended its abolition. In January 2009, the legislature took the unexpected step of repealing the law in its entirety. Four years since 

abolition, I have heard no reports that the public security situation in Taiwan has 

deteriorated because of the law’s repeal. In part this is because gradual reforms 

leading to abolition meant that the number of people undergoing reformatory training had dwindled. People who formerly would have been treated as hooligans were 

increasingly being channeled through the standard criminal process. A sudden 

shock to the system would similarly be politically difficult to accept in the PRC and, 

thus, Taiwan’s experience suggests that incremental reforms to RTL might allow for 

a smoother transition than abrupt repeal. 

The gradual decline in the previously unfettered punishment powers of Taiwan’s 

police must be viewed within the broader context of reforms to the criminal justice 

system that had gathered strong support. Beginning in the late 1990s, Taiwan’s 

Criminal Procedure Code underwent seismic changes, even while further reforms to 

the procedures for hooligan cases appeared to stall and those cases remained largely 

behind closed doors without any prosecutorial involvement and using heavily truncated judicial proceedings. 

As reforms to the criminal justice system progressed, the judiciary, legislature and 

executive gradually recognized the untenable gap between the new procedures applied to ‘‘criminal’ cases and those used for ‘‘hooligan’’ cases. Likewise, the PRC’s 

newly revised Criminal Procedure Law includes a number of reforms that are unavailable to people facing RTL. Taiwan’s experience also underscores that merely involving an entity called a ‘‘court’’ is insufficient to guarantee a fighting chance for 

the suspect to contest the possible imposition of RTL. What is needed is not just 

more process but rather more meaningful process. I am certainly not expecting anything resembling the judicial independence we enjoy in the United States to blossom 

overnight in China. Nonetheless, even modest judicial review can encourage the police and prosecutors to be more cautious in how they use their powers. For example, 

after Taiwan voided the prosecutorial power to detain people without judicial approval in 1997, the courts approved the vast majority of detention applications. At 

first glance, it might appear that judicial review served little purpose. However, the 

advent of judicial review also quickly saw a considerable decline in prosecutors’ applications for detention. In other words, prosecutors in Taiwan sought detention far 

less once they had to go through the courts even though the courts rejected few applications. 

Given existing political constraints and other distorting influences upon PRC 

courts, which significantly diminish prospects for independent judicial action, it 

would be unfortunate if the PRC should establish the equivalent of Taiwan’s ‘‘public 

security tribunals.’’ That would impose further restrictions on fair court procedures 

while misleading the public into thinking that adequate court review was being 

granted. It would be far better for the PRe’s judicial resources to be expanded to 

assure that, at a minimum, all decisions imposing or recommending RTL would receive in practice the same judicial review as currently available in principle under 

the Administrative Litigation Law. Giving full force to the procedures provided for 

in the Administrative Litigation Law would be an initial step. A more significant 

step short of abolition would be to recognize that RTL is criminal in nature and require that all cases follow the procedures laid down in the Criminal Procedure Law. 

In highlighting the ways that Taiwan’s past might be helpful in charting the 

PRC’s path forward with respect to RTL, I recognize that despite shared historical 

and cultural ties, Taiwan’s recent experience is far from a perfect blueprint for the 

future of RTL. Most glaringly, since the late 1980s, Taiwan has transitioned to a 

vibrant multi-party democracy and the story of criminal justice reforms are embedded in the larger story of this political transition. Moreover} Taiwan’s constitutional 

court played a critical role in both drawing attention to the human rights abuses 

involved in reformatory training and forcing the legislature to respond. Sadly, the 

Council has no counterpart in the PRC, where the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress has the exclusive power to interpret the Constitution but, 

in practice, does not exercise it. 

That said, Taiwan’s reform path still has much to offer despite the PRC’s current 

political reality. Taiwan’s judicial reforms did not flourish until the political climate 

changed. Nevertheless, reforms during the martial law era-such as the establishment of the public security tribunals-helped lay a foundation for future reforms even 

though the tribunals were heavily flawed from a human rights perspective. Likewise, Taiwan’s revision to its Criminal Procedure Code in 1982 that allowed defense 

counsel to participate in the investigation stage made little difference at the time 
33 

1 New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc., A Decade of Bail Research in New York City 

(August 2012). 

but was seized upon by lawyers in the 1990s as they began to vigorously expand 

their roles in the criminal process. 

Even if it is unlikely that the PRC will directly and swiftly follow Taiwan’s path 

by abolishing RTL, Taiwan’s experience might at least stimulate new thinking and 

begin to assuage concerns that reforming RTL will lead to a deterioration in social 

order. As a possible intermediate step towards abolition, the Taiwan precedent of 

classifying hooligans into two categories and subjecting only those in the second, 

more serious category to incarceration may reduce the number of people subject to 

RTL detention, numbers that have been far larger in the PRC than in Taiwan. 

In light of this background, what steps should US policymakers take? The US’s 

ability to influence the path of RTL reform is, of course, limited. Reform will only 

happen when the government bodies in the PRC that have a vested interest in 

RTL—particularly the Ministry of Public Security—are willing to budge. What the 

US can do is both offer our own experience and serve a coordinating role in helping 

to introduce people in the mainland to Taiwan’s experience. As an added benefit, 

although there are differences in legal terminology, the shared language between 

Taiwan and the Mainland allows for a more fluid, efficient discussion than is possible through translation. 

The current relatively warm cross-strait relations have opened up opportunities 

for legal exchanges unthinkable in the past. In addition to bilateral cross-strait exchanges of scholars and personnel involved directly in administering the criminal 

justice system, I have also been involved in successful multilateral conversations 

that included the PRC and Taiwan, along with participants from the US, Hong 

Kong, Japan, and other jurisdictions. These meetings are relatively easy to arrange 

with participants from academia and other non-governmental positions. There remain challenges for government personnel from both Taiwan and the PRC to physically travel across the strait, though indications are that these restrictions are 

starting to relax. For example, Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice recently established an 

Office of International and Cross-Strait Affairs. Alternatively, sometimes a third location, like Hong Kong, can serve as an easier meeting point. Another option is to 

make greater use of video conferencing capabilities. 

A lack of accurate information regarding our bail system is an illustration of how 

not only cross-strait but also US–PRC meetings of legal practitioners and scholars 

can at least take the concrete step to dispel misconceptions regarding our criminal 

justice system that can serve as barriers to reform. I have on several occasions 

cleared up the mistaken belief that, only because the US has advanced technology 

to track people, it is rare for US defendants to fail to appear in court and, in contrast, the PRC is not ready for broader use of bail. In reality, the US bail system 

is quite low-tech and failure to appear rates are still very low: a recent study by 

the New York City Criminal Justice Agency (CJA) found that, using 2005 data, the 

failure to appear rate in New York City was 16%.1 However, CJA found only 7% 

failed to return within thirty days: many defendants miss court dates ‘‘because of 

forgetfulness, illness, inability to find child care or transportation, or some other 

reason related to a disordered life rather than a willful attempt to evade justice.’’ 

Careful screening for risk factors at the time of bail determinations, not use of 

high-tech tracking methods, is largely responsible for New York’s ability to release 

approximately 78% of non-felony defendants on their own recognizance without dire 

consequences for public security. I am convinced that the PRC could take steps to 

expand its system of release pending trial, which is at present seldom used. Similarly, there is room for creative thinking regarding how the prison-like RTL might 

be converted into a system akin to the US probation system that involves a much 

less severe deprivation of liberty. Reform efforts in the US to change our current 

practice of using administrative detention for unwanted immigrants offers another 

interesting point of comparison to the PRC’s discussions regarding possible changes 

to RTL. 

This is all to say that both the US’s and Taiwan’s experiences could help the PRC 

chart a reform path that, while it might not immediately abolish RTL, could gradually lead to significant reforms. And the time is ripe for these discussions. President 

Ma Ying-jeou has even proposed that the subject of human rights be placed on the 

cross-strait agenda. It is increasingly clear that stronger cross-strait relations cannot be built on economic ties alone. A meaningful discussion of how each side treats 

people who face criminal, or quasi-criminal, sanctions is an important next step in 

exploring prospects for the greater mobility of people between the PRC and Taiwan. 

Although the PRC has generally been careful not to impose RTL on visitors from 

Taiwan, the PRC’s abolition of that administrative punishment would send the is-
34 

land’s people a strong signal of legal progress. It would be especially comforting to 

business personnel and other Taiwanese who reside on the Mainland. 

Finally, US policymakers can continue to draw attention to the PRC’s stated goal 

of ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Although the PRC signed the ICCPR in 1998, it has thus far failed to ratify it. RTL 

stands as a notable barrier to ratification because it is difficult, if not impossible, 

to square the lack of judicial procedures for an RTL sentence with the ICCPR’s requirement that people charged with crimes be afforded a ‘‘fair and public hearing 

by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law’’ and that 

they be allowed to examine witnesses against them (Art. 14). Even if not labeled 

by domestic law as a criminal charge, a jurisdiction cannot skirt ICCPR protections 

by calling a proceeding ‘‘administrative’’ in nature. 

As Xi Jinping and his cohorts begin their terms, I hope that the new PRC leadership has the wisdom to see that RTL, like Taiwan’s reformatory training, should become a relic of the past. Surely there are many legal experts across the strait and 

from the US who are willing and able to provide valuable advice on charting a path 

to an RTL-free future. I hope that the US government will support those efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to present a few thoughts. I look forward to our 

discussion with the Commission. 
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HARRY WU

MAY 9, 2013

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Thank you for inviting me to speak before the Commission today. As a survivor 

of China’s brutal system of forced labor camps, the issue of laojiao reform is particularly meaningful to me. Ever since arriving in the US in the mid-1980s, I have 

fought tirelessly to expose the reality of forced labor camps in China. The CECC 

has also played a valuable role in raising awareness of this pressing issue, and I 

am tremendously grateful for their work in this regard. 

As you are all aware, Chinese government officials have expressed intent to reform the laojiao system. Although I welcome changes to this horrible system, we 

must place proposed laojiao reforms in context. We must remember that the laojiao 

has long been an integral component of the Communist Party’s efforts to imprison 

dissidents and maintain political stability. In addition, we need to recognize that the 

laojiao is only one part of a larger system of arbitrary detention institutions. In light 

of these realities, we must ask whether proposed reforms represent a genuine attempt to align the Chinese criminal justice system with international norms or just 

another effort to maintain stability in the face of mounting societal pressure to abolish this repressive system. 

HISTORY OF FORCED LABOR IN CHINA

All authoritarian governments employ repressive tools in an attempt to maintain 

and project power. The Soviet Union relied on the gulag. Nazi Germany established 

a vast network of concentration camps. In China, the government has long relied 

on a system of labor camps to jail dissidents who threaten political stability. 

The Chinese government initially established two networks of labor camps: laogai 

camps and laojiao camps. Although conditions in laogai and laojiao camps were substantially similar, laogai camps were reserved for convicted criminals, whereas 

laojiao camps served as jails for political dissidents and suspected petty criminals. 

In 1994, Chinese authorities proclaimed an end to the laogai system when they 

changed the name of these facilities to ‘‘jails.’’ The government continues, however, 

to openly use laojiao camps. 

The origins of Chinese labor camps can be traced to the Soviet gulag. In the early 

1950s, Soviet security officials helped their Chinese comrades design a system of 

labor camps capable of jailing large numbers of dissidents. In addition to isolating 

troublemakers from the rest of society, these camps functioned to transform class 

enemies and criminals into ‘‘new socialist beings’’ through a combination of hard 

labor and thought reform. 

Early laojiao camp inmates arrived in three waves: The first wave arrived in 1956 

and consisted of an estimated 200,000 counterrevolutionaries. This label was applied to former bureaucratic officials under the Nationalist government and others 

deemed counterrevolutionaries during the early years of communist rule. The second 

wave of labor camp inmates took place from 1957 to 1958. These prisoners were 

mostly ‘‘rightists’’ who were arrested during the ‘‘Anti-Rightist Movement.’’ The 

third wave occurred a couple of years later and was comprised of millions of peasants who had moved to cities from the countryside in search of food and work. Chi-
42 

nese cities were unable to cope with this influx of peasants, so the government decided to incarcerate these people in labor camps. 

Early laogai inmates were issued sentences of indefinite duration. In 1960, however, the government limited laogai sentences to a maximum of three years. Despite 

the imposition of sentencing limits, many inmates toiled in laogai camps long after 

the expiration of their sentence. 

Although many inmates remained in labor camps throughout the 1960s and 

1970s, reliance on the laogai and laojiao as a means to jail criminals and dissidents 

waned during the madness of the Cultural Revolution. In 1979, however, Deng 

Xiaoping reinstituted the labor camp system in order to deal with increasing social 

unrest that accompanied economic reforms. At the same time, Deng limited the 

length of laojiao sentences to four years. Prior to 1979, laojiao sentences were of indefinite duration. 

Today, an estimated 300–400 labor camps exist in China. These camps jail an estimated 200,000–300,000 inmates. Although the Chinese government has increasingly used laojiao camps to incarcerate petty criminals, a large number of laojiao 

inmates are petitioners and political dissidents. In addition, individuals incarcerated 

in laojiao camps are jailed without trial. Laojiao inmates are forced to perform hard 

labor for long hours and are often subjected to vicious beatings and other forms of 

abuse. In addition to laboring, inmates are forced to attend lengthy, daily study sessions during which they are subjected political indoctrination. Food rations at 

laojiao camps are meager, and inmates are routinely denied timely medical care. 

PROSPECTS FOR MEANINGFUL REFORM

Laojiao camps exist in modern China despite the fact that the practice violates 

protections outlined in the Administrative Punishments Law, the Criminal Procedure Law, and the Law on Legislation, each of which prohibits the arrest and incarceration of an individual in the absence of authorization from the People’s 

Procurate. Moreover, imprisoning an individual for exercising fundamental human 

rights undermines protections outlined in the Chinese Constitution. Laojiao inmates, however, are incarcerated at the whim of public security forces without even 

the pretense of due process protections, often for engaging in constitutionally protected activities. Despite these foundational legal protections, Ministry of Public Security regulations and State Council decisions provide the hollow legal justification 

for the continued use of laojiao labor camps. This supremacy of patchwork regulations over duly enacted laws and constitutionally protected rights exemplifies the 

dominant position of public security forces in China’s criminal justice system. It is 

this disproportionate power granted to public security forces and their mission of 

maintaining political stability that serves as the greatest obstacle to rule of law reform in China. 

In addition to facing resistance from public security forces, laojiao reform has 

been hampered by the reluctance of Chinese authorities to formally recognize past 

oppression perpetrated by the Party. Abolishing laojiao camps would vindicate criticism leveled against the Party for its historical reliance on labor camps as a means 

to suppress dissent. In addition embarrassing Party leaders, such an admission 

might prompt an influx of lawsuits seeking compensation for past labor performed 

and suffering endured. Despite indicating willingness to reform laojiao camps, it is 

not clear that the Party is prepared to accept the consequences of abolishing the 

laojiao system. 

It is also important to note that the laojiao is only one component of China’s vast 

system of arbitrary detention institutions. In addition to laojiao camps, authorities 

imprison individuals in facilities such as black jails, psychiatric hospitals, law education classes, military prisons, juvenile detention facilities, and the shuanggui system of punishment for Party members. Moreover, Chinese courts sentence political 

dissidents to lengthy prison sentences in violation of international human rights 

standards. Although providing a pretext of legality, such sentences are often issued 

in the absence of meaningful due process protections. Thus, the reform or even abolition of laojiao camps will not alter the arbitrary character of the countless politically motivated detentions imposed by Chinese authorities each year. Meaningful reform to China’s criminal justice system would require the creation and empowerment of an independent judicial system committed to upholding substantive rule of 

law principles. 

Instead of signaling an intention to more closely align China’s criminal justice 

system with international rule of law norms, laojiao reform is likely an attempt to 

maintain stability in the face of mounting societal pressure to end this specific relic 

of Maoist repression. In the end, laojiao reform proposals represent nothing more 

than a substitute for meaningful political change. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The US Congress should pass a resolution condemning the laojiao system and 

encouraging the Chinese government to completely abolish the use of labor camps 

to punish non-criminal offenders. 

(2) The US Congress should work to raise awareness of other forms of arbitrary 

detention still in use by the Chinese Communist Party. 

(3) The US Congress should pass a resolution in solidarity with the growing international movement to urge the Chinese government to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The ICCPR explicitly forbids the practice of arbitrary detention, and China signed the treaty in 1998. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW

JERSEY; COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

MAY 9, 2013

Over the past several months, the Chinese government has suggested that reforms might soon come to China’s brutal reeducation through labor (RTL) system. 

Under the current RTL system, Chinese officials can order Chinese citizens to be 

held in reeducation through labor centers for up to four years without a trial or 

legal representation. There are no judges, no defense attorneys, and no prosecutors. 

If the public security forces want to detain an individual for years without any judicial review, they have authority to do so. Detainees have little recourse. 

China’s police forces have used this administrative system for decades to target 

‘‘minor offenders,’’ whose crimes fall beneath the threshold of the Criminal Law. 

And, while the RTL system was created to ‘‘educate’’ minor offenders, Chinese police 

officials frequently use RTL to punish, among others, petitioners, dissidents, drug 

users, sex workers, Falun Gong practitioners, and individuals who belong to religious groups not approved by the government. The unchecked decisionmaking power 

has given China’s police forces an extra cudgel to wield against a range of so-called 

troublemakers and those brave citizens wiling to advocate for change. 

Once held within the RTL system, detainees are faced with a grim reality. They 

are forced to work long hours for little pay, often in unsafe working conditions. In 

addition, the detainees are sometimes subject to harassment or torture by officials— 

and even beatings by other inmates seeking shortened sentences. An April 2013 investigative article in a Chinese magazine highlighted cruel conditions in one of 

these camps. In the report on the Masanjia RTL detention center in northeast China’s Shenyang city, ex-detainees described a range of abuses, including harsh restraints, electric shocks, extended solitary confinement, and forced labor. 

It is a nightmare that tens of thousands of Chinese citizens live with every day. 

Of course, China’s RTL system is not the country’s only forced labor camp system. 

Prison inmates, throughout China, continue to be subjected to forced labor and 

harsh working environments. I recall one of my earliest visits to Beijing, where I 

was able to visit Beijing Prison No. 1, one of hundreds of the vast Laogai system, 

where jelly shoes and socks were being made for export. We saw factory workers’ 

heads shaved, very gaunt, and at least 40 Tiananmen Square activists in large vats 

with dye all over their bodies. Obviously, the dye is penetrating their skin and being 

absorbed into their systems. And we complained to the Administration that we 

knew, because we brought back the socks and the jelly shoes, that were being made 

by convict labor, including political prisoners, and it was showing up on our shores. 

An import ban was imposed and that place shut down, although I am sure they just 

relocated. 

In recent months, stories of harsh work conditions and wrongful detentions have 

sparked public outrage and intensified calls for reforms. In response to controversial 

cases, Chinese citizens have taken to the Internet to voice opposition to the RTL 

system and to the corrupt practices. Citizens have also used popular social media 

and microblogging Web sites to express support for those detained unjustly. Even 

China’s state-run publications have questioned the RTL system and its abuses. In 

response to the case of a young village official ordered to two years of RTL, the 

Global Times—an official publication under the People’s Daily—wrote, ‘‘It’s worrying 

that people can still be punished for expressing or writing critical thoughts in modern China. Ren’s case is not an isolated one.’’ 

Officials appear to be listening. In March, China’s new Premier Li Keqiang told 

a press conference in Beijing that RTL reforms may be unveiled before the end of 

the year. Other officials at lower-levels have similarly voiced support for RTL reforms or voiced their expectations for a timely end to this brutal system. 
44 

Still, today, tens of thousands of people languish in China’s 350 RTL detention 

centers. Rhetoric is not enough. 

China’s new leaders should now act immediately to end reeducation through labor 

for once and for all. And, if they can have the courage to end this brutal and senseless system of arbitrary punishment, we commend them. 

But, let’s not forget: RTL orders are not the only form of arbitrary detention in 

China. Officials routinely use home confinement, harassment, torture and unofficial 

holding centers to silence those seeking to advocate for human rights or expose official abuses. Without a doubt, the outdated and cruel RTL system should be abolished immediately; however, the other forms of arbitrary detention and official harassment must end, as well. 

Over the past few months, we have witnessed increasingly loud calls for reform 

and justice throughout China, as citizens have bravely and publicly called for an 

end to this arbitrary system of punishment and cruelty. Today, we are fortunate to 

have four expert panelists who can give us further insights into these developments 

and the potential for RTL reform. We look forward to hearing about the prospects 

for RTL reform and for other reforms that could end the arbitrary detention of Chinese citizens. 

Æ