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i 

75–144 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–135] 

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: 

RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND TIMETABLE 

FOR SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 20, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CHRISTOPHER BRIGHT, Professional Staff Member 

PAUL LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

ARTHUR MILIKH, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, June 20, 2012, Afghan National Security Forces: Resources, 

Strategy, and Timetable for Security Lead Transition ..................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, June 20, 2012 ...................................................................................... 25 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2012 

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: RESOURCES, STRATEGY, 

AND TIMETABLE FOR SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Andrews, Hon. Robert, a Representative from New Jersey, Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Investigations ......................................................................... 2 

Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Investigations ......................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Sedney, David S., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, 

Pakistan and Central Asia .................................................................................. 2 

Townsend, MG Stephen, USA, Director, Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination 

Cell, The Joint Staff ............................................................................................. 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Sedney, David S. ............................................................................................... 30 

Townsend, MG Stephen ................................................................................... 35 

Wittman, Hon. Rob ........................................................................................... 29 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Andrews ..................................................................................................... 45 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 46 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 52 

Mr. Critz ............................................................................................................ 51 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 49 

(1) 

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: RESOURCES, 

STRATEGY, AND TIMETABLE FOR SECURITY LEAD 

TRANSITION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 20, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:35 p.m. in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rob Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mr. WITTMAN. Today the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee convenes the first of a series of hearings related to the 

Afghan National Security Forces. 

At this hearing, we will receive testimony from the Department 

of Defense about the resources and strategy related to training the 

ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] and the timetable for 

transitioning security lead responsibility from U.S. and NATO 

[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces to the ANSF. The Department of Defense today is represented by Mr. David Sedney, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan 

and Central Asia; and Major General Stephen Townsend, Director 

of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for your participation. Thank you 

for your service to our country. We look forward to your testimony 

on plans for training and equipping the Afghan National Security 

Force, and details about the projected size and related rationale of 

the ANSF in the near and long term. 

Many of us on the committee have just returned from a congressional trip to Afghanistan. And during our visit, we traveled to several provinces and met with local leaders, including the chiefs of 

police in a number of provinces. We also had the opportunity to 

talk to the military commanders on the ground who provided their 

impressions of the level of support that will be needed to create a 

self-sustaining ANSF. 

It is my hope that our witnesses today can provide further context on these important issues. And as an administrative note, I 

recognize that members of other subcommittees will join us. And 

pursuant to the committee’s rules, I will recognize these members 

after all O&I Subcommittee members have had an opportunity to 

question the witnesses. And we have with us today, in the stead 

of Mr. Cooper, our ranking member, Mr. Andrews. 
2 

And I would like to turn it over to him for any opening statement 

he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT ANDREWS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NEW JERSEY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also appreciate the 

witnesses and their service to our country. And I want the record 

to show that I will never fill Mr. Cooper’s shoes in any way, shape, 

or form. I will make sure he tells him that. 

Thank you for calling the hearing. Look, a pivotal aspect of our 

country’s strategy in Afghanistan is for the Afghans to be able to 

provide their own security. And a pivotal aspect of that goal is the 

training of the security forces and where that all stands. 

No reflection on today’s witnesses, but one of the reasons why I 

think it is so timely the chairman called this hearing is that, frankly, through two administrations we have had a long history of unfounded and inaccurate optimism on these questions. And I know 

that the two witnesses are dedicated to telling the facts as they see 

them. 

I know the committee is dedicated to hearing the facts as they 

are. So, Chairman, thank you for this opportunity, and we thank 

the witnesses for being here. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Andrews. We appreciate your 

leadership on this issue also. 

At this point, I would like to ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee members, if any, be allowed to participate in today’s 

hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity 

to ask questions. Is there an objection? Without objection, non-subcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time for 

5 minutes. 

And with that, we will begin with our witnesses, and begin with 

Mr. David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. Mr. Sedney, the floor is 

yours. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID S. SEDNEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND 

CENTRAL ASIA 

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 

ranking member—or acting ranking member. Thank you. Thank 

you for the opportunity to be here today. 

The subject, as the two of you have introduced it, we in the Administration believe is exactly on point. The key to success in Afghanistan is the success of the Afghan National Security Forces 

over the long term. The United States’ fundamental objectives—our 

strategy, our campaign plan in Afghanistan—have been consistent 

since President Obama announced them in December of 2009. 

Our goal remains to deny safe havens to Al Qaeda, and to deny 

the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government. 

Thanks to more than 10 years, and particularly over the past 2- 

plus years, of dedication and sacrifice of our forces, our coalition 
3 

1Mr. Sedney intended to say ‘‘ANSF’’ rather than ‘‘ANS.’’ 

partners and their Afghan partners and the Afghan people, we 

have taken enormous strides toward these objectives. 

To that end, U.S., Afghan, and coalition forces continue to work 

to drive down the Taliban-led insurgency in their strongholds and 

to build up the capacity of the Afghan security forces and the Afghan government. Our efforts remain on track to enable the Afghans themselves to assume the lead for security nationwide by the 

end of 2014. 

As we continue to shift more areas to Afghan security lead and, 

by the end of this September pull out the final 23,000 surge troops 

which will return home at that time, that is all made possible by 

the improvements in the Afghan National Security Forces. American and coalition forces that remain on the ground after September will facilitate the continued transition of security to the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, in accordance 

with General Allen’s campaign plan. 

As you said, as I mentioned, the key to this success is the increasing capability and confidence of the Afghan security forces and 

to the Afghan people in those security forces. The Afghan National 

Army and Afghan National Police are both on schedule to meet 

their goal for size by or before October, this year. 

Additionally, I would point out that the Afghan security forces 

now participate in over 90 percent of all operations in Afghanistan, 

and are in the lead for over 40 percent of these missions. And that 

rate of growth is on an upward trend. As General Allen stated to 

the House and Senate in March, the ANS 1 are better than we 

thought they were to be—and importantly, they are better than 

they thought that they could be. 

This improved capacity is allowing the Afghan security forces to 

assume the security lead effectively. With the first two tranches of 

transition that are already under way, 50 percent of the population 

lives in areas where the Afghan security forces are in the lead. 

That number will climb to 75 percent with the recently announced 

tranche three of transition, which will begin to be put in place this 

summer. 

Tranche three contains a number of contested areas; areas where 

the Taliban is active. Tranche three will really test the Afghan security forces. This fighting season that is coming up—that we are 

already in this year—will be the most significant challenge for the 

Afghanistan security forces, as they are more in the lead than ever 

before. 

However, the time for this test is now, when we and our coalition 

partners have the forces in theater to ensure their success. Certainly the insurgency retains the ability to carry out complex attacks. April 15th attacks in Kabul, the recent attack on forward operation base Salerno, were sophisticated and coordinated. However, 

I would point out that those attacks were largely tactical and operational failures. 

And the response to the attacks, particularly in Kabul, highlighted the increasing competence of the Afghan security forces. Because in Kabul, the Afghan security forces carried out the complete 

reaction and taking down of the forces that had attacked. We have 
4 

seen two major achievements in the last 6 weeks that have sent 

a strong signal to the Afghan people, to the Taliban people, and to 

countries in the region. 

First, the strategic partnership agreement that President Obama 

and President Karzai signed in May. President Obama subsequently made a speech to the nation from Afghanistan. That 

showed that the United States and Afghanistan are committed to 

a mutually beneficial relationship, not just until 2014 but beyond 

2014. That strategic partnership extends for 10 years, until 2024. 

Secondly, the Chicago Summit—the NATO Summit in Chicago— 

earlier this month was a great success, and demonstrated the continued dedication of over 50 NATO and other partner countries to 

supporting stability and security in Afghanistan. In Chicago, ISAF 

[International Security Assistance Force] members and partners reaffirmed their commitment to the Lisbon timeline to complete transition by the end of 2014, and also and very importantly, to continue engagement in Afghanistan after 2014. 

As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen put it, ‘‘NATO and our 

ISAF partners will not leave the task undone. We will not let Afghanistan slip back into the hands of militants, which the vast majority of Afghan people utterly reject. We will finish the job to help 

create a secure Afghanistan, secure for our shared security.’’ 

Again I will repeat, our goal is to ensure that Afghanistan is 

never again a base from which attacks are launched on the United 

States, our allies, and our partners. And in Chicago, our partners 

acknowledged once again that shared goal. I would also point to 

two recent U.S.-Afghan bilateral arrangements: the detentions and 

special operations memorandums of understanding. 

They preceded the strategic partnership agreement, and those 

two MOUs [Memorandums of Understanding] are critical to demonstrating U.S. commitment to Afghanistan’s sovereignty, and they 

rely for their execution on the increased capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. 

Now while I have stressed the successes and the progress, I also 

want to very directly acknowledge that we have serious challenges 

still ahead. Limited governance capacity and corruption continue to 

plague Afghanistan, and they limit the effective governance that 

will be necessary for full transition. 

Additionally, as stated by General Allen in his testimony and repeatedly in testimony by other witnesses from this Administration 

and others, the Taliban-led insurgency continues to operate from 

safe havens in Pakistan. And although we have had indisputable 

successes against Al Qaeda, as I am sure all of you are aware, we 

continue to press the Pakistanis on the need for them to take action against the Taliban and affiliated groups which operate out of 

Pakistan and carry out attacks on coalition and Afghan forces in 

Afghanistan. 

We will continue to work with our allies and partners, in the 

Pakistani and Afghan governments, and our international partners 

to address these issues. We will keep Congress informed of our 

progress. As I close, I would like to thank the House Armed Services Committee and this subcommittee for the opportunity to appear before you today, for your continued support for our men and 
5 

women in uniform, and for your support to the Afghan security 

forces. 

Because without your commitment to funding and resourcing the 

Afghan forces we could not have achieved the progress of the last 

3 years. I look forward to your questions, look forward to your insights. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sedney can be found in the Appendix on page 30.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sedney. Thank you so much for 

your testimony. 

We now look forward to the testimony of Major General Stephen 

Townsend, Director of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell. 

STATEMENT OF MG STEPHEN TOWNSEND, USA, DIRECTOR, 

PAKISTAN/AFGHANISTAN COORDINATION CELL, THE JOINT 

STAFF 

General TOWNSEND. Chairman Wittman, Congressman Andrews, 

members of the subcommittee thanks for this opportunity to appear 

before you today and discuss how the Afghan National Security 

Forces are doing. Our bottom line up front is that we are on track 

to achieve our Nation’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan. 

A sustainable and sufficient ANSF, and transition, are two 

linchpins of our strategy. And to echo what Mr. Sedney said, the 

ANSF continue to grow and improve, and remain on track to assume the lead for security by the end of 2014. ISAF remains focused on building a capable ANSF of 352,000.That becomes a 

mechanism for defeating the insurgency. The ANSF continue to 

meet or exceed this year’s recruiting objectives, with the Army and 

the Air Force expected to meet their combined goal of 195,000 by 

the end of this summer. And the police reaching their goal of 

157,000 by October. 

To be sure, the ANSF continues to face challenges such as literacy, attrition, and shortages of noncommissioned officers. The 

NATO training mission and the Afghan ministries provide literacy 

programs to approximately 90,000 ANSF each day. This is going to 

make the ANSF one of the most literate elements of Afghan society. 

Attrition continues to be an issue, as well. Although attrition will 

not keep the ANSF from meeting their manning goals, it continues 

to hamper the long-term development of the ANSF. The security 

ministries continue to implement policies to combat attrition, and 

they are working. Attrition has gone down over the last several 

months . 

One example is, the MOD [Ministry of Defense] recently approved stricter timelines to drop AWOL [absent without leave] personnel from unit rosters. Shortages of NCOs [noncommissioned officers], sergeants, continue to affect the development of the force as 

well. The army and police are training and promoting from within 

their ranks to fill these critical positions. 

The ANSF are taking the lead in training their own forces, and 

they are implementing instructor cadre training programs. These 

Afghan instructors are providing more basic and advanced skills 

training at Afghan-led training centers every day. Operationally, 

the ANSF is making steady progress as well. ISAF Joint Command 
6 

currently rates 67 percent of the army units and 62 percent of the 

police units. 

And the top two tiers, or categories, of operational effectiveness— 

that is, effective with advisors and independent with advisors— 

from January to April, the percentage of Afghan-led partnered operations increased from 33 percent to 59 percent. In some regions, 

Afghan forces conduct more independent operations than they do 

partnered operations. 

The ANA [Afghan National Army] special operations forces also 

continue to grow and increase their operational proficiency. For example, ANA SOF [Special Operations Forces]-led operations increased from 44 percent in January to 54 percent in April. As we 

plan for a responsible drawdown of our forces in Afghanistan, the 

ANSF will continue to face challenges on the battlefield. But they 

won’t face these challenges alone. 

To support the ANSF during transition, ISAF is shifting to a security force assistance model. That puts Afghans in a lead combat 

role and has ISAF forces increasingly assuming a train, advise, and 

assist role. During this transition period, ISAF will still fight 

alongside our Afghan partners when needed, but we will shift into 

more of a support role as the Afghans move to the front. 

ANSF’s operational challenges include logistics, army and police 

interoperability and confidence, among others. In my own opinion, 

the ANSF’s greatest challenge is one of confidence. Our agreement 

to stand with them beyond 2014 has been a tremendous boost to 

their confidence. The will of their force will strengthen as their 

leadership strengthens and as their capabilities improve, and as 

they continue to move more and more to the front. 

Circling back to the bottom line, we assess that our security 

strategy, our security transition, is on track to have a sufficient 

and sustainable ANSF assume full responsibility for security across 

Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Finally, thank you all for the work 

that you do on behalf of our service men and women, as well as 

your efforts to ensure their protection and safety as they complete 

their mission in Afghanistan. 

I stand ready to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Townsend can be found in 

the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Major General Townsend. Appreciate 

your testimony, as well as Mr. Sedney. 

We will begin now with questioning. And I want to begin with 

Mr. Sedney to get your perspective. You had spoken about transition, that we are in tranche two now. When we were downrange, 

we spoke with General Allen just last week, Ambassador Crocker, 

about some concern about the more difficult areas in transition 

being pushed to the end, to tranche five. 

I know now there is a repositioning to put some of the more difficult areas into tranche three. Let me ask you this. If you do not 

achieve the desired results in this transition—whether it is tranche 

three, four, or five—are there contingency plans? We know 2014 is 

the complete turnover. Are there contingency plans, are there alternative schedules if goals aren’t met, if transition doesn’t take place 

smoothly in some of these more challenging areas within Afghanistan? 
7 

Can you give us your perspective on what you see as those contingency scenarios and alternate schedules? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you very much, Congressman. And thank 

you and you and your colleagues for making the trip out to Afghanistan to speak directly with our commanders and our troops and, 

of course, our Afghan partners. 

In terms of plans for how we are going to evaluate the success 

of transition and how we might adjust the existing campaign plan, 

the process that we have in place is one where at the end of this 

fighting season—and including after the remainder of U.S. surge 

forces return home at the end of September—General Allen and his 

staff will review what happened over this year. 

As I said in my testimony and as I am sure you heard our there, 

this is going to be a testing summer for the Afghan security forces. 

They are going to be in the lead as never before. So we are going 

to have to evaluate them. At the same time, beginning in just a few 

weeks, the third tranche of transition will be started, including in 

some very difficult contested areas. 

So General Allen will have had the summer’s experience to 

evaluate that. He will do that, then he will submit a report up the 

chain of command evaluating what he believes are what the future 

requirements are. So rather than developing a whole list of contingency plans, what we are focusing on is making what we are doing 

now successful. And we have a review process in place, whereby 

the commander in the field will evaluate if there are changes that 

are necessary; he will recommend those up the chain of command 

through General Mattis at CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] 

and then to the Secretary and to the President. So that is the process that we are looking for. I will say, and you have been in Afghanistan more recently than I have, but I will be able to—that 

won’t be the case in about 5 days because I will be back out there 

myself and will be looking at that. 

As General Allen said in his testimony, and as you may have 

heard when you were out there, we are finding that the Afghans, 

rather than doing less well than we expected, are often doing better than we expect. There are some cases where they aren’t doing 

as well as either we expect, or they, and that is where we are able 

to give them the additional help that they need. 

But we are also, as I said, seeing places where they are doing 

better than expected. We have, actually, some very aggressive and 

I think it is a very positive thing, Afghan commanders who are 

pushing to do even more than sometimes we think they are ready 

to. That is a judgment that our commanders out in the field have 

to make every day about whether people are ready to do things. 

If you stretch too far, that can be dangerous. But if you don’t 

stretch far enough, then you are not going to achieve your goal. So 

we do have this review process in place for this year. I would expect we would have the same process in place. 

I would also add that in terms of the issue of the composition of 

the Afghan security forces, Secretary Panetta, in his formal meetings with the Afghan interior defense ministers in April for a group 

that is called the Security Consultative Forum—where we meet 

and discuss the strategic level issues relating to the Afghan security forces—they agreed on a 6-month review process to examine 
8 

the performance of the Afghan security forces, to evaluate what additional inputs might be needed, what changes might be needed. 

So again, we have these review processes in place that we take 

very seriously, and look forward to being able to come back and 

brief you and your colleagues as these review processes are completed. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sedney. 

Major General Townsend, we know right now the majority of efforts there are along the lines of village stabilization operations. 

And that most of that is being executed by our special operators. 

As we begin to draw down forces to the 68,000 by the end of 2013, 

the question is, is that transition going to take place in a way to 

make sure that support elements are in place to make sure our 

special operators continue to have what they need as they get 

placed more and more out on an island to pursue these operations? 

The concern is, if it isn’t strategic in the way the drawdown is 

structured that those special operators may not have what they 

need—whether it is air support, whether it is other logistical support—and they find themselves on an island. Can you speak to that 

issue? And is the planning taking into account strategically where 

we will be in continuing to pursue this fight, especially along the 

lines of the village stabilization operations with our special operators and ANSF forces in these areas? 

General TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. As you might expect, we are planning for various contingencies through now until the 2014 and even 

beyond 2014 what we call our ‘‘enduring presence’’ might look like. 

And none of those plans have really firmed up yet. 

But the VSO, Village Stability Operations, and Afghan local police initiative that you mentioned, is a very high priority for 

COMISAF [Commander of the International Security Assistance 

Forces]. And so, absolutely, I can assure you that the planning will 

allow for the proper support that those hearty little bands of special operations folks, and also general purpose forces out on the 

frontier where those sites are at, the support they need will be 

there for them. 

VSO–ALP [Village Stability Operations–Afghan Local Police] is 

something that is part of our enduring presence planning. So we 

envision that program continuing after 2014. So even in our enduring presence footprint, there will be VSO–ALP support and support 

to those forces that are providing it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. 

And with that, I will move to Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. I thank the witnesses for your testimony. 

Mr. Secretary, you indicated that Afghan security forces participate in 90 percent of operations and are in the lead in 40 percent. 

What is the difference between being in the lead and participating? 

Mr. SEDNEY. I am going to call a little bit on my uniformed—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. [Off mike.]. 

Mr. SEDNEY [continuing]. Uniformed colleague here because he is 

a lot more accustomed to describing operations than I would say. 

But I think, to me, one of the key things that I look at when I look 

at reports from my uniformed colleagues on this, when the issue 

comes to lead, are they lead in planning the operation. 
9 

Not just are they lead in carrying it out, but do they have the 

capacity to plan, do they execute according to plan? And then afterwards, do they have the capability to do an after-action review to 

see what went wrong, what went right in order to do it the next 

time better. 

But I am going to defer a little bit on this to you, Steve. 

Mr. ANDREWS. General, what would that look like? 

General TOWNSEND. I will use a very kind of a simple analogy 

of a patrol. A patrol gets a mission and they meet together. The 

first thing they do is they plan that mission. When the Afghans are 

in the lead, they are planning the mission. We are kind of helping 

and advising. 

Just a short while ago, almost every mission in Afghanistan 

would have been planned by an American, sergeant or officer. 

When that patrol rolls out the gate, who is leading that patrol? 

Who is actually in front, and who is in the command position? A 

short while ago that would have been an American. 

Now, increasingly—and actually the latest reports are more than 

40 percent—they are in the mid- to high-50 range. Half of those patrols are now led by an Afghan leader with an American leader 

tagging along behind watching the Afghan leader control the operation. 

When you get to the objective, the force that is on the patrol, 

what is the predominance of the force? At RC–East [Regional Command–East], in a recent report, said 61 percent of the troops on a 

mission these days in RC–East are Afghans. That was not the case 

when I was there a little over a year ago in RC–East. And then 

on the objective, who is actually giving the orders—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

General TOWNSEND [continuing]. And who is controlling the soldiers as they move about the objective. Increasingly, in more than 

half the cases now that is an Afghan. So that is sort of the difference between participating and leading. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Very helpful. That is very helpful. Thank you. 

Mr. SEDNEY. Can I just add one thing, sir? 

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I just—— 

Mr. SEDNEY. Okay. 

Mr. ANDREWS [continuing]. Want to jump to the next question. 

What is the difference between a unit that is independent with an 

advisor and effective with an advisor? What is the difference? 

General TOWNSEND. Effective with an advisor is really a matter 

of degree. If you are an effective with an advisor, you are getting 

a lot of advice. And if you are independent with an advisor, you are 

getting much less advice. But the big difference is, who is generating the operations? 

Mr. ANDREWS. Gotcha. 

General TOWNSEND. If an Afghan commander is saying, ‘‘Hey, we 

need to do an operation tomorrow,’’ and giving orders to an Afghan 

subcommander, then they are generating the whole idea of the operation. And so that is really the difference between being independent—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. This is not a trick question, but is it possible for 

an Afghan unit to be not in the lead, but be independent with an 

advisor? Or is that oxymoronic? 
10 

General TOWNSEND. Okay, I haven’t really thought about this 

particular question. To be not in lead—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. Well, I will put it to you this way. If an 

Afghan unit is in the lead of an operation, are they by definition 

independent? Or are they just effective? 

General TOWNSEND. No, they may just be effective. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Gotcha. Are there any Afghan units that are in 

the lead that don’t hit the top two categories? 

General TOWNSEND. Yes, there are actually. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Are you concerned that American troops might be 

under the command of a commander who is in an outfit that isn’t 

at least effective? 

General TOWNSEND. Sir, they are not. American troops are not 

under the command of the Afghan leader there. They are partnered 

and they are on the battlefield together, but there is an American 

leader there in charge of American troops. 

Mr. ANDREWS. All right. Do we have any data on the attrition 

rates among the Afghan security forces? Are they up, are they 

down? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Yes, we do have data, which we will be happy to 

provide the committee. We have some nice graphs. The answer is 

that the attrition is down in both the Afghan National Army and 

Afghan National Police over the last 6 months. 

Happy to pass these graphs up to you if you would like. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 45.] 

Mr. ANDREWS. Sure. Unanimous consent to put them in a record, 

if that is—— 

Mr. SEDNEY. Okay, we can do that. 

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the bottom line, though? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Bottom line in—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. What was the attrition rate a year ago? What is 

it now? 

Mr. SEDNEY. In the case of the Afghan National Police, a year 

ago attrition was ranging from 1.4 percent to 4.6 percent. In the 

last 6 months it has ranged from 3.4 percent to, in the most recent 

period, 0.5 percent. 

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the main reason for attriting? Why do 

people leave? 

Mr. SEDNEY. I am going to defer a little bit of this to my colleague here. But a lot of the reasons—attrition are people who have 

entered and leave before their contracts are up; the most common 

reason, is family reasons. People have family problems at home, 

and they feel they can’t solve them. So going—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. My time is about to expire. One thing, if you have 

it, I would be interested in the KIA [killed in action] rates for Afghan forces. I hope it is zero, I mean God forbid. But I mean, what 

is happening with their KIA rates? Are they going up or down, or 

staying the same? 

General TOWNSEND. I don’t know which way they are trending, 

but I do know that their army loses, they have twice the casualty 

rate that we do. And their police have about four times the casualty rate that we do. So they are in this thing. 
11 

Mr. ANDREWS. I offer no glee with that statistic, by the way. I 

just want to know what it was. I am sure you don’t either. 

Thank you. This is very, very helpful. I appreciate your testimony. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Andrews. 

We will go to Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the things, 

when General Allen was making his presentation just the other 

day he just talked about tranche one, tranche two, tranche three. 

And what I asked is that we need a better way of measuring 

progress across that continuum of ineffective all the way to independent with advisor, whatever your scales are either on a districtby-district basis or some sort of way to communicate progress in 

the transition. 

In other words, Mr. Sedney, you said that after the first two that 

50 percent of the population lives under the control of the Afghans. 

Which would say that we are done with transition in both tranche 

one and tranche two. And I am not sure that was accurate. 

And maybe I just misunderstood it. But we need some of the 

metrics that you are using to show yourselves progress. We need 

those, too. And so any way you can be helpful in that regard, we 

are open to that. Rob and I were over there last week, and we went 

down to Panjwaii District. 

And we had a presentation by the Afghan commander there on 

operations over the next several months in his AO [area of operations] that was as professional as anything we would get anywhere else by folks in our uniforms. This guy was very impressive. 

Maybe it was just the interpreter knew what to do and he might 

have not been very impressive at all, but I suspect he was being 

interpreted correctly. 

But I came out of that meeting very impressed with this guy, 

and the fact that he is going to be in charge here pretty soon. 

Major General Townsend, the ALP [Afghan Local Police]—the 

numbers we are shown for post-2014 in terms of the numbers of 

security forces versus the money that will be needed year in and 

year out to fund those—the money to pay the ALP, is in the estimate of what the international community will have to come up 

with each year to fund the security forces. 

But the force number itself, the 30,000 ALP guys, are not in the 

force number itself. My concern is, hey, I am sold on the project— 

on what we are doing with ALPs—because the Taliban’s sold on it. 

They are threatening them. They are coming after them because 

they see them as a threat to their ability to operate within these 

villages. 

Is there someone in the Ministry of Interior who is going to take 

ownership of the ALP and be that champion that is necessary to 

prolong this? I know we like it, but there has got to be somebody 

in the Afghan system that is going to share that idea with us. Are 

you aware, Mr. Sedney, or either one of you? 

General TOWNSEND. Sure. First, I would like to answer just the 

thing you said about transition at the start. Those measurements 

are there. They are measurements to all the stages of transition. 

And to answer your sort of unasked question about, you know, has 

any place completed it. No, none of the tranche one or tranche two 
12 

districts, provinces, or municipalities have completed all four 

stages of transition yet. 

Some of them are in stage three, and some of them, a couple, 

have entered stage four. But none of them have completed transition just yet. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, having that information would be helpful. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 46.] 

General TOWNSEND. Sure. Then on your question about the ALP 

versus the troop numbers, and is anybody going to take charge of 

that. First, the troop numbers, you are correct, are not in the 

ANSF end-strength, by design. The money, however, is. And what 

we anticipate in funding in the outyears, international contributions, the MOI, the Ministry of Interior, already owns the VSO– 

ALP program. 

And, in fact, there is a chain of command that runs through the 

police chain of command. And those ALP forces are responsible to 

the district chief of police. So there already is a funding, a training 

funding and equipping line, that comes down through the Ministry 

of Interior to the ALP. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I guess the question then is, between the two of 

you are y’all confident that the Afghans sufficiently value this program that they won’t siphon off that funding and go somewhere 

else with it after transition. 

Mr. SEDNEY. Well, I think there are two questions there. Are we 

confident they won’t siphon off the funding. Yes, we are confident 

of that because we control that funding. So that funding right now 

does not go to them. 

Mr. CONAWAY. No, no, no. I mean post-2014. 

Mr. SEDNEY. But post-2014, the ALP program has been controversial in Afghanistan. There is ownership for the Ministry of 

Interior. As the ALP–VSO program has proven its effectiveness, we 

are getting more and more support from the top levels there. 

As that continues over the next 2 years I think we are very much 

on track for that. But it is certainly no secret that a number of 

high-ranking Afghans, people in their parliament, have been critical in the past of the ALP program. To get that buy-in, we are 

going to need at least another year or two of success to build that 

support. 

Bureaucratically, as my colleague said, yes, in the Ministry of Interior there is a structure that governs the ALP. Right now, that 

structure is very—we have a lot of mentors in that process. So we 

are building that capacity and we think we are on track to complete by 2014. But it is one of things that we are going to be having 

in that review process. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conaway. 

We will now go to Mr. Critz. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, you mentioned earlier something that I had heard last 

year and the year before. The concern for attrition and the lack of 

NCOs. And if you could, now the Secretary mentioned that the attrition had gone from 4.4 percent—in a range of, we will say, 
13 

around 4.5 percent a year ago, I believe—to 3.4 percent a month 

ago; ranging down to half a percent. 

And just for comparison purposes, what is the U.S. military? 

What is our attrition rate? 

General TOWNSEND. Congressman, I don’t know the answer to 

that question. I can tell you this about the Afghanistan attrition. 

For the last—we have got a goal of 1.4 percent per month. And 

they have—the Afghan army is—about at that goal now. It has 

been declining, their attrition has been declining, for the last several months. 

The police are actually at that goal. And, in fact, I think they are 

slightly below the goal. They are meeting the goal, exceeding the 

goal now. The army is not quite there yet. But it has been on a 

steady slope of improvement for the last several months. 

Mr. CRITZ. Well, good, good. And that is because the police force 

was what I was going to ask about next, as well. But can you explain when you say that there is an issue with NCOs? What exactly do you mean? 

General TOWNSEND. First of all, there is just a shortage. About 

17,000 NCOs short in the army, and about 11,000 NCOs short in 

the police. 

Mr. CRITZ. So if 17,000—how many NCOs do they have and how 

many does that mean that they need? 

General TOWNSEND. That is a good question. I don’t know. I will 

ask my colleagues here. 

Mr. CRITZ. Well, 17,000 short of some number. 

General TOWNSEND. Yes, yes. I don’t know that off the top of my 

head. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay. 

General TOWNSEND. So with the NCOs, there are two real issues 

here. One is a cultural one. They have not been an army that had 

a professional noncommissioned officer core previously. So, you 

know, we are trying to, one, train the army and the senior leadership of the army to value noncommissioned officers. 

So that is a work in—that is probably the broad thing that is 

going on. Then next is actually filling their ranks. And then they 

have standards for the noncommissioned officers. They have to be 

able to read, so that is one shortfall there that we are working on. 

So as these guys get recognized in the ranks as a high-performing 

soldier they are identified to be in noncommissioned officers school. 

They had to go to read, and they have to go to an NCO corps 

and pass that before they can be an NCO. So it is a work in 

progress, filling these slots. 

Mr. CRITZ. Well, the reason I ask is, like I said, I had heard that 

issue in years past. I was in Afghanistan 2 years ago, I was in Afghanistan last year. And I am curious, with the growing amount 

of the force, has it remained a constant percentage of lack of 

NCOs? Or is it a number that has increased exponentially, or are 

we seeing a sharp decline in the—I mean, we all know that you 

have got to have those sergeants on the ground because you are 

going to have some lack, or approaching chaos at some points, if 

you don’t have a amount of people you need. 

And that is, as we transition here, I am trying to find out will 

we have the NCOs needed to support this 352,000 level? Or as we 
14 

discussed at the Chicago Summit in May, are we looking more at 

a 230,000 number? And where are we going with this? 

General TOWNSEND. Well, we will have the NCOs we need because that is a focused area that we are trying to improve. So we 

will look at the data and we will try to provide you an answer before the hearing is over. If not, we will provide it for the record as 

to the general population of NCOs. 

My guess is it probably remained pretty constant, slightly improving. Because we have been growing the force. 

Mr. CRITZ. Yes. 

General TOWNSEND. So it is hard to actually, you know, meet the 

objective when you are adding requirements, which we have been 

doing. But we will have the NCOs we need to man and lead the 

352,000 force. 

I will let Mr. Sedney address where it goes from there. 

Mr. SEDNEY. Just two additional points, Congressman. The first 

is, as Steve stated, the reason they don’t have enough NCOs is because just as on our forces, in order to be a really effective NCO 

you have to have 10 or 15 years of experience. And this is an army 

that generally has less than five. 

And so they are going to grow into that. Secondly, on filling the 

NCOs through the process that General Townsend described. Because we will have reached the numerical goals, the 352,000, by 

the end of this summer, that is going to give the Afghan security 

forces 2 years—from October 2012 through the end of 2014—to refine their quality, to build this NCO course, to build their juniorand middle-level officer corps. 

Will the process be finished? No. We, and others, will have to remain to train, advise, and assist and after that. But they will have 

the beginnings of what they need in terms of numbers if not in 

quality by 2014, and the next 2 years is when we will see the 

greatest progress in the NCO and junior officers. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Critz. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Townsend and Secretary Sedney, thanks so much for your service to our 

country. 

A couple points. First of all, I have a concern, I think, in looking 

back at U.S. military history and our involvement in South Vietnam. One of the issues, I think, that complicated the efforts of the 

army of South Vietnam was that we gave them our doctrine. And 

it was of high mobility, and that was difficult to support after we 

left Vietnam. 

And I was in Afghanistan in November. And they took me out 

to see a training exercise. And it was for artillery. And it was with 

towed artillery. And having served in the United States Army in 

mechanized infantry, been an infantry officer in the United States 

Marine Corps, I am thinking why on earth have we procured for 

them towed artillery instead of mortars. 

And when I pressed the ISAF representative, he said, ‘‘Well, sir, 

you know, Karzai had insisted on, you know, heavier, more expensive—he wanted F–16s [Fighting Falcon fighter jets] and he want-
15 

ed this and he wanted that. And so towed artillery was kind of the 

compromise.’’ 

And I am wondering how many areas like that, that where we 

have given them weapons and tactics that don’t fit their—that 

aren’t realistic as to their capability to maintain that after we are 

gone. And and General Townsend, I wondered if you could reflect 

on that. 

General TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. I have actually seen that same 

towed artillery. I would point out that the U.S. Army and the U.S. 

Marine Corps today have a lot of towed artillery. And the Afghans 

have had towed artillery for decades. So towed artillery is nothing 

new, and there is nothing out of character for the Afghan army of 

the past or the present. 

They do have mortars, as well. They have light mortars and medium-caliber mortars, much like we do. So they have, I think, indirect fire systems that they can have high mobility with. And then 

they have some that are less mobile. But I have seen them attach 

those, tow those E–30 howitzers behind their—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. I want to remind you this is at U.S. taxpayers’ expense. And mortars don’t require all of the support elements that 

towed artillery does. And so you and I obviously differ on that. Let 

me ask you about my concern about the culture of corruption in Afghan security forces, which is stunning. 

I pressed the Oversight and Investigations Committee, under 

Darrell Issa, to conduct an investigation into the conduct of Afghan 

security forces and the lack of oversight at the Dawood military 

hospital where, in part, $42 million of U.S. military aid has been 

missing, unaccounted for. Where the general officer in charge of 

that hospital was merely transferred, was never relieved. 

Where Afghan police and Afghan soldiers were dying in the hospital from malnutrition and from a lack of medical care because the 

families couldn’t come up with the necessary bribes. Certainly it 

speaks to a lack of oversight for ISAF personnel, the monitors. But 

also it speaks to not just the culture of corruption, but also just the 

fact that to what extent have we formed a military organization 

that—I mean, how capable are they when they would allow this to 

occur? 

And so I am wondering if you all could reflect on that. Who 

wants to start? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Maybe if I could start, Representative Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure. 

Mr. SEDNEY. First of all, thank you for your concern and interest 

in this area. The situation you mentioned at the military hospital 

is one that as we became aware of it we began investigating and 

began working with the Afghans to take corrective action. There 

are currently investigations and corrective action under way with 

that hospital. 

Let me just go back to the words you used—‘‘a culture of corruption.’’ There is, to be frank, not just hundreds but thousands of 

years of history in Afghanistan’s surrounding regions where corruption has been part of the fabric of life. 

It is not something that the Afghan people, however, want. It is 

not something that the majority of the Afghan military officers and 

the leaders of the Afghan military want themselves; from the min-
16 

isters on down, I have seen a lot of both leaders at the top, leaders 

in the middle, and ordinary soldiers who are committed to not allowing corruption to destroy the structures that the Afghans need 

and that we are financing. 

But yes, there is corruption. As I mention in my prepared statement, corruption continues to be a problem. We have to work with 

the Afghans to give them the capability to get rid of that corruption. That is a challenge because not only do you need to have the 

laws in place, you have to have the effective structures in place, 

you have to have a judicial system, prosecutors, courts, a system 

of incarceration. 

All of these things the Afghans are building, or in some cases rebuilding. So it is a huge challenge. But while recognizing that corruption is a problem, I would not agree that it is endemic to the 

point where our investments are not going to pay off. 

We have some really good partners in the Afghans. We have 

some problematic ones. We have some ones who are corrupt, and 

we need to work with the Afghans to get rid of those. But I appreciate very much the point you are making. 

The things that happened in that hospital are the kind of things 

that should never have happened to any human being anywhere. 

And we are working with the Afghans to correct them. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last point, I am just 

concerned that that issue at the hospital is something that very 

well could be representative throughout the Afghan security forces. 

And I think we in Congress certainly need to know—to get down 

to the bottom of it. 

Thank you so much. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Coffman. 

We will move to Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me as a 

nonmember of this subcommittee to ask questions today. I appreciate it. 

And greetings, gentlemen. Mr. Sedney, can you characterize for 

us the evolution of the Afghan Security Forces readiness over the 

last decade? And basically tell me when did they start turning the 

corner to become a force to be reckoned with in Afghanistan? 

Mr. SEDNEY. I can. I actually was on the ground in Afghanistan, 

deputy chief of mission, at our embassy on May 1, 2002, when the 

first U.S. special forces arrived to begin training the Afghan army 

a little over 10 years ago. From that very, very, I will have to say, 

discouraging start—when we had not enough money, not enough 

trainers, not enough trainees in windowless, bombed-out buildings—to what we have today, we have made incredible progress. 

I would also say that for too long the effort in Afghanistan was 

underresourced both in terms of money, but also in terms of the 

level of training and support that we were able to give. The former 

chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Mullen, described that 

very graphically when he said—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. But you don’t have to go—— 

Mr. SEDNEY [continuing]. ‘‘In Afghanistan, we just do what we 

can.’’ 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I don’t want you to go too far—— 
17 

Mr. SEDNEY. But the turning point, I would say really, was about 

3 years ago, following the strategic review by President Obama and 

members of this Administration, which recognized what we had not 

been doing in Afghanistan. Where we put additional resources, 

both personnel and money, and we really began to build the Afghan security forces to a size and capability that they are now 

showing. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. 

Mr. SEDNEY. We made the strategic decision, and the impacts we 

are seeing today. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And let me interrupt you because I got a few other 

questions. I am sorry, I would love to listen. So how many Taliban 

are we fighting now in Afghanistan? 

Mr. SEDNEY. There are estimates from the intelligence community, and I will defer to them on that, but I would say it is a very 

hard figure to come up with how many. Because many of the people—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. [Off mike.]. 

Mr. SEDNEY [continuing]. Who fight with the Taliban are parttime Taliban. There are people who fight just for a day, and there 

are permanent fighters. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I understand. 

Mr. SEDNEY. There are Taliban in Afghanistan, there are Taliban 

in—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I would include all of those part-timers. 

Mr. SEDNEY. And Taliban in Pakistan. 

Mr. JOHNSON. In fact, I think probably most of them would be 

part-timers. But approximately how many, 20,000? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Again, deferring to the intelligence community, the 

last estimate that I recall seeing that was releasable publicly was 

15,000 to 20,000. I don’t know if you have a better or a different 

figure, Steve. 

General TOWNSEND. No, same figure. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Now, the commitment to withdrawing our 

forces by the end of 2014, does that include special operations 

forces? 

Mr. SEDNEY. We have committed to drawing down our forces by 

the end of 2014, and ending a lead combat role. But we have committed to continuing a presence in Afghanistan after 2014. In the 

strategic partnership agreement that we signed with Afghanistan 

last month, we agreed to begin negotiations on a bilateral security 

agreement which will set the parameters for what that force is, including the participation of special forces after 2014. 

So we are about to begin those negotiations to come up with how 

many special forces there will be in Afghanistan after 2014. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right, thank you. We are talking about 230,000 

Afghan National Security Forces by 2017. We would be drawing 

down about 120,000 from the force at its maximum height. That is 

going to produce 120,000 jobless individuals who understand how 

to fight. And what do we do with those? 

And also, 230,000 on 20,000. How do we get to that 230,000 manpower figure for 2017? 

Mr. SEDNEY. That was exactly one of the subjects that Secretary 

Panetta discussed with the Afghan minister of defense, Minister 
18 

Wardak, and Minister of Interior Mohammadi in their security consultative forum in April. And they agreed to have a regular 6- 

month review of where the Afghan security forces stand and what 

our future plans are—and the security situation in Afghanistan— 

to see what pace that would allow for the drawdown of Afghan security forces to a long-term, sustainable level. 

And the goal of something in the neighborhood of 230,000 by 

2017 is one we broadly agreed to. But the actual pace—and the 

character, the way we get there is something we will be doing in 

these 6-month reviews. In terms of what happens to those who 

might be demobilized, there is a certain level of natural attrition. 

Afghan security forces, army, and police sign on for 3-, 4-, and 

5-year contracts. And a lot of them leave—30 percent to 40 percent 

of them leave—at the end of their contracts. That is normal in 

forces. So there is a certain level of normal reduction in forces. 

There is the possibility of such things as a reserve force. And we 

have had experience in Afghanistan—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Who will pay? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Pardon? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Who would pay for those—well, I guess—yes. 

Mr. SEDNEY. In terms of payment, we have worked on a future 

plan of funding for Afghanistan that would come from the United 

States, would come from our international partners but more and 

more from Afghanistan itself—with a goal of Afghanistan paying 

for its own security forces by the year 2024. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And how did we arrive at the 230,000 mark for 

2017? And is that still a reasonable guestimate of the number of 

Afghan security forces on the ground at that time, given the fact 

there are 20,000 Taliban? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Well, that figure certainly depends on the degrading 

of the Taliban. As I said, our campaign plan has been to degrade 

the Taliban, push the Taliban down, build up the Afghan security 

forces. And in our reviews, we are going to check and see whether 

that is actually happening. 

But a much-diminished Taliban, a much less effective Taliban, 

will require less forces. And that is what that calculation is based 

on. But we are going to be looking at it every 6 months to see if, 

in fact, that is happening. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. Thank you. We are 

going to start with the second round of questioning. There is some 

interest in panel members for us to do that. 

General Townsend, I will follow up on Mr. Johnson’s question. 

And that is, looking at the underlying assumptions on where we 

are going, transitioning with ANSF—as we spoke of 352,000 force 

structure by the end of 2012, and then transitioning to 230,000 by 

the end of 2017—I guess my question is, what are the assumptions 

and analysis that went into that to determine that that was a proper force structure at that time? 

How does that coincide with the coincidence of a drawdown of 

American troops or ISAF troops during that time period? If you can 

just lay out where the thought process has gone, where it has been, 

where we are today with how we came to that number of 230,000. 
19 

I know there is obviously a resource element associated with 

that, but also a strategic element associated with that. So I would 

like to get your reflection on that. 

General TOWNSEND. First of all, the 352,000 was the result of a 

lot of analysis, to include wargaming and that kind of thing, to 

allow us to defeat—allow the ANSF to defeat—the Taliban. So that 

is how we get to 352,000. Then there has been a decision here in 

our Government to sustain that through 2015, as you know. 

And that is to get them through a year or more after our drawdown, and through elections. Some sensitive timeframes that will 

happen in the future there. So then how do you get to some number in the future? And why 230,000? Actually, ISAF and NTM–A 

[National Training Mission–Afghanistan] ran a number of planning 

excursions and 230,000 is just one of them. 

Quite honestly, it is one that we would probably pick for ourselves that is a smaller force that is pretty well equipped and capable. There were other courses of action, some larger with less capability. To have more troops, you would have to have, you know, 

fewer trucks and helicopters and things like that. 

So the approximately 230,000 course of action is one that we 

agreed to with the Afghans and our international partners. And as 

you said, there is a resource—you know, that is the $4.1 billion 

course of action. But these 6-month reviews that Mr. Sedney talked 

about are every 6 months we are going to reevaluate. 

If that still makes sense to us, based on the threat, based on 

what is going on in the world. That Afghans, quite honestly, would 

like to have a larger force and more capability. But the world community is going to fund most of that, and so, you know, there is 

a tradeoff there. So I think that as we go down the road we will 

make these 6-month reviews and determine if 230,000 makes 

sense, or maybe something else makes sense. 

At some point in the near future here we are going to be asking 

Afghans, okay, give us your course, your preferred course of action. 

Because we have done a lot of that planning, and then brought 

them into it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Gotcha. 

Mr. Sedney, in speaking about those 6 months’ reviews, I am assuming that they will also include ISAF forces. You are looking at 

drawdown, obviously, after 2015 of the ANSF forces. But also ISAF 

forces to the end of 2014, where we will be, theoretically, out. Will 

those 6-month evaluations also consider if we haven’t reached an 

acceptable security condition with that transition with ISAF force 

presence after December 2014? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Well, the ISAF mandate the NATO heads of state 

have agreed on runs out at the end of 2014. That was the decision, 

made at Lisbon in 2010, that the Afghan security forces would be 

fully in the lead by the end of 2014. In terms of moving towards 

that, very definitely both the size, but more importantly the capabilities and the actions that will be carried out by the ISAF forces 

will be considered. 

But as NATO stated in Chicago in defining essentially an interim milestone in 2013, that that will be the point at which Afghan forces are in the lead, with our support. So there will be a 

year and a half with the Afghan forces in the lead and ISAF sup-
20 

port. And as they become more and more in the lead, they will 

need less and less ISAF support. 

So we will be evaluating in those 6-month reviews, looking primarily at the performance of the Afghan security forces. And then 

if there are areas where the Afghan security forces need additional 

training, advising, assisting—areas where they are facing challenges—then the commander in the field, I am sure, will recommend methods to do that. 

So yes, it is very much a joint unitary process, looking at the entire spectrum in the whole country of Afghanistan. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Sedney. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I understand that President Karzai, by the constitution, cannot 

run again. And that there has not been a credible election yet in 

Afghanistan. And I know in Iraq, under General Casey, coalition 

forces actively supported the independent electoral commission of 

Iraq to make sure that there were credible elections. 

What efforts are going to be made next time to make sure—or 

to assist the Afghan people to make sure—that there is a credible 

election so that there is a peaceful transition of power? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Coffman. You have hit 

on a key issue, which is the successful elections and a successful 

transition of power; something that does not happen in that region 

of the world in general. So it will be an historic achievement, and 

one that the Afghan people are very much aware of. 

As you said, President Karzai has pledged publicly, and privately 

to the U.S. Government, that he plans to step down to facilitate a 

transfer of power. In terms of the Department of Defense, in terms 

of the military role, in terms of the role that NATO and ISAF will 

play in both of the last two elections, in 2004 and 2009, the actual 

security protection that was available in areas where security had 

been achieved was led by the Afghan forces, particularly in 2009. 

I know it is the judgment of our commanders in the field that 

that is going to be able to be the case in 2014, as well. So in terms 

of the military’s role, we will be supporting the Afghan security 

forces to the degree necessary in 2014 for those elections in order 

to carry out the security. The biggest challenge, of course, is having 

a credible and legitimate process that results in a transfer of power 

that the Afghan people, the international community, see as legitimate. 

That there is a very active political dialogue in Afghanistan already, and our colleagues at the State Department and elsewhere 

are working to that end. But I would say on the security side, all 

the indications are—and Steve, you can correct me if I am wrong— 

we think the Afghan security forces are going to be in a very good 

shape to take the lead and be very effective at it in maintaining 

security during the election period. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Going forward, President Karzai has come 

down on these night raids which, in terms of my understanding, 

are very effective in terms of capturing key insurgents. Where are 

we at right now with night raids in terms of working with the 

Karzai administration? 
21 

General TOWNSEND. Quite honestly, Congressman, the night 

raids question has pretty much dropped in the pressure. It was 

highly pressurized a few months ago, and now it has dropped significantly because we have made this agreement on night raids, or 

special operations, with the government of Afghanistan. 

And essentially, we are turning over night raids, at an accelerated pace, to them. They have now four of their own strike forces 

that are doing these raids side-by-side. They are partnered with 

Americans, they are enabled by Americans. But they are completely in the lead for four of these strike forces. 

There are coalition forces that are still operating each night. 

They are partnered also with Afghans. But it is the discussion we 

had earlier about who is in the lead and who is participating. But 

because of that agreement and because of the continuing success 

of these operations, the pressure on that topic has dropped significantly with the government of Afghanistan. 

Mr. COFFMAN. In terms of our ability to phase down our forces, 

being able to redeploy them out of Afghanistan utilizing Pakistan 

has become an issue in working with the Pakistani government. I 

wonder if you could reflect on where we are right in that negotiation process. 

Mr. SEDNEY. We have been talking with the Pakistanis about reopening the ground lines of communication, and we continue those 

discussions. I think people from my office have been involved in 

those discussions. My deputy was in Islamabad for about the last 

6 weeks or 7 weeks carrying them out. 

We have not reached agreement yet, but we do find a great deal 

of willingness on the Pakistan side to reopen those. And we will report back to the committee when that happens. But what I would 

stress is that primarily due to our partnership with a number of 

other countries to the north of Afghanistan we have been able to 

continue operations without any interruption or any hindrance. 

And that the level of supplies for our troops in Afghanistan, for 

our NATO partners’ groups in Afghanistan, is higher now than it 

was before those Pakistani ground lines of communication were 

closed. It does cost more money. It is a much longer route. It goes 

through some more difficult areas in terms of development of the 

transportation networks. 

But all that said, due to some tremendous work by our colleagues 

at TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command], at CENTCOM 

[U.S. Central Command], and by a number of civilian carriers, we 

are actually in very good shape and able to move forces in and out 

and equipment in and out of Afghanistan, as is necessary. 

However, we don’t want to be dependent upon the north any 

more than we want to be dependent on Pakistani. We were very 

much interested in having both routes open. There is both healthy 

competition there and a diversity of supply lines that we think is 

strategically important. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Coffman. 

And we will move back to Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. The $4 billion, Mr. Sedney, that is projected to be necessary to support that smaller force of 230,000 dollars—230,000 ANSF in 2017—that represents about 20 percent of 
22 

the current Afghan GDP [gross domestic product]. If we assume 

that Afghanistan will experience economic growth and improvements in governance, maintaining that force will, of course, require 

substantial international contributions. 

What steps are being taken to get commitments from international donors, and how much progress have we made? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you, Congressman. Last year, former Secretary of Defense Gates, proposed publicly that our ISAF and other 

partners contribute 1 billion euros a year towards the future cost 

of the Afghan security forces. Since that time, we have been working very actively with our NATO and other partners, including 

countries in the Middle East and in Asia that are also part of the 

ISAF force. 

And I would say we are very, very close to that goal right now. 

Because some of these discussions are still in diplomatic channels, 

we are not in a position to give you the details now. But very soon 

we will be able to. We have gotten a very positive response, and 

countries are willing to make multiyear commitments. 

Obviously, each country has different budget processes, different 

political processes. But the commitments that were made in Chicago have been very positive. At the same time, as I mentioned before, the goal by 2024—the goal set out by President Karzai and 

endorsed by just about every Afghan that I know—is that Afghanistan will be able to become self-sustaining for its security forces. 

That is a very stretched goal that is going to require a huge 

growth in the Afghanistan economy. There are other prospects in 

a number of areas—agricultural, transportation, mining—for that 

growth. But in the end, it all depends on security. If security is in 

place, Afghanistan has a lot of areas where its economy can grow 

and meet that goal. 

And that, of course, comes back to the Afghan security forces. 

But as I said, we have been very pleased with the response from 

other countries, and we look forward to giving you more details of 

that once the diplomatic discussions are completed. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I understand also that the poppy crop has been— 

or the level of production has declined dramatically this growing 

season. What is the reason for that? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The full evaluation of that is still ongoing, including 

by our intelligence agencies. And we should have their official reports in a few weeks. But from what we understand, there is a 

combination of factors involved. One of the largest is weather and 

crop blights, other natural factors. 

But we have also seen a decline in production, particularly in 

areas where we have been most effective in our military counterinsurgency operations. Particularly in the Helmand Province area, 

where the combination of increased security and an effective crop 

substitution effort—this is a whole-of-government effort, with the 

participation from our colleagues in the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, State 

Department, and other international partners—giving farmers the 

opportunity to grow something else. 

Even though it might be less profitable in one sense is much 

more secure because they don’t have the risk of having their crop 

destroyed, they have legitimate outlets for it, they are not being 
23 

preyed upon by Taliban and criminals. So we have seen that happening. But I would say the largest reasons, at least anecdotally 

that we can report right now, are natural. But they are both natural and as a result of our policies. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Can you share a little bit with us about the Afghanistan police forces that we are also training, and what will be 

our financial commitment, if any, for them after 2014? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Well, the financial commitment we talked about before was for the Afghan security forces, including the army and the 

police; both the uniformed police, the border police, and the Afghan 

local police that the chairman discussed before. 

The police, as a whole, in Afghanistan, as in every other conflict 

and post-conflict societies, does lag behind. The police in Afghanistan, Representative Coffman mentioned before, casualty rates. 

The police bear a much higher casualty rate than the army. They 

tend to be in smaller groups, often isolated, and are quite often the 

choice of target for the insurgents. 

That combination has made it more challenging to build the police. However, we see significant progress in the police. The attrition figures that I mentioned before show that the policemen are 

staying in, staying in longer, becoming part of their communities 

in an effective way. 

There are continuing problems with corruption, as Representative Coffman mentioned. It is a problem in the police forces in 

many areas in Afghanistan that needs to be addressed. I don’t 

know, Steve, if you have any comments about the police, from your 

experience. 

General TOWNSEND. My experience over the last year in RC East, 

where the police continue to improve—and this is most notable in 

the selection and promotion of police leadership—when I first got 

there, I had an Afghan police general who was my partner. And 

when I heard word of his impending assignment I was quite nervous because he was not very corrupt. 

And I thought an honest guy, trying to do right for his country. 

I was very concerned. And in every case, the incoming leader 

proved to be better than his predecessor. So that was my experience in RC East. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

I would like to thank the members of the committee and our witnesses today for your testimony. We appreciate the time. And with 

that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 20, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 20, 2012 

(29) 

Statement of Hon. Rob Wittman 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations 

Hearing on 

Afghan National Security Forces: Resources, Strategy, 

and Timetable for Security Lead Transition 

June 20, 2012 

Today the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee convenes 

the first of a series of hearings related to the Afghan National Security Forces. 

At this hearing, we will receive testimony from the Department 

of Defense about the resources and strategy related to training the 

ANSF and the timetable for transitioning security lead responsibility from U.S. and NATO forces to the ANSF. 

The Department of Defense is represented today by: 

• Mr. David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia; and 

• Major General Stephen Townsend, Director of the Pakistan/ 

Afghanistan Coordination Cell. 

Thank you for your participation. 

We look forward to your testimony on plans for training and 

equipping the ANSF, and details about the projected size and related rationale of the ANSF in the near and long term. 

I have just returned from leading a congressional trip to Afghanistan. During my visit, I traveled to several provinces and met with 

local leaders, including the chiefs of police. I also had the opportunity to talk to military commanders, who provided their impressions of the level of support that will be needed to create a selfsustaining ANSF. It is my hope that our witnesses today can provide further context on these important issues. 
30 

** EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY ** 

STATEMENT OF 

DAVID S. SEDNEY 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA 

BEFORE THE 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON A&'\fED SERVICES 

SUBCOMMITEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

.JUNE 20, 2012 
31 

Mr. Chainnan, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to update you on 

the Afghan National Security Forces and Transition. 

The United States' fundamental objectives, strategy, and campaign plan in Afghanistan have not 

changed. Our goal remains to deny safe havens to al-Qaida and to deny the Taliban the ability to 

overthrow the Afghan government. Thanks to the more than ten years of dedication and sacrifice 

of our forces, our Coalition partners, and the Afghan people themselves, we have taken 

enonnous strides towards achieving those objectives, particularly over the last three years. 

To that end, U.S., Afghan, and Coalition forces continue to work to drive-down the Taliban-Ied 

insurgency in their strongholds and to build-up the capacity of the Afghan National Security 

Forces and the Afghan Government. Our efforts remain on track to enable the Afghans 

themselves to assume the lead for security nationwide by the end of2014. As we continue to 

shift more areas to Afghan security lead, by the end of this September, the final 23,000 American 

"surge" troops will return home. The American and Coalition forces that remain on the ground 

will facilitate the continued transition of the security lead to tbe Afghan National Anny (ANA) 

and Afghan National Police (ANP) in accordance with General Allen's campaign plan. 

The key to this recent success and for a successful Transition is the increasing capability and 

confidence of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The ANA and ANP are both on 

schedule to meet their goal by or before October. Additionally, the ANSF now participate in 

over 90 percent of all operations in Afghanistan and are in the lead for over 40 percent of these 

missions, and this rate is growing. As General Allen statcd to Congress in March, the ANSF are 

"better than we thought they were to be. Importantly, thcy're better than they thought they could 

be." 

This improved capacity has allowed the ANSF to assume more and more of the security lead in 

Afghanistan. With the first two tranches of Transition currently underway, 50 percent of the 

population lives in areas with ANSf' in the security lead. This number will climb to 75 percent 

when the recently announced Tranche Three begins transition this summer. Tranche Three 

contains a number of contested areas and this will test the capabilities of the ANSF. This 

2 
32 

fighting season will be the most significant challenge yet for the ANSF. However, the time to 

test them is now, when we have the forces in thcatcr to ensure their success. Currently, the 

insurgency retains the ability to conduct complcx attacks. The April 15 attacks in Kabul and thc 

recent attack on FOB Salerno were sophisticated and coordinated. However, these attacks were 

largely tactical and operational failures, and the response to the attacks in Kabul in particular 

highlighted the increasing competence of the ANSF. 

We have seen two major achievements that send a strong signal to the Afghan people, the 

Taliban and the region. First, the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) signed in May by 

Presidents Obama and Karzai shows that the United States and Afghanistan are committed to a 

mutually beneficial relationship beyond 2014. Second, the Chicago Summit was a great success 

and demonstrated the continued dedication of over 50 NATO and other partner nations to 

supporting security and stability in Afghanistan. ISAF's members reaffirmed their commitment 

to the Lisbon timeline to complete transition by the end of2014 and continue engagement in 

Afghanistan post-2014. As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen put it, "NATO and our ISAF 

partners will not leave the task undone. We will not let Afghanistan slip back into the hands of 

militants, which the vast majority of Afghans utterly reject. We will finish the job to help create 

a secure Afghanistan - for our shared security." 

Two additional U.S.-Afghan bilateral arrangements, the Detention and Speeial Operations 

Memoranda of Understanding (MOL's), preceded the SPA and were completed earlier this 

spring. These two MODs were critical to demonstrating U.S. commitment to Afghan 

sovereignty and the expanded capacity of the ANSF. 

While we have made progress, challenges still exist. Limited governance eapacity and 

corruption continue to plague Afghanistan and limit effective governance. Additionally, as 

stated by General Allen during his testimony to the Congress in March, the Taliban-led 

insurgency still operates from safe havens in Pakistan. Although we have had indisputable 

successes against al-Qaida, we continue to press the Pakistanis on the need to take greater action 

against the Taliban and affiliated groups. We will continue to work with our Allies and partners, 

3 
33 

and the Pakistani and Afghan governments to address these issues and to keep the Congress 

informed of our progress. 

As I close, I would like to thank the House Armed Service Committee and the Subcommittee for 

the opportunity to appear before you today and for your continued support for our men and 

women in uniform. I would also like to extend my gratitude for your support for the Afghan 

National Security Forces. Without your commitment to funding and rcsourcing the Afghan 

forces, we could not havc achieved the progress of the last three years. I look forward to your 

questions. 

4 
34 

Defense.gov Blography: DavidS. 5edney 

David S. Sedney 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and 

Central Asia 

David Samuel Sedney Is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia in the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. 

Mr. Sedney was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia from 

2007·2009. He served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.s. Embassy in 

Beijing from 2004~ 2007. Previously Mr. Sedney was Deputy Chief of 

Mission at the United States Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan from 2003~ 

2004, where he was Charge d'Affaires from August through November 

2003, 

Mr, Sedney was also Deputy Chief of Mission in Kabul in 2002, after the 

re·opening of the Embassy. Mr. Sedney was Director for Afghanistan at 

the National Security Council (2003), Senior Advisor in the State 

Department's Office of e-Diplomacy (2002), Senior Advisor to John 

Negroponte, United States Ambassador to the United Nations (2001-

2002), Deputy Director of the State Department's Office of Chinese and 

Mongolian Affairs (1999-2001), and Special Assistant to Stephen 

Sestanovich, Ambassador-at-Large and Special RepresentatIVe for the 

Newly Independent States (1997-1998). 

Eartier, Mr. Sedney served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the United States Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan (1995~1997), 

Political-Military Officer at the United States Embassy in Beijing, China (1991~1994) and Political Officer, Refugee Officer 

and Consular Officer at the United States Embassy in Bucharest, Romania (1985-1987). He was a Watch Officer at the 

State Department's Operations Center (1987~ 1988) and Duty Officer and Senior Duty Officer at the White House 

Situation Room (1988-1989). 

Before joining the State Department, Mr. Sedney spent five years as a house-husband in Bern, Switzerland; Baton 

Rouge, Louisiana; and WiHiamstown, Massachusetts, raising three daughters. Mr. Sedney also taught courses at North 

Adams State College and WHliams College. Earlier he worked for the United States Department of Labor's Wage and 

Hour Division after stints as a factory worker, truck driver and taxicab driver. 

Mr. Sedney is a graduate of Princeton University and Suffolk University School of Law. He attended Louisiana State 

University's School of law where he studied Law of the Sea and International Law. Mr. Sedney is a distinguished 

graduate of the National War College. He speaks Romanian, Mandarin Chinese and Azerbaijani. Mr. Sedney has 

received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service, the Department of State's Superior Honor 

Award six times, and Department of State's Meritorious Honor Award twice. 
35 

Not For Distribution Until Released By The Committee 

STATEMENT BY 

MAJOR GENERAL STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, U.S. ARMY 

DIRECTOR, PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN COORDINATION CELL 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND 

TIMETABLE FOR SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION 

20 JUNE 2012 
36 

Not For Distribution Until Released By The Committee 

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity today to discuss with you how the Afghan 

National Security Forces (ANSF) are doing. 

Our bottom line up front is that we are on track to achieve our strategic objectives 

of denying al Qaeda safe havens in Afghanistan and denying the Taliban the ability to 

overthrow the Afghan Government. A sustainable and sufficient ANSF and Transition 

are two linchpins of our strategy. The ANSF continue to grow and improve and remain 

on track to assume the lead for security by the end of 2014. 

Over the last few months we have seen several key indicators of progress that 

support our approach to security in Afghanistan. We signed agreements to transfer 

detention and night operations to Afghan lead. These were followed by signing a 

Strategic Partnership Agreement, announcement of the third tranche of areas to begin 

Transition and the NATO Summit in Chicago. These events are important steps in 

transitioning to Afghan security lead, supporting Afghan sovereignty, defeating the 

Taliban, and preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a terrorist safe haven. 

These accomplishments were possible because of increased ANSF capacity. 

Through steady growth in fielded forces and improved operational capabilities, the 

ANSF are assuming a greater role in providing security throughout Afghanistan. 

ISAF remains focused on building a capable AN SF that can defend Afghanistan 

and become the defeat mechanism of the insurgency. ANSF continue to meet or 

exceed this year's recruiting objectives. For example, the Afghan National Army (ANA) 

is expected to meet their 2012 manning goal of 195,000 personnel by the end of this 

summer. The Afghan National Police (ANP) will reach their 2012 manning goal of 

157,000 personnel before October 2012. As the AN SF meet their manning goal of 

352,000, recruiters can become more selective to improve the quality of the force. 

The ANSF continue to face challenges such as literacy, attrition, and filling 

noncommissioned officer (NCO) ranks. The NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan 

(NTM-A), Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD), Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOl) provide 

literacy programs at training facilities and to the fielded force. Approximately 90,000 

ANSF are in literacy classes on any day across Afghanistan. These programs are 

making the ANSF one of the most literate elements of Afghan society. 

To be sure, challenges remain. Attrition continues to be an issue for the MOD 

and MOL Although attrition will not keep the ANSF from meeting their manning goals, it 

continues to hamper long-term development. The security ministries continue to 
37 

Not For Distribution Until Released By The Committee 

implement policies to combat attrition. The MOD directed significant changes to their 

policy to add timelines to drop AWOL personnel from unit rosters. This updated policy 

is expected to reduce the impact of AWOL personnel within the force. 

NCO shortages continue to effect the development of the force. The ANA and 

ANP have developed plans to address NCO shortfalls. Both services are training, and 

promoting personnel from within their ranks to fill these critical leadership positions. 

The ANSF are taking the lead in training their forces and implementing instructor 

cadre development programs. These Afghan instructors are capable of providing basic 

and advanced skills training at Afghan regional training centers and branch schools. 

ANSF instructors will continue to assume more of the lead for training throughout 2013. 

Operationally the AN SF is making steady progress. ISAF Joint Command (IJC) 

currently rates 67% of all ANA units and 62% of all ANP units in the top two operational 

effectiveness categories of effective with advisors or independent with advisors. The 

number of AN SF and ISAF partnered operations increased from 116 in January 2012 to 

126 in April 2012. The percentage of Afghan-led partnered operations increased from 

33% in January 2012 to 59% in April. In some regions of the country Afghan forces 

conduct independent operations at a higher rate than their partnered operations. This 

increase in operational capacity continues at a steady pace. 

The ANA's special operations capacity continues to grow and increase 

operational proficiency. The ANA is fielding special operations forces (SOF) across 

Afghanistan to support operations against insurgent and terrorist networks that threaten 

the transition process. These elements train and partner with ISAF SOF units. In the 

past three months, ANA SOF led or independently conducted operations increased from 

44% in January 2012 to 54% in April 2012. 

At the local and district level, Afghans are improving security with Village Stability 

Operations and Afghan Local Police initiatives. VSO and ALP programs are challenging 

the insurgency at the local level and facilitating village to national level governance. 

All of these improvements in Afghan capacity are maintaining pressure on the 

insurgency as we recover our surge forces by the end of summer 2012. As we plan for 

a responsible draw down of our forces in Afghanistan the AN SF will face challenges on 

the battlefield but they will not face these challenges alone. To support the AN SF 

during transition ISAF is shifting to a Security Force Assistance (SFA) model that puts 

Afghans in a lead combat role with ISAF assuming a train, advise, and assist posture. 

During the transition period, ISAF will continue to fight alongside the AN SF when 

needed but will shift into a support role as Afghans step forward. 
38 

Not For Distribution Until Released By The Committee 

The ANSF's operational challenges include logistics, Army-Police interoperability 

and confidence among others. Logistics systems in ANA and ANP are under 

development. NTM-A continues to generate logistics capacity to support the ANSF and 

ANP in the field. The ANSF logistics system is improving as ANA Corps and ANP 

regional systems come on line in support of the fielded force. 

Interoperability between the ANA and ANP remains an issue to improving overall 

AN SF effectiveness. Some of this is "cultural friction" that will reduce over time as these 

forces operate and fight together. Operational Coordination Centers at the regional and 

provincial levels are one way to help improve interoperability between AN SF and better 

coordinate their efforts. 

In my own opinion, the ANSF's greatest challenge is one of confidence. Our 

agreement to stand with them beyond 2014 has been a tremendous boost to their 

confidence. As the ANSF continue to move to the fore, their confidence will increase. 

The will of the force will further increase as leadership and capability improve across the 

formation. Once the ANSF realizes their potential they will become a force capable of 

securing Afghanistan. 

In conclusion, we assess that security transition is on track to have the ANSF 

assume full responsibility for security across all of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. We 

remain committed to building a suitable and sustainable AN SF capable of defending 

Afghanistan from internal threats. As noted in the Chicago Summit declaration, "we 

have taken important steps on the road to a stable and secure Afghanistan and to the 

goal of preventing Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that 

threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world." 

Thank you for the work you do on behalf of our servicemen and women, as well as 

your concerted efforts to ensure their protection and safety as they complete their 

mission in Afghanistan. I stand ready to answer your questions. 
39 

United States Anny 

Major General Stephen 1. Townsend 

Director 

Pakistan/Afghanist.n Coordination Cell 

Joint Staff 

3000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Room BD945A 

W.shington, DC 20318-3000 

Since: .lui 2011 

SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE ROTC 

EDUCAllONAI, DEGREES 

NOIth Georgia College - BS - Psychology 

United States Anny Command and General StaffColJege - MMAS - Militmy Science 

United States A,my War College - MA - Strategy 

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED 

InfantlY Officer Basic and Advanced Courses 

United States Anny Command and General Staff College 

Anncd Forces Staff College 

United States Anny War College 

FOREIGN LANGUAGES None recorded 

PROMOTIONS 

2LT 

lLT 

CPT 

MAl 

LTC 

COL 

BO 

MG 

FROM TO 

Jul 11 Present 

May II Jul II 

Jun 10 May 11 

Jlll1 09 .Ttm 10 

Nov 08 .T1ll1 09 

Feb 08 Nov OS 

Dec 04 Nov 07 

Aug 04 Nov 04 

.T1ll1 03 .TuI 04 

Jul 02 Jun 03 

llll1 00 .Tun 02 

Jul 99 .T1ll1 00 

page J 00 

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 

26 May 82 

26 Nov 83 

1 Feb 86 

1 Apr 94 

1 Feb 99 

1 May 04 

J 1 .Tun 09 

15 May 12 

ASSIGNMENT 

Director, Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination Cell, Joint Sta1{ 'Washington, DC 

Deputy Commanding General (Operations). 101 st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Fort Campbell, 

Kentucky 

Deputy Commanding General (Operations), I Olst Airborne Division (Air Assault)/Combined Joint Task 

Foree-IOI, OPERATION ENDURING I'REEDOM. Afghanistan 

Deputy Commanding General (Operations). 10Ist Airbol11e Division (Air Assault), FDit Campbell, 

Kentucky 

Senior Commander. Fort Campbell, Fort Campbell, Kentucky 

Executive Officer to the Commander, United States Central Commmld, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 

Commander, 3d Brigade (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), 2d Infantry Division, FOIt Lewis, Washington 

to include duty as Commander. Multi-National Division-Baghdad StJike Force and Multi-National CorpsJraq Operational Reserve. OPERA TlON IRAQI FREEDOM. Jraq 

Special Assistant to the Commanding General, I Corps, FOlt Lewis. Washington 

Assistant Chief of Staff; G-3 (Operations), 10th Mountain Division (Light), FDit Drum, New York to 

include duty as Director of Operation, CIJ-3, Combined Joint Task Force - 180, OPERA TlON 

ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan 

Student, United States Almy War College, Cm'lisle Bamtcks. Pennsylvania 

Commander, 4th Battalion. 31st Infantly, 10th Mountain Division (Light). FDit Drum, New York and 

OPERA TlON ANACONDA, Afghanistao 

S-3 (Operations), 2d Bligade, 78th Division Brigade (Training Support), Fort Drum, New York 
40 

MG Stephen J, Townsend 

Dec 96 .!un 99 Strategy and Policy Ollicer, J-5, later Special Assistant to the Commander-n- Chid; United States Pacitic 

Command, Camp H, M, Smith, Hawaii 

Jul 94 Dec 96 Senior Liaison Ollicer, later S-3 (Operations), 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia 

and OPERA nON UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Haiti 

Aug 93 Jun 

Jun 90 JUIl 

94 

93 

Student, United States Army Command and General StatrColiege, FOit LeavenwOIth, Kansas 

Commander, C Company, 3d Banalion, later Assistant S-3 (Operations), 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort 

Benning, Georgia 

Dec 88 

Jtn 86 

Jun 90 

Dec 88 

S-3 (Air), 75th Ranger Regiment, Folt Benning, Georgia and OPERATION lUST CAUSE, Panama 

S-3 (Operations), Headquarters and Headquarters Company, later Commander, A Company, 4th 

Battalion, 21st Inlan!ry, 7th InlantlY Division (Light), Folt Ord, Calitomia 

Jan 86 

Nov 84 

Jun 86 

Dec 85 

Student. Inlantry Ollieer Advanced Course, United States Anny Intillltry School, Folt Benning, Georgia 

Assistant S-3 (Operations and Training), later Executive Ollicer. Combat Support Company, 2d 

Battalion, 505th InfantlY, 82d Airbome Division, FOlt Bragg, NOlth Carolina 

Dec 82 Nov 84 Rille Platoon Leader, A Company, 2d Battalion (Airbome), later Platoon Leader, E Company, 505th 

InfantlY, 82d Airbome Division, FOlt Bragg, Nonh Carolina and OPERA nON URGENT FURY, 

Grenada 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

Director, Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination Cell. loin! Statl: 

Washington, DC 

Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 10Ist Airbome Division (Air 

Assault)/Combined loint Task Foree-IOI, OPERA nON ENDURING 

FREEDOM, Afghanistan 

Executive OHicer to the Commander, United States Central Command, 

MaeDill Air Force Base, Florida 

Commander, 3d Brigade (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), 2d InfantlY 

Division, Fort Lewis. Washington to include duty &'i Commander, Multi~ 

National Division-Baghdad Strike Force and Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

Operational Reserve, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq 

Director of Operation, C/J-3, Combined Joint Task Force - 180, 

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan 

Strategy and Policy Officer, 1-5, later Special Assistanl to the 

Commander-n- Chief, United States Pacific Command, Camp H, M, 

Smith, Hawaii 

SUMMARY OF OPERA nONS ASSIGNMENTS 

Deputy Commanding General (Operations), IOIst Airbome Division (Air 

As.sault)/Combined Joint Task Force-I 01, OPERATION ENDURING 

FREEDOM, Afghanistan 

Commander. 3d Brigade (Stlyker Brigade Combat Team), 2d IntilOtl)' 

Division, Fort Lewis) \Vashington to include duty as Commander, Multi~ 

NationaJ Division-Baghdad Strike Force and Mu!ti~National Corps-Iraq 

Operational Reserve, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq 

Assistant ChiefofStatl: G-3 (Operations), lOth Mountain Division 

(Light), FOlt Drum, New York to include duty as Director of Operation, 

C/l-3, Combined loint Task Force - 180, OPERA TION ENDURING 

FREEDOM, Afghanistan 

Commander, 4th Battalion, 31st InfantlY, 10th Mountain Division (Light), 

FOlt Drum, New York and OPERATION ANACONDA, Atghanistan 

Senior Liaison Ottieer, later S-3 (Operations), 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger 

Regiment, Folt Benning, Georgia and OPERA TJON UPI IOLD 

DEMOCRACY, Haiti 

S-3 (Air), 75th Ranger Regiment, Folt Benning, Georgia and 

OPERATION JUST CAUSE, Panama 

Rille Platoon Leader, A Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), later Platoon 

Leader. E Company, 505th Infantry, 82d Airbome Division, Folt Bmgg, 

North Carolina and OPERATION URGENT FURY, Grenada 

page 2 01'3 

DATF 

Jul 11-Present 

Jun IO-May II 

Feb 08-~ov 08 

lun 06-Sep 07 

Jun 03-Jul 04 

Dec 96-lun 99 

DATE 

Jun IO-May 11 

Dec 04-Nov 07 

lun 03-1ul 04 

lun OO-lun 02 

lui 94-Dec 96 

Dee 89-Jan 90 

Dec 82-Nov 84 

GRADE 

Bligadier General 

Brigadier General 

Colonel 

Colonel 

ljeutenant 

Colonel/Colonel 

Lieutenant Colonel 

GRADE 

Brigadier General 

Colonel 

l.ieutcnant 

ColoncilC olone! 

Lieutenant Colonel 

Major 

Captain 

Second LieutenantlFirst 

Lieutenant 
41 

MG Stephen J. Townsend 

US DECORA TraNS AND BADGES 

Defense Superior Service Medal 

Legion of Merit 

Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device 

Bronze Star Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Defense MeritOJious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Almy Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Joint Service Achievement Medal 

Almy Achievement Medal (with 4 Oak LeafClllsters) 

Combat Infantryman Badge (with Star) 

Combat Action Badge 

Expelt Infantryman Badge 

Mastcr Parachutist Badge 

Air Assault Badge 

Ranger Tab 

page 3 of3 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JUNE 20, 2012 

(45) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS 

Mr. SEDNEY. See attached ANA and ANP Charts from April 1230 Report, pgs. 20 

& 30, with attrition levels through March 2012. [See page 10.] 
46 

ANA Attrition Rates, December 2011 through May 2012 

Dec 2011 Jan 2012 Feb 2012 Mar 2012 Apr 2012 May 2012 

2.3% 1.9% 1.8% 1.2% 1.6% 2.3% 

ANP Attrition Rates, December 2011 through May 2012 

Dec 2011 Jan 2012 Feb 2012 Mar 2012 Apr 2012 May 2012 

1.4% 1.0% 1.1% 0.6% 1.3% 1.0% 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

General TOWNSEND. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] [See page 12.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 20, 2012 

(49) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. How was the 2014 transition deadline initially determined? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The security Transition process was jointly conceived and developed 

by the Afghan Government, the U.S. Government, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) nations 

at a variety of international fora, beginning with the London Conference in January 

2010 and culminating with the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010. Over 

this period, the Inteqal (‘‘Transition’’) Framework, which governs the Afghan-led 

transition process, was developed based on mutually agreed criteria for phased transition to Afghan security lead by the end of 2014. Following this joint Afghan and 

NATO/ISAF assessment, the ISAF contributing nations gathered in Lisbon and confirmed their commitment to this framework, signing a declaration with the Afghan 

government to transfer primary security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan 

government by the end of 2014. 

Mr. WITTMAN. On what assumptions about the security environment and ANSF 

size and capability was the 2014 decision based? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The Inteqal (‘‘Transition’’) Framework, which governs the Afghan-led 

transition process, was developed based on mutually agreed criteria for phased transition to Afghan security lead by the end of 2014. ISAF contributing nations gathered in Lisbon in 2010 and confirmed their commitment to this strategy and 

timeline, signing a declaration with the Afghan government to transfer primary security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan government by the end of 2014. 

In 2011, the Department of Defense conducted a comprehensive analysis to examine options for the development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and 

identified the minimum level of capabilities needed to establish and preserve security in Afghanistan sufficient to support our core national security goals, and to 

yield an ANSF structure that is sustainable within the limits of Afghan human capital, economic capacity, and the International Community’s willingness to provide 

long-term assistance. 

The current planned ANSF force of 352,000 is considered necessary to complete 

the Transition to Afghan lead security responsibility by the end of 2014, and to secure the country during the transition of power following the Afghan Presidential 

election in 2014, while mitigating the effects of the U.S. and coalition drawdowns. 

In April 2012, Secretary Panetta and the Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior 

committed to conducting six-month reviews of the ANSF force structure to determine future needs based on the evolving security environment. 

Mr. WITTMAN. What is the evidence that security situation in Afghanistan will be 

sufficiently improved by 2017 to allow the ANSF to be reduced by 120,000 troops? 

Mr. SEDNEY. An improving security environment would allow for a carefully 

planned, conditions-based reduction to an enduring force by 2017; however, no plans 

have been finalized at this time. Plans to reshape the Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) into a more sustainable force and to refocus toward enduring security roles are still in development and pre-decisional. In April 2012, Secretary Panetta and the Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior committed to conducting 

six-month reviews of the ANSF force structure to determine future needs based on 

the evolving security environment. 

Mr. WITTMAN. If conditions on the ground in Afghanistan do not improve as expected what will be the mechanism for revising the current sizing strategy? 

Mr. SEDNEY. General Allen, Commander of the International Security Assistance 

Forces (ISAF), committed to working with the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to conduct six month reviews of the operational conditions and the 

capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in order to adapt the plan 

for the final size and structure of the ANSF as conditions require. The first of these 

reviews will occur following this summer fighting season once ISAF has had a 

chance to observe the ANSF as it increasingly takes the lead and its capabilities 

are tested. 

Mr. WITTMAN. What factors will determine the size of ANSF after the U.S. and 

NATO transition primary security responsibility to the ANSF? 
50 

Mr. SEDNEY. The residual type and intensity of the threat in a post-2014 environment, and the capabilities exhibited by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 

in the field, are among the most important factors in determining the size of the 

ANSF after the transition. In addition to operational considerations, follow-through 

on international pledges made at the Chicago Conference to help sustain the ANSF 

through 2017 will influence end strength. Accordingly, Afghan government’s ability 

to sustain the ANSF using approaches and cost factors that are appropriate in an 

Afghan context will also affect the long-term size of the Afghan force. 

Mr. WITTMAN. What plans are being developed to manage the reduction in the 

ANSF from 352,000 to 230,000? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Plans for a managed force reduction of the Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) are still in development and pre-decisional at this time. The Department of Defense is fully aware of the challenges associated with managing a responsible reduction, and is examining multiple contingencies and policy options. This includes examining lessons learned from previous force reductions and demobilizations that will help inform future plans. 

Mr. WITTMAN. When will the ANSF be fully trained? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is on track to meet its 

goal of recruiting a force of approximately 352,000 by October 1, 2012. Those recruits will enter training as slots are available. The Afghan National Army (ANA) 

is scheduled to achieve its surge-level end-strength of 187,000 soldiers inducted by 

December 2012, and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2013. The Afghan National Police (ANP) is expected to reach its surge-level 

end-strength of 157,000 personnel inducted by February 2013, and to have these 

personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2013. The Afghan Air Force 

(AAF) is expected to reach its goal of 8,000 airmen inducted in December 2014, and 

to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2017; although 

we are currently examining methods to accelerate this process. 

Mr. WITTMAN. When will the full-strength ANSF be fielded? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police are expected to have their full surge-level end strength trained, equipped, and fielded by 

December 2013. The Afghan Air Force are expected to have their full surge-level 

end strength trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2017; although we are currently examining methods to accelerate this process. 

Mr. WITTMAN. If security conditions do not improve sufficiently by December 

2014, will all U.S. combat forces be withdrawn nonetheless by that date? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The transition strategy and framework, established at the 2010 

NATO Lisbon Summit and reaffirmed at the 2012 NATO Chicago Summit, is on 

track to transition full security responsibility to the Afghan Government and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by December 2014. As provided for in the 

Strategic Partnership Agreement, an enduring presence will remain in Afghanistan 

to ensure that our hard fought gains are consolidated and sustained by providing 

continuing support for the ANSF and for counterterrorism operations. 

Mr. WITTMAN. What conditions will the United States consider when determining 

the extent of further U.S. troop drawdowns? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The campaign plan calls for several conditions to be met before completion of the transition in Afghanistan. The ability of the Afghanistan National Security Forces to provide suitable and sustainable security for a given area will be 

one of the key factors in determining U.S. and coalition forces presence. Other factors involve the ability of the provincial government to provide adequate services to 

the Afghan people, including access to basic social services, rule of law, and the capability for economic growth. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Who will decide the scope and pace of U.S. withdrawals? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The Department of Defense is currently working with commanders 

in the field to determine the scope and pace of additional force reductions after October 2012. Plans for further reductions are still in development and pre-decisional 

at this time. Following the summer fighting season and the full recovery of U.S. 

surge forces by the end of September 2012, General Allen will conduct an assessment to determine force levels for 2013. This assessment will take into account the 

aftermath of the fighting season and the progress of the Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) and evaluate what combination of forces will be needed to handle 

the operating environment in 2013. This assessment will then be pushed up the 

chain of command for review. The safety of U.S. forces and the success of the mission are the primary concerns in our planning efforts. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Will a continued, steady drawdown of U.S. troops increase the risk 

of successfully transitioning security to the ANSF by the 2014 deadline? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The scope and pace of additional U.S. force reductions after October 

2012 are still being determined. Future reductions will be tied to the conditions on 
51 

the ground and the ability of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) to 

provide security as they assume the lead. The performance of the ANSF over this 

summer fighting season, as we drawdown to the pre-surge level of 68,000 and as 

the Afghans increasingly take the lead in contested areas, will provide a good baseline assessment for how the ANSF can handle U.S. force reductions in the future. 

Additionally, as the ANSF increase in capability and take the lead in conducting 

operations, the International Security Forces Assistance (ISAF) will transition to the 

Security Force Assistance (SFA) model. This represents a shift in focus from conducting counterinsurgency operations to providing partnering and advising assets 

necessary to develop and support ANSF operational effectiveness. Finally, in accordance with the Strategic Partnership Agreement, we will continue to provide support 

after 2014 to the Afghan Government and the ANSF to ensure a sustainable transition of security responsibilities 

Mr. WITTMAN. What size U.S. military presence will be needed in Afghanistan to 

achieve the U.S. goals of conducting counterterrorism operations and training and 

advising the ANSF? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The United States, along with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, will maintain an enduring presence to support the continued 

training and development of the Afghan National Security Forces and to engage in 

counterterrorism efforts aimed at combating al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Future U.S. 

force level requirements will be determined based on what assets are needed to support those activities and missions, and will be guided by the need to ensure that 

Afghanistan has the ability to secure itself against internal and external threats. 

Towards that end, an Afghanistan-United States Bilateral Commission was established under the Strategic Partnership Agreement to promote cooperation and monitor progress. A U.S.-Afghanistan Working Group on Defense and Security will conduct regular assessments of the threat level in Afghanistan as well as the Afghan 

government’s security and defense requirements. Recommendations will be made to 

the Bilateral Commission that should establish mutually determined levels of support and assistance. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ 

Mr. CRITZ. How willing is the Afghan government to accept the transition? 

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CRITZ. How confident are we that the Afghan government is aligned with U.S. 

interests? How do we make sure our interests are aligned? 

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CRITZ. Is there any evidence that old members of Northern Alliance are rearming for possible civil war after transition, as suggested by CRS? 

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CRITZ. Could you please identify any provinces or locations where you are concerned local militia may cause problems for the national Afghan government? 

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CRITZ. How have the most recent Parliamentary elections (2010) impacted the 

opinion of Afghans on the legitimacy of the government and its ability to provide 

security? 

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CRITZ. What is your opinion about governing capacity at local levels? 

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CRITZ. How willing is the Afghan government to accept the transition? 

General TOWNSEND. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CRITZ. How confident are we that the Afghan government is aligned with U.S. 

interests? How do we make sure our interests are aligned? 

General TOWNSEND. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CRITZ. Is there any evidence that old members of Northern Alliance are rearming for possible civil war after transition, as suggested by CRS? 

General TOWNSEND. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CRITZ. Could you please identify any provinces or locations where you are concerned local militia may cause problems for the national Afghan government? 

General TOWNSEND. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CRITZ. How have the most recent Parliamentary elections (2010) impacted the 

opinion of Afghans on the legitimacy of the government and its ability to provide 

security? 

General TOWNSEND. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CRITZ. What is your opinion about governing capacity at local levels? 

General TOWNSEND. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 
52 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. Breakdown of $4.1b spending. Does it include train and equip, SFA 

(Security Assistance Force) or only direct costs to train, equip, and pay for salaries 

and operations of the ANSF? 

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. COOPER. Describe the Security Force Assistance (SFA) model: numbers, ROE, 

etc. Where are we with the planning for this? 

Mr. SEDNEY. ISAF Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities are the cornerstone 

of developing ANSF capacity in support of Transition. Advisor Teams are instrumental in advising and assisting the fielded ANSF as they assume the lead for security through the Transition process. With Afghan leadership and our continued support, the ANSF will become an institution of national unity, the ultimate mechanism for defeating the insurgency and the long-term guardian of Afghan peace, stability, and prosperity well after 2014. This model operationalizes the shift from 

ISAF’s role in combat operations and partnering with ANSF units to a mission focused primarily on training, advising, and assistance. 

The exact details for SFA are classified by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers—Europe (SHAPE). The Department of Defense can provide a classified briefing 

describing the numbers, locations, and composition of SFA Advisor Teams. 

The planning for training and deploying Advisor Teams remains on schedule. This 

model is not entirely new. It builds upon the experience and lessons learned from 

previous mentor teams. To codify these lessons, SHAPE published a detailed concept 

of operations in March 2012. The first U.S. Advisor Teams deployed in January 

2012 in advance of the concept of operations. Successive U.S. Army and Marine Advisor Teams have been deploying throughout 2012. The second phase of Advisor 

Teams, with U.S. and international contributions, will arrive in the fall of 2012. 

Recognizing the challenges in shifting to a new model while still engaged in combat 

operations, SHAPE and the U.S. are engaging partner nations to continue to support the SFA model through 2014. This effort will ensure achieving the Lisbon Transition milestone, though some requirements will end as ANSF units demonstrate 

the capacity for independent operations and geographic areas successfully exit from 

Transition. 

Mr. COOPER. How many Taliban are we fighting? How many of these are ‘‘hard 

core’’ ideologically committed fighters and how many are part-time, local fighters? 

How are these numbers derived? What are the metrics we use to determine if someone is a Taliban fighter? 

Mr. SEDNEY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. COOPER. Explain in more detail why the poppy crop is down? How much is 

due to environmental factors (drought, blight, etc.) and how much due to ISAF or 

GIROA efforts? Can this lower level of production be sustained once U.S. forces 

withdraw? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The primary causes for the lower poppy crop yield are environmental 

factors, including bad weather and poor soil conditions. It is uncertain whether 

blight can be attributed as a factor in the lower crop yield. The poor soil is, in part, 

a result of the success of the Afghan government-led Helmand Food Zone program, 

which increased food production and reduced poppy cultivation in food zone areas 

with higher soil quality. This pushed poppy farmers away from the province’s fertile 

land to a more austere desert environment. The weather this year has been particularly unfavorable to poppy crops with colder temperatures and more precipitation 

than in past years. 

U.S. forces in Afghanistan do not directly support poppy eradication efforts other 

than to provide in extremis support to eradication teams under attack, consistent 

with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) policy. The U.S. Department of State supports the Afghan Government’s ‘‘Governor Led Eradication’’ program. Although final verified results are not 

available for the Governor Led Eradication program at this time, the program is on 

track to more than double last year’s result of 3,810 hectares of poppy eradicated. 

Eradication efforts must be carefully planned to inflict the most damage on major 

drug producer’s poppy crop and be focused in areas where farmers have access to 

alternatives to poppy cultivation. This requires a whole-of-government approach led 

by the Afghan Government with enabling support from the U.S. Government. 

Sustained lower level production will depend, in part, on continued U.S. assistance to Afghanistan after 2014. Department of Defense is working presently on a 

post-2014 CN strategy for Afghanistan. 
53 

Mr. COOPER. How do we deal with the Pakistan safe havens? Is Pakistan currently taking actions to eliminate safe havens for the Haqqani Network, the Quetta 

Shura Taliban, or HiG? Do we expect such actions in the future? Why or why not? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Militant and terrorist networks continue to exploit Pakistan-based 

sanctuaries. At the same time, there appears to be a growing recognition on the part 

of many Pakistani leaders that a secure and stable Afghanistan is vital for Pakistan’s future. We look forward to Pakistan taking action towards achieving this 

goal. These sanctuaries remain a strategic threat to the campaign in Afghanistan. 

A capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), along with the support of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) training, advice, assistance, layered defense, and enablers, is the best mechanism to mitigate the effects of these sanctuaries in Afghanistan. 

Nevertheless, the threat must also be mitigated within Pakistan, a security interest that Pakistan shares. Pakistan has suffered enormous casualties as a result of 

transnational terrorist networks and from acts of terrorism that often emanate from 

sanctuaries inside Pakistan. This includes more than 11,000 military personnel 

killed or wounded in action and more than 30,000 civilian causalities since September 11, 2001. Security assistance is a key tool designed to advance U.S. interests 

by helping Pakistan’s efforts in this fight against the militants that enable safe havens, and the Coalition Support Fund authority is used to reimburse Pakistani efforts in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Nevertheless, where Pakistan’s action to combat sanctuaries falls short, the U.S. 

Government will continue to engage Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders and 

urge them to take action to dismantle these sanctuaries. This includes holding Pakistan to its commitments to pressure the Haqqani Network and to encourage all 

Taliban elements as well as other Afghan groups, including Hizb-e-Islami, to join 

a political settlement in Afghanistan. 

Mr. COOPER. How do we deal with Afghan government corruption? What are the 

impacts of corruption? What level of confidence should NATO members have that 

corruption will be controlled post-2014? Does corruption currently undermine the effectiveness of GIROA and the ANSF? Is governmental corruption linked at all to 

the Taliban’s ability to recruit new fighters? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The United States has implemented a number of initiatives both to 

support the Afghan government in its efforts to reduce corruption and organized 

crime, and also to ensure that U.S. contracting and development assistance are not 

subject to fraud and corruption. These initiatives include: sustained engagement, capacity-building, and technical assistance in key Afghan ministries; an expansion of 

interagency efforts to mature conduct thorough assessments of organized crime and 

corruption in key sectors as a basis for action; the creation of joint, Presidentiallysponsored forums to promote inter-ministerial coordination and develop concrete 

counter-corruption recommendations; and the development of investigative leads 

and other forms of support for vetted Afghan law enforcement, investigative, and 

oversight bodies. Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF)-Shafafiyat coordinates counter-corruption efforts within the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF). CJIATF-Shafafiyat fosters a common understanding of the corruption 

problem, plans and implements ISAF anti-corruption efforts, and integrates ISAF 

anti-corruption activities with those of key Afghan and international partners in an 

effort to address President Karzai’s goal of an ‘‘active and honest administration’’ 

in Afghanistan. 

Despite this sustained effort, corruption remains one of the biggest challenges facing Afghanistan. It undermines the effectiveness, cohesion, and legitimacy of the Afghan Government and alienates elements of the population. It deters investment, 

impedes licit economic growth, enables criminal networks to influence important 

State institutions and functions, and facilitates the narcotics trade and other 

transnational threats emerging from Afghanistan. Therefore, counter-corruption efforts are essential to strengthening critical Afghan institutions and consolidating 

gains in the wake of improved security as the process of transition continues. 

A series of recent Afghan government commitments towards anti-corruption and 

good governance has instilled confidence in the international community. Cooperating to strengthen Afghan institutions and governance is one of the basic tenets 

of the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement and a critical component underpinning the enduring partnership. At the Tokyo conference in early July, the 

international donor community and Afghanistan developed a framework for accountability, whereby money would be withheld if Afghanistan cannot meet benchmarks 

for improving governance and finance management, as well as for safeguarding the 

democratic process. Following this conference, President Karzai issued a 23-page decree ordering the Supreme Court to accelerate corruption investigations and requir-
54 

ing his ministries, prosecutors, and judiciary to institute a list of government reforms to address bribery, cronyism, and nepotism. 

Mr. COOPER. In your opinion, what will determine ANSF success? What factors 

could undermine ANSF capability and success in the future? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have made tremendous 

strides in their development as a force capable of providing security for Afghanistan. 

As of June, Afghan forces were in the lead for over 70% of total conventional operations across Afghanistan. Efforts to continue developing ANSF leadership, improving the overall quality of the force, and further expanding enabler capabilities, such 

as logistics, close air support, medical evacuation, and intelligence will affect the 

long-term success of the ANSF’s ability to provide security for the Afghan people. 

Factors that will challenge the ANSF’s success in the future include limited resources to fully implement current development plans, sourcing the right mix of Security Force Assistance Teams to mentor and advise ANSF units, developing an 

ANSF enabler capability, and improving ANSF retention and attrition rates to sustain overall force quality. 

Mr. COOPER. Can the Afghan Local Police (ALP) be sustained when we leave? 

Who will fund and train? Does the Afghan Ministry of the Interior have the ability 

to effectively oversee and control the ALP sites and units in the absence of USSOF? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The Afghan Ministry of Interior will continue to administer the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program after the security transition is completed at the 

end of 2014. The ALP model is for it to become a program commanded and controlled by local Provincial and District Chiefs of Police (COP). It was established in 

2010 by an Afghan Presidential Decree. Pay, uniforms, and equipment are distributed through the Afghan National Police system. U.S. Special Operation Forces and 

Coalition Forces continue to develop capacity in the ALP and will continue to work 

with District COPs, and Provincial COPs to develop and maintain a sustainable program. These over-watch efforts are part of a long-term engagement plan to transition security to Afghan control. 

Mr. COOPER. As ALP is part of MOI, is ALP officially considered part of ANSF? 

If not, why is ALP funded through ANSF? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) are validated by and report to the 

Ministry of Interior. They are not part of the Afghan National Police tashkil and 

do not count toward the Afghan National Security Force approved level of 352,000 

personnel. However, as part of the Ministry of Interior, the ALP are funded through 

the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. 

Mr. COOPER. Explain the procedures by which we control ALP funding and make 

sure it won’t be misspent. 

Mr. SEDNEY. The Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC) oversees the 

management of all Afghanistan Security Force Funds (ASFF). ASFF provides support to the Ministry of Interior for the Afghan Local Police (ALP) for salaries, equipment, and recruiting. The funds are executed in accordance with standard procedures used for all U.S. financial support provided to the Afghan National Security 

Forces. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan oversees the obligation and execution of the ASFF. 

Mr. COOPER. General Allen has stated there are three key factors for successful 

transition in Afghanistan: 1) security, 2) governance, and 3) development. Do you 

agree? Are there any other factors that you believe are significant? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Yes, I agree with General Allen. Security, governance, and development are the three pillars of the Inteqal ‘‘Transition’’ Framework, which governs the 

transition process. Improvements in security conditions and the performance of the 

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been the keys to success thus far in 

the transition process, but good governance and development are necessary to ensure that those gains result in sustainable Afghan self-reliance. Although there are 

many factors influencing the success of Transition, regional security and cooperation 

from Pakistan and Iran is another critical factor. The insurgency’s safe haven in 

Pakistan remains one of the biggest threats to a durable and sustainable Afghanistan. Strengthening border coordination and cooperation between Afghanistan and 

its neighbors will be necessary for long-term success. 

Mr. COOPER. LTG Bolger stated that if the ANSF is reduced below 352,000 he believed many of those that leave ANSF will go into civilian positions with the Afghanistan government. Do you agree? Will there be any program to facilitate such 

placements? Do those personnel have skills that would be directly applicable to such 

positions? Can GIROA support such an increased number of personnel? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Plans for a managed force reduction of the Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) from 352,000 to 230,000, which would include contingency plans for 

the ‘‘reintegration’’ of demobilized personnel, are still in development. A common 

feature of reintegration programs during past demobilizations is job training and job 
55 

placement to ensure that reintegrees have the appropriate knowledge and skills to 

pursue alternate livelihoods. It is unknown at this time what the Afghan government’s civilian workforce requirements will be three to four years from now and 

whether they will be able to absorb any of these personnel. 

Mr. COOPER. Please explain the corrective actions and investigations taken re- garding the alleged loss of $42 million at the Dawood hospital. 

Mr. SEDNEY. Since 2010, the U.S. and Afghan governments have conducted a series of investigations, including several by the Department of Defense Inspector 

General for Special Plans and Operations (DOD IG–SPO), on the management, medical care services, and logistics capability and accountability at Dawood National 

Military Hospital. These investigations arose from concerns raised by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM–A) regarding the status of the medical logistics system within the Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) and the alleged mismanagement and corruption at Dawood Hospital. 

At the urging of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) leadership, the 

Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) replaced key leadership at both Dawood Hospital 

and the Medical Command, including the Afghan National Army (ANA) Surgeon 

General and Commander of Dawood Hospital, General Ahmed Zia Yaftali, in December 2010. New leadership was brought in to establish more stringent planning 

and oversight and to advance the professional conduct and accountability of the 

medical staff and administrators. 

Based on the findings and recommendations of DOD IG–SPO, NTM–A medical advisors and mentors have worked in close coordination with their Afghan counterparts to establish systems and processes that have significantly improved logistics 

and supply management and have introduced greater transparency and efficiency. 

These changes have improved accountability while also reducing theft, misappropriation, unauthorized use, and improper distribution. 

Numerous oversight mechanisms are now in place to ensure continued progress. 

The Logistics Training Advisory Group (LTAG) and Medical Training Advisory 

Group (MTAG) conduct continuous ‘‘Battle Field Circulations’’ to provide daily monitoring and to ensure compliance. The Logistics Validation Team provides quarterly 

assessments. DOD IG and the Afghan MOD continue to monitor the progress and 

provide frequent reviews. 

Additionally, an Afghan inter-ministerial investigative team with the High Office 

of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) is currently investigating the allegations of corruption and mismanagement at Dawood hospital. The HOOAC investigation is supported by sustained ISAF and interagency engagement and is overseen 

by a joint Afghan-international Special Cases Committee. 

Mr. COOPER. Please describe in detail the operational assessment process used to 

evaluate the ANSF. What data is collected? Who evaluates the data? What method 

of analysis is used to evaluate the data? Who makes the final decision as to a CUAT 

determination? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The CUAT, a method used to assess progress in the development of 

the ANSF, was developed in early 2010 by the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) with the 

first reported cycle (referred to as Cycle 1) being released in May 2010. It was implemented to inform Coalition commanders on progress of the ANSF in their area 

of operations and to provide input to the multiple reporting requirements of the 

ISAF headquarters. The CUAT was developed through interaction between the 

staffs of ISAF, IJC, and the Regional Commands (RCs) and was based on existing 

reporting constructs in place at the time. The CUAT was developed because assessment tools in place at the time were not providing sufficient detail on the development and progress of the ANSF. 

The CUAT is completed by the commander of the partnered Coalition unit or advisor team that has responsibility of an ANSF unit. Once completed by the 

partnered Coalition unit, the CUAT is reviewed by the partnered Coalitions unit’s 

chain of command and forwarded to IJC for review. IJC reviews the CUATs with 

the Regional Commands and compiles a summary table of the CUAT cycle results 

which are forwarded to ISAF headquarters for use in various reporting requirements. 

The primary purpose of the CUAT is to rate an ANSF unit’s effectiveness by assigning the unit a rating on a five-level scale (known as Ratings Definition Levels, 

or RDLs) based on the unit’s ability to operate independently. An RDL rating reflects an ANSF unit’s overall operational effectiveness; however, this overall rating 

is derived from a more detailed assessment of each unit. The overall score is based 

on nine capabilities-based functional areas: leadership, operations, intelligence, logistics, equipping, personnel, maintenance, communications, and training and education. Those functional assessments are based on quantitative data (personnel, 

equipment, and training) as well as qualitative assessments by the Coalition 
56 

partnered advisors on areas affecting the overall effectiveness of the unit. Leadership assessments (‘‘very positive,’’ ‘‘positive,’’ ‘‘neutral,’’ negative,’’ and ‘‘very negative’’) and partnering data are also incorporated into CUAT reports. 

While the CUAT in and of itself is an incomplete assessment, it has aided in 

meeting the requirement to track the ANSF’s growth and development towards a 

capable fighting force. ISAF and its subordinate commands are continuously scrutinizing both the CUAT and their overall approach to assessing the ANSF. 

Mr. COOPER. Breakdown of $4.1b spending. Does it include train and equip, SFA 

(Security Assistance Force) or only direct costs to train, equip, and pay for salaries 

and operations of the ANSF? 

General TOWNSEND. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. COOPER. Describe the Security Force Assistance (SFA) model: numbers, ROE, 

etc. Where are we with the planning for this? 

General TOWNSEND. Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the 

counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. The SFA model supports ISAF in assuming a supporting role in the campaign while enabling the ANSF to assume the 

lead security role across all of Afghanistan as part of the Lisbon-based security transition process. SFA teams vary in size based on operational requirements and are 

focused on executing train, advise, and assistance missions with ANSF counterparts 

(Army and Police). SFA teams operate under the standard ISAF Rules of Engagement (ROE) and retain the inherent right to self-defense. Planning is complete 

while deployment of teams and overall SFA footprint will adjust as units improve 

over time. 

Mr. COOPER. How many Taliban are we fighting? How many of these are ‘‘hard 

core’’ ideologically committed fighters and how many are part-time, local fighters? 

How are these numbers derived? What are the metrics we use to determine if someone is a Taliban fighter? 

General TOWNSEND. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. COOPER. Is the ANSF respected by Afghans? Is it respected by the Taliban? 

Are there differences in perceptions about the various elements of the ANSF? 

General TOWNSEND. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. COOPER. Explain in more detail why the poppy crop is down? How much is 

due to environmental factors (drought, blight, etc.) and how much due to ISAF or 

GIROA efforts? Can this lower level of production be sustained once U.S. forces 

withdraw? 

General TOWNSEND. The primary causes for the lower poppy crop yield are environmental factors such as bad weather and poor soil conditions. Blight cannot be 

attributed as a factor with any certainty. The poor soil is, in part, a result of the 

success of the GIROA-led Helmand Food Zone program which reduced poppy cultivation significantly in the food zone while pushing poppy farmers away from the 

province’s fertile land to a more austere desert environment. The weather this year 

has been particularly unfavorable to poppy crops with colder temperatures and more 

precipitation than in past years. 

U.S. forces in Afghanistan do not directly support poppy eradication efforts other 

than to provide in extremis support to eradication teams under attack, consistent 

with NATO/ISAF policy. The U.S. Department of State supports the Afghan Government’s ‘‘Governor Led Eradication’’ (GLE) program. While final, verified results are 

not available for the GLE at this time, the program is on track to more than double 

last year’s result of 3,810 hectares of poppy eradicated. I believe that the eradication 

effort must be carefully planned to inflict the most damage on major drug producer’s 

poppy crop and be focused in areas where farmers have access to alternatives to 

poppy cultivation. This requires a whole-of-government approach led by the Afghan 

Government with enabling support from the U.S. Government. 

Sustained lower level production will depend, in part, on continued U.S. assistance to GIROA after 2014. The Department of Defense (DOD) is working presently 

on a post-2014 CN strategy for Afghanistan; I look forward to providing a copy of 

this strategy in November 2012. 

Mr. COOPER. How do we deal with the Pakistan safe havens? Is Pakistan currently taking actions to eliminate safe havens for the Haqqani Network, the Quetta 

Shura Taliban, or HiG? Do we expect such actions in the future? Why or why not? 

General TOWNSEND. Militant and terrorist networks continue to exploit Pakistanbased sanctuaries. These sanctuaries remain a strategic threat to the campaign in 

Afghanistan. A capable ANSF, along with the support of ISAF training, advice, as-
57 

sistance, layered defense, and enablers, is the best mechanism to mitigate the effects of these sanctuaries in Afghanistan. 

Nevertheless, the threat must also be mitigated within Pakistan, which is an interest that, to a degree, Pakistan shares. Pakistan has suffered enormous casualties 

as a result of military operations against the networks that enable safe havens and 

from acts of terrorism that often emanate from the sanctuaries, including more than 

11,000 military personnel killed or wounded in action and more than 30,000 civilian 

causalities. Security assistance is a key tool designed to advance U.S. interests by 

helping Pakistan’s efforts in this fight against the militants that enable safe havens; 

Coalition Support Funds, meanwhile, reimburse Pakistani efforts in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Nevertheless, where Pakistan’s support falls short, we will continue to engage 

Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders to take action on its side of the border to 

dismantle these sanctuaries, to include holding Pakistan to its commitments to 

squeeze the Haqqani Network and encouraging all Taliban elements as well as 

other Afghan groups, including Hizb-e-Islami to join a political settlement in Afghanistan, as Pakistan’s previous Prime Minister publicly committed. 

Mr. COOPER. How do we deal with Afghan government corruption? What are the 

impacts of corruption? What level of confidence should NATO members have that 

corruption will be controlled post-2014? Does corruption currently undermine the effectiveness of GIROA and the ANSF? Is governmental corruption linked at all to 

the Taliban’s ability to recruit new fighters? 

General TOWNSEND. The United States has implemented a number of initiatives 

to support the Afghan Government in its efforts to reduce corruption and organized 

crime, while working to ensure the U.S. contracting and development assistance are 

not subject to fraud and corruption. These initiatives include sustained engagement, 

capacity-building, and technical assistance in key Afghan ministries, an expansion 

of interagency efforts to mature organized crime and corruption estimates in key 

sectors as a basis for action, the creation of joint, Presidentially-sponsored forums 

to promote inter-ministerial coordination and develop concrete counter-corruption 

recommendations, and the development of investigative leads and other forms of 

support for vetted Afghan law enforcement, investigative, and oversight bodies. 

CJIATF-Shafafiyat coordinates counter-corruption efforts within ISAF, fostering a 

common understanding of the corruption problem, planning and implementing ISAF 

anti-corruption efforts, and integrating ISAF anti-corruption activities with those of 

key Afghan and international partners, to address President Karzai’s goal of an ‘‘active and honest administration’’ in Afghanistan. 

Despite this sustained effort, corruption remains one of the biggest challenges in 

Afghanistan. It undermines the effectiveness, cohesion, and legitimacy of the Afghan 

Government and alienates elements of the population. It deters investment, impedes 

licit economic growth, enables criminal networks to influence important state institutions and functions, and facilitates the narcotics trade and other transnational 

threats emerging from Afghanistan. Counter-corruption efforts are therefore essential to strengthening critical Afghan institutions and consolidating gains in the 

wake of improved security as the process of transition continues. 

A series of recent commitments made by Afghanistan towards anti-corruption and 

good governance has instilled confidence in the international community. Strengthening Afghan institutions and governance was one of the basic tenets of the U.S.- 

Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement and a critical component underpinning our 

enduring partnership. At the Tokyo conference in early July, the international donor 

community reached agreement with Afghanistan on a framework for accountability, 

whereby money will be withheld if the country cannot meet benchmarks for improving governance and finance management, as well as safeguarding the democratic 

process. Following this conference, President Karzai issued a 23-page decree ordering the Supreme Court to accelerate investigations and his ministries, prosecutors, 

and judiciary to institute a list of government reforms battling bribery, cronyism, 

and nepotism. 

Mr. COOPER. In your opinion, what will determine ANSF success? What factors 

could undermine ANSF capability and success in the future? 

General TOWNSEND. The ANSF has made tremendous strides in their development as a force capable of providing security for Afghanistan. Continuing to develop 

ANSF leadership, improving the overall quality of the force, and further developing 

enabler capabilities, such as logistics, close air support, medevac, and intelligence 

will affect the long-term success of security transition and the ANSF’s ability to provide security for the Afghan people. 

Factors which will challenge the success of the ANSF in the future include limited 

resources to fully implement current development plans, sourcing the right mix of 

Security Force Assistance Teams to mentor/advise ANSF units, development of 
58 

ANSF enabler capability, and improving ANSF retention and attrition rates to sustain overall force quality. 

Mr. COOPER. Can the Afghan Local Police (ALP) be sustained when we leave? 

Who will fund and train? Does the Afghan Ministry of the Interior have the ability 

to effectively oversee and control the ALP sites and units in the absence of USSOF? 

General TOWNSEND. The Afghan Ministry of Interior will continue to administer 

the Afghan Local Police program after security transition is completed at the end 

of 2014. The Commander of ISAF has submitted a request through CENTCOM to 

SECDEF, requesting enduring ALP funding post-2014. ALP is an Afghan-owned 

program commanded and controlled by local Provincial and District Chiefs of Police 

(COP) that was established by a 2010 Afghan Presidential Decree. Pay, uniforms, 

and equipment are all distributed through the Afghan National Police system. U.S. 

Special Operation Forces and Coalition Forces continue to develop capacity in the 

ALP, District COPs, and Provincial COPs to maintain a sustainable program. These 

overwatch efforts are part of a long term engagement plan to transition security to 

Afghan control, ensuring that ALP will have effective oversight in the absence of 

daily coalition presence. 

Mr. COOPER. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the ALP? 

General TOWNSEND. The program’s primary strength lies in the local selection 

process of ALP members. They are handpicked by the local village elders to protect 

the villages they come from. This differs from the ANP and ANA model where the 

majority of soldiers and police officers come from different regions of Afghanistan 

to perform their duties. 

The ALP program has significant Afghan and coalition oversight through the Village Stability Operations initiative, and links together the local elders, GIRoA (for 

pay and weapons), and the Chiefs of Police. Additionally, the National Directorate 

of Security (NDS) performs background checks during in-processing adding another 

layer of quality control. The success of the program is dependent upon the leadership and when needed, tactical support by the District and Provincial Chiefs of Police. ALP works best in areas where police leaders understand and embrace the program as part of the fabric of Afghan National Security Force composition in rural 

areas. High casualty rates among ALP and local leaders at the sub-national level 

continue to be a challenge as well. 

Mr. COOPER. As ALP is part of MOI, is ALP officially considered part of ANSF? 

If not, why is ALP funded through ANSF? 

General TOWNSEND. The Afghan Local Police are validated by and report to the 

Ministry of Interior. They are not part of the Afghan National Police tashkil and 

do not count toward the approved Afghan National Security Force approved level 

of 352,000. However, they are a legitimate GIRoA security force and eligible for 

funding from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. 

Mr. COOPER. General Allen has stated there are three key factors for successful 

transition in Afghanistan: 1) security, 2) governance, and 3) development. Do you 

agree? Are there any other factors that you believe are significant? 

General TOWNSEND. Yes, I agree with General Allen. Security, governance, and 

development are the three pillars of the Inteqal ‘‘Transition’’ Framework, which governs the transition process, and are carefully evaluated and monitored to judge the 

readiness of an area for each successive stage of transition. Improvements in security conditions and the performance of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 

have been the keys to success so far in the transition process, but good governance 

and development will help ensure that those gains result in sustainable self-reliance. While there are many factors influencing the success of transition, another 

critical one is regional security and cooperation. The insurgency’s safe haven in 

Pakistan remains one of the biggest threats to a durable and sustainable Afghanistan. Strengthening border coordination and cooperation between Afghanistan and 

its neighbors will be necessary for any long term success. 

Mr. COOPER. LTG Bolger stated that if the ANSF is reduced below 352,000 he believed many of those that leave ANSF will go into civilian positions with the Afghanistan government. Do you agree? Will there be any program to facilitate such 

placements? Do those personnel have skills that would be directly applicable to such 

positions? Can GIROA support such an increased number of personnel? 

General TOWNSEND. Plans for the managed force reduction of the Afghan National 

Security Forces (ANSF) from 352,000 to 230,000, which includes contingency plans 

for the ‘‘reintegration’’ of demobilized personnel, are still in development. A common 

feature of reintegration programs during demobilizations in the past is job training 

and job placement to ensure that reintegrees have the appropriate knowledge and 

skills to pursue alternate livelihoods. It is unknown at this time what GIROA’s civilian workforce requirements will be 3–4 years from now and whether they will be 

able to absorb any of these personnel. However, any job training and placement re-
59 

integration program for demobilized ANSF will take into account these market demands. 

Mr. COOPER. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Taliban insurgency? 

General TOWNSEND. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. COOPER. Please explain the corrective actions and investigations taken regarding the alleged loss of $42 million at the Dawood hospital. 

General TOWNSEND. Since 2010, the governments of the United States and Afghanistan have conducted a series of investigations, including several by the Department of Defense Inspector General for Special Plans and Operations (DOD IG– 

SPO), on the management, medical care services, and logistics capability and accountability at Dawood National Military Hospital. These investigations arose from 

concerns raised by the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM–A) regarding the 

status of the medical logistics system within the Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF) and the alleged mismanagement and corruption at Dawood Hospital. 

At the urging of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) leadership, the 

Afghan Ministry of Defense moved to replace key leadership at both Dawood Hospital and the Medical Command, including the ANA Surgeon General and Commander of Dawood Hospital, General Ahmed Zia Yaftali, in December 2010. New 

leadership was brought in to establish more stringent planning and oversight to advance the professional conduct and accountability of the medical staff and administrators. 

Based on the findings and recommendations of DOD IG–SPO, NTM–A medical advisors and mentors have worked in close coordination with their Afghan counterparts to stand up systems and processes that have significantly improved logistics 

and supply management and have introduced greater transparency and efficiency. 

These changes have improved accountability while reducing theft, misappropriation, 

unauthorized use and improper distribution. 

Numerous oversight mechanisms are in place to ensure continued progress. The 

Logistics Training Advisory Group (LTAG) and Medical Training Advisory Group 

(MTAG) conduct continuous ‘‘Battle Field Circulations’’ to provide daily follow up 

and ensure compliance. The Logistics Validation Team provides quarterly assessments. DOD IG and the Afghan MOD continue to monitor the progress and provide 

frequent reviews. 

Additionally, the allegations of corruption and mismanagement at Dawood hospital are currently under criminal investigation by an Afghan inter-ministerial investigative team with the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC), 

supported by sustained ISAF and the interagency engagement and overseen by a 

joint Afghan-international Special Cases Committee. These investigations are still 

ongoing. 

Mr. COOPER. Please describe in detail the operational assessment process used to 

evaluate the ANSF. What data is collected? Who evaluates the data? What method 

of analysis is used to evaluate the data? Who makes the final decision as to a CUAT 

determination? 

General TOWNSEND. The CUAT, a method used to assess progress in the development of the ANSF, was developed in early 2010 by the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) 

with the first reported cycle (referred to as Cycle 1) being released in May 2010. 

It was implemented to inform Coalition commanders on progress of the ANSF in 

their area of operations and to provide input to the multiple reporting requirements 

of the ISAF headquarters. The CUAT was developed through interaction between 

the staffs of ISAF, IJC, and the Regional Commands (RCs) and was based on existing reporting constructs in place at the time. The CUAT was developed because assessment tools in place at the time were not providing sufficient detail on the development and progress of the ANSF. 

The CUAT is completed by the commander of the partnered Coalition unit or advisor team that has responsibility of an ANSF unit. Once completed by the 

partnered Coalition unit, the CUAT is reviewed by the partnered Coalitions unit’s 

chain of command and is entered into the CIDNE database. IJC reviews the CUATs 

with the Regional Commands and compiles a summary table of the CUAT cycle results which are forwarded to ISAF headquarters for use in various reporting requirements. 

The primary purpose of the CUAT is to rate an ANSF unit’s effectiveness by assigning the unit a rating on a five-level scale (known as Ratings Definition Levels, 

or RDLs) based on the unit’s ability to operate independently. An RDL rating reflects an ANSF unit’s overall operational effectiveness; however, this overall rating 

is derived from a more detailed assessment of each unit. The overall score is based 

on nine capabilities-based functional areas: leadership, operations, intelligence, lo-
60 

gistics, equipping, personnel, maintenance, communications, and training and education. 

While the CUAT in and of itself is an incomplete assessment, it has aided in 

meeting the requirement to track the ANSF’s growth and development towards a 

capable fighting force. ISAF and its subordinate commands are continuously scrutinizing both the CUAT and their overall approach to assessing the ANSF. 

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