1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DAYVED WOODARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 04-141 Erie

)

PHB DIE CASTING, )

)

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

McLAUGHLIN, SEAN J.

Presently pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the

Defendant, PHB Die Casting. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Dayved Woodard (“Woodard” or “Plaintiff”), started working at PHB Die Casting

(“PHB” or “Defendant”), on February 9, 1998. Plaintiff, an African-American male, worked

primarily as a Die Cast Punch Operator at PHB’s Fairview location. (Complaint ¶ 5). Plaintiff

remained at PHB through October 17, 2003.

Plaintiff contends that, throughout his four years working at PHB, he was subjected to a

racially hostile work environment. Plaintiff recounts the following comments and incidents which

purportedly took place during his tenure at PHB in support of his allegation of a racially hostile

environment. 

Woodard cites two incidents where a co-worker reported to him that another co-worker had

used the racially offensive term “nigger.” (Complaint ¶¶ 19, 21; Woodard Depo., Dkt. #21, Ex. 3,

pp. 33-40). Neither of these comments were made in the presence of Woodard or any other minority

employee. (Woodard Depo., pp. 33-34). Woodard further testified that he had never actually

overheard that word while working at PHB. (Id. at 39-40).

Woodard also describes an incident that occurred in 2000 where he and another AfricanAmerican employee, Jamal Shields, were horsing around and laughing because Shields had hit

Woodard with a rubber band. After observing their horseplay, Jay Lewis, a PHB employee,

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purportedly queried another employee, Al Cropeck, as to “who let the monkeys out?” (Woodard

Depo., pp. 42-44). Again, Woodard did not actually hear the comment firsthand, but had it relayed

to him by Cropeck. (Id.)

Woodard testified that a fellow employee, Nick Hazenback, had twice used the phrase, “you

people,” in Woodard’s presence. Sometime in 2000, Hazenback approached Woodard and asked

him how many children he had. When Woodard told Hazenback that he had two daughters,

Hazenback commented, “I thought you people had a lot of kids.” (Complaint ¶ 30; Woodard Depo.,

pp. 47-48). Although Hazenback told Woodard that he “didn’t mean anything by it,” Hasenback

apparently made the same “joke” about a year later after having forgotten the prior exchange.

(Woodard Depo., p. 48). Hazenback also made a comment in 2001 to the effect that Woodard’s

stocking cap made him look like he was headed out to do a “drive-by shooting.” (Id. at 81).

Another PHB employee, Gordon Phillips, used the phrase “you people” in a conversation

with Plaintiff on Martin Luther King Day in 2000. According to Woodard, Phillips expressed

surprise that Woodard had shown up for work that day, remarking that “I thought it was a holiday

for you people.” (Id. at 49-50). 

Later in 2000, Woodard asked a co-employee, Dave Turner, for a bathroom break. Turner

responded, “what do you need to do, go handle one of your drug deals?” (Complaint ¶ 32; Woodard

Depo., p 54). 

Woodard also recounts three incidentsthat took place between himself and a PHB electrician,

Bill Diehl. Woodard testified that Diehl approached him in 1999 and asked, “what are you?” When

Woodard asked what he meant, Diehl rejoined, “well, you’re too light to be black, too dark to be

white, what are you?” (Woodard Depo., pp. 55-56). Later on, in 2001, Diehl encountered Woodard

while looking for an African-American female co-worker, Darlene Jones, and said, “I’m looking for

someone. You’re the right color, but the wrong sex.” (Id. at 57). Finally, in early 2003, Woodard

was approached again by Diehl, who queried whether Woodard knew where chitlins came from.

When Woodard indicated no, Diehl informed him that chitlins were “what the slaves were allowed

to have after the master made them slaughter the pigs.” (Id. at 54-55). 

In addition to the aforementioned comments, Woodard testified to once seeing a smallgraffiti

of a “cross with a KKK” in one of the bathrooms at PHB. (Complaint ¶ 27; Woodard Depo., p. 69).

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The image appeared to be drawn by means of a black ballpoint pen and was approximately 2 inches

by 3 inches high. (Id.) Woodard testified that PHB removed the graffiti after Woodard complained

about it, but that it took several months for them to do so. (Id. at 70-71). 

In addition to his allegations of a hostile work environment, Woodard asserts that, throughout

his employment at PHB, he was routinely assigned to “harder” jobs than white employees in his

position. Without citing specifics, Woodard contends that he suffered disparate treatment in his job

assignments, primarily by being assigned to “the worst jobs within the workplace” and “routine

assignment to the most difficult machines.” (Complaint ¶ 9). Woodard further contends that, while

he was assigned to the “worst and most difficult jobs,” Caucasian employees routinely were assigned

to “easier” jobs. (Complaint ¶ 11). 

Woodard filed the underlying complaint on May 26, 2004. PHB filed a motion for summary

judgment on May 23, 2005, and Woodard responded on June 26, 2005. PHB filed a reply on August

22, 2005, and oral argument on the summary judgment motion was held on September 12, 2005.

This matter is ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(c). In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must “make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of [each] element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986). In evaluating whether the non-moving party has established each necessary element, the

Court must grant all reasonable inferences from the evidence to the non-moving party. Knabe v.

Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410, n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a reasonable

trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587).

III. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

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1 The Third Circuit has consistently applied the same legal standard in analyzing

claims brought pursuant to Title VII and the PHRA. Goosby v. Johnson &

Johnson Medical, Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 317 n.3 (3rd Cir. 2000); Jones v. School

District of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 409 (3rd Cir. 1999). Therefore, although

we analyze Woodard’s claim under Title VII only, our analysis is equally

applicable to his PHRA claim. 

4

Under Title VII and the PHRA it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any

individual with respect to this compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because

of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin. See Weston v. Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, Dept. of Corrections, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3rd Cir. 2001), citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1).1

 To establish a claim under Title VII based on an intimidating or offensive work

environment, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that he or she suffered intentional discrimination because

of race; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally

affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the

same race in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.” See Aman v. Cort

Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3rd Cir.1996). In employing this analysis a court must

evaluate the frequency of the conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,

and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. See Harris v. Forklift

Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). Title VII is not violated by “[m]ere utterance of an ... epithet

which engenders offensive feelings in an employee” or by mere “discourtesy or rudeness,” unless

so severe or pervasive as to constitute an objective change in the conditions of employment. See

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (citations omitted). Thus, “‘simple

teasing,’ offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)” are not actionable

under Title VII. Id. at 788. 

Because we find that Woodard has failed to present a triable issue of fact with respect to

elements two and four of the prima facie case for a hostile environment claim, we shall confine our

analysis accordingly.

A. Whether the discrimination was pervasive, regular and severe

We note at the outset that Title VII is not meant to be a “general civility code for the

workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). To be actionable

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under Title VII, the harassment must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

[the victim’s] employment and create an abusive work environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme

Court has made clear, conduct “must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions

of employment.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. Harassment is pervasive and regular when “incidents

of harassment occur either in concert or with regularity.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1484. Despite this

high standard, however, the Third Circuit has acknowledged that “the advent of more sophisticated

and subtle forms of discrimination requires that [courts] analyze the aggregate effect of all evidence

and reasonable inferences therefrom, including those concerning incidents of facially neutral

mistreatment, in evaluating a hostile work environment claim.” Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251

(3rd Cir. 2001).

In Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251 (3rd Cir. 2001), the defendants subjected a MexicanAmerican plaintiff to ethnic slurs, including referring to him as “the boy from the barrio” and

“mojado” (the Spanish word for “wetback”), dealt with disagreements by asking if the plaintiff

intended to pull out a switchblade, wrote derogatory messages on the marker board in plaintiff’s

cubicle, rounded the numbers on all other employee evaluations upward while rounding the

plaintiff’s numbers downward, disproportionally assigned other minorities and trainees to the

plaintiff’s unit, gave him knowingly contradictory instructions and impossible-to-perform tasks, and

referred to him as “an affirmative-action hire.” Cardinas, 269 F.3d 259. The Third Circuit found

those activities to be sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment. Id.

at 263. Similarly, in Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074 (3rd Cir. 1996), the Court

found a hostile work environment where African-American employees were referred to as “one of

them” or “another one,” told not to touch or steal anything, made to do menial jobs, screamed at,

threatened with termination, had their time cards stolen, were falsely accused of wrongdoing, had

information necessary to their jobs withheld, and were given conflicting orders. Additionally, the

employer’s general manager had stated at a district meeting that “the blacks were against the whites”

and that if they did not like it they could leave. Aman, 85 F.3d at 1082-84. 

When judged against the above, the conduct here is patently insufficient to satisfy the severity

requirement of a hostile environment claim. While the comments and conduct at issue here were

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unprofessional and insensitive, courts have consistently required a stronger showing of egregious

conduct than that described by Woodard. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 57 Fed.

Appx. 68, 75-77 (3rd Cir. 2003) (holding that alleged incidents, including managers making

comments that “the way [two African-American employees] were eating at their desks, it must be

their culture,” and that if such clerks did not do their work, “I’m going to sit at their desks with a

whip,” were not sufficiently severe and pervasive, even considering the comments in conjunction

with other facially neutral alleged mistreatment of the employee); Jackson v. Flint Ink N. Am. Corp.,

382 F.3d 869, 870 (8th Cir. 2004) (denying summary judgment where plaintiff was subjected to six

racially derogatory comments, including use of the word “nigger” in his presence, and particularly

because plaintiff witnessed a physically threatening graffiti depicting his name in conjunction with

a burning cross and a KKK sign, but noting that the decision to deny summary judgment “is not

altogether free from doubt,” and that the facts straddled the “cusp of submissibility.”); Woodland

v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 302 F.3d 838, 844 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that “racist graffiti -

drawings of ‘KKK,’ a swastika, and a hooded figure” on the walls of the plant bathroom, a racially

derogatory “poem” strewn about the plant, and three racially derogatory comments made about

plaintiff (but out of his presence) were “neither severe nor pervasive. . .”); Peters v. Renaissance

Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that six incidents, including a reference

to black music as “wicka wicka woo music” by a supervisor, a bartender’s request to investigate an

African-American guest who was allegedly stealing coins from a fountain, other African-American

guests being denied additional ice and cups for a party, and one use of the word “nigger” in plaintiffs

presence, were not severe or pervasive); Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1994)

(holding that two overtly racial remarks directed at plaintiff, including use of the terms “nigger” and

“KKK,” distribution of an arguably racial cartoon, and general ridicule and harassment were not

severe or pervasive). 

Unlike in the cases discussed above, Woodard’s counsel admitted that very few racially

tinged comments were actually directed towards Plaintiff in his presence. Woodard testified that

he never overheard a single use of the more offensive terms alleged, “nigger” and “monkey”:

Q: Just to make sure I understand then, the use of the

word nigger at PHB was not something concerning

which you had personal knowledge, but rather - -

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A: I never heard it.

Q: What you’ve told me is information provided by

others?

A: Right.

(Woodard Depo., pp. 39-40). Counsel reiterated this point at oral argument:

The Court: He also testified that he himself never heard

directly any racial slurs, is that correct?

Mr. Johnson: He never directly heard the word nigger. He

did - - he did hear different comments or

phrases that he took as racial or slurred.

The Court: So he never heard that term directed to him?

Mr. Johnson: That’s correct.

(Hearing Transcript, 9/12/05, p. 14).

Indeed, the only comments Woodard directly overheard were the comment about the drug

deal, the comment about the drive-by shooting, the comment about chitlins, and the two references

to “you people.” Each of these remarks are tinged with racial overtones and stereotypes and are

undoubtedly offensive, but none are egregiously severe. Woodard was not physically threatened or

humiliated. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (noting that circumstances to consider “may include the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's

work performance.”). Rather, the comments he endured were precisely the type of “isolated incidents

of racial enmity” that are not actionable under Title VII. See Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d

1094, 1103 (2nd Cir. 1986). Even coupled with the single instance of racist graffiti observed by

Woodard, they do not rise to the level of severity displayed in Cardenas and Aman.

In addition to being qualitatively deficient, many of Woodard’s claims, including those that

are the most egregious, consist of hearsay statements that are unsupported by first-hand evidence.

Although incidents occurring outside of a plaintiff’s presence and not directed at him are relevant

to a hostile environment claim under the requisite totality of the circumstances analysis, see Schwapp

v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 108-09 (2nd Cir. 1997) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23), the Third

Circuit has held that “comments referring to other individuals that [are] merely overheard by

[plaintiff] are the sorts of ‘offhanded comments and isolated incidents’ that the Supreme Court . .

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. cautioned should not be considered severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work

environment.” Caver v. City of Trenton, 2005 WL 2045715 (3rd Cir. 2005) (quoting Faragher, 524

U.S. at 788).

In sum, we conclude that Woodard has failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to

create a triable issue of fact as to whether his “workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions

of his employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.

Consequently, summary judgment is appropriate on this basis. 

B. Whether the discrimination would have detrimentally affected a reasonable person

of the same race in that position

We also find that Woodard has failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the fourth

prong set forth in Aman, namely, that the discrimination would have detrimentally affected a

reasonable person of the same race in his position. Aman, 85 F.3d at 1081. In considering whether

the objective test is met, we are directed to consider “all the circumstances,” including “the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see also Abramson v. William Patterson

College of New Jersey, 260 F.3d 265, 280 (3rd Cir. 2001). 

 As discussed above, the conduct at issue here was neither frequent nor severe. The incidents

described by Woodard, even assuming that they were indeed racially motivated, are insufficient as

a matter of law to establish that the work environment here would have been hostile from the

“standpoint of a reasonable person.” Consequently, summary judgment is appropriate on this

alternative ground.

IV. DISPARATE TREATMENT

Assertions of disparate treatment are governed by the burden-shifting framework outlined

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Thus, Woodard bears the initial burden

of establishing a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). To establish his prima facie case, Woodard must demonstrate that:

(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an

adverse employment action despite being qualified; and (4) the circumstances of the adverse

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employment action create an inference of discrimination. See Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv.,

352 F.3d 789, 797 (3rd Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). 

When a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the

employer to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the employer’s allegedly

adverse action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the defendant meets this burden, the

plaintiff then must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s proffered

reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination, and not the real motivation for the unfavorable job

action. Id. at 804.

Woodard, an African-American, is a member of a protected class. Moreover, it is not

disputed that Woodard was qualified for his position as a DCPO at PHB. Woodard’s claim fails,

however, because he had not raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he was subjected to an

adverse employment action creating an inference of discrimination.

The Supreme Court has defined an adverse employment action as:

A tangible employment action consists of a significant change in

employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,

reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a

decision causing a significant change in benefits. . . A tangible

employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm.

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1998). Such an action must be “serious

and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment.” Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3rd Cir. 2004) (quoting

Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 263). 

Loss of money or benefits is not required in order for a change in an employee’s working

conditions to constitute an adverse action; rather, an adverse employment action might consist of

changes in location, duties, perks, or other basic aspects of the job. Mondzelewski v. Pathmark

Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 787 (3rd Cir.1998) (citing Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 703 (7th

Cir.1987)). Thus, courts have consistently held that “discriminatory assignments, undermining of

work conditions and harassment are exactly the kind of actions that Title VII was designed to

prevent.” See Ferrell v. Harvard Industries, Inc., 2001 WL 1301461, *20 (E.D. Pa. 2001);

Mondzelewski, 162 F.3d at 787 (meat factory worker’s reassignment to a shift leaving him less free

time and requiring him to work Saturday evenings was sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether

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2 We have serious doubts, in any event, that Woodard’s conclusory allegations of

being assigned to “more difficult” jobs, in and of itself, is sufficiently

particularized to reasonably support a conclusion that he was subjected to an

adverse employment action at all.

10

the terms, conditions and privileges of his job were altered in retaliation for discrimination

complaint); Hampton v. Borough of Tinton Falls Police Dep’t, 98 F.3d 107, 116 (3rd Cir.1996)

(under Title VII, appointment to undesirable police assignment sufficient to withstand summary

judgment on retaliation claim); Collins, 830 F.2d at 703 (under Title VII, “adverse action” does not

require loss of money or benefits but rather may consist of changes in location, duties, perks, or other

basic aspects of the job). 

Here, Woodard asserts that he “has consistently been subjected to disparate treatment based

upon his race in the form of assignment to the worst jobs within the workplace and . . . routine

assignment to the most difficult machines . . .”. (Complaint ¶ 9). Woodard further alleges that

Caucasian employees were assigned to much easier jobs. (Complaint ¶ 11). In the abstract, this

allegation of racial bias in the assignment of workplace tasks sufficiently implicates the “terms,

conditions and privileges of his job” so as to be cognizable under Title VII. See, e.g., Mondzelewski,

162 F.3d at 787. Nonetheless, Woodard’s claim fails because he has not produced sufficient

evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he was assigned to “more difficult” jobs than

white employees at PHB.2

In response to Woodard’s allegations, PHB has presented a spreadsheet report identifying

each job and machine operated by Woodard throughout his employment at PHB. PHB’s report also

identifies, by name and race, the other employees who ran the same job and machine during shifts

before and after Woodard. (Affidavit of Catherine Bernard, Dkt. #25, Ex 2, Woodard Job Activity

Report). The results of the report demonstrate that white employees at PHB were assigned to the

same jobs and machines as Woodard during shifts preceding and following Woodard’s shift.

(Bernard Affidavit, ¶¶ 2-9). Moreover, PHB has provided affidavits asserting that job assignments

at PHB were made on a random basis without regard to race, and that most incidents where an

employee worked the same machine more frequently than other employees resulted from temporary

production needs, customer priorities, or an employee’s expertise and training on an individual

machine. (Phillips Affidavit ¶¶ 16-17; Sayers Affidavit ¶¶ 13-18).

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Woodard argues that PHB’s spreadsheet fails to account for several factors that impact on

the difficulty of a job assignment beyond simply the machine that is used. These include the size

of the parts being placed in the machine, the composition of those parts, and the cycle time of the

machine. (Woodard Depo. I, pp. 69-71). Be that as it may, Woodard offers no evidence that white

employees who worked on the same machines had the luxury of machining parts that were lighter

and less cumbersome over a longer period of time.

Moreover, even if Woodard could demonstrate that he was routinely assigned to more

difficult jobs than his co-workers, his testimony indicates that any such disparity resulted from an

incident between Woodard and his supervisor, rather than because of his race. Woodard testified

that his assignment to more difficult jobs “started after an incident with Ron Sayers.” (Woodard

Depo., p. 82). According to Woodard, Rex Ryan, a PHB supervisor, had asked Woodard to come

in for a Saturday shift. Due to an apparent mis-communication between Ryan and Sayers, Sayers,

who was not expecting Woodard to come in that Saturday, ordered him to go home. (Id.) Although

Woodard complied with Sayers’ order to go home, PHB later investigated the incident and paid him

for the time he spent at work that Saturday. (Id.) Woodard testified that this incident provoked

Sayers to assign him to difficult jobs:

[F]rom there on, you know, I just felt like, you know, Ron had it out

for me. I’m not sure if he got in trouble for sending me home or

what. But from there on I felt like he had it out for me. And he was

putting me on, you know, the worst jobs he could here and there.

(Woodard Depo., pp. 82-83). 

Moreover, Woodard testified that Sayers would “take care of” Jamal Shields, an AfricanAmerican, by giving him easier jobs and assignments. (Woodard Depo., p. 97). Sayers allegedly

urged Woodard to be more like Shields. (Id.) While this supports the inference that Sayers may

indeed have “had it out for” Woodard, it does nothing to ascribe any racial animus to the

discriminatory conduct. 

In sum, Woodard has not raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he was assigned to

difficult jobs more frequently than his white employees. As such, he cannot make out a prima facie

case of disparate treatment and summary judgment is appropriate.

VI. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE

To sustain a constructive discharge claim, a Plaintiff must prove that his employer knowingly

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engaged in conduct which foreseeably resulted in working conditions so intolerable or unpleasant

that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would resign. See Durham Life Ins. Co. v.

Evans, 165 F.3d 139, 155 (3rd Cir. 1999); Aman, 85 F.3d at 1085. Summary judgment is appropriate

if a trier of fact could not reasonably conclude that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s shoes would

have felt compelled to resign. Hopson v. Dollar Bank, 994 F.Supp. 332, 340 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 

As noted above, Woodard’s allegations fall short of demonstrating that a hostile working

environment existed at PHB. Thus, Plaintiff cannot establsih the necessary factual predicate for a

constructive discharge claim. See Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 718-719 (3rd

Cir. 1997) (“In light of our conclusion that no hostile work environment existed . . ., [plaintiff]

cannot show the necessary predicate to maintain a constructive discharge claim, specifically, that

there were ‘conditions of discrimination’ so intolerable that a reasonable person would have

resigned.”); Greb v. Potter, 2005 WL 1387649, *10 (D.N.J. 2005) (“[T]he Third Circuit [has]

intimated that if a plaintiff fails to demonstrate a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff will

likewise fail to establish the necessary predicate for a constructive discharge claim.”).

VI. PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS ACT

Claims of race discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. C.S.A.

§ 951 et seq., are analyzed under the same framework as a Title VII claim, “as Pennsylvania courts

have construed the protection of the two acts interchangeably.” Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d

420, 425 n. 3 (3rd Cir. 2001); see also Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 317

(3rdCir. 2000) (holding that Title VII and PHRA discrimination analyses are identical). Accordingly,

for the reasons discussed supra, summary judgment is also granted as to Woodard’s PHRA claim.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, PHB’s motion for summary judgment is granted. An appropriate

Order follows. 

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Case 1:04-cv-00141-SJM Document 37 Filed 11/18/05 Page 13 of 14
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DAYVED WOODARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 04-141 Erie

)

PHB DIE CASTING, )

)

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

AND NOW, this 18th day of November, 2005, and for the reasons set forth in the

accompanying Memorandum Opinion, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDEREDthat the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant, PHB

Die Casting, [Doc. No. 19] is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant, PHB

Die Casting, and against Plaintiff, Dayved Woodard. 

The clerk is hereby directed to mark the case closed.

/s/ Sean J. McLaughlin 

Sean J. McLaughlin

United States District Judge

cm: All parties of record. ___

 

 

 

 

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