1. Plaintiff is currently an inmate at USP-Allenwood, White Deer, Pennsylvania, and he is serving

a 360-month federal sentence. Recently, on March 18, 2010, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

affirmed Plaintiff‘s Judgment and Commitment. See U.S. v. Reynolds, 2010 WL 971818 (3d Cir.

3-18-10). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:CV-06-1400

:

Plaintiff : Magistrate Judge Blewitt

:

v. :

:

CAPTAIN KATZ, et al., :

:

Defendants :

 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Michael Curtis Reynolds, filed this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, on July 17, 2006. Plaintiff was a federal pre-trial detainee at Lackawanna County Prison

(“LCP”), Scranton, Pennsylvania, during the relevant times of this case. Plaintiff is proceeding pro

se. 

1

On December 1, 2009, the District Court issued a Memorandum and Order and

dismissed all of Plaintiff‘s claims in the instant case except for his excessive force claim arising on

July 14, 2006, while Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at LCP, and his claim that he was improperly

placed in disciplinary custody after the incident. (Doc. 283). The District Court stated, in pertinent

part, as follows: 

1. Defendants’ supplemental motion for summary judgment 

(Doc. 250) is granted in part.

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2. On January 19, 2010, the parties consented to proceed before the undersigned for trial

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). (Doc. 292). 

2

2. Summary Judgment is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s claims

relating to denial of access to the law library and medical

treatment following a July 14, 2006 incident while confined as

a pre-trial detainee at the Lackawanna County Prison.

3. Plaintiff’s cross supplemental motion for summary judgment

(Doc. 257) is DENIED.

4. Reynolds’ claims of being subjected to excessive force on

July 14, 2006 and thereafter being improperly subjected to

a term of disciplinary custody will proceed.

(Doc. 283, pp. 17-18)(emphasis added).2

On May 5, 2010, the Court issued an Order and directed that the parties file 3-page

letter briefs on the above stated Heck issue by May 20, 2010. The Court indicated that it would

hear argument, outside of the presence of the jury, on the Heck issue after the jury was selected

and prior to opening statements. (Doc. 350). As a result of the continuance of the jury selection

and trial, a second Order was issued on May 12, 2010, affording the parties until June 1, 2010, to

file their letter briefs. (Doc. 356). The parties submitted their filings as directed by the Court.

(Docs. 361, 362, and 364).

This Court has repeated that Plaintiff’s trial will only relate to his excessive force claim

against Defendants Girvasi, Moskwa and Katz arising while Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee in

Lackawanna County Prison on July 14, 2006, and his claim that he was improperly placed in

disciplinary confinement after the incident. Moreover, this Court has pointed to the District

Court’s above quoted December 1, 2009, Memorandum and Order regarding which of Plaintiff‘s

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3. In its December 1, 2009 Memorandum, the District Court noted that Defendants’ Summary

Judgment Motion did not “address Plaintiff’s claim that [Defendant] Captain Katz improperly

subjected him to a term of disciplinary custody” after the July 14, 2006 incident. The Court thus

held that this claim would also proceed to trial. (Doc. 283, p. 15, n. 6).

3

claims were dismissed and which claims remained for trial. Specifically, as stated, the District Court

held the following claims remained in this case: 

 Reynolds’ claims of being subjected to excessive force on

July 14, 2006 and thereafter being improperly subjected to

a term of disciplinary custody will proceed.

(Doc. 283, pp. 17-18) (emphasis added). 

3

During one of the pre-trial conferences conducted by this Court, the parties stated that

after the July 14, 2006 incident involving Plaintiff at LCP in which he attempted to wear his shower

sandals to the prison law library, he was charged with a misconduct for failing to obey by an order

of prison staff. Subsequently, Plaintiff was found guilty of the misconduct charge, and he was

sentenced to disciplinary confinement in the SHU at LCP for two weeks as his sanction. As part of

his claims remaining in his case, in addition to his excessive force claim, it appeared as though

Plaintiff sought damages with respect to his disciplinary confinement after the July 14, 2006

incident. During a pre-trial conference, Plaintiff stated that he filed a grievance regarding his

disciplinary conviction and sanction, and that he exhausted his administrative remedies available

at LCP. However, Plaintiff admitted that he was not successful via the LCP administrative remedy

process in having his disciplinary conviction and sentence overturned. Further, Plaintiff indicated

that he did not successfully have his disciplinary conviction and sentence overturned through any

other proceeding, such as a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

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4

It appeared to this Court that, to the extent that Plaintiff was deemed as challenging his

disciplinary conviction on the July 14, 2006 misconduct charge and his 2-week disciplinary

confinement sanction he received, and to the extent he sought damages on this claim, which may

have affected the validity of his disciplinary conviction, this claim may be Heck barred until Plaintiff

successfully had this stated disciplinary conviction overturned. 

In Braggs v. Flatt, 2009 WL 2750120, *4-*5 (W. D. Pa.), the Court stated: 

Heck v. Humphrey [512 U.S. 447 (1994) ] and its progeny. In Heck,

the Supreme Court held that a prisoner could not maintain a § 1983 

action for damages under the civil rights laws if “a judgment in favor 

of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction

or sentence ... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction

or sentence has already been invalidated.” 512 U.S. at 487. The Court 

has summarized this so-called “favorable termination requirement” 

by explaining that a “state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior

invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no

matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction 

or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily

demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson,

544 U.S. 74, 81-82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005). See also Hill v.

McDonough, 574 U.S. 73 (2006); Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 124 S.Ct.

1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004).

Further, in Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 

906 (1997), the Supreme Court extended Heck further by holding that a state

prisoner's § 1983 action challenging a prison disciplinary sanction and seeking

“money damages, based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the

decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed,

is not cognizable under § 1983” unless the disciplinary sanction has been

overturned or invalidated. 520 U.S. 641, 648, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906.

(Emphasis added); Kalomiris v. Monroe County Syndicate, 2009 WL 73785, *8 (M.D. Pa.).

Thus, any claim of Plaintiff Reynolds which would impugn the validity of his July 14,

2006 disciplinary conviction at LCP and his 2-week disciplinary confinement he received as a

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5

sanction regarding the failure to obey an order misconduct charge would be precluded by Heck.

See Washam v. Stesis, 321 Fed. Appx. 104, 105 (3d Cir. 2009); Sandy v. Lehigh Co. Dist. Attorney,

2008 WL 910001, *1-*2 (E.D. Pa.). 

Upon reviewing the Heck briefs of the parties, and after hearing from the parties at the

June 4, 2010 final telephonic pre-trial conference, it is apparent that Plaintiff seeks to testify about

the conditions of his 2-week confinement in the SHU at LCP following the July 14, 2006 incident,

and that he does not seek to invalidate his disciplinary conviction. Nor does Plaintiff seek damages

for harm caused by his SHU confinement that implicate the validity of his disciplinary conviction.

In Howard v. BOP, 2008 WL 318387, *17-*18 (M.D. Pa.), the Court stated: 

“[The Heck] rule applies to claims challenging ‘prison disciplinary sanctions that alter the

duration of a prisoner's incarceration,’ such as the loss of statutory good time that resulted from the

incident reports at issue here, but does not apply ‘to claims that implicate only the conditions, and

not the fact or duration, of a prisoner's incarceration.’” (emphasis added) quoting Torres v. Fauver,

292 F. 3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 2002); Wilkins v. Bittenbender, 2007 WL 708993, *1 (3d Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff Reynolds has represented to this Court that he is not seeking to give testimony

which would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction and the 2-week SHU

confinement sanction he received. Rather, Plaintiff states that he seeks to testify about the

conditions of his 2-week confinement in the SHU at LCP, such as his alleged inability to use the

law library during this time and the alleged destruction of his legal materials, which he states were

supposed to be boxed and given to him in the SHU after he was confined there following the 

July 14, 2006 incident. 

This Court finds that the recent Third Circuit case of Arango v. Winstead, 352 Fed. Appx.

664 (3d Cir. 2009), is on point with our case. In Arango, the Court stated:

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6

The District Court ruled that [inmate] Arango's due process claim 

was not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of the “favorable 

termination rule” announced in Heck and extended to prison 

disciplinary sanctions that alter the duration of the prisoner's 

incarceration in Edwards. Under that rule, a § 1983 plaintiff cannot seek 

damages for harm caused by actions that implicate the validity of the 

fact or length of her confinement, unless she can prove that the sanction

has been reversed, invalidated, or called into question by a grant

of federal habeas corpus relief. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 

S.Ct. 2364; Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48, 117 S.Ct. 1584. This bar 

applies not only to requests for money damages, but also to requests for 

equitable and declaratory relief. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,

81-82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005). However, claims that 

relate only to the conditions, and not the fact or duration, of incarceration

are not subject to the favorable termination rule. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 

at 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242; Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 145, 150 

(3d Cir.2002).

Arango challenges the prison officials' actions that resulted in her

placement in restricted housing for thirty days and removal from 

a prison program. Because these sanctions did not alter the length

of her incarceration, the success of her claim would not “necessarily 

imply the invalidity” of the fact or duration of her confinement. Edwards,

520 U.S. at 646, 117 S.Ct. 1584; Torres, 292 F.3d at 150. Thus, Arango's 

claim is not subject to the favorable termination rule and is cognizable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Id. at 665-666. 

As in Arango, this Court finds that Plaintiff Reynolds is challenging the LCP official’s,

namely Defendant Katz’s, actions that resulted in his placement in restricted housing (SHU) for two

weeks and his inability to use the law library and have his legal materials. Because these sanctions

did not alter the length of Plaintiff’s incarceration, the success of his claim would not “necessarily

imply the invalidity” of the fact or duration of his confinement. Thus, the Court finds that to the

extent stated herein, Plaintiff Reynolds’ testimony about the conditions of his two-week SHU

confinement at LCP following the July 14, 2006 incident is not Heck-barred. 

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7

Plaintiff Reynolds’ claim regarding his 2-week confinement in the SHU at LCP following

the July 14, 2006 incident relate only to the conditions, and not the fact or duration, of his SHU

confinement. Plaintiff challenges the conduct of Defendant Katz that resulted in his placement in

the SHU for two weeks and his alleged inability to use the law library and access his legal materials

while confined in the SHU. This claim does not affect the length of his incarceration or the fact of

his two week confinement in the SHU. Therefore, Plaintiff ‘s testimony regarding the conditions

of his 2-week confinement in the SHU at LCP after the July 14, 2006 incident is not Heck barred.

During the June 4, 2010 final pre-trial conference, defense counsel argued that to the

extent Plaintiff was asserting a due process claim regarding his 2-week confinement in the SHU at

LCP, he failed to state a cognizable claim since he was not deprived of a liberty interest protected

by the Due Process Clause. The Court agrees with defense counsel. In Arango, after the Third

Circuit Court found that the Plaintiff inmate’s claim regarding her placement in restricted housing

for 30 days and removal from a prison program was not Heck barred since her claim related only

to the conditions of her restricted housing confinement and the sanctions she received did not alter

the length of her incarceration, the Court held that the Plaintiff inmate did not state a plausible

violation of a protected liberty interest. Thus, the Third Circuit Court found that Plaintiff Arango’s

due process claim was subject to dismissal since she failed to state a deprivation of a protected

liberty interest. Specifically, the Arango Court stated: 

Although Arango's due process claim is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

to survive a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, her complaint “must

contain sufficient factual matter” to state a plausible claim of a deprivation of a 

liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. 

The Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]s long as the conditions or degree 

of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed 

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8

upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause 

does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial 

oversight.” Asquith v. Dep't of Corr., 186 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir.1999) (quoting 

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). Due 

process applies only where the conditions of confinement impose “atypical 

and significant hardship [s] on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 

418 (1995). Placement in administrative segregation for days or months at a

time or transfers to more restrictive custody do not implicate a protected liberty 

interest. See Torres, 292 F.3d at 150; Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 

522-23 (3d Cir.2002). Nor does removal from a prison program, as restriction 

from participation in prison programs is among the conditions of confinement

that an inmate may reasonably anticipate during her incarceration. See James v. 

Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 629 (3d Cir.1989). Therefore, Arango's complaint, 

alleging that she was removed from a program and placed in thirty days 

restrictive housing, did not state a plausible violation of a protected liberty 

interest.

352 Fed. Appx. at 666. 

The Arango Court then held: 

Because Arango's due process claim implicated only the conditions, and not the 

fact or duration, of her confinement, the District Court erred in ruling that the claim 

was not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) 

dismissal was appropriate because Arango's complaint did not state a deprivation 

of a protected liberty interest, and we will summarily affirm the District Court's 

grant of defendant's motion to dismiss for that reason.

Id. 

Thus, while the Court agrees with Plaintiff Reynolds that his claim regarding the

conditions of his 2-week confinement in the SHU at LCP is not Heck barred, the Court also agrees

with Defendants that this claim does not state a viable due process claim, since Plaintiff‘s allegations

that he did not have access to the law library and his legal materials when he was placed in the

SHU for two weeks, does not state a deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Restrictions from

using the law library and restrictions to personal belongings while in temporary disciplinary

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4. The Plaintiff is statutorily precluded from recovering punitive damages against local

governmental agencies but not against the individual Defendants. The Supreme Court has

determined that, absent a statute to the contrary, punitive damages cannot be awarded against a

government entity. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748 (1981).

However, this preclusion of a punitive damages remedy does not apply to the individual

defendants. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct. 1625 (1983). In Smith, the Court held that

punitive damages may be recovered from individual defendants in certain §1983 cases. 

 

9

confinement in the SHU are conditions of confinement that an inmate may reasonably anticipate

during his incarceration. 

In the June 4, 2010, final pre-trial conference, Plaintiff indicated to the Court that he will

attempt to use his testimony regarding the conditions of his two-week SHU confinement at LCP

following the July 14, 2006 incident to support his claim for punitive damages against the three

remaining individual Defendants. On June 4, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Punitive Damages

and a support brief. (Docs. 368 and 369). The Court notes that Plaintiff correctly recognizes that

he may be able to recover punitive damages against the three individual Defendants in this case

on his § 1983 claims. 

4

As the Court stated in Patel v. Himalayan Intern. Inst. of Yoga Science and Phil., 1999 WL

33747891 (M.D. Pa.), punitive damages are intended to punish and deter. In Coleman v. Kaye, 87

F. 3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir. 1996), the Third Circuit held: 

punitive damages may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated

by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or

callous indifference to the federally protected rights of

others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625,

1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983).

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10

Further, in Brennan v. Twp. of Teaneck, 350 F. 3d 399, 429-430 (3d Cir. 2003), the Court

held that retaliatory motive may be insufficient alone in § 1983 retaliation action to satisfy the

award of punitive damages. The Brennan Court stated that “it is clear under the Court’s holding

in Smith v. Wade that punitive damages require more than the retaliatory motive itself.” Id. 

In Pribula v. Wyoming Area School Dist., 599 F. Supp. 2d 564, 580 (M.D. Pa. 2009),

the Court stated that “[p]unitve damages may be awarded in a case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 ‘when the Defendant ‘s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when

it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” 

The Court will allow Plaintiff Reynolds’ testimony about the conditions of his two-week

SHU confinement at LCP following the July 14, 2006 incident insofar as he seeks to offer it to

support his claim for punitive damages against the three individual Defendants. The Court will not

permit such testimony to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to support a due process claim. Moreover,

after the close of testimony at trial, if the Court finds insufficient evidence presented by Plaintiff with

respect to his claim for punitive damages based upon the above stated standard, the Court may

dismiss this claim and may not charge the jury with respect to it. Also, if Plaintiff‘s punitive damages

claim is dismissed at trial, there will be no questions regarding such claim in the Jury Interrogatories.

Finally, there appears to be a discrepancy as to under which constitutional provision

Plaintiff Reynolds’ excessive force claim falls. The Court had been referencing an excessive force

claim in this case that would be considered under the standard for such a claim under the Eighth

Amendment. Plaintiff Reynolds contends that since he was a pre-trial detainee at LCP during the

relevant time of his excessive force claim, it does not fall under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff

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5. Since Plaintiff Reynolds was a federal pre-trial detainee at the relevant time of his excessive

force claim, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applies to his claim, as opposed to the

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applicable to state pre-trial detainees. Regardless of

whether the inmate is a state or federal pre-trial detainee, the standards developed in excessive

force claims filed by inmates under the Eighth Amendment are applicable to Plaintiff Reynolds’

case.

11

stated that his excessive force claim is brought under the Fourth Amendment. The Court finds that

Plaintiff‘s excessive force claim is brought pursuant to the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause

since he was a federal pre-trial detainee at the relevant time. Indeed, the District Court has made

this determination in its December 1, 2009 Memorandum, Doc. 283, pp. 11-13. The District Court

cited to Suprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5, 18 (3d Cir. 2005), and quoted the Third Circuit as follows:

“A pre-trial detainee’s claim that he has been subjected to unconstitutional conditions of

confinement . . . are coextensive with those of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment.” (Id., p. 11). The District Court then relied in part on Fuentes v. Wagner,

206 F.3d 335 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 821 (2000), regarding the Eighth Amendment

standard. (Id., p. 12). 

In Redman v. Kennedy, 2008 WL 5110783, *2 (W. D. Pa.), the Court stated:

Fuentes v. Wagner sets forth the standard for evaluating excessive force

claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Due Process Claim 

of the Fourteenth Amendment:5

A detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication 

of guilt in accordance with the due process of law. However, 

once the Government has exercised its conceded authority to 

detain a person pending trial, it obviously is entitled to employ 

devices that are calculated to effectuate this detention. Thus, 

restraints that are reasonable related to the institution's 

interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, 

constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are 

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12

discomforting. Obviously, ensuring security and order at the 

institution is a permissible nonpunitive objective, whether

the facility houses pretrial detainees, convicted inmates, 

or both. Consequently, whether ... restrictions and practices 

constitute punishment in the constitutional sense depends

on whether they are rationally related to a legitimate 

nonpunitive government purpose and whether they appear 

excessive in relation to that purpose. Thus, there is a distinction

between punitive measures that may not be constitutionally 

imposed prior to a determination of guilt and regulatory

restraints that may.

206 F.3d 335, 342 (3d. Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted).FN1 For a 

pretrial detainee to state an excessive force claim against a prison official, 

he must adduce evidence that the force used was applied “maliciously 

and sadistically to cause harm” and not “in a good-faith effort to

maintain or restore discipline.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 

S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).

FN1. Although Redman does not state the specific 

grounds for his constitutional claims, his complaint appears 

to allege a claim for use of excessive force. The Eighth 

Amendment does not directly apply to pretrial detainees. Wilson

v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir.2000) (“the Eighth 

Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment applies to 

excessive-force claims brought by convicted criminals 

serving their sentences.”). Instead, the relevant inquiry is the 

due process analysis set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,

99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (applying Fifth

Amendment due process clause to Federal pretrial 

detainees), and Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150 (3d Cir.2005) 

(applying Bell' s analysis, under Fourteenth Amendment 

due process clause, to State pretrial detainees). Under Bell,

the question is whether the challenged conditions of 

confinement “amount to punishment of the detainee ... 

prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process 

of law.” 441 U.S. at 535. Therefore, while the Eighth Amendment 

protects convicted prisoners from “cruel and unusual 

punishments,” the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

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13

Amendment protects pretrial detainees from the purposeful 

infliction of punishment without due process of law. Hubbard,

399 F.3d at 158.

The factors that are relevant to this inquiry include: “the need for application 

of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force 

used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and 

any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Hudson,

503 U.S. at 7 (citations omitted). An inmate does not have to show that

the harm suffered was sufficiently serious in order to make out a 

constitutional violation where excessive force was used. Absence of 

serious injury does not end the inquiry. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. See

also Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 104 (3d. Cir.2000) (“Following Hudson's 

focus on the force used, as opposed to the injury inflicted, we

conclude that although the degree of injury is relevant for any 

[constitutional violation] analysis, there is no fixed minimum quantum 

of injury that a prisoner must prove that he suffered through 

objective or independent evidence in order to state a claim for 

wanton and excessive force”).

(Emphasis added). See also Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dis., 272 F.3d 168, 172-73 (3d Cir.

2001).

In Cole v. Mistick, 2009 WL 1160962, *7 (W.D. Pa.), the Court held:

This court has already determined that the proper standard for Plaintiff's 

excessive force claims is the standard under the substantive due process 

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment given that Plaintiff was a pre-trial 

detainee. Dkt. [114] at 4 to 5.

In an excessive force claim, the core judicial inquiry is “whether force 

was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or 

maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 

(1992). While Hudson was an Eighth Amendment standards case 

involving convicted prisoners, that same standard applies to pre-trial 

detainees at least under the circumstances of this case which involve 

Plaintiff engaging in two prison disturbances. Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 

F.3d 335, 347 (3d Cir.2000) (“Accordingly, we hold that the Eighth 

Amendment cruel and unusual punishments standards found in Whitley 

v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) and 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992), 

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14

apply to a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim arising in the 

context of a prison disturbance.”). Factors relevant to this inquiry 

include: the need for application of force; the relationship between that

need and the amount of force used; the threat reasonably perceived 

by the responsible officials; and any efforts made to temper the 

severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citations 

omitted). The absence of serious injury is a relevant, but 

not dispositive, additional factor to be considered in the subjective 

analysis. Id. See also Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 104 (3d Cir.2000) 

(holding that there is no fixed minimum quantum of injury that a 

prisoner must prove he suffered through either objective or

independent evidence in order to state a claim for excessive

force).

The significance of the Hudson and Brooks line of cases is that they 

essentially did away with the traditional requirement of an objective 

serious deprivation and focused solely on the subjective intent of 

the actor. Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir.2000) (“In 

Hudson, the Court distinguished between prisoner conditions-of-confinement

and medical-deprivation claims, on the one hand, and wanton use of 

unnecessary force claims on the other. Although the former kind of 

claim cannot survive without evidence that a deprivation was ‘harmful 

enough’ ..., the latter kind of claim has no such requirement ...”).

The Court does not agree with Plaintiff Reynolds to the extent he was deemed as stating

that his excessive force claim was brought under the Fourth Amendment. In Jankowski v. Demand,

2008 WL 1901347, *6 (W.D. Pa.), the Court stated as follows: 

The Fourth Amendment governs excessive force claims only within 

the context of those claims stemming from an arrest or investigatory stop. 

Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 346-47 (3d Cir.2000) ( citing

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)).

Since Plaintiff's excessive force claim does not arise out of the events 

occurring during her arrest, but rather during pretrial detention, 

the Fourth Amendment does not apply. Id. Instead, as articulated by the 

Supreme Court in Graham, it is the Due Process Clause as applied 

to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, that offers protection

to pretrial detainees putting forth claims of excessive force. 490 U.S. at 

395, n. 10 ( citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-539, 99 S.Ct. 

1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). In order to establish a Due Process 

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6. Since the Court has heard the arguments of the parties during the final pre-trial conference,

and since the Court has addressed the remaining pre-trial issues in the foregoing Memorandum and

Order, it will not conduct argument on these issues when the trial commences on June 8, 2010,

after the jury is selected. 

15

violation, “... the detainee must show that the force used amounts to 

a wanton infliction of punishment, as opposed to an amount rationally 

related to exercising control.” Id. ( citing Fuentes, 206 F.3d 335). If a 

plaintiff is unable to show that the use of force was wanton, the Court 

will then consider whether the use of force was “really an incident of a 

legitimate nonpunitive objective.” Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 342.

Thus, Plaintiff Reynolds’ excessive force claim raised in this case will be considered as

brought under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the above stated standard regarding

such a claim will be used, including the jury charge, in this case.6

SO ORDERED. 

s/ Thomas M. Blewitt 

THOMAS M. BLEWITT

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: June 8, 2010

Case 4:06-cv-01400-TMB Document 372 Filed 06/08/10 Page 15 of 16
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Case 4:06-cv-01400-TMB Document 372 Filed 06/08/10 Page 16 of 16