Interim Decision #1917 

MATTER OF VIZCARRA-DELGADILLO 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-14699687 

Decided by Board November 6, 1968 

Deportation proceedings may be terminated as "improvidently begun" even 

after the deportation hearing has proceeded to a final conclusion and a deportation order has been entered; hence, the special inquiry officer, upon 

motion of the District Director, did not lack authority to terminate deportation proceedings. 

CHARGE : 

Lodged: Act of 1962—Section 241(0 (5), V.S.C. 1251 (a) (6)1 —Conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1546. 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: 

Phelan, Simmons & Ungar 

517 Washington Street 

San Francisco, California 94111 

(Letter memorandum filed, 

concurring in appeal) 

ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Irving A. Appleman 

Appellate Trial Attorney 

(Oral argument waived) 

This is an appeal by the District Director of the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service from an order of the special inquiry 

officer denying the Service's unopposed motion to terminate the 

deportation proceedings. 

The record before us reflects the following undisputed facts: 

The respondent is an alien, a native and citizen of Mexico, who 

was admitted to the United States for permanent residence on 

September 18, 1965. On August 9, 1966, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, he was convicted on his plea of guilty to a charge of aiding and abetting the 

alteration and possession of a false immigration document, in violation of 18 U.S.O. 1546 and 2. Deportation proceedings were 

started against respondent, charging that because of his conviction he was deportable under section 241 (a) (5) of the Act. At a 

hearing on October 13, 1966, respondent through counsel conceded his deportability as charged and a deportation order was 

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Interim Decision #1917 

entered which became administratively final on respondent's 

waiver of his right to appeal. 

On October 18, 1968, the District Director filed a motion requesting the special inquiry officer to terminate the proceeding 

under 8 CFR 242.7 on the ground that the deportation proceeding 

had been improvidently begun. The motion recited that on October 31, 1966, the respondent had filed a motion in the District 

Court to set aside hi's conviction; that the District Court had denied the motion; that on appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had affirmed the judgment below; and 

that respondent had filed a petition for a writ of certiorari which 

was then pending before the Supreme Court. The motion stated 

no other facts which might indicate why the District Director 

had concluded that the deportation proceedings had been improvidently begun. Counsel for respondent stated that they had no 

objection to the motion and they filed no response to it. 

The special inquiry officer denied the motion. in a decision 

dated Octter 28, 1968, he concluded that he lacked power under 

8 CFR 242.7 to entertain such a motion after entry of a deportation order; and that, in any event, even if he had jurisdiction he 

would deny the motion because it failed to contain a reasonable 

explanation for the District Director's belief that the proceeding 

had been improvidently begun. It is this decision of the special inquiry officer which is before us on appeal. 

In a letter to this Board dated October 30, 1968, joining in the 

appeal, counsel for the respondent point out that the only avenue 

of relief from deportation available to him appears to be the vacating of the conviction underlying the deportation order ; and 

they state they have agreed to dismiss their pending certiorari 

petition if the deportation proceedings are terminated. In addition to the foregoing information which was not before the special inquiry officer, we have also considered the facts brought out 

in the reported opinion in respondent's court proceedings, Vizcarrct-Delgadillo v. United States, 395 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1968), which 

were apparently not called to the special inquiry officer's attention. 

We think that the special inquiry officer did not lack power to 

terminate the deportation proceeding, if that course was otherwise indicated, merely because an administratively final deportation order had already been entered. Even though the posture of 

the case did not fit neatly within any of the patterns formulated 

in 8 CFR 242.7, the administrative process is sufficiently malleable to warrant recourse to other sources of authority. The admin52 
Interim Decision #1917 

istrative power to terminate deportation proceedings in appropriate cases existed even before 8 CFR 242.7 was promulgated? 

That regulation must be '.viewed as an extension of such power, 

rather than as a limitation upon it. Even after a final deportation 

order has been entered, the deportation proceedings may be reopened for proper cause, 8 CFR 108.5 and 242.22, and the proceedings can then be terminated in appropriate cases. We shall 

consider the District Director's motion as if it had been filed 

under the regulations last cited. 

This raises the question, implicit in the special inquiry officer's 

decision, whether there is authority on the part of any one to terminate a deportation proceeding as "improvidently begun," once 

a final deportation order has been entered. We think there is. 

Section 241 (a) of the Act sets up numerous grounds for the expulsion of aliens in the United States and section 242 (b) prescribes the procedure for determining the deportability of any 

alien upon any of such grounds. It cannot be supposed, however, 

that Congress contemplated that those charged with tkikiesponsibility for enforcing the immigration laws must automatically 

start and relentlessly pursue deportation proceedings against all 

aliens who seem to fit within the statutory proscription. As Judge 

(now Mr. Justice) Marshall stated in a similar context, Pignatello v. Attorney General, 350 F.2d 719, at 725 (2d Cir., 1965) : 

. . . The statute does not command the Attorney General to deport all 

aliens who have been convicted of two crimes involving a moral turpitude; it 

merely states that any such alien "shall, upon the order of the Attorney 

General, be deported OP 

Those charged with responsibility for enforcing the criminal laws 

have prosecutive discretion in determining whether to initiate 

criminal prosecution in a given case. A similar discretion not to 

proceed in a given case must be accorded to those responsible for 

immigration law enforcement? And where, following the formal 

start of deportation proceedings, additional facts or policy considerations arise which lead those responsible to conclude that this is 

not the sort of case in which such proceedings should have been 

started in the first place, 8 CFR 242.7 wisely provides the mechanics for termination on the ground that the proceeding was 

"improvidently begun." 

See Matter of B—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 713 (A.G., 1955) ; Pignatello v. Attorney General, 350 F.2d 719, 724-726 (2d Cir., 1965). 

2 To conjure up an extreme example, it can hardly be supposed that any 

one would criticize the failure to start deportation proceedings against a 

clearly deportable alien in the terminal stages of cancer. 

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Interim Decision # 1917 

We see no reason why the same considerations should not also 

apply with equal force even after the deportation hearing has 

proceeded to a final conclusion and a deportation order has been 

entered. There is generally nothing immutable about a deportation order; it does not have the res judicata effect of a court 

judgment. Even a criminal judgment of conviction affirmed on 

appeal may be set aside on the prosecutor's motion on the ground 

that the proceeding violated prosecutive policy, Petite v. United 

States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). An administrative deportation order 

is not entitled to greated inviolability. 

A more troublesome question is presented by the special inquiry officer's alternate basis for denial, i.e., that the District 

Director's motion contained no reasonable explanation for his 

conclusion that the proceeding had been improvidently begun. Before actual commencement of the deportation hearing, 8 CFA 

242.7 makes it dear, the District Director has decisive power to 

terminate the proceedings; but after actual commencement of the 

hearing the regulation provides merely that he may move for dismissal on that ground. The special inquiry officer in this case has 

read the regulation as contemplating, not the automatic grant of 

such a motion, but an informed adjudication by the special inquiry officer (and presumably by this Board, in the event of appeal) on an evaluation of the factors underlying the District 

Director's conclusion. 

The regulation is not specific on this point, and reasonable arguments can be mustered on both sides of the issue. It may be 

contended, on the one hand, that in view of the separation of 

functions sought to be achieved by the Act, 3the question whether 

a proceeding has been improvidently begun is one which is addressed primarily to prosecutive discretion and should therefore 

not be of concern to special inquiry officers or this Board, whose 

functions are essentially quasi-judicial. This should be so a fortiori in a situation like the present, where termination of the proceedings is sought by both the Service and the respondent, and 

the latter is represented by competent counsel. Under such circumstances, it can be said, there is no purpose to be served in 

having the District Director's conclusion reviewed further by the 

special inquiry officer or this Board, either for the purpose of 

seeing that the alien is not disadvantaged or for the purpose of 

promoting proper enforcement of the immigration laws. On the 

other hand, the language of the regulation does point to a distinc2 See Marcell° v. Bonds, 349 'U.S. 302 (1955.) 

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tion between the District Director's unquestioned power of termination before the hearing is actually commenced and his mere 

privilege of moving for dismissal thereafter_ Perhaps the best solution would be to amend the regulation to specify more particu 7 

 larly what is intended. We need not determine this question at this pOint. Even assuming arguendo that the special inquiry officer and this Board on 

appeal have jurisdiction to review the District Director's conclusion that the deportation proceeding was improvidently begun, 

the facts now before us are sufficient to justify that conclusion. 

The circumstances under which the respondent was induced to 

enter his guilty plea to the criminal charge, as outlined in the 

Ninth Circuits' reported opinion in his case, supra, and the factors recited in the letter from respondent's counsel dated October 

30, 1968, all point to the reasonableness of the District Director's 

conclusion, as a matter of prosecutive judgment, that these deportation proceedings were improvidently begun and should be terminated. 

As we have indicated, all the facts now before us were not before the special inquiry officer when he made the decision under 

review. No useful purpose would be served, however, if we were 

to remand the case to the special inquiry officer for that reason. 

The following order will therefore be entered 

It is ordered that the appeal be sustained, that the deportation 

order be withdrawn, that the deportation proceedings be reopened, and that on such reopening the deportation proceedings 

be and they are hereby terminated. 

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