1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MATTHEW YOUNG, : Case No. 4:15-cv-01917

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : (Judge Brann)

:

SUNBURY POLICE :

DEPARTMENT, GARY :

HECKMAN, and CHRISTOPHER :

BLAISE, :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

February 3, 2016

Pending before this Court is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6), filed by Defendants Sunbury Police Department, Gary Heckman, and 

Christopher Blaise (hereinafter “Defendants”) against Plaintiff Matthew Young 

(hereinafter “Mr. Young”).1The motion seeks to dismiss Mr. Young’s claims for 

violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq., 

(hereinafter “ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (hereinafter 

“RA”) and for violations of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983.2 This matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition.

 

1 ECF No. 18.

2 ECF No. 1.

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In accordance with the following reasoning, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is 

denied.

I. BACKGROUND

According to Mr. Young’s complaint, he suffers from the following physical 

and mental disabilities: antrioventricular septal defect, mitral valve insufficiency, 

postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome, seizures, neurocardiogenic syncope and 

palpitations, mild mental retardation, Asperger’s syndrome, ADHD, developmental 

delay, speech delay, short stature disorder, growth hormone deficiency, facial 

dysmorphism, hearing loss, and failure to thrive.3 Due to his many disabilities, Mr. 

Young, age eighteen, speaks, understands, performs math, and reads at a third 

grade level for which he receives private tutoring. This tutoring was to have

occurred at the Degenstein Community Library, Sunbury, Pennsylvania. Prior to 

the onset of the tutoring, Mr. Young and his father met with the library staff. Mr. 

Young’s father explained the nature of Mr. Young’s disabilities and asked them to 

call him if they experienced any issues with Mr. Young. 

With that background in mind, on October 30, 2014, Mr. Young, then age 

seventeen, experienced a “serious health emergency in the form of an episode of a 

neurocardiogenic syncope/tonic-clonic seizure” while he was at the Degenstein 

 

3 ECF No. 1 at ¶ 8.

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Community Library waiting to begin a tutoring session.4 During the seizure, Mr. 

Young fell to the floor and began moving in an unusual fashion, which included 

tugging at his loose-fitting clothing. A library staff member observed this behavior 

but reported to the library director that she had witnessed Mr. Young lying on the 

floor, exposing himself, and masturbating. The library director proceeded to call 

911 and reported the staff member’s observations. 

Police officers from the Sunbury Police Department were dispatched and 

Officer Gary Heckman arrived on the scene, followed minutes later by Officer 

Christopher Blaise. The officers proceeded to arrest Mr. Young. As Mr. Young 

was escorted through the library parking lot, Officer Blaise, who knew Mr. Young 

and his father, shouted to Mr. Young’s father, who was then returning to the 

library, that Mr. Young had been “masturbating” and that he was being taken to the 

police station. 

At the police station, the police proceeded to interrogate Mr. Young, 

refusing to allow Mr. Young to see his father and denying his father’s request to 

obtain medical care for his son. After Mr. Young’s father spoke to Officer 

Heckman and informed him of Mr. Young’s disability and need for medical care, 

Officer Heckman replied, “I don’t buy it. He knows what he’s doing.”5 Mr. Young 

was eventually released into his father’s custody and transported to a hospital 

 

4

Id. at ¶ 12-14.

5

Id. at ¶ 28-29.

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where he was admitted for two days of treatment to stabilize him after the seizure.

Mr. Young’s arrest led to charges that were subsequently dismissed as baseless.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may file a 

motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 

Such a motion “tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading” and “streamlines litigation 

by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.”6“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes 

a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”7This is true of 

any claim, “without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or 

on a close but ultimately unavailing one.”8

Beginning in 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States initiated what 

some scholars have termed the Roberts Court’s “civil procedure revival” by

significantly tightening the standard that district courts must apply to 12(b)(6) 

motions.9In two landmark decisions, Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly and 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Roberts Court “changed . . . the pleading landscape” by 

“signal[ing] to lower-court judges that the stricter approach some had been taking 

was appropriate under the Federal Rules.”10 More specifically, the Court in these 

 

6

 In re Hydrogen Peroxide Litigation, 552 F.3d 305, 316 n.15 (3d Cir. 2008) (Scirica, C.J.) (quoting Szabo v. 

Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.)). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 

319, 326–27 (1989).

7

 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 73 (1984)).

8

 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

9

 Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 Rev. Litig. 313 (2012).

10

 550 U.S. 544 (2007); 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Wasserman, supra at 319–20.

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two decisions “retired” the lenient “no-set-of-facts test” set forth in Conley v. 

Gibson and replaced it with a more exacting “plausibility” standard.11

Accordingly, after Twombly and Iqbal, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’”12 “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”13 “Although the 

plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a 

pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.”14 Moreover, “[a]sking for plausible grounds . . . calls for enough facts 

to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 

[wrongdoing].”15

The plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”16 No matter 

the context, however, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent 

with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and 

 

11

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)) (“[a]cknowledging that Twombly retired the 

Conley no-set-of-facts test”).

12

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

13

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

14

 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., No. 14-3792, 2016 WL 106159, at *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2016) (Jordan, J.) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted).

15

 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

16

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

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plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”17

When disposing of a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all 

factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged 

in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].”18 However, “the tenet that a court 

must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable 

to legal conclusions.”19 “After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or ‘bare-bones’ 

allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss.”20 “Threadbare recitals of 

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.”21

As a matter of procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 

Circuit has instructed that:

Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court 

reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it 

must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a 

claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no 

more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 

Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court 

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.22

 

 

17

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotations omitted)).

18

 Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (Nygaard, J.).

19

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted).

20

 Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (Nygaard, J.).

21

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

22

 Connelly, 2016 WL 106159, at *4 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

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III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Young’s complaint consists of a claim against the Sunbury Police 

Department for violations of the ADA and RA (Count I) and a claim against 

Officers Gary Heckman and Christopher Blaise for violations of the Fourteenth 

and Eighth Amendments for a denial of medical care under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(Count III).

23 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants seek to dismiss both counts of 

Mr. Young’s complaint. The Court will address these issues in turn.

A. Count I

Defendants request that the Court dismiss Count I of Mr. Young’s complaint 

because Mr. Young failed to demonstrate a prima facie claim for a violation of the 

ADA and the RA. Specifically, Defendants’ submit that the ADA and the RA are 

inapplicable to this case because the Third Circuit has never held that either the 

ADA or the RA apply to arrest cases. In the absence of Circuit precedent, they cite 

decisions from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth 

Circuits for the proposition that “this Court should not use the ADA or the RA to 

circumscribe an officer’s ability to arrest Plaintiff because of an alleged mental 

disability.”24 Mr. Young, conversely, argues that he has adequately pled facts to 

demonstrate a prima facie claim under the ADA and RA and cites cases from both 

this Court and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

 

23 ECF No. 1. Count II, for violations of the ADA and RA asserted against the Degenstein Community Library, was 

voluntarily dismissed by Mr. Young. ECF No. 24. 

24 ECF No. 19 at 6.

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Pennsylvania holding that the ADA and RA apply to arrest cases under the 

“wrongful arrest” and the “reasonable accommodations” theories. 

Defendants also argue that Mr. Young has failed to satisfy the requirements 

of Ashcroft v. Iqbal25 because he failed to plead any facts 1) which tend to 

demonstrate that he was discriminated against or arrested because of his disability, 

2) establishing that the Sunbury Police Department had a record of, or that Officers 

Heckman and Blaise had prior knowledge of, Mr. Young’s disabilities, or 3) which 

suggest that the Sunbury Police Department receives federal financial assistance.26

Defendants also argue that Mr. Young’s request for compensatory damages under 

the ADA and RA must be dismissed because compensatory damages are 

unavailable absent a showing of intentional discrimination and Mr. Young fails to 

plead any facts to support a finding of intentional discrimination.

In response, Mr. Young argues that he has pled sufficient facts to establish 

that the officers had knowledge of Mr. Young’s disability and need for medical 

care and that he was discriminated against because of his disability. He further 

argues that the Third Circuit held, in Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E. for 

M.E,

27 that a plaintiff need not prove intentional discrimination to recover 

 

25 556 U.S. at 678.

26 This Court acknowledges that Mr. Young has failed to allege that the Sunbury Police Department receives federal 

financial assistance. Defendants, however, in bringing this argument, fail to contest the assumption that it does. 

Therefore, in light of the fact that this motion to dismiss is denied, this Court will assume that the Sunbury Police 

Department receives federal financial assistance.

27 172 F.3d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 1999).

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compensatory damages under the ADA and RA, but that regardless of this holding, 

he adequately pled facts supporting intentional discrimination.

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability 

shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied 

the benefits of the services, programs, or activities by a public entity, or be 

subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”28 Pursuant to Section § 504 of the 

RA, “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability... shall, solely by reason 

of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits 

of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 

Federal financial assistance . . .”29

For purposes of the ADA, the term “disability” is defined as “a physical or 

mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” 

which include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, 

eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, 

reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”30 Major life 

activities also include “the operation of a major bodily function, including but not 

limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, 

 

28 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

29 29 U.S.C. § 794.

30 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).

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bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive 

functions.”31

1. Police activity under the ADA and RA

Both Mr. Young and Defendants properly indicate that the Third Circuit has 

yet to address the issue of whether or not arrest cases fall under the ADA and RA. 

Defendants argue that this Court should apply the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in 

Hainze v. Richards,

32 which held that: 

Title II does not apply to an officer's on-the-street responses to 

reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those 

calls involve subjects with mental disabilities, prior to the officer's 

securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to human 

life. Law enforcement personnel conducting in-the-field investigations 

already face the onerous task of frequently having to instantaneously 

identify, assess, and react to potentially life-threatening situations. To 

require the officers to factor in whether their actions are going to 

comply with the ADA, in the presence of exigent circumstances and 

prior to securing the safety of themselves, other officers, and any 

nearby civilians, would pose an unnecessary risk to innocents. While 

the purpose of the ADA is to prevent the discrimination of disabled 

individuals, we do not think Congress intended that the fulfillment of 

that objective be attained at the expense of the safety of the general 

public.

Several district courts within the Third Circuit, however, have declined to 

follow Haize unless clearly “exigent circumstances” were present at the time of the 

 

31 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

32 207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2000).

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arrest.33 Putting the rationale of Haize aside, there are two theories under which 

police actions have been found to fall under the ADA and RA: the “wrongful 

arrest” theory and the “reasonable accommodation” theory.34 These theories are 

clearly explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 

Gohier v. Enright.

35

The “wrongful arrest” theory is applicable when “police wrongly arrested 

someone with a disability because they misperceived the effects of that disability 

as criminal activity.”

36 Alternatively, the “reasonable accommodations” theory 

applies when police investigate and arrest a person with a disability for a crime 

unrelated to that disability, but fail to “reasonably accommodate the person's 

disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer 

greater injury or indignity in that process than other arrestees.”

37

 

33 See Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 237 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (Kane, J.) (“The Hainze rationale 

for disallowing ADA claims when the challenged conduct occurred during ‘exigent circumstances’ does not apply 

here, and this Court believes that the Third Circuit would agree.”), see also Mohney v. Pa., 809 F. Supp. 2d 384, 399 

(W.D. Pa. 2011), Broadwater v. Fow, 945 F. Supp. 2d 574, 591, n. 15 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (Connor, J.) (“The 

[defendants] urge the court to adopt the Fifth Circuit's holding in [Hainze], which held that the ADA does not apply 

to police officers' actions during an arrest. The court's esteemed colleague, the Honorable Yvette Kane, Chief Judge, 

undertook a thorough refutation of the Hainze opinion in [Schorr], which the court adopts in toto.”), Hogan v. City 

of Easton, 2004 WL 1836992, *7 (E.D. Pa. August 17, 2004) (court did not apply Hainze as “the situation was under 

control and no one was in danger.”).

34 Schorr, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 238-9 (citing Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999)).

35 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999).

36 Id. at 1220-1 (internal citations omitted).

37 Id.

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2. Prima Facie Case for Compensatory Damages under the ADA and RA

The substantive standards for determining liability under the ADA and RA 

are the same.38 Accordingly, to make a prima facie case under ADA or the RA, the 

plaintiff must establish that:

(1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) he was 

excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, 

programs, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to 

discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of his disability.39

While Defendants properly note that the Third Circuit has not yet spoken on 

the issue of compensatory damages under Title II of the ADA, this Court has 

previously held that compensatory damages are available under the RA and the 

ADA.40 As noted above, Mr. Young cites to Ridgewood Bd. Of Educ. v. N.E. for 

M.E.,

41 for the proposition that “a plaintiff need not prove that defendants’ 

discrimination was intentional” to recover compensatory damages under the ADA 

and RA. 

This Court, however, previously considered the Ridgewood holding in Baker 

v. Southern York County School District42 and found, instead, that a plaintiff “must 

present sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination to survive summary 

 

38 Defreitas v. Montgomery Cnty. Corr. Facility, 525 Fed. Appx. 170, 178 n. 13 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing McDonald v. 

Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 94–95 (3d Cir. 1995).

39 Defreitas, 525 Fed. Appx. at 178 (citing Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 475 F.3d 524, 553 n. 32 (3d 

Cir. 2007)).

40 Baker v. Southern York Cnty. Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 6561434 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2012) (Connor, J.).

41 172 F.3d 238, 253(3d Cir. 1999).

42 2012 WL 6561434 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2012).

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judgment on his compensatory damages claim.”43 Moreover, the Court, in Baker,

further applied the deliberate indifference standard to determine intentional 

discrimination.44 “Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a 

federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that . . .

likelihood.”

45 The public entity is on notice that an accommodation is required 

when either the plaintiff has alerted the public entity to his need for 

accommodation or “where the need for accommodation is obvious.”46 A “failure 

to act must be a result of conduct that is more than negligent, and involves an 

element of deliberateness.”

47

In paragraphs eight through ten of Mr. Young’s complaint, Mr. Young avers 

that he is a qualified individual with a disability and provides a comprehensive list 

of his physical and mental disabilities and indicates that he resides with his father, 

who provides his daily care. Consequently, this Court concludes that Mr. Young 

has pled sufficient facts to allege that he is a qualified, disabled individual under 

the ADA.

 

43 Baker, 2012 WL 6561434 at *3 (citing Kaitlin C. ex rel. Shannon M. v. Cheltenhap Tp. Sch. Dist., 2010 WL 

786530 (E.D. Pa. March 5, 2010) (“We agree with our sister court's reasoning in Kaitlin C. that ‘[t]here is no 

indication that the court's statement in Ridgewood was intended to apply to § 504 claims seeking compensatory 

damages.’ The Kaitlin C. court conducted an in-depth analysis of the Rehabilitation Act's remedies provision as well 

as Supreme Court precedent to support its conclusion that compensatory damages under § 504 require a showing of 

intentional discrimination.”)

44 Baker, 2012 WL 6561434 at *3 (citing Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Bartlett v. N.Y. State Board of Law Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2d Cir. 1998) rev’d on other grounds, 527 U.S. 

1031 (1999); Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999); Ferguson v. City of Phx., 157 

F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998) (which described both the current “intentional discrimination” standard and a 

“discriminatory animus” standard which was later rejected by Duvall.)).

45 Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139.

46 Id.

47 Id.

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Mr. Young also pleads the he suffered a seizure which caused him to fall to 

the floor, move in an unusual fashion, and tug at his loose-fitting clothing.48 He 

further alleges that he was arrested as a direct result of this seizure, after a library 

staff member called the police when she erroneously believed Mr. Young was 

exposing himself and masturbating.49 Again, this Court concludes that Mr. Young 

has pled enough facts to establish that he was wrongfully arrested because of a 

misperception that the effect of the disability was, instead, criminal activity.

Finally, Mr. Young further pleads that, after his arrest, Mr. Young’s father 

notified police that Mr. Young was in medical distress and needed medical care.50

Mr. Young alleges that the police refused to permit Mr. Young’s father to see him 

and refused to provide medical care for him, and instead proceeded to interrogate 

him, without his father being present.51 Mr. Young pleads that because of police 

conduct, he experienced delay in treatment, pain and suffering, embarrassment, 

emotional trauma, fear of police, authority figures, and the general public, and 

humiliation.52 As above, Mr. Young has pled sufficient facts to establish that 

Defendants failed to reasonably accommodate his disability in the course of his 

arrest, which caused him to suffer injury.

 

48 ECF No. 1, ¶ 14.

49 Id. at ¶ 15-16.

50 Id. at ¶ 26.

51 Id. at ¶¶ 26-28.

52 Id. at ¶ 31.

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That said, Mr. Young must plead enough facts to establish that Defendants 

acted with deliberate indifference; he must establish that Defendants were on 

notice that Mr. Young required an accommodation and that they failed to act. Here, 

Mr. Young pled that Officer Blaise knew Mr. Young and his father personally and 

knew of Mr. Young’s disabilities.53 Mr. Young also pled that Officer Heckman 

became aware of Mr. Young’s abnormal behavior and that he concluded that he at 

least had a speech impediment and a learning disability.54 Defendants were 

subsequently told by Mr. Young’s father that he suffered from disabilities and that 

he required immediate medical attention.55 Officer Heckman replied that he did not 

“buy it” and that Mr. Young knew what he was doing.56

This Court concludes that Mr. Young has pled sufficient facts to make an 

argument that Mr. Young’s need for an accommodation was at least obvious, that 

the Defendants failed to act, and that their failure to act was more than negligent 

because they were told by Mr. Young’s father of his need for medical attention and 

nevertheless refused to provide it.

At this early stage in the litigation, Mr. Young has pled sufficient facts to 

establish a prima facie claim for compensatory damages under the ADA and RA.

These claims survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

 

53 Id. at ¶¶ 17, 25.

54 Id. at ¶ 20.

55 Id. at ¶ 26.

56 Id. at ¶ 29. 

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B. Count III

Defendants also seek dismissal of the Section 1983 claims against Officers 

Heckman and Blaise on the theory that the officers are entitled to qualified 

immunity because their conduct was not clearly unlawful. Defendants also claim 

that Mr. Young has failed to assert a claim under the Eighth and/or Fourteenth 

Amendments for a denial of medical care because he failed to allege any facts that 

would demonstrate that the officers were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Young’s 

medical condition or that they sought to punish him by denying him medical care. 

Defendants argue that the claims against the officers, like the claims against the 

Sunbury Police Department, are simply conclusory statements that fail to satisfy 

the pleading standard enunciated in Iqbal and Twombly. Lastly, Defendants seek to 

dismiss Mr. Young’s request for punitive damages against the officers because he 

fails to plead any allegations of egregious or wanton conduct. 

The law recognizes that police officers are generally protected by qualified 

immunity but can nevertheless be liable under Section 1983 if they are found to 

have violated an individual’s constitutional rights. In Saucier v. Katz,

57 the 

Supreme Court of the United States articulated a two-pronged test for courts to 

administer to determine whether or not a police officer is entitled to qualified 

immunity.

 

57 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).

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Under the Saucier test, a court must first decide if, taken in the light most 

favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show that the officer’s 

conduct violated a constitutional right.58 If a violation of a constitutional right 

could be found, the court must also determine “whether the right was clearly 

established.”59 A right is clearly established if “a reasonable official would 

understand that what he is doing violates that right.”60 “[E]xisting precedent must 

have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”61 Saucier and 

its progeny allow officers the flexibility to make reasonable but mistaken 

judgments and “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 

violate the law.’”62

The two-pronged Saucier test was reexamined by the Supreme Court in 

Pearson v. Callahan.

63 The Pearson Court diluted Saucier, holding that while the 

sequence of the two-pronged test may be appropriate in some circumstances, it is 

no longer mandatory. The decision as to which of the two prongs should be 

examined first is left to the sound discretion of the district court and in light of the 

circumstances of the particular case at hand.

64

 

 

58 Id.

59 Id.

60 Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

61 Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 350 (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 at ––––, 131 S. Ct. 2074 at 2083 (2011)).

62 Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 350 (citing al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at ––––, 131 S. Ct. at 2085 (internal citations omitted)).

63 555 U.S. 223 (2009)

64 Id. at 236.

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The Supreme Court of the United States held in Estelle v. Gamble,

65 that 

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” proscribed by the Eighth 

Amendment.66 Not all “inadvertent failure[s] to provide adequate medical care” to 

prisoners, however, become cognizable claims under the Eighth Amendment.67

“[A] prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”

68

While Mr. Young was not a convicted prisoner at the time of the alleged 

violation, the Supreme Court has held that the “Fourteenth Amendment affords 

pretrial detainees protections ‘at least as great as the Eighth Amendment 

protections available to a convicted prisoner.’”

69 The Third Circuit has further 

applied the deliberate indifference standard to arrestees.70

To find that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference to an arrestee’s 

medical needs, the arrestee must show that he had a serious medical need and that 

acts or omissions by the defendant indicated deliberate indifference to that 

need.71 Therefore, Mr. Young must plead sufficient facts to establish that Officers 

Heckman and Blaise knew of the risk to Mr. Young and nevertheless disregarded 

 

65 429 U.S. 97 (1976).

66 Id. at 104 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).

67 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.

68 Id. at 106.

69 Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003)(citing City of Revere v. 

Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)).

70 Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636–37 (3d Cir. 1995).

71 See Gunter v. Township of Lumberton, 535 Fed. Appx. 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Natale, 318 F.3d at 582).

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it.72 To that end, Mr. Young alleged that Officer Blaise knew Mr. Young and his 

father personally and knew of Mr. Young’s disabilities.73 Mr. Young further pled 

that, while at the library and prior to arresting Mr. Young, Officer Heckman 

“immediately perceived that Plaintiff was behaving abnormally and concluded that 

he at least had a speech impediment and a learning disability” based upon 

interaction with Mr. Young.

74

After arresting Mr. Young and transporting him to the police station, 

Defendants were told by Mr. Young’s father that he suffered from disabilities and 

that he required immediate medical attention.75 As has been previously noted, 

Officer Heckman replied that he did not “buy it” and that Mr. Young knew what he 

was doing.76 Mr. Young pled that he was “eventually” released to the custody of 

his father, who transported him to the hospital, where he was admitted for two days 

in order to stabilize him after the neurocardiogenic syncope/tonic-clonic seizure.77

Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Mr. Young, as the 

Court is obliged to do, and mindful of existing precedent as delineated above, the 

Court believes that Mr. Young has sufficiently pled that Defendants violated a 

 

72 Id.

73 ECF No.1 at ¶¶ 17, 25.

74 Id. at ¶ 20.

75 Id. at ¶ 26.

76 Id. at ¶ 29. 

77 Id. at ¶ 30.

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constitutional right to receive medical care and that Officers Heckman and Blaise 

knew of the risk to Mr. Young and nevertheless disregarded it.

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Counts I and III pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)78 is denied.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

 

78 ECF No. 18.

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