J-A10009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TAQI BROWER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1566 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 19, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004646-2019

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TAQI BROWER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1567 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 19, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005176-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED JULY 18, 2023

Taqi Brower appeals1from the judgments of sentence entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on October 19, 2021, following 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Brower filed separate notices of appeal under the two lower court dockets 

involved. We consolidated the appeals sua sponte as they raised identical 

challenges to the PCRA court’s order.
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his guilty pleas to possessing a concealed firearm without a license, 

aggravated assault, possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”), simple assault, 

and recklessly endangering another person. On appeal, Brower challenges his 

guilty plea and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review, 

we affirm. 

On November 6, 2019, Brower, represented by counsel, pled guilty 

under both of the above dockets. Two years later, on October 19, 2021, the 

trial court sentenced Brower to an aggregate term of sixteen to thirty-two 

years’ incarceration. The trial court denied Brower’s post sentence motions to 

reconsider sentence. This timely appeal followed. 

In his first issue, Brower contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently entered because the trial court failed to conduct 

a proper colloquy. In response to Brower’s claim of error, the Commonwealth 

argues that this issue was waived. See Commonwealth's Brief, at 6. We are 

constrained to agree.

“A defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea on 

direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy or file a motion to 

withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing.” Commonwealth v. 

Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609-10 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “Failure 

to employ either measure results in waiver.” Id. at 610. 
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Here, Brower did not file any post-sentence motions to withdraw his 

guilty pleas.2 Nor did Brower raise any claim regarding the voluntariness of 

his pleas during the plea hearing. Moreover, while Brower sought, and was 

granted, reinstatement of his direct appeal rights, he did not seek 

reinstatement of his right to file a post-sentence motion. Therefore, Brower 

waived his challenge to his guilty plea by failing to preserve the argument. 

See id. at 610. 

In his second and final issue, Brower challenges the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. “Generally, a plea of guilty amounts to a waiver of all 

defects and defenses except those concerning the jurisdiction of the court, the 

legality of the sentence, and the validity of the guilty plea.” Commonwealth 

v. Reichle, 589 A.2d 1140, 1141 (Pa. Super. 1991). “[T]he determination of 

whether discretionary aspects of sentencing may be challenged after a guilty 

plea is entered depends upon the actual terms of the plea bargain, specifically, 

to what degree a sentence agreement has been reached.” Commonwealth 

v. Dalberto, 648 A.2d 16, 18 (Pa. Super. 1994). 

Where the plea agreement provides specific penalties, an appeal from a 

discretionary sentence will not stand; however, where the plea agreement 

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2 As noted above, Brower did file a post-sentence motion under each docket; 

however, the motions only challenged the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. See Post-Sentence Motion to Reconsider Sentence, 10/28/21; see 

also Supplemental Motion to Reconsider Sentence, 1/23/22. 
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provides for no sentencing restrictions, the entry of a guilty plea will not 

preclude a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing. See id. at 

20. When the plea agreement falls somewhere between a negotiated plea 

and an open plea, we must determine the effect of the hybrid plea agreement 

on the right to challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See id. at 

21. Here, Brower entered an open guilty plea that did not purport to limit the 

sentencing court’s discretion in any way. Therefore, he may challenge the 

discretionary aspects of the sentence. See id.

We review discretionary sentencing challenges with great deference to 

the sentencing court: 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. 

Commonwealth v. Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1123 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). However, “[a] challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence must be considered a petition for 

permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a claim is not absolute.” 

Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). 

To invoke this Court’s jurisdiction over this issue, Brower must satisfy a 

four-part test: 
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(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see 

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief 

has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted; brackets in original). 

Here, Brower preserved his issue through timely post-sentence motions 

to modify his sentence, and filed a timely appeal. Further, counsel has included 

the required Rule 2119(f) statement. We therefore review the Rule 2119(f) 

statement to determine if Brower has raised a substantial question. 

We must examine Brower’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine 

whether a substantial question exists. See Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 

A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Our inquiry must focus on the reasons for 

which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, 

which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. (citation 

and emphasis omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). 

Brower “must show that there is a substantial question that the sentence 

imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” McAfee, 849 A.2d at 

274 (citation omitted). That is, “the sentence violates either a specific 

provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a 

particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.” Tirado, 870 

A.2d at 365. “Additionally, we cannot look beyond the statement of questions 
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presented and the prefatory 2119(f) statement to determine whether a 

substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Provenzano, 50 A.3d 148, 

154 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

Brower asserts his sentence is manifestly unreasonable because the trial 

court imposed an excessive sentence and failed to state its reasons for 

departing from the guidelines on the record. This claim raises a substantial 

question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Garcia-Rivera, 983 A.2d 

777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Where an excessive sentence claim is based on deviation from the 

sentencing guidelines, we look for an indication that the 

sentencing court understood the suggested sentencing range. 

When there is such an indication, the sentencing court may 

deviate from the sentencing guidelines 

to fashion a sentence which takes into account the 

protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant, and the gravity of the particular offenses as it 

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and the 

community, so long as the court also states of record the 

factual basis and specific reasons which compelled him to 

deviate from the guideline range. 

Thus, simply stated, the sentencing guidelines are merely 

advisory and the sentencing court may sentence a defendant 

outside the guidelines as long as the sentencing court places its 

reasons for doing so on the record. 

Tirado, 870 A.2d at 366 (citations omitted). 

Brower has a prior record score of 0, and the offense gravity score for 

aggravated assault is 11. The trial court applied the deadly weapon used 

enhancement, for which the sentencing guidelines recommend a minimum 

sentence of fifty-four to seventy-two months, plus or minus twelve months for 
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aggravating or mitigating circumstances. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.17(b). The 

firearm charge has an offense gravity score of 9, and calls for a basic guideline 

sentence of twelve to twenty-four months, plus or minus twelve months for 

aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court imposed consecutive 

sentences for an aggregate term of sixteen to thirty-two years’ incarceration. 

These sentences far exceed the aggravated range of the sentencing 

guidelines. In fact, the trial court imposed a sentence which is nearly double 

even the aggravated range of the guidelines for each offense and directed 

them to run consecutively to one another. 

To begin, the court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report. 

See N.T., 10/19/21, at 33 (trial court answering affirmatively to defense 

counsel’s statement that everyone had the opportunity to consider the PSI 

report). Thus, we must 

presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant 

information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed 

those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A 

pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for itself .... 

Having been fully informed by the pre-sentence report, the 

sentencing court’s discretion should not be disturbed. This is 

particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where it can 

be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of awareness of 

the sentencing considerations, and there we will presume also that 

the weighing process took place in a meaningful fashion. It would 

be foolish, indeed, to take the position that if a court is in 

possession of the facts, it will fail to apply them to the case at 

hand. 

Commonwealth v. Hallock, 603 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation 

omitted). See also Tirado, 870 A.2d at 368. 
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Additionally, at sentencing, the court considered the arguments of 

counsel, the victim statements, and Brower’s allocution. Further, the court 

acknowledged twice that it considered the guidelines. See N.T., 10/19/21, at 

33-34. The court also made it clear it had considered the § 9721(b) sentencing 

factors. See id. at 34. Under these circumstances, we cannot find that the 

trial court abused its discretion.3 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/18/2023

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3 Brower additionally argues the court failed to consider the PSI and mitigating 

circumstances. As we stated above, we find the court considered the PSI 

report. Accordingly, we presume the judge was aware of all sentencing 

factors, including mitigating circumstances. See Tirado, 870 A.2d at 368. 
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