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79–952 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–10] 

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING 

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 27, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

CATHERINE MCELROY, Counsel 

TIM MCCLEES, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, February 27, 2013, The Role of Intelligence in the Department 

of Defense ............................................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, February 27, 2013 .............................................................................. 9 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2013 

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities 8 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities ...................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Flynn, LTG Michael T., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency ................. 5 

Vickers, Dr. Michael G., Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Vickers, Dr. Michael G., joint with LTG Michael T. Flynn .......................... 13 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS

AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 27, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:05 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The subcommittee will come to order. And let 

me thank the witnesses and guests for your patience, as we have 

had votes that went on longer than expected. The other administrative note is that Mr. Langevin is on his way and will be here momentarily. But I want to go ahead and begin the hearing, and 

whenever he arrives, before or after, we will give him the opportunity to make his opening statement. 

I want to welcome members, witnesses, and guests to this hearing on the role of intelligence in the Department of Defense [DOD]. 

I suspect our witnesses will agree that the central role of intelligence is growing rapidly for our warfighters and for the Nation 

as a whole in an increasingly complex, fast-changing world. And as 

one of our witnesses testified at our last hearing, today there is no 

part of the world that we can ignore. Clause 1(c) of rule X of the 

House rules place responsibility on the House Armed Services 

Committee for, quote, ‘‘tactical intelligence and intelligence-related 

activities of the Department of Defense,’’ end quote. 

While the overall committee has always followed these issues 

closely, Chairman McKeon decided this year that we should focus 

more closely on the array of military intelligence issues. The committee rules now assign this subcommittee with responsibility for 

intelligence policy, including coordination of military intelligence 

programs, national intelligence programs, and DOD elements that 

are part of the Intelligence Community. 

The fact that Mr. Langevin, Chairman Miller, Dr. Heck, and I 

also serve on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence helps ensure that Congress fulfills its responsibilities to the 

American people in conducting independent oversight and in making budgetary decisions on these crucial programs and agencies. 

Having responsibility for military intelligence, science and technology, special operations, cyber, and counter-weapons of mass de-
2 

struction [WMD] helps give this subcommittee a broad and more 

integrated picture of many of the most challenging national security issues facing our Nation. Of course, these capabilities are some 

of those that we would undoubtedly rely upon in meeting some of 

the threats that arise, but they are also some of the capabilities 

that can help identify and prevent threats before they arise. Having both intelligence oversight and operational oversight enables us 

to have a more complete view of all that faces our warfighters. 

Today we want to look at the role intelligence plays in the Department of Defense. A primary focus for us will always be whether 

and how DOD intelligence is meeting the needs of the warfighters, 

wherever they are and whatever they may be asked to do. We also 

want to examine DOD’s current intelligence requirements, including gaps in our knowledge and capabilities, integration of intelligence with military planning, organization and personnel issues, 

as well as DOD support to and from the broader Intelligence Community. 

We all, on both sides of the river, have our hands full. As the 

witnesses note in their written statement, intelligence budgets are 

declining even before the across-the-board cuts known as sequestration begin on Friday. But the world is not getting any safer. It 

is not getting any less complex. We have limited resources, but unlimited problems. That is part of what makes intelligence so crucial. 

More than ever, I think it is essential that the administration 

and those in uniform work together with us in Congress to use our 

resources as efficiently and as effectively as possible. And I look 

forward to working with both of our distinguished witnesses toward 

that goal. 

At this point, we will turn for the opening statements of our distinguished witnesses, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [USD(I)], Michael G. Vickers, and the Director of Defense 

Intelligence Agency [DIA], Lieutenant General Michael Flynn. And 

then, as I say, when Mr. Langevin gets here, we will have his opening statement. 

Dr. Vickers. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL G. VICKERS, UNDER SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary VICKERS. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry and distinguished members of the committee. General Flynn and I are 

pleased to appear before you today to discuss the importance of intelligence within the Department of Defense. 

The unclassified nature of the opening portion of this hearing 

precludes us from discussing in detail many aspects of Defense Intelligence, as well as sharing some of our greatest successes. We 

welcome the opportunity to meet in closed session to fully discuss 

Defense Intelligence capabilities and contributions with you. 

Before I discuss the importance of Defense Intelligence in achieving our national security objective, I would like to review some of 

our most pressing national security challenges. 

First and foremost, we seek nothing less than the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda—dismantling and defeating core Al Qaeda in the 
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Pakistan-Afghanistan region, defeating its affiliates on the Arabian 

Peninsula, in Iraq and Syria, and in East and North Africa, and 

preventing the group from reconstituting. 

Second, we must successfully transition our mission in Afghanistan. 

Third, as the Arab world undergoes a historic transition, we 

must posture ourselves for the new normal that brings with it increased instability and violence, and we must accelerate the transition to a representative government in Syria. 

Fourth, we must prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems, specifically, but not exclusively, with regard to Iran and North Korea. 

Fifth, we must defend against cyber threats. 

Sixth, we must deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression and ensure our continued access to the global commons and to critical regions such as East Asia. To be successful in this effort, we must 

be able to counter rapidly evolving anti-access/aerial denial threats. 

Seventh, we must ensure that we continue to provide decisive intelligence and decision advantage to our national policymakers, and 

our operators and warfighters, and that we are postured to prevent 

strategic surprise. 

Finally, we must ensure the continued economic leadership of the 

United States. This is the foundation upon which our long-term national security rests. 

At the same time as our intelligence and defense budgets are declining, the challenges, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, are increasing 

and becoming more complex. Intelligence is a major source of U.S. 

advantage. It informs wise policy and it enables precision operations. It is our front line of defense. 

The continued war against Al Qaeda and instability in the Middle East and North Africa requires us to continue to enhance our 

counterterrorism capabilities. Our national security strategy in 

Asia will require significantly different investments over the next 

15 years in order to obtain the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities most appropriate to the unique challenges of 

ensuring access in the Pacific. 

Likewise, countering cyber threats and nuclear proliferation requires new resources, as well as new ways of operating. We are 

also improving our human intelligence capability by implementing 

the Defense Clandestine Service. Lastly, critical intelligence capability, such as our overhead and cryptologic architectures, continue 

to require modernization and recapitalization. Budgetary instability and the prospect of further deep cuts put these investments 

at risk. 

Defense Intelligence is comprised of the DOD organizations, infrastructures, and measures of intelligence and counterintelligence 

components of the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the military services, the three combat support agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency [NSA], and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency [NGIA], and the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO]. I also exercise oversight of the security 

elements of the Department of Defense, including the Defense Security Service [DSS]. 
4 

Defense Intelligence has just under 60,000 civilians and 123,000 

military members supporting our national military intelligence 

missions both here at home and alongside our combat forces worldwide. Defense Intelligence partners at all levels with our counterparts in the broader Intelligence Community [IC], including the Director of National Intelligence [DNI], the Central Intelligence 

Agency [CIA], Department of Homeland Security [DHS], Federal 

Bureau of Investigation [FBI], and numerous other elements. 

Under Titles 10 and 50 of the United States Code, the Secretary 

of Defense has broad policy and budgetary responsibility for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by DOD 

components and personnel. In addition, under Title 50, the Secretary has several specific statutory responsibilities for elements of 

the IC that are part of DOD, including DIA, NGA, NSA, and the 

NRO. 

Consistent with the DNI statutory responsibilities, the Secretary 

is responsible for the continued operation of those elements as effective organizations for the conduct of their missions in order to 

satisfy DOD and IC requirements. Congress established the position of USD(I) in fiscal year 2003, enabling DOD to strengthen its 

management of Defense Intelligence. As the USD(I), I am the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, and security matters, and to that end, 

I exercise his authority, direction, and control over the defense 

agencies and DOD field activities that are defense intelligence, 

counterintelligence [CI], or security components. 

I am also dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence in 

the office of the DNI. The DNI and Secretary of Defense jointly established this position in 2007 to ensure the integration, collaboration, and information sharing between our two organizations. 

My close relationship with Director Clapper, himself a former 

USD(I) and someone intimately familiar with Defense Intelligence, 

enable us to work together seamlessly to manage resources in pursuit of our national security objective. We each manage our respective resource portfolios. The DNI executes the National Intelligence 

Program [NIP]. I execute the Military Intelligence Program [MIP]. 

To characterize the relative scale of our portfolios in the fiscal 

2013 President’s budget request, the NIP totaled $52.6 billion compared to $19.2 billion request to fund the MIP. DOD MIP funds intelligence, CI, and intelligence-related programs, projects, and activities that provide capabilities to effectively meet warfighter operational and tactical requirements. I also oversee the Department’s 

broader Battlespace Awareness Portfolio, which includes the NIP, 

intelligence-related special access programs, and other intelligencerelated activities. 

Let me close, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the 

committee, by thanking you for your support for Defense Intelligence. I am committed to working with the Congress and this 

subcommittee in its new responsibility to find the best way to continue to deliver intelligence advantage to our Nation, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Vickers and General 

Flynn can be found in the Appendix on page 13.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Dr. Vickers. 
5 

General Flynn. 

STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL T. FLYNN, USA, DIRECTOR, 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

General FLYNN. Good afternoon, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking 

Member Langevin and distinguished members of this committee. 

Thanks for the opportunity to discuss the Defense Intelligence 

Agency and our contributions to the Department of Defense. I have 

been the director of DIA now for 7 months and I cannot overemphasize how proud I am to serve our Nation in this capacity. 

As our defense strategy highlights, our Nation is at a moment of 

transition. The global security environment presents increasingly 

complex challenges and a growing list of threats and adversaries. 

The demands on the U.S. intelligence system have skyrocketed in 

recent years and these demands are only expected to increase. 

That said, DIA’s mission is to prevent strategic surprise by providing our warfighters and our national security leaders the best 

intelligence available on foreign nation-state military capabilities 

and military-like capabilities of non-nation-state actors, as well as 

their intentions. With over 16,000 employees in 262 locations 

around the world, including 142 countries and 31 U.S. States, I believe DIA is well postured to accomplish that mission. 

Our workforce boasts an impressive range of skills necessary to 

accomplish our mission. For instance, over 5,000 of our men and 

women have served on one or more deployments in combat zones 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more than 550 employees currently 

are deployed in theater today. Additionally, over 50 percent of 

DIA’s employees are assigned outside of Washington, DC. DIA people have proficiency in 54 languages with more than 500 employees 

who speak a critical language, and we are planning to further expand our language capacity in the coming years. 

DIA’s mission breaks down into two essential tasks, collection 

and analysis, and I would like to begin by outlining our collection 

capabilities first. As Director of DIA, I serve as the Defense Collection Manager, so I ensure that the agency provides robust intelligence collection requirements management that helps drive our 

collection in all-source analysis missions. Much of this activity is in 

direct support of our combatant commands and our service intelligence centers. 

These responsibilities include planning and assessing the Defense Department’s intelligence collection requirements, managing 

the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of the Department, and ensuring the professionalization of the collection management career field. In addition to managing intelligence requirements, our specific collection operational capabilities fall into two 

categories. First is our human intelligence, counterintelligence, and 

Defense Attache ́ System. And second is our measurement and signature intelligence collection capabilities. 

DIA gains vital information from our highly specialized overt and 

clandestine human intelligence [HUMINT] activities. DIA manages 

the Defense Clandestine Service, which leverages our unique military access and proficiencies to fulfill defense and national level intelligence requirements in a fully integrated operational environment with our interagency partners. 
6 

DIA also manages the Defense Attache ́ System, which trains, directs, and supports U.S. military attache ́s assigned to U.S. embassies or consulates in 139 countries around the world. These talented attache ́s work for the U.S. ambassador as members of the 

country team and coordinate military activities with the host nation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DOD equivalents. 

Further, in close coordination with the Defense Clandestine Service and the Defense Attache ́ System, DIA’s counterintelligence professionals identify and neutralize threats posed by hostile foreign 

intelligence and terrorist groups. As Director of DIA, I am also the 

Defense Department HUMINT and CI manager. In this management capacity, DIA leads, directs, and centrally manages the 

worldwide defense HUMINT and CI enterprise by ensuring that 

properly trained HUMINT and CI professionals, fully integrated 

across the defense and national HUMINT and CI communities, coordinate and deconflict their efforts to best support defense and national intelligence collection requirements. 

Second is our measurement and signature collection capability. 

DIA is responsible for managing the policy, requirements, and 

standards for this vital national intelligence mission. Measurement 

and signature intelligence [MASINT] capabilities primarily identify, measure, and track the unique signatures or attributes of all 

foreign military equipment and chemical, biological, and nuclear 

weapons. Aside from this core responsibility, DIA’s technical collectors also use other techniques, such as biometrics, forensics, and 

document and media exploitation, to satisfy tactical to strategic intelligence requirements. While collection is a vital component of 

what we do, the foundation of DIA’s mission is to provide all-source 

defense intelligence analysis in support of our warfighters, our 

military services, our Joint Staff, and our Nation’s policymakers. 

Regardless of its source, whether it comes from open source or 

a Twitter feed, from an agent inside a terrorist group or a scientist 

abroad, from biometric data or a chemical signature left behind 

after a weapons test, or from overhead imagery or a cyber attack, 

DIA collects, analyzes, processes, and disseminates to our customers all-source analysis assessments and key judgments, painting as clear a picture as possible, enabling leaders at all levels to 

make better, more informed decisions. 

We are continuously seeking ways to apply the right mix of classified and open-source information that identifies future national 

security challenges and threats, and the people, trends, movements, ideologies, and social phenomena fueling them. From feedback received across our customer base that I stated above, to include our law enforcement partners and allied and coalition partners, what our analysts produce provides these customers, especially our troops in harm’s way, a more decisive advantage in today’s increasingly complex national security environment. That is 

our litmus test for judging our performance. 

As we transition from a decade of war and hard-won lessons 

learned, DIA is building on the best practices we have learned 

since September 11, 2001. Principally, we are focusing on the integration and fusion of intelligence and operations and the success of 

applying the full range of intelligence capabilities, such as 

HUMINT, signals intelligence [SIGINT], geospatial and cyber, 
7 

against some of the hardest targets we face, whether those are 

state or non-state actors. This all must be done in close collaboration with our Intelligence Community and interagency partners, as 

well as our foreign partners. 

These two essential tasks, collection and analysis, represent critical components in our Nation’s arsenal of intelligence weapons and 

are increasingly in demand during these very uncertain times. Because of the pace of events and this growing uncertainty, we find 

ourselves in an era where strategic warning cycles and timelines 

are much faster than they were even 5 years ago. So in all that 

we do, we must operate at our customers’ speed and inside their 

decisionmaking cycles, no matter the time zone. 

To this end, my goal for DIA is simple: We will remain the best 

defense intelligence agency in the world and continue to provide 

world-class intelligence support to those men and women willing to 

sacrifice for this country. To do so, we must continue to carefully 

recruit, retain, and manage the talent that represents our Nation’s 

national security future. This is vital. 

Before I conclude, I would like to take this opportunity to mention the impact that sequestration will potentially have on DIA. 

First, I am in complete agreement with Under Secretary Vickers 

and his complete statement, and I hope I have made clear that DIA 

is about putting our people first. We cannot accomplish our mission 

without the men and women who serve this Nation so well. The 

impact sequestration will have on an organization which depends 

on human resources for its capability is astoundingly complex and 

far-reaching. There is a geometric impact which includes not only 

the cost of lost opportunity, but also the cost of rebuilding the capability that we stand to lose. 

What we cannot predict is the real impact on national security 

of that lost capability. If we think that our adversaries will use this 

time to take a strategic pause or that we will somehow manage to 

stay ahead of the most potentially catastrophic intelligence issues 

while opting to take cuts against the low-threat areas, then we are 

deluding ourselves. The real cost of this action is in public insecurity and potential strategic surprise. 

Since it is very difficult to prove a negative, there is no way to 

know what we will have missed, nor to appreciate the cost of that 

missing intelligence. At best, we may never know what key intelligence we have missed as a result of sequestration. At worst, I fear 

we may find ourselves rehashing another major intelligence failure. 

Above all else, what defines DIA is the value our people bring 

to our operating forces, our Nation’s military, and national security 

leaders, as well as our coalition and foreign partners who depend 

on our capabilities. Speaking truth to power is critical during these 

uncertain times and no other standard is more important. Thank 

you all for your service to our Nation, and I look forward to the 

questions in closed session. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Flynn and Secretary 

Vickers can be found in the Appendix on page 13.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

I would yield to the distinguished ranking member for any comments he would like to make. 
8 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for 

running behind schedule. I had to speak on the floor just before 

this hearing started. So first of all I want to welcome our witnesses, Secretary Vickers and General Flynn. 

Thank you for your testimony. I certainly look forward to hearing 

more and getting into the questions and answers. 

Most especially, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding 

this hearing. As you are well aware, the Intelligence Community 

is an issue that is of great interest to me, as it is to you, and of 

great importance to this committee and to the Congress. And I am 

certainly pleased that this subcommittee now has jurisdiction over 

intelligence policy within the Department of Defense because, like 

the gentleman from Texas, I also have the benefit of examining intelligence matters from my position on the Select Committee on Intelligence. So it provides great crossover. 

I certainly look forward to working with the gentleman to ensure 

that our intelligence efforts and resourcing are harmonized between the two committees, particularly with regard to the provision 

of timely and accurate intelligence to decisionmakers, the defeat of 

Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and the new geopolitical challenges that 

we face across the globe, and the burgeoning field also of 

cybersecurity. 

It is my goal to make sure that our Intelligence Community is 

properly resourced between the MIP and the NIP and that, wherever possible, it is well coordinated, but also, when necessary, 

deconflicted. 

So with that, in the interest of brevity and maximizing the utility 

of our time today, I would yield back so that we can proceed with 

the classified component of this hearing, but I would be remiss if 

I didn’t first again welcome the panel, Under Secretary Vickers and 

Lieutenant General Flynn, who I might mention is a fellow Rhode 

Islander. 

And great to have you both here, and I certainly look forward to 

our continued work together as we work to move forward. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman. 

And with that, the open portion of this hearing is adjourned, and 

we will reconvene immediately next door in closed classified session. 

[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed 

session.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 27, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 27, 2013 

(13) 
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