Filed 10/6/21 In re K.T. CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re K.T., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B311043

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Q.T.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP00518)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County. Tamara E. Hall, Judge. Affirmed.

Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________________
2

Appellant Q.T. is the father of K.T., born July 2019, 

and Kal. T., born August 2020. J.W. is the minors’ mother. 

On March 2, 2021, the court declared the minors to be dependent 

children of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 300.1 The court removed the minors from Q.T.’s custody. 

Q.T. appealed,2 contending that the court’s orders are not 

supported by substantial evidence. 

We detail the court’s two orders. We then turn to the 

evidence that Q.T. repeatedly committed acts of domestic 

violence. We explain why the domestic violence placed the 

minors at a substantial risk of serious harm. We conclude by 

affirming the court’s orders.

I. The Order Declaring the Minors Dependent Children 

of the Court (§ 300)

The court found “by a preponderance of the evidence that 

all counts of the petition as pled are true.” The two counts 

alleged by the petition are based on subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) of 

section 300.

Subdivision (a) of section 300 focuses on the substantial 

risk that the child will suffer serious physical harm inflicted 

nonaccidentally by the child’s parent.3 The pertinent part of 

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.

2 The appeal is from the dispositional order, i.e., the 

judgment (In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 107, 112) and the 

subsequent order after judgment removing the minors from 

Q.T.’s custody. (§ 395, subd. (a)(1).)

3 “A child who comes within any of the following descriptions 

is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge
3

subdivision (b)(1) is the substantial risk that the child will suffer 

serious physical harm as a result of the failure of the parent to 

protect the child or adequately protect the child from the 

custodian with whom the child has been left.4

In addressing the evidence that supports the allegations of 

the petition, the court also considered evidence generated by 

Kylee F. (hereafter Kylee), born September 2013, whose father 

and mother are respectively L.P. and S.W., the mother of the two 

minors involved in this appeal. Kylee resides with mother S.W. 

Father L.P. and mother S.W. have a joint custody agreement 

regarding Kylee that is not pertinent to this appeal.

The petition relies on the same set of facts to support the 

allegations under subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) of section 300. The 

general thrust of these facts is that appellant Q.T. and mother 

S.W. have a history of engaging in violent verbal and physical 

altercations in the presence of the children. One specific incident 

that person to be a dependent child of the court: [[¶]] “(a) The 

child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will 

suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the 

child by the child’s parent or guardian.” (§ 300, subd. (a).)

4 “A child who comes within any of the following descriptions 

is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge 

that person to be a dependent child of the court. . . . [¶]] (b)(1) 

The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the 

child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of 

the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to 

adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or 

negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately 

supervise protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with 

whom the child has been left.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)
4

that occurred in November 20205 was when Q.T. pushed S.W. 

with his shoulders, while S.W. was holding the infant Kal. T., 

into a dresser, resulting in the dresser and a television falling, 

breaking the television. On another occasion, Q.T. struck S.W. 

with a bag even though she was pregnant. Kylee witnessed 

verbal altercations between Q.T. and S.W. Kylee is afraid of Q.T. 

S.W. has failed to protect the children from Q.T. and has allowed 

him unlimited access to the children.

In ruling on the petition, the court found that mother S.W. 

did not have the ability to protect her children and lacked insight 

into the problem of domestic violence that she was facing. The 

court noted appellant Q.T.’s history of domestic violence with a 

former girlfriend. The incident with the television for which S.W. 

tried to assume responsibility showed she was under the 

influence of Q.T., which is not unusual in domestic violence cases. 

Kylee was found to be a credible witness. The court noted that 

Q.T. and S.W. had had an encounter at a Denny’s restaurant 

which ended with their arrest.

II. The Order Removing the Minors from the Physical 

Custody of Father Q.T. (§ 361)

The court removed both minors from the physical custody 

of their father, Q.T., under the authority of section 361, 

subdivision (c)(1).6 The court found that there was a substantial 

5 The petition states this event occurred in December 2020. 

Subsequent witness statements place this event in November 

2020.

6 “A dependent child shall not be taken from the physical 

custody of his or her parentswith whom the child resides at the 

time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds 

clear and convincing evidence of any of the following
5

danger to the physical health, safety and emotional well-being of 

the minors if the minors were returned home with Q.T.

The court also ordered that the minors were to remain in 

the home of their mother S.W.7 and that the care and custody of 

the minors was under the supervision of the Los Angeles

Departments of Children and Family Services (hereafter the 

Department).

The court ordered monitored visitation for Q.T. with the 

minors which were not to take place in S.W.’s home. S.W. was 

not to be present during the visitations.

The court ordered the Department to provide Q.T. with 

family enhancement services. The court also ordered Q.T. to 

complete a 52-week course in the domestic violence program.

III. The Domestic Violence In Which Q.T. Engaged 

Justifies the Trial Court’s Orders

Appellant points to the facts that the trial court based its 

findings on documentary evidence, that the court never saw Q.T. 

or S.W. in person, and only heard from Q.T. on the telephone. 

Appellant specifically questions the court’s findings that Q.T. and 

S.W. were not credible in that such findings, in order to be 

compelling on appeal, usually rest on the trial court’s personal 

observation of the person. Given these circumstances, appellant 

circumstances listed in paragraphs (1) to (5), inclusive . . . [[¶]] 

(1) There is or would be a substantial danger to the physical 

health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of 

the minor if the minor were returned home.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)

7 This disposition is specifically authorized by subdivision 

(c)(1)(B) of section 361.
6

contends that we should independently review the record. 

We decline this invitation.

“[W]e review both the jurisdictional and dispositional 

orders for substantial evidence. [Citation.] In doing so, we view 

the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s 

determinations, drawing all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings and orders. 

Issues of fact and credibility are the province of the juvenile court 

and we neither reweigh the evidence nor exercise our 

independent judgment. [Citation.] But substantial evidence 

‘is not synonymous with any evidence. [Citations.] A decision 

supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on 

appeal. [Citation.] . . . “The ultimate test is whether it is 

reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in 

light of the whole record.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Yolanda 

L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.) 

The court’s orders are supported by substantial evidence.

S.W.’s statement about the incident with the television shows 

that both Q.T. and S.W. acted out violently. This was S.W.’s 

statement about this incident: “We (mother and [Q.T.] father) 

were living together. The reported incident happened around 

November 2020.[8] We were talking about finances and the kids 

were with my grandma in the front house. Kylee has a tendency 

to be nosey and she came over to see what was taking place while 

we were having words. All of the things from the room were in 

the living room because the room was being painted. While in 

the living room, we (mother and [Q.]T. father) walked past each 

other and he bumped shoulders with me. I went into the dresser 

8 This incident is hereafter referred to as the November 

incident.
7

and the T.V. fell. I got angry and threw his game console. I was 

not holding the baby [Kal. T.]. The T.V. broke. I called the cops 

and he left before they got there. The police told me not to call 

them if we want to be together and advised us to seek counseling 

instead.”

This was not an accidental, neutral encounter. S.W.’s 

statement that “I went into the dresser” indicates a degree of 

force on Q.T.’s part, not just a casual bump or jostle. That she 

then, admittedly angry, “threw his game console” suggests that 

S.W. thought she had been pushed, not simply bumped. And of 

course she would not have called the police if it was nothing but a 

purely accidental encounter. In short, the evidence supports the 

finding that this was a physical altercation between Q.T. and 

S.W.

Kylee put the same incident this way: “I remember when 

they got a new T.V. The room had to get painted and they [Q.T. 

and S.W.] got into a fight. I was there. His PS4 (video console). 

He was always playing with his PS4. I asked him to help because 

[Kal. T.] was crying. He didn’t want to help. He kept playing.

I needed help from Q.T. to make the bottle for [Kal. T.]. She was 

one-year old. She’s still one-year-old. My mom then came home 

from work and they got into a fight. [Q.T.] shoved her onto the 

T.V. [Kal. T.] was in her hands. The T.V. broke when he shoved 

her. The T.V. fell. That’s the end of that story.”

Q.T. admitted that the incident with the T.V. took place. 

However, he claims he only accidentally bumped into S.W. which 

caused her to “back up” to a dresser which in turn made the T.V. 

fall. Nonetheless, Q.T. admits that S.W. “was already mad at 

him” before the T.V. fell and she “grabbed his PlayStation and 

threw it outside the home.” Q.T.’s admission that he left the 
8

house and did not return for two weeks because he did not want 

to go to jail further bolsters that the encounter was violent in 

nature.

As the Department report summarized it: “Although [S.W.] 

reports the arguments with [Q.T.] were not normally physical or 

dangerous, the family has a history of reported incidents to law 

enforcement that have been escalating over time. On one 

occasion, [S.W.] and [Q.T.] engaged in an argument outside of a 

Denny’s restaurant and law enforcement was called which 

resulted in [Q.T.] being arrested.” 

Kylee reported another violent incident that occurred when 

S.W. was pregnant with Kal. T.: “In the morning we came back 

and [Q.T.] was angry because he made food and he threw the 

diaper bag at my mom. She was pregnant with Kal. T. My mom 

called the police. [Q.T.] was hiding in the bathroom with [K.T.] 

and I was really scared. The police asked questions and my mom 

told me not to tell the police that [Q.T.] was here.” Although S.W. 

denied that this incident took place, the details in the statement 

make it more likely than not that Kylee got it right.

Q.T. engaged in domestic violence with another family of 

his in 2018. Q.T. has a child with another mother, L.H. In 2018, 

L.H. reported that Q.T. had threatened to shoot up L.H.’s house. 

L.H. also reported that domestic violence occurred two years 

previously. Q.T. acknowledged an arrest in 2018 for the violence 

involving L.H. He also acknowledged a court hearing in 2019 

also involving L.H. during which the court ordered anger 

management and domestic violence classes.

In In re Nathan E. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 114 (Nathan), 

mother and father began arguing in the bedroom while their 

three children slept in a different bedroom. Father began yelling 
9

at mother, pulled on a necklace she was wearing and, in doing so, 

scratched and clawed at her neck. Father left the bedroom, she 

locked the door, and he then started punching the door before 

fleeing the apartment. (Nathan, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 117.) 

The trial court sustained allegations under subdivisions (a) and 

(b)(1) of section 300, as in the case at bar. (Nathan, supra, 61 

Cal.App.5th at p. 120.) On appeal, mother claimed that since 

domestic violence is not aimed at the child, any harm could not be 

“ ‘inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child’ ” as subdivision (a) of 

section 300 requires. (Ibid.) 

The issue was whether acts of domestic violence between 

the parents create a substantial risk of serious physical harm to 

the child. Significantly, the children in Nathan were not present 

when the domestic violence occurred. Nonetheless, the court in 

Nathan held that domestic violence between the parents did 

create the risk of serious physical harm “inflicted 

nonaccidentally” upon the child by the parents. The court held 

that while many cases have found dependency jurisdiction in 

domestic violence cases under subdivision (b)(1), domestic 

violence between the parents is also grounds for such jurisdiction 

under subdivision (a) of section 300. (Nathan, supra, 61 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 121–122.) The Nathan court cited In re 

Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 598–599 in support 

which had held that exposure of the child to domestic violence 

puts the child to a substantial risk of suffering serious physical 

harm inflicted nonaccidentally by the parent. (Ibid.) The court 

in Nathan “firmly” rejected mother’s contention that domestic 

violence cannot be the basis for jurisdiction under subdivision (a) 

of section 300. (Nathan, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 122.)
10

Nathan stands for the sensible proposition that when the 

parents are embroiled in domestic violence, the child or children 

are in danger of serious physical harm. This is so even if the 

children are not present when the domestic violence occurs. The 

reason for this is the vulnerability of the child in the face of the 

unpredictable outcomes of domestic violence. No one can predict 

the course that parental violence will take once it has been 

unleashed. Nor is there any assurance that the violence will not 

be repeated with unknown consequences, which is a subject we 

address below. 

Nathan is not the only court that has held that even when 

the acts of violence occur in the child’s absence, the child is at 

substantial risk of physical harm. In In re T.V. (2013) 217 

Cal.App.4th 126, 134, father punched mother and knocked her to 

the ground. The minor was not there when this happened. 

Nonetheless, the court concluded that “the domestic violence 

between the parents was ongoing and likely to continue, thus 

placing [the minor] at substantial risk of physical harm.” (Ibid.) 

It is the likelihood of a recurrence of domestic violence that 

justifies judicial intervention. Past violent behavior is the best 

predictor of future violence. (In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th

568, 576, disapproved on a different ground by Conservatorship of 

O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1012.) In this case, there is solid 

evidence that the November incident was not an isolated 

instance. There was the Denny’s restaurant episode which ended 

in Q.T.’s arrest, the time that Q.T. threw a diaper bag at S.W. 

and, very significantly, the bad history with L.H. in 2018 which 

resulted, among other things, in anger management classes for 

Q.T. And S.W. confirms that there have been repeated angry 

confrontations, at least two of which ended by S.W. calling the 
11

police. There is also the fact that Q.T. continues to deny that he 

engages in domestic violence. “A parent’s denial of domestic 

violence increases the risk of recurring.” (In re V.L. (2020) 54 

Cal.App.5th 147, 156.)

The court in this case recognized the danger of recurrence. 

The court ordered Q.T. to complete another 52-week course in 

domestic violence prevention. In doing so, the court denied Q.T. 

credit for the previous course in anger management since that 

course evidently did not make an impression on Q.T. (In re V.L., 

supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.)

We do not agree with Q.T.’s contention that there was no 

physical violence, only argument, between Q.T. and S.W. The 

November incident was a physically violent event, as was the act 

of throwing a diaper bag at S.W. While it is true, as Q.T. states, 

that these acts did not cause physical harm , “[a]ctual harm to a 

child is not necessary before a child can be removed.” (In re V.L., 

supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) “The court need not wait until a 

child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and 

take the steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re R.V. (2012) 

208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843, cited in In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th

766, 773.)

We conclude that both of the court’s orders on appeal were 

justified, and even compelled, by the substantial risk that the 

minors will suffer serious physical harm as a result of the 

domestic violence perpetrated by Q.T.9 The threat of domestic 

violence certainly satisfies subdivision (a) of section 300 in 

9 Q.T. argues the court failed to state facts to support its 

removal order under section 361, subdivision (e). The court, 

however, incorporated its jurisdictional findings and rationale 

into the dispositional hearing.
12

exposing the minors to the risk of serious physical harm. The 

circumstance that S.W. was to an extent complicit in the violent

encounters with Q.T. indicates that she failed to protect the 

minors from Q.T.’s violence. Her admission that she was so 

angry after being pushed into the dresser that she retaliated 

violently by throwing the game console shows her inability to 

distance herself from the violence generated by Q.T. In our view, 

this shows she is unable to protect the minors from Q.T.’s 

violence and which satisfies subdivision (b)(1) of section 300.

IV. The Remainder of the Court’s Orders Are Affirmed

Q.T. contends that the visitation order was an abuse of 

discretion, principally because, according to Q.T., the orders of 

the court finding the children to be dependents of the court and 

removing them from Q.T.’s custody are not supported by the 

evidence. For the reasons set forth above, we do not agree with 

the premise of this argument and therefore reject it.

Independently from the foregoing, we find the court’s 

orders, including the visitation order, to be warranted by the 

facts. It is evident that the overall plan for the family formulated 

by the court was to keep the children with their mother, and keep 

that family unit intact, while distancing Q.T. from the family unit 

without depriving him of access to the children. Given that there 

are no complaints about S.W.’s performance as a mother, with 

the exception of tolerating Q.T.’s violence, it is of course best to 

keep children of such a tender age with their mother. Keeping 

the Department in the picture is also a sound decision in that 

S.W. cannot be completely trusted to keep the children safe from 

Q.T. Limiting Q.T. to supervised visits in locations other than 

S.W.’s home is also the right decision since it protects the 

children and still maintains Q.T.’s access to them. The entire 
13

plan, taken as a whole, leaves the door open to positive changes, 

including changes in and improvement of behavior by Q.T. 

Requiring Q.T. to complete another course in the prevention of 

domestic violence is yet another positive aspect of the court’s 

plan.

Viewed as a whole, the court’s orders, including the 

visitation order, are a sound exercise of the court’s discretion 

based on the facts and circumstances of this case. 

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

OHTA, J. *

We Concur:

GRIMES, Acting P. J. 

WILEY, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.