Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1703-CR-480 | December 15, 2017 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John T. Wilson

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jimmy D. Tanksley,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 15, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A05-1703-CR-480

Appeal from the Madison Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Thomas Newman, 

Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

48C03-1407-FB-1186

Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Jimmy Duane Tanksley appeals the trial court’s revocation of his direct 

placement in a community transition program (“CTP”) and imposition of the 

remainder of his sentence in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). We 

affirm. 

Issues

[2] Tanksley raises the following issues on appeal:

I. whether the trial court exceeded its authority and denied him due 

process in revoking his placement in the CTP;

II. whether the trial court abused its discretion and denied him due 

process in revoking his placement; and

III. whether Tanksley was subjected to multiple punishments for the same 

offense in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy.

Facts

[3] On March 9, 2015, Tanksley pled guilty to Class C felony battery resulting in 

serious bodily injury and admitted to being an habitual offender. On April 6, 

2015, the trial court imposed an eight-year sentence enhanced by twelve years, 

for an aggregate sentence of twenty years, all of which was ordered executed in 

the DOC. The trial court indicated that it would consider sentence 

modification if Tanksley successfully completed the Purposeful Incarceration 

Program, a structured program that included drug and alcohol counseling. 

Tanksley successfully completed the program.
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[4] On September 6, 2016, Tanksley filed a motion for modification of his sentence. 

On October 28, 2016, at the request of the trial court, CTP Coordinator Doug 

Taylor evaluated Tanksley and deemed him a good candidate for sentence 

modification. Tanksley told Taylor that: (1) he had “learned about his triggers 

and how to handle them”; (2) “he feels ‘he’s got no more chances’”; (3) he 

“can’t go out and do the same thing and get different results”; and (4) his longterm goal was to “stay clean.” App. Vol. II pp. 33, 34. On October 31, 2016, 

after a hearing, the trial court modified Tanksley’s sentence and placed him in 

the CTP. The trial court advised Tanksley of its zero-tolerance policy 

(“Policy”) regarding drug and alcohol violations by offenders whose sentences 

had been modified from DOC to the CTP. At the outset of Tanskley’s CTP 

placement, Taylor reviewed the CTP’s rules prohibiting drug and alcohol use 

with him, and Tanksley signed an acknowledgment thereof. 

[5] Tanksley’s residential placement was at a work release center. On December 

12, 2016, after a permitted leave, he returned smelling of alcohol. He 

admitted—verbally and in writing—to drinking whiskey. A urine screen 

revealed that he had also used methamphetamine, amphetamine, opiates, and 

morphine. On January 6, 2017, CTP Coordinator Taylor filed a notice of 

violation with the trial court in which he referenced the application of the 

Policy as follows: “On all modifications from the IDOC to CTP, Judge 

Newman has a ‘ZERO TOLERANCE POLICY’ concerning the use of drugs 

and/or alcohol.” Id. at 36. Tanksley was placed in the Madison County 

correctional complex on December 13, 2016, and received formal notice of the 
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alleged “violation of suspended executed sentence” on approximately January 

26, 2017. Id. at 40. 

[6] On January 23 and 30, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on Tanksley’s 

alleged violation. First, Taylor and Deana Pagnotti testified to the foregoing 

facts on behalf of the CTP. Next, Tanksley testified that he had been making 

steady progress before the violation; that the violation was an isolated incident; 

and that he had accepted responsibility by admitting to the violation.

1

 He also 

denied having prior knowledge of the Policy and argued that the Madison 

County Community Corrections (“MCCC”) had improperly failed to conduct 

an internal hearing regarding the alleged violation, punishable by a CTP 

sanction, before involving the trial court. The trial court found that Tanksley

had violated the conditions of the CTP, revoked his placement, and imposed

his original DOC sentence, stating: 

. . . I was persuaded that Mr. Tanksley would be an appropriate 

person to put in the community transition program by 

modification. It’s unfortunate that Mr. Tanksley apparently was 

not really ready to take advantage of the opportunity that he had 

worked hard to get for himself. He’s violated C. T. P. The court 

modified him to C.T.P., the court now unmodifies him from C. 

T. P. and orders him to be returned to the Department of 

Corrections to serve what I would anticipate would be his 

original sentencing date.

Tr. pp. 46-47. Tanksley now appeals.

 

1 At the hearing on the violation, Tanksley denied using methamphetamine. Tr. p. 17.
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Analysis

I. Authority

[7] Tanksley argues that the trial court exceeded its authority and denied him due 

process in revoking his placement in the CTP. Probation and community 

corrections programs serve as alternatives to commitment to the DOC, and 

both are made at the sole discretion of the trial court. McQueen v. State, 862 

N.E.2d 1237, 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Community corrections is “a program 

consisting of residential and work release, electronic monitoring, day treatment, 

or day reporting[.]” Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-2. A defendant is not entitled to 

serve a sentence in either probation or a community corrections program. Id. 

Rather, placement in either is a “matter of grace” and a “conditional liberty that 

is a favor, not a right.” McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1242 (quoting Cox v. State, 706 

N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999)).

[8] The standard of review of an appeal from the revocation of a community 

corrections placement mirrors that for revocation of probation. Id. A 

revocation of community corrections placement is civil in nature, and the State 

need only prove the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 

The due process requirements for probation revocation hearings are more 

flexible than in a criminal prosecution, “allow[ing] courts to enforce lawful 

orders, address an offender’s personal circumstances, and protect public safety.” 

Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438 (Ind. 2007). Therefore, we review such 

revocation decisions under an abuse of discretion standard. Prewitt v. State, 878 

N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). 
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Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the court must 

make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of 

probation actually has occurred. If a violation is proven, then the 

trial court must determine if the violation warrants revocation of 

the probation. Indiana has codified the due process requirements 

at Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3 by requiring that an evidentiary hearing 

be held on the revocation and providing for confrontation and 

cross-examination of witnesses and representation by counsel. 

When a probationer admits to the violations, the procedural due 

process safeguards and an evidentiary hearing are not necessary. 

Instead, the court can proceed to the second step of the inquiry 

and determine whether the violation warrants revocation. In 

making the determination of whether the violation warrants 

revocation, the probationer must be given an opportunity to 

present evidence that explains and mitigates [his] violation.

Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted), 

trans. denied.

[9] Tanksley argues that he was denied due process of law because an internal 

disciplinary board of the MCCC did not first conduct an internal hearing to 

determine whether he should be removed from the CTP before Taylor asked the 

trial court to revoke his placement; he maintains that the trial court lacked 

authority to so act. 

[10] We initially note that “[t]here is no question that the sentencing court has 

continuing jurisdiction over a defendant such that it may modify or revoke his 

probation.” Montgomery v. State, 58 N.E.3d 279, 282 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 

Our state legislature has specifically and unequivocally conferred upon trial 
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courts the authority to revoke a defendant’s placement in a community 

corrections program. Indiana Code Section 35-38-2.6-5(4) provides in part:

If a person who is placed under this chapter violates the terms of 

the placement, the community corrections director may do any 

of the following:

* * * * *

(4) Request that the court revoke the placement and 

commit the person to the county jail or department of 

correction for the remainder of the person’s sentence. . . .

I.C. § 35-38-2.6-5(4). Due process is satisfied if, during a revocation hearing, 

the defendant is given “‘written notice of the claimed violations, disclosure of 

the evidence against him, an opportunity to be heard and present evidence, the 

right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and a neutral and 

detached hearing body[.]’” Isaac v. State, 605 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1992).

[11] Here, Tanksley received written notice of the alleged violations in December 

2016; Taylor notified the trial court of the violations on January 6, 2017; and 

Tanksley was afforded a hearing on January 23 and 30, 2017, wherein he was 

represented by counsel, confronted and cross-examined witnesses against him, 

and admitted to prohibited drug and alcohol use.2 That the trial court, and not

 

2 As we held in Sanders, it is well-settled that where an offender who is facing revocation of a community 

corrections placement admits to the violation, procedural due process safeguards and an evidentiary hearing 

are unnecessary, and the trial court may simply proceed to determining whether the violation warrants 

revocation. 825 N.E.2d at 955. Under cross-examination, Tanksley testified as follows:
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an internal board of the MCCC, revoked Tanksley’s placement does not 

constitute denial of due process. See id. (affirming trial court’s revocation of 

defendant’s community corrections placement and finding no denial of due 

process where defendant was given notice of alleged violations and an 

opportunity to be heard and to confront witnesses against him); see also Madden 

v. State, 25 N.E.3d 791, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (any argument regarding due 

process denial based on alleged lack of hearing is negated by the fact a hearing 

was in fact provided). 

[12] Based on the foregoing, the trial court acted within its statutory authority and 

continuing sentencing jurisdiction when, at the request of the CTP, it revoked

Tanksley’s placement and reinstituted his remaining DOC sentence for his 

admitted violation of the Policy. He was not denied due process.

 

Q: Why did you use [drugs and alcohol]?

A: Like I said I became complacent. It was a one (1) time thing.

Q: Isn’t it true that you told Mr. Taylor that you thought you could get away with it 

is that true?

A: . . . [Y]eah.

Tr. p. 22. 
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II. Abuse of Discretion3

[13] Tanksley argues that the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the Policy. 

Indiana Code Section 11-10-11.5-11.5(b) provides that “if a person violates a 

CTP rule or any condition established by the sentencing courts,” revocation of 

the offender’s placement and imposition of his remaining sentence may occur. 

Here, Tanksley, who had to complete drug and alcohol counseling in the 

Purposeful Incarceration Program before the trial court would even consider 

modifying his sentence, was well aware of the prohibition on drug and alcohol 

use by CTP participants. At the hearing on the motion to revoke Tanskley’s 

placement, Taylor testified as follows:

A: . . . [A]t the modification hearing Judge Newman umm . . 

. indicates to the offender that he has a zero (0) tolerance 

policy, that’s for the use of drugs or alcohol during the 

program and that would mean that we would report back 

to Judge Newman if there was a situation where that has 

been violated. Normally since the offender basically still 

considered department property of the Department of 

Corrections since they’re finishing DOC time, we would 

not involve the judge’s [sic] on just a regular C. T. P. 

situation but Judge Newman did specify that these 

offenders that are being modified are zero (0) tolerance 

 

3 Tanksley also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing such a harsh sentence, 

particularly given the progress he made before the violations. Trial courts are not required to balance 

“aggravating or mitigating circumstances when imposing sentence in a probation revocation proceeding.” 

Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 59-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Mitchell v. State, 619 N.E.2d 961, 964 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1993)), overruled in part by Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 220, 223 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Moreover, 

violation of a single condition of placement is sufficient to revoke placement. Gosha v. State, 873 N.E.2d 660, 

663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
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have a zero (0) tolerance policy for the use of drugs and 

alcohol. 

Q: And were you at that modification hearing?

A: Yes.

Q: And so it’s your position that the client’s [sic], your 

participants are told in court that day there’s a zero (0) 

tolerance?

A: Yes. 

Tr. p. 31. Taylor also testified that he had personally reviewed the CTP’s “rules 

about the use of drugs and alcohol” with Tanksley, who signed an 

acknowledgment of the same. Id. 

[14] Despite being granted a modification to CTP over the prosecution’s objection, 

Tanksley used methamphetamine, amphetamine, opiates, morphine, and 

whiskey while he was on a permitted leave from work release. We regard the 

trial court’s Policy as an exercise of its continuing sentencing discretion to 

“modify or revoke” a CTP placement. See Montgomery, 58 N.E.3d at 282 n.1. 

Tanksley understood the extent to which the trial court had shown him grace, 

but failed to honor it. See McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1242. We find no abuse of 

discretion or denial of due process from the revocation of Tanksley’s CTP 

placement and imposition of the remaining balance of his DOC sentence. See 

Gosha, 873 N.E.2d at 663 (violation of a single condition of placement is 

sufficient to revoke placement).
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III. Double Jeopardy

[15] Tanksley argues that he was “subjected to multiple punishments for the same 

offense in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy.” Appellant’s Br. 

at p. 15. “[A] violation of a condition of community corrections does not 

constitute an offense within the purview of double jeopardy analysis.” 

McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1244. “Double jeopardy protection applies only to 

criminal proceedings, and revocation of community corrections placement 

proceedings are not criminal proceedings because violations must be proven 

only by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. For these reasons, Tanksley 

cannot establish a double jeopardy violation here.

Conclusion

[16] Tanksley was given a hearing that comported with due process. The trial court 

did not exceed its authority or abuse its discretion in revoking his direct

placement in the CTP. Tanksley also cannot establish a double jeopardy 

violation under the circumstances. We affirm.

Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Mathias, J., concur.