[Cite as State v. Jones , 2012-Ohio-1231.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO : Plaintiff-Appellant : C.A. CASE NO. 24610
vs. : T.C. CASE NO. 11CR319 WILLIAM L. JONES : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellee :

. . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 23 rd day of March, 2012.

. . . . . . . . . Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Pros. Attorney; Johnna M. Shia, Asst. Pros. Attorney, Atty. Reg. No. 0067685, P.O. Box 972, Dayton, OH 45422 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Bahjat M. Abdallah, Atty. Reg. No. 0078504, 15 West Fourth Street, Suite 100, Dayton, OH 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee

. . . . . . . . . GRADY, P.J.:
{¶ 1} This appeal is brought by the State pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A) and 2953.08(B). The State asks us to reconsider our holding in State v. Milby , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23798, 2010-Ohio-6344, on which th e trial court relied when it imposed a sentence pursuant to R.C. 2750.99 for Defendant ’s violation of R.C. 2950.06(A), (F) for2 failure to verify his residence addr ess. We decline to reconsider Milby , and will affirm the judgment of the trial court. {¶ 2} The facts of the present case relevant to the error the State assigns are essentially the same as those in Milby and subsequent decisions in which we followed Milby

. See: State v. Johnson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24029, 2011-Ohio-2069; State v. Alexander , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24119, 2011-Ohio-4015; State v. Pritchett , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24183, 2011-Ohio-5978; and, State v. Alltop , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24324, 2011-Ohio-5541. {¶ 3} In 1981, Defendant was convict ed of attempted rape, a second degree felony. He was subsequently classified by the court in 1997 as a sexual predator, after Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law became effective. That cl assification imposed address notification and verification requirements on Defendant for his lifetime. {¶ 4} In 2008, Ohio adopted a version of the Adam Walsh Act (AWA), which superseded the prior Megan’s Law. The AWA adopted different classi fications for sexual offenders. It also imposed more stringent registration and notifica tion requirements than were imposed by Megan’s Law and in creased penalties for their violation. {¶ 5} Defendant was reclassified by the Attorney General pursuant to the AWA as a Tier III sexual offender. In January of 2011, Defendant failed to veri fy his residence address in violation of R.C. 2950.06, and was charged w ith an AWA violation. Defendant pled no contest to the offense. Instead of the manda tory three year term prescribed by R.C. 2950.99 for an AWA violation, based on Defendant’s 1981 conviction for a second degree felony, the court sentenced Defendant to community control sanctions for a violation of R.C. 2950.063 under the prior version of R.C. 2950.99 in Mega n’s Law, which is a third degree felony. The State appeals from that final judgment.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶ 6} “THE FELONY SENTENCING STATUTE R.C. 2950.99 IS NOT APPLIED RETROACTIVELY WHEN THE CONDUCT FOR WHICH A DEFENDANT IS CONVICTED AND SENTENCED OCCURRED AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE STATUTE OR JANUARY 1, 2008.” {¶ 7} The State concedes that, per State v. Bodyke , 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, Defendant’s classi fication under Megan’s Law as a sexual predator has been restored, and that as a resu lt he is subject only to those registration and verification requirements that Megan’s Law imposes on him. The State argues that, nevertheless, the pena lties imposed for an AWA violation by R.C. 2950.99 yet apply, because Defendant’s offense occurred after the AWA became effective. {¶ 8} We addressed and rejected the basis of the state’s argument in Pritchett , one of the cases that applied and followed Milby

. Pritchett stated at ¶ 26 and 28: Very recently, in State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 2011–Ohio–3374, the Supreme Court of Oh io held that the provision of 2007 Am.Sub. S.B. 10, which imposes great er penalties on sexual offenders, such as Pritchett, for violations of notification and regi stration requirements than applied when they were convicted of their underlying sexual offense, violates the prohibition against retroactiv e laws in Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.4 * * * Under Megan's law (which had b een applied to Pritchett in 2005), Pritchett with the 2005 prio r failure to notify conviction was subject to sentencing for a felony of the third degree. As a result of a subsequent amendment of the law, Pritchett was instead sentenced for a second degree felony offense. That amendm ent of the law is void, per Williams. The sentence the court imposed pursuant to that law is likewise void. It would be a manifest injustice to continue Pritchett' s incarceration on a void sentence. {¶ 9} What we said in Pritchett likewise applies in this case. {¶ 10} Finally, we note that the State appealed our decision in Milby to the Ohio Supreme Court, and by Entry filed on Oc tober 5, 2011, in Case No. 2011-0292, the Supreme Court declined to accept that decision for review. {¶ 11} The trial court properly applied our holding in Milby , and correctly sentenced Defendant for a third degree felony offense ba sed upon the penalty for a violation of R.C. 2950.06, failure to verify residence address, in effect under Megan’ s Law. See: former R.C. 2950.99(A) (1)(a)(i). {¶ 12} The assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

DONOVAN, J., And HALL, J., concur.5

Copies mailed to: Johnna M. Shia, Esq. Bahjat M. Abdallah, Esq. Hon. Frances E. McGee