NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F INEC-1 

This TM series is used lor documentation and timely communication 01 

preliminary results. mterim reports. or special purpose information: and 

has nol received complete formal rel/iew. editorial control. or detailed 

editing. 

Northeast Fishery Management 

Task Force 

Overview Document 

of the 

Northeast Fishery Management 

Task Force, 

Phase I 

Richard C. Hennemuthl, Brian J. Rothschild2 , 

Lee G. AndersonJ , and William A. Lund, Jr.4 

1 Woods Hole Laboratory, National Marine Fisheries Service, Woods Hole, MA 02543 

2 Chesapeake Biological Laboratory, Univ. of Maryland, Box 38, Solomons, MD 20688 

3 Coli. of Marine Studies, Univ. of Delaware, Robinson Hall, Newark, DE 19711 

4 Marine Research Laboratory, Univ. of Connecticut, Box 278, Noank, CT 06340 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Philip M KlutZnick Secretary 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

Richard A. Frank. Administrator 

National Marine Fisheries Service 

Terry L. Leltzell. ASSistant Administrator for Fisheries 

Northeast Fisheries Center 

Woods Hole, Massachusetts 

October 1980 
PREFACE 

This document is the result of studies originating within the Northeast Fishery 1\1anagement Task Force. The Task Force, organized in 1979 

by the New England and Nlid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council" and 

funded by the NMFS, seeks to promote discussion and dialogue on the 

major issues of fishery management and to explore the effects of various 

fishery management alternatives. 

Composed of representatives from the fishing industry, Regional 

Fishery Management Councils, federal and state agencies, academic institutions, and general public, the Task Force will operate in three phases. 

The first phase will assemble background information for identifying and 

analyzing management options. The second phase will examine this 

background information to determine the data requirements, regulatory 

measures, administrative procedures, and enforcement methods 

associated with each management option. The third phase will critically 

review the various options for application to specific fisheries, particularly 

the Atlantic demersal finfish fishery. 

This document is one of eight developed under Phase I operations. It 

was issued in March 1980 as a separate publication, but is being reissued 

in the NOAA Technical Memorandum N.lvlFS-F/NEC series, as are the 

seven other Phase I documents, since it lays the groundwork for them. 

Jon A. Gibson, Coordinator 

NOAA Technical Memorandum N2'dFS-F !lVEC series 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 

The rv1anagement Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 

Management Objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3 

The Management Environment .................................... 4 

The Ecological Basis of Fisheries ..................................... 5 

The Social Basis of Fisheries Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6 

The Technical Basis of Management ............... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7 

Methods of Management .......................................... 7 

Nlanagement Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7 

Regulatory Measures ............................................. 8 

Timing, Monitoring, and Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11 

Benefits ......................................................... 12 
BACKGROUND 

The waters off the northeastern coast of the United 

States :'iupport some of the richest fisheries in the world. 

Estahlishment of the 200 mile limit in 1976 under the 

Fisheries Conservation and Management Act for the first 

time gave the 11 and its fishing industry the opportl!nity to ensure that these fisheries yield the greatest 

possible henefit to the public and the industry that 

serves it. not merely in the short run, but for the future, 

The :\ortheast Fisheries Management Task Force was 

organized in 1979 to provide a forum for discussion of the 

major issue:; which management, government, and industry must resolve. The Task Force is made up of 

representatives from the fishing industry, from the 

<1CUdClllic sphere, and from d1e f~egi()nal Fisheries 

:\];:n"st'llwnt Councils. Its joh will llt: tl) ,:ddress the 

ran~,· ot alternative:'> available, to assess the benefits to 

be expected from each, to translate these alternatives 

into specific ohjectives, and to show, by way of example, 

how the alternatives might apply to particular fisheries. 

The idea of management is not new. Local rules, for 

example. on the taking of anadromous spawning fish 

,;uch a,.; alewives .. rules that set catch limits at so 

many harrels per householder or that restrict fishing to 

alternate days of the week ... are virtually as old as the 

colonial settlement of America. 

But management can he controversial. This is not surprising. since it may hring into focus conflicts between 

,.;hort·term henefit" to those who use the fishery 

resources. and henefits to accrue in the future. If the 

prohlem:'i were as simple, say, as the problem that confronts a farmer: the balance between the quantity and 

\'alue of crop yields versus the costs of land, working that 

land. and maintaining its fertility, any conflicts might 

be readily resolved. But fishery management is not that 

,.;imple. The resource, unlike the farmer's, is common 

property'. Yields are difficult to determine. The populations of fishes that yield the "crop" move from place 

to place intermingling with other populations so that the 

con,;equences of different fishing practices become dif· 

ficult to evaluate. The effect of a rise or fall in numbers 

()f one species upon the numbers of another. that is the 

interaction between populations, must also be con-

;;idered, These are technical prohlems addressed mainly 

hy' fishery biologists and managers. 

At bottom. management is addressed to social and 

enmomic goals which mayor may not be served by such 

t radirional approaches as maintaining maximum yields 

of \'adous species over many years. These economic 

a;;pet'ts may include price-maintenance, distribution of 

henefits among various localities and classes of 

fishermen. consumer prices. and yield of critically-

!lveded protein I this last is of course less crucial in the 

!l()ft heastern l'. than in some nther countries l. Most 

modern tisherieii are capital-intensive: natural fluctuutions in fish populations, let alone those brought on 

bv mi,..;judgment of the fishing pressure those populations can sustain, can be disastrous for those who invest in these fisheries and for the future climate in which 

they can prosper. 

Perceptions of management's effectiveness have often 

heen negative: "the regulatory regime is confusing"; 

"statistics and stock assessment are inadequate"; "enforcement is perfunctory". The Task Force has undertaken to address these problems and to improve com· 

munications hetween fisheries scientists and managers, 

and members of the fishing industry. Its work has heen 

divided into three phases. 

The first phase, which is covered in the present report. 

\,,,'as carried out by eight working groups, each concerned 

with a different major aspect of fishery management. 

The group,; included members of the fishing industry, 

t h p :VI anagemen t Counci Is, sta t e and federa \ 

~')\·8rnments. and universities. Phd:;e I was generally 

concerned with assemhling hackground information for 

identification and analysis of management options. 

In the second phase, to follow later, management options potentially applicable to fishery management in 

the ~ortheast will be identified, Data requirements. 

regulatory measures. administration, and enforcement 

methods will he examined in relation to management 

all ernati ves. 

Finally, in Phase III. the options developed in Phase II 

will he critically reviewed with respect to actual 

fisheries. in particular the 0l'ortheast demersal fin 

fishery. Government agencies, the Councils. and the 

public will participate. so that all concerned may better 

understand the management rationale, 

In the pages that follow, we will first describe the 

process of management. :"-Jext we will take up its objec· 

tives and the social, ecological. and technical en 

vironments in which these objectives are to be achieved. 

We then di,;cu:-" the methods of management, and final· 

ly. the types (If benefits which are sought from the 

proces,.;. 

THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS 

:'vIanagement should be viewed as a comprehensive 

process or system. Often, in practice. what is considered 

to he management is only a fragment of the process we 

discuss here. Enforcement, for example. or stock assessment might be emphasized, while the context in which 

these elements can have an effect i" more or less ignored. 

Regulation and management are not equi\"alent: regula· 

ti()n is one of the tools availahle to management. hut c\ 

system of management might be devised in which 

re;.!;ulation plavs no part. 

The workings of the proposed management process are 

diagrammed in Figure 1. It may he seen as a continullus 

c\de by which the present state of affairs is described: 

oi)ject i ves are e:'>ta blished toget her wit h a plan tnr 

achie\'ing them and reviewing them by those concerned: 
THE FISHFRIES MANAGEMENT PROCESS 

Determine if aoals 

ha ve been met: 

(1; ~--~ ~------------~ 

Measure benefits. 

~lonitor eff-ects; 

social and resource. 

Implement specific 

regulations or controls. 

Federal and public 

review. 

Prepare specific 

management pl an. 

Evaluate feasibility. 

Technical ana pol ky 

cons iderat ions. 

2 

Evaluate states of 

industry and resource. 

Determine needs and 

desires. 

Defi ne obj ecti ves. 

Devise management 

strategies for 

achieving objectives. 

Determine measurable 

quantities to evaluate 

success in meetina 

objectives. -

Policy 

analysis. 
the necessary data for monitoring effects and benefits of 

management are gathered; and the success of the 

program is judged preparatory to revising it. 

Management is in a real sense experimental. Lessons 

are learned from the process and incorporated in the 

form of revisions. The whole cycle need not run its course 

for this to happen, as the "feedback" arrows at various 

points in the diagram show. The quality of management 

decisions depends on the information available, and on 

decision-making skill. Because information is often 

lacking, incomplete, or questionable, such skill is 

crucial. While uncertainties about the natural or social 

environment will always be with us, uncertainties arising 

from vaguely-articulated management processes can 

and should be identifieq and rooted out. 

The iterative (If "feedhack" process of management 

may lead to change" in objectives if, for example, they 

were formulated incorrectly in the first place, or if the 

social purposes they were originally intended to serve 

should change. Changing objectives because an existing 

management approach does not achieve them is quite a 

different matter, since this undermines the structure of 

rational decision. 

Obviously, testing each potentially useful management option by means of the iterative, experimental 

process is impractical. Alternatives may be tested by 

modelling or "bench" analysis, which. though it may be 

imperfect, will help to sort out the best option to try in 

practice. Such analysis would be brought to bear on the 

earlier steps (2 through 6) illustrated in Figure 1. 

lYIANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES 

The management process (see Figure 1) starts by 

describing the present state of fishery resources and the 

industry that exploits them. and then. in social, 

economic, and biological terms, determines future objectives. How these objectives are defined is crucial to the 

management process. To be useful, objectives must be 

clearly stated, practically attainable, of measurable 

benefit. and based upon an understanding of all aspects 

of the problem they address, rather than fragments of 

the problem. 

Experience teaches us that the way in which management ohjectives have been framed in the past may make 

them difficult to translate into action. Often, they are 

stated in excessively general terms; "maximize social 

welfare", for example, or "catch all underutilized species 

in C waters", Such statements may be unarguable as 

general goals. but they need to be supplemented by more 

specific subobjectives whose attainment can be 

measured with data and techniques that are either at 

hand or practically obtainable. 

In setting subobjectives. however, one must keep the 

broader purpose in mind. Objectives which focus only on 

part of a problem must be linked together in a com-

:3 

prehensive approach, to reduce the risk of achieving one 

goal by unwittingly defeating others. In a multi-species 

fishery, for example, management concentrating upon 

one or two principal species and ignoring the complex of 

species making up the by-catch may indeed approach 

optimal catch levels for the species selected but in so 

doing reduce catches for the fishery as a whole to suboptimal levels. 

Fully as important as defining the objectives 

themselves is specifying the process for attaining them. 

For instance, regulating a fishery to achieve "optimal 

stock size" is of little use as an objective if optimal stock 

size cannot be established, or indeed, if stock size cannot 

be measured at all with sufficient precision. Specific 

ohjectives require specific information from the 

ecological and s()('ill'E'('n~hlmic environments fOf 

assessing the impact of the management system. Objectives should be framed in terms of definahle events and 

measurable benefits, recognizing that severe mismatches may exist between time-spans of social and 

ecological processes, the latter commonly being slower. 

This implies a nested set of objectives and subobjectives 

with opportunity for feedback in the process, as indicated in Figure l. 

The problem of defining objectives and the pathways 

for achieving them raises a number of issues which are 

discussed in turn below: 

Reactive vs. predictive management. When cause and 

effect are fully understood, management can be predictive. a state of affairs that is only rarely completely 

achievable in practice. Where the choice of objectives, 

the nature of benefits. or the consequences of intervention are uncertain, or the ecological responses of the 

resources imperfectly known, management may have to 

be more or less reactive, incorporating what is learned in 

the process of management in revisions of technique and 

perhaps in redefinitions of objectives, when experience 

shows the original definition to have been unsatisfactory. 

This "feedback" approach will be particularly necessary 

when objectives are long-term, or when techniques are 

untried. Reactive management is not necessarily 

"unplanned"; provision for reactive steps can be part of 

the planning. The greater the uncertainty in the system, 

the more reactive must be the management approach 

taken. with a proportionately greater need for timely 

monitoring of events, It is important that changes 

observed which lead to "course corrections" be evident 

not only to the managers but also to those affected by the 

management policy. 

Objectives implicit in the choice of method. A given 

objective may be approached by a variety of methods, 

each of which may facilitate. or frustrate. achievement 

of "ome other objectives in ways which mayor may not 

be foreseen. For example, "limited entry" might be 

aimed at reducing fishing effort. but in choosing this 

method, one implies that the social or economic con-
sequences of employing it are also objectives of the plan. 

Identifying any "hidden" or implicit objectives in a spectrum of alternative methods will help in choosing among 

those methods. The distinction between methods and 

objectives must at all times be borne in mind; a method 

is a means of achieving an objective, which should be 

clearly articulated: it is not an end in itself. 

Biological objectives. Maintaining a resource in some 

particular state may be set forth as a management objective. but this often begs the question of why such a state 

is desirable. There are certainly biological constraints on 

objectives. However. the purposes of management are 

social. and objectives of management, assuming they are 

realistic in ecological terms, should be established with 

reference to the social consequences they are intended to 

produce. 

Public and private objectives. The Fishery Conservation and Management Act sets forth objectives which are 

desirable as a matter of national policy, but not 

necessarily from' the individual fisherman's, 

businessman's, or community's perspective. The 

Regional Fishery Management Councils must reconcile 

any conflict. 

The Act's first purpose, to establish a fishery conservation zone under C.S. controL has been achieved (except 

for some uncertainties about U.S. and Canadian 

jurisdictions}; domestic objectives take precedence over 

foreign objectives. 

A system of conservation and domestic management, 

a second purpose of the Act, has also been started, byestablishing the Regional Fishery Management Councils, 

but "conservation and management", which are stated 

as joint goals. have not so far been given equal weight by 

the public and its legislatures. Conservation (i.e. prevention of "overfishing and depletion") has been initially 

emphasized as a separate and overriding objective, 

whereas management is addressed to optimum yield and 

domestic fishery development, to which ends conservation may be directed. . 

Integration of public objectives with private objectives 

(t he diverse desires of individuals, firms, local communities and other organizations may, of course, also 

c'J!lilit! among themselves) Idl often require trial-andt~rror. Even the interests d.:,·lared by individuals may 

generRt.e multiple, conflicting objectives. Common interests and those which are peculiar to specific individuals or groups must be sorted out. The latter may 

be served by appropriate selection of management units 

and expressed in terms of a series of subobjectives 

tailored to individual needs which nevertheless are consistent with a long-term, common goal. 

Overfishing and depletion are nebulous terms if their 

"prevention" is considered outside of the context of optimum yield. A depleted stock is sometimes defined as 

one which has fallen below the maximum point on yield 

or stock-recruitment curves. However, the observed 

variability in productivity of fish stocks is often too large 

4 

to apply the underlying theoretical models on which 

such definitions are based. Overfishing, therefore, would 

better be evaluated in terms of management, that is. 

social. objectives. If it is seen that a population, in the 

course of pursuing such objectives, is becoming unacceptably low (in the national sense), then the objectives 

should be revised. since it is probably possible to fish a 

stock to the point (hal it will no longer support a continuing fishery. 

Full utilization is an FCMA objective which implies 

that any surplus in excess of domestic capacity may be 

allocated to foreign fishermen. if public and domestic 

management ohjectives are thereby served. At issue are 

questions of competition between domestic and foreign 

fishermen. availability of stocks that might be jointly 

fished. and interspecific relationships between stocks 

that might be independently fished by foreign and 

domestic neets. Since one objective of the Act is 

domestic fishery development, economic interactions 

and direct resource competitivn must be taken into account. If predictions of the effects of foreign fishing are 

imprecise (for instance, due to competition), a reactive 

mode of management may be best. 

Starting point for management. In principle, objectives can he developed without regard to present practices, but as a practical matter, these practices and their 

relation to the current state of the resources will influence the approach to be taken, particularly for the 

shorter term. There is often strong pressure for maint aining the status quo, particularly if management has 

not yet been much developed. I\1anagement might start 

with rather general objectives which minimize disruption of traditional practices, reserving those that require 

more stringent regulation for later, if these should be 

required. Setting general objectives need not imply a 

lack of purpose. For example, objectives addressed to the 

resource as a whole rather than to individual species or 

stocks of fish might prove to be more beneficial than a 

species- or stock-specific approach. 

THE MANAGEMENT 

ENVIRONMENT 

Fisheries are based on a natural resource. The ecology 

of this resource is only to a limited extent alterable by 

human intervention, and the consequences of such inter\'ention may be difficult to foresee or to control. 

:vianagement, then, must first of all collaborate with the 

natural wor~ings of the environment. Management's 

purposes are sociaL It is the social environment which 

determines which goals are desirable, and the most 

accepta ble ways of achieving them. Finally, management is limited by the techniques available for its purposes. These topics are explored further below. 
The Ecological Basis of Fisheries 

Intelligent fishery management requires an 

understanding of the relationships between the living 

and non-living elements of the natural environment, and 

the impact of fishing upon them. Ecology is the study of 

such relationships. 

Ecologists may focus upon individual organisms, populations of organisms, or the relationships between populations. Since the health of a fishery depends upon 

whole populations of animals rather than individuals, 

the ecology of populations and the interaction between 

them is emphasized for purposes of fishery management. 

Populations ... many individuals of the same species 

living and reproducing among themselves in a definable 

space .. , have at any moment certain attributes which 

an' of fundamental importance tr, fisheries science and 

management: birth rate, death rate, growth rate, and 

age (or size) distribution (that is, the population will 

have a characteristic percentage of its members in each 

of several age or size categories; this may change 

markedly with time), 

The classical growth modeL According to this model, a 

population of animals finding itself in an environment 

where food and living-space are ample will increase slowly at first, then more rapidly as the many surviving 

young grow to reproduce themselves, much as capital invested at compound interest grows as the interest is 

added to the principal. 

Unlike invested capital, however, the animal population, according to this model, eventually will cease 

growing as its size becomes balanced with the supply of 

food, space, or some other factor necessary to support it. 

It has reached its "equilibrium density". 

Growth of this sort is called density-dependent. The 

population size at this point reflects the "carrying 

capacity" of the environment for that particular species 

at that particular time. (Population growth is not always 

limited by density-dependent factors however; 

sometimes alteration of the physical environment or intrusion of a competing species better-adapted. to the environment will bring it to a halt; these are densityindependent factors). 

The density-dependent growth model underlies one of 

the traditional concepts of fishery management. If we 

were able to remove from a population a tonnage of fish 

each year equal to the natural annual increase, the population abundance would remain the same . .'Moreover, if 

that "parent" population were of a size where annual increase was most rapid (that is, not at the early stage of 

expansion, described above. or approaching the 

tapering-off point), the amount that could be cropped 

would be at its greatest. the so-called "maximum 

sustainable yield". 

Regrettably from the point of view of practical 

management this model does not describe what often 

happens in nature. It assumes that the numbers of young 

added to a population are proportional to the numbers of 

5 

adults, while practical experience with most fish populations has shown this to be untrue, Many major 

fisheries either began or were expanded on the strength 

of one or two good year-classes which supported these 

fi:,;heries for a number of years; additions to the population were not directly proportional to the numbers of 

spawning adult:; (though the quantity and quality of the 

spawning stock is one among several important factors in 

year-class success). 

System dynamics. What is wrong, then, with the simple 

model underlying the concept of maximum sustainable 

yield? In general. it is deficient in that it treats the population's environment as fixed. whereas in fact natural 

environments are dynamic, that is to say, in a state of 

constant Lux, Quantity 3nd qualitv of food varies with 

time, and food requirements m2:,\ Lt' quite different for 

different life-stages. ~loreover, genetically unrelated 

populations do not exist in a vacuum but interact with 

one another: positively, as when increases in a prey population favors its predator, or negatively, when two 

predators compete for limited numbers of prey, The 

relationships between species may be exceedingly complex. Animals which are prey at one life sta'ge may 

become predators at another, while competition can be 

quite indirect. Such relationships may be quite difficult 

to decipher. and even more so to predict. 

The interactions among organisms in a natural 

assemhlage in[uence the growth rates and abundance in 

a dynamic fashion, If a population is not fished, all 

growth is ultimately balanced by natural mortality 

(although owing to the dynamic interactions, this does 

not insure that populations will be stable in size). When 

fishing starts, there are greater removals from the population than additions. Though these removals may to 

some extent be offset by increased survival and growth 

among the remaining fishes, they my be so extensive 

that a new balance is established between fishing mortality and recruitment; a point may even be reached 

where fishing is no longer economical. 

Recruitment is the process by which new individuals are 

added to the exploitable portion of a population; it is int1uenced by the processes of spawning, hatching, growth, 

and survivaL and in turn recruitment influences population density and fishing success. Prior knowledge of 

expected recruitment is desirable for management. 

Three approaches may be taken to predict it. 

1. A historical type of predictive model is based on 

observed relative strengths of past year classes. The 

frequency of occurrence of various year-class sizes 

in the past are piotted, and the probability of 

future year-class sizes predicted. assuming that 

future conditions will be the same as in the past 

and that they will inr1uence year-class success in 

the same way, 

2. The prerecruit portion of the population may be 

sampled by special ;mrveys or from fishermen's 
records to provide prerecruit indices. Relative 

strengths of prerecruit year classes may be compared, and the number of prerecruits in past year 

classes may be related to the number of fish suosequently recruited. This method provides year-toyear information to the manager. 

3. By developing a basic knowledge of the environmental and population factors which determine successful year classes, a more reliable means 

of prediction could be formulated. This method 

(like prerecruit indices) might permit prediction of 

year-class strength before recruitment is complet.ed, and at the same time furnish insight into 

long-term trend o . Far more knowledge of the 

ecology of fish populations is needed for this 

method to become feasible. 

While estimates of future recruitment are essential for 

any management plan whose objectives are based on 

population size, attempting to influence recruitment by 

manipulating population size is an uncertain endeavor, 

since the effect of spawning upon recruitment is itself 

uncertain. It is particularly difficult to adjust plans to 

compensate for year-to-year changes in recruitment for 

short-lived species such as squid: the time for reacting to 

observed recruitment is simply too short. 

Multi-species approaches. In \'iew of the dynamic interactions in nature, a single-species approach to 

management is inadequate, particularly for multispecies fisheri~s, or fisheries where the by-catch is 

significant. 

To avoid the deficiencies of a single-species approach, 

management might address itself to the productivity 

and harvest potential of an entire ecosystem, since the 

ecosystem in the long run has greater stability than any 

of its components. However, to be practical, management must recognize the social fact that some species are 

more desirable than others, and in some measure direct 

the fisheries to certain species. This suggests a multispecies scheme of management: individual species, 

groups of species, or particular fisheries (defined by area 

or gear) would be regulated to control the relative 

balance of the species mix. 

The Social Basis of Fisheries Manag,mi\:';ll 

Fish stocks are managed not for their own sake but to 

achieve social objectives, and this takes place in a social 

context. Exploitation for short-run advantage at this 

expense of future generations is obviously irresponsible, 

so time is an important dimension in management planning; if maximum social benefit over time is set as a 

goal, the survival of the fish stocks is assured. But the 

success of managem'ent is to be measured, finally. in 

social terms. 

A clear statement of social objectives must precede 

formulation of a management strategy, but this is difficult because the perception of what is beneficial may 

6 

\'ary from fishery to fishery. and from one social group or 

region to another. 

Tile fir!'! consequence of a particular management option and the means used to implement it is upon the 

composition of the fleet for a given fishery and the 

fi"hing method" used. These. in turn. may affect: 

• the number of fish caught and the costeffectiveness of catching them. 

• distribution of income and employment among 

geographic areas. social groups, large and small 

firms. vessel types, etc. 

• efficiencY and income in the processmg and 

marketing sectors. 

• cultural life and community structure in the 

area" concerned. 

• international balance of trade and, depending on 

the level of foreign participation in a fishery, 

international relations. 

Different management options can affect such aspects 

or social well-being in different and sometimes conflicting ways. It \\'ill be necessary. therefore, to rank the good 

and bad potential consequences of various options, and 

to secure some consensus on which are most important. 

Where conflicts exist. they mllst be directly addressed in 

setting management objectives. 

There is a social basis to fishery management, but also 

a social context consisting of the participants in management and fishing and the social institutions in which 

they operate. To make the distinction more clear, consider Figure 1. in which a technical plan is devised, and 

then subjected to various processes of review. It may be 

that. abstractly speaking, a single administrative 

authority would be most effective for a particular 

fishery. In the existing social context, however. this may 

be impractical; given the existing body of law and the 

responsibilities and interests of governmental, trade, environmental, and consumer groups, all may have to be 

accommodated if management is to succeed. In particular. to be well-understood are the internal workings 

of the Coast Guard and the Departments of Commerce 

and State and the relations between them, for they are 

re;-ponsible for approving. im;)lementing, and enforcing 

management plcl:1C, 

The indi\'iduab \Vh\l"C inclu~try' is being managed have 

a most urgent interest in the process and their 

cooperative response can be crucial to success. For example. if management dictates a closed fishing season, 

fishermen may obser\'e this season but react by building 

bigger boats, with the unfortunate result (demonstrated 

from past experience) that the catch and its cost increase. 

Clearly, the needs and possible reactions of the industry must be contemplated in choosing management 

options. and the industry must realize that its needs are 

being considered. This points toward maximum public 

participation in the management process. 
As a practical matter, the needs and desires of all concerned cannot always be met; their reactions should be 

anticipated and the consequences of these reactions 

weighed in advance. For example, if a certain management option is likely to lead to litigation, the question 

should be asked, is the objecth-e worth the trouble and 

expense of defending it? 

The social basis of management is implicit in the concept of "optimum yield". When judging what that optimum might be, biological and technical facts-of-life 

must be given full weight, but managers must always 

have before them the principle that management is intended to serve social ends. 

The Technical Basis of Management 

The technology availahle to the fishing industry and i(J 

those charged with enforcing management plan;,; must be 

considered in developing those plans. Technical practicality is one aspect; another is cost. 

Fixed or passive gears, for example, may favor 

development of a self-regulating fishery, providing a 

practical means of achieving a fixed exploitation rate, 

but such gears may be too costly in present circumstances for certain species or fishing grounds. 

Other gears may be cost-effective in t he short run, but 

may adversely alter the enyironment or cause excessive 

damage to the prerecruit "tock. 

Processing and marketing may be limiting facto!"s as 

well. In New England. the danger of declining catches 

resulting from increasing capacity of the fleet might be 

in some measure offset by developing fisheries for unexploited species, but this makes it essential to include 

processors and marketers in the management program, 

and to give them technical assistance in preparing and 

selling the catch. 

Enforcement may be constrained by the physical 

dimensions of the area under surveillance. For some 

types of regulation such as effort limitation by fishing 

days, remote sensing or telemetry, or perhaps satellite 

surveillance, may offer solutions. 

The ability technically to monitor the effects of 

management on both the stocks and the social sector 

may greatly affect assessments of management's value. 

Improvements are needed both in hardware (sampling 

tools) and in statistical and survey design. 

METHODS OF MANAGEMENT 

Management Units 

The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 

1976 states that "to the extent practicable, an individual 

stock of fish shall be managed as a unit throughout its 

range and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as 

a unit or in close coordination". How these units are 

defined is of fundamental practical importance to 

~ 

I 

successful management. For example, a single management unit encompassing the entire east coast might be 

justifiable on genetic grounds for certain migratory 

species, but a regulation based on such a unit could 

prove to be inappropriate for particular regions of the 

coast for a number of biological, social, or economic 

reasons. On the other hand, a multiplicity of small 

management units could become impossible to coordinate. Some middle ground is indicated. 

Management units are defined by the nature and distribution of the resources themselves, by social and 

economic factors, and by fishery technology. 

The fishery resources to be found in the U.S. Fishery 

Conservation Zone off the New England and ~Iiddle 

Atlantic states contain some :200 species, but [Ire 

dominated by perhaps twt) dozen species of finfish ~1nd 

mollusks which form the basis of the commercia! catch. 

Basic biological knowledge about these species: their 

seasonal and geographical distribution, identification of 

separate stocks, their reproductive patterns, and their 

ecological response to their environment, including interactions with other species, is fundamental to the 

definition of management units. . 

But a knowledge of how they are caught and marketed 

is essential as well. A few of the species mentioned are 

the targets of a pelagic fishery (pelagic trawl and purse 

seine) in which, by and large, only the species sought is 

captured. Most species, however, are taken on or near 

the bottom by otter trawl; this gear, though it selects 

more or less for the size of fish caught, does not select for 

species, resulting in a by-catch of non-target species 

which may be substantial. In fact, the annual landings of 

certain species, including many commercially important 

ones, may be predominantly, or almost entirely, as bycatch. 

Preoccupation with "target" species of a fishery, 

without due attention to the effect of management on 

the fishes composing the by-catch, could lead to 

unplanned-for, and possibly adverse. effects on the condition of the by-catch stocks. 

There is another kind of interaction between species at 

the harvesting level. Fishermen switch their effort from 

species to species seasonally and according to abundance 

and price, in order to maximize their profit" . .Ylanagers 

must b€' alert to the dIect that regulatory measures 

directeri at on€' species may have upon t his seasonal 

switching by fishermen and upon their annual income. 

The economic interactions hetween species can be 

tra.ed further. to the murketplace. The fisherman's 

pn, e tur one species may depend directl:,; on the landings 

of anot her. and where markets are regional in nature. the 

fish need not he tanried in the same port or nearby 

ports. For example. sea-scallop prices may be affected hy 

landings throughout the :\ew England and :Ylid-Atlnnuc 

regions, by imports, and by the price of such competitive 

species as lobsters. It follows that the perspective of 

management must be wide enough to include the multispecies nature of fisheries throughout a region. 
The geographic distribution. and in many cases the 

migrate,r\" habits. of fish stocks. and the economic interaction::: between species at the harvesting and 

n:arketin;.: le\·els. point towards broad definitions of 

management units. Management units defined in 

biolng-ical and economic terms can be expected to cut 

aero,.:" existing jurisdictional boundaries. For managemen: to succeed. jurisdictions must cooperate. 

To sum up. management units must: 

1. com prehend seasonal and geographical distribution Oil he fishery resources. 

2. addres", the multiple species nature of most ~ew 

England and Mid-Atlantic fisheries in terms of the 

b~-catch. which makes LIp a substantial part of 

IOtal landings. and in terms of the seasonal pattern 

of switching from one species to another in man~' 

fleetl'. a pattern which has e\"oived to generate 

maximum returns from resources who"e abundance 

\'arib over the ~·ear. 

3. transcend. where ne~essary. jurisdictional boundaries. incorporating institutional agreements to 

in"ure effecti\'€' implementation. 

Regulatory Measures 

Fishery management is intended to increase social 

benefits from the resource. Thus. choice of management 

techniques requires clear statements of social objectives. 

Each technique must be weighed against its alternatives 

(including the alternative of doing nothing) in terms of a 

n um her of biologicaL social. and economic criteria, to 

(:\'1011l1int' how 1 he llndt'rlying social object lves mig ht 

best be served. The criteria for judging alternat ive 

techniques are described brief1y as follows: 

1. Control of fishing mortality. \Vhen fish stocks 

decrease to low lewis from intense fishing mortality, additional effort is required to maintain catches, which 

may lead to economiC' waste. An efficient fishery implies 

control of fishing mortality. 

2. Biological impacts other than control of fishing 

mortality. Techniques may affect specific components 

of the resource, such as small fish. spawners, or fish of a 

p:Hti('ular species. with implications fur recruitment and 

1utuli.' yidds. or the avaiiability I)f a giwn species to a 

pnrticular user group. 

3. Relation to the natural functioning of the fishery 

s~'stem. System productivity is ultimately traceable to 

such natural factors as radiation from the sun. The inn uence of management practices on large natural 

systems. and on the socio-economic environment in 

which the fisheries take place, is limited. Recognizing 

this, techniques should be chosen which enhance the 

operation of these mechanisms rather than interfering 

with it. 

4. Relation to harvesting efficiency. Efficiency of a 

fi"hery may be expressed in several ways: proportion of 

8 

potential productivit~· actually used. cost per unit of 

catch. income per unit of catch. catch per unit of energy 

expended. etc. The efficiency measure used depends on 

the objective of the plan and must be appropriate to it. 

5. Historical precedence for the technique. Success 

m;IY depend on the credibility of the approach among 

those affected: past perceived success or failure of a particular method must be considered (though in no wa~' 

should this preclude new techniques) 

6. Costs of enforcement and administration. Calculation of net benefits must include costs of administration 

and enforcement. and these costs must be justified in 

terms of potential returns. 

7. Impact on non-target components of a system. 

Objectives of management are often specific for a particular species. user-group. or processing segment of the 

industry. Impact on other system components must be 

considered to avoid unwanted consequences (for example. on existing. flexible patterns of response to changes 

in resource abundance or price I. 

S. Impact on distribution of benefits. In an unre~ulated fishery. distribution of benefib evolves 

11111 urally. some groups benefiting more than others. 

I\Lmagement techniques may affect this natural distrihut ion in desirable or unwanted W(l~7S. 

9. Relation of a technique to its scientific basis_ The 

impact of a management technique is usually assessed 

b~' scientific means. The cost and feasibility of such 

a:-.sessment varies between techniques. Further. the 

"robustness" of the scientific basis, that is to sa~', its 

ability to yield useful results despite imperfections in the 

method or the data, varies also. 

The fishing industry (like any industry) has an input 

side and an output side. In the fishery, inputs are 

defined in terms of effort (number of boats, area fished, 

time spent fishing, power of the gear L Outputs are 

defined by landings. The input and output sides of the 

fishery are represented diagrammatically in Figure 2. on 

t he left and right respectively. The input side has a 

direct effect on fishing mortality, and from this, any 

measures that are aimed at the harvesting ~ector itself 

may he considered "direct" regula~i()ns in lprms of their 

('treet on fishing mortality. Direct regulations are 

(,Iassified as "active" or "passiw"; the former are concerned with total catch or effort. while the latter restrict 

t he location and time of fishing. type of gear used, and 

t he size-selectivity of the catch. The dist inct ion between 

active and passive is important because the effects of 

passive regulation, in the absence of direct controls on 

catch or effort, cannot be explicitly estimated; without 

catch and lor effort limits, mortality is theoretically un· 

bounded. 

Measures aimed at the output side of the industry are 

classified as "indirect": such measures seek to affect the 

behavior of the harvesting sector (and hence fishing mor-
<..0 

OJ rec L ~~n!:!ilJ~ 

Open fishing 

Qua rlerly quo til 

1 rill limits 

Vessel c1asslfi 

cation limit 

I nd Iv idua I quota 

Cl.ASSIFICATlOU OF IIEGUlA10ilY t1EASURES 

Indirect Controls ---_._---_. "" 

- -----_. 

Tax on effort f-·-·---J . ____ ._._... . .. -.- Hfor-t 

(2) Tax on components I j .. - 1- -... --. 

~·-----·-·-···-- 1 

(1) landil19s 

Tax on land ings 

of effort: 

E:~ fished --I Lj~p~:~~_:~ 

_._ .. _-] .. -

o t J ..... -......... -. ulpu s .. _ .. __ _ 

-_. ---. time f I shed 

I. ~~~~x_ on s Ile (3) Size selectivity 

Tax 011 relative size 

-{ (I) T~~::I;tf"t I _r-;-----·- } l (1 ) 

------- LHf_~I'~_ T- --.----.--- . -.. __ . ____ . ____ 1 I r~~~i-~J 

(2) Restrict Ions all -- .. ----

Total 

Open fishing 

Quarterly Iinilt 

cOlllponent s of efforl: [ --. .-[J Trip IlInlt 

:~:: (I icenses) ._~n~ut_sJ QUANTITY L~I~~~~_ts_. 

:l~I~: [ ____ L - Illfldividual 

_ ~Ize select _ (3) _s~~~~ectlv Ity __ ._vessel 111It1t 

[~~i~~_~~~~-~:~-;~t~~.IJ--. - [{~ 1~~~-iPiIt 

Vessel classifiC1l liOfl limit 
tality itself! by manipulations in the social and economic 

(that is to say, shore-based) spheres. 

In the upper portion of Figure 2, controls on inputs and 

outputs (i.e. direct and indirect controls) are in terms of 

price. in the lower portion in terms of quantities caught 

or landed. 

There are :w() ways in which price controls may be 

applied t () in put,: (effort i, First. if a useful measure of efj mi I Lg, 1 on -clay" I can he est a blished. a unit tax can be 

]('\]t'c1 In term:' of such a measure, Alt.ernatively. where 

:-1]('11 d mt'a;;ure does not exist. one or more components 

p1 efi(1rt ('an he laxed (taxes on ;!ear or fishing time, for 

{<xample I, II different sizes of fish can be selectively 

nwg-hL a tax can be devised to discourage taking of 

~mall fish, A 1 ax on small-meshed nets would serve this 

purpose. 

Turning to price controls on outputs. taxes on landings. which mRy or may not be scaled to different sizes of 

fi"h, can modil\' fishing activity and fishing mortality in 

roughlY the sanw manner as a direct tax on effort, 

a,..."uming that there are not di"cards at sea (i.e, that land 

ing;,; are equivalent to the catch). The treatment and 

control of discard" may he critical to the effectiveness of 

lilany of the alternative management techniques; 

measures that do nol minimize discards will probably 

prm'e rplat iyc;,ly ineffC'ctiw. hut the problem of discards 

will not easil~' be overcome hecause of their low value at 

the d()ck, 

Direct controls on quantities caught are an alternative 

t<1 taxe" in altae-kin;! the prohlem of effort limitation. 

Total eifnrt mil." he limited if a suitable measure of effort 

can he defined. Lacking such a measure, components of 

eff{Jrt can he controlled in ways analogous to the application of price controls described above. Size-selectivity 

can be influenced by mesh-size regulations (though there 

are technical and biological constraints). 

Indirect quantitati\'e controls on effort (that is, controis applied on the output side) consist of some form of 

lilncl'in~ quota. Such quotas can have a size-selective 

structure. 

Some general ohservations can be made on the 

claSF-ltication shown in Figure 2. 

l. Output controls (price and quantity) control the 

2l~;"\Int and "i7.(" of fish aClual1.\' landed; input (J]]trols 

aflt.,t! 11w alI1{)Ullf and size of the catch via tht: Hmount 

and type of fishing activity. 

2. Controls designated as item ''1'' in the diagram are 

1 heoretically interchangeable, if jandings are completely 

determined by effort. In such cases, if a tax could be 

de\'ised to achieve a certain level of effort, an analogous 

tax on landings could produce the same result, or a catch 

restriction could be substituted for an effort restriction. 

In pract ice, unfortunately, it is difficult to relate raw effort to catch, with the result that the different approaches \'ar~' \,.,idely in effectiveness. 

3. Restrictions on components of effort (item "2" on 

the input side of the diagram) are not reflected on the 

10 

output side; there is no way to control landings produced 

by particuiar components of effort. Limits on total effort 

(item "1") on the input side are absolute. but limitations 

hased on components of effort become so only if all components are included in the regulatory scheme. If only a 

few components are controlled. fishermen may increase 

the other components of effort to compensate. if it is 

profitable to do ,,0. 

4. Restrictions on size-selecti\"it~' may be used independently of restrictions on effort or landings but this 

will not control total effort in a precise manner, 

However. if size-selective controls are effective. mortalitv of smaller fish which results from a given level of effort 

will be limited. Both size and mortalit~· must be controlled to achieve maximum yield per recruit. 

5. All of the management techniques shown in the 

diag-ram are associated with implicit income distribution 

patterns. In the absence of controls. the patterns evolve 

from the nature of the fish stock and the characteristics 

of t he fleet exploiting it. This will again become the case 

if controls are simply in the form of total effort restrictions, or total landings quotas. The "natural" distribuI i()n of henefits. however. may he altered by resort to the 

techniques listed at the extreme right and left of the 

diagram. By using quarterly quotas, trip limits, vessel 

classification limits. or individual vessel quotas or effort 

allotments, certain groups within the fleet may be 

assured of a share in the catch that they might not 

otherwise get, or the catch may be distributed more 

evenly over the year, To achieve the overall objectives of 

management, the various techniques for redistributing 

benefits must be used in a context of total effort or total 

quota limitations, 

6. Fishery management techniques may be judged by 

their ability to achieve desired levels of fishing mortality 

or size-selectivity, and by the relative harvesting efficiency that results from their applications. General 

conclusions about the various approaches listed in the 

diagram are difficult to draw. Quotas are designed to 

produce a given catch level; whether they also produce 

target levels of fishing mortality depends on changes in 

size of the fish population. Effort limits, on the other 

hand, depend "!l detl'lmining accurately the 

relationship between effort and fishing mortality and on 

reducing effort effectively when necessary. For financial 

controls to be effective, one must know the relationship 

between amount of tax and the resulting restriction on 

effort or landings. This may be difficult to predict in a 

multi-species fishery where various species compete in 

the marketplace. 

7. More definite conclusions may be stated about the 

influence of management techniques upon the cost of 

harvest. Four such techniques lead to minimal cost. 

These are: taxes on landings, taxes on effort. a total 

quota with individual vessel allotments, and a total effort limit with individual effort allotments. Other 
techniques either directly or indirectly cause harvesting 

costs to be greater than necessary. 

Timing, lVlonitoring, and Enforcement 

Timing: I' nder the requirements of the Fishery 

Conservation and ~lanagement Act, and associated 

statutes. it takes a minimum of 2:")0 days to process a 

fishery management plan, or a major amendment to 

such a plan. following its submission by a Fishery 

Management ('ouncil. The plans must be reviewed each 

year, and usually, to date, the plans cover one year, 

.'\I1H'IHIII1I:'I1I.; an.' required tl) extend the plans into subsequent years. and generally. sin\"~ these amendments 

im"he quota" and optimum yields. they are considered 

major amendments, The result is that Councils must 

prepare such amendments before the effects of the plan 

currently in force can be known. 

:v1ulti-year plans and "framework" plans are alternati\'es til the one year plan, Multi-year plans establish 

management regimes. including target quotas, that remain in effect for periods of time that mayor may not be 

specified. Framework plans establish criteria for various 

changes. including quotas, by regulation rather than 

amendment. Framework plans take only 95 days, not 

2.')0, for amendment, but they have a disadvantage from 

the Council's point of view: under these plans, Councils 

may recommend changes, but may not make them 

directly. Thus they delegate some of their authority to 

the).; ational :'\larine Fisheries Service. 

Because of this, the Councils must be careful, in set· 

ting up framework plans. to limit the role of the 

~ational Marine Fisheries Service; the :\MFS should be 

allowed to react to various anticipated conditions in the 

fishery. but it should not be allowed to initiate actions 

without the full public participation which is intrinsic to 

the function of the Councils. Such participation is essential in securing the cooperation of the fishing industry, 

Present experience with the Fishery Conservation and 

~lanagement Act indicates that flexibility in the 

development, amendment. and implementation of 

management plans must be increased if these plans are 

to be responsive to the dynamic nature of the fisheries. 

Plans must be responsive to changing stocks and fishery 

conditions and to unforeseen consequences of the 

management plans themselves. Excessive flexibility, 

however, constant tinkering with a given management 

regime. is to be guarded against; a regime should be 

applied long enough for its effects to be evaluated_ 

Experience with existing plans suggests that the limits 

within which flexible response may be allowed should be 

more rigorously defined than they have been to date. 

Phasing of fishery management plans to conform with 

traditional or evolving seasonal patterns in the fishery 

may he beneficial. though a difficulty may arise in 

reallocating resources in cases where both foreign and 

11 

domestic fleets are involved and their respective seasons 

differ. 

Monitoring: Assessing the effectiveness of a management plan depends on a regular now uf accurate 

biological, economic, and social data and an orderly 

system for interpreting those data. Much of the information which is of direct use to the Councils has been 

sy~tematically accumulated over many \'ears. but a" 

their work proceeds. additional requirements have 

he{'onH,' plain, Tht· li"t 01 thl'se reqlliremellt:-; is quitt' 

long, and need not he reviewed here. I 

Two points "hould he brought out, howe\'er. The first 

is that the' Councils me bound h~' certain t imt' {'onst I'Clints, such as legi"lated hearing and review schedule", 

clll,l I r'" l):ganizat jllll of m:·lIl:l;.;ernent plans in tl'tms of 

ri:,hill~ years. whi,"h may not tit com'enient' the 

existing schedule,.; of data gathering and analysis of such 

agencies as the ~ational Marine Fisheries ~ervice. In 

order for the Councils to ha\e information when they 

need it. it is nece;;saf\' for them to project their 

rt'quireml'llts well in advance. to permit the suppliers of 

dn ta to sr hed ule t heir work accordingly. . 

The sl'cond point concerns required reporting by 

fishermen and processors, Councils shoulrl keep chanl!;es 

in the"e reporting procedures to a minimum. recognizing 

that the quality of data supplied will prohahly decrea:,e 

fa" tht' complexity and scope of I'eporting requirt'ments 

increases. The quality of reports from these "ectors 

almost certainly will reflect their satisfaction with the 

management process. 

Enforcement: Fishery management plans have been 

developed, approved. and implemented more rapidly 

than the enforcement program:- necessary to support 

them. and frequently with little regard for the resources 

available for enforcement or the cost·henefit aspects of 

enforcement. Enforcement agencies have not always 

allocated their resources to fit the requirements of the 

management plans. In choosing- methods of controL 

those that are more or less self-enforcing should be given 

the closest attention. 

It is essential that fishermen and processors perceive 

enforcement to be regularly carried out. violations 

resulting in certain penalties. A fixed schedule of 

penalties (similar to those applied in motor vehicle 

cases) which increase with repeated offenses may serve 

as a deterrent. since consequences of conviction will be 

known beforehand. Such a plan. moreover. may expedite 

the legal process. This approach has been recommended 

hy the Mid-Atlantic Council for the surf clam and ocean 

quahog fisheries: if successful. it may serve as a model 

for ot her fisheries. 

,-\ \' ,mpretwnH\ e inventorv of available and recommended data 

WIll he found in an Appendix to the present document: 

f<:cI)rlr;mfC and Hiulu;.;!caf [)ala .Veed.'-1' fur Fl',\'U!TU?S .\t{nna~rmt:'n{ 

u ith Particular Reierencp tf) thl' Sr'(' Enuialld and .Hiri, 

:\ tlanl!(' ,Ir('a.' 
BENEFITS 

Fisheries management is intended to improve social 

linduding economic) benefits to those involved directly 

and indire('tl~' in the fishing industry. and to those who 

consume its product. These benefits are measured by 

yanouo' indices of change. Because there is a cost 

aSi'()ciated with management. and because management 

programs which result in improved benefits for one secltJr ma\, dr· so to some extent at the expense of another 

sector. it i" net benefit which must be weighed before undertaking a management scheme. Due to uncertainties 

inherent in the process. opportunities for feedback which 

may lead to re\'isions or even abandonment of a management approach. must be huilt into the program. 

~1anagement may affect social well-being in ways that 

are not contemplated in the objectives set forth. Positive 

eirecto' are of course welcome: unforeseen negative effects 

become a cost of management. Obviously, every effort 

shoula be made to anticipate all consequences of a comprehensive management program, keeping surprises, 

whether pleasant or otherwise, to a minimum. 

Both the magnitude ornet benefits, and their distribution (who gets the benefits and who bears the cost) must 

be addressed in framing the objectives. 

The nat me of benefits to be expected from a particular 

management plan will vary with it.s objectives. General. 

h. though. they will accrue to one or more of the 

following groups: 

1. Commercial harvesters. Benefit.s for this group 

uo'uall\ are measured in termi' of profit, but may include 

such social aspects as economic security and way of life. 

2. Recreational harvesters. The benefit might be 

measured b~' the number of days fished. The value of 

each day can vary, hut depends partly on the number 

and type of fish caught, which can be influenced by 

management . 

3. Processors. Benefits are measured in term~ of 

profil;'. and employment. Economic security and way of 

life may also be factors. 

4. Consumers. Benefits take the form of increased 

~lIpplies. lower prices. and better quality' of the product. 

Ill!'TeaSeS in harvesting efficiency ma~' make a surplus of 

e('onomic inputs available for production of new fishery 

products or for other economic sectors. 

Some of t.he indices for measuring benefits are discussed in Appendices to this document. Social benefits 

include many hard-to-quantify elements. such as way of 

life, community structure, or work satisfaction of 

processors and harvesters. Some related index is usually 

employed. The point to be made here is that indices 

must be developed and data gathered so that 

management's effectiveness can be objectively judged. It 

should be recognized, however, that many types of 

benefits cannot presently be measured very well (an approach based on uncertainty theory may prove useful 

herel so that changes in management based on measured 

benefits should be made cautiously. 

·~·U.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1981-700'915/369 

12