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80–376 2013

THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION: 

POLICY AND GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER 

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND THE 

ECONOMY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 28, 2013 

Serial No. 113–11 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

Chairman 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Chairman Emeritus 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

Vice Chairman 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey 

BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILL JOHNSON, Missouri 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

Ranking Member 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

Chairman Emeritus 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

Chairman 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

Vice Chairman 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio) 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

Ranking Member 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California (ex officio) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

Chairman 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

Vice Chairman 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILL JOHNSON, Missouri 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan, ex officio 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

Ranking Member 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, ex officio 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Hon. Paul Tonko, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 4 

Hon. Bobby L. Rush, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 4 

Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Hon. Ed Whitfield, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth 

of Kentucky, opening statement ......................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

California, opening statement ............................................................................. 21 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

WITNESSES

Allison Macfarlane, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ....................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 74 

Kristine L. Svinicki, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ............... 23 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 108 

George Apostolakis, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ................ 23 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 120 

William D. Magwood, IV, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ....... 24 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 126 

William C. Ostendorff, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ........... 25 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 137 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

List of Nuclear Reglatory Commission (NRC) licensing actions, submitted 

by Mr. Gingrey ..................................................................................................... 61 

Letter of January 7, 2013, from the National Mining Association to the 

NRC, submitted by Mr. Burgess ......................................................................... 64 

Letter of February 7, 2013, from House Members to the NRC, submitted 

by Mr. Barrow ...................................................................................................... 68 

Picture of Emergency Filtered Containment Vent ................................................ 72 

Chart entitled, ‘‘Nuclear Regulatory Timeline (Typical—4 Unit Fleet)’’ ............. 73 

(1) 

THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION: 

POLICY AND GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 9:02 a.m., in Room 

2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Shimkus 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Shimkus, Whitfield, Scalise, 

Gingrey, Hall, Pitts, Terry, Murphy, Burgess, Latta, Harper, 

Cassidy, McKinley, Kinzinger, Griffith, Bilirakis, Johnson, Barton, 

Upton (ex officio), Rush, Tonko, Dingell, Markey, Engel, Green, 

Capps, Barrow, Christensen, Castor, McNerney, and Waxman (ex 

officio). 

Staff present: Nick Abraham, Legislative Clerk; Gary Andres, 

Staff Director; Charlotte Baker, Press Secretary; Mike Bloomquist, 

General Counsel; Sean Bonyun, Communications Director; Allison 

Busbee, Policy Coordinator, Energy and Power; Annie Caputo, Professional Staff Member; Vincent Esposito, Fellow, Nuclear Programs; Tim Hassenboehler, Chief Counsel, Energy and Power; 

Alexa Marrero, Deputy Staff Director; David McCarthy, Chief 

Counsel, Environment and the Economy; Mary Neumayr, Senior 

Energy Counsel; Chris Sarley, Policy Coordinator, Environment 

and the Economy; Peter Spencer, Professional Staff Member, Oversight; Lyn Walker, Coordinator, Admin/Human Resources; Jeff 

Baran, Democratic Senior Counsel; Phil Barnett, Democratic Staff 

Director; Alison Cassady, Democratic Senior Professional Staff 

Member; Greg Dotson, Democratic Staff Director, Energy and Environment; and Caitlin Haberman, Democratic Policy Analyst. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I would like to call the hearing to order, and welcome our guests and my colleagues. I recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening statement. 

Before I do that, there are early votes, as a lot of members know. 

We are going to try to go rapidly through the opening statements 

as quick as possible and then get into our round of questioning. We 

will then break for votes. We will see what the will of the committees are. We may have to come back to finish up at least the first 

round. With that, I would like to now recognize myself for 5 minutes for my opening statement. 

2 

First, let me welcome you all here. It is nearly 2 years since the 

Fukushima accident and nearly 1 year since the NRC issued a 

suite of requirements responding to the accident. Since you last 

testified before this committee, the NRC instituted a moratorium 

on licensing actions until the agency addresses a court remand of 

its Waste Confidence rule. We have also heard announcements two 

nuclear plants will close prematurely and there is speculation in 

the press that several others may also. 

So, it is in this context I would like to discuss the defense-indepth philosophy, which has been fundamental to nuclear safety in 

our country since the industry’s inception. I am sure we all agree 

it plays a vital safety role. That was a painful lesson for the Japanese to learn and one that was highlighted by the Diet report, 

which stated: ‘‘The defense-in-depth concept used in other countries 

has still not been fully considered.’’ 

With the Atomic Energy Act, Congress endeavored to balance the 

benefits that nuclear energy brings to the general welfare with protection of public health and safety. I am concerned the Commission 

risks undermining this balance by shifting to an unlimited application of the defense-in-depth philosophy in reaction to the 

Fukushima accident. 

Defense-in-depth has, or should have, a sensible constraint. For 

example, I understand there is a three-unit nuclear plant here in 

the United States, which currently has eight emergency diesel generators. These reactors need six generators to ensure safety in case 

the plant loses access to offsite supplies of electricity. That means 

this site has two redundant spares. In the wake of Fukushima, this 

site will add two more in a separate bunker away from the plant 

for a total of ten diesel generators. 

An unmanaged application of the defense-in-depth philosophy 

would question why stop at 10? Why not have 20? Or a hundred? 

I don’t know what the right number is. However, common sense 

and critical thinking should show that at some point there are diminishing safety benefits from additional generators. It seems to 

me cost-benefit analysis provides a necessary and sensible constraint in this situation: that safety gains should be significant 

enough to outweigh additional costs. 

Unfortunately, with the NRC staff’s filtered-vents proposal, we 

have exactly the opposite. The staff’s recommendation to mandate 

filtered vent structures failed the cost-benefit test so the staff chose 

to justify the mandate based upon the defense-in-depth philosophy. 

The staff recommended this mandate against the advice of the 

NRC’s body of experts, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. That committee advised a more holistic approach, recognizing that all plants are different and a one-size-fits-all mandate 

may create unintended consequences. 

As the Near-term Task Force wrote in their 2011 report following 

the Fukushima accident: ‘‘Adequate protection has typically only 

led to requirements addressing beyond-design-basis concerns when 

they were found to be associated with a substantial enhancement 

in safety and justified in terms of cost.’’ 

Recommendation one in their report was that the Commission 

should reassess the role that the defense-in-depth philosophy 

should play. While the Commission has not resolved this policy 

3 

question, agency staff nonetheless appears to be embedding its preferred approach in the filtered-vent recommendation. I don’t think 

the staff should attempt to set policy on a matter on which the 

Commission has not yet reached a conclusion. 

Furthermore, this matter was raised in our January 15th letter, 

which 20 of my colleagues and I signed, and the Commission’s response was unsatisfactory beginning with the failure to answer our 

very first question: When will the NRC conduct a gap analysis of 

the regulation differences between the United States and Japan? I 

expect some of my colleagues will likely share some additional concerns with your response. I am disappointed that you didn’t take 

your communication with members of this committee more seriously and I expect that you will do that in the future. 

I again want to thank you all for being here today. I look forward 

to your testimony. 

[The statement of Mr. Shimkus follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS

First, let me welcome you all here. It is nearly two years since the Fukushima 

accident and nearly one year since the NRC issued a suite of requirements responding to the accident. Since you last testified before this Committee, the NRC instituted a moratorium on licensing actions until the agency addresses a court remand 

of its Waste Confidence rule. We have also heard announcements two nuclear plants 

will close prematurely and there is speculation in the press that several others may 

also. 

So, it is in this context I’d like to discuss the defense-in-depth philosophy which 

has been fundamental to nuclear safety in our country since the industry’s inception. I’m sure we all agree it plays a vital safety role. This was a painful lesson for 

the Japanese to learn and one that was highlighted by the Diet (Dee-ett) report 

which stated: ‘‘The defense-in-depth concept used in other countries has still not 

been fully considered.’’ 

With the Atomic Energy Act, Congress endeavored to balance the benefits that 

nuclear energy brings to the general welfare with protection of public health and 

safety. I am concerned the Commission risks undermining this balance by shifting 

to an unlimited application of the defense-in-depth philosophy in reaction to the 

Fukushima accident. 

Defense-in-depth has, or should have, a sensible constraint. For example, I understand there is a three-unit nuclear plant here in the U.S. which currently has eight 

emergency diesel generators. These reactors need six generators to ensure safety in 

case the plant loses access to off-site supplies of electricity. That means this site has 

two redundant spares. In the wake of Fukushima, this site will add two more in 

a separate bunker away from the plant for a total of ten diesel generators. 

An unmanaged application of defense-in-depth philosophy would question why 

stop at 10? Why not have 20? Or a hundred? I don’t know what the right number 

is. However, common sense and critical thinking should show that, at some point, 

there are diminishing safety benefits from additional generators. It seems to me 

cost-benefit analysis provides a necessary and sensible constraint in this situation: 

that safety gains should be significant enough to outweigh additional costs. 

Unfortunately, with the NRC staff’s filtered vents proposal, we have exactly the 

opposite. The staff’s recommendation to mandate filtered vent structures failed the 

cost-benefit test so the staff chose to justify the mandate based on the defense-indepth philosophy. The staff recommended this mandate against the advice of the 

NRC’s body of experts, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. That Committee advised a more holistic approach recognizing that all plants are different and 

a one-size-fits-all mandate may create unintended consequences. 

As the Near-term Task Force wrote in their 2011 report following the Fukushima 

accident: 

‘‘...adequate protection has typically only led to requirements addressing beyonddesign-basis concerns when they were found to be associated with a substantial enhancement in safety and JUSTIFIED IN TERMS OF COST.’’ 

Recommendation 1 in their report was that the Commission should reassess the 

role that the defense-in-depth philosophy should play. While the Commission has 

not yet resolved this policy question, agency staff nonetheless appears to be embedVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:27 Jun 27, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 113\113-11 CHRIS
4 

ding ITS preferred approach in the filtered vents recommendation. I don’t think the 

staff should attempt to set policy on a matter on which the Commission has not yet 

reached a conclusion. 

Furthermore, this matter was raised in our January 15th letter, which twenty of 

my colleagues and I signed, and the Commission’s response was unsatisfactory beginning with the failure to answer our first question: When will the NRC conduct 

a ‘‘gap analysis’’ of the regulation differences between the U.S. and Japan. I expect 

some of my colleagues will likely share some additional concerns with your response. I’m disappointed that you didn’t take your communication with Members of 

this Committee more seriously and I expect that you will in the future. 

I again want to thank you all for being here today and look forward to your testimony. I’d now like to yield to our Ranking Member Mr. Tonko for the purposes of 

an opening statement. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And now I would like to yield to our ranking member, Mr. Tonko, for the purposes of an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL TONKO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, and good morning. Thank you, Chair 

Shimkus and Chair Whitfield, for holding this hearing. I thank 

Chairman Macfarlane and Commissioners Svinicki, Apostolakis, 

Magwood and Ostendorff for appearing before the subcommittees 

today. 

The work of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is extremely important to the public. Congress recognized way back in 1974 that 

the licensing and regulation of nuclear power and radioactive materials should be separate from research and development and promotion of the civilian nuclear industry. Public confidence in this 

technology is directly related to their confidence that the NRC will 

act to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants and the 

safe handling of nuclear materials. 

Nuclear power provides nearly 20 percent of our electricity nationally. If we are to continue to rely on nuclear power, we must 

maintain safe operations and we must deal with nuclear waste in 

a manner that inspires public confidence and serves the needs of 

the 104 power plants that we have across our Nation. It is a tall 

order, and one that obviously comes with many challenges. The 

tragic events in Japan that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi 

plant were a stark reminder of how important safety is to this industry. To the public, there is no such thing as a small nuclear accident. A large one is devastating. I encourage the NRC to take the 

steps necessary to implement the recommendations from the review of that tragedy to further improve the safety of our Nation’s 

nuclear power plants. 

Again, I thank you for being here this morning. I look forward 

to your testimony. 

I would like now to yield my remaining time to the ranking 

member of the Energy and Power Subcommittee, Representative 

Rush. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Mr. RUSH. I want to thank you, Mr. Tonko, for yielding. I want 

to thank the chair, and I want to thank you, Chairwoman 

Macfarlane, and all the NRC Commissioners for being here today. 

5 

As a representative of the great State of Illinois, which houses 

more nuclear reactors than any other State in the country, I am 

eager to hear about the progress that the NRC is making in regards to recommendations that the Near-Term Task Force released 

back in July 2011 following the nuclear disaster at Fukushima. My 

constituents want to be assured that the NRC adopts commonsense 

protocols for both mitigating risk of a nuclear disaster as well as 

procedures to safeguard the public in the event that a disaster occurs. Safety is my primary concern, and I would support the implementation of a performance-based approach that will allow licensees to employ a combination of systems to address performance 

standards and avoid widespread disaster in the case of emergencies. 

Another issue of great importance to me is the NRC’s work with 

Historically Black Colleges and Universities, HBCUs. In May 2012, 

the NRC was honored as one of the government agencies that was 

most supportive of the engineering departments of HBCUs, and I 

look forward to hearing more about the types of programs and 

forms of support the NRC provides to these HBCU colleges and 

universities. It is in the national interest to make sure that we are 

educating all of our students to enter the STEM fields of science, 

technology, engineering and math, and so it is very encouraging to 

hear that the Nation’s foremost nuclear authority is providing its 

support to help move our Nation forward in this effort. 

I look forward to engaging the Commissioners on these very important issues, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time. 

The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mr. 

Upton, for 5 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. UPTON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Certainly, oversight of federal agencies is a very important responsibility for this committee, especially for the NRC, given the 

broad scope of changes within the nuclear industry, and there are 

two particular issues on my mind today: the NRC’s reactor oversight process and the impact of budget sequestration on the NRC. 

In 2000, the NRC’s reactor oversight process was implemented 

under Chairman Richard Meserve’s leadership, a chairman well respected on both sides of the aisle. The development of the process 

was very rigorous with the goal of creating an objective, measurable process that would provide an accurate representation of a 

plant’s performance while minimizing subjectivity. 

Last year, the Palisades plant in my district spent time in column 3, a designation for troubled plants, which requires significantly increased inspections. This raised considerable concerns 

among folks in my corner of the State, concerns certainly that I 

shared. Entergy needed to do better, and they outlined their comprehensive and methodical plans for returning Palisades to the 

high level of safety that all plants should have. 

This past November, the NRC returned Palisades back to column 

1, the best column, which normally would signify the NRC’s conclusion that the plant is operating safely and should give the local 

6 

communities confidence that the plant is back on the straight and 

narrow. However, when the NRC made the determination to move 

Palisades back into column 1, the agency did so begrudgingly, I believe, and qualified the rating, indicating that it would continue to 

apply increased oversight beyond the normal inspections for column 1. That does send a mixed message to the community: does 

Palisades belong in column 1 or not, and I would like some clarification on that. 

In closing, I would like to echo the disappointment expressed by 

Chairman Shimkus regarding the NRC’s response to our January 

letter. We did ask very detailed questions, yet the response was 

somewhat dismissive, even contradicting the Japanese Diet report’ 

conclusion that they had not fully considered the defense-in-depth 

philosophy as Chairman Shimkus mentioned. You wrote that you 

would give us careful consideration but the answers were not quite 

where we would like them to be. 

So with that, I would yield back the balance of my time to Chairman Whitfield. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON

Oversight of federal agencies is an important responsibility for this committee, especially for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission given the broad scope of changes 

within the nuclear industry. There are two particular issues on my mind today: The 

NRC’s Reactor Oversight Process and the impact of budget sequestration on the 

NRC. 

In 2000, the NRC’s Reactor Oversight Process was implemented under Chairman 

Richard Meserve’s leadership, a chairman well respected on both sides of the aisle. 

The development of the process was very rigorous with the goal of creating an objective, measurable process that would provide an accurate representation of a plant’s 

performance while minimizing subjectivity. 

Last year, the Palisades plant in my district spent time in ‘‘Column 3,’’ a designation for troubled plants which requires significantly increased inspections. This 

raised considerable concerns among folks in Southwest Michigan—concerns that I 

shared. Entergy needed to do better, and they outlined their comprehensive and methodical plans for returning Palisades to the high level of safety that it should have. 

This past November, the NRC returned Palisades to Column 1, the best column, 

which normally would signify the NRC’s conclusion that the plant is operating safely and should give the local communities confidence that the plant is back on the 

straight and narrow. However, when the NRC made the determination to move Palisades back into Column 1, the agency did so begrudgingly and qualified the rating, 

indicating that it would continue to apply increased oversight beyond the normal 

inspections for Column 1. This sends a mixed message to the community—does Palisades belong in Column 1 or not. I would like some clarification on that. 

In closing, I’d like to echo the disappointment expressed by Chairman Shimkus 

regarding the NRC’s response to our January 15th letter. We asked very detailed 

questions, yet the response came off as dismissive, even contradicting the Japanese 

Diet (pronounced DIE-it) report’s own conclusion that they had not fully considered 

the defense-in-depth philosophy as Chairman Shimkus mentioned. You wrote that 

you would give our views ‘‘careful consideration’’ but the answers provided to our 

questions fall short. These are serious questions that deserve thoughtful and thorough deliberation. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ED WHITFIELD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you very much, and I want to certainly 

welcome all the Commissioners here today. We appreciate the important work that you do and recognize the importance of nuclear 

energy for providing energy in our country. 

7 

The NRC Near-Term Task Force report, which was issued last 

summer, highlighted some lessons learned from the Three Mile Island accident. Some of the actions taken by the NRC after Three 

Mile Island were not subject to a structured review and were subsequently found not to be of substantial safety benefit and were removed. 

I am concerned that the NRC’s consideration of post-Fukushima 

issues is not as structured and integrated as it should be. I would 

like to call your attention to four items which appear to be interrelated but which the Commission is considering individually, independent of each other. Number one: the Near-term Task Force Recommendation number one concerning the defense-in-depth philosophy, which Chairman Shimkus mentioned; number two, the Severe Accident Management Order the Commission issued a year 

ago; number three, the filtered-vents proposal about which we 

wrote to you; then number four, the economic consequences proposal regarding the potential for land contamination. 

From looking at records of the Commission, it is quite clear that 

many statements have been issued about how these issues are related to each other and yet it seems that the Commission is determined to treat each one separately in what some people say is an 

unstructured process. 

The Commission’s 2011 decision to prioritize its work into three 

tiers was a good start but time has passed and there is a great deal 

more information that has surfaced since then. It seems like a 

more integrated approach to post-Fukushima issues is long overdue. So I hope we have an opportunity to discuss that some this 

morning, and I would yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Whitfield follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ED WHITFIELD

I also want to thank you for coming here today. In our last hearing with the Commission, I expressed my optimism and hope that Chairman Macfarlane would restore collegiality to the Commission. She appears to be doing a better job than her 

predecessor and I think we are all very grateful for that. 

When you folks were here last summer, I urged all of you to remember that the 

costs of regulatory changes are ultimately born by consumers who are struggling to 

fill their gas tanks and pay their bills. This concern is now joined by a concern for 

those who will lose their jobs at plants that may close prematurely. 

I stated my firm belief that we need to ensure that any additional regulatory costs 

are justified by real safety benefits. Those concerns are just as valid today, especially given that the Commission is considering a recommendation from the staff 

that is NOT cost-justified, as Chairman Shimkus just mentioned. 

Last summer, I also referenced a cautionary comment from the NRC Near-term 

Task Force report regarding lessons learned from the Three Mile Island accident: 

‘‘...some of the actions taken by the NRC after Three Mile Island were not subjected 

to a STRUCTURED review and were subsequently not found to be of substantial 

safety benefit and were removed.’’ 

I am concerned that the NRC’s consideration of post-Fukushima issues is not as 

structured and integrated as it should be. I’d like to call your attention to four items 

which appear to be inter-related but which the Commission is considering individually, independent of the others: 

•The Near-term Task Force Recommendation #1 concerning the defense-in-depth 

philosophy which Chairman Shimkus mentioned; 

•The severe accident management order the Commission issued a year ago; 

•The filtered vents proposal about which we wrote to you; and 

•The Economic Consequences proposal regarding the potential for land contamination. 

8 

Clearly the recommendation to mandate filtered vents is propelled by concerns 

about land contamination that might result from a severe accident. In fact, in the 

Commission’s January meeting on filtered vents, there were 43 statements about 

how the filtered vents issue is linked to the other items I just mentioned. The transcript for the Commission’s meeting on Economic Consequences last September tells 

a similar story: 49 statements on how it is linked to these other issues. Altogether, 

we reviewed transcripts from 4 Commission meetings since August on these topics 

and found 145 references indicating how these issues are linked. 

I simply don’t understand why, with these issues so intertwined, that the Commission would consider each one separately, in such an unstructured process. The 

Commission’s 2011 decision to prioritize its work into three tiers was a good start. 

But time has passed and there is a great deal more information that has surfaced 

since then. It seems like a more integrated approach to post-Fukushima issues is 

long overdue. So I hope we get some clear explanations this morning. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time. 

Without objection, I would like to be able to allow Mr. Waxman 

when he arrives 5 minutes to do his opening statement, and we 

will move right into questions until he arrives. So I would like to 

recognize myself for the first 5 minutes—oh, we will go to the Commission. We are so anxious to talk to you all, so Chairman, you are 

recognized 5 minutes for your opening statement. 

STATEMENTS OF ALLISON MACFARLANE, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION; HON. KRISTINE L. 

SVINICKI, COMMISSIONER; HON. GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS, 

COMMISSIONER; HON. WILLIAM D. MAGWOOD, IV., COMMISSIONER; AND HON. WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF, COMMISSIONER 

STATEMENT OF ALLISON MACFARLANE 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Thank you, Chairman Shimkus. Good morning. Chairman Whitfield, Ranking Member Rush, Chairman 

Shimkus, Ranking Member Tonko and distinguished members of 

the subcommittees, on behalf of the Commission, I appreciate the 

opportunity to appear before you to discuss policy and governance 

at the NRC. 

When the Commission appeared before you last on July 24, 2012, 

I pledged to work closely with my fellow Commissioners and to approach my job as Chairman in a collaborative and collegial manner. 

Over the past 7 months, we have developed a very productive, respectful and collegial working relationship. In my tenure, I have 

also gained an even greater appreciation of the expertise of the 

NRC staff who carry out the mission of ensuring the safe and secure use of radioactive materials and protecting public health and 

safety and the environment. I believe the NRC is operating very 

well and is fulfilling its mandate. I am pleased with the NRC’s 

commitment to use operating experience and insights to continuously improve and remain a strong and effective regulator. 

As we approach the second anniversary of the great Tohoku 

earthquake and the subsequent tsunami in Japan, I would like to 

share my personal impressions from a recent visit to the 

Fukushima Daiichi site. I was struck by the deserted villages, 

abandoned roads and rail lines that we passed on the drive to the 

plant. More than 160,000 people today are displaced from their 

homes there, and the site itself is scattered with twisted metal and 

debris from the force of hydrogen explosions in the reactor buildVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:27 Jun 27, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 113\113-11 CHRIS
9 

ings as well as the tsunami itself. While the Japanese are diligently working to clean up and decommission the site, it will take 

them many decades to complete. 

The NRC continues its work to apply lessons from Fukushima to 

the regulation of NRC-licensed nuclear facilities. You may recall 

that the NRC identified a series of recommendations that were 

subsequently prioritized in three categories or tiers. The NRC has 

already taken many actions on the near-term priorities and is now 

turning its attention to long-term actions. We are actively exchanging lessons learned with the international community and maintaining a high level of open collaboration with the industry and 

public. 

Throughout this process, the agency remains determined to ensure that the regulatory actions stemming from this review do not 

become a distraction from day-to-day safe plant operations. The 

NRC has approved license renewals for 73 reactors and continues 

to review additional applications. However, two reactors that had 

planned to operate an additional 20 years have recently announced 

their intention to permanently close due to economic factors. In the 

months and years ahead, the NRC will adjust our oversight from 

ensuring these reactors operate safely to ensuring they will be decommissioned safely. 

Overall, the U.S. reactor fleet is performing well. There are a few 

reactors that have had significant performance problems, which the 

NRC is addressing in accordance with its regulatory procedures. 

Browns Ferry Unit 1 continues to address equipment problems. 

Fort Calhoun remains shut down as it addresses problems stemming from an inadequate flood strategy and a fire. And the San 

Onofre Nuclear Generating Station has been shut down for more 

than a year due to unexpected degradation of the plant’s replacement steam generators. The NRC will not allow any of our licensed 

facilities to operate unless we are satisfied that they can do so safely. 

Since the NRC issued the first combined operating licenses last 

year for new reactors at the Vogtle and Summer sites in Georgia 

and South Carolina, construction has begun. Although there has 

been significant progress at both sites, there have also been some 

delays due to design implementation and fabrication issues. We anticipate that all necessary license amendments will be issued by 

the end of this week, which will permit both sides to begin pouring 

first nuclear concrete. 

Among other activities in the licensing and regulation of radioactive materials, the NRC is preparing to implement construction 

and operating inspection programs for two newly licensed facilities: 

a uranium laser enrichment facility and the depleted uranium 

deconversion facility. We have also revised our regulations for the 

physical protection of spent fuel transportation and are preparing 

to publish a new role to expand security measures for the physical 

protection of category 1 and 2 byproduct material. The NRC staff 

continues to make progress in addressing the issues cited in the 

Court of Appeals decision on waste confidence. Our work is already 

well underway and on schedule for completion by September 2014. 

The Commission has directed that all affected license application 

review activities will continue but the agency will not issue final 

10 

licenses dependent upon the waste confidence decision until the 

court’s remand is addressed. The agency is actively engaging the 

public in the process. 

The NRC continues to make international cooperation a priority 

with active involvement in a variety of bilateral and multilateral 

initiatives. I recently assumed the chairmanship of the Multinational Design Evaluation Program, an organization that strives 

to leverage the knowledge and resources of regulators to improve 

the design reviews of new commercial power reactors. In the next 

several months, the NRC will continue its focus on these and other 

important issues. 

I am proud of our accomplishments and confident that we will 

address the challenges ahead with the same high-quality work. I 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and would be 

happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Macfarlane follows:] 

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80376.001

WRITTEN STATEMENT 

BY ALLISON M. MACFARLANE, CHAIRMAN 

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

TO THE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

SUBCOMMITTEES ON ENERGY AND POWER, ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY 

FEBRUARY 28,2013 

Good morning, Chairman Whitfield, Ranking Member Rush, Chairman Shimkus, 

Ranking Member Tonko, and distinguished members of the Subcommittees. On behalf of the 

Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss policy and 

governance at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 

When the Commission appeared before you last on July 24, 2012, I had joined the NRC 

only 15 days earlier. At the time, I pledged to work closely with my fellow Commissioners and to 

approach my job as Chairman in a collaborative and collegial manner. Over the past seven 

months, we have developed a very productive, respectful, and collegial working relationship, 

and we have sustained an environment of open communication. 

I also have an even greater appreciation of the skills and expertise of NRC management 

and staff who carry out the mission of ensuring the safe and secure use of radioactive materials 

and protecting public health and safety and the environment. I have been particularly 

impressed by the NRC resident inspectors, who are assessing licensees' activities at the 

nation's nuclear power plants and selected nuclear fuel cycle facilities every day. In general, I 

believe the NRC is operating very well, and we are addressing challenges and identifying areas 

for improvement to make us a more effective and efficient regulator. 
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80376.002

In the 38 years since the NRC was established, its mission and focus has remained 

steadfast: protecting public health and safety and promoting common defense and security. 

Through our oversight of regulated facilities and materials, we use operating experience and 

insights to ensure we continue to learn lessons and remain a strong and effective regulator. 

NRC has approved license renewals for 73 reactors. Most facilities with renewed 

licenses have replaced or planned to replace major pieces of equipment, such as the steam 

generators or reactor vessel heads. Additionally, each licensed facility has an aging 

management program which the agency reviews. Seeking approval for license extension, 

however, is not a guarantee that a reactor will choose to operate for 60 years. In addition, 

business factors may influence the life of nuclear power plants. Recently, the owners of the 

Kewaunee Nuclear Plant and Crystal River Unit 3 announced plans to permanently close these 

reactors due to economic factors. In the months and years ahead, NRC will adjust our oversight 

from ensuring these reactors operate safely to ensuring they will be safely decommissioned. In 

addition, a few plants are shut down for extended periods as they address some unique 

challenges. I will address those specifically later in my testimony. 

Before turning to the challenges ahead, I want to briefly recap a few accomplishments 

since we were last before you in a hearing. The Commissioners and the staff have been busy. 

Specifically we have been: 

• Steadily working through the Fukushima lessons-learned recommendations; 

• Monitoring all operating reactors, including those requiring heightened oversight; 

• Conducting construction oversight of the new Vogtle and Summer reactors; 

• Addressing the court decision related to waste confidence; 
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• Continuing to engage our international partners; and 

• Overseeing of construction of new fuel cycle facilities. 

FUKUSHIMA 

We are approaching the second anniversary of the Great T5hoku Earthquake and 

subsequent tsunami in Japan. The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant 

continues to serve as a reminder that the NRC and industry must be prepared to address 

reasonably foreseeable events that could lead to severe accidents. We continue to work 

applying lessons from the accident to our regulation of NRC-licensed nuclear facilities. The 

NRC will take every reasonable precaution to prevent such an accident from happening here in 

the United States. 

I would like to take this opportunity to share my personal impressions of my recent visit 

to the Fukushima Daiichi site. I was struck on the drive to the facility by the deserted villages, 

abandoned roads and rail lines, covered not with cars and trains, but overgrown weeds. More 

than 160,000 people who lived within 20 kilometers of the plant no longer occupy their homes 

and do not know when they will be allowed to permanently return. The site itself is scattered 

with twisted metal from the hydrogen explosions in the reactor buildings and debris spread by 

the force of the tsunami. I have seen the progress made by the Japanese in the reinforcement 

of the protective sea wall, the management and cleanup of contaminated water, the stabilization 

of damaged buildings, and the preparation for removal of nuclear fuel, starting with the spent 

fuel in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool. The Japanese are diligently and methodically working to clean 

up and decommission the site, but it will take decades to complete. 

In July 2011, we received a series of recommendations from an agency task force that 

was charged with reviewing NRC's regulations to determine if additional measures were needed 
14 


80376.004

to address lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. After further review from experts both 

inside and outside the NRC, the NRC prioritized these recommendations into three tiers. Tier 1 

encompasses those actions to be addressed in the near term, Tier 2 to follow as soon as the 

necessary information and critical skill sets become available, and Tier 3 as longer-term 

activities. The Commission established a goal to implement the lessons learned within five 

years, 

To address the Tier 1 activities, in March 2012, the NRC issued orders requiring power 

reactor licensees to have reliable indicators of water levels in the spent fuel pool and to develop 

strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling following 

a "beyond-design-basis" extreme natural event. A third order required licensees with BWR 

Mark I and Mark II containments to have a reliable hardened vent to prevent over-pressurizing 

the containment during a severe accident. In addition, the agency issued a "request for 

information" for licensees to reevaluate the seismic and flood hazards at their sites, to conduct 

seismic and flooding hazard "walkdowns" to identify any degraded or nonconforming conditions, 

and to assess the adequacy of power supplies for their communication systems if there was a 

prolonged loss of offsite power. Finally, NRC initiated two rulemakings to augment existing 

requirements regarding station blackout and the integration of emergency procedures, 

The NRC is moving forward to implement these safety enhancements at the same time 

as we are actively exchanging lessons learned with the international community, The agency 

will evaluate additional lessons learned for applicability to U,S. reactors and will take action, as 

necessary. Throughout the process, NRC staff has maintained a high level of open 

collaboration with the industry and public, holding 82 public meetings in fiscal year 2012, While 

it is important that we proceed to deal with the lessons of Fukushima, the agency remains 
15 


80376.005

determined to assure that the regulatory actions stemming from this review not become a 

distraction from the day-to-day actions necessary for oversight of ali operating nuclear facilities. 

Let me assure you that the Commission will continue to appropriately prioritize work on 

measures to mitigate the impact of extreme events with the work necessary to maintain safety 

of the reactor fleet and other nuclear facilities. As part of that effort, the NRC is considering the 

cumulative effects of regulation, rulemaking initiatives stemming from Fukushima lessonslearned activities, and the agency's methodology for prioritizing rulemaking activities. 

ENHANCED OVERSIGHT 

There are five performance categories under the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process. 

Operating reactors in Column 1 of this "action matrix" have the highest level of safety and 

security performance and receive a baseline-level of NRC inspection, while those in Columns 2, 

3 and 4 receive an increasing level of NRC oversight and inspection. Reactors in Column 5 are 

required to shut down until problems are addressed. For reactors in extended shutdown, NRC 

has special oversight programs. Currently, there are 84 reactors in Column 1, 15 in Column 2, 

and three in Column 3. 

As you may be aware, there are reactors that have more significant performance 

problems. Browns Ferry Unit 1 has been in Column 4 since the fourth quarter of 2010 as a 

result of problems with a residual heat removal flow control valve. Plants in this column receive 

the most NRC attention short of a mandated shutdown. 

Fort Calhoun remains under Inspection Manual Chapter 0350 oversight as a result of 

problems stemming from an inadequate flood strategy and a fire that started in a safety-related 

electric breaker. The plant has been shut down since May 2011 following flooding along the 
16 


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Missouri River. The "0350" oversight process is for reactors in an extended shutdown condition 

resulting from significant performance or operational concems. Fort Calhoun has been pursuing 

activities to prepare the plant for restart under heightened NRC oversight. 

The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) was placed under Inspection 

Manual Chapter 0351 oversight in September. This is oversight intended for reactors that are in 

an extended shutdown for reasons other than systemic significant performance problems. The 

problem at SONGS, which has been shut down since January 2012, largely centers on a single 

technical issue -- degradation of the plant's replacement steam generators. In this case and 

that of Fort Calhoun, the NRC will not authorize restart until we are satisfied that the facilities 

can be operated safely. 

In November 2012, the NRC moved the Palisades nuclear plant from Column 3, which is 

for plants with a degraded level of performance, back to Column 1. Although plants in Column 1 

meet all safety and security performance objectives and are inspected by NRC under the 

normal baseline program, in this case, the NRC is adding 1,000 hours of inspections at the plant 

in 2013 to ensure plant issues are adequately resolved. 

NEW CONSTRUCTION 

Since the NRC issued the first Combined Operating Licenses last February and March 

for new reactors at the Vogtle and Summer stations in Georgia and South Carolina, construction 

has begun. Although there has been significant progress at both sites, there also have been 

some delays while the NRC, the licensees, and their vendors addressed design implementation 

and fabrication issues. NRC inspectors have identified code compliance issues with the rebar 

design of the basemat and walls, which delayed pouring concrete for the "nuclear islands," or 

bases, of the reactors. Both licensees are in the process of resolving these problems and are 
17 


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planning the first nuclear concrete pour next month. Other issues identified by NRC inspectors 

have been in the area of civil construction and digital instrumentation and control. Both sites 

experienced issues with the delivery and quality of fabrication of plant modules. The agency 

and the licensees remain focused on ensuring the issues are identified and resolved. 

These are the first generation of reactors built under the new construction regulations. 

In 1989, the NRC developed an alternative licensing process under 10 CFR Part 52 to that 

allows applicants to seek a "combined license" for both construction and operation of a nuclear 

power plant. This differs from the current fleet of reactors that were licensed under a two-step 

process that allowed construction to begin under a construction permit based on preliminary 

safety and design information, followed later by an operating license after completion of 

construction. The Part 52 regulation authorizes construction based on a standardized design 

and provides conditional authority to operate the reactor subject to verification that it has been 

constructed in accordance with the license. The intent of the new licensing process was to 

eliminate the "design-as-you-go" approach. In order to minimize the potential for long delays in 

bringing new reactors online, applicants must adhere to speCifications in their approved 

standardized design. The Commission and staff intend to continue to work with licensees and 

vendors to ensure that we establish a common understanding of the expectations regarding asbuilt design detail and finality of the approved design. 

MATERIALS 

Among other activities in the licensing and regulation of radioactive materials, the staff is 

preparing to implement construction and operating inspection programs for two newly-licensed 

facilities. In September 2012, NRC issued a license to GE-Hitachi to construct and operate a 

uranium enrichment plant using laser technology in Wilmington, North Carolina. In October 

2012, NRC issued a license for construction and operation of a depleted uranium deconversion 
18 


80376.008

facility in New Mexico. This facility will convert depleted uranium hexafluoride into fluorine 

products for commercial sale and depleted uranium oxide for disposal. 

In ongoing work, the staff regularly inspects dry cask storage facilities and currently is 

reviewing applications to renew such facilities at two different reactor sites and numerous spent 

fuel storage casks. In fiscal year 2012, the agency revised its regulations for the physical 

protection of spent fuel transportation and the regulations for advanced notification to Native 

American tribes regarding transportation of certain types of nuclear waste. 

We are also preparing to publish a new regulation, 10 CFR Part 37, which provides 

expanded security measures for the physical protection of category 1 and 2 byproduct material. 

Other activities include continuing reviews of nine applications for new, renewed or 

expanded in-situ uranium recovery facilities. 

WASTE CONFIDENCE 

The Commission has directed the NRC staff to address the issues cited in the u.s. 

Court of Appeals decision on waste confidence by September 2014. The Commission also 

directed that all affected license application review activities will continue, but the agency will not 

issue final licenses dependent upon the Waste Confidence Decision or the Temporary Storage 

Rule until these issues are addressed. The agency has engaged the public in the process, 

holding six public meetings so far, and additional meetings are planned on a regular basis in the 

months ahead. 
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INTERNATIONAL 

The agency continues to make international cooperation a priority. In December 2012, 

the NRC held the first-of-its-kind International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security. The 

conference brought together regulators and security experts from around the world and served 

as a valuable opportunity to foster enhanced cooperation in this important area. Also in 

December, I led the U.S. delegation to the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in 

Fukushima Prefecture, Japan. It was during this trip that I had the opportunity to visit the 

Fukushima site. The visit also served as a significant opportunity to reaffirm the strong bilateral 

relationship between the NRC and our Japanese counterpart, the new Japan Nuclear 

Regulation Authority (JNRA), The NRC remains committed to supporting its Japanese 

colleagues as we all continue to move forward from the Fukushima accident. In addition, the 

NRC remains actively involved in U.S. Government activities with respect to the Convention on 

Nuclear Safety. 

The NRC has also continued its international interactions in the area of new reactor 

development. In January, I assumed the chairmanship of the Multinational Design Evaluation 

Program (MDEP), an organization that strives to leverage the knowledge and resources of 

national regulatory authorities to improve the regulatory design reviews of new commercial 

power reactors. Coming up in mid-March, the MDEP Policy Group will meet in the U.S. to 

continue its work with a recently expanded membership that now includes India and the United 

Arab Emirates. In addition, the NRC remains actively involved in multilateral initiatives, such as 

those at the International Atomic Energy Agency, and bilateral assistance initiatives to promote 

a strong, independent regulatory structure for all countries that use nuclear and radioactive 

materials. 
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Finally, NRC's 25th annual Regulatory Information Conference, which will be held March 

12-14, has drawn representatives from 34 countries who will participate in the conference and in 

bilateral meetings with me and my fellow Commissioners. 

A LOOK AHEAD 

While we have accomplished much, many challenges are ahead for the NRC. In the next 

several months, the Commission's focus will include the following issues: 

• Continue enhancing our regulations where necessary in the aftermath of the Fukushima 

accident; 

• Continue preparing the agency's waste confidence environmental impact statement and 

temporary storage rule; 

• Strengthen our close cooperation with international partners; 

• Conduct construction oversight of the new Vogt/e and Summer reactors 

• Complete the licensing review and prepare for the third mandatory hearing on the 

application in to construct a new reactor in Levy County, Florida. 

Chairman Whitfield, Ranking Member Rush, Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member Tonko, 

and distinguished members of the Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before you today. My colleagues and I would be pleased to respond to your questions. 
21 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Chairman. 

Now I would like to turn to the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Waxman, for his 5-minute opening statement. Then we 

will turn back to the Commissioners for your hopefully 2-minute 

opening statements. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

begin by welcoming Dr. Allison Macfarlane, the Chairman of the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and her colleagues on the Commission. Thank you all for being here today. 

By all accounts, Chairman Macfarlane has ushered in a new era 

of collegiality at the Commission. I commend her for her leadership. 

The Commission is grappling with a number of important matters that deserve our attention. 

In California, the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station has 

been shut down for more than a year due to serious problems with 

the plant’s brand-new steam generators. The generators cost California ratepayers $670 million. This expense was large, but the 

new equipment was supposed to last for decades. Two of the steam 

generators did not even last a year. 

Southern California Edison has requested permission to restart 

one of the plant’s two reactors. The Commission has an obligation 

to ensure that the reactor could operate safely before it is allowed 

to restart, and California residents are counting on the Commission 

to do its job carefully and with safety as the first priority. 

But the Commission should also look at its own actions to understand why it did not detect the design and manufacturing flaws in 

these steam generators before they were turned on. If the NRC had 

detected these problems before the generators were installed, California ratepayers could have saved hundreds of millions of dollars. 

The Commission also continues to address the safety gaps revealed by the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, which happened almost 2 years ago. Last year, the Commission issued three 

orders to U.S. commercial nuclear reactors to enhance safety in the 

wake of the Fukushima disaster. Today is the deadline for operators to submit their plans for implementing these orders. Nuclear 

plant operators have until the end of 2016 to fully implement their 

plans to increase safety. It is important that this safety deadline 

does not slip as others have in the past. 

A major problem at Fukushima was that hydrogen gas built up 

in the reactor and eventually exploded when the pressure could not 

be released. One of the Commission’s post-Fukushima orders requires reactors similar to the type used at Fukushima to install 

pressure-venting systems that operate reliably in severe accident 

conditions. That is a commonsense improvement, and I commend 

the Commission for requiring that step. 

The Commission’s technical experts recently recommended that 

the Commission go a step further to require these reactors to install filters on the vents in order to reduce the amount of radioactive material released with any vented gases. The NRC staff conVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:27 Jun 27, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 113\113-11 CHRIS
22 

ducted a full cost-benefit analysis and concluded that this safety 

precaution would be amply justified. Safety should be the Commission’s top priority, and I urge the Commission to approve the NRC 

staff’s recommendation to require filtered vents as soon as possible. 

I was pleased to hear Chairman Macfarlane’s testimony. I am 

looking forward to the comments of her colleagues and for the opportunity to ask questions about these issues and the other significant safety issues pending before the Commission. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Waxman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN

I want to begin by welcoming Dr. Allison Macfarlane, the chairman of the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC), and her colleagues on the Commission. Thank you 

for being here today. 

By all accounts, Chairman Macfarlane has ushered in a new era of collegiality at 

the Commission. I commend her for her leadership. 

The Commission is grappling with a number of important matters that deserve 

our attention. 

In California, the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station has been shut down for 

more than a year due to serious problems with the plant’s brand new steam generators. The generators cost California ratepayers $670 million. This expense was 

large, but the new equipment was supposed to last for decades. Two of the steam 

generators did not even last a year. 

Southern California Edison has requested permission to restart one of the plant’s 

two reactors. The Commission has an obligation to ensure that the reactor could operate safely before it is allowed to restart, and California residents are counting on 

the Commission to do its job carefully and with safety as the first priority. 

But the Commission should also look at its own actions to understand why it did 

not detect the design and manufacturing flaws in these steam generators before 

they were turned on. If the NRC had detected these problems before the generators 

were installed, California ratepayers could have saved hundreds of millions of dollars. 

The Commission also continues to address the safety gaps revealed by the 

Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, which happened almost two years ago. 

Last year, the Commission issued three orders to U.S. commercial nuclear reactors to enhance safety in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. Today is the deadline 

for operators to submit their plans for implementing these orders. Nuclear plant operators have until the end of 2016 to fully implement their plans to increase safety. 

It is important that this safety deadline does not slip as others have in the past. 

A major problem at Fukushima was that hydrogen gas built up in the reactor and 

eventually exploded when the pressure could not be released. One of the Commission’s post-Fukushima orders requires reactors similar to the type used at 

Fukushima to install pressure venting systems that operate reliably in severe accident conditions. That’s a commonsense improvement and I commend the Commission for requiring that step. 

The Commission’s technical experts recently recommended that the Commission 

go a step further to require these reactors to install filters on the vents in order 

to reduce the amount of radioactive material released with any vented gases. The 

NRC staff conducted a full cost-benefit analysis and concluded that this safety precaution would be amply justified. Safety should be the Commission’s top priority, 

and I urge the Commission to approve the NRC staff’s recommendation to require 

filtered vents as soon as possible. 

I look forward to hearing the views of Chairman Macfarlane and her fellow commissioners about these issues and the other significant safety issues pending before 

the Commission. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. 

The Chair now recognizes Commissioner Svinicki for 2 minutes. 

23 

STATEMENT OF KRISTINE SVINICKI 

Ms. SVINICKI. Thank you, Chairman Whitfield, Ranking Member 

Rush, Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member Tonko, Chairman 

Upton and distinguished members of the subcommittees for the opportunity to appear before you today at this oversight hearing to 

examine NRC policy and governance. 

Since the Commission appeared before you last summer, NRC 

has continued its important and diverse activities related to oversight and licensing of nuclear power plants, research, test and 

training reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, medical, industrial 

and academic uses of radioactive materials, and the transport, storage and disposal of radioactive materials and waste. Of these many 

diverse responsibilities, I will highlight two of current focus. 

The NRC continues to oversee industry compliance with the 

cybersecurity regulations that NRC put in place in 2009 to protect 

critical digital assets at nuclear facilities. Working cooperatively 

with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the Department of Homeland 

Security and other organizations, we continue to monitor and help 

combat the cyber threats to our Nation. 

In the area of small modular reactors, the NRC continues its 

work to identify and resolve policy and licensing issues related to 

adapting our regulatory framework, which was developed for large 

light water reactors, to the diverse designs and approaches put 

forth by the small modular reactor community of developers. NRC 

policy encourages early discussion prior to submission of a license 

application between NRC agency staff and potential applicants in 

public meetings. These discussions enable the NRC staff to identify 

and resolve potential issues early in the process. These efforts will 

continue and will take more specific form as the U.S. Department 

of Energy advances its SMR program activities this year and next. 

All of these activities are achieved through the committed efforts 

of the women and men of the NRC who work to advance the NRC’s 

mission of ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety 

and promoting the common defense and security day in and day 

out. I am grateful to them for the work they do. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear and look forward to your 

questions. Thank you. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, and now the Chair recognizes Commissioner Apostolakis for 2 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Chairman Whitfield, Ranking Member Rush 

and members of the subcommittees, good morning. 

At the 2-year anniversary of the accident at Fukushima, the 

NRC and the nuclear industry have made significant progress in 

addressing lessons learned. Decisions on nuclear safety matters 

should not be made without careful deliberation. Such deliberation 

includes the technical evaluations by NRC senior management, the 

views of the statutory advisory committee in regard to safeguards, 

and public interactions with external stakeholders. 

As a result of this open and transparent process, the technical 

basis for implementing the Near-Term Task Force recommendations was strengthened. Additional technical issues for considerVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:27 Jun 27, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 113\113-11 CHRIS
24 

ation were identified in such areas as filtration of containment 

vents, loss of the ultimate heat sink, and the expedited transfer of 

spent fuel to dry casks to cask storage. 

The process for reaching post-Fukushima decisions has been and 

continues to be methodical and transparent. This decision-making 

process has highlighted the potential tension between implementing new safety enhancements and maintaining regulatory stability. Our own Principles of Good Regulation state that NRC regulation should be perceived to be reliable and not unjustifiably in a 

state of transition. The agency will continue to face the challenge 

of striking the right balance between safety enhancements and regulatory stability. 

In closing, I note that there are many other safety improvements 

being made at nuclear power plants that are not related to 

Fukushima. These also require significant resources to implement. 

It is a challenge to ensure that additional new requirements do not 

adversely affect the implementation of more safety significant activities or our licensees’ ability to maintain their focus on day-today safe operation. Thank you. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Commissioner. 

Now, Commissioner Magwood, you are recognized for 2 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM D. MAGWOOD, IV 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Thank you, and good morning. Chairman 

Shimkus, Ranking Member Tonko, Chairman Whitfield and Ranking Member Rush, Chairman Upton and distinguished members of 

the subcommittees, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to 

discuss the activities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Two years after the massive earthquake struck northeastern 

Japan that precipitated the disaster at the Fukushima plant, responding to these important lessons of that event remains a very 

high priority for our agency. While we continue to work with our 

Japanese friends and the international community to study the sequence of events at Fukushima to mine this tragedy for information that will help prevent future disasters, we have already 

learned the highest priority lessons. 

We understand that we must change the way we think about extreme events, what we in our business call beyond-design-basis 

events. These events are rare but can result in very high consequences. Fukushima has led to new thinking regarding how U.S. 

facilities should prepare for these occurrences. 

From Fukushima, we understand it is possible for a nuclear 

plant to experience the loss of both offsite power and onsite emergency diesel generators as a result of a single event. We have also 

seen the unanticipated challenges associated with the failure of 

multiple reactors at a single site. 

This Commission has led our agency to aggressively respond to 

these new learnings. We have issued orders to address these issues 

and many more. I believe that the great majority of risk revealed 

in the aftermath of Fukushima has been addressed by the actions 

we have taken thus far. Nevertheless, more work remains both in 

implementing successfully the decisions we have already made, and 

to address remaining important issues such as the improvements 

25 

that can be considered regarding containment of venting systems 

for Mark I and Mark II boiling-water reactors. 

My colleagues and I have had many spirited, open discussions 

and debates over these matters, and we have all spent countless 

hours with the excellent NRC staff as we work to find the best solutions to these difficult issues and assure the health and safety of 

the American people. Meanwhile, the regular work of our agency 

continues. As our work continues, we appreciate the strong interest 

that you have demonstrated in our activities and the ongoing efforts that we have in becoming a stronger, more effective and more 

open nuclear safety regulator. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes Commissioner Ostendorff for 2 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Chairman Shimkus, Chairman Whitfield, 

Ranking Member Rush, thank you for the chance to be here today. 

As we approach the 2-year anniversary of the Fukushima Daiichi 

event, I think that we are making very good progress at our agency 

in implementing previous actions in response and in looking at 

what needs to be done and what does not need to be done. 

Along with all my colleagues here at this table, I know that we 

take seriously our responsibilities in making sure that we do not 

impose additional requirements without there being a strong justification. I firmly believe as a Commissioner that we are doing just 

that. 

With respect to other work, safety performance of our licensees 

remains very good. When deficiencies are identified, we enhance 

our level of oversight and we ensure appropriate corrective actions 

are taken. 

We are also effectively providing construction oversight of new 

reactors in Georgia and in South Carolina and are promptly addressing the waste confidence remand from the D.C. Circuit Court 

of Appeals. 

I appreciate this committee’s oversight role and I look forward to 

your questions. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you. You get the prize, Commissioner 

Ostendorff. I would like to now begin our opening round of questions. I will recognize myself for the first 5 minutes. 

As you all know, we are still waiting for a decision from the D.C. 

Circuit Court on whether the NRC is legally bound to resume consideration of the Yucca Mountain license application. Chairman 

Macfarlane, last July when you last testified before this committee, 

I asked you if you would honor the court’s decision, and you said, 

and I quote, ‘‘Absolutely.’’ Do you still stand by that statement? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Absolutely. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. To the rest of the Commissioners, will you also 

commit to honor the court’s decision? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes, I do. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes. 

26 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Our investigation last year uncovered an estimate 

by NRC staff indicating that the Yucca Mountain Safety Evaluation Report could be completed in 6 to 8 months. The Safety Evaluation Report would document the NRC’s review and conclusions 

regarding the license application. In answers to questions following 

our last hearing, the NRC stated the cost would be approximately 

$6.5 million. The NRC’s Performance and Accountability Report 

issued 2 weeks ago states that the NRC currently has $10.4 million 

in unobligated balances from the Nuclear Waste Fund for the purpose of reviewing the license application, and this is to all five 

Commissioners: Having committed to honor the court’s decision, if 

the court orders the NRC to resume its review of the license application, will you commit to ensuring that staff will complete the review and publicly release the Safety Evaluation Report in accordance with these time and resource estimates? Chairman? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Well, I will first wait to see what the court’s 

decision is and then I will wait to see the analysis of the available 

funds. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So you don’t believe that you have $10.5 million 

in unobligated accounts in the NRC? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We do. Whether it is released or not is another 

issue. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And you don’t agree that you responded in your last appearance here that there was $6.5 million in—well, it was 

the projected cost. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I agreed to that. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And you have agreed that if the court decides to 

move forward that you as the Chairman of the Commission would 

do so? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. OK. Thank you. Same question to you, Commissioner Svinicki? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Mr. Chairman, the figures that you mentioned, I 

believe are correct. I do not know if the NRC staff would need to 

update the cost estimate for completing and issuing the SERs. The 

longer the duration of the suspension of their activities, it may be 

that reconstituting their work would have a higher price tag than 

that, but of course, any direction to the staff will be deliberated 

amongst the Commissioners. As an individual member of the Commission, I do believe there would be value in completing that work. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you. Commissioner Apostolakis? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I agree with Commissioner Svinicki. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Great. Commissioner Magwood? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes, I would echo that as well, and also add that 

I think we also would require some additional guidance from Congress on that to assure we apply the money correctly, but with all 

those constraints, absolutely. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And Commissioner Ostendorff? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I agree there is value in moving forward to 

complete the SERs and publicly issue those documents irrespective 

of what the long-term siting of the repository may be. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And final question. If the court issues such an 

order, will you commit to provide this committee with monthly reports on the staff’s progress and expenditures of resources? 

27 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Commissioner Svinicki? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you very much. Now the Chair recognizes 

the gentleman from New York, Mr. Tonko, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Last March, the Commission issued three orders to United States 

commercial nuclear reactors to enhance safety in the wake of the 

Fukushima disaster. One of the orders is focusing on boiling-water 

reactors, similar to the type used in Fukushima. The Indian Point 

nuclear facility south of my Congressional district uses this type of 

reactor. NRC is requiring these reactors to install hydrogen venting 

systems that would be reliable and operable under emergency conditions. That seems like common sense, and in fact, today is the 

deadline for operators to submit their plans for implementing these 

orders to the NRC. 

Chairman Macfarlane, these reactors have until the end of 2016, 

I believe, at the latest, to execute these plans. Is that correct? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. To execute the—I believe that is correct. 

Mr. TONKO. That is more than 5 years after the Fukushima accident for only three orders. The post-Fukushima task force made 

many additional recommendations for how to improve reactor safety. Chairman Macfarlane, how long will it take, in your opinion, to 

implement all of the Fukushima task force’s recommendations? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. This is an issue that we are looking at, and 

we are trying to—we are evaluating a number of these recommendations going forward. As you know, we have prioritized 

them into three tiers. The first tier were the activities that could 

be conducted immediately without further study, and now we are 

evaluating the tier two and tier three activities to see if there is 

reason to go forward with them, but we are doing it with all due 

deliberation. 

Mr. TONKO. I appreciate that, but I believe it is important to 

maintain a sense of urgency in the implementation of the lessons 

learned from Fukushima. As time passes, we tend to lose focus, but 

the hazards don’t become any less real over the course of time. 

I want to also ask you about another issue that seems like common sense, and that is whether NRC should require the installation of filters on these hydrogen vents in order to reduce the 

amount of radiation released into the outside air in the event of a 

severe accident. NRC’s technical experts recommended that the 

Commission require filtered vents. Some members of this committee have raised concerns that this requirement would be too 

costly. Chairman Macfarlane, my understanding is that the NRC 

staff did a full cost-benefit analysis examining both quantitative 

and qualitative factors. Is that correct? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. That is correct. 

Mr. TONKO. And there is nothing unusual about looking at qualitative factors. Is that correct? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. That is correct. 

28 

Mr. TONKO. As is consistent with NRC’s guidance on cost-benefit 

analyses? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes. 

Mr. TONKO. OK. Well, based on its analysis, NRC staff determined that requiring filtered vents would be cost-justified and 

would indeed increase safety. Is that correct? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. That is the staff’s analysis. 

Mr. TONKO. I know you are currently voting on this issue. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We are. 

Mr. TONKO. And I respect that process. I believe that you need 

to work together to come to a conclusion on this issue, but I would 

encourage you to resist outside pressure to disregard the expert 

recommendations of your staff. I think it is imperative. I think it 

is important that we move forward having learned from the lessons 

of Fukushima, and it is important for us to maintain a sense of 

safety with all of our nuclear activity across the country. 

So with that, I thank you, and Mr. Chair, I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair 

now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Upton, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. UPTON. Well, again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do appreciate, as I said in my opening statement, your particular concern as we all share with my particular plant in my district, the 

Palisades plant, and it is in the interest of all that that Palisades 

plant be returned to column 1, which it was. I appreciated you 

keeping us updated. And as I indicated in my opening statement, 

and you indicated as well, that you are going to apply increased 

oversight beyond the normal inspections for that particular facility. 

Can you elaborate at all in terms of how long that might last, what 

progress we have seen since you indicated such a number of weeks 

ago? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Sure. The increased oversight is a result of 

degradation in safety culture that we observed at the Palisades 

plant, and they had a few other issues but this was the issue that 

prompted the increased oversight, and we are going to continue 

with the increased oversight to ensure that the positive changes 

that we have seen at the Palisades site in safety culture hold, and 

we will continue that for a while as long as we are convinced that 

changes have permanently taken place at the plant, and this is 

completely normal and this is what we do with other plants. We 

are not singling out Palisades in any particular manner, and it is 

all moving in a very positive direction. 

Mr. UPTON. I appreciate that, and I appreciate your leadership, 

and I just want to extend an invitation. In my district, I have two 

facilities that are literally 10 miles north of where I live and 10 

miles south, and it would be an easy trip for you perhaps to come 

visit both on literally the same day, so I appreciate your leadership 

and I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair 

now recognizes the ranking member of the Energy and Air Quality 

Subcommittee, Mr. Rush, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSH. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairwoman Macfarlane, I am going to switch the focus again 

from some of the nuclear-centered anxieties that are prevalent on 

29 

this committee, and I want to focus on what I consider one of your 

strengths. 

In my opening statement, I remarked that I was pleased to see 

the NRC being honored as one of the governmental agencies that 

was most supportive of the engineering departments at HBCUs in 

2012, and I think that is an issue that really we need some airing 

on and hearings of this type, and that is the issue of getting more 

students to go into the STEM fields so that they can be the engineers and scientists of the future, and I want to commend your 

agency again for its outstanding achievement. 

The API recently released a report that half of this industry will 

turn over in the next 7 to 10 years and it is in our national security 

interests that we make sure that we train young people to become 

scientists and engineers and that they have the skills and the expertise that is necessary to replace this aging workforce. Can you 

provide this committee with more information on programs, what 

forms of support the NRC provides to these HBCUs and do you 

think that these types of programs can be replicated at other agencies? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We can certainly provide a list in writing on 

these programs, and I think these programs are very important. 

Coming from an academic background myself, I find it very important and I have been getting briefed from the staff on all the range 

of programs that we have. We have some very important programs 

to not only encourage students to go into these fields but also to 

make sure there are faculty there to teach the students, and I 

think that is an important piece of this as well. So these are very 

important programs. I don’t know if my colleagues would like to 

comment. 

Mr. RUSH. Anybody? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Sure, Congressman, just a quick comment. I 

agree with Chairman Macfarlane. I think these activities are very 

important, and it is not simply programs aimed at HBCUs obviously. It is really the broader academic community. And NRC has 

a unique role to play because it is not just simply the dollars that 

we put into this, it is also a lot of our staff who are very interested 

in these programs and serve as champions for various universities 

across the country where they travel and I travel quite frequently 

to visit students and talk to students about careers in science and 

technology, and of course, particularly nuclear science and technology. 

In the area of our Minority-Serving Institutions program, I think 

the biggest portion of the program is what we would call capacity 

building, building the ability of these universities to compete on a 

more equal basis with larger universities for research dollars and 

other types of grants. So it is something that we are very proud 

of. 

Mr. RUSH. Ms. Macfarlane, the NRC Principles of Good Regulation state, and I quote, ‘‘Regulatory activity should be consistent 

with the degree of risk reduction they achieve. Where several effective alternatives are available, the option which minimizes the use 

of resources should be adopted,’’ and ‘‘Once established, regulations 

should be perceived to be reliable and not unjustifiably in a state 

of transition.’’ What specific measures do you employ to ensure that 

30 

the NRC’s regulatory process provides sufficient flexibility to satisfy these principles while ensuring a predictable and stable regulatory regime? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We operate a number of different processes to 

ensure that there is a stable regulatory regime, and we work closely with industry and other stakeholders to ensure that we are 

going forward and we are sensitive to issues that come up. 

Mr. RUSH. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair 

recognizes the chairman of the Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee, Mr. Whitfield, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Chairman Shimkus, and thank you 

all for your statements. 

In my opening statement, I talked about the Near-Term Task 

Force recommendation number one concerning the defense-in-depth 

philosophy, the Severe Accident Management Order, the filteredvents proposal, and the economic consequences proposal, and I noticed that after last July’s hearing, Commissioner Ostendorff, you 

submitted answers to some questions we had submitted in which 

you supported an integrated, prioritized assessment of the NearTerm Task Force recommendations, and as I said in my opening 

statement, all of these issues seem to be so intertwined and yet 

there seems to be an effort at the Commission to do them independent and separate of each other. Would you give me your views 

on this issue? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Thank you very much, Chairman Whitfield, for 

the question. It is a very important question. 

My personal views on this are as follows, that there may be some 

externally who would criticize the NRC staff for the sequencing of 

these four issues that you just raised. I take a different view, and 

I will tell you that amongst the five of us when we meet in periodic 

meetings several times a month one-on-one, we discuss this exact 

issue. I would fear that for us to go back and tell our Executive 

Director for Operations go back and sequence this in the way that 

you think is appropriate, that we would be inappropriately delegating our own policy decision-making authority to our staff. I 

think it is incumbent upon us as decisionmakers to take that integration and prioritization function on these key policy issues and 

deal with them as a Commission-level decision, not a staff decision. 

So for instance, if I could just add, in our economic consequences 

vote, and nothing is wrapped up but we have all had lots of discussions on this, and the filtered-vents vote, I think you will see when 

those votes are released under our processes, there has been significant consideration for the interconnection of these issues. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Would any of the other Commissioners like to 

make a comment? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes, Chairman Whitfield. I agree with Commissioner Ostendorff. I would add that I think since our responses last 

summer, individually and as a Commission, we are trying to strike 

a balance between, as Congressman Rush just read, our commitment to a principle that the entire regulatory framework not be 

unjustifiably in a state of transition and the need to disposition 

some of these measures which have been under evaluation. So we 

are attempting to integrate as well as we can but at the same time, 

31 

if issues are held open even longer, we contribute to this state of 

transition for the regulatory framework. So as we discuss with each 

other and we feel we are able, if we can disposition an individual 

issue, we think that getting that stabilized is beneficial. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Let me add that I agree with both of my colleagues on this issue, and we have been discussing it on a very regular basis, but I think what we are also benefiting from, as the 

staff does more analysis, is more information to help us really understand all the issues that are at play and exactly how we can 

deal with the overlap or the lack of overlap, depending on the particular issue. So we are giving this due consideration, please be assured. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Yes, sir? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Well, in addition to what my colleagues said, 

there is one other element that plays a role in our decision-making 

process, and that is how long it would take to implement one of 

those recommendations. Ideally and logically, recommendation one 

should be the first one to deal with, but recommendation one requires time, it requires rethinking of the regulatory system, so I 

don’t think any one of us would want us to still be working on recommendation one without doing anything else. So there are other 

actions that we can take, and it is not an ideal situation. But 

again, there is this time pressure too, that we do want to do something, and recommendation one will have to wait for a while. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Magwood? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Not to be the only one to stay silent on the issue, 

I guess I will have to make some comment. I think that the outcomes that we have been able to generate I think have been good, 

and that is not to say that we could not have had a more, I guess 

I should say a more coordinated approach to how these issues were 

sequenced and how we approach them, but to be honest, a lot of 

these issues have evolved a bit while we have been working on 

them. For example, we have merged some of the issues together so 

that they aren’t independent decisions anymore. So our understanding of how to approach this has changed as we have gone forward. So it is easy to look backwards and say well, I wish we could 

have done it this way, but I think the progress we have made so 

far has been so positive that I am hesitant to be overly critical of 

the fact that I would have liked to have seen one decision come before another. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, thank you all so much for talking about it. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The chairman’s time has expired. The Chair now 

recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Waxman, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chair Macfarlane, I would like to start by asking you about the 

problems with San Onofre. I mentioned it in my opening statement. The nuclear generating station is located near San Diego. In 

2010 and 2011, new steam generators were placed in service at 

that plant. The project cost California ratepayers $670 million but 

the new equipment was supposed to last for decades. However, 

since January 31 of last year, both reactors have been shut down 

after a tube in one of the units’ steam generators started leaking 

32 

radioactive steam into the atmosphere. When you last testified before the committee, all five Commissioners agreed that this is a serious safety issue that must be corrected before the plant restarts. 

The operator of the plant, Southern California Edison, is now proposing to run one of the units at 70 percent of power for 5 months. 

I know that NRC staff is evaluating that proposal. 

Chairman Macfarlane, would running a plant at less than full 

power for an extended period of time normally require an amendment to the plant’s operating license? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. You know, we are in the process of evaluating 

the proposal by Southern California Edison for their restart, and 

we are also evaluating whether they understand the root cause of 

the problem with the steam generators, and let me assure you first 

of all, that we will not let the plant operate until we are assured 

that it can operate 100 percent safely. 

Mr. WAXMAN. But my question is—and I thank you for that comment—is that if they are going to run this plant at less than full 

power, don’t they require an amendment to the plant’s operating 

license? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I think this is in adjudicatory space right now 

and so I can’t comment on that particular issue. 

Mr. WAXMAN. NRC didn’t detect the flaws in the generators before they were turned on. That raises important questions. How did 

this happen? How do we make sure it doesn’t happen again? What 

progress has NRC made in answering these outstanding questions? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. The process for changing out steam generators 

at plants—and this has been done at 65 plants across the country, 

65 reactors. We have done this over and over. It has been a fairly 

straightforward process. So the situation at San Onofre is somewhat unique. But nonetheless, we are going back and evaluating 

whether we have the right procedures in place when these big 

pieces of equipment are changed. So this is an active area. 

Mr. WAXMAN. And how long do you figure this is going to take? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. That what is going to take? 

Mr. WAXMAN. This evaluation to know what NRC didn’t do and 

should have done and will do in the future. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I am not sure, but we are in the process of determining lessons learned, and we will really move on with lessons 

learned once this situation with San Onofre is completed. 

Mr. WAXMAN. I want to turn to the issue of climate change and 

its impact on nuclear power plants. For years, scientists have 

warned that climate change will bring more extreme weather and 

flooding, more heat waves and droughts. We are now experiencing 

impacts consistent with these predictions. 

Chairman Macfarlane, what is NRC doing to ensure that our Nation’s nuclear plants can operate safely not only in the current climate but in a warmer climate with more extreme weather? There 

are indications that climate change is already having a harmful impact on the nuclear sector. Last August, Dominion Power was 

forced to shut down a nuclear reactor at its Millstone Power Station in Connecticut because the water it needs to cool its reactor 

became too warm. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes, I appreciate that question. I think it is 

important for us to evaluate all external hazards including those 

33 

that may be posed by climate change, but I think the Fukushima 

accident showed us that we need to be aware of recent information 

in terms of earthquake activity, tsunami, etc. So we need to be prepared for all of that, and in fact, we are moving in that direction 

right now. In the tier one activities from the Fukushima follow-on, 

we have asked plants to reevaluate both the seismic and flooding 

hazard, and the flooding hazard is a broad hazard. It can be from 

riverine flooding from too much rain, from coastal storm surge, as 

we saw during Hurricane Sandy, even from tsunamis. And then as 

we move through our other—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. Are you aware of other instances of nuclear plants 

shutting down or curtailing their output as a result of cooling 

water they depend on becoming either too warm or too scarce? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes. If it becomes their licensing basis, they 

do have to shut down. 

Mr. WAXMAN. The Tennessee Valley Authority has to curtail its 

output of its Browns Ferry nuclear reactors in Alabama during the 

summers of 2010 and 2011 because the temperature of the river 

used for cooling waters became too hot. Exelon Corporation had to 

receive special permission from regulators last summer to continue 

to operate its Braidwood reactors in Illinois when their cooling 

water pond’s temperature reached 102 degrees. 

The impact of climate change on our Nation’s nuclear power 

plants are real and happening now, and I think it is even going to 

get worse in the future. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you. The gentleman yields back his time. 

The Chair now recognizes the chairman emeritus from the full 

committee, Mr. Barton, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, both chairmen and ranking members of 

the subcommittees for holding this hearing. It is very decent of the 

full Commission to come before the two subcommittees. 

Madam Chairwoman, several months or maybe a month ago, myself and 20 other members sent you a letter asking some kind of 

general policy questions. One of the questions we asked was, when 

we could expect your Commission to conduct a full regulatory review between the Japanese system and the United States system, 

and in spite of some of the things that you said to member of this 

committee informally and in private conversation, you didn’t answer that question, and I was a little bit surprised. I didn’t think 

that was a trick question. Do you want to enlighten the committee 

why you were so nonresponsive to such a basic baseline question? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Well, let me thank you for your question. I appreciate it, and I am sorry you found our answer wanting. And I 

will start off, and I will invite my colleagues to jump in, because 

it was a response from all of us collectively. 

Let me note first of all that operational experience is a 

foundational element in our work at the NRC, and the experiences 

at Fukushima represent experience that we need to learn from. We 

are of course aware of the situation with Japan and we are aware 

of the analyses that the Japanese have done themselves of the accident and their conclusions. Nonetheless, I think the accident pointed out a number of issues that are important for us to learn from. 

For instance, prior to the accident, we had not imagined that more 

34 

than one reactor could melt down at a single facility. So it is imperative for us to now consider that in our regulatory analysis. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, can we—— 

Ms. MACFARLANE. But let me invite my colleagues to comment. 

Mr. BARTON. Let me just do a quick follow-up. Are you willing 

to commit to the committee right now that you will conduct such 

a full regulatory review comparison and, if so, when might we expect that to be given to the committee and the public? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I think that we are working with all due deliberation, very carefully considering the lessons learned from the 

Fukushima accident and I think we are—— 

Mr. BARTON. That is not an answer to my question. You know, 

are you going to conduct a full regulatory review or not? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I am satisfied with the analysis and the 

progress that we are making at the agency. 

Mr. BARTON. So you think you have already done it even though 

you have not—— 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I think we have done an adequate job, and we 

are—— 

Mr. BARTON. Does the rest of the Commission agree with that? 

That is a stunning statement if you all agree with that. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Congressman Barton, if I may, predating Chairman Macfarlane’s service on the Commission, as an individual 

member, I did propose in a vote to my colleagues that the Commission direct the staff to conduct a regulatory comparison. This was 

in the months immediately succeeding the event in Japan. In the 

process of working as a deliberative body, my proposal was scoped 

down to a comparison of station blackout requirements. I respect 

the majority, so I appreciate that my colleagues on the Commission 

supported a partial comparison at that time. 

I continue to believe that a more complete comparison would be 

a good check for us even 2 years from the accident. It would allow 

us to be aware if we have any gaps that we have not yet addressed. 

Our direction to the staff arises from a majority vote. 

Mr. BARTON. I am not trying to be argumentative but I don’t see 

how you can decide what to do going forward if you really don’t do 

a thorough review of the two regulatory systems that are currently 

in existence, or were in existence at that time. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. BARTON. Sure. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And our point is this. Collegiality is great, but just 

signing a letter because that is the majority way instead of you 

have opposition and you have a better way to do it, stand your 

ground. We want you to be collegial. We want you to talk. But this 

letter and this response is unacceptable to this committee, and we 

would ask that we get it right and that you give us a thorough 

analysis of the two systems. 

Mr. BARTON. I can assure you that most members of the committee on both sides of the aisle are not trying to sandbag the Commission. In fact, I would say to the contrary, we are your biggest 

allies. So to be nonresponsive, I won’t say it is shocking because it 

is not the first time we have received such a nonresponse from a 

regulatory agency but it was disappointing. 

With that, I yield back. 

35 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. The Chair now 

recognizes the other chairman emeritus of the full committee, Mr. 

Dingell, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy and 

commend you for this hearing. 

A yes or no question here. This is to the chairman. As you know, 

the Yucca Mountain facility remains unused yet we are still generating nuclear waste at facilities across the country at a tremendous 

rate. Has the Commission considered whether the D.C. Circuit 

Court’s 2012 decision and the lack of a permanent storage facility 

will affect the continuation of existing licenses or possibly invalidate them? Yes or no. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. It won’t invalidate existing licenses. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, if not, does the Commission plan to do so? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Sorry. Can you repeat the question? 

Mr. DINGELL. If not, does the Commission plan to do so? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. To invalidate existing licenses? 

Mr. DINGELL. Well, what are you going to do? You have already 

said—you have given me an answer to the first part of the question. Does the Commission plan then to take any further action 

here such as terminating the use of the facility and reviewing or 

bringing to a halt the development of the nuclear power in the 

country? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Let me ask for clarification. Are we talking 

about—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Please submit the answer in written form, and Mr. 

Chairman, I will submit questions to the Commission. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Without objection, all members will be able to submit questions to the Commission for a response. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Madam Chairman, would you submit then 

additional information on this subject for the record to the committee? I will be submitting to you an appropriate letter on this 

matter. 

Now, this is again yes or no. The nuclear industry has been 

ahead of many industries in cybersecurity efforts, and the Commission had robust cyber regulations already in place. Do you believe 

the Commission has the necessary authority and resources to do all 

you can to defend against cybersecurity threats and breaches and 

prepare for future threats? Could you answer this yes or no? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes. 

Mr. DINGELL. Again, Mr. Chairman, I will be submitting some 

questions on this point for the record. 

Madam Chairman, in addition to the nuclear facilities and the 

computer infrastructures that support them, nuclear facilities could 

potentially be disrupted through offsite attacks such as attacks on 

the mines or transportation or on other activities at the companies 

that manufacture parts. If reactor fuels, parts, equipment or other 

products are qualified to come on site, should the Commission have 

jurisdiction or input over cyber or physical protection before it 

comes on site? Yes or no. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We are beginning to look into this issue. 

Mr. DINGELL. All right. And again, I will submit some questions 

on this. 

36 

Madam Chairman, the Fukushima disaster obviously gave us a 

lot to think about when it comes to nuclear energy, and the Commission has put considerable thought into this matter. However, in 

a recent letter to the Commission, I joined my committee colleague, 

Mr. Barrow, for whom I have great respect, and others to express 

concern about a pending decision that may require a significant 

number of nuclear facilities to install containment filtered vents. 

The concern is, it may not be appropriate for the facilities your decision may affect due to the differences in affected reactors. Would 

a case-by-case evaluation provide greater certainty the best technologies are being used rather than a broad approach such as a filtered-vent proposal? Yes or no. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I am sorry. I didn’t get the question. 

Mr. DINGELL. Well, I am running out of time. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. The filtered-vents issue is still an active area 

of voting so I am not going to talk about it right now, with all respect to my colleagues. 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you. I will submit again questions on this. 

In regards to other Fukushima recommendations already put in 

place, please submit for the record why these were issued as orders 

and not through the rulemaking process. Why did you issue these 

as orders and not through the rulemaking process? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Because we felt that these particular activities 

were activities that needed to be accomplished very quickly. Rulemaking is a very time-consuming process, and in response to what 

we now know about what can happen at reactors based on the 

Fukushima accident—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, they will be submitted rather imperfectly, 

and this is going to require further refinement by the Commission, 

is it not? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes. We are in rulemaking mode as well. 

Mr. DINGELL. Madam Chairman, I submitted a question to you 

last year with regard to the status of an application by Aerotest 

Operations for an indirect license transfer to Nuclear Labyrinth. In 

your written response, you indicated that the Commission would 

request additional information from Aerotest. It is my understanding that such additional information has been submitted. 

Does the Commission anticipate requesting further information to 

Aerotest? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. The information was submitted, I believe, this 

past January and it will take between 6 to 8 months for us to review this. 

Mr. DINGELL. Would you please submit for the record your 

timeline on this? 

And Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. The Chair now 

recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Gingrey, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the recognition. Since 

we are somewhat rushed for time—I think we have Floor votes 

coming up soon—let me get right to the questions, and I am going 

to go starting with Chairwoman Macfarlane, and I want each of the 

Commissioners to respond to this if you will. 

To me, it seems abundantly clear that this Administration unilaterally decided to ignore the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and indeed 

37 

canceled Yucca Mountain, our Nation’s only nuclear waste repository program. Subsequently, the Commission’s waste confidence 

rule was vacated by the D.C. Circuit Court, which rebuked the 

Commission when it wrote, ‘‘The Commission apparently has no 

long-term plan other than hoping for a geologic repository.’’ As a 

result, you have a 2-year moratorium now on issuing new plant licenses or renewals for existing plants. For each of the Commissioners, again, Chairwoman Macfarlane, I will start with you. 

Wouldn’t simply following the law and reconstituting the Yucca 

Mountain program reestablish a basis for confidence that there will 

be a disposal path for spent nuclear fuel? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. This issue, the Yucca Mountain issue, is in the 

courts right now and we will await the decision of the courts and 

we will follow the law. 

Mr. GINGREY. Please. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes, I believe that having clarity in both the language of the law and its implementation would allow the NRC to 

continue its licensing activities. I suppose I am just observing that 

if the national policy for disposal of these materials is uncertain, 

then these types of legal complications such as waste confidence 

arise in our licensing activities. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I agree with Chairman Macfarlane. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I think it is quite evident that the uncertainty in 

national policy created the situation we have with Waste Confidence, so I think the answer to your question obviously is yes, but 

I would also stress that I believe that our original Waste Confidence decision in 2010 was, in my view, and remains, in my view, 

appropriate. So I still think that was a good aste confidence determination at the time despite the fact the court didn’t agree with 

me on that. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Congressman, I agree with Commissioner 

Magwood. I voted on that waste confidence decision when I first got 

to the Commission along with other colleagues here. I believe that 

we recognized it is the Department of Energy’s responsibility under 

the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to establish a repository. We had 

good faith that they would follow that law. The law should be followed or amended. 

Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, I have a list of the licensing actions 

subject to the moratorium issued by the Commission. This is the 

list, Mr. Chairman, and I would like unanimous consent that this 

document be included in our record. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Is there objection? Hearing none, so ordered. 

[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] 

Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

On the third page of this document, listed are two independent 

spent fuel storage installations. That is a fancy word for interim 

storage, of which we have 68, as I understand it, across the country, 68 different interim storage facilities. So there are two that 

can’t get their existing license renewed because of this waste confidence moratorium. There are some individuals that probably hope 

that interim storage will fix the waste confidence problem, but that 

looks like a catch-22 to me. Can each of you comment, again, starting with the chairwoman, can each of you comment on how interim 

38 

storage can solve waste confidence if you cannot license it because 

of the moratorium? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. First of all, let me point out that the resolving 

of the waste problems is the purview of the Congress and the Administration and not the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Our job 

is to ensure that any interim storage facilities, any repositories, if 

so deemed by law, if that is our role, then we—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. If the gentleman would yield, it is the law of the 

land, so just for the record, I think no one in the basic reading of 

the law would say that Yucca Mountain is not the law of the land. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes, I am not trying to say that Yucca Mountain is not the law of the land. I am just clarifying our role as regulators. 

Mr. GINGREY. Why don’t we move along pretty quickly? I am running out of time and I would like to hear from each one of the Commissioners on this as well. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Congressman, I would only observe that the Commission, I believe, has crafted a response to the adverse court decision, which is not dependent on legislative action. We have directed 

our staff to remedy and rehabilitate both the rulemaking and the 

environmental impact statement that the court found lacking. Once 

that activity is complete, our ability to issue licenses and the legal 

underpinning for that will be restored. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I agree. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes, I agree with Commissioner Svinicki. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I also agree. 

Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. I yield back. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Capps, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your testimony, and Chairwoman Macfarlane, 

as we discussed before, Diablo Canyon Power Plant is located in 

my Congressional district. Diablo Canyon is the largest private employer in the area. PG&E, which operates the plant, does a lot of 

great work. I visited there several times over the years and I want 

to thank you for taking the time to visit the plant earlier this year. 

Now, we have known for a long time that this nuclear plants sits 

on the Hosgri earthquake fault. But in 2008, the U.S. Geological 

Survey discovered a new fault called the Shoreline fault. The Energy Commission recommended and our State PUC directed that 

the utility conduct independent peer-reviewed advanced seismic 

studies prior to applying for relicensing. As you know, PG&E asked 

to have the relicensing request paused pending completion of these 

studies. The NRC granted their request, and I supported that action. 

PG&E came up with a plan for the studies but California’s 

Coastal Commission rejected it last year due to environmental concerns. I was similarly concerned about these impacts on marine 

life, which is why I supported making it limited pilot program. But 

the health and safety of my constituents is my top priority, and I 

strongly believe that additional study of the fault is needed before 

the relicensing process can move forward. While I understand this 

effort has been driven by the State, I would hope the NRC would 

39 

also want to have the best, most up-to-date information about this 

fault. 

Chairwoman Macfarlane, do you also agree that having additional independent data on the Shoreline fault would be helpful? 

And I would appreciate it if you just say yes or no. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Well, additional information can always be 

helpful but we can operate with the information that we have. 

Mrs. CAPPS. But you do agree that more information is a good 

thing? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I agree in general that more information is a 

good thing. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Last October, the NRC published a research information letter claiming that Diablo Canyon is seismically safe, yet 

there are other scientific studies that seem to conflict with the 

NRC’s report, and I am holding up one. USGS seismologist Dr. 

Jeanne Hardebeck, who discovered the Shoreline fault, just published an article in the peer-reviewed Bulletin of Seismology Society of America which says, and this is a quote: ‘‘Much is unknown 

about the Shoreline fault.’’ This raises concerns for me and my constituents that there are still unanswered questions about the seismic situation. So Chairwoman Macfarlane, how can we ensure that 

these questions and concerns are properly addressed? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Well, fortunately, right now there is an ongoing process. There is a committee called the Senior Seismic Hazard 

Assessment Committee that is actively evaluating the seismic situation at Diablo Canyon and they are in the middle of their process. 

We are observing this process and we are looking to see what the 

outcome is. 

Mrs. CAPPS. And the fact remains that another federal scientist 

in a peer-reviewed study says more information is needed. So we 

clearly need to figure this out. I think we can agree that every 

angle must be thoroughly examined. NRC analysis needs to incorporate independent, concrete data that can be tested against those 

of seismic experts like Dr. Hardebeck. I think it makes sense to 

have the best eyes and minds in the country working together looking at these seismic issues because, actually, first and foremost, 

this is about safety. The NRC has the responsibility to make sure 

that Diablo Canyon is as safe as it can be today but also in the 

future. And I want the record to note that Diablo Canyon and the 

NRC have more than a decade to make these decisions because 

these licenses don’t expire until over a decade from now, so there 

is no rush. We must work together to find a responsible way to 

gather and consider the additional data before relicensing moves 

forward. 

Chairwoman Macfarlane, I hope you share this commitment, and 

I look forward to working with the NRC to ensure that this process 

is done right. I do have some additional questions for the Chairwoman and for other members of the panel but I am going to submit those for the record, and I look forward to their response. I do 

have 45 seconds left and I want to know if there is another response that you would like to give now, or any of the other members of the Commission about this very urgent need at the nuclear 

facility in my Congressional district. 

40 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I think it is important that we make sure that 

these plants can operate safety, I agree with you, but I will offer 

my colleagues an option to comment. 

Mrs. CAPPS. All right. I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentlelady yields back her time. The Chair 

recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Terry, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairwoman Macfarlane, I represent Fort Calhoun, and you did 

mention Fort Calhoun in your written statement, so I want to follow up and ask a specific question regarding the NRC’s relationship with the folks at Fort Calhoun and Omaha Public Power. I 

meet with them fairly regularly on the status of Fort Calhoun. I 

don’t meet with you regularly on it. My question as a layman, reading the newspaper articles and hearing about their continuous 

meetings, what I am concerned about is, it seems about every 6, 

7 months, the NRC issues a new list of to-do things for that plant 

before it could reopen. So it appears to me as a layperson that the 

NRC may not have all of its organization skills applied here in the 

sense that it just seems like they get really close to being able to 

reopen and then all of a sudden they get this new list. Why and 

how does that happen? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I think we are working deliberately again, 

carefully with Fort Calhoun, and as you know, there were a number of issues that arose at the site, I think it was in 2011 , in the 

summer of 2011, first the flooding issue and then a fire. 

Mr. TERRY. And the fire. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Right, and then there were a number of significant safety-culture issues. As you know, Omaha Power Public 

District has now contracted with Exelon to operate the site, so it 

is a matter of getting those Exelon folks in, reestablishing stability 

at the site and addressing the issues that exist. 

Mr. TERRY. Are you familiar with Fort Calhoun and that process? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes. I have not visited the site yet. 

Mr. TERRY. You are speaking at a general level here. I already 

know about Exelon, and there was an additional punch list once 

the approval of Exelon had come in and helped with the management culture there, and as I understand the new punch list, it 

didn’t really have much to do with the management aspect but 

physical things in that plant. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Right. 

Mr. TERRY. And it just seems odd that those physical things were 

there a year and a half ago but they weren’t on your list, and that 

gives me concern that, well, there is another agenda out there, at 

least questions like that. I just want to put that out there. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I understand your concern, and a couple of 

these issues have come up as a result of the licensee discovering 

of these issues. Some of them have to do with electrical penetrations into the containment building. There are a number of technical issues like this that the licensee noticed and therefore we are 

under obligation to ensure that these particular issues are addressed. I invite my colleagues to—— 

Mr. TERRY. Well, I am going to go on to my next question. Because of your situation and incidences that occurred internally, we 

41 

wrote a bill for reform of the NRC a couple years ago, 3657. Are 

you familiar with that bill? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I am familiar. 

Mr. TERRY. It has not been reintroduced, comma, yet. So I am 

going to go down the list. Is everyone familiar with that bill? Ms. 

Svinicki? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes. 

Mr. TERRY. So one of the major parts of that is about the declaration of emergencies that seem to be one of the abuses that was 

identified. So do you believe that the Chairman should officially declare an emergency to the Commission and to Congress before assuming emergency powers? And I am going to go from you, Chairwoman, on down. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I think the Chairman should certainly consult 

with his or her colleagues when declaring an emergency. 

Mr. TERRY. And to Congress? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. And to Congress. 

Ms. SVINICKI. I think certainly members of the Commission need 

to be notified and there needs to be an official declaration. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes, I agree. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes, there should be an official declaration. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes. 

Mr. TERRY. I have three more questions that I cannot ask in 17 

seconds. 

Mr. Magwood, I just want to thank you for your strength during 

a difficult process before Chairman Macfarlane got there. So good 

job. Yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair 

recognizes the lady from Florida, Ms. Castor, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning and 

thanks to the Commissioners for your testimony this morning. 

Over the past 5 years or so, certain ratepayers in Florida have 

struggled with the cost and uncertainty of the Crystal River nuclear power plant north of Tampa Bay. In 2009, the previous owner 

of the plant embarked on somewhat typical repairs to the plant but 

during those repairs the containment wall was seriously cracked, 

and the new owner announced earlier this month its intent to close 

the plant. That is the first closure of a nuclear power plant in Florida, the first major closure of a plant in the Southeastern United 

States. So I understand the utility and the NRC face two choices 

on how to decommission the plant. You can either decontaminate 

it quickly over time called decon under the NRC lingo or over 60 

years, a process known as safe storage where the radioactivity decays over time. The utility announced that they are choosing the 

latter option. What is the role of the NRC? Do you agree with that? 

What analysis goes into those options? What is your role? Do you 

agree with that decision? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Those options are both options that are available under our regulatory framework. So a plant can decide to decommission immediately such as what was done at Maine Yankee 

or it can decide to put the plant in SAFSTOR for up to 60 years 

before finally decommissioning the site. So those are all available 

within our purview and our role is to ensure that whichever path 

is chosen is carried out safety and securely. 

42 

Ms. CASTOR. What are the pros and cons of—— 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I think that is in part up to the licensee to decide what the pros and cons are. 

Ms. CASTOR. So the NRC’s role is not to provide direction? The 

rules provide that they can choose either option and then you provide oversight and input once that option is selected? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Correct. 

Ms. CASTOR. Because it is interesting that the estimates I have 

seen that decommissioning the plant quickly would cost under a 

billion dollars while safe storage over 60 years could cost over $6 

billion. Does that sound correct in the ballpark? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I am not sure for the particular facility at 

Crystal River. I don’t know, maybe my colleagues could comment. 

Ms. CASTOR. There is just a lot of sensitivity because in Florida, 

there was an advanced recovery fee and ratepayers have been on 

the hook for future construction. They may be left on the hook for 

very significant sums of money for a plant that was never repaired 

and one that may not be built, alternative fuel, so that kind of costbenefit analysis does not enter into your oversight responsibility? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. No, that is a cost-benefit analysis that would 

be done by the licensee. 

Ms. CASTOR. OK. So at this point once they have selected the 

safe store option, what kind of oversight do you provide on that 

process? What kind of input? How involved, what kind of staff requirements? Can you go into a little more detail on that, please? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We provide oversight to make sure that what 

remains of the facility remains in a safe and secure manner and 

so we will continually inspect it to make sure that that occurs. 

Ms. CASTOR. So continually how often are you in contact with the 

utility and how often are you on site? Maybe it will be necessary 

for you all to meet with me after the hearing to provide those details. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Sure. I am happy to go through the details of 

all of this so that you understand the whole process. 

Ms. CASTOR. Does the impending sequester, across-the-board cuts 

through all government agencies, affect your ability on what you 

would plan to do on oversight of the decommissioning process at 

Crystal River? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. No, it won’t. We will ensure that our main 

mission, which is to ensure the operating facilities and decommissioned facilities, shutdown facilities, will remain safe and secure. 

Ms. CASTOR. Does it affect it at all? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. No. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentlelady yields back her time. The Chair 

now recognizes the vice chairman of the Energy and Air Quality 

Subcommittee, Mr. Scalise, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCALISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all of our 

panelists coming and engaging in this hearing. 

In a March 2011 information paper to the Commission, the NRC 

staff had cautioned that the cumulative effects of regulation ‘‘can 

potentially distract licensee or entity staff from executing other primary duties that ensure safety or security,’’ and, you know, I have 

looked at this cumulative effect risk and it seems valid. 

43 

[Slide shown.] 

Mr. SCALISE. If you can turn your attention to the slide on the 

screen, this is a timeline of the regulatory actions an average 

owner of four reactors would need to comply with. Clearly, this represents a lot of new requirements in addition to what we already 

expect of them every day to safely and reliably operate their plants. 

We raised this matter in our hearing last July, and the NRC’s 

response was ‘‘Process enhancements focus more on scheduling and 

less on reducing or scaling back requirements.’’ We raised this 

issue again in our January 15th letter, and the NRC’s response 

was, ‘‘The staff is currently working with industry to understand 

the impact of implementation dates,’’ and mentioned the timely development of guidance. 

So more regulation is not always safer. Sometimes it is just more 

things that they have to do that take away from their primary 

safety responsibility. I don’t know how anyone can look at this slide 

and dismiss the cumulative impact of regulations as merely a matter of scheduling, and I am told that in addition to this, there are 

approximately 40 more post-Fukushima items yet to be considered. 

Is that correct? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We are in the process of considering a number 

of post-Fukushima activities. 

Mr. SCALISE. Do you know how many? I am told it is around 40. 

Is that an accurate assessment or do you know an exact number? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I think it is—— 

Mr. SCALISE. Higher or lower? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. It is lower. 

Mr. SCALISE. How much lower? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. It depends on exactly how specific you want to 

get. 

Mr. SCALISE. Well, if you know it is less than 40, than you know 

it is some number below that, so 30 maybe? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We will get back to you with the specific exact 

number for the record. 

Mr. SCALISE. So you will get that back to the committee? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. But that does not mean we will decide to enforce all of those activities. Those are things that are under consideration. 

Mr. SCALISE. Well, you know, and that is on top of what everybody is already expected to do, you know, and I guess that gets to 

a question of priorities. At some point if you are not going to enforce all of them, then you have got to establish some set of priorities, I would expect because—— 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We have. 

Mr. SCALISE. You have that? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes, we have a set of priorities. 

Mr. SCALISE. Do the people who operate all the reactors know 

what those priorities are that you are going to enforce? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes, they do. 

Mr. SCALISE. And if you can get that to us as well. Can you do 

that? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Sure. 

Mr. SCALISE. Because we all want the same thing. We want safety. We want the nuclear plants to be safe. But you have repeatedly 

44 

indicated that our plants are safe and that regulatory changes are 

often referred to as safety enhancements. So what I would like to 

know from the panel is how to seriously tackle the cumulative impacts of these regulations. Who would like to go first? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Well, we have been talking with industry on 

these issues. I know this is an area of concern for them, and we 

are concerned that we do not want to distract licensees from their 

main mission of ensuring safety at the facilities, of course. At the 

same time, I think it is our job to impose whatever requirements 

are needed to provide adequate protection of public health and 

safety. 

Mr. SCALISE. But are you going to impose things that you yourself know you are not even going to enforce? I mean, is that really 

the responsible thing to do? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Everything we impose, we will enforce, of 

course. Let me ask my colleagues to comment because I think they 

would like to. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. About 3 weeks ago, the Commission directed 

the staff to do two broad things. The first one is to propose ways 

of achieving these things, prioritization of new requirements or potential requirements with existing requirements. For example, 

when we received the Fukushima report from the Near-Term Task 

Force, we just prioritized the Fukushima recommendations regardless of what else was going on. So now we are asking the staff to 

actually consider what else is going on in the future and give 

prioritization of everything. And second, we are asking the staff, directing the staff to come up with options for giving the licensees 

the option of arguing back why certain requirements they should 

delay because they are doing something else that is of more safety 

significance, and to do that. 

Mr. SCALISE. And real quick—I apologize, I have got 3 seconds 

left—I just want to ask when you are sending that list with 30 or 

whatever the number is going to be of those new items, does that 

include new regulatory guides, issuing new generic communications, using revised interim staff guidance, developing inspection 

findings, disposition of license, amendment requests? Are those 

what would be included in that list or would that be outside of 

that? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. These are issues that are under consideration. 

These aren’t decisions that we have made yet. 

Mr. SCALISE. OK. So as you get those, if you could share those 

with us. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. The Chair now 

recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. McNerney, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So many questions, 

so little time. 

Commissioner Svinicki, how does the security of nuclear plants 

compare to conventional power plants with regard to cyber attacks? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I would say that the NRC has some of the, I think, 

most specific and strongest regulations in the cyber area. As I mentioned, in 2009, NRC was able and had the authority to put in 

place cybersecurity regulations that have the licensees identify all 

of what we term critical digital assets at the site and then propose 

45 

a security plan to the NRC. We have received those from all of our 

power plant licensees. We have reviewed them, and I believe that 

we have begun our process of inspecting those cybersecurity plans 

that are in place. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. So they may be more secure than our conventional plants? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I have visited one fossil plant but I did not discuss 

cybersecurity there so I am not certain. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Is there any legislation needed to enable the nuclear plants to secure themselves from cyber attack? 

Ms. SVINICKI. In my time on the Commission since 2008, the 

Commission has looked very actively at our legal authorities, and 

we have not identified any gaps that we have, so we do not seek 

any additional authorities in this area. We feel that we have a very 

robust authority. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. One or two other questions for you. 

Small modular reactors—how long might it take for a competent 

power producer to get a license for a small modular reactor? Are 

there any licenses out there now? 

Ms. SVINICKI. There are not, and we have no pending designs 

that are undergoing review right now. We do anticipate with the 

Department of Energy’s program now, they made selection of a 

technology for their program late last year. We expect that we may 

receive that application in, I think either late 2013 or 2014, I believe. Chairman Macfarlane says it will be 2014. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Are there any foundries in the United States capable of producing the containment vessels for these reactors? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I think I would like to take that question for the 

record to be certain of being accurate in my response, but I believe 

that the intention is that the small modular reactors would have 

components, a substantial portion of which would be able to be 

manufactured here in the United States. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. But the large containment vessel, you are not 

sure of? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I am not certain for the various designs that are 

proposed for small modular reactors. I am not sure of the largest 

of the sizes of those. I don’t know if any my colleagues are. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. How about for the other kind of nuclear reactors? Are those foundries capable of producing those? 

Ms. SVINICKI. For the large light water reactors, there are not 

U.S. facilities. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Chairman Macfarlane, you are a true expert in 

nuclear waste. Is that correct? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. That is correct. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. You mentioned in your testimony the laser uranium enrichment facilities. Are those also used in processing nuclear waste? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. No, they are not. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Do you see other facilities for nuclear waste 

than Yucca Mountain on the horizon that could be acceptable within a 20-year time frame? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I think what is acceptable and what policies 

develop is in part dependent on what occurs in Congress and the 

Administration. In the original Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there 

46 

was always a question of a second repository, and currently, the 

Yucca Mountain repository was to be statutorily bound by certain 

volume of material. That volume is already exceeded at reactors, so 

there is an open question about a second repository. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. In a futuristic sense, do you see nuclear waste 

becoming valuable in its own right within the next 20 or 50 years? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. It is not my area of expertise. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair 

now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Burgess, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BURGESS. I thank the chairman for the recognition. 

Commissioner Svinicki, let me ask you a question. In your opening remarks, you made mention of the fact of the ability to reenergize or revisit Yucca Mountain would depend not only on the funding but the degree to which the data collected during the license 

application, the degree to which that data has degraded over time. 

Now, I was fortunate enough to go with Chairman Shimkus to 

Yucca Mountain 2 years ago. At that point they were 6 months into 

their appropriations lapse, and the gentleman who showed us 

around that day did make mention of the fact that there will over 

time be an attrition of that data or degradation of that data. It appeared to me that there was a lot of material collected during that 

license application. Do you have a sense as to—you know, we always talk about the half life of nuclear material but do you have 

a sense about the half life of this data that has been collected during the licensing application and how long the inactivity of the 

Congress or the Commission, how that will harm the ability to reclaim that data? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Congressman, my testimony in response to the 

prior question discussed the fact that the longer that activities 

have been in suspension, the more challenging and expensive the 

reconstitution is or reconstitution may even be imperiled. Although 

you are mentioning data and analysis, what I had in my mind 

when I made that statement was actually people and experts and 

scientists. I know that the NRC, since the suspension of its Yucca 

Mountain activities, has had retirements of scientists who had been 

on this project for over 20 years and also we have reassigned individuals. Conceptually, they may be available then to be brought 

back to this work but there is additionally, as you mentioned, at 

Yucca Mountain, there were physical samples and core borings. 

The quality and chain of custody of those, in the licensing process 

is a very, very important matter. I don’t know the state of DOE’s 

preservation of any of that or the chain of custody of those materials for the purposes of us relying upon them in a scientific investigation. So I think there are many dimensions to the challenges 

of reconstitution but time is the enemy. 

Mr. BURGESS. Yes, there is big machinery that was in use that 

seemed to be just out in the weather and had daisies growing out 

of the treads and that sort of thing, which just you really had to 

wonder, this funding lapse or this appropriations lapse is very 

damaging, and the real loser here is the poor consumer who has 

funded this for years with surcharges on their bill with the expectation that in the future their reliability and their supply of elecVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:27 Jun 27, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 113\113-11 CHRIS
47 

tricity would be assured because the federal government was in 

fact taking care of this problem of long-term storage. Is that a fair 

statement? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes, it is. 

Mr. BURGESS. And I do want to acknowledge the fact that you 

have been very responsive to my office and my staff, and I appreciate that. I was also concerned when the Fukushima reactor went 

down, the danger from the rods and the spent fuel pools. You provided some reassurance to us that that was not as big a problem 

as it appeared in the press, so I was grateful for your input that 

day. 

Chairman Macfarlane, can I ask you a question? I have a letter 

here from the National Mining Association to you dated from January 7th of this year, and they have several points that they were 

making, but the lead point and one that is of concern to uranium 

producers in my area of North Texas is the relicensing applications 

that apparently are pretty expensive. Their fees are pretty expensive and yet they are told by the Commission that the staff manhours are not there to be able to process those relicensing applications because of lack of funding, but it does seem like they are 

funding that activity with their application fees. What am I missing here? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. No, I think we have—my understanding is, we 

have adequate staff to deal with the new applications and the relicensing applications. The issue sometimes is that we don’t get complete applications and so there is a period of back and forth with 

the licensees. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, and again, the opinion of this letter submitted by the National Mining Association was these applications 

were submitted in their entirety and that they were complete. I 

would appreciate some follow-up on this because clearly there is a 

concern, and Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to put 

the National Mining Association letter into the record. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Is there objection? Hearing none, so ordered. 

[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] 

Mr. BURGESS. Since you were so compliant, I will yield back my 

8 seconds. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. It is a historical event, your yielding back time. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, 

Mrs. Christensen, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, 

everyone. 

In addition to the three orders to commercial nuclear reactors in 

the United States in order to address the safety concerns raised by 

the Fukushima accident in Japan that you issued last year, the 

NRC also required all commercial nuclear reactors to perform inspections or walk-downs to verify that they are prepared to respond 

to flooding and earthquakes as required in their licenses and that 

all necessary equipment to respond to such events is available, 

functional and properly maintained. 

Chairman Macfarlane, I understand that all operators have completed walk-downs of their facilities? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. They have. 

48 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. And what did the walk-downs find? Did they 

raise any red flags about the preparedness of the U.S. nuclear fleet 

to respond to a serious flood or seismic event? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I appreciate the question. Most plants were 

just finding only minor discrepancies. A few plants identified more 

significant issues in the flooding walk-downs. In the seismic walkdowns, no significant issues to date. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. And the NRC, as I understand it, they asked 

the U.S. commercial reactors to go a step further and reevaluate 

their flood and seismic hazards and compare any newly identified 

hazards with the extreme-events plans are designed to withstand. 

What was the goal of the reevaluations, or was that just for the few 

plants that—— 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Well, the reevaluation actually was begun 

even before Fukushima, the Fukushima accident, and then it was 

folded into the Fukushima recommendations, but the goal is to 

bring the plants and their seismic hazard analysis and flooding 

hazard analysis into up-to-date current information that is available in the earth sciences. So it is updating the hazard analysis at 

all these facilities. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I understand that the reevaluations will be 

completed by the end of 2015. Is that correct? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. And then once they are complete, what would 

the next step be for NRC? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Depending on what is found, we will have to 

go individually plant by plant and see if some changes are required 

or not. It depends on what we find at each plant. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. These reevaluations, they are to 

be a critical step in ensuring that the U.S. nuclear fleet is prepared 

to respond to a range of hazards and protect the public health in 

an emergency. I appreciate your answers. 

I don’t have any further questions, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentlelady yields back her time and now the 

Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Latta, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LATTA. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you very much to you all for being here today. We really appreciate it. 

If I could just kind of back up a little bit. There were a few comments made today about cybersecurity, and as we all know, in the 

last month, month and a half, it has been in the news quite a bit, 

and in fact, just last week in my district, we had a large 

cybersecurity event that we had the FBI in to talk to about 170- 

plus people in my district as to what is happening and what they 

have to do protect themselves and their businesses. But if I could, 

going back, the NRC had an order after September 11th that had 

ordered nuclear power plants to enhance their security including 

requirements for certain cybersecurity threats, and this effort later 

culminated in a specific cybersecurity rule in 2009 and the associated regulatory guidance was based on the cybersecurity standards 

published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 

and the Department of Homeland Security, and if I could, Commissioner Ostendorff, could I ask if you could give a brief overview of 

49 

how that rule is being implemented and the level of coordination 

between the NRC and other agencies. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. 

This is a complicated area. Two years ago, this Commission worked 

with FERC and NERC to outline the lines of demarcation using 

what is called a bright-line survey to ensure that we had a unitary 

regulatory approach that only the NRC would regulate on-site, basically the transmission line boundary of the plants, recognizing 

that NERC on behalf of FERC is regulating externall y. So that I 

would say is a great example of positive cooperation inside the U.S. 

interagency to ensure we did not have conflicting regulatory inspections, rules, et cetera. 

The cyber rule that our licensees are required to be in compliance with as of the end of December of last year, currently our staff 

is out and doing inspections to ascertain compliance with that rule. 

I think our staff is well equipped to do that. I think we will find 

some things we hadn’t thought about. This is a tough area. But I 

think we have the proper resources and the proper approach going 

forward. This Commission is staying very actively involved with 

our federal agency counterparts. Just last Thursday, we spent 21⁄2

hours in a classified briefing with DHS on cyber issues for the 

United States and so I think it is an issue that is very much before 

us as a Commission and an agency. 

Mr. LATTA. Well, thank you very much, and Mr. Magwood, if I 

could just ask you briefly, I know that in 2011 when you all were 

testifying before us here in committee, I had asked questions, just 

kind of paraphrasing how if you had all the information that you 

needed to make informed decisions and pretty much you had said 

most of the time that that was happening. Can you tell me how are 

things going right now with the flow of information back and forth 

for you all to make these very important decisions that come before 

the NRC today? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Actually, Congressman, the question has never 

come to my mind in the last 6 or 7 months so I think the situation 

at the NRC is working very well. 

Mr. LATTA. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair 

recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Macfarlane, in your testimony you mentioned the importance of international cooperation with the NRC. In 2011, our 

committee members led by Representative Murphy, we did a trip 

to France and Sweden to see how the French and Swedish reprocess and store their nuclear waste. I was impressed with the 

progress not only in France, because I was there in 1998 to look 

at how they are reprocessing their waste but particularly with Sweden seeing what they have done with even a prototype of a deep 

storage. I am interested in learning what cooperation is presently 

taking place between the Commission and, for example, Sweden 

and France and what lessons can be taken from their models. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. In terms of nuclear waste disposal? 

Mr. GREEN. Nuclear waste disposal, or recycling. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Right. We don’t do a lot on the back end of the 

fuel cycle with these countries. We certainly exchange information 

50 

with their regulators and what their regulators regulate because it 

is not our job to make policy for the back end of the fuel cycle in 

the United States. We just oversee the existing facilities. So we are 

aware of what is going on there and we are aware of what their 

regulators are doing at these facilities. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, it sounds like you are saying that for the 

United States to be involved in reprocessing, and even for the longterm nuclear storage, whether it be Yucca Mountain or something 

similar to what Sweden has done, you need more guidance from 

Congress? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes, please. 

Mr. GREEN. Myself along with 25 other Democratic members sent 

a letter to you 3 weeks ago calling for your agency to adopt a flexible performance-based approach as recommended by the independent ACRS with regard to mandating filters on boiling-water 

reactors. First I wanted to ask, what is the status of the Commission’s response to our letter? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We responded to your letter. 

Mr. GREEN. You did? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We sent you a response. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Unacceptably, but they did respond. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Second, I would like to learn what outreach the 

Commission has made toward industry and other stakeholders in 

order to achieve the regulatory goal in the safest and most effective 

and least costly manner. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We meet regularly with industry and other 

stakeholders who are interested in these issues and understand 

their concerns and work together. 

Mr. GREEN. Another question. In your testimony, you state the 

NRC, due to the lack of final waste confidence rule, will not issue 

any final licenses until at least September of 2014. As you are 

aware, most legislation that is passed by this chamber and signed 

into law typically calls for agencies to issue rules within 6 to 12 

months, and I would like to hear why the Commission, for an issue 

that goes to the heart of your agency’s duties, needs in excess of 

2 years to issue a final rule. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. In developing an environmental impact statement and other processes we are governed by NEPA law and other 

laws, and there is a public comment period that must be incorporated into all these things, and this is in part what takes time. 

Mr. GREEN. Additionally, I would like to learn what guidance the 

Commission has provided these facilities whose licenses are being 

delayed. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We are actively working on the licenses. We 

just won’t issue the final licenses or license renewals in this period. 

Mr. GREEN. With the likelihood of sequestration hitting all federal agencies by midnight tonight, I would like to ask first what 

steps is the NRC taking in order to best comply with sequestration. 

Are furloughs or layoffs anticipated? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. We do not anticipate any furloughs or layoffs. 

Mr. GREEN. And second, will sequestration in any way degrade 

the NRC’s ability to keep our Nation’s nuclear facilities safe? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Absolutely not. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

51 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And if the gentleman would yield, just to correct 

the record, I think you were referring to a Barrow letter that you 

signed that I am unsure of whether the Commissioner responded 

to. Would someone want to address that? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I believe we have not responded to that letter. 

Sorry. 

Mr. GREEN. You haven’t responded to the Barrow letter? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Right. 

Mr. GREEN. Because obviously from Georgia, they have a bigger 

interest. We are having our problems in Texas because one of our 

investors for the South Texas expansion also owned Tokyo Power, 

so we are still looking for $125 million to expand nuclear power in 

South Texas. Thank you. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair 

now recognizes the other gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Johnson, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I thank the chairman for the recognition, and I am 

new to the Energy and Commerce Committee so I look forward to 

the discussions we will have with you Commissioners, and I thank 

the chairman for holding this hearing on a very, very important 

topic. 

Ms. Macfarlane, according to the Japanese government’s report, 

and I quote, ‘‘TEPCO’s manual for emergency response to a severe 

accident was completely ineffective.’’ What is your view and the 

view of your colleagues about the ability of U.S. emergency response capability to a severe accident? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I think we are prepared but I think we must 

be mindful that there are situations that we may not be expecting 

and we need to learn from operating experience, but I invite my 

colleagues to comment. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. One of the problems that they had in Japan 

is that there was no single authority making decisions. In this 

country, we have made sure that there is one authority. We are not 

going to go to higher political figures to approve what needs to be 

done. So I believe that we are in much better shape than the Japanese were at that time. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Congressman, I would just add to my colleagues’ comments two specific issues we are also addressing. One, 

as mentioned earlier, in response to a prior question, we have not 

typically dealt with multiple-unit accidents. We have dealt with a 

one-reactor accident at one site even if that site had two or three 

reactors. So we are looking at multi-unit response. Secondly, we 

are looking at how to integrate our casualty and operating procedures in a more effective way. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Sure. Well, I appreciate those answers, and Mr. 

Apostolakis, you actually hit on something that I want to go to 

next. The Japanese Diet report stated, ‘‘We believe that the root 

causes were the organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for decisions and actions.’’ A report by the 

American Nuclear Society Special Committee on Fukushima stated, 

‘‘The committee believes that in responding to the accident at the 

Fukushima Daiichi plant, human error and flows in governance 

and regulatory oversight contributed to the severity of the accident.’’ 

52 

Mr. Apostolakis, you just mentioned that we are way ahead of 

where the Japanese were. Don’t you think it is important to compare our regulatory systems with Japan’s to see if we share some 

of the gaps that contributed to the accident? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. There is no formal comparison that the Commission has done. However, that doesn’t mean that we are not 

aware of the differences, and if one wanted a more formal approach 

to the evaluation, that would be an interesting thing, but I don’t 

think we can say that we completely ignored the differences between us and the Japanese when we issue actions, orders or other 

regulations. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I appreciate that. It seems to me that such 

a comparison would reveal and further validate what you just testified to, that America is much further ahead of where the Japanese 

were in terms of information flow, decision making, and it would 

seem to me that that would be an important step prior to issuing 

additional regulations that are going to additionally hamstring our 

nuclear industry from operating, and in some cases, according to 

nuclear industry experts, drive our team our of existence. 

So I am not sure we are doing our homework. We know that we 

are ahead of the Japanese and yet we want to proliferate regulations to address what? I mean, if we don’t know what the gaps are, 

what are we addressing? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I wanted just to comment. I think we have 

heard loud and clear today, I don’t think we have been effective at 

communicating back to this committee a satisfactory answer to 

your question. I think the Japanese Lessons Learned Directorate, 

about 20 people on our staff, have been working these issues, looking at differences. I think we failed to communicate that in a clear 

manner to this committee and I think I need to talk to my colleagues about how can we better respond because I think a lot of 

the work that we have done, we have not appropriately told you 

how we are doing it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I would appreciate responses to that because 

I think that is a necessary first step before we start issuing regulations that address some gap that we are not even aware of. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And I appreciate the gentleman from Ohio. Maybe 

we will get a chance to officially ask you for a better response. And 

now the Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. 

Engel, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome 

everyone. Thank you for joining us here today. 

My district is very close to the Indian Point nuclear plant in Buchanan, New York. The safety of Indian Point continues to be one 

of the most serious issues facing the Hudson Valley region, and I 

have been calling for it to be shut down for years. I was the first 

Member of Congress to call for its shutdown, probably 10 years 

ago, and Governor Cuomo has also called for it to shut down. The 

bottom line is the siting of the plant, it is near the major metropolitan area in the country, the New York metropolitan area, and if 

it were being built today, it would never be built in Buchanan, New 

York. Frankly, I think that the scrutiny of the renewal for the licenses of these plants should be as great as a new plant being 

53 

built. I don’t understand why there seems to be less of a threshold 

for relicensing of the plants than there is for a brand-new plant. 

Safety is safety, and it should be the same for both of them. 

Since the disaster at Fukushima, the need to shut down Indian 

Point, as far as I am concerned, has only grown. I am not opposed 

to nuclear power. I never mentioned closing Indian Point until I 

started learning about it. It is built on a major fault. On September 

11th, one of the planes hitting the World Trade Center flew directly over Indian Point. It is just unbelievable. I am happy that 

the NRC has implemented three immediate orders but I hope there 

will be strong follow-up, especially in regards to plants like Indian 

Point that have a history of problems. The fire last month at one 

of their transformers is just the latest in a long line of a systematic 

failures at the Point. Let me say, every Member of Congress who 

has a district very near to Indian Point has called for its closing. 

Beyond the safety issues at Indian Point, there are numerous environmental concerns—the effect on the Hudson River—and I have 

asked the NRC to see if we can move to a closed-cycle cooling system, which would have less of an impact on the water and the fish. 

Another major concern is the radioactive waste stored in the pools, 

almost three times the amount that is currently being stored there 

than was stored at Fukushima, and the plant sits near a reservoir 

that serves almost 9 million people. I hope we will find a long-term 

plan for storing this waste. I will soon be reintroducing legislation 

that would call for material to be moved into dry casks within a 

year, and I hope that we will consider it. 

Let me say that the safety violations at Indian Point and other 

nuclear power plants have raised serious questions about nuclear 

power safety. I anticipate that the NRC will continue to monitor 

the plants closely and to see that the three immediate orders are 

implemented quickly and effectively. 

Can someone please tell me why there seems to be a lesser 

standard for the relicensing of plants than there is to build a plant? 

If a plant is unsafe or if there are questions about its safety, why 

should it matter if it is newly built or if it is an old plant where 

the license is being renewed? Safety is safety and that is the bottom line. I am wondering if anybody can tell me the rationale for 

that. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I will take a stab at that and offer it to my 

colleagues, but very briefly, in relicensing, we look at the overall 

systems and structures in the plant. We continually evaluate the 

equipment, inspect and oversee the equipment, the operations of 

the facility, the safety culture of the facility. We have resident inspectors on site. Currently right now at Indian Point there are four 

for two reactors who every day are there overseeing the safe operation of the facility, but let me ask my colleagues to jump in. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes, I don’t think it is accurate to say that we 

have a lesser standard for license renewal. The license renewal focuses on aging effects, and I think that is appropriate because the 

plant has operated for 40 years or will have been operated for 40 

years. If anything else happens that threatens safety, as the chairman said, then it is handled according to the normal processes we 

have for operating plants, so the only new thing is this aging effect, 

54 

so it is not a lesser standard, it is a more limited review. The scope 

is more limited. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, it still would seem to me—I understand what 

you are saying, but it still would seem to me that the scope should 

be broadened. There have been questions about it and they are legitimate questions. It is not just two or three people who are opposed to nuclear power. There are serious questions by those of us 

that support nuclear power, and I do. I think the United States has 

to have a balanced energy policy, but I think that it is clear to me 

that Indian Point should be shut down. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair 

recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hall, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I noted, Commissioner Magwood, you were talking of issues and 

the things that you are faced with, and I am just trying to make 

the point that you all do work and studies for us with dangerous, 

threatening and relentless enemies out there. 

I think I want to ask Commissioner Apostolakis—I do better calling you George. Did I pronounce it right? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes. 

Mr. HALL. A year ago, you testified before the Senate EPW committee and made the following remarks: ‘‘I don’t think that what 

happened in Fukushima can happen here, and I repeated, it was 

not unthinkable.’’ Were you talking about it was not unthinkable 

that that could happen there? Is that what you meant? It is not 

important, but that is the way I took it. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. People were saying that what happened in 

Fukushima was an unthinkable event. I said no, it was not. I 

mean, there were so many flaws in the system and the design that 

really it was not unthinkable. 

Mr. HALL. Well, let me go, and in fairness to you, say what you 

did say. You said, ‘‘I don’t think what happened in Fukushima can 

happen here, and I repeat, it was not unthinkable. They made terrible mistakes. There are, I think, a couple of things that stand out 

if you look at happened in Japan. The regulatory authority there, 

NISA, was very, very weak technically and they didn’t have the 

amount of independence that we have, for example. The second is 

more technical. It has to do with tsunami calculations where they 

were very poorly done, let us put it that way. They ignored data 

from the past.’’ Is that still—do you still feel that way? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. This is still my view, yes. 

Mr. HALL. You don’t think an accident like Fukushima can happen here? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. No, I don’t think so. 

Mr. HALL. Well—— 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Well, I mean—— 

Mr. HALL. I hope so. I hope you are right. But, you know, some 

15 or 20 years ago, we did a study in the committee I chaired at 

that time studying asteroids, and we found out during the hearing—and I got people from Russia, China, England and, I believe, 

France that were supposed to have witnesses here but none of 

them showed because they were told that we were going to get a 

world operation to look for asteroids because they affect the world 

and not just Texas or not just your State or this Nation, and none 

55 

of them showed. But during the committee hearing, it came up that 

an asteroid had just missed this country by 15 minutes some time 

the year before. No one knew it. I didn’t know it. No one knew it, 

and we really ought to be studying that. 

I think isn’t it more reasonable to think and to thoroughly consider the imposition of additional requirements and ensure that 

any requirements are cost-effective, that an accident like 

Fukushima can happen here? The asteroid just happened in Russia, and we got pictures of it. We know what happened there. We 

don’t know why it was there or when it was coming or when the 

next one will come. You protect us from very serious and relentless 

enemies. Why is it that you think that that just couldn’t happen? 

Please don’t let up, because it could happen. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Well, I don’t think the question really should 

be whether something can happen. It is really a question of probability, and for example, you mentioned the asteroid issue. I don’t 

think that there could be a rationale on our part to start protecting 

nuclear plants from them. It happened in Russia, but this is not 

something that we should do. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I apologize. I have no idea what is going on with 

the microphone. We will work through it. Would the gentleman 

continue? 

Mr. HALL. Don’t you kind of think the public might benefit from 

a better understanding of the differences between nuclear safety in 

Japan and nuclear safety here? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. No, we certainly would benefit from that, yes. 

Mr. HALL. But if you think it couldn’t happen here, I don’t understand how you can answer that last question as you did. I know 

things can happen. I don’t know how much more time I have. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Your time is expired. 

Mr. HALL. In that case, I want to yield a question—oh, the gentleman is gone. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. No, the gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. HALL. I yield back my time. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. Just in time 

for Mr. Markey. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Massachusetts, Mr. Markey, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

The Fukushima meltdowns taught us that not only do we need 

to develop safeguards to present nuclear accidents but we must 

also plan strategies to respond to such an accident and to minimize 

the damage. Twenty-three reactors in this country have the same 

design as the ones that melted down in Japan including Pilgrim in 

Massachusetts and Vermont Yankee. The NRC staff recommended 

that these reactors have vents that could release hydrogen gas to 

prevent the sort of explosions that occurred in Japan and also that 

the vents include filters to remove the radioactive materials that 

would be released into the air if the vents were used. These filtered 

vents are already used in Canada and in many European countries. 

I strongly urge the Commission to follow the recommendations of 

the technical staff. If you fail to do so, I believe you will be making 

a mistake. I think you have a responsibility to ensure public health 

and safety in the face of a nuclear catastrophe that we know could 

happen here. 

56 

You have all testified in the past that you support the Commission’s internal commission procedures. Do you all believe that we 

should follow those internal Commission procedures that are currently in force? Do you all believe that that is the case? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. I think we should strive to comply with our internal Commission procedures but they don’t foresee every situation that might occur. 

Mr. MARKEY. So I have here a copy of your procedures for transmitting sensitive documents to Congress, which says that your general practice is to release them to members of your oversight committee, and that includes every member of this committee. Over 

the years, members of this committee have requested and received 

hundreds of sensitive documents as part of their oversight efforts 

including security-sensitive materials, proprietary materials and 

other nonpublic documents. I believe that every member of this 

committee will be as disturbed as I was to learn that in its failure 

to fully respond to several of my most recent oversight letters, the 

Commission is currently violating its internal Commission procedures. The Commission is even considering a change to these procedures to enable it to refuse future requests for documents made 

by members of this committee. So I ask all of you, do you support 

your current procedures to provide sensitive documents to members 

of your oversight committee? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Right now, the Commission is evaluating the 

request that you made, and we are in deliberations on it, and I 

don’t want to say any more about that until we have actually been 

able to go through them. 

Mr. MARKEY. Well, I think that in fact the Justice Department 

has made a ruling that there is not a conflict with the Freedom of 

Information Act, that in fact their current guidance says that giving materials to a Member of Congress should not result in an 

agency having to make them public. So if you make this change, 

you will be obstructing legitimate Congressional oversight of your 

activities and you will be creating a more secretive agency, and I 

am going to resist this in every single way I can. 

The San Onofre nuclear reactors have been shut down for more 

than a year because of unexpectedly high levels of wear found in 

both steam generators. Three weeks ago, Senator Boxer and I sent 

you a document I obtained that said that Southern California Edison and Mitsubishi engineers had identified some technical problems that could have caused this wear long before the steam generators were installed, but the document also says that they chose 

not to implement recommended design fixes because they wanted 

to avoid a more rigorous safety review and licensing process at the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. You then told us that you had initiated an expansive investigation regarding the completeness and 

accuracy of information that had been provided to you, and I understand that the Inspector General has also initiated an investigation of its own. So Chairperson Macfarlane, Southern California 

Edison wants to restart one of the reactors as soon as this summer. 

Can you commit to postponing any decision on this request until 

after the pending investigations are completed and reviewed by the 

Commission? 

57 

Ms. MACFARLANE. What our usual process is in this kind of situation, when all the technical aspects of the particular issues have 

been adequately addressed, our staff, our executive director of operations will check with our office of Inspector General, our office of 

investigations to ask if there are any issues or information that 

might prevent the restart, and that is how we usually go about 

this. 

Mr. MARKEY. Well, I strongly recommend that you complete the 

investigation before you give permission to restart. I think that the 

prudent way to proceed on this issue, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. Just for informing the public, there are votes now on the floor. We are going to 

try to make sure those in attendance get a chance to speak. I 

would encourage people to do it quickly. 

I would also, just in response to my colleague, I think there is 

an understanding of personal and executive sessions and issues in 

the record that may not be appropriate to air, and so we can address that later. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do appreciate all 

of you all being here. I will tell you that in my first term of Congress, that first meeting that I had with you—not you, Chairman, 

but before you were on board—was probably the scariest hearing 

that I participated in just because I knew the important issues you 

all were dealing with and the problems that you all were having 

were of great concern. I feel much better today. While we may or 

may not agree on some issues, I feel very confident that you all are 

working hard and trying to move in the right direction, and it 

makes me feel much better than I did this time a little short of 2 

years ago. So I do appreciate that. 

I would ask you all to look at, and particularly, I am going to 

address this question to you, Commissioner Ostendorff. You all 

have had some time working on this and the subcommittees have. 

In the Commonwealth of Virginia, we had a nuclear power plant, 

North Anna, which after experiencing a nearby earthquake in Mineral, Virginia, was shut down for a period of time. We understand 

this shutdown was a result of the earthquake and subsequent NRC 

processes were a positive example of bringing a unit back online 

after an atypical event. The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, which was just mentioned, is currently offline, and I know 

there may be other issues involved, but it had an atypical event 

that initially at least didn’t rank as high as the earthquake, and 

I am just wondering if you can explain if the process that was used 

in North Anna is also the same process that is currently being used 

in that situation, San Onofre. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Congressman, I would comment that overall, 

the process is the same as far as how a determination is made 

whether it is safe to technically restart a nuclear power plant. 

There are some significant differences, however, between the San 

Onofre case and the North Anna earthquake from August of 2011. 

Those differences involve other pending investigations, which we 

can’t discuss in this forum. They also involve adjudicatory matters 

58 

before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, so I will acknowledge there are some significant differences there. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. All right. I appreciate that. 

I had another question, and I want to just make a statement. It 

appears that when looking at regulations, and I have been given 

some data that it appears that the estimates for new regulations, 

the cost of those estimates have been off by being as much as 350 

percent more. I hope that you all will look at your processes behind 

the scenes, because when you are deciding what to do on regulation, there is a cost analysis involved, and if you are off by 350 percent, it indicates that something is not being analyzed correctly 

and I would hope that you all would do a better job on that as you 

go forward with any new regulations. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the gentleman 

from Georgia, Mr. Barrow, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BARROW. I thank the chairman. I thank the Commissioners 

for appearing today. I just want to share my concerns about proposed regulations to require the installation of external containment filters on boiling-water reactors. I want to begin by saying, 

I understand the Commission requires a cost-benefit analysis in 

order to make sure there is adequate protection for the public. I 

also understand that there is a movement to go forward with such 

regulations even in the absence of a finding that it is necessary in 

order to provide adequate protection for the public concern. 

I have generated a letter, which has been subscribed to by a 

number of my colleagues, members of the House as diverse as Mike 

McIntyre, Jim Matheson, myself, Mr. Dingell on the one hand and 

other members like Steny Hoyer, Jim Clyburn, Mike Doyle, Joe 

Crowley, Rob Andrews and Chaka Fattah on the other, basically 

making the case that we want to have you all make sure that there 

is an adequate cost-benefit analysis performed before imposing any 

such mandate on the industry. The letter concludes as follows: ‘‘Absent a finding that mandatory filter installation is necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public, we believe the Commission 

should work with the industry to achieve the regulatory goal in the 

safest, most effective and least costly manner.’’ That letter speaks 

for itself, and with the chairman’s permission, I would like to submit this letter for inclusion in the record. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Without objection, so ordered. We have already 

discussed the letter. 

Mr. BARROW. I want to make it a part of the record on my time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all. 

[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair 

now recognizes our final member, Mr. Kinzinger from Illinois, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

your time today. Chairman Macfarlane, I am happy to see that the 

focus of this hearing is on the important work of the Commission. 

I believe your work over the next several years will determine the 

viability of the industry, and your decisions will have an impact on 

U.S. energy policy for decades. 

59 

The members of this committee need to be aware that the bounty 

of natural gas that we have unlocked through technology and innovation is a blessing but it is going to bring new challenges. I have 

35 power-generating facilities in my district, and every single one 

is being impacted by the lower price of natural gas including the 

four nuclear power plants. Good for the consumer but it may not 

be good for a diverse energy supply. We have some of the best 

minds in the world creating and collaborating on new nuclear technology. It would be a shame if low-cost natural gas discouraged 

U.S. companies from investing in nuclear R&D, facilities and education. 

A lot of what you heard today is about the regulatory process, 

and I believe that the members who support nuclear power want 

to ensure that the Commission is operating under the best processes for the safety of the plant. I hope you will help us in this effort by answering a few more questions. We will just make them 

quick yes or no questions. 

I understand that the Atomic Energy Act grants the Commission 

broad authority to issue safety requirements and that the Commission’s regulatory tools include orders, rulemaking and policy statements. So just yes or no, please. With regard to orders, is it true 

that the Commission has the authority to issue orders with merely 

a majority vote? We will start with you. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Is it that the Commission has the authority to 

issue orders without conducting technical and cost-benefit analysis? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. If we deem it adequate protection, yes. 

Mr. KINZINGER. So yes? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. A regulatory basis is required for orders. 

Mr. KINZINGER. OK. Is it true that the Commission has the authority to issue orders without any public participation? Do you 

have the authority? 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes, we do. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And as I understand it, safety requirements that 

the Commission determines are necessary for the adequate protection of safety are not subjected to cost-benefit analysis. The less 

significant safety enhancements are subject to cost-benefit analysis, 

and if found inadequate, can be challenged under the agency’s 

Backfit Rule. Is it true that orders are not subject to challenge 

under the Backfit Rule? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. True. 

Ms. MACFARLANE. Yes. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Yet here we have the agency staff recommending 

that you issue an order to mandate filter systems, an approach 

that your expert advisory body, the Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards, disagrees with, that failed a cost-benefit analysis and 

60 

about which there are serious questions that agency staff may have 

underestimated the cost. I believe that orders are a necessary and 

a valid tool where there is an urgent safety need in the immediate 

aftermath of events like September 11th or Fukushima. However, 

it is nearly 2 years since the Fukushima accident and the Commission acted on the most urgent, safety-significant changes a year 

ago. It is time to return to what we members would call regular 

order: restoring the agency’s historic reliance on rigorous technical 

and cost-benefit analysis and public involvement inherent in the 

process of rulemaking. 

I understand my friend and colleague, Lee Terry, is working on 

legislation in this area, and I plan to work with him to address my 

concern that the Commission’s use of orders should be limited to 

urgent, significant safety needs, and with that, Mr. Chairman, I 

will yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. We want to 

thank you for coming. It will not be your last appearance. I know 

you are looking forward to that. 

If there are no other members wishing to ask questions, members are reminded that the record will remain open for 10 business 

days to submit additional questions for the record. 

There being no other business to come before the subcommittee, 

the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 

61 


80376.011

LICENSING ACTIONS AFFECTED BY WASTE CONFIDENCE REMAND 

Projects Managed by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) 

Project Projected 

DSEIS1 

Projected 

FSEIS2 

Publication Publication 

South Texas Nov. 2012 June 2013 

Grand Gulf Feb. 2013 Aug. 2013 

Callaway Feb. 2013 Sept. 2013 

Crystal River Published TBD 

Limerick Nov. 2012 May 2013 

Watts Bar 2 Published Dec. 2012 

(10 CFR 

Part 50 

operating 

license)4 

Davis-Besse Feb. 2013 Sept. 2013 

Seabrook Dec. 2012 April 2013 

(supplement) 

Indian Point Published Dec. 2012 

(supplement) 

Diablo Jan. 2015 June 2015 

Canyon 

Draft supplemental environmental impact statement 

Final supplemental environmental impact statement 

Projected Delay' 

4 months for 

SEISs, 14 months 

for license issuance 

None for SEISs, 

12 months for 

license issuance 

None for SEISs, 

10 months for 

license issuance 

None for FSEIS, up 

to 14 months for 

license issuance 

3 months for 

SEISs, 9 months 

for license issuance 

None for SFES' or 

license issuance 

None for SEISs, 

4 months for 

license issuance 

None for SEISs, 

9 months for 

issuance 

None for FSEIS, up 

to 13 months for 

license issuance 

None; not likely to 

require explanatory 

text given projected 

SEIS dates 

Adjudicatory 

Issues Other than 

Waste Confidence 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Assumes license issuance occurs in October 2014 or later. Where applicable. projections are contingent on 

resolution of adjudicatory issues. 

4 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50. "Domestic Licensing of Production and 

Utilization Facilities" 

5 Supplemental final environmental statement 

ENCLOSURE 
62 


80376.012

2 

Project Projected 

DSEIS1 

Projected 

FSEIS2 

Projected Delay' 

Publication Publication 

Sequoyah Jan. 2014 Aug. 2014 None 

(anticipated) 

Syron and June 2014 Jan. 2015 None 

Sraidwood 

(anticipated) 

Projects Managed by the Office of New Reactors (NRO) 

Project Projected Projected 

DEIS6 FEIS7 

Publication Publication 

Levy Published Published 

STP Published Published 

Comanche Published Published 

Calvert Published Published 

Fermi Published Nov. 2012" 

Lee Published TSD 

North Anna TSD TSD 

Turkey Point TSD TSD 

Harris Jan. 2013* Jan. 2014* 

Belt Bend TBD TSD 

PSEG ESP June 2013' June 2014' 

"Dates are tentative 

Draft environmental impact statement 

Final environmental impact statement 

Projected SER 

Completion 

Estimate 

Oct. 2012' 

TSD 

June 2015' 

TSD 

TSD 

Nov. 2012* 

TSD 

TSD 

TSD 

TBD 

July 2014' 

Adjudicatory 

Issues Other than 

Waste Confidence 

Application not yet 

received 

Application not yet 

received 

Planned Uncontested 

Hearings 

Feb. 2013' 

TSD 

Nov. 2015* 

TSD 

TSD 

March 2013 

TSD 

TSD 

TSD 

TBD 

TSD 
63 


80376.013

3 

Projects Managed by the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards INMSS) 

Project Projected Final Projected Adjudicatory 

fAa Publication Delay in Issues Other than 

Issuing Waste Confidence 

License 

Calvert Cliffs Published 2 years No 

ISFSI9 renewal 

Prairie Island Oct. 2013 10 months Yes 

ISFSI renewal 

Environmental assessment 

indeoendent soent fuel storaae installation 
64 


80376.103

KATIE SWEENEY General Counsel 

January 7, 2013 

The Honorable Allison M. Macfarlane 

Chairman 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Dear Chairman Macfarlane: 

Thank you for the invitation to brief the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on 

February 20, 2013 regarding issues of importance to the National Mining Association's 

uranium recovery members. As we discussed last year, NMA believes that an annual 

meeting on uranium recovery regulatory issues can provide an excellent forum to allow 

Commission members to be thoroughly briefed by industry and other interested 

stakeholders. The format of the briefing, however, is critical to ensure adequate 

discussion of the most significant issues. Therefore, I am writing to comment on the 

proposed format for this briefing, as well as to offer some suggestions on topics that 

currently are at the forefront of the development of the domestic uranium recovery 

industry. I hope that you will consider these suggestions when finalizing the schedule 

for this briefing. 

I am concerned that the format of this briefing will not allow the NMA to adequately 

address relevant industry issues. By offering only 5-10 minutes for NMA to present its 

views on specific issues, the Commission is relegating our discussion to mere "talking 

points" rather than to a truly substantive discussion. Previously, in an August 2012 

letter to the Commission, NMA suggested that the Commission use a format that allows 

more time for interested stakeholders to present their views and for an expanded 

dialogue between such stakeholders and Commission members so that all views and 

their supporting facts may be considered and queried. Furthermore, NMA suggested 

that all stakeholders' slides, written testimony, and any other detailed information be 

shared in advance with the Commission, NRC staff and others speaking at the briefing. 

Advance submissions on relevant regulatory issues also will be a good way to focus the 

scope of discussion. By allowing stakeholders to submit issues in advance, the 

Commission can direct such stakeholders to consult NRC Staff on which issues are of 

particular importance to NRC from a legal and/or policy perspective and to direct 

stakeholders to prepare and submit specific advance information that the Commission 

deems most relevant to a productive briefing. Thus, NMA respectfully requests that the 

Commission tailor a format for this briefing that reflects NMA's previous suggestion. 

National Mining Association 101 Constitution Avenue, NW r Suite 500 East I Washington, DC 20001 ! (202) 463-2600 
65 


80376.104

Chairman Macfarlane 

January 7, 2013 

Page Two 

In addition, NMA believes that the list of issues, ranging from legal/regulatory to policyrelated items, should include each of the following topics. 

(1) First, as a general matter, the lack of NRC Staff agency resources available to 

process uranium recovery license and license amendment or renewal applications has 

resulted in considerable problems for the industry. Several license applicants have 

experienced significant delays in licensing of their proposed projects and, the vast 

majority of the time, are being told it is due to a lack of agency resources. At least two 

license applicants that participated in the NRC's pre-submission audit process and who 

submitted extremely high-quality applications already have experienced significant 

delays in the licensing process starting with basic completeness review. While NRC's 

primary mission does not relate to shareholder or investor perspectives, NMA believes 

the Commission needs to assure that processing of license applications must be 

accomplished efficiently and cost-effectively. 

(2) Second, NRC's conduct of the National Historic Preservation Act's (NHPA) 

Section 106 process has become a source of great concern within the uranium recovery 

industry. Industry understands that the Section 106 process is mandatory for new 

operating facilities and for some other licensing actions and has attempted to assist the 

Agency in conducting this process. However, industry is deeply concerned with the lack 

of a standardized process or protocol, perhaps a regional programmatic agreement, for 

the Section 106 process and with the failure of NRC Staff to be more decisive in its role 

as the "lead agency" in its licensing process. NMA believes an open discussion on this 

issue will allow all interested stakeholders to better understand how the process can be 

improved and can lead to more efficient licensing. 

(3) Third, there are several process-related issues that require some detailed 

discussion with the Commission. NRC billing practices have long been a difficult issue 

for industry. For several years, industry has been dissatisfied with the level of detail 

contained in NRC's billing invoices, especially when it relates to time and fees charged 

by NRC-retained independent contractors. NRC invoices have been wholly lacking in 

standard detail that every consultant, law or accounting firm in the private sector must 

provide and NRC's hourly rates exceed those of many of these organizations in the 

Western part of the country. Accordingly, NRC's invoices do not offer industry any 

opportunity to gauge the reasonableness of fees incurred for different phases of the 

licensing process which, in turn, makes a lessons learned approach for future licensing 

actions virtually impossible to implement. NMA has met with and communicated in 

writing with NRC's Chief Financial Officer (See Attached Letter) and has received no 

reply to date. NMA would like to explore this issue in more depth with the Commission. 

(4) The structure and focus of licensing reviews are also an issue that requires some 

significant attention. Industry has found that environmental and safety reviews often 

employ different licensing approaches and do not narrow their focus to "significant risks" 

National Mining Association 101 Constitution Avenue, NW I SUite 500 East f Washington, DC 20001 I (202) 463"2600 
66 


80376.105

Chairman Macfarlane 

January 7, 2013 

Page Three 

of harm contrary to the Supreme Court caution in the so-called 1980 Benzene decision 

(Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute) and the 

Commission-approved risk-informed regulatory program. By allowing license reviews to 

be focus on a larger range of "insignificant risks," additional delays are realized in the 

licensing process. Moreover, environmental reviews which are essentially procedural in 

nature take far too much time and cost far too much compared with the Commission's 

primary responsibility for public health and safety reviews. This results in a waste of 

agency and company resources that should not occur in the first place. Thus, this issue 

is paramount to achieving the goal of cost-effective and efficient licensing. 

(5) Several looming regulatory and policy issues need to be extensively discussed 

during this briefing. Industry is concerned with the lack of progress on the finalization of 

new and/or revised standard review plans (SRP) for in situ and conventional/heap leach 

uranium recovery facilities. NRC Staff typically refer to the former as the "bible" for new 

ISR license applications and license renewals. Yet, industry has been proceeding over 

the last six years without an updated set of SRPs and have been forced to "read the 

minds" of NRC Staff when it comes to changing or evolving safety and environmental 

requirements. Indeed, the Commission needs to address the importance of such 

documents specifically to its licensing board panels, which have little familiarity with the 

technical aspects of these operations. Finalization of these SRPs should be a priority 

as they will require extensive public comment prior to finalization. 

(6) The Commission should also consider involving itself in the upcoming rulemaking 

by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart W 

radon emission standards for uranium mill tailings impoundments. The interpretation 

and application of these standards by EPA to uranium recovery facilities appears to be 

unnecessarily redundant and overly burdensome given the Commission's existing 

regulations for such facilities. Precedent for Commission involvement in regulations 

under Part 61 exists as the Commission participated in the rescission of 40 CFR Part 

61, Subpart I and T in the 1980s which resulted in a reduction of duplicative, 

overlapping regulation. Industry believes that the Commission would be well-served to 

actively consider this opportunity to increase regulatory efficiency. 

(7) Finally, the new final rule for revisions to 10 CFR Part 40.32(e) on pre-licensing 

site construction is a source of immense confusion for industry. When a potential 

revision to Part 40.32(e) was initially raised by an industry delegation, the ultimate goal 

for this new rulemaking was to clarify the scope of pre-licensing site construction 

activities that could be conducted without concern for denial of a requested license. 

Unfortunately, the Statement of Considerations for the final rule as well as the rule itself 

has further complicated this issue. NMA believes that the Commission decision in NFS 

cited by both NMA and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) in its comments on the 

Proposed Rule has either been ignored or wholly misinterpreted, thus leaving industry in 

a state of confusion. NMA would appreCiate further discussion of this issue at the 

February 20, 2013 briefing. 

National Mining Association 101 ConstItution Avenue, NW ! SUite 500 f:ast I Washington, DC 20001 I (202) 463-2600 
67 


80376.106

Chairman Macfarlane 

January 7, 2013 

Page Four 

Please do not hesitate to contact me to discuss these requests at (202) 463-2627. 

Thank you very much for your time and consideration in this matter. 

Sincerely, 

Katie Sweeney 

General Counsel 

National Mining Association 101 Constitution Avenue, NW 1 Suite 500 East I Washington, DC 20001 I (202) 463-2600 
68 


80376.014

February 7. 2013 

The Honorable .'\ili,on :1.1. 'vlacfarlanc 

Chairman 

Cniled States Nuckar Regulalory Commission 

Mail SlOp 016-G4 

Washington DC 20555-000 I 

Dear Chairman Macfarlane: 

:--Juciear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations require that a cosl-benefit analysis be 

performed and meet spccillcd stlmdanJs prior 10 imposing new requircmel1ls - a prm:css tim! is designed to 

ensure Ihat the regulation of our civilian reacmr fleet is grounded in successful and realistic periiwmance. 

We wanll() make sure that a recenl proposal to require installation of external containment lilters on 

boiling \\atc!' reactor ... mct~ts those standards, 

It's our understanding that Commission statfhas concluded that Stich a mandate is not nt'et!ssar~y 

to mcetlhc "adequate prorecli()J1" slandard and is not justified on a cost-benefit basis. In addition. the 

Commission's independent Advisory Committee on Reaoor !>afcguards (ACRS). after rcvie,,·ing an 

analysis prepared by the staff and others on this issue. concluded that a more flexible. pcrfnrmance-bascd 

approa,h "ould \lork beller l0 reduce the potcntiallor radioactive material releases than a "one size tits 

all" requirement. 

The "RC's Principles <J/ UooJ Regulation slates. , .... regulall1ry activities shuuld be cousisten! 

\\ ilh Ihe degree of risk reduction they achieve. Where sc, eral effective alternatives are available. the 

option which minim;lcs the lISC of reSources should be adopted:' Based on that guidance ano consistenl 

\\ith lh~ ;\CRS conclusions. it appears that plant-spedne strategies. based nn risk assessments. s<:icI1tifi~ 

uata. and a Si1C"S unique charactcri:itics. might be more effective at preventing land contamination in a 

severe accident. Absent a finding that mandatory filter installation is necessary to ensure adequate 

prllll'Clion of the public. we believe the Commission shocld work with the industry to achieve the 

regulatory goal in the safest. most cJTcetivc, and least costly manner. 

Thank Y0tl again for your service. We look forward to }our response. 

Sin.:crcly. 
69 


80376.015
70 


80376.016
71 


80376.017

1. Jolm Barrow 

2. Bill Pascrell. Jr. 

3. Stanford Bishop, Jr. 

4. John D. Dingell, Jr. 

S. Ed Pastor 

6. Sheila Jackson Lee 

7. Steny H. Hoyer 

8. William L. Owens 

9. James E. Clyburn 

10. Michael F. Doyle 

11. Joseph Crowley 

12. Bennie Thompson 

13. Bobby L. Rush 

14. Robert E. Andrews 

15. Chaka Fallah 

16. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger 

l7. Gene Green 

18. Danny K. Davis 

19. Daniel Lipinski 

20. Terri A. Sewell 

21. Daniel B \1affei 

22. Cedric L. Richmond 

23. Robert A. Brady 

24. Bill Foster 

25. Mike Mclntyre 

26. Jim Matheson 
72 


80376.018

80376.019
74 


80376.020

UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555·0001 

April 26. 2013 

The Honorable Ed Whitfield 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Power 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

United States House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Chairman Whitfield: 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission appeared before the Committee on Energy and 

Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Power and Subcommittee on Environment and the 

Economy. on February 28, 2013. at a hearing entitled, ''The Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Policy and Governance Challenges." From that hearing, you forwarded questions for the 

hearing record. The responses to those questions are enclosed. If J can be of further 

assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me. 

Enclosure: 

As stated 

Sincerely, 

Rebecca L. Schmidt, Director 

Office of Congressional Affairs 

cc: The Honorable Bobby L. Rush. Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Energy and Power 
75 


80376.021

UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 

April 26. 2013 

The Honorable John Shimkus 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

United States House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Chairman Shimkus: 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission appeared before the Committee on Energy and 

Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Power and Subcommittee on Environment and the 

Economy, on February 28, 2013, at a hearing entitled, "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Policy and Governance Challenges. " From that hearing, you forwarded questions for the 

hearing record. The responses to those questions are enclosed. If I can be of further 

assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me. 

Enclosure: 

As stated 

Sincerely, 

Rebecca L Schmidt, Director 

Office of Congressional Affairs 

cc: The Honorable Gene Green, Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy 
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Question. 

ANSWER. 

Member Requests for the Record from Representative Steve Scalise 

I don't know how anyone can look at this slide and dismiss the 

cumulative impact of regulations as merely a matter of scheduling, 

and I am told that, in addition to this, there are approximately 40 

more post-Fukushima items yet to be considered. Is that correct? 

The original Near Term Task Force report, from which most post-Fukushima items originated, 

contained a total of 12 overarching recommendations regarding potential improvements to the 

regulation and oversight of nuclear power plants in the U.S. Many of these recommendations 

had subparts, which focused on improved accident mitigation strategies for beyond design basis 

external hazards, spent fuel pool instrumentation, hardened containment venting systems for 

bOiling water reactors with Mark I and Mark II containments, confirming compliance with seismic 

and flooding design bases, reevaluating seismic and flooding hazard assumptions, and 

assessing staffing and communications capabilities during extended station blackout and multiunit events. 

Counting each subpart, there were 35 total recommendations for proposed action. In its 

evaluation and implementation of these recommendations, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) has recognized that many of these proposed actions can be consolidated and addressed 

by a single action. For example, the Mitigating Strategies Order issued in March 2012, when 

fully implemented, is expected to address at least seven subparts of various overarching 

recommendations. 

The NRC continues to review and evaluate the remaining post-Fukushima items to determine if 

there is a sound technical basis to take additional regulatory action. The NRC staff issued its 

detailed plans for further evaluation of these items in a July 13, 2012, status paper to the 

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Commission, and issued its latest update on these activities in a February 14, 2013 information 

paper to the Commission. 

The main focus of the NRC's efforts to address the cumulative effects of regulation 

(CER) is less a matter of scheduling and more one of ensuring that called for actions to 

promote safety actually are needed and do not inadvertently distract licensees from 

executing other fundamental safety or security responsibilities. The NRC developed the 

following definition for the cumulative effects of regulation (CER): 

CER describes the challenges that licensees, or other impacted entities 

(such as State partners) face while implementing new regulatory positions, 

programs, or requirements (e.g., rules, generic letters, backfits, 

inspections). CER is an organizational effectiveness challenge that results 

from a licensee or impacted entity implementing a number of complex 

regulatory positions, programs or requirements within a limited 

implementation period and with available resources (which may include 

limited available expertise to address a specific issue). CER can potentially 

distract licensee or entity staff from executing other primary duties that 

ensure safety or security. 

In order to address CER, the NRC added procedures to its rulemaking process to provide 

licensees and other impacted entities an opportunity to inform the NRC of the impacts of 

proposed rules before they are finalized and implemented. To provide this opportunity, the NRC 

increased public participation throughout all phases of the rulemaking process, including by 

seeking specific public comments on CER when proposed rules are published for comment, and 

by holding a public meeting on implementation during the final rule stage. The NRC also added 

publishing draft guidance with proposed rules -- and final guidance with final rules - to its 

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rule making process. The goal of these additional procedures is to identify any resource 

constraints early in the rulemaking process, reduce the likelihood of unintended consequences, 

and improve focus on safety-beneficial activities. While these additional CER-related 

rulemaking procedures may reduce, or even in some cases eliminate rulemaking actions, such 

eliminations or reductions are not in this respect a principal objective of CER. 

The NRC continues to examine the additional procedures put in place to address CER. Last 

month, the Commission directed the staff to prepare a report due in March 2015 on the 

effectiveness of the CER process and its implementation status. The Commission also directed 

the staff to: 

• Develop and implement outreach tools that will allow NRC to consider 

more completely the overall impacts of multiple rules, orders, generic 

communications, advisories, and other regulatory actions on licensees 

and their ability to focus effectively on items of greatest safety import. 

• Seek volunteer facilities to perform "case studies" to review the accuracy 

of cost and schedule estimates used in NRC's regulatory analysis 

• Carefully monitor the CER approach to ensure that no Significant 

unintended consequences result from the direction provided 

As the agency evaluates potential additional regulatory activities, actions planned or already 

taken will be accounted for in future decisions. For example, the Commission is currently 

considering a March 27, 2013, staff proposal to change the implementation plans for some 

additional emergency preparedness recommendations because their intent is being adequately 

addressed through the implementation of the Orders on mitigating strategies that were issued in 

March 2012. 

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Member Requests for the Record from Representative Bobby Rush: 

Question. Can you provide this committee with more information on programs, 

what forms of support the NRC provides to these HBCUs and do you 

think that these types of programs can be replicated at other 

agencies? 

ANSWER. 

NRC's assistance to Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) during FY 2012 

included: 1) grant awards to three HBCUs (faculty. student and curriculum development) 

through NRC's Nuclear Education Grants Program: 2) interactions by NRC's University 

Champions with school representatives to discuss agency priorities, funding, and program 

opportunities; and 3) a broad range of support and funding provided through the agency's 

Minority Serving Institutions Program. 

The Minority Serving Institutions Program assists institutions including HBCUs to: 1) achieve 

academic excellence; 2) build capability, capacity and infrastructure; 3) develop human capital 

(faculty and students); 4) gain knowledge and skills needed to effectively compete for grants, 

cooperative agreements, contracts, and resources; 5) participate in Federal and public 

programs; and 6) create a diverse skilled science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 

(STEM) pipeline. Since its inception in 2006, the Minority Serving Institutions Program has 

awarded over $13 million in grants for capacity and infrastructure building, research projects, 

training, developmental and experiential learning, leadership, mentoring, internships, 

scholarships, fellowships, tuition, lodging, and other assistance. For four consecutive years, the 

Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology has recognized the NRC as a "Top 

Supporter of HBCUs." 

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Additionally. there is a Minority Serving Institutions Program HBCU Research and Development 

(R&D) Participation program that supports mission-related research on campuses and at 

Federal laboratories. This program provides experiences in engineering. risk assessment. 

emergency preparedness. environmental assessment. information technology and 

management, geotechnical fields, health physics, mathematics! statistics, materials science, 

and fire protection. The R&D Participation program provides participants stipends, sabbatical 

leave. and on- campus appointments. The program funds college sponsored STEM programs, 

which serve Pre-K through college students, teachers, guidance counselors, administrators, 

education leaders, and researchers. Over the last three years, 500 plus K-12 faculty and 

students have been served by HBCU faculty researchers. Over the last four years, 432 

appointments were made (125 faculty and 307 students). The R&D Participation program 

served 80 HBCUs, 92 high schools. and five middle schools from 44 states. In FY12, NRC's 

Minority Serving Institutions Program awarded $1.343,326 to HBCUs to conduct STEM-related 

programs and activities, and $269K through the R&D PartiCipation program. 

The NRC believes that this type of Minority Serving Institutions Program may be replicated at 

other agencies, with the appropriate level of commitment, necessary knowledge and skills, and 

sufficient resources. The NRC's Minority Serving Institutions Program has been viewed as a 

model program for developing a workforce skilled in science. technology. engineering. and 

mathematics, and for diversity inclusion initiatives. 

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QUESTION 1. 

ANSWER. 

Questions from Representative Ed Whitfield 

In our hearing last July, Commissioner MagWood referred to the 

post-Fukushima actions the Commission approved on March 9, 

2012, and stated: "We still have much work to do but the steps taken 

thus far represent a very significant increase in safety based on the 

Fukushima experience." 

a) Has any effort been made to account for the increase in safety 

inherent in those actions? 

b) Shouldn't this new, higher level of safety provide the threshold 

against which the benefits of any future actions should be 

analyzed? 

a) Yes, the NRC accounts for actions already taken as well as those planned, in evaluating 

regulatory decisions regarding post-Fukushima actions. The Commission approved two 

actions taken in March of 2012 on the basis of ensuring adequate protection of the 

health and safety of the public. Site-specific studies would be needed to quantify the 

increase in safety for each individual reactor, but the Commission qualitatively 

considered the significant safety benefit that would be gained from these actions if an 

extreme external event were to cause challenges at a reactor in the United States similar 

to that at Fukushima. 

b) The Commission will consider the safety benefit of any future post-Fukushima actions. 

Included in these considerations would be any cost/benefit analyses required by NRC 

regulations. 

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QUESTION 2. 

ANSWER. 

I understand that there are several domestic companies developing 

small modular reactors (SMRs) that have engaged NRC staff about 

design certification activities. Which designs have been endorsed 

by potential license applicants who have written to the NRC 

indicting their intent to build such a design? 

a. Does the NRC currently have adequate staff resources to address 

its small reactor licensing work? 

b. If the NRC is faced with limited resources for licensing activities, 

how will the NRC prioritize its licensing efforts with regard to small 

reactors? 

c. Please provide the status of the NRC's progress on aligning the 

existing regulatory framework developed primarily for large light 

water reactors with that needed for SMR technologies including any 

issues that might require rulemaking. 

The NRC annually publishes a Regulatory Information Summary to request information from 

industry about plans to submit design certification applications and license applications. 

Industry responses to the NRC's December 2012 request indicate that four domestic companies 

plan to submit design certification applications to the NRC for small modular light water reactor 

designs. Those companies are B&W mPowerTM, NuScale, Westinghouse, and Holtec. Two 

utilities responded expressing their intent to submit license applications. They are the 

Tennessee Valley Authority referencing the mPowerTM design to be constructed at the Clinch 

River site in Tennessee, and Ameren referencing the Westinghouse design to be constructed at 

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the Callaway site in Missouri. There are also some companies, both foreign and domestic, that 

have informed the NRC of plans to submit design certification applications and various license 

applications for non-light water designs. These include Toshiba for its liquid sodium cooled 

reactor, the 4S, and STL, a South African company, for its pebble bed high temperature gas 

cooled reactor. Finally, the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Alliance, a consortium of domestic 

and foreign companies, has informed us of its plans to submit a construction permit application 

for a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor based on the Areva design. 

a. The NRC's FY 2013 budget and FY2014 budget requests were predicated on 

conducting reviews of two small modular reactor designs that use light water reactor technology. 

However, neither the current budget nor the FY2014 budget request would support all of the 

work that has been identified. In addition to NRC staff resources, the agency had planned to rely 

on contractor support for parts of the reviews. However, impacts from budget sequestration, 

which result in reductions to contractor support, will challenge the ability of the NRC to move 

forward on these projects. 

b. The NRC's budget for new reactor licensing activities accommodates licensing and 

deSign certification for both large reactor and small modular reactor designs. The NRC 

prioritizes the full range of new reactor work (large and small designs) to the extent budgeted 

resources are available. Within this larger context, NRC will prioritize the small modular reactor 

review work to first support the projects selected by the Department of Energy (DOE) through its 

SMR Licensing Technical Support Program. 

c. The NRC's existing regulatory framework is appropriate for reviewing the small modular 

light water reactor deSigns and license applications. Through pre-application activities, 

principally with mPowerTM and NuScale, design-specific review guidance is being developed by 

the NRC to facilitate review of these designs and their unique features. These design-specific 

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review standards are supplemented by NRC's continuing effort to maintain and update its 

Standard Review Plan. 

Based on responses received to the December 2012 Regulatory Information Summary that 

indicate that some entities plan to submit design certification applications for non-light water 

reactor technologies. the NRC has identified approaches that could be implemented to support 

the review of these "advanced non-light water reactor" designs. last year. in response to a 

request from Congress. the NRC staff prepared a document entitled "Report to Congress: 

Advanced Reactor licensing", which details the NRC's efforts and plans regarding advanced 

reactors. The Commission transmitted this report to Congress on August 22,2012. 

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QUESTION 1. 

ANSWER. 

Questions from Representative John Shimkus 

I understand the NRC is analyzing the safety of using dry cask 

storage for extended periods of time. What is the time frame 

currently being analyzed? 

a. Is the NRC considering a requirement that Independent Spent 

Fuel Storage Installations maintain or reinstate the capability to 

repackage dry cask storage canisters? 

The NRC is examining the technical needs and potential changes to the regulatory framework 

that may be needed to continue licensing of spent nuclear fuel storage beyond the initial and 

first renewal licensing periods. In May 2012, the NRC issued for public comment a report on 

identifying and prioritizing the technical information needs affecting potential regulation of 

extended storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel. This report noted that. for this 

evaluation. the NRC has considered performance of the storage systems over an initial 300 

year period following removal of the spent nuclear fuel from the reactor. The NRC staff selected 

the long analytical period in order to capture potential effects of relatively slow-acting 

degradation processes. 

The NRC is not currently considering a requirement that Independent Spent Fuel Storage 

Installations maintain or reinstate the capability to repackage dry cask storage canisters. 

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QUESTION 2. In Finding #2 of the Commission's 2010 waste confidence 

determination, the NRC found that a repository would be available 

"when necessary". The court vacated the NRC's determination, and 

now the Commission is forced to initiate a new waste confidence 

proceeding. 

a) Since the scope of the NRC waste confidence proceeding seems 

focused on environmental impact issues, how will you gather 

evidence to support Finding 2, which addresses repository 

availability, not environmental impact? 

b) Will DOE provide evidence for the record on its plans for a 

repository? 

c) Without evidence from DOE, what sort of evidence do you think 

would support a repository availability finding? 

d) In vacating the NRC's Waste Confidence rule, the court directed 

the NRC to examine the environmental impact if a repository is 

never available and the period of storage on site is indefinite. 

Isn't the Finding #2 determination of repository availability a 

necessary element of determining the time period to be 

examined by the environmental impact statement? 

e) To what extent will the Commission consider the "No Action" 

alternative documented in the Yucca Mountain Environmental 

Impact Statement? 

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ANSWER. 

a. Consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act, the NRC will make reasonable 

assumptions regarding the availability of a repository. The NRC's reasonable assumptions will 

include an assessment of repository availability within 60 years beyond the licensed life for 

operation of the reactor, within 160 years beyond the licensed life for operation of the reactor, 

and indefinite storage (i.e., a repository is never available). The information that the NRC is 

considering in the generic environmental impact statement includes international and domestic 

experience in siting a geologic repository, the January 2013 DOE report, "Strategy for the 

Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste: and the 

2012 report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. 

b. In January 2013, DOE published its "Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," which will be used as part of the analysis in 

the generic environmental impact statement that will support the updated Waste Confidence 

Rule. The DOE Strategy Report states that it is the Administration's goal to have a repository 

sited by 2026, licensed by 2042, and constructed and open by 2048. The NRC also plans to 

consider other publicly available information. 

c. The generic environmental impact statement will make a number of reasonable 

assumptions regarding repository availability. In addition to the DOE's recently published 

"Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive 

Waste" (January 2013), the NRC will rely on a variety of information and analyses to support 

any conclusion on repository availability. This information includes international and domestic 

experience in siting a geologic repository and the 2012 report of the Blue Ribbon Commission 

on America's Nuclear Future. 

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d. The Finding #2 determination of repository availability is not a necessary element of 

determining the time period to be examined by the environmental impact statement. The NRC 

is planning to analyze three scenarios in the environmental impact statement. These scenarios 

are the short-term period of continued storage (a repository available after 60 years), a longterm period of continued storage (repository available after 160 years), and indefinite storage (a 

repository is never available). The environmental impact statement will determine the impacts 

of continued storage for each of the scenarios. 

e. The Commission, in its staff requirements memorandum of September 6,2012, directed 

the NRC staff to adopt or incorporate by reference, as appropriate, all or part of other agencies' 

EISs in the Waste Confidence generic environmental impact statement. A specific example 

given by the Commission was the Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement "no-action" 

alternative. 

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Questions from Representative Joe Barton 

In the response to this Committee's January 15, 2013 letter regarding filtered vents, the 

NRC failed to answer the question of when it will conduct a full review of the regulatory 

differences between the U. S. and Japan that existed at the time of the accident, 

indicating that it has limited such review to merely three issues: station blackout 

protections, hydrogen control, and transferring spent fuel from pools to casks. 

Furthermore, the NRC response stated that the U. S. and Japan have "similar approaches 

to safety, including defense-in-depth protections." Such an inadequate response 

generates more questions than answers. Please respond to the following: 

qUESTION 1. 

ANSWER. 

When will the Commission conduct a full review of the regulatory 

differences between the U.S. and Japan that existed at the time of 

the accident? 

Within the U.S., nuclear power plant operations are conducted in accordance with NRC 

regulations, informed by NRC guidance documents and industry guidance and initiatives, and 

controlled by programs developed by each licensee. The NRC is assessing all of these 

elements as we continue to more fully understand the Fukushima accident and its implications 

for the U. S. nuclear power plants. These assessments continue to be documented in various 

reports and papers generated by the agency. 

The Commission recently directed the NRC staff to document its comparison of U.S. and 

Japanese regulatory requirements that were in effect at the time of the accident, focusing on 

those areas most relevant to the sequence of events and accident mitigation capabilities at 

Fukushima. The Commission indicated that the staff's documentation should describe how 

those differences were factored into post-Fukushima actions taken by the NRC. 

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The NRC routinely considers international operating experience within our regulatory processes 

and has done targeted comparisons of U.S. requirements against those of Japan and other 

countries to enhance our understanding of the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi or help identify 

lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. 

The assessments performed by the NRC and other regulatory bodies around the world have 

highlighted that there are lessons to be learned regardless of the regulatory program in place. 

The NRC staff's lessons-learned include the need to consider multi-unit accident scenarios; 

have adequate staffing and communication capabilities during an emergency of this type; have 

spent fuel pool instrumentation for real-time monitoring of water levels; consider enhanced 

protection against extreme natural hazards; and be prepared for prolonged station black-outs. 

The NRC's discussions with its international regulatory counterparts, and comparisons of our 

respective implementation strategies, suggests that safety regulatory bodies are coming to 

similar conclusions. The NRC is participating in conferences and meetings convened by the 

International Atomic Energy Agency and other organizations to continue to communicate 

regarding lessons learned. All of this outreach has informed the staff's efforts and reinforced 

that we have identified appropriate lessons learned. 

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QUESTION 2. If the Commission believes the U.S. and Japan have similar 

approaches to safety, including defense-in-depth protections, does 

it also believe we face a similar risk for a Fukushima-like accident? 

If not, please describe any and all nuclear safety differences 

between the U.S. and Japan as existed in Japan at the time of the 

Fukushima accident including but not limited to, each of the 

following: 

a. A fully independent and transparent regulatory agency 

b. The design basis process for siting and constructing nuclear 

plants including data and assumptions used as underpinnings 

for the design basis 

c. Operator training and licensing 

d. Emergency preparedness and response including 

communications, training, government interface 

e. Control room habitability 

f. Station blackout protections 

g. Safety culture including a safety-conscious work environment 

and corrective action program 

h. Supplemental emergency equipment similar the NRC's B.S.b 

requirements 

i. Severe accident preparation including training, manuals, 

equipment inspections and maintenance 

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j. Seismic and flooding requirements 

ANSWER. 

The NRC Near Term Task Force report issued in July 2011 concluded that an event similar to 

the Fukushima accident was not likely to occur at U.S. plants. However. the NRC recognized 

that we could learn from the event and make appropriate safety enhancements at U.S. plants by 

reviewing the course of events that resulted in the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. and we are 

currently taking appropriate regulatory action to implement those safety enhancements. 

As described in the answer to Question 1. the Commission recently directed the NRC staff to 

document its comparison of U.S. and Japanese regulatory requirements that were in effect at 

the time of the accident. focusing on those areas most relevant to the sequence of events and 

accident mitigation capabilities at Fukushima. We expect that the staffs comparison will 

address most or all of the items described in parts (a) through Ul of your question. We will 

submit the staffs comparison to the Committee when it is completed. 

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QUESTION 3. Was the Japanese Diet report incorrect when it stated that Japan 

had not fully incorporated the defense-in-depth philosophy? If yes, 

please explain. 

ANSWER. 

The Commission respects the conclusions of the Japanese Diet report, has no basis to disagree 

with any of them in relation to Japan's regulatory needs, and has taken the Diet's report 

conclusions into account when considering whether changes should be made to NRC regulatory 

programs. 

As additional background, the Japanese Diet report refers to a defense-in-depth framework 

prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which includes five levels of defense. The 

first three levels generally relate to the protection against traditional design-basis events 

associated with both plant malfunctions and external hazards. The plant equipment and 

procedures to protect against these design-basis events in Japan are similar to that required in 

the U.S. and other countries. The fourth level of defense in depth in the IAEA framework is 

intended to provide protection against beyond-design-basis events such as the unexpected 

failure of multiple-plant systems or an external event exceeding the design-basis values (e.g., 

the tsunami flooding the Fukushima site). The fifth level of defense in the IAEA framework is 

associated with offsite emergency preparedness. 

It is within the fourth level of defense that some countries had imposed requirements beyond 

those in place in Japan at the time of the accident. As mentioned in the NRC's near term task 

force report, U.S. plants had put in place severe accident management guidelines and 

mitigating strategies for the loss of large areas due to fires or explosions, both of which might 

have helped operators deal with beyond-design-basis external events. Many of the actions 

taken by the NRC, as well as the new Japanese Nuclear Regulatory Authority and other 

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international regulators, have focused on this fourth level of defense by providing additional 

improvements to nuclear plant capabilities to deal with these beyond-design-basis external 

hazards and the related losses of electrical power. 

Regarding the fifth level of defense, lessons learned from the Fukushima accident related to 

emergency preparedness are also being evaluated, with improvements being pursued in the 

U.S., Japan, and other countries. 

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QUESTION 1. 

ANSWER. 

Questions from Representative John D. Dingell 

As you know, the Yucca Mountain facility remains unused yet we are 

still generating nuclear waste at facilities across the country. Has 

the Commission considered whether the D.C. Circuit Court's 2012 

decision and the lack of a permanent storage facility will affect the 

continuation of existing licenses or possibly invalidate them? 

Please answer yes or no. 

Yes, the Commission has considered whether the D.C. Circuit Court's 2012 vacatur and remand 

of the 2010 update to the Waste Confidence Rule invalidates or otherwise affects the 

continuation of licenses that the NRC issued prior to the court's decision. Under the National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), an agency need not revisit or invalidate a past, final decision 

like a license issuance or a license renewal when new information emerges after the agency 

has made a final decision. As a result, the Commission has not revoked, suspended, or 

amended existing licenses. 

Further, the Commission considered the effects of the court's decision on ongoing licensing 

reviews. In an August 7,2012 Commission Order, the Commission stated that it would not 

issue reactor or independent spent fuel storage installation licenses dependent upon the Waste 

Confidence Decision or the Temporary Storage Rule until the court's remand is appropriately 

addressed. The Commission stated, however, that this determination extends only to final 

license issuance, and that all licensing review work and proceedings should continue to move 

forward, short of a final decision on license issuance. 

Regarding the current lack of a repository for spent nuclear fuel, the D.C. Circuit found that the 

NRC must consider a "no-repository" scenario in its NEPA analysis for Waste Confidence. The 

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NRC has stated publicly that it will consider a no-repository scenario in the generic 

environmental impact statement that it plans to issue to support an updated Waste Confidence 

Rule. By September 2013, the NRC plans to issue for public comment the draft generic 

environmental impact statement and proposed update to the Waste Confidence Rule. 

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QUESTION 2. 

ANSWER. 

In addition to nuclear facilities and the computer infrastructures that 

support them, nuclear facilities could potentially be disrupted 

through off site attacks such as at the mines that produce fuel or 

companies that manufacture parts. If reactor fuel, parts, equipment, 

or other products are qualified to come on site, should the 

Commission have jurisdiction or input over cyber or physical 

protection before it comes on site? 

The NRC has sufficient jurisdiction over the materials and components that enter NRC-licensed 

facilities to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety and 

common defense and security under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the 

Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. The NRC has also consistently asserted its jurisdiction 

over a broad range of activities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle and throughout the component 

manufacturing process in an effort to maintain the integrity of materials and components that 

can impact safety and security. In addition, the NRC and the U.S. Department of Transportation 

have transportation requirements to ensure safe and secure shipments of material from one 

facility to another. 

More specifically, with regard to cyber and physical protection, the NRC implements a rigorous 

oversight program based on the licensees' approved physical and cyber security plans, which 

comply with NRC regulations for physical protection of plants and materials. Among other 

things, these plans require licensees to inspect the contents of all deliveries. In addition, NRC 

inspections are conducted to ensure that licensees are performing in accordance with their 

approved plans. The NRC's broader oversight program includes routine inspections, 

interviewing licensee staff, performing exercises, assessing overall performance, participating in 

working groups with industry for information sharing, and intelligence networks. 

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Additionally, the NRC regulations emphasize that the licensees are ultimately responsible for 

buying from qualified vendors and for the integrity and compliance of all materials brought 

onsite. As part of the NRC's oversight program, the NRC periodically inspects vendors that 

produce parts and equipment for operating and new reactor facilities to ensure that the 

licensees are adhering to our requirements for vendor oversight and to ensure those 

requirements remain current and adequate. 

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QUESTION 3. 

ANSWER. 

The Fukushima disaster obviously gave us a lot to think about when 

it comes to nuclear energy and the Commission has put 

considerable thought into this matter. However, in a recent letter to 

the Commission, I joined my committee colleague, Mr. Barrow, and 

others, to express concern about a pending decision that may 

require a significant number of nuclear facilities to install 

containment filtered vents. The concern is that it may not be 

appropriate for the facilities your decision may affect. Due to the 

differences in the affected reactors, would a case-by-case evaluation 

provide greater certainty that the best technologies are being used 

rather than a broad approach such as the filtered vent proposal? 

a. In regards to other Fukushima recommendations already put into 

place, please explain why these were issued as orders and not 

through the rulemaking process. 

This matter was still pending at the time of the hearing and a decision regarding installation of 

filters on containment vents has since been made. On March 19, 2013, the Commission 

directed the staff to amend a March 2012 Order to require that containment vents be capable of 

operation during a severe accident (i.e., after reactor core melting begins). In addition, the 

Commission directed the staff to initiate a rulemaking to look at a variety of additional strategies 

that could reduce the potential release of radioactive material during a severe accident 

including, but not limited to, containment filters. This rulemaking will also examine how to best 

assure the integrity of the reactor containments during severe accidents. This rulemaking effort, 

including the time to evaluate additional strategies, is expected to take about four years. 

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a. In March 2012, the Commission issued three Orders, two of which were based upon 

ensuring adequate protection of the health and safety of the public, because the 

Commission believed that the safety improvements to be gained from the Orders should 

be achieved more immediately than the rulemaking process could accommodate. 

Although the NRC did not go through the rulemaking process, the NRC staff engaged a 

range of stakeholders during development of the Orders. We expect that rulemaking will 

be undertaken in the future to incorporate these Orders into regulations. 

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QUESTION 4. Last year I submitted a question to Chairman Macfarlane in regards 

to the status of an application by Aerotest Operations for an indirect 

license transfer to Nuclear Labyrinth. In your written response, you 

indicated that the Commission would request additional information 

from Aerotest. It is my understanding that the additional information 

was submitted by Aerotest last month. Does Commission anticipate 

requesting additional information from Aerotest? 

ANSWER. 

a. What is the Commission's anticipated timeline to make a final 

decision on the application? 

On January 10, 2013, Aerotest Operations and Nuclear Labyrinth submitted responses to the 

requests for additional information. The NRC staff is reviewing these responses and, at this 

time, does not anticipate requesting more information. 

a. The NRC staff is performing a review of the indirect license transfer application and all 

responses to the requests for additional information to determine if the transfer 

application meets the requirements of the regulations. Consistent with the established 

schedule of a six to eight month review time following the receipt of all required 

information, the NRC staff plans to make a final decision by the end of June 2013. 

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QUESTION 1. 

ANSWER. 

Questions from Representative Lois Capps 

My constituents are concerned by the lack of progress on 

implementing a long-term storage solution for the spent fuel at 

Diablo Canyon. Chairman Macfarlane, what assurances can you 

provide my constituents that the NRC is committed to implementing 

a long-term solution for fuel storage? 

a. If no long-term site can be identified, I'm concerned that San Luis 

Obispo and other communities will become de facto long-term 

storage sites. Has the NRC developed a plan for long-term 

storage of spent fuel at Diablo Canyon and other nuclear reactor 

sites? 

b. If you are developing such a plan, will it strengthen current 

standards to ensure long term safety? 

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is the lead agency for implementing any changes to the 

national policy on nuclear waste management. The DOE released its Strategy for the 

Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, which 

provides the Administration's framework for implementing a long-term solution for fuel storage 

and disposal. The NRC is prepared to fulfill its regulatory role in assuring the continued safe 

management of spent nuclear fuel. Spent nuclear fuel is currently managed safely and securely 

under NRC oversight in both wet and dry storage at Diablo Canyon and other nuclear reactor 

sites. As the national policy evolves, the NRC's mission remains the same - to ensure the safe 

and secure use of radioactive materials while protecting people and the environment. 

27 
103 


80376.049

QUESTION 2. 

ANSWER. 

Dr. Jeanne Harderbeck, a U.S. Geological Survey seismologist, 

recently published a peer-reviewed article in the Bulletin of the 

Seismology Society of America that raises numerous questions 

about the safety of the Shoreline Fault. Did the NRC consider Dr. 

Harderbeck's scientific findings in its analysis for "RIL 12-01 

Confirmatory Analysis of Seismic hazard at the Diablo Canyon 

Power Plant from the Shoreline Fault Zone" (ML 121230035)? 

a. If not, why not? And, if so, how did Dr. Harderbeck's findings 

affect the NRC's analysis 

The NRC's Research Information letter (Rill was made public in September 2012. This 

document used a deterministic approach to confirm that the seismic hazard (response 

spectrum) from the Shoreline Fault was still enveloped by the Hosgri Spectrum represented by 

the ground motion response spectrum previously used to evaluate Diablo Canyon's safety 

related structures, systems and components. Dr. Harderbeck's paper was published in February 

2013. She used a specific algorithm (Optimal Anisotropic Dynamic Clustering) to infer and 

refine the geometry of the Shoreline Fault. Based on the study, she proposed that the two faults, 

Hosgri and Shoreline faults, may intersect each other at certain depth. She also estimated that 

the hypothetical earthquake associated with the Shoreline fault would be in the range of 6.4 to 

6.8. 

Although the Rll incorporated more or less the same Shoreline Fault model in terms of 

magnitude and geometry to estimate the seismic hazard at the Diablo Canyon site, it did not 

and could not consider some of Dr. Harderbeck's more recent views expressed in her paper 

published in the Bulletin of the Seismological SOCiety of America because the Rll pre-dates the 

28 
104 


80376.050

paper. However. per NRC's Post-Fukushima seismic information letter request to all licensees, 

the Diablo Canyon licensee is currently reevaluating the seismic hazard at the site using the 

latest seismic source, ground motion prediction equations, and site response (all three seismic 

hazard components), based on the latest NRC regulatory requirements. The NRC staff believes 

that the views expressed in Dr. Harderbeck's paper will be fully considered by the experts 

involved in the seismic hazard reevaluation process. 

29 
105 


80376.051

Questions from Representative Doris O. Matsui 

As you know, there are nine commercial shut down nuclear power plant sites in the U. S., 

including Rancho Seco owned by my hometown utility, the Sacramento Municipal Utility 

District. Although the spent fuel is monitored and well-guarded, and is not an immediate 

safety or security concern, the presence of spent fuel at these sites is costly and 

prevents the use of the site for economically productive uses that would benefit the 

community. 

Because SMUD and the utilities that own the other shut down reactors are not able to 

move the spent fuel to a permanent storage site, I am supportive of the federal 

government moving it to interim storage facilities. We need interim storage with or 

without a permanent faCility. 

QUESTION 1. 

ANSWER. 

Can you outline for me what challenges the Commission faces in 

moving spent fuel to interim storage? 

The NRC has the regulatory infrastructure in place to license dry interim storage facilities and 

has licensed such a facility. The Department of Energy is the lead agency for implementing any 

changes to the national policy on nuclear waste management, which includes moving fuel to dry 

interim storage. This topic is addressed in the Strategy for the Management and Disposal of 

Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste (January 2013), which provides the 

Administration's framework for implementing a long-term solution for fuel storage and disposal. 

As the national policy evolves, the NRC's mission remains the same - to ensure the safe and 

secure use of radioactive materials while protecting people and the environment. 

30 
106 


80376.052

QUESTION 2. 

ANSWER. 

Do you believe that independent progress can be made on 

developing interim storage facilities even though we cannot 

currently reach a consensus on a permanent repository? 

The Department of Energy is the lead agency for implementing any changes to the national 

policy on nuclear waste management, which includes moving fuel to dry interim storage. This 

topic is addressed in Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and 

High-Level Radioactive Waste (January 2013), which provides the Administration's framework 

for implementing a long-term solution for fuel storage and disposal. The NRC is not responsible 

for implementing the national policy on nuclear waste management including development of 

interim storage facilities. Rather, the NRC's responsibility is independent licensing, regulation, 

and oversight of interim storage facilities. NRC is not responsible for site selection, but will 

consider the suitability of a site as part of the licensing process. The NRC has in place the 

appropriate regulatory framework to license and regulate future interim dry storage facilities. 

31 
107 


80376.053

I believe it makes sense to move spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned sites first and 

I hope we can start seeing progress made in this area. As we all know, the U. S. Court of 

Appeals for the D. C. Circuit is currently considering whether or not to order the NRC to 

resume consideration of the Yucca Mountain license application. 

QUESTION 3. 

ANSWER. 

Can you tell me what challenges the NRC or DOE would face if the 

federal court orders work to resume on Yucca? In particular do you 

see impediments to reacquiring the permits, or finding the 

personnel and knowledge base to resume where work was left off? 

If the federal court directs NRC to resume work on the Yucca Mountain license application, the 

agency will comply, to the extent that funds are currently available. The NRC's principal 

challenge would be to reconstitute its review team with individuals from within and outside the 

Agency who possess the critical skills and knowledge base. 

32 
108 


80376.054

The Honorable Ed Whitfield 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy 

and Power 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

United States House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

The Honorable John Shimkus 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment 

and the Economy 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

United States House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

April 19, 2013 

Dear Chairman Whitfield and Chairman Shimkus: 

I appeared before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power and the Subcommittee on 

Environment and the Economy of the Committee on Energy and Commerce on February 28, 

2013, at an oversight hearing entitled, "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Policy and 

Governance Challenges," along with my colleagues on the Commission. In response to your 

letter of March 22, 2013, enclosed please find my responses to questions for the record, 

directed to me, from that hearing. 

If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me. 

Enclosure: As stated 

cc: The Honorable Bobby L. Rush 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Energy and Power 

The Honorable Paul Tonko 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Environment 

and the Economy 

Sincerely, 

IRA! 

Kristine L. Svinicki 
109 


80376.055

Member Requests for the Record from Representative Jerrv McNerney 

QUESTION 1 

ANSWER: 

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) - how long might it take for a 

competent power producer to get a license for a SMR? 

For planning purposes, the NRC assumes that it would take a minimum of 30 months after an 

application is accepted for docketing for the agency to reach a licensing decision. The ability to 

meet this timeline would be dependent on many factors, including: the licensing process 

chosen by the applicant (10 CFR Part 50 or Part 52); whether the applicant is referencing a 

deSign previously certified by the NRC; the completeness and quality of the license application; 

and the applicant's responsiveness to NRC requests for additional information. Other factors 

that could lengthen the time it takes to complete the review of an application, which are 

separate from the application itself, include the NRC's ability to staff and resource its review, 

and the degree to which the application presents novel aspects that have not been previously 

considered by the NRC. This last point, in particular, could have the largest impact on the 

review schedule of an application incorporating a first-of-a-kind plant design. 

Page 1 of 11 
110 


80376.056

QUESTION 2 

ANSWER: 

Are there any foundries in the United States capable of producing the 

containment vessels for these reactors? 

Based on information provided by the NRC staff, it is my understanding that Lehigh Heavy 

Forge Corporation, in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, is capable of producing the vessel for an SMR. 

If there are other fabricators with this capability, they have not yet been identified to the NRC 

staff. 

Page 20f11 
111 


80376.057

QUESTION 1 

ANSWER: 

Questions from Representative Ed Whitfield 

In our hearing last July, Commissioner Magwood referred to the 

post-Fukushima actions the Commission approved on March 9, 

2012, and stated: "We still have much work to do but the steps taken 

thus far represent a very significant increase in safety based on the 

Fukushima experience." 

a) Has any effort been made to account for the increase in safety 

inherent in those actions? 

b) Shouldn't this new, higher level of safety provide the threshold 

against which the benefits of any future actions should be 

analyzed? 

a) Yes, the NRC accounts for actions already taken, such as the three March 2012 actions 

as well as those planned, in evaluating regulatory decisions regarding post-Fukushima 

actions. 

b) The Commission will consider the safety benefit of any future post-Fukushima actions, 

including any cost/benefit and backfit analyses required by NRC regulations. 

Additionally, actions planned or taken will be accounted for in future decisions. 

Page 30f11 
112 


80376.058

QUESTION 2 

ANSWER: 

I understand that there are several domestic companies developing 

small modular reactors (sMRs) that have engaged NRC staff about 

design certification activities. Which designs have been endorsed 

by potential license applicants who have written to the NRC 

indicating their intent to build such a design? 

a) Does the NRC currently have adequate staff and resources to 

address its small reactor licensing work? 

b) If the NRC is faced with limited resources for licensing activities, 

how will the NRC prioritize its licensing efforts with regard to 

small reactors? 

c) Please provide the status of the NRC's progress on aligning the 

existing regulatory framework developed primarily for large light 

water reactors with that needed for sMR technologies including 

any issues that might require rulemaking. 

The NRC annually publishes a Regulatory Information Summary to request information from 

industry about plans to submit design certification applications and license applications. 

Industry responses to the NRC's December 2012 request indicate that four domestic companies 

plan to submit deSign certification applications to the NRC for small modular light water reactor 

deSigns. Those companies are B&W mPowerTM, NuScale, Westinghouse, and Holtec. Two 

utilities responded, expressing their intent to submit license applications. They are the 

Tennessee Valley Authority referencing the mPowerTM design to be constructed at the Clinch 

River site in Tennessee, and Ameren referencing the Westinghouse design to be constructed at 

the Callaway site in Missouri. There are also some companies, both foreign and domestic, that 

have informed the NRC of plans to submit design certification applications and various license 

applications for non-light water designs. These include Toshiba for their liquid sodium-cooled 

reactor, the 4S, and STL, a South African company, for their pebble bed high-temperature gascooled reactor. Finally, the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Alliance, a consortium of domestic 

and foreign companies, has informed us of its plans to submit a construction permit application 

for a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor based on the Areva design. 

a) The NRC's FY 2013 budget and FY2014 budget requests were predicated on 

conducting reviews of two small modular reactor designs that use light water reactor 

technology. However, neither the current budget nor the FY2014 budget request would 

support all of the work that has been identified. In addition to NRC staff resources, the 

agency had planned to rely on contractor support for parts of the reviews. However, 

impacts from budget sequestration, which result in reductions to contractor support, will 

challenge the ability of the NRC to move forward on these projects. 

Page 4 of 11 
113 


80376.059

b) The NRC's budget for new reactor licensing activities accommodates licensing and 

design certification for both large reactor and small modular reactor designs. The NRC 

prioritizes the full range of new reactor work (large and small designs) to the extent 

budgeted resources are available. Within this larger context, NRC will prioritize the 

small modular reactor review work to first support the projects selected by the 

Department of Energy (DOE) through its SMR licensing Technical Support Program. 

c) The NRC's existing regulatory framework is appropriate for reviewing the small modular 

light water reactor designs and license applications. Through pre-application activities, 

principally with mPowerTM and NuScale, design-specific review guidance is being 

developed by the NRC to facilitate review of these designs and their unique features. 

These design-specific review standards are supplemented by NRC's continuing effort to 

maintain and update its Standard Review Plan. 

Based on responses received to the December 2012 Regulatory Information Summary 

that indicate that some entities plan to submit design certification applications for nonlight water reactor technologies, the NRC has identified approaches that could be 

implemented to support the review of these "advanced non-light water reactor" designs. 

Last year, in response to a request from Congress, the NRC staff prepared a document 

entitled "Report to Congress: Advanced Reactor licensing," which details the NRC's 

efforts and plans regarding advanced reactors. The Commission transmitted this report 

to the Congress on August 22, 2012. 

Page 50f11 
114 


80376.060

QUESTION 1 

ANSWER: 

Questions from Representative John Shimkus 

I understand the NRC is analyzing the safety of using dry cask 

storage for extended periods of time. What is the time frame 

currently being analyzed? 

a) Is the NRC considering a requirement that Independent Spent 

Fuel Storage Installations maintain or reinstate the capability to 

repackage dry cask storage canisters? 

The NRC is examining the technical needs and potential changes to the regulatory framework 

that may be needed to continue licensing of spent nuclear fuel storage beyond the initial and 

first renewal licenSing periods. In May 2012, the NRC issued for public comment a report on 

identifying and prioritizing the technical information needs affecting potential regulation of 

extended storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel. This report noted that, for this 

evaluation, the NRC has considered performance of the storage systems over an initial 300 

year period following removal of the spent nuclear fuel from the reactor. The NRC staff 

selected the long period for analytical purposes in order to capture potential effects of relatively 

slow-acting degradation processes. 

The NRC is not currently considering a requirement that Independent Spent Fuel Storage 

Installations maintain or reinstate the capability to repackage dry cask storage canisters. 

Page 6 of 11 
115 


80376.061

QUESTION 2 

ANSWER: 

In Finding #2 of the Commission's 2010 waste confidence 

determination, the NRC found that a repository would be available 

"when necessary". The court vacated the NRC's determination, and 

now the Commission is forced to initiate a new waste confidence 

proceeding. 

a) Since the scope of the NRC waste confidence proceeding seems 

focused on environmental impact issues, how will you gather 

evidence to support Finding 2, which addresses repository 

availability, not environmental impact? 

b) Will DOE provide evidence for the record on its plans for a 

repository? 

c) Without evidence from DOE, what sort of evidence do you think 

would support a repository availability finding? 

d) In vacating the NRC's Waste Confidence rule, the court directed 

the NRC to examine the environmental impact if a repository is 

never available and the period of storage on site is indefinite. 

Isn't the Finding #2 determination of repository availability a 

necessary element of determining the time period to be 

examined by the environmental impact statement? 

e) To what extent will the Commission consider the "No Action" 

alternative documented in the Yucca Mountain Environmental 

Impact Statement? 

a) Consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act, the NRC will make reasonable 

assumptions regarding the availability of a repository. The NRC's reasonable 

assumptions will include an assessment of repository availability within 60 years beyond 

the licensed life for operation of the reactor, within 160 years beyond the licensed life for 

operation of the reactor, and indefinite storage (i.e., a repository is never available). The 

information that the NRC is considering in the generic environmental impact statement 

includes, for example, international and domestic experience in siting a geologic 

repository, the January 2013 DOE report, "Strategy for the Management and Disposal of 

Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," and the 2012 report of the Blue 

Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. 

b) In January 2013, DOE published its "Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," which will be used as part of the 

analysis in the generic environmental impact statement that will support the updated 

Waste Confidence Rule. The DOE Strategy Report states that it is the Administration's 

Page 7 of11 
116 


80376.062

goal to have a repository sited by 2026, licensed by 2042, and constructed and open by 

2048. The NRC also plans to consider other publicly available information. 

c) The generic environmental impact statement will make a number of reasonable 

assumptions regarding repository availability. In addition to the DOE report "Strategy for 

the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste" 

(January 2013), the NRC will rely on a variety of information and analyses to support any 

conclusion on repository availability. This information includes international and 

domestic experience in siting a geologic repository and the 2012 report of the Blue 

Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. 

d) The Finding #2 determination of repository availability is not a necessary element of 

determining the time period to be examined by the environmental impact statement. The 

NRC is planning to analyze three scenarios in the environmental impact statement. 

These scenarios are the short-term period of continued storage (a repository available 

after 60 years), a long-term period of continued storage (repository available after 160 

years), and indefinite storage (a repository is never available). The environmental 

impact statement will determine the impacts of continued storage for each of the 

scenarios. 

e) The Commission, in its staff requirements memorandum of September 6,2012, directed 

the NRC staff to adopt or incorporate by reference, as appropriate, all or part of other 

agencies' EISs. A specific example given by the Commission was the Yucca Mountain 

Environmental Impact Statement "no-action" alternative. 

Page 8 of 11 
117 


80376.063

Questions from Representative Doris O. Matsui 

QUESTION 1 

As you know, there are nine commercial shut down nuclear power plant sites in the U.S., 

including Rancho Seco owned by my hometown utility, the Sacramento Municipal Utility 

District. Although the spent fuel is monitored and well-guarded, and is not an immediate 

safety or security concern, the presence of spent fuel at these sites is costly and 

prevents the use of the site for economically productive uses that would benefit the 

community. 

Because SMUD and the utilities that own the other shut down reactors are not able to 

move the spent fuel to a permanent storage site, I am supportive of the federal 

government moving it to interim storage facilities. We need interim storage with or 

without a permanent facility. 

Can you outline for me what challenges the Commission faces in moving spent fuel to 

interim storage? 

ANSWER: 

The NRC has the regulatory infrastructure in place to license dry interim storage facilities and 

has licensed such a facility. The Department of Energy is the lead agency for implementing any 

changes to the national policy on nuclear waste management, which includes moving fuel to dry 

interim storage. This topic is addressed in the DOE report "Strategy for the Management and 

Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste" (January 2013), which 

provides the Administration's framework for implementing a long-term solution for fuel storage 

and disposal. As the national policy evolves, the NRC's mission remains the same - to ensure 

the safe and secure use of radioactive materials while protecting people and the environment. 

Page 9 of 11 
118 


80376.064

QUESTION 2 

ANSWER: 

Do you believe that independent progress can be made on 

developing interim storage facilities even though we cannot 

currently reach a consensus on a permanent repository? 

The Department of Energy is the lead agency for implementing any changes to the national 

policy on nuclear waste management, which includes moving fuel to dry interim storage. This 

topic is addressed in the DOE report "Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste" (January 2013), which provides the 

Administration's framework for implementing a long-term solution for fuel storage and disposal. 

The NRC is not responsible for implementing the national policy on nuclear waste management, 

including development of interim storage facilities. NRC's responsibility is independent 

licensing, regulation, and oversight of interim storage facilities. NRC is not responsible for site 

selection, but will consider the suitability of a site as part of the licensing process. The NRC has 

in place the appropriate regulatory framework to license and regulate future interim dry storage 

facilities. 

Page 10 of 11 
119 


80376.065

QUESTION 3. 

I believe it makes sense to move spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned sites first and 

I hope we can start seeing progress made in this area. As we all know, the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is currently considering whether or not to order the NRC to 

resume consideration of the Yucca Mountain license application. 

Can you tell me what challenges the NRC or DOE would face if the federal court orders 

work to resume on Yucca? In particular do you see impediments to reacquiring the 

permits, or finding the personnel and knowledge base to resume where work was left 

off? 

ANSWER. 

If the federal court directs NRC to resume work on the Yucca Mountain license application, the 

agency will comply. to the extent that funds are currently available. The NRC's principal 

challenge would be to reconstitute its review team with individuals from within and outside the 

Agency who possess the critical skills and knowledge base. 

Page 11 of 11 
120 


80376.066

The Honorable Ed Whitfield 

Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Energy and Power 

Congress of the United State 

2125 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515-6115 

The Honorable John Shimkus 

Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Environment and the Economy 

Congress of the United State 

2125 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515-6115 

April 19, 2013 

Dear Chairman Whitfield and Chairman Shimkus: 

Regarding the questions addressed to me in your letter of March 22, 2013, my response 

is attached. 

Sincerely, 

c:-~ George Apostolakis 

cc: The Honorable Bobby L. Rush, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Power 

The Honorable Paul Tonko, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Environment and Economy 
121 


80376.067

QUESTION 1. 

ANSWER 

Questions from Representative Ed Whitfield 

In our hearing last July, Commissioner Magwood referred to the 

post-Fukushima actions the Commission approved on March 9, 

2012, and stated: "We still have much work to do but the steps taken 

thus far represent a very significant increase in safety based on the 

Fukushima experience." 

a) Has any effort been made to account for the increase in safety 

inherent in those actions? 

b) Shouldn't this new, higher level of safety provide the threshold 

against which the benefits of any future actions should be 

analyzed? 

a) The Commission approved two actions taken in March of 2012 on the basis of ensuring 

adequate protection of the health and safety of the public, and one action as a significant 

enhancement to the protection of public health and safety. Site-specific studies would be 

needed to quantify the increase in safety for each individual reactor, but the Commission 

qualitatively considered the significant safety benefit that would be gained from these 

actions if an extreme external event were to cause challenges at a reactor in the United 

States similar to that at Fukushima. 

b) The Commission will continue to consider the safety benefit for any future postFukushima actions. Included in these considerations would be any cost/benefit analyses 

required by NRC regulations or Commission direction. I intend to consider previously 

required safety enhancements, as appropriate. 

QUESTION 2. I understand that there are several domestic companies developing 

small modular reactors (SMRs) that have engaged NRC staff about 

design certification activities. Which designs have been endorsed 

by potential license applicants who have written to the NRC 

indicating their intentto build such a design? 

a) Does the NRC currently have adequate staff resources to 

address its small reactor licensing work? 

b) Ifthe NRC is faced with limited resources for licensing activities, 

how will the NRC prioritize its licensing efforts with regard to 

small reactors? 

cl Please provide the status ofthe NRC's progress on aligning the 

exiting regulatory framework developed primarily for large light 

water reactors with that needed for SMR technologies including 

any issues that might require rulemaking. 
122 


80376.068

ANSWER. 

The NRC annually publishes a Regulatory Information Summary to request information from 

industry about plans to submit design certification applications and license applications. 

Industry responses to NRC's December 2012 request indicate that four domestic companies 

plan to submit design certification applications to the NRC for small modular light water reactor 

designs. Those companies are B&W mPowerlM, NuScale, Westinghouse. and Holtec. Two 

utilities responded expressing their intent to submit license applications. They are the 

Tennessee Valley Authority referencing the mPowerTM design to be constructed at the Clinch 

River site in Tennessee, and Ameren referencing the Westinghouse design to be constructed at 

the Callaway site in Missouri. There are also some companies, both foreign and domestic, that 

have informed NRC of plans to submit design certification applications and various license 

applications for non-light water designs. These include Toshiba for its liquid sodium cooled 

reactor, the 4S, and STl, a South African company, for its pebble bed high temperature gas 

cooled reactor. Finally, the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Alliance, a consortium of domestic 

and foreign companies, has informed us of its plans to submit a construction permit application 

for a high temperature gas cooled reactor based on the AREVA design. 

a) The NRC's FY 2013 budget and FY2014 budget requests were predicated on 

conducting reviews of two small modular reactor designs that use light water reactor 

technology. However, neither the current budget nor the FY2014 budget request would 

support all of the work that has been identified. In addition to NRC staff resources, the 

agency had planned to rely on contractor support for parts of the reviews. Budget 

sequestration could challenge the ability of the NRC to move forward on these projects. 

b) The NRC's budget for new reactor licensing activities accommodates licensing and 

deSign certification for both large reactor and the small modular reactor designs. NRC 

prioritizes the full range of new reactor work (large and small designs) to the extent 

budgeted resources are available. Within this larger context, NRC will prioritize the 

small modular reactor review work to first support the projects selected by the 

Department of Energy (DOE) through its SMR licensing Technical Support Program. 

c) NRC's existing regulatory framework is appropriate for reviewing the small modular light 

water reactor designs and license applications. Through pre-application activities 

principally with mPowerTM and NuScale, design-specific review guidance is being 

developed by the NRC to facilitate review of these deSigns and their unique features. 

These design-specific review standards are supplemented by NRC's continuing effort to 

maintain and update its Standard Review Plan. 

last year, in response to a request from Congress, the NRC staff prepared a document entitled 

"Report to Congress: Advanced Reactor licensing", which details the NRC's efforts and plans 

regarding advanced reactors. The Commission transmitted this report to Congress on August 

22, 2012. Responses received to the December 2012 Regulatory Information Summary 

indicate that some organizations plan to submit design certification applications for non-light 

water reactor technologies. The NRC has identified approaches that could be implemented to 

support the review of these advanced non-light water reactor designs. 

2 
123 


80376.069

QUESTION 1. 

ANSWER. 

Questions from Representative John Shimkus 

I understand the NRC is analyzing the safety of using dry cask 

storage for extended periods of time. What is the time frame 

currently being analyzed? 

a) Is the NRC considering a requirement that Independent Spent 

Fuel Storage Installations maintain or reinstate the capability to 

repackage dry cask storage canisters? 

The NRC is examining the technical needs and potential changes to the regulatory framework 

that may be needed to continue licensing of spent nuclear fuel storage beyond the initial and 

first renewal licensing periods. In May 2012, the NRC issued for public comment a report on 

identifying and prioritizing the technical information needs affecting potential regulation of 

extended storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel. This report noted that, for this 

evaluation, the NRC has considered performance of the storage systems over an initial 300 

year period following discharge of the spent nuclear fuel from the reactor. The NRC staff 

selected the long analytical period in order to capture potential effects of relatively slow-acting 

degradation processes. 

The NRC is not currently considering a requirement that Independent Spent Fuel Storage 

Installations maintain or reinstate the capability to repackage dry cask storage canisters. 

QUESTION 2. In Finding #2 of the Commission's 2010 waste confidence 

determination, the NRC found that a repository would be available 

"when necessary". The court vacated the NRC's determination, and 

now the Commission is forced to initiate a new waste confidence 

proceeding. 

a) Since the scope of the NRC waste confidence proceeding seems 

focused on environmental impact issues, how will you gather 

evidence to support Finding 2, which addresses repository 

availability, not environmental impact? 

b) Will DOE provide evidence for the record on its plans for a 

repository? 

c) Without evidence from DOE, what sort of evidence do you think 

would support a repository availability finding? 

dl In vacating the NRC's Waste Confidence rule, the court directed 

the NRC to examine the environmental impact if a repository is 

never available and the period of storage on site is indefinite. 

Isn't the Finding #2 determination of repository availability a 

necessary element of determining the time period to be 

examined by the environmental impact statement? 

e) To what extent will the Commission consider the "No Action" 

alternative documented in the Yucca Mountain Environmental 

Impact Statement? 

3 
124 


80376.070

ANSWER 

a) Consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act, the NRC will make reasonable 

assumptions regarding the availability of a repository. The NRC's reasonable 

assumptions will include an assessment of repository availability within 60 years beyond 

the licensed life for operation of the reactor, and within 160 years beyond the licensed 

life for operation of the reactor, and indefinite storage (Le., a repository is never 

available). The information that the NRC is considering in the generic environmental 

impact statement includes intemational and domestic experience in siting a geologic 

repository, the January 2013 DOE report, ·Strategy for the Management and Disposal of 

Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," and the 2012 report of the Blue 

Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. 

b) In January 2013, DOE published its ·Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," which will be used as part of the 

analysis in the generic environmental impact statement that will support the updated 

Waste Confidence Rule. The DOE Strategy Report states that it is the Administration's 

goal to have a repository sited by 2026, licensed by 2042, and constructed and open by 

2048. The NRC also plans to consider other publicly available information. 

c) The generic environmental impact statement will make a number of reasonable 

assumptions regarding repository availability. In addition to the DOE's recently 

published "Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and HighLevel Radioactive Waste" (January 2013), the NRC will rely on a variety of information 

and analyses to support any conclusion on repository availability. This information 

includes international and domestic experience in Siting a geologic repository and the 

2012 report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. 

d) The Finding #2 determination of repository availability is not a necessary element of 

determining the time period to be examined by the environmental impact statement The 

NRC is planning to analyze three scenarios in the environmental impact statement 

These scenarios are the short-term period of continued storage (a repository available 

after 60 years), a long-term period of continued storage (repository available after 160 

years), and indefinite storage (a repository is never available). The environmental 

impact statement will determine the impacts of continued storage for each of the 

scenarios. 

e) As directed by the Commission on September 6,2012, the NRC staff will use available 

information from a number of sources, including the Yucca Mountain Environmental 

Impact Statement The NRC will consider the Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact 

Statement "no-action" alternative in the Waste Confidence generic environmental impact 

statement 

4 
125 


80376.071

QUESTION 1. 

ANSWER. 

Questions from Representative Doris O. Matsui 

Can you outline for me what challenges the Commission faces in 

moving spent fuel to interim storage? 

The Department of Energy is the lead agency for implementing any changes to the national 

policy on nuclear waste management, which includes moving fuel to dry interim storage. This 

topic is addressed in the recently released Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, which provides the Administration's framework 

for implementing a long-term solution for fuel storage and disposal. The NRC has the 

regulatory infrastructure in place to license dry interim storage facilities and has already licensed 

such a facility. As the national policy evolves, the NRC's mission remains the same - to ensure 

the safe and secure use of radioactive materials while protecting people and the environment. 

QUESTION 2. 

ANSWER. 

Do you believe that independent progress can be made on 

developing interim storage facilities even though we cannot 

currently reach a consensus on a permanent repository? 

The Department of Energy is the lead agency for implementing any changes to the national 

policy on nuclear waste management, which includes moving fuel to dry interim storage. This 

topic is addressed in the recently released Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, which provides the Administration's framework 

for implementing a long-term solution for fuel storage and disposal. The NRC is not responsible 

for implementing the national policy on nuclear waste management including development of 

interim storage facilities. NRC's responsibility is licensing, regulation, and oversight of interim 

storage facilities. NRC is not responsible for site selection, but will consider the suitability of the 

site as part of the licensing process. The NRC has in place the appropriate regulatory 

framework to license and regulate future interim dry storage facilities. 

QUESTION 3. 

ANSWER. 

Can you tell me what challenges the NRC or DOE would face if the 

federal court orders work to resume on Yucca? In particular do you 

see impediments to reacquiring the permits, or finding the 

personnel and knowledge base to resume where work was left off? 

If the federal court directs NRC to resume work on the Yucca Mountain license application, the 

agency will comply, to the extent that funds are currently available. The NRC's principal 

challenge would be to reconstitute its review team with individuals from within and outside the 

Agency who possess the critical skills and knowledge base. 

5 
126 


80376.072

UNITED STATES 

~'!)Ci..!:AR ::?EGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHiNGTON. D.C~ 20555 

CCMMISS!CNEfl 

The Honorable Ed Whitfield 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy 

and Power 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

United States House of Representatives 

Washington, D,C. 20515 

The Honorable John Shimkus 

April 19, 2013 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment 

and the Economy 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

United States House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Chairman Whitfield and Chairman Shimkus: 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power and the 

Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy at the February 28.2013 hearing entitled 

"Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Policy and Governance Challenges." By letter dated March 

22, 2013, you provided additional questions for the record related to this hearing: my responses 

to these questions are enclosed. In developing these responses I have worked closely with my 

colleagues and expect that my responses will be oonsistent with those provided by Chairman 

Macfarlane and other members of the Commission. 

Please do not hesitate to contact me should you or the members of your subcommittees have 

any additional questions. 

Sincerely. 

William D. Magwood, IV 

cc: The Han. Bobby L Rush. Ranking Member. Subcommittee on Energy and Power 

The Hon. Paul Tonko. Ranking Member. Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy 

Enclosure 
127 


80376.073

QUESTION 1 

ANSWER 

Questions from Representative Ed Whitfield 

In our hearing last July, Commissioner Magwood referred to the 

post-Fukushima actions the Commission approved on March 9, 

2012, and stated: "We still have much work to do but the steps 

taken thus far represent a very significant increase in safety based 

on the Fukushima experience." 

a) Has any effort been made to account for the increase in 

safety inherent in those actions? 

b) Shouldn't this new, higher level of safety provide the 

threshold against which the benefits of any future actions 

should be analyzed? 

a) The Commissio:1 approved actions taken in March of 2012 on the basis, in part. of 

ensuring adequate protection of the health and safety of the public, Site-specific studies would 

be needed to evaluate the increase in safety for each individual reactor. but the Commission 

qualitatively considered the significant safety benefit that would be gained from these actions if 

an extreme external event were to cause challenges at a reactor in the United States similar to 

that at Fukushima, There is much benefit to planning for unexpected events, As the accident at 

Fukushima taught us, you cannot prevent or predict every natural disaster or every accident 

But we can better prepare for how we will recover from unexpected events. 

b) The Commission will consider the safety benefit for any future post-Fukushima actions, 

Included in these considerations would be any necessary cost/benefit analyses. 
128 


80376.074

QUESTION 2 

ANSWER 

I understand that there are several domestic companies developing 

sma!! modular reactors (SMRs) that have engaged NRC staff about 

design certification activities. Which designs have been endorsed 

by potential license applicants who have written to the NRC 

indicating their intent to build such a deSign? 

a} Does the NRC currently have adequate staff resources to 

address its small reactor licensing work? 

b) If the NRC is faced with limited resources for licensing 

activities, how will the NRC prioritize its licensing efforts with 

regard to small reactors? 

c} Please provide the status of the NRC's progress on aligning 

the exiting regulatory framework developed primarily for 

large light water reactors with that needed for SMR 

technologies including any issues that might require 

rulemaking. 

NRC annually publishes a Regulatory Information Summary to request information from industry 

about plans to submit design certification applications and license applications. Industry 

responses to NRC's December 2012 request indicate that four domestic companies plan to 

submit design certification applications to the NRC for small modular light water reactor designs. 

Those companies are B&W mPowe,TM NuScale, Westinghouse, and Holtec. Two utilities 

responded expressing their intent to submit license applications. They are the Tennessee 

Valley AuthOrity referencing the mPower,M design to be constructed at the Clinch River site in 

Tennessee, and Ameren referencing the Westinghouse design to be constructed at the 

2 
129 


80376.075

Callaway site in Missouri. There are also some companies, both foreign and domestic, that 

have informed NRC of plans to submit design certification applications and various license 

applications for non-light water designs. These include Toshiba for their liquid sodium cooled 

reactor. the 4S, and STL, a South African company, for their pebble bed high temperature gas 

cooled reactor. Finally, the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Alliance, a consortium of domestic 

and foreign companies, have inform·"d us of their plans to submit a construction permit 

application for a high temperature gas cooled reactor based on the Areva design. 

a) The NRC's FY2013 budget and FY2014 budget requests were predicated on conducting 

reviews of two small mcdular reaclo' designs that use light water reactor technology. However, 

neither the current budget nor the FY2014 budge! request would support all of the work that has 

been identified. In addition to NRC staff resources, the agency had planned to rely on 

contractor support for parts of the reviews. However, impacts from budget sequestration. which 

resulted in reductions to contractor support, will challenge the ability of the NRC to move 

forward on these projects. 

b) The NRC's budget for new reactor licensing activities accommodates licensing and 

design certificaticn for both large reactor and the small modular reactor designs. NRC 

prioritizes the full range of new reactor work (large and small designs) to the extent budgeted 

resources are available. Within this larger context, NRC will prioritize the small modular reactor 

review work to first support the projects selected by the Department of Energy (DOE) through its 

SMR Licensing Technical Support Program. 

cj NRC's existing regulatory framework is appropriate for reviewing the small modular light 

water reactor designs and license applications. Through pre-application acttvities principally 

with mPower 1M and NuScaie, design-specific review guidance is being developed by the NRC 

to facilitate review of these designs and their unique features. These design-specific review 

3 
130 


80376.076

standards are supplemented by NRC's continuing effort to maintain and update its Standard 

Review Plan. 

Based on responses received to the December 2012 Regulatory Infomnation Summary that 

indicate that some entities plan to sLbmit design certification applications for non-I;ght water 

reactor technologies, the NRC has identified approaches that could be implemented to support 

the review of these ;'advanced non-light water reactor" designs, Last year, in response to a 

request from Congress, the NRC staff prepared a document entitled "Report to Congress: 

Advanced Reactor Licensing", which details the NRC's efforts and plans regarding advanced 

reactors. The Commission transmitted this report to Congress on August 22.2012. 

4 
131 


80376.077

QUESTION 1 

ANSWER 

Questions from Representative John Shimkus 

I understand the NRC is analyzing the safety of using dry cask 

storage for extended periods of time. What is the time frame 

currently being analyzed? 

al Is the NRC considering a requirement that Independent Spent 

Fuel Storage Installations maintain or reinstate the capability 

to repackage dry cask storage canisters? 

The NRC is examining the technical needs and potential changes to the regulatory framework 

that may be needed to continue licensing of spent nuclear fuel storage beyond the initial and 

first renewal licensing periods, In May 2012, the NRC issued for public comment a report 

identifying and prioritizing the technical information needs affecting potential regulation of 

extended storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel, This report noled that, for this 

evaluation, the NRC has considered performance of the storage systems over an initial 300 

year period foHowing re'Tloval of the spent nuclear fuel from the reactor The NRC staff selected 

the long period for analytical purposes in order to capture potential effects of relatlvely 

slow-acting degradatior processes, 

a) The NRC is not currently considering a requirement that Independent Spent Fuel 

Storage Installations maintain or reinstate the capability to repackage dry cask storage 

canisters. 

QUESTION 2 in Finding #2 of the Commission's 2010 waste confidence 

determination, the NRC found that a repository would be available 

5 
132 


80376.078

"when necessary", The court vacated the NRC's determination, and 

now the Commission is forced to initiate a new waste confidence 

proceeding. 

a) Since the scope of the NRC waste confidence proceeding 

seems focused on environmental impact issues, how will you 

gather evidence to support Finding 2, which addresses 

repository availability, not environmental impact? 

h) Will DOE provide evidence for the record on its plans for a 

repository? 

c) Without evidence from DOE, what sort of evidence do you 

think would support a repository availability finding? 

d) In vacating the NRC's Waste Confidence rule, the court 

directed the NRC to examine the environmental impact if a 

repository is never available and the period of storage on site 

is indefinite. Isn't the Finding #2 determination of repository 

availability a necessary element of determining the time 

period to be examined by the environmental impact 

statement? 

el To what extent will the Commission consider the "No Action" 

alternative documented in the Yucca Mountain Environmental 

Impact Statement? 

6 
133 


80376.079

ANSWER 

a) Consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act, the NRC will make ,easonable 

assumptions regarding the availability of a repository. The NRC's reasonable assumptions will 

include an assessment of repository availability within 60 years beyond the licensed life for 

operation of the reactor. and within 160 years beyond the licensed life for operation of the 

reactor, and indefinite storage (i.e., a repository is never available). The information that the 

NRC is considering in tre generic environmental impact statement includes international and 

domestic experience in siting a geologic repository, the January 2013 DOE report, "Strategy for 

the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," and 

the 2012 report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. 

b) In January 2013. DOE published its "Strategy forthe Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," which will be used as part of the analysis in 

the generic environmemal impact statement that will support the updated Waste Confidence 

Rule. The DOE Strategy Report states that it is the Administration's goal to have a repository 

sited by 2026, licensed by 2042 and constructed and open by 2048. The NRC also plans to 

consider other publicly available information. 

c) The generic environmental impact statement will make a number of reasonable 

assumptions regarding repOSitory availability. In addition to the DOE's recently published 

"Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive 

Waste" (January 2013). the NRC will rely on a variety of information and analyses to support 

any conclusion on repository availability. This information includes international and domestic 

experience in Siting a geologic repository and the 2012 report of the Blue Ribbon Commission 

on America's Nuclear Future. 

7 
134 


80376.080

d) The Finding #2 determination of repository availability is not a necessary element of 

determining the time period to be examined by the environmental impact statement. The NRC 

is planning to analyze three scenarios in the environmental impact statement These scenarios 

are the short-term period of continued storage (a repOSitory available after 60 years). a 

long-term period of continued storage (repository available after 160 years) and indefinite 

storage (a repository is 'fever available). The environmental impact statement will determine 

the impacts of continued storage for each of the scenarios. 

e} As directed by the Commission on September 6,2012, the NRC staff will use available 

information from a number of sources, including the Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact 

Statement. The NRC will consider the Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement 

"no-action" alternative in the Waste Confidence generic environmental impact statement 

8 
135 


80376.081

Questions from Representative Doris O. Matsui 

QUESTION 1 Can you outline for me what chalienges the Commission faces in 

moving spent fuel to interim storage? 

ANSWER 

The Department of Energy is the lead agency for implementing any changes to the national 

policy on nuclear waste management, which includes moving fuel to dry interim storage. This 

topic is addressed in the recently released Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, which provides the Administration's framework 

for implementing a long-term solution for fuel storage and disposal. The NRC has the 

regulatory infrastructure in place to license dry interim storage facilities and has licensed such a 

facility. As the national policy evolves, the NRC's mission remains the same - to ensure the 

safe and secure use of radioactive materials while protecting people and the environment. 

QUESTION 2 Do you believe that independent progress can be made on 

developing interim storage facilities even though we cannot 

currently reach a consensus on a permanent repository? 

ANSWER 

The Department of Energy is the lead agency for implementing any changes to the national 

policy on nuclear waste management, which includes moving fuel to dry interim storage. This 

topic is addressed in the recently released Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste. which provides the Administration's framework 

for implementing a long-term solution for fuel storage and disposal. The NRC is not responsible 

for implementing the national policy on nuclear waste management including development of 

interim storage facilities. NRC's responsibility is independenllicensing, regulation. and 

9 
136 


80376.082

oversight of interim storage facilities. NRC is not responsible for site selection, but will consider 

the suitability of the site as part of the licensing process. The NRC has in place the appropriate 

regulatory framework to license and regulate future interim dry storage facilities. 

QUESTION 3 

ANSWER 

Can you tell me what challenges the NRC or DOE would face if the 

federal court orders work to resume on Yucca? In particular do you 

see impediments to reacquiring the permits, or finding the 

personnel and knowledge base to resume where work was left off? 

If the federal court directs NRC to resume work on the Yucca Mountain license application, the 

agency will comply, to the extent that funds are currently available. The NRC's principal 

challenge would be to reconstitute its review team with individuals from within and outside the 

Agency who possess the critical skllls and knowledge base. 

10 
137 


80376.083

April 19, 2013 

The Honorable John Shimkus 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

United States House of Representatives 

2125 Raybum House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515-6115 

Dear Chairman Shimkus: 

I appeared before the Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy on February 28, 

2013, along with my colleagues on the Commission. On March 22. 2013. you forwarded 

questions for the hearing record. The responses to those questions are enclosed. My fellow 

colleagues on the Commission and I worked closely together to respond to the Subcommittees' 

questions. I expect that my responses will be generally consistent with those provided by 

Chairman Macfarlane and my other Commission colleagues. 

If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me. 

Sincerely. 

William C. Ostendorf( 

Enclosures: 

As stated 

cc: The Honorable Paul Tonko 
138 


80376.084

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28,2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable Ed Whitfield 

1. In our hearing last July, Commissioner Magwood referred to the post-Fukushima 

actions the Commission approved on March 9, 2012, and stated: "We still have much 

work to do but the steps taken thus far represent a very significant increase in safety 

based on the Fukushima experience." 

a. Has any effort been made to account for the increase in safety inherent in those 

actions? 

b. Shouldn't this new, higher level of safety provide the threshold against which the 

benefits of any future actions should be analyzed? 

a. Yes, the NRC accounts for actions already taken, such as the three March 2012 actions 

as well as those planned, in evaluating regulatory decisions regarding post-Fukushima 

actions. 

b. Several processes are in place for the rigorous review of possible changes to NRC 

regulatory requirements. Following the Fukushima accident, the Commission 

established a senior management steering committee to consider possible postFukushima regulatory actions the agency may undertake. In addition, the NRC 

operates in accordance with its own "backfit rule," which applies whenever the NRC 

considers adopting possible regulatory changes. These backfit rule assessments 

consider the safety benefits of existing plant features and those required by previous 

regulatory actions (e.g., the Orders issued in March 2012). 

As the agency continues to evaluate Tier 2 and Tier 3 recommendations, actions 

planned or already taken will be considered. For example, the Commission is currently 

considering a March 27, 2013, staff proposal to change the implementation plans for 

Tier 2 emergency preparedness recommendations because their intent is adequately 

addressed through the implementation ofthe March 2012 Orders on mitigating 

strategies. In addition, the Commission recently directed the staff to begin rulemaking 

efforts for the inclusion of filtering strategies for boiling water reactors with Mark I and 

Mark II containments. In that decision, the Commission approved issuing orders that 

require licensees to install severe accident capable hardened vents. Therefore, as part 

of the rulemaking effort, the staff will assume the installation and safety benefit of those 

severe accidents capable hardened venting systems. 

Enclosure 

Page 1 of 9 
139 


80376.085

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28, 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable Ed Whitfield 

2. I understand that there are several domestic companies developing small modular 

reactors (SMRs) that have engaged NRC staff about design certification activities. Which 

designs have been endorsed by potential license applicants who have written to the NRC 

indicating their intent to build such a design? 

a. Does the NRC currently have adequate staff resources to address its small reactor 

licensing work? 

b. If the NRC is faced with limited resources for licensing activities, how will the NRC 

prioritize its licensing efforts with regard to small reactors? 

c. Please provide the status of the NRC's progress on aligning the existing 

regulatory framework developed primarily for large light water reactors with that 

needed for SMR technologies including any issues that might require rulemaking. 

The NRC annually publishes a Regulatory Information Summary to request information from 

industry about plans to submit design certification applications and license applications. 

Industry responses to NRC's December 2012 request indicate that four domestic companies 

plan to submit design certification applications to the NRC for small modular light water reactor 

designs. Those companies are B&W mPowerTM, NuScale, Westinghouse, and Holtec. Two 

utilities responded expressing their intent to submit license applications. They are the 

Tennessee Valley Authority referencing the mPowerTM design to be constructed at the Clinch 

River site in Tennessee and Ameren referencing the Westinghouse design to be constructed at 

the Callaway site in Missouri. There are also some companies, both foreign and domestic, that 

have informed the NRC of plans to submit design certification applications and various license 

applications for non-light water designs. These include Toshiba for their liquid sodium-cooled 

reactor, the 48, and 8TL, a South African company, for their pebble bed high-temperature gascooled reactor. Finally, the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Alliance, a consortium of domestic 

and foreign companies, has informed us of its plans to submit a construction permit application 

for a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor based on an AREVA design. 

a. The NRC's FY2013 budget and FY2014 budget requests were predicated on conducting 

reviews of two small modular reactor designs that use light water reactor technology. 

However, neither the current budget nor the FY2014 budget request would support all of 

the work that has been identified. In addition to NRC staff resources, the agency had 

planned to rely on contractor support for parts of the reviews. However, impacts from 

budget sequestration, with reductions to contractor support, will challenge the ability of 

the NRC to move forward on these projects. 

b. The NRC's budget for new reactor licensing activities accommodates licensing and 

design certification for both large reactor and the small modular reactor designs. The 

NRC prioritizes the full range of new reactor work (large and small designs) to the extent 

Enclosure 

Page 2 of9 
140 


80376.086

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28,2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

budgeted resources are available. Within this larger context, the NRC will prioritize the 

small modular reactor review work to first support the projects selected by the 

Department of Energy (DOE) through its SMR Licensing Technical Support Program. 

c. NRC's existing regulatory framework is appropriate for reviewing the small modular light 

water reactor designs and license applications. Through pre-application activities 

principally with mPowerTM and NuScale, design-specific review guidance is being 

developed by the NRC to facilitate review of these designs and their unique features. 

These design-specific review standards are supplemented by the NRC's continuing 

effort to maintain and update its Standard Review Plan. 

Based on responses received to the December 2012 Regulatory Information Summary 

that indicate that some entities plan to submit design certification applications for nonlight water reactor technologies, the NRC has identified approaches that could be 

implemented to support the review of these "advanced non-light water reactor" designs. 

Last year, in response to a request from Congress, the NRC staff prepared a document 

entitled "Report to Congress: Advanced Reactor Licensing," which details the NRC's 

efforts and plans regarding advanced reactors. The Commission transmitted this report 

to Congress on August 22,2012. 

Enclosure 

Page 3 of9 
141 


80376.087

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28, 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable John Shimkus 

1. I understand the NRC is analyzing the safety of using dry cask storage for extended 

periods of time. What is the time frame currently being analyzed? 

a. Is the NRC considering a requirement that Independent Spent Fuel Storage 

Installations maintain or reinstate the capability to repackage dry cask storage 

canisters? 

The NRC is examining the technical needs and potential changes to the regulatory framework 

that may be needed to continue licensing of spent nuclear fuel storage beyond the initial and 

first renewal licensing periods. In May 2012, the NRC issued for public comment a report on 

identifying and prioritizing the technical information needs affecting potential regulation of 

extended storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel. This report noted that for this 

evaluation, the NRC has considered performance of the storage systems over an initial 300 

year period following removal of the spent nuclear fuel from the reactor. The NRC staff selected 

the long analytical period in order to capture potential effects of relatively slow-acting 

degradation processes. 

a. The NRC is not currently considering a requirement that Independent Spent Fuel 

Storage Installations maintain or reinstate the capability to repackage dry cask storage 

canisters. 

Enclosure 

Page 40f9 
142 


80376.088

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28, 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable John Shimkus 

2. In Finding #2 of the Commission's 2010 waste confidence determination, the NRC 

found that a repository would be available "when necessary". The court vacated the 

NRC's determination, and now the Commission is forced to initiate a new waste 

confidence proceeding. 

a. Since the scope of the NRC waste confidence proceeding seems focused on 

environmental impact issues, how will you gather evidence to support Finding 2, 

which addresses repository availability, not environmental impact? 

b. Will DOE provide evidence for the record on its plans for a repository? 

c. Without evidence from DOE, what sort of evidence do you think would support a 

repository availability finding? 

d. In vacating the NRC's Waste Confidence rule, the court directed the NRC to 

examine the environmental impact if a repository is never available and the period 

of storage on site is indefinite. Isn't the Finding #2 determination of repository 

availability a necessary element of determining the time period to be examined by 

the environmental impact statement? 

e. To what extent will the Commission consider the "No Action" alternative 

documented in the Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement? 

a. Consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act, the NRC will make reasonable 

assumptions regarding the availability of a repository. The NRC's reasonable 

assumptions will include an assessment of repository availability within 60 years beyond 

the licensed life for operation of the reactor, within 160 years beyond the licensed life for 

operation of the reactor, and indefinite storage (i.e., a repository is never available). The 

information that the NRC is considering in the generic environmental impact statement 

includes international and domestic experience in siting a geologic repOSitory, the 

January 2013 DOE report, "Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear 

Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," and the 2012 report of the Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America's Nuclear Future. 

b. In January 2013, DOE published its "Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," which will be used as part of the 

analysis in the generic environmental impact statement that will support the updated 

Waste Confidence Rule. The DOE Strategy Report states that it is the Administration's 

goal to have a repository sited by 2026, licensed by 2042, and constructed and open by 

2048. The NRC also plans to consider other publicly available information. 

Enclosure 

Page 50f9 
143 


80376.089

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28,2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

c. The generic environmental impact statement will make a number of reasonable 

assumptions regarding repository availability. In addition to the DOE's recently 

published "Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and HighLevel Radioactive Waste" (January 2013), the NRC will rely on a variety of information 

and analyses to support any conclusion on repOSitory availability. This information 

includes international and domestic experience in siting a geologic repository and the 

2012 report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. 

d. The Finding #2 determination of repository availability is not a necessary element of 

determining the time period to be examined by the environmental impact statement. The 

NRC is planning to analyze three scenarios in the environmental impact statement. 

These scenarios are the short-term period of continued storage (a repository available 

after 60 years), a long-term period of continued storage (repository available after 160 

years), and indefinite storage (a repository is never available). The environmental 

impact statement will determine the impacts of continued storage for each of the 

scenarios. 

e. As directed by the Commission on September 6, 2012, the NRC staff will use available 

information from a number of sources, including the Yucca Mountain Environmental 

Impact Statement. The NRC will consider the Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact 

Statement "no-action" alternative in the Waste Confidence generic environmental impact 

statement. 

Enclosure 

Page 60f9 
144 


80376.090

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28, 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable Doris Matsui 

As you know, there are nine commercial shut down nuclear power plant sites in the U.S., 

including Rancho Seco owned by my hometown utility, the Sacramento Municipal Utility 

District. Although the spent fuel is monitored and well-guarded, and is not an immediate 

safety or security concern, the presence of spent fuel at these sites is costly and 

prevents the use of the site for economically productive uses that would benefit the 

community. 

Because SMUD and the utilities that own the other shut down reactors are not able to 

move the spent fuel to a permanent storage site, I am supportive of the federal 

government moving it to interim storage facilities. We need interim storage with or 

without a permanent facility. 

1. Can you outline for me what challenges the Commission faces in moving spent fuel to 

interim storage? 

The NRC has the regulatory infrastructure in place to license dry interim storage facilities and 

has licensed such a facility. But, the Department of Energy is the lead agency for implementing 

any changes to the national policy on nuclear waste management, which includes moving fuel 

to dry interim storage. This topiC is addressed in the recently released "Strategy for the 

Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste" (January 

2013), which provides the Administration's framework for implementing a long-term solution for 

fuel storage and disposal. As the national policy evolves, the NRC's mission remains the same: 

to ensure the safe and secure use of radioactive materials while protecting people and the 

environment. 

Enclosure 

Page 7 of9 
145 


80376.091

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28. 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable Doris Matsui 

2. Do you believe that independent progress can be made on developing interim storage 

facilities even though we cannot currently reach a consensus on a permanent 

repository? 

The Department of Energy is the lead agency for implementing any changes to the national 

policy on nuclear waste management, which includes moving fuel to dry interim storage. This 

topic is addressed in the recently released "Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-level Radioactive Waste" (January 2013), which provides the 

Administration's framework for implementing a long-term solution for fuel storage and disposal. 

The NRC is not responsible for implementing the national policy on nuclear waste management, 

including development of interim storage facilities. The NRC's responsibility is independent 

licensing, regulation, and oversight of interim storage facilities. The NRC is not responsible for 

site selection, but will consider the suitability of the site as part of the licensing process. The 

NRC has in place the appropriate regulatory framework to license and regulate future interim 

dry storage facilities. 

Enclosure 

Paae 80f9 
146 


80376.092

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28, 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable Doris Matsui 

I believe it makes sense to move spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned sites first and 

I hope we can start seeing progress made in this area. As we all know, the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is currently considering whether or not to order the NRC to 

resume consideration of the Yucca Mountain license application. 

3. Can you tell me what challenges the NRC or DOE would face if the federal court orders 

work to resume on Yucca? In particular do you see impediments to reacquiring the 

permits, or finding the personnel and knowledge base to resume where work was left 

off? 

If the federal court directs the NRC to resume work on the Yucca Mountain license application, 

the agency will comply, to the extent that funds are currently available. The NRC's principal 

challenge would be to reconstitute its review team with individuals from within and outside the 

agency who possess the critical skills and knowledge base. 

Enclosure 

Page 9 of9 
147 


80376.093

April 19, 2013 

The Honorable Ed Whitfield 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Power 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

United States House of Representatives 

2125 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515-6115 

Dear Chairman Whitfield: 

I appeared before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power on February 28,2013, along 

with my colleagues on the Commission. On March 22, 2013, you forwarded questions for the 

hearing record. The responses to those questions are enclosed. My fellow colleagues on the 

Commission and I worked closely together to respond to the Subcommittees' questions. I 

expect that my responses will be generally consistent with those provided by Chairman 

Macfarlane and my other Commission colleagues. 

If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me. 

Sincerely, 

William C. Ostendorff 

Enclosures: 

As stated 

cc: The Honorable Bobby L. Rush 
148 


80376.094

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28, 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable Ed Whitfield 

1. In our hearing last July, Commissioner Magwood referred to the post-Fukushima 

actions the Commission approved on March 9, 2012, and stated: "We still have much 

work to do but the steps taken thus far represent a very significant increase in safety 

based on the Fukushima experience." 

a. Has any effort been made to account for the increase in safety inherent in those 

actions? 

b. Shouldn't this new, higher level of safety provide the threshold against which the 

benefits of any future actions should be analyzed? 

a. Yes. the NRC accounts for actions already taken, such as the three March 2012 actions 

as well as those planned, in evaluating regulatory decisions regarding post-Fukushima 

actions. 

b. Several processes are in place for the rigorous review of possible changes to NRC 

regulatory requirements. Following the Fukushima accident, the Commission 

established a senior management steering committee to consider possible postFukushima regulatory actions the agency may undertake. In addition, the NRC 

operates in accordance with its own "backfit rule," which applies whenever the NRC 

considers adopting possible regulatory changes. These backfit rule assessments 

consider the safety benefits of existing plant features and those required by previous 

regulatory actions (e.g., the Orders issued in March 2012). 

As the agency continues to evaluate Tier 2 and Tier 3 recommendations, actions 

planned or already taken will be considered. For example, the Commission is currently 

considering a March 27, 2013, staff proposal to change the implementation plans for 

Tier 2 emergency preparedness recommendations because their intent is adequately 

addressed through the implementation of the March 2012 Orders on mitigating 

strategies. In addition, the Commission recently directed the staff to begin rulemaking 

efforts for the inclusion of filtering strategies for boiling water reactors with Mark I and 

Mark II containments. In that decision, the Commission approved issuing orders that 

require licensees to install severe accident capable hardened vents. Therefore, as part 

of the rulemaking effort, the staff will assume the installation and safety benefit of those 

severe accidents capable hardened venting systems. 

Enclosure 

Page 1 of9 
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80376.095

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28, 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable Ed Whitfield 

2. I understand that there are several domestic companies developing small modular 

reactors (SMRs) that have engaged NRC staff about design certification activities. Which 

designs have been endorsed by potential license applicants who have written to the NRC 

indicating their intent to build such a design? 

a. Does the NRC currently have adequate staff resources to address its small reactor 

licensing work? 

b. If the NRC is faced with limited resources for licensing activities, how will the NRC 

prioritize its licensing efforts with regard to small reactors? 

c. Please provide the status of the NRC's progress on aligning the existing 

regulatory framework developed primarily for large light water reactors with that 

needed for SMR technologies including any issues that might require rulemaking. 

The NRC annually publishes a Regulatory Information SummaI)' to request information from 

industry about plans to submit design certification applications and license applications. 

Industry responses to NRC's December 2012 request indicate that four domestic companies 

plan to submit design certification applications to the NRC for small modular light water reactor 

designs. Those companies are B&W mPowerTM, NuScale, Westinghouse, and Holtec. Two 

utilities responded expressing their intent to submit license applications. They are the 

Tennessee Valley Authority referencing the mPowerTM design to be constructed at the Clinch 

River site in Tennessee and Ameren referencing the Westinghouse design to be constructed at 

the Callaway site in Missouri. There are also some companies, both foreign and domestic, that 

have informed the NRC of plans to submit design certification applications and various license 

applications for non-light water designs. These include Toshiba for their liquid sodium-cooled 

reactor, the 4S, and STL, a South African company, for their pebble bed high-temperature gascooled reactor. Finally, the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Alliance, a consortium of domestic 

and foreign companies, has informed us of its plans to submit a construction permit application 

for a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor based on an AREVA design. 

a. The NRC's FY2013 budget and FY2014 budget requests were predicated on conducting 

reviews of two small modular reactor designs that use light water reactor technology. 

However, neither the current budget nor the FY2014 budget request would support all of 

the work that has been identified. In addition to NRC staff resources, the agency had 

planned to rely on contractor support for parts of the reviews. However, impacts from 

budget sequestration, with reductions to contractor support, will challenge the ability of 

the NRC to move forward on these projects. 

b. The NRC's budget for new reactor licensing activities accommodates licensing and 

design certification for both large reactor and the small modular reactor designs. The 

NRC prioritizes the full range of new reactor work (large and small designs) to the extent 

Enclosure 

Page 20f9 
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80376.096

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28,2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

budgeted resources are available. Within this larger context, the NRC will prioritize the 

small modular reactor review work to first support the projects selected by the 

Department of Energy (DOE) through its SMR Licensing Technical Support Program. 

c. NRC's existing regulatory framework is appropriate for reviewing the small modular light 

water reactor designs and license applications. Through pre-application activities 

principally with mPowerTM and NuScale, design-specific review guidance is being 

developed by the NRC to facilitate review of these designs and their unique features. 

These design-specific review standards are supplemented by the NRC's continuing 

effort to maintain and update its Standard Review Plan. 

Based on responses received to the December 2012 Regulatory Information Summary 

that indicate that some entities plan to submit design certification applications for nonlight water reactor technologies, the NRC has identified approaches that could be 

implemented to support the review of these "advanced non-light water reactor" designs. 

Last year, in response to a request from Congress, the NRC staff prepared a document 

entitled "Report to Congress: Advanced Reactor Licensing," which details the NRC's 

efforts and plans regarding advanced reactors. The Commission transmitted this report 

to Congress on August 22,2012. 

Enclosure 

Page 30f9 
151 


80376.097

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28, 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable John Shimkus 

1. I understand the NRC is analyzing the safety of using dry cask storage for extended 

periods of time. What is the time frame currently being analyzed? 

a. Is the NRC considering a requirement that Independent Spent Fuel Storage 

Installations maintain or reinstate the capability to repackage dry cask storage 

canisters? 

The NRC is examining the technical needs and potential changes to the regulatory framework 

that may be needed to continue licensing of spent nuclear fuel storage beyond the initial and 

first renewal licensing periods. In May 2012, the NRC issued for public comment a report on 

identifying and prioritizing the technical information needs affecting potential regulation of 

extended storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel. This report noted that for this 

evaluation, the NRC has considered performance of the storage systems over an initial 300 

year period following removal of the spent nuclear fuel from the reactor. The NRC staff selected 

the long analytical period in order to capture potential effects of relatively slow-acting 

degradation processes. 

a. The NRC is not currently considering a requirement that Independent Spent Fuel 

Storage Installations maintain or reinstate the capability to repackage dry cask storage 

canisters. 

Enclosure 

Page 4 of 9 
152 


80376.098

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28, 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable John Shimkus 

2. In Finding #2 of the Commission's 2010 waste confidence determination, the NRC 

found that a repository would be available "when necessary". The court vacated the 

NRC's determination, and now the Commission is forced to initiate a new waste 

confidence proceeding. 

a. Since the scope of the NRC waste confidence proceeding seems focused on 

environmental impact issues, how will you gather evidence to support Finding 2, 

which addresses repository availability, not environmental impact? 

b. Will DOE provide evidence for the record on its plans for a repository? 

c. Without evidence from DOE, what sort of evidence do you think would support a 

repository availability finding? 

d. In vacating the NRC's Waste Confidence rule, the court directed the NRC to 

examine the environmental impact if a repository is never available and the period 

of storage on site is indefinite. Isn't the Finding #2 determination of repository 

availability a necessary element of determining the time period to be examined by 

the environmental impact statement? 

e. To what extent will the Commission consider the "No Action" alternative 

documented in the Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement? 

a. Consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act, the NRC will make reasonable 

assumptions regarding the availability of a repository. The NRC's reasonable 

assumptions will include an assessment of repository availability within 60 years beyond 

the licensed life for operation of the reactor, within 160 years beyond the licensed life for 

operation of the reactor, and indefinite storage (i,e" a repository is never available). The 

information that the NRC is considering in the generic environmental impact statement 

includes international and domestic experience in siting a geologic repository, the 

January 2013 DOE report, "Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear 

Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," and the 2012 report of the Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America's Nuclear Future. 

b, In January 2013, DOE published its "Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," which will be used as part of the 

analysis in the generic environmental impact statement that will support the updated 

Waste Confidence Rule, The DOE Strategy Report states that it is the Administration's 

goal to have a repository sited by 2026, licensed by 2042, and constructed and open by 

2048, The NRC also plans to consider other publicly available information. 

Enclosure 

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Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28, 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

c. The generic environmental impact statement will make a number of reasonable 

assumptions regarding repository availability. In addition to the DOE's recently 

published "Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and HighLevel Radioactive Waste" (January 2013), the NRC will rely on a variety of information 

and analyses to support any conclusion on repository availability. This information 

includes international and domestic experience in siting a geologic repository and the 

2012 report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. 

d. The Finding #2 determination of repository availability is not a necessary element of 

determining the time period to be examined by the environmental impact statement. The 

NRC is planning to analyze three scenarios in the environmental impact statement. 

These scenarios are the short-term period of continued storage (a repOSitory available 

after 60 years), a long-term period of continued storage (repository available after 160 

years), and indefinite storage (a repository is never available). The environmental 

impact statement will determine the impacts of continued storage for each of the 

scenarios. 

e. As directed by the Commission on September 6, 2012, the NRC staff will use available 

information from a number of sources, including the Yucca Mountain Environmental 

Impact Statement. The NRC will consider the Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact 

Statement "no-action" altemative in the Waste Confidence generic environmental impact 

statement. 

Enclosure 

Page 6 of9 
154 


80376.100

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28, 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable Doris Matsui 

As you know, there are nine commercial shut down nuclear power plant sites in the U.S., 

including Rancho Seco owned by my hometown utility, the Sacramento Municipal Utility 

District. Although the spent fuel is monitored and well-guarded, and is not an immediate 

safety or security concern, the presence of spent fuel at these sites is costly and 

prevents the use of the site for economically productive uses that would benefit the 

community. 

Because SMUD and the utilities that own the other shut down reactors are not able to 

move the spent fuel to a permanent storage site, I am supportive of the federal 

government moving it to interim storage facilities. We need interim storage with or 

without a permanent facility. 

1. Can you outline for me what challenges the Commission faces in moving spent fuel to 

interim storage? 

The NRC has the regulatory infrastructure in place to license dry interim storage facilities and 

has licensed such a facility. But, the Department of Energy is the lead agency for implementing 

any changes to the national policy on nuclear waste management, which includes moving fuel 

to dry interim storage. This topic is addressed in the recently released "Strategy for the 

Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste" (January 

2013), which provides the Administration's framework for implementing a long-term solution for 

fuel storage and disposal. As the national policy evolves, the NRC's mission remains the same: 

to ensure the safe and secure use of radioactive materials while protecting people and the 

environment. 

Enclosure 

Page 70f9 
155 


80376.101

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28, 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable Doris Matsui 

2. Do you believe that independent progress can be made on developing interim storage 

facilities even though we cannot currently reach a consensus on a permanent 

repository? 

The Department of Energy is the lead agency for implementing any changes to the national 

policy on nuclear waste management, which includes moving fuel to dry interim storage. This 

topic is addressed in the recently released "Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste" (January 2013), which provides the 

Administration's framework for implementing a long-term solution for fuel storage and disposal. 

The NRC is not responsible for implementing the national policy on nuclear waste management, 

including development of interim storage facilities. The NRC's responsibility is independent 

licensing, regulation, and oversight of interim storage facilities. The NRC is not responsible for 

site selection, but will consider the suitability of the site as part of the licensing process. The 

NRC has in place the appropriate regulatory framework to license and regulate future interim 

dry storage facilities. 

Enclosure 

Page 8 of9 
156 

Æ 


80376.102

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittees on Energy and Power & Environment and Economy Hearing 

February 28, 2013 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

The Honorable Doris Matsui 

I believe it makes sense to move spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned sites first and 

I hope we can start seeing progress made in this area. As we all know, the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is currently considering whether or not to order the NRC to 

resume consideration of the Yucca Mountain license application. 

3. Can you tell me what challenges the NRC or DOE would face if the federal court orders 

work to resume on Yucca? In particular do you see impediments to reacquiring the 

permits, or finding the personnel and knowledge base to resume where work was left 

off? 

If the federal court directs the NRC to resume work on the Yucca Mountain license application, 

the agency will comply, to the extent that funds are currently available. The NRC's prinCipal 

challenge would be to reconstitute its review team with individuals from within and outside the 

agency who possess the critical skills and knowledge base. 

Enclosure 

Page 9 of9