Non-Traditional Security Threats and 

Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation 

James M. Keagle, PhD 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University 

August 2012
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy 

or position of the National Defense University, Department of Defense, or U.S. Government. All 

information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials. 

James M. Keagle, PhD 

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy 

or position of the National Defense University, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 

All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials. 

James M. Keagle, PhD 

Dr. James M. Keagle is the Director of the Transforming National Security seminar series at the 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University 

(effective September 2007). Prior to this position, Dr. Keagle was the National Defense 

University's Provost (effective 2004) and Vice President for Academic Affairs (effective 2000). 

Prior to these positions, he served as a professor of National Security Strategy at NDU. In that 

role Dr. Keagle worked as a research faculty member assisting with NDU’s modeling and 

simulation and work with interagency education and training. 

Accepting an appointment to the U.S. Air Force Academy, he graduated second academically in 

his class in June 1974. Following graduation, he went to the University of Pittsburgh to complete 

his Master’s of Arts degree in political science and earned a graduate certificate in Latin 

American studies. After a tour as a munitions maintenance officer, Dr. Keagle went on to 

become an assistant professor of political science at the U.S. Air Force Academy. In 1980, he 

went on to Princeton University where he completed both a Master’s of Arts degree and Ph.D. in 

politics. He proudly notes his honorary PhD from the Military Technical Academy of Romania--

the only United States citizen so honored. 

Following his extensive education, Dr. Keagle’s next six tours were political-military assignment 

that included direct access and interaction with Cabinet-level government officials on national 

security related matters. These assignments included work for two Combatant Commanders as a 

senior strategist; for the Office of Secretary of Defense pertaining to Cuba; Deputy Director, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense Bosnian Task Force; and for the Deputy Under Secretary of 

the Air Force in International Affairs as Senior Strategist. Military medals include the Defense 

Superior Service Award, the Legion of Merit, and the Purple Heart. 

Concurrent with, and since leaving military service, Dr. Keagle has held the position of adjunct 

professor at a number of institutions to include: Syracuse University, American University, 

Central Michigan University, Catholic University, University of Colorado, and Lake Superior 

State College. He also holds honorary professorships with Transylvania University in Brasov, 

Romania, as well as the Mongolian Defense University--again, the only American so honored. 

ii 
iii 
Contents 

Introduction......................................................................................Error! Bookmark not defined.

The Global Commons Under Siege ............................................................................................. 2

The Hybrid Threat ...................................................................................................................... 2

Access and Stability In the Global Commons ............................................................................ 4

Chronically Fragile States............................................................................................................ 5

The Challenge of the Global Commons...................................................................................... 8

Outer Space................................................................................................................................. 8

Airspace ...................................................................................................................................... 9

Maritime...................................................................................................................................... 9

Land ............................................................................................................................................ 9

Cyber Space................................................................................................................................. 10

Incident Characterization Cyberspace ...................................................................................... 11

Attribution Determination Cyberspace..................................................................................... 11

Proportionate Retaliation Cyberspace—and the Cross-Domain Challenge ............................. 12

Overlapping Jurisdictions ......................................................................................................... 12

Role of Defense Capabilities In Cyberspace............................................................................. 13

Space Assurance ....................................................................................................................... 14

Sea Control ............................................................................................................................... 14

Air Superiority .......................................................................................................................... 14

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 14

LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1. The Hybrid Threat........................................................................................................... 2

Figure 2. Shifting Our Weight ........................................................................................................ 3

Figure 3. Notional OPLAN Phasing ............................................................................................... 3

Figure 4. Stabilitiy and Reconstruction Mission............................................................................. 4

Figure 5. Boundary Claims............................................................................................................. 5

Figure 6. Carving up the Arctic ...................................................................................................... 5

Figure 7. Governed/Ungoverned Space.......................................................................................... 6

Figure 8. Capacity and Will............................................................................................................ 7

iv 
INTRODUCTION 

The global commons have routinely been considered as physical spaces that are not under direct 

nation-state control—common grassland that all must share, for example. They demand 

responsible management so as not to exhaust their supply (fisheries) or do irreparable harm to 

the world’s ecosystem (species extinction, pollution of the atmosphere, contamination of potable 

water supplies). These spaces may also be vital to states and other global actors as they provide 

access and connectivity to the rest of the world (sea lines of communication). The global 

commons in the 21st century lexicon of security has expanded even further to consist of outer 

space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace. Together the aforementioned constructs 

“constitutes the fabric or connective tissue of the international system,” as Flournoy and Brimley 

noted in 2009.1 Strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan used the term in describing the world’s oceans 

as “a great highway... a wide common” in his 1890 volume, The Influence of Sea Power Upon 

History. Mahan’s viewpoints influenced security policies and military capabilities for decades.2

Today, as we push the envelope even further regarding our understanding and importance of the 

global commons, some suggest that the human species itself constitutes an essential element of 

the global commons and that human rights, equitable development, ethnic cleansing, and civil 

wars are legitimate parts of the expanding definition of the global commons. Regardless, the 

global commons is an important part of regional and global security and offers challenges and 

opportunities for cooperation as we share this planet. 

Access to and use of the commons for political, economic, and military purposes has, until very 

recently, been almost an international fact of life. Nation-states have long utilized the commons 

to promote political ideals by using the open seas, and later airways, to diplomatically engage 

others around the globe. Economically, the “free” commons have contributed to globalization 

and the exploitation of the world’s resources, providing a conduit to unite consumers with 

regional markets and marketers. Furthermore, nearly uncontested freedom to operate on the seas, 

in the air, in orbit, and in cyberspace meant that the United States and its allies exercised a high 

level of strategic freedom of maneuver as they focused on the prosecution of land and air 

campaigns around the world. This reality is changing rapidly as concerns about climate change 

and diminishing supplies of raw materials as well as the assertions about the rights of the 

oppressed (think Arab Spring) grow. Unlimited freedom to access and use the commons can and 

should no longer be taken for granted. Real and perceived scarcity must be addressed—not 

through conflict but rather through global and regional efforts to manage our planet and govern 

its inhabitants more responsibly. Better understanding of these security challenges and 

opportunities for expanded cooperation is the purpose of this paper. 

 

1

 Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “The Contested Commons,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (July 2009): 

17. 

2

 Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History,” in Roots of Strategy: Book 4, ed. David 

Jablonsky (Mechanicsburg, Penn: Stockpole Books, 1999): [page 3]. 

1 
THE GLOBAL COMMONS UNDER SIEGE 

Three features of the current and expected operational landscape are most pressing, as noted in 

the 2010 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review: 

• Hybrid Threats that blur traditional categories of conflict 

• Assured access to and stability in the Global Commons 

• Frequency and severity of problems with chronically fragile states3

Each of these deserves serious explanation and study. 

The Hybrid Threat 

Figure Source: Beyond the “Hybrid” Threat at smallwarsjournal.com 

Figure 1. The Hybrid Threat 

• Adversaries are likely to seize the initiative and employ a mix of conventional weapons, 

irregular tactics, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, cyber attack, and criminal 

behavior, supported by an information campaign 

• Higher and lower intensity forms of conflict often converge, blurring the categories and 

features of warfare 

• State or non-state actors (or combination thereof) employ a blend of two or more 

components of the spectrum of conflict, including economic, diplomatic, informational, 

and or/social domains 

The 21st century is filled with examples of this type of conflict. Among those that come to mind 

are the Hezbollah efforts in Lebanon in 2006 and the array of Arab Spring movements in the 

greater Middle East beginning in 2011. 

This more complicated threat environment is captured in the next several illustrations. 

 

3 Quadrennial Defense Review, Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Pt. I, Chapter 2, §118 (b) (1), 1 February 2010. 

2 
27

Rebalancing Future Force Capabilities

P

Figure 2. Shifting Our Weight 

In Figure 2 the central message is that force capabilities must adjust to meet new security 

challenges. As we shift up and to the right, the role of large conventional forces engaging one 

another diminishes and new requirements emerge. These new security challenges provide 

opportunities for collaboration and cooperation—as well as posing non-traditional threats to 

security establishments. 

It is likely to mean smaller conventional forces and greater attention to special operation forces, 

intelligence collection, and unmanned systems. 

28

Notional OPLAN Phasing 

versus Level of Military Effort

Phase 0

OPLAN activation Phases OPLAN termination

Global Shaping

Theater Shaping

Deter

Phase I

Seize the

Initiative

Phase II

Dominate

Phase III

Stabilize

Phase IV

Enable

Civil

Authority

Phase V

Shape Shape

OPLAN xxxx

Shaping

Phase 0

OPLAN xxxx 

Shaping

Shaping Activities

Deterring Activities

Seizing the Initiative 

Activities

Dominating Activities

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 3. Notional OPLAN Phasing 

Figure 3 even more dramatically tells the new story that avoiding war (Phase 0) is just as or more 

important than waging war or combat.4

 

4

 National Security Strategy 2010, The White House, May 2010 

3 
29

Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Gap

Figure 4. Stability and Reconstruction Mission 

Figure 4 paints another powerful dynamic—that stability and reconstruction missions are now 

co-equal with major combat missions in terms of priority and importance.5

ACCESS AND STABILITY IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS 

Perhaps the most pressing issue in the Asia–Pacific region is the PRC’s anti-access/area denial 

strategy. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has leveraged military modernization programs 

combined with forward positioning of anti-ship ballistic missiles and economic and diplomatic 

policies into a position of greater influence. Arguably, by posing a greater threat not only to 

Taiwan but also to the U.S. Navy carrier battle groups, the PRC is causing other Asia-Pacific 

nations to reconsider their longer term political and military strategic alliances. The United 

States, for one, has announced the now oft-repeated pivot toward Asia—and taken steps to 

strengthen military and political ties with nations constituting the 2nd island ring around China—

much like its containment strategy against the U.S.S.R during the Cold War. How all this plays 

out in the coming decades will largely shape the balance between conflict and cooperation in the 

region. Whether China is able to leverage the Shanghai Cooperation Council and other regional 

forums into effective tools of its long-term strategy of influence remains to be seen.6

The PRC has sought to wield this regional and global influence in the Arctic as well, as climate 

change begins to open up the Northern Route as a potential game changer in the distribution of 

fossil fuel resources from supply locations to countries that are dependent on external sources for 

their energy needs. As the maps in Figure 5 and Figure 6 highlight, Russian territorial claims in 

the Arctic assert sovereignty over a potential fossil fuel transportation route game changer. This 

becomes more than just a race to secure fossil fuel resources in the Arctic. The greatly reduced 

 

5

 Joint Chiefs of Staff. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. (Washington, DC, 2011) 

6 http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace 

July 2011, as available on Internet May 29, 2012

4 
shipping distances via a route that hugs the Siberian coast (and may be under Russian control) 

may fundamentally diminish the value of the Malacca Straits and other key transportation 

networks that currently serve the world’s commerce. The United Nations convention on the Law 

of the Sea may prove insufficient to address these emerging issues. 

Figure 5. Boundary Claims 

Figure 6. Carving up the Arctic 

CHRONICALLY FRAGILE STATES 

5 
U.S. strategy has long concerned itself with economically and politically fragile states. Greater 

emphasis has been placed on this since the early days of the war on terror. 

33

Governed / Ungoverned Space

• Governed space: A geographic space over which a state authority has both the capacity 

and political will to exercise its sovereignty responsibly (i.e., to maintain order and territorial 

integrity in conformity with the principles of a secure international order based on state 

sovereignty).

• Ungoverned Space: The absence of state capacity and/or political will to exercise 

responsible sovereignty.

– We can further specify types of ungoverned spaces, including:

• Anarchic – a regime lacks the capacity to govern part or whole of country and no other actor 

has stepped in to fill the vacuum

• Competing governance – as a result of some mix of a regime’s inability or unwillingness to 

govern sub-national spaces or exercise specific governance functions, other actors attempt to 

fill the governance vacuum

– This concept does not address ill-governed spaces – regimes that use the principle of 

sovereignty as a shield behind which to engage in activities that pose threats to the 

international community.

• Now it is YEMEN and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Penisula

Figure 7. Governed/Ungoverned Space 

Since 9/11 the language has included ungovernable or ungoverned spaces—where the host 

government lacks the physical capacity and/or the political will to exercise sovereign power. 

Within counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies, these areas have become breeding 

grounds and sanctuaries for terrorist organizations to operate and conduct operations with 

impunity. What followed are capacity development programs to defeat, deter, and dismantle 

these organizations. Both in terms of governance capacity and political will, as Figure 8 

suggests, international cooperation will be key. 

6 
34

Capacity and Will

• Key components of governance capacity:

– Security capacity (e.g., police, intelligence, paramilitary, military)

– Administrative capacity (e.g., basic infrastructure, education system, public 

health and sanitation, public finance system)

– Political capacity (e.g., channels for political participation, system of checks 

and balances, robust government organizations)

• Key components of political will:

– Leaders’ volition to exercise governance in conformity with the principles of 

a secure international order based on state sovereignty

• Volition is shaped by cultural, historical, and legal contexts

– The willingness to expend resources and political capital to do so

Figure 8. Capacity and Will 

Whether best understood as nation building, stability and reconstruction operations, or long–term 

economic development, these will pose security challenges and opportunities for cooperation for 

the foreseeable future. It also raises the very difficult challenge of discriminating between civil 

wars, wars of external aggression, and genocide. The world has taken a clear position on 

genocide—Never Again. Yet it remains extremely difficult to obtain consensus for collective 

action in these cases, however clear the facts on the ground may seem to some. As the world 

wrestles with a period of tight and austere budgets, finding the funds for long-term sociopolitical and economic development and war avoidance strategies will be difficult. 

While not limited to fragile states, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) 

constitutes a fertile ground for regional cooperation. Be it in response to the 2011 earthquake off 

the coast of Japan and subsequent tsunami and nuclear reactor breaches or the tsunami that 

devastated Indonesia in 2008, HADR will be an essential element of the world’s collective 

response to tragic natural events. The Transformative Innovation for Development and 

Emergency Support (TIDES) program shows initial promise for such collaboration. Its goals 

include leveraging global talent, integrating multiple approaches, and sustaining longer term 

development through private sector investment. It supports the basic needs of stressed 

populations by focusing on key infrastructures—water, power, shelter, cooking, cooling and 

heating, lighting, sanitation, and information and communications technology. TIDES goes 

beyond HADR to broader support for civil authorities and building their general capacities.7

 

7 See www.star-tides.net for a more complete description of the TIDES program.

7 
THE CHALLENGE OF THE GLOBAL COMMONS 

Whether understood as air, land, sea, cyber, or space, these domains of the global commons 

comprise the infrastructure on which the global system operates and its major components 

flow—be it information, people, commerce, finance, technology, or military muscle. Individual, 

national, and global prosperity and governance depend on this interconnected and interdependent 

network of relationships that operate within and across these domains. Prosperity and freedom 

can be enhanced or threatened depending on how security challenges and regional cooperation 

efforts are balanced. 

Outer Space 

Society has become dependent on capabilities and information delivered to, from, and through 

space. Perhaps the most dramatic of these examples is the prosecution of the war against Al 

Qaeda. While some of the operational details remain unknown to the general public, it is 

commonly understood that the combination of special operations forces and intelligence officers 

rely on outer space to transmit data in almost real time regarding the location of individual 

human targets and the subsequent application of lethal force (via drones) across international air 

space and sovereign borders. This new kind of warfare may define conflict for the next several 

decades. 

Furthermore, resourceful adversaries may leverage asymmetric technologies and unconventional 

approaches to circumvent traditional advantages, negate core strengths, and exploit 

vulnerabilities of competing forces. They could exploit the Outer Space Commons in a variety of 

challenging ways: 

• Offensive computer network operations and electronic warfare with kinetic first strikes 

could disrupt battlefield network information and space systems. 

• Space systems could deny the use of reconnaissance, early-warning, communications, 

navigation, and weather satellite assets that enhance land-based military operations. 

Equally important, we have become highly dependent on space for more routine 

communications, be it the use of GPS for everyday mundane transport of goods, people, and 

service from one location to another, or the transmission of more secure information that is the 

lifeblood of international financial markets. Figuring out the rules and codes of conduct that 

should govern this domain is both a commercial and governmental responsibility—and one that 

demands cooperation and reconciliation of competing views and cultures. It goes far beyond 

simple declarations regarding prohibitions on weapons in space or anti-satellite weapons 

(ASAT). Space debris poses dangers in space, and when it falls to Earth, it may pose threats to 

people in its path. Space law and emerging capabilities regarding co-orbital intercept systems, 

attribution, proportionality, and escalation (res line) all merit significant international attention. 

Lastly, no one in the Asia-Pacific Theater can ignore the challenges that weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) pose. Cooperative ballistic missile defense (BMD) offers one area of 

cooperation for peacefully managing the global commons and addressing those who pursue 

provocative military policies. 

8 
Airspace 

Closely related to the challenges WMD pose in space, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles could 

threaten ships at sea, civilian population centers, or military build-up areas. 

Fourth generation fighter aircraft and sophisticated air defense weapons could put in question 

local air supremacy or superiority. 

Drones and other remotely operated or unmanned systems provide challenging international 

issues as we seek terrorists hiding in sanctuaries. We face an immediate future in which domestic 

airspace will be a focus of the debate about the use of drones. We need to wrestle with the legal 

and air space management issues associated with these systems operating over the homeland—

and the pass-off challenges as the systems cross international boundaries. 

Maritime 

While state actors have been the traditional threat in regard to interrupting or denying lines of 

communications and challenging assured access to strategic resources, non-traditional threats are 

(re-) emerging and worthy of regional efforts to diminish if not deny their effect. Maritime 

terrorists, modern day pirates, and criminal organizations are appearing with increasing 

frequency and complicate the defense challenges in the maritime domain. Swarming as an 

operational tactic has become increasingly relevant. Since the “enemy” often enjoys the 

advantages of seizing the initiative in battle, our forces must also adopt similar attributes of 

flexibility and speed (and stealth) to be able to respond in time. This will undoubtedly require 

cooperation and collaboration in information and intelligence sharing as well as potentially 

pooling national assets. 

Expanded interests in off-shore resource development and exploitation also offer opportunity for 

cooperation as well as conflict. Be it energy in the Spratly Islands or the Arctic or minerals ripe 

for deep seabed mining, we will need more cooperation in the future to address the challenges of 

prosperity, peace, limited resource supply, and growing resource demand. 

Land 

Perhaps the two most dramatic examples of this changing domain come from Central and South 

Asia. First, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation felt the pain of its 

curtailed land route through Pakistan using Karachi as a port of entry. The Northern 

Transportation Network, which is much more dependent on air bridges, ultimately proved 

satisfactory—but at a much higher cost. 

Second, as the international community seeks opportunities for the economic development of 

Afghanistan, it is constantly reminded of the challenges of landlocked states. The future is often 

linked to a modern day Silk Road, with trucks replacing camels and pack mules as the preferred 

mode of transportation. Moreover, if Afghanistan can finds ways to unlock its projected mineral 

wealth, then more will flow on these new roads than silk rugs and tea. Still, the inherent 

advantages of maritime transportation make forecasting the economic success of a new Silk 

Road problematic. 

9 
CYBER SPACE 

U.S. policy spokespersons repeatedly identify cyber as the greatest single security threat. 

Cyberspace integration brings new levels of vulnerability and the potential for mass disruption of 

infrastructures or functions across critical military, political and economic targets. Complicating 

the challenge is that the overwhelming majority of targets are in the private sector, demanding a 

degree of cooperation and (classified and sensitive) information sharing across boundaries rarely 

crossed in the past. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) Strategy was released in 2011. It is intended for the whole of 

government and contains five strategic initiatives: 

• Strategic Initiative 1: Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and 

equip so that DOD can take full advantage of cyberspace’s potential 

• Strategic Initiative 2: Employ new defense operating concepts to protect DOD networks 

and systems 

• Strategic Initiative 3: Partner with other U.S. government departments and agencies and 

the private sector to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy 

• Strategic Initiative 4: Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners 

to strengthen collective cybersecurity 

• Strategic Initiative 5: Leverage the nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional cyber 

workforce and rapid technological innovation8

Strategic Initiative 4 addresses directly the need for international cooperation. As the strategy 

notes: 

“The development of international shared situational awareness and warning capabilities will 

enable collective self-defense and collective deterrence. By sharing timely indicators about cyber 

events, threat signatures of malicious code, and information about emerging actors and threats, 

allies and international partners can increase collective cyber defense. Cyberspace is a network 

of networks that includes thousands of ISPs across the globe; no single state or organization can 

maintain effective cyber defenses on its own.”9

At least two specific concerns complicate the problem for international and national security 

specialists: 

• Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)-class malware attacks (targeted, zero-day, stealthy) 

are real world possibilities 

• While cyberspace relies on the digital infrastructure of individual countries, such 

infrastructure is globally connected 

We are faced with similar challenges to those discussed already in the above space section: 

domain incident characterization; attribution determination; firewalls versus active defense 

mechanisms in an asymmetric environment; proportionate retaliation; and the enforcement and 

 

8

 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, pg. 9. 

9

 Ibid. 

10 
adjudication mechanisms. Seeking to support responsible behavior and oppose and dissuade 

those who seek to disrupt network systems, an international cooperation regime would need to 

share warning capabilities, engage in capacity building, and conduct joint training activities.10

Since criminal exploits, military or industrial espionage, critical infrastructure infiltration or 

sabotage, and nationalist hacker protests might represent elements or techniques of cyber 

warfare, figuring out appropriate cooperative as opposed to individual responses will be difficult. 

Such increased sharing and cooperation is far simpler to describe in a strategy document than to 

implement in practice. 

Some of the tough questions that demand common answers follow: 

Incident Characterization Cyberspace 

• Is cyber warfare characterized as simply “an armed conflict conducted in whole or part 

by cyber means?” (JCS Joint Terminology) 

• In addition to “military operations to deny an opposing force the effective use of 

cyberspace systems and weapons,” how does the world commonly address cyber 

intrusions on governmental services, financial enterprises, and media outlets? 

• Would attacks cross the threshold for an act of war if adversaries cause physical damage 

to energy, water, or transportation systems? 

Attribution Determination Cyberspace 

The difficulty in identifying attackers with a high degree of confidence in a timely manner 

complicates deterrence, preemption, and common response strategies. 

• Botnets and proxy servers enable attackers to operate with anonymity and impunity. 

Advanced persistent threats conceal or avoid detection of attacker identities. 

• Challenges in detecting attacks or breaches and attributing correctly delays target 

identification and retaliatory response. 

• Failure to detect intentions, moves and origins stalls preemption and could lead to 

overreactions and miscalculations. 

One solution to the above is resilient, layered, active cyber defenses. Is this a shared 

responsibility? What is the nature of the (financial) burden sharing? 

• Protecting the computers, networks, and control systems in Defense and civilian sectors 

requires a multi-layered, defense-in-depth strategy that wields active security defenses. 

What does active defense mean? Sniping? 

One place to begin is with protecting civilian and military cyberspace physical assets (computers, 

servers, controllers, cables, transmitters, satellites and sensors—the potential targets) and their 

vulnerabilities. Next, national and collective responses are needed to develop capabilities, 

 

10 See National Security Space Strategy, The White House, January 2011 @ 

www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassifiedSummary_Jan20

11.pdf. 

11 
including protocol filters, content sensors, behavioral anomaly scanners, and forensic analysis, to 

detect and stop, or discover and mitigate, malicious activity. Again, we need a significant 

investment in resources for these detection capabilities and a common agreement as to what 

constitutes malicious activity. 

Obviously, this demands public, private, and international partnerships that share threat 

intelligence, analyze vulnerabilities, and identify risk mitigation strategies. 

This is far easier to describe in words than execute in practice, particularly in an environment 

that long operated on a need-to-know basis and very limited sharing across national and 

bureaucratic boundaries. 

Proportionate Retaliation Cyberspace—and the Cross-Domain Challenge 

Even if the attackers are known with certainty, a challenge exists in determining what incidents 

justify responses that involve specific uses of force. 

• What are the thresholds? Substantial deaths, secondary kinetic damage or cascading 

economic losses could justify proportionate retaliation by cyber or kinetic means. 

• Does a right to counter-strike in self defense exist if attackers target financial systems, 

public sectors or utilities such as power grids, communications networks, or critical 

defense industries? 

• If origins are traced and force is the response, can collateral damage be avoided or limited 

to acceptable levels if the intrusions were launched through thousands of hijacked 

computers in third-country or target nation sites? 

• Key role of signaling—how will the various actors in the “partnership” interpret the event 

and construct a common response that clearly and unambiguously signals intent and 

intended consequences ( in order to avoid an escalation spiral)? 

Overlapping Jurisdictions 

Transnational cyber incidents underscore overlapping jurisdictions that pose control concerns for 

prosecution. 

• If an attack originates from servers linked to multiple sources, sufficient evidence might 

not exist to confirm an endorsed attack from a single or multiple sources/governments; 

and if the source is not a nation, what is the response, and against whom is it targeted? 

• Some transnational investigative cooperation is required to enforce a commonly agreed to 

body of criminal laws and to prosecute actors for attacks generated from sovereign 

territory, and it is complicated by routing of attack traffic and information acquired 

through compromised servers in a third-party country. What will be the venue for 

developing that internationally accepted body of law? How will differing standards of 

privacy be reconciled? 

• Some countries may not be willing to compromise sources and methods to reveal 

knowledge. 

• Some countries may not be willing to acknowledge they are blind to a specific event and 

need outside assistance (acknowledging a vulnerability). 

12 
• The best information may be in hands of private sector (CNN effect); there is a growing 

body of research about crowd source in the era of social networks that needs common 

attention11

• Prosecution of enraged citizens, dedicated activists, and criminal elements, many of 

whom reside outside the targeted nation, might not still be feasible given attribution 

challenges and legal costs. All of this returns to the discussion of failed or near-failed 

states and their vulnerabilities. 

One obvious conclusion to reach is that internationally acceptable rules could promote order in 

cyberspace by encouraging states to meet their duties in protecting citizens from crime, 

upholding the right of self-defense, and applying rules of modern warfare. But that will be a long 

and difficult road to steer. 

ROLE OF DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IN CYBERSPACE 

Defense capability development considers how to counter competitors who wage warfare in the 

commons. The identification and fielding of overwhelming force, both as a deterrent and a 

defensive capability, might include the abilities in the following areas: 

• The traditional use of firewalls for data and critical infrastructure protection 

• Vulnerability mapping and anomaly detection 

• Attack mitigation and resiliency 

• Active defenses 

It is worth noting that General James Cartwright (USMC, retired), former Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted in May 2012 that the United States needed to protect its military 

systems, including the stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, from hackers. “That’s the reality of the 

battlefield we are going to be in.” Cartwright went on to add that “in military terms of offense 

and defense we are thinking 90% defense, 10% offense. That is bass-ackwards for us. Our job is 

to kill things....”12 This theme was reinforced with the public release of the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency’s efforts on Plan X. As Ellen Nakashima reports, this is part of an 

“ambitious effort to develop technologies to improve cyberwarfare capabilities, launch effective 

attacks and withstand the likely retaliation.” Or, as she summarizes, this “push marks a new 

offensive phase.”13

One way to move ahead in this new world is to emulate NATO’s Smart Defense concept 

worldwide among partners. According to Henrik Breitenbauch and Bastian Giegerich, Smart 

Defense is a game-changer regarding defense planning and weapons procurement in that it is 

based on true international cooperation. They conclude that international burden sharing is a 

 

11 See for example, “The Rise of Crowdsourcing,” @ www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html. 

12 Walter, Pincus, “Retired General Talks Frankly on Defense,” The Washington Post, May 22, 2012, P.A13, 

reporting General Cartwright’s remarks to the Joint Warfighting Conference in Norflok, VA, on May 15, 2012. 13 Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Builds a Cyber ‘Pan X’,” The Washington Post, May 31, 2012, pp. A1, AA6. 

13 
14 

 

must—and that products and projects must “include partners from two or more allied nations.”14

Some areas for possible collaboration are noted below.

Space Assurance 

• Satellite Protection (redundancy, encryption, hardening, and maneuverability) 

• Space situational awareness (identifying hazards, determining intent, and attributing 

actions) 

• Operationally responsive (rapid reconstitution capability) 

Sea Control 

• Operations at greater ranges against advanced maritime recon-strike networks—the 2nd 

island ring strategy 

• Hard-kill fleet protection 

• Defeat of combat networks 

Air Superiority 

• High velocity ballistic and cruise missile interception—kinetic kills 

• Enemy air defense degradation or destruction of sophisticated integrated air defense 

systems 

• Evolution and revolution of the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act loop as time compression 

and the need to shoot first lead us toward rules of engagement and predetermined firing 

procedures that take humans further from the decision loop to employ lethal force in 

specific situations 

• Penetrating long-range precision attack aircraft that are based outside of immediate kill 

zones 

CONCLUSION 

Non-traditional security threats increasingly occupy the time and resources of national security 

professionals. The cyber domain has the attention of many of us, but other domains also are ripe 

with threats and opportunities for collaboration and cooperation. Given the broad array of threats 

across a number of domains the Asia-Pacific region should expand its emphasis in cooperative 

efforts to reduce the likelihood of war—and if that fails, mitigate its effects. These new threats 

pose enormous challenges in developing a common value base. Following through with a shared 

set of responses will require constant vigilance and perhaps nearly instantaneous or even preemptive actions in order to protect and advance the security, prosperity, and freedom of likeminded nations and peoples. Ultimately, they may require the supreme sacrifice of blood and 

treasure. We must hope that we are up to the challenge. 

14 Henrik Breitenbauch and Bastian Giegerich, “A Smart Opportunity,” Defense News, May 21, 2012, p. 37.