Annual Report 

to the 

President 

and the 

Congress 

William S. Cohen 

Secretary of Defense 

1&\ 

~ 

April1997 
Appendix H 

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 

In October 1994, the President transmitted the UN Law 

of the Sea (LOS) Convention to the Senate for advice 

and consent. DoD has long supported the United States 

becoming a party to the Convention, provided U.S. concerns with its deep seabed mining provisions could be 

adequately addressed. The Deep Seabed Mining Implementing Agreement of July 1994 removed those 

concerns and cleared the way for widespread acceptance 

of the entire Convention, which is of major strategic and 

economic importance to the United States. 

The United States is and will continue to be a global 

power with global interests. Protecting these interests 

will require U.S. security commitments around the 

world and, when vital U.S. interests are threatened, a 

willingness to use American military power. The LOS 

Convention establishes agreed international rules 

regarding freedoms of navigation and flight essential 

for maintaining the global mobility, presence, and 

readiness of U.S. armed forces. The navigational rights 

and freedoms in the Convention are used on a daily basis 

by naval and air forces of the United States, its allies, 

and coalition partners. 

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The United States is moving into a new era where the 

LOS Convention, already having come into force with 

over 100 parties, is gaining more and more importance 

in maintaining the balance between coastal and maritime interests. Most key U.S. maritime allies, including 

Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 

Korea, and the United Kingdom, as well as other 

Organization for Economic Cooperation Development 

countries who, like the United States, had previously 

refused to become a party, have joined or are in the process of joining very soon. 

The United States, being both a maritime and a coastal 

nation with the largest Exclusive Economic Zone in the 

world, has much to gain by becoming a party. In fact, 

the United States risks seriously degrading its ability to 

speak with authority if it fails to join, because the United 

States will then become the world's most important 

maritime power outside the Convention. Receiving the 

Senate's advice and consent at the earliest possible time 

is the next step for ensuring continued American leadership in this vital area. 
Important U.S. navigation and overflight interests in the 

world's oceans continue to be challenged by the 

excessive claims of certain coastal states which assert 

maritime claims inconsistent with international law. 

Such excessive claims are contrary to the clear international consensus demonstrated by the entry into force 

of the UN Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention and the 

large number of States party to the Convention (107 

States as of September 30, 1996). Although not yet a 

party to the LOS Convention, the United States views 

the navigational provisions of the Convention as reflective of customary international law and, as such, available for all nations to enjoy. 

Despite these positive developments in the law of the 

sea, it remains necessary for maritime nations, like the 

United States, to protest excessive claims by coastal 

states through diplomatic channels and to exercise 

Country Excessive Claims Challenged 

Appendix I 

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 

navigation and overflight rights in disputed areas. The 

United States Freedom of Navigation program has 

challenged excessive claims to counter any argument 

that such claims are valid due to acquiescence over time. 

Since its inception in 1979, the Freedom of Navigation 

program has filed over 100 diplomatic protests and 

conducted over 300 operational assertions against 

excessive claims. 

In FY 1996, the U.S. armed forces conducted operational assertions against the excessive maritime claims 

of the countries listed in the table below. In addition, 

military vessels and aircraft frequently conducted 

routine transits on, over, and under international straits, 

such as the Straits of Gibraltar, Hormuz, and Malacca. 

Over 50 air, surface, and subsurface transits through the 

archipelagic sea lanes of Indonesia and the Philippines 

were conducted in accordance with the LOS Convention. 

Bangladesh Excessive straight baselines; claimed security zone, claimed territorial airspace beyond 

12 nautical miles (nm) 

Burma 

Cambodia 

China 

Egypt 

India 

Iran 

Maldives 

Oman 

Pakistan 

Philippines 

Sudan 

Vietnam 

Yemen 

Excessive straight baselines; claimed security zone, claimed territorial airspace beyond 12 nm 

Excessive straight baselines; claimed security zone, claimed territorial airspace beyond 12 nm 

Prior permission for warship to enter the territorial sea 

Excessive straight baselines, prior permission to enter the territorial sea 

Prior permission for warship to enter the territorial sea 

Excessive straight baselines; prior permission for warship to enter the territorial sea 

Excessive straight baselines; prior permission to enter the territorial sea 

Excessive straight baselines; prior permission to enter the territorial sea 

Prior permission for warships to enter the territorial sea 

Excessive straight baselines; claims archipelagic waters as internal waters 

Prior permission for warship to enter the territorial sea 

Excessive straight baselines; claimed security zone 

Prior permission for warship to enter the territorial sea 

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