Art of War Papers

The Rhodesian African Rifles

The Growth and Adaptation

of a Multicultural Regiment through the

Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980

 Michael P. Stewart, Major, US Army 

 Command and General Staff College

 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
The cover photo courtesy of the Library of Congress is that of General 

Dwight Eisenhower giving orders to American paratroopers in England.
The Rhodesian African Rifles

The Growth and Adaptation

of a Multicultural Regiment through the

Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980

A Thesis Presented To the Faculty of the US Army

Command and General Staff College in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements For The

Degree

Master of Military Art and Science

Military History

by

Michael P. Stewart, Major, US Army

B.S., The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, 1998

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2011-02
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

 Stewart, Michael P.

 The Rhodesian African Rifles : the growth and adaptation of a 

multicultural regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980 / by 

Michael P. Stewart, Major, US Army.

 pages cm

 M.A. US Army Command and General Staff College 2012

1. Southern Rhodesia. Army. Rhodesian African Rifles--History. 2. 

Zimbabwe--History, Military--20th century. 3. Zimbabwe--History--

Chimurenga War, 1966-1980. I. Title. II. Title: Growth and adaptation of 

a multicultural regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980. 

 UA869.Z55S74

2012

 968.91’04--dc23

 2012043963

2012

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover 

a wide variety of military history topics. The views 

expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the 

author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department 

of the Army or the Department of Defense. A full list 

of CSI Press publications available for downloading 

can be found at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/

index.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as 

an official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official 

seal on any republication without the express written permission of the 

Director of CSI.

Editor

C. Fischer
iii

Abstract

The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth And Adaptation Of 

A Multicultural Regiment Through The Rhodesian Bush War, 

1965-1980, Major Michael P. Stewart

The Rhodesian African Rifles overcame profoundly divisive racial and 

tribal differences among its members because a transcendent “regimental 

culture” superseded the disparate cultures of its individual soldiers and 

officers. The RAR’s culture grew around the traditions of the British 

regimental system, after which the RAR was patterned. The soldiers of 

the RAR, regardless of racial or tribal background, identified themselves 

first as soldiers and members of the regiment, before their individual race 

and tribe. Regimental history and traditions, as well as shared hardships 

on deployments and training were mechanisms that forced officers and 

soldiers to see past differences. The RAR is remarkable because these bonds 

stayed true through to the end of the war, through incredible pressure on 

black Rhodesians to succumb to the black nationalist groups and cast off 

a government that was portrayed to them as oppressive, racist and hateful. 

Through the end of the Bush War, 1965-1980, RAR soldiers remained 

loyal and steadfast to their regiment, and that must be their legacy. In the 

end, the values of the government were irrelevant. It was the regiment that 

drew these men in, and their loyalty was more to their comrades and their 

heritage than to any particular government or cause.
iv

Objectives of the Art of War Scholars Program

The Art of War Scholars Program is a laboratory for critical thinking. 

It offers a select group of students a range of accelerated, academically 

rigorous graduate level courses that promote analysis, stimulate the desire 

for life-long learning, and reinforce academic research skills. Art of War 

graduates will not be satisfied with facile arguments; they understand 

the complexities inherent in almost any endeavor and develop the tools 

and fortitude to confront such complexities, analyze challenges, and 

independently seek nuanced solutions in the face of those who would opt 

for cruder alternatives. Through the pursuit of these outcomes, the Art of 

War Scholars Program seeks to improve and deepen professional military 

education. 

The Art of War Program places contemporary operations (such as those 

in Iraq and Afghanistan) in a historical framework by examining earlier 

military campaigns. Case studies and readings have been selected to show 

the consistent level of complexity posed by military campaigns throughout 

the modern era. Coursework emphasizes the importance of understanding 

previous engagements in order to formulate policy and doctrinal response 

to current and future campaigns. 

One unintended consequence of military history education is the 

phenomenon of commanders and policy makers “cherry picking” 

history—that is, pointing to isolated examples from past campaigns 

to bolster a particular position in a debate, without a comprehensive 

understanding of the context in which such incidents occurred. This trend 

of oversimplification leaves many historians wary of introducing these 

topics into broader, more general discussion. The Art of War program seeks 

to avoid this pitfall by a thorough examination of context. As one former 

student stated: “The insights gained have left me with more questions than 

answers but have increased my ability to understand greater complexities 

of war rather than the rhetorical narrative that accompanies cursory study 

of any topic.”

Professor Michael Howard, writing “The Use and Abuse of Military 

History” in 1961, proposed a framework for educating military officers in 

the art of war that remains unmatched in its clarity, simplicity, and totality. 

The Art of War program endeavors to model his plan:

Three general rules of study must therefore be borne in mind by the 

officer who studies military history as a guide to his profession and who 

wishes to avoid pitfalls. First, he must study in width. He must observe the 

way in which warfare has developed over a long historical period. Only 

by seeing what does change can one deduce what does not; and as much 

as can be learnt from the great discontinuities of military history as from 

the apparent similarities of the techniques employed by the great captains 
v

through the ages....Next he must study in depth. He should take a single 

campaign and explore it thoroughly, not simply from official histories, 

but from memoirs, letters, diaries. . . until the tidy outlines dissolve and 

he catches a glimpse of the confusion and horror of real experience... 

and, lastly, he must study in context. Campaigns and battles are not like 

games of chess or football matches, conducted in total detachment from 

their environment according to strictly defined rules. Wars are not tactical 

exercises writ large. They are...conflicts of societies, and they can be 

fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting 

them. The roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the 

battlefield, in political, social, and economic factors which explain why 

armies are constituted as they are, and why their leaders conduct them in 

the way they do.... It must not be forgotten that the true use of history, 

military or civil... is not to make men clever for the next time; it is to make 

them wise forever.

Gordon B. Davis, Jr.

Brigadier General, US Army

Deputy Commanding General

 CAC LD&E

Daniel Marston

DPhil (Oxon) FRHistS

Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair 

 in the Art of War

US Army Command & General 

 Staff College
vi

Acknowledgments

This work would not have been possible without the efforts of many 

others on my behalf. First and always, I must thank my wife, Jennifer, 

for her unwavering support and sacrifice during the many long hours of 

research and writing that kept me away from my family. Thanks also to 

Dr. Dan Marston, Dr. Nick Murray, and Dr. Scott Stephenson for your 

guidance and counsel, and to my colleagues at the Command and General 

Staff College Art of War Scholars Program--Eric, Darrell, Mike, Marcus, 

Art and Half-Pint. I also appreciate the gracious assistance of eminent 

Rhodesian historian, Dr. Richard Wood, who provided maps, insight, and 

continued correspondence throughout this project.

I am eternally grateful to the veterans of the Rhodesian Army and 

Rhodesian African Rifles, many of whom I had the privilege of meeting 

during the course of this study. These are remarkable men whose hospitality, 

openness and honesty were tremendous. I only hope this work is adequate 

representation of a worthy and noble regiment.
vii

Table Of Contents

Chapters

Abstract................................................................................................iii

Objectives............................................................................................. iv

Acknowledgments................................................................................ vi

Table Of Contents............................................................................... vii

Acronyms ...........................................................................................viii

Chapter 1 Introduction ........................................................................... 1

Chapter 2 Why Did They Fight? .......................................................... 13

Chapter 3 Phase One: 1965-1972......................................................... 31

Chapter 4 Phase Two: 1972-1974......................................................... 45

Chapter 5 Phase Three: 1974-1977 ...................................................... 65

Chapter 6 Phase Four: 1977-1979........................................................ 83

Chapter 7 Phase Five: April 1979-April 1981...................................... 93

Chapter 8 Conclusions ....................................................................... 107

Bibliography ......................................................................................115

Figures

Chapter 1

 Figure 1. Ready for the Regiment ..................................................... 9

 Figure 2. Proud, professional RAR NCOs...................................... 10

Chapter 5

 Figure 1. RAR machine gunner....................................................... 70

 Figure 2. RAR paras waiting for a fireforce call-up........................ 76

Chapter 6

 Figure 1. Mrs. Rule, the widow of Lieutenant Colonel Kim Rule.. 89

Chapter 7

 Figure 1. RAR soldiers at Brady Barracks.................................... 104

Chapter 8

 Figure 1. Map of Rhodesia.............................................................110

 Figure 2. Rhodesian population, 1969 ...........................................111

 Figure 3. Rhodesian Security Forces Operational Boundaries ......112
viii

Acronyms

2IC Second In Command (Executive Officer)

ANC African National Council

BSAP British South Africa Police

CIO Central Intelligence Organization

CO Commanding Officer 

COIN Counterinsurgency

ComOps Combined Operations

FRELIMO

(Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique) Liberation 

Front of Mozambique

FROLIZI Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe

FPLM

(Forças Populares para o Libertaçåo de 

Moçambique) Popular Forces for the Liberation of 

Mozambique

GOC General Officer Commanding

JMC Joint Military Command

JOC Joint Operation Centre

KAR King’s African Rifles

NRR Northern Rhodesia Regiment

OAU Organization of African Unity

OC Officer Commanding 

OCC Operations Coordination Committee

OP Observation Post

PATU Police Anti-Terrorist Unit

PF Patriotic Front

PRAW Police Reserve Air Wing

PWO Platoon Warrant Officer

PV Protected Village

RAF Rhodesian Air Force

RAR Rhodesian African Rifles

RENAMO 

(Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) Mozambican 

National Resistance

RhAF Rhodesian Air Force

RLI Rhodesian Light Infantry

RNR Rhodesia Native Regiment

RSF Rhodesian Security Forces

RSM Regimental Sergeant Major

RR Rhodesia Regiment (after UDI)

RRAF Royal Rhodesian Air Force

RRR Royal Rhodesia Regiment (prior to UDI)

SAANC South African African National Congress

SADF South African Defence Force

SAP South African Police
ix

SAS Special Air Service

SB Special Branch

TTL Tribal Trust Land

UANC United African National Council

UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence

WO Warrant Officer 

ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army

ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union

ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union

ZIPA Zimbabwe People’s Army

ZIPRA Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army

1

Chapter 1

Introduction

During 65 years of regimental history, men of different races 

with a common ideal had worked and fought together in a spirit 

of true comradeship and mutual esteem. In the process, a respect 

and understanding evolved between them which comes only to 

men who face conflict together and which cannot be described. 

Without exception, all who served with the regiment were proud 

of it and would testify to the unique and profound effect it had on 

their lives.

— Alexandre Binda, Masodja: the History of the Rhodesian African 

Rifles and its Forerunner, the Rhodesia Native Regiment

The Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) overcame profoundly divisive 

racial and tribal differences among its members because a transcendent 

“regimental culture”-described above as a “common ideal”-superseded the 

disparate cultures of its individual soldiers and officers. The RAR’s culture 

grew around the traditions of the British regimental system, after which 

the RAR was patterned. The soldiers of the RAR, regardless of racial or 

tribal background, identified themselves first as soldiers and members of 

the regiment, before their individual race and tribe. Regimental history and 

traditions, as well as shared hardships on deployments and training were 

mechanisms that forced officers and soldiers to see past such differences. 

These factors enabled the RAR to withstand the racial and tribal tensions 

of the Rhodesian Bush War (1965-1980) and thrive as a combat effective 

and competent military force. The history of the RAR provides an example 

of how military culture, effectively developed, can prevail over cultural 

clashes among groups of mixed identity. 

Cultural backdrop

The RAR principally recruited from three groups of people within 

Rhodesia: the officer corps primarily came from the white Rhodesian 

population, while the ordinary soldiers and most noncommissioned 

officers were from the Ndebele (Matabele) tribe of southwest Rhodesia 

and the Shona (Mashona) tribe of the north, east, and central portions of 

the country. 

The ability of the RAR to bring together disparate racial groups is 

altogether more impressive when one remembers that the Ndebele 

and Shona tribes fought each other shortly before the arrival of whites 

in the country. The Ndebele were descendants of the Zulus, who lived 
2

further south, and they arrived in the southwestern portion of what would 

become Rhodesia around 1837. The warlike Ndebele immediately came 

to dominate the relatively disorganized Shona tribes of the area, raiding 

villages and generally treating Shona as inferior tribes within the Ndebele 

kingdom. Several decades of internecine rivalry ensued, until the arrival 

of white settlers in 1890.1

The 1890 arrival of Cecil John Rhodes’ pioneer column began to establish 

Southern Rhodesia-a British protectorate-based on mining rights dubiously 

granted to his British South African Company by King Lobengula of the 

Ndebele. Several years of sporadic fighting between the native tribes and 

Rhodes’ pioneers ended in 1897 when the British South Africa Company 

defeated a tribal uprising. White settlers quickly established a government 

and economic system such that by 1931, most of the land and power 

belonged to the 50,000 whites, while the one million black Africans found 

themselves poor, uneducated and largely left out of the political process.2

The dynamics of racial and tribal differences in Rhodesia were rooted 

in this conflict, and were left simmering from the 19th century through to 

the 1961 nationalist movements. By 1961, the cause of black nationalism 

in Southern Rhodesia was led by the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 

a predominantly Ndebele but tribally mixed group. In 1963, a faction of 

ZAPU split off to form the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), 

which became a predominantly Shona group. These two movements 

derived from the same tribal populations as the RAR, yet they were never 

as successful at setting aside tribal conflicts and rivalries as the RAR was. 

Using only their own tribal culture to guide behavior, the soldiers of the 

RAR most likely could not have formed a cohesive unit-ZAPU and ZANU 

never did. It took a more powerful culture-a regimental one-to unite these 

disparate elements into one cohesive unit.

The Rhodesian African Rifles: a Historical Overview

The RAR was the oldest and largest regiment in the Rhodesian army. 

Its roots dated to the 1916 formation of the Rhodesia Native Regiment 

(RNR), which fought for the British in East Africa during World War 

I. When the regiment stood down in 1919, a cadre of the RNR formed 

the Askari platoon of the British South Africa Police (BSAP). When the 

Empire called again, in 1940, this cadre formed the nucleus around which 

Lieutenant Colonel Francis John Wane built the Rhodesian African Rifles.3

After training in Northern Rhodesia, Kenya and Tanganikya (Tanzania), 

the regiment deployed to Burma in 1944, where it distinguished itself 

in the fighting during the Arakan campaign, and again at Taungup and 

Tanlwe Chaung.4
3

After the Burma Campaign, Major Walter Walker (later General Sir 

Walter Walker KCB, CBE, DSO & bar), said of the RAR:

The conduct of the askari, most of whom had never experienced 

enemy fire before, deserves a lasting tribute. Their energy and 

endurance on the march and on patrol through some of the worst 

country in the Arakan, their constancy and discipline under the 

stress of persistent mortar and artillery fire, and their cheerfulness 

throughout the appalling weather conditions, which developed in 

the latter stages of the operation, were beyond praise.5

Further praise for the RAR came from a captured Japanese officer’s 

diary, where he noted, “[t]he enemy soldiers are not from Britain, but are 

from Africa. Because of their beliefs they are not afraid to die, so, even 

if their comrades have fallen, they keep on advancing as if nothing had 

happened. They have excellent physique and are very brave, so fighting 

against these soldiers is somewhat troublesome.”6

After World War II, the RAR remained active, guarding Royal Air 

Force training bases in Rhodesia, before briefly deploying to the Suez in 

1952. After the regiment returned home from Egypt, Queen Elizabeth II 

presented them with the Queen’s and Regimental Colors on 12 July 1953.7

The regiment deployed again, this time to Malaya from 1956-8, as part of 

the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland fighting alongside the forces of 

other Commonwealth nations. While in Malaya, the RAR proved adept at 

jungle warfare, honing its skills hunting down communist terrorists in the 

southern Malayan province of Johore.8

After returning home again in 1958, the RAR was assigned to “duties in 

the aid of the civil power,” and over the next several years was deployed 

into Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where civil unrest was unraveling 

the Central African Federation - a British colonial administrative unit 

comprised of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 

With the breakup of the federation in 1963, three new states emergedZambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia), Malawi (formerly Nyasaland) and 

Rhodesia (formerly Southern Rhodesia).9

The RAR returned to the control of the Rhodesian Army in 1963, just 

as ZAPU and ZANU were beginning increasingly militant campaigns to 

overthrow the white Rhodesian government. ZAPU and ZANU each built 

military organizations, called the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army 

(ZIPRA) and Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), 

respectively. Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence from Britain 

on 11 November, 1965. From that date until 1980, the RAR served as 
4

a critical element of Rhodesian security forces, conducting hundreds of 

operations in the bush alongside other Rhodesian troops. 

Of the RAR’s performance during the Bush War, Army Commander 

Lieutenant General G. Peter Walls said:

The men of this regiment are above faction or tribe or politics. 

They are an elite group of fighting men, both European and 

African, to whom the country owes an incalculable debt for their 

dedication and bravery. And their moral courage in the face of 

insidious assaults from those who would undermine their sense of 

purpose is nothing short of admirable. . . . But not only are they 

brave and efficient soldiers. Their spirited approach to their task 

and their joie-de-vivre, their sheer love of serving are an example 

which many would do well to emulate.10

When the ZANU-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), led by Robert Mugabe, 

took control of the country following elections in 1980, the nation became 

Zimbabwe, and the RAR became the 11th, 22nd, and 33rd Infantry 

Battalions of the Zimbabwe National Army. The regiment continued to 

serve Zimbabwe as a multicultural organization, while nationalist ZIPRA 

and ZANLA factions fought one another based on tribal differences and 

feuds. In fact, the RAR intervened in clashes between elements of ZIPRA 

and ZANLA in holding camps after the elections.11 Officers and soldiers 

of the RAR began to leave the regiment as the command of the Zimbabwe 

National Army ordered the unit to sever its links to its traditions in order 

to incorporate the largely untrained and incompetent soldiers and leaders 

from ZIPRA and ZANLA into its ranks. The RAR officially disbanded in 

April 1981.12

Throughout its history the RAR served with distinction, first for the 

British Crown and the Commonwealth, then for its own country on its 

own soil, and ultimately-briefly-under the command of its former enemy, 

Robert Mugabe. Throughout all the changes and amidst all the competing 

cultural influences, the RAR remained a steadfast, professional military 

force. It was precisely this history and lineage that established the 

regimental culture of the RAR.

Symbols, Training, and Shared Hardships

The symbols, training and shared hardships in the RAR enhanced values 

of loyalty, pride, and discipline, as well as the importance of regimental 

identity over that of the individual. Symbols, such as the regimental colors 

and badge, embodied the history and nature of the regiment. Training 

and deployment bonded the individual members of the regiment together 

through shared hardship and accomplishment.
5

For any regiment, the colors are the most visible symbol of the unit’s 

history. The RAR was no exception. When the Queen presented colors 

to the RAR in 1953, she publicly and permanently acknowledged the 

regiment and major campaigns in which it earned honors.13 The Queen 

Mother concluded her speech at the presentation of the RAR colors with 

the following words:

In the short history of the Rhodesian African Rifles you have 

proved by your service in Burma that you can hold your own 

in battle. By your service since the war you have shown that 

you carry your duties towards the Queen, the Colony, and its 

people, with smartness and efficiency. I know how many of 

you volunteered to serve in the Middle East when help was 

needed. By this, you have shown that you are ready to take 

your share in the welfare of the Commonwealth, by all these 

things you have won the honour of carrying your Colours. I 

present them in recognition of your loyalty in the past, and in 

the faith that you and those that follow you in the Regiment 

will always guard its tradition and strive to bring new honour 

to its name.14

In addition to the battle honors, the Queen’s colors represented the 

regiment’s allegiance to the British sovereign, symbolized in the crown and 

the interposed crosses of St. Andrew and St. George on the Union Jack.15

The single icon of the colors provided every member of the regiment, from 

the commanding officer to the newest private, a reminder of exactly what 

their predecessors had done. “The colours emblazoned with battle honours, 

commemorating some of the gallant deeds performed by members of the 

regiment, are a visible record. They keep a feeling of pride in past and 

present soldiers.”16 By learning the history behind the words and symbols 

on the colors, as instructed during their training, soldiers understood what 

was expected of them and they took pride in their regiment.

If the colors embodied the history, the RAR badge displayed the truly 

multi-cultural nature of the regiment. This badge, devised within months 

of the establishment of 1st Battalion in 1940:

consisted of the Matabele shield (I-Hawu), in brown and white, 

upon which was vertically placed a knobkierie (nkudu) and 

crossed assegais. Across the bottom left to top right was the Shona 

digging spear (Museve) with the narrow sharp blade and an iron 

pick at the base of the shaft. Crossing from bottom right to top 

left of the badge was the broad-bladed fighting spear of the Zulu 
6

warrior (Umkonto). The badge was supported by a scroll bearing 

the inscription Rhodesian African Rifles, with black lettering on a 

red background.17

By capturing essential elements of the Ndebele and Shona cultures, the 

regimental badge symbolized the unity of these two historically hostile 

tribes within the RAR. The RAR created a new cultural symbol in which 

its soldiers, regardless of race or tribe, could take great pride. By breaking 

down the tribal barriers between individuals, this symbol allowed RAR 

soldiers to build loyalty, both to the regiment and between themselves.

The fighting spirit of the RAR evolved during its training and deployments. 

Training was tough, and shared by all members of the regiment-officers, 

soldiers and noncommissioned officers alike. Retired Australian Brigadier 

John Essex-Clark recalls his time as a lieutenant and platoon commander 

in the RAR, training his platoon to deploy to Malaya in 1956:

We snap-shot at moving targets many times a week. The twenty-five 

metre ranges were less than a hundred metres away and were used day 

and night. I taught my askari to aim very low, at the crotch area, so they 

would hit the chest in the gloom of the jungle. Within a few months 

every askari in my platoon could, while blindfold, strip, clean, assemble, 

load and fire at level targets in front of them. Their immediate action 

drills on automatic weapons were instantaneous and they could fix faults 

instinctively. They could pack up their gear and break camp at night 

within minutes. They could slip stealthily into ambush within seconds 

and most of them could hit with ease a moving ‘figure’ target at twentyfive metres.18

Training remained paramount through the Bush War, particularly on 

marksmanship, as most African soldiers had little experience with firearms 

before joining the army. In conducting training, the RAR soldiers learned 

the capabilities of their officers, and learned to trust them.19

Loyalty to officers in the RAR was paramount. In 1977, when the 

regiment was designated for parachute training, many of the men had 

never even seen an aircraft before, let alone jumped from one. Their 

motivation to do such an unnatural task did not come from their faith 

in the aircraft, parachute or any training-in the end, as one RAR officer 

described, it was a matter of trust between the officer and his men. After 

explaining how everything functioned on the aircraft and the parachute, as 

well as detailing drop altitudes and possible malfunctions, one officer was 

reminded of the simplicity of the matter when a soldier said, “Ishe, if you 

go, I will follow.”20
7

The regiment deployed frequently throughout its history, particularly 

during the 1965-1980 Bush War while fighting ZIPRA and ZANLA. The 

rotation schedule during the Bush War was typically a six week deployment 

in the bush, followed by a ten day period to rest, recover and refit, then 

back out for six more weeks.21 There simply was no time for racism in the 

RAR, nor was there room to accommodate tribal feuds. RAR soldiers and 

officers worried more about the level of training and competence of their 

men than tribal backgrounds. This cannot be said for ZIPRA and ZANLA. 

Tribal loyalties divided the two nationalist communist armies, and they 

proved unable to overcome their differences, even when mutual interest 

should have brought them together. In its heritage, symbols, training, and 

deployments, the RAR created an overriding organizational culture that 

transcended tribal and racial differences by bringing diverse individual 

backgrounds into a common culture.22

The deep sense of loyalty between officers and soldiers remains 

immediately apparent among former members of the regiment today. An 

American Special Forces Vietnam veteran and former RAR company 2IC,23

commented that “[f]or those whites who served with African Soldiers in 

The Rhodesian Bush War there remains something that can best be called 

a ‘Forever Sadness’ caused by the separation after ‘Independence’ in the 

New Zimbabwe in March of 1980. I have a lump in my throat just thinking 

of the loss.”24

Purpose and Conduct of this study

The purpose of this study is to explore the regimental culture of the RAR, 

and to trace how that culture evolved throughout the Bush War, from 1965 

to 1980. The aim is to answer the question: why would a black African fight 

to sustain a white-rule government in Africa? Logically, there should have 

been little willingness among the black population of Rhodesia to fightoften against family members-on behalf of a government that offered little 

social or political opportunity for blacks. The answer lies in the traditions, 

history, and culture of the regiment. Simply put, black soldiers in the RAR 

did not fight for the white government; they fought out of loyalty to their 

regiment and to each other. This is an attempt to explore and describe the 

depth of that loyalty.

The author, an active duty US Army officer and combat veteran, has 

objectively researched the history and traditions of the RAR (particularly 

during the Bush War of 1965-1980) to develop this study. The difficulties 

of developing and training multi-cultural military organizations present 

very real and current challenges to the US military-in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
8

and increasingly in our expanding security cooperation role in Africa. This 

study offers insights into one successful historical example of a multicultural military unit, the RAR.

In conducting this study, the author interviewed over 30 Rhodesian Army 

veterans in South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Their 

memories and insights guide much of the discussion here. These veterans 

were mostly former officers in the RAR, although their ranks vary from 

warrant officer to major general and their regiments include the RAR, 

Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), Special Air Service (SAS), Rhodesia 

Regiment (RR), Rhodesian Army Education Corps, Grey’s Scouts, and 

Selous Scouts. Many served in multiple regiments, some also served in 

other colonial regiments (such as the King’s African Rifles and Northern 

Rhodesia Regiment), and most also served on the Rhodesian Army staff or 

the School of Infantry at least once in their careers. Several were company, 

battalion, and brigade commanders through key periods of the Bush War. 

The critical missing piece of this research is the perspective of the black 

soldiers who served in the regiment. Time and circumstance did not allow 

interviews with these men during this study, but future studies in this field 

must capture their insights.

The insights gathered from interviews are injected into the context and 

events of the Bush War through the five phases of that war. These phases 

were first introduced by Dr. J. R. T. Wood (a former Rhodesia Regiment 

soldier and eminent historian on Rhodesia) in his book Counterstrike from 

the Sky. The events and details surrounding developments in each phase, 

as they affected the RAR, are described for the benefit of a reader who 

may have little prior knowledge of Rhodesia or the Rhodesian Bush War. 

The aim is not to portray a complete picture of how Rhodesia lost the war. 

Other historical accounts have addressed such ideas,25 and many of these 

works may be found in the bibliography. The aim of this study is simply 

to follow how these events and details influenced (or did not influence) 

change in the culture of the RAR through the war.

Where referenced, the interviews are kept confidential: that is, the names 

of the interviewed officers are not disclosed here. This is not at the request 

of the men interviewed, but in adherence to the policies of the Art of War 

Scholars Program at the US Army Command and General Staff College. 
9

Figure 1. Ready for the Regiment. Intake of new soldiers at Depot RAR

Source: CE20110908G0001, former RAR officer (photo by Robal Studios).
10

Figure 2. Proud, professional RAR NCOs: Standing from left: Colonel C. B. 

McCullagh MBE, RSM N. Tumbare, Command Sergeant Major Obert Veremu, 

Command Sergeant Major Pfupa, Command Sergeant Major Gobe, 

Command Sergeant Major Kisi and CSM Kephasi

Source: Alexandre Binda, Masodja: The History of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its 

forerunner, the Rhodesia Native Regiment (Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 2007), 257.
11

Notes

1. Mark R. Lipschultz and R. Kent Rasmussen, Dictionary of African 

Historical Biography (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 

167-8. 

2. J. R. T. Wood, “Countering the CHIMURENGA: The Rhodesian 

Counterinsurgency Campaign,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, eds. 

Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 192.

3. Alexandre Binda, Masodja: the History of the Rhodesian African Rifles 

and its Forerunner, the Rhodesia Native Regiment (Durban: 30 Degrees South 

Publishers, 2007), 41; Christopher Owen, The Rhodesian African Rifles (London: 

Leo Cooper Ltd., 1970), 2.

4. Binda, Masodja, 64-68.

5. Owen, 63. 

6. Owen.

7. Binda, Masodja, 109; J. R. T. Wood, The War Diaries of Andre Dennison

(Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1989), 372.

8. Binda, Masodja, 115-133.

9. Binda, 169-173.

10. Binda, Masodja, 268. 

11. Binda, 380-389. At Entumbane, the RAR stood between ZIPRA and 

ZANLA elements of the newly created Zimbabwe Army and prevented escalation 

of the fighting into a full-scale civil war. This is covered in more detail in Chapter 

7.

12. Wood, War Diaries, 372; Binda, Masodja, 389.

13. Binda, Masodja, 225. The four battle honors earned by the RAR by 1953 

were: East Africa 1916-18, Arakan Beaches, Taungup, and Burma 1944-45.

14. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother (speech to the Rhodesian 

African Rifles, 12 July 1953).

15. Unlike the RLI, the RAR never adapted the green and white Rhodesian 

President’s Color to replace the Queen’s color after UDI. 

16. Wood, War Diaries, 14.

17. Wood., 13.

18. John Essex-Clark, Maverick Soldier: an Infantryman’s Story (Burwood, 

Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1991), 34.

19. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview by author, Durban, 

Republic of South Africa, 13 September 2011.

20. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview; CF20110920S0001, 
12

former RAR officer, interview by author, London, England, 20 September 2011; 

CE20110915B0001, Former RAR and SAS officer, interview by author, Cape 

Town, Republic of South Africa, 15 September 2011. Ishe meant “sir” or “chief,” 

and was the term of respect from RAR soldiers to their officers. 

21. CE20110913M0001. This schedule was also reiterated in many other 

interviews with numerous former RAR officers.

22. CE20110909T0001, former RAR officer, interview by author, 9 

September 2011; CF20110920S0001, former RAR officer, interview.

23. 2IC is an abbreviation for “Second in Command.” In the Rhodesian 

Army, as in the British Army, the 2IC for a company or battalion had essentially 

the same duties and responsibilities as an Executive Officer (XO) in the American 

military structure. 

24. CG20110927S0001, former RAR officer, interview by author, Portland, 

Oregon, 27 September 2011.

25. Such broader analytical works include J. K. Cilliers’ Counterinsurgency 

in Rhodesia; Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin’s The Rhodesian War: 

A Military History; J. R. T. Wood’s article in Counterinsurgency in Modern 

Warfare; and Greg Mills and Grahame Wilson’s RUSI article, “Who Dares Loses? 

Assessing Rhodesia’s Counterinsurgency Experience,” to list a few.
13

Chapter 2

Why Did They Fight?

The white Rhodesians refused to accept an effective safeguard 

mechanism [of unimpeded movement toward majority rule] and 

instead, in a referendum on July 20, 1969, approved republic status 

which will end all ties with Great Britain as well as constitutional 

proposals which lay the groundwork for perpetuation of white 

control. The white minority-4 percent of the population of Southern 

Rhodesia-made the decision; no more than a handful of the blacks 

voted. The minority of the 4.8 million blacks in Southern Rhodesia 

who are politically active have been expressing their opposition to 

the consolidation of white rule in two ways. A small segment have 

directly supported the liberation groups. . . . Another small group 

has campaigned internally to get as many Africans as possible on 

the voter rolls.

— US National Security Council, Study in Response to National 

Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern Africa, December 1969

When one studies the RAR’s actions in the Rhodesian Bush War, one 

simple question surfaces along with a complicated answer: why would a 

black African soldier voluntarily fight to preserve a white-rule government 

in Africa? The above excerpt from a USNational Security Study in December 

1969 highlights the essence of the Rhodesian struggle as it was perceived 

outside of Rhodesia. Notably, a third group of black Rhodesians-those 

who supported the government and joined the security forces to preserve 

it-is not considered. According to the USNational Security Council study, 

a “politically active” black Rhodesian had little cause to support the white 

Rhodesian government against the nationalist movements. Many did, 

however. By the end of the war, Rhodesian Security Forces boasted three 

battalions (nearly 80 percent of the regular army) of predominantly-black 

RAR, and many more RAR battalions could have been established. In 

addition, many of the BSAP policemen were black, and national service 

eventually placed black soldiers in the Rhodesia Regiment.1

To the RAR soldier, the regiment was a source of income, stability, and 

family pride-in many instances, he was doing the same job his father and 

grandfather had done before him. In the regiment, the RAR soldier was a 

respected member of a team rich in traditions and proud of its history. He 

was a part of a unique culture all its own. He was not a second-class citizen, 

nor was he viewed as inferior or incapable.2

 Leaders in the RAR-black 
14

and white-were tough, experienced, capable men who led by example 

and from the front, as do most good leaders in professional armies. While 

factors such as income, stability and family pride brought recruits to the 

RAR, they stayed and fought because of loyalty to the regiment and to 

their leaders.

Black Nationalism versus White-Rule

In exploring why black Africans fought for the Rhodesian government, 

one may ask its opposite question: why would they not? The seeds of black 

nationalism were well established by the 1960s. The white government 

offered little incentive, few opportunities for economic or political 

inclusion, and was viewed by many as a racist, colonial power.3

Black nationalist movements in Rhodesia dated back to the 1920s. 

Several incidents, including a 1948 general strike in Bulawayo, indicated 

a growing nationalist undercurrent within black Rhodesian society. The 

various movements for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia under the 

Central African Federation eventually became the Southern Rhodesian 

African National Congress (SRANC) in 1957 under the leadership of 

Joshua Nkomo. After it was banned in 1960, the SRANC reformed briefly 

as the National Democratic Party, then as ZAPU in 1961. ZAPU’s agenda 

took a much more militant and hardline stance on immediate majority rule 

than its predecessors, conducting attacks on symbols of power structure 

and vulnerable white targets. This led to a ban on ZAPU in 1962, and the 

arrest of most of its leaders, including Nkomo. In 1963, Ndabiningi Sithole 

and others disaffected with Nkomo’s leadership of ZAPU (including 

Robert Mugabe, Herbert Chitepo and Rex Nhongo) split off and formed 

ZANU, which committed itself to “a nonracial, democratic socialist, panAfricanist state within the British Commonwealth,”4

 and pursued an even 

more hardline, militant movement for immediate majority rule. ZAPU 

and ZANU were Rhodesian manifestations of the larger black nationalist 

movements spreading across the African continent in the “post-colonial” 

period that began after World War II. By 1963, nationalist movements in 

Africa had swept from Algeria to Zambia, with varying degrees of successful 

transition.5 As British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan famously stated in 

1960, “The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether 

we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. 

We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account 

of it.”6

On the surface, ZAPU and ZANU represented a revolutionary movement 

and were a part of the “wind of change.” They promised a fundamental 
15

overhaul of the structure and governance of Rhodesia from minority 

(white) to majority (black) rule. They promised black Rhodesians their 

rightful share of the wealth and prosperity held by the tiny minority of 

whites under the Rhodesian system. Where that promise proved insufficient 

to secure support, they threatened and exacted horrific reprisals for any 

blacks who failed to support their struggle. Beneath the veil of good will, 

the true potential ugliness within the promise of ZANU and ZAPU was 

apparent to Rhodesia: to hand governance over to majority rule before that 

majority was ready to manage the country was inadvisable.7 For Rhodesia, 

a quick glance north at the examples of the Congo, Zambia and Malawi 

provided ample evidence of the consequences of rushed majority rule. This 

coming wave of uncertainty and limited successful examples of transition 

to majority rule surely drove some politically aware black Rhodesians to 

defend the status quo of a stable (albeit exclusive) white government.8

The government of Rhodesia drew its heritage from precisely the imperial 

spirit of colonization and minority rule that was already obsolete. Cecil 

John Rhodes, the founder of Rhodesia, can quite objectively be described 

as the ultimate British imperialist.9 White Rhodesia was founded upon 

commercial farming and mining. These industries relied on a steady supply 

of cheap, unskilled labor to support the endeavors of wealthy landowners 

and an efficient, business-friendly government to provide security as well 

as the economic mechanisms to maximize trade and profit. By 1961, this 

system had created a thriving economy that was unrivalled among African 

countries. It was truly the “jewel” of the continent. But a white government 

ruled it, and whites owned the key land. Black Rhodesians had little say 

in the governance of the country, they had no real vote, and they had very 

little share of the profitable farmland and mining properties. These issues 

were the fundamental reasons the militant black nationalist movement 

grew in Rhodesia, and they were the reasons the rest of the world refused 

to support the government of Ian Smith.10

These two sides-militant nationalism and incumbent white rule-grew 

increasingly polarized and vied for recruits among the black population. 

Military-aged black males in Rhodesia were often forced to choose their 

side.11 Logically, there should have been little motivation for them to 

volunteer and fight to sustain the white-rule system. To many Rhodesian 

blacks, ZAPU and ZANU were not exactly the right answer. They 

represented hatred, communism and unbridled violence. For many more 

Rhodesian blacks, their lives in the rural tribal areas-politics aside-were 

increasingly interrupted by clashes and violence surrounding the issue of 

majority rule. To protest the atrocities of ZANU and ZAPU and protect 
16

their own livelihoods and tribal system, many black Africans voluntarily 

fought for white Rhodesia-in the RAR and in other elements of Rhodesian 

Security Forces.12

In fact, many more black recruits volunteered than could be accepted for 

service. One former RAR training officer stated that on recruiting days 

many more volunteers would stand outside the gates of the depot than 

required to fill 200 available training slots, from which about 130 trained 

soldiers would be selected and sent to the regiment after a six month 

training program.13 This availability of volunteers did not substantially 

diminish throughout the Bush War, even after fighting intensified through 

the late 1970s and the RAR was constantly deployed to fight increasing 

numbers of ZANLA and ZIPRA. In an interview with Illustrated Life 

Rhodesia in 1975, Lieutenant Colonel David Heppenstall, commander of 

1RAR, stated that the regiment had no shortage of candidates, “often 100 

per cent more than we require, and sometimes more than that percentage. I 

can recall one occasion when we required 100 recruits, and 500 applied.”14

The RAR soldiers were never forced to fight against their fellow 

tribesmen in the nationalist organizations. However, they chose to do so in 

great numbers. The rest of this chapter will explore the reasons why many 

black soldiers made this choice.

Income

In 1963, the lowest entry-level African soldier in the RAR was paid about 

10 percent of what his “European,” or white, counterpart made in the RLI. 

This pay system was inherited from the Federal Army of Rhodesia and 

Nyasaland, and before that, from the British colonial army. The unequal 

pay scale improved only very slightly, until major reforms were made in 

1977-8 to increase pay and opportunities among black and white soldiers 

in the Rhodesian army. Even so, the relatively modest pay for an African 

recruit in the RAR was on par or better than most of his other options 

and placed the RAR soldier in rather good financial standing among his 

counterparts in the villages and farms of Rhodesia.15

Most other black Rhodesians were unskilled laborers in the commercial 

farms or mines, or lived in the tribal areas as subsistence farmers. With 

little education and slim opportunity for advancement outside the army 

or police, there were few opportunities elsewhere. Within the regiment, 

however, an RAR soldier could expect a solid starting pay and excellent 

chance for advancement from private to senior NCO in a merit-based 

promotion system.16
17

Stability

The RAR provided family housing, meals, education and medical 

care to its African soldiers and their families. When the soldier was in 

the field, his family received free meals, and they drew from the support 

network of other families of soldiers and officers on the military barracks. 

Unlike their white counterparts, black soldiers did not pay into a pension 

program, nor were they charged for meals themselves.17 African terms of 

enlistment were 7 years, compared to 3 years for white enlistments, which 

provided a stable employment environment and ample opportunity for 

the RAR soldier to learn his craft and become proficient. The Rhodesian 

Army Education Corps ran schools for children and wives, as well as for 

the soldiers themselves, so there was substantial incentive for an RAR 

soldier to stay with the regiment once he had a family. This system also 

allowed children of RAR soldiers to grow up with an appreciation of the 

familial atmosphere of the regiment, which encouraged them to follow in 

the footsteps of their fathers.18

Family Pride

In selecting candidates for entry into the RAR, one of the easiest criteria 

to use was a family member’s service and recommendation. The RAR 

recruited from all over Rhodesia, but most heavily from the Karanga, 

a tribe of the Shona people found predominantly in the Fort Victoria 

(now Masvingo) area in the central and southeastern part of the country. 

By recruiting heavily from one tribe, the regiment facilitated a family 

tradition among the Karanga, where grandfathers served in the Rhodesia 

Native Regiment during World War I, fathers served in the RAR in World 

War II, and sons counted the days until they too could stand the line as a 

masodja (soldier) like their forebears. By recruiting family members of 

RAR soldiers, the regiment gained known military skills from a ready pool 

of willing recruits.19

This is not to say the RAR was a Karanga tribal army. The demographics 

of the regiment were nearly identical to the black demographics of the 

nation. The RAR was about 85-90 percent Shona (not exclusively Karanga), 

10-12 percent Ndebele, and a much smaller percentage of other tribes.20

By comparison, the black Rhodesian population was approximately 19 

percent Ndebele, 77 percent Shona, and 4 percent other tribes (Tonga, 

Venda, and Shangaan).21
18

Regimental Traditions

The RAR was originally established as a colonial rifle regiment of the 

British Army. As such, its regimental culture was defined by the same basic 

traditions and heritage as other regiments of the British Army, particularly 

other British colonial regiments in Africa such as the King’s African Rifles 

and the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. To define this tradition and heritage, 

one must first understand how the British regimental system was applied 

in Africa. 

In establishing security for its colonies, the British Empire relied heavily 

on locally recruited security forces to maintain order, put down riots and 

assist the police. By statute, the employment of British regular forces was 

restricted “to the defence of maritime fortresses and coaling stations.”22

The rest of the business of securing the empire was left to locally raised 

units under the control of civil authorities. This led to a dizzying array of 

colonial regiments loyal to the British Crown: 

From Wei-hai-Wei in North China to Port of Spain in Trinidad, 

and from Halifax in Nova Scotia to Hobart in Tasmania, there 

were soldiers organized, equipped and drilled in accordance 

with the manuals issued by the War Office in London. Some 

were called Scouts, others were named Levies, or Rifle Corps, 

or Guides, or Rangers, or Camel Corps, or Militias, or Military 

Police, or Defence or Frontier Forces. Seldom did their languages, 

organizations or roles exactly match and it was rare for the 

uniforms of any two to be precisely the same. But common to 

all, apart from the Drill Manual, was a dependence on the British 

Army to provide the officers and, in some cases, senior NCOs to 

command and train them in peace, and to lead them in war.23

The RAR was like any other colonial regiment, except in its lack of 

dependence on the British Army for its leadership. Because of its unique 

status as a self-governing colony after 1923, Southern Rhodesia recruited 

its own white officers into the RAR. Even the RAR’s sister formations to 

the immediate north-the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and King’s African 

Rifles-relied mainly on seconded officers and NCOs from the British Army, 

so the investment of RAR officers in fighting for their own regiment, for 

their own country, was quite a profound difference between the RAR and 

most other British colonial regiments.24

The colors and badge of the regiment, as mentioned in the previous 

chapter, represented the history and multicultural background of the 

regiment, respectively. The RAR took great pride in these symbols, as 
19

British military tradition demands. Each regiment of the British Army 

designs and produces its own badge, and the RAR badge was no different. 

The badge and colors were unique to each regiment-the RLI also had 

its own badge, as did the BSAP and Rhodesia Regiment-and these were 

proudly displayed by the soldiers of the regiment on their uniforms and on 

parade.25

Parades were extremely important events for the RAR. The regiment 

conducted parades for many occasions: trooping the color, the Queen’s 

birthday, reviews for distinguished visitors, Regimental Week (called 

Tanlwe Chaung, after the RAR’s famous fight in Burma), and countless 

other occasions. Pride in appearance and smart drill were distinct points 

of pride for the RAR, and the men took great satisfaction in displaying 

the highest military standards on parade. The RAR seemed to enjoy this 

formal military culture a bit more than its sister infantry regiment, the 

RLI26-not to say that they looked better or drilled better, but that parades 

had more value as manifestations of military precision to RAR soldiers 

than to their RLI comrades. This formal tradition was a tremendous source 

of self-esteem for black Rhodesians, who had few other opportunities to 

work as peers with their white counterparts.27

Uniforms were also a source of pride for the men of the RAR, very much 

in the British colonial mold. African soldiers had a reputation of paying 

particular attention to detail and proudly wore their uniforms. Early in 

the war, the RAR soldiers turned out in immaculately starched khakis 

complete with putees around their ankles.28

The RAR bush hat was one item of uniform item that set the regiment 

apart. On the evolution of the distinctive RAR bush hat:

In 1960, the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel S. B. 

Comberbach, suggested that the RAR bush hat as worn by 

officers and warrant officers should be embellished in some way. 

The following year, a proposal was submitted to army HQ for 

the regiment to wear a three ostrich feather hackle in their bush 

hats. The commanding officer of 1KAR (Nyasaland) immediately 

objected, since his unit wore an ostrich feather hackle. The 

objection, of course, was upheld. One member of the Dress 

Committee then unkindly suggested that the RAR hackle should 

consist of Somabula bird feathers. The next sensible proposal, 

made by Major G. A. D. Rawlins, the battalion 2IC, was that the 

hackle should be made up of black ox-hair, the color worn by 

Lobengula’s Mbizo Regiment whose former military kraal had 
20

been near the present-day Methuen Barracks. This Matabele impi, 

which had retained a strong Zulu strain, had worn black trimmings 

on their arms and legs.29

In the pattern of the British regimental system, once an officer was badged 

into the RAR as his parent regiment, he stayed on the regimental rolls, 

and continued wearing his RAR uniform (badge, hat and dress uniform) 

no matter where he was assigned. This created a sense of belonging and 

ownership between the individual and his regiment. Very rarely did an 

officer change his parent regiment, and only then with the expressed 

approval of the Colonel of the Regiment.30

African Traditions and Practices of the RAR

In addition to these British traditions, the RAR had a few traditions and 

practices of its own. Its mascot, songs, and habit of secretly “naming” 

officers were all generated by the men and added to the RAR’s culture 

and esprit de corps. Additionally, Platoon Warrant Officers (PWOs) 

were a unique duty position within the RAR, created to provide black 

supernumeraries and role models for the soldiers within the platoons. For 

example, RAR soldiers killed in action usually had two funerals-one for 

the regiment and one for their family in the kraal. All of these traditions 

served to cement the bond of loyalty between the African soldier and his 

regiment, and these bonds proved strong throughout the war.31

The regimental mascot, a goat, came about after some selection. 

Originally, the regiment had chosen a zebra as its mascot, but in practice 

found both the zebra and its successor, a donkey, unfit for military life. 

Finally, in May 1965, “Chief Cronje of the Fingo Tribe (a people who had 

accompanied Rhodes’ Pioneer Column) solved the problem by presenting 

the regiment with a three-month old goat, promptly named ‘Induna.’”32

Induna rapidly became a favorite among the troops, and was trained to 

kneel on its forelegs and bow its head to “present arms.” Induna lived 

to the age of eight, and on his death, was given a guard of honor, Last 

Post and Reveille, and was succeeded as the regimental mascot by another 

goat, Private Tendai.33

The soldiers had a habit of singing songs on route marches, details, at 

parties and anytime the opportunity presented itself. Accounts of the RAR 

songs marvel at the sound of the voice of the regiment, lifted in unison 

in “Sweet Banana,” (the regimental song), or any other song relating to 

their experience in the war. It was quite common, particularly after some 
21

“lubrication of the throats” with a liberal dosage of chibuku (African homebrewed beer), for RAR soldiers to burst into boisterous song, mainly about 

their regiment and their history. These soldiers were extraordinarily happy, 

and justly proud of their achievements.34

African soldiers had a name for every officer in the regiment. It was a sign 

of acceptance for a white officer to be given a name by his soldiers, from 

Lt Col F.J. Wane (named Msoro-we-gomo, or “the top of the mountain”), 

who served with the Rhodesia Native Regiment in World War I and then 

rebuilt the RAR in 1940, to a young subaltern (named “Mr. Vice” after his 

father’s position in the Rhodesian Air Force), or Captain (later Brigadier 

in the Australian Army) John Essex-Clark (named Mopane, after the tall, 

slender hardwood found in the Rhodesian bush). The names were not 

always particularly flattering or exalting, but the existence of a nickname 

demonstrated acceptance of an officer among the ranks of his soldiers, 

and were shared with the officers only occasionally by the NCOs of his 

platoon.35

Platoon Warrant Officers (PWOs) were a highly effective group of senior 

leaders in the RAR. These leaders were absolutely essential to sustaining 

and perpetuating the regimental culture of the RAR. PWO was a rank 

between Colour Sergeant and Warrant Officer. The PWO was the primary 

noncommissioned officer in a platoon. Most PWOs had at least 12-14 years 

of service, and they were responsible for ensuring that the orders of the 

platoon commander were carried out, caring for the soldiers, and training 

the members of the platoon-including the young lieutenant in command. 

If the platoon ever lost its lieutenant, the PWO was there to lead them in 

combat. The PWO was the principal instrument of regimental culture in 

the RAR. He knew, taught, and exemplified the history and values of the 

regiment. Without exception, every former officer interviewed spoke with 

special respect and reverence for this class of leaders in the regiment.36

The RAR truly fostered a familial environment among its soldiers and 

officers. When the regiment lost a soldier, for example, “the war stopped” 

for his platoon. As previously mentioned, his fellow soldiers held a funeral 

service at the regiment’s chapel before releasing his body to his family in 

the kraal, where his relatives would gather for a days-long remembrance, 

drinking chibuku and singing. On rare occasions, families invited white 

officers from the regiment to these events, and the officers were honored 

to attend. Those officers who did attend tribal funerals recalled the events 

with great reverence as a profound experience.37
22

Leadership

The RAR was blessed during the course of its history with some 

outstanding leaders. Like other British colonial units in Africa, the officers 

were all white (until 1977, when the first black officers were commissioned), 

and most of the NCOs and all of the soldiers were black. By its nature, the 

RAR challenged a leader to adapt to cultural norms among his soldiers. 

Good officers in the RAR tended to be those who learned the languages 

and tribal customs of their soldiers, to understand what motivated them 

and what they feared.38 Leading and training these soldiers took patience, 

as many of the problems presented by RAR soldiers-from multiple wives 

to witchcraft and spirit mediums-were completely foreign to white, 

“European” culture.39

Officers in the Rhodesian Army were very highly selected. In one typical 

officer intake in 1977, 650 candidates applied, 178 went to a selection 

board, and 45 were selected as officer cadets. Of these, 18 actually passed 

out of training as Second Lieutenants.40 These 18 were then sent out to the 

Rhodesian Army based on where they were needed, and where their cadre 

saw that they fit best. According to a former officer cadet course instructor, 

“We paid great attention to the leaders we were going to use.”41 Officers 

who were to serve in the RAR were selected after completing the 13 month 

officer cadet course at the School of Infantry in Gwelo, after which, “we 

knew those guys [officer cadets] as well as their dads did.”42 In selecting 

which newly commissioned officers were sent to the RAR, the selection 

committee looked for the more serious, more outgoing officers, who were 

able to interact with people, and who instinctively led by example.43

Leadership by example was among the most important traits of an RAR 

officer. “If clean boots were the order of the day, the officer had to have 

the cleanest boots.”44 This was what the soldiers expected of their officers. 

RAR soldiers did not respond well to being given an order and expected 

to operate with initiative, as could well be done within the commando 

structure of the RLI. To function best, the RAR officer had to lead from the 

front, and they were selected and trained to do just that.45 

Equally important was the leadership of the black noncommissioned 

officers and warrant officers. The Regimental Sergeants Major (RSMs), 

Company Sergeants Major (CSMs), Warrant Officers (WOs) and Platoon 

Warrant Officers (PWOs) were the epitome of what a black soldier could 

strive to be, until the first black officers were commissioned in July 

1977.46 These men knew, lived, and taught the history and traditions of 

the regiment to soldiers and officers alike, and they were among the most 

capable soldiers in Rhodesia.47
23

Leaders in the RAR understood the importance of morale. Napoleon’s 

famous quote, “morale is to the physical as three is to one” was of utmost 

importance in training and leading African troops. “The aim was to create 

a unit with high morale; that is . . . the conquest of fear and the will to 

victory.”48 To that end, officers of the RAR ensured the basic needs of their 

soldiers-pay, family, education, pride-were met, and that their soldiers 

were constantly involved, never bored. In preserving morale over time, 

RAR leaders ensured the lessons and values of the regiment endured across 

generations and through the challenging situations the regiment faced.49

Conclusion

The reasons black soldiers joined the RAR are best summed up by CSM 

Obert Veremu, who said in 1975:

I joined the Army when I was 20 years old, in 1953. My uncle is a 

soldier, and I knew if I joined the Army, I would be all right. I enjoy 

the work very much, and also it is very good to have everything 

free-uniforms, rations (our wives, too, get free rations while we 

are away on active service); medical attention, and schooling for 

our children. . . . These terrs are bad men. I have seen tribesmen 

who have been beaten to death by them. I also saw the woman 

whose lip they tore off with pliers. It is very bad what they are 

doing to their own people.50

In many respects, black Rhodesian soldiers enlisted for the same reasons 

most soldiers enlist in most armies-income, stability, pride, tradition, 

leadership. These pieces of regimental culture in the RAR are not virtues or 

characteristics that cannot be found anywhere else. The RAR is remarkable 

because these reasons and these bonds stayed true through the end of the 

war, through incredible pressure on black Rhodesians to succumb to the 

black nationalist groups and cast off a government that was portrayed to 

them as oppressive, racist and hateful. 

The experience of the RAR in the Bush War provides an excellent 

opportunity to examine why soldiers choose to fight. During the course 

of the war, the atmosphere in which these soldiers worked was constantly 

changing and frought with racial, tribal, and international tension. The 

world in which the RAR soldier lived was turned upside-down, so that 

by 1980, his former enemy commander was his commander-in-chief. 

The enemy he had hunted down for 15 years, who had killed his friends, 

were integrated as peers into his formation. Militarily, the RAR was never 

defeated, but in the end, its war was lost. Loyalty for this soldier to anything 
24

but his regiment evaporated amidst the tremendous shifts resulting from 

the emergence of a majority-rule state of Zimbabwe.

Through to the end of the Bush War, and beyond, RAR soldiers remained 

loyal and steadfast to their regiment, and that must be their legacy. In the 

end, the values of the government-white-rule or otherwise-were irrelevant. 

It was the regiment that drew these men in, and their loyalty was more to 

their comrades and their heritage than to any particular government or 

cause. 
25

Notes

1. CF20110920S0001, former RAR officer, interview; Nick Downie and 

Lord Richard Cecil, Frontline Rhodesia, DVD (Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 

2007). In 1979, Prime Minister Muzorewa extended national service requirements 

to black Rhodesians. Prior to Muzorewa’s governance, national service-that is, 

mandatory military service-only applied to whites. Throughout most of the Bush 

War, black service was strictly voluntary.

2. John Redfern, “Racial Discrimination in the Rhodesia and Nyasaland 

Army,” Rhodesian Army memorandum, October 1962; John Redfern, “The 

Requirement for a Non-Racial Army in Southern Rhodesia,” Rhodesian Army 

memorandum, October 1963. In 1962 and 1963, then-Captain (later Colonel) John 

Redfern at the Rhodesian Army School of Infantry wrote these two memoranda 

to the army commands of the Federal Army and Rhodesian Army respectively. 

In them, Redfern highlighted that racial practices of the Federal Army were 

unsuited for continued application, particularly in Southern Rhodesia. While his 

recommendations were not enacted at the time, it is noteworthy that the Rhodesian 

Army command concurred and forwarded them to the Rhodesian Air Force for 

action. The Air Force decided the status quo should remain, and the idea was not 

acted upon until 1977. The Rhodesian Army, and the RAR particularly, seemed 

far more open-much earlier-to racial integration than Rhodesian society as a 

whole (or American or British society at the time, for that matter). Additionally, 

during the course of researching this paper, the author personally interviewed 

over 30 Rhodesian Army veterans, from across the spectrum of service within 

the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). Without exception and in the most explicit 

terms, these men recounted their tremendous respect and admiration for the black 

soldiers with whom they had the privilege of serving. To say the African soldier 

was a respected member of a team is an understatement, as evident in how these 

men felt, and still feel, for their comrades. 

3. Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Declonisation 

1918-1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 365; Eliakim M. 

Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union: 1961-87 (Trenton: Africa World 

Press, 2005), 78. Sibanda is a professor in the history department at the University 

of Winnipeg, and a former ZAPU member.

4. Norma Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerilla War: Peasant Voices (Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 1993), 85. This quote is from ZANU’s first policy 

statement under Ndabiningi Sithole. 

5. Kriger, 82-85; Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, The Rhodesian 

War: A Military History (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2009), 24-27. From January 

1960 to the end of 1961, the number of independent nations in Africa went from 8 

to 26, including Congo, Nigeria, Tanzania, Malawi, and Zambia. Algeria became 

independent in July 1962, and Uganda by that October. The “wind of change” was 

blowing south; this fact was readily apparent to Rhodesians.

6. Harold Macmillan (speech to South African Parliament, 3 February 

1960). 
26

7. Ian Douglas Smith, The Great Betrayal: the Memoirs of Ian Douglas 

Smith (London: Blake, 1997), 149-50.

8. CF20110920S0001, former RAR officer, interview.

9. Cecil John Rhodes (1853-1902) was the founder of Rhodesia and 

a self-avowed advocate of the British Empire. Arriving in Natal, South Africa 

in 1870, Rhodes quickly began to speculate in diamond claims in Kimberley. 

These mining interests formed the De Beers Consolidated Mines and gained 

Rhodes a fortune and considerable political power in the Cape Colony, which 

he devoted to the furtherance of his own world views and the greater spread 

of British influence across southern Africa and the globe. Rhodes’ second will, 

written in 1877, bequeathed his yet unrealized fortune to found a secret society 

that would extend British rule over the whole world and colonize most parts of 

it with British settlers, leading, among other things, to the “ultimate recovery 

of the United States of America” by the British Empire. In 1890 (the same year 

his British South African Company pioneer column moved across the Limpopo 

River into Mashonaland to found Fort Salisbury and Rhodesia) Rhodes became 

premier of the Cape Colony, where he began arranging his vision of a South 

African federation under the British flag. After sponsoring a failed raid into the 

Transvaal under Leander Jameson in 1895, however, Rhodes was forced to resign 

this position. After falling from power, he devoted himself to building a railroad 

from the Cape to Cairo to solidify British influence on the African continent 

and facilitate the spread of the British Empire. Ultimately unsuccessful in this 

endeavor, Rhodes died in Muizenburg, South Africa in 1902, leaving most of 

his £6 million inheritance to Oxford University in the form of scholarships for 

students from the United States, the British colonies, and Germany. For more on 

Cecil John Rhodes, read one of his several biographies, such as Cecil Rhodes: The 

Colossus of Southern Africa, by J. G. Lockhart and the Hon. C. M. Woodhouse 

(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963).

10. Smith, The Great Betrayal, 149-50. 

11. CE20110909T0001, former RAR officer, interview. This former RAR 

officer recalled walking through a village near Fort Victoria late in the war to 

see nothing but old men, women and children. All of the military aged men were 

either in the RAR or in ZANLA. This effect on the population is often lost in 

military accounts of combat, but it had a tremendous effect on Rhodesian blacks. 

Neutrality was not an option.

12. Only the RLI and Special Air Service (SAS) remained all-white through 

the end of the war. Black soldiers were recruited and served in the RAR, British 

South African Police (BSAP), Selous Scouts, Rhodesia Regiment, Guard Force, 

and eventually the more controversial Security Force Auxiliaries.

13. CE20110908G0001, former RAR officer, interview by author, 

Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa, 8 September 2011. This officer recalled 

days when thousands of black Rhodesians stood outside the gates of Depot RAR 

to fill an advertised 200 open billets.
27

14. Beverley Whyte, “An Elite Group of Fighting Men,” A Pride of Men: 

The Story of Rhodesia’s Army (supplement to Illustrated Life Rhodesia), August 

7, 1975: 16-19, 18.

15. Redfern, 1963, paragraph 6; James E. Dornan, ed., Rhodesia Alone

(Washington, DC: Council on American Affairs, 1977), 36; The Internet Archive, 

“Employment and Climatological Data,” http://www.archive.org/details/

EmploymentAndClimatologicalData (accessed 21 November 2011); 

CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview. The numbers to show 

salaries for military versus other occupations are difficult to find. However, 

interviews reveal that the RAR soldiers were generally better paid, with better 

opportunity for advancement, than their peers in other occupations. Redfern cites 

the African recruit’s starting annual pay at £36.10.0 in 1963. According to 1973 

data in Encyclopedia Rhodesia, 40 1/2 percent of black Rhodesians worked in 

agriculture and forestry (by far the leading occupation), which, according to a 

1976 economic survey, paid Rh$125 per year, as of 1966. Converting between 

currencies, and accounting for inflation and the devaluation of the pound in 1972 

precludes accurate analysis of these numbers. Interviews revealed, however, that 

African soldiers in the RAR had better opportunities in the regiment than in other 

occupations.

16. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview; CF20110920V0001, 

former RAR officer, interview by author, London, England, 20 September 2011.

17. Redfern, 1963, paragraph 11.”European” soldiers were required to pay 

not less than 5 shillings per day for rations, and 7 1⁄4 percent of their income 

towards a pension plan. Africans did not pay for these benefits, although this 

accommodation by no means made up for the lack of pay and allowances for 

blacks.

18. Redfern, 1963, paragraph 11; CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, 

interview; CF20110919H0001, former Rhodesian Army Education Corps officer, 

interview by author, Aylesford, England, 19 September 2011.

19. CE20110908M0001, former RAR officer, interview by author, 

Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa, 8 September 2011.

20. Binda, Masodja, 12; CE20110909R0001, former RAR officer, interview 

by author, Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa, 9 September 2011. In addition, 

these percentages are consistent with the regimental demographics given by most 

Rhodesian veterans interviewed for this project. By comparison, ZANU recruited 

predominantly from the KoreKore Shona, in the northeastern portion of the 

country, and ZAPU was almost entirely Ndebele and Kalanga, both tribes from 

Matabeleland. 

21. Peter Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War: A Military 

History (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2009), 18.

22. James Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century

(London: Macdonald, 1981), 205.
28

23. Lunt, xiii. 

24. CE20110908W0001, former RAR officer, interview by author, 

Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa, 8 September 2011; CE20110910H0001, 

former RAR officer, interview by author, Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa, 

10 September 2011; CE20110908M0001, former RAR officer, interview. The 

British Army system of secondment allowed officers (and NCOs) to volunteer 

for service in colonial units, during which service they drew their regular pay 

plus pay from the colonial governments. In many British regiments, promotion 

or advancement often took a very long time, and service in regiments like the 

KAR or NRR frequently presented superb opportunities for better pay and more 

opportunity than continued service in regular British Army regiments. For more 

on how the secondment system worked in colonial regiments, read James Lunt’s 

Imperial Sunset.

25. CE20110915B0001, former RAR officer, interview. This officer also 

stressed that the badge and uniform of the RAR was earned, not given to, the 

soldiers, and these were a source of great pride and individual accomplishment.

26. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

27. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview; Alexandre Binda, 

The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry (Durban: 30 Degrees South, 2007), 75.

28. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

29. Binda, Masodja, 170. 

30. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

31. CE20110908M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

32. Binda, Masodja, 173. In Sindebele, the language of the Ndebele, 

“InDuna” means “great leader.” 

33. Binda. In Chishona, the language of the Shona, “Tendai” is a female 

name meaning “thankful.”

34. CE20110908M0001, former RAR officer, interview; CE20110915B0001, 

former RAR officer, interview. Most officers interviewed recall the songs and 

voices of the African soldiers in the RAR as a great motivator for all ranks.

35. Owen, 6; CE20110915B0001, former RAR officer, interview; EssexClark, 34. Owen describes Lt Col Wane’s nickname; the young subaltern’s came 

from an interview with the author, and Essex-Clark described his nickname.

36. CE20110908M0001, former RAR officer, interview; CE20110913B0001, 

former RAR officer, interview by author, Durban, Republic of South Africa, 13 

September 2011; CE20110913R0001, former RAR officer, interview by author, 

Cape Town, Republic of South Africa, 13 September 2011.

37. CE20110908M0001, former RAR officer, interview; CE20110913M0001, 

former RAR officer, interview; CE20110915B0001, former RAR officer, 

interview.
29

38. CE20110908M0001, former RAR officer, interview; CE20110913B0001, 

former RAR officer, interview; CE20110913R0001, former RAR officer, 

interview.

39. Spirit mediums are a central piece of Shona culture. The Shona believe that 

all spirits are reincarnated after death, and that more powerful spirits continuously 

overlook the well-being of tribal areas and certain tribes. To the Shona, respect 

for the spirit medium is paramount. The 1893 Mashonaland uprising was led by 

two spirit mediums-Mbuya Nehanda and Kaguvi-both of whom were arrested and 

hung by the British South African Company. Before hanging, Nehanda promised 

that her bones would rise again to bring about a second uprising, or Chimurenga,

which is what ZANU eventually claimed itself to be. Failure to understand the 

power of spirit mediums is a critical misstep for any foreign student of this 

culture. For more information on spirit mediums (which could easily fill a course 

of study on its own), see “The Social Organization of the Mashona, Part III,” by 

C.J.K. Latham in the Rhodesia Native Affairs Annual 1979, http://www.archive.

org/stream/TheRhodesiaNativeAffairsDept.AnnualFor1979/NADA2#page/n3/

mode/1uu. 

40. CF20110920V0001, former RAR officer, interview.

41. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

42. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview. Up to 1965, 

Rhodesian Army officer candidates went through the Royal Military Academy at 

Sandhurst. The cadet course at Gwelo stood up after UDI in 1965. It was modeled 

after Sandhurst, but tailored to Rhodesian Army requirements. One officer 

interviewed, a Sandhurst graduate, was charged specifically with establishing the 

cadet course at the Rhodesian Army School of Infantry after UDI.

43. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

44. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

45. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview; CE20110915B0001, 

former RAR officer, interview.

46. Binda, Masodja, 315. The first black officers were WO I Martin Nkatazo 

Tumbare and WO I Wurayayi Mutero, both former RSMs of 1RAR and 2RAR, 

respectively. They were commissioned in June 1977. 

47. CE20110908M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

48. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

49. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview; CE20110908M0001, 

former RAR officer, interview; CE20110913B001, former RAR officer, interview 

by author.

50. Whyte, 18.

31

Chapter 3

Phase One: 1965-1972

The Rhodesian Bush War, fought between the white-rule Rhodesian 

government and the black nationalist organizations ZAPU and ZANU, 

effectively began on 11 November 1965, when Rhodesia unilaterally 

declared its independence from British rule. Initial incursions of nationalist 

groups into Rhodesia prior to UDI were small, sporadic, and generally 

disorganized. By August 1964 both ZANU and ZAPU1

 were banned from 

Rhodesia, and operated exclusively from Zambia. Small strikes and raids 

were their modus operandi.

2

 The first real contact, in April 1966, occurred 

during Operation Pagoda, when several groups of ZANU insurgents 

infiltrated from Zambia to attack various targets, including infrastructure, 

police stations and white farms.3

 Subsequent insurgent operations during 

this phase did not substantially change from a pattern of small elements 

(10-30 insurgents) crossing the Zambezi River, living in the bush and 

striking targets of opportunity. Their aim was not really to incite a popular 

uprising, but more to cause instability in Rhodesia and force British 

military intervention to keep the peace. Throughout Phase One, insurgent 

leaders genuinely believed the British would intervene if they could stir up 

enough trouble. This type of sporadic contact continued until December 

1972 when insurgent operators, realizing the British would not intervene 

and under the increasing influence of Maoist philosophy (particularly in 

ZANU), executed a significant change in tactics which opened the second 

phase of the Bush War.4

Rhodesian Army participation generally (and RAR participation 

specifically) in early contacts during Phase One was limited. Rhodesian 

police, principally the BSAP, saw terrorist incursions inside the borders of 

Rhodesia as criminal activities, falling exclusively under police purview. 

Once involved, the RAR found itself at the beginning of a learning curve in 

a new kind of conflict-unlike Burma, Malaya or Central African Federation 

deployments of recent memory. The regiment had much to learn as they 

faced their new enemies.

Operation Pagoda: The “Battle of Sinoia”

On the night of 1 April 1966, thirteen ZANU fighters crossed the Zambezi 

River from Zambia into Rhodesia. Seven additional fighters crossed the 

river the following night. These men were charged by ZANU leaders to 

begin the struggle to liberate Zimbabwe, in the hopes of securing funding 

from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), rallying black Rhodesians 

to the ZANU cause while inspiring whites to leave the country, and 
32

generally causing enough unrest inside Rhodesia for the British to deploy 

troops.5 These twenty fighters were organized into four groups. The first 

group of five men, code named the “Chimurenga” group, were to go to 

the Umtali area in Eastern Rhodesia to attack the oil refinery and pipeline 

installations there. The second group, code named “Demolition” group, 

consisted of two men and was tasked to “blow up bridges and culverts 

along the road between Fort Victoria and Beitbridge.”6 The third group, 

code named “Gukula-Honde,” was made up of six men and was to “subvert 

locals in the Tribal Trust Lands south and west of Sinoia,” then join the 

fourth group. This group, the “Armageddon” group, was the seven-man 

element that crossed the night of 2 April. Their mission was to train the 

locals subverted by the Gukula-Honde group, then raid farms and attack 

police stations.7

On 12 April, three members of the Chimurenga group spent the night 

in the kraal8 of one of the members about forty miles from Umtali, while 

the other two stayed with a sympathizer at Old Umtali Mission. Locals 

reported the pair at Old Umtali to police, who apprehended them the 

following morning. After interrogation, these two led police to the kraal

where the remaining three members were also arrested. Once this group 

was more thoroughly questioned, police learned of the existence of the 

other three groups and began to search for them.9

Meanwhile, Special Branch (SB)10 also learned the location of the 

Armageddon group. During an Operations Coordinating Committee 

(OCC) meeting between the Rhodesian Army, Rhodesian Air Force 

(RhAF), BSAP and Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) to decide 

whether to eliminate this group or follow them in hopes of uncovering 

their contacts, Police Commissioner Frank Barfoot insisted in the interest 

of public safety that they could no longer remain at large. The resulting 

massive police operation, involving 83 BSAP policemen supported by 

four RhAF helicopters, took place near Sinoia on 28 April. Armed with 

World War One vintage Lee-Enfield .303 rifles11 and no radios capable 

of communicating with the helicopters, the largely reservist police force 

surrounded the rendezvous point between the terrorists and the SB 

informant, and a firefight ensued. Despite poor communication and several 

tactical blunders during the operation, police killed all seven members 

of the Armageddon group, one from a helicopter-mounted MAG12 after 

expending 147 rounds of ammunition.13

This operation was a major event for both sides. To ZANU, this was the 

start of the war in Rhodesia. In fact, 28 April-the day the Armageddon 

group met their fate-is a public holiday in Zimbabwe marking this 
33

beginning of the “Chimurenga,” or “War of Liberation.” As ZANU 

spokesman Washington Malinga said on 30 April 1966, it was “only the 

beginning.” For the Rhodesian forces, this began a contest for jurisdiction 

over counterinsurgency operations between the army and the police. The 

Army absolutely insisted on its inclusion in any future counterinsurgency 

operations-they were better trained, better equipped and more experienced 

in hunting and dealing with insurgents (in Malaya and Federal 

deployments) than the police. The police, on the other hand, had a much 

more sophisticated intelligence network inside Rhodesia, constant contact 

with the population, and no desire to cede control within its own borders 

to the army. For their part, the RhAF helicopter crews recognized the need 

to have effective radio contact between the helicopters and ground units. 

Coming out of Sinoia, however, RhAF commanders began to resist future 

involvement of helicopters as gunships, seeing their role as exclusively 

support or troop transport.14 All organizations recognized the need to 

train and prepare for future fights against ZAPU and ZANU in Rhodesia. 

While the RAR did not participate at Sinoia, the lessons learned there 

and passed across the Rhodesian Army directly contributed to future RAR 

experiences in the war.15

Operation Pagoda continued until 18 September 1966, resulting in the 

eventual death or capture of the remaining eight members of the Demolition 

and Gukula-Honde groups (as well as eleven ZAPU terrorists who 

infiltrated separately) by combined police and army operations involving 

small elements of both the RAR and RLI.16 Perhaps the most important 

result of the experiences during Pagoda was the formation and use of Joint 

Operations Centres (JOCs), consisting of army, air force, BSAP and SB 

officers, plus any other relevant agencies specific to an operation. The JOC 

structure was more focused than the OCC, as its members were oriented 

locally, rather than nationally. This “command by committee” would 

remain a part of Rhodesian operations throughout the war, resulting in 

a more streamlined coordination process, improved communication and 

sharing of intelligence at the local, tactical level.17

The RAR participated in a few other operations in 1966. During these 

operations, the regiment further familiarized itself with JOC procedures, 

operations with the police, and methods of tracking and apprehending 

terrorists. The RAR’s mastery of these concepts would become critically 

important in the coming years of operations against insurgents, particularly 

in Operation Nickel in 1967.18
34

Operation Nickel

On 10 August 1967, a policeman stopped an RAR patrol along the 

Wankie-Victoria Falls road in the northwest corner of the country to tell 

them he had found a pack in the area and he believed there were terrorists 

nearby. The platoon set out stop groups and initiated a sweep operation,19

and quickly captured a terrorist. Interrogation would reveal this man to be 

a lost member of a 79-man combined ZAPU and South African African 

National Congress (SAANC) element that crossed the Zambezi and 

separated about four days previously. With one terrorist captured and a 

lead to many more, the RAR established a JOC at Wankie and brought in 

more police and soldiers. Operation Nickel was on, and it would prove one 

of the most formative experiences of the RAR in the Bush War.20

The ZAPU-SAANC group was divided into two subgroups. The first, 

code named Lithuli, was made up of 48 men (initially 54: 13 ZAPU and 

41 SAANC),21 and was to set up a base in the Tjolotjo area, near the 

Botswana border. The second group of 21 men (initially 23: 14 ZAPU 

and 9 SAANC) was code named Lobengula, and had Nkai as its objective, 

where it would receive assistance from members of the Zimbabwe Church 

of Orphans. From these two areas, each group was to establish recruiting 

and training bases to bring in local tribesmen, then attack European farms 

and police stations. After establishing these camps, the SAANC contingent 

would continue through Bechuanaland (Botswana) to the Sekhukuneland, 

Zululand and Transkei regions of South Africa.22

On 13 August, a BSAP patrol reported sighting insurgents near the 

Inyantue River area. Major Taffy Marchant, Officer Commanding (OC) A 

Company 1RAR, sent a seven-man section under the command of Captain 

Peter Hosking, his 2IC, along with two civilian trackers to follow up on 

this report. Marchant also sent a platoon led by Regimental SergeantMajor (RSM) Aubrey Korb and Company Sergeant-Major (CSM) 

Timitaya shortly behind Hosking’s detachment. Hosking made contact 

with what he believed to be a five-man terrorist element (it was actually 

the entire 21-man Lobengula group) and called for reinforcements. More 

police and more soldiers arrived by helicopter, and in the ensuing firefight 

both Hosking and Platoon Warrant Officer (PWO) Kephas were wounded, 

as well as police officers Tiffin and Phillips. Two RAR soldiers, Lance 

Corporal Davison and Private Korani, were killed in action. The RAR 

soldiers pulled back into an all round defense. The Lobengula group lost 

three killed and one seriously wounded (he would later be killed) in the 

contact.23
35

Over the next few days, Rhodesian and Botswana police arrested three 

members of the Lobengula group in separate incidents. The rest of the group 

was pursued by 3 Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Ian Wardle, with 10 

Platoon (under Lieutenant Graham Noble) and the Mortar Platoon (led 

by Lieutenant Piers) acting as stop groups. In another firefight, Wardle’s 

platoon killed eight and captured six terrorists, completely accounting for 

the Lobengula group.24

Meanwhile, the 47-man Lithuli group, much more disciplined and better 

led (by a man named John Dube) than their counterparts, moved to the 

Leasha Pan, near the western section of the Tjolotjo Tribal Trust Land 

(TTL). On 19 August, the Mortar Platoon made contact with two members 

of this group, killing one of them. The platoon followed the tracks but 

lost contact. Dube assembled his men and quietly conducted two night 

movements into Tjolotjo TTL, while in the midst of security forces. By 

the morning of 22 August, the Lithuli group had established a camp in 

the Tjolotjo TTL, complete with camouflaged positions in an all round 

defense. Lt Nick Smith, commanding 1 Platoon, found tracks leading 

to this camp and followed them. At 1400, Smith’s platoon made contact 

with the Lithuli group. In the firefight that followed, both Smith and PWO 

Timitaya were killed. Lance Corporal Mavaradze recounted:

We then carried on firing, knowing the enemy was still there. 

Firing stopped again because we had no more ammunition and 

the enemy formed up with bayonets fixed. We withdrew, leaving 

our packs, radios, some rifles, and two dead bodies. After we 

had withdrawn we took up an all round defence and shared our 

remaining rounds. I then sent off three men to get help and later 

withdrew completely to the Wankie boundary road, and stayed 

there the night.25

The Lithuli group had suffered three killed, three wounded, and two 

lost to desertion. They enthusiastically took the abandoned equipment, 

food, and water and continued to move east. While moving, the group 

opened fire on a group of RAR soldiers, wounding one. “Hearing this 

firing, Lieutenant Peirson, commanding several ambush positions not far 

away, unwisely left his ambush position to investigate; tragically, he was 

mistaken for the enemy and shot and killed.”26

On 23 August one of the deserters from Lithuli group was captured by 13 

Platoon at Siwuwu Pools. Lieutenant Bill Winnall took 13 and 15 Platoons 

to pursue the lead resulting from his interrogation, and discovered tracks 

of approximately 30 men. Estimating himself to be about 3 hours behind 
36

the enemy, Winnall continued pursuit while the Mortar Platoon deployed 

in an ambush position on the Tegwani River. While waiting for an airstrike 

against the suspected enemy positions, Winnall decided to move his 

platoon into thick bush and establish a base for the night: 

No sentries were posted and no clearance patrols were sent out, 

the soldiers being scattered about the area in groups of two or 

three, smoking and chatting. Observing this carelessness, the 

enemy commander, Dube, seized the opportunity and, in company 

with one of his men, both wearing combat jackets (looted off 1 

Platoon’s dead) casually sauntered over to the security force 

position. Exchanging greetings with the AS [African Soldiers], 

Dube rapidly assessed the troops’ deployment and then called out 

the order to his men to open fire.27

In the ensuing engagement, Lance Corporal Cosmos and Patrol Officer 

Thomas were killed, eight men were wounded (including Lt. Winnall), 

and the patrol withdrew to form a defensive position and evacuate the 

casualties. 

At this point, the JOC accepted an RLI Commando28 from Army 

Headquarters, in addition to 48 additional A Company soldiers and 

D Company 1RAR. These reinforcements arrived on 23 August, and 

immediately began patrolling in the vicinity of the Nata and Tegwani 

River junction, where Dube and his men were hiding. The JOC moved to 

Tjolotjo to better control security force actions.29

Dube then took seven men from the remnants of the Lithuli Group to 

find water and food. This small group got lost, and Dube was arrested 

in Botswana with three of his men on 28 August. When Dube failed to 

return to the main group, the remaining 31 men moved along the Tegwani 

on the night of 25 August. Without their leader, the group began to fall 

apart. Over the next two days, three more men deserted, the seventeen 

SAANC members split off to go to South Africa through Botswana, 

while the remaining eleven men, exhausted, stopped. On the morning of 

28 August, two of these men deserted and were arrested. On 31 August, 

an insurgent named Ncube went to a kraal to get some food. While the 

old woman he had approached prepared his meal, she sent a girl to alert 

security forces, who promptly arrived and arrested Ncube. Ncube led 7 

Troop, 1RLI with 11 Platoon, D Company 1RAR to the hide-out that he 

and five other insurgents occupied. In the ensuing firefight, four insurgents 

were killed and one fled.30
37

Through the next few days, security forces continued patrolling, looking 

for the rest of the Lithuli group. While following up on tracks leading 

away from a dead rhino, on 4 September, Lt. Noble and 10 Platoon 

engaged three more insurgents. One of the insurgents threw a grenade, 

killing Private Nyika and wounding Private Pezisayi. This set off a fire, 

which cooked off the enemy ammo and grenades and kept the remaining 

RAR soldiers at bay. Once the fire died out, 10 platoons swept the area 

and recovered three dead insurgents. Patrolling continued until Operation 

Nickel concluded the morning of 8 September 1967. In December, one 

of the outstanding insurgents was arrested in Plumtree, and in May 1968, 

South African police in Durban arrested another.31

The results of Operation Nickel were immediate and far-reaching. On the 

enemy side, ZAPU did not consider the operation a failure. Not only was 

the war now underway, but they had killed security forces and they were 

able to capitalize on their own version of the truth back in Zambia, where 

ZAPU was working to establish themselves as the better Zimbabwean 

movement to the OAU and their Zambian hosts. For their part, ZANU 

praised the courage of the fighters involved but condemned as a “gross 

blunder” the alliance with SAANC, whose efforts ZANU believed should 

have been focused in their own country, not in Rhodesia.32

For the RAR, the results were somewhat humbling. At the outset of the 

war, the Rhodesian Army expected the RAR to have no problems defeating 

the incompetent insurgents, due to its previous experience in Malaya and 

Federal deployments. But the regiment committed a few tactical blunders 

that hurt its reputation. The lessons learned for the RAR were the value of 

confident and decisive junior leadership (as Lt. Wardle and Capt. Hosking 

displayed), and the disastrous results of tactical carelessness, as seen in Lt. 

Winnall’s actions. Also, during Nickel, RAR troops only carried 50 rounds 

of ammunition to limit the amount of weight each soldier had to carry. 

This practice came from the regiment’s experience in Malaya and recent 

experience against ZANU and ZAPU, where their enemy did not stand 

and fight, and soldiers rarely had the opportunity to fire. RAR soldiers 

were also firing their newly issued FN FAL rifles on automatic, wasting 

the little ammunition they had. These faults were immediately corrected. 

Training subsequently focused on single, aimed shots, limiting the use of 

full automatic fire to lead scouts, and increasing the basic load for all RAR 

soldiers to 150 rounds.33 Two ideas that were not immediately capitalized 

on, but would become crucial to success later in the war were the use 

of helicopters as fire support platforms (not just troop transport), and the 
38

importance of tracking-finding and following signs of enemy movementto counterinsurgency operations.34

Perhaps of more strategic importance than these adjustments, however, 

was the subsequent offer of South African assistance to Rhodesia that 

came immediately after Nickel. The involvement of SAANC immediately 

brought the interest of the Pretoria government, eager to fight its own 

counterinsurgency away from home soil. Pretoria sent about 2,000 South 

African “police”35 to assist Rhodesian Security Forces in COIN operations 

in the Zambezi valley. While Rhodesians considered their new South 

African allies to be clumsy, inefficient, and inexperienced-they were 

disparagingly called “ropes” (thick , hairy, and twisted) or “clumpies” (due 

to clumsy bushcraft)-for political reasons, they were welcome additions to 

the fight, and would eventually nearly equal the size of the Rhodesian 

regular army. South Africa would also add critical enablers such as 

helicopters and aircrews, along with tremendous economic assistance.36

South African involvement in Rhodesia proved to be a “double-edged 

sword,” however, as after the 1974 fall of Mozambique and Angola to 

communist guerrillas, South Africa became Rhodesia’s only friend in the 

global community. South African Prime Minister John Vorster would use 

to his advantage later in the war.37

Operation Cauldron

The RAR was deployed several more times through the first phase of 

the war, pursuing groups of terrorists across sparsely populated areas of 

the country, in constant cooperation with the police and with the willing 

assistance of the locals. In March 1968, a game ranger came across a 

wide track made by terrorists conveying supplies between several camps 

they had established near the Chewore River. He called in the police, and 

Operation Cauldron began, which was to be a “baptism of fire” for the 

RAR’s sister regiment, the RLI. The RLI would emerge from Cauldron as 

a tested, proven and capable unit, earning the nickname, “The Incredibles,” 

which would stick through the end of the war.38

The enemy in Operation Cauldron was once again a mixture of ZAPU 

and SAANC, a contingent of 100-125 men whose aim was to establish 

a number of base camps between the Zambezi River and Sipolilo in the 

north-central part of the country. From here, locals were to be trained and 

armed, and eventually unleashed on an unsuspecting Rhodesia at a later 

date. The RLI, with the SAS and limited participation from the RAR, 

put an end to those plans in the ensuing months, killing 58 terrorists and 

capturing a large number, while the rest limped back to Zambia.39
39

The RAR participation in Operation Cauldron consisted of 14 Platoon, E 

Company 1RAR, led by Lieutenant Ron Marillier. Although Marillier was 

awarded the Bronze Cross of Rhodesia for his actions during Cauldron, 

his platoon-and the RAR-drew heavy criticism from the RLI and Army 

command (including Colonel Peter Walls, later the Rhodesian Army 

Commander) for multiple failures in the face of the enemy. Essentially, the 

RAR soldiers proved reluctant to move under fire and attack the enemy. 

Several attempts to rally these soldiers proved unsuccessful, and in their 

first contact, the RAR platoon and the RLI commando moving with them 

were forced to pull back and call in an airstrike against the enemy position. 

The RAR lost one soldier, Corporal Erisha, killed and two wounded, 

PWO Herod40 and Private Wilson. Marillier had only taken command of 

his platoon the day before it was moved into Operation Cauldron, so he 

did not know the names of most of his men, nor did they know him. In 

contact, the men would not follow him, and control of the platoon broke 

down. These shortfalls can be attributed to the elevated sense of enemy 

capability amongst RAR soldiers coming out of Operation Nickel, and the 

fact that the RAR was still adjusting to its new war, discovering that their 

experience in Malaya and Nyasaland did not exactly apply against ZAPU 

and ZANU. Fortunately, both of these factors would evaporate rapidly in 

the coming operations, and the RAR was to become quite proficient at 

hunting and killing insurgents in the Bush War.41

Operation Cauldron had a few significant outcomes. For its small part in 

the operation, the RAR learned more about how to fight its new enemy. 

Lessons from Cauldron, combined with Nickel, would be applied in future 

operations to bring the RAR back into the fold as a top-tier counterinsurgent 

force. Also, the RLI proved itself as an effective force, beginning its own 

sterling reputation. Unfortunately, a third outcome was that the Rhodesian 

Army-indeed the entire Rhodesian population-began to believe that the 

military situation was well in hand, and this war would not be a major 

problem. This was much to their detriment, as the years from 1968-72 

are marked by an astonishing lack of pursuit, adjustment, and analysis by 

Rhodesian Security Forces against their enemy. The enemy, meanwhile, 

were adjusting their tactics.42

Conclusion

The RAR began the Rhodesian Bush War as respected veterans of 

Burma, Malaya, and Central African Federation deployments-by far the 

senior regiment of the Rhodesian Army, expected to outperform its peers 

and emerge victorious from every fight. In its first two operations against 

ZAPU and SAANC, however, the regiment displayed some disturbing 
40

tactical blunders. The upstart RLI (only formed in 1961), however, came 

into its own during Operation Cauldron-in the face of a questionable RAR 

performance. 

Between Nickel and Cauldron, the RAR proved that seniority did not 

instill competence, and that adjustments were required to succeed in 

this new war on Rhodesian soil. The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant 

Colonel Bill Godwin, recognized this need and immediately set out to 

make these corrections, and regain the vaunted reputation of the regiment. 

Valuable lessons learned by the regiment in these first operations-the 

value of tracking and moving small units around the battlefield, the price 

of overestimating the enemy (as Marillier’s platoon did during Cauldron), 

and the necessity of competent, effective junior leaders-would lead to 

phenomenal success later in the war. Ironically, most of these shortcomings 

for the RAR were also lessons learned from Malaya, although some early 

accusations against the RAR concluded that its “Malayan Way” nearly 

caused failure in Operation Nickel.43

In 1972, several key events occurred which changed the face of the war. 

ZANU, under the influence and mentorship of Maoist Chinese advisors, 

realized that success in their protracted war depended on the support of the 

population, and their tactics shifted to coercion and collusion with rural 

villagers in Rhodesia. ZAPU followed suit, although much more slowly, 

and both groups increased their operational tempo. The regiment was 

about to get very busy.44
41

Notes

1. Originally banned in 1961, ZAPU continued to operate outside 

Rhodesia as “ZAPU” and inside Rhodesia as the People’s Caretaker Council 

(PCC). In 1964, the PCC was also banned, along with ZANU.

2. Kriger, 88.

3. Moorcraft, 29; Binda, Masodja, 204-5. 

4. Wood, Counterstrike, 37. Historian Richard Wood’s five phases of 

the Rhodesian Bush War as outlined in Counterstrike will frame this paper’s 

discussion of how the RAR adapted and changed through the war. Phase 2 

began with the 1972 Altena Farms attack and ended with the 1974 Portuguese 

withdrawal from Mozambique, which opened the northeastern border area 

to ZANLA incursions, substantially increasing the number and frequency 

of contacts between RSF and CT forces that characterized Phase 3 (1974-

1977). Phase 4 (1977-April 1979) saw massive concessions by the Rhodesian 

government towards majority rule, ending in the 1979 election of a black Prime 

Minister, Bishop Muzorewa. Phase 5 (April 1979-April 1980) was characterized 

by increasing international pressure, failure of outside states to recognize 

Muzorewa’s government, and the election of Robert Mugabe as president of 

Zimbabwe which ended the Bush War.

5. Wood, Counterstrike, 75; Binda, Masodja, 204-5; Moorcraft, 29-31. 

Moorcraft and McLaughlin’s account of Sinoia varies slightly in accounting for 

the number and nature of the ZANU groups. They broke the Pagoda / Sinoia 

groups into 21 terrorists split into 3 groups. As Wood and Binda wrote much 

later after the war (The Rhodesian War was originally written in 1982), both had 

access to actual operational reports and other primary sources, so where numbers 

or dates disagree, Wood and Binda’s data are used throughout this paper, as cited 

here.

6. Binda, Masodja, 204-5.

7. Binda.

8. Kraal is an Afrikaans corruption of the Portuguese curral, meaning 

cattle pen or enclosure. In Rhodesia, this word described an African village or 

dwelling.

9. Binda, Masodja, 204-5.

10. Special Branch of the Central Intelligence Organization provided 

much of the intelligence throughout the war. This organization had an extensive 

network of informers and operatives in the tribal areas and outside Rhodesia 

who reported to CIO and to the police. Integration of Special Branch intelligence 

with military operations was slow to evolve, and caused quite a bit of frustration 

within the army early in the war.

11. Wood, Counterstrike, 77.The Armageddon group, like the other ZANU 

terrorists sent into Rhodesia, was armed with a mixture of semi-automatic 
42

“Soviet SKS 7.62mm rifles, French MAT-49 9mm submachine guns, German 

Luger 9mm pistols, Soviet F1 and RGD5 grenades,” placing them at a distinct 

firepower advantage over the much older BSAP bolt-action Lee-Enfields. 

12. Mitrailleuse d’Appui Général, or General Purpose Machine Gun, 

designed by the Belgian company Fabrique Nationale (FN), was the standard 

issue machine gun used by the Rhodesian Army. It is an automatic, air-cooled, 

gas-operated machine gun firing belt-fed 7.62×51mm NATO ammunition from 

an open bolt. While it was experimentally mounted in helicopters, as noted 

here, it was far more prevalent among ground troops, issued at one per infantry 

rifle section (8-10 men), and later fireforce stick (4 man element), in the RAR 

and RLI. This machine gun was also adopted for use by the US Army and US 

Marine Corps in the mid-1980s as the M240. Rhodesian helicopters would 

later use twin Browning .303 machine guns and, eventually, 20mm cannons as 

armament.

13. Wood, Counterstrike, 76-79; Binda, Masodja, 204-5; Moorcraft, 31; 

Ron Reid-Daly, “The War in Rhodesia” in Challenge: Southern Africa within the 

African Revolutionary Context, ed. A. J. Ventner (Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1989), 149.

14. Reid-Daly, Challenge, 156; Binda, Masodja, 224; Wood, Counterstrike, 

61-63. Until 1973, RAF use of helicopters as gunships was largely experimental, 

and RhAF command continued insisted on using helicopters in a support, rather 

than combat role. This position would later be reversed at the army’s insistence, 

RhAF Alouette helicopters equipped with MAGs, twin .303 Browning machine 

guns with reflexive sights, and by July 1974 with French Matra MG151 20mm 

cannons, were employed as “K-Cars” in fireforce operations with great effect.

15. Moorcraft, 29; Wood, Counterstrike, 80; Reid-Daly, 149-50; Binda, 

Masodja, 205.

16. Binda, Masodja, 206-10.

17. Wood, Counterstrike, 80.

18. Binda, Masodja, 206-7. Operations Grampus and Vermin are two such 

operations mentioned by name in the Regimental History. The JOC quickly 

became the central node of information, and its maturing process as a command 

element became evident as operations continued.

19. Rhodesian Army, COIN Manual, Part II-ATOPS [Anti-Terrorist 

Operations] (Salisbury, 1975), 91-2. Rhodesian tactics frequently called for 

sweep operations using “stop groups” and “sweep groups.” Typically, stop 

groups-the hunters-were placed in concealed positions along likely avenues of 

escape, crossing points or natural lines of drift. The sweep group-the houndsthen deliberately searched the entire area to flush the target out of hiding 

and into a waiting ambush at the stop group position. This tactic, refined and 

employed from helicopters, was the basis for fireforce, and it was employed 

throughout the war. 

20. Binda, Masodja, 214.
43

21. Binda, Masodja, 215. After crossing the Zambezi, 10 men were 

separated from the two groups, one of whom was captured by security forces. 

2 additional men of mixed race “were tasked with a separate mission in South 

Africa,” bringing the initial total to 79, with 69 remaining when the RAR made 

contact.”

22. Binda.

23. Binda, Masodja, 215-6.

24. Binda.

25. Binda, Masodja, 218-9.

26. Binda, 219.

27. Binda.

28. Binda, Saints, 46. In 1965, the RLI restructured from a conventional 

infantry battalion into a “commando” battalion. While keeping its designation as 

a battalion, its subordinate units were called commandos rather than companies, 

and troops rather than platoons. The RLI had four commandos (numbered 1, 2, 

3, and Support). Each commando was further subdivided into five troops of 25 

men (as opposed to three platoons of 37 men), although they typically operated 

at strength of four troops due to manpower shortages and casualty rates. So, an 

RLI commando consisted of 100-125 men divided into 4-5 troops. 

29. Binda, Masodja, 219-20; Binda, Saints, 60. 

30. Binda.

31. Binda.

32. Binda, Saints, 64; Moorcraft, 32-3.

33. Binda, Masodja, 224; CE20110910H0001, former RAR officer, 

interview; CF20110920H0001, former RAR officer, interview by author, 

London, England, 20 September 2011.

34. Reid-Daly, Challenge, 156.

35. This number also included army and air force units, but the word 

“police” was used to obscure South African military involvement in what was 

internationally viewed as a British affair.

36. Moorcraft, 32; Reid-Daly, Challenge, 158-9.

37. Wood, Counterstrike, 53.

38. Binda, Saints, 64.

39. Binda, Masodja, 227.

40. Binda, Saints, 78. PWO Herod, while recovering from his wounds, was 

credited with saying famously to RLI Sgt Tim Baker, “We of the RAR used to 

laugh at your soldiers. To us they looked like boys. But they showed us how to 

fight. They have the faces of boys, but they fight like lions.” 
44

41. CE20110910H0001, former RAR officer, interview; Reid-Daly, 

Challenge, 161-2; Binda, Masodja, 227.

42. Moorcraft, 33; Binda, The Saints, 77-8; Binda, Masodja, 227.

43. Reid-Daly, Challenge, 155; CE20110912G0001, former RAR officer, 

interview by author, Durban, Republic of South Africa, 12 September 2011.

44. Wood, Counterstrike, 35-37.
45

Chapter 4

Phase Two: 1972-1974

The problem of establishment of bases is of particular importance. 

This is so because this war is a cruel and protracted struggle . . 

. [S]ome part of our country-or, indeed, most of it-may . . . be 

captured by the enemy and become his rear area. It is our task to 

develop intensive guerrilla warfare over this vast area and convert 

the enemy’s rear into an additional front. Thus the enemy will 

never be able to stop fighting. In order to subdue the occupied 

territory, the enemy will have to become increasingly severe and 

oppressive.

— Mau Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare

From 1971 and leading to the December 1972 attack on Altena Farm 

in northeast Rhodesia, ZANU adopted a Maoist strategy to establish a 

base area in Rhodesia, spread security forces thin and collapse morale 

through consistent attacks on rural targets. In response, Rhodesian forces 

established a JOC at Centenary. This JOC became the headquarters for 

Operation Hurricane across the northeast portion of Rhodesia, and the first 

of six operational areas (Hurricane, Thrasher, Repulse, Tangent, Grapple, 

and Splinter) that would define the Rhodesian war effort.1

This period saw several security force developments, including the 

establishment of the first Operational Area (Hurricane); the start of the 

Protected Village (PV) program in contested areas of the country; the 

inception of the Selous Scouts; and the early development of a rapid 

airborne reaction force, called Fireforce, to quickly strike on actionable 

intelligence.2

Politically during this phase, the December 1971 rejection of the 

Home-Smith agreement for transition to majority rule stymied an early 

Rhodesian political solution to the growing insurgency and contributed 

to turmoil within and outside of Rhodesia. The Portuguese withdrawal 

from neighboring Mozambique in 1974, and subsequent handover of 

Mozambique governance to the Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique 

(FRELIMO) guerrillas, effectively eliminated the Rhodesian government’s 

crucial eastern ally. This left Rhodesia’s sole remaining friendly ports and 

borders with South Africa. FRELIMO would also provide sanctuaries in 

Mozambique for ZANLA and open the north and east border regions to 

ZANLA infiltrations unencumbered by the more restrictive terrain of the 

Zambezi River along the Zambian border. Despite these developments, by 
46

1974 security forces had reduced the number of insurgents in the country 

to 60 individuals, all contained in the northeast.3

The Home-Smith Agreement and Pearce Commission

To understand the environment in which the RAR operated during this 

phase of the war, it is important to understand the significant political 

events that occurred. As the RAR began to consistently engage and pursue 

their enemy, much was in turmoil in Rhodesia. 

In September 1965, the British Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) 

established five principles for Rhodesian independence: 

First, the principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority 

rule, already enshrined in the 1961 constitution, would have to be 

maintained and guaranteed. There would also have to be guarantees 

against retrogressive amendment of the constitution. There would 

have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the 

African population. There would have to be progress towards the 

ending of racial discrimination. The British Government would 

need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was 

acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.4

A sixth principle was added in January 1966: no oppression of the 

majority by the minority, or of the minority by the majority.5

The first principle-unimpeded progress to majority rule-was the nominal 

reason Britain refused to grant independence to Rhodesia.6

 Under the 

1961 constitution, which was referenced by the CRO above and annexed 

to the UDI seven weeks later, there were two voter rolls—”A” roll and 

“B” roll. While these rolls were not explicitly racially divided, the A roll 

was restricted to higher thresholds of property, education and incomethus, higher contributions to income tax revenues-and was predominantly 

white. The B roll, with lower standards, was almost entirely black.7

The 65 seats of the Rhodesian Assembly were subdivided into 50 

constituency and 15 district seats. Both rolls voted for constituency 

and district seats. However, the 1961 constitution had a “cross-voting” 

influence built in: that is, B roll votes were capped at 20 percent of the total 

vote for the 50 constituency seats, and A roll votes were likewise capped 

at 20 percent for the 15 district seats. The end result of this complicated 

voting system was that whites (A roll voters) had a controlling majority of 

50 constituency assembly seats, while the black majority only effectively 

controlled 15 district seats. This breakdown was representative of 

contributions to “the fisc,” or the income tax revenue of Rhodesia, but it 
47

was grossly out of step with the demographics of the country. In asking 

black leaders to accept this constitution, the Rhodesian government was 

effectively asking that they accept a long, slow road to majority rule: once 

enough blacks met the education, property and income requirements to 

qualify as A roll voters, they would gain parity in electing the constituency 

seats. Black nationalist leaders initially signed an agreement endorsing 

this constitution, but later reneged and urged the black population to reject 

the constitution during the 1962 referendum.8

In 1969, the Rhodesian Front proposed a new constitution, which 

declared Rhodesia to be a republic.9

 This UDI constitution still offered a 

viable path to majority rule, thus meeting the first principle laid out by the 

CRO, but it was an even slower path than the 1961 constitution. Smith and 

the Rhodesian Front still believed they had made generous concessions 

toward majority rule, and had met the first four principles outlined by the 

CRO.10 As a step backward on the path to majority rule, however, the UDI 

constitution alienated more of the moderate black population from the 

Rhodesian Front and provided a rich opportunity for ZANU and ZAPU to 

capitalize on the Rhodesian Front’s apparent unwillingness to share power. 

In the April 1970 general election, the Rhodesian Front won all 50 A 

roll seats. In April 1971 the newly appointed Conservative British Foreign 

Secretary, Lord Alec Douglas-Home, flew to Salisbury to discuss the new 

Rhodesian constitution and assess the acceptability of this document as 

meeting the principles for British recognition of Rhodesia. From April to 

November 1971, Douglas-Home negotiated with Smith’s representatives 

to create a compromise agreement. When Douglas-Home left for England 

in November, he assured Smith that London would be satisfied, pending a 

few formalities. The resulting agreement conceded additional B roll seats 

in the Rhodesian Assembly-giving black voters a total of 22 seats (still 

short, however, of a “blocking third” to prevent additional amendments to 

the constitution). In the compromise Home-Smith Agreement: 

Rhodesia had to declare its intention to make progress toward 

ending racial discrimination; accept a new declaration guaranteeing 

individual rights and freedoms; include steps to enable more 

Africans to compete on equal terms with whites for civil-service 

jobs; review the cases of all detainees and restricted persons; and 

set up an independent committee to study racial discrimination 

and make recommendations to the Rhodesian government. Up to 

£50 million in British aid was to be given to Rhodesia over a tenyear period, and the Rhodesian government was to match this sum 

to promote educational and job opportunities for Africans.11
48

This agreement was accepted by both the Rhodesian Front and the 

British representatives as meeting the first four principles laid out by the 

CRO in 1965.12

To meet the fifth principle-satisfaction of the British Government that 

the proposal was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole-the 

British formed a twenty-one man commission, chaired by a British judge, 

Lord Edward Holroyd Pearce. Pearce’s three deputy chairmen were Sir 

Maurice Dorman (former Governor-General of Sierra Leone and Malta), 

Sir Glyn Jones (former Governor of Nyasaland), and Lord Harlech (former 

British Ambassador to the United States). Neither Pearce nor Harlech had 

any experience in Africa, and while all of the other commissioners were 

former colonial officers in Africa, none of the commissioners were black, 

which instantly eroded any credibility of the commission amongst black 

nationalist leaders.13

The Pearce Commission arrived in Rhodesia in January of 1972 and 

began meeting with Rhodesians to determine their views on the HomeSmith Agreement (also called the Anglo-Rhodesian Agreement). From 

January to March, the commission met with about 6 percent of the black 

population amid violence between police and African National Council 

(ANC)14 nationalists against accepting the agreement. In May, Pearce 

reported to Lord Douglas-Home and Parliament that black Rhodesians 

“roundly rejected” the Home-Smith Agreement and that British sanctions 

should continue.15

According to Ian Smith, the Pearce Commission’s report was a fraud, 

because apart from the fact that “the vast majority of our black people 

were unable to comprehend what was taking place, the commission had 

seen less than 5 per cent of our black people-and yet they were prepared 

to submit a report purporting to represent the views of 100 per cent!”16

However, according to Dr. Wellington Nyangoni, a former ZANU member 

and African history professor at Brandeis University, “African opposition 

to the Anglo-Rhodesian Agreement was overwhelming, and their rejection 

of the Agreement rendered it unacceptable.”17 Whatever the cause for the 

Pearce Commission’s findings, by 1971 it was clear that Rhodesia was 

beginning to fragment along racial lines, either at the urging of black 

nationalists of the ANC, ZAPU, and ZANU or because of an out-of-touch 

Rhodesian Front government. 

Amidst all of this turmoil, the RAR continued to recruit, fight and thrive 

as a multicultural organization. None of the political or social dynamics 

in motion within the country were reflected within the regiment. The 
49

controversy surrounding the Home-Smith Agreement and the Pearce 

Commission did not affect the availability of black recruits for the RAR at 

all, nor did it seem to affect soldiers serving in the regiment. Indeed, the 

regiment still had many more recruits than it could accept waiting outside 

its gates on recruiting days, and the soldiers serving in the regiment saw 

themselves as a staunchly apolitical force, undeterred by the political 

events surrounding them. Like most other RAR traditions, the absence of 

politics in the regiment was a British Army notion not copied in ZIPRA, 

ZANLA, or later in the Security Force Auxiliaries.18

Operation Hurricane

In December 1972, ZANU insurgents attacked Altena Farm near 

Centenary “to study the reaction of the enemy and his tactics so we could 

decide upon our own tactics,”19 according to their commander, Rex Nhongo. 

ZANLA attacked from Chiweshe TTL, where they had established a base. 

The farm was randomly selected as a target, but the attack deliberately 

provoked a Rhodesian response, which ZANLA watched very carefully. 

ZANLA operators had been in the Chiweshe TTL for over a year, and had 

subverted the population in much of the Northeast portion of the country. 

Their intent was not only to subvert the population but to force RSF to 

spread themselves out, resulting in constant attrition of troops and morale 

over time. ZANLA insurgents had given up on the idea that the British 

Army would intervene on their behalf if they could generate enough 

civil unrest. They were learning from their Chinese mentors, and their 

strategy and tactics shifted to a more popular struggle, focused on setting 

conditions for insurgency among the kraals and tribal areas. Only once 

conditions were set among the population would ZANLA conduct any 

sort of military action, carefully avoiding costly direct confrontation with 

security forces, where ZANLA was at a disadvantage.20

The Rhodesian response to the attack on Altena Farm was to establish a 

JOC at Centenary and initiate Operation Hurricane to find and destroy the 

ZANLA forces in the area. To that end, a mixture Rhodesian Security Forces 

(RSF), including elements of 1RAR, were deployed into the operational 

area as the first troops in what would be an eight-year operation. These 

troops immediately noticed that the locals were no longer as willing to 

cooperate with security forces-they were afraid of ZANLA reprisals, and 

their chief was a ZANLA supporter.21

Until Operation Hurricane, Rhodesian Security Forces believed they had 

the situation well in hand. They believed that black Rhodesians would 

fully support the white government’s efforts against the insurgents, and 
50

that no major adjustments to their tactics were necessary, despite reports 

to the contrary (including documents captured during an SAS raid against 

a FRELIMO-ZANLA22 base camp in Mozambique). It took the attack on 

Altena Farm to sound the alarm within the Rhodesian command. Once 

Rhodesian commanders realized that the paradigm of universal black 

support was an illusion, they made several adjustments in how they fought 

the war as well. The RAR would play a vital role in implementing these 

tactics.23

Protected Villages

One of the adjustments made by RSF was an effort to isolate the 

population from insurgent influence and create “no-go” areas24 in sparsely 

populated regions by creating Protected Villages (PVs). The effectiveness 

of these villages was mixed-they did help create civilian “no-go” areas 

to facilitate RSF pursuit of insurgents, but they failed to address the core 

issue of popular support for the insurgency.25

PVs were not new to the RAR soldiers, some of whom had experience in 

Malaya, as well as in Mozambique with Portuguese troops.26 Malayan PVscalled “New Villages”-were highly effective at denying insurgent access 

to the population. The Portuguese versions of PVs, called aldeamentos, 

were not as effective because the Portuguese program in Mozambique was 

hastily executed and inadequately resourced.27 The Rhodesian PVs were a 

blend of the Malayan and Portuguese concepts, and were a strategic failure 

of the Bush War.

According to counterinsurgency theorist Sir Robert Thompson, there are 

three main objectives of a PV strategy:

The first, a prerequisite for the other two, is the protection of the 

population. . . . The most vital aspect of protection, however is 

the elimination within the hamlet of the insurgent underground 

organization. Until this is done, no hamlet will be secure against 

repenetration and treachery, nor can the people themselves be 

expected to take positive action on behalf of the government 

until insurgent agents and supporters within the hamlet have been 

removed. The second object . . . is to unite the people and involve 

them in positive action on the side of the government. . . . This can 

only be done by involving the people in a small way in national 

policies which both affect and benefit them, first in the defence 

of their community and secondly in its development. The third 

objective . . . is this development in the social, economic, and 

political fields. . . . The significant point here is that at the end of 
51

the [Malayan] Emergency very few families wished to leave their 

new homes and return to their old sites.28

In practice, Rhodesian PVs did not separate the population from 

insurgent influence prior to moving them into the villages, nor was there 

ever enough investment in the infrastructure, social, economic or political 

fields to influence the population to support the government.29

In establishing the PV program, Rhodesian Deputy Minister of Law and 

Order Wickus de Kock emphasized that the purpose of the program was to 

create no-go areas, where access was restricted to “authorised members of 

the Security Forces.”30 This is a very different emphasis from the Malayan 

model, which focused on isolating the population from insurgents by first 

focusing on meeting security and infrastructure needs of the villagers 

themselves. In contrast to de Kock’s policy, the Rhodesian Army stated that 

the intent of the operation that relocated people into PVs was “to deprive 

terrorists of their vital contact with the civilian population, particularly 

at night, when they force tribesmen to accommodate and feed them as 

they move through the area.”31 These two shades on the intent of the PV 

program reveal a rift between government policy and army practice, and 

neither of the stated intents addressed what was most successful in Malayasafeguarding and improving conditions for the people.32

A third perspective on the intent of PVs came from an Internal Affairs 

planning document, which stated, “The short term objective is the removal 

of the African people from terrorist influence for the sake of national 

security, but the full attainment of this short term aim must surely result 

in our reaching the ultimate goal of more concentrated and more rapid 

development of the African people and the areas which they inhabit.”33 The 

emphasis of the PV program never shifted to that second long term goal of 

development due to lack of resources, poor planning and misunderstanding 

amongst planners of the intent of the program.34

The result of this confused PV policy was the hasty establishment of 

poorly planned, insufficiently secured and under-resourced villages that 

inspired no confidence in the government and were still vulnerable to 

insurgent attacks. The civilians’ situation had most certainly not improved, 

and in their view it had deteriorated. According to a black Member of 

Parliament, Aaron Mungate, the main objections to PVs among the black 

population were:

1. The only people who were protected were those within the keep 

itself (i.e. the guards).

2. In the majority of the Protected Villages no timely and adequate 

water supply had been installed.
52

3. People had been forced from their traditional, and in some 

instances, substantial homes with no compensation and no aid towards 

buying materials to erect new ones. 

4. Because only the gates of the Protected Villages were guarded, the 

fences around the village did not prevent communication between the 

villagers and the insurgents.35

The Rhodesian PV program suffered from two main shortcomings in 

execution. First, there was “an over-emphasis on the short term goal of 

physically concentrating the local population and the freedom of action 

this would give the Security Forces. Second, the program never had the 

resources committed to it-either financially or militarily, to succeed.36 In 

the only truly successful example of population control the Rhodesians 

had (Malaya), the government committed adequate economic resources to 

the endeavor, resulting in New Villages truly becoming better places to live 

than their alternative. This was a lesson that the British had learned rather 

painfully by the time the RAR were deployed there in 1956. In Malaya, 

there were also more than enough security forces to isolate the villages 

from the insurgents-Rhodesia had neither the will nor the manpower to 

commit to PV security early enough to make a difference. Instead, PVs 

became unsanitary breeding grounds for contempt toward the government, 

and excellent targets for coercion and manipulation by the insurgents.37

The PV program is one area where the RAR could have played a 

tremendous role in turning popular support back to the government of 

Rhodesia. Had the Rhodesian government invested the time and effort 

into developing meaningful local protection of the PVs at their inceptionpossibly using RAR platoons as partners and trainers for village security 

forces, at least the security situation within PVs would have improved, 

and potential inclusion of the villagers in securing their own fate may 

have prevented their availability to the insurgents for psychological and 

physical attacks. Eventually, two security initiatives would attempt to 

redress the vulnerability of PVs and the surrounding tribal areas-Guard 

Force and Security Force Auxiliaries (Pfomu re Vanhu, mentioned earlier). 

Both initiatives were severely challenged in providing adequate training, 

equipment, and supervision. By the time these forces were stood up, they 

couldn’t be trained fast enough to meet the threat.38

The RAR knew how to train African soldiers. They had established a 

rigorous selection and training program of their own, and understood 

quite well how to overcome the challenge of taking a raw recruit from 

a Rhodesian kraal, with very limited education, no experience with a 
53

rifle, and little cultural understanding of how the army was structured and 

turning him into a capable soldier-loyal and dedicated to his regiment. The 

development of such a force took time, as the RAR well knew.39 In 1973, 

Rhodesia had time, but by 1977, when efforts to secure the PVs were 

stepped up and Guard Force was formed, time was up and the insurgents 

had the upper hand in the tribal areas.

Selous Scouts

By 1973, the Rhodesian Army realized that it had a real problem 

gathering actionable military intelligence on insurgent locations and 

activities. Until Operation Hurricane, counterinsurgency operations relied 

on intelligence primarily gathered by BSAP and Special Branch from 

willing locals. Due to the insurgents’ shift to a Maoist strategy of coercion 

and intimidation of local populations, intelligence sources dried up almost 

completely in 1971, and something had to be done to get RSF back into 

action. The Rhodesians studied two very effective examples to accomplish 

this: the British experience against Mau-Mau guerrillas in Kenya, and the 

Portuguese example of the fleches,

40 a unit made up of local tribesmen 

and turned insurgents used to great effect in Angola and Mozambique. 

Patterned after these examples, small groups of Rhodesian soldiers, with 

turned ZIPRA and ZANLA insurgents integrated into their organization, 

formed into gangs that imitated insurgent tactics to discover the support 

network and track movements of real insurgent groups. These experiments 

resulted in tremendous success, and the army formed a regiment to further 

develop and implement these “pseudo” operations in Rhodesian strategy. 

The regiment was called the Selous Scouts, named after the renowned 

Rhodesian hunter, Frederick Courtney Selous.41

The Selous Scouts’ newly appointed CO, Lieutenant Colonel Ron 

Reid-Daly, was given top priority on selecting, equipping, and training 

personnel-black and white-from across the RSF. Recruitment for the Scouts 

was universal: anyone from any regiment could volunteer for selection, 

and no unit could refuse such a request. This resulted in some friction 

between the RAR and Selous Scouts, as Reid-Daly recruited heavily 

from the RAR to fill his ranks. For the RAR soldiers, selection to the 

Scouts meant more adventure in a special operations unit, more prestige 

as a highly trained special operator, and a significant increase in pay. The 

Selous Scouts offered equal pay for black and white members (unlike any 

other Rhodesian unit at the time), and they offered the additional incentive 

of a “special unit allowance”-an extra Rh$1.20 a day, which effectively 

made the average black Scout’s pay the same as the RSM of an RAR rifle 

battalion. As a result, the Selous Scouts tended to draw out top-performing 
54

NCOs from the RAR, placing the regiment in competition with ReidDaly’s recruiters.42

The RAR was not the only source for black Selous Scouts, however. 

Many were also drawn from the BSAP, SB, and a great many were 

captured, “tame” insurgents whose experience in ZANLA and ZIPRA was 

critical to the Scouts’ infiltration of the insurgents’ networks. Many of the 

former RAR NCOs served with great distinction as Selous Scouts. While 

serving with the Scouts, former RAR soldiers earned seven Silver Crosses 

of Rhodesia, twenty-four Bronze Crosses of Rhodesia, one Member of the 

Legion of Merit, one Defence Forces Medal for Meritorious Service and 

thirteen Military Forces Commendations. Two of these men earned both 

the Silver and Bronze Crosses of Rhodesia, making them the most highly 

decorated NCOs in the Rhodesian Army.43 As Reid-Daly stated in The War 

Diaries of Andre Dennison:

Relations between the RAR and the Selous Scouts were not always 

cordial during the Rhodesian war. That is perfectly understandable 

from the RAR point of view, for they had to stand by and watch 

many of their best men poached for the Selous Scouts. But if one 

looks back dispassionately now, free from the stress and tensions 

brought about by the war, officers and soldiers of the RAR must 

only feel pride in the many deeds of valour performed by their 

men who served with great courage and distinction in the Selous 

Scouts.44

One Selous Scouts officer interviewed for this study recalled his selection 

course, which 175 candidates started, from whom only 12 were selected. 

At the tender age of 38, this officer struggled to finish the final forced 

march of the course, a tremendously long journey with full kit. He stopped 

to rest his aching feet, nearly at the end of his endurance, and a fellow 

candidate from the RAR stopped with him, picked up his rucksack and 

finished alongside the officer, carrying his own pack and the officer’s the 

rest of the way. Such was the selflessness and spirit of these men. To be 

sure, the RAR was not the sole reason for the astounding success of the 

Selous Scouts, but “without the men of the RAR, the Scouts would not 

have been half as effective.”45

Fireforce

How do you force the guerrilla into confrontation situations (contacts) on 

your own terms, given the fact that the enemy’s tactics and training make 

him adept at avoiding these situations?... Army actions alone (ambushes 

and fleeting contacts) seldom result in the guerrilla suffering significant 
55

casualties and follow-up operations on foot using trackers are also of 

dubious value.... Air power used in isolation is similarly ineffective. In 

order to locate the guerrilla and force him to fight (or surrender), the 

peculiar attributes of ground and air forces acting in concert are required. 

Employed in the appropriate manner they provide the best possible chance 

of inflicting heavy casualties, and combined they provide a formidable 

fighting force.46

To act on the real-time intelligence gathered by the Selous Scouts and 

others, the Rhodesian Army needed a rapid reaction force on standby, 

with coordinated air support and ground troops ready to rapidly attack and 

destroy identified cells of terrorists before they could escape. To this end, 

the SAS began experimenting with dropping paratroops in Tête province 

of Mozambique to vertically envelop targeted insurgent groups. These 

experiments, combined with the refined insertion of heliborne troops from 

RhAF Alouette helicopters, led to the deployment of the first “fireforce” at 

Centenary in January 1974.47

Early fireforce deployments consisted of several groups of four men, 

called sticks. In each stick was “a junior officer, NCO or senior trooper, 

armed with an FN rifle and equipped with a VHF A63/76 radio; two 

riflemen, one with first aid training; and a machine gunner carrying a 

MAG 7.62mm machine gun.”48 An Alouette helicopter could carry one 

stick of soldiers-the troop-carrying helicopters were called “G-Cars.” 

The fireforce commander, usually the company or troop commander 

or 2IC, rode in a command helicopter, called a “K-Car.” The fireforce 

commander was responsible for spotting terrorists on the ground, talking 

to the Observation Post (OP), coordinating all troop deployments, and 

integrating airstrikes from bombers and Lynx49 aircraft with ground 

operations, while the K-Car pilot coordinated all helicopter movements 

and kept his aircraft in the fight. Within a few months of starting fireforce 

deployments (by June 1974) K-Cars were also equipped with 20mm Matra 

cannons, and were able to effectively engage ground targets while circling 

over the contact at 800 feet.50

Several sticks were deployed according to direction from the fireforce 

commander circling overhead in the K-Car. These sticks would serve as 

“stop groups” while another group (one or several sticks, depending on the 

situation) acted as a “sweep group,” tasked to clear the open area to flush 

their quarry into an ambush at the stop group locations. The circling K-Car 

provided fire support from its mounted gun, and coordinated strikes from 

Lynx and other aircraft.51
56

On 15 February 1974, the efforts of establishing fireforce were rewarded 

as 20 RLI soldiers were called in and arrived on five Alouette helicopters 

to assault an insurgent camp discovered by an Air Force pilot near Mount 

Darwin. Later that same month, one of the first Selous Scouts operations 

led by Lieutenant Dale Collett infiltrated a large group of ZANLA cadre 

operating in Rhodesia. By 18 April 1975, Lt. Collett’s group had enough 

intelligence to call in a fireforce. Once again, the fireforce at Centenarythis time from B Company 1RAR-arrived and surrounded the insurgents. 

The final result of this contact was 7 insurgents killed, 5 captured (one of 

whom died later), and 7 escaped (two of whom were believed wounded). 

Another body was found three weeks later. The results of these early 

fireforce operations were encouraging to the RAR and the RSF in general.52

There were lessons yet to be learned in employment of fireforce, and the 

weapons and tactics would continue to evolve for the rest of the war-notably 

with the addition of 20mm Matra cannons to the Alouette gunships (called 

K-Cars) in June 1974, and the use of DC-3 Dakotas to drop paratroops 

in 1977 (until 1977 only the SAS were parachute qualified). The concept 

began with four or five sticks of troopers deploying by helicopter with 

additional sticks arriving via ground convoy (called the “land tail”), and 

would eventually evolve into large packages of hundreds of soldiers 

employed in “jumbo” fireforces conducting external raids into Zambia and 

Mozambique. The size of the Fireforce was determined by the size of the 

enemy and the situation on the ground.53

The RLI and RAR were the principal units to execute fireforce 

operations. RLI commandos and RAR companies rotated through fireforce 

deployments at forward airfields scattered throughout the operational 

areas of the country. In later “jumbo” fireforce raids into Zambia and 

Mozambique the RLI and SAS operated almost exclusively, while the 

RAR tended to execute internal fireforce operations (that is, within the 

country of Rhodesia). This was because the RAR was generally better at 

pursuing insurgents through the tribal areas while operating amongst the 

population to gain intelligence and look for inconsistencies. The RLI’s 

strengths-aggressive, fast-paced, initiative driven contact-were much 

better suited to external operations.54

Between Selous Scouts and fireforce, RSF made the innovations 

necessary to counter the Phase Two tactical shift to Maoist principles 

that ZANLA made in 1972. By the end of 1974, there were only 60-70 

insurgents left operating in Rhodesia, all contained in the northeast part of 

the country and vastly outnumbered by the RSF. Militarily, Rhodesia had 

regained the military advantage and had the insurgents pressed nearly to 
57

the breaking point. The population had been moved into PVs in much of 

the area identified as insurgent stronghold, isolating them (temporarily) 

from insurgent influence.55

Loss of an ally: Portugal withdraws from Africa

On 25 April 1974, the Portuguese Army in Lisbon staged a coup d’état

(the Carnation Revolution) and took over the government. The new 

government in Lisbon, made up largely of disillusioned army officers tired 

of fighting costly colonial wars in Africa, promptly granted independence 

to all of its African colonies, and on 25 July 1974 Mozambique was 

turned over to FRELIMO as over 250,000 Portuguese inhabitants fled the 

country.56

The Portuguese withdrawal and the subsequent takeover of Mozambique 

by FRELIMO was a strategic disaster for Rhodesia. Portugal was a crucial 

ally to the Rhodesian government. They offered military cooperation, trade 

and access to ports on the Indian Ocean. Despite their tactical ineptitude 

and relatively poor military attributes,57 the Portuguese had been fighting a 

counterinsurgency much longer than their Rhodesian counterparts, and the 

Rhodesians learned much about what to do (and what not to do) from their 

Portuguese allies and neighbors. In fact, the Portuguese contribution to 

joint military discussions were crucial in developing the early Rhodesian 

responses to nationalist insurgent operations. PVs and pseudo operations 

were both patterned after Portuguese examples (the former, unfortunately, 

was patterned more closely than it should have been). The formation of 

Grey’s Scouts, a mounted infantry unit, as an effective counterinsurgency 

force was also a Rhodesian idea with Portuguese precedent.58

Without Portuguese Mozambique, Rhodesia only had South Africa to 

turn to for assistance, and that put the Rhodesian government at the mercy 

of its southern neighbor, under tremendous pressure of its own. As the 

new government of Mozambique, FRELIMO-already allied with ZANLA 

by tribal ties and as a fellow nationalist group-subsequently offered 

its direct assistance, bases and safe haven throughout Mozambique. 

FRELIMO ceased all assistance to the Rhodesian government, enforced 

the UN Embargo, and closed its ports to Rhodesian cargo. With FRELIMO 

assistance (and without Portuguese Army interference) ZANLA had 

unrestricted access to Mozambique and another 1,100 kilometers of border 

along which to stage incursions and strikes. The Rhodesian Army and the 

RAR would soon have an unsolvable problem on their eastern frontierit would later prove no longer possible to militarily contain the growing 

insurgency.59
58

Conclusion

Those developments were yet to come, however. By the end of the second 

phase of the Bush War, RSF had overcome the insurgents’ shift to a Maoist 

strategy by establishing the first permanent JOC in Operation Hurricane, 

and by adapting new tactics to isolate the population, increase intelligence 

and act decisively when that intelligence revealed a valid target. At the end 

of 1974, as at the end of 1971, Rhodesia had the war very much in hand 

militarily. This would not continue. The loss of the friendly Portuguese 

government in Mozambique increased regional pressure on Rhodesia, and 

left the Rhodesian Front government with very few options. From this 

point forward, factors beyond Rhodesian control would drive the pace of 

the war. 

For its part, the RAR remained steadily and increasingly employed 

throughout this period. The advent of fireforce increased demands on the 

regiment. The RAR had learned valuable lessons since Operation Nickel, 

and proved its effectiveness in conducting fireforce operations, patrols, 

and observation post missions against an increasingly familiar ZANLA 

opponent. 

The political uncertainties of the Pearce Commission and increased 

insurgent intimidation in the tribal areas and kraals had surprisingly little 

effect on the availability of black volunteers for service in the regiment. 

While never explicitly employed in securing Protected Villages, the RAR 

could have provided a valuable service by committing to the development 

of PV security forces during this critical period. Later attempts to secure 

PVs (discussed in subsequent chapters) would be hastily conceived and 

poorly executed. 

With the formation of the Selous Scouts, many of the best NCOs left the 

RAR for better pay and more adventure as trackers and pseudo operators 

under Lt. Col. Reid-Daly. While the loss of these NCOs did degrade 

1RAR slightly, the regiment still retained its reputation as a superb 

counterinsurgency force and did not suffer tremendously. 

The loss of Portuguese influence in Mozambique would have profound 

effects on the RAR, as the increased tempo of the war stretched its 

companies more thinly across a wider area of the country. The numbers 

of insurgents encountered by fireforce operations would quickly increase 

from dozens to hundreds, while the RLI and SAS strikes targeted thousands 

of insurgents in external raids. 
59

Notes

1. These operational areas were permanent JOCs with attached 

subordinate units from RSF. The size of RSF forces in each operational area 

varied with the level of activity in them, but generally consisted of several 

infantry companies and sliced elements of BSAP, Special Branch, Selous Scouts, 

RhAF and any other security forces required for operations. 

2. Wood, Counterstrike, 37-39.

3. Wood, 39.

4. Colonial Relations Office to Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, 21 

September 1965, as found in Hyam, 369-70.

5. Hyam, 370.

6. Smith, 156. Smith (then Prime Minister of Rhodesia) suggests other 

reasons Britain did not grant Rhodesian independence. Chiefly, he states that the 

British government under Harold Wilson and the Labour Party was motivated to 

support black nationalists by its desire to “appease the OAU,” while Ted Heath’s 

Conservative Party, which won the 1970 British general election, was more 

interested in obtaining British entry into the European Economic Community 

than solving the Rhodesian problem. Whatever the reason, British attitudes 

regarding Rhodesian recognition certainly differed between Salisbury and 

London, and between the Colonial Office, Foreign Office and Prime Minister 

in both Labour and Conservative governments. The resulting duplicity of Her 

Majesty’s Government confused both the Rhodesian government and black 

nationalist movements. 

7. Patrick O’Meara, Rhodesia: Racial Conflict or Coexistence (Ithaca: 

Cornell University Press, 1975), 15.

8. O’Meara, 40-54; Smith, 151-2; Nyangoni, 57-8; Martin, 68-9.

9. Smith, 151; O’Meara, 43. The 1969 “UDI” constitution also amended 

the Assembly seat allocation to 50 A roll, 8 B roll, and another 8 seats to be 

nominated by tribal chiefs. The cross-voting concept was removed, and the B 

roll was explicitly designated for “non-European” voters. For the first time, 

Rhodesian voter rolls were explicitly racially divided. The UDI constitution 

provided a means to increase the number of B roll seats in tandem with the 

increase in blacks meeting the standards for the higher roll (higher education, 

property and income tax contributions), up to parity at 50 B roll seats. Then, 

once blacks reached parity with whites, “a committee would be appointed 

to decide how to bring about an African majority government, and their 

suggestions would require approval by two-thirds of Parliament (essentially 

giving the white minority a veto power).” Ian Smith disagreed with the idea of 

racial division, believing that Rhodesia should “perpetuate the principle and 

continue our philosophy of trying to establish a genuine meritocracy in keeping 

with Rhodes’s famous dictum: ‘Equal rights for all civilised men.’” His efforts 

to exclude racial divisions were not accepted by the rest of the Rhodesian Front, 
60

and the racial language, which had not been in the Rhodesian constitution 

since the 1952 Federal constitution, remained in the 1969 document. In March 

1970, a general election placed the UDI constitution into effect and formed the 

Rhodesian government into a republic, with explicitly racial division of voter 

rolls.

10. Smith, 152. 

11. O’Meara, 42.

12. Smith, 153.

13. O’Meara, 46-7. 

14. J. K. Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia (Dover: Croom Helm, 

1985), 11. The ANC was formed by Bishop Abel Muzurewa (also spelled 

Muzorewa) in 1971 with the expressed purpose of actively encouraging black 

Rhodesians to reject the Home-Smith Agreement. In this endeavor, it was highly 

successful, as described here. The ANC, unlike ZAPU and ZANU, never formed 

a military arm to take up arms against the Rhodesian government, and so was 

never banned from participating in Rhodesian politics. Muzurewa would come 

to be seen as a moderate nationalist leader, and would engage in talks over the 

next few years with the Smith government, ending in the Internal Settlement of 

March, 1978 and the establishment of majority rule in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe.

15. Smith, 156; O’Meara, 54; Cilliers, 11; Kriger, 86; Wood, Counterstrike, 

35; Lester A. Sobel, ed., Rhodesia/Zimbabwe 1971-77 (New York: Facts on File, 

1978), 30-1.

16. Smith. Smith’s estimation of the percentage of Africans polled by the 

Pearce Commission (5 percent) differs from other accounts, which place the 

number at 6 percent. The discrepancy is noted here because Smith is quoted 

directly. Most other sources support the 6 percent number. Regardless, the 

Pearce Commission only met with a tiny sample of African population after 

much violence surrounding their arrival from both ANC activists and Rhodesian 

police. The Pearce Commission report acknowledged that fact but believed 

they had captured the predominant feeling of the black population, much to the 

consternation of Smith and the Rhodesian Front.

17. Wellington W. Nyangoni. African Nationalism In Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)

(Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1977), 89. 

18. CE20110908G0001, former RAR officer, interview; 

CE20110908M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

19. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe

(London: Faber and Faber, 1981), 73.

20. Binda, Masodja, 248; Wood, Counterstrike, 38; Martin, 73.

21. Binda, Masodja, 262-3; Wood, Counterstrike, 38; Martin, 146.

22. FRELIMO (Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique), or Liberation Front 
61

of Mozambique, was the communist insurgent group in Mozambique fighting 

against the ruling Portuguese government. Because of their tribal similarities 

(the western portion of Mozambique was predominantly inhabited by Shona 

tribes) ZANU and ZANLA were able to make great allies of FRELIMO, using 

their bases for training, staging and operating extensively. ZAPU tended to 

operate out of Zambia throughout the war.

23. Martin, 97.

24. These were open areas for RSF to engage the insurgents without 

placing the population at risk by moving selected rural populations into 

consolidated compounds

25. Cilliers, 101.

26. Binda, Masodja, 265; CE20110909R0001, former RAR officer, 

interview; CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview. By this point, 

Rhodesian Army planners were working in Pretoria with both Portuguese and 

South African counterparts to drive policy decisions and compare experiences. 

Called Exercise Alcora, these planning sessions were largely influenced by the 

Portuguese contingent until their sudden withdrawal in 1974 (following the coup 

in Lisbon). Portugal was seen as the most experienced counterinsurgent force of 

the three parties involved. Once the Portuguese withdrew, the sessions became 

known as Exercise Oryx, and Rhodesian and South African military planners 

continued to meet in Pretoria. 

27. John P. Cann, Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War 

1961-1974 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), 159. 

28. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (St. Petersburg, 

FL: Hailer, 2005), 124-5. Thompson refers to “strategic hamlets” to describe 

this concept. A veteran of Malaya himself, Thompson was also influential in 

adapting this theory for US commanders in Vietnam, where US and Vietnamese 

forces also attempted a strategic hamlet program, with minimal success. The 

concept is to create pockets of security and safety inside contested areas, 

allowing popular support to grow due to favorable security conditions, while 

denying resources and assistance to the insurgents. American counterinsurgency 

theorist John McCuen also describes this as the “oil spot strategy” in his book, 

The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War.

29. Cilliers, 99.

30. Cilliers., 82. De Kock used the term “no-go areas” in his statement, 

which are defined in Rhodesian Army manual, Military Support to the Civil 

Power, as areas “from which all civilians are excluded by an order of the 

Protecting Authority, in terms of Section 4(1)(b) of the Emergency Powers 

(Maintenance of Law and Order) regulations 

. . . in order to ensure that they do not become involved in operations conducted 

by Security Forces against terrorists. Only authorised members of the Security 

Forces, on duty, will move in no-go areas and no action may be instituted against 
62

them for any death or any act performed in good faith in the course of operations 

conducted during the time whilst the order is in force.”

31. Cilliers, 84.

32. Cilliers, 82-4.

33. Cilliers, 99.

34. Cilliers. Internal Affairs was the ministry of the Rhodesian government 

charged with administering the tribal areas. They were the lead agency for 

instituting the PV program, with the military in support.

35. Cilliers, 85.

36. Cilliers, 99. 

37. Cilliers, 88. 

38. CE20110912G0001, former RAR officer, interview; 

CG20110927S0001, former RAR officer, interview. In one interview, a former 

RAR officer said that he was placed in charge of pfomu re vanhu in 1979. On his 

assignment to work with pfomu re vanhu, this officer said that he had very little 

direction, and no understanding of what the intention was with the men he was 

to train. He-then a Lieutenant-and his CSM were given the task of developing a 

six-week program to conduct basic military training, then pushing the trainees 

out as quickly as possible.

39. CE20110912G0001, former RAR officer, interview. See later 

discussion on SFAs. After initial training by Selous Scouts, the SFA program 

was run by officers of 1RAR. Guard Force was formed by Brigadier Bill 

Godwin, former CO 1RAR, brought out of retirement by Rhodesian Army HQ 

for the task.

40. Former Selous Scouts officer, interview by author, 10 November 2011; 

Reid-Daly, Top Secret War, 109-11, 120. In standing up the Selous Scouts, Lt 

Col Reid-Daly admits openly to both the British and Portuguese influences. 

In fact, both British and Portuguese officers were directly involved with the 

development of Selous Scouts concept. Lieutenant Spike Powell, who worked 

in pseudo operations in Kenya (and was later killed in the second Air Rhodesia 

Viscount shot down by ZIPRA in 1979) collaborated in the early pseudo 

operations experiments in Rhodesia (as early as 1966), and Reid-Daly personally 

visited the flechas compound at Vila Pery (Chimoio), Mozambique, to study 

their methods and tactics. Colonel Oscar Cordosa, commander of the flechas, 

would later lead several of his men into Rhodesia to join the Selous Scouts after 

FRELIMO took over Mozambique in 1974. 

41. Reid-Daly, Top Secret War, 65-69. Selous, an Englishman, arrived 

in Africa in 1871 at the age of 19. He hunted elephants and other big game in 

what would later become Rhodesia, and was widely respected by the Ndebele 

and several notable characters, such as avid big game hunter and US President 

Theodore Roosevelt, Kaiser Wilhelm I and author Rider Haggard. Haggard later 
63

immortalized Selous as Alan Quartermain, the hero of King Solomon’s Mines. 

At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, he attempted to join the army but was 

rejected because of his age (he was 62). However, he was later recruited by the 

War Office after it was determined that the Brits were losing too many men 

to the bush and diseases while chasing down German forces in East Africa. 

Finally brought into service and commissioned as a Lieutenant, Selous was 

a tremendous asset to the British army, but was killed by a stray bullet in a 

skirmish near the Rufiji River in Uganda. Out of respect for his mastery and love 

of the African bush, he was buried where he fell and his grave stands today on a 

game reserve which bears his name.

42. Reid-Daly., 102-7. In his book, Reid-Daly describes an “insidious plot” 

within the RAR to undermine his recruiting efforts. After his initial recruiting 

drive, he received word that 90 percent of the candidates from the RAR had 

withdrawn their applications. At Reid-Daly’s insistence, Army HQ subsequently 

ordered all who applied to go to selection, and Reid-Daly offered the candidates 

the opportunity to choose between the Selous Scouts and the RAR at the end of 

selection. Few chose to leave the Scouts.

43. Reid-Daly, Challenge, 155.

44. Wood, War Diaries, xii.

45. CB20111110S0001, former Selous Scouts officer, interview by author, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 10 November 2011. 

46. Wing Commander Peter R. Briscoe, as quoted in Alexandre Binda’s 

The Saints.

47. Wood, Counterstrike, 90.

48. Wood, 102.

49. A Lynx was a Cessna 337, armed with .30 caliber cannons and rockets. 

Lynxes were crucial enablers for Fireforce action, able to move in, stay low over 

a target area for a long period of time and provide immediate, accurate airstrikes 

when required, as well as guide in attacks from other strike aircraft.

50. Wood, Counterstrike, 96-103.

51. The RhAF was able to employ an aging and tiny fleet of ground attack 

aircraft with tremendous effect on the battlefield. These included Hawker-Hunter 

FGA9 ground attack fighters, Vampire FB52 fighters, English Electric Canberra 

B2 light bombers, Provost trainers (adapted to carry .303 machine guns and 

napalm bombs). Sales of aircraft, engines and repair parts were the first round 

of sanctions imposed on Rhodesia by the United Nations after UDI, and so the 

fact that these aircraft continued flying throughout the war is a testament to the 

ingenuity and resourcefulness of the Rhodesian Air Force “blue jobs.”

52. Binda, Masodja, 265-6; Wood, Counterstrike, 91. Wood describes this 

action as a disappointment due to the RAR commander landing during the fight 

to direct action from the ground. Regardless, the results of this Fireforce, like 
64

the previous action of the RLI, resulted in higher insurgent kill rates than had 

been achieved prior to Fireforce. The RAR, like the rest of the Rhodesian Army, 

would continue to improve and adapt from this action. 

53. Wood, Counterstrike, 91-2. The DC-3 Dakota, called the “Paradak,” 

could deliver up to 20 paratroops at a time. The Rhodesian use of paratroops in 

Fireforce was born of necessity, due to a shortage of helicopters: one Paradak 

delivered the same number of troops as five Alouette helicopters, and increasing 

numbers of Fireforce callouts against larger groups of insurgents called for 

airborne insertion in addition to heliborne insertion just to get enough forces on 

the ground to handle the situation.

54. CE20110909T0001, former RAR officer, interview; Wood, 

Counterstrike, 96.

55. Cilliers, 21-2; Wood, Counterstrike, 39; Trevor Desfountain, summary 

and background notes of a 1979 Rhodesian Strategy Revision Conference, 

compiled in 1984. Cilliers and Wood disagree on the number of insurgents 

operating in Rhodesia at the end of 1974. Wood cites that there were 60, Cilliers 

that there were 70. At any rate, the number was small, and the insurgents had 

lost the military edge they had started to gain with the attacks in Chiweshi in 

1972.

56. Binda, Masodja, 266. 

57. Al J. Ventner, “Why Portugal Lost Its African Wars,” in Challenge: 

Southern Africa within the African Revolutionary context (Gibraltar: Ashanti, 

1989), . Rhodesians who worked with their Portuguese counterparts in 

Mozambique saw little military competence or bushcraft in the largely 

metropolitan Portuguese Army. With notable exceptions, such as the flechas, 

most Portuguese soldiers had little knowledge and less interest in African affairs, 

and their attitude was manifest in their lack of military intensity. Nonetheless, 

Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique, and the subsequent turnover of 

governance to FRELIMO, was a tremendous loss for Rhodesia.

58. CE20110909R0001, former RAR officer, interview; 

CE20110913M0001, former Grey’s Scouts officer, interview; Cann, 139. 

Exercise Alcora was a crucial joint collaborative effort between Rhodesian, 

South African, and Portuguese military planners, in which the Portuguese 

had the leading role. Portuguese dragoons, or dragões, began operating in 

Silva Porto, Angola in 1966 and by 1971 were also in Mozambique. This idea 

predated Grey’s Scouts, a Rhodesian mounted infantry unit formed in 1976. The 

use of horse-mounted troops in the southern African bush was highly effective.

59. Cilliers, 19-20; Binda, Masodja, 266.
65

Chapter 5

Phase Three: 1974-1977

Phase three of the war, from 1974-77, initially saw a negotiated détente 

and a ceasefire brokered by South African Prime Minister John Vorster 

during a December 1974 conference with the “frontline” states of Zambia, 

Tanzania, Botswana, Angola and Mozambique. This ceasefire was quickly 

broken by ZANU and ZAPU, and the war intensified again through 1976. 

ZANLA and ZIPRA continued to build strength and recruit from among the 

black rural population, as large numbers of whites, mostly from the urban 

centers, began to leave the country. Rhodesian forces responded to the 

insurgent violation of the ceasefire agreements by attacking into Zambia 

and Mozambique, targeting ZIPRA and ZANLA base camps. To control 

a growing military operation within and outside of Rhodesian borders, 

Ian Smith established a Combined Operations (ComOps) organization, 

deploying increasing numbers of security forces and striving to “contain 

the war.1

The increased demands on security forces caused the Rhodesian 

government to create a second battalion of RAR, among other changes 

to National Service and Territorial Force structures. This period also saw 

the commissioning of the first black officers in June 1977, followed by 

parachute training for both RAR and RLI soldiers later that same year. 

Political activity was marked by increased outside political pressure from 

South Africa, Britain and the United States to force Rhodesia towards 

majority rule.2

Détente

In late 1974 South African Prime Minister John Vorster agreed to enter 

into a détente with the front-line states to resolve the situation in Rhodesia. 

The aim was to unite ZANU, ZAPU and ANC under the leadership of 

Bishop Abel Muzorewa, and then to negotiate a settlement between the 

united nationalist movements and Smith’s government. If this scheme 

worked, the front-line states promised to recognize white-rule South Africa, 

buying the apartheid government time and influence among its neighbors, 

albeit at the Rhodesia’s expense. The terms of the ceasefire-as dictated 

by the leaders of Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania-were an immediate 

end to hostilities, withdrawal of South African forces from Rhodesia, the 

lifting of bans on ZANU and ZAPU, and release of political detainees. 

The released nationalist leaders and Smith’s government would attend 

a constitutional conference in Lusaka to negotiate the transfer of power 

in Rhodesia to majority rule. In exchange for these terms, the frontline 
66

states would use their influence to discourage ZANLA and ZIPRA military 

actions in Rhodesia; prevent incursions from frontline states into South 

Africa; bring Nkomo, Sithole and Mugabe to the negotiating table; and 

host the Lusaka conference.3

Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front government, still attempting to cope with the 

loss of its eastern trading partner and ally, and facing a five-fold increase in 

its front line (which now included the entire Mozambique border, as well 

as the Zambia and Botswana borders), had little choice but to accept the 

terms of détente. Refusal of these terms would have cut crucial ties with 

South Africa and completely isolated Rhodesia. So, on 11 December 1974, 

Smith agreed to the ceasefire and released all detainees, among whom 

were Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU), Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU), and Robert 

Mugabe (ZANU). RSF pulled back and stopped pursuing insurgents in 

Rhodesia. The consequences of this would prove disastrous. In discussing 

the détente, Smith said:

We were on the brink of dealing them a knock-out blow-we had 

them on the run-of this we had no doubt. In our minds, the détente 

exercise undoubtedly saved those terrorists remaining in Rhodesia 

because our security forces abided by the terms of the ceasefire. 

We pulled back in order to give the terrorists time to comply with 

their part of the bargain. However, before long it became clear 

the enemy had no intention of keeping its promise. This not only 

affected us militarily, but, more importantly, psychologically. The 

terrorists cashed in on our withdrawal by telling the locals that 

they had won the war and that we were retreating. Our actions (and 

those of the departing South African police units) substantiated 

their claims. This was probably the most important aspect of all.4

Smith was right-ZANLA was nearly militarily defeated before the 

détente. Fighting in the northeast during Operation Hurricane had taken its 

toll on trained insurgent fighters and leaders, and the nationalist movement 

was starting to melt down-not without some assistance from Rhodesian 

Central Intelligence Organization (CIO). In November 1974, a rebellion 

broke out within the ranks of ZANLA over the detached lifestyle of the 

ZANU and ZANLA leadership in Lusaka, lack of supplies and poor 

administration of the war. While newly recruited ZANLA soldiers fought 

and died in Rhodesia, some of the ground commanders for ZANLA saw 

their leaders’ opulent lifestyles outside the country as hypocrisy. Called the 

Nhari Rebellion, this revolt was ultimately put down by the ZANU Chief of 

Defense, Joseph Tongogara.5

 The two leaders of the Nhari Rebellion were 

executed, along with others. A few months later, in March 1975, ZANU 
67

Chairman Herbert Chitepo was also assassinated in Lusaka.6 Between the 

Nhari Rebellion, Chitepo’s assassination, and subsequent rivalry amongst 

ZANU members, the Zambian government soon tired of ZANU. By 28 

March, Zambia arrested most of ZANU’s members in the country and 

closed their offices, saying ZANU were “prejudicial to the maintenance of 

peace, order and good government.”7

After this humiliation of ZANU’s leadership and Zambia’s refusal to 

continue to support their movement, the remaining ZANU members in 

Zambia fled to Mozambique. This left the Rhodesian nationalist movement 

in Zambia exclusively to ZAPU and ZIPRA. Additionally, the OAU now 

insisted on funneling its funding through Muzorewa’s ANC, so resources, 

logistics, and leadership for ZANLA were all getting even more scarce in 

1975. The new chairman for ZANU, Robert Mugabe, began to establish 

himself and his organization in Mozambique. This move temporarily shut 

down ZANU operations in Rhodesia for much of the year. By Rhodesian 

intelligence estimates, in December 1975 there were only three groups of 

10 ZANLA insurgents each operating in Rhodesia.8

Then an idea surfaced among the nationalists to form a “third force,” to 

unite ZIPRA and ZANLA into one organization committed to the armed 

struggle for the liberation of blacks in Rhodesia. Led by Rex Nhongo 

(ZANLA) and Alfred “Nikita” Mangena (ZIPRA), this organization called 

itself the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA). While the union lasted quite 

briefly, ZIPA did carry out attacks along the new open border between 

Manicaland (in eastern Rhodesia) and Mozambique. In response to these 

attacks, Rhodesia established Operation Thrasher in February 1976, based 

out of Umtali, and increased call-ups among Rhodesian army reserves. 

This increased activity also led to the creation of a second RAR battalion. 

2RAR, like 1RAR, was completely filled by black volunteers. Many more 

potential recruits were still turning out to enlist in the RAR than could be 

accepted.9

2RAR

At the breakup of the Central African Federation in 1963, the Rhodesian 

Army recommended to the government that the RAR be comprised of 

two battalions with three line companies each. The idea was that it would 

be much easier to grow each battalion to accommodate four or five rifle 

companies and a support company, should the need arise, than to build 

a new battalion on short notice-potentially in the middle of a war. The 

Rhodesian government refused this request, and decided instead to keep 

the RAR strength at one battalion, adding a fifth company, “E” Company, 
68

in 1964. “Regrettably, the Rhodesian Front did not trust the African 

soldier.”10

Distrust of black soldiers had two principal sources: past experience 

during the establishment of Rhodesia, and the Congo Crisis of 1961. After 

the tribal uprisings of the 1890s, Rhodesia was wary of creating a black 

regiment (the RNR), for fear that a trained, armed force of blacks could 

easily overthrow the relatively small white security forces-many of whom 

had personally experienced the events of the 1890s. The RNR exhibited no 

such tendencies however; nor did the RAR during any part of its existence. 

Suspicions of black troops rose again in June 1960 with news of the Congo 

Crisis. In the southern Congo region of Katanga, black soldiers of the 

Force Publique mutinied against their white officers and “attacked local 

white civilians, looting, raping, and inciting a mass exodus of Belgian 

officers, administrators and settlers during the summer of 1960.” The fear 

of a black mutiny on the heels of the Congo Crisis led to the creation of allwhite regular army units in the Central African Federation-the RLI, SAS, 

and Armored Car Regiment-to balance the four “African” battalions in the 

Federal Army (the NRR, two battalions of KAR, and the RAR). This move 

was to mitigate a perceived vulnerability of the white population against 

a similar mutiny in the Central African Federation amidst “subversive 

activities of nationalists in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.” This fear 

was not founded in any evidence of such activity in the RAR, but seemed 

to be the source of hesitation in the Rhodesian government to follow the 

army’s recommendation and create additional RAR battalions early on.11

Once the Bush War began, in the late 1960s, the Rhodesian government 

also failed to: 

heed warnings from the army that, despite the presence of two 100-

man companies of South African police, its regular component 

was overstretched when merely assisting the BSAP with border 

control. The retired former Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy 

Welensky, suggested raising 10 RAR battalions, but, because 

the immediate threat seemed so minor, and funds were short, the 

Treasury and the Department of Defense were fatally deaf to all 

pleas.12

It took the government over a decade to realize that more black troops 

were absolutely necessary to keep up with the demands of the war. By 

1975, Rhodesia could no longer sustain the notion that black troops were 

an unnecessary risk.
69

In the early part of 1975, accurately predicting imminent increasing 

demands for troops after FRELIMO took power in Mozambique, the RAR 

began to form the nucleus of a new battalion by increasing the number of 

trainees at their training wing. These 230 recruits passed out in July and 

formed “A” Company, 2nd Battalion RAR (2RAR), under the command 

of Major André Dennison.13

The battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Hosking, 

adopted the motto “Tinowira Kukunda,” which meant “We fight to win.” 

2RAR was tasked to rapidly form and immediately commence operations, 

based out of Fort Victoria in the central-eastern part of the country. E 

Company 1RAR was entirely transferred over to form C Company 2RAR, 

and B Company 2RAR formed shortly after with recruits passing out 

of the newly established Depot RAR. By November 1975, A Company 

2RAR was deployed around Chipinga, in the Manicaland province along 

the southeastern border of Rhodesia. These were the initial stages of 

what would become Operation Thrasher. The formation of 2RAR was a 

tremendous undertaking, as 1RAR provided most of the NCO leadership for 

the new battalion. That this endeavor was completed with minimal impact 

on continuing operations, and that 2RAR was immediately available as a 

combat force is a testament to the professionalism, training, and leadership 

of the RAR. It also proves that there was still an ample recruiting base 

for RAR soldiers in 1975, as the additional strength requirements were 

adequately met with volunteers.14

With the shared heritage and leadership between 1RAR and 2RAR, 

the two battalions naturally had much in common. However, one key 

difference between the two battalions of RAR, however, as noted by a 

former 2RAR subaltern, was 2RAR’s lack of emphasis on many of the 

older, more formal colonial British traditions practiced in years past. 

According to this officer, “we [2RAR] were less regimental” than 1RAR. 

In 18 months of service with the battalion, for example, this officer only 

wore his “Number one” dress uniform once, to a funeral for another officer. 

By this point in the war, 1RAR was not practicing much formality eitherboth battalions were busy enough fighting the war. But from its inception, 

2RAR never had the opportunity to practice many of the formal traditions 

of its predecessors. Importantly, the business of fighting the war-and the 

carried-over knowledge of imported NCOs from 1RAR-served as ample 

replacement for British regimental traditions, and 2RAR never had any 

problems among race or tribe within its ranks, either. By this point, the 

soldiers were more concerned with whether or not the man next to them 

could shoot and perform his duties than whether he was Shona or Ndebeleor whether his boots were properly shined, for that matter.15
70

Figure 1. RAR machine gunner, ready for action.

Source: Alexandre Binda, Masodja: The History of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its 

forerunner, the Rhodesia Native Regiment (Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 2007), 363.
71

Increased Insurgent Activity and Rhodesian Response

As a result of the increased activity along the Mozambique border, 

Rhodesian forces established two new Operational Areas in 1976: Thrasher 

in February, and Repulse in May. In addition to the newly formed 2RAR, 

additional national service call-ups increased overall troop strength by 

about 20,000, but the pressure from insurgent activities continued to build 

through 1976.16

With ZIPA attacking further south along the Mozambique border and 

ZANLA rebuilding itself in border camps in Mozambique, the eyes of the 

OAU now turned to ZAPU to carry on the nationalist movement. ZAPU 

had been focused on equipping and training its Soviet-trained ZIPRA 

forces in Zambia, sending leaders to Soviet Eastern Europe and Cuba for 

indoctrination and training. They had not conducted any major operations 

in Rhodesia for quite some time. By mid-1976, the OAU told ZIPRA to 

start fighting or lose their funding. ZIPRA duly began infiltrating across 

the Zambezi River in northwest Rhodesia and northeast Botswana. In 

August 1976, Rhodesian forces established Operation Tangent to counter 

the increased ZIPRA activity. Thus, in less than one year, RSF operations 

went from one operational area to four, as insurgents took advantage of the 

détente and changing circumstances to increase their activity.17

Increased operations brought more need for a unified command to 

manage what was now a nationwide military operation. Rhodesians knew 

the Malayan example of a “Director of Operations” quite well, and in 

March 1977, Ian Smith formed the Ministry of Combined Operations 

somewhat after the Malayan model, appointing Lieutenant General Peter 

Walls as the Commander of Combined Operations (ComOps). While this 

resulted in increased coordination, Lt. Gen. Walls was never afforded 

the same supreme authority over all efforts and agencies as the Director 

of Operations was in Malaya-he was even outranked within his own 

organization by the Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General John Hickman. 

Quite often the ComOps organization bogged down in bureaucratic inertia, 

as other agencies sent deputies and generally were not bound to obey the 

directives coming from Lt. Gen. Walls. However, the organization of 

ComOps, while far from perfect, was a positive step towards unifying the 

war effort across government agencies at the strategic level.18

One of the tendencies of ComOps and the JOC system used by the 

Rhodesian Army was that battalions seldom operated as entities of their 

own. Each JOC commanded elements of several different regiments (RAR, 

RLI, RR, BSAP, Selous Scouts, etc.) attached on rotational duty. In fact, 
72

within weeks of assuming command of 2RAR, one former commander was 

placed in command of the JOC in Chiredzi, where none of his companies 

were assigned. He didn’t see his own troops for several months, during 

which time they were farmed out to other operational areas.19

During one deployment in 1975, D Company 1RAR deployed to an 

operational area and integrated with a company of national servicemen 

of the Rhodesia Regiment (RR). For the entire six-week rotation, the two 

units broke down into integrated teams, and one RR NCO recalled that 

two of his soldiers, both of Afrikaans descent, drew an assignment to work 

in a four-man stick under a black RAR corporal with a black RAR lance 

corporal as a MAG gunner. These two white soldiers each owned farms 

which employed hundreds of blacks. They were not accustomed at all to 

taking orders from black men, and initially expressed their hesitation at 

spending time in the bush under the command of a black NCO. But at the 

insistence of their own NCO they duly set off for a six week duty with 

their RAR colleagues.20

At the end of six weeks, the RR NCO anxiously waited at the rendezvous 

for his soldiers to return from their patrol. His curiosity peaked when he 

saw the RAR corporal walk in from the bush with an extra ruck sack on 

his back and an extra pair of boots slung over his neck. The RAR lance 

corporal walked in behind him, also with extra boots and an extra ruck 

sack in addition to his machine gun. When the RR NCO asked the RAR 

corporal if he had any problems with the two men, the corporal said, “No, 

absolutely not.” Then, the two white soldiers came staggering in, obviously 

exhausted, with a new-found respect for their black counterparts. They 

had learned the ability of the RAR soldiers to conduct extended patrols 

over long distances in the Rhodesian bush, and had trouble keeping up. 

They came away with an intimate knowledge of this and learned to respect 

their black colleagues’ capabilities.21

External Operations

With ZANLA and ZIPRA establishing camps and assembly areas just 

across the borders in Zambia and Mozambique, Rhodesia was faced with 

a military problem common to many counterinsurgency operations. In 

order to effectively attack the insurgents before they came into the country 

and dispersed into smaller groups, Rhodesian forces needed to conduct 

offensive operations within other sovereign nations, namely Zambia and 

Mozambique. Given the extreme political pressure on the Rhodesian Front 

government, this was a tough problem to solve. As they had done in the 

past, the neighboring governments would condemn any such attacks on 
73

“refugee camps,” and demand further international retribution, which 

Rhodesia could ill afford (particularly from its only remaining friendly 

neighbor, South Africa).22

In the face of evidence, however, Rhodesia could hardly sit and wait 

for large groups of insurgents gathering across the borders to enter the 

country and overwhelm security forces there. In one case, Selous Scouts 

conducted a reconnaissance between 27 May and 4 June 1976, identifying 

a large ZANLA-FPLM camp on the Mudzi River, about 30 kilometers 

inside Mozambique. True to Mao’s teaching that “you cannot win at the 

conference table what you have not won on the battlefield,” Mugabe was 

preparing a massive attack by ZANLA into Rhodesia to coincide with 

the Geneva Conference, planned for October 1976. According to reports, 

approximately 2,000 insurgents were operating inside Rhodesia by the end 

of October, with another 8,000 ready to enter from Mozambique. As one 

officer described the situation, if Rhodesia allowed the buildup to continue 

unabated in Mozambique, they would find their current problems to be 

“the thin end of a very thick and ugly wedge to come.”23

In response to the intelligence gathered, and to weaken Mugabe’s 

position going into the Geneva Conference, RSF planned Operation 

Mardon, a set of preemptive attacks to destroy the Mudzi Camp and others, 

disrupting the logistical support and infiltration routes into northeastern 

Rhodesia. Shutting down these bases and routes would also force ZANLA 

to infiltrate further south along the Mozambique border, where terrain 

favored Rhodesian detection and fireforce operations. In August 1976, the 

Selous Scouts had conducted a major attack near this area, killing over 

1,000 insurgents in a major ZANLA base at Nyadzonya.24

Operation Mardon called for SAS, RLI, Grey’s Scouts (horse-mounted 

infantry) and two companies of RAR (D Coy 1RAR and A Coy 2RAR) to 

simultaneously attack targeted camps on 31 October to maximize surprise 

and prevent the insurgents’ escape. Of all forces involved, D Coy 1RAR 

had the most success against its target, the Mudzi Camp. After conducting 

a night march in through extremely difficult terrain under heavy combat 

loads, D Company arrived at their target, which they believed to be a few 

dozen ZANLA fighters transiting between other camps. What they found 

was actually training camp teeming with over 800 ZANLA recruits under 

the protection of FRELIMO and Tanzanian troops. Unexpected delays in 

the approach march caused the attack to shift a day later than planned. 

Without air support (the limited sorties available were supporting strikes 

on other targets), Lieutenant David Padbury and the 2IC, Captain Glenn 

Reed (an ex-American Special Forces soldier) planned a hasty attack on 
74

the 800 insurgents inside the camp, setting stop groups in ambush on the 

backside (east side) and a sweep group assaulting across the camp from 

west to east.25

With D Company moving into stop positions on the eastern side of the 

camp, Padbury set up a command post on the high ground to the west. 

Capt. Reed began moving the sweep group and mortars into position 

along a ridge south of Padbury’s position, but before the sweep group was 

in place, a group of Tanzanian soldiers walked into Padbury’s position, 

triggering a premature firefight. The sweep group and mortars quickly 

moved into position and began to assault across the camp, under effective 

mortar fire. The stop groups, nearly in their ambush positions, opened 

fire on the fleeing insurgents. In the ensuing battle, one RAR soldier was 

burned by a phosphorus grenade and Capt. Reed called for a casevac 

using fireforce helicopters stationed nearby. The helicopters also provided 

additional fire support from their guns, as well as observation platforms 

to spot hidden insurgents. In the end, over 30 insurgents were killed at 

Mudzi camp, smaller numbers were killed elsewhere during the operation, 

and Rhodesian forces withdrew, having effectively disrupted the logistical 

base and infiltration routes in the area.26

The RAR only participated in few external operations-notably, Op Mardon 

and Op Murex later in the war. The great strength of black soldiers in the 

RAR was in their superior bushcraft and ability to observe and interact with 

the local population. ComOps tended to employ the RAR inside Rhodesia 

rather than on the larger raids into Zambia and Mozambique that became 

defining roles of the RLI and SAS. RAR soldiers, while quite capable of 

these types of strikes, tended to be less aggressive and more thorough in 

executing their missions. Their ability to observe and communicate with 

the population inside Rhodesia was crucial to internal operations.27

Parachute Training

By late 1976, increased fireforce actions were starting to reveal the 

limitations of the small fleet of Rhodesian helicopters. Army Headquarters 

decided that the only other way to rapidly get troops into a fireforce 

action was by airborne insertion, and so in late 1977 the RLI and RAR 

began parachute training. The addition of paratroops to fireforce allowed 

commanders to get many more troops on the ground in the first wave, 

resulting in more successful fireforce contacts. The first unit of the RAR 

to become airborne qualified was B Company 1RAR in October 1977, 

with the rest of the regiment following closely behind. Initially, there were 

concerns that black Rhodesian soldiers would not jump out of airplanes, 
75

or that their superstitious nature would cause them to panic on the aircraft, 

but the RAR proved all critics wrong, and were enthusiastic about being 

airborne. “A” Company 2RAR, under Maj. Dennison’s leadership, became 

one of the most capable and respected fireforce elements in the Rhodesian 

Army.28

RAR soldiers proved themselves capable of every task they were ever 

asked to do. They participated in fireforce, limited external operations, 

extended patrols in the bush, and airborne operations. They earned respect 

for their loyalty, spirit and discipline. But they truly found their strength 

patrolling the bush, working with the local population, and manning 

Observation Posts (OPs) for extended periods. They were much more 

patient and attuned to local customs than their RLI counterparts. In one 

example, an RAR soldier on an OP with an officer observed three women 

walking down a path towards a village, one of whom was carrying a 

suitcase. The white officer thought nothing of it, but the black soldier said, 

“Ishe, the one with the suitcase is a terrorist.” “How could you possibly 

know?” asked the officer. “She is carrying the suitcase in her hand. Our 

women carry things on their heads.” A patrol caught up to the “women,” 

who were in fact insurgents dressed as women walking into a village. This 

was the strength of the RAR as a counterinsurgent force. They knew the 

tribes and customs, and could instantly spot what was out of place.29 On 

another occasion: 

A group of male civilians, walking along, was spotted from a 

distance. The [RAR] OP pointed out one of them as an insurgent, 

even though at first glance nothing distinguished him from the 

rest of the men. He was picked up, however, and found to be 

carrying an AK concealed beneath his coat. When quizzed, the 

RAR soldiers said that they knew he was an insurgent as he swung 

only one arm when walking (the other held the weapon against his 

body).30

The ability of RAR soldiers to notice and blend into the culture around 

them, obviously, came from the fact that they grew up in the same culture 

they were observing. This fact, however, was not always to their advantage, 

especially when their identity as RAR soldiers was revealed to insurgents 

operating near their family homes.
76

Figure 2. RAR paras waiting for a fireforce call-up.

Source: CE20110908G0001, former RAR officer (photo provided by RAR officer).

War on the home front

One of the unfortunate circumstances RAR soldiers (and black soldiers in 

other units of the Rhodesian army) faced was that their extended families 

were in the same kraals, indeed were the same families, from which the 

insurgents recruited and relied for support. It was not uncommon, therefore, 

for an RAR soldier to return to his kraal on leave to find insurgents 

infiltrating his village and intimidating his family. A few soldiers were 

killed when their identity was known to insurgents. In at least one such 

incident, however, an RAR private home on leave was able to coordinate, 

and then participate in, a fireforce on a group of ten insurgents who had 

arrived in his kraal requesting food. Private Wilfred, of A Company 1RAR, 

reported the “terrs” to a local farmer, providing descriptions of the men 

in his village that assisted the K-Car in identifying them. Then, he “was 

given a rifle, webbing and combat jacket and became a member of Stop 

1.” The subsequent contact killed nine of the ten, and a follow up ambush 

was set for the tenth insurgent but he was not seen again.31

Political Pressure

As the pace of the insurgency increased during 1976, so too did the 

political pressure on both the Rhodesian government and nationalist 

sides to compromise and end the conflict. The frontline states were 
77

economically affected by the ongoing war, and the OAU was increasingly 

frustrated by the inconclusive efforts of the nationalist organizations. 

For their part, Britain wanted to end to an embarrassing problem while 

maintaining the relevance of the British Commonwealth in Africa. South 

Africa was looking for a way to gain more time and recognition for its own 

international pariah of apartheid government. At this point, US Secretary 

of State Henry Kissinger, the master of “shuttle diplomacy,” stepped in to 

attempt to mediate and bring both sides to an agreement.32

Entering Africa on the heels of two embarrassing recent US failures in 

Vietnam and Angola,33 Kissinger was eager to:

co-opt the program of moderate evolutionary reform, that is to say 

majority rule, and minority rights. At the same time we sought to 

create a kind of firebreak between those whose radicalism was 

ideological and those whose radicalism was geared to specific 

issues. We could meet the demands for majority rule; we never 

thought we could co-opt the ideological radicals; our goal was to 

isolate them.34

Kissinger had a deadline of his own. By September 1976, it was 

becoming increasingly apparent that Jimmy Carter would win the 

upcoming USpresidential elections. This would hurt the process, as any 

deal brokered by a “lame duck” American administration would expire 

under the new administration. This American political situation allowed 

the Patriotic Front to bide their time and see if a better result would come 

of waiting for the new USpresident.35

In September 1976, Kissinger and Vorster invited Ian Smith to Pretoria. 

In a frank discussion, the two impressed upon Smith that his efforts were 

doomed to failure if he stayed his course and continued to fight transition 

to majority rule. They presented a plan, drafted by the British and agreed 

upon by the frontline states and black Rhodesian nationalists. This plan 

proposed an interim government, half-white and half-black, to preside 

over a two year transition to majority rule. Smith’s options, as presented by 

Kissinger and Vorster, were to accept these terms and attend a conference 

with the nationalist leaders to decide how to implement the plan, or reject 

the offer and immediately lose all financial and military support from 

South Africa. Faced with such options, Smith returned to Salisbury and 

conferred with his cabinet and the caucus, and the Rhodesian government 

ultimately accepted the terms proposed by Vorster and Kissinger. A 

conference was set for October 1976 in Geneva to settle the details and 

set a course for transition to majority rule. Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe 
78

and Ndabaningi Sithole all attended the conference. After two months of 

abortive attempts to reach an agreement, the conference ended with no 

results. The fighting continued.36

Perhaps the greater impact of the Kissinger talks and the Geneva 

Conference was the revelation of a rift between the South African and 

Rhodesian governments. This was a new development, and its impact on 

white Rhodesia, when combined with the prospects of more war, increased 

national service, and tougher economic times ahead, was devastating. At 

the end of 1976, the number of whites leaving Rhodesia was greater the 

number of whites entering the country.37 The ‘white flight’ had begun, due 

in large part to the perception that Rhodesia was friendless and hopeless. 

This dramatic change in attitude among white Rhodesians would also 

affect the war in the coming years. Ian Smith observed that the doubts 

among the white Rhodesian community “were not about the British, 

Americans, Europeans or the communist-inspired Commonwealth, whom 

we had known all along we could not trust. Instead, they were about the 

South Africans, whom we had believed would stand together with us.”38

Conclusion

This period of the war saw tremendous changes in the Rhodesian Army 

and the RAR. From its relatively confident position in 1974, the Rhodesian 

Army was stressed to its limit when the pace of the war increased through 

1976. The 1975 détente was a complete failure, which ultimately ceded 

momentum and initiative over to the insurgents, severely damaging morale 

across the Rhodesian Army. 

Faced with larger groups of insurgents training in safe havens in Zambia 

and Mozambique, Rhodesia chose a strategy of external strikes against 

large targets, integrating parachute training across its principal infantry 

units: the RAR and RLI. Intent on limiting insurgent capacity to infiltrate 

Rhodesian tribal areas, these external raids increasingly committed a large 

percentage of the army away from the country, leaving the population 

even more vulnerable in the tribal areas.

Despite the creation of 2RAR and increased national service commitments, 

RSF did not have nearly enough troops to secure the population where it 

was most vulnerable, in the kraals and tribal areas and along the borders 

with Zambia and Mozambique. 
79

Notes

1. Cilliers, 67-8, 197; Wood, Counterstrike, 43-4. 

2. Binda, Masodja, 267-8; Wood, Counterstrike, 40-44.

3. Martin, 145.

4. Pat Scully, Exit Rhodesia (Ladysmith: Cotswold Press, 1984), 52.

5. Cilliers, 34; CE20110909R0001, former RAR officer, interview. Of 

note, Many of the “Nhari rebels,” including Thomas Nhari, were relatively new 

commanders recruited from the area of Operation Hurricane, in the northeastern 

part of Rhodesia. They were Shona, from the KoreKore and Zezuru tribes. 

Joseph Tongogara and the ZANU high command were all Shona Karanga 

tribesmen who joined ZAPU much earlier in the war, before splitting to form 

ZANU. The KoreKore and Zezuru resented what they saw as Karanga tribal 

monopoly of ZANLA’s key leadership.

6. Smith, 174-5. Years later, the Rhodesian CIO chief, Ken Flower, would 

reveal that Chitepo’s assassination was a CIO operation, which happened to be 

timed perfectly to coincide with existing ZANU discord. Everyone in Zambia, 

including the Zambian government, believed Tongogara assassinated Chitepo. 

Chitepo’s death would lead to more infighting in ZANU. 

7. Martin, 159-167, 179.

8. Moorcraft, 41.

9. Moorcraft, 41-2.

10. CF20110920H001, former RAR officer, interview by author; Wood, 

War Diaries, 12. As the officer interviewed indicated, the Rhodesian army’s 

response to the government’s lack of trust of black soldiers was “absolute 

rubbish.” 

11. Owen, 2-3; Banda, Saints, 20; James Dobbins et al., The UN’s Role in 

Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 5.

12. Wood, “Chimurenga,” 199.

13. Major Dennison rose to be a legend within the Rhodesian Army. 

Born in Bradford, England, he served in the British Army in several regiments, 

including 22 SAS in Borneo. He was seconded to the Malaysian Rangers from 

1965-68, to the Malawi Rifles from 1969-71 and retired from the British Army 

in 1975 to accept a three year commission with the Rhodesian Army. Enroute 

to Rhodesia, Dennison stumbled across a mercenary ring forming up to attack 

Rhodesia from Zambia. When he notified the Director of Military Intelligence, 

Lt. Col. Peter Hosking (later the CO, 2RAR), Hosking agreed he should join 

the group and act as an informant. During a party for the mercenary group 

on the eve of their departure for Lusaka, the group drew too much attention 

to itself and lost its sponsor. The group dispersed, and on 1 October 1975, 

Dennison joined 2RAR to command A Company. He was a no-nonsense leader 
80

and an outstanding Fireforce commander, “who inspired his men by example, 

professionalism and dedication to defending the hard-pressed people of all race 

groups in Rhodesia.” Andre Dennison was killed on 3 June 1979 by friendly fire. 

Wood, War Diaries, viii, 5.

14. CE20110910H0001, former RAR officer, interview.

15. CE20110909T0001, former RAR officer, interview. 

16. Moorcraft, 42; Wood, War Diaries, 51. In May 1976, national service 

was extended from 12 to 18 months, and national servicemen in the field due 

to stand down were retained on active service. Territorial forces (comprised of 

national servicemen) were kept in the field. This trend would continue as the 

tempo of the war continued to increase and whites began to leave the country in 

larger numbers.

17. Binda, Masodja, 284-94; Moorcraft, 41-3; Binda, Saints, 185.

18. Wood, Counterstrike, 43-4; Desfountain, paragraph 7.

19. CE20110910H0001, former RAR officer, interview.

20. CE20110910W0001, former RR NCO, interview by author, Durban, 

Republic of South Africa, 10 September 2011.

21. CE20110910W0001.

22. Cilliers, 172-5.

23. Reid-Daly, Top Secret War, 338; J. R. T. Wood, “Counter-punching on 

the Mudzi: D Company, 1st Rhodesian African Rifles, on operation ‘Mardon’ 1 

November 1976,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 9, no. 2 (Autumn 1998): 64.

24. Reid-Daly, Top Secret War, 321-406. In August 1976, Operation 

Eland, a flying column of Selous Scouts, with 14 vehicles and 84 troops, 

armed with vehicle mounted 20mm cannons (taken from scrapped Vampire 

fighters), twin MAG machine guns, 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns, twin .30 caliber 

Browning machine guns, and 81mm mortars drove 30 km into Mozambique to 

a ZANLA training base on the Nyadzonya River known to contain over 5,000 

insurgents. The Scouts arrived on the camp wearing FRELIMO uniforms just 

after ZANLA’s morning parade-as planned-and opened fire, killing between 

1,000 and 1,300 insurgents before driving back across the border to Rhodesia. 

Captured documents and insurgents from the raid clearly indicated the purpose 

and intent of this camp as a training facility for ZANLA, but ZANU and 

FRELIMO, as was to be the standard, insisted that Rhodesians were murdering 

civilians in refugee camps. 

25. Wood, Small Wars, 69-72.

26. Wood, Small Wars,74-81; CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, 

interview; CE20110909T0001, former RAR officer, interview.

27. Binda, Masodja, 372-4; Cilliers, 197; CE20110913M0001, former 

RAR officer, interview; CE20110909T0001, former RAR officer, interview. 
81

28. CE20110910H0001, former RAR officer, interview; Peter J. Hosking, 

foreward to The War Diaries of André Dennison, by J. R. T. Wood (Gibraltar: 

Ashanti, 1989), viii-ix.

29. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview. The RAR soldiers’ 

strengths on OP missions are also documented in Binda, Masodja, 310-11.

30. Binda, Masodja, 311.

31. Binda, 295.

32. Smith, 198-9. Shuttle diplomacy is the use of a third party to resolve 

a diplomatic crisis, in this case the introduction of the United States as an 

intermediary between Britain and Rhodesia. Kissinger used this technique 

most famously in the 1973 negotiation of the cessation of hostilities after the 

Yom Kippur War between Israel and the Arab states led by Egypt and Syria. 

Kissinger’s technique was to isolate each party, extract demands and possible 

concessions, and shuttle between the two until a compromise was accepted by 

both parties. The Rhodesian situation was complicated by the fact that although 

Britain was not a belligerent party, they were legally required to endorse any 

compromise government in order for Rhodesia to gain international recognition 

and for sanctions to be lifted. As such, Kissinger treated the black nationalist 

groups (ZANU, ZAPU and ANC), and the leaders of the frontline states, as a 

third leg of the agreement.

33. In April 1975, the People’s Army of Vietnam forces entered Saigon, 

destroying the US backed government of the Republic of Vietnam and creating 

a unified communist state. This came after the US withdrew all troops and 

support for Vietnam, and was widely viewed as a strategic failure of the United 

States in stopping the spread of communism. Also in 1975, the US was further 

embarrassed by its involvement in backing the FPLA in Angola against Cuban 

and Russian communist-backed MPLA. The MPLA soundly defeated the FPLA, 

and the US was smeared with a second consecutive foreign policy debacle. For 

more on the US in Vietnam, see John Nagl, Dale Andrade, or Richard Hunt’s 

works. For more on Angola, see Fred Bridgland or John Cann’s works.

34. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “Henry Kissinger on the USand Rhodesia,” 

Washington Post, 3 July 1979.

35. Smith, 189.

36. Smith, 202-222.

37. Wood, War Diaries, 60. “[D]uring the first half of 1976 Rhodesia had 

endured a net loss of 2,271 whites, compared with a net gain of 1,590 whites in 

the first half of 1975. 

38. Smith, 223.

83

Chapter 6

Phase Four: 1977-1979

During phase four, from 1977-79, the Rhodesian government began to 

genuinely move towards majority rule, with negotiations beginning in late 

1977 and ending with the March 1978 Internal Settlement. Bishop Abel 

Muzorewa, Ian Smith, Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau 

formed an interim government with an eye toward a popular election and 

a path to increased black participation in the political process. ZANU 

and ZAPU formed the Patriotic Front coalition and refused to participate 

in this process, but remained aligned against each other and in separate 

camps in Mozambique and Zambia as they stepped up attacks in Rhodesia. 

Rhodesian military actions focused on external strikes at the core of 

ZANLA’s and ZIPRA’s support structures in Mozambique and Zambia, 

while political militias and “turned insurgents” formed into Security Force 

Auxiliaries to provide security in tribal areas.1

There were also some significant changes to the RAR during this period. 

The first black officers were commissioned in June 1977, and with the 

advent of majority rule following the Internal Settlement, national service 

was extended to the blacks, bringing in the first black conscripts into the 

Rhodesia Regiment and the RAR.

Internal Settlement

After the failed conference in Geneva, Ian Smith believed that continued 

reliance on Great Britain, South Africa and the United States to solve the 

Rhodesian problem was futile. The disparate and constantly fluctuating 

agenda of outside influences were not constructive in finding any 

meaningful solution, nor was it truly in their interests to do so. “We all 

came to the conclusion that our salvation lay in working together with our 

internal black leaders-in spite of their shortcomings they seemed more 

reliable than our so-called ‘friends’ of the free world.”2

So in late 1977, Smith met with moderate black leaders to work on a 

settlement. Smith’s objective was to determine and agree upon a way 

to implement the Anglo-American Agreement presented by Kissinger 

in 1976. Participating black leaders were “Muzorewa, Gabellah (from 

Matabeleland), Chikerema, Ndabaningi Sithole, and the two chiefs, Chirau 

and Kayisa Ndweni.”3

As Ian Smith explained in his New Year’s Message to Rhodesia on 31 

December 1977:
84

The British have been trying to settle the Rhodesian problem in a 

manner which would best settle their own interests, rather than the 

interests of Rhodesia. Rhodesians have thus come to the conclusion 

that their best bet is to bring Rhodesians together around the 

settlement table, to the exclusion of outside interference. The talks 

are proceeding well and I believe all delegations will agree that 

we have made significant progress. The basic position remains 

the same. In exchange for acceptance of the principle of majority 

rule, we are negotiating the inclusion in the constitution of those 

safeguards necessary to retain the confidence of our white people, 

so that they will be encouraged to go on living and working in 

Rhodesia and thus continue to make their contribution to the 

economic progress of the country.4

The settlement discussions continued from January through March, 

making slow progress towards a final agreement. Both Joshua Nkomo and 

Robert Mugabe were absent from these discussions, having elected instead 

to meet as the newly formed “Patriotic Front” (PF)5 with the new British 

Foreign Secretary (David Owen) and the new American Ambassador to 

the UN (Andrew Young) in Malta. 

The Malta Conference resulted in the Patriotic Front accepting a UN role 

in supervising elections, and called for a ten man Governing Council made 

up of two representatives from each of the delegations in Geneva (Mugabe, 

Sithole, Nkomo, Muzorewa, and Smith) and a Resident Commissioner, 

presumably British. Additionally, and particularly objectionable to Smith, 

was a requirement that the Chief Justice, Police Commissioner and 

Secretary to the Cabinet vacate their posts, presumably the first of many 

required to do so. Not only did Smith reject the outcomes of Malta and 

a follow up conference (called “Malta Two”) held in Dar es Salaam, but 

David Owen and US Secretary of State Chris Vance-the hosts of Malta 

Two-agreed that the PF’s insistence on dominating any settlement was 

“unacceptable.”6

The results of the Rhodesian government’s meetings from January to 

March 1978, however, ended in a signed agreement among all participants 

(Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau) on 4 March 1978. The resulting 

interim government, run by an Executive Council of the four signatories, 

was tasked to “organize a cease-fire, to remove racial discrimination, to 

draft a new constitution and to hold elections later in the year before a 

handover to ‘black’ government at the end of December.”7

 Smith negotiated 

an assurance that the white minority retained a voice by securing 28 seats 

of 100 in parliament and requiring a three-quarters majority to enact 
85

any constitutional change. Nkomo and Mugabe completely rejected the 

Internal Settlement because the military and police remained under white 

control, and they objected to whites retaining a blocking minority in the 

parliament.8

The interim government, as designed in the Internal Settlement, went into 

effect and proceeded to undertake the immense tasks before it. The most 

immediate challenge facing the interim government under Muzorewaand perhaps the most difficult-was the actual achievement of a cease fire. 

The Patriotic Front, staunchly opposed to any progress that did not grant 

its ringleaders immediate and uncompromised personal power, set out to 

prevent any semblance of progress by Muzorewa and Smith’s government. 

The three black signatories to the Internal Settlement were dubbed the 

“blacksmiths,” and ZANLA declared 1978 “the Year of the People,” to 

be filled with preparations for Gore re Gukurahundi, or the “Year of the 

People’s Storm,” in 1979. By mid-1978, ZANLA had infiltrated 13,000 

guerrillas into Rhodesia, spread across the country and training local 

forces to support the insurgency.9

For its part, ZIPRA also escalated the war, attempting to discredit the 

Interim Transitional Government. On 3 September 1978, ZIPRA insurgents 

shot down an Air Rhodesia civilian aircraft with a SAM-7 missile as it was 

taking off from Lake Kariba with 52 passengers aboard. Horrific stories 

later emerged of ZIPRA guerrillas murdering the survivors of this attack, 

and public revulsion of Nkomo and ZIPRA was palpable. A second attack 

on an Air Rhodesia aircraft in February 1979 killed 59 civilians, and 

further cemented hatred for ZIPRA among Rhodesian whites and security 

forces.10

“The Spear of the People:” Security Force Auxiliaries

In bringing about a ceasefire between the government and the vast 

network of insurgents in the country, the Executive Council believed that 

Muzorewa’s ANC (now called United African National Council, or UANC) 

and Sithole’s faction of ZANU11 could bring their followers over to the 

government side. With majority rule achieved, the government assumed 

that the insurgents would have no more reason to fight. Both Muzorewa 

and Sithole claimed to be in control of the majority of ZANLA forces, and 

each duly called for their “armies” to switch sides and become auxiliaries 

to RSF. Called the “Spear of the People”-Pfomu re Vanhu in Chishona, or 

Umkonto wa Bantu in Sindebele-the Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs) 

were hastily established to feed, clothe, train, and pay turned insurgents 

who accepted the offer to fight for the Interim Transitional Government.12
86

The real problem was the loyalty of the SFAs to their respective political 

factions rather than to Rhodesia itself. Whereas the RAR-indeed, all of the 

RSF-were staunchly apolitical,13 the SFAs were defined as political forces. 

In this respect, they were similar to ZANU and ZAPU. Training these men 

was a difficult process, as they did not believe they had anything to learn 

from the RSF. Once employed, they worked in tribal areas, and Security 

Forces were not allowed into those areas. In effect, the SFAs were allowed 

to operate like ZANLA or ZIPRA and feed off the population, as long as 

they did so in the name of the Interim Transitional Government rather than 

ZANU or ZAPU.14

In practice, the SFA program was a failure. Neither Muzorewa nor Sithole 

had a solid connection to the actual ZANLA forces in Rhodesia. The vast 

majority of Muzorewa’s and Sithole’s followers who turned out for SFA 

training had never been insurgents-most were rounded up by UANC 

and ZANU(Sithole) from the villages in order to add to the numbers of 

each faction’s “army.” Training for the SFAs was initially the job of the 

Selous Scouts. As Reid-Daly notes, “[n]either my officers nor I viewed 

the new order of things with any marked enthusiasm, because none of us 

could see it working, but orders were orders, so the Selous Scouts swung 

into disciplined action.” The selection of Selous Scouts to train former 

insurgents to fight for the interim government was an interesting choice. 

If any actual ZANLA insurgents ever discovered their trainers were the 

hated sku’zapo,15 this would surely introduce unnecessary tension into 

the situation. But, as most of the new trainees had never actually been 

insurgents, and the Scouts were very careful not to reveal their identity, it 

never became a problem.16

Needless to say, the real ZANLA took some exception to the SFAs. In 

at least one instance, a recently trained group of Muzorewa’s SFAs were 

moving into the Wedza TTL to establish themselves, only to be captured 

by a ZANLA group operating there. The ZANLA group stumbled upon a 

few newly trained SFA soldiers who had separated from the group, and 

quickly ordered two of them to return to the main SFA group and arrange 

a meeting. The inexperienced auxiliaries agreed, and were promptly taken 

prisoner by ZANLA. Most of these auxiliaries were summarily executed. 

Forty-one corpses were later discovered by a Police Reserve Air Wing 

pilot overflying the area. The few who escaped reported back to police 

what had happened. The Scouts quickly made contact with the ZANLA 

group and within a week killed 29 of them, either directly or by calling in 

fireforce.17
87

The RAR took over training the SFAs in August 1979. As with the 

Scouts, the RAR were not enthusiastic about the mission, but they carried 

out their orders. In recalling the SFA training program, one former RAR 

officer stated that he (a Lieutenant at the time) and his CSM were called 

aside, given a task to develop and execute a six-week training program 

for the phomu re vanhu. Unsure exactly what the program was or why 

they were involved, the Lieutenant and NCO duly executed a very basic 

training program, consisting of marksmanship and fundamental military 

skills before passing out their trainees less than two months later.18

RAR Actions

Much of the RAR’s activity during this phase was fireforce action and 

night patrols. A typical fireforce call-up, involving A Company 2RAR, 

occurred on 9 October 1978, when a Selous Scouts OP in Operation Area 

Repulse reported 50 insurgents between the Lundi River and a smaller 

tributary.19

A Lynx aircraft initiated contact, marking the target for a strike by 

Hunter fighter-bombers of the RhAF. Following this bomb run, the 

K-Car carrying the company commander, Maj André Dennison, arrived 

overhead. Two “stop groups” were inserted by helicopter (G-Cars) along 

likely avenues of escape, while four sticks of paratroopers jumped in to 

form a sweep line and flush out the insurgents. In the ensuing firefight, the 

troops on the ground, guided by Dennison and the K-Car pilot, conducted 

multiple sweeps, displaying aggressive and thorough pursuit of the enemy. 

In the end, up to 38 insurgents and trainees were killed, one insurgent was 

captured, and six escaped. Because only 16 weapons were found, however, 

SB only credited the fireforce with 16 kills. Dennison disputed this claimaccording to him, the target was a training camp, so not all the trainees 

were armed but most had webbing and several had hand grenades. While 

directing the action from the K-Car, Maj Dennison was shot through his 

knee but remained overhead for another hour and fifteen minutes until the 

K-Car had to refuel. Dennison and the sweep group commander, WOII 

Mandava Dick, were later recommended for the Bronze Cross of Rhodesia 

for their actions that day.20

At dusk on 11 August 1978, an eight-man patrol from Support Company 

1RAR, led by Lieutenant Pat Lawless, was operating in the Devil’s Gorge 

area of Zambia21 in conjunction with a simultaneous SAS operation. 

Lawless’ patrol made contact with three insurgents, killing two and fatally 

wounding the other. As the wounded man was dying, Lawless interrogated 

him and learned of a nearby insurgent company of about 100 men:
88

Lawless laid an ambush for the night-he had two MAGs. 

He also set up a claymore mine along the track but nothing 

happened. However, at first light, as they began to dismantle the 

claymore, preparatory to moving on, they saw some 70 insurgents 

approaching along the track. Every soldier immediately squirmed 

back into his position and waited for Lawless to spring the 

ambush. As soon as the enemy was in the killing ground, the order 

was given. Eight insurgents were killed and 15 wounded in this 

initial attack. A further 20 men, initially unseen, tried to outflank 

the patrol by sneaking down the hillock behind their position. 

However, Corporal Ernest Rashmira noted the move and, leaping 

up, charged them, firing bursts from his MAG, killing three.22

After continuing the attack for several hours against such overwhelming 

odds, the small patrol, low on ammunition, withdrew. Lawless was later 

awarded the Silver Cross of Rhodesia for this and other actions.23

In many instances similar to the two described above, the RAR continued 

to demonstrate their ability to engage and destroy their enemy. The lessons 

from early operations like Nickel and Cauldron were well-learned and the 

regiment was emerging as a superb counterinsurgent force. Recruiting 

continued and young black Rhodesians volunteered in droves to join the 

RAR as operations continued across the country (and beyond). 

Changes to the RAR

As early as the breakup of the federation, the Rhodesian Army had begun 

to consider commissioning black officers for service in the regiment. In 

the early 1970s, one former RAR officer recalls evaluating a number 

of black candidates for selection to the Cadet Course at the School of 

Infantry in Gwelo. The Officer Selection Board was sufficiently impressed 

with the black candidate’s attributes-after a five day selection course he 

was among the top five of twenty candidates. In the end, however, the 

Brigadier in charge of the board decided it was still too early to send one 

black cadet through the course by himself. As the RAR officer recalls, “it 

would be very unfair on the black chap to put him through the difficulties 

of integrating at the point in time when integration wasn’t in the cards.”24

In June 1977, however, the Rhodesian Army commissioned its first black 

officers. Two former RSMs-Martin Tumbare (RSM, 1RAR) and Wurayayi 

Mutero (RSM, 2RAR)-were commissioned, and more black officers 

followed. According to the Regimental History, “on 25 August, [Tumbare] 

was presented with the late ‘Kim’ Rule’s sword by Mrs. Rule. It had been 

Kim Rule’s wish that his sword be presented to the first African to be 
89

commissioned in the Rhodesia Army. Fittingly, it was a member of the 

battalion he had commanded who received the honour.”25

Figure 1. Mrs. Rule, the widow of Lieutenant Colonel Kim Rule OBE, presents 

her late husband’s sword to the first African to be commissioned, Lieutenant N. 

M. Tumbare DMM.

Source: Alexandre Binda, Masodja: The History of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its 

forerunner, the Rhodesia Native Regiment (Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 2007), 321.
90

Notes

1. Wood, Counterstrike, 44-6.

2. Smith, 237-8.

3. Smith, 242.

4. Smith, 241-2.

5. Formed in October 1976, the Patriotic Front (PF) was the latest attempt 

by the two nationalist parties-ZANU and ZAPU-to work together. The formation 

of the PF was a direct response to Nhongo and Mangena’s formation of the 

ZIPA in January 1976, as well as an attempt to negotiate with the newly elected 

Democratic administration of the United States, and Labour Party government of 

Great Britain. Previous attempts at unifying ZANU and ZAPU, some mentioned 

in earlier chapters, were the Joint Military Command (JMC) formed in February 

1972, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), formed in October 

1974, the unification of ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI under Muzorewa’s ANC 

in December 1974, and finally the uniting of elements of ZANLA and ZIPRA 

to form ZIPA in January 1976. Every attempt was brought about due to outside 

pressure, and each ended in failure. In fact, by the end of the war, ZIPRA and 

ZANLA were fighting each other in Rhodesia when they weren’t fighting the 

RSF. For an excellent discussion on Zimbabwean attempts at unity, see Daniel 

R. Kempton, Soviet Strategy Toward Southern Africa (New York: Praeger, 

1989), 118-125.

6. Smith, 252.

7. Martin, 293.

8. Martin.

9. Martin, 292.

10. Binda, Masodja, 327, 364; CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, 

interview.

11. Sithole never really relinquished leadership of ZANU after he was 

deposed by Robert Mugabe. The resulting split in ZANU meant that a small 

faction remained loyal to Sithole and operated inside Rhodesia while the vast 

majority of the movement was controlled by Mugabe from Mozambique. The 

smaller group is commonly referred to as ZANU (Sithole). Reid-Daly, Top 

Secret War, 564.

12. Reid-Daly, Top Secret War, 563-5.

13. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

14. Reid-Daly, Top Secret War, 567.

15. Reid-Daly, Top Secret War, 146. Sku’zapo was the nickname used by 

the insurgents to describe the Selous Scouts. According to Reid-Daly, “’Skuz,’ is 

a corruption of the English, excuse me, while apo is the Shona word for here in 

the immediate sense. Thus, in direct translation Skuz’apo might mean: Excuse 
91

me here . . . or: excuse me for what I have just done.” In context, it refers to 

the way two pickpockets approach their victim, one bumping the target and 

muttering “skuz’apo” while the other takes advantage of the distraction to lift his 

wallet. The Selous Scouts took great pride in their nickname, and their distinct 

unpopularity among the enemy. 

16. Reid-Daly, 565-6; CB20111110S0001, former Selous Scout officer, 

interview. No clear reason is evident for the selection of the Selous Scouts as the 

training force for the SFAs. Reid-Daly suggests that by this point his force had 

become a “go-to” force for nearly any unsolveable problem-indeed, that may 

be true. Or perhaps, as one former Scout officer proposed, their status as former 

insurgents may have helped in understanding the minds of their new trainees. 

And as hated as the Scouts were, they certainly commanded the respect of the 

insurgents. The SFA training mission would pass to the RAR in 1979.

17. Reid-Daly, Top Secret War, 570-1.

18. CG20110927S0001, former RAR officer, interview.

19. Binda, Masodja, 344-5; Wood, War Diaries, 273-5.

20. Binda, Masodja, 344-5; Wood, War Diaries, 273-5.

21. The RAR did conduct external operations, like the one described here, 

into Zambia and Mozambique. These patrols routinely submitted false Location 

Station (LOCSTAT) reports to prevent enemy knowledge of their operations. 

22. Binda, Masodja, 349.

23. Binda.

24. CE20110909R0001, former RAR officer, interview. The candidate in 

question commissioned into the Corps of Signals in 1978. He rose to the rank 

of Captain before the end of the war, and was believed to have retired from the 

Zimbabwe Army years later as a Lieutenant Colonel.

25. Binda, Masodja, 315. Lt. Col. G. E. L. “Kim” Rule commanded 1RAR 

from 1950-1955. While he was CO, Rule was responsible for the regiment 

receiving its colors from the Queen. His manuscript of the history of the 

regiment was a critical primary source for the writers of Masodja.

93

Chapter 7

Phase Five: April 1979-April 1981

On 30 January 1979, the (white) Rhodesian electorate went to 

the polls in a referendum on the majority-rule constitution. An 

overwhelming 85% voted ‘yes’ to black rule-probably one of 

the few times in history a people have willingly and deliberately 

voted themselves out of power. However, the British government 

declared the result irrelevant.

— Alexandre Binda, Masodja: the History of the Rhodesian African 

Rifles and its Forerunner, the Rhodesia Native Regiment

During the final phase of the war, Rhodesia voted itself into majority 

rule under its first black Prime Minister. Under the new government, and 

now called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the nation expected recognition from the 

British as well as an end to sanctions, having met all six conditions for 

recognition as laid out by the British government in 1965-6. However, 

ZANU and ZAPU refused to accept the arrangement, and instead intensified 

their military actions. The British declared the 1979 elections irrelevant, 

and the UN continued sanctions. In September 1979, the British hosted a 

conference in London, at Lancaster House, between the government of 

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the PF, along with representatives of the frontline 

states. In the subsequent election, Robert Mugabe and ZANU(PF) were 

voted into power. Zimbabwe was granted independence on 18 April 1980.1

The Army during this phase fought desperately to suppress ZANLA 

insurgents flooding the country, while striking at external targets in Zambia 

and Mozambique. The Third Battalion of RAR formed in October 1979, 

consolidating several of the racially integrated Independent Companies 

of the Rhodesia Regiment under one headquarters. Once Mugabe took 

control of the country, the former RSF organizations began to break apart, 

and many of the white soldiers and officers chose to resign and leave the 

country. 

The RAR, however, remained intact and began to integrate with its 

erstwhile enemies, ZANLA and ZIPRA. In large holding camps across 

the country, ZANLA and ZIPRA consolidated alongside each other and 

frequently clashed, most notably at a camp outside Bulawayo called 

Entumbane. Here, the RAR stood between ZIPRA and ZANLA to prevent 

the wholesale slaughter of one by the other and protect the civilian 

population from the two warring factions.2
94

April 1979 Elections

1979 began with tremendous steps toward immediate majority rule in 

Rhodesia. The first step was a referendum among the white population to 

accept the majority rule constitution as drafted by the Interim Transition 

Government of Muzorewa, Smith, Sithole and Chirau. Placing their faith in 

the “black moderates,” the white population of Rhodesia overwhelmingly 

voted in favor of black rule in their country. Subsequently, on from 17-

20 April, nearly 2 million black voters-about 64 percent of the country’s 

eligible voters-went to the polls, and on the principal of “one man, 

one vote,” elected Bishop Muzorewa’s UANC into power, under the 

“Government of National Unity” between the various parties. This was a 

historic undertaking, and one which Rhodesians hoped would end the war. 

Several teams of international observers, including a British team led by 

Lord Boyd, reported that the elections were free and fair, by the strictest 

Western standards.3

From April to August 1979, Rhodesians waited for the Carter 

administration in the United States and the newly elected Conservative 

government of Margaret Thatcher in Britain to recognize ZimbabweRhodesia. As the US and Britain delayed recognition of the new 

government, ZANLA and ZIPRA increased their operations, further 

taxing an already extremely stressed RSF.4 From late 1978 to May 1979, 

officially recorded monthly incidents nearly tripled, from under 600 to 

1,706 as insurgent groups, primarily ZANLA, exacted revenge for local 

support given to the UANC. “By September 1979, the UANC popular 

base had vanished.”5

Finally, instead of recognizing the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Government 

of National Unity, “on Monday, 6 August, at the Commonwealth 

conference in Lusaka, Margaret Thatcher reneged on her promise of 

recognition under pressure from Nigeria and Australia and set another 

course with a new commitment to an all-party conference in London.”6

This conference brought Nkomo and Mugabe back to the table with the 

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government. In advising Muzorewa on attending the 

conference, Smith says:

[W]hile I had previously resisted any thought of an all-party 

conference, believing that if we persisted we would gain recognition 

of our honest and straightforward effort, I was reconciling myself 

to a change of thought, and my close colleagues in the Rhodesian 

Front agreed. There were two main reasons I have mentioned. 

First, the terrorists were gaining support among the indigenous 
95

population, not through convincing argument an appeal, but by 

using the dreadful weapon of intimidation. Second, the Western 

leaders would not face up to making a decision which conflicted 

with the views of the OAU-90 per cent of whose membership 

comprised countries governed by communist leaders.7

In September 1979, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Peter Carrington, 

hosted a constitutional conference at Lancaster House in London. All 

parties, including Mugabe and Nkomo, were to resolve the problem of 

majority rule in Rhodesia.

Lancaster House Conference

From 10 September to 23 December 1979, delegations led by Ian Smith, 

Robert Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo, and Abel Muzorewa attended the Lancaster 

House conference, along with delegations from the frontline states. The 

purpose of the conference was to develop an acceptable framework for 

the government and set a date for internationally supervised elections. 

Carrington’s approach to settling the problem differed from previous 

attempts. Rather than negotiate primarily with the PF, his proposals “first 

were directed at Mozambique and Zambia as the countries serving as hosts 

to the insurgents. Both countries were economically desperate for an end to 

a war that was threatening to engulf them.”8

 In fact, without pressure from 

Samora Machel of Mozambique, Mugabe would have left the conference 

and forfeited his stake in the British negotiations entirely.9

The results of the Lancaster House Conference were agreements to an 

immediate ceasefire, a Commonwealth monitoring force under General 

John Acland to supervise movement of belligerents into 16 assembly 

points, and an election to be held as soon as possible. 

RAR Actions

Fireforce actions continued, at an increasing pace for the RAR. In 

Operation Area Hurricane during November 1979, Support Company 

1RAR planned an attack on a “liberated area” in a Tribal Trust Land, from 

which insurgents were routinely shooting at a Police Reserve Air Wing 

(PRAW) light aircraft. According to the plan, the PRAW pilot was to fly 

his normal route, with a 1RAR fireforce following about 15 miles behind. 

If the plane drew fire, the pilot was to drop a smoke marker on his way out 

of the area, and the fireforce would arrive directly behind to deal with the 

insurgents. The fireforce consisted of two K-Cars, four G-Cars (each with 

a four-man stop group), with a reserve of paratroops standing by at the 

airfield. There was also a land tail carrying more troops, ammunition and 

heavy weapons, driving a specific route to assist in any contact.10
96

On the morning of 14 November, the PRAW aircraft duly took off on 

his route, and the fireforce and land tail were shortly behind, following 

a preset pattern of rendezvous points while the helicopters flew just 

above the ground to avoid detection. At one such rendezvous point, the 

Company Sergeant Major (leading the land tail) reported spotting a group 

of 30 insurgents running into the hills 3 kilometers away. The fireforce 

immediately turned and deployed to engage the insurgents, with the K-Cars 

firing their 20mm cannon at the fleeing men. Shortly after a Lynx dropped 

a frantan11 canister near the top of a prominent dwala,12the stop groups on 

G-Cars landed at the top. After receiving reinforcements flown in from 

the land tail, two sticks formed a sweep line and moved out to establish 

contact with the insurgents, now estimated at a strength of 40-50 men and 

hiding in a riverbed. The fireforce commander decided to use helicopters 

to cover the far exits of the riverbed as the sweep groups advanced.13

After advancing about thirty meters into their sweep, the RAR soldiers 

came under heavy fire, and remained in contact with this group of insurgents 

for the rest of the day and into the night, receiving reinforcements from the 

land tail through the afternoon. At one point, the commander of the first 

wave of troops, Lt. Lawless: 

Pulled my stop groups back from the cave, and called in an air 

strike from a Canberra armed with 200 Alpha bombs (small 

football shaped bombs which bounced, armed, then detonated at 

about waist-height), which had been scrambled from Salisbury and 

was orbiting the contact area. The first box of 50 bombs fell well 

short, the second landed beyond the target-and the third landed on 

my sweep line! Miraculously, nobody was hurt, and the Canberra 

pilot, obviously embarrassed by his performance so far, made no 

mistake with the fourth box, which landed short and bounced into 

the cave, shredding the luckless terrs inside.14

The RAR troops maintained contact through the night, engaging 

insurgents attempting to escape. In the morning, Lieutenant Lawless says, 

“I reported to my commanding officer that we had killed 26 terrs for the 

loss of one officer killed [Captain Jim Hardy, shot in the head during the 

initial sweep] and one wounded, and handed over command to him. By 

1000, we were back at Mtoko [the fireforce base] . . . and by 1130 we were 

once again airborne en route to another terrorist sighting.”15

Operation Murex

Shortly after this fireforce action, in November 1979, Support Company 

1RAR was selected for an external operation into Zambia. Selous Scouts 
97

had discovered and frustrated ZIPRA plans for a conventional invasion of 

Rhodesia. During operations in Zambia, Lieutenant Edwin (Piringondo) 

of Selous Scouts discovered, mapped, and conducted reconnaissance on 

a ZIPRA brigade in a fortified base in the Kabanga Mission area (about 

80 miles northeast of Livingstone). Support Company 1RAR and a troop 

of Selous Scouts were to attack the base and, if possible, capture the 

radios and message pads to decipher coded messages from a ZIPRA team 

operating in Rhodesia. The attack was coordinated to start at 1230 on the 

designated day, because at that time, ZIPRA soldiers were typically all 

cleaning their weapons.16

After detailed planning and rehearsals and one-day weather delay, the 

operation was a “go,” and it went “like clockwork.” Seven Hunters, three 

Canberras and four K-Cars conducted preliminary air strikes, while two 

G-Cars, four Cheetahs,17 and the Paradak all delivered troops to their 

objectives on time, receiving almost no ground-fire (because all of ZIPRA’s 

weapons were disassembled for cleaning) in the process. 

After a short sharp contact with a few determined members of ZIPRA, we 

found and captured the radios and codes, which were immediately airlifted 

out by a Cheetah. A number of well-sited bunkers were located under trees 

among anthills, but the paras re-assembled ZIPRA’s AA weapons (heavy 

Soviet 12.7 and 14.5mm machine guns) and blasted them. We found large 

food and ammunition supplies, which took several hours to clear. We 

killed 35 members of ZIPRA and captured five for the loss of one Selous 

Scout killed. One trooper and a pilot were injured by ground-fire while 

over-flying another large and hitherto unsuspected ZIPRA position as we 

withdrew.18

A few weeks later, the Rhodesian Army forces would withdraw back 

within its own borders as Lord Soames, the interim British governor, 

arrived to facilitate the peace settlement negotiated at Lancaster House.

The RAR in 1979 was busily engaged as a highly effective 

counterinsurgent force. Again, by this stage they were deployed constantly 

against ever-increasing numbers of ZANLA and ZIPRA, but they never 

wavered in their commitment, nor was recruiting a challenge. The soldiers 

remained absolutely loyal to the regiment, and the regiment remained true 

to the country.

3RAR forms

In September 1979, Army Headquarters announced that several of the 

independent companies of the Rhodesia Regiment, now teeming with 
98

conscripted black national servicemen, would form the Third Battalion 

RAR. Two independent companies based in Umtali in eastern Rhodesiaalong with a third independent company in nearby Inyanga-rebadged into 

the RAR. These companies had served with some distinction alongside 

the RAR and RLI in recent years, and they were well respected by both 

regiments. Senior NCOs from 1RAR and 2RAR came to the new battalion, 

and Depot RAR in Balla Balla ran several courses “to inculcate the values 

and traditions required of RAR soldiers into the Umtali and Inyanga 

troops.”19

Lieutenant Colonel Terry Leaver was the first commander of the 

battalion, and by October 1979, 3RAR commenced operations. By this 

time, the Lancaster House Conference was ongoing, and the battalion’s 

first missions were to prevent ZANLA infiltration across the Mozambique 

border during the conference. The battalion continued to operate on the 

eastern border throughout the transition of government. In March 1981, 

3RAR would be designated 33 Infantry Battalion of the Zimbabwe Army 

under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ron Marillier.20

Mugabe Elected

By 6 January 1980, Lt. Gen. Acland’s Commonwealth Monitoring Forceabout 1,300 strong-had assembled 15,730 insurgents in assembly points. 

Within days, the number grew to 22,000, of which 16,500 were ZANLA 

and the remainder ZIPRA. RSF were restricted to their bases until elections 

were complete. Importantly, thousands of insurgents did not report to the 

Assembly Points; among these were the political commissars, key leaders, 

and “hard-core insurgents.” Most of the population of the Assembly Point 

camps was mujiba, (local informants) and low-level recruits. Left among 

the population, the “hard-cores” would continue to intimidate and coerce 

the people to vote their way-for Mugabe.21

On 4 March 1980, the election results revealed that Mugabe had won 

63 percent of the vote. On 18 April, he became the Prime Minister of 

an independent Zimbabwe, as Prince Charles and Lord Soames handed 

over the country and departed. 1RAR provided the guard of honor for the 

farewell ceremony.22

The RAR in the Zimbabwe Army

The three battalions of RAR continued to serve in the Zimbabwe Army, 

along with many of its officers. The three battalions of the regiment were 
99

designated 11, 22, and 33 Infantry Battalions of the Zimbabwe Army. 

While the rest of the army struggled to integrate factions of ZIPRA, 

ZANLA, and Rhodesian forces, the RAR remained as it was, and provided 

a model professional force for its sister units in the Zimbabwe Army.23

Other elements of the Rhodesian Army, however, did not survive the 

transition to Zimbabwe. The RLI disbanded on 17 October 1980. The 

SAS disbanded 31 December 1980. The Selous Scouts were integrated 

back into their parent regiments, and those who had only ever been 

Scouts consolidated into 4th (Holding Unit) RAR. “On 1 October 1980, 

4 (HU) RAR ended its short life and became the 1st Zimbabwe Parachute 

Battalion.” Many of the officers and men of the RLI, SAS, and even a 

few from the RAR went to South Africa and served in the South African 

Defense Force (SADF). In fact, a Pathfinder Company of SADF’s 44 

Paras, called “The Philistines,” was made up entirely of ex-Rhodesians.24

For some time, the RAR remained untouched, retaining its distinctive 

badge, uniform, and shoulder patch (minus a “Rhodesia” insignia). In 

correspondence, the Battalion Commnader, Lt Col. Mick McKenna, 

continued to refer to his unit as “11 Infantry Battalion (1RAR).” The 

commanders and many officers continued to serve with the same men 

they had trained and fought beside throughout the war. There was some 

hope that this would remain so, and that the new Zimbabwe could form a 

professional force and transition into the peaceful, integrated society that 

had been the objective for so long.25

Entumbane: “The Battle for Bulawayo”

The first Zimbabwe government was an uneasy union, under Prime 

Minister Robert Mugabe, of three factions-Mugabe’s ZANU, Nkomo’s 

ZAPU, and Smith’s Rhodesian Front (in a much smaller capacity than 

before). The armies of these three factions were billeted together at various 

assembly points across the country as they waited for integration into the 

new national army. Old rivalries between ZANLA and ZIPRA dominated 

the camps, leading to several tense situations. The political and military 

situation was not helped by constant ZANU(PF) propaganda distributed 

throughout the country, over television and radio broadcasts. The situation 

deteriorated rapidly when the newly appointed ZANU(PF) Minister of 

Finance, Mr. Enos Nkala, made a pair of speeches in November 1980 

emphasizing the creation of a one-party state under the leadership of 

ZANU(PF).26
100

In response to Nkala’s rhetoric and ZANU(PF) propaganda, ZIPRA 

forces near the township of Entumbane just outside Bulawayo began to 

move truckloads of reinforcements into their camp. The ZANLA soldiers 

quartered there noticed the increase, and someone started shooting. Police 

riot squads were unable to contain the ensuing four hour firefight, which 

spread into the town. Small arms fire, rocket grenades, mortars and 

machine guns inspired civilian supporters in the town to join the fray, 

adding to the chaos.27

Zimbabwe Army command therefore ordered 1RAR (now designated 11 

Infantry Battalion, Zimbabwe Army) to stop the fighting.

D Company was first on the scene and deployed along the railway 

line at Mpopoma, thus cutting off the city centre to the nowmutinous warring factions. Support Company was positioned on D 

Company’s right flank. The Zimbabwe Army 12th Battalion was also 

in support but proved to be more of a hindrance than a help. During 

the afternoon, A, B, and C companies arrived and took up positions 

to the right of D Company and Support Company.28

At nightfall, the fighting subsided, but ZIPRA had called to their nearby 

Gwaai River Mine assembly point for heavy weapons and vehicles to 

support their fight. In the morning, the reinforced ZIPRA forces attacked 

ZANLA’s position, and the RAR swung into action. As the RAR initiated 

their assault on ZIPRA and ZANLA under the cover of Hawker Hunter 

aircraft, the mutineers reconsidered their options and called for a ceasefire. 

Brigadier Mike Shute, commander of 1 Brigade Zimbabwe Army (and 

former commander of 1RAR), arranged for the mutineers to surrender their 

heavy weapons. 1RAR established an outpost at a beer hall overlooking 

the two camps, reinforced with mortars and a troop of armored cars to keep 

the peace. The battalion rotated a company at a time through observation 

duties at the beer hall in Entumbane.29

For the next few months, ZIPRA continued building strength in 

Matabeleland, apparently preparing for a coup. ZIPRA was concerned that 

they had no political future in Zimbabwe under Mugabe and ZANU(PF), 

and they had begun moving their vast stockpiles of Soviet equipment 

from Zambia into Zimbabwe. Equipped with T-34 tanks, armored cars, 

anti-aircraft guns, BTR-152 Armored Personnel Carriers, and about 6,000 

soldiers, ZIPRA’s forces were substantial. On 10 January, Mugabe fired 

Nkomo as Minister of Home Affairs. The RAR began planning for the 

imminent clash between ZIPRA and ZANLA.30
101

On 8 February, ZANLA soldiers attacked their ZIPRA colleagues in one 

of the assembly points, killing over 60 ZIPRA soldiers. When news of 

this incident reached the newly formed 13 Infantry Battalion-which was 

in training with a team of British instructors at another assembly pointthe ZIPRA members of that battalion attacked their ZANLA colleagues, 

killing 12. Once again, D Company 1RAR arrived to restor order, and 

quickly drove into the camp to settle the issue. In the ensuing action, the 

RAR killed 40 ZIPRA soldiers, and much of the rest of the battalion was 

detained. “Arriving at work the following day, the British instructors were 

astonished to find the ZIPRA half of their trainees (minus the deceased and 

the escapees), clad only in underpants and squatting in neat silent rows 

under the watchful eyes of their RAR captors.”31

The fighting continued over the next several days, during which a 

severely outnumbered 1RAR, reinforced with a troop of four armored 

cars32 and supported by one Lynx aircraft, destroyed the better part of a 

motorized rifle battalion (equipped with Soviet BTR-152s). Of this action, 

the Lynx pilot explains:

On the morning of the action [12 February 1981] I was dispatched 

as a first reaction singleton aircraft from the Thornhill base in 

Gwelo to Bulawayo to assist the RAR. . . . My aircraft was armed 

with the standard two machine guns and SNEB rockets, which, 

because we were expecting to be marking for the Hunters were 

only smoke, not HE. . . . [Once over the RAR’s position] it was 

immediately apparent that he [Major Lionel Dyke] and his men 

were under considerable pressure and might be overrun. Lionel 

asked for a strike(s) on the position giving him the most problems. 

. . . I then put in a strike firing the SNEB as a distraction and 

strafing with machine guns. After pulling out from this I seem 

to remember that Lionel was most appreciative but did mention 

that all the fire directed at him was now concentrated on me; 

something along the lines of all hell let loose. He then asked me 

for another strike and it was during this attack that I took damage. 

I was in the dive when I took a number of rounds through the 

cockpit which took out the front engine, destroyed the right side of 

the instrument panel, passed an inch or so in front of my nose and 

then out of the left side of the aircraft. . . . I continued and strafed 

again but for lack of a front engine had to tell Lionel that I was off 

to Brady [airfield] but would be back as soon as I could. When I 

arrived I was greeted by a Wing Commander, who was a bit put 

out and it seemed to me at the time it was because I did not have 

the correct weapon load.33
102

According to the accounts in Masodja, when the commander of C 

Company 1RAR (Maj Lionel Dyke) called for air support, the request was 

denied. The pilot, however, heard the request, disobeyed orders and flew 

anyway, repeatedly striking targets in support of the RAR. His aircraft 

was repeatedly shot during his numerous gun and rocket runs. In Masodja, 

Maj. Dyke and Second Lieutenant John Hopkins (another officer involved 

the action) claim the pilot received or was recommended for a Silver 

Cross of Rhodesia. He did not receive any commendation, however, 

other than generous praise in subsequent correspondence between Dyke 

(1RAR), Brigadier Mike Shute (Commander, 1 Brigade), and Air Force 

Headquarters.34

On the evening of 12 February 1981, elements of the RAR battle group 

went to find the rest of ZIPRA’s forces:

The armoured cars were sent down to Essexvale battle camp 

to deal with ZIPRA’s armoured battle group but soon found 

that the enemy was prepared to surrender their ten T34s and 

remaining BTR 152 APCs, GSP bridging equipment, artillery and 

amphibious vehicles. On inspection, it was found that the T34s 

were fortunately unserviceable. These captured vehicles were 

subsequently removed to the battalion’s concentration area on 

Brady Barracks Airfield where the RAR removed souvenirs and 

useful items.35

The official casualty figures listed 260 dissident killed, but the RAR 

disagrees-the regiment accounted for over 400 dead on its own, without 

losing a man. After the Entumbane fight, massive ZIPRA factions deserted 

fearing retribution. Mugabe would never trust his Ndebele colleagues. 

He would eventually unleash a North Korean trained 5th Brigade of the 

Zimbabwe Army into Matabeleland in 1983 to massacre tens of thousands 

of Ndebele, accusing them of plotting against ZANU(PF).

The RAR’s actions at Entumbane displayed-better than any other 

example-the loyalty and professional values of the regiment. By this point, 

everything had changed in Zimbabwe. The RAR’s enemy had become its 

commander-in-chief. Its mission had gone from destroying two insurgent 

armies to integrating them. Outside of its own chain of command, the 

army around the RAR was a hollow shell of its former self. Lt. Gen. Walls 

stayed on briefly but had just resigned as the commander of the Zimbabwe 

Army, and nationalist faction leaders were filling the ranks of Army 

Headquarters. Fortunately, the headquarters of 1 Brigade, commanded by 

Brigadier (later Major General) Mike Shute remained largely intact, but 
103

the other units of the brigade and the army were beginning to degrade as 

a professional force-as 12 and 13 Infantry Battalions demonstrated during 

the actions in January and February 1981. 2RAR and 3RAR similarly 

remained intact, serving as model organizations within their respective 

brigades during similar ZANLA-ZIPRA confrontations in quieter areas of 

the country. Neither battalion had a large fight like 1RAR at Entumbane, 

however.36

So why would the RAR deliberately stop ZIPRA and ZANLA from 

killing each other? Why would white officers support the ZANU(PF) 

government, and why would black soldiers follow their white officers 

against black mutineers? As one officer involved in the fight said: 

My loyalties lay to my Brigade Commander (Mike Shute), my 

regiment, and to the country and its defenceless population. 

Insofar as the regiment was concerned, I believe their loyalty 

lay to their officers and, more importantly, to each other.

. . . There were no instances of a reluctance to obey orders or 

desertion as we fought without fear or favour against both ZIPRA 

and ZANLA and anyone else who got in our way as we carried 

out our duties.37

The actions of the RAR at Entumbane saved Mugabe’s government 

from certain civil war against an enemy (ZIPRA) that was heavily armed, 

trained and supported by Soviet backers. Indeed, many outside Rhodesia 

believed that either Nkomo’s ZIPRA or Walls’ former RSF forces would 

execute a coup d’état against Mugabe, but no coup ever materialized. The 

end result of Entumbane was a final blow to the military might of ZIPRA, 

and most of its Soviet equipment was captured and redistributed among 

the rest of the Zimbabwe Army.38

Conclusion

In the final phase of the Bush War, the RAR demonstrated its proficiency as 

a fighting force. The true nature of the loyalty and dedication of its soldiers 

to their regiment-never doubted during its history-was displayed one last 

time at Entumbane, where loyalty to anything else but the regiment would 

have faltered. The RAR by this point was an exemplary fighting force in 

its own right. The soldiers and leaders demonstrated tremendous learning 

and growth from Operation Nickel, where a company of RAR struggled 

against lightly armed, poorly trained insurgents in 1967, to Entumbane, 

where a battalion of RAR stood its ground against a motorized brigade, 

destroying a motorized battalion without losing a man. 
104

Figure 1. RAR soldiers at Brady Barracks, February 1981.

Source: Alexandre Binda, Masodja: The History of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its 

forerunner, the Rhodesia Native Regiment (Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 2007).

In less than one year’s time, the national government transitioned 

twice to majority rule-once to Bishop Muzorewa in April 1979, then to 

Robert Mugabe in March 1980. For the first time in its history, Rhodesia 

(as Zimbabwe-Rhodesia) pressed blacks into national service, leading to 

the formation of 3RAR and ending a long tradition of purely voluntary 

black service in the Rhodesian Army. Despite the tremendous pressure 

and volatile state of the country through its transition from Rhodesia to 

Zimbabwe, the RAR kept its tradition and culture alive and remained as a 

crucial element of stability in the new national army. 
105

Notes

1. Binda, Masodja, 364, 383.

2. Binda, Masodja, 389.

3. Wood, War Diaries, 327-9. The vote was conducted at fixed and 

mobile polling stations across all eight electoral regions. Observed by a British 

Conservative Party team under Lord Boyd and several other international 

observers, 1,853,333 voters (63.9 percent of 2,900,000 eligible voters) went to 

the polls. Of these, 1,212,639 voted for Muzorewa’s UANC (67.27 percent), 

262,928 (14.58 percent) for Sithole’s ZANU-PF, 194,446 (10.79 percent) for 

the United National Federal Party led by Chief Kayisa Ndiweni. Allocated 

by percentage of the vote, assembly seats awarded to each party were: 51 to 

UANC, 12 to ZANU-Sithole, and 9 seats to UNFP. The remaining 28 seats 

were reserved for the Rhodesian Front under Ian Smith to ensure that the sixth 

principal for recognition-that is, protection of the minority from the majoritywas met.

4. Smith, 305-11. 

5. Cilliers, 55.

6. Smith, 311; Wood, War Diaries, 355-8. Specifically, Nigeria 

nationalized British Petroleum holdings in its country and threatened further 

economic actions, including withdrawing from the Commonwealth, if 

Thatcher’s government recognized Muzorewa’s government and normalized 

relations with Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, as Thatcher stated she would do mere 

months before. Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser supported Nigeria’s 

action, as did Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Their 

actions convinced Thatcher that recognition of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia would result 

in the downfall of the Commonwealth and severe economic (oil) pressure on 

Great Britain.

7. Smith, 313.

8. Cilliers, 55.

9. Smith, 321. “Mugabe believed that he had not gained sufficient 

concessions to ensure his victory in the election, and so he decided to register his 

protest by making a dramatic withdrawal from the conference. He had packed 

his bags and was making arrangements to fly out to the United States” Machel 

informed Mugabe that if he broke away from the conference, he would not be 

permitted to continue using Mozambique as a base for his operations. Mugabe, 

chastened, returned to the conference. 

10. Binda, Masodja, 371.

11. Frangible tank munitions, or “frantan” were Rhodesian made napalm 

canisters.

12. A dwala is a large rock formation, in Chishona.
106

13. Binda, Masodja, 371-2.

14. Binda, Masodja, 372.

15. Binda.

16. Binda, Masodja, 372-3.

17. Bell UH-1 helicopters snuck into Rhodesia late in the war to replace the 

aging fleet of Allouettes were called “Cheetahs.”

18. Binda, Masodja, 374.

19. Binda, Masodja, 365-6.

20. CF20110922M0001, former RAR and SAS officer, interview by 

author, Reading, England.

21. Wood, Counterstrike, 48.

22. Binda, Masodja, 383; Martin, 330.

23. CF20110920S0001, former RAR officer, interview.

24. Binda, Masodja, 383; CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, 

interview. 

25. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

26. Binda, Masodja, 383-4; Moorcraft, 182.

27. Binda, Masodja, 384. 

28. Binda.

29. Binda, Masodja, 384.

30. Binda, 385.

31. Binda, 385-6.

32. The armored car used by the Rhodesian Army was the Eland 90 Mk9, 

a South African variant of the French made AML Panhard. The Eland was a 

wheeled (4x4) vehicle armed primarily with a 90mm gun and a 60mm breechloading mortar. 

33. CF20111116J0001, email correspondence with the author, 16 

November 2011.

34. CF20111116J0001.

35. Binda, Masodja, 388-9. From a statement by 2nd Lt. John Hopkins, A 

Company 1RAR.

36. CF20110920V0001, former RAR officer, interview.

37. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

38. CE20110913M0001; CE20110920S001, former RAR officer, interview 

by author.
107

Chapter 8

Conclusions

Since the birth of the Regiment I have known it. Since its formation 

I have done what I could to teach these men of the Rhodesian 

African Rifles. I have seen the glorious results of that teaching of 

mine and of the officers of the Regiment. 

And today we all smile together. For have we not fought and 

risked our lives side by side to keep our land safe from the horrible 

things we have seen here? And the war being over, we feel that 

we may think of our fighting comrades and-having seen what war 

can cause to people and to lands-may humbly say Ishe Komborera 

Africa [God save Africa].

— RSM Stephen Machado, 1RAR,

written after returning from Burma in 1945

This study of the RAR reveals several points about the Rhodesian 

Bush War that have been largely missed in previous accounts. Many of 

the existing histories of Rhodesia discount the important role of black 

soldiers in the Rhodesian Army-some flatly fail to acknowledge that, 

particularly towards the end of the war, most of the Rhodesian Security 

Forces were black. In the RAR, the Rhodesian government had a historical 

demonstration of blacks and whites working together-a true non-racial 

organization, and a model for cooperation across cultures. Many critiques 

of Rhodesia’s transition to majority rule state that it was a case of “too 

little, too late.” The tragic truth of this also applies to the RAR: throughout 

the war, there were not enough RAR battalions, and the realization that 

more black soldiers-and black officers-were needed occurred far too late 

in the war, despite early recommendations from the Rhodesian Army as 

early as 1963. 

Throughout its history, and particularly during the Bush War, the soldiers 

of the RAR remained unquestioningly loyal and faithful to their regiment. 

The soldiers of the RAR were well trained, well-disciplined and feared by 

their enemy. They were respected by nearly every soldier who ever worked 

with them. They overcame precisely the same racial and tribal divisions 

that tore their country apart with an identity of their own-a regimental 

culture that demanded the best of its members, black and white.
108

Why did The RAR fight?

The RAR never suffered for recruits. By one officer’s recollection, at the 

end of war, 11 Infantry Battalion (1RAR) was at full strength, with 1,505 

soldiers, all the same soldiers who fought for Rhodesia.1

The other battalions were similarly fully manned. The regiment never 

had to leave its base to conduct recruiting drives. They would simply 

announce what days they were open to recruits, and volunteers came to 

the depot in droves. 

Young black men knew the regiment-their fathers served in it, as did their 

grandfathers. The pay and living arrangements, while far inferior to those 

of white soldiers, made the RAR a lucrative job for a black Rhodesian. 

The RAR uniform was something of which he could be justly proud. Once 

they arrived at the RAR for training, however, the traditions and mindset 

of the regiment began to manifest themselves in the actions of the young 

soldiers. Recruits were taught exactly what their predecessors had done, 

and what was expected of them, through traditions handed down from 

long-ago service with the British Army. This instruction built three basic 

values of the RAR soldier: loyalty, pride, and discipline. These values 

made the RAR a formidable force on the Rhodesian battlefield.

How Did The RAR change through the war?

At the beginning of the war, the RAR was still very linked to its past as 

a colonial British unit. That link never really faded. The badge, colors, 

uniform, and structure remained throughout the war. Even at Entumbane 

in 1981, the RAR still wore their Rhodesian patches and badge. However, 

over the course of the Bush War, some of the formalities of British 

African units fell away. Formal social gatherings were rare by the end 

of the Bush War, as officers spent more time training and deploying than 

socializing. Parades and drill instruction were not emphasized as heavily 

as marksmanship and patrolling.

While the RAR conducted relatively few external raids, they showed 

that they were capable of doing so. Instead, the regiment tended to focus 

on internal operations-that is, operations within Rhodesia to locate and 

destroy insurgent networks in the kraals and tribal areas. The regiment 

could observe and engage the black population much more naturally and 

efficiently than their counterparts in the RLI.

Unfortunately, the Rhodesian Army could not act on its own advice in 

1963 to form more battalions of RAR, or to equalize pay and commission 

black officers into the ranks. This would have been a welcome move for the 
109

army, but politics prevented it. 2RAR did not form until 1975, and 3RAR 

not until 1979. Had additional battalions formed earlier in the war-even as 

late as 1973-the additional black troops might have accomplished the one 

critical task that Rhodesian strategy failed to address—they might have 

connected more of the black population with the government of Rhodesia. 

The creation, late in the war, of Guard Force and Security Force 

Auxiliaries (pfomu re vanhu) indicate a belated attempt to secure the 

Protected Villages and tribal areas from insurgent infiltration. However, 

as the RAR well knew, properly trained forces took time to create. Earlier 

commitment of additional battalions of RAR to this task may have 

prevented the dismal failure of the PV program, and enabled the Rhodesian 

government to avoid the forced use of political militias such as the SFAs.

What happened to the RAR?

When the regiment disbanded, most of the RAR soldiers stayed in 

Zimbabwe. They had nowhere else to go, and most lacked the means 

to move. Some white officers, committed to helping their new country, 

also stayed. Most of the white officers, seeing no hope for their future in 

Zimbabwe, either left for South Africa or Great Britain. 

Some of the black soldiers, NCOs and officers who stayed in Zimbabwe 

continued to serve in the Zimbabwe Army, one former RAR soldier is 

reported to have become a Lieutenant Colonel, eventually commanding 11 

Infantry Battalion (formerly 1RAR).2

 In 2007, four former RAR soldiers 

came to London for the release of the Regimental History, Masodja. 

When reunited with their former officers, these men were overcome with 

emotion, as were the officers. There was no hatred or anger between these 

men and the whites who left.3

In the end, the legacy of the RAR is the creation of a multicultural 

organization that stood the test of tremendous pressure as the nation it 

served changed, struggled, and ultimately collapsed. Despite the violent 

changes in the world around it, the regiment stood until it was forced to 

abandon its link to past traditions and merge into the ranks of the Zimbabwe 

Army. 

What does this mean?

As of the writing of this paper the US military is involved in developing 

military organizations to build and maintain stability in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. The role of the US military in developing and assisting 

African militaries is also increasing, after the 2008 establishment of US 

Africa Command. These examples share the challenges that the RAR 
110

successfully overcame. The challenges of creating a national army out 

of Tajik, Pashtu, and Dari cultures, or Sunni and Shia tribes in Iraq, or 

any number of tribes in any African country, is not unlike the RAR’s 

challenge of uniting its white, Ndebele, and Shona cultures into a cohesive 

and effective unit. The success of the RAR resided in its creation of an 

overriding concept-the regiment-to which every soldier bound himself 

above all other divisive elements of his background. Properly developed 

and maintained, military culture, based on loyalty to the regiment, can be 

a catalyst to unite disparate cultural groups of soldiers.

Figure 1. Map of Rhodesia.

Source: Courtesy of Dr. J. R. T. Wood.
111

Figure 2. Rhodesian population, 1969.

Source: 1969 Census data, as found at: http://mappery.com/South-RhodesiaPopulation-Map (accessed 10 October 2011).
112

Figure 3. Rhodesian Security Forces Operational Boundaries.

Source: Courtesy of Dr. J. R. T. Wood.
113

Notes

1. CE20110913M0001, former RAR officer, interview.

2. CF20110920S0001, former RAR officer, interview.

3. CF20110920H0001, former RAR officer, interview.

115

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Interviews

Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Scholars Program 2011. 

Scholars Program Art of War Research Study 2011. Research Study, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS: Ike Skelton Chair in the Art of War, 2011. This 

study included interviews of counterinsurgency practitioners and policy 

professionals from the United States, United Kingdom, and South Africa. 

Each interview was executed as an oral history interview and adhered to 

Army policies of informed consent in compliance with federal law. Finally, 

each interview was coordinated throught the Ike Skelton Chair in the Art 

of War, CGSC Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa

CE20110908G0001. Former RAR officer. Interview by author, 8 

September 2011.

CE20110908W0001. Former RAR and SAS officer. Interview by author, 

8 September 2011.

CE20110908M0001. Former RAR officer. Interview by author, 8 

September 2011.

CE20110909R0001. Former RAR officer. Interview by author, 9 

September 2011.

CE20110910T0001. Former RAR officer. Interview by author, 9 September 

2011.

CE20110910H0001. Former NRR and RAR officer. Interview by author, 

10 September 2011.

Durban, Republic of South Africa

CE20110910W0001. Former RR NCO and officer. Interview by author, 

10 September 2011.

CE20110912A0001. Former RLI officer. Interview by author, 12 

September 2011.

CE20110912G0001. Former Royal Gurkha Rifles and RAR officer. 

Interview by author, 12 September 2011.

CE20110912G0001. Former BSAP, RRR and RAR officer. Interview by 

author, 12 September 2011.
116

CE20110913B0001. Former RAR officer. Interview by author, 13 

September 2011.

CE20110913M0001. Former KAR, RAR and Grey’s Scouts officer. 

Interview by author, 13 September 2011.

Cape Town, Republic of South Africa

CE20110913R0001. Former RAR and SAS officer. Interview by author, 

13 September 2011.

CE20110914B0001. Former KAR, RLI, and RAR officer. Interview by 

author, 14 September 2011.

CE20110914H0001. Former RAR Warrant Officer. Interview by author, 

14 September 2011.

CE20110915C0001. Former RAR, Royal Gurkha Rifles, and SAS officer. 

Interview by author, 15 September 2011.

CE20110915B0001. Former RAR and SAS officer. Interview by author, 

15 September 2011.

CE20110916G0001. Former RAR officer. Interview by author, 16 

September 2011.

CE20110916M0001. Former RAR and SAS officer. Interview by author, 

16 September 2011.

Aylesford, England

CF20110919C0001. Former RAR officer. Interview by author, 19 

September 2011.

CF20110919H0001. Former RRR, RAR, and Rhodesian Army Education 

Corps officer. Interview by author, 19 September 2011.

CF20110919W0001. Former RLI and RAR officer. Interview by author, 

19 September 2011.

London, England

CF20110920H0001. Former RAR officer. Interview by author, 20 

September 2011.

CF20110920S0001. Former KAR, RAR officer. Interview by author, 20 

September 2011.

CF20110920V0001. Former RAR officer. Interview by author, 20 

September 2011.
117

Reading, England

CF20110922L0001. Former British Army, RAR officer. Interview by 

author, 22 September 2011.

CF20110922L0002. Former RAR, British Army officer. Interview by 

author, 22 September 2011.

CF20110922M0001. Former RAR, SAS officer. Interview by author, 22 

September 2011.

Portland, Oregon

CG20110927S0001. Former U. S. Special Forces, RAR officer. Interview 

by author, 27 September 2011.

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

CB20111110S0001. Former Selous Scouts officer. Interview by author, 10 

November 2011.

Personal Accounts

Croukamp, Dennis. The Bush War in Rhodesia: An Extraordinary Combat 

Memoir of a Rhodesian Reconnaissance Specialist. Boulder, CO: Paladin 

Press, 2007.

Cox, Chris. Fireforce: One Man’s War in the Rhodesian Light Infantry. 

Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 2006. 

Essex-Clark, John. Maverick Soldier: An Infantryman’s Story. Carlton: 

Melbourne University Press, 1991.

Lemon, David. Never Quite a Soldier: A Rhodesian Policeman’s War 

1971-1982. Alberton: Galago, 2006.

Mills, Greg, and Grahame Wilson. “Who Dares Loses? Assessing 

Rhodesia’s Counter-Insurgency Experience.” RUSI 152, no. 6 (December 

2007): 22-31.

Smith, Ian Douglas. The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas 

Smith. London: Blake, 1997. 

Warren, Charlie. Stick Leader: RLI. South Africa: Just Done Productions, 

2007.

Wood, J. R. T. The War Diaries of André Dennison. Gibraltar: Ashanti, 

1989.
118

Documents

DesFountain, Trevor. Summary and Background of 1979 Rhodesian 

Strategy Revision Conference.

Essex-Clark, John. “The Incorrigible Trio~A Subaltern’s View: A 

Controversial Essay in Bonding, Leadership, and Morale.”

Marillier, Ron. “A Short History of the 3d Battalion Rhodesian African 

Rifles.”

National Security Council. Study In Response to National Security Study 

Memorandum 39: Southern Africa. Washington, DC, 9 December 1969.

Redfern, John. “Racial Discrimination in the Rhodesia and Nyasaland 

Army.” Rhodesian Army memorandum, October 1962.

———. “The Requirement for a Non-Racial Army in Southern Rhodesia.” 

Rhodesian Army memorandum, October 1963. 

Doctrinal References

Department of the Army. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Washington DC: 

Government Printing Office, 2006.

Rhodesian Army. COIN Manual, Part II—ATOPS [Anti-Terrorist 

Operations]. Salisbury, 1975.

Secondary Sources

Andrade, Dale. “Westmoreland was right: Learning the wrong lessons 

from the Vietman War.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 2 (June 

2008): 145-181.

Bergerud, Eric. The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia 

Province. Oxford: Westview Press, 1991.

Binda, Alexandre. Masodja: The History of the Rhodesian African Rifles 

and its forerunner, the Rhodesia Native Regiment. Johannesburg: 30 

Degrees South, 2007.

———. The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry. Edited by Chris Cocks. 

Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 2007.

Bridgland, Fred. “Angola and the West.” In Challenge: Southern Africa 

within the African Revolutionary context, edited by Al J. Ventner, 117-145. 

Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1989.

Burton, Brian, and John Nagl. “Learning as we go: the US Army adapts to 

COIN in Iraq.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 3 (September 2008): 

303-327.
119

Cann, John P. Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 

1961-1974. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997.

Cilliers, J. K. Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia. London: Croom Helm, 

1985.

Clayton, Anthony. Counterinsurgency in Kenya: A study of military 

operations against the Mau Mau, 1952-1960. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower 

University Press, 1976.

Coates, John. Suppressing Insurgency. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 

1992.

Cole, Barbara. The Elite: The story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service. 

South Africa: 1985.

Comber, Leon. Malaya’s Secret Police 1945-1960: The Role of the Special 

Branch in the Malayan Emergency. Melbourne: Monash University Press, 

2009.

Corum, James. “Training Indigenous Forces in 

Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies.” March 

2006. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/

pubs/display.cfm?PubID=648 (accessed 20 June 2011).

Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathnell, Brett 

Steele, Richard Teltshik, and Anga Timilsina. The UN’s Role in NationBuilding: From the Congo to Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005.

Dornan Jr., James E., ed. Rhodesia Alone. Washington, DC: Council on 

American Affairs, 1977.

Downie, Nick, and Lord Richard Cecil. Frontline Rhodesia. DVD. 

Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 2007.

Farwell, Byron. Mr. Kipling’s Army. New York: W. W. Norton, 1981.

Gann, Lewis H., and Thomas H. Henriksen. The Struggle for Zimbabwe: 

Battle in the Bush. New York: Praeger, 1981.

Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: 

Praeger Security International, 1964, 2006.

———. Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

2006.

Gentile, Gian. “A strategy of tactics: population centric COIN and the 

Army.” Parameters (Autumn 2009): 5-17.

Green, T. N. The Guerilla - Selections from the Marine Corps Gazette.

New York: Praeger.
120

Hack, Karl. “The Malayan Emergency as a Counter-Insurgency Paradigm.” 

The Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (June 2009): 383-414.

Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century.

St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006.

Henniker, M. C. A. Red Shadow Over Malaya. London: William 

Blackwood and Sons, 1955.

Hoffman, Bruce. Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The 

Rhodesian Experience. Santa Monica : RAND, 1992.

Hoffman, Frank. “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?” Parameters

(Summer 2007): 71-87.

Hoffman, Frank, Jennifer M. Taw, and David Arnold. Lessons for 

Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience. Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 1991.

Hopkinson, Michael. The Irish War of Independence. Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2002.

Horne, Alistair. “The French Army and the Algerian War 1954-62.” 

In Regular Armies and Insurgency, edited by Ronald Haycock, 69-83. 

London: Croom Helm, 1979.

Hunt, Richard. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts 

and Minds. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.

Hyam, Ronald. Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 

1918-1968. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Jeudwine, Hugh. “A Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-1, and 

the Part Played by the Army in Dealing with it (Intelligence).” In British 

Intelligence in Ireland: The Final Reports, edited by Peter Hart, 17-60. 

Cork: Cork University Press, 2002.

Kempton, Daniel R. Soviet Strategy Toward Southern Africa: The National 

Liberation Movement Connection. New York: Praeger, 1989.

Kilcullen, David J. The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the 

Midst of a Big One. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

———. Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Kitson, Frank. Bunch of Five. London: Faber and Faber, 1977.

Komer, Robert. Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam 

Conflict. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986.
121

———. The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a 

Successful Counterinsurgency Effort. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1972.

Krepinevich, Andrew. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore, MD: Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Kriger, Norma. Zimbabwe’s Guerilla War: Peasant Voices. Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Lockhart, J. G., and The Hon. C. M. Woodhouse. Cecil Rhodes: The 

Colossus of Southern Africa. New York: Macmillan, 1963.

Lunt, James. Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century. 

London: Macdonald Futura, 1981.l

MacKinlay, John. “Rethinking Counterinsurgency.” RAND 

Counterinsurgency Study, Volume 5, 2008.

———. The Insurgent Archipelago. London: C Hurst and Co Publishers 

Ltd., 2009.

Malkasian, Carter, and Daniel Marston, eds. Counterinsurgency in Modern 

Warfare. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010.

Martin, David, and Phyllis Johnson. The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The 

Chimurenga War. London: Faber and Faber, 1981.

McCuen, John. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War. Harrisburg, PA: 

Stockpole Books, 1966.

Miers, Richard. Shoot to Kill. London: Faber and Faber, 1959.

Minford, John. Sun Tzu The Art of War: The Essential Translation of the 

Classic Book of Life. New York: Penguin Press, 2002.

Moorcraft, Paul L., and Peter McLaughlin. The Rhodesian War: A Military 

History. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1982.

Nagl, John. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: 

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

Nyangoni, Wellington W. African Nationalism in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). 

Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1977.

O’Meara, Patrick. Rhodesia: Racial Conflict or Coexistence? Ithaca: 

Cornell University Press, 1975.

Owen, Christopher. The Rhodesian African Rifles. Edited by Lt.-General 

Sir Brian Horrocks. London: Leo Cooper, 1970.
122

Paret, Peter. French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: 

The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine. London: Pall Mall 

Press, 1964.

Phillips, Rufus. Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of lessons 

not learned. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008.

Porch, Douglas. “Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French 

Colonial Warfare.” In Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by Peter Paret, 

376-407. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

———. “French Imperial Warfare 1945-62.” In Counterinsurgency in 

Modern Warfare, edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, 87-101. 

Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010.

Race, Jeffrey. War Comes to Long An. California: UC Press, 1972.

Ramsey, Robert. Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification 

in the Philippines, 1900-1902. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute, 2007.

Reed, Douglas. The Battle for Rhodesia. New York: Devin-Adair, 1967.

Reid-Daly, Ron. Selous Scouts: Top Secret War. Cape Town: Galago, 1983.

———. “War in Rhodesia--Cross-Border Operations.” In Challenge: 

Southern Africa within the African Revolutionary context, edited by Al J. 

Ventner, 146-182. Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1989.

Scully, Pat. Exit Rhodesia. Ladysmith: Cottswold Press, 1984.

Shy, John, and Thomas Collier. “Revolutionary War.” In Makers of 

Modern Strategy, edited by Peter Paret, 815-862. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1986.

Sibanda, Eliakim M. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union 1961-87: 

A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia. Trenton: Africa 

World Press, 2005.

Smith, Simon. “General Templer and Counter-insurgency in Malaya: 

Hearts and Minds, intelligence, and propaganda.” Intelligence and 

National Security 16, no. 3: 60-78.

Sobel, Lester A., ed. Rhodesia / Zimbabwe 1971-77. New York: Facts On 

File, 1978.

Stiff, Peter. Cry Zimbabwe: Independence - Twenty Years On. Alberton: 

Galago, 2000.
123

Stubbs, Richard. “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The 

Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 1948-1960.” In Counterinsurgency 

in Modern Warfare, edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, 101-

118. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010.

Sutherland, Riley. Army Operations in Malaya, 1947-1960. Santa Monica 

CA: RAND, 1964.

Thompson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency. London: Chatto 

and Windhus, 1966.

Thompson, W. Scott, and Donaldson Frizzell, eds. The Lessons of Vietnam.

New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1977.

Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency.

Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 1985.

Tse-Tung, Mao. On Guerilla Warfare. New York: Dover Publications, 

2005.

Ucko, David. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the US 

Military for Modern Wars. Washington, DC: Georgetown University 

Press, 2009.

Ventner, Al J. ed. Challenge: Southern Africa within the African 

Revolutionary context. Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1989.

———. The Chopper Boys: Helicopter Warfare in Africa. London: 

Greenhill, 1994.

Willbanks, James. Abandoning Vietnam. Lawrence, KS: University of 

Kansas Press, 2004.

Wood, J. R. T. “Countering the CHIMURENGA: The Rhodesian 

Counterinsurgency Campaign.” In Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 

edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, 191-208. Oxford: Osprey 

Publishing, 2010.

———. Counterstrike From the Sky: The Rhodesian All-Arms Fireforce 

in the War in the Bush 1974-1980. South Africa: 30 Degrees South 

Publishers, 2009.

———. “Counter-punching on the Mudzi: D Company, 1st Rhodesian 

African Rifles, on operation ‘Mardon’ 1 November 1976.” Small Wars 

and Insurgencies 9, no. 2 (Autumn 1998): 64-82. 


Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Visit our website at: 

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/index.asp

Art of War Papers