U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–177PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

ASIA’S DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY STRUCTURE:

PLANNING U.S. ENGAGEMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 23, 2018

Serial No. 115–152

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Amy Searight, Ph.D., senior adviser and director, Southeast Asia Program, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................................. 7

Aparna Pande, Ph.D., director, Initiative on the Future of India and South 

Asia, The Hudson Institute ................................................................................. 18

Michael D. Swaine, Ph.D., senior fellow, Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace ........................................................................................ 30

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 3

Amy Searight, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 10

Aparna Pande, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 20

Michael D. Swaine, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 33

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ann Wagner, a Representative in Congress from the State of Missouri, and written responses 

from: 

Amy Searight, Ph.D. ............................................................................................ 54

Aparna Pande, Ph.D. ........................................................................................... 56

Michael D. Swaine, Ph.D. .................................................................................... 57

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ASIA’S DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY 

STRUCTURE: PLANNING U.S. ENGAGEMENT 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. YOHO. Let the hearing come to order. 

Good afternoon, and thank you for being here today, and sorry 

for the delay. Sometimes that voting schedule does get in the way. 

Members present will be permitted to submit written statements 

to be included in the official hearing record. Without objection, the 

hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject 

to length limitations and the rules. And the witnesses’ written 

statements will be entered into the hearing. 

As my colleagues on the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee, the world’s 

strategic and economic gravity is shifting eastward. Asia has already become the essential arena where the United States must 

compete to advance our economic interests and defend the American-led order that has underwritten global security and prosperity 

for decades. 

Moreover, we need a game plan. The United States won’t be a 

credible competitor in this high-stakes arena without a long-term 

national strategy, and that is one of the goals we are focusing on 

in this committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee is to help 

map a long-term strategy that doesn’t change with each administration as easily as we have seen in the past so that we have a 

long-term vision. 

Our main adversary in this competition, the People’s Republic of 

China, is the master of generational strategies. When Xi Jinping 

came to power in 2012, China’s Communist Party laid down two 

centenary goals, objectives for the 100th anniversary of the party 

in 2021 and the 100th anniversary of the PRC in 2049. Xi has followed this roadmap ever since. 

It has been nearly 500 days since President Trump’s inauguration. Over the last several months, his administration has begun 

to lay out a body of work containing a long-term national strategy 

for the United States with significant attention to the Asia-Pacific 

region. This committee has a role to play in the strategic planning 

2

process, as I said earlier, which is why we have convened today’s 

hearing. 

In December, the White House released a new U.S. National Security Strategy that reflects a return to great power competition, 

acknowledging a U.S-China relationship that is fundamentally 

competitive. Taking up a more honest vision of China’s regional 

global role, the National Security Strategy casts aside decades of 

wishful thinking. It says policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in the international institutions in global commerce would turn them into benign actors and 

trustworthy partners. Turned out to be false. 

This view is an emerging consensus in and outside of government 

and across partisan lines. And I also would like to add that it is 

across different nations, because we are seeing this as other countries come in and talk to us, that they are saying the same thing. 

It will likely define Asia for years to come. 

The administration has begun to lay out a free and open IndoPacific strategy specific to Asia, which emphasizes the strategic 

interconnection of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The 

strategy promotes nations’ freedom from coercion and the ability to 

defend their sovereignty and freedom internally in terms of good 

governance, human rights, and fundamental liberties. It also promotes openness, freedom of the sea, peaceful dispute resolution, 

and open trade in investments. 

These strategies go a long way toward defining a structure for 

U.S. engagement, a framework that our diplomats and the Armed 

Forces will operate within to advance not just U.S. national interests but those of our regional partners, and, you know, the alliances that we have. You know, a lot of people, you know, they 

think we have pivoted away from the Asia Pacific. Nothing could 

be further from the truth. 

But this work is far from over. There have been scant details on 

how the executive branch will operationalize its strategy for Asia. 

It is still unclear what role emerging mechanisms like the Quad 

will play in our Indo-Pacific strategy. Questions remain about how 

the U.S. strategy will integrate with those of our close partners like 

India, which is a major pillar of the Indo-Pacific vision the administration has laid down. Some experts are concerned that such a 

strategy would marginalize ASEAN, which has always been a core 

component of U.S. engagement in Asia, and it will continue into 

the future. 

Today, with the help of our expert panel, we will work toward 

some of these answers. We will discuss these strategies and their 

implication from an oversight perspective, and to inform our upcoming East and South Asia budget hearing with administration 

officials. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today, and again apologize 

for the delay. And I now turn to our ranking member, Mr. Brad 

Sherman, from California. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]

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30177d-1.eps

Asia's Diplomatic and Security Structure: Planning U.S. Engagement 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Wednesday, May 23,2018 

Opening Statement of Chairman Ted Yoho 

Good afternoon. 

As my colleagues on the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee know well, the world's strategic and 

economic gravity is shifting eastward. Asia has already become the essential arena where the 

United States must compete to advance our economic interests and defend the American-led 

order that has underwritten global security and prosperity for decades. Moreover, we need a 

game plan-the United States won't be a credible competitor in this high stakes arena without a 

long-tenn national strategy. 

Our main adversary in this competition, the People's Republic of China, is the master of 

generational strategies. When Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China's Communist Party laid 

down two "centenary goals," objectives for the IOO'h anniversary of the Party in 2021, and the 

IOO'h anniversary of the PRC in 2049. Xi has followed this road map ever since. 

lt's been nearly 500 days since President Trump's inauguration. Over the last several months, his 

administration has begun to lay out a body of work containing a long-tenn national strategy for 

the United States, with significant attention to the Asia-Pacific. This Committee has a role to 

play in this strategic planning process, which is why we've convened today's hearing. 

In December, the White House released a new U.S. National Security Strategy that reflects a 

return to great power competition, acknowledging a U.S.-China relationship that is 

fundamentally competitive. Taking up a more honest vision of China's regional and global role, 

the National Security Strategy casts aside decades of wishful thinking. 

It says, ''policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in 

international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and 

trustworthy partners .. turned out to be false." This view is an emerging consensus in and outside 

government, and across partisan lines. lt will likely define Asia for years to come. 

The administration has also begun to lay out a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategy specific to 

Asia, which emphasizes the strategic interconnection of the Western Pacific and the Indian 

Ocean. The strategy promotes nations' freedom from coercion and ability to defend their 

sovereignty, and freedom internally in terms of good governance, human rights, and fundamental 

liberties. It also promotes openness- freedom of the seas, peaceful dispute resolution, and open 

trade and investment. 
4


30177d-2.eps

These strategies go a long way towards defining a structure for US. engagement, a framework 

that our diplomats and armed forces will operate within to advance US. national interests. But 

this work is far from over. There has been scant detail on how the executive branch with 

operationalize its strategy for Asia. It's still unclear what role emerging mechanisms like the 

Quad will play in our Indo-Pacitic strategy. Questions remains about how the US. strategy will 

integrate with those of our close partners, like India, which is a major pillar of the lndo-Pacitic 

vision the administration has laid down. Some experts are concerned that such a stratetlY would 

marginalize ASEAN, which has always been a core component of US. engagement in Asia. 

Today, with the help of our expert panel, we'll work towards some of these answers. We'll 

discuss these strategies and their implications from an oversight perspective, and to inform our 

upcoming East and South Asia budget hearings with administration officials. 
5

Mr. SHERMAN. This is a broad hearing with many things to discuss. I will mention a few. 

As to democracy and human rights, we see strong democracies in 

Japan, Taiwan, Mongolia, South Korea, and India, yet Southeast 

Asia is lagging. In general, it has an average score from Freedom 

House of 4.8, halfway between the 1 and the 7, the 1 being the 

best. Burma’s transition to democracy has now morphed into this 

terrible ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya with 600,000 refugees 

fleeing into Bangladesh. And China, hardly a democracy, oppresses 

its Uighur and Tibetan minorities, but more to the point—but even 

perhaps more significant—its government has no theoretical basis 

for its own legitimacy. 

Democracy, you know, can be accepted as legitimate. Theocracy 

or monarchy, where there is a culture that accepts that, might explain why they are running things. Communism was a theology 

perhaps or a theocracy, but Xi is not the vanguard of the proletariat. So the only answer they have to the question as to why they 

are running things is because they have provided a high level of 

economic growth, and at some point they won’t. And we will test 

to see whether the Chinese people accept the Communist Party 

that isn’t a Communist Party but is in power because they are 

doing such a great job at running the economy when they are not 

doing a great job at running the economy. We will see what happens. We see with India some $15 billion of arms sales, and naval exercises. We see India developing its ties with Southeast Asia, but 

only 2 or 3 percent of Southeast Asia’s trade is with India. And it 

would be good if India presses Southeast Asia to move in the direction of democracy, we are reviving the quadrilateral group involving the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India. And where it is conducting maritime patrols or where it is working for development 

and democracy, this could be a useful working group. 

As to trade, we have a larger trade deficit with China in 2017 

than 2016. We have conducted talks in which the other side has 

refused to commit itself to any quantifiable reduction in the trade 

deficit, and we have caved. There isn’t a term for this that Beijing 

will understand. It is called paper tiger, and it describes an approach where you scream about a trade deficit and then settle for 

no change, except that we eliminate our sanctions or roll them back 

with regard to ZTE. So that on the one hand, the President says 

he is going to create a new coalition to bring Iran to its knees and 

force them to make concessions that President Obama couldn’t 

even dream of or chose not to. And at the same time the message 

goes out to companies around the world we don’t really impose 

sanctions on big companies, we will pick a few small ones now and 

then. And so Iran will be deprived of a few small trading partners. 

There is one area where I think we need a more dovish approach, 

and that is the so-called islands. They are really islets, some of 

them rocks, off the coast of China, sometimes hundreds of miles off 

the coast of China. They are located off the shores of the most populated continent, yet for millennia, no one has ever chosen to live 

on them. That is how valuable they are. 

It is said that whoever controlled these islets would stand astride 

major trade routes with trillions of trade. All of that trillions is in 

6

and out of Chinese ports, so if China can control these islets, they 

could blockade their own ports. There are also some oil tankers 

that get close to some of these islets that could easily change their 

route and be far from these islets. So let us hope that neither in 

Beijing nor in Washington is a dispute over these islets a reason 

to fan the flames of war or fan the flames of increased military expenditure. We should work something out without allowing those 

in both countries that want to raise tensions to justify military expenditures to be successful. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Do you want to have an opening statement, Dr. Bera? 

Mr. BERA. May I? 

Mr. YOHO. Yes, sir, you can. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Obviously, a very timely hearing. And, you know, I think both 

the chairman and the ranking member touched on a number of 

issues that are of key importance to the region. I am going to add 

one more. 

When we think about some of the tensions in the South China 

Sea that continue and actually are escalating as you start to see 

the Chinese deploy missile systems on the Spratlys as they have 

had their first bomber landing on the Spratlys, and yet I know the 

administration has withdrawn their invitation to RIMPAC as a 

first step. What we can anticipate, you know, if we just think about 

how the Chinese respond, you know, if you give them an inch, they 

are going to ask for a foot, and then unfortunately we should have 

stopped them, you know, several years ago when it would have 

been less complicated. 

At this juncture, though, we have to send a strong message that 

militarization of the South China Sea, you know, claiming disputed 

territories is not acceptable, and we’re going to be very interested, 

and I think in a bipartisan way, Members of Congress would be 

very supportive of the administration continuing to send a strong 

message that, you know, we have to keep these waterways open. 

We do not, you know, accept China’s claims that this is their territory, and we have to stand in partnership with the nations in that 

region, the Philippines, Vietnam, and others to send that strong 

message and keep those waterways open. 

In addition, just, you know, sticking to kind of the maritime conversation, we are seeing that increased cooperation and partnership between the United States and India, and trilaterally or 

quadrilaterally with Japan, the United States, India, and Australia. And, you know, again, I think I speak for members of this 

committee—subcommittee as well as the full committee that we do 

think that from a strategic direction it is an incredibly important 

partnership, both bilaterally but also trilaterally and 

quadrilaterally, and certainly support continued movement and 

partnership in that direction. So I am very interested in hearing 

the witnesses’ take on some of this. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Dr. Bera. I appreciate it. 

I am going to say something I say often. You are probably going 

hear it more than once today. The world is going through a tectonic 

7

shift in world powers we haven’t seen since World War II. You 

know, we went through a World War II powers emerge from that, 

and we are going through that today in a different fashion. I am 

63 years old, and I have not ever seen the type of rivalry that we 

have seen. And I think what it comes down to is countries that 

have free and open thinking and democracies and things like that 

versus socialism with Chinese characteristics, which China is proposing or out there promoting. They can call it whatever they want. 

It is still communism, and we are seeing these two forces come together. You have got democracies and you have got that forum that 

Xi Jinping and the Communist Party is promoting. 

And so as you guys do your statements and the questions, that 

is where my focus is on how do we balance that to avoid conflict 

in the future, that we focus on economics, trade cultural exchanges 

and the advancement of all of us and not go into these conflicts 

that we have seen too much of. 

And so with that, let me introduce our speakers: Dr. Amy 

Searight, the senior adviser and director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Dr. 

Pande—did I say that right, Pande?—director of the Initiative on 

the Future of India and South Asia at the Hudson Institute; and 

Dr. Michael Swaine, senior fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

I assume you all have testified before a committee before. You 

have got the little timer clock up there. Green light comes on when 

you have a lot of time. Yellow light is you start to slow down or 

finish. And then the red light. We are not crunched for time. I 

think you will be able to freely speak. 

So if you would, Dr. Searight, give your testimony. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF AMY SEARIGHT, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND 

DIRECTOR, SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Thank you, Chairman Yoho and Ranking Member 

Sherman. Thank you for inviting me to testify today on this really 

timely and important topic. 

As the United States and much of the world really intensifies its 

focus on North Korea and resolving the tensions there, it is important for us to maintain a broader and long-term view on key regional dynamics that are shaping Asia’s diplomatic and security 

structure in ways that will impact the United States and the region 

for years to come. 

For countries in the Indo-Pacific, and in Southeast Asia in particular, this is a time of strategic flux and uncertainty. Many in the 

region are wondering if we are nearing an inflection point where 

Chinese engagement and influence will outstrip America’s traditional leadership in the region. The United States has tremendous 

reserves of hard and soft power in the Indo-Pacific, but there is a 

growing sense that U.S. strategy and focus is adrift at a time when 

China is demonstrating laser-sharp focus on regional priorities. So 

as you said, Mr. Chairman, the United States really needs a game 

plan, a long-term strategy for the region. 

Southeast Asia is at the crossroads of the Indo-Pacific. The countries in the region are critically important to the United States in 

8

their own right, both in strategic and economic terms, but more 

broadly, the region of Southeast Asia represents the chessboard on 

which the great power rivalry between the United States and 

China is being contested. 

China’s efforts to win over friends in Southeast Asia and pacify 

ASEAN as a counterbalance to its own actions has been formidable. 

The United States has upped its game in Southeast Asia in recent 

years as well, leading to some substantial gains on security partnerships and capacity building, yet questions remain about U.S. 

commitment and staying power. 

For the United States to craft a compelling and enduring strategy for the Indo-Pacific that resonates in Southeast Asia, we have 

to first consider the key priorities and concerns of countries in the 

region. And there are three I want to point to. 

The first is their interest in managing great power rivalry. As 

the strategic environment of Southeast Asia and the broader IndoPacific grows increasingly contested, countries are seeking ways to 

both engage and hedge against closer ties with China, while not 

being forced to choose between China and the United States. 

The second priority that we have to keep in mind is that in 

Southeast Asia economics remains paramount. For the governing 

elites of Southeast Asia, economics is the foundation of security. 

Whereas the United States has traditionally led regional efforts to 

foster economic openness and integration that has been critical to 

the region’s economic success for decades, the U.S. withdrawal from 

the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the lack of a viable economic engagement strategy to replace it has created a strategic void at a 

time when China has been ramping up its highly ambitious Belt 

and Road Initiative. 

The third priority for the region is ASEAN centrality. ASEAN 

has been the central driver of regional cooperation and stability 

among its Southeast Asia member nations for over half a century, 

and has developed a remarkable track record of averting conflict 

and coercion among its members and building trust and cooperation through dialogue and adherence to norms of noninterference 

and peaceful resolution of disputes. Southeast Asian countries put 

great stock into ASEAN and ASEAN centrality since they know 

that ASEAN-led mechanisms are the best way for the collective interests of these countries to be taken into account. 

And here I also want to make the case for why ASEAN centrality 

matters for the United States. ASEAN-led frameworks from the 

ASEAN Regional Forum to the East Asia Summit to the ADMMPlus provide a venue for the United States to work with like-minded partners to help define issues and shape regional goals and expectations. But ASEAN’s primary value to U.S. strategic interests 

lies in its ability to shape the normative environment, and at 

times—at certain times, to a limited extent, speak with one voice. 

The norms-based regional architecture that ASEAN has created 

remains critical to a strategy of promoting a rules-based order that 

imposes some degree of normative pressure on countries seeking to 

subvert collective norms, as China has sought to do in unilaterally 

changing the status quo in the South China Sea. 

In my written testimony, I discuss at some length the reasons 

why the conception of the Indo-Pacific is a welcome shift in our 

9

geostrategic framing of the region because it highlights the important maritime challenges that have come to the fore as key priorities for the United States and our partners in the region, and it 

also highlights the increasingly important role that India is playing 

in the regional security order. But since my time is short, let me 

turn to the Trump administration’s free and open Pacific strategy. 

And in particular, I want to point to two shortcomings in the strategy and the way it has been rolled out from the perspective of 

Southeast Asia. 

The first is the heavy security focus without a parallel economic 

approach. Most Southeast Asian countries welcome security cooperation with the United States, but they grow nervous about a 

United States that only appears engaged on the security front. The 

U.S. withdrawal from TPP sent shock waves across the region, and 

offering to replace TPP with a set of bilateral trade agreements 

premised on the notion that the primary goal is to erase bilateral 

trade deficits with the United States holds little appeal for countries in Southeast Asia. 

The second problem has been the conflation of the free and open 

Indo-Pacific with the Quad. The Quad met as a grouping for the 

first time in over a decade at the assistant secretary level on the 

sidelines of the East Asia Summit days after President Trump 

rolled out his free and open Indo-Pacific vision in his Da Nang 

APEC speech. The news media latched on to this development and 

overhyped the significance of the meeting. 

To be clear, I think that the Quad is a useful framework that 

holds long-term strategic potential and should be encouraged, but 

it will take some time before the Quad amounts to much in the 

way of substantive cooperation and strategic significance. It is still 

in its very early days. So all of the talk of the Quad has crowded 

out discussion of the role of Southeast Asia in a free and open IndoPacific and—in a free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. 

There has been no clear message of how Southeast Asia fits into 

this vision that has been conveyed to the region. This has led many 

to question whether the quad is the preferred strategic framework 

for the Trump administration and whether it will displace ASEAN 

unity. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Searight follows:]

10


30177a-1.eps

C[NlEH WR 

lNTH!'IATlONAL ST\J!ll[$ 

Statement Before the 

House Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

A 

Amy 

Senior Adviser and 

Center f(n and International Sn1dics 

2018 

2200 Rayburn House Oftlce Building 
11


30177a-2.eps

Searight: Written Testimony, HFAC A&P Subcommittee 05/23/2018 2 

Thank you for inviting me to testify on this important and timely topic. As the United States and 

much of the world intensifies their focus on resolving tensions with North Korea over its nuclear 

program, it is important to maintain a broader and long-term view on key regional dynamics that 

are shaping Asia's diplomatic and security structure in ways that will impact the United States and 

the region for years to come. 

For countries in the Indo-Pacific and in Southeast Asia in particular, this is a time of strategic flux 

and uncertainty. Many in the region are wondering if we are nearing an inflection point where 

Chinese engagement and influence will outstrip America's traditional leadership in the region 

The United States' hard and soft power remains formidable in the Indo-Pacific region, but there is 

a growing sense that U.S strategy and focus is adrift, at a time when China is demonstrating lasersharp focus on regional prwrities. U.S. security and economic ties to the region remain very strong, 

and the values of democracy, good governance, and human rights continue to resonate across 

Southeast Asia, as the incredible democratic election results in Malaysia affirm. But U.S. 

engagement has been lacking, especially on the economic front, a point to which I will rehrrn 

below 

Southeast Asia is at the crossroads of the Indo-Pacific. At the very heart of Southeast Asia lies 

the South China Sea, which connects the Indian and Pacit1c oceans, and thus provides the lynchpin 

for the commercial, diplomatic, energy and security interdependencies that arise ±rom this 

maritime nexus. The countries in the region are critically important to the United States in their 

own right The ten economies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

collectively form what is now the 5'h largest economy in the world, and the region's 635 million 

people represent the world's 3'd largest market, behind only China and India. ASEAN is the 41

h 

largest export market for the United States, behind Canada, Mexico, and China, and is the largest 

destination for U.S. investment in Asia, hosting more U.S. direct investment than China, Japan, 

and India combined. Five of the ten ASEAN cmmtries are home to populations larger than 50 

million, and more than half the population in the region is lmder 30 years of age. The region also 

includes the largest Muslim majority democracy in the world (Indonesia), and two U.S. treaty 

allies (Thailand and the Philippines), along with increasingly important security partnerships 

(Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia). 

The economic and strategic significance of Southeast Asia to the United States is compelling on 

its own terms. But Southeast Asia also represents the chess board on which the great power rivalry 

between the United States and China is being contested. China's efforts to win over friends in 

Southeast Asia and pacify ASEAN as a counterbalance to its geostrategic e±Iorts have been 

formidable. The United States has upped its game in Southeast Asia in recent years as well, leading 

to some substantial gains on security partnerships and capacity building efforts. And while the 

region itself welcomes the United States to play a balancing role and clearly does not want a Pax 

Sinica to emerge, it questions U.S. commitment and staying power 
12


30177a-3.eps

Searight: Written Testimony, HFAC A&P Subcommittee 05/23/2018 

Sowheas/ Asia priori lies 

For the United States to craft a compelling and enduring strategy for the Indo-Pacific that resonates 

with our key partners in Southeast Asia, we first have to consider the key concerns and priorities 

of countries in the region. There are three main priorities: 

1. Manage great power rimfry. As the strategic environment of Southeast Asia and the broader 

Indo-Pacific grows increasingly contested, cmmtries are seeking ways to both engage and 

hedge against closer ties with China, while not being forced to choose between close 

relations with China and the United States. On the one hand, Southeast Asian countries have 

real concerns about China on both the strategic and economic front They benefit from 

China's economic rise and growing trade and investment linkages with China, but they are 

concerned about the political strings that often come attached to these linkages. They are 

also concerned about China's militarization of the South China Sea and its willingness to 

blatantly disregard international law on issues related to maritime disputes. They are looking 

for tools and options to manage these downside risks while continuing to benefit from 

economic linkages. The United States can provide these options and tools through closer 

security and economic ties, capacity building, and vocal support for good governance, rule of 

law and democracy. Southeast Asia is increasingly looking to other partners as well, 

including Japan, Australia, India, and South Korea, to provide options and maneuverability in 

this increasingly contested space 

2. Economics remain paramounl. Despite growing security concerns related to maritime 

disputes in the South China Sea, China's rapid military modernization, and its willingness to 

resort to coercion to achieve its aims, countries in Southeast Asia remain wedded to an 

economics-first approach to diplomatic and political relations. This is a region where 

relatively high economic growth has fed the legitimacy and longevity of many governments, 

and the rulers and the developmental states they have built remain focused on delivering the 

economic goods to the populace. As these countries have pursued a strategy of relative 

economic openness and forging commercial ties that have embedded them in regional 

production networks, they have become not only more prosperous but more secure, 

politically and strategically For most Southeast Asian governing elites, therefore, economics 

is the foundation of security Whereas the United States has traditionally led regional efforts 

to foster this economic openness and integration through mle-making, trade negotiations and 

consensus-building in APEC, the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership and 

lack of a viable economic engagement strategy has created a strategic void, at a time when 

China has been ramping up its highly ambitious Belt and Road initiative. 

3. ASEAN centrafily. ASEAN has been the central driver of regional cooperation and stability 

among its Southeast Asian member nations for over 50 years. ASEAN has a remarkable 

track record of averting conflict and coercion among its members, and building trust and 

cooperation through dialogue and adherence to norms of non-interference and peaceful 

resolution of disputes. ASEAN's origins as a non-aligned block of countries and its 

normative underpinnings have provided a useful foundation for engaging regional powers 

and helping to manage great power rivalries and tensions that threaten to divide the region 
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Searight: Written Testimony, HFAC A&P Subcommittee 05/23/2018 4 

and disrupt economic growth and regional stability. Since the Cold War, ASEAN has played 

a central role in the regional security architecture by leading the formation of multilateral 

frameworks that engage key regional partners, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 

the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Ministerial Plus (ADMM 

Plus). Southeast Asian cmmtries put great stock in ASEAN, since they !mow that ASEANled mechanisms are the best way for the collective interests of these countries to be taken into 

account. 

Why AS'EAN centrality matters/or the United States 

It's important to note here why ASEAN centrality also matters for the United States. ASEAN-led 

frameworks, from the ASEAN Regional Forum to the East Asian Summit to the ADMM-Plus, 

provide a venue for the United States to work with like-minded partners to help define issues and 

shape regional goals and expectations. Meeting with ten-member countries and the "plus" 

countries at one set of meetings, both multilaterally and in bilateral discussions on the margins, 

creates diplomatic economies of scale- it is much more efficient to engage many countries at once, 

and seek a common approach to an issue. As Secretary Mattis put it in his Shangri La remarks last 

year, "a stable region requires us all to work together, and that is why we support greater 

engagement with ASEAN. Because no single bilateral relationship can get us where we want to 

go. Only working in concert can take us forward." 

But ASEAN's primary value to U.S. strategic interests lies in its ability to shape the normative 

environment and, at certain times to a limited extent, speak with one voice. It is viewed as a benign 

player and neutral arbiter that can confer legitimacy on regional developments. Unfortunately, 

ASEAN's recent difficulties in maintaining unity on key issues has undercut its ability to drive the 

regional agenda and steer outcomes. Yet ASEAN remains highly relevant, and greatly beneficial 

to U.S. interests. ASEAN 's propeller may be damaged, yet it continues to provide critical ballast 

that helps counter Chinese assertiveness and maintain stability in an increasingly competitive 

strategic enviromnent. 

ASEAN has developed and promoted norms that have shaped regional expectations of behavior 

and have become increasingly embedded in the regional architecture over time. On the economic 

side, ASEAN has embraced and promoted "open regionalism," encouraging governments to 

maintain relative openness to investment and commerce which has been a key to the region's 

economic success. In the security realm, ASEAN has promoted norms of non-coercion, mutual 

respect, and emphasis on dialogue as a means to build trust and resolve disputes. These regional 

frameworks have been critical to a strate1,>y of promoting a rules-based order that imposes some 

degree of normative pressure on countries seeking to subvert collective norms, as China has sought 

to do in seeking to unilaterally change the status quo South China Sea 

The Indo-Pacific: A Geostratexic Framinxwhose time has come 
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Searight: Written Testimony, HFAC A&P Subcommittee 05/23/2018 

The regional construct of the Indo-Pacific has been growing in use among strategic thinkers in 

many countries, notably Australia, Japan, Indonesia, the United States, and India, as it has become 

more and more apparent that the Indian Ocean Region and the Asia Pacific are bound together by 

a number of strategic interdependencies that merit a holistic approach to strateb'Y formulation and 

policy making. This new regional framing is a welcome shift in spatial and functional conception 

that has several advantages for U.S. strategy. 

The first is the inclusion of India as a strategic focus. India is an important maritime democracy 

that has long been a net security provider in the Indian Ocean Region, but it has increasingly hrrned 

its strategic focus to East Asia, moving from a "Look East" to an "Act East" policy of more active 

engagement in East Asia security affairs. Although India still has a way to go to live up to its 

potential as a strategic and economic partner for Southeast Asia, it has forged much stronger 

strategic ties with many countries in the region including the United States, Japan, Australia, and 

Vietnam. India has also embraced ASEAN centrality and participates in the EAS and ADMM 

Plus. Prime Minister Modi hosted the ten ASEAN leaders for the first Indian-ASEAN summit 

earlier this year, and he will give keynote remarks at the Shangri La security dialogue in Singapore 

early next month. India's !,'Towing voice in regional security dialogues is a welcome development, 

since it vocally supports principles such as freedom of navigation and deep respect for international 

law. 

The second advantage of the Indo-Pacific framing is that it naturally focuses attention on the 

maritime domain. The concept points to the confluence of the Indian and Pacific oceans, including 

through critical waterways like the South China Sea, the importance of the linkages that arise from 

this maritime connectivity- the flows of commerce and energy that are the lifeblood of the region, 

and the vital need to secure sea lanes of communication to enable these ±lows. This shift to a more 

maritime focus is useful because it sharpens attention on the key issues that are current priorities 

for the United States and its allies and friends in the region, including concerns over Chinese 

maritime coercion in the South and East China Seas, managing maritime territorial disputes, and 

building maritime security capabilities of littoral states so that they can monitor and police their 

territorial waters. 

The third conceptual shift in the Indo-Pacific framing is perhaps less helpful, which is a shift from 

an economic lens to a much more heavily security focus. Decades ago, an earlier regional 

conception of the "Pacific Rim" highlighted the economic linkages across the Pacific, and gave 

rise to regional dialo!,'l!es on economic cooperation and openness that culminated in the lmmch of 

the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation fonun (APEC). The Pacific Rim was replaced with AsiaPacific, but the focus remained heavily on economic cooperation. APEC has fostered "open 

regionalism" norms and helped germinate the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, which 

held the promise of elevating the economic landscape of the Asia-Pacific into a more open, 

dynamic, and mles based economic order. The shift to an Indo-Pacific conception leads to an 

overwhelming focus on security issues, especially maritime security. In part this is due to the fact 
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Searight: Written Testimony, HFAC A&P Subcommittee 05/23/2018 6 

that there is no regional architecture to support an Indo-Pacific wide economic dialogue. APEC 

does not include India, and this is for good reason - India has not yet demonstrated that it is ready 

to be a constructive partner on trade and invest:ment liberalization in a consensus-based forum like 

APEC. As I ari,'lJed above, the shift to a maritime security focus is helpful in that it mirrors the 

key challenges and priorities of the United States and its allies and partners in the region The 

downside, however, is that it opens the door to a less balanced approach to regional strategy that 

over -emphasizes the security dimension while giving short shrift to economic engagement, which 

remains a top priority for Southeast Asia. 

The Trump Administration's "Free and Open !ndo-Pacific" stratefiY 

Six months after President Trump rolled out the "free and open Indo-Pacific" vision in his speech 

at the APEC summit in Danang, Vietnam, it is fair to ask how effective the administration has 

been in articulating this vision to the region and devising a strategy for advancing its goals. 

Let me point to two main shortcomings in the rollout of this strategy, with respect to how it is 

perceived in Southeast Asia. The first is the heavy security focus without a parallel economic 

approach. Most Southeast Asian countries welcome security cooperation with the United States, 

but they grow nervous about a United States that only appears engaged on the security front Even 

the Rebalance tmder President Obama was widely criticized for being overly security focused, 

until the TPP negotiations gained momentum. The US withdrawal from TPP sent shockwaves 

across the region, since it was the first time that the United States had backed away from leadership 

on serious economic liberalization efforts in the region Offering to replace TPP with bilateral 

trade agreements, premised on the notion that the primary goal is to erase bilateral trade deficits 

with the United States, does not look like "free and open" trade and holds little appeal for countries 

in Southeast Asia. Countries are looking for options to balance and hedge against economic 

engagement with China and their massively ambitious Belt and Road initiative, but despite some 

talk about "predatory economics," the administration has not yet offered a compelling vision for 

how U.S. economic partnership can help countries flourish economically while maintaining 

strategrc autonomy. 

The second problem has been the conflation of the "free and open Indo-Pacific" with the Quad 

The emphasis on India as part of the strategic framing, as one of the "maritime democratic 

bookends" to the Indo-Pacific region, has contributed to the over-hyping of the one "new" element 

of the strategy, which is the resurrection of the Quad - name! y cooperation between India, 

Australia, Japan, and the United States. The Quad met as a grouping for the tlrst time in over a 

decade at the Assistant Secretary level on the sidelines of the EAS, days after President Trump's 

"free and open Indo-Pacific" rollout speech. The news media latched on to this development and 

overestimated the significance of this meeting. To be clear, the Quad is a useful framework that 

holds long-term strategic potential, and should be encouraged. But it will take some time before 

the Quad amounts to much in the way of substantive cooperation and strategic significance. Tt is 
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still in the very early days, with no guarantee that all four countries will want to continue regular 

and high-level engagement In the meantime, all of the talk of the Quad has crowded out 

discussion of the role of Southeast Asia in a "free and open Indo-Pacific" stratetlY President 

Tnunp made no mention of ASEAN or ASEAN centrality in his Danang speech It was helpful 

that he convened a U.S.-ASEAN summit in Manila, but no clear messages of how Southeast Asia 

fits into his vision has been conveyed to the region. This has led many to question whether the 

Quad is the preferred strategic framework for the Tnunp adininistration, and whether it will 

displace ASEAN centrality. When Singapore's Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan was asked 

last week if Singapore would consider joining the Quad, he replied that too many questions remain 

about the substance of the Quad to consider joining, included whether ASEAN would remain 

central to the region's architecture, and whether it would sufficiently promote multilateral ism and 

the rule oflaw. 

Recommendations 

1. Articulate a vision of a free and open mles-based order in the Indo-Pacific that puts Southeast 

Asia at the geQb>Taphic and diplomatic center, embraces A SEAN centrality, and articulates 

how better resourced security cooperation willie ad to a more stable, prosperous, and mlesbased regional order. 

2. Encourage President Trump to invite the ten ASEAN leaders to a summit to build on the 

gains of Sunny lands and give momentum to U.S capacity building efforts with ASEAN. 

3. Encourage President Tmmp to participate in the East Asian Summit in Singapore this 

November, and advocate for high-level engagement by the adininistration in multilateral 

meetings in the region. 

4. Revisit the Trans Pacific Partnership and consider re-joining The TPP, now renamed the 

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), remains 

a potent vehicle for market opening and high standard rule-making, in particular in areas of 

digital trade that will enormous! y benefit American firms. It also continues to drive regional 

economic strategies, as seen by oftlcials rrom both Indonesia and Thailand indicating interest 

in joining the pact Rejoining the TPP would benefit U.S. economic interests, and catapult 

the United States back into a leadership position on trade and investment that has been sorely 

missed in the region. 

5. Extend and expand the Maritime Security Initiative (MSI). Launched in 2016 with a fiveyear time horizon, MSI authorizes DoD to engage in capacity building efforts to increase 

maritime domain awareness, information sharing, and maritime security capabilities in key 

littoral states adjacent to the South China Sea. MSI is a worthy efiort to help our littoral 

partners in their ability to monitor and police their territorial waters and thus resist 

encroachment and coercion. It also encourages them to share information and work more 

effectively together in the maritime domain. However, these capacity building efforts take a 
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Searight: Written Testimony, HFAC A&P Subcommittee 05/23/2018 

long time to bear meaningful results. Congress should consider extending MSI authorities 

beyond 2020, and expand the scope of coverage to include countries in the Indian Ocean 

such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 

8 
18

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Thank you, ma’am. I appreciate it. 

Dr. Pande. 

STATEMENT OF APARNA PANDE, PH.D., DIRECTOR, INITIATIVE 

ON THE FUTURE OF INDIA AND SOUTH ASIA, THE HUDSON 

INSTITUTE 

Ms. PANDE. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member——

Mr. YOHO. Turn your mic on. 

Ms. PANDE. Okay. Sorry. 

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member. I would like to 

thank you for inviting me to speak here today. 

American grand strategy for Asia and the Pacific, since the end 

of the second World War, has centered on creating an Asian diplomatic and security architecture that ensured stability and security 

in the region. American preeminence ensured the rules-based 

order, which opposed notions of idealogical dominance or arbitrary 

assertions of territorial claims and disputes. The post-World War 

Asian security structure has rested on American economic and 

military might, combined with a network of partners and allies 

across the region. 

The economic and military rise of China over the last two decades poses a challenge to American preeminence. China is gradually creating a new Asian order with Chinese primacy at its heart. 

U.S. strategy needs to be one of renewed engagement with its partners and allies across the region—India, Japan, Southeast Asia—

to construct a configuration that will be able to counter the Chinese 

march. 

Currently, China’s economic and military rise faces no structured 

challenge. Japan’s military role is inhibited by its constitution, 

while many in Australia and the United States have, for years, assumed China to be a benign power and have invested in an economic relationship favoring their potential challenger. 

Among Asian countries, India has consistently viewed China’s expanding influence with suspicion. This is partly a function of historical experience. India had engaged Communist China as an 

Asian brother from 1949 to 1962, only to become victim of its military aggression over a border dispute. Since 1962, India has noted 

China’s efforts to build close ties with countries on India’s periphery, thereby trying to possibly encircle India, as well as China’s efforts, to lay the groundwork for military and naval bases throughout the Indian Ocean. 

With a population of more than one billion, India is also the 

country with sufficient manpower to match that of China. Thus, 

India would have to be central to any security architecture designed to contain China or aimed at ensuring that China does not 

transform its considerable economic clout into threatening military 

muscle in the Asia Pacific. 

India’s growing economic and security relationships and interest 

in the Indo-Pacific region are aligned with its deepening partnership with the United States. However, India is different from traditional American allies, whether in Europe, Latin America, or Asia, 

for whom the United States was the key security provider. 

19

India wants to maintain its own security capabilities, does not 

wish to become a burden on the American taxpayer. It seeks a relationship that helps build India’s resources and capabilities so that 

India can play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific. 

U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific would, therefore, benefit by 

bearing the following in mind: India would never want a relationship of dependence or one in which the U.S. has to incur all costs. 

Treating India as a country critical to U.S. interests, the United 

States could think about a special partnership with India, whereby 

India could be exempt from many of the export control regulations 

that govern military sales. Thus, India would be able to deliver 

military capabilities without adding to America’s burden of cost. 

Any attempts to balance ties between India and other South Asian 

states should be abandoned to enhance India’s capacity to confront 

China. 

On the economic front, both India and the U.S. would benefit if 

U.S. trade policies were adjusted to enable the rise of India as a 

strategic competitor to China. Any short-term loss in dollars and 

cents would be offset by the immense benefit to the U.S. of having 

a major, 1-billion strong nation standing by its side to ensure that 

China and its closed system do not emerge dominant in the Asia 

Pacific for years to come. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Pande follows:]

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30177b-1.eps

Testimony of Dr. Aparna Pande, Director, Initiative on The Future of India and South Asia, 

Hudson Institute on "Asia's Diplomatic and Security Structure: Planning US Engagement" 

Subcommittee on Asia the Pacific 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

May 23, 2018, 2 pm 

American grand strategy for Asia and the Pacific, since the end of the Second World War, has 

centered on creating an Asian diplomatic and security architecture that ensured stability and 

security in the region. American preeminence ensured a rules·based order, which opposed 

notions of ideological dominance (such as the rise of communism) or arbitrary assertions of 

territorial claims and disputes (such as that relating to the status of Taiwan.) The post-World 

War Asian security structure has rested on American economic and military might, combined 

with a network of partners and allies across the region. 

The economic and military rise of China over the last two decades poses a challenge to 

American pre-eminence. China is gradually creating a new Asian order with Chinese primacy at 

its heart. U.S. strategy needs to be one of renewed engagement with its partners and allies 

across the region --India, Japan and South East Asia·- to construct a configuration that will be 

able to counter the Chinese march. Currently, China's economic and military rise faces no 

structured challenge. Japan's military role is inhibited by its Constitution while many in Australia 

and the United States have, for years, assumed China to be a benign power and have invested 

in an economic relationship favoring their potential challenger. 

Among Asian countries, India has consistently viewed China's expanding influence with 

suspicion. This is partly a function of historical experience. India had engaged Communist China 

as an Asian brother from 1949 to 1962, only to become victim of its military aggression over a 

border dispute. Since 1962, India has noted China's efforts to build close ties with countries on 

India's periphery, thereby trying to possibly encircle it, as well as its efforts to lay the 

groundwork for military and naval bases throughout the Indian Ocean. 

With a population of more than one billion, India is also the country with sufficient manpower 

to match that of China. Thus, India would have to be central to any security architecture 

designed to contain China or aimed at ensuring that China does not transform its considerable 

economic clout into threatening military muscle in the Asia-Pacific. 

India's foreign policy 

Indian leaders have always seen their country as one that will play a role on the global stage but 

primarily in Asia. The belief in India as an Asian leader and an example to Asia has been deeply 

ingrained in Indian thinking for centuries. 

1 
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Immediately after independence, however, India's policy makers while desirous of playing a 

role on the global stage, chose not to join either of two Cold War blocs adopting instead the 

policy of nonalignment. For decades India also remained bogged down in India's immediate 

vicinity, dealing with security challenges, first from Pakistan and later from China. Slow 

economic growth also impeded India's greater role on the world stage and resulted in an 

inward orientation for more than four decades. 

It is only from the 1990s with the end oft he Cold War, economic liberalization within and 

changing global situation that New Delhi started to rebuild relations with countries in Asia 

especially the Indo-Pacific. In recent years India's economic growth and military modernization 

have led to rising ambitions in international politics as well as a new set of more prominent 

security concerns for New Delhi, namely the deepening presence of China in India's backyard. 

India's antagonistic relationship with China- its northern neighbor and rival for leadership in 

Asia- dates back decades but it is the not-so-peaceful rise of China that lies at the core of what 

is happening today. After building its economic and military potential China has over the 

decades encroached in a region that India has always considered its sphere of influence: South 

Asia and the Indian Ocean region. 

Delhi has long sought to compartmentalize its disputes with all its neighbors, hoping that 

economic ties and people to people relations will over time build trust that will help resolve any 

pending border disputes. From the 1990s India and China sought to build people to people ties 

and economic relations and allow the border issue to remain on the backburner. Today China is 

one of India's top economic partners and the two countries do collaborate globally on issues 

like climate change and in the World Trade Organization (WTO). 

While it has worked with some of its immediate smaller South Asian neighbors this policy will 

not necessarily work with China. China used the last four decades of peace with India to create 

its economic miracle and modernize its military. India's economy has, however, not grown 

consistently at double digits (which is critical) and its military modernization is decades behind 

what it should be. 

India and the Chinese Challenge 

Since 1989, China's annual GDP (gross domestic product) growth rate has averaged almost 10 

percent. Over the same period, India's growth rate averaged halfthat (5.5 percent during the 

1990s and early 2000s and around 7 percent over the last decade). China is an USD 11 trillion 

economy while India is an USD 2.3 trillion economy. In 2018 China's military budget of USD 175 

billion is significantly larger than India's military budget of USD 45 billion.' 

India's immediate neighborhood of South Asia has always been India's first line of security but 

for decades India's policy was simply to presume that this was India's sphere of influence and 

t A1l Data is World Bank Data taken from h:ttp_,sf}...dillih.WQ!:l<Xh011k!2r[[ 

2 
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30177b-3.eps

India's neighbors would accept that 'Delhi knows best.' Growing Chinese presence, however, 

have made Indian leaders aware that managing a sphere of influence is not only a function of 

telling others what to do but being able to expend resources that deny space to competitors. 

Knowing that all of Delhi's smaller South Asian neighbors bear a latent resentment against 

Indian predominance in the region -a function of the circumstances under which several 

countries emerged from a unified India under colonial rule-- Beijing has always used the Indiacard in its relations with these countries. India, on the other hand, has been impeded by its 

inability to allocate resources comparable to those of China in India's immediate neighborhood. 

While the majority of India's developmental assistance (over 85 percent) is provided to its 

immediate neighbors in South Asia, India has never expended enough to compete with China's 

assistance programs. Further, India's ability to deliver projects on time has also been hurt by 

complacence, bureaucratic negligence, and political indifference. 

China's deep strategic and economic relationship with Pakistan exemplified in the China 

Pakistan Economic Corridor (or CPEC), China's assistance to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal, 

China's attempts to create friction between India and Bhutan and finally Chinese actions in 

Maldives are all seen by India as impinging on India's sovereignty and security. Indian leaders 

have always resented the presence of any external power in the region unless that power 

accepted Indian predominance. Beijing's refusal to do so has repeatedly irked New Delhi. 

China's rise has forced New Delhi to take a more active stance in containing its rival. Indian 

analysts have always viewed China's policy as one of strategic encirclement, often called the 

string of pearls theory, one designed to give the PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) an advantage in 

a potential conflict, and more leverage in negotiations over disputes. 

New Delhi is wary of Chinese bases and ports especially in the Indian Ocean from Hambantota 

in Sri Lanka to Gwadar and Jiwani in Pakistan on the Persian Gulf, as well as potential bases in 

the Maldives and in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. New Delhi views the One Belt One Road 

(OBOR) or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a continuation of China's planned encirclement 

of India. 

In Pakistan alone, China has financed over USD 46 billion dollars of development projects. 

Through a combination of readily available low-interest loans, gifts to those in power, as well as 

generous clearance of unpaid debts, Beijing has thus created a strategic network across large 

parts of Asia and even Africa and Latin America. In some cases, the huge quantum of lending 

seems designed to lure nations into a debt trap, leaving them beholden to China for years to 

come. 

China has over the last two decades also deepened its activities in the Indian Ocean by building 

military bases, securing access to ports and islands and even sent its submarines into a region 

that India sees as its sphere of influence. Since 2012, Chinese submarines have been sighted on 

3 
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30177b-4.eps

an average of four times every three months in the Indian Ocean region and in 2016 a Chinese 

submarine called at the Pakistani port of Karachi, just off India's coast. 2 

India may have been slow initially to respond to Chinese presence but is finally deploying its 

capabilities and resources. In early May 2018, for the first time since the Second World War, 

India has decided to station fighter planes in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands with the aim being 

to strengthen India's hold over the crucial Malacca, Sunda, and Lumbok Straits and the Straits 

of Ombai Wetar and the eastern Indian Ocean Region. 

For some years, Delhi had contemplated leveraging these strategically located island chains as 

its line of defense against China. Air bases in Car Nicobar and Campbell Bay have also been 

identified as bases for these fighter planes. The Indian Navy has positioned warships in the 

region and also built two floating docks to repair and refurbish warships. Delhi also plans to 

allow tri-service command to the Commander in Chief of Andaman and Nicobar Command 

(CINCAN) so that he can exercise direct control over all assets and men including those of the 

Indian Air Force and the Indian Army. 

India, ASEAN, and the Indo Pacific 

In January 2018 on the eve of India's Republic Day- when for the first time India hosted the 

leaders of all ten ASEAN states as chief guests at the event- Prime Minister Narendra Modi 

wrote in an OpEd "Indians have always looked East to see the nurturing sunrise and the light of 

opportunities. Now, as before, the East, or the Indo-Pacific region, will be indispensable to 

India's future and our common destiny." 3 

India's historical and civilizational ties with South East Asia date back centuries reflected in 

centuries of trade ties, spread of Hinduism and Buddhism from the Indian subcontinent and an 

ancient Indian empire that extended its presence to South East Asia (the Chola Empire). 

However, it is only from the 1990s that India adopted its 'Look East' policy, aimed at building 

closer economic ties with the region, and only in the last decade that a security dimension has 

been added to this relationship. 

Reflective of this 'Act East' policy India's trade with the region stands at USD 76 billion with 

India being a member of the proposed RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) 

free trade agreement. India has also deepened partnerships with South East Asian countries 

aimed at bolstering their defense capabilities and making them strategically useful partners. 

4 
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In 2015, India and Singapore signed defense cooperation and strategic partnership agreements. 

The Indian armed forces helped build the capacity of their Vietnamese counterparts and in 

February 2017 the two sides held discussions on the sale of Surface-to-Air Akash and supersonic 

Brahmos missiles. New Delhi has provided over USD 500 million in credit to Vietnam to 

modernize their armed forces and since 2016 India has trained Vietnamese navy submariners at 

its naval training school. 

The Malacca straits are critical for India, as they are for China, with almost 40 percent of India's 

trade passing through these straits. In mid-May 2018, Indonesia and India signed an agreement 

as part of which Indonesia has given India access to the strategically located island of Sa bang, at 

the northern tip of Sumatra and less than 300 miles from the Malacca Straits. India will invest in 

the dual-use port and economic zone of Sa bang and also build a hospital. Indian naval ships will 

also visit the port which is deep enough even for submarines. 

New Delhi has also boosted relations with the Pacific Islands, again a region with which India 

shares civilizational ties and a large Indian diaspora. Since 2014, there have been annual 

conferences of the Forum for India Pacific Islands Cooperation either in India or in the region 

itself and New Delhi has offered massive assistance including annual Grant-in-Aid to each of the 

14 Pacific countries ranging from USD 125,000 to 200,000. India has also set up a fund for 

adapting to climate change, capacity building of coastal surveillance systems and technical 

training and educational fellowships. 

In the Indian Ocean region, India has deepened relations with island nations like Seychelles, 

Maldives and, Mauritius as well as with strategically located countries like Oman and UAE. In 

January 2018, India and Seychelles signed a 20-year pact whereby India would build an airstrip 

and a jetty for the Indian navy on Assumption Island. In February 2018 during Mr Modi's visit to 

Oman, a country with which India has historic ties dating back to the colonial era, New Delhi 

and Muscat finalized an agreement through which India gained access to the strategically 

located port of Duqm, on Oman's southern coast. India and the UAE conducted their first naval 

exercise in February 2018. 

India's Emerging Partnerships 

India has also sought to build deeper strategic relations with Japan, another like-minded 

country that seeks a similar security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region and views the rise of 

China as a challenge. 

India and Japan have historical and civilizational ties and Japan is the largest bilateral donor to 

India. In 2011 the two countries signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement 

(CEPA) and bilateral trade stands at USD 14 billion. 

New Delhi understands the need to build infrastructure both within India but also in its 

immediate neighborhood and the Indian Ocean region. Delhi views Tokyo as a key partner for 

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the development of infrastructure through the Japan and ADB co-sponsored Expanded 

Partnership for Quality Infrastructure Initiative as an alternative to One Belt One Road (OBOR). 

Hence, instead of accepting Chinese investment in the much-needed development of Indian 

infrastructure, India has preferred Japanese investment. In 2014 Japan offered to invest USD 35 

billion in infrastructure projects aimed at building industrial corridors and highways and an 

additional USD 17 billion bullet train project being announced in 2017. 

In April 2018, Japan, United States and India agreed to collaborate on infrastructure projects in 

South and South East Asia, primarily countries like Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar. India will 

help with the development of ports, Japan with building industrial parks and the US will focus 

on building power plants. 

India is also deepening its relationship with the United States. For decades the United States 

was the predominant maritime power in the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions. The U.S. built a 

network of alliances with countries in the region, built the economies and defense 

establishments of a number of these countries, and ensured it had partners and bases to 

ensure freedom of navigation and protection of national security interests. 

Today China has created a counter model through its One Belt One Road Initiative whereby it 

initially provides high interest loans with no strings attached to countries across Asia and Africa 

to help build their infrastructure from highways to ports. Then once the countries are indebted 

to China, China is able to use the ports as potential bases and ensure the country's economy is 

tied to the Chinese economy. 

The United States and India 

The rise of China means that Washington needs regional powers to buffer its own strength 

more than it did in the past. As a populous, democratic, market economy, India's size and 

values make it a natural partner for the United States. 

India's rapid economic growth, around 7 percent per year for the last few years, makes it a 

contender for the world's fastest expanding economy. The average income in India has nearly 

doubled in the past ten years, and economic modernization promises to bring more jobs and 

advanced industry. 

From being 'estranged' democracies during the Cold War, India and the US today are in the 

words of former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson: the "two bookends of stability- on either side 

of the globe- standing for greater security and prosperity for our citizens and people around 

the world." 

This was, however, not always the case. Despite American support for Indian independence, 

and a common appreciation for democracy between the two nations, India's first Prime 

Minister Jawaharlal Nehru opted for nonalignment. While the United States provided economic 

6 
26


30177b-7.eps

and developmental aid to India, New Delhi perceived American support to Pakistan as 

detrimental to Indian interests. 

India's close relations with the Soviet Union was another factor that kept Delhi and Washington 

estranged. Right from independence India's leaders sought to build domestic capabilities 

whether economic, military or even educational. During the Cold War, India welcomed aid from 

both blocs. The United States developmental aid in the form of PL-480 loans and assistance in 

the setting up of India's higher educational institutions was deeply appreciated. 

However, American companies were not keen on manufacturing in India whether in the 

economic or military arena. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was more willing to help set 

up coal and steel mills and provide assistance to India's infant domestic military manufacturing 

complex. 

Further, New Delhi perceived Moscow as an ally in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 

especially when it came to issues relating to Pakistan and Kashmir. The United States, on the 

other hand, was viewed as being more sympathetic to Pakistan. 

From being an offshore balancer in South Asia during the Cold war and enabling Pakistan's 

desire for parity with India, the United States has in the last two decades seriously championed 

a strategic partnership with India. Washington has also acknowledged India as the dominant 

regional and an emerging global power. 

From having almost no military relations during the Cold War to India becoming a Major 

Defense Partner of the United States, the two countries have come a long way. The designation 

of Major Defense Partner allows India to purchase advanced and sensitive technologies at par 

with many of America's closest allies and partners. From USD 20 billion in bilateral trade in the 

year 2000 the figure stands at USD 115 billion in 2018. 

When the United States looks to Asia it no longer sees the peaceful rise of China, instead it sees 

an economic and military rival that seeks to undermine the international liberal order that the 

United States helped establish after the Second World War. Washington now seeks like-minded 

democratic free-market societies as allies and partners in upholding this rules-based order. 

The US views India as a counterweight to a rising China. As the world's largest democracy with a 

multicultural society and expanding military heft, New Delhi has the potential to balance 

China's expansion westward. As the PLA Navy moves into the Indian Ocean and builds a blue 

water fleet, the United States sees India as a valuable partner in balancing China at sea. 

Going Forward 

India and the United States agree on the need for an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific and, 

upholding a rule based liberal international order. The January 2015 'U.S.-India Joint Strategic 

Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region,' spoke of how the two countries seek "a 

7 
27


30177b-8.eps

closer partnership" to promote "peace, prosperity and stability" by boosting regional economic 

integration, connectivity, and economic development. 

India's growing economic and security relationships and interest in the Indo-Pacific region are 

aligned with its deepening partnership with the United States. Two years after signing the USIndia Joint Strategic Vision of 2015, India joined the Quad (a strategic grouping ofthe United 

States, India, Japan and Australia) and there is talk about making the grouping something more 

than an annual talk shop. In February 2018 during the visit of French President Emanuel Macron 

to India, New Delhi and Paris signed an agreement whereby the two countries would open their 

bases to warships from each other's navies. 

From being 'estranged' democracies during the Cold War, India and the US today share, in the 

words of former Secretary of State Tillerson a "growing strategic convergence." From having 

almost no military relations during the Cold War India is today a Major Defense Partner of the 

United States. The United States increasingly also views India as a potential regional security 

provider and seeks to build India's security capacity through commercial and defense 

cooperation between the two militaries. 

Even though the India -US relationship is much deeper and multi-dimensional today than it has 

ever been there is still a gap in expectations of the other from both sides and the two countries 

are still in a process of adjusting and adapting. 

Despite closer relations with the United States, India is still reluctant to join any formal alliance 

structure. India is a virtual American ally but is still reluctant to be a formal American ally. India 

is reluctant to cede power to a collective security mechanism and so is reticent to join any 

formal military alliance or any grouping that appears like a military alliance. 

India has consistently sought freedom from external pressures. While every country seeks this 

kind of autonomy for India it has been a matter of policy. The colonial experience left an 

indelible mark on India's collective personality. More than seven decades after Independence, 

seeking freedom from external pressures is as much at the core of India's external relations as it 

was when India was a colony. During the Cold War the policy was referred to as nonalignment 

and after the Cold War it is defined as strategic autonomy. 

India is a member of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa grouping (BRICS), the 

Russia, India and, China grouping (RIC), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (All B) 

where China is the main investor at the same time. At the same time India is against the One 

Belt One Road or Belt and Road Initiative (OBOR/BRI), supports Japan's Quality Infrastructure 

Initiative, is a member of the Quad and views the United States as a natural ally, reflecting 

India's pursuit of maximum options in foreign relations. 

India seeks more global engagement at the same time as it retains strategic autonomy. India 

seeks to be a part of multilateral organizations but prefers bilateral relationships. So, it would 

8 
28


30177b-9.eps

prefer bilateral relationships with the US and all its allies and is not in favor of arrangements 

like the Quad becoming formal military alliances. 

Indians believe in the promise of India as an Asian power and future great power. They seek 

strong economic growth not only to become China's rival but also for socio-economic 

development at home. India's long drawn out military modernization is not only directed 

towards China but also to ensure the territorial integrity of India from both domestic and 

external threats. 

India wants recognition of its pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean region and in South Asia but is 

reticent to openly confront China. New Delhi understands the threat it faces on the land and 

sea border from China but there is also a recognition of the limitations of its economic and 

military capabilities. Further, in a realist Hobbesian sense, India believes it needs to fend for 

itself when it comes to the China threat and does not believe any country will come to its 

assistance. 

At the end ofthe day India's concerns about its immediate neighborhood remain paramount in 

the threat perception of India's leaders and strategists. For India, South Asia is more important 

than South China Sea, so concerns about American willingness to help with respect to Pakistan 

and Afghanistan may create differences between Washington and Delhi. 

India is different from traditional American allies whether in Europe, Latin America or Asia for 

whom the United States was the key security provider. India would never want that kind of a 

relationship. Instead India seeks a relationship where Washington does for India what the 

United States did for China decades ago: the belief that helping build China's economic, 

technological and military might would make China a more responsible global player and 

maybe even a free market democracy. 

If the U.S. wants India to play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific, New Delhi seeks more economic 

investment, technological expertise and the sale and manufacture of state of the art defense 

equipment. 

U.S. policy toward India must include the following considerations: 

(1) The U.S. must recognize that India's size and history makes it different from other, smaller 

American allies in Asia. 

(2) Instead of subjecting the India-U.S. relationship to a one-size-fits-all policy towards allies, 

the United States should consider a special partnership with India, which exempts India from 

Export Control regulations governing military sales. 

(3) U.S. trade policies should also be adjusted to enable the rise of India as a strategic 

competitor to China. 

9 
29


30177b-10.eps

(4) Attempts to 'balance' ties between India and other South Asian states, notably Pakistan, 

should be abandoned to enhance India's capacity to confront China. 

Any short-term loss in dollars and cents or other, less significant nominal alliances, would be 

offset by the immense benefit to the United States of having a major, one-billion strong nation 

standing by its side to ensure that China and its closed system do not emerge dominant in the 

Asia-Pacific for years to come. 

10 
30

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Dr. Pande. 

Dr. Michael Swaine. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. SWAINE, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

ASIA PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. SWAINE. Thank you very much, Chairman Yoho, Ranking 

Member Sherman. It is a pleasure to be in front of your committee 

again. I am a security expert, so I will talk about security-related 

issues and the question of avoiding conflict in Asia. 

Right now, we are in a period of enormous transition in the Asia 

Pacific, as you know, away from a 70-year long period of American 

strategic clarity, economic strength, and military predominance to 

a much more unclear and potentially tumultuous period driven, 

above all else, by the changing power relationship between the 

United States and its major allies, particularly Japan, and a continually rising China. 

Although the United States remains the top maritime power and 

economic investor alongside Japan, across the region, and as in 

many ways expanding—and is in many ways expanding its absolute capabilities over time, it nonetheless is declining in relative 

terms compared with China. Beijing is now the major trader across 

the region, rapidly increasing its level of investments and deploying 

a formidable set of naval, air, and missile capabilities that clearly 

call into question the capacity of the United States and its allies 

to exercise freedom of action and prevail in a crisis or conflict along 

China’s maritime periphery. 

In confronting this changing environment, Beijing and Washington currently hold fundamentally different notions about the 

best means of preserving stability and prosperity over the long 

term. The United States favors a continuation of American maritime military predominance and overall leadership. This includes 

the clear of capacity to prevail in any potential serious conflict with 

China, extending up to at least China’s 12-nautical mile territorial 

waters. This viewpoint is expressed or implied in current and past 

national security and national defense strategy documents. 

In contrast, Beijing favors, at the very least, something approaching a multipolar power structure or, at most, a Sino-centric 

structure. Either way, China is pursuing a more secure and preferential environment along its maritime periphery. This by implication or design means that American military predominance is 

clearly under threat. 

In fact, looking forward, it is my view that far from—and it is 

far from clear that U.S. and allied military predominance within 

the first and second island chains, that is to say out to approximately 1,500 nautical miles from the Chinese mainland, can be 

sustained on a consistent basis over the long term, just as it is virtually impossible for China to establish its own predominance in 

that region due to U.S. and allied strengths. 

Changing relative economic capabilities, military capital stocks, 

and advances in military technologies all call such developments 

into question. And studies have been done both at Carnegie and by 

the RAND Corporation that reinforce this notion. In the absence of 

stabilizing measures, the near-inevitable emergence of a clear level 

31

of Sino-U.S. allied parity in the Western Pacific will almost certainly increase the likelihood of crises and possibly even conflict 

over the handling of volatile issues, such as Taiwan and maritime 

disputes in the East and South China Seas. 

What is the primary danger here? The danger is that a rising 

China will overestimate its growing leverage and opt for various 

forms of pressure or coercion to greatly alarm others, and that the 

United States will overreact to such behavior in an effort to compensate for what is, in fact, its declining relative capabilities, thus 

threatening to make each disputed policy area into an unstable test 

of relative influence. We are already seeing this dynamic at work 

in the South China Sea and elsewhere. 

Given these considerations, it is my view that the best optimal 

outcome for both nations is the development of a stable and cooperative balance of power in the Western Pacific in which the most 

vital interests of both the U.S. and its allies and the Chinese are 

protected, and neither side enjoys the clear capacity to dominate 

the other militarily within at least the first island chain. 

In addition, the U.S., its allies, and China must also work to 

build a more integrated and dynamic regional economic network of 

benefit to all as a bulwark to a stable military balance. For the 

U.S., the security balance should center on retaining a robust yet 

defense-oriented U.S.-Japan alliance, supplemented by an expanding set of mutually verifiable understandings with Beijing and 

other Asian powers. 

Such understandings would be aimed at stabilizing the military 

balance with China at a level that both sides can live with. This 

level could be conceived as one in which each side possesses capabilities sufficient to deter the other from using force to resolve serious differences, but with each lacking the clear superiority that 

could in the eyes of the other foster aggressive intentions. Such a 

balance is most compatible with what is called a mutual denial 

strategy. 

Such understandings must also aim at diffusing and demilitarizing the most contentious issues in the region, from the Korean 

peninsula to Taiwan and maritime disputes. This can be attained 

most optimally in the context of a defense-based regional military 

balance. 

The goal of a more integrated and dynamic economic region 

would require the U.S., China, and other Asian economies to 

strengthen their domestic economic growth and deepen their commitment to free trade. Most importantly, successful, long-term integration will depend on getting Beijing and Washington to join a 

common trade architecture. That is why we need a TPP so much. 

The Chinese eventually would probably have been compelled to join 

TPP over time. 

The creation of a stable balance of power in the Western Pacific 

will require American initiative and strength, not passivity and 

certainly not one-sided concessions. Conditionality, reciprocity, and 

a willingness and ability to suspend or reverse actions taken or 

contemplated if China fails to cooperate are central to this process. 

It will also require the development of domestic consensus, allied 

and friendly support, sustained U.S.-China dialogue, and interlinked changes in several existing regional security policies. 

32

Maintaining prosperity and stability in Asia and within the U.S.-

China relationship more broadly will require new ways of thinking, 

new approaches, and some risk taking. But in my view, the alternatives are far less attractive. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Swaine follows:]

33


30177c-1.eps

•. , 

·~ CARNEGIE 

ENDOWMENT FOR 

INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

ASIA'S DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY 

STRUCTURE: PLANNING U.S. 

ENGAGEMENT 

Michael Swaine 

Senior Fellow 

"\sia Program 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Testimony before U.S. House Subcommittee on 

Asia and the Pacific 

May 23,2018 

THf GLOBAL THINK TANK J BE.U!NG BF:iRlJT BRUSSEl5 MOSCOW NEV\ DELHi WASHJN\310N 
34


30177c-2.eps

Thank you very much Mr. Cha.irman. 

\\,-c arc in a period of enormous transition in the _Asia-Pacific, away fron1 70-plus years of An1crican 

strategic clarity, economic strength and military predominance, to a much more unclear and 

potentially tumultuous period dr-iven above all else by the changlng power relationship bet\\-een the 

United States (and its major allies, in particular Japan) and a continually rising China. 

In confronting this uncertain environment, Beijing and \'Fashington currently hold fundan1entally 

different notions about the best means of prcscrYing stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific O\,Cf 

the long tet·m: 

The Un-ited States favors cont-inued American maritime predominance and overall leadership. This 

includes the clear capacity to pre-.;;ail in any potential conflict with China on issues that matter, 

extending at least up to China's 12 nn1 territorial \Vaters. This \ icwpoint is expressed or implied in 

current and past U.S. National Security and Defense Stratehr1es. 1 

In contrast, Beijing fayors at the \'cry least something approaching a multipolar po\\·Cr structure, or at 

n1ost a Sino-centric sttuctur·e in \vhich China enjoys a mot·e secure t·e.br1on along its maritime periphery 

and is able to reject or resist any efforts to threaten its vital interests across the Asia-Pacific. 

Those \vho call for either continued unan1.bi.bruous _;\_merican predon1.inance or a far n1.ore assertiYe 

Ch-inese drive for dom-inance often base the-ir arguments of the necessity for such action on faulty 

theoretical and h-istotical factors or· a n1is1·eading of current e-.;;idence. 

Rising po"\vers are not destined to seek hard-power dom-inance at all costs. And despite constant 

assert-ions by non-specialtsts, China is not histotically pr-ed-isposed to dominate the As-ia-Pac-ific in 

hard-power terms. Ch-ina's pre-modern imperial h-istory pro\· ides a much more nuanced and m-ixed 

set of potent-ial lessons in these areas. 

T\'fore often than not, Beijing h-istor-ically employed soft-po\ver economic and d-iplomatic methods to 

deAect reJ.:,rional tht·eats and ensur·e secutity \vhile at tin1es using rnilttary force to subjugate neat·by 

ad\·ersarics. Also, it is important to keep in m.:ind that pre-modern China \Yas not a nation-state \\ith 

clear and consistent boundar-ies, and that each Chinese dynasty adopted a different set of strategies to 

defend against external threats. 

Looking forward, the notion that unequivocal L:.S. or Chinese predominance in the Western Pacific 

constitutes the only basis for long-term regional stability and prosperity is a dangerous concept, for 

t\Yo bas-ic reasons. 

Strat~f!:Y oft he L' 111ted States ojAmerira: Sbatpe11i1~g tbe America11 

a".nu;;um, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 201S), 

I /Dtlcunwnts/pubs/201 R-N:n1on~Ll-Defense-
35


30177c-3.eps

Pirst, as long as China continues to gro\v and develop overseas interests, it \vill resist, in an 

increasingly determined fashion, L: .S. efforts to sustain predominance by negating Beijing's efforts to 

project power along China's maritime periphery, Yiewing such efforts as a direct threat to its O\Hl 

security. The resulting intensifying security competition, already well undcnvay (as reflected in the 

recently issued U.S. National Security Strategy), \\·ill further polarize the region, inject zero-sum 

calculations and fears into almost e\·ery U.S or Chinese initiati,.e, and generally force other Asian 

states to choose between Beijing and \Vashington on n1any issues, son1cthing they definitely do not 

want to do. 

Second, it is far from clear that U.S. military predominance within the first and second island chains 

(i.e., out to appnJxirnately 1,500 miles fnm1 the Chinese main1and) can be sustained on a consistent 

basis O"\Tr the long term, just as it is virtually in1possiblc for China to establish its O\vn prcdon1inancc 

-in that ret.,rion. Chang-ing relat-ive economic capabil-it-ies, mil-itary cap-ital stocks, and ach'ances in 

n1ilita1-y technolobries all call such deYelopn'lents into c1uestion. Indeed, studies in recent years by 

Carnegie and the RAND Corporation ha\'e strongly suggested the difficulty of maintaining U.S. 

predon1-inance in the As1a-Pacific. 2 

lviorcO\·er, key L:.S. Asian allies such as Japan and South Korea will Ycry lil.;.cly remain unwilling 

and/ or unable to aU,b'lnent declining t·elative U.S. po\ver in a major \vay, thus retaining U.S./alhed 

prcdon'linancc. Absent a major paradigm-shifting event or series of events, they \\'ill almost certainly 

lack the capacity and polit-ical commitment to boost the-ir military and economic capab-ilities and alter 

their militat-y doctrine sufficiently, and some allies could ren1ain highly hesitant to stand in lockstep 

\\'ith \\·'ash-ington against Ch-ina. 

\Vhilc a Chinese economic collapse wotJd make moot the abo,.e conclusions, such a collapse is 

unlikely, and delaying any policy adjustments on either side in response to the sh-ifting po\ver 

distt·ibution in Asia, in anticipat-ion of such a collapse, will only n1ake it n1ore difficult to n1ake 

stabili:t:ing adjustments in the future. '1 'his is the case gt,. en both the long lead t-imes required to make 

such adjustments, and the fact that mutual susp-ic-ions will likely have deepened by then, thus 

preventing the mutual acconunodationnecessat-y. \\:e are \veil on the way to creating such deep 

suspicions, especially with the recent issuance of the highly zero-sum-oriented U.S. National Security 

and National Defense Stratehries. 

Accord-ing to the above-mentioned Carnehrie stud-ies, eyen a relatiYely lo"\v-growth Ch-ina will st-ill 

almost certainly manage to greatly increase its economic and military capabilities in the \Xrcstern 

Pac-ific relat-iYe to those of the United States and its allies, thus signif-icantly building its presence and 

confidence in that region. 

2 T\.fichael D. S\va-ine et al., Cl.lilla's :Hilila!J' and lfx U.S.}apall Alliallre in2030: A S!rall'gir f\Jd AsseJ.J"JJ/ml 

""nuge<m, DC: Carnegie Endowment for lnternationall'eace, 2013), 

and-L._.s -j:-lpti-n -all-::ancc 1n-2{)3fJ 

~lralc,gic-nct-assr-~smcni-pub-51679; 1\.Iichacl D. Swaine ct al., Conflid and Cooperatio11 in the AJia-Padjit 

Region: A (\Vashington, DC: Carnegie Endo\\·mcnt for International Peace, 

2015); and IIeginbotham eta!., 'l'he l'.S.-C!Ji11a Military Scoremrd: lioms, Ce~gmphy, a11d the broil'it!g 

Balall<> of Power 1996-2007 (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2015), 

/ \V\"\""\V.t·anJ.<_)rg;' C(lntenr / Ua1n/ rand/pubs I 1 ese;u-ch_n.~pons/RR31 )Cl/RR392/RA "i'Tf) _RR392. p 

2 
36


30177c-4.eps

Indeed, in the absence of concerted stabilizing measures, the ncar-inevitable emergence of a clear level 

of Sino-U.S./ allied parit\· in the \\.estern Pacific ,,ill ahnost ccrtainh· increase the likelihood of crises 

and possibly even conflict over the handling of \'Olatilc issues such as Taiwan and n1aritimc disputes in 

the East and South China Seas. The primary danger is that: a) a rising China will m·er-estimate its 

grow-ing le,. erage and opt for various forms of pressure or coercion that greatly alarm others; and b) 

the United States will overreact to such Chinese behavior, in an effort to compensate for its declining 

rclatiYc capabilities, thus raising the likelihood of conflict. rvlorco\'cr, such crises ,,.ill ahnost certainly 

occur regardless of the presence of superior t.:.S. power on a globalleyel. 

G-iven these considerations, the best optin1al outcome for both nations is the deYelopm.ent of a stable 

and cooperative balance of po"\vcr in the \"Xcesten1 Pacific, in "\Yhich the most vital interests of both the 

U.S. and -its all-ies and the Chinese are protected and ne-ither s-ide enjoys the clear capac-ity to dominate 

the other militarily "\Vithin at least the first island chain. 

Such a balance \\'111t·equ1t·e both gt·eatet· confidence-butkhng and crisis managen1ent n1easut·es (CHi\fs 

and CMliis) and mutual assurances and restraints, as well as efforts to reduce the Yolatility of the most 

likdy sources of future U.S.-China crises in the \\/estern Pacific. These include issues on the Korean 

Peninsula, Taiwan, t·ebrional n1ilitat·y intelligence and sutYeillance operations and other actiYities, and 

n1aritin1c ten-itorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. This \vould an1ount to the creation of 

a de facto buffer zone along Ch-ina's mar-itime per-iphery, -in'i-'oh;-ing -its neutraltzat-ion as a locat-ion from 

"\vhich to project either l'.S. or Chinese power. 

Specifically, such a buffet· zone will likely rec1uit·e: a) a unified, nonaligned (m onlY loosely ali~-,med) and 

hence largely neutralized Koran PcninstJa; b) a militarily restrained' fai\van Strait en\'ironmcnt; c) a 

more stable and pred-ictable set of understandings rehrarding mar-itime terr-itorial disputes; d) a 

comn1on, defense-oriented, mutual denial military operational strategy and fot"Ce sttuctut·e within at 

least the first (and possibly the second) island chain (i.e., about SDU-15110 nm from China's coastline); 

and e) more cred-ible policies and assurances -in support of a mutual deterrence nuclear force posture. 

These features of a stable balance are described in detail in the 2016 Carnebrie report entitled CTealit~g a 

Stable Asia: A11 Agmda.JOr a{_ 1.S.-C'hiHa Halallce f!! Pouw:" 

1\.-iany obstacles he in the way of achie,.ing a stable, cooperati,.e balance of power in Asia, including: 

• A U.S refusal or -inabil-ity to ser-iously contemplate an alternati-.;;'e to American predominance, 

for historical, bureaucratic and conceptual reasons; indeed, the n1ost recent l'.S. National 

Secur-ity and Defense Strategies rashly support a zero-sum approach to China support-i-.;;'e of 

such pt·edominance. 

U.S. resistance to any significant change in the secut-ity environn1cnt and policies inYolving 

K.orca, Taiwan, and maritime territot-ial disputes, fearing destabilizing allied reactions, ranging 

fron1 Japanese ren1ilita1-ization and nuclearization to a political and security shift toward China. 

'lvlichacl D. Swaine \vith \\'enyan Dcng and Au be Rey Lcscurc, (Jfratil{g a Stable A.1·ia: An A,gendafora 

U.S.-C'J:;illa Balance DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), 
37


30177c-5.eps

• Oppos-it-ion by Japan, South Korea, and Ta-i"\van to such changes, -in part due to a des-ire to 

a"\-oid ha,-ing to increase their O"\Vn defense expenditures; each \Vould prefer that the U.S. 

continue to ser\'e as their security guarantor. 

• A highly susp-icious Chinese reg-in1e d-is-inclined to contemplate any self--in1posed hnTits on its 

sovereign rights and its rising political and n1ilitary abilities, partly due to :its excessive 

vulnerab-ility to ultra-nat-ional-ist domest-ic pressures. 

These problems suggest that a so-called Sino-American "Crand Bargain" to create an _Asian balance 

of po\\·er :is unlikely. The above understandings and force postures can only occur gradually, in stages, 

in a pragmatic, "test-and-adjust" manner, over a relatively long period (i.e., a decade or n1ore). T\YO 

variations (i.e., a n1inimahst and maxin1alist \'ersion) of the process invoh-ed in creating a stable 

balance of po\ver -in the \\·-estern Pacific at·e presented -in the above-n1entioned 201 G Catneg1e report. 4 

The first step -in th-is process is for \\·-ash-ington, Be-ij-ing, and other major As-ian ptnvers to accept the 

reality of the chant.,ring po\ver distribution in the \\·-estetn Pacific and the need for more than n1arginal 

adjustments and l-im-ited CBT\-fs. This recogn-it-ion involves not only an acceptance of current and 

future po\ver trends, but also an ackno\vledgement of the l-ikely fact that "muddl-ing throughn and 

efforts to sustain or create U.S. or Chinese predominance, respectively, will produce more problems 

than trans-it-ion-ing to a balance of po\\-er. 

But even under the best of conditions, this type of major adjustment \v-ill requ-ire courageous and fars-ighted leadership, some r-isk taking, and a susta-ined level of h-ighly effect-ive d-iplomacy. None of 

these qualities a:re e-.;;ident at present in eithe:r the l' nited States or China. 

Finally, it -is -important to state that the arhrument for the creation of a stable balance 

of po\\·er in the \\'estern Pacific docs not require deal mak..ing with China from a position of American 

,,-eakness, as some will undoubtedly allege. Tt rests on the effective use of the Un-ited States' 

substantial military and economic po\\·er, both globally and regionally, rather than on an attempt to 

make the best of a weak and d-im-in-ish-ing posit-ion. It ant-ic-ipates that the Un-ited States w-ill rema-in the 

n1ost po\verful and influential nation in the world for n1any decades to con1e and that \\.'ashington, 

with the support of its allies and friends, can retain a leadership role in Asia-in many respects 

alongs-ide Be-ij-ing--in a manner that -is reassuring to all regional po\vers. 

In other \\·Ords, the process this argument presents for creating long-term stability and prosperity 

rel-ies on Amer-ican in-it-iative and strength, not pass-ivity and certa-inly not one-sided concessions. Tt 

also guards against possible Chinese m:ispcrceptions of American compromise and restraint as a sign 

of\\ eakness of which to take advantage. Condit-ional-ity, reciprocity, and a'' ill-ingness and an ability to 

suspend or reverse actions 

taken or contemplated arc central to the process of building a stable ba1ance over time. 

While doubtless difficult to achieve, the creation of a stable balance of power in 1\sia will prove 

possible if viewed as the price that both sides \Ytmld need to pay to avert an inct·easingly dangenJus 

'Ibid. 
38


30177c-6.eps

and unpredictable regional security competition that neither side can \vin. 

5 
39

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. I appreciate that and very compelling. 

And, again, I just can’t overemphasize the significance of the 

Southeast Asia. We met with Admiral Harris, Harry Harris, back 

a couple months ago, and he was saying that within 50 years, there 

will be more people living in that region in the world than outside 

of that region, and people want to know why is it important that 

we focus on that. I think that is a pretty good indicator of why. 

And these are things that we are very cognizant of. 

And I agree with all of you in that we didn’t have a clear plan, 

and it hasn’t been just over the last 8 years or the last 16 years. 

I think we have been distracted as a Nation, and we need to focus 

where we are going to be 50 years from now or 100 years from now, 

and we should have the policies in place of where we are going as 

a Nation. And that is what I see has been lacking in Washington, 

and I know the ranking member and myself, we have talked about 

this as building tools within the Foreign Affairs Committee, that 

we can use—the administration can use with our direction. 

The thing with TPP, when we first—when President Trump got 

in and he pulled out of that immediately, I know that ruffled a lot 

of feathers, but I think it was the right thing to do. It was a very 

decisive action, and then you have got to deal with the fallout. And 

I say it was the right thing to do, being decisive, number one. 

Number two, even candidate Clinton said she wasn’t going to support that. We were told there wasn’t the support here in the House. 

I wasn’t supporting it, not that we get to vote on it, but it was one 

of those things you brought finality to it so now we can move on. 

And we have talked to a lot of those countries, and they talked 

about their distaste for us pulling out of that, and I fully understand that. And we also understand the window it opened up for 

China. 

Our goal is to focus on economics, trade, and national security. 

And when we talk about ASEAN, and we all know what ASEAN 

is, the 10 nations that account for 653 million people, $2.5 trillion 

worth of trade. And we know their neutrality rules of not interfering with other nations. We have brought up to the Prime Minister in ASEAN nations of why this is probably a good time to 

bring that group together, because we see what China is going to 

do. You saw what the Philippines did when they challenged China 

at the Court of Arbitration in The Hague and the Court ruled in 

the Philippines’ favor, but yet China ignored it. 

Xi Jinping told President Obama in 2015 they would not militarize those islands, and so now they are militarized. They are landing bombers on there. And if we don’t—I think one of you brought 

up if we don’t stop it now, it is not going to be easier 3 years from 

now. 

We have got to come to a consensus and have that block of countries, not just ASEAN, we saw Canada weigh in and says China 

can’t continue to claim territory that the rest of the world disputes. 

And if we don’t stand up now, it is going to be harder and it is 

going to destabilize that area. 

And I think where it is all clear where Xi Jinping is going in the 

19th party, Communist Party Congress, he said it was time for 

the—the era of China has come. No longer will China be made to 

swallow their interests around the world. It is time for China to 

40

take the world’s center stage. I don’t know about you, but I find 

that very threatening, and it is unacceptable. This is something, 

again, we as members of—with a lot of interest around the world, 

we have to stand up. 

And when I talked to the ASEAN nations and asked them why 

has it been so successful, and this is what we hear over and over 

again: American leadership, honoring of contracts, the rule of law. 

IP protection. All those things that we bring to the table that we 

know the other parties that are offering an alternative don’t, and 

we have seen that over and over again. And, yes, they have got a 

very aggressive One Belt, One Road initiative, and that is why we 

introduced the BUILD Act that is bipartisan in the House, bipartisan in the Senate. In fact, we had Secretary Pompeo today talking about why this is such an important strategy or tool for the 

United States Government. And, again, we want to create the tools 

and craft the tools that an administration can use. And I challenged him or he challenged me saying that I didn’t think we could 

compete dollar-for-dollar, nor do I want to with China. But he says, 

I think this tool will do that because we bring in the expertise and 

the funding of outside corporations, and we can partner up with 

other countries. 

So with that, let me get back to a question. What does the 

United States need to do operationally—to operationalize the free 

and open Indo-Pacific strategy? And what should be an immediate 

priority, and what should we consider long-term goals? Dr. 

Searight? 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Yes. I think the first priority is to more clearly 

articulate the vision, and make it more clear how Southeast Asia 

fits into it, how even the security side which is, you know, there 

has been a lot of talk about our security partnerships with countries like Vietnam, India and many others. There hasn’t been a real 

articulation of how different lines of effort on the security side, economic side, et cetera, add up to a vision of, you know, a coherent 

strategy that the United States is really bringing to the table. So 

that is number one. I think that has been a little lackluster, although it is early. You know, it has only been 6 months since President Trump gave his speech, so there is room for other senior officials to lay that out. 

Secondly, I would go right to economics. And I agree with you, 

Mr. Chairman, that the BUILD Act, the proposed reforms of our 

development finance institutions would be a very welcome thing to 

pass, even though, you know, it is not large in terms of resources, 

but on the margins, it really can make a difference. And there is 

real interest, as you know, with countries like Japan and Australia, 

perhaps India, working with us in various ways to really promote 

a more responsible approach, high-standard approach to lending 

and infrastructure development. So forming a sort of loose coalition 

where we are all bringing our tools to the table and working with 

the private sector to help promote infrastructure development in 

the region would be very welcome. And in particular, I think there 

is a lot of potential for a U.S.-Japanese partnership on that. 

And finally, I would say—I have to say that I think that the 

United States should consider coming back to TPP. It was a real 

disappointment, not just because the United States decided not to 

41

join in, but it was—the reason why it was so shocking was that the 

countries in the region could not conceptualize that the United 

States would really walk away from an initiative where it had provided such leadership and such a clear vision for where the regional economic architecture should go. So if there was an alternative on the table that would be a similar vehicle for promoting 

high standards, rulemaking on key issues like digital trade, et 

cetera, if there was a vehicle like that, I would be fully supportive 

of that, but honestly, I don’t see any alternative out there. 

And with TPP-11 launched, you have officials from Thailand and 

Indonesia taking a look, you know, talking about they want to 

come onboard at some point in time. It is still the defining discussion in the region on economics, and we are just not in the game. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree with you, and I am going to hold off on any 

other comments from you, the other two witnesses, so Ranking 

Member Sherman can weigh in. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Our foreign policy establishment promoted trade 

deals that have decimated America and sucked the marrow out of 

the middle of this country. Many were so destructive to the United 

States that in desperation our people reached out to elect Donald 

Trump President of the United States. And now we are told that 

we can be consistent and clear, have a clear vision if only we return to those policies again. The trade deficits don’t matter. The 

jobs don’t matter. What matters is staying true to the pro-Wall 

Street positions that have guided our policy in the past, and therefore, must be the true epitome of American patriotism. 

It is not the fault of the Midwest for voting for Donald Trump, 

it is the fault of the foreign policy establishment for giving us trade 

deals, such as those who urge ‘‘economic engagement.’’ Wonderful 

slogan, I love it. And said, therefore, if we give MFN for China, our 

trade deficit will grow with China by only $1 billion per year. They 

were off. It is about a $300 billion increase. You know, I deal with 

numbers here in Washington all the time. Now they are off by 5 

percent, they are off by 2 percent, they are off by 8 percent. This 

estimate was off by 30,000 percent, because the people making the 

estimate had no care as to whether they were accurate. 

To turn to the people, I know it has been put forward that the 

idea of a new trade relationship with Southeast Asia has no appeal 

for Southeast Asia. I agree. If they can keep the status quo, they 

love that. The only way a new trade relationship with any of the 

areas of Asia will be appealing is if the alternative is a complete 

lack of access to the U.S. market. Then a fair trade relationship 

might start looking good. But as long as Asia hears from us that 

substantial power in Washington wants to continue the huge trade 

deficits, why should they agree to anything else, except maybe 

something that increases the trade deficit even more. 

But aside from trade, I have got a question for Dr. Pande, completely different angle. I made a statement on Sri Lanka’s Remembrance Day to remember the tens of thousands of lives lost in Sri 

Lanka’s civil war. Should we halt ties, security ties, with Sri Lanka 

until it makes progress on human rights issues, especially accounting for the disappeared and missing persons, and providing some 

degree of political autonomy to the Tamil minority? 

42

Ms. PANDE. Ranking Member, while human rights are important, 

I understand your perspective. India did try this policy a decade 

ago, and India did try and use pressure on Sri Lanka and disengage slightly with Sri Lanka. The problem, China walked in and 

Hambantota, the port was built by China in Sri Lanka, almost 90 

percent of Sri Lanka’s debt is owned by China. So we have to have 

a policy which is balanced. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Excuse me. Usually, countries feel they have to 

pay their debt or they will be blacklisted by the western capital 

markets. If it is up to 90 percent, why don’t we just issue a rule 

for the SEC that says a default on all the debt of Sri Lanka to 

China isn’t a black mark against them in selling their debt to the 

west, and then China would learn not to own 90 percent of a country’s debt. 

Go on. 

Ms. PANDE. So I believe it has to be balanced where you sort of—

you remain engaged with the country, and China does not walk in, 

otherwise China is in Sri Lanka, China is in Maldives, China owns 

a large part of the debt in Bangladesh and Nepal. So a number 

of——

Mr. SHERMAN. Not to mention the naval facilities in Pakistan. 

Ms. PANDE. Yes, Pakistan. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to go on to Dr. Swaine. You have talked 

about an alliance that we have with Japan. NATO is a mutual defense alliance. We urge countries there to spend 2 percent of their 

GDP on their national defense. That is ridiculously low, since we 

spend 6 percent, then we lie to our people and say it is only 5 percent, by telling them not to notice that veterans are a cost of maintaining a defense capacity. But anyway, we settle for 2 percent. But 

it is a mutual defense. Every country has to defend the others. 

With Japan, we don’t have a mutual defense. Japan has not been 

attacked in the last 50 years militarily. The United States was attacked on 9/11. The major NATO powers sent troops on the ground 

in Afghanistan. Japan sent none. How do we explain what kind of 

relationship we have with Japan? 

We can’t call them our dependency. At the same time, it is not 

a mutual defense treaty. It is as if we are unpaid mercenaries? I 

don’t know what the term would be. How do we turn our defense 

relationship with Japan into something that is mutual, instead of 

them claiming that because Douglas MacArthur thought that they 

shouldn’t—they should have a clause in their constitution. They 

are responsible for their own constitution. It is not like there is a 

provision in it that said—you know, that they are a dependency of 

the United States, they can’t change their constitution without the 

permission of the descendants of Douglas MacArthur. 

How do we get a mutual defense agreement with Japan instead 

of a one-sided one where we have to defend them, and they don’t 

do anything for us, except help defend themselves? 

Mr. SWAINE. Well, Representative Sherman, I am not somebody 

who believes that the U.S.-Japan alliance is an unfair alliance. I 

think the Japanese——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, we were attacked on 9/11. How many Japanese soldiers were put in harm’s way to defend the United States 

after that attack? 

43

Mr. SWAINE. I think you have to ask—you have to measure this 

in terms of to what degree was Japan prepared to provide assistance both in supporting U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific, which they 

were. Their support for U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific is a very 

vital one. It is absolutely essential. 

Mr. SHERMAN. They help us defend their region, but we were attacked by forces from Afghanistan. We died. Europe sent forces to 

Afghanistan. Japan sent none. So you have got NATO——

Mr. SWAINE. No combat forces. 

Mr. SHERMAN. No combat forces, yes, people on the ground risking their lives. Britain did that. France did that. Germany did that. 

And they are inadequate. So if inadequate describes the European 

contribution to mutual defense, what term do I use for Japan that 

sent zero? 

Mr. SWAINE. Well, I think the term for Japan is that they are 

committed to providing for defense of their interests in the Western 

Pacific, the interests of the United States——

Mr. SHERMAN. I have gone way over time, but I think you have 

capsulized it. They are dedicated to protecting their interests. 

Mr. SWAINE. Well, it is not just their interests, though, Member. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We have an interest in them. They have an interest in us. They defend their interests. They don’t defend our interests, except if our interests and their interests are being defended. 

Obviously, the world is better because Japan is in it, and Japan is 

willing to contribute to the world the continued existence of Japan. 

But when we were attacked, not a single Japanese soldier was put 

in harm’s way, and yet I am told every day that Americans have 

to be ready to die by the tens of thousands, if necessary, to defend 

our allies in Northeast Asia, and that every day our soldiers and 

sailors have to wake up and say, I might die today for that defense. 

It is not an exactly parallel relationship. 

I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. I appreciate your thoughts and your comments on 

that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And I have been able to overcome my shyness. 

Mr. YOHO. You have. I have even seen you laugh a few times on 

the committee. That is good. 

Moving forward. You know, we have got the serious problem 

going into the 21st century. All right. Good enough. Thank you. 

Thank you for being here. 

To set a strategy for the United States of America to let people 

in the Southeast Asia, all over the world, all of our allies, our trading partners know that America is committed, you know, pulling 

out of TPP, I know we lost some political clout there, there is no 

doubt about that, but I am of the camp that it wasn’t going to pass, 

and the best thing is pull the Band-Aid off quick and move on. 

What would you recommend for the ASEAN nations, for our Indian partners, what would be the best move forward to show that 

America is committed? We have got the military presence we have 

there. So since you have already spoke, Dr. Searight, Dr. Pande, 

if you would go. 

Ms. PANDE. India is onboard with the Indo-Pacific strategy. I 

agree with Dr. Searight that maybe a little more clarification of the 

strategy would help. However, from India’s point of view, the InVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:04 Aug 23, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_AP\052318\30177 SHIRL
44

dian Ocean region is its sphere of influence, it is its backyard, and 

so India will remain engaged. It has started to engage more with 

ASEAN countries: India and Singapore, India and Vietnam, India 

and Indonesia. Recently, India will lease a port of Indonesia, 

Sabang, which is near the Malacca Straits. India has also built a 

lot of relationships with Oman where India is going to lease port 

of Duqm. So India has started to build its relationships, but it will 

need a little more help. 

You had mentioned earlier about where the U.S. is investing in 

the BUILD Act. There is also something like the MCC, the Millennium Challenge, and India, the U.S., and Japan are cooperating in 

Nepal. There is an India-U.S.-Japan infrastructure project for 

South and Southeast Asia. The three countries will collaborate on 

building ports, providing energy, and industrial parts. 

And so while it is not going to be dollar-for-dollar competition 

with OBOR, it is going to be qualitatively much better, and it is 

going to provide a sort of another alternative to countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and countries in the broader Indo-Pacific. 

And finally, messaging. Just as disinviting China from RIMPAC 

sent a message and Quad sends a message, I believe signaling and 

messaging at periodic intervals does play a big role as well. 

Thank you. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Dr. Swaine, what are your thoughts? I know you are not bashful 

either. 

Mr. SWAINE. I have a somewhat different view on all this from 

what people have been saying. I think, on the one hand, it is very 

essential for the United States to have a strategic plan, as you say. 

It is absolutely essential. But that strategic plan has to include 

both efforts to strengthen the position of the United States and the 

region and that of its friends and allies, and efforts to engage the 

Chinese in ways that will reassure them about the ultimate objectives of the United States. 

The free and open Indo-Pacific strategy, as currently conceived 

and as reflected in the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, is not that strategy. It is a very clear, in my view, 

zero sum, highly adversarial document unprecedented for the 

United States to have ever issued with regard to Asia and with regard to China, and I think it will eventually, unless there is some 

engagement effort to it that has to do with cooperation and reassurance in both directions, it will end up polarizing the region. It 

will end up forcing countries in the region to make decisions about 

whether they lean more to the United States or they lean more to 

the Chinese. 

And in many respects, the Chinese position in Asia, as I said in 

my remarks, is increasingly that of they are growing in their level, 

their relative level of influence. So people will not easily leap to 

supporting the United States for this strategy. So it is going to 

have to be adjusted in ways that are not so focused on two diametrically opposed world views, the revisionist world order of China 

and the free and democratic world order of the United States and 

its allies, because that is a recipe for the Cold War. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. No, I agree with you. 

45

Mr. SWAINE. We will end up in a Cold War. 

Mr. YOHO. Yes. We have been through that, and I don’t want to 

go through that again. I remember those years. 

And I think you brought up a very good point, very salient, of 

how do you incorporate China in this? You know, what I see is 

China is being the aggressor. You know, we have seen what they 

have done, just their actions, what they are doing in India now 

with the mining. They are going to divert all the water and those 

tunnels, a 1,000 kilometer tunnel I think it is. And they are just 

marching on, marching on. We see them in the Western hemisphere with the $10.3 billion they lent to Haiti, knowing that they 

won’t be able to pay that back. They will have another strategic 

port in our hemisphere right off our coast, and these are things 

that I think are disconcerting all over. 

And then you see them going after the democracies, giving people 

alternatives, the pressure they put on Hong Kong, and then what 

they are doing with Taiwan. If we don’t come to terms with them—

and, you know, what I saw the initiative coming out of the White 

House is a strong stance, like stop. And I agree with you that we 

have to get to a point where what is acceptable? There is plenty 

of room on the world stage. 

But it can’t be one over the other one, and it has to be mutually 

beneficial. 

Do you guys have any thoughts how the best way to proceed with 

that, if you were to negotiate with China and India and the regional partners in that? 

I think I made our stance pretty clear where we stand with 

ASEAN. You know, we are here. We have done our phone ops, we 

have increased that through this committee, the recommendations 

for that, the foreign military sales. Like with Vietnam, we are trying to expedite some of those things. But I don’t want it to be 

confrontational. And I agree, you know, we have seen enough war 

and death and destruction. And it doesn’t advance us very much. 

So in the end result of all those is we always wind up trading, so 

let’s just focus on the trade and what we can do diplomatically. 

What are your thoughts of the best way to engage China on this? 

Mr. SWAINE. Well, I’ve written an entire report on this subject 

called Creating a Stable Asia. 

Mr. YOHO. Trading with what? 

Mr. SWAINE. Creating a Stable Asia. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

Mr. SWAINE. It is a Carnegie report. It came out about 2 years 

ago, and it systematically lays out some of the arguments that I 

presented in very abbreviated form here. 

I think the first step here has to be a recognition and a discussion within the United States about where we want to be in 20 or 

30 years in Asia. We haven’t had that discussion. 

Mr. YOHO. We haven’t. 

Mr. SWAINE. But that discussion cannot rest on a common assumption that all will be right as long as United States retains its 

dominance. In my view, that is a futile and likely self-destructive 

argument. It has limits to it. 

Mr. YOHO. I would agree with you. 

46

Mr. SWAINE. There are people who believe that that is exactly 

what needs to be done, and so they call for a vast increase in U.S. 

defense spending, for example, all kinds of economic initiatives, 

and they don’t explain how exactly we are supposed to acquire 

these resources to do all these things. $50 billion over 10 years, 

which is what the Trump administration has said they want to increase spending, is, relatively speaking, a drop the bucket in Asia. 

And the United States is not going to have the resources to leap 

ahead. 

So what it has to do, it has to get smarter about this. It has to 

think, if it is going to establish a balance of power in Asia that is 

a genuine balance, it has to start talking about where you can 

reach certain accommodations that are mutual on the most hot-button issues. First and foremost is Taiwan. Taiwan is still a very tumultuous and very volatile issue for the United States and China. 

Mr. YOHO. Absolutely. 

Mr. SWAINE. The Chinese right now are very concerned about 

where things are going, as is the United States. I believe there 

needs to be some kind of understanding there. 

Now, we are prohibited from talking to the Chinese about anything that relates to restraint on either side because of the Six Assurances. We have a document I am sure you are familiar with. 

Mr. YOHO. Sure. 

Mr. SWAINE. I believe that elements of that document are fast becoming obsolete. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. SWAINE. If we don’t establish some kind of understanding 

with the Chinese about limits on systems and limits on policies and 

assurances about nonuse of force, the Chinese are, ultimately, as 

they grow in their increase in power in that local regional area and 

they see domestic developments in Taiwan moving further away 

from them, they’re going to be more inclined to use coercion——

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. SWAINE [continuing]. In this situation. And we have to have 

a set of policies in place that can deal with that eventuality if it 

occurs. And that’s not one of declaring Taiwan as a strategic bastion for the United States, which is what some people are now arguing. That is a recipe for war with the Chinese. 

Mr. YOHO. Now, that is a well-made point. 

Dr. Searight? 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Yeah, I would just add, you know, I have mentioned already that the region wants to manage great power relations. They want the United States and China to figure out a 

modus vivendi to more or less get along. They don’t want to be 

drawn into a big trade war, for example, between the United States 

and China. 

At the same time, they don’t want to see, you know, what is 

sometimes referred to as a G2. So they don’t want to see too much 

accommodation between the United States and China that will circumvent their priorities. So that is why ASEAN centrality is so important. They don’t want to see the United States and China go off 

in a corner and decide how they are going to manage all kinds of 

regional issues and who gets what and not have their interests, you 

know, be fully represented. 

47

So I think, you know, the United States has basically been doing 

this, but you have got to walk that line in the middle. You have 

got to stand up—you know, the United States is welcome in the region. It is known what the United States stands for, and standing 

up for those principles is really important. So showing up is really 

important and standing up for the principles that we have all been 

talking about, everything from freedom and navigation and open 

economics to democracy, rule of law, human rights, good governance. And there is still a lot of—even though we have seen a lot 

of democratic backsliding in the region, and that is very concerning——

Mr. YOHO. Yeah. 

Ms. SEARIGHT [continuing]. There are some bright signs too. You 

know, Malaysia’s election was a stunning result, and it shows that 

the people of Malaysia, you know, at a certain point, they pushed 

back and demanded accountability from their government, demanded anticorruption and better governance, and made history. 

And I think that affirms kind of the values that we have long stood 

for in the region, and that is a real opening for us to embrace. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Dr.Pande? 

Ms. PANDE. I echo Dr. Searight in some ways. One, consistency 

of American policy. The allies need to know where the U.S. stands 

on different issues, on China, what it plans to do, sort of the economic or military so that they can also plan their strategies. 

Two, India sort of feels a G2 or a movement toward the G2, because India would not like China to be one of the countries or 

China to be the country which is responsible for South Asia or 

Southeast Asia. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Ms. PANDE. And finally, allow the regional partners like Japan, 

India, Southeast Asia, to play a role in the region, to do what they 

can do with this infrastructure, trade, building relationships, but 

let them build their own relationships, which in the end will benefit U.S. interests long term. 

Mr. YOHO. Now, I think you all touched on the same thing. You 

know, we can’t do it alone. We are at a point where we can’t. You 

know, we are an aging country. We have got a lot of debt. We are 

spread out throughout the world. But we have got great allies, we 

have got great partners, and we have got the rule of law that I 

think works well for us, and that other people respect. 

I have spoken to a lot of the ASEAN nations, a lot of the, you 

know, different associations. And it always comes up, we depend on 

American leadership. The world depends on American leadership. 

So we have those things that we can depend on. And I think the 

biggest thing is to work out a game plan on how we balance that 

power. You know, I am hoping that period of time where one nation conquering another nation is a bygone in history, but sometimes you wonder with what is going with a rising China. And like 

I said, to be supplanted from the world stage as a superpower 

won’t be tolerated by us or any other country. 

Let me just go back, because you guys brought up Taiwan, and 

this is something I think is a very urgent hotbed. I think North 

48

Korea is very urgent, very serious, but I think what is going on in 

the Asia-Pacific theater is much more than that, and long term. 

The Tsai administration has established the new southbound policy. The free part of the free and open Indo-Pacific is about keeping 

nations free from coercion. This is very relevant for Taiwan, which 

is facing increased coercion from the PRC. 

How should Taiwan be prioritizing this Indo-Pacific strategy, in 

your thoughts? And this will be the last question, and we will all 

get out of here. 

Dr. Searight, you want to go first? 

Ms. SEARIGHT. I think Taiwan is important. I think, again, it is 

a question of standing up for our principles and standing up for, 

you know, being consistent in our policy. The Southbound Policy by 

the Tsai government is one that the United States should find 

ways to support. It is a very sort of economic and diplomatic-focused policy, and there are a lot of ways, I think, that the United 

States can help through Ambassadors in the region and think tank 

linkages and everything else, to help put the Taiwanese and Southeast Asians together. Because there is a business relationship 

there. There is a lot of Taiwanese investment in the region, but 

there is somewhat a lack of familiarity about, you know, what Taiwan’s diplomacy is all about, what Taiwan stands for. So I think 

we can play a supportive role there. 

But I will let Dr.Swaine address the how to deal with China on 

Taiwan issue. That is more his lane. 

Mr. YOHO. We are just going to go right down the lane here, then 

we will go to you. 

Dr.Pande. 

Ms. PANDE. India’s relationship with Taiwan is primarily economic and trade. However, India’s Act East Policy in the last few 

years has increased economic relationship with Southeast Asia and 

with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. And so the Act East, the 

southbound Indo-Pacific, I believe, sort of are in some ways coming 

together and that will benefit the region. But purely Taiwan question, I will leave to Mr. Swaine. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Dr.Swaine, the pressure is on. 

Mr. SWAINE. I believe the essential, the fundamental elements of 

U.S.-Taiwan policy should be held in place. I don’t think there is 

any alternative to the United States acknowledging that there is 

the statement, basically, in the original communique with the Chinese and then the statements that accompany that in the Taiwan 

Relations Act. And that is a balancing act for the United States. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. SWAINE. You know that. I think we have to continue with 

that balancing act for the time being. I think the Taiwan Travel 

Act jeopardizes that. It has the potential for shifting the understanding that we have had with Beijing now for 40 years about 

what is the central basis for stability in the Taiwan Strait. 

The Chinese have maintained a commitment to seeking a peaceful resolution of the issue as a priority. It is in their formal statements. In return for that, the United States pledged that it did not 

challenge the Chinese view that there is one China. That is the 

basis of the understanding between the United States and China 

49

about Taiwan. If either one of those two things change in an unambiguous way, there are going to be real problems. 

The Chinese, I believe, are concerned now that Taiwan is engaged in what is called soft independence. I think they are overly 

alarmed about aspects of this, but their concern really focuses on 

the change in the domestic political environment on Taiwan. 

The Kuomintang, the nationalist party, is in considerable disarray. The idea of eventual unification is becoming more problematic. 

Mr. YOHO. It is. 

Mr. SWAINE. The Taiwan people themselves vacillate on this. 

Growing numbers have been more identified as Taiwanese, but it 

reached the kind of height during the Ma Ying-jeou period, and it 

is actually going down somewhat now. 

Chinese are very pragmatic. The Chinese on Taiwan, they don’t 

want to make declarations and support moves that would be really 

dangerous for themselves. I think they want more diversification in 

their economic relationships, which is why Tsai Ing-wen has the 

policy of looking in other areas. But they also recognize that their 

relationship with the mainland is essential to their development. It 

remains essential to their development. 

So what do you do in this kind of circumstance? You have got 

to be able to establish some kind of understanding that puts a lid 

on the impact of escalating military capabilities in this area. And 

that means you have got to have to talk about what is a basis for 

restraint in the deployment of forces or the development of forces 

that are specifically relevant to Taiwan. 

It is a challenging issue because a lot of these forces are dualuse, and they are not just focused on Taiwan. But it is one where 

I think there needs to be more dialogue about what is the basis for 

a stable floor in terms of the military deployments that both sides 

would have that would be relevant to Taiwan, and then how do you 

reassure each side that this basic pact is not going to be altered 

fundamentally? 

Mr. YOHO. If you have time, I would like to challenge you on—

or I don’t know if it is a challenge, just question you on it. 

Essential to their development, the relationship Taiwan has with 

China; I see it more as essential to their survival to maintain that 

relationship. But you were talking about the——

Mr. SWAINE. I would agree with that. 

Mr. YOHO [continuing]. The U.S. and China have an agreement 

from 40 years ago. You know, hands off here, we know where we 

stand. And you said—I think you said that China was honoring 

that. Yet when you look at the coercion that China has done 

against Taiwan: Going after them in the World Health Assembly, 

getting them uninvited, going after their diplomatic ties, getting 

them uninvited, breaking those ties, going to the Dominican Republic and offering them $3.1 billion to have them break ties with 

Taiwan, what they have done with American businesses because 

they recognize Taiwan as a destination country. 

Mr. SWAINE. Right. 

Mr. YOHO. And they go after them and they keep going after 

them. So I don’t see them being passive in this relationship. I see 

them being very aggressive, and it is putting the squeeze on them. 

50

And so at some point, you either decide to let it be consumed by 

China—Taiwan—or you say, we are going to honor the agreement 

we had of providing them with defensive mechanisms. And if we 

don’t stand up today, as we have talked about the South China 

Sea, it is going to be harder in 3 years. 

And I think this is where I think we need to implore all the nations in the South China Sea that enough is enough. You know, I 

would ultimately like to see them demilitarize those islands. Is that 

possible? I don’t know. But I know it will be easier today than 5 

years from now. And I think we just need to—who do we want to 

align with? And the world is going to have to decide. You either 

align with people that are going to follow the rule of law and honor 

contracts or people that are going to tell you I am not militarizing 

the South China Sea, yet they turn around and do it. And they 

have told those lies over and over and over and over again. 

So I think the world will have to decide that. I’m going to side 

with the good guys. 

I thank you for your time to be here. I thank you for your statements and your patience while we had to go vote. And, you know, 

normally members are here, but when we start late, they kind of 

scatter like—well, when you turn the light on with some creatures. 

Anyway, thank you, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(51)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

Ted Yoho (R-FL), Chairman 

May 16,2018 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held by the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in Room 2200 of the Rayburn 

House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

http//www.ForeignAffairs.housc~): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, May 23, 2018 

2:00p.m. 

Asia's Diplomatic and Security Structure: Planning US Engagement 

Amy Searight, Ph.D. 

Senior Adviser and Director 

Southeast Asia Program 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Aparna Pande, Ph.D. 

Director 

Initiative on the Future oflndia and South Asia 

The Hudson Institute 

Michael D. Swaine, Ph.D. 

Senior Fellow 

Asia Program 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

By Direction of the Chairman 

specwL 

regord w 

may he 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ________ A_si_"_m_ul_t_lte_P_a_e:_ifi_c _______ HEARING 

Day WNlnesday Date. ___ U_'~'J_' 1_3~,_2_fi_I8 __ Room ____ 2_10_0 __ _ 

Storting Time ---"1": 3,.0'-.t"J/"'11'--_Encling Time 3:45pm 

Recesses l __ l ( __ to __ )( __ to __ ) L__to __ } L__to __ ) L__to __ } L__to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Clwinmm Yoho 

Check"" of !lie following til a! app(1•: 

Open Session CZJ Executive ~sed) Session D Televised D 

'l'J'J'LJ<:OF HEARING: 

Electronically Rccord£!L(tapcd) D 

Stenographic Record U 

A.'lia'.v Diplnmatic aud Securi~l' Structure: Plamrillg U.S. Eugagement 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMHEHS PRESENT: 

Rep. Yolw, Rep. Pei'IJ' 

Rep. Slrenmm, Rep. Berrt 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark witlr a11 *!(they are not members Qf/idl committee) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [2] NoD 

(lf "no", please lisr belmr and include Iitle, agency, depm·fment, or organization) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE Ht<;CORU: (List any statements submilledfor the record) 

QFR- Wag net· 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

01" 

TIME ADJOURNED __ 3_:4_5.:_p_m_ 
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30177f-1.eps

Questions for the Record 

Congresswoman Ann Wagner 

AP Subcommittee Hearing: ''Asia's Diplomatic and Security Structure: Planning U.S. Engagement" 

May 23,2018 

Dr. Searight, as co-chair of the ASEAN Caucus, l' d like to ask you about the South China Sea 

dispute-an issue that still figures prominently in the U.S.-ASEAN relationship. ASEAN 

countries are right to remain worried. They occupy a stretch of strategically important water 

bridging the Pacific and Indian oceans that China has militarized in defiance of international law. 

In fact, China landed long-range bombers in the South China Sea for the first time two days ago 

and shows no signs of slowing its push to extend its power projection capabilities in Southeast 

Asia. 

To what degree is the Department of Defense continuing the U.S.-ASEAN Maritime Security 

Initiative to help A SEAN states counter Chinese aggression in the South China Sea" 

The Department of Defense launched the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) in 2016 as a 

capacity building program to enhance maritime security and maritime domain awareness capabilities in 

Southeast Asia. The original five-year, $425 million initiative focused on five littoral A SEAN states--

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam- along with some more limited assistance 

for Singapore, Brunei and Taiwan. The program offered equipment and training to these states to improve 

their abilities to address a range of maritime challenges, including China's growing assertiveness in the 

South China Sea. A key goal of MSI has been to build a shared maritime domain awareness architecture 

that will help countries share information, identify potential threats, and work collaboratively to address 

common challenges 

In July 20I8, the NDAA re-authorized the Southeast Asia MSI- rebranded as the Indo-Pacific Maritime 

Security Initiative- through 2025. The new initiative expands eligible countries to include Bangladesh, 

India, and Sri Lanka as recipients for MSI support, although the priority countries will likely remain the 

South China Sea littoral states. The longer time horizon will be helpful in planning the Pentagon's efforts 

for sustained, long-tenn acquisition, training and human capital efforts to improve capabilities that 

require time to pay off. However, House Appropriators cut the Southeast Asia Maritime Security 

Initiative in halffrom $100 million to $48.8 million. The set MSI dollar amount allocation is still being 

debated in Congress as of August 2018. 

The Department of Defense and State are currently in discussion with individual Southeast Asian 

countries on which programs to support as parts of the MSI as well as the new $300 million package of 

security assistance to the Indo Pacific region announced earlier this month by Secretary Pompeo, which 

will largely be expanded Foreign Military Financing ($290 million of the $300 million package). 

Pentagon and State Department officials have indicated that they will continue to prioritize programs that 

will help build maritime security capacity and maritime domain awareness for Southeast Asian countries. 

2 It is my understanding that ASEAN sees itself as a neutral bloc with the ability to diffuse tensions 

between China and the United States. A SEAN may stand to gain much from this arrangement 

now, but will it be able to retain this role if Sino-U.S. competition grows more hostile? 
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A SEAN was founded in the 1960s as both an anticommunist bloc but also as a regional grouping that 

stood in solidarity against being drawn into superpower rivalry, and those roots to this day give ASEAN a 

strong inclination towards neutrality in the growing competition between the United States and China. 

Most states within A SEAN have strong economic ties to China, but they also welcome a robust economic 

and security presence by the United States. ASEAN' s convening power, in part based on its stated 

neutrality and interest in managing great power relations, gives it a primary role in shaping regional 

dynamics and outcomes. 

And yet ASEAN is a bloc often-member countries that are remarkably diverse in culture and 

demography, levels of development, and security challenges. Each have quite different relationships with 

the United States and China, and they make their own alignment, balancing, and hedging decisions based 

on their own national interests. Within ASEAN of course there are two treaty allies to the United Statesthe Philippines and Thailand; a strong strategic partner in Singapore; and growing strategic cooperation 

benveen the United States and Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. On the other side, Cambodia and Laos 

are much closer to China in tenns of economic and security cooperation, and to some extent this holds 

true for Brunei and Myanmar. 

A SEAN's requirement of consensus leads to lowest common denominator positions on important 

regional matters, and this opens the door for China to seek to disrupt ASEAN unity on key issues like the 

South China Sea. By peeling off ASEAN members, in particular Cambodia and Laos, from supporting 

unified ASEAN positions on matters related to the South China Sea, China has been able to weaken 

ASEAN's relevance and its ability to play the role of neutral arbiter. Meanwhile, countries like Vietnam, 

and at times Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, will continue to push ASEAN to take a stronger 

collective stance on South China Sea issues, and will resist etforts by China to dominate the region 

economically and strategically on its own terms. 

The shifting strength of ASEAN unity and voice is an ever-evolving dynamic as countries go through 

leadership transitions that bring new priorities, and as the region continues to eye China's actions and 

strategic intentions warily. The recent revelations ofMalaysia's newly elected government led by Prime 

Minister Mahathir regarding China's unfavorable financing of massive Belt and Road Initiative projects 

under the previous regime have added to regional concerns about the nature of China's bid for regional 

economic leadership. It is an opportune time for the United States to embrace ASEAN centrality, and 

engage individual member states, with an eye towards boosting their ability to act as a bulwark against 

Chinese dominance 
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Questions for the Record 

Congresswoman Ann Wagner 

AP Subcommittee Hearing: "Asia's Diplomatic and Security Structure: Planning U.S. 

Engagement" 

May 23,2018 

I. Dr. Pande, Nepal has served as a buffer state between China and India but has drawn 

closer to China in the last few years. Will vanishing buffer zones between China and 

India, coupled with longstanding border disputes in the Himalayas, leach India's ability 

to act as a region a! power? 

a. Has U.S.-Japanese-lndian collaboration on infrastructure projects in Nepal slowed 

its slide towards Beijing? 

Congresswoman Wagner, India's relationship with Nepal, as with all its immediate South Asian 

neighbors, is an old historical, cultural, economic and strategic one. Delhi has long viewed 

India's neighbors are its first line of security without adequately realizing that managing a sphere 

of influence is not only a function of telling others what to do but being able to expend resources 

that deny space to competitors. This has changed in recent years and India has not on! y increased 

its economic assistance to Nepal but, unlike China, Delhi has sought to ensure that its assistance 

and investment in Nepal aligns with the priorities and requirements of the Nepalese. 

India does face a challenge with the deepening Chinese presence, and massive amounts of 

money that Beijing is expending through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in South Asia. Not 

only has India upped its game but along with Tokyo and Washington, Delhi hopes to create a 

counter architecture to contain the Chinese march. 

In April 2018, India, US and Japan announced that they would collaborate on infrastructure 

projects in three countries of South and South East Asia- Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar. 

India will help with the development of ports, Japan with building industrial parks and the US 

will focus on building power plants. Results are already visible with Bangladesh seeking 

Japanese assistance for some of its infrastructure projects and Nepal turning to India for building 

its hydroelectric power plants. 
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30177h-1.eps

Questions for the Record 

Congresswoman Ann Wagner 

AP Subcommittee Hearing: "Asia's Diplomatic and Security Structure Planning U.S. 

Engagement" 

May 23,2018 

1. Dr. Swaine, you've been an outspoken critic of the Free and Open lndo-Pacific strategy. 

While 1 understand why the United States may not want to back China into a comer, l'm 

not convinced it's wise to write off closer relations with lndia, Japan, and Australia. What 

sort of alignment structure would you like to see the United States pursue? 

I am certainly not writing off closer relations with India, Japan, and Australia. We should 

remain particularly close to our allies Japan and Australia. India is more inclined to accept 

closer relations with the US, at present, but in my opinion, New Delhi will always want to 

remain more independent trom the US than either Tokyo or Sydney and to retain reasonably 

good relations with Beijing. The US is currently moving in the opposite direction, i.e. toward an 

adversarial relationship with Beijing. Indeed, my objection to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific 

strategy is that it is founded on an essentially adversarial, largely zero-sum posture toward China, 

a relationship we should not and cannot atl'ord to pursue, politically, diplomatically, and 

financially. What is the alternative? We need to get smarter about creating both positive and 

negative incentives for Beijing to work with Washington and its allies to create a more stable 

Asia as China's power continues to grow, and to create a more equitable and durable economic 

relationship. This will require a US reassessment of the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) and a 

partial renegotiation of the WTO to create institutions that serve both US and Chinese interests 

more fully (in the latter case) and to exert gradually increasing pressure on Beijing to become 

more open and rules-oriented (in the former case). The current ·'beggar-thy-neighbor" bilateral, 

and punitive approach adopted by the Trump Administration is self-defeating, especially in the 

long run. 

Secondly, the USG needs to have a genuinely serious, non-polemical, interests-based dialogue 

with Beijing on the future strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific. The Obama Administration 

began such a low-protile dialogue near the end of its term, but of course Trump did not follow 

through, given his hugely erroneous obsession with trade deficits. In my view, any such 

dialot,'lle should aim at creating the conditions for a stable balance of power, a genuine balance 

of power, in Asia and a reasonably amicable one (to the extent possible), between the US and its 

allies and China. I have written at length about these conditions, that include a transition by both 

sides toward a more defense-oriented, denial force posture, and a range of understandings on 

Asia's hot button regional issues, including Taiwan, Korea, maritime disputes, and military 

activities. My argument can be found in my essay Beyond American Predominance, and in my 

Carnegie report Creating a Stable Asia. Your statl'can easily locate them on the Carnegie 

Endowment's web site. Despite the current" worse casing" climate in Washington, this view is 

not unique to myself. Other individuals with deep policy experience and knowledge of China 

have endorsed at least the basics of it. 

But none of this can happen if the United States continues to close itself off from serious 

reassessments of existing economic institutions and from a recognition that the 70 plus years of 
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American predominance in the Western Pacific is coming to an end. We need a better strategy 

than simply to ally with other democracies to counter China's so-called" revisionist world view" 

and to double-down on defense spending in a largely futile effort to stay well ahead of China 

militarily in Asia. Theses countries will not fully endorse such a strategy, and less so other 

countries in Asia. We are moving toward forcing Asian countries to choose sides, which they 

will mightily resist.