Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 20, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00946-CV

ALEX GOVAN, Appellant

V.

LA KEITHA STROUD, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

Ellis County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 21-C-3911

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The trial court granted appellee La Keitha Stroud’s motion for summary 

judgment. In a single issue on appeal, appellant Alex Govan argues that the 

judgment was not supported by factually-sufficient evidence. Concluding that 

Govan’s issue is inadequately briefed, we affirm the judgment as challenged on 

appeal.1

1 The Supreme Court of Texas ordered the Court of Appeals for the Tenth District of 

Texas to transfer this appeal (No. 10-22-00429-CV) to this court. Misc. Docket No. 22-9115
2

I. BACKGROUND

In 2020, Govan and Stroud became engaged. The two entered into several 

agreements related to wedding and living expenses. After their relationship 

deteriorated, the engagement ended a few months before the planned day of their 

wedding. Stroud filed suit against Govan, alleging several claims, including breach 

of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, civil theft, civil battery, negligence, and 

fraud. After Stroud’s counsel responded to the demand letter sent by Govan’s 

counsel, Govan’s counsel filed an agreed motion to withdraw.

Shortly thereafter, Stroud filed a motion for traditional and no-evidence 

summary judgment.2 The trial court signed a summary judgment (1) in favor of 

Stroud for economic damages, mental-anguish damages, a civil penalty, and 

attorney’s fees, and (2) dismissing with prejudice all of Govan’s claims.3

II. ANALYSIS

Representing himself on appeal, Govan argues that the summary-judgment 

evidence was factually insufficient.4 However, we conclude Govan’s issue is 

(Tex. December 27, 2022); see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 73.001, .002. Because of the transfer, 

we decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of 

stare decisis if our decision otherwise would have been inconsistent with the transferor court’s 

precedent. See Tex. R. App. 41.3.

2 The no-evidence motion for summary judgment was directed at Govan’s counterclaim 

and motion for sanctions.

3 The summary judgment order does not contain general language that makes the 

judgment final, but it does actually dispose of all parties and all claims. See Bella Palma, LLC v. 

Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) (holding that even though judgment did 

not contain “an unequivocal expression of finality[,]” judgment was still “final and appealable 

because there was no question the trial court intended it to be so”); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 

39 S.W.3d 191, 192–93 (Tex. 2001) (holding that judgment is final when it “states with 

unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties”).

4 We treat Govan’s brief as raising a singular issue challenging the factual sufficiency of 

the judgment below, even though Govan represents having the following five issues:
3

inadequately briefed.

First, in summary fashion, Govan simply recites a half-page of background 

facts—that are not directly pertinent to the issue of factual sufficiency—without 

reference to the record. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g) (“ The brief must state concisely 

and without argument the facts pertinent to the issues or points presented. . . . The 

statement [of facts] must be supported by record references.”).

He then summarily asserts—without citing the record or legal authorities—

1. Does the summary judgment evidence support a judgment of $35,558.16 for 

economic damages plus a prejudgment interest at a rate of five and one-half 

percent (5.50%) per annum from the date of the Original Petition through the date 

of the judgment? 

2. Does the summary judgment evidence support a judgment of $1,000.00 as a 

penalty for civil theft? 

3. Does the summary judgment evidence support a judgment of $3,521.22 plus 

prejudgment interest at a rate of five and one-half percent (5.50%) per annum 

from the date of the Original Petition through the date of the judgment for 

Plaintiff/Appellee’s mental anguish damages associated with contracting the 

STD?

4. Does the summary judgment evidence support a judgment of $23,362.50 for 

attorney fees? 

5. Does the summary judgment evidence support a judgment of $3,000.00 for 

attorney fees if Defendant/Appellant files a post-judgment motion?

While factual-sufficiency review is not applicable to appellate review of a summary judgment, 

we will construe his brief liberally as challenging whether Stroud’s summary judgment evidence 

established “as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of fact.” Gibbs General Motors 

Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. 1970).

We also note that in his “Summary of the Argument” section of his brief, Govan argues 

the trial court “erred in excluding and failing to consider critical evidence that could have been 

presented by Appellant.” However, this argument is never even mentioned again in his brief. 

More importantly, Govan neither specifies what specific evidence he thinks the trial court should 

have considered or what evidence the trial court allegedly erroneously excluded, nor does he cite 

to any portion of the record in which he presented the trial court with evidence that was allegedly 

erroneously excluded.

Accordingly, to the extent that his brief can be interpreted as raising an issue on the 

exclusion of evidence, we conclude that such issue is inadequately briefed. Tex. R. App. P. 

38.1(g), (i).
4

that “Stroud did not provide sufficient evidence.”5 See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) 

(“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, 

with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). Even though we 

consider the pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant liberally, pro se litigants are not 

excused from complying with all applicable rules of procedure and substantive 

law. See Sorrow v. Harris Cnty. Sheriff, 622 S.W.3d 496, 501 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. denied) (citing Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 

249, 258 (Tex. 2014)).

Accordingly, we overrule Govan’s sole appellate issue as inadequately 

briefed.6 Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g), (i).

5 We note that Govan does mention two cases in his “Summary of the Argument” 

section: “The exclusion of the evidence is contradictory to the rulings established by the 

Supreme Court of Texas in Miller v. Wilson and in Brown v. Davis.” However, Govan fails to 

expound on how the trial court deviated from this supreme court precedent or otherwise explain 

how these cases support his arguments. More importantly, these two cases do not exist. We have 

not been able to find any cases with these given styles that are relevant to the issues at hand, and 

it is further worth noting that both of these citations just happen to be palindromic: Brown v. 

Davis, 123 S.W2d 321 (Tex. 2002) and Miller v. Wilson, 456 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. 2000).

Also, Govan only mentions these fabricated cases in connection with the argument that 

the trial court erred by excluding and failing to consider certain evidence presented by Govan. 

But as discussed in footnote 4, we have already concluded that issue—to the extent it has been 

raised—to be inadequately briefed. Thus, specifically regarding his argument that Stroud “did 

not provide sufficient evidence” to support summary judgment, Govan cites no caselaw.

6 We are cognizant that based on the facts of the case, appellants should generally be 

given a reasonable opportunity to amend their appellate brief before a court of appeals affirms or 

reverses the trial court’s decision based solely on defects or irregularities in appellate procedure. 

See Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994). However, 

the following axiom is also true: “Allowing our intermediate courts some discretion in ordering 

rebriefing is necessary to balance the twin objectives of a liberal and just construction of 

procedural rules and the prompt and efficient resolution of appeals.” Id. at 285 (emphasis added).

For example, in Horton v. Stovall, the appellant occasionally cited her appendix instead 

of the record and the appellant’s brief contained several incorrect record citations. 591 S.W.3d 

567, 568 (Tex. 2019). The supreme court reprimanded the court of appeals for not allowing the 

appellant an opportunity to amend her brief: “[c]ourts are not required to comb through the 

record to find evidence to support a party’s appellate issues, but nothing prevents courts from 

undertaking reasonable efforts to locate evidence described in a party’s brief—a task made less 
5

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court as challenged on appeal.

/s/ Charles A. Spain

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Zimmerer, and Spain.

burdensome when the record is filed electronically.” Id. (emphasis added). 

By contrast, in the present case, Govan makes no citation to the record whatsoever. His 

appellate brief has an appendix attached to it, but he does not cite it. Additionally, as noted in 

footnote 5, supra, the cases Govan cites are fictional. Even after employing reasonable efforts, 

we could not determine what caselaw Govan was attempting to cite that could possibly support 

this position. Thus, given the facts of this case, we deem it within our discretion to conclude that 

Govan has waived his appellate issue instead of allowing him an opportunity to amend or rebrief. 

See St. John Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes, 595 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2020) (“Finally, 

we note that courts of appeals retain their authority to deem an unbriefed point waived in lieu of 

requesting additional briefing.”); Fredonia, 881 S.W.2d at 284 (“[T]he settled rule [is] that an 

appellate court has some discretion to choose between deeming a point waived and allowing 

amendment or rebriefing, and that whether that discretion has been properly exercised depends 

on the facts of the case.”).