Executive Order 13650 Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security Public Listening Session, Baton 

Rouge Louisiana

Date: February 19, 2014

Location: Louisiana State Police Academy, 7901 Independence Blvd., Baton Rouge, LA 70806

Introduction and Opening Remarks

Patrick White, Facilitator, introduced the proceedings and remarked:

• There are opportunities for those on the phone to comment at the Newark, New Jersey session 

scheduled for February 27. Written comments can also be provided to eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov.

• This session is being recorded for note-taking purposes only.

• Purpose: Provide stakeholders an overview of the Executive Order 13650: Improving Chemical 

Facility Safety and Security (EO) progress to date and provide an opportunity for the public to 

provide comments, feedback, and suggestions.

Summary and Progress to Date

Jordan Barab, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA):

• Thanked those attending the session

• Referenced the additional sessions that have been held since November 2013

• It is important to be in Louisiana.

o Mentioned some of the chemical releases over the past few years (land, air, and sea)

• The working group is aware that there are companies doing a good job and want to address outliers 

not cooperating with the regulations.

• The President has tasked the Government to take measures and make recommendations to improve 

the safety and security of chemical facilities.

o The White House is very serious about these issues and wants the hard issues addressed, 

including through policy recommendations.

• Each agency has an important role to play in chemical facility safety and security:

o The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) focuses on security;

o OSHA focused on worker health and safety;

o The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) focuses on facility safety and the protection of 

human health and the environment.

• Two of the EO goals are to improve operational coordination and information sharing and to 

modernize regulations and best practices.

• The working group divided the directives into manageable sections and established four working 

groups:

o Sections 3 and 4: Coordination of Federal agencies

 Plan to work together (all stakeholders from the Government to local communities)

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 Highlighted the EPA Region II Pilot Program that defines high risk and inspection 

prioritizations between agencies

o Section 5: Examining ways that data is collected and disseminated between agencies and to 

local stakeholders as needed.

 Agencies have defined sharing regimes and a common terminology.

 The goal is to build a flexible data-sharing process with more accessible information.

o Section 6: Policy, Guidance, and Standards Modernization

 Focuses on policy issues

 Developed a list of options to improve safety and security by improving risk 

management practices

 There is a draft document on the OSHA EO webpage for review. Lisa Long will 

review the options listed in the paper later in the introduction.

 Will develop a plan based on the commented options

 Anything decided based on these options will still undergo the rulemaking process.

 The Interim Chemical Advisory was also issued on August 30 on the safe handling, 

sale, and storage of ammonium nitrate. This document is considered an evergreen 

document.

o Section 7: Stakeholder Outreach and Best Practices

 Runs the listening sessions

• Comments may be submitted through the OSHA EO Website or at eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov.

• In the coming weeks and months, the working group will finalize tasks and making 

recommendations to the President. This will mean that the results will be public, and a working plan 

will be established going forward.

• One 90-day status update has been made, and another is forthcoming in a few days.

• The purpose of these listening sessions came out of the tragedy in West, Texas in April 2013. Based 

on that, the working group is looking to establish a better method for promoting safety and security 

in chemical processing facilities.

Mathy Stanislaus, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response Executive, 

EPA, Executive Order 13650 Working Group Co-Chair:

• Underscored Mr. Barab’s comments that these listening sessions are crucial to understanding insight 

from all stakeholders in establishing recommendations for the President.

• The working group has heard a lot about local preparedness and gaps in that infrastructure as well 

as access of local responders to chemical facility data during emergencies. This has become a major 

point of focus.

• Another point that has been raised is better notification to the local community in case of an 

emergency. 

• The working group has also heard a lot about the need for coordinated outreach to smaller and midsized facilities that do not have the ability to fully understand and comply with the existing 

regulations.

• Coordination of data among the Federal programs has been a topic throughout the listening 

sessions. Easier and understandable data that can be consumed by stakeholders is important.

o EPA is specifically looking at two programs: Risk Management Plan (RMP) program and the 

Emergency Planning Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) program.

 Looking at additional hazards, including reactivity hazards

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 Looking at additional chemicals to add to the regulated list

 Using industry-based programs for risk-based analysis

 Safety considerations and how data can be better enabled for local responders

• The working group is planning to modify the ammonium nitrate alert based on responses from 

industry that some information is outdated.

• The rough end date of the EO deliverables is the end of May. A progress report will be available in 

the next few days to update stakeholders on the work done to date.

Dave Wulf, Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD), DHS, Office of Infrastructure 

Protection:

• ISCD is responsible for administering the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)

program as well as the pending Ammonium Nitrate Security Program.

• Amy Graydon will fill in for Mr. Wulf from time to time during this session.

• DHS brings a unique security-centric perspective to chemical protection through voluntary and 

regulatory initiatives.

• The voluntary programs are meant to assist chemical facilities in navigating the regulations.

• The U.S Coast Guard leads the efforts for the Maritime Security Transportation Act.

• DHS coordinates with stakeholders across the industry to establish these programs and promote 

chemical sector resilience.

• The CFATS program identifies and regulates those programs at the highest risk for terrorist attacks 

and exploitations.

o More than 4,200 facilities are regulated. More than 70 of these are in Louisiana.

o Since 2007, ISCD has made much progress to make Americans safer through inspections and 

authorization of chemical facility Site Security Plans.

o Through the implementation of safer processes and chemicals, more than 3,000 facilities 

have modified their process and holdings so that they are no longer high risk.

Matt Wren, Department of Justice/Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF):

• ATF also regulates the explosives industry.

• This includes the storage, handling, manufacturing, and distribution of ammonium nitrate fuel oil.

• All stakeholders are here to promote more safety and security. The best way to get to that point is 

to receive input from the public, and he is looking forward to the audience’s comments.

Lisa Long, OSHA provided a brief summary of the options document, “Executive Order 13650, Section A 

– Solicitation of Public Input on Options for Policy Regulation and Standards Modernization,” located 

at: https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/Section_6ai_Options_List.html.

Mr. White established some session ground rules:

• The purpose is to hear a diverse set of opinions from a broad spectrum of people.

• The working group is not looking for consensus on any topics.

• Comments should be related to the Executive order.

• Please respect the opinion of others.

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• State your name, organization, and/or stakeholder group when presenting.

• Five minutes are provided to each person when speaking.

Registered Speakers:

Steve Taylor, Missouri Agribusiness Association (MAA), remarked:

• He and his organization have much experience with fertilizer-grade ammonium nitrate (AN).

• Organization joined with Federal representatives to sponsor ammonium nitrate regulatory training 

throughout Missouri.

o EPA, OSHA, DHS, and Missouri State regulators conducted the training.

o During the training, the OSHA official stated that 29 CFR 1910.109(i) would be enforced.

• Current provisions for 1910.109(i) are only related to equipment-grade AN in blasting agents and 

other related components.

• Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) guidelines address the safe handling of technical-grade 

ammonium nitrate and advocate for rulemaking to update 109i.

o Missouri Agribusiness disagrees on IME’s position to prohibit wooden bins.

 If proper safety guidelines are followed, wooden bins are safe.

 A close review of past accidents shows that confinement, compression, and 

contamination are the causes.

• In regards to coordination and information sharing, more attention should be put on emergency 

response planning.

o MAA has a history of working with Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs). In July 

2013, he participated in the Region 7 LEPC/Tribal Emergency Response Commission

Emergency Planning & Response Conference. 

o MAA developed its own guidelines and looks forward to an opportunity to discuss those at a 

later time.

o More attention should be placed on emergency response planning.

o Participated in many sessions and panel discussion related to AN handling

• Quoted Karl Brooks: “The worst time to know your emergency responders is when you roll up on an 

incident.”

• Overall general recommendations:

o He would like to see CFATS long-term implementation and authorization.

o PSM retail facility exemption should be retained.

o They are skeptical of including AN in RMP.

Andy Zellinger, Louisiana Bucket Brigade (LBB) on behalf of Anna Hrybyk, commented:

• Louisiana Bucket Brigade supports grassroots actions to hold industry and Government accountable 

for the true costs of chemical pollution.

• Louisiana is particularly vulnerable due to the amount of pipelines and oil wells in the State.

o Produces the most oil and has the second largest refining capacity in the United States

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• According to the National Response Center, 10 petrochemical accidents per week occur in Louisiana.

• Coast Guard has been taking more complaints, at over 4,000 complaints a year.

• There are 20,000 people and 90 schools and day care centers within 2 miles of refineries. These 

buildings shake when flares go off. Residents can hear workers talking inside the plant on the 

intercom.

• Three areas need strengthening:

o EPA RMP: Improve methods of targeting high-risk facilities for inspections.

 Leverage additional programs from OSHA, the State police, and the Louisiana

Department of Environmental Quality.

 Often, facilities’ self-reported measures in their Risk Management Plans do not 

correlate with what they actually have in their facilities or what they report to other 

agencies.

 In Oct 2010, the LBB review of Exxon Mobile Baton Rouge refinery’s RMP showed 

that the RMP does not comply with the Clean Air Act Part 68: Accidental Release 

Prevention.

• Accidents from this facility were not reported to EPA’s RMP based on this

review.

• On April 14, 2010, a flash fire sent people to the local hospital’s burn unit,

but no information was given regarding its root cause.

 Need additional RMP inspectors in Region VI.

 Improve enforcement of violations found during inspections to ensure that facilities 

take concrete meaningful action when fault is discovered.

o LEPC improvement:

 LEPCs are great in theory, but in practice they are not legally enforceable.

 There are many EPCRA violations within LEPC plans, specifically in sections 301 and 

303.

 Specific dates do not exist for training plans. Also, there is no mention of 

environmental monitoring or protection.

 They need better funding and enforcement capabilities.

o Improving information for first responders:

 Fenceline monitoring should be increased, and the data collected should be 

available to the public in real time.

 Currently the Clean Air Act does not require this and should be updated to do so.

Darryl Wiley, Environmental Justice program, Sierra Club, remarked:

• Welcome to Cancer Alley. This is the heart of the beast where chemical accidents occur on a regular 

basis.

• Emergency response time is poor—including hours and days after an accident.

• There is not an environmental justice (EJ) reality in the United States.

o The EO working group needs to give this greater consideration.

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o There is no EJ analysis required in any Federal reviews. This should occur.

• Post-Hurricane Katrina Louisiana has seen changes to public access to emergency planning.

o The Local Emergency Planning Commissions no longer allow public input since the 

hurricane. Mr. Wiley said that he has not been invited to any meetings or asked to engage in 

any planning efforts.

o He is not aware if the State commissions are operating but said that announcements are not 

made and that the community is not engaged.

• In regards to a risk map, when the law first occurred, he had to work through his Congressman to 

get to the LEPC to look at risk map data 

• Enforceable regulation needs to be established, as oppose to establishing limits for voluntary 

compliance.

o Voluntary compliance does not work; for example, every time I drive over 70 miles per hour 

on the freeway, I do not write myself a speeding ticket.

• Enforcement is important. 

• We often talk all over the place about chemical safety after accidents, but we need to actually get a 

handle on it.

• Including the transportation of these materials, including tar sands by rail, makes this a difficult 

situation. Cleanup from preventable accidents is important.

• Have to force petrochemical plants to implement safer chemicals and safer processes and not the 

same old 18th- and 19th-century procedures they know they can profit from

• Question from Mr. Barab: At each session the working group has been dealing with handling 

questions about balancing security and public awareness. How should it be done?

o Mr. Wiley responded: He has been harassed by rent-a-cops when taking pictures of facilities. 

There is a water treatment plant less than 10 blocks from his house. There has been no 

effort to reduce risk through implementing inherently safer technology (IST).

• Question from Mr. Stanislaus: What is the meeting that you mentioned that no longer occurs?

o Mr. Wiley responded: The LEPC meeting in New Orleans and the State Emergency Response 

Commission. He does not know if they are still meeting and, if so, where. He used to attend 

both on a regular basis but cannot anymore for some reason. Everything has shifted since 

Katrina, and information is missing.

• Question from Mr. Stanislaus: Does he have a proposal for applying an environmental justice 

analysis to Federal review?

o Mr. Wiley responded: He and the Sierra Club have been considering how to put 

environmental justice analysis in the safety tools. He is shooting for March 31for the 

publication of those comments.

Wilma Subra; CERC representative, former LEPC Chair, Technical Adviser to the Louisiana Environmental 

Action Network, and President of the Subra Company; commented:

• The industrial facilities in the East Baton Rouge Parish break the EPA’s Risk Management plans 

anywhere from one unknown chemical to 40 unknown chemicals.

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o The worst-case scenarios extend from the two worst facilities out to 19 and 25 miles.

o Population risk in these areas is 420,000 and 470,000 individuals, respectively.

• While we conduct this EO listening session, we are in the worst-case vulnerable zone in the Parish.

• 18 chemicals exceed the threshold levels in this area. In addition, 29 other chemicals exceed the 

threshold level in adjacent areas.

• This pattern of risk is associated with other parishes along the Mississippi river.

• Adding additional chemicals and substances to the RMP rule will reduce risk in these industrialized 

areas.

o However, due to security issues, the populations are not aware. They rely on EPA to protect 

them, but they need to be provided with better awareness so they can reduce their own 

risk.

o More data needs to be made available to the public.

• The oil and gas industry is booming in the United States through the development of shale deposits.

o This has caused a wide array of environmental issues.

o There is a desperate need for EPA and OSHA to develop and implement regulatory programs 

for shale, oil, and gas workers and communities.

o OSHA needs to remove the exemption and implement rules to cover the drilling and 

fracturing of shale oil.

o OSHA must resume enforcing Process Safety Management (PSM) standards in regards to 

this work.

o EPA must include upstream oil and gas facilities under RMP and EPCRA. They release large 

quantities of toxic chemicals into the air, water, and land, and their production byproducts 

are dangerous while being located close to each other, resulting in dense development.

 One centralized facility in the Eagle Ford area of Texas reported a release of 42 

pounds of benzene, as well as other releases.

• Question from Mr. Stanislaus: Are there recommendations coming from the Stronger Group’s

deliberations that could inform the EO in terms of best practices and deliberations?

o Ms. Subra responded: Stronger developed guidelines that the working group should review, 

and it has reviewed a number of States. Texas has been extremely reluctant to participate.

Anne Rolfes, Louisiana Bucket Brigade (LBB) and the Green Army, remarked: 

• Shared a story about how President Johnson was told that he should not address civil rights issues.

In response, President Johnson said, “What the hell is the Presidency for?”

• It is time for all of us to get some guts.

• The audience’s statements are the same things that have been said for the past 20 years.

• When Exxon and other chemical producers are telling you to slow down, a child can tell that the 

situation is out of hand.

• If the Federal Government cannot be tough and stand up to companies, what is the job of the 

President for?

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• Has submitted written comments, but this will not be changed through written comments. These 

issues will be changed through will.

• The President is aware that he needs to make hard changes through the Executive order.

• Four recommendations:

o Increase buffer zones.

o Chemical Safety Board needs teeth (also other emergency planning laws).

 The Emergency Planning Commissions in local parishes are in clear violation of the 

law based on their meeting minutes (specifically, St. Bernard Parish and East Baton 

Rouge Parish).

 EPA’s Regional Enforcement Representative says that he cannot do anything.

 When they attempt to file lawsuits, the laws are so weak that there is nothing they 

can do.

o Criminal Prosecution of plant managers and public relations personnel:

 Public relations/affairs representative at Exxon Mobil said that none of their 

chemicals came close to leaving their facility. There is no impact on the community.

 Hold companies responsible for lying during public statements.

o Federal agencies should take over the State of Louisiana.

 Louisiana has a culture that protects industry.

• Funding should be pulled from large corporations (Exxon) to fund the regulation push.

• She moved back to Louisiana when she was 30 years old. She is now 45, and Mossville continues to 

have issues.

Willie Mae Weese, Vice President of Louisiana Environmental Justice Community Organizing Coalition

(LEJOC), commented:

• LEJCOC is a statewide group formed to support the needs of the environmental justice communities 

in Louisiana. They also address racism and other social issues.

• St. James Parish is a fenceline community between New Orleans and Baton Rouge surrounded by 17 

industries known as Cancer Alley.

• It truly is Cancer Alley because she knows many people in her community who have cancer or have 

recently died from cancer.

• Toxic chemicals emitted by the companies include:

o Sulfuric Acid

o Nickel and Nickel Compounds

o Chlorine

o Hydrochloric Acid

• There is no evacuation route established for this community.

Diane Honor, LEJCOC, stated:

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• She recently had a heart attack.

• Is asking for proper transportation of the sick

• She is asking for community notification of plant issues and transportation away when an accident 

occurs.

• Notification does not occur until after a few days after an accident.

• Question from Mr. Barab: What type of evacuation plans currently exist?

o Ms. Honor responded: The current plan is you can get out if you have a vehicle, and 

evacuation plans are word-of-mouth.

• Question from Mr. Barab: Has there been an evacuation recently?

o Ms. Honor responded: She says no, but there have been accidents recently with limited 

communication and no push to evacuate.

Agnes Francisco, Community Advocate, commented:

• Moved to Alexandria in 1959 where they were surrounded by treating plants for railroad ties and 

telephone poles

• Many deaths have occurred, from babies to college students to the elderly.

• From January 1, 2013 to September 2013, 113 people died.

• The EPA in Dallas knows about it. They have asked the treating company to do soil sampling.

o EPA was told that the company did the sampling before they arrived and that there was 

nothing wrong. EPA did do their own sampling, and the company results do not match the 

City of Alexandria results.

o Why is the sampling different?

• Knows that someone in each house on a particular street who has died of cancer.

• She wants to know what her area can do for clean air against a company that has been polluting 

since 1923 and has the money to continue to do so.

Molly Brackin, LBB, Monitoring and Evaluation Associate, commented:

• The Executive order acknowledges the importance of information exchange

• Has seen communication breakdowns

o She has had numerous conversations with people who have no information about accidents 

and who are left in the dark.

• There is a major difference between what can be released and what has been released by an 

accident.

• Communities and first responders should not have to search for information on chemicals and 

pollutants. It should be provided to them.

• There is a chronic accident problem in Louisiana regarding chemical accidents.

o In January 2014, there have been 62 National Response Center reports.

• LBB has an open-source tool to track these accidents.

o Pollution map that has a Website available to the public:

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 iWitness Pollution Map: http://map.labucketbrigade.org/

o Sourced to the population for social network reporting and response

o Geolocates citizen complaints

o Provides a visual of the offsite impacts of chemical accidents

o LBB uses the tool to contest the claim that accidents do not affect those communities.

• More needs to be done to protect communities from dangerous polluting neighbors.

Marcia Oursler, Louisiana Bucket Brigade (LBB) commented:

• Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) is only updated to 2012 instead of 2014.

• One month ago, community members in Shreveport, Louisiana started to complain about air quality 

issues. The TRI said there were no potential; however, an analysis by LBB disagreed.

o Air contained benzene, hydrogen sulfide, methyl ethyl ketone, chlorobenzene, n-hexane, 

propene, and toluene.

o All of these create health problems.

• LBB analysis tends to inform the communities better than any other reports or data shares.

• Communities have a right to know about the chemicals that fill their air.

• Urges OSHA to improve some issues and take some steps:

o Enhance information sharing.

o Identify additional ways to work with stakeholders to identify best practices.

o Adopt EPA’s policy for Risk Management Plan’s List of Regulated Substances.

• The Federal Government should institute the precautionary principle:

o Various chemicals should only be used if proven safe for human health.

o RMP should be adjusted to include a more thorough list of chemicals that benefit the 

welfare of both industry and surrounding communities.

• In a world where synergistic relationships are not unheard of for varying substances, it is 

increasingly important for disclosure to be in the public knowledge. 

• Mr. Barab asked a question: What is a LBB “bucket analysis?”

o Ms. Oursler responded: The LBB uses a “bucket” to pull a sample of the air for analysis. It is 

a lined bucket connected to a vacuum cleaner that will suck in and contain an air sample in 

about 3 minutes. It then uses a GCE Mass Spectrometry to analyze the information.

Steve Arendt, ABS Group, Process Safety Expert, commented:

• Addressing the panel for the third time

• There are four kinds of companies:

o Companies that know what to do and do it

o Companies that know what to do and fail

o Companies that know what to do and intentionally do not do it (criminals)

o Companies that don’t know what to do.

• Efforts should be targeted differently based on different classes of companies.

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• He endorses a number of suggestions in improving enforcement and information collection.

• Root causes are important.

• Information for proper targeting should be demanded from industry for flexible regulations.

o If companies want flexible regulations, then they should be willing to deal with providing 

more information to do so.

• The Chemical Safety Board should be leveraged for improvement. They should write accident 

reporting requirements which should lead to better performance metrics.

• Any rule changes should be used to solve the problems and fix the root causes. Solutions that do not 

fix root causes are a waste of time and money.

• Extend the stakeholder involvement process to assess written comments.

• Create a Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)-type committee in a multi-stakeholder 

environment for rulemaking feedback instead of vacuum-type rulemaking.

• Open up economic impact analysis to the light of day, especially ones done by OMB.

• Question from Mr. Barab: It takes OSHA 7–10 years to issue a regulation from an RFI. Are there any 

suggestions to speed up that process? The reason it takes so long is due to robust public input.

o Mr. Arendt responded: Unfortunately, the only way to speed up regulation implementation 

is more accidents, and he would rather that not happen. Stakeholder involvement could 

speed it up.

• Mr. Barab asked: What information should they get from companies to improve targeted 

enforcement?

o Mr. Arendt responded: Solicitation of ideas should be pulled from companies covered by 

the regulations to find those that are avoiding the regulations. This will help alleviate any 

misunderstanding of data. If we want performance-based requirements, then information 

should be provided to make it easier for the Government to create those requirements as 

well as making it fairer for industry.

• Question from Mr. Stanislaus: What is your view of disclosure of information on root cause analysis?

o Mr. Arendt responded: The PSM standard does not use root cause; it uses performance 

standard. RMP does use root cause. The standard is to now go after root causes. All PSM 

information is available at facilities to OSHA personnel. The tragedy is that 20 years of data 

is in plants but is not referenced in a suitable way. Improving activities that get better and 

higher quality information and making it available to everyone (including root causes) can 

be helpful in the future.

Marylee Orr, Louisiana Environmental Action Network, remarked:

• This has been and is still called Cancer Alley.

• The goal of the RMP is to prevent accidental releases that can cause serious harm and to mitigate 

damages that do occur.

• In Louisiana, 51.6 million pounds are allowed to be released into the air under permit exemptions,

and 12.6 million pounds are allowed to be released into the water.

• Accidental releases are very frequent.

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o These releases add to the overburden of approved exposure.

• A number of accidents were collected along the Mississippi River. During the month of January, 

there were 33 reports. In December, there were 29, and so on during previous months. The average 

release is nearly one per day. Each month there are hundreds of releases related to different types 

of oils and other pollutants that are not considered “chemical” releases. For the January releases:

o There were 38 toxic chemicals from 18 facilities.

o Exxon Mobil refinery had the most releases.

o 7 events released Benzene

o 4 events released HCl.

• Hundreds of accidental release events had detrimental health events in communities, specifically, 

from the Exxon facility.

• A corrosion specialist from a British Commonwealth company visited Louisiana. He was appalled at 

the conditions, noting that an environment like this would not be allowed in his country.

• Facilities need to be upgraded to the most up-to-date processes, procedures, and equipment.

Edward Flynn, Vice President, Health Safety and Security for Louisiana Chemical Association (LCA), 

commented:

• LCA represents 63 chemical companies in the State of Louisiana.

• The core value of every company is an unwavering commitment to community, safety, and security.

• They try to operate safely with the goal of zero accidents, but he understands that they do not have 

a perfect record.

• When accidents happen, the collective responsibility is to determine why.

• Understanding the root cause of the accident is most important to preventing a future accident.

• LCA agrees with many elements outlined in the EO, specifically in sections 3, 5, and 7.

• As responsible operators, we have an obligation to drive a culture of safety. This is the right thing to 

do, and it is the smart thing for business to do as well.

o This means engaging with other stakeholders in the chemical community.

• LCA has committees of company representatives that meet monthly.

o Safety and security are not proprietary, and these meetings are used to share information 

that is important to the EO. 

o One main goal is continuing performance improvement.

o Committees also provide an innovative way to teach a culture of safety to undergraduate 

engineers in school who will be members of the chemical industry. They partner with 

Louisiana State University and plan to expand to other schools.

• Efforts at the plant level are also important, including:

o OSHA’s Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) Program

o American Chemist Council’s (ACC) ResponsibleCare® Program

o Serious About Fostering Excellence (SAFE) Program is LCA’s voluntary program created in 

the mid-1990s to evaluate and improve performance and process safety.

• Process safety takes many forms. 

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o They share the American Chemistry Council’s views on inherently safer technology (IST).

• Question from Mr. Barab: Why do you not agree with Section 6?

o Mr. Flynn responded: This is a discussion that continues to take place within the 

organization. There will be comments submitted regarding Section 6 that cannot be 

referenced yet at this listening session.

• Question from Mr. Stanislaus: In terms of root cause analysis and information sharing, there is a 

tension between proprietary information and public awareness. What information should we 

disclose? What is the right balance?

o Mr. Flynn responded: There is a long history of a right-to-know culture in this State. There 

was a big effort in the late ‘90s when RMP was created. 9/11 has added a security 

consideration in how can we thread the needle to provide enough information for right to 

know while balancing security concerns. An Internet-ready information share is not feasible 

due to this. This is why the reading rooms were set up. A controlled fashion needs to be 

continued.

• Follow-up from Mr. Stanislaus: How can local information sharing be better done?

o Mr. Flynn responded: There is a rekindling of desire among the company to re-energize 

community advisory panels. It is not a one-size-fits-all approach, but it can be an effective 

way for plants to share information with the community directly. These panels take a lot of 

maintenance work and community support, but it is a good mechanism.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked: In terms of the outlier problem, how should the Government address it?

o Mr. Flynn responded: He was looking to the Government with the same question. Looking at 

State-based and trade-based organization are solid starts. There are probably chemical 

manufacturers in Louisiana that do not belong to his trade group. There is always a need for 

outreach to small facilities (mom and pop operations) to find outliers that may exist simply 

because they are not knowledgeable of all of the existing regulations. Additionally, LEPCs 

need to be made aware of where outlier facilities exist.

William Fontenot, private citizen, commented:

• If Mr. Flynn’s comments were correct, then there is no need for a hearing or listening session.

• In December 1984, the Union Carbide accident in India occurred. 23,000 people died due to that, 

and 150,000 people were seriously injured or still have health problems.

o Union Carbide concluded that it was a disgruntled employee who created the incident. 

What it did not mention is that 2 years earlier in Taft, Louisiana, a similar configuration of 

tanks existed and water entered the tank, creating a similar reaction. The major difference 

was that there was control equipment that brought everything under control.

• Almost all industrial accidents and injuries are preventable. There is no excuse for the kinds of 

accidents that occur.

• Workers at facilities need to know more of what they are working with and what they are standing 

next to. Very little information is adequately provided to workers (particularly contract workers) 

about potential accidents.

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• More information needs to be made available about products used in these industries to make sure 

it is being handled correctly and safely.

• Question from Mr. Barab: In terms of IST, how can we properly define and balance IST regulations?

o Mr. Fontenot responded: Part of the problem for the chemical spill in West Virginia was 

that emergency responders did not have access to spill information. It is very critical that the 

EO recommends to the President that information is made available to workers and security 

people who respond to accidents. We need to put in place less dangerous materials. 

Terry Newton, Director Safety and Compliance for Nelson Brothers, remarked:

• Comments will center on ammonium nitrate (AN) solids

• AN is the key component in blasting agents.

• Nelson Brothers has never had an injury or illness to employees or public due to AN release or 

detonation.

o They have been in business since 1956.

o This is attributed to best practices and regulatory compliance.

• They are a member of Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME).

• Supports all of the IME recommendations made to the EO, specifically:

o Support updating and strengthening 29 CFR 1910.109(i)

 Eliminate the storage of AN in combustible structures

 Advise outside emergency responders to not fight fires involving AN but should 

instead evacuate personnel and locals to a safe distance

 They believe that this is a proven bedrock of AN safety.

 This standard was violated at West, Texas.

 This recommendation is based on their focus on employees and safety, as opposed 

to materials and equipment.

o Oppose adding ammonium nitrate or other explosives to RMP.

 Division 1.1 explosives are the most sensitive; these are not regulated by RMP and 

were delisted in 1998.

 An accident of 1.1 explosive would not create a release event, and the ATF current 

regulations handle surrounding communities in such an event.

 There are no gaps in the regulation of explosives for RMP to fill.

 If 1.1 explosives are not covered, then less sensitive explosives like AN should also 

not be covered.

• Question from Mr. Stanislaus: If there are gaps, should they be filled through other programs and 

not RMP?

o Mr. Newton responded: Correct.

• Question from Mr. Barab: Should AN also not be added to PSM?

o Mr. Newton responded: Correct.

• Question from Mr. Barab: Aren’t there different ammonium nitrate regulations for explosive versus

agricultural use?

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o Mr. Newton responded: There are ATF-specific regulations, and they apply to explosives.

• Comment from Mr. Rice: ATF regulates AN storage when it is stored near a blasting agent that can 

be recognized as an explosives. AN, by itself, is not regulated by ATF.

• Question from Mr. Wulf: Could you talk a little bit about security measures in place for AN?

o Mr. Newton responded: AN and blasting agents have the same security measures. Under 

ATF regulations, they also have the same locking standards.

• Question from Mr. Stanislaus: Is his recommendation only related to explosives or to AN in general?

o Mr. Newton responded: He is referencing AN in general. There are differences from those 

of the Missouri Agribusiness group.

• Question from Mr. Wulf: Is the locking an industry standard?

o Mr. Newton responded: It is an industry standard and an ATF standard as related to blasting 

agents.

• Question from Mr. Rice: Should the locking standard be across the board?

o Mr. Newton responded: Certainly, for security purposes, yes.

Rick Vance, Nelson Brothers, remarked:

• Nelson Brothers is not a manufacturer of AN, but they are an end user in the mining industry.

• Explosives operations use a large amount of AN. It can be manned safely and properly.

• He will focus on security recommendations:

o Along with IME, they support the push of a supplemental proposal of rulemaking prior to 

final rulemaking on the Ammonium Nitrate Security Program.

 Nothing in the current proposal relates to the good housekeeping standards OSHA 

promotes and are related to current best practices.

 The DHS proposal for registration and vetting will not work for the explosives 

industry due to bulk shipping.

 A transportation interface is essential. The chain of custody procedures oversteps 

TSA authority to determine the security risk of those engaged in AN transportation.

 We should not overlay redundant registration and vetting systems over the existing 

ATF standards and systems that already vet and determine who is appropriate to 

possess such explosives.

 Urge DHS to address the unique operating conditions

• Use ATF, CFATS, or explosives vetting as sufficient under the proposed AN 

Security Program.

 It is inappropriate to finalize the proposal in the midst of the EO process.

o ATF should have access to criminal background checks and other vetting and registration 

systems.

o Encourage the ATF to close the so-called terror gap.

 Federal law does not require ATF to allow people with “positive hits” access to 

explosives materials—it only penalizes after these individuals receive access to 

explosives materials.

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 IME thinks this is an inadvertent oversight when the Safe Explosives Act was 

enacted.

 Presidents Bush and Obama have asked for the gap to be closed.

• Question from Mr. Wulf: He appreciates the comments on AN rulemaking. Transporters are a major 

issue, and DHS wants to align with ATF. Given that there is a gap in the ATF authorities relating to 

AN, how should we address the gap as we continue to wait for other gaps that still exist?

o Mr. Vance responded: He is not sure how to close the gap in the interim period due to the 

fact that it takes regulations through the system. He would need help on answering that 

question.

Christine Bennett, Mossville, Louisiana resident, Mossville Environmental Action Now (MEAN), 

commented:

• She is wearing a mask because her white blood cell count has dropped.

• Her doctors only know antibiotics and not chemical releases.

• Revelation 11:18 is her answer to the President.

• They are living in a kill-zone among all of the chemical plants.

• She asked if the facilitator or the panel is being paid by industry.

• Sasol is now coming to Mossville as well, and they are not regulated yet. The Mossville community is 

hoping that Sasol will not receive the permits.

• Wants Mossville to be relocated before Sasol is permitted to establish themselves in the community.

• Why isn’t there a toxicologist available to communities where fenceline issues are prevalent?

• Why are records only kept for a few years locally after a release instead of as permanent records 

that are electronically based and available to the public?

• There needs to be a better way to record accidents and releases and have access to them 24/7.

• Requests that Sasol is not allowed to come to Mossville before permits are granted to the company

Delmar Bennett, Mossville resident, MEAN, remarked:

• He has some new ideas that he was not able to present previously.

• In terms of security, terrorists are a problem.

• However, he feels that residents are actually being attacked by the plants themselves because the 

air they breathe is toxic.

• During shelter-in-place, why has it not been established that communities cannot be issued 

something like masks until shelter-in-place is called off?

• In terms of a water system, can filtration be provided after accidents or release issues?

• The companies are the ones that report to the EPA and other agencies about plant issues. Should 

there be a regulation that plants are be required to stay ahead of their potential issues?

• Mr. Barab commented that there is a mechanical integrity requirement that does require plants to 

stay ahead of potential issues.

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• Question from Mr. Stanislaus: How is the community currently notified when shelter-in-place is 

called and how many people follow those instructions?

o Mr. Bennett responded: There is a horn that blows. It is tested once per week (Tuesday at 

12 PM). The numbers are impossible to track. Additionally, many people don’t know exactly 

what the horn means. Education is only done by word-of-mouth.

Lt. Gen, Russel Honore, Ret., Green Army, remarked:

• Moved to Louisiana 4 years ago and got involved with the Green Army

• There is an early 19th-century governance in Louisiana creating a 21st-century threat.

• Facilities are abusing our human rights by hurting the environment.

• Fines are negotiable, and that is a problem. This system needs to be strengthened when it is found 

that facilities are negligent.

• Self-regulation needs to be fixed. The State allows this, and it is unacceptable.

• This is a high flood-prone area, and no known flood protection exists with more than 100 chemical 

plants.

• Plants are so close that there could be chain reactions, creating a weapon of mass destruction issue.

• These facilities do not have environmental impact statements.

o He stated that during his time with the Army, he needed an environmental impact 

statement for everything he did. Why does this same concept not exist for these plants?

• There should be a Federal EPA Command and Control Center in the State of Louisiana due to the 

large amount of plants and volume of chemical products between Baton Rouge and New Orleans.

The Federal EPA office should be a Command and Control Center.

• There needs to be a better alert system.

o Horns are not appropriate. What about a reverse 911 concept?

o There is no requirement for community training. 

• What happened to an automated system alerting that releases have occurred and notifying

community members immediately?

• There should be a black box concept established during releases and responses.

• Health monitoring should be provided.

• EPA should have a monitoring number where public can report.

• “Smell something, say something” should be the new moniker.

• They need a Justice Department review. Release issues are criminal and should be treated as such.

• A Federal inspector should exist per plant 24 hours per day.

• By and large these are good companies. They just do bad things.

Open Comment Period

Ronald Carriger, Mossville resident and member of MEAN, remarked:

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• In terms of shelter-in-place, it is a pointless measure because most houses are not going to be 

able to seal out the chemical during a release.

• In response to being told to move away, it is not always that easy.

Wilma Subra, Subra Company and Louisiana Environmental Action Network, commented:

• Her open comment statements are a continuation of her earlier comments.

• Upstream oil and gas production facilities store many chemicals and harm the environment. 

Excess threshold quantities are exceeded; however, they are not regulated in that fashion. 

These facilities also store and process flammable mixtures and have explosions and/or fires on a 

fairly frequent basis, particularly production well sites and injection well sites.

• Unit trains transport shale oil and tar sand from North Dakota and Canada, respectively, to the 

Gulf Coast facilities and refineries. These trains’ rail lines are in desperate need of repair. They 

are located near residential communities and two-lane streets.

• Flowback water and waste from shale development are being transported to Louisiana for 

disposal by barge now as well, and they are going to have to deal with it.

• The EPA and Department of Transportation should monitor and address risks associated with

the transportation and storage of fracturing waste stream.

• The EPA RMP should address these waste streams. EPA needs to monitor the industrial facilities 

and enforce rules and regulations.

• Sufficient resources need to be provided to these Federal organizations to actually address 

these issues and to protect associated workers and communities.

• If the risk to communities cannot be reduced, then adequate buffer zones need to be created 

and communities relocated to compensate.

• Question from Mr. Stanislaus: In terms of adequate buffer zones, how would they be 

implemented?

o Ms. Subra responded: State agencies have a small distance established based on 

injection well or landfill. The vulnerable zone is much larger than the current standard. 

Any buffer zone should be based on the vulnerable zone and not based on current 

regulations.

Marylee Orr, Louisiana Environmental Action Network (LEAN), remarked:

• Addressed issue of citizen monitoring

o Regulatory and enforcement arms currently have limited resources.

o Citizen monitoring is an excellent way to fill the ability and resource gap that is left after 

Federal regulatory budget cuts.

• It is unacceptable that facilities intimidate citizens attempting to monitor facilities under 

homeland security considerations.

• Industry in Louisiana uses security as an excuse to not document environmental disruptions.

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• Many who document environmental issues are threatened and harassed under homeland 

security issues.

• LEAN encourages Federal agencies to take appropriate action to protect the health and wellbeing of chemical facility workers and communities.

• Communication is the key to everything. There is not enough communication.

• The issue of buffer zones is something they feel very strongly about.

• Relocation needs to be done rightly and justly when needed.

• Shelter-in-place is not dealt with properly, and she would like to create more dialogue with that 

in the future.

• Question from Mr. Barab: Several speakers have mentioned worker hazards. Why have many 

workers not testified?

o Ms. Orr responded: Workers feel very intimidated by companies in filing OSHA reports. 

Their NGO has created an environment where people can approach them, but that is 

not the norm in the corporate environment. Someone said to her once, “I sell my body 

for so much an hour to feed my family,” and that is not right.

Delmar Bennett, Mossville resident, MEAN, remarked:

• He has been a plant worker and knows many plant workers.

• Plant workers truly feel that they have arrived in life and have reached a goal in life that puts 

them above other people. As a result, they are willing to die to remain in that status.

• Most plant workers get to a point in life where they are actually able to adapt to the chemical 

inhalation until they are about 65 years old. Upon retirement, their body takes a shock, and they 

go through many changes.

Lt. Gen, Russel Honore, Ret., Green Army, remarked:

• It should be against the law to state that jobs would be lost if regulations are increased.

• We need to look at the Federal level to determine what lean management and production truly 

means.

o As a result, most workers are subcontractors, and institutional knowledge is lost at 

plants. This can cause major structural and process issues at older plants.

• There needs to be a minimal safety zone surrounding a plant.

• We need rules similar to those of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for plant operation,

including no-notice inspections.

o There is no requirement in Louisiana for bonding to run a chemical plant.

 If you are going to build a plant, then you can cover a loss created by an 

accident at the plant.

Terry Newton, Nelson Brothers, commented:

• He wanted to expand on the PSM statement.

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• OSHA excluded blasting agents from PSM because it is highly unlikely that a mass explosion will 

occur.

• AN does pose a threat that the PSM is intended to address.

• If AN blasting agents are managed properly under current OSHA regulations, workers, first 

responders, and the public are adequately protected.

• Additional regulations will not prevent future tragedies; rather, existing regulations coupled 

with best practices need to be better implemented and communicated.

• Outlier topic:

o The company feels that this can be address by working with the local emergency 

response community.

o The question is how to identify these so-called outliers. This can be best done through 

emergency responders as the eyes and ears.

o DHS can leverage FEMA resources to better train emergency responders as a conduit to 

provide outreach identification.

• It is Nelson Brothers’ practice to invite local emergency responders to trainings on their facility 

to better understand their business and risks.

• Most emergency responders want to know these things. An invitation and engagement is the 

most important.

• Statement from Mr. Barab: He is surprised to hear that AN does not provide a risk that should 

be regulated under PSM standards based on the results of West, Texas.

o Mr. Newton responded: The product that exploded was not just AN, and the studies 

claim that it was AN in addition to other components.

• Mr. Barab asked: What is the logic that contaminations should not be covered by PSM?

o Mr. Newton responded: 100% pure AN chemical on its own should not be covered by 

PSM, but contaminants should be considered. In their industry, contamination does not 

occur. Contaminants creates bad product.

• Question from Mr. Stanislaus: How should we look at LEPCs as a vehicle for outliers when they 

are staffed by volunteers?

o Mr. Newton responded: There are obvious limited resources, but local emergency 

responders (fire, police, etc.) know that community better than anybody and should be 

leveraged to understand what may fly under the radar for larger regulatory 

organizations. He does not know how to exactly fund that.

• Follow-up from Mr. Stanislaus: Each of the major trade groups has codes and different thirdparty auditing standards. How much of that capacity can be brought to the LEPC level for their 

effective distribution to outliers?

o Mr. Newton responded: As a member of IME, they are in support of working with local 

emergency response groups. They are not able to fund anything but are more than 

happy to work with them.

Steven Taylor, Missouri Agribusiness Association (MAA) remarked:

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• Regarding the outlier discussion, MAA have been tackling that by attempting to leverage other 

databases.

o Missouri sales tax database

o Missouri registration database

• He encourages his membership to engage other competitors that are not members and to 

communicate that information to the LEPCs.

• In regards to PSM, they approach it according to how chemicals are cooked. They focus on 

storage only.

o Contamination is an issue. How is that handled?

o They focus their energy in their industry on storage guidelines and not necessarily PSM.

• In regards to wooden bins, there is not a one-size-fits-all concept. He has members who have 

huge quantities of AN, but someone on the edge of town has a smaller amount of AN.

o Engaging LEPCs with an emergency response plan and communicating how that facility 

can be tackled in case of an emergency is necessary. 

• In terms of AN fires, they will engage a fire, but if the fire is close to AN, then it will not be 

engaged.

• Question from Mr. Stanislaus: Operationally, if a local responder has knowledge that AN is 

there, why would they ever fight that fire?

o Mr. Taylor responded: If the facility is spread out over a quarter mile, and a small 

building fire is several hundred yards from the AN storage, then it should be fought. If 

the fire is closer to AN, then it should be avoided. This is why a layout of the facility 

should be shared with the LEPC so they can coordinate emergency response for 

containment, evacuation, etc.

• Follow-up from Mr. Stanislaus: The challenge is making sure that emergency responders actually 

have that information.

o Mr. Taylor responded: He recognizes that LEPCs have limited resources, and he thinks 

that regional meetings and bringing groups together to identify needed capabilities is a 

good first step, especially in rural areas.

• Question from Mr. Barab: One-size-fits-all is always a problem with regulatory standards, but in 

terms of OSHA, they are more concerned about the facility and not necessarily the surrounding 

community. They do treat each facility as a single unit.

o Mr. Taylor added: It is worker safety as well identifying when to properly attack an AN 

fire.

Mr. White adjourned the afternoon session to reconvene at 6 PM for the 2 hour evening session.

Evening Session Registered Speakers

• There were no pre-registered speakers for the evening session.

Evening Session Open Comment Period

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Baton Rouge, LA
• There were no speakers for the open comment period during the evening session.

Closing Comments

• Jordan Barab addressed the audience:

o The intent behind the sections is to get public input and build them into a report for the 

President.

o The working group is still taking comments on the option paper, the Request for 

Information (RFI) revision, and the OSHA’s PSM standards modernization.

o Everything can be reviewed 

at https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/index.html on the Chemical Security 

Executive Order page.

o Reiterated that written comments are appreciated

The last session in Newark is scheduled for next Thursday, February 27.

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 22

February 19, 2014

Baton Rouge, LA
Participant Analysis 

Stakeholder Group

2/19/2014 

Baton 

Rouge, LA

Chemical Producer 2

Ag Supply 0

Chemical Storage 2

State/Local Regulator 0

First Responder 0

Media 2

Owner/Operator 1

Industry Association 3

Labor Organization 0

Federal Representative 5

Environment/Community 17

Consensus Organization 0

Other: 1

Citizen 2

Education 0

Security 1

Vendor 0

State/Local 1

Tribal 0

Health/Research 0

TOTAL

(Attended In-Person) 37

Conference Call 55

Attended (InPerson & Conf Call) 92

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 23

February 19, 2014

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Executive Order 13650

Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security

February 19, 2014 Listening Session 

Hosted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the 

Department of Labor (DoL) 

Location: Louisiana State Police Training Academy, 7901 Independence Blvd, Baton Rouge, LA 70806

Agenda

12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m. Registration

1:00 p.m. – 1:35 p.m. Welcome, Introductions, and Overview

Patrick White, Facilitator

Jordan Barab, OSHA, Executive Order 13650 Working Group Co-Chair

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Mathy Stanislaus, EPA, Executive Order 13650 Working Group Co-Chair

Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response 

Dave Wulf, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Infrastructure Protection

Matt Wren, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) 

Overview Section 6a

Lisa Long, OSHA

1:35 p.m. – 1:50 p.m. Listening Session Format

Patrick White, Facilitator

1:50 p.m. – 5:00 p.m. Comments from Listening Session Participants

5:00 p.m. – 6:00 p.m. BREAK

6:00 p.m. – 6:20 p.m. EO Overview

Jordan Barab, OSHA, Executive Order 13650 Working Group Co-Chair

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Overview Section 6a

Lisa Long, OSHA

6:20 p.m. – 6:25 p.m. Listening Session Format

Patrick White, Facilitator

6:25 p.m. – 7:50 p.m. Comments from Listening Session Participants

7:50 p.m. – 8:00 p.m. Closing Remarks

Jordan Barab, OSHA, Executive Order 13650 Working Group Co-Chair

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety and Health Administration

8:00 p.m. Adjournment

Persons also may submit written comments to NPPD/ISCD/Mailstop 0610, Department of Homeland Security, 245

Murray Lane, SW, Arlington, VA 20598-0610. Comments will also be accepted by email 

at: EO.Chemical@hq.dhs.gov or through the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov.

For more information on EO 13650, please visit https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/index.html

and https://www.dhs.gov/topic/chemical-security.