RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0693-22 

T.L.,1

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

J.D.S., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

___________________________

Submitted on March 20, 2024 – Decided April 16, 2024 

Before Judges Firko and Vanek. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket 

No. FV-20-1352-22. 

Carlos Diaz-Cobo, attorney for appellant. 

Gomperts McDermott & Von Ellen, LLC, attorneys for 

respondent (Marisa Lepore Hovanec, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

1

 We use initials to protect the parties' privacy and the confidentiality of these

proceedings in accordance with Rule 1:38-3(d)(10). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0693-22

Defendant J.D.S. appeals from a September 23, 2022 amended final 

restraining order (FRO) entered against him, and in favor of his wife, plaintiff 

T.L., pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 

2C:25-17 to -35. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his 

request to consider a fifty-five-minute audio recording and certain photographs 

at the FRO hearing and improperly concluded that plaintiff needed a FRO to 

protect her from defendant. Based on our careful review of the record, we 

conclude defendant has not shown the trial court's evidential rulings were an 

abuse of discretion. Since plaintiff established the need for a FRO for her 

protection from defendant, we affirm. 

I. 

On March 1, 2022, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order 

(TRO) against defendant on plaintiff's complaint predicated on defendant's 

physical assault of plaintiff and threat to kill her during the course of an 

argument that occurred earlier that day. Plaintiff filed an amended domestic 

violence complaint and an amended TRO was entered on March 8, 2022, 

detailing: (1) assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1, as the sole predicate act; (2) one prior 

incident of domestic violence between the parties in May 2021 which had not 

been reported to law enforcement; (3) defendant's criminal history; and (4) that 
3 A-0693-22

defendant was arrested for simple assault stemming from this incident. The 

amended TRO prohibited defendant from: returning to the residence, engaging 

in future acts of domestic violence against plaintiff, communicating with 

plaintiff, stalking, following or threatening her, and possessing firearms or other 

weapons. 

On March 22, 2022, plaintiff filed a second amended domestic violence 

complaint, adding the predicate acts of terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3; 

harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4; and false imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3. 

Plaintiff also expanded the factual basis for relief, setting forth that defendant 

would not allow her to leave the room she was in, ripped clothing from her body 

and took her cell phone. The second amended complaint also detailed additional 

past instances of domestic violence, including: in 2020, defendant threw a lamp 

at plaintiff; in September 2021, defendant chased plaintiff from their home and 

repeatedly hit and kicked the car she retreated to for safety; and in December 

2021, defendant blocked plaintiff from exiting a bathroom she had sheltered in 

after defendant chased her around the house. A second amended TRO was 

entered based upon the additional allegations. 

On April 14, 2022, the trial court began a hearing (the FRO hearing), 

which continued on May 3, 2022. Both parties were represented by counsel and 
4 A-0693-22

testified. No other witnesses were called. At the outset of the hearing, the trial 

court found it had jurisdiction to consider the entry of a FRO under the PDVA, 

since plaintiff and defendant were married on February 13, 2021, and resided 

together until the March 1, 2022 occurrence. 

Plaintiff testified at the FRO hearing that on March 1, 2022, she and 

defendant were having an argument when defendant snatched her cell phone 

from her hand and said "[t]his is my phone, b[*]tch." Plaintiff retrieved her iPad 

and retreated into a walk-in closet. Defendant followed, grabbed plaintiff's iPad, 

and said "[t]his is mine too, b*tch." Plaintiff testified that defendant then stood 

in the doorway of the closet and would not move to allow her to leave. 

Defendant yelled obscenities at her prior to running towards her to "flatten" her, 

grabbing her, and saying "I will f[*]cking kill you," before headbutting her. 

Defendant let plaintiff go after she said she was going to call the police. 

Plaintiff testified that defendant appeared to pretend to cry. After plaintiff 

asked if he was "fake crying," defendant grabbed her, threw her into a dresser 

and "choked her up," causing her to yell and scream "get off me." Defendant 

grabbed her shirt, ripping it before taking hold of her and pushing her into 

shelves, which came crashing down on both of them. 
5 A-0693-22

Plaintiff screamed for defendant to get off of her and then tried to run out 

of the room. As she was attempting to take her phone back, defendant picked 

plaintiff up and threw her on the bed. When he did that, plaintiff attempted to 

gouge his eyes out and defendant picked her up off the bed and threw her into a 

wall. Plaintiff spit on defendant and he called her a "stupid b[*]tch" and grabbed 

her so that she could not move. Defendant then yelled obscenities at plaintiff, 

and, in return, plaintiff spit at him several times and screamed back at him. 

Attempting to restrain plaintiff, defendant "slam[med] [her] body to the 

chair." This hurt plaintiff's back, and she began to cry. Defendant let her go, 

called her a stupid b[*]tch, took her iPhone and iPad, and left the house. There 

happened to be police officers outside the house in a construction area and they 

came to help plaintiff. 

Plaintiff's attorney moved several photographs depicting plaintiff's 

injuries into evidence. The trial court sua sponte ruled additional photographs 

of the same injuries were inadmissible as cumulative. When plaintiff's counsel 

used these additional photographs of plaintiff's injuries later in the trial during 

cross-examination to ask defendant about specific injuries plaintiff suffered, 

defense counsel did not object. 
6 A-0693-22

Plaintiff testified to the following prior incidents of domestic violence: 

(1) in May 2021, defendant grabbed her and left a permanent mark on her arm 

by body slamming her and causing her back injury; (2) in September 2021, 

defendant kicked the car she was hiding in and yelled obscenities, (3) in 

December 2021, defendant blocked her from going outside of her house; and (4) 

defendant threw a lamp at her in 2020. Plaintiff testified she was seeking a FRO 

since she was fearful of defendant. 

On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that she told the police on March 

1, 2022 that defendant had called her a "b[*]tch." Defense counsel attempted to 

play a fifty-five-minute audio recording of an interaction between plaintiff and 

police officers during which counsel alleged plaintiff did not relay this 

information. Counsel sought to impeach plaintiff's credibility with the 

recording, but the trial court sustained plaintiff's objection due to the length of 

the recording and since the evidence was only minimally relevant. The 

statement related only to the predicate act of harassment and was not dispositive 

because plaintiff had spoken with the officers numerous times and all of their 

conversations were not captured on the proffered audio. 

Defendant testified the parties had an argument that began in another part 

of the house and ended up with them continuing the argument in the closet. 
7 A-0693-22

Plaintiff attempted to walk out of the closet and defendant put his hands on 

plaintiff's waist intending to give her a hug and she "took a swing" at him 

resulting in defendant "grab[bing] her arms" and asking whether "she had lost 

her mind." Defendant admitted he "c[ould]" have grabbed plaintiff's shirt when 

this happened. Defendant testified that he held her arms down for a while and 

when he let go she tried to kick him, so he grabbed her arms again to hold her 

down. Defendant testified that his only physical contact with plaintiff was 

"[m]ostly restraining her," and he did not falsely imprison her nor did he act 

with an intent to harass her, kick, or shove her. Instead, he grabbed her to try 

and stop the altercation. 

During direct examination of defendant, counsel attempted to elicit 

testimony establishing that plaintiff did not fear defendant. Defendant testified 

that plaintiff gouged his eyes and his physical conduct was for self-defense. He 

asserted that he did not physically imprison plaintiff, kick, shove, offensively 

touch or harass her. On cross-examination, defense counsel did not object to 

plaintiff's counsel playing three audio recordings, including one where 

defendant admitted pushing plaintiff. 

Defendant testified that when he moved back into the residence after the 

TRO was entered, he learned that plaintiff had moved out, taking her belongings 
8 A-0693-22

and those of her daughter.2 He saw that there was some damage, stating there 

were "tons of dishes broken, the bed was broken, some of [his] items were 

missing" and there were "a lot of things that needed to be cleaned up and thrown 

away based on the damage left in the house." Plaintiff's counsel objected based 

on relevancy and defense counsel argued in response that "[t]he conduct of 

[plaintiff] while she was departing the marital home, knowing that [defendant] 

was going to be moving back in . . . directly contradict[s] the idea or the belief 

that [plaintiff] . . . needed a [FRO] to protect herself from [defendant]." The 

trial court did not strike the testimony, but sustained the objection to defendant 

moving photographs of the damage into evidence, finding that the condition of 

the house after the TRO was entered was not relevant. 

Defendant also proffered photographs of scratches around his eye and 

eyelid as the result of the altercation with plaintiff on March 1, 2022, but the 

trial court precluded the introduction of additional photos as cumulative. 

Defendant initially denied any prior domestic violence incidences occurred. 

However, after plaintiff's counsel played an audio recording, defendant admitted 

2

 The record is unclear as to the age of plaintiff's daughter, as well as her 

relationship to defendant. 
9 A-0693-22

pushing plaintiff across the room in May 2021 stating, "I admit that I pushed 

her." 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered the requested FRO 

finding plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence the predicate acts of 

assault and harassment, as well as the need for entry of a FRO to protect her 

from defendant. The trial court found that although plaintiff alleged harassment, 

terroristic threats, assault, and false imprisonment as predicate acts, only one 

predicate act must be established in order for a FRO to be issued. The trial court 

found that plaintiff established by a preponderance of the credible evidence that 

defendant attempted to cause, or purposely, knowingly or recklessly caused 

bodily injury sufficient to constitute simple assault. The trial court found 

plaintiff to be a more credible witness than defendant and, as a result, concluded 

that defendant injured her. 

The trial court also found that plaintiff established the predicate act of 

harassment based upon defendant's conduct. The trial court found plaintiff's 

audio recordings lacked credibility since she was the only one aware the 

conversation was being recorded and, thus, she could adjust her behavior 

accordingly. Since the trial court found that assault and harassment were 
10 A-0693-22

established by a preponderance of the credible evidence, it stated that there was 

no need to address terroristic threats or false imprisonment. 

The trial court rejected defendant's assertion that the March 1, 2022 

occurrence was a mutual fight, in light of the history of domestic violence 

between the parties which was established through plaintiff's credible testimony. 

The trial court found plaintiff credible as to the May, August and September, 

2021 domestic violence incidents between the parties and the prior incidents 

involving defendant's former spouses or girlfriends. The trial court found 

defendant less credible since he was sometimes evasive and he attempted to 

contradict his admission to throwing plaintiff across the room, which was 

confirmed in an audio recording. 

The trial court found that a FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from 

immediate danger and to prevent further abuse. The arguments that the FRO 

was not needed because the parties were getting divorced were rejected by the 

trial court because it did not mean that defendant would not have an opportunity 

to contact plaintiff, especially since they have children together. The trial court 

cited A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 N.J. Super. 402 (App. Div. 2016), in support of its 

conclusion that plaintiff fleeing the marital home and no longer being in 

immediate danger are not factors weighing against the issuance of a FRO under 
11 A-0693-22

Silver.3 As a result, the trial court ruled that because of the history of domestic 

violence, and the nature of the predicate offenses, a FRO was necessary to 

prevent further abuse, regardless of whether the parties divorce. 

After the decision was rendered, plaintiff's counsel told the trial court she 

intended to file a certification of services in support of a request for an order 

compelling defendant to pay for plaintiff's counsel fees. The court instructed 

that plaintiff's counsel was to make defendant's counsel aware when these 

documents were filed and to follow the proper court processes and procedures 

for doing so.4

 

On September 23, 2022, the trial court entered an amended FRO awarding 

$5,950 in counsel fees as compensatory damages under the PDVA payable by 

defendant to plaintiff's counsel, within thirty days. Defendant appeals from the 

September 23, 2022 amended FRO. 

II. 

Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in prohibiting 

defendant from playing an audio tape purporting to show that plaintiff's 

testimony was untruthful and barring defendant's use of photographs allegedly 

3

 Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (2006). 

4

 The record is unclear as to when plaintiff's certification of services was filed. 
12 A-0693-22

showing damage to defendant's belongings after the TRO was entered. 

Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly found "the FRO was 

necessary." 

Plaintiff argues that defendant improperly appealed only the September 

23, 2022 amended FRO, which added a counsel fee award and, therefore, we do 

not need to address the merits of the May 3, 2022 FRO. We are unconvinced 

that we should view defendant's appeal so narrowly. The September 23, 2022 

amended FRO incorporates the FRO protections entered on May 3, 2022, 

coupled with the fee award. Thus, it is appropriate for us to consider whether 

the trial court erred in granting the FRO relief on May 3, 2022, which was reentered by way of the September 23, 2022 amended FRO. 

III. 

Appellate review of a trial court's decision to enter a FRO in a domestic 

violence matter is limited. Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. 116, 121 (App. 

Div. 2005). "A reviewing court is bound by the trial court's findings 'when 

supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting Cesare 

v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). "This deferential standard is even more 

appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of 

credibility.'" L.M.F. v. J.A.F., Jr., 421 N.J. Super. 523, 533 (App. Div. 2011) 
13 A-0693-22

(quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)). A trial 

judge who observes witnesses and listens to their testimony is in the best 

position to "make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who

appear on the stand." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 

104 (2008). 

Further, we "accord particular deference to the Family Part because of its 

'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. 

Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413). "Reversal 

is warranted only when a mistake must have been made because the trial court's 

factual findings are '"so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the 

competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests 

of justice."'" Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 433 (App. Div. 2015) 

(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 

(1974)). However, we review de novo "the trial judge's legal conclusions, and 

the application of those conclusions to the facts." Ibid. (quoting Reese v. Weis, 

430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)). 

Rulings as to the admissibility of evidence or testimony are also governed 

by an abuse of discretion standard. Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 

551 (2019). Therefore, we "review a trial court's evidentiary ruling only for a 
14 A-0693-22

'clear error in judgment.'" State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020) (quoting 

State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017)). The de novo standard of review only 

governs where the trial court applies the incorrect legal standard to decide an 

evidential objection. Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190, 214 (App. Div. 

2021). See Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 

(2011). 

IV. 

 We address defendant's argument that the trial court's evidential rulings 

deprived him of a fair hearing. Defendant first posits that the trial court 

improperly ruled that it would not consider a fifty-five-minute audio tape of a 

conversation between plaintiff and two police officers evidencing plaintiff never 

alleged defendant called her a "b[*]tch" to show her testimony was untruthful. 

Defendant also argues the trial court erred in not allowing testimony and photos 

which he contends establish plaintiff was not in "fear for her life" and did not 

need a FRO to protect her from defendant. 

 As to the video recording, defendant has not established the trial court 

abused its discretion in precluding defendant from playing a fifty-five-minute 

audio tape which would have established, at best, only that plaintiff did not 

complain to the police that defendant specifically called her a "b[*]tch" on 
15 A-0693-22

March 1, 2022. There were other conversations between plaintiff and various 

police officers regarding the March 1, 2022 event in which she may have relayed 

this expletive. As a result, under N.J.R.E. 403, the probative value of the 

evidence was substantially outweighed by interests of judicial efficiency in not 

allowing a lengthy audio tape to be played. 

Nor has defendant established the trial court abused its discretion in 

precluding him from using photographs to establish plaintiff was not in fear of 

him because his personal property, including clothing, was in disarray in the 

apartment when he arrived to retrieve it post-TRO. Even if plaintiff damaged 

defendant's clothing, the photographs of damaged clothing bore no relevance 

under N.J.R.E. 401 to the issues before the court. There was no abuse of 

discretion in the determination not to permit the photographs. 

V.

In light of our conclusions regarding the evidential issues, we need only 

briefly discuss defendant's generalized argument that the amended FRO was 

improperly entered. 

Defendant does not take issue with the applicability of the PDVA or the 

finding of the predicate acts of assault and harassment. He only contends the 
16 A-0693-22

trial court erred in finding that a FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from 

further acts of domestic violence. 

We begin by acknowledging that the purpose of the PDVA is to "assure 

the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law 

can provide." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting 

State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492, 504 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting N.J.S.A. 

2C:25-18)). Consequently, "[o]ur law is particularly solicitous of victims of 

domestic violence," J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 473 (2011) (alteration in 

original) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997)), and courts will 

"liberally construe[] [the Act] to achieve its salutary purposes." Cesare, 154 

N.J. at 400. 

In order for a FRO to be entered, the two prongs under Silver must be 

satisfied. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27. First, the court "must determine 

whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, 

that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has 

occurred." Id. at 125. Satisfaction of this prong is not at issue here. 

If a court finds a predicate act occurred, "the judge must [next] determine 

whether a restraining order is necessary to protect the plaintiff from future 

danger or threats of violence." D.M.R. v. M.K.G., 467 N.J. Super. 308, 322 
17 A-0693-22

(App. Div. 2021). This is done by "an evaluation of the factors set forth in 

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6)." J.D., 207 N.J. at 475-76 (quoting Silver, 

387 N.J. Super. at 127). The factors which the court should consider, if 

applicable, include but are not limited to: 

(1) The previous history of domestic violence between 

the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, 

harassment and physical abuse; 

(2) The existence of immediate danger to person or 

property; 

(3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and 

defendant; 

(4) The best interests of the victim and any child;

(5) In determining custody and parenting time the 

protection of the victim's safety; and 

(6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection 

from another jurisdiction. 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).] 

"[W]hether the victim fears the defendant" is an additional factor the trial 

court may consider. G.M., 453 N.J. Super. at 13 (quoting Carfagno v. Carfagno, 

288 N.J. Super. 424, 435 (Ch. Div. 1995)). The trial court must determine, 

pursuant to the totality of the circumstances, whether the FRO is necessary "to 

protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Silver, 
18 A-0693-22

387 N.J. Super. at 127; see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b) (stating "the court shall 

grant any relief necessary to prevent further abuse"). The inquiry is necessarily 

fact specific. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127-28.

Although the trial court is not required to incorporate all of these factors 

in its findings, "the [PDVA] does require that 'acts claimed by a plaintiff to be 

domestic violence . . . be evaluated in light of the previous history of violence 

between the parties.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. at 401-02 (quoting Peranio, 280 N.J. 

Super. at 54). Whether a restraining order should be issued depends on the 

seriousness of the predicate offense, on "the previous history of domestic 

violence between the plaintiff and defendant including previous threats, 

harassment and physical abuse," and on "whether immediate danger to the 

person or property is present." Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 248 

(App. Div. 1995). 

The trial court must exercise care "to distinguish between ordinary 

disputes and disagreements between family members and those acts that cross 

the line into domestic violence." R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 225 (App. 

Div. 2017). The PDVA is not intended to encompass "ordinary domestic 

contretemps." Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. at 250. Rather, "the [PDVA] is 

intended to assist those who are truly the victims of domestic violence." Silver, 
19 A-0693-22

387 N.J. Super. at 124 (quoting Kamen v. Egan, 322 N.J. Super. 222, 229 (App. 

Div. 1999)). 

The trial court did not err in concluding the second Silver prong was 

established based upon consideration of the applicable factors set forth in 

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a), in addition to whether plaintiff fears defendant. The 

previous history of domestic violence between the parties, the threats of danger 

to plaintiff on March 1, 2022, and plaintiff's best interests as a victim of 

domestic violence all support the issuance of the FRO. A FRO is also necessary 

to protect plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence based on plaintiff's 

credible testimony that she was fearful of defendant, who had purposefully tried 

to physically harm her on prior occasions and had the opportunity to do so in 

the future. 

The multiple prior acts of domestic violence between the parties are 

engrained in the fabric of their relatively short marriage. Plaintiff testified to 

various physical altercations and actions taken by defendant to control her 

through intimidation and violence. Defendant admitted to prior physical 

altercations. The record in this case clearly depicts a history of physical violence 

between the parties, which weighs in favor of the entry of a FRO to protect 

against future abuse. 
20 A-0693-22

At the FRO hearing, plaintiff confirmed that she was in fact afraid of 

defendant because he has been physically violent to her. During the March 1, 

2022 incident, defendant threatened to kill plaintiff. The trial court's credibility 

determinations based upon the testimony at the hearing are afforded deference. 

We are convinced based upon the credible evidence in the record that the trial 

court did not err in concluding a FRO is necessary to protect plaintiff from 

defendant. 

Our consideration of the FRO hearing record, along with the trial court's 

credibility findings, and an evaluation of applicable factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 

2C:25-29(a), as required by prong two of Silver, supports entry of the September 

23, 2022 amended FRO. Therefore, we affirm the September 23, 2022 amended 

FRO, finding that it is necessary to protect plaintiff from future danger or threats 

of violence from defendant. 

 Affirmed.