Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB, FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

Countering terrorism is very hard. Countering it across global 

and regional geographic boundaries is even harder. Also, 

as increasingly powerful technologies become available 

to terrorists, the consequences of failing to surmount their 

adaptiveness and agility become much larger. It is vital to 

recognize that, despite some very impressive progress that 

the United States and the international community have 

made in combating terrorism since 9/11, we still struggle as a 

global community with the creation of durable, permanent 

solutions, and outcomes against it. This important publication urges consideration of how we might be able to find 

better pathways, better solutions, and better designs into 

the future. The future will not wait for us.

ISBN 978-1-941715-36-9

Countering Transregional Terrorism 

Edited by Peter McCabe

Foreword by Lieutenant General Michael K. Nagata

JSOU Report 18-5

JSOU Report 18-5 Countering Transregional Terrorism 

PHOTO BY DIZAIN/SHUTTERSTOCK
Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Command Historian, CANSOFCOM Education 

and Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 

Air University and JSOU Senior Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University and the 

Center for Strategic Studies

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU mission 

is to prepare SOF to shape the future strategic environment by providing 

specialized joint professional military education, developing SOF-specific 

undergraduate and graduate level curriculum and by fostering special operations research, analysis and outreach in support of USSOCOM objectives. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) 

where efforts center upon the USSOCOM mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Francis X. Reidy, Interim Director, Center for Strategic Studies

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor

Elizabeth Sylvester, B.S., Journalism, JSOU Press Assistant Editor

Resident Senior Fellows

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs

David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics

Christopher Marsh, Ph.D., Political Science

Editorial Advisory Board
JSOU Report 18-5

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2018

Countering Transregional 

Terrorism

Foreword by Lieutenant General 

Michael K. Nagata

Edited by Peter McCabe
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to 

the Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, Joint Special Operations 

University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) is currently accepting written works 

relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information, please 

contact the CSS Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for your interest 

in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in August 2018.

ISBN 978-1-941715-36-9
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

The Enemy is Us: How Allied and U.S. Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s 

Survival, JSOU Report 18-4, Norman Cigar

Complexity, Organizational Blinders, and the SOCOM Design Way, JSOU Report 18-3, 

David C. Ellis and Charles N. Black

Advancing SOF Cultural Engagement: The Malinowski Model for a Qualitative 

Approach, JSOU Report 18-2, Robert R. Greene Sands and Darby Arakelian

Growing SOLO: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities, 

JSOU Report 18-1, Troy White

Resistance Views: Tartu Resistance Seminar Essays on Unconventional Warfare and 

Small State Resistance, edited by Kevin D. Stringer and Glennis F. Napier

How Do SOF Contribute to Comprehensive Deterrence? 

JSOU Report 17-11, Robert Haddick

On the cover. The Countering Transregional Terrorism Symposium, hosted by the 

Joint Special Operations University with Canadian Special Operations Forces Command and Special Operations Command North, was held 13-14 June 2017.

Back cover. PHOTO BY DIZAIN/SHUTTERSTOCK
v

Contents

From the Director .............................................................................. vii

Foreword 

Michael K. Nagata .........................................................................ix

Introduction: Countering Transregional Terrorism

Peter McCabe................................................................................ 1

Chapter 1. Building an Effective Model that Defeats a 

Pathway not a Commodity 

Christopher Burns.......................................................................... 9

Chapter 2. Counterterrorism in U.S. National Security Strategy

Nathan Barrick ............................................................................ 17

Chapter 3. Making Sense Out of Chaos: Introspection as a 

Tool for Asking Pertinent Questions with Regard to 

Transregional Terrorism

Emily Spencer.............................................................................. 45

Chapter 4. The Crime Terror Nexus: Causes, Consequences, 

and Opportunities for Disruption

Colleen McCue, John Gaughan, Meghan Cumpston .................... 55

Chapter 5. Transnational Criminal Organizations as 

a Social Phenomenon

Paul S. Lieber .............................................................................. 79

Chapter 6. Women of the Caliphate: Fighting for the Narrative

Lindsay M. Coombs and Howard G. Coombs .............................. 89
Chapter 7. Origin and Epidemiology: Extremism and Radicalization 

are Psychological Processes, not Religious Beliefs 

Patrick J. Christian, Aleksandra Nesic, David Sniffen, 

Basimah Hallawy-Rowe, Tasneem Aljehani, Khaled Al Sumairi, 

Narayan B. Khadka, Selam Alemayo, Kwadjo Owusu-Sarfo......... 107

Chapter 8. Countering Transregional Terror: A Canadian Perspective

Peter Dawe ................................................................................123

Chapter 9. SOF Success, Political Success and the Murky Middle: 

Potential Benchmarks for SOF in Countering Transregional Terrorism

Bernd Horn ................................................................................137

Acronym List .....................................................................................153
vii

From the Director 

Symposia are signature academic engagements for the Center for Strategic Studies and this publication follows a 13-14 June 2017 symposium, 

“Countering Transregional Terrorism,” conducted at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. We recognize that 

a single engagement is rarely sufficient to fully develop concepts or to listen 

to other voices, so it has become our custom to follow each symposium with 

an edited volume that extends the richness and reach of the conversation to 

JSOU Press readers. The contributions to this volume recap or advance major 

concepts and include other—perhaps dissenting—voices to the conversation.

A special note of thanks is necessary to acknowledge the continuing 

collaboration with the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command and 

the U.S. Special Operations Command North who invest time, effort, and 

intellect to make symposia and supporting research a reality. We also express 

our thanks to Lieutenant General Michael Nagata, U.S. Army, who graciously 

accepted our invitation to write the foreword. 

As always, we appreciate your feedback or comments.

Francis X. Reidy

Interim Director, Center for Strategic Studies

ix

Foreword 

Lieutenant General Michael K. Nagata

Countering terrorism is very hard. Countering it across global and 

regional geographic boundaries is even harder. Also, as increasingly 

powerful technologies become available to terrorists, the consequences of 

failing to surmount their adaptiveness and agility become much larger.

In writing this foreword for such a notable collection of essays and papers, 

I had to confront the challenge of being brief enough to entice the reader 

while also being valuable enough to match the impressive content herein. 

Accordingly, I offer the reader four “appetizers” to ponder while consuming 

the more valuable “main dishes” offered in subsequent pages.

First, it is vital to recognize that, despite some very impressive progress 

the United States and the international community have made in combating 

terrorism since 9/11, we still struggle as a global community with the creation 

of durable, permanent solutions, and outcomes against it. The redeployment 

of significant U.S. military forces back into the Levant to combat the Islamic 

State of Iraq and Syria only three years after our withdrawal from Iraq after 

defeating its precursor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, amply demonstrates how elusive 

durable solutions remain for us. 

Second, the preponderance of the United States government’s organizations that combat terrorism are primarily organized geographically, while at 

the same time, terrorist movements and elements are increasingly effective 

at operating across, and without regard for, geographic boundaries. From 

Department of Defense geographically oriented combatant commands, to 

state department regional bureaus, to intelligence agencies’ country desks 

and offices, and beyond—we are “hardwired” to organize our thinking, our 

products, our promotion and professional development practices, and even 

our career paths according to how we have organized ourselves geographically. As a result, the terrorist is too often able to effectively “steal a march” 

on us in both the physical and virtual worlds by operating without regards 

to these boundaries. 

Third, the access that people everywhere, including terrorist elements 

have, to increasingly powerful technologies and capabilities that once were 
x

the sole province of the nation state makes the consequences of failure in 

grappling with the foregoing much more dangerous. When one considers 

the power that has arisen because of digital technology in such areas as 

weaponizing commercially available Unmanned Aerial Systems or online/

virtual radicalization efforts, it should be abundantly clear there is a steep 

price to pay for failing to find either 1) durable solutions, or 2) more effective 

pathways to address terrorism challenges that are borderless.

Fourth, much of our contest against terrorist movements is increasingly 

moving into domains and arenas where our traditional reliance on military 

or “kinetic” power is already becoming far more difficult to employ. This 

fight is increasingly moving into arenas where our comparatively smaller and 

less well-resourced abilities to prevent terrorist travel, to deny terrorists their 

funding and resources, to more effectively contest their use of the internet, 

to combat their ideology, and to prevent the creation of terrorist movements 

and actors will often be more important than our military or kinetic power. 

This will require us to significantly strengthen our traditional investments 

for these “non-kinetic” tasks.

I commend the content of this important publication to the reader, and 

urge consideration of how we might be able to find better pathways, better 

solutions, and better designs into the future. The future will not wait for us.

Lieutenant General Michael K. Nagata, U.S. Army

Director of Strategic Operational Planning

National Counterterrorism Center
1

McCabe: Introduction

Introduction: Countering Transregional 

Terrorism

Peter McCabe

In June 2017, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), MacDill AFB, 

Tampa, Florida, hosted a symposium on countering transregional terrorism. While another symposium or conference focusing on terrorism might 

not elicit much excitement, this symposium gathered together an eclectic 

group of military, government civilians, academics, and practitioners from 

various backgrounds to tackle this difficult topic. The Canadian Special 

Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) and the U.S. Special Operations Command North were the main participants but the Mexican Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) also participated along with counterterrorism (CT) 

experts from government and industry. 

There are numerous questions to be answered. Why meet on this particular topic? Are the various agencies across the range of governments devoted 

to countering terrorism successful or failing? What does this volume hope 

to achieve? First, the symposium was created to address this particular topic 

because despite some success, terrorism is still a global phenomenon. Second, 

CT organizations are having some tactical success but the wide-ranging 

nature of the issue prevents many organizations from seeing strategic progress. For example, in 2015, a total of 11,774 terrorist attacks occurred worldwide, resulting in more than 28,300 deaths and more than 35,300 people 

injured. In addition, more than 12,000 people were taken hostage.1 However, 

the total number of terrorist attacks in 2015 decreased by 13 percent and 

total deaths due to terrorist attacks decreased by 14 percent, compared to 

Dr. Peter McCabe serves as a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special 

Operations University (JSOU). He came to JSOU from the U.S. Central 

Command where he worked as a strategic policy planner. Prior to that, he 

retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Colonel in 2011. He received his Ph.D. in 

political science from the University of Florida with a focus on international 

relations and comparative politics.
2

JSOU Report 18-5

2014. This was largely due to fewer attacks and deaths in Iraq, Pakistan, and 

Nigeria. This represents the first decline in total terrorist attacks and deaths 

worldwide since 2012.2 Third, this volume is important because it provides 

various viewpoints on a range of CT topics. Much like the JSOU-sponsored 

symposium, with varied presentations and discussion, this volume covers 

multiple areas of concern for counterterrorism. 

As previously mentioned, terrorism is a global phenomenon. Terrorist attacks took place in 92 countries in 2015; however, they were heavily 

concentrated geographically. More than 55 percent of all attacks took place 

in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and India), and 74 

percent of all deaths due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries 

(Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Syria).3 One would believe that 

CT efforts should be focused in these few states, however, that would be 

treating the symptom and not the cause. Focusing CT efforts on a few bad 

actors would provide short-term results but would soon be ineffective. As 

Rich Yarger posits, “modern terrorism, like all things in the 21st century, is 

interconnected and interdependent.”4

 This means that terrorism is a pervasive and persistent threat that requires a long-term strategy.

While the mainstream media has recently focused on the right wing 

(nationalists) and left wing (antifa) terrorist threat, it is religious terrorism 

that presents the largest threat. A State Department study from 20115 explored 

ideologies behind terrorist attacks worldwide and concluded that religious 

(mainly Sunni-Salafi-Jihadi) extremists accounted for almost 71 percent of 

those attacks. Left wing (secular, political, anarchist) groups were a distant 

second at 15 percent and right wing nationalist groups only accounted for 

less than 1 percent. Overall, there were 12,533 attacks that killed more than 

22,000 people. These numbers, however, do not tell the whole story and can 

be taken out of context. Mary Habeck contends the enemy must be defined 

through ideology, organizationally, and as combat groups. She does this by 

showing that Islam is not the enemy, rather, jihadi-salafi (.0167 percent of 

the Muslim community)6 is the real enemy. Habeck argues that jihadi-salafi 

is an extreme version of Salafism, seeking to transform Islam, and have a 

global concept for their violence. Hence, as noted before, focusing CT efforts 

on specific locales does not provide long-term solutions. Rather precisely 

defining and understanding the enemy will allow an ideologically savvy, 

globally coherent, counterinsurgency strategy.7
3

McCabe: Introduction

This volume provides analysis of countering transregional terrorism from 

a broad range of perspectives. The chapters are written by practitioners who 

are active in operations, policy, and research. The reader will benefit from 

synthesizing these divergent viewpoints. The following can be considered 

an executive summary of each chapter to highlight the arguments and 

propositions of each author. The hope is that the reader will gain a better 

appreciation for the complex nature of the transregional terrorism problem 

set—even better if the reader can identify and advocate for certain possible 

solutions for implementation. As General Raymond A. Thomas III, United 

States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Commander argues, 

“[countering transregional threats] requires focused effort to secure and hold 

our gains by empowering local entities within and among the populations 

that terrorists exploit.”8

Building an Effective Model That Defeats a Pathway, Not a 

Commodity

Brigadier General Burns’ chapter begins this edited volume because it covers 

a topic that was discussed at length during the symposium: How does the 

U.S. build an effective model that is effective beyond the tactical? General 

Burns concludes with it takes deeper analysis than is currently being done. 

Too much focus is spent on stopping the trafficking of certain commodities 

through pathways and not enough on defeating the pathways themselves. 

How does one focus on the pathway? First, by creating a strong ownership 

narrative that emphasizes the risk of illicit trafficking. Second, by establishing a flat organizational framework that can lead to operational success. 

Third, by building trust. This is much easier said than done, but can be 

accomplished when all agency equities are taken into account and addressed. 

This introductory chapter will challenge the reader to think differently about 

the trafficking problem.

CT in U.S. National Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy report is published by the executive branch 

of the U.S. government. “It is intended to be a comprehensive statement 

articulating the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the U.S. that 

are important to its security.”9 In this chapter, Nathan Barrick tackles this 

topic by tracing the evolution of the U.S. national strategy against global 
4

JSOU Report 18-5

jihadi and terrorism. He concludes the U.S. has been and continues to be 

in a reactive mode vice taking the strategic initiative. This is not to say that 

some approaches have not been successful. On the contrary, some current 

CT approaches must be continued. First, the military network of intelligence 

and operations is a necessity. Second, it is vital to continue to increase our 

partners’ CT legal frameworks. Finally, whole of government approaches, 

such as sharing information and coordinating activities, have been successful. Mr. Barrick recommends changes to future CT strategies: emphasize a 

culture of resilience; defeat the global jihadist narrative; and starve the ideology of recruits through narratives to vulnerable populations that provide 

peaceful alternatives. 

Making Sense Out of Chaos

Thinking differently is the goal of Dr. Emily Spencer’s chapter. As she notes, 

it is important to “fully understand the issue and address it from the correct 

perspective.” The process involves recognizing one’s own limitations and/or 

blinders so the correct question can be asked from the best perspective to 

solve the problem. Dr. Spencer is advocating introspection—the ability to 

examine or observe one’s own mental and emotional processes. She provides 

numerous examples of how introspection can be an aid and how avoiding 

it can be detrimental. Applying introspection to the problem of countering 

transregional terrorism involves asking the right questions and Dr. Spencer 

provides examples of macro questions for SOF to consider. She concludes 

that “asking the right questions enables correct responses.”

The Crime-Terror Nexus

This chapter on the crime-terrorism nexus analyzes the problem from a different perspective. Dr. Colleen McCue, Lieutenant Colonel John Gaughan, 

and Major Meghan Cumpston examine why the Islamic State of Iraq and 

Syria (ISIS) supports “criminals and others demonstrating social deviance or 

other patterns of antisocial behavior.” The authors conclude that three criminally oriented narrative themes—jihadi cool, super predators, and redemptive—are intentional lines of recruitment in the ISIS radicalization and 

recruitment strategy. This crime-terror nexus requires a different response 

from special operations and involves non-kinetic activities and increasing 

the role of law enforcement. Special operations can assist in the cross-border 
5

McCabe: Introduction

collaboration among military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies to 

counter transregional terrorism.

Transnational Criminal Organizations as a 

Social Phenomenon

The previous chapter focused on the terrorism-organized crime nexus. This 

chapter by Dr. Paul Lieber tackles the problem of transnational criminal 

organizations as a social phenomenon. He does this by examining three 

aspects of transnational crime (transnational gangs, human trafficking, and 

drug trafficking) and concludes in each case they are social activities and 

require social actors to sustain and grow. This is another call for looking at 

the problem through a different lens which requires a different approach to 

counter. 

Women of the Caliphate

This sixth chapter by Drs. Lindsay and Howard Coombs explains the 

Canadian fight for the narrative concerning Western women radicalized by 

extremist organizations. The authors examine the radicalization narrative 

to help understand why it works. In the case of ISIS, the strategic narrative is 

“multidimensional and appeals to a broad spectrum of individuals.” Focusing on women, the narrative depicts joining ISIS as a “form of empowerment, 

liberation, and the opportunity to live in a society that reflects their belief 

systems and worldviews.” Dr. Coombs recommends developing a gendered 

strategic narrative created by women for women with two main aspects. 

First, Canada should increase the number of women (including Muslim) 

who work in the security sector countering the narrative. Additionally, “a 

Canadian strategic narrative should examine and emphasize the brutal realities of living in ISIS controlled territory.” These and other recommendations 

create a gendered strategic narrative created by women for women. 

Origin and Epidemiology

The rest of this title is “Extremism and Radicalization are Psychological 

Processes, not Religious Beliefs.” Hopefully this subtitle will intrigue the 

reader, and he or she will jump into this well-researched chapter by Dr. Patrick Christian, Dr. Aleksandra Nesic, et al. The authors argue that extremism 

and radicalization originates from a psychosocial crisis rather than religious 
6

JSOU Report 18-5

beliefs. Their research focuses on the most vulnerable populations susceptible 

to radicalization—refugees—and how trauma transference, countertransference, and extremism contribute to explaining their reality. More importantly, 

the authors provide a solution that reaches out to this vulnerable population 

before local and national security forces get involved. 

Countering Transregional Terror: A Canadian Perspective

Major-General Peter Dawe provides the Canadian perspective in a global 

fight. The General describes the transregional threat specifically to Canada 

through numerous, recent examples of extremist activity. The Canadian 

approach is outlined which highlights the most recently released Canadian 

Defence Policy (April 2017). CANSOFCOM serves as the “interface between 

national defence and the government’s national security apparatus, and is 

therefore a key contributor to the national campaign to counter transregional 

terrorism on a multitude of levels.” A networked approach is emphasized as 

the international community must work together if it hopes to be successful. 

SOF Success, Political Success, and the Murky Middle

The final chapter by Colonel (retired) Bernd Horn tackles a most difficult 

topic in the countering transregional terrorism discussion. He provides the 

reader with an examination of potential benchmarks for SOF success in 

countering transregional terrorism. How is it measured? Is SOF having a 

positive effect? What does success look like? Dr. Horn provides a short historical analysis of SOF performance in conflict to illustrate the difficulty of 

defining success. It is important to be successful in real terms as well as in 

the battle for perception. To that end, the author provides a list of benchmarks SOF can use to help determine success. While these benchmarks 

are not comprehensive, they do provide the reader with a yardstick to track 

accomplishments to help determine success. 

Endnotes

1. “Statistical Information on Terrorism in 2015,” U.S. Department of State, 

Diplomacy in Action, accessed 14 August 2017, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/

crt/2015/257526.htm.

2. “Statistical Information on Terrorism in 2015,” U.S. Department of State, Diplomacy in Action.
7

McCabe: Introduction

3. “Statistical Information on Terrorism in 2015,” U.S. Department of State, Diplomacy in Action.

4. Rich Yarger, SOF and a Theory of Modern Terrorism (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 

September 2016), 13.

5. “Country reports on terrorism 2011,” U.S. Department of State, 31 July 2011, 

accessed 14 August 2017, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195555.htm. 

6. Mary Habeck, “Preventing the re-emergence of terrorist organizations: the challenge of defining the enemy,” PowerPoint presentation presented 13-14 June 2017, 

Countering Transregional Terrorism Symposium, MacDill AFB, FL.

7. Habeck, “Re-emergence of terrorist.”

8. General Raymond A. Thomas, III, U.S. Army Commander United States Special 

Operations Command, Statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, 4 

May 2017, accessed 26 Dec 2017, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/

media/doc/Thomas_05-04-17.pdf.

9. National Security Strategy Archive, accessed 26 Dec 2017, http://nssarchive.us/.

9

Burns: Building an Effective Model

Chapter 1. Building an Effective Model 

that Defeats a Pathway not a Commodity 

Christopher Burns

“

News distracts us from deeper analysis.” These are some of the first 

words spoken at the June 2017 Countering Transregional Terrorism 

Conference hosted by Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), U.S. 

Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH) and Canadian Special 

Operations Forces Command Education and Research Centre. These words 

came from Dr. Hassan Abbas, Professor of International Security Studies 

at National Defense University. As the newest Theater Special Operations 

Command (TSOC), these words run true and were strengthened at CAPSTONE1

 where the advice from the four-star leaders was to block time for 

strategic thinking. In this 24-hour news cycle with requests for information, 

it is easy to forget that our role as a TSOC is to look out beyond the ridge 

line and understand what is going on beyond the tactical and effect change 

that supports our outcomes. This chapter is my humble attempt to do just 

that. The intent of this chapter is to address what keeps the command up at 

night and also try and frame the issues in a way that may make more sense 

moving forward.

Answering the first question on what keeps the command up at night; it 

is illicit commodities that originate or come into the Western hemisphere 

that impact the U.S. way of life. This is a different perspective than has been 

discussed in the past. We historically look at specific threats and how to 

defeat them. This hyper focus on a single illicit commodity has not reduced 

U.S. Army Brigadier General Christopher Burns retired in 2018 as the Commander of Special Operations Command North. He has successfully served 

in numerous assignments within special operations throughout his 33 year 

career to include working at operational detachment, company, battalion, 

and brigade level, as well as numerous theater special operations commands, 

Joint Special Operations Task Force, U.S. Special Operations Command, and 

the Joint Staff.
10

JSOU Report 18-5

overall supply. However, there is now a move afoot to look at the pathway 

instead. As a TSOC this makes sense because, as the threat evolves, the one 

constant in most cases is that the pathways remain to move people, drugs, 

gold and anything else imaginable for profit.

Illicit and licit pathways have been around for centuries pushing various 

commodities through them with little or no impact from state actors. It 

could be argued that transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) have so 

well established practices they are able to predict what will be seized along 

the path and adjust for that ‘breakage rate.’ The other challenge is that these 

groups have been around for decades or more and have an economic system 

all their own that is hard to break due to impacts at the local and societal 

levels. These pathways are a business and as such the U.S. needs to look at 

them differently. Examining various commodities it is easy to see that distribution is controlled and any attempt to curtail distribution is difficult due 

to the insatiable demand for the commodity. In fact, any pressure under the 

current construct drives more innovative ways to get it to the consumer. One 

only has to look at what is discovered at our borders by law enforcement to 

realize there is motivation and creativity to get the illicit commodity to the 

consumer. Money is no object if there is a high enough return on investment. The SOCNORTH and U.S. challenge is dealing with the producer, 

supplier, and consumer who see benefit in their illicit activities while market 

forces drive unwanted outcomes and risk. In this 

supply chain the only entities pushing back are 

state governments and they are under resourced 

comparatively.

The other key issue to understand is that the 

nature of this network is different than what we 

have experienced with violent extremist organizations (VEOs). TCOs focus on the business 

aspect of their activities which requires taking a 

step back, relooking the problem and breaking 

out what is similar and what is different between 

TCOs and VEOs. There is also a need to explore 

where these two intersect for convenience. Both have the ability to impact 

the level of confidence a population has with its government. For TCOs, the 

goal is to create an environment where illicit commerce can flow with the 

least amount of disruption from legal authorities and rivals. For VEOs, it is 

The SOCNORTH 

and U.S. challenge 

is dealing with the 

producer, supplier, 

and consumer who 

see benefit in their 

illicit activities while 

market forces drive 

unwanted outcomes 

and risk.
11

Burns: Building an Effective Model

about destabilizing governments so these groups can fill the void with ideological views and govern as the government pulls back/fails. In most cases 

both prey initially on the vulnerable population that reside further from the 

capital. This requires looking at the TCO center of gravity and then creating 

an environment that is detrimental to business continuity or entry by other 

TCOs. This is a complicated network that is global in nature—similar to 

VEOs but with a business focus. 

Much like a business, TCOs and VEOs use enablers to get things done. 

In some cases, these enablers serve both groups. Think about a businessman 

and how he moves through countries. He will have a travel agent, agenda, 

and key contacts at each destination to facilitate his movement. He also will 

have talented people who work for him on-site or at the home office whose 

job it is to plan and direct activities for the enterprise. Understanding how 

business and enablers work is key to how to impact the network. It is important to understand the demand for a product and how product lines evolve. 

The TCO goal is to remain profitable and relevant to customers. If TCOs 

lose product relevance, the product needs to be replaced or it will fail. In 

many cases TCOs will migrate to higher return illicit commodities that are 

also more risky. Another challenge is outside vendors that provide services 

to legitimate businesses as well as TCOs. These outside vendors view TCOs 

as preferred customers due to the unreported income obtained. A secondary benefit of outside vendors is the revenue they generate that supports 

local economies along the supply chain (elasticity of money; stores, services, 

housing, etc.). 

TCOs are businesses and as such they assess and respond to the changes 

in the commodity climate and take advantage of increased demand. These 

changes can come very fast which challenge timely government reactions. 

This, combined with limited government influence in rural areas, allows 

TCOs to dominate a market with minimal risk to supply and distribution 

networks. This is different from a VEO that has a goal to take over the government. This presents a challenge to SOCNORTH because as TCO leadership changes, the new leader acts aggressively and is willing to change an 

established set of rules. A TCO’s level of investment in (win over support 

of) a population is smaller than a VEO. In a sense, marketing and recruiting 

are much more cost-effective for a TCO. One area that can be more expensive for TCOs is human capital, where corruption and for-profit motives of 

employees affect the bottom line. This typically does not occur in a VEO 
12

JSOU Report 18-5

which has an ideological desire, not a profit motive. Both entities require 

competent talent or risk network failure.

So, what does this mean to those focusing on TCOs (with potential VEO 

nexus) on an illicit pathway? The key is to think differently but apply what we 

can from over a decade of fighting insurgents. There is a need to understand 

second and third order effects more so than in Iraq or Afghanistan. There is 

a need to create an environment that is not supportive of illicit businesses, 

but yet can support the local population’s way of life through licit pathways. 

As such, it requires moving away from focusing on an illicit commodity 

and focusing instead on defeating the supply chain and demand pathways. 

Commodities will evolve through a pathway as the market changes. The 

key for the TSOC and geographic combatant command is to think about 

what is coming today and, more importantly, tomorrow, and try and deny it 

from getting on the pathway. In theory, this sounds easy but in fact it is hard 

because of the demand pull of the commodity. The U.S. relies on organizational innovation as do the pathway facilitators. The more money involved, 

the more sophisticated these organizations get. Just look at the weekly police 

blotter of a border city and you can see everything from smuggling of products and people in false trunks to tunnels. This requires creative thinking 

on both sides of the border.

So, how do we tackle this wicked problem2 in a different way? First, 

ensure the focus centers on the pathways, and not the commodity. Focusing 

on pathways moves away from the cost benefit of a commodity. Develop a 

strong ownership narrative that highlights the danger of increasing pathway 

demand which will have a negative impact on society in the long run. The 

goal is to get people to take action around this narrative to affect change. 

Countries that do not take action do not embrace this narrative and will 

require partners to help them understand the risk to their country. This can 

work through reports that show the impact of allowing the pathway stay 

open, and the impact of inaction. The idea is to move the country to action. 

In executive coaching the phrase “if it is your goal you will take the action” 

is often espoused.3

 Once a strong ownership conversation takes place, if the 

partner does not take action, then it is not their goal and you know where 

you stand. The key is to create a strong ownership conversation.

Second, create a flat organizational framework built on trust. If you can’t 

trust your partners in your country, you will have an even harder time trusting those outside your country. Corruption is a major issue. The author 
13

Burns: Building an Effective Model

believes that if people are held accountable for corruption (lack of ownership), the possibility exists to transform and unify whole governments. 

History is full of turning points when key leaders realize the status quo is 

unacceptable. Unfortunately, for most leaders it takes a historic flash point 

for action to occur. The author argues that strong ownership narratives can 

sway leaders. Ownership of the problem unifies organizations to focus on the 

problem and not compromise goals. If everyone believes change is needed 

then change will occur. The other benefit of a flat network is the speed with 

which information and operations can lead to operational success, not just 

tactical victories. Thoughtful measurements are required to show the value 

of such organizational change. Another benefit is the flat sharing of information and collaboration which has a cumulative effect—the power of team 

work. Each organization creates value for each other which leads to better 

actions and outcomes that could not be achieved in isolation. This leads to 

collective success, not individual glory.

Third, play to each other’s strengths. An apt example is the find and fix 

portions of an operation against a TCO which involves a whole of government approach. But in the end, it becomes a law enforcement finish since 

it is a criminal activity. The Special Operations Forces (SOF) strength is 

network analysis and being an interlocutor for all the various organizations 

that get applied to this challenge. Law enforcement’s goal is to make a case 

to bring to trial while SOF want to take apart the network so it is never able 

to function again. The conundrum is the discoverability line. How can SOF 

make sure they do everything they can to understand and take apart the 

network, while at the same time allow law enforcement to make a case? The 

answer is trust. If organizations trust each other they can make sure they 

pass information that benefits (both) the breakdown of the network and 

helps make a case without compromise.

A state’s laws have to be strong enough so pathway suppliers and enablers 

perceive the risk as too high. An example of this would be stronger smuggling laws. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to take down 

pathway facilitators need to be shared. There is also a need to understand 

how to define operational versus tactical success. This requires a thoughtful examination of who you ‘roll up’ and what impact that has ‘bending the 

curve down’ for an illicit network. This may create a worse problem if it is 

not done correctly. This is a global enterprise and, as such, the pathways 
14

JSOU Report 18-5

move from one area of responsibility into another. As such SOF can look at 

a problem globally and help deny the pathway.

This wicked problem is further complicated as the supply chain travels 

from country to country until it gets to the buyer. This requires the network 

to share information rapidly and understand each country’s level of ownership of the problem and their ability to eliminate the illicit pathways. If SOF 

think of the buyer as the last stop, it is all about stopping the commodity as 

far upstream in the chain as possible; much like “defense in depth.”4 This 

requires all entities to declassify and share information that work under the 

detaining country’s laws. This is no easy task given the current classification 

process, but to be flat and fast necessitates a need to share more. 

To apply these concepts requires keeping in mind a few things. First, this 

is a team sport. All involved need to play to their strengths and understand 

the true value of collaboration and cooperation. That means sharing information, flat communications, and trust-based ownership of the problem. 

All credit is shared credit. Second, be careful not to over-build working 

groups so the focus and message gets lost. This can lead to diluting the 

force, especially in the interagency environment, as groups are spread out. 

Third, build structure and alignment from the strategic to tactical level that 

aligns and supports the end state. Fourth, capture and share best practices 

as they come up. During meetings, ensure accountability and coach agencies 

through frequent touch points to remain on track and identify shortfalls 

early and often. All partners have competing interests. The ones with strong 

ownership—that have accountability and success—can make an impact at 

all levels. Lastly, there is a need for diverse viewpoints to solve problems and 

allow experimentation. If this was an easy problem set, there would already 

be a solution. The fact we do not have one means we need to think outside 

the box. It requires a different viewpoint when planning. It is operationalized 

through actions and the impact measured. This is experimentation. Try it 

and see what happens. Bring the team together to review the impacts and 

try again with refined concepts. Success will follow as impact variables are 

understood. Obviously, the enemy gets a vote and has a profit motive which 

will change their TTPs.

In conclusion, we need to think differently than we have in the past about 

this problem. What needs to change is the ownership conversation from a 

commodity to a pathway. All governments have a natural desire to focus on 

the commodity that is impacting their population and not the bigger picture. 
15

Burns: Building an Effective Model

This leads to lack of interest when the commodity that is traveling through a 

country does not have an impact. A pathway will adjust to actions against it 

and as such a pathway needs to be degraded for all illicit commodities. This 

requires us to not be distracted by the news and do that deep thinking Dr. 

Abbas mentioned. By creating a sense of ownership, accountable actions, and 

experimentation, there can be a downward bend in the operational curve. 

This leads to impactful outcomes versus just changing actors on the illicit 

pathway. In the end it is about the illicit commodities on pathways being 

reduced year after year. To accomplish this we need to look at operational 

not tactical success. 

Endnotes

1. The CAPSTONE General and Flag Officer Course was created in 1982 with participation on a voluntary basis. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1986 subsequently mandated that all newly-selected 

general and flag officers attend CAPSTONE. The course objective is to make 

these individuals more effective in planning and employing U.S. forces in joint 

and combined operations. The CAPSTONE curriculum examines major issues 

affecting national security decision making, military strategy, joint/combined 

doctrine, interoperability, and key allied nation issues. Additional information 

can be obtained at the National Defense University CAPSTONE website, accessed 

30 Nov 17, http://capstone.ndu.edu/.

2. A wicked problem is a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of 

incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to 

recognize. One example of organized crime and terrorist wicked problems, see 

Charlie Edwards, “Winning on Wicked Issues,” The World Today, Vol. 64, No. 

2 (February 2008): 19–21.

3. Marissa Bracke, “The Real Reason You’re Not Taking Action on Your Goals” 

11 April 2011, accessed 4 Dec 17, http://marissabracke.com/real-reason-nottaking-action-on-goals.

4. The practice of arranging defensive lines or fortifications so that they can defend 

each other.

17

Barrick: Counterterrorism in U.S. National Security Strategy

Chapter 2. Counterterrorism in U.S. 

National Security Strategy

Nathan Barrick

The United States has been at war for more than 16 years—its longest 

and most expensive conflict. These facts are not surprising to national 

security leadership, who have tried to explain that this war will be a long 

war and that it is a generational conflict.1 The media and the American 

people may have heard and interpreted these warnings as euphemisms for 

difficult, but not as permanent. On 12 September 2001, few questioned the 

justification or need for a war against jihadi terrorists. Sixteen years later, 

we would be remiss if we do not challenge the assumptions underpinning 

the United States’ prosecution of what is popularly known as the “War on 

Terror.”2

 Looking past a long series of tactical and operational successes, by 

meaningful measures the United States is not winning the strategic level of 

this conflict. 

Terrorism challenges conventional frameworks about the levels of war—

strategic, operational, and tactical—because a terrorist act is an isolated 

tactical-level event intended to have strategic political consequences. Acts of 

terror are asymmetric tactics utilized when a group is not capable or willing 

to challenge established governments through existing political processes, 

or with conventional armed forces to achieve their political objectives. The 

United States and its counterterrorism (CT) coalition are fighting terrorist groups now frequently referred to as violent extremist organizations, 

who have become integrated into insurgencies or civil wars in Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, and the Philippines. The United States is fighting two primary terrorist organizations with 

transregional reach attempting to establish a physical caliphate—al-Qaeda 

Nathan Barrick, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of South Florida, has 

a research focus on national security strategy. He is a former U.S. Army 

infantry (West Point) and Eurasian foreign area officer (Stanford University), 

with experience as a planner or senior analyst in multiple unified commands.
18

JSOU Report 18-5

(AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Hostilities have spread 

inexorably into country after country after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan: 

Nigeria against Boko Haram in 2002; against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) after the 

U.S. invasion in 2003; to Yemen against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

in 2004; Lake Chad Basin (Chad, Niger) against Boko Haram in 2009; Libya 

against first AQ allies in 2011 then later ISIS; followed by Salafi jihadists in 

the Sinai in Egypt in 2011; Kenya against AQ ally al-Shabaab in 2011; Syria 

against AQ, al-Nusra Front, then ISIS after 2012; and again to Iraq against 

ISIS in 2014. The number of Western nations attacked by catastrophic terrorism has increased. The number of jihadists has multiplied several times. This 

chapter will examine how jihadists seem to be closer to their desired strategic end state—an apocalyptic battle between Islam and unbelievers—than 

the U.S. is to a world in which jihadists are denied the ability to radicalize, 

mobilize, and organize terrorists to threaten the United States. This chapter 

examines how U.S. national strategy for defeating terrorism should adjust 

to account for this strategic reality or risk further surprises jeopardizing 

the expected victory. 

Introduction

In some ways, this strategic dilemma—winning the battles but losing the 

war—reflects the ongoing debate about the efficacy of CT strategies and the 

inherent difficulties in declaring war on a particular tactic, as opposed to 

orienting the war on an actual enemy or threat. In other ways, this situation challenges another perspective—the belief in a special American role 

in the world and whether historical verities about conflict and culture do 

or do not pertain to the United States.3 Over the past decade and a half, 

people in the West have dramatically increased their understanding of Islam, 

and international anti-terrorism or CT efforts have evolved from a focus on 

direct action to kill or capture key terrorist leaders, to an attempt to address 

the root causes of grievances thereby undermining jihadist claims to legitimacy referred to as countering violent extremism (CVE).4

 Unfortunately, 

the broadening dialogue in public spaces, on open or encrypted communication apps (Twitter or Telegram), and in content sites offering anonymity 

(JustPaste.it or Pastebin) or in the Dark Web, has also served to radicalize 

elements of vulnerable populations.5 Because the world’s vulnerable populations—people at risk due to socio-economic ills, lack of effective governance 
19

Barrick: Counterterrorism in U.S. National Security Strategy

capacity, or other grievances—are so numerous, this aspect of the conflict 

has only increased the violent scope of a problem which predates 9/11. Even as 

the religious legitimacy of the jihadist cause is undermined by the increase of 

authoritative, moderate Islamic voices rejecting terrorism—especially suicide 

bomber attacks against other Muslims—and despite the losses suffered by 

AQ, AQI, and most recently ISIS, the popular appeal among Sunni populations for Salafi jihadism has increased substantially as measured by foreign 

fighter flows and an increase in attacks inspired by these organizations.6

When this increasing popularity of violent extremism—more inspired 

attacks and more radicalized individuals seeking to become foreign terrorist 

fighters—is paired with the CT strategic approach of decapitation, we observe 

an effect not unlike that of the mythical Lernaean hydra, whose heads multiply when cut off. Undoubtedly, this military methodology has resulted in 

hampering the effectiveness of jihadi attack planning and organizational 

leadership. Some leaders are harder to replace than others; some leaders’ 

reputations grow in stature and capability after their death, providing an 

inspirational morale boost; other marginalized leaders are given newfound 

opportunities to realize their own skills and excellence. Describing the current jihadi terrorist threat as leaderless and inspirational may exaggerate the 

corporate effectiveness, but the terrorist organizational threat adapts to its 

political and security environments.7 

Perhaps an important starting point for challenging strategic assumptions 

is the practical question of victory: Is the United States winning? By almost 

any observable and measurable criteria of strategic victory, the answer is no. 

There are more terrorists in more unstable places continuing to wage jihad 

than when the fight started. In 2001, Salafi jihadist groups were active in at 

least 20 countries and there were nine countries where these groups had 

safe havens or significant operating spaces (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, 

Indonesia, Philippines, Algeria, Tunisia, Mali, and Niger). By 2017, with some 

of the groups existing in 2001 declaring allegiance to AQ or responding to 

the rise of ISIS, Salafist jihadist groups were active in at least 35 countries, 

with known operating space or safe havens in 17 countries (all the same as 

2001 except Indonesia, plus Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Chad, 

Cameroon, and Kenya).8 While the U.S. is not winning, there is progress. 

Important terrorist leaders have been killed like AQI’s leader Abu Musab 

al-Zarqawi in 2006 and AQ’s leader Osama bin Laden in 2011, organizations 

destroyed or forced to fragment or adapt, the anti-terrorist coalition has 
20

JSOU Report 18-5

enlarged, territories controlled at one time by terrorist forces have been taken 

back, although some territory in Iraq and Afghanistan was temporarily taken 

back by terrorists and retaken by coalition and host nation forces. There has 

been progress with some successful operations and many tactically significant victories, but the anti-terrorist coalition is not winning.9

 Not winning 

is not the same thing as losing, but it can be and often is the same. Just not 

in this case, not yet. Because this is an ideological struggle, the nature of 

the conflict is akin to a war of attrition. Since exhaustion or loss of will to 

continue the struggle might occur for either side at any moment in a war of 

attrition, not losing and not winning can both be true. 

Instead, the expansion of the conflict has increased the importance of the 

ideologies at stake. Precipitating this expansion and conflict was exactly AQ’s 

strategic intent in conducting its jihadi terror campaign and also a strategic 

consequence AQ’s rival, ISIS relished.10 Jihadist theology and Western ideas 

are locked in a trial by combat. Fortunately, expansion does not necessarily 

aid the jihadists’ strategic end-state of establishing a caliphate or achieving 

an apocalyptic defeat of Western civilization; expansion is only the first step 

towards those ends. Also, expanding and escalating the conflict by conducting terrorist attacks in Western lands has not had the exact effect jihadists 

desire but it has drawn Western attention to Muslim grievances and attracted 

foreign fighters and sympathizers, which advances their cause. Western 

governments and society have proven resilient in the face of terrorist casualties, and, secondly, there is no flagging of Western will to prosecute this 

fight. Even countries that recoiled from internationalizing the war on terror 

(Spain) continued to effectively counter terrorism in their own country.11 

Pakistan, which adopted Islamic militant proxies as an element of national 

grand strategy, found it necessary to distance itself from these proxies and 

wage a costly counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign to avoid being targeted 

by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism.12 U.S. efforts at internationalizing the conflict have proven a boon to terrorist recruiting, especially 

by the U.S. invasion of Iraq to prevent possible weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) from reaching terrorist hands.13 It is necessary to observe, however, 

that the U.S. coalition’s strategic narrative does not adequately provide a 

counter to the strategic narratives of the Salafi jihadi. The U.S. coalition’s 

denial of a conflict against Islam does not appear to resonate in the face of 

popular grievances about decades of exploitation by Western nations and 

the repressive, autocratic governments the U.S. has at times supported. The 
21

Barrick: Counterterrorism in U.S. National Security Strategy

coalition’s expressions of resolve have not been effective in deterring terrorism or dissuading the jihadi threat. Also, U.S. diplomatic attempts to counter 

the influence of potential international partners like Russia and China, who 

are less interested in Western values, has divided the anti-terrorist narratives 

within the international involvement in terrorist-generated conflict zones.14 

Interestingly, it seems that where the U.S. coalition or the Salafist jihadists 

have sought to expand the conflict, or limit undesired participants in the 

conflict, the effects have been the opposite of those intended.

Successive U.S. national strategies or strategic pronouncements have not 

given a satisfying explanation for the unexpected expansion of global jihadist 

threats. No articulation of U.S. national strategy included an expectation that 

global jihadi threats would expand before being destroyed. Successive U.S. 

presidents have not promised it will be darker before a victorious dawn—

except perhaps President Bill Clinton prior to 9/11.15 This omission is not 

simply a perceived necessity to avoid negative public opinion, but instead is 

an unexpected, adverse strategic effect. The expansion of the global jihadist 

threat and the increased numbers of terrorists has constituted a strategic surprise, whose relevance for the CT strategy has so far been under examined. It 

is possible to suspect that any subconscious or conscious consideration of this 

effect by U.S. national security leaders and strategists is immediately subordinated to the heartfelt belief that Western values will prevail (democratic 

rule, respect for human rights, commercial access to global markets, and 

separation of religion and politics). Therefore, if it is a well-grounded belief 

that Western values will prevail, then is it an effective strategy to downplay 

the ideological component of this conflict? Is it perhaps possible that Western 

officials’ minimizing the religious aspect of this conflict (which is perceived 

in the West as prudent caution, beyond simple political correctness) in some 

way actually advancing the jihadist cause? Arguably, something is advancing, 

spreading, and metastasizing the jihadist cause. A war-winning coalition 

strategy must decisively address and end this jihadist expansion through a 

more effective strategic narrative. 

This next section will trace the evolution of U.S. national strategy against 

terrorism and global jihadists. An important decisive moment along this 

path was the effect of 9/11 on U.S. CT strategy and the strategic parallels 

drawn from Pearl Harbor. After the U.S. invaded Iraq, U.S. CT strategy 

was adjusted by strategic reviews of the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Although President Obama criticized President Bush’s conduct of the War 
22

JSOU Report 18-5

on Terror, he doubled down on some aspects of U.S. strategy in ways that 

exacerbated the strategic dilemma and lack of strategic narrative. As this 

chapter is being written, an operational-level victory over ISIS in Syria and 

Iraq appears imminent and may afford an opportune inflection point to 

improve U.S. approaches to its national CT strategy.

Pre-9/11 U.S. CT Strategies

The first national strategy for combating terrorism was published by the 

White House in February 2003, almost 18 months after the 9/11 attack by 

AQ.16 But, the first publicly released National Security Strategy under President Reagan in January 1987 mentions terrorism in various forms about 25 

times.17 And the first major presidential step in what must be considered a 

nascent approach to national strategy against terrorism was President Richard Nixon’s September 11, 1970 call for the U.S. commercial aviation industry to increase security measures on passenger airplanes, including armed 

guards onboard.18 President Nixon then established a Cabinet Committee to 

Combat Terrorism, highlighting that it was a problem encompassing diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement functions.19 In a memo recommending the establishment of the committee, National Security Advisor Henry 

Kissinger and John Erlichmann emphasized: “the total problem transcends 

the matter of trying to prevent terrorism. We must not only take every possible step to prevent such acts but also we must prepare to react quickly and 

effectively to an act of terrorism that directly involves the United States—for 

instance the kidnapping of an American diplomat abroad or a foreign diplomat here.” Tellingly, for domestic political considerations, they continued, 

“We need to get the highest level of attention focused now on this problem 

... as well as taking action that will pull the teeth of potential critics who 

might use an act of terrorism as a basis for raising the cry that government 

leadership is inadequate to meet such emergencies.”20 Less than six months 

later, the U.S. Ambassador to Sudan and the Charge d’Affaires, along with 

a Belgian diplomat were executed in a hostage situation in which the U.S. 

refused to negotiate with hostage takers. This was the start of the U.S. policy 

of non-negotiation with terrorists. 

After the Nixon administration’s first steps towards a national CT strategy, President Ford’s administration was the first to consider the probability of a catastrophic terrorist attack inside the United States. Cabinet level 
23

Barrick: Counterterrorism in U.S. National Security Strategy

officials were skeptical about this low-probability high-impact event, frequently stymieing efforts by mid-level officials, who had responsibility for 

policy and strategy for addressing international terrorist threats, to prevent 

or deter attacks.21 Importantly, the prospect of terrorists using WMD to 

attack the United States was highlighted after a 1974 nuclear bomb hoax in 

Boston, which led the Ford administration to create the Nuclear Emergency 

Search Team capability as part of U.S. counterterrorist forces.22

The President Carter administration initially deferred to diplomatic and 

economic sanctions to address the major terrorist crisis of Iranian extremists 

taking American diplomats hostage in Tehran. However, after months of 

frustrating diplomatic negotiations, and with presidential approval ratings 

dropping due to perceived weakness, President Carter turned to the U.S. 

Army’s newly certified elite CT unit—the 1st Special Forces Operational 

Detachment-Delta—more popularly known as Delta Force, to conduct a 

commando raid to rescue the hostages. Although the raid failed, the mission’s failure set in motion an investigation (The Holloway Commission) 

recommending improvements which would contribute to military reform 

under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. After thirty years of development 

and adaptation, more than half of which includes combat experience, the 

U.S. military now possesses unequalled 

CT capabilities. 

Measures the President Carter 

administration implemented included 

enforcing Section 303 of the International and Security Assistance and 

Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 

which sought to punish state sponsors 

of terrorism. This included dual-use 

technologies such as heavy equipment 

transport trucks to Libya, as well as making it more difficult for American 

businesses to operate in countries listed on the black list of state sponsors 

resulting in such countries receiving very limited U.S. assistance of any type. 

President Carter initially placed Libya, Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen on the 

list; President Reagan later added Iran, Cuba,23 and North Korea; and Sudan 

was listed by President Clinton. Some countries have since been removed 

from the list in response to diplomatic efforts and negotiations: South Yemen 

was dropped when it merged with North Yemen to become Yemen; Iraq and 

Although the raid failed, the 

mission’s failure set in motion 

an investigation (The Holloway 

Commission) recommending 

improvements which would 

contribute to military reform 

under the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act of 1986.
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JSOU Report 18-5

Libya were removed by President George W. Bush; North Korea removed by 

President Bush in 2008 during nuclear-related negotiations; and President 

Obama removed Cuba in 2015.24 This focus on state sponsorship of terrorist 

groups remain a key component of the U.S. strategic approach to CT.

However, in the early 1980s, the impact on the United States by international terrorism was increasing. In 1983, over 250 Americans were killed in 

terrorist attacks—the most in a single year to that point.25 President Reagan 

responded by asking Congress to pass four combating terrorism related 

bills: an Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of HostageTaking; the Aircraft Sabotage Act; the Act for Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts; and a Prohibition Against the Training or Support 

of Terrorist Organizations Act of 1984.26 President Reagan reiterated the 

United States policy to never make concessions to terrorists, because “to do 

so would only invite more terrorism.”27 President Reagan administration’s 

efforts were in response to an increasing trend in terrorist attacks against 

the United States—a trend that continued until 1991.28 Of note for consideration in reassessing U.S. strategy on CT is the Long Commission report 

written after an investigation of the Beirut Airport/U.S. Marine headquarters 

bombing in 1983. The Long Commission identified the potential threat in 

allowing U.S. terrorist opponents to impact U.S. political policy, especially 

if those terrorists were backed by state sponsors. The report advocated the 

U.S. should adopt a proactive CT policy, rather than waiting for terrorists 

to attack and then responding. Additionally, the report highlighted the ineffectiveness and inadvisability of relying on physical defenses.29 However, the 

U.S. imposed measures to harden the physical defenses of overseas facilities, 

especially embassies in the Middle East, and, significantly, the State Department continued as the lead U.S. agency in combating terrorism. The U.S. 

strategic approach was embodied in the concept of terrorism as a crime and 

persuading or negotiating international protocols, bilateral and multilateral, 

to enhance and enforce cooperation in finding, apprehending, and prosecuting terrorists. The U.S. military, intelligence community, and agencies like 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were supporting efforts that had 

more resources and capacity to implement counterterrorist policies than 

the State Department. 

It is important to examine how the State Department approached this 

responsibility. Secretary of State George Schulz’s leadership was characterized by his empowering the internal bureaucracy of the department and 
25

Barrick: Counterterrorism in U.S. National Security Strategy

reliance on the professional Foreign Service. State’s bureaucracy was not 

empowered to manage a CT strategy because the top-level leadership was 

not actively prioritizing the effort. The bureaucracy did lay the foundation 

of organizations and policies that could play a role in an active CT strategy 

if given prioritization including: a Rewards program to expand collection 

of intelligence on terrorists; better interagency cooperation on legal matters 

(including aiding in implementing the “long arm” statute which placed FBI 

legal attachés in many U.S. embassies); and an expanded intelligence activity 

inside the State Department, as well as a mechanism for sharing intelligence 

across the interagency (which was not supported fully). Unfortunately, most 

of these positive developments were hampered by the State Department’s 

small staff and small budget. Additionally, the impetus driven by threatening 

events, dropped off due to fewer terrorist attacks occurring.30

President George H.W. Bush was one of America’s key government officials very knowledgeable about international terrorism (he had been assigned 

as chair of a cabinet level Task Force on Combating Terrorism by President 

Reagan), but his administration saw a concurrence of events which resulted 

in a decade of decreasing attacks. U.S. victory in Desert Storm against Iraq, 

the negotiations in the Oslo Accords between Israel and Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union 

have a correlative, perhaps even causal, effect on a global decrease in terrorist 

attacks in the 1990s. This decrease was likely tied to the disruption in terrorist 

group safe havens, funding, and causes these events had in Eastern Europe, 

the region around Israel, and Iraq. Interestingly, in responding to criticism 

about ending the Desert Storm campaign and leaving Saddam Hussein in 

power in Iraq, President Bush said: “If we’d continued, hundreds of thousands of American troops would be on the ground in Iraq today attempting 

to pull warring factions together or bogged down in some guerrilla warfare. 

Whether in Korea or in Lebanon, history shows us the danger of losing sight 

of our objectives. Liberators can easily become occupiers. A Commander in 

Chief has to know not only when his objectives have been reached but when 

to consolidate his gains.”31

Despite a decreasing number of attacks, terrorism remained a problem 

throughout President Clinton’s administration, primarily due to Iran’s 

state sponsorship, the rise of the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas, 

and instability in Somalia. President Clinton issued Presidential Decision 

Directive 39, articulating that U.S. Policy on Terrorism would be to pursue 
26

JSOU Report 18-5

and prosecute terrorist criminals and help other countries in their efforts 

to do the same. President Clinton’s administration took steps to increase 

international cooperation to combat terrorism. In 1996, at a G7 conference, 

President Clinton called on the international community to do four things 

to combat terrorism: give terrorists nowhere to hide, deny them resources, 

strengthen border security, and prevent terrorists from “misusing the hightech communications we all rely on for commerce and cooperation.”32 In 

1996, President Clinton emphasized the fight against terrorism as a national 

priority and a national security priority; he increased the references to terrorism in the National Security Strategy (NSS) in the early part of his term. 

In President Clinton’s 1998 NSS, published after the East Africa embassy 

bombings, terror and its variants were mentioned 104 times (bin Laden’s 

network was mentioned four times, though not by name). Presidents Reagan, 

George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton mentioned terrorism in their published 

NSSs the following number of times: Reagan 27 times in 1987, and 18 in 1988; 

Bush 9 times in 1990, 11 in 1991, and 17 in 1993; Clinton 26 times in 1994, 27 

in 1995, 57 in 1996, and 42 in 1997; 59 times in 2000 (bin Laden network 3 

times) and 93 in 2001 (bin Laden network 5 times).

President Clinton was the first to also emphasize how difficult combating terrorism would become. In an address in 1996, two years before AQ 

destroyed two U.S. embassies in East Africa, President Clinton said: “This 

will be a long, hard struggle. There will be setbacks along the way. But just 

as no enemy could drive us from the fight to meet our challenges and protect our values in World War II and the Cold War, we will not be driven 

from the tough fight against terrorism today. Terrorism is the enemy of 

our generation, and we must prevail.”33 President Clinton importantly also 

addressed another aspect of how terrorism strategically affects a nation and 

the international community. Responding to critics who felt terrorism was 

an exaggerated threat (more people are killed by drunk driving for example, 

or struck by lightning), President Clinton highlighted the negative political 

impact on international negotiations which prevent intractable grievances 

from being resolved, perpetuating aspects of human misery. He claimed, 

“The question is not only how many lives have been lost in each attack, but 

how many futures were lost in their aftermath.” Additionally, the psychological damage in fear and the danger of terrorists accessing higher technological 

capabilities to inflict harm were worthy of national security attention.34 As 

one expert and close observer of the development of U.S. counterterrorism 
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opined, “American perceptions have gradually evolved from the traditional 

view of terrorism as a ‘crime’ to a new disposition characterizing it as a new 

and unprecedented tactical and strategic form of warfare.”35 This chapter 

will discuss this point further, because how strategically harmful terrorism 

actually is must be reevaluated in the context of the United States’ strategic 

situation today.

The Impact of 9/11 on U.S. CT Strategy

The event which crystallized terrorism as a threat to U.S. national security 

was AQ’s 9/11 attack on the United States, killing more Americans than were 

lost at Pearl Harbor in 1941. Many researchers and commentators view the 

9/11 attack as a Pearl Harbor-like event bringing the U.S. reluctantly into a 

war it should be committed to finish as quickly as possible.36 But we must set 

aside emotional, visceral reactions and think strategically. Pearl Harbor and 

9/11 have fundamental differences, which are crucially necessary to realize 

before the U.S. makes fatally strategic errors that could result in catastrophic 

consequences. In the first place, Pearl Harbor was a significant military—specifically naval—defeat, which gave Japan operational and strategic opportunity to conduct activities in the Pacific theater. If Japan had been ready to, or 

even capable of, projecting force across the Pacific to invade the West coast 

of the U.S., little could have prevented it. Japan instead used the strategic 

moment it gained in time by its successful attack to act regionally and at the 

operational level of war, which afforded the U.S. an opportunity to exploit 

the fortuitous escape of its aircraft carriers from Pearl Harbor’s devastation. 

Despite Japan’s strategic surprise, the strike validated the concept of the 

aircraft carrier, which replaced the battleship as the strategically significant 

vessel in naval warfare. Because Japan missed destroying the U.S. aircraft 

carriers at Pearl Harbor, the apparent defeat was only an ephemeral setback—

the only thing we had to fear was indeed fear itself. Strictly speaking from 

a strategic perspective, it could be argued the losses at Pearl Harbor were 

strategically inconsequential in terms of the United States’ naval strength 

in the Pacific, as demonstrated by the subsequent naval air battles of Coral 

Sea and Midway.37 The United States had already started to shift its domestic 

manufacturing and production to a wartime footing over a year prior to 

the attack. What would have been the expected economic consequence of 

Pearl Harbor as a declaration of war—full mobilization—was moot because 
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military expansion and preparation had already been placed in motion. In 

the end, Pearl Harbor’s actual significance was a legitimizing, unfalsifiable 

pretext for declaring war, which the democratic political establishment in 

Washington D.C. could proceed to do without jeopardizing their political 

careers. Japanese Admiral Yamamoto, the brilliant military mastermind of 

the Pearl Harbor attack, was entirely correct when his strategic intuition 

was no longer obscured by his preparations for the operation and could see 

beyond the strike to its consequences, “I fear all we have done is awaken a 

sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.”38

As horrible as the 9/11 attack was in terms of loss of life and personal 

traumatic experiences, in terms of strategic impact on the United States, 

it was inconsequential. The U.S. response to 9/11 has been extremely consequential, but how quickly the U.S. recovered from the attack itself needs 

noting. There was no enemy even remotely capable of exploiting the temporary strategic moment. The catastrophic terrorist attack did not change any 

military, naval, or aviation tactical, operational, or strategic verity or way of 

warfare. A Department of Homeland Security macroeconomic impact analysis determined that while there was short run impact of a 0.5 percent drop 

in annual gross domestic product growth for 2001, forecast fears of severe 

economic consequence were possibly “subject to significant error, and/or 

that forecasters were anticipating negative shocks such as subsequent attacks 

that did not materialize.” The report concluded that it was not clear why the 

forecasts were wrong and recognized that national economic resilience was 

an “obvious possibility,” but that more research was needed.39 The 9/11 attack 

and subsequent war on terror do not seem to have negatively affected the 

long term economic growth of the United States.40 Economic growth involves 

such a large number of factors, that assessing the impact of a single major 

event is difficult; hence, it diminishes the strategic economic significance of 

the 9/11 attack. It begs the question whether a different response than going 

to war might have had a different long-term economic effect. Such a counterfactual is beyond the scope of this research, but should be considered in 

contemplating the economic consequences of changing the U.S. strategic 

approach to continuing a longer war.

There is little known evidence yet that any jihadist strategic thinkers 

questioned the wisdom of the 9/11 attack result; there was apparently little 

intuitive sense of possible strategic error. Instead, the U.S. response to 9/11 

was exactly the strategic outcome expected by the jihadists. Their strategic 
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intent was not to knock America to its knees, but instead initiate a war 

between the West and the nations in the Muslim world, which in bin Laden’s 

view, would result in an ultimate victory for the Islamists.41 Because there is 

an apocalyptic quality to the jihadi cause, from their strategic perspective, 

the continuing conflicts appear to indicate progress toward their ultimate 

ends. How the U.S. chooses to leave Afghanistan, and whether that outcome 

mirrors the Soviet departure after eight years of war in the 1980s, will likely 

shape future jihadist perceptions of their possible strategic success for this 

entire conflict. 

From a Western national security perspective, the Taliban government 

of Afghanistan strategically erred in not surrendering Osama bin Laden 

and AQ fighters to U.S. demands. That action allowed the U.S. to avoid 

the debate about whether the nation could declare war on the technique of 

terrorism, or even a group of individuals as a non-state actor, by providing 

a territorially-bounded concept of a theater of operations. But from a nonstate actor jihadi perspective, the U.S. fixated on a conflict where borders 

matter and ideology takes a back seat. AQ hoped to start an apocalyptic war 

between the West and Islam, by banking on Americans overreacting to the 

9/11 attack; they hoped the U.S. would ignore how anti-American sentiment 

and tensions between Western and Islamic culture fueled AQ’s movement.42

In this sense, the conflict with the United States has expanded and energized 

tens of thousands of recruits to the jihadist cause and has spread to over 

three dozen countries where terrorist cells are known to operate and conduct 

regular attacks. Despite 16 years of CT successes, the number of jihadi terrorists has expanded exponentially since 2001.43 In AQ’s view, the United States 

strategically blundered into the “Bear Trap,” as it were; however, whether 

AQ has fundamentally underestimated and misjudged the United States as 

an opponent—expecting a similar result as the mujahidin achieved in the 

Soviet-Afghan War—is, objectively speaking, still a matter of future assessment.44 Al-Qaeda may view the U.S. engagement of other nations in a coalition of the willing to facilitate cross-border and transregional cooperation 

as an aid to expanding the conflict and not as strategic pressure. What the 

terrorists likely did not expect was the U.S. government’s efforts to deny that 

the War on Terror was a war on Islam (in spite of jihadist claims to the contrary). The United States also started to empower moderate, non-jihadist and 

secular, Muslim voices and governments to attack the theological legitimacy 

of AQ’s jihad. This approach was nascent in President Bush’s 2003 National 
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Strategy for Combating Terrorism, comprising a single paragraph on page 24, 

but significantly expanded through the 2006 update to reflect an increasing 

emphasis on democratic values and the harm the jihadi cause was doing to 

Muslims. By President Obama’s 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 

this aspect of the conflict was a recurring theme throughout the document.

Before examining how the U.S. CT strategy post-9/11 evolved, it is worth 

summarizing U.S. grand strategy and the role CT had at the moment of 

9/11. The complete explanation of the evolution of U.S. grand strategy is a 

subject for a longer work, but in late 2001, the U.S. had not identified any 

specific national strategic threat against which to organize its national security strategy—the Cold War had been over for more than a decade. The U.S. 

deliberately avoided simply switching the Cold War reticle onto the next 

largest Communist nation, the People’s Republic of China, instead opting 

to capitalize on an expected peace dividend. After a decade of debate, the 

U.S. military settled on the concept of Transformation—transformation 

from threat-based strategic calculus to capabilities-based. The actual publication of the strategic approach would be after 9/11, but the intellectual 

heavy-lifting had already been worked. In this approach, terrorism was just 

one of a diverse set of challenges or risks. In a capabilities-based approach, 

the most pressing concern was the acquisition by a terrorist group of WMD 

capabilities. From the U.S. perspective, thorough understanding of a terrorist group’s grievances, raison d’etre, or adoptive strategy, was less important 

than preventing the capability to mount a WMD attack or conduct an operation to attack the U.S. homeland. The U.S. government’s CT policy was a State 

Department-led, state sponsor-focused effort to enhance international law 

enforcement cooperation to identify, apprehend, and prosecute individual 

terrorists and enhance passive, defensive measures making high-probability 

targets less vulnerable and terrorist/criminal travel more difficult. The U.S. 

also ensured it possessed a rapid response, special operations, counterterrorist capability to react to multiple terrorist-related scenarios, including those 

potentially involving WMD.

Just prior to 9/11, a Congressional investigation into U.S. CT policy identified the need for a more unified government effort, especially in terms of 

homeland security. The hearing identified weaknesses in intelligence sharing 

procedures among U.S. agencies and with international partners. Terrorists 

had demonstrated an escalation of attacks against U.S. interests after Khobar 

Towers, the East Africa embassies, and the USS Cole. However, while the 
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committee recommended improvements in organization and passive defensive measures, the core tenets of U.S. CT policy remained unchanged: no 

concessions to terrorists; bring terrorists to justice through law enforcement 

channels; isolate and pressure state sponsors of terrorism; and assist partners 

and allies in improving counterterrorist capabilities.45

The U.S. approach to CT evolved after 9/11. First, the Patriot Act increased 

domestic surveillance capabilities and law enforcement authorities to capture suspected terrorists and thwart their attacks.46 Second, President Bush 

ordered a comprehensive investigation into the 9/11 attacks, resulting in the 

9/11 Commission Report which offered several recommendations for upgrading the U.S. approach.47 Third, an outcome of the Congressional CT review 

in March 2001, as well as the 9/11 Commission report, a single cabinet-level 

department was created to better integrate cross-government efforts and 

agencies to defend the homeland.48 Fourth, to realize a two-decades long 

effort to better integrate intelligence sharing on CT, the Bush Administration 

established the National Counterterrorism Center with representatives from 

across the intelligence and law enforcement communities, integrating border 

and transportation security processes, as well as financial capabilities.49

The Evolving U.S. CT Strategy

The first published (in February 2003) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism emphasized an important shift in U.S. policy—the U.S. was now using 

all elements of national power to “attack terror networks; reduce their ability to communicate and coordinate their plans; isolate them from potential 

allies and from each other, and identify and disrupt their plots before they 

attack.” The U.S. also articulated the international cooperation aspect of its 

strategic approach to CT in a more detailed and sophisticated fashion: “by 

eliminating their sanctuaries, leadership, finances, and command, control 

and communications capabilities; denying further sponsorship, support, 

and sanctuary to terrorists by cooperating with other states to take action 

against those who provide support; diminishing the underlying conditions 

that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting the international community to 

focus our mutual efforts and resources addressing legitimate political and 

social needs and by reducing security vulnerabilities in the countries most 

at risk; and, defending the United States, its citizens, and interests at home 

and abroad.”50
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Three years later, the U.S. made a significant shift in CT strategy, presumably informed by the greater research and attention placed on studying and 

understanding the global Salafist jihadist threat. The 2006 National Strategy 

for Combating Terrorism included lines of effort now dedicated to longer 

term strategic elements related to the root causes of terrorism. The U.S. now 

wanted to: “advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the 

ideology of terrorism; prevent attacks by terrorist networks; deny terrorists 

the support and sanctuary of rogue states; deny terrorists control of any 

nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and, lay the 

foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the 

fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success.”51

The invasion of Iraq and subsequent insurgency, as well as the decision 

to remain in Afghanistan, shifted U.S. strategy toward exporting democracy and nation-building. Was this shift in strategy a genuine change in the 

U.S. theory of victory over terrorism? Or was it a rhetorical fig leaf to cover 

the inability to make a decision to leave Afghanistan and Iraq after the initial CT-related objectives were mostly accomplished? It is well known and 

researched, that President Bush’s decision to pursue nation-building also 

advanced AQ’s strategy by embroiling the U.S. in a regional conflict. The 

draw of foreign jihadist fighters from around the world to Afghanistan and 

Iraq were possible because the U.S. decided to stay. The early signal the U.S. 

was shifting its counterterrorist strategy in a significant way occurred in July 

2004, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, when President Bush announced “we will 

confront them overseas so that we do not have to confront them at home.”52

The U.S. strategy on CT shifted under the Bush administration because 

of the nature of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. Prior U.S. CT strategy 

had not included actively invading other countries, toppling regimes, and 

pursuing terrorists relentlessly with military force in foreign countries. In 

addition, the U.S. found itself unable 

to outpace AQ’s media capabilities. 

Although the U.S. was successful 

in keeping the Palestinian conflict 

sidelined in global media, AQ’s message continued to resonate drawing foreign fighters by the thousands. Instead of eliminating terrorist safe 

havens in Afghanistan and Iraq, the zone of instability and terrorist network 

activity spread from West Africa to the Philippines and the danger of dirty 

The draw of foreign jihadist fighters from around the world to Afghanistan and Iraq were possible 

because the U.S. decided to stay. 
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bombs and chemical-biological weapons increased with greater connectivity 

between terrorist and transnational criminal networks. Criticism in Western 

media channels of the Iraq invasion and occupation opened up a vulnerability in the U.S. coalition’s cohesion that AQ and its affiliates attempted 

to exploit by conducting attacks in Spain, Uzbekistan, Germany, and the 

United Kingdom. 

When President Obama took office in 2009, the U.S. was already on its 

way out of Iraq and at the new administration’s urging was conducting strategic reviews about how and when it could withdraw from Afghanistan. As 

the complex realities ‘on the ground’ were realized by the Obama administration, the President’s desire to improve the U.S. image and rebuild U.S. 

prestige resulted in doubling down on the role of U.S. values.53 President 

Obama tried to undo growing concerns that the U.S. was waging a war on 

Islam. At first, the Obama administration attempted to move away from the 

rhetoric of expanding Western democracy, but a wave of popular protests 

and uprisings across North Africa and into Syria and Yemen in 2010 and into 

early 2011, commonly referred to as the Arab Spring, thwarted that effort.54

Regional instability in the Arab world played into the global jihadist hands 

as they attempted to subvert popular uprisings against corrupt authoritarian governments. The U.S. initially supported these democratic uprisings, 

but were also hesitant because many of the existing governments were close 

partners in the war against violent Islamic extremist organizations like AQ. 

The U.S. quandary and delay in acting damaged the U.S. reputation for 

democratic values and tied American policy to corrupt regimes. 

The widespread instability opened up space for a new jihadist organization, ISIS. Born out of the remnants of AQI and reinvigorated by anti-regime 

militants in Syria, in early 2014, ISIS (aka, the Islamic State in the Levant, or 

Daesh) exploded out of Raqqah, Syria to conquer huge swaths of eastern and 

southern Syria and northern and western Iraq. While the Obama administration may have ignored warnings from its intelligence community, the 

surprise onslaught was even more damaging to the fragile Iraqi security 

forces who struggled to halt the invaders.55 The unexpected boon for U.S. CT 

efforts was that ISIS and AQ were not acting in concert and were possibly 

even at odds, despite their common desire for a caliphate. The U.S. reacted 

to save its Iraqi partner and respond to global concerns about the outmigration of the Syrian people from the extended conflict. The U.S. mounted 

military operations in concert with its partners to recover the initiative in 
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the region. Recent successes in liberating Mosul and overrunning the ISIS 

caliphate obscure the fact the U.S. may have lost the initiative. If the timing 

and location of U.S. CT efforts are dictated by enemy action, then the U.S. 

does not have the strategic initiative.

Others might claim the U.S. retains freedom of maneuver and the ability 

to conduct global strikes in a time and place and manner of its choice. But, 

in a strategic sense, this is not the same as exercising the strategic initiative. 

There are likely several distinct strategies which could be adopted to defeat 

the violent jihadist extremists, which would vary in their effectiveness and 

efficiency, costs both financial and human, collateral damage, and degree 

of success. 

Even after an anticipated operational victory in Iraq and Syria, ISIS and 

its branches, AQ and its affiliates, as well as a myriad of lesser groups around 

the globe have still metastasized the jihadist threat into a global phenomenon. The shock of the 2014–2017 ISIS campaign in Syria and Iraq leaves 

indicators towards a few strategic options for the jihadists: they can attempt 

to renew the conflict in Syria/Iraq, they can relocate to another regional area 

(including returning to Afghanistan), they can subside into sleeper cells and 

wait another day, or a new group may achieve strategic surprise. The divide 

between AQ and ISIS also gives rise to strategic speculation whether the 

experience of ISIS, especially if key leaders are lost, will cause a rapprochement between the two groups. Will a jihadist “third way” group arise to 

reclaim the banner of jihad? What will be the strategic impact if the inspired 

attacks continue after ISIS is defeated in Syria and Iraq?

Conclusion

The key question before Western decision-makers is whether or not the experience with ISIS can influence a needed shift in U.S. national CT strategy. 

The U.S. must acknowledge the ideological component of the jihadist threat, 

and then adjust its strategy to account for the ideological battleground. Some 

current CT approaches must be continued. First, the military network of 

intelligence and operations is a proven CT necessity and effective stratagem 

for taking on a distributed network of terrorists. Second, increasing the legal 

frameworks in various countries for prosecuting terrorists ensures our partners and allies have the capacity and capability to use nonmilitary means to 

CT. Third, establishing whole of government abilities to share information 
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and coordinate activities is another success that will have to be sustained. 

Finally, CVE campaigns being waged with the assistance of numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are beneficial. CVE efforts are longerterm, population mindset, culture-influencing events that can undermine 

the concept of jihad in best case scenarios. These approaches must continue 

as part of the longer-term U.S. CT national strategy. 

The core elements of the current U.S. CT strategy, as articulated in the 

2011 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which should remain the 

focus of a robust National Counter-Terrorism Center and intelligence community effort, are: depriving terrorists of critical enablers; eliminating safe 

havens; and preventing the acquisition of WMD. Building partnership capacity should be carefully continued in terms of identifying partner needs, 

enhancing cooperation (especially intelligence sharing), and learning to rely 

on partner nations to act. The U.S. might consider outsourcing its critique on 

human rights-related issues to the United Nations and other NGOs, rather 

than publicly broadcasting these complaints as a central point of U.S. diplomatic action. U.S. values do not need to be constrained, just rechanneled 

into a venue that minimizes making the United States the standard bearer 

and primary target, and instead enhancing the legitimacy of such efforts by 

empowering the institutions of the international community.

The elements of the current strategy that should be amended include 

“degrading the linkages between AQ and its affiliates,” “diminishing the 

drivers of violence,” and “countering AQ’s ideology and narrative.”56 Degrading the linkages between terrorist organizations will be a targeted effect of 

depriving these groups of their network enablers. This does not need to be 

a specified part of the overall strategy, because it will likely be a specific 

objective intrinsic to named operations. This point is minor compared to 

the adjustments necessary in the other two elements.

Diminishing the drivers of violence is a monumental task and is closely 

tied to other issues such as development, globalization, climate change, 

humanitarian relief, and poverty reduction. It is not the United States’ sole 

responsibility to do this for the globe; this is the responsibility of every 

government to provide for its citizens. This part of the strategy is wellintentioned and some might even argue, quixotic. The human condition is 

relative, and while an admirable goal, raising the standard of living of the 

lowest quartiles of the world’s population is a never-ending quest. The U.S. 

must not get distracted by nation-building to avoid tar pit-like quagmires.
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Countering the ideology and narrative must be amended and defined as 

a decisive line of effort. Importantly, there is a difference between pushing/

proclaiming an idea and defeating an idea. Pushing an idea is forcing someone to change the way they think, while defeating an idea creates space for 

an alternative idea. The U.S. must be receptive to an alternative that is not 

the U.S. narrative, but that would be better than the violent jihadist extremist narrative. This approach can build on ongoing CVE, diplomatic, and 

information-related efforts but the prioritization should reflect an approach 

more recognizable as COIN.57

Any change to future U.S. CT strategies must recognize that preventing 

all terrorist attacks is a desired, but aspirational goal. The reality is the U.S. 

national security institutions may not be able to stop all attacks, especially 

“inspired” attacks.58 The truth is they do not need to. The focus must shift to 

a culture of resilience, which was an important principle President Obama 

added to the strategy.59 The U.S. should expound upon this principle and 

make it a cornerstone of the strategy. The U.S. CT strategy must defeat the 

global jihadist narrative. Rather than attempting to outlast and outfight a 

foe who has demonstrated martyr-like qualities, the author recommends 

defeating this ideology by focusing on strategic narratives60 to make space 

for vulnerable populations to choose a more pacific alternative.

Endnotes

1. George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses National Security, Homeland 

Security and the Freedom Agenda at U.S. Army War College,” Office of the 

Press Secretary, 17 December 2008, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.

gov/news/releases/2008/12/20081217-6.html; Barack Obama, “Statement by the 

President on ISIL,” Office of the Press Secretary, 10 September 2014, https://

obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-presidentisil-1; Sydney J. Freedberg, “Countering Terrorists & Great Powers On The Cheap: 

Dunford’s 2-Front War,” Breaking Defense (website), 19 June 2017, https://

breakingdefense.com/2017/06/countering-terrorists-great-powers-on-the-cheapdunfords-2-front-war/); James Mattis, “Transcript: Defense Secretary James 

Mattis on ‘Face the Nation,’” 28 May 2017, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/

transcript-defense-secretary-james-mattis-on-face-the-nation-may-28-2017/.

2. While still in popular use in casual conversation, the media, reputable journals, 

and even among defense related think tanks the term “War on Terror” is considered obsolete by professionals and senior leaders have avoided using the phrase 

in major addresses. David French, “Trump Makes Two Promising Moves in the 

War on Terror,” National Review, 22 September 2017, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/451645/donald-trump-war-terror-new-policy-changes-smart-
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promising; Saskia Brechenmacher and Steven Feldstein, “Trump’s War on 

Terror,” The National Interest, 18 October 2017, http://carnegieendowment.

org/2017/10/18/trump-s-war-on-terror-pub-73478; Donald Trump, “Remarks 

by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia,” 21 August 

2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia/; Terry Moon Cronk, “Mattis: Military 

Force Authorizations Remain Sound,” DOD News, Defense Media Activity, 30 

October 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1358069/mattismilitary-force-authorizations-remain-sound/; General Raymond A. Thomas 

III, “Statement of General Raymond A. Thomas, III, U.S. Army, Commander, 

United States Special Operations Command before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee,” 4 May 2017, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/

doc/Thomas_05-04-17.pdf. 

3. This combination of factors—winning the battles but losing the war and testing 

America’s role in the world—are also reminiscent of the U.S. experience in the 

Vietnam War. While this chapter will not further compare these two conflicts, 

there is research of this type available from the last 16 years.

4. Barack Obama, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, White House, June 2011, 

9-10; Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security 

Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism, 28 October 2016; Robert L. McKenzie, 

“Countering Violent Extremism in America: policy recommendations for the next 

president,” 28 October 2016, accessed October 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/

research/countering-violent-extremism-in-america-policy-recommendationsfor-the-next-president/; Mark Gould, “Understanding Jihad,” Hoover Institute, 

Stanford University, 1 February 2005, accessed October 2017, https://www.hoover.

org/research/understanding-jihad.

5. Gabriel Weimann, “Terrorist Migration to the Dark Web,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol 10, No 3 (2016), accessed January 2018, http://www.terrorismanalysts.

com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/513/html.

6. SAPA-AFP, “Saudi cleric denounces suicide bombers,” 12 December 2013, https://

www.iol.co.za/news/world/saudi-cleric-denounces-suicide-bombers-1621715; 

Kirk H. Sowell, “Downplaying Jihad in Jordan’s Educational Curriculum, 2013-

2017,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 11, No 6 (2017), http://www.terrorismanalysts.

com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/664/1322; https://counterjihadreport.com/

category/al-azhar-university/; Katherine Zimmerman, America’s Real Enemy: 

The Salafi-Jihadi Movement, July 2017, American Enterprise Institute, 20.

7. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century

(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); David Tucker, “Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom is Wrong” 

Homeland Security Affairs 4, Article 5 (June 2008), accessed October 2017, 

https://www.hsaj.org/articles/122; Stanley McChrystal with Tantrum Collins, 

David Silverman & Chris Fussell, Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for 

a Complex World (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2015); Ori Brafman and Rod 
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A. Beckstrom, The Starfish And the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless 

Organizations (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2006).

8. Compare Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, May 2002 

and Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, July 2017, https://

www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf.

9. Katherine Zimmerman, America’s Real Enemy: The Salafi-Jihadi Movement, 

American Enterprise Institute, July 2017; Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: 

Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2007); 

Jeff Seldin “Is US Losing a Key Part of the War on Terror?” VOA News, 12 

September 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/is-us-losing-key-part-of-war-onterror/4025019.html; Daniel Byman, “Are We Winning the War on Terrorism?,” 

Brookings Institute, 23 May 2003, https://www.brookings.edu/research/are-wewinning-the-war-on-terrorism/; Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “U.S. ‘not winning’ 

in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary tells Congress,” Reuters, 13 June 2017, https://

www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan/u-s-not-winning-in-afghanistandefense-secretary-tells-congress-idUSKBN1941Y1.

10. Radwan Mortada, “Al-Qaeda’s 20-Year Plan: From 9/11 to Final Victory,” AlAkhbar English, 29 January 2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18437; 

Bill Roggio, “The Seven Phases of The Base,” Long War Journal, 15 August 2005, 

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2005/08/the_seven_phase.php; Cameron Glen, “Al Qaeda v ISIS: Ideology & Strategy” Wilson Center, 28 September, 

2015, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-ideology-strategy.

11. Christopher Woody, “Inside Spain’s quiet fight on the frontline of Europe’s war on 

terror,” Business Insider, 5 June 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/spain-antiterrorism-campaign-border-security-2017-6; Lisa Abend, “Spain’s Secret Role in 

the War on Terror,” Time, 2 December 2008, http://content.time.com/time/world/

article/0,8599,1863264,00.html; Aleksandra Zieba, “Counterterrorism Systems 

of Spain and Poland: Comparative Studies,” paper from European Consortium 

for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Sessions of Workshops 2015 (Warsaw), 

Counterterrorism Strategies of the European States: Problems, Solutions and 

Challenges, accessed October 2017, https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/

d47dc01e-e154-4db1-8c04-7f08b0692592.pdf; Fernando Reinares, “After the 

Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and the Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain,” WP 40/2008 El Cano Royal Institute (translated from Spanish) 

14 October 2008, accessed October 2017, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/

portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/

zonas_in/international+terrorism/dt40-2008.

12. S. Paul Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy: Islamist Militancy, National Security, and 

the Pakistani State (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017); Chirasree 

Mukherjee, “Pakistan’s Role in the War on Terror: A Degenerative or a Progressive One?,” International Affairs Review, XXI, no 1 (fall 2012): 22-35, http://www.

iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/mukherjee.pdf; New America Foundation, The Battle For Pakistan, 2010 (Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy 

Papers); Lalwani, Sameer “Pakistan’s COIN Flip: The Recent History of Pakistani 
39

Barrick: Counterterrorism in U.S. National Security Strategy

Military Counterinsurgency Operations in the NWFP and FATA,” New American 

Foundation April 2010; Shuja Nawaz, FATA—A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting 

the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 

of Pakistan, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), January 2009; 

Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation 

Building in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia (London, England: Viking 

Press, 2008). 

13. Seth G. Jones, Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qa’ida since 9/11 (New 

York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2012), 141–160, 239–260.

14. Henry Plater-Zyberk, Russia’s Contribution as a Partner in the War on Terrorism

(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, July 

2014).

15. Bill Clinton, “Graduation Address at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD,” 

22 May 1998, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/05/22/clinton.academy/

transcript.html; and Bill Clinton on 20 August 1998: “My fellow Americans, our 

battle against terrorism did not begin with the bombing of our Embassies in 

Africa, nor will it end with today’s strike. It will require strength, courage, and 

endurance. We will not yield to this threat; we will meet it, no matter how long 

it may take. This will be a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism, between the rule of law and terrorism. We must be prepared to do all that 

we can for as long as we must.” In his “Address to the Nation on Military Action 

Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan,” 20 August 1998, http://www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=54799; President Clinton’s warnings 

to President George W. Bush during their transition as noted in David Milne, 

Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy (New York: Farrar, 

Strauss & Giroux, 2015), 433.

16. George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism, White House, 

February 2003.

17. Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States, White House, 

January 1987.

18. Stephen Collinson, “Nixon’s own 9/11: When terrorism came of age,” CNN online, 

29 July 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/27/politics/terrorism-1970s-richardnixon/index.html.

19. Richard Nixon, “Memorandum Establishing a Cabinet Committee To Combat 

Terrorism,” 25 September 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 

The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3596.

20. This perception about how a President’s domestic political situation is affected by the 

President’s responses to terrorism has likely been an enduring political concern in 

the United States. Clive Barber, “The Dawn of American Counterterrorism Policy,” 

Richard Nixon Foundation & Presidential Library, 6 September 2016, https://www.

nixonfoundation.org/2016/09/the-dawn-of-american-counterterrorism-policy/.
40

JSOU Report 18-5

21. Timothy Naftali, “There’s Very Little We Can Do: Gerald Ford and Counterterrorism” Version 1.3 Draft Section for Study of US Counterterrorism Strategy, 

1968–1993, http://www.washingtondecoded.com/files/tngrf.pdf.

22. Timothy Naftali, “There’s Very Little We Can Do: Gerald Ford and Counterterrorism,” United Press International, “Secret Unit: Targeting Nuclear Terrorism” Los Angeles Times, 24 August 1986, available from http://articles.latimes.

com/1986-08-24/news/mn-17327_1_nuclear-terrorism.

23. Nora Gamez Torres, “Cuba: How it was added to the list of countries that sponsor 

terrorism,” Miami Herald, 18 April 2015, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/

nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article18886467.html.

24. Michael Kraft and Yonah Alexander, Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy 

(Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), xxxviii.

25. Most of these casualties occurred in the Hezbollah bombing of the U.S. Marine 

Corps Headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon.

26. Ronald Reagan, “Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation 

To Combat International Terrorism,” 26 April 1984, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, available from https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/

speeches/1984/42684a.htm.

27. Ronald Reagan, “The President’s News Conference -- Trans World Airlines 

Hijacking Incident,” 18 June 1985, https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/

archives/speeches/1985/61885c.htm.

28. David B. Muhlhausen and Jena Baker McNeill, Terror Trends 40 Years’ Data on 

International and Domestic Terrorism (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2011), accessed October 2017, http://www.heritage.org/terrorism/report/

terror-trends-40-years-data-international-and-domestic-terrorism. 

29. The Long Commission (1983). Report of the Department of Defense Commission 

on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 23 October 1983, Department of 

Defense, 20 December 1983, https://fas.org/irp/threat/beirut-1983.pdf.

30. Michael Kraft & Yonah Alexander, Evolution of U.S. CT policy, xxxvii; Newsweek, 

“Counterterrorism: Victim of Success?” Newsweek online 4 July 1993, available 

from http://www.newsweek.com/counterterrorism-victim-success-194754.

31. George H.W. Bush, “Remarks to the American Legion National Convention” in 

Chicago, Illinois on 25 August 1992, available from https://bush41library.tamu.

edu/archives/public-papers/4713.

32. Kraft and Alexander, Evolution of U.S. CT policy, 75.

33. Kraft and Alexander, Evolution of U.S. CT policy, 76.

34. Kraft and Alexander, Evolution of U.S. CT policy, 82–84.

35. Kraft and Alexander, Evolution of U.S. CT policy, xxxi.

36. Some accounts even mirror the conspiracy theorist comparisons between 9/11 

and Pearl Harbor like David Ray Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing 
41

Barrick: Counterterrorism in U.S. National Security Strategy

Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11 (Northampton, MA: Interlink 

Publishing Group, 2004). 

37. There were in fact only two subsequent naval battles in the Pacific War which 

featured battleships fighting battleships. The first off Guadalcanal in 1942. The 

second during the Battle of Leyte Gulf in the Surigao Strait, featured only 6 

battleships on the U.S. side (five of which had been sunk or damaged at Pearl 

Harbor) and only one on the Japanese side.

38. The quote is actually from the movie Tora! Tora! Tora!—there is no verifiable 

provenance for the quote. However, subsequent historical analysis of Admiral 

Yamamoto’s views supports the idea that Yamamoto understood the strategic 

consequences of war with the United States. He believed the strike only afforded 

Japan a temporary window of opportunity against the United States before the 

superior industrial might of the U.S. would change the strategic calculus in the 

Pacific and for Japan’s future prospects.

39. Bryan W. Roberts, “The Macroeconomic Impacts of the 9/11 Attack: Evidence 

from Real-Time Forecasting,” Department of Homeland Security, Working Paper, 

2009, accessed October 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/

Macroeconomic%20impact%209_11%202009.pdf.

40. Catherine Mulbrandon, “Long-term Real Growth in US GDP Per Capita 

1871-2009,”Visualizing Economics, last modified March 8, 2011, http://visualizingeconomics.com/blog/2011/03/08/long-term-real-growth-in-us-gdp-per-capita1871-2009.

41. Osama Bin Ladin, “Letter to the American people,” The Guardian, 24 November 2002, available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/

theobserver.

42. Bin Laden “Letter to the American people.”

43. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, 24 September 2014, S/RES/2178 

(2014); United States Institute of Peace, The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and 

Beyond, December 2016/January 2017; also sponsored by the Wilson Center, this 

report is a collaboration by 20 experts on the Middle East, Islamic extremism, 

and jihadism and reflects the work of two conferences held between August and 

November 2016. Tim Lister “9/11 anniversary: How has terrorism changed in 

the past 14 years?” 10 September 2015, accessed January 2018, http://www.cnn.

com/2015/09/10/us/9-11-how-has-terror-changed/index.html.

44. While this view may not sit well with American and Coalition military officers 

who have served in Afghanistan (and Iraq), I believe their professional appraisal 

will ultimately include understanding the difference between expectations of 

success and future realities, the fact the Coalition is still fighting in Afghanistan 

as of late 2017, and that fundamental to objective appraisal is the durability of 

the Afghan government after the Coalition’s departure. Mohammad Yousef and 

Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story (Lahore, Pakistan: Jang 

Press, 1992); Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan
42

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(New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2010); Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011).

45. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, Washington D.C., May 

2002.

46. The Patriot Act “Uniting and Strengthening America by providing appropriate 

tools required to intercept and obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act 

of 2001 (107th Congress Public Law 56, Page 115 STAT. 272, Public Law 107-56, 

107th Congress, accessed October 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW107publ56/html/PLAW-107publ56.htm.

47. 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, The National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 22 July 2004, accessed October 2017, 

https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.

48. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107–296, November 25, 2002, 116 

STAT. 2135, accessed October 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/

publications/hr_5005_enr.pdf.

49. Kraft and Alexander, Evolution of U.S. CT Policy, xliv.

50. George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, White House, 

February 2003.

51. George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, White House, 

September 2006.

52. George W. Bush, “Remarks at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, 

Tennessee,” 12 July 2004, accessed October 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

pkg/P-2004-book2/pdf/P-2004-book2-doc-pg1287.pdf.

53. Jessica Stern, “Obama and Terrorism: Like It or Not the War Goes On,” Foreign 

Affairs, September/October 2015.

54. David Ferguson, “Silencing the Arab Spring with Co-opted Counterterrorism,” 

Berkeley J. Middle E. & Islamic L. 1 (2016), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/

jmeil/vol7/iss1/1.

55. House of Representatives (2016); “Initial Findings of the U.S. House of Representatives Joint Task Force on U.S. Central Command Intelligence Analysis,” 10 

August 2016, https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/house_jtf_on_centcom_intelligence_initial_report.pdf; Jim Axelrod and Emily Rand “Investigation reveals CENTCOM general delayed intel on ISIS fight meant for 

the president,” CBS News, 22 September 2016, https://www.cbsnews.com/

news/did-a-centcom-general-delay-intelligence-meant-for-the-president/. 

Ali Watkins, “Intelligence Chief Puts New Spin On Claims Of Slanted ISIS 

Reports: Where does the responsibility for faulty intelligence lie?” Huffington Post, updated 28 December 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/

james-claer-isis-intelligence_us_560d5a72e4b076812700fedf. 

56. Barack Obama, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, White House, June 2011, 

9-10, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.
43

Barrick: Counterterrorism in U.S. National Security Strategy

57. Jonathan Carroll, Countering the Islamist Insurgency (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 

2017).

58. Vivienne Walt, “Terrorist Attacks Suggest a Change in ISIS Tactics” Time, 26 

June 2015, http://time.com/3937602/isis-terrorist-attacks/. 

59. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, February 2015.

60. The table is the author’s assessment and suggestion for consideration of an adjusted 

strategic narrative as a point of discussion.

45

Spencer: Making Sense Out of Chaos

Chapter 3. Making Sense Out of Chaos: 

Introspection as a Tool for Asking 

Pertinent Questions with Regard to 

Transregional Terrorism

Emily Spencer

A man approaches a stranger with a dog in a park. Politely he asks, 

“Does your dog bite?” The stranger replies that no, his dog does not 

bite. The man bends down to pet the dog only to be severely mauled 

by the beast. Bloodied and perplexed he questions the stranger as 

to why he would say that his dog does not bite. The stranger looks 

him in the eye and says simply, “this is not my dog.” The moral: ask 

the right question.1

The Red Army Faction (RAF), also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, 

was a left-wing militant group in Germany that existed from 1970 to 

1998. It claimed to be a communist and anti-imperialist urban guerilla group 

engaged in armed resistance against a fascist state. In total, the group is 

credited with causing 34 deaths and approximately 300 bomb attacks, arsons, 

and bank robberies. Although key leadership was captured throughout their 

existence and its effectiveness waned, particularly after the fall of the Soviet 

Dr. Emily Spencer is the director of research and education at the Canadian 

Special Operations Forces Command Education and Research Centre. She 

holds a doctoral degree in war studies from the Royal Military College of 

Canada and has authored, coauthored, and edited numerous books, chapters, and articles on the contemporary military operating environment. Her 

research focuses on the importance of cultural knowledge to succeed in the 

contemporary operating environment, as well as the role the media plays in 

shaping and understanding world events. Spencer is an adjunct professor at 

Norwich University and a Joint Special Operations University Senior Fellow.
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Union and the end of funding by the East German Stasi, the group was 

never fully run down and some members were still at-large at the end of 

the century.

When teaching strategic thinking, I often present the class with the 

above vignette and ask students to figure out how to locate and capture the 

remaining terrorists. This example is useful because it requires all elements 

of strategic thinking—critical and creative thinking as well as emotional 

intelligence2 —to solve. In particular, it requires critical thinking skills as a 

first step towards finding a solution.

Not surprisingly, every group that I have worked with to date which has 

included military members, law enforcement, and intelligence analysts, as 

well as other groups within the defense and security framework, have come 

up with the same responses. In general, the solutions are all potentially viable 

but they are also quite predictable. The options include releasing prisoners 

and following them, bribing them, following known associates and family 

members, and trying to pose as a criminal in order to gain the confidence 

of imprisoned RAF members so that they might share information, just to 

mention a few (and not to mention the more politically incorrect options 

that sometimes surface). 

What is predictable about all of these responses is that they all approach 

the issue from a law enforcement/security agency point of view. Every group 

has placed themselves in the position of the good guys trying to capture the 

bad guys. It is not until students are asked to change their perspective and 

to think like a terrorist—or someone living on the lam—that students start 

to broaden their point of reference.

When asked what the terrorists would need to survive and how they 

might need to live, groups tend to think of looking for things that stand out 

from the normal, much like the German Grenzschultzgruppe 9 (GSG9),3 

aka Border Guard Group 9, and police services eventually did. While the 

German government utilized a number of tactics to try and shut down the 

RAF—such as surveillance of known family and associates, analysing old 

Stasi files and agents/handlers, offering earlier release to incarcerated RAF 

members in return for information, etc.—the last members of the RAF were 

only located after authorities utilized a different lens to solve their quandary, 

specifically looking at the problem through the eyes of the fugitives. In the 

end, the elusive final felons were arrested by undertaking a search of all those 

in Germany who paid for utilities in cash. The logic was that if you were a 
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Spencer: Making Sense Out of Chaos

wanted felon, it would be difficult to get credit and have a credit card/bank 

account. As such, it was relatively easy for the GSG9 and police services to 

verify the actual identities of the very few people who paid for their utilities 

in cash. Importantly, when using this example in the classroom, most groups 

are also able to come up with this solution once they are prompted with the 

more direct question of how might you need to function if you were living 

as a fugitive.

What this example highlights is that in order to problem solve, you need 

to fully understand the issue and address it from the correct perspective. 

Not surprisingly then, the first step is to recognize your limitations and/or 

blinders in order to make sure that you are indeed actually asking the correct 

questions from the best perspectives in order to solve the problem.

As such, introspection becomes an important tool in developing the ability to ask effective questions. In fact, as Sun Tzu so aptly noted in the 5th 

Century BCE, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not 

fear the result of a hundred battles.” The questions for our purposes are 

what does “know yourself” really mean; and how can this knowledge help 

uncover what questions we should be asking, specifically with regard to 

transregional terrorism?

Within the military context in general, knowing yourself tends to take 

on a very practical connotation. Often it is expressed within the realm of 

capabilities. In general, it refers to what individuals and/or groups can do 

and is reflected by notice to move times, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), standard operating procedures (SOPs), expertise, training, 

and experience for example. Sometimes when looking at the softer side of 

these capabilities, resiliency might be considered, or even gaps in ability. 

Ultimately, within a military context, “know yourself” is very practical, 

and measurable, expressed by what can (and sometimes cannot) be done. 

As such, it is very action focused.

Not surprisingly, the focus on knowing yourself within a military context tends to be on ‘what’ can be done while not nearly as much attention is 

generally given to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ elements that not just support, but, 

more importantly, drive the ‘what’ function. Biases, whether based on personal experience, or cognitive, associated more with brain composition and 

neurotransmitters, are generally not fully reflected upon. Nor are cultural 

beliefs and values and the emphasis on shared cultural values within a group 

and/or differences between groups. Additionally, individual differences such 
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JSOU Report 18-5

as being an introvert or extrovert or preferring direct or indirect communication styles do not tend to get too much consideration either. This level of 

introspection is often considered irrelevant, time consuming, and perhaps 

even wishy-washy by military members who are more focused on immediate, 

often kinetic, solutions. Consequently, within a military context, the focus 

on knowing yourself tends to reside at the ‘what’ I/we can do level rather 

than at the ‘why’/‘how’ we do what we do level.

When tackling the problem of transregional terrorism, the potential solution space is going to be limited if individuals, departments, and agencies, 

and even nations, approach the issue from the same perspective. Understanding why we do, what we do and not just what we can and cannot do, is the 

first step in broadening this perspective.

Introspection as a potential solution to transnational terrorism would 

help to shed light on why those working in defense see the world the way they 

do. For example, why do we still think in terms of borders and jurisdictions 

and allow terrorists the freedom of maneuver? Terrorists are not limited 

by our point of view. But we are limiting ourselves if we do not understand 

where our own point of view is coming from and question whether or not it 

is still relevant to, or required of, the contemporary operating environment.

Part of building a solution based on introspection is the development of 

more diversification within teams as well. Notably, being a diverse group 

on its own does not imply being more effective. Diverse groups that show 

high levels of cultural intelligence and work well with each other, however, 

have been shown to outperform homogenous groups on every occasion.4 As 

such, cooperation within a whole-of-government or international context 

is also important to establish, and much more likely to occur, if each group 

has been introspective about not just their capabilities—what they can and 

cannot do—but also why and how they do what they do.

When it comes to transregional terrorism, we want to make sure that 

we are asking the right questions. To go back to the case study presented at 

the beginning, initially, when students are asked how to catch the remaining terrorists the answers, as mentioned, are predictable. They focused on 

capabilities, what we can do, essentially running through potential TTPs 

and SOPs. When asked how the terrorists might need to live as fugitives, 

a whole new line of inquiry presented itself—one that helped to remove 

the unconscious blinders of how things are perceived in a given, accepted 

framework and instead look at how things might be.
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Spencer: Making Sense Out of Chaos

Subsequently, the more precise issue with regards to Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) to ponder is what can introspection mean for SOF in terms of 

combating transregional terrorism? Again, applying introspection can help 

determine if the focus is on the right issues and the correct types of questions are being asked. For instance, specifically with respect to SOF, should 

the focus be more on the preventative side of defense, i.e., countering violent 

extremist organizations, or is being reactive the best option? Is a kinetic 

solution best or should a softer approach be applied? This line of inquiry 

highlights the issue of whether or not 

the right people with the right skill sets 

are being employed. Additionally, are the 

partnerships that are being established 

the correct ones or should SOF be looking to partner more strongly with nongovernmental organizations and not-for-profits, for example? Are all partner 

nations committed to the same end? Do they see the problem the same way? 

Finally, how should success be measured? 

Ultimately, introspection helps you understand why you do what you 

do. This understanding allows you to then more clearly see your limitations 

and potential possibilities. What this increased understanding of yourself 

subsequently provides is for you to have a more open-minded perspective. 

Being more open-minded ultimately helps with your ability to see other 

perspectives. The bottom-line of being able to see other perspectives more 

clearly is that you are more likely to be able to ask the right questions.

As Aristotle noted, “knowing yourself is the beginning of all wisdom.”5

The idea that introspection is a valuable tool is not new. It is time to reharness its potential and expand our understandings of transregional terrorism. Therefore, the logical next step is to determine how this tool can be 

effectively utilized.

To help address this concern, I would like to share another anecdote 

that I often use when teaching. This particular story addresses the element 

of fear and how fear can affect decision-making. Notably, it is not the item 

that is feared that has an effect on decision-making, but rather one’s own 

views about the item that can prove to be detrimental. As such, like in so 

many instances, the power of fear rests within the individual and thus the 

solution begins with introspection.

This line of inquiry highlights 

the issue of whether or not 

the right people with the right 

skill sets are being employed.
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JSOU Report 18-5

The true story of the 19th century sinking of the U.S. whaleship Essex, 

as retold by Professor Karen Thompson Walker and which represented part 

of the inspiration for Herman Melville’s epic tale Moby Dick, is an excellent example of how we create the world in which we live through our own 

thoughts and feelings.6 In 1819, the whaleship Essex found itself nearly 5,000 

kilometers off the coast of Chile. There were 20 U.S. sailors on board when 

the ship was struck by a sperm whale and sustained a massive leak. The 20 

whalers huddled in three small whale-boats as the Essex flooded and sank. 

They were 16,000 kilometers from home and about 1,600 kilometers from 

the nearest landmass. They were floating in the middle of the Pacific with 

only rudimentary navigation equipment and limited food and water. There 

was no way to signal for help and there would be no search parties. As such, 

they were left alone with their fears.

Twenty-four hours after the Essex had sunk, the whalers came to the 

conclusion that they needed a plan. While they had options, none appeared 

good. They were just about as far from land as it was possible to be on earth. 

Their first option was to go to the nearest landmass, which were the Marquesas Islands (Tahiti), roughly 2,000 kilometers away. Even though they 

represented the closest landmass, there were rumors that the islands were 

inhabited by cannibals. Their second option was to sail to Hawaii. The danger 

with this option, however, was that given the season, they were likely to 

encounter potentially fatal storms along the way. Their third option was to 

go 2,500 kilometers south and then hope the winds would be favorable to 

get them to South America. The danger with this longest option was that 

they had limited food and water.

Essentially, they needed to choose between cannibals, storms, and starvation. Their imaginations went wild conjuring images of each of these possibilities. Not surprisingly, the most vivid image that they created was that 

of cannibals sinking their human teeth into human flesh and roasting live 

bodies or boiling them in water to later be devoured in some sort of ritualistic feast where limbs would be pulled off corpses and gnawed on like 

chicken bones.

As such, while sailing to Tahiti represented the most logical choice, and 

likely best chance of survival, the imagery of cannibals elicited the most fear 

and this choice was rejected. The fear of being ripped apart by storms also 

proved too much to bear. The least gruesomely imagined death, that of starvation, evoked the least fear and, despite the fact that this option represented 
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Spencer: Making Sense Out of Chaos

the furthest distance to travel and the most likely outcome of running out of 

water and food, it was chosen because it also evoked the least vivid imagery. 

Death by starvation and dehydration did not cause the same fear as being 

ripped to shreds by a storm or human teeth.

Two months into their journey, somewhat predictably, they ran out of 

food. By the time they were finally picked up by a passing boat over half of 

the crew of the Essex were dead. Ironically, amongst the survivors some had 

resorted to their own form of cannibalism—the very thing they feared most.

Ultimately, the fear the crew of the Essex chose to listen to governed their 

fate. What they feared most—cannibals—was instantaneously rejected as 

an option even though Tahiti represented the likeliest chance of survival. 

Conversely, the fear of dehydration and starvation did not elicit nearly as 

much detailed imagery and, consequently, fear, and was thus selected even 

though it represented the least probable chance of survival. 

The ill-fated crew of the Essex had allowed their own thoughts and feelings, ultimately, their imaginations, to guide their decision-making. Consequently they made a poor decision that was based on fear rather than reason. 

It was a bad choice that many of them paid for with their lives. Importantly 

for our discussion, if they had been more introspective about why and how 

they came to the conclusions they had, the results may have been different. 

Indeed, they may have realized that they were not making rational choices, 

based on evidence and probabilities.

Not surprisingly, the first, and most important step in using introspection as an enabler for asking the right questions is to recognize that we are 

in control of our thoughts. Only by accepting that we live in a world of our 

own creation, will we be able to broaden our perspectives. 

The second step in applying introspection as an enabler for asking the 

right questions is to be precise. In the case of the crew of the Essex, the 

question and follow-on discussions should not have been about what might 

happen in each circumstance, but rather which circumstance offered the 

highest probability of survival. At a minimum, the cost/benefit potential 

for each option should have been clearly expressed in a non-emotionally 

driven manner.

Finally, introspection helps to identify strengths and weaknesses so that 

we may leverage our strengths and mitigate our shortcomings. By knowing at 

what things, and under which circumstances, we excel, we can help create an 

optimum environment for success. Additionally, knowing your weaknesses 
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can allow you to preemptively establish methods to circumvent them or, at 

least, mitigate them.

To return to the issue of transregional terrorism and SOF, understanding your viewpoint more clearly through the use of introspection can allow 

for a more precise understanding of who allies are, who the enemy is, what 

options are realistically available, what constitutes success, what the legal 

boundaries are, and what moral and ethical concerns need to be addressed. 

Examples of macro questions could include:

1. What/who exactly is the threat?

2. What are the key issues with regards to security, financial interests, 

and humanitarian concerns?

3. Who are the principle stakeholders within both national and international perspectives (e.g. foreign affairs, defense, etc.)?

4. How does each group garner support?

5. What are the legal/ethical/moral guidelines?

6. What is the desired end-state?

7. What is an acceptable end-state?

8. What is the cost-benefit analysis? And, most importantly,

9. The issue of “how” and “why” should be applied to each question, 

leading to additional, more in depth, inquiry to each point.

SOF are, generally, natural problem solvers. Transregional terrorism is a 

problem that many governments have decided lies within the SOF domain 

of national defense. As such, SOF will, by default, want to solve the problem. 

This natural inclination, if unrecognized, however, could lead to a predictable response of a high-tempo, potentially capture/kill type mission—in 

short, a continuation of the decapitation strategy. By applying introspection 

and recognizing strengths, limitations, and natural inclinations, SOF will 

be able to place themselves in a position of strength by understanding their 

viewpoint, broadening their perspective, and asking pertinent questions.

For example, for SOF in Iraq, or anywhere for that matter, the difficult 

part of precision direct action raids is often locating the enemy. Sensitive 

site exploitation in Iraq consisted of gathering cell phones, computers and 
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Spencer: Making Sense Out of Chaos

documents into a sandbag and then dropping them off with analysts in a 

building in Baghdad. By the time the information was processed any useful 

intelligence had normally become irrelevant. Recognizing that there was 

a problem that needed to be fixed, the operational commander carefully 

explained how and why they were doing what they were doing. Through 

this introspection he conceived a better way to accomplish the goal. He then 

parlayed congressional funding into a buying spree of state-of-the-art technology that could process computer files and cell phone call logs of detainees 

in a matter of mere minutes. He also hired hundreds of Arab linguists and 

analysts to make sense of the information they were now privy too. As a 

result, the information from one raid could provide the necessary intelligence to allow follow-on raids conducted as early as the same day/night. He 

also strong-armed U.S. intelligence agencies into sending representatives to 

the Task Force’s global headquarters. Finally, the commander decentralized 

decision-making and promoted a culture of risk-taking and innovation. The 

end result was increased effectiveness. The number of operations skyrocketed 

from ten a month in 2004 to 300 a month in 2006. 

The above example highlights the importance of knowing your strengths 

and weaknesses. More importantly, it illustrates how introspection can lead 

to effective action by allowing you to ask the right questions of yourself and 

others. Ultimately, asking the right questions enables correct responses.

Endnotes

1. Adapted from a commonly cited story.

2. Strategic thinking is the art of aligning critical and creative thinking, and emotional intelligence in a holistic manner in order to achieve sustainable success 

within complex, dynamic and multiplayer environments. See Emily Spencer, 

Thinking for Impact: A Practical Guide for Special Operations Forces (Kingston: 

ERC Press), in progress.

3. A counterterrorism hostage rescue and special operations police unit of the 

German federal police.

4. David Rock and Heidi Grant, “Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter,” Harvard 

Business Review, 4 November 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/11/why-diverse-teamsare-smarter; Katherine W. Phillips, “How Diversity Makes Us Smarter,” Scientific American, 1 Oct 2014, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/

how-diversity-makes-us-smarter/.

5. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, Chapter II, The Internet Classics Archive, http://

classics.mit.edu//aristotle/metaphysics.html.
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6. This story is derived from an excellent TedGlobal talk by Karen Thompson 

Walker. While the analysis is unique for this chapter, the story, including 

much of the vocabulary, is entirely that of Karen Thompson Walker. I recommend watching her TedGlobal talk. Karen Thompson Walker, “What Fear 

can Teach Us,” TedGlobal 2012 http://www.ted.com/talks/karen_thompson_

walker_what_fear_can_teach_us. 
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McCue, Gaughan, Cumpston: The Crime Terror Nexus

Chapter 4. The Crime Terror 

Nexus: Causes, Consequences, and 

Opportunities for Disruption

Colleen McCue, John Gaughan, Meghan Cumpston 

Three years ago, when the caliphate was originally established, researchers started seeing what appeared to be intentional social media segmentation and associated microtargeting by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS) in support of direct outreach to criminals and others demonstrating 

social deviance or other patterns of antisocial behavior. Initially, this did 

not make sense, particularly when viewed within the context of the strict 

interpretation and application ISIS has of of sharia law, to include public 

Dr. Colleen McCue is a principal data scientist with CACI Intl. where she supports special missions. Her areas of expertise include the application of advanced 

analytics to the analysis of crime and intelligence data. She earned her doctorate 

in psychology from Dartmouth College, and completed a five-year postdoctoral 

fellowship at the Medical College of Virginia, Virginia Commonwealth University. 

Lieutenant Colonel John Gaughan is the commander of the Joint Geospatial 

Intelligence Squadron in the JSOC Intelligence Brigade. He is a career Air Force 

intelligence officer with multiple deployments conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions in support of Special Operations Forces. 

He earned his bachelor of arts in Spanish from The College of the Holy Cross 

and his master's in international relations from the University of Oklahoma.

Major Meghan Cumpston is a squadron executive officer in the JSOC Intelligence Brigade and has served in various command and staff positions, including 

service as an instructor in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. 

She earned her bachelor of arts in political science at Villanova University and 

her master's in international relations and economics from the Johns Hopkins 

University School of Advanced International Studies.
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executions in ISIS-held territory for similar behavior.1 On the other hand, the 

increased prevalence of criminal offending and other prior antisocial behavior among foreign fighters and attackers,2

 while unexpected and apparently 

inconsistent with the fundamental approach ISIS has of sharia, is consistent 

with their use of these individuals as an expendable or otherwise disposable 

resource. 

While the increased prevalence of criminality among ISIS fighters and 

attackers seemed initially surprising, the confluence of crime and terrorism 

was not entirely unexpected. This finding aligns with three, criminallyoriented narrative themes outlined below that explicitly target criminal and 

other antisocial behavior: “jihadi cool,” “super predators,” the “redemptive” 

narrative, suggesting this line of recruitment is intentional and providing 

data supporting the efficacy of the microtargeting strategy of ISIS for the 

radicalization and recruitment of criminally-involved or otherwise socially 

deviant individuals. 

What Can We Learn from History? 

Numerous authors have noted an increasing prevalence of criminals among 

fighters. In their analysis of the relationship between crime and terror, Basra 

and Neumann3 documented an increased prevalence of known criminals 

among recent attackers using open source and media reports; noting that 

actual prevalence is likely higher than official reporting may indicate. In 

their analysis, they reviewed the complexity of the crime-terror link describing putative causes, consequences, and correlates of this relationship and 

noting that “no uniform profile emerges from the sample.”4 Rather, several 

models describing the crime-terror relationship emerge. These proposed 

models include the “redemption” narrative, prison networking and recruiting, opportunities to transfer existing skill sets to supporting terrorist activities, social norms promoting the use of crime to advance jihad, and the use 

of white collar and other financial crimes to finance terrorism. In other 

words, different people radicalize for different reasons, under different circumstances, and in different ways. While Basra and Neumann5

 indicate 

they do not believe ISIS is directly targeting criminals for recruitment, some 

knowledge and understanding of their identified radicalization and recruiting pathways would support similarly targeted efforts designed to counter 
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McCue, Gaughan, Cumpston: The Crime Terror Nexus

directly these varied and disparate recruiting and radicalization pathways. 

These and other related models are described below. 

Convergent Recruiting. The simplest and most direct explanation is that 

these groups are pulling from the same demographic pool. Direct overlap 

in the population increases the likelihood that the demographic typologies 

will align and there will be some “dual purpose” recruiting.6

Reduced Inhibition/Lower Threshold. Extending convergent recruiting, the 

same factors that may predispose an individual to criminal behavior also 

may predispose them to terrorism. Desire for excitement, a lower threshold 

for or willingness to violate social rules and norms, including the rule of 

law can be common attributes of individuals attracted to crime and/or terrorism. Similarly, terrorism and related attacks may provide meaning to 

and/or an outlet for individuals with an innately violent interactional style 

or those otherwise predisposed to violence by providing outlet or meaning 

for violent acts.

Skill Transfer. Skills used to commit crime also may translate to skills 

required for material support to terror. For example, document forgery and 

some economic crimes may be beneficial as relates to the ability to generate 

funds to support terrorism, which may explain at least some of the overlap. 

Even sale of illegal narcotics provides revenue and also supports leverage and 

associated exploitation of apostate behaviors. Similarly, revenue emanating 

from illegal activities is relatively fungible and can easily move into and out 

of other illegal activity given the lack of accountability of funds.

Financial Crimes to Finance Terrorism. Again, some traditionally whitecollar and related financial crimes can be used instrumentally to economically support terrorism. These may include document forgery, credit card 

fraud, illicit supply chains, and other criminal enterprise used to support 

terrorism.7

Instrumental Use of Existing Criminal Enterprise. Financial requirements 

necessary for material support of terrorism also may include contracting or 

otherwise securing desired skill sets, particularly as relates to illicit supply 

chains and trafficking, forged documents, procurement of weapons, securing clean vehicles, and safe houses. While these individuals may or may not 

support the ideology or agenda, or may not even be witting, their material 
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support to terrorism may provide valuable insight regarding the attack 

planning process and local facilitation. Depending on their level of knowledge, involvement, and desire to protect their ongoing criminal activity 

(i.e., their criminal day job),8 they may represent a critical weakness in the 

terror network.

Social Rules and Norms. Social rules and norms regarding crime, particularly against nonbelievers, likely influence the crime-terror nexus. Criminologists have described the tension between legal and illegal enforcement 

elements, particularly as relates to the enforcement of social rules and norms 

in illegal networks and criminal enterprise denied access to formal institutions designed to enact the rule of law.9

 Extending this model of systemic 

criminal activity,10 some patterns of crime are not only acceptable, but 

actively encouraged through explicit messaging and social learning, particularly if perpetrated against kuffar or unbelievers.11 Again, the exploitation 

of vice through the sale and distribution of illegal narcotics underscores this 

activity as undesirable, creating both personal and social vulnerability, while 

also providing funding to support terrorist activities.

Prison Networking and Recruiting. Prisons have long been known to be 

criminogenic environments. Often serving as finishing schools for many 

patterns of offending, it is not unusual for inmates to leave the correctional environment with a broader criminal skill set than they possessed 

on entry.12 Prison census data document an increased presence of Muslims 

among prison populations. Whether this is cause, consequence or correlate is unknown at this time and the subject of active debate.13 Active gang 

recruiting and radicalization in particular have been associated with the 

correctional environment, creating significant challenges to those attempting 

to prevent growth of these groups within prison walls, while also trying to 

deradicalize known gang members or terrorists in prisons. Efforts to mitigate 

the impact that these individuals may have on the larger population are similarly challenging given opportunities for networking within the correctional 

environment, and associated challenges in segregating specific populations. 

Finally, the redemptive narrative described later in this paper in the review 

of direct recruiting strategies may be particularly difficult to distinguish 

from faith-based rehabilitation efforts given its ostensibly prosocial themes. 
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McCue, Gaughan, Cumpston: The Crime Terror Nexus

Criminogenic Environment: Micro-Diaspora Communities. The role of 

diaspora communities in terrorism has been described previously and 

includes direct recruiting, as well as the use of organized crime and related 

criminal activity to provide financial support to terrorism.14 As a result, the 

role that environment plays in the enablement of radicalization is gaining 

significance. These environmental factors include elements associated with 

the conflict zone and micro-diaspora communities that result in incomplete or failed assimilation.15 This may be particularly true for second or 

third generation migrants who perceive themselves as belonging to neither 

the old nor the new society and as a result are disenfranchised from the 

majority culture.16 The sense of camaraderie and belongingness offered by 

some criminal groups, and the alignment with a cause promoted by a terror 

group may be especially attractive to individuals looking for a connection 

and meaning. Therefore, understanding the unique challenges associated 

with migration and immigrant enclaves, particularly as it relates to access 

to economic, educational, and vocational opportunity—real or perceived—

may provide some insight regarding the role of environment and associated 

microcommunities in radicalization and enablement of external operations. 

Moreover, this understanding may provide the context necessary to inform 

anticipation and influence in support of novel approaches, including nonkinetic opportunities for disruption.

Criminogenic Environment: The Conflict Zone. The multifocal criminogenic aspects of the conditions in the caliphate to include maternal, familial 

and community factors are outlined, below. These conditions parallel those 

known to set the conditions for criminal behavior—particularly violent 

behavior—and have the potential to create a “perfect storm” of consequence 

and influence that will be associated with fighters qualitatively more lethal 

than those currently encountered.17

Maternal. Women fill a uniquely important role in the lives of their 

children. Women who chose to bring their children to the caliphate and 

directly expose them to the conflict, as well as jihadi role models and 

other predators represent the first level of impact. Related, there is strong 

encouragement for women to have babies, thereby populating the next 

generation and ensuring continuity if not aggressive growth of ISIS.18

This may represent a marked increase in original estimates regarding a 
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pending “youth bulge” in many Arab states that may further exacerbate 

conditions known to drive radicalization and recruiting. Finally, women 

in ISIS are explicitly encouraged to not only support, but also actively 

enable indoctrination, radicalization and recruiting; delivering their sons 

“Patiently to Death.”19 Criticism of their role in exposing their children to 

risk is anticipated and proactively countered by ISIS propaganda authors.20

Unfortunately, women may represent an especially vulnerable population in ISIS, unable to protect or effectively advocate for their children 

given their lack of influence and frequent marginalization, as illustrated 

explicitly by ISIS propaganda.21

Familial. Overall, the shortage of men related to disproportionate representation of males in migrant flows22 and losses due to battle deaths23

has likely altered demographics in the region. Moreover, and given their 

active involvement in terrorism, many of the males that remain are fighters, caliphate leaders, or other supporters of ISIS, and are not good role 

models. Directly illustrating this point, adult males in propaganda videos 

and other ISIS media can be observed engaging in battle, executing prisoners, and supporting indoctrination and training of so-called “Cubs of the 

Caliphate”—images designed to influence and shape young boys’ behavior. 

Similarly, ISIS recruiting videos illustrate boys and young men joining 

the fight, with scenes portraying the camaraderie and esprit de corps that 

would be particularly attractive.24 Other videos depict age appropriate 

play (e.g., running races, “capture the [ISIS] flag”), in addition to other 

training activities (e.g., firearms training) that would resonate with boys. 

In these propaganda materials, the boys participate in activities with 

adult males in the community and are portrayed as equal to or a peer 

of the adult males in some scenes. Again, this will appeal to young boys 

seeking acceptance of and approval from adult males in the community. 

Fighters are seen smiling, and there are cheers and fist pumps at the end 

of action sequences. On closing what appears to be a training exercise, 

adult fighters remove their facial coverings and masks, and one adult 

male can be seen putting his arm around a young boy. The attention paid 

by the adult trainers in these materials will be particularly attractive to 

young boys seeking approval from adult male role models (e.g., apparent 

encouragement, putting his arm around the shoulder of the boy); scenes 

expected to be especially compelling for the young men and boys who 
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might otherwise be deprived of adult male role models and/or attention 

from adult males given demographic changes associated with battle deaths 

and migration out of the region. 

Community. Additional parallels between current conditions in ISIS and 

the academic literature on illegal narcotics markets include the normalization, expectation, and glamorization of violence. Media reports from 

ISIS reveal increased frequency of and associated community tolerance to 

public executions and torture, including direct exposure of children and 

other sensitive members of the community to intensely violent imagery 

and acts as this behavior becomes part of the “new normal.”25 Extending the comparison, open social media, recruiting materials and martyr 

testimonials are replete with references to the expectation, prestige and 

glamour associated with dying in support of jihad. Community acceptance 

of or even promotion of violence and radicalization can be especially 

damaging to young children. This is particularly consequential during 

critical periods of emotional and moral development when young people 

are acquiring behaviors and judgments relating to the value of human 

life, including their own; social responsibility; and the ethics of harming 

others.26 Erosion of social rules and norms, and diminished perception 

of collective efficacy can further limit the ability of a community to 

effectively police itself and enforce the rule of law—a situation that may 

set the conditions for the replacement of the legal enforcement structure 

with illegal enforcement elements.27 For example, in communities taken 

over by ISIS, hisbah, or accountability police, have been emplaced as the 

illegal enforcement network. Moreover, acceptance of and aggressive 

promotion of participation in jihad also can be seen in the promulgation 

of textbooks and other educational and training materials being disseminated within ISIS. Underscoring the potential consequence of these 

behaviors, previous research on other patterns of high risk or criminal 

behavior indicate youth perceptions that adult members of the community participate in these activities is associated with an increased 

likelihood that they also will choose this pathway. For example, research 

on communities associated with open air, illegal drug markets revealed 

increased participation in illegal activity on the part of children. In these 

communities, drug selling was perceived as a viable career choice and 

young people saw roles like lookout and runners as entry level positions. 
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Exemplifying this perception, young children could be heard calling 

out, “five-oh!” when police cruisers entered a neighborhood, alerting 

the dealers of law enforcement presence.28 Similarly, elevation of jihadi 

fighters and caliphate key leaders in the community as role models, tacit 

approval of jihad and related activities from significant people (mother, 

family, community), also positions jihad and other positions in ISIS as 

viable life choices, particularly for young men and boys in the community. 

The “loner/loser” model of recent attackers aligns with the model 

described almost ten years ago,29 which anticipated the current attacker 

typology, including links to criminal groups and general patterns of antisocial behavior. Underscoring the behavioral cadence and predictability 

generally associated with “bad” behavior,30 the behavioral typology of future 

fighters and their origins outlined in the original research has proven to 

be accurate regarding the roots and general behavioral typology of foreign 

fighters, as well as for terrorists electing to carry out attacks in their home 

locations. It is important to note, however, that this work was not novel. 

Rather, the analysis was based on a solid foundation of earlier social science 

research and represented a direct extension of a model developed to describe 

young violent offenders associated with illegal narcotics markets in the U.S. 

in the late 1990s.31 Unfortunately, the paper has been relatively prescient in 

predicting the emergence of the new wave of violence, including offender 

typologies and the link to criminal groups and general patterns of antisocial 

behavior that the community is seeing in some of the recent attackers. It 

also indicates that while the recent wave of immigrants may include some 

individuals of concern, many more future attackers likely are already in 

place and just need to be activated. Again, behavioral typologies of recent 

attackers align well with the model outlined, underscoring the resilience 

of the derived behavioral typologies and highlighting the value of deeper 

analysis in support of meaningful insight and related action in response to 

a truly complex environment.

Direct Recruiting

Basra and Neumann32 document the increased prevalence of criminals 

among ISIS fighters, but suggest that ISIS is not recruiting explicitly for 

criminals. Rather, the increased prevalence of criminals noted among ISIS 

fighters and attackers and associated overlap in population is coincidental 
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and associated with the other recruiting themes they propose. While it is 

likely that there is some coincidental recruitment or convergent targeting of 

specific but common groups for both crime and terror, analysis of recruiting themes, including open social media, suggests at least some intentional 

microtargeting of criminal groups for terrorist organizations and/or attacks. 

The recruiting themes identified parallel and extend the radicalization pathways identified previously and include “jihadi cool,” “super predators,” and 

the redemptive narrative. Again, the population segments identified and 

described by Basra and Neumann,33 and the associated recruiting pathways 

and themes are similar. The difference resides in the inferred intentionality on the part of ISIS as it relates to the desirability and potential role of 

criminals in their organization. 

Direct recruiting: Jihadi cool. “Jihadi cool” was described as a recruiting 

pathway prior to the establishment of ISIS in 2014.34 Lifestyle factors, not 

ideology, represent the attractive hook. By way of example, members of alShabaab indicate promises of a girl, a gun, and a motorbike as key incentives for joining the group.35 ISIS has leveraged and extended this recruiting 

channel, actively promoting the jihad lifestyle as cool, edgy, and something 

to be emulated. Recruiting materials and propaganda emphasize camaraderie, fellowship, and esprit de corps; packaging and promoting conflict as 

a team sport. 

Consistent with the group’s attention to their brand,36 ISIS-branded 

spirit wear to include t-shirts, beanies, jewelry, and other accessories are 

increasingly prevalent on the open internet. Moreover, propaganda materials and other media include content apparently designed to shape jihad as 

a lifestyle. Assuming the role by adopting the lifestyle and look frequently 

is the first step in a conversion process. This will be particularly true for 

those exploring or otherwise testing the boundaries of established social 

rules and norms, risk takers, disaffected or disenfranchised youth, or those 

incompletely assimilated who are caught between old and new worlds and 

are simply looking for an identity, as is increasingly described.37

Direct recruiting: “Super Predators”. Experience with juvenile murderers 

suggests some young people have an apparently internally motivated, inappropriate interest in violence.38 These super predators have been described 

as “aggressive, violent and remorseless,”39 frequently seeking out opportunities and environments that will not only tolerate but support their violent 
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interactional style. Research on juvenile murderers suggests that potential 

recruits already experiencing violent urges, behavior, or other antisocial 

tendencies may be attracted to ISIS as a possible avenue through which to 

explore these urges and execute desired behaviors. With this model in mind, 

the extremely violent content offered by ISIS likely would be exciting and 

may serve as facilitators for young people predisposed to violent behavior. 

Juveniles predisposed to serious patterns of violence who had considered, 

or even articulated to others, “I wonder what it would be like to take a life,” 

may find a conflict zone particularly attractive. 

In reviewing propaganda materials and other content, ISIS has demonstrated an ability to actively reach out, connect with, and activate the 

“shadow” in the virtual environment.40 In other words, they have been able 

to identify, actively engage, and connect with individuals predisposed to 

violence, exhibiting an inappropriate interest in violence, or otherwise comfortable violating social rules and norms. This may include direct outreach 

through first person shooter games, recruiting videos and related propaganda material utilizing mounted GoPro cameras providing the first person 

shooter perspective popularized in video games, as well as explicit outreach 

and related narrative, e.g., content using the theme “This is our call of duty.” 

Video content in particular has been identified as preferred and particularly 

effective facilitators for youthful violent offenders and juvenile murderers.41

Direct Recruiting: Redemptive Narrative. The “redemptive narrative” as 

a recruiting theme is increasingly prevalent in the literature. Whether this 

reflects an actual increase overall, or merely increased interest on the part 

of researchers is unclear, but it is emerging as a powerful theme for Muslims and non-Muslim converts alike. It is important to note, however, that 

this is not a new theme. Participation in a holy war as a means by which to 

receive redemption for sin goes back at least a thousand years. In contrast to 

faith-based approaches to prisoner rehabilitation, however, the “redemption 

narrative” involves the use of religion and associated religious themes to 

redirect or otherwise channel criminal behavior in support of terrorism and 

related terrorist objectives. This approach may be particularly effective in its 

ability to leverage critical incidents or inflection points in the life trajectory, 

including consequence associated with criminal activity or other patterns 

of antisocial behavior.42
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McCue, Gaughan, Cumpston: The Crime Terror Nexus

Direct Recruiting: Cubs of the Caliphate. Given the clear intentionality 

of the effort, while not directly linked to the crime-terror nexus, the Cubs 

of the Caliphate are important to note. In contrast to forcible conscription 

often associated with child soldiers, Cubs training involves the intentional 

exposure to, forced participation and immersion in violence in support of 

the active development of future fighters as part of the ISIS “long game.”43

Incorporation of the intentional exposure to violence and incremental indoctrination further exacerbates the environmental consequence, setting the 

conditions for a transgenerational challenge that will be extremely difficult 

to mitigate or reverse.

Marketing ISIS. In parallel, with efforts to better understand and characterize ISIS fighters, it is becoming increasingly clear that ISIS is similarly 

sensitive to different radicalization and recruiting pathways, and is actively 

marketing itself, including campaigns explicitly targeting criminals and 

other socially deviant or disenfranchised individuals. Industry analysts 

describe the successful use of “earned media” by ISIS as a means by which 

to optimize limited advertising spend and reach; noting that “terrorists now 

inhabit a world where all the tools of contemporary marketing and advertising are at their disposal.”44 As a lifestyle brand, ISIS is reaching out to “young 

men who feel like their current life is purposeless,” providing an opportunity 

to “be someone and play a meaningful role in a glamorized apocalyptic 

battle” with a “community of like-minded individuals looking to be part of 

something greater than themselves;” an approach that proactively and very 

effectively undermines counter narrative.45

Consideration of recruitment from a marketing perspective, “conversion” 

is defined as a “marketing tactic that encourages a customer to take specific 

action.”46 This process has been referred to as nurturing, a prospect down the 

marketing conversion funnel in recognition of the incremental process and 

associated attrition in numbers during conversion. Actions can range from 

forwarding a tweet to joining the fight or perpetrating an attack. Within 

this construct, purchasing and wearing an ISIS t-shirt or other spirit wear 

may represent an early step in this incremental conversion process. Moreover, it also sets the conditions for evolution in affiliation to avoid cognitive 

dissonance, i.e., “I am wearing the t-shirt, therefore I must approve of the 

message.” 
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Analysis of ISIS open social media and related content reveals sophisticated use of various, intersecting and complementary media channels in 

support of common, reinforced themes. Moreover, as content is repeated 

across multiple channels, it begins to compel its own influence.47 In addition, 

attention to and evolution of their “brand” through slick marketing and 

tightly controlled messaging in their “official” publications further highlights 

parallels to sophisticated, commercial marketing concepts;48 evoking comparison between ISIS magazine Dabiq to an in-flight magazine in recognition of its production quality and professional look and feel.49 Similarly, ISIS 

recruiting videos, while presenting the first person shooter perspective that 

reinforces the gaming aspect of conflict, also illustrate death in a peaceful 

manner; highlighting tenderness and care that the other fighters pay to the 

deceased. Again, these scenes do not represent realistic portrayal of conflict. 

Rather, combat is depicted as a team sport, as a lifestyle or brand.50 Moreover, action sequences in these propaganda videos parallel popular YouTube 

video themes, including activities that mimic parkour (e.g., jumping between 

buildings, rolling falls). 

Implications

While interesting from a social science research perspective, what does 

this mean and why is it important? Insight regarding radicalization and 

recruiting lines of effort can be used to inform options, including non-kinetic 

options for disruption. Moreover, knowledge of historical patterns and trends 

can provide a framework for understanding that can be used to generate 

these options. Being able to develop a useful model for at least some of the 

recruiting narratives also provides insight regarding the attacker typologies in support of informed anticipation and influence. While prediction 

does not always translate directly to prevention, it can be used to reduce the 

search space geospatially and demographically, providing understanding 

and insight regarding the target audience for recruiting. 

Reduction of the Search Space. Location matters. Different people radicalize and join the fight for different reasons in different locations. Geospatially, 

deeper understanding regarding place preferences of U.S. adversaries and 

the role that enabling environments may play in facilitating their actions 

can support informed approaches to anticipate and influence, including 
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information-based area reduction in support of informed allocation and 

optimization of limited resources. 

Research on European micro-diaspora communities, and related analysis of jihadi fighter and attacker typologies has provided invaluable insight 

regarding enabling factors for radicalization and recruitment.51 With that 

research in mind, a quick back of the envelope calculation illustrates the 

potential operational use of these data: Males account for approximately 50 

percent of population. While females are increasingly being recruited for 

action, this allows an initial reduction in the demographic search space by 

half. A very generous, yet informed guestimate suggests that adjudicated 

criminals may account for as much as 10 percent of the population,52 although 

the actual rate likely will vary based on demographics and socioeconomic 

status. It is important to note these data reflect only known, formally adjudicated criminal offending, which may underrepresent actual involvement 

in criminal activity.53 This, however, yields another significant reduction in 

the sample of interest. Moreover, additional data indicate an over representation of second or third generation emigres54 from North Africa,55 resulting 

in the “not here, not there” challenge with failed or otherwise incomplete 

assimilation. While North Africa generally accounts for a large percentage 

of migrants in the EU countries of interest, this demographic segment still 

reflects only a portion of the total population, which would concomitantly 

reduce the demographic cohort of interest, as well as provide insight regarding possible location given known patterns of demographic clustering/geographic self-segregation (i.e., the microcommunities).56 Again, this yields 

additional reductions in the sample of interest and associated refinement 

of location. While not perfect, data-based approaches to demographic and 

geospatial area reduction can be used to provide novel insight and understanding regarding possible adversary recruiting pathways, including market 

analysis and segmentation, and associated lines of effort; guiding informed 

resource allocation and optimization, as well as anticipation and influence. 

Remote Activation and Guidance. Given the lack of identifiable links 

between attackers and terrorist networks, the increasing use of a disconnected model for activation and guidance is proving to be especially challenging particularly a priori links that can be used to identify and prevent 

or thwart attacks. 
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Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS routinely provide 

training, direction, and guidance through their media publications. Recent 

examples include the AQAP after action report (AAR) of the Orlando nightclub attacks,57 and ISIS notes in their publications called “Just Terror Tactics.”58 By way of example, Inspire magazine Orlando attack AAR includes a 

detailed analysis of the attack59 including explicit guidance regarding target 

selection based on preferred victim demographics and desired narrative, 

timing to increase the likelihood that victims would be impaired due to 

alcohol consumption, physical attributes of the location facilitating victim 

control and confinement in a planned kill zone, and recommended tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTP) improvements to increase the percentage of victims targeted. The authors also captured performance metrics, 

establishing a baseline casualty rate of 33 percent that could be used as a 

benchmark for future attacks. Social science researchers and intelligence 

analysts have seen numerous indicators of a long game in propaganda materials and media associated with both AQ and ISIS. Similarly, the use of the 

AAR process to identify elements of the TTP that worked and those that did 

not, as well as the identification of performance metrics and establishment 

of benchmarks indicates an interest in improving performance in anticipation of a long game that includes future attacks. Again, the redemptive narrative provides some insight as it relates to the opportunity to derive some 

meaning and associated attention, even if from an untimely death. Just as 

impromptu shrines mark the locations of street violence, slick reporting on 

“martyrs” may represent a particularly attractive option for a young person 

with perceptions of limited opportunities for success.60

Several repetitive themes throughout the JSOU symposium61 were related 

to the requirement for novel approaches to transdisciplinary collaboration 

that transcend geographic boundaries and professional domains in order to 

effectively respond to an increasingly agile, transregional threat that is evolving within the U.S. decision cycle. The importance of increased understanding in support of truly informed response was emphasized. While there are 

historical cadences that may provide useful models for framing and understanding current events, the current threat is evolving so rapidly that the 

academic story has not yet been written or even understood in many cases. 

Again, the authors have seen these themes in public facing social media 

going back at least three years, underscoring the insight of ISIS regarding 

their “market” and patience in executing the long game.62 The increased 
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McCue, Gaughan, Cumpston: The Crime Terror Nexus

prevalence of known criminals among attackers is consistent with these 

recruiting efforts. The narrative themes used to attract and recruit can be 

subtle, and likely to pass many of the filters designed to flag “offensive” content. In fact, the redemption narrative in particular likely would be viewed as 

prosocial to uninformed observers. These messages also appear to transcend 

culture and national boundaries, as exemplified by Western fighters responding to the call; offering ISIS a unique opportunity to reach well beyond their 

current terrestrial boundaries in support of mobilizing a globalized cadre of 

self-initiators. The ability of ISIS to effectively activate this group represents 

a unique challenge to us given the lack of obvious pre-attack indicators. 

In addition, for the individuals involved, global TV coverage is infinitely 

more attractive than having your sneakers tossed over the phone lines or an 

impromptu memorial on a street corner in your neighborhood. This is the 

ultimate glamour play for individuals so inclined.

Moreover, meaningful incorporation of the unique authorities and capabilities of law enforcement partners affords new opportunities for disruption. 

Exploiting existing knowledge in new ways, our law enforcement partners 

bring novel insight, access, and understanding to the fight through their 

prior, primary experience with almost half, if not more of these individuals, 

as well as the associated criminal enclaves and microcommunities. Their 

experience can be used to increase understanding and build options, including non-kinetic opportunities for disruption. 

Options

A full review of counter radicalization and deradicalization options is well 

beyond the scope of this paper; however several key themes were repeated 

throughout the Symposium63 including the importance of novel, transdisciplinary approaches and the need to proactively establish what success looks 

like in support of meaningful evaluation of effort. Echoing his comments 

from the Symposium, Lieutenant General Nagata noted recently, “There are 

going to be some instruments that we attempt that will not work, but the 

only way we will know they don’t work is if we attempt them, and once we 

realize they do not work, we persevere and try the next idea.”64 Criminal 

justice research supports the necessity of rigorous, unflinching evaluation of 

effort to identify what works, for whom and under what conditions, because 

as Lieutenant General Nagata indicated, some things work, some do not, and 
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some make the problem worse.65 Just as the law enforcement community 

could not arrest its way out of violent crime, options for meaningful, sustainable solutions to the challenge of radicalization will be similarly complex 

and challenging. Getting in front of the radicalization, indoctrination, and 

recruiting pipeline promises better outcomes, and meaningful, sustainable 

solution to this challenge. Therefore, within those constraints, two lines of 

effort with relevance to the crime-terror nexus will be considered: deradicalization programs, and Jigsaw’s “redirect” method.66

Deradicalization. As outlined above, radicalized individuals frequently by 

definition pose a significant threat to society and are not easily accommodated within the current correctional environment, where efforts to deradicalize are complicated significantly by concerns regarding within prison 

radicalization and recruiting. Results to date, particularly as it relates to 

long term outcomes, are not promising.67 Unfortunately, these results were 

not surprising given extensive experience in correctional programming. Key 

lessons learned from the criminal justice literature include the following:

• Patterns of offending perceived as prestigious and/or programs associated with differential treatment often attract offenders who may have 

no prior involvement (but learn when group housed). In one recent 

case study, the level of actual participation in terrorist acts, planning, or even terrorist ideology was questionable, with one program 

participant advising she had pursued entry into the deradicalization 

program as a means by which to “escape her ‘family cocoon’ and get 

some ‘fresh air.’”68 While this likely will not be true for all programs, 

experience in the criminal justice arena indicates that some individuals will “fake bad” in an effort to enter programs that are perceived 

as prestigious or that provide some other type of secondary gain, 

including better accommodations or even shelter and sustenance. Of 

particular concern, outcome data indicate that at least some of these 

individuals may “learn” in these settings, and go on to engage in this 

new pattern of offending.69

• The proliferation of junk science is endemic in counter radicalization and deradicalization programming. Similar to criminal justice 

programs, people just seem to know what will work. A good idea 

presented well frequently will be implemented, regardless of whether 

the program is based on sound clinical judgment or peer-reviewed 
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McCue, Gaughan, Cumpston: The Crime Terror Nexus

research. There is science to behavior change and associated programming that rarely makes it into these “treatment” programs.”70

Unfortunately, the consequence of these failed programs is diminished 

public safety.71

• Lack of meaningful, rigorous outcome evaluation. This is common in 

correctional programming, as well as many models for counter radicalization and deradicalization. Good ideas abound, but programs are 

rarely evaluated. In many cases, program developers and advocates 

have an inherent confidence in the efficacy of their program despite 

the lack of supporting outcome metrics, which often is sufficient to 

keeping them running and even replicated. It often takes years to 

demonstrate stable outcomes by which time many programs, including those that do not work have become institutionalized, thereby 

perpetuating ineffective or even criminogenic programming. Just as 

with criminal justice programming, the consequences of ineffective or 

deleterious deradicalization programming are far too serious to leave 

to chance. Rigorous, unflinching outcome evaluation is key. Some 

things work, some do not, and some make the problem worse. Without 

rigorous outcome evaluation, however, it is difficult, if not impossible 

to know what works, for whom and under what circumstances.72

At this point in time, while there are promising concepts and programs, 

there are no deradicalization programs that have been demonstrated to be 

effective using meaningful outcome metrics. In many cases, it is just too 

soon for even the most promising programs to say anything definitive about 

long term, sustainable outcomes. Probably the biggest concern regarding 

the opportunity for successful deradicalization relates to the fact that these 

individuals by definition already 

have crossed boundaries related to 

social rules and norms, as well as 

the established rule of law in some 

cases. As the law enforcement community learned from violent crime, 

locking them up—even with intensive rehabilitation programming 

in place—generally results in less than satisfactory outcomes. Therefore, 

while removing fighters from the battlespace may prevent future attacks, 

As the law enforcement community learned from violent crime, 

locking them up—even with intensive rehabilitation programming 

in place—generally results in less 

than satisfactory outcomes.
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identifying individuals before they take that first action provides a far greater 

array of options, including non-kinetic opportunities for disruption. The 

key is prevention. As the U.S. considers options, the military brings unique 

understanding and insight given its mission and direct exposure to captured 

enemy material, and can play an important role in this particular line of 

effort. 

The “Redirect” Method. Social science researchers and intelligence analysts have seen direct marketing campaigns by terrorists to susceptible 

groups, including criminals, via open social media and digital marketing. 

In response to this, Jigsaw—Google’s research arm—leveraged their expertise in support of a novel, innovative approach to countering ISIS’ use of 

YouTube content to advance their radicalization and recruiting effort.73 In 

their report, Jigsaw confirmed what people knew;74 ISIS is effectively leveraging the online environment for radicalization and recruitment, particularly 

as it relates to the use of keyword searches and extremist YouTube content 

designed to radicalize and recruit. Moreover, they believed they had effectively identified a group already well along in the radicalization and recruitment process, including those who were “ideologically committed” and in 

“ISIS’ orbit,” possibly already in the caliphate75 —a group of high interest to 

the community.

Two of the stated goals for the redirect method developed by Jigsaw 

included “Get the bad stuff down” and “Make counter-narrative more accessible.” Analysis of their metrics reveals they achieved a “click through” rate 

(i.e., the user clicked on the content presented to them as part of the campaign) that performed three to four times better than a normal ad campaign. 

Moreover, people spent more than twice as long viewing the Jigsaw content 

as compared to YouTube averages during their two-month pilot study. These 

results supported robust performance of the Jigsaw redirect method using 

standard digital marketing benchmarks.76 Review of the redirect method, 

however, reveals focus on process metrics from a marketing perspective 

rather than actual outcomes. In response to this important distinction, the 

Counter Extremism Project77 conducted additional analysis of the redirect 

method and found that not only are Google’s efforts to divert users away 

from radicalization and extremist content not working, but the prevalence 

of the material actually may have increased in both frequency and relevance 

in search results. Despite Google’s active and ostensibly very well informed 
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efforts to minimize it in search, this finding suggests that the content might 

have been intentionally optimized.78 

Conclusion

ISIS and others’ online radicalization and recruiting are gaining importance 

as external attackers can be identified, groomed, and activated through virtual coaching onto the “target.” Conversion from aspiration to action, radicalization to movement, is becoming progressively more rapid and opaque. 

Plots are increasingly simple involving limited planning and participants, 

simple TTPs and a quick flash-to-bang, which makes them more difficult to 

detect and prevent. Approaches designed to counter the group’s efforts need 

to be similarly well informed, precise, and agile. 

The convergence of crime and terror underscores the transdisciplinary 

nature of the current threat and need for novel responses, particularly those 

that get us in front of the problem by enabling informed anticipation and 

influence. Activation of criminals and other marginalized individuals trying 

to identify a cause or meaning, rather than ideological affiliation, represents 

a particularly danger. The role of law enforcement, including the growing 

relevance and importance of finish options outside traditional military lanes, 

is becoming progressively more important. The complex interaction between 

crime and terrorism likely represents the future fight.

While it may be true that the academic community is creating the science 

as the U.S. works this problem set, the military has unique access, insight 

and understanding through primary source data (including adversary media 

and propaganda, as well as other sources of captured enemy material). In 

addition to honoring the sacrifice of blood and treasure required to acquire 

this valuable information, military access to primary sources affords the 

understanding necessary for meaningful, sustainable approaches. As the 

U.S. explores opportunities to move from counting and reporting, chasing problems to get in front of them, understanding history and temporal 

cadences in similar behavior may provide models for current understanding, 

particularly if they provide insight regarding effective approaches to prevention, thwarting mitigation and response, including non-kinetic opportunities 

for disruption. 
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Endnotes

1. c.f., VICE News documentaries and as reported https://www.truthrevolt.org/

news/vice-news-video-captures-isis-extremism.

2. Rajan Basra and Peter R. Neumann, “Criminal pasts, terrorist futures: European 

jihadists and the new crime-terror nexus,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 6 

(2016): 25–40.

3. Basra and Neumann, “Criminal pasts, terrorist futures.”

4. Basra and Neumann, “Criminal pasts, terrorist futures.”

5. Basra and Neumann, “Criminal pasts, terrorist futures.”

6. Basra and Neumann, “Criminal pasts, terrorist futures.”

7. Basra and Neumann, “Criminal pasts, terrorist futures.”

8. Marco C. Oved, “Terrorism doesn’t play in Marseilles, but organized crime does,” 

Toronto Star, 25 July 2016.

9. Paul J. Goldstein, “The drugs/violence nexus: A tripartite conceptual framework,” 

The Journal of Drug Issues, 15 (1985).

10. Goldstein, “The drugs/violence nexus.” 

11. Basra and Neumann, “Criminal pasts, terrorist futures.”

12. Colleen R. McLaughlin, “Prisoner Rehabilitation: Felling Better but Getting 

Worse,” Building Violence: How America’s Rush to Incarcerate Creates Violence 

(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000), edited by John P. May, 23-27. 

13. For discussion of this issue, c.f., Sam Bowman, “Are 70% of France’s prison 

inmates Muslims?” Adam Smith Institute, 29 March 2017.

14. Bruce Hoffman, “Radicalization, Terrorism, and Diasporas,” in The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism (Rand: National Security Research Division, 

2007) edited by Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, Andrew Curiel, and Doron 

Zimmerman, 1–3. 

15. Hoffman, Rosenau, Curiel, and Zimmerman (2007), The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism, vii-xi.

16. Hoffman et al., The Radicalization of Diasporas.

17. Colleen McCue, and Kathryn Haahr, “The impact of global youth bulges on 

Islamist radicalization and violence,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 11 (2008); C. McCue, 

Joseph T. Massengill, Dorothy Milbrandt, John Gaughan, and Meghan Cumpston, 

“The ISIS Long Game: A Tripartite Analysis of Youth Radicalization and Indoctrination,” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 8 (2017): 21–26.

18. The Hague, “The Children of ISIS: The indoctrination of minors in ISIS-held 

territory,” National Coordination for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) 

and the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), 2017.

19. “Sisters: Be a supporter not a demoralizer,” Rumiyah, 10 (2017), 16–19.

20. “Sisters: The woman is a shepherd in her husbands’ home and responsible for 

her flock,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017), 20.
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McCue, Gaughan, Cumpston: The Crime Terror Nexus

21. “Sisters: The female slaves of Allah in the houses of Allah,” Rumiyah, 12 (2017), 

36–38.

22. Phillip Connor, “Number of refugees to Europe surges to record 1.3 million in 

2015,” Asylum seeker demography: Young and male, Global Attitudes & Trends, 

Pew Research Center, 2016.

23. Brian Dodwell and Dan Rassler, “A view from the CTC foxhole: LTG Michael K. 

Nagata, Director, Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, NCTC,” CTC 

Sentinel 10, no. 6 (2017): 11–15.

24. Quentin Sommerville and Riam Dalati, “An education in Terror,” BBC, August 

2017.

25. Katrin Kuntz and Andy Spyra, “Life after Islamic State: ‘They taught us how to 

decapitate a person,’” Der Spiegel, 14 April 17.

26. Lawrence Kohlberg, The development of moral character and moral ideology (New 

York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964).

27. Oved, “Terrorism doesn’t play.” 

28. Jerry Oliver and Colleen R. McLaughlin, “Focusing on the other side of the crime 

scene tape: What happens when ‘normal’ is the problem?” The Police Chief 65, 

no. 110 (1996): 50–53.

29. McCue and Haahr, “The impact of global youth bulges.” 

30. Colleen McCue, Data Mining and Predictive Analysis: Intelligence Gathering and 

Crime Analysis, 2nd Ed. (Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann (Elsevier), 

2015).

31. Colleen R. McLaughlin, Jay A. Yelon, Rao Ivatury, and Harvey J. Sugerman, 

“Youth violence: A tripartite examination of putative causes, consequences, and 

correlates.” Trauma, Violence & Abuse 1, no. 2 (2000): 115–127.

32. Basra and Neumann, “Criminal pasts, terrorist futures.”

33. Basra and Neumann, “Criminal pasts, terrorist futures.” 

34. Dina Temple-Raston, “Jihadi Cool: Terrorist recruiters’ latest weapon,” NPR, 26 

March 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125186382

35. Temple-Raston, “Jihadi Cool.”

36. Landon Shroder, “The Islamic State’s Propaganda War: Advertisers and marketers weigh in on the world’s angriest ad campaign,” VICE News, 14 July 2015.

37. Hoffman et al., The Radicalization of Diasporas.

38. Colleen McCue, “Juvenile Murderers,” in Managing Death Investigation, 1, ed. 

5, (US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2002), edited by 

Arthur Westveer. 

39. William J. Bennett, John J. Diluio, and John P. Walters, Body Count, (New York: 

Simon & Schuster, 1996), 21-34. 

40. Stephen A. Diamond, “Essential secrets of psychotherapy: What is the “shadow”, 

understanding the “dark side” of our psyche,” Psychology Today, 20 April 2012.
76

JSOU Report 18-5

41. David Grossman, On killing: The psychological cost of learning to kill in war and 

society (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1996).

42. Basra and Neumann, “Criminal pasts, terrorist futures.”

43. David Grossman, On killing; McCue et al., “The ISIS Long Game.”

44. Shroder, “The Islamic State’s Propaganda War.”

45. Shroder, “The Islamic State’s Propaganda War.”

46. See Conversion Marketing, www.marketing-schools.org/types-of-marketing/

conversion-marketing.html. 

47. Shroder, “The Islamic State’s Propaganda War.”

48. Shroder, “The Islamic State’s Propaganda War.”

49. Prashant Rao, “If the Islamic State’s ‘caliphate’ had an airline, Dabiq would be 

its in-flight magazine,” Twitter @prashantrao, 10 July 2014.

50. Shroder, “The Islamic State’s Propaganda War.”

51. McCue and Haahr, “The impact of global youth bulges;” Basra and Neumann, 

“Criminal pasts, terrorist futures;” and Hoffman et al., The Radicalization of 

Diasporas.

52. The U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (USBJS) reported that 1/110 (0.91%) of adult 

residents were in federal or state prisons, or county jails in 2013, and 1/51 were 

on probation or parole at the same time. These individuals represent only those 

officially adjudicated, or “known” criminals. Therefore, actual rates will be higher. 

Lauren E. Glaze and Danielle Kaeble, Correctional Populations in the United 

States, 2013, U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014; McCue, Data Mining.

53. Basra and Neumann, “Criminal pasts, terrorist futures;” McCue, Data Mining.

54. Hoffman et al., The Radicalization of Diasporas.

55. McCue and Haahr, “The impact of global youth bulges.” 

56. McCue and Haahr, “The impact of global youth bulges.” 

57. “The Orlando Operation,” Inspire, June 2016.

58. “Just Terror Tactics: Hostage Taking (Part 4),” Rumiyah, 9 (2017), 46–51.

59. “The Orlando Operation.”

60. Shroder, “The Islamic State’s Propaganda War.”

61. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Symposium, Countering Transregional Terrorism, June 12–14, 2017.

62. McCue et al., “The ISIS Long Game.”

63. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Symposium (2017).

64. Dodwell and Rassler (2017). 

65. Lawrence W. Sherman, Denise C. Gottfredson, Doris L. Mackenzie, and John 

Eck, “Preventing crime: What works, what doesn’t, what’s promising,” National 

Institute of Justice, 1997.
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McCue, Gaughan, Cumpston: The Crime Terror Nexus

66. Andy Greenberg, “Google’s clever plan to stop aspiring ISIS recruits,” Wired, 7 

December 2016.

67. Mia Bloom, In Foreign Affairs Quick Note, Council on Foreign Relations, 

21 July 2015 and Soeren Kern, “France: Deradicalization of jihadists a ‘total 

fiasco,’” Gatestone Institute, 26 February 2017, www.gatesoneinstitute.org/9982/

france-deradicalization.

68. Kern, “France.”

69. McLaughlin, “Prisoner rehabilitation.” 

70. Sherman et al., “Preventing crime.”

71. McLaughlin, “Prisoner rehabilitation.” 

72. Sherman et al., “Preventing crime.”

73. Greenberg, “Google’s clever plan.” 

74. Greenberg, “Google’s clever plan.” 

75. Greenberg, “Google’s clever plan.” 

76. Greenberg, “Google’s clever plan.” 

77. Counter Extremism Project, “Tracking Google’s Counter-Narrative Program,” 

2017.

78. Counter Extremism Project, “Tracking.” 

79

Lieber: Transnational Criminal Organizations

Chapter 5. Transnational Criminal 

Organizations as a Social Phenomenon

Paul S. Lieber 

Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) have increasingly 

been able to use the global economic environment to their advantage. 

TCOs have grown more complex over time, and so has our ability 

to defeat them, however, this complexity has challenged our ability 

to access and use collective information available.1 

Introduction

In an interconnected world, it is unsurprising that transnational organized 

crime is thriving. Criminal networks now possess unparalleled mechanisms to collaborate toward common outcomes with organizations that 

span states, regions, and even the entire globe to enable successes. Despite 

common perception, research finds that criminal networks—not law enforcement—are driving technological advancements. In the cat and mouse game 

that is countering globalized criminal activity, international law enforcement 

and its supporting interagency are persistently in reactive mode. Criminal networks—rooted in sophistication, diversity of organization, lack of 

legal restraint, and endless flexibility—are more agile than legal authorities 

designed to stop them.

Social media only exacerbates this problem. The multitude of available 

correspondence mechanisms facilitate a communication and currency flow 

so vast it’s impossible to truly gauge possibilities and reach. Long gone are 

the days of smoky backroom meetings and dark web message board chats, 

they’ve been replaced with an array of collaboration possibilities so extensive 

Dr. Paul Lieber is a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations 

University. Prior to that he served as the command writer for the United 

States Special Operations Command, and as strategic communications advisor to the commander of Special Operations Command-Australia.
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that even the most sophisticated data scraping and/or analysis tools will 

miss them. 

Moreover, and via global migration, defined boundaries and actions for 

criminal actors are likewise a thing of the past. Partnerships can and will 

emerge out of convenience, marriages where a chain of illicit activities will 

naturally form and strengthen. While transnational criminal organizations 

still recognize territorial strongholds, they are keen and willing to include 

other actors when actions are mutually beneficial. Yesterday’s competition 

can be today’s business partner.

Still, it isn’t motivation for profits primarily behind the success of transnational criminal networks. While mutual financial gain can induce collaboration, dollars alone do not forge relationships and/or maintain them. 

Nor do they substantiate longer term partnerships, especially into places 

ripe with risk for those unfamiliar with new entities or territories. Even the 

most sophisticated transnational organized criminal network can quickly 

crumble thanks to but one actor who fails to respect and protect the interests 

of all involved.

Despite this nuance, there is almost no research on the social variables 

that drive transnational organized crime networks. Knowledge of these variables could produce a better understanding of how and why these organizations grow and thrive, likewise provide law enforcement and partners a 

means to reduce their reactive posture. Toward this end, this chapter explores 

three key aspects of transnational crime within North America: international 

gangs, human trafficking, and trafficking.

Transnational Criminal Networks

To begin, research indicates that despite tales of deliberate, tangled webs 

of calculated criminal collusion, transnational criminal networks are more 

matters of convenience versus meticulous alignments.2

 TCOs will seek out 

others of like mind to extend the length of a criminal chain and into sister 

efforts and territories. When opportunities present themselves, transnational 

criminal networks may simultaneously explore means to expand capabilities and geography. Still, inquiries into this topic uncover, in most instances 

TCOs join with others for reasons rarely excessively strategized or considered 

well in advance of an opportunity. 
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Lieber: Transnational Criminal Organizations

Data on transnational criminal networks operating within North America, however, often depicts them as a defined nexus with fluid routes. Numbers of illicit activities and actors are grouped together to highlight trends, 

potency, and challenges. Trend reporting, however, lends itself to countermeasures favoring attacking a network at large. Meaning law enforcement 

and sister interagency allies are funded to address the data which lies before 

them. In this instance, a monolithic transnational criminal beast featuring 

seemingly tight collaboration toward combined regional effect and chaos. 

In actuality and aforementioned, these actors are simply aligning and then 

de-coupling, informally, as opportunities emerge.

Nearly 20 years ago, the United Nations defined transnational organized 

crime as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of 

time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious 

crimes or offences [...] in order to obtain, directly, or indirectly, a financial 

or other material benefit.”3

 This definition speaks to the convenience factor 

of these networks, also the potential benefit of assessing individual network 

nodes. Jamieson confirmed this nuance, finding that while transnational 

organized crime is now more transnationally organized, it has also deregulated and delocalized.4

 This translates to more opportunity and reach for a 

TCO, but also less rigidity in how a network structures themselves—also 

geographic identification and supporting restrictions. Moreover, a combination of blurred boundaries, deregulation, and informal arrangements is a 

formula ripe for influence from external actors. As evidenced by the diverse 

array of criminal activities ISIS incorporates to fund their activities worldwide, the allure for terrorism to intermingle with transnational organized 

crime is certainly present and worrisome.5

Jamieson deemed TCOs as a social phenomenon, a network of relationships rooted in reciprocal benefits that extends to the heart of society and 

institutional and economic life.6 Meaning, transnational criminal networks 

are a great deal more than like minds exchanging money. They are attached 

to the foundational core of the communities in which they reside, so much 

so they can be intertwined with governance, and capable of setting the economic tone for all activities in a region to include legal ones. 

Therefore and perhaps not surprisingly, TCOs can see themselves as 

simply another business sector in a landscape of other industries within a 

region. United Nation analysts concluded: 
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What is at work is no longer individual illegal markets but a systemic, 

transnational, multisectoral ‘parallel economy,’ comprised of networks of mutually supporting ‘submarkets.’ This ‘parallel economy’ 

often has its own labor exchange, distribution methods, and networks. In addition, it also has its own financial and banking system, 

as well as its own firms, which display a degree of entrepreneurial 

flair, managerial, skill, and organizational adaptability that matches 

or even surpasses that of many licit transnational businesses.7

TCOs function in the same way legitimate business operate: they recruit 

and constantly network to identify top talent from legitimate industries 

and business.8 This talent may perceive little difference between criminal 

networks and their above board counterparts. Similarly, these recruits—

compensated better (noting risk factors inherent in joining a TCO)—are 

motivated by and subsequently marketed to via a lens of challenge and/or 

thrill seeking that this employment genre provides. 

Akin to other industries, competing TCOs may become partners as 

mutually beneficial opportunities arise. Also, and with limited organizational restrictions on how they operate, TCOs are often on the bleeding edge 

in the use of technology.9 With enormous flexibility in what solutions they 

can adopt and how to enact them, TCOs have the luxury to quickly implement new innovations sans legal and authority restrictions. 

Transnational Gangs 

Perhaps the most well-known TCO element is based on its size—transnational gangs are a global phenomenon only growing in number. To provide 

some sense of scale, in the US alone there are 731,500 gang members across 

21,500 different gangs.10 Still, and contrary to what some may believe, only 

a small portion of these gangs have any ties to drug trafficking and/or sister 

drug related activities.11,12 For transnational gangs, their preference is to 

commit “cafeteria style,” smaller and impromptu crimes.13

Interestingly enough—and despite strong branding and cohesiveness—

few gang members rely on internet-based communication mechanisms to 

solidify their network and affiliations.14 Research on transnational gangs 

reveals that international presence stems from increased global mobility versus attempts to recruit in other regions.15 This contradicts findings 

that nearly half of those surveyed perceive transnational gangs to possess 
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Lieber: Transnational Criminal Organizations

a formal, deliberate international presence. Also, what presence does exist 

is more wannabees versus actual gang members. While these individuals 

create personas and web landing spots to signify desired affiliation with a 

gang organization, there is often no evidence they are formally linked to a 

gang in any way, shape, or form.16

Thus, transnational gangs—while vast in numbers—are more regionally 

aligned. In Mexico, social and cultural identity, and community networks 

effectively place limits on gang activity trying to permeate the country.17 

These networks limited gang penetration into particular areas and/or set 

boundaries on what actions they could conduct. As globalization produces 

increased mobilization, one can only speculate if such localization effects 

strengthen (as a defensive mechanism) or ameliorate (as a natural side effect).

Human Trafficking

Akin to transnational gangs, human trafficking is perceived to be linked 

to wider TCOs as a logical way to fund activities. As human trafficking 

networks are purposefully designed to transcend geographic boundaries, it 

stands to reason they would be intertwined with larger networks in North 

America. As stated earlier, this research explored transnational criminal 

networks from a North American perspective, with the majority of research 

therefore conduced on human trafficking originating in Mexico. Specifically, 

on the migrant and/or asylum seeking function of Mexican citizens attempting to illegally enter the United States for employment or nefarious means. 

Research, however, reasons for a more personalized approach to human 

trafficking of Mexicans. Sanchez argues that for these individuals, human 

trafficking is a family arrangement, comprised of trusted networks.18 Within the 

communities in which trafficking originates—such activities and their facilitators 

are well known and have been established 

for potentially decades—this is anything 

but an undesirable activity. Select families, transcending generations, are known 

and arguably respected for their ability to 

human traffic, and are seen as trusted agents to move individuals across difficult locations. Smuggling tasks are a family affair—ones logically assigned 

Select families, transcending 

generations, are known and 

arguably respected for their 

ability to human traffic, and 

are seen as trusted agents 

to move individuals across 

difficult locations.
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by gender. While men will handle more of the physical and protection-based 

nuances, women will execute financial and logistical steps needed to facilitate the smuggling.19,20 Not surprisingly, smugglers tend to be migrants or 

asylum seekers themselves, as they possess both the social ties and needed 

awareness to effectively move others along paths they themselves may have 

traveled prior.21,22

This is not to insist human trafficking in North America is anything 

short of illegal or something to be condoned. While Sanchez argues that 

the trafficking of Mexicans is intentionally over-simplified to present worst 

case scenarios,23 deadly crimes are occasionally committed. On the U.S.-

Mexico border, kidnapping acts are sometimes conducted by crews who rob 

smugglers of the migrants24,25,26 and can result in death. In some instances, 

these kidnappings can be supported by State actors, making prevention and 

prosecution difficult. 

Drug Trafficking

Perhaps no transnational criminal activity is more reliant on social capital 

than drug trafficking. In contrast to slews of movies celebrating elaborate 

drug trafficking networks that conspicuously span the globe, drug trafficking is actually a highly fragmented activity based on dynamic supply and 

demand at a given time.27 It therefore comes as a surprise that there is but 

one study to date on how drug trafficking network, social structures operate. 

There are none specific to North America.

Echoing both transnational gangs and human trafficking, Yeslyurt28

argued that social networks are the lifeblood in the success of any drug 

trafficking network. Specifically, he uncovered a system comprised on three 

distinct types of social capital required for it to thrive. The first emphasizes 

relational ties—social commodities vital to ensure open channels for the flow 

of resources to operate in and through. Second, those with strong relational 

bonds help sustain needed conduits to move goods across locations and 

through said channels. 

Similarly and third, network structure can identify new opportunities 

when said structures are well formed. Conversely, a weaker network will 

introduce constrains upon individual actions. Combining all three concepts, 

formalizing relational ties into a reliable network structure featuring tight 

relational bonds can help alleviate operational deficiencies while locating 
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efficiencies. Network configuration will also determine how long a drug 

trafficking network can sustain. Research finds that the smaller the network 

structure the better (i.e. less redundant or only those essential to the operation are featured within), likewise it best succeeds when non-hierarchical in 

nature. Such networks feature only essential individuals, and responsibilities 

and rewards shared.

In essence, drug trafficking is arguably more a social arrangement with 

financial gains versus the reverse. Cross, Parker and Sasson echoed these 

sentiments, finding that social structures of drug trafficking entities—not 

product discrepancies—will ultimately drive prices for goods.29 Related, they 

pointed to “natural qualities—charm, health and intelligence” of an actor as 

the most important social currency in drug trafficking.

Conclusion

To summarize, despite common perceptions of a vast, TCO network in North 

America comprised of sophisticated collaborations between individuals and 

entities, collusion is a seeming fallacy. While vastly under-researched, what 

was examined uncovered social networks as the most prominent factor in 

determining the success of three aspects of transnational crime (transnational gangs, human and drug trafficking) in the United States, Mexico, 

and Canada.

While international gangs are alive and well, their penetration across 

borders remains more about convenience than planned. Localized social 

capital reigns supreme, so much so it will resist influence from external actors 

into a region. The internet serves little purpose in changing this nuance, and 

acts as advertising versus actualization. This trend may continue, lessen, or 

even disappear of time.

Family is most important to the success of human trafficking, especially 

in Mexico and when the United States is the intended destination. Trusted 

agents and individuals—many whom experienced this on the other side of 

the business exchange—are behind this illicit activity. So much so, scholars 

such as Sanchez question whether it should be viewed under a negative lens.30

Last, drug trafficking may be the most social of all these core transnational criminal activities. It is heavily reliant on relational ties, network 

structure, and individual personality. Most importantly, it requires a level 

playing field by all involved to sustain. 
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Combined, this cursory analysis of these three core aspects of transnational criminal activity produce a like hypothesis: they are social activities 

and require social actors to sustain and grow. With this being said, more 

research is sorely needed to better examine how these social activities are 

conceptualized in actual communication, also a closer look at the North 

American continent is needed to truly understand how TCOs within operate. 

This research argues for at least consideration of re-conceptualizing ways 

to address TCO activity in the areas of transnational gangs, human trafficking, and drug trafficking, respectively. As billions of dollars derived from 

transnational crime flows across borders each year, it is imperative for those 

seeking to limit effects of this movement to rethink their approaches. Tracking goods or networks will not necessarily yield insights on the potency of 

an illicit route and/or one’s commitment to sustaining it. Similarly, technological solutions designed to combine versus better explore data on this 

topic will only confound. This research snapshot points to a social driven 

phenomena; countermeasures must reflect this reality. 

Endnotes 

1. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (26 Dec 2013), Public 

Law 113-66. Retrieved 13 Jul 2017, https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ66/

PLAW-113publ66.pdf.

2. Alison Jamieson, “Transnational Organized Crime: A European Perspective,” 

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24 (2011): 377–387.

3. United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 1997, E/

CN.15, 7/Add.1.

4. Jamieson, “Transnational Organized Crime.” 

5. Jamieson, “Transnational Organized Crime.”

6. Jamieson, “Transnational Organized Crime.”

7. United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 1996, E/

CN.15, 2, 9.

8. Marc Goodman, “What Business Can Learn From Organized Crime,” Harvard 

Business Review, (November 2011): 2–30. 

9. Goodman, “What Business Can Learn From Organized Crime.” 

10. Andrew Papachristos. “Gang World,” Foreign Policy 147 (March-April 2005): 

48–55.

11. Papachristos, “Gang World.”
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Lieber: Transnational Criminal Organizations

12. Nielan Barnes, “A Comparative Analysis of Transnational Youth Gangs in Central 

America, Mexico and the United States (DRAFT),” Center for Inter-American 

Studies and Programs at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, 2006.

13. Papachristos, “Gang World.” 

14. Papachristos, “Gang World.”

15. Papachristos, “Gang World.”

16. Papachristos, “Gang World.”

17. Barnes, “A Comparative Analysis of Transnational Youth Gangs in Central 

America, Mexico and the United States (DRAFT).” 

18. Gabriella Sanchez, “Critical Perspective on Clandestine Migration Facilitation: 

An Overview of Migrant Smuggling Research,” Journal of Migration and Human 

Security 5, no. 1 (2017): 9–27.

19. Gabriella Sanchez, “Women’s Participation in the Facilitation of Human Smuggling: The Case of the US Southwest,” Geopolitics 21, no. 2 (2016): 387–406. 

20. Sheldon Zhang, Ko-Lin Chin, and Jody Miller, “Women’s Participation in Transnational Human Smuggling,” Criminology 45, no. 3 (2007): 699–733.

21. Victoria Stone-Cadena, “Indigenous Ecuadorian Mobility Strategies in the 

Clandestine Migration Journey,” Geopolitics 21, no. 2 (2016): 345–65.

22. Stephanie Maher “Friends and Handlers: Facilitating Passage Out of West Africa,” 

Critical Approaches to Irregular Migration Facilitation: Dismantling the Smuggler 

Narrative Conference, April 2016, Florence.

23. Sanchez, “Critical Perspective.” 

24. Daniel Martinez, “Coyote Use in an Era of Heightened Border Enforcement: 

New Evidence from the Arizona-Sonora Border,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42, no. 1 (2015): 103–19.

25. Jeremy Slack, “Captive Bodies: Migrant Kidnapping and Deportation in Mexico,” 

Area 48, no. 3 (2015): 271–77.

26. Gabriella Sanchez, Border Crossings and Human Smuggling (London: Routledge, 

2015). 

27. Mangai Natarajan, “Understanding the structure of a large heroin distribution 

network: A quantitative analysis of qualitative data,” Journal of Quantitative 

Criminology 22, no. 2 (2006): 171–192.

28. Hamdi Yesilyurt, “The analysis of social capital and social networking of drug 

trafficking,” International Journal of Human Sciences 11, no. 1 (2014): 280–290.

29. Rob Cross, Andrew Parker and Lisa Sasson, Networks in the knowledge economy

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

30. Sanchez, “Critical Perspective.”

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Coombs and Coombs: Women of the Caliphate

Chapter 6. Women of the Caliphate: 

Fighting for the Narrative

Lindsay M. Coombs and Howard G. Coombs

Strategic narrative expresses strategy as a story, to explain one’s 

actions. - Emile Simpson1

Introduction

Simpson, a former British Army officer and a junior fellow at Harvard 

University, describes a strategic narrative as aligning one’s own forces 

through the creation of common understanding and shared purpose, to 

convincing opponents and others of one’s policy goals or ends.2 It is the latter 

idea that underpins this chapter, which focuses on the gendered dimensions 

of the Canadian ‘fight for the narrative’ against the Islamic State of Iraq and 

Syria (ISIS). Comprehending the importance of the narrative as strategy will 

enable those combating radicalization to create narratives that negate the 

insidious impact of messaging that moves Westerners,3 including Canadian 

women, to travel abroad to support causes like ISIS.4 In these cases, it is 

necessary to provide narratives that overwhelm those of your opponent. It 

Lindsay M. Coombs is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Studies 

at Queen's University. She is also a graduate research fellow at the Centre for 

International and Defence Policy. Her research interests include defense policy, 

gender studies, Canadian security and defense, and the Canadian Armed Forces.

Howard G. Coombs is an assistant professor and the associate chair of 

war studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, in Kingston, Ontario. 

He is also a part-time Army reservist who serves with the Office of the 

Chief of Reserves, located at the Canadian Armed Forces National Defence 

Headquarters.
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must be a counter-message that serves the interests of those exposed to it, 

more so than those offered by extremist organizations.5

Since the conflict in Syria began in 2011 there has been a massive influx 

of Westerners traveling to the region in support of ISIS. These migrants 

include a historically unprecedented number of Western women.6 According to a 2016 Government of Canada 

(GoC) Public Safety report, at that 

time 36,500 radicalized travelers had 

gone to Syria since the beginning of 

that conflict. This number included 

6,600 Westerners and approximately 

180 Canadians. Estimates suggest that 

36 Canadian women are included in 

this cohort.7 While exact demographics on this cohort are not available, 

radicalized Western women are typically second or third generation Muslim 

immigrants—a group similar to the profiles of Western males who become 

extremists. However, in some cases, women of other cultural backgrounds 

who have adopted Islam travel to pursue a path of radicalization that leads 

them to joining extremist groups like ISIS.8

 These and other issues have led 

to an introspection on the radicalization of these women. 

As a signatory to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, 

Canada is committed to condemning violent extremism and working to 

prevent the “recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals 

who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the 

purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in terrorist acts.”9

Despite pursuing a number of initiatives to achieve these goals, the aforementioned 2016 GoC Public Safety report also indicates that the number of 

women who were extremist travelers has increased since the establishment 

of the ISIS “Caliphate” in June 2014.

The participation of women in terrorist organizations and activities is not 

new. What is new is the number of women who have subscribed to Daesh’s 

ideology and traveled, or attempted to travel, abroad to join Daesh. Women 

now constitute approximately 20 percent of total extremist travelers from 

Canada. In some cases, women have taken their children to conflict zones.10 

Although one could argue that the numbers of radicalized Canadians 

may appear minor, their influence is disproportionate to this number. 

While exact demographics on 

this cohort are not available, 

radicalized Western women are 

typically second or third generation Muslim immigrants—a 

group similar to the profiles of 

Western males who become 

extremists.
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Extremists abroad utilize social media and other digital outlets to create their 

own narratives and to bolster radicalized messaging. Moreover, the presence 

of women among these radicalized travelers helps to create an impression 

that ISIS is an Islamic proto-state, attracting women who will contribute to 

the strengthening of its population through various state-building initiatives.11 The result is that these extremist Canadians assist in bringing more 

radicalized recruits from Western nations into the fold of ISIS. In addition, 

these and other extremist travelers tend to exacerbate the security situation 

in the conflict area and have demonstrably posed threats to their countries 

of origin when they return. 

Although women of the caliphate are often depicted on social media 

and in ISIS propaganda as mothers and wives, they are also fierce enforcers and supporters of the organization. Like their male counterparts, these 

women have complex motivations for taking part in the terrorist organization, motivations that are hardly as simple as wanting to become a ‘jihadi 

bride.’ As noted by Eric Hoffer, in The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature 

of Mass Movements, there are several reasons that may explain why individuals embrace various ideologies, like those espoused by ISIS. However, for 

Hoffer, such radicalization is stimulated because there is a perceived need for 

change among discontented individuals who feel powerless in their current 

society or culture. To address this need for change, individuals or communities may look beyond their current environment. Such individuals are willing 

volunteers for mass movements that are perceived to address their wants. 

Interestingly, Hoffer also argues that while mass movements may have 

widely differing belief systems, there is a certain uniformity in the factors 

that may create their discontent.12 While Hoffer does not address the idea of 

gender in his writing, it certainly can be connected to this discussion. For 

example, recent research led by Canadian sociologist Lorne Dawson tends 

to suggest the same logic from interviews with radicalized Islamists who 

become foreign fighters. Dawson suggests that for these extremists, terrorist 

activities are an outlet for needs that cannot be satisfied through legitimate 

means.13

Based on these ideas and extant research, one can argue that the narratives produced by ISIS provides women with a coherent message: the life they 

will lead in regions dominated by ISIS will be better in most aspects than 

the life they are leading today.14 ISIS seems to understand this and plays on 

the factors that lead to these individuals’ discontent, marketing itself as an 
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organization that supports women in the pursuit of their goals. In the case of 

radicalized women, ISIS messaging suggests that by joining the organization 

women will fulfill a sense of religious duty, garner a feeling of belonging, 

reject Western perceptions of feminism, and can pursue a quest for romance 

and adventure. Taken as a whole, ISIS utilizes a craftily constructed gendered 

narrative to inspire these women to support the group’s violent cause. 

Although Canada and other coalition members have undertaken various national and international level counterterrorism (CT) and countermessaging initiatives, the overarching nature of the narrative is still evolving. 

Arguably, in the case of radicalized women, creating a strategic narrative 

necessitates the application of a gender perspective.15 Ultimately, Canada—

and allied nations such as the United States—must create a strategic narrative that forces ISIS to react to Western messaging, rather than vice versa.

Constructing a Strategic Narrative: The Importance of 

Employing a Gendered Lens

Strategy formulation involves taking the exigencies of policy and matching 

them to ends (objectives), ways (options), and means (resources) to create a 

strategy, which in turn results in concrete actions by alliances and nations. 

Strategy evolves as ends, ways, and means change. According to Simpson, 

the strategic narrative is an explanation of this constantly shifting relationship. The strategic narrative takes the abstract ideas of strategy and makes 

them understandable to audiences. 

While strategy and narratives should intertwine in a complex discourse, 

at the most basic level the strategic narrative is a story in which the complex 

ideas incorporated in strategy are simplified and made easily understandable for the audience.16 It should be tailored as needed to reach those for 

whom it is intended. There are four main elements: (1) a protagonist and an 

antagonist—people, (2) a world view or perspective, (3) an objective, which 

provides a purpose, and (4) a manner of achieving the goal, thereby defining a process. The story allows people to identify with the strategic narrative 

and, in turn, the strategy. 

The strategic narrative that ISIS utilizes to recruit women is multidimensional and appeals to a broad spectrum of individuals. In terms of messaging, it is evident that ISIS is very agile and able to transition quickly when 

reacting to external organizations and institutions that attempt to provide 
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counternarratives. ISIS does so through various social media websites and 

social networks.17 Thus, a Western strategy ought to be based on a better 

narrative designed to cause, as Hoffer might say, discontented women to 

question the messaging provided by ISIS, and to do so in a rapid and flexible 

fashion using analogous modes of transmission.

A Narrative for Radicalization: The Recruitment of Women 

by Isis

At the outset, ISIS discouraged women from migrating to support their 

cause. As a militant Salafi group, it believed that there was no place for 

women in war. Instead, ISIS members active on social media urged their 

female followers to support the group’s efforts by fundraising, as well as by 

asking their husbands, brothers, and sons to join the fight.18 When, however, 

ISIS began claiming territory in 2013—thereby moving closer to their goal of 

establishing an Islamic caliphate—the group began to see women as necessary for the establishment of a functioning proto-state. The group required 

female police officers to inspect women passing through checkpoints. Its 

strategy necessitated female security forces to enforce Islamic laws of dress 

and conduct on women in ISIS-held territory, and women to create households where they could raise the next generation of fighters.19 Consequently, 

when the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared the birth of the 

caliphate in the summer of 2014, he also called for women to migrate to its 

territories in Iraq and Syria to assist in the building of an Islamic proto-state. 

Therefore, in addition to simply attracting male fighters, ISIS prioritizes the 

recruitment of women to provide the caliphate with a semblance of stability.

Women are strategically recruited by ISIS to enhance the perceived 

legitimacy of the proto-state.20 Accordingly, requests for women to perform 

traditional household roles, as well as fill skilled or auxiliary positions like 

doctors, nurses, and engineers, have become a central component of the 

group’s recruitment efforts. Scholars Anita Peresin and Alberto Cervone 

suggest that women in terrorist organizations like ISIS play important roles 

not only in “raising their children in the path of jihad,” but select women 

are also given authority over “managing the finances and the logistics of 

operations, recruiting new fighters and female companions, collecting and 

disseminating intelligence, providing medical care, glorifying the struggle, 

and spreading the jihadist ideology through [the] Internet.”21 Although the 
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roles women are allowed to perform within ISIS territory are limited, with 

both their activities and physical mobility highly restricted, it is evident that 

women are an integral component of their state-building efforts.

With the group’s increased desire for women to join the fight, ISIS has recognized the need to develop strategies and disseminate narratives explicitly 

designed to recruit women. Although the reasons men and women choose to 

join terrorist organizations often overlap, both genders tend to be motivated 

by distinct driving forces. As such, ISIS has constructed different narratives 

for each gender; while men are encouraged to fulfill their religious duty by 

joining the fight, women are promised spiritual fulfilment, a sense of belonging, a deep bond of sisterhood, romance, adventure, and the ability to raise 

children committed to ISIS ideology.22 As a terror group of a contemporary 

nature, ISIS capitalizes on modern technology and social media to disseminate these messages.23 Through its extensive online presence, ISIS is capable 

of distributing polished propaganda materials to audiences across the globe. 

While ISIS recruitment efforts are perhaps most notable on social media 

platforms like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Tumblr, the group has also 

created its own online magazine. Thus, ISIS is not only waging war on the 

ground, but also online through its virtual presence.24

ISIS has become infamous for the decentralized aspects of its communications strategy. Indeed, the importance of social media in recruiting 

new members to the terrorist organization has been widely recognized by 

academics, news outlets, and policymakers. By operating on various social 

media platforms, followers and supporters of ISIS have become independent 

media outlets. These followers propagate ISIS messages by posting online, 

creating online groups, re-posting official propaganda, and by producing 

their own content.25 Through these methods, ISIS supporters form communities that engage in real-time discussions online. Figures show that in the fall 

of 2014 there were approximately 45,000 Twitter accounts used by supporters 

of ISIS.26 Moreover, of these supporters, “73 percent had an average of 500 

followers, others had up to 50,000 followers.”27 These supporters and sympathizers are capable of disseminating ISIS propaganda from anywhere in the 

world, thereby enabling them to tap into diverse audiences and networks. 

Women who have already traveled to ISIS-controlled territories are given 

the important role of recruiting others online. These women spend significant 

time online each day, disseminating ISIS propaganda and communicating 
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with potential new recruits. These female recruiters present idealized images 

of life in the caliphate, as noted by scholar Mah-Rukh Ali: 

[Women] post online idyllic pictures of a fun, harmonious life within 

the Islamic State. They tell stories of happy families, post pictures of 

cats on Twitter, and share recipes. They use social media to express 

their grievance at the treatment of Muslims across the world, and 

their perception of ISIS as a truly Islamic society, built on sharia law. 

They spread the belief that it is a feminist duty of all female Muslims 

to travel to ISIS areas. They believe that in this world they will get 

everything they need, not only a man that loves her, children, a 

beautiful house, but also recognition as women warriors fighting 

alongside men on the battlefield for a just cause.28 

Through their online communications, these women provide a channel 

of intimate information for the recruitment of new women. They humanize, 

personalize, glorify, and distort the experiences of traveling to and living in 

ISIS territory, breaking down conceptions of fear and mystery that typically 

surrounds terrorist organizations.29 In doing so, it greatly reduces the anxiety and hesitation that could prevent a potential recruit from joining ISIS.30

Among some of the most prominent female ISIS recruiters are “[W]estern 

women,” such as British national Sally Jones who operated under the online 

pseudonym Umm Layth. On her social media accounts and blogs, Umm 

Layth presented a romanticized version of life in the caliphate and referred to 

it as “paradise.”31 She also urged her thousands of online followers to migrate 

to Iraq and Syria without delay, and provided them with detailed instructions for women who wish to travel to ISIS-held territories. On her Tumblr 

page, titled “Diary of a Muhajirah,” Umm Layth posted about daily life, 

marriage, martyrdom, religion, and answered anonymous messages about 

ISIS with reassurances and advice.32 To her female followers, she promised 

personal power within a society that is united by a common cause.33 Ultimately, women like Umm Layth are invaluable to ISIS because they act as 

decentralized messengers, able to spread the group’s propaganda in accessible and colloquial terms to women in their countries of origin. In turn, 

their propaganda reaches a wider audience, appeals to a range of desires, and 

enables recruiters to establish common ground with potential new recruits.34

ISIS also produces centralized propaganda initiatives that comprise the 

core of its official communications, including the group’s online publication 
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titled Dabiq magazine. First issued in July 2014 and released in several different languages, Dabiq echoes the official views of ISIS and calls for its 

readers to undertake acts of terror across the globe.35 With its well-edited 

articles and high-definition illustrations, it is evident that this publication 

plays a critical role in both spreading the ISIS ideology and recruiting new 

members.36 Initially, women were included in Dabiq magazine as being a part 

of the larger Muslim community, incorporated in terms like “all Muslims,” 

but were rarely addressed specifically.37 However, as the role of women in 

establishing a functioning caliphate increased in importance, women became 

more visible in Dabiq magazine. Since the seventh issue—produced in 2015 

when ISIS had begun to consolidate territory across Iraq and Syria—women 

have been featured prominently in the magazine, both authoring articles and 

as the subjects of interviews.38 Using Dabiq as a platform to address women 

directly, female authors have written about “marriage, the taking of female 

slaves, family life and female migration,” and frequently make promises 

“relating to issues of religious duty, state building, belonging, sisterhood, 

adventure, romance and influence.”39

While it is clear that women are being actively recruited by ISIS, this 

does not mean that the radicalization of women occurs as a passive process; 

these women make conscious and intentional decisions to join extremist 

groups. Studies which suggest that women are lured or have been groomed 

by recruiters who employ tactics similar 

to those used by pedophiles in order to 

ensnare their unsuspecting prey, seriously 

misrepresent the radicalization of women. 

By framing the radicalization of women 

in such terms, it infantilizes women by 

implying that they are incapable of making 

their own decisions or asserting their own 

agency, that they lack the political engagement necessary to make such choices, and 

that they are the innocent victims of their 

circumstances. Moreover, it grossly overestimates recruiter’s powers of 

seduction and persuasion.40 Similarly, arguments that women travel abroad 

to join ISIS primarily with the goal of becoming a ‘jihadi bride’ are reductionist as they oversimplify the diverse range of multi-causal factors that 

lead to women’s radicalization. 

Studies which suggest that 

women are lured or have 

been groomed by recruiters 

who employ tactics similar 

to those used by pedophiles 

in order to ensnare their 

unsuspecting prey, seriously 

misrepresent the radicalization of women.
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By focusing on women as victims rather than as active perpetrators and 

decision-makers, these studies deliver a skewed representation of women’s radicalization. For many women, joining ISIS is perceived as a form 

of empowerment, liberation, and the opportunity to live in a society that 

reflects their belief systems and worldviews.41 Typically, these potential 

recruits actively seek out both the messages and messengers of ISIS and, 

for those who choose to travel to join the group, tend to be inspired by the 

propaganda and narratives that they find.42 As noted in a recent report by 

the International Centre for the Study of Violent Extremism, “while propaganda in itself seldom radicalizes or recruits a person to an organization, it 

catalyzes radicalization and consolidates already held sympathies.”43

Canada’s Whole-of-Government Approach to 

Counter-Radicalization

Canada has adopted a multifaceted whole of government, or interagency, 

approach to address counter-radicalization. Public Safety Canada is the lead 

government department, with the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 

Preparedness responsible for leading CT initiatives and related matters pertaining to national security. Within this context, community initiatives to 

contact social networks, especially within the Canadian-Muslim community, 

have been undertaken, as well as counter-messaging initiatives.44 Of note is 

that Canada and allies are participating in a coordinated fashion to devise 

measures for counter-messaging. The Global Counter ISIS Coalition Communications Group is a primary vehicle for these efforts. Its February 2017 

meeting in the United Kingdom attracted 38 countries.45 Although countermessaging is active, it is doubtful that it is occurring through a gendered lens.

In 2015, The Standing House Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development raised a number of observations concerning the need 

for vigorous Canadian counter-ISIS activities.46 As part of its response the 

GoC stated:

Canada is also developing a counter-narrative approach which 

involves targeted support of influential local actors best positioned 

in communities to deliver messages countering ISIS’s narrative that 

resonate, and is looking at ways to prevent Canadians from being 

radicalizing to the point of violence.47
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The GoC also laid out Canadian interests in this sphere:

Advancing core Canadian values such as democracy, transparency and accountability, pluralism, and human rights—including 

women’s rights and respect for religious freedom.48

Initiatives to engage community leaders and groups who are the targets 

of extremist narratives in order to neutralize negative social messaging seem 

to have had some degree of success. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said 

of efforts to produce an appropriate strategic narrative or the use of social 

media to promulgate those messages.49 In 2015, despite the clearly articulated 

strategic goals, there was a paucity of gendered perspectives in Western narratives to counter ISIS messaging.50 Sadly, despite the many efforts of multiple 

agencies, attempts to advance a coherent international strategy have not 

achieved many positive outcomes.51

Simpson clearly articulates that strategic narratives must be tailored for 

specific audiences. In the case of women at risk of radicalization, there is 

little evidence that a gendered strategic narrative, acceptable to all agencies, 

will be devised in the near future. To capture this script, it is necessary to 

utilize a gendered perspective in messaging. First, one ought to acknowledge 

the idea articulated by Hoffman et al.—that women are seeking something 

which they cannot achieve in their place of origin.52 However, these women 

do have a myriad of reasons for becoming ‘women of the Caliphate’ which 

range from desire, to belonging, to the support of a Muslim community, 

through a need to practice Islam in a welcoming environment, to a belief that 

this is the equivalent of a pilgrimage. Arguably, Western strategic narratives 

have been hindered not only by a rejection of gender-based concepts, but also 

the refusal to acknowledge radicalized women as active decision makers who 

may intentionally choose to travel abroad to join extremist organizations. 

In order to create a comprehensive strategic narrative, Western societies 

must address this negative thinking. To do so, however, they must increase 

the number of women, including Muslim women, who work and serve in the 

security sector countering extremism. As policymakers, advisors, teachers, 

and community activists, women have a significant role to play in the creation of a dominant strategic narrative that addresses the gendered dimensions of ISIS recruitment strategies. Not only will this continue the trend 

of engaging the Muslim diaspora and its leadership within Canada, but it 

will also ensure that women’s voices are heard; one cannot create effective 
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policy without women’s engagement throughout each stage of crafting and 

employing a strategic narrative.53

Canadian national leaders and opinion makers must comprehend this 

strategic objective so that a higher-level narrative can be coherently constructed in Canada. They might use the Canadian interests so clearly laid 

out by The Standing House Committee on Foreign Affairs and International 

Development in 2015 as a starting point because they are still applicable 

today, perhaps even more so. A Canadian strategic narrative should examine 

and emphasize the brutal realities of living in ISIS controlled territory. Moreover, that the proto-state is inimical to Western conceptions of feminism and women’s 

rights, and uses women in ways that are not 

tolerated in Western countries like Canada. 

ISIS propaganda, such as Dabiq, concerning 

life for women of the caliphate does not match 

reality. Gender progressive dialogue espousing strategic ideals that simultaneously respects Muslim ideals, needs to 

be created and encouraged to neutralize the ISIS narrative. Additionally, 

Canada and other Western countries should engage with women who have 

been involved with ISIS, but who have become disillusioned with the organization through their negative experiences, by having them speak out in 

public forums.54

Another area that could be explored and linked to Canadian interests 

as part of the strategic narrative is the idea of reformist or moderate Islam. 

Canada must encourage critical Muslim dialogue concerning extremist conceptions of jihad, or “struggle,” and the repressive ideologies associated with 

them, as well as emphasize the deleterious impact on women.55 These discussions will attract devout Muslims who disagree with these radical concepts 

and assist Muslim leaders who fight against terrorism. In addition, creating 

gender strategic narratives in the education process and encouraging activism is key to negating the early radicalization of young women.56

A Canadian strategic narrative ought to reflect Canadian goals and values 

while also addressing the hopes, needs, and beliefs of its female audience. It 

is evident that the creation of a gendered strategic narrative must incorporate all aspects of this in order to neutralize the radical narratives of groups 

like ISIS. Only by doing this will Canada be able to operationalize a strategic narrative that appeals to Western women and minimize the catalyzing 

A Canadian strategic 

narrative should examine 

and emphasize the brutal 

realities of living in ISIS 

controlled territory.
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effects of extremist recruitment efforts. One could opine that other Western 

nations could adopt a similar perspective in countering attempts to radicalize women.

Conclusion

A complete strategic narrative tells a story that is convincing to those who 

are exposed to it. It is not separate from strategy but reflects its ends, ways 

and means, in a fashion nuanced for the audience for which it is intended. 

The female audience, once mostly disregarded by ISIS, is now actively sought 

to create legitimacy as a proto-state. These ISIS narratives target Western 

Muslim women in a variety of roles from skilled professions through mothers 

to fighters, with messaging emphasizing their importance to the caliphate. 

While the reality is different from the content of these ISIS narratives, it 

does attract women with a variety of motivations. Reductionist interpretations of women as jihadi brides, or as having been lured or groomed to join 

ISIS oversimplify the complex motivations behind women’s radicalization, 

creating an image of innocent women enslaved by issues outside their control. These explanations are inaccurate and do not assist with resolving the 

problem posed by increasing numbers of women attracted to ISIS.

The means of communicating these ideas are varied but largely involve 

direct contact with Western Muslim communities and presenting a strategic narrative over social media. The latter messaging is pervasive, adaptive 

and agile, able to respond quickly to Western attempts to negate its content. 

Canada participates in coalition activities to create counter-narratives and 

propagate Western narratives. Concomitantly, Canada conducts a multifaceted national campaign under the guidance of the Minister of Public Safety 

and Emergency Preparedness, along with Public Safety Canada, using a 

whole of government approach. Unfortunately, these efforts lack a gendered 

perspective and, as such, are unable to address the complex motivations that 

inspire Western women to join ISIS. 

Peace and success can only be developed if it is fully inclusive and involves 

more women, particularly Muslim women, in a variety of roles within GoC 

departments, both as policymakers and advocates, and to establish community engagement in other official capacities. Furthermore, the strategic 

narrative must be tailored to reveal the reality of life for women who have 

joined ISIS. Canada must encourage moderate female Muslims and others 
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to engage a reformist debate that not only reinforces Islamic values, but does 

so in the context of Canadian strategy and strategic narration. Only in this 

fashion will Canada, and other Western countries like the United States, be 

able to create a gendered strategic narrative that discursively reflects desired 

goals and values.

The authors would like to thank Douglas Bland, professor emeritus 

and past chair of the Defence Management Studies program at 

Queen’s University, for his review and advice.

Endnotes

1. Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat As 

Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 233.

2. Simpson, War from the Ground Up.

3. Western civilization has traditionally been thought of as those countries and 

cultures with a Catholic/Protestant world view. In Samuel P. Huntington’s The 

Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and 

Schuster, Inc., 1996) this includes the United States and Canada, Western and 

Central Europe, Australia, and Oceania.

4. The Government of Canada (GoC) uses Daesh to describe the Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as it is the 

GoC position that “ISIL/ISIS is neither Islamic nor a state.” Canada, Public 

Safety Canada, “2016 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada: Building 

a Safe and Resilient Canada” (2016), 1, accessed 10 October 2018, https://www.

publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rprtrrrst-thrt-en.pdf.

5. Dr. Douglas Bland, professor emeritus and past chair of the Defence Management 

Studies program at Queen’s University, e-mail message to author, 29 September 

2017.

6. Erin Marie Saltman, “Western Female Migrants to ISIS: Propaganda, Radicalisation, and Recruitment” in Combating Violent Extremism and Radicalization in 

the Digital Era, Majeed Khader, ed. (Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 

2016), 191.

7. This article states that at that time there were 15-20 Canadian women with 

ISIS. Tom Blackwell, “Two Canadian women among ISIL fighters captured 

in Mosul: reports,” National Post, 17 July 2017, http://nationalpost.com/news/

world/two-canadian-women-among-isil-fighters-captured-during-battle-formosul-reports.

8. Hailey Robinsmith, “Female Radicalization in the West: Motivations and Security 

Challenges,” presented at the Women in International Security (WIIS) Canada 

Annual Workshop, Montréal, Québec, Canada, 17-19 May 2017.
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9. United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, “Threats to 

international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,” 24 September 2014, 

http://undocs.org/S/RES/2178.

10. How this figure of 20 percent represents a growth in the number of female extremist travelers is not discussed in the report. Canada, Public Safety Canada, “2016 

Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada: Building a Safe and Resilient 

Canada,” https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrstthrt/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-en.pdf. 

11. Canada, Public Safety Canada, “2016 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada: 

Building a Safe and Resilient Canada,” 2016, accessed 10 October 2018, https://

www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rprtrrrst-thrt-en.pdf; Tom Blackwell, “Two Canadian women among ISIL fighters 

captured in Mosul: reports,” National Post, 17 July 2017, http://nationalpost.com/

news/world/two-canadian-women-among-isil-fighters-captured-during-battlefor-mosul-reports.

12. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (New 

York: Harper & Row, 1951).

13. Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam, “Talking to Foreign Fighters: 

Insights into the Motivations for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & 

Terrorism 40, no. 3 (2017): 206–207.

14. Husain Haqqani, “Inclusive Security for the Muslim World,” PRISM: women, 

peace & inclusive security 6, no. 1 (2016): 63.

15. Using a gender perspective, or lens, means striving to make gender visible in social 

phenomena. It focuses on how and why social processes, standards, and opportunities systematically differ according to gender. See United States, Department of 

Defense, National Defense University, Center for Complex Operations, PRISM: 

Women, Peace & Inclusive Security 6, no. 1 (2016) for discussion of gendered 

perspectives in defense; Judith A. Howard and Jocelyn A. Hollander, Gendered 

Situations, Gendered Selves: A Gender Lens on Social Psychology (California: 

AltaMira Press, 2000).

16. Simpson, War from the Ground Up, 179–181.

17. Captain Kevin Kline, Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, “Panel 3: The Use 

of Social Media and the Counter-Narrative,” presented at Countering Transregional Terrorism: A Joint Special Operations University Symposium, MacDill 

Air Force Base, Florida, 13-14 June 2017; see Richard Barrett, “Foreign Fighters 

in Syria” The Soufan Group, 2 June 2014, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/

uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.

18. Aryn Baker, “How ISIS is Recruiting Women from Around the World,” Time 

Magazine, 6 September 2014, http://time.com/3276567/how-isis-is-recruitingwomen-from-around-the-world/.

19. See Anita Peresin and Alberto Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat of ISIS,” Studies 

in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 7 (July 2015): 495-509; Aryn Baker, “How ISIS 

is Recruiting Women from Around the World,” Time Magazine, 6 September 
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2014, http://time.com/3276567/how-isis-is-recruiting-women-from-around-theworld/; Lizzie Dearden, “How ISIS Attracts Women and Girls from Europe with 

False Offer of ‘Empowerment,’” The Independent, 5 August 2017, http://www.

independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-jihadi-brides-islamic-state-womengirls-europe-british-radicalisation-recruitment-report-a7878681.html.

20. Kate Storey, “The American Women of ISIS,” Marie Claire, 22 April 2016, http://

www.marieclaire.com/politics/a20011/Western-women-who-join-isis/.

21. Anita Peresin and Alberto Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat of ISIS,” Studies in 

Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 7 (July 2015): 498.

22. Kate Storey, “The American Women of ISIS,” Marie Claire, 22 April 2016, http://

www.marieclaire.com/politics/a20011/Western-women-who-join-isis/; Ester 

Strommen, “Gender Perspective on the Emerging Security Threat of Female 

Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Da’esh- from Recruitment to Sentencing,” presented 

at the Women in International Security (WIIS) Canada Annual Workshop, 

Montréal, Québec, Canada, 17-19 May 2017.

23. Mah-Rukh Ali, “ISIS and Propaganda: How ISIS Exploits Women,” Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, Fellowship Paper (2015): 4, http://reutersinstitute.

politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/research/files/Isis%2520and%2520Propaganda-

%2520How%2520Isis%2520Exploits%2520Women.pdf. 

24. Louisa Tarras-Wahlberg, “Seven Promises of ISIS to its Female Recruits,” International Centre for the Study of Violent Extremism, January 2017, http://www.

icsve.org/research-reports/seven-promises-of-isis-to-its-female-recruits/.

25. Tarras-Wahlberg, “Seven Promises of ISIS to its Female Recruits.” 

26. United States, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, “The Evolution of Terrorist Propaganda: The Paris Attack And Social Media,” 27 January 2015, 40, http://docs.house.

gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20150127/102855/HHRG-114-FA18-Transcript-20150127.

pdf; Christina Schori Liang, “Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering 

Islamic State Propaganda,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Policy Paper 2015/2

(February 2015), 5, http://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Publications/CyberJihad-Understanding-and-Countering-Islamic-State-Propaganda; J.M. Berger, 

“The Evolution of Terrorist Propaganda: The Paris Attack and Social Media,” The 

Brookings Institute, 27 January 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/

the-evolution-of-terrorist-propaganda-the-paris-attack-and-social-media/.

27. Christina Schori Liang, “Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic 

State Propaganda,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Policy Paper 2015/2 

(February 2015), 5, http://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Publications/

Cyber-Jihad-Understanding-and-Countering-Islamic-State-Propaganda.

28. Mah-Rukh Ali, “ISIS and Propaganda: How Isis Exploits Women,” Reuters Institute 

Fellowship Paper, University of Oxford University, 2015, http://reutersinstitute.

politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/research/files/Isis%2520and%2520Propaganda-

%2520How%2520Isis%2520Exploits%2520Women.pdf.
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29. Erin Marie Saltman, “Western Female Migrants to ISIS: Propaganda, Radicalisation, and Recruitment,” in Combating Violent Extremism and Radicalization in 

the Digital Era, Majeed Khader, ed. (Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 

2016), 191.

30. Saltman, “Western Female Migrants to ISIS.” 

31. Lizzie Dearden, “How Isis Attracts Women and Girls from Europe with False Offer 

of ‘Empowerment,’” The Independent, 05 August 2017, http://www.independent.

co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-jihadi-brides-islamic-state-women-girls-europebritish-radicalisation-recruitment-report-a7878681.html.

32. Lindsay Coombs and Melissa Hawco, “The Journey of ‘Jihadi Brides’: An Odyssey 

of Faith,” ON TRACK 19, no. 2 (2015): 7.

33. Ali, “ISIS and Propaganda.”

34. Mia Bloom, Bombshell: Women and Terrorism (Pennsylvania: University of 

Pennsylvania Press, 2012); Erin Marie Saltman, “Western Female Migrants 

to ISIS: Propaganda, Radicalisation, and Recruitment,” in Combating Violent 

Extremism and Radicalization in the Digital Era, Majeed Khader, ed. (Hershey PA: 

Information Science Reference, 2016), 191; Kate Storey, “The American Women of 

ISIS,” Marie Claire, 22 April 2016, http://www.marieclaire.com/politics/a20011/

Western-women-who-join-isis/.

35. Editions of Dabiq magazine are available in English, Arabic, Turkish, French, 

German and Russian. Louisa Tarras-Wahlberg, “Seven Promises of ISIS to its 

Female Recruits,” International Centre for the Study of Violent Extremism, January 

2017, http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/seven-promises-of-isis-to-its-femalerecruits/; Christina Schori Liang, “Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State Propaganda,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Policy Paper 

2015/2 (February 2015), 4, http://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Publications/

Cyber-Jihad-Understanding-and-Countering-Islamic-State-Propaganda.

36. Tarras-Wahlberg, “Seven Promises of ISIS to its Female Recruits.” 

37. Tarras-Wahlberg, “Seven Promises of ISIS to its Female Recruits.” 

38. Ali, “ISIS and Propaganda.” 

39. Tarras-Wahlberg, “Seven Promises of ISIS to its Female Recruits.” 

40. Simon Cottee, “What ISIS Women Want,” Foreign Policy, 17 May 2016, http://

foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/17/what-isis-women-want-gendered-jihad/; Beverley 

Milton-Edwards and Sumaya Attia, “Female terrorists and their role in jihadi 

groups,” The Brookings Institute, 9 May 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/female-terrorists-and-their-role-in-jihadi-groups/; For articles suggesting 

that women are recruited in a manner similar to the way pedophiles prey upon 

children, see “How does ISIS try to recruit Canadian girls? By using same tactics as pedophiles, TV special says,” The National Post, 14 March 2015, http://

nationalpost.com/news/isis-recruiting-tactics-are-pretty-creepy. 
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41. Beverley Milton-Edwards and Sumaya Attia, “Female terrorists and their role 

in jihadi groups,” The Brookings Institute, 9 May 2017, https://www.brookings.

edu/opinions/female-terrorists-and-their-role-in-jihadi-groups/.

42. Simon Cottee, “What ISIS Women Want,” Foreign Policy, 17 May 2016, http://

foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/17/what-isis-women-want-gendered-jihad/.

43. Tarras-Wahlberg, “Seven Promises of ISIS to its Female Recruits.” 

44. Canada, Public Safety Canada, “Counter-terrorism,” https://www.publicsafety.

gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/index-en.aspx, accessed 19 October 2017.

45. Canada, Public Safety Canada, “2016 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to 

Canada: Building a Safe and Resilient Canada,” 2016, available at https://www.

publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrstthrt-en.pdf, 21 and 24; United States, Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Fact Sheet: The Global Coalition - Working to Defeat ISIS” (Washington, 

D.C.: 22 March 2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/03/268609.htm.

46. Canada, Parliament of Canada, The Standing House Committee on Foreign 

Affairs and International Development, “Canada’s Response To The Islamic 

State Of Iraq And The Levant (ISIL),” March 2015, http://www.ourcommons.

ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-2/FAAE/report-8.

47. Canada, Parliament of Canada, “Government Response to the Eighth Report of 

the Standing House Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development Entitled: ‘Canada’s Response to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL),’” 2015, http://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-2/FAAE/

report-8/response-8512-412-203.

48. Canada, Parliament of Canada, “Government Response to the Eighth Report of 

the Standing House Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development Entitled: ‘Canada’s Response to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL).’”

49. Lorne Dawson, “Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into their motivations,” 

presented at A Century of Conflict: The Middle East and International Security, 

1917-2017, Wu Conference Centre, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, 

New Brunswick, Canada, 1–2 February 2017.

50. Erin Marie Saltman and Melanie Smith, “‘Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’: Gender 

and the ISIS Phenomenon” (London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015), 

https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Till_Martyrdom_Do_

Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf. 

51. Hailey Robinsmith, “Female Radicalization in the West: Motivations and Security 

Challenges” and Ester Strommen, “Gender Perspective on the Emerging Security Threat of Female Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Da’esh- from Recruitment 

to Sentencing,” both presented at the Women in International Security (WIIS) 

Canada Annual Workshop, Montréal, Québec, Canada, 17-19 May 2017.

52. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer.
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53. Robinsmith, “Female Radicalization in the West” and Strommen, “Gender Perspective on the Emerging Security.”

54. Saltman and Smith, “‘Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon” and Robinsmith, “Female Radicalization in the West: Motivations 

and Security Challenges.”

55. Antony Adolf, Peace: A World History (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 

98. According to Adolf, Jihad represents a struggle “with oneself and others for 

Allah” and “only when externalized as a pacification of non-believers” does it 

become “a form of war-making.” 

56. Robinsmith, “Female Radicalization in the West.”
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Christian et al.: Origin and Epidemiology

Chapter 7. Origin and Epidemiology: 

Extremism and Radicalization1

 are 

Psychological Processes, not Religious 

Beliefs 

Patrick J. Christian, Aleksandra Nesic, David Sniffen, 

Basimah Hallawy-Rowe, Tasneem Aljehani, Khaled Al 

Sumairi, Narayan B. Khadka, Selam Alemayo, Kwadjo 

Owusu-Sarfo

Introduction

This chapter addresses the challenge of young-adult and refugee vulnerability to the spread of violent extremist ideology, subsequent 

radicalization, and devolution into violence-related behavior. The authors’ 

approach is characterized by grounded theory drawn from extensive field 

research in South America, Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and 

Asia. The research concludes that extremism and radicalization originate 

Patrick James Christian, Ph.D., is a psychoanalytical anthropologist specializing in 

the psychopathology of violent ethnic and cultural conflicts. He is a retired U.S. 

Army Special Forces officer with field research and military engagement experience 

in numerous regions. He researches and develops advanced military social science 

programs for Army Special Operations Forces personnel and deployed teams.

Dr. Nesic is a Sociocultural Conflict Psychologist, specializing in psychology 

of violence and extremism. She has over a decade of university teaching, 

research and curricula development in peace and conflict studies with extensive field work in conflict and post-conflict zones. She is currently researching 

and developing advanced military social science programs for Army Special 

Operations Forces personnel and deployed teams.
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from profound psychosocial crisis rather than religious belief or unmet 

physical needs. Based on these findings, the authors advocate for designing 

and implementing clinical countering violent extremism (CVE), radicalization intervention and prevention programs that operate far forward of 

local and national security interdiction points. The authors’ CVE research 

and development uses a community clinical engagement approach to repair 

damaged psychosocial and emotional refugee populations’ social tissue to 

build resiliency against virulent extremist ideology and violent extremist 

organization (VEO) recruitment. Simultaneously, this approach introduces 

advanced psychosocial-emotional analytical frameworks to government 

agency employees responsible for refugee services administration, including health and welfare. Community clinical engagement and government 

services training and advising efforts work collaboratively to identify and 

disrupt lines of extremism and radicalization within the vulnerable youngadult and refugee populations. 

The Challenge of War Refugees

Worldwide, the flow of war refugees has now exceeded 60 million human 

beings.2 This is the highest level ever recorded. According to the United 

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, 

We are witnessing a paradigm change, an unchecked slide into an 

era in which the scale of global forced displacement as well as the 

response required is now clearly dwarfing anything seen before.3

The scope and volume of war refugees now threatens political and social 

destabilization in the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas. The destabilizing effects of the war refugees on the host populations receiving them can 

best be understood within human psychology concepts of trauma, transference, and countertransference (see fig. 3), through which virulent strains 

of violent ideology spread into vulnerable populations.4 These little understood social psychological processes present the possibilities of tremendous 

damage to the social fabric with attendant political upheaval to both refugee 

and host populations. The effects of these three processes can be managed 

and mitigated with early diagnosis and treatment. Left untended, the Arab 

Spring of violent revolutions and their descent into anarchy may yet spread 

westward with the flow of refugees and displaced persons.
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The Origin of Violent Extremism and Radicalization: Psychosocial-Emotional Damage from Trauma 

The authors propose a psychological definition of extremism as the effect 

on a traumatized human being trying to reestablish a cognitive thoughtrelationship to reality and their susceptibility to ‘totalization’ of cause and 

effect.5 This type of totalizing thought is especially prevalent when it involves 

the nature of their emotional pain and psychological suffering from profound loss and alienation.6

 Violent extremism is a psychological totalization 

of thought regarding the effects of emotional pain and psychological suffering that overwhelms the cognitive thought process. To restore connection with reality, the cause of these effects 

are attributed to an ‘other’ group because 

of that group’s actions, policies, or physical 

presence.7

 Said differently, extremism is the 

mind’s errant attempt at establishing meaning to suffering by assigning an antagonist to 

its internal protagonist. This creates a narrative that provides grounding structure of 

cause and effect.8 While extremism is a cognitive (conscious) thought process, extremism is driven by the subconscious’ 

ego requirement for meaning-of-suffering, without which the ego is destabilized and the identity that it supports (or represents) begins to devolve in a 

process of self-loathing that can threaten psychic annihilation—a common 

basis for suicidal terror participation.9

Traveling within the 16 million war refugees is a collective memory of 

profound terror and reality shattering losses of children, family, home, and 

an ancient historical narrative that carried generational remembrance and 

existential meaning. Behind the seemingly calm faces of the refugees lays a 

vast invisible psychological trauma of a social reality broken under armored 

tank treads, bombing, rape, or brutal beheadings. The surviving families 

that are filling the growing Lebanese/Turkish/European refugee camps are 

likely suffering from a collection of conflicting cognitive thoughts of survival 

and alienation; raw emotions of unintegrated grief, shame and rage; and 

subconscious ideations of hope, despair, and terrorized anxiety. 

By most accounts, the physical needs of war refugees in Europe and 

the United States are being met by a combination of services provided by 

Violent extremism is a 

psychological totalization 

of thought regarding the 

effects of emotional pain 

and psychological suffering 

that overwhelms the cognitive thought process.
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governmental and nongovernmental organizations, especially in comparison 

to those remaining in Lebanon and Syria. Even as the most life-threatening 

basic survival needs (food, shelter, medicine, and physical protection) are 

met, the deeper, psychological needs that were previously submerged, begin 

to surface and destabilize families and individual members of such psychologically traumatized refugee communities. In the hierarchy of human needs, 

all are required to sustain life. Human needs are organized into a hierarchy 

because extreme cold kills before thirst which kills before hunger, and so 

on. At the deep end of the human needs hierarchy lies the psychological, 

sociological, and emotional needs that sustain cognitive reality and provide 

purpose for human life. Adding to the difficulty of care and administration 

of traumatized refugees, are trauma effects such as irrational phobia, interpersonal guardedness, increased social distance, and relational ruptures.10

Traumatized individuals, while needing an emotionally safe and secure 

environment can frequently be prone to intense mistrust of not only other 

refugees but service providers of host nations. They may be overcome by 

fears of emotional closeness and may present resistance to necessary interpersonal attachments/reattachments which they perceive as harbingers of 

further loss.11 These are classic symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 

made more complicated by their socio-centric psychological organization 

(see fig. 3). 

The human security analytical framework (fig. 3) is a primary clinical 

assessment and engagement tool for the cultural conflict psychologists and 

sociologists researching violent extremism and behavioral radicalization.12

For most war refugees, the psychological structure of their personal and 

Figure 1. Human Security Analytical Framework. 

SOURCE: VALKA-MIR/USED WITH PERMISSION
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Christian et al.: Origin and Epidemiology

family identity has become unstable from failing archetypes (such as heroism, sacrifice, and masculinity) that essential components of a group identity 

and necessary to sustain a psychological organization of a patriarchal society 

(see fig. 4).13,14 As the sociological structure of family, ethnic, and cultural 

kinsmen within the larger community collapses with the destruction of their 

homes, farms, and towns, their generational transmission of historical narrative that memorializes their past, connects to their present, and prepares 

their children for the future is at imminent risk of obsolescence with the loss 

of so many members of family and ethnic kin. 

Furthermore, the war refugees find themselves in camps or towns within 

the hosting nations whose psychological organization, sociological structure, 

and emotional expressions are vastly different than the refugees own rapidly 

failing group identity. As individuals, and as a body of humans, they are in a 

profound psychological and emotional crisis.15 Their primary loss of home, 

rootedness, the sense of self and place is now vanquished and made worse by 

the day-to-day meaninglessness of routinized camp experience lived within a 

Figure 2. Large Group Identity Construct. 

SOURCE: VALKA-MIR/USED WITH PERMISSION
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grid environment in a new (host) cultural context. In this state, the refugees 

are extremely vulnerable to damaging transference and countertransference 

exchanges with their host population. These ‘psychological transfers’ of roles, 

feelings, and meanings between refugees and hosts establish the basis for 

extremism and radicalization that requires early intervention.16

The Epidemiology of Extremism and Radicalization: 

The Relationship Between Trauma Transference, 

Countertransference and Extremism

The cognitive and subconscious minds of traumatized refugees continuously 

seek to reestablish their relationship with reality. Unaided by supportive 

intervention that needs to utilize and apply psychological and emotional 

issues of conflict trauma, the refugees’ thought patterns desperately attempt 

to seek out explanatory meanings to relieve their suffering. Two common 

modes of transference entail the psychic extremes of idealization and devaluation. For example, many find that their suffering is relieved by meanings/

explanations that are based on safety/security, where the host population 

takes on the role of idealized savior or rescuer. For others, suffering is 

relieved by affixing responsibility for their suffering, often as a relief from 

unbearable survivor guilt. In this version of transference, the host population takes on the role of betrayer and devalued, because they were a culpable 

witness to the death of their families without intervening to save them. These 

two examples illustrate the vulnerable state of mind of the refugees as they 

search for meaning/explanations that support the reestablishment of their 

personal and family relationship with reality. 

Figure 3 illustrates in detail the ebb and flow of transference and countertransference processes between the refugees and their host community, 

where the refugees reassign meaning and feelings onto their new surroundings within their host benefactor community.17 It is this process of transference and search for meaning/explanations that is highly susceptible to 

interference by terror/criminal ideologues who work to reshape meaning for 

the traumatized refugees as anti-modern, anti-Western, anti-host government and call for mental and physical resistance. 

The call to assign responsibility onto the host population for refugees 

suffering affects only a percentage of the traumatized population. As well, 

many traumatized refugees are able to recover their relationship to their 
113

Christian et al.: Origin and EpidemiologyFigure 3. Transference/Countertransference of Trauma: Psychological Extremization, Radicalization and Weaponization Process. SOURCE: VALKA-MIR/USED WITH PERMISSION
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new reality without succumbing to totalization of thought necessary for 

extremism and subsequent radicalization. However, those who are unable 

due to a host of internal psychological reasons are vulnerable to extremism/

radicalization and could become a serious danger to themselves and their 

host community.18

For those members of the traumatized refugee community whose affected 

psychological-emotional state remains vulnerable to extremism, additional 

supportive intervention is required to prevent their descent into radicalization and subsequent recruitment by terror/crime organizations. The patterns 

of psychological and emotional traumatization and the ideologue involvement within the transference, countertransference, and secondary trauma 

constitute the extremism health event that the authors refer to as the epidemiology of violent extremism. The epidemiology of violent extremist ideations show how traumatized thought is influenced as a pattern towards the 

host population as a causative agent of suffering and how that thought pattern is transmitted between traumatized and non-traumatized populations. 

Refugee transference in this context involves the (mostly) unconscious 

redirection of feelings and attitudes about their suffering/condition/plight 

onto a more accessible representation of their tormentor or savior—the host 

population. These transference reactions include both rational and irrational 

themes. The representation of the host population as tormentor is a common 

ideation pushed by terror/criminal ideologues, and the representation of the 

host as savior is viciously attacked by those same ideologues at each setback 

suffered by the refugee.19 What is important to remember is that the traumatized refugees’ minds are attempting to reconstruct a reality damaged by 

violent loss and unresolved terror. Their fixation on the host-population as 

either tormentor or savior through this transference of meaning and feeling is not based on reality, but an attempt at realigning a damaged reality. 

Countertransference on the other hand, is often a reaction to transference, where those in that power position (host population) develop conscious 

or unconscious positive or negative feelings about the refugees. Countertransference is based not on reality but often on, unconscious effects that 

the presence of refugees have on the group identity definition of the host 

population.20 As with transference, countertransference attitudes also include 

both rational and irrational themes. Countertransference effects of alienation, exclusion, or revulsion can have powerfully radicalizing effects on the 

traumatized refugees, fueling powerful ideological narratives of the host 
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population as tormentors and causative agents of their suffering and loss. 

To this end, countertransference process creates secondary trauma—when 

there is sufficient intermingling of 

psychological-emotional narratives from the traumatized refugees to the host population, to the 

point where elements of the host 

population begin to suffer trauma 

(breaking of reality) on behalf of the 

refugees. Secondary trauma within 

members of the host population 

that are related (real or perceived) 

to the refugees can create equal levels of totalizing thought within this part 

of the host population despite the fact that they may never have even visited 

the conflict zone. 

Psychological Organization and Sociological Structure as 

Inhibitors to Effective Refugee Adjustment and Acculturation 

Psychological organization of identity and sociological structure of society 

are the underlying inhibitors for effective refugee adjustment and acculturation into their new surroundings.21 These are aided by differences in 

cultural/emotional expression which are often overlooked by those helping 

the refugees resettle, host nation community, or the refugees themselves. 

This inhibition of refugee adjustment and acculturation is not to be confused 

with integration, but merely an ability to sustain psychological, emotional, 

and physical life cycles within a new social environment. The inability of 

refugee families and individual members to successfully adjust and acculturate into their new host environment creates and sustains conditions of 

alienation, shame, and ultimately rage that can be redirected by ideologues 

into radicalization and terror/crime recruitment, specifically toward the 

host-nation population. 

The two most important inhibitors of refugee adjustment and acculturation are psychological organization and sociological structure. Figure 4 illustrates the differences between sociological structures that are characteristic 

of the refugees’ norm versus the sociological structures characteristic of 

their new host benefactors.22

Countertransference effects of 

alienation, exclusion, or revulsion 

can have powerfully radicalizing 

effects on the traumatized refugees, fueling powerful ideological 

narratives of the host population as 

tormentors and causative agents of 

their suffering and loss. 
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Central to the refugees’ discomfort will be the normative and expected 

behavior of school aged children and young adults. In egocentric (individualistic) societies, the locus of internal member control is inculcated into 

children from the earliest possible age. The egocentric child is taught independent thought, responsibility for their actions, their success, their failure, 

and ultimately their life destiny, separate from the destiny of siblings, parents, and extended family. 

By contrast, in sociocentric (collectivistic) communities, the locus of 

taught/learned member control is external to the individual. Family members are inculcated with the idea that they as primary and extended family, 

are responsible for the behavior or control of each other. The sociocentric 

child is taught collective thought/decision making with shared responsibility 

for their actions, success, failure and ultimately, their interrelated life destiny. 

Figure 4. Sociocentric (Collectivistic) and Egocentric (Individualistic) 

Cultural Groups. SOURCE: VALKA-MIR/USED WITH PERMISSION
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Western social structures are oriented around individual agency, where 

the self is conceptualized and practiced as an independent entity of other 

‘selves’ and as such, it requires children and adults to continuously move 

between situations with varying normative behavioral expectations (social 

rules) such as school, clubs, play, jobs, and so on. This can present the sociocentric family with quite a dilemma. The basis of sociocentric (collectivist) 

social order involves a different psychological organization of the family 

and community, one that is based on merged family identities with a central 

prototype that is limited to internal influence.23 Essentially, the concept and 

understanding of self in egocentric society is independent from others in the 

family, community and society, whereas the concept and understanding of 

the self in sociocentric society is interdependent on other selves in the family, 

community and society.24 Refugee families can and do adapt. But when this 

important inhibitor to acculturation is combined with war trauma, their 

ability to adjust and adapt to their new found sociological structure that 

is based on a different (individual-egocentric) psychological organization, 

becomes very difficult indeed. 

Traumatized families are already dealing with tremendous psychosocial/emotional issues, and when confronted with a clearly alien version of 

social order, their ability to recover and adapt becomes seriously degraded. 

The resulting enhanced psychological crises for the group means that more 

members will become vulnerable to extremist, totalizing thoughts as they 

struggle to reconnect their traumatized lives to the new meanings of their 

host environment. This increase in members’ extreme thought/meanings 

of their situation can in turn lead to increased opportunities for extremist ideologues to shape their thought-meanings into political, weaponized 

radicalization. This serves to increase the overall recruitment base for violent 

terror or crime organizations. 

The Solution: Intervening Forward of State and Federal 

Security Interdiction Points

As events have demonstrated in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, and 

Africa, governments’ reliance on local and national security interdiction 

points places the burden of effort towards the end of the security spectrum 

where the host population is most vulnerable to attack. This arrangement 

also requires the state to increasingly advance its domestic intelligence 
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apparatus into the refugee and host populations in a manner that reduces 

civil liberties and undermines human rights protection and the rule of law. 

The solution is to ensure counter violent extremism and radicalization intervention and prevention programs, operate far forward of both local and 

national security interdiction points. 

There is a critically needed focus on human security, forward of and in 

support of, state security. Counter violent extremism clinical engagement 

can operate within the refugee community to repair damaged psychosocial 

and emotional tissue sufficient to build resiliency against virulent extremist ideology and VEO recruitment. This engagement can help community 

members learn to separate out the intense currents of opinionated feelings 

regarding the terrifying events in their home country from the new reality of 

their host benefactor communities. While these opinionated feelings emerge 

as various strains of political dialogue, underlying these opinionated feelings are threats to large group identity definition, distinction, affirmation, 

and the meanings that directly sustain their conceptions of reality as Arab, 

Muslim, and the various tribal/nationalist identities of the refugees and their 

host populations. The goal is to build human security directly within refugee 

populations and/or in support of government/state agencies: 

• Through the stabilization of large group identity at the family, family 

member, and cultural identity community;

• Through tribal/nationalist identity mediation that reassures family 

lines of origination with present day belonging. These lines of origination and belonging tend to fray and collapse in the extreme violence 

in northern Iraq and Syria;25

• Through mediation of meaning that conforms to reality that meets 

their underlying psychosocial-emotional needs, rather than the ideologues’ political cause;

• Through translation assistance of their sociocentric psychological 

organization to the new egocentric organization within their host 

benefactor community.

Simultaneously, this engagement introduces advanced psychosocial/

emotional analytical frameworks to government agency employees responsible for refugee administration, health and welfare. Such a program should 

equip the community clinical engagement and government services training and advising to work collaboratively to identify and disrupt lines of 
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extremism and radicalization within the vulnerable young adult and refugee 

populations. 

Endnotes 

1. Epidemiology is the science of studying the factors determining and influencing 

the frequency and distribution of a health-related event and their causes in a 

defined human population. Used in this context of mental health, epidemiology 

of violent extremism and radicalization deals with the origination, influence, 

transmission, and effects of totalizing cognitive thought that lead to violent 

extremism.

2. “Figures at the Glance” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), accessed 9 March 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-aglance.html.

3. “Worldwide displacement hits all-time high as war and persecution increase” 

UNHCR, 18 June 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2015/6/558193896/

worldwide-displacement-hits-all-time-high-war-persecution-increase.html.

4. Sigmund Freud, Observations on Transference-love (London: Hogarth Press, 1915). 

Transference and countertransference were first articulated by Sigmund Freud, 

and involved psychological interaction between a therapist and his/her patient. 

The vast majority of war refugees however, are from socio-centric or collectivist 

societies which are differentiated from individualist or egocentric societies by 

the locus of member control. In the latter, the locus of member control is external to the individual and rests with the collective of family and ethnic cultural 

kin and requires therapeutic treatment regimens that are group centric. In the 

former, the locus of member control is internal to the individual allowing for 

more individual therapeutic treatment as a successful treatment regimen. 

5. Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (Madison, CT: International 

Universities Press, 1936). Anna Freud describes trauma as a “piercing” or breaking of a person’s psychological understanding of reality. 

6. Douglas Bremer and Charles Marmar, Trauma, Memory and Dissociation 

(Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1998). For clinical treatment, 

it is important to differentiate between two sources of trauma, and associated 

reactive rage that are often conflated in both the clinical literature and in discussions of violent extremism. They are interrelated with the loss of meaning, and 

sense of alienation described in this section. The two modes of reactivity include 

primordial “reactive rage” towards the perpetrators of traumatic experience(s), 

and “abandonment rage” towards the failure of perceived protective agents to 

provide security (host government, foreign internal defense forces, or culture 

of refuge). 

a. The first entails abandonment to the world, the second abandonment by, or 

from, the world. Etiologically, these sources of rage can be differentiated. 

Experientially, they are often fused, and undifferentiated. Each of these 
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sources of rage, and modes of reactivity become fused in the described 

“totalization” of thought and affective response referenced. 

b. Assessment and treatment requires assisting victims with differentiating 

between their: (1) primary emotional pain, and loss; (2) reactive rage towards 

perpetrators; (3) abandonment rage towards those perceived as having a duty 

to protect them from the fates suffered; and (4) those perceived as having a 

humanitarian responsibility to respond to their plight, after the fact. 

7. Kjetil Søreide, “Epidemiology of Major Trauma,” British Journal of Surgery 96, no. 

7 (2009): 697–698. Because of their perceived culpability as passive witnesses (i.e., 

by-stander apathy), as emotionally indifferent observers, or as active contributors 

to further abandonment, host nations become the targeted ‘other’ for the ‘totalized’ rage of the violent extremist. It is an overdetermined response: (1) partial 

reality (the equivalent of an iatrogenic or induced transference resistance); (2) 

partial displacement within the transference (affectively correct, but interpersonally misdirected); and (3) a target of convenience (chosen for its proximity 

in time and place, and symbolic value).

8. Gershen Kaufman, The Psychology of Shame: Theory and Treatment of ShameBased Syndromes (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1996). The rage itself 

serves cathartic, retributive, and defensive functions. The defensive component 

is the turning of passive suffering and existential despair, feelings of meaninglessness, powerlessness, and loss of any sense of participation in family/group 

locus of control; into what is experienced as a more tolerable, active, empowered, 

though transient and illusory sense of empowerment and purpose. When that 

purpose orients towards ideations of punishing the perceived responsible agent, 

the affected refugee member reaches his/her most likely recruitment point, 

whether that be self-recruitment or external recruitment. 

9. Thomas Scheff and Suzanne Retzinger, Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage 

in Destructive Conflicts (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Company, 1991). It establishes the archetypal dynamic of victimization and vilification. The most at-risk 

refugees suffer from extreme self-punitive super-ego pathology - often having 

its genesis in rational and irrational guilt, related to the trauma(s) experienced, 

and which is enacted at the interpersonal level (physical and/or emotional sadomasochism). These individuals as a subtype of refugees also frequently exhibit 

control sensitivity and sensitivity to guilt, making them a higher than normal 

candidate for meaning manipulation and subsequent recruitment. 

10. Judith L. Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Book, 1992). As 

used here, archaic typologies of human identity are psychological prototypes 

of fundamental human characteristics as expressed within a specific cultural 

context. Archaic types of masculinity, femininity, heroism, and sacrifice (as well 

as thousands of others) inform members of a collective identity how to express 

themselves in thought and emotion in order to achieve psychosocial placement 

within family, community, and ultimately, within their own self-assessment of 

worth. 
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11. Maurice Eisenbruch, “From Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to Cultural Bereavement: Diagnosis of Southeast Asian Refugees.” Social Science & Medicine 33, no. 

6 (1991): 673–80.

12. The Psychosocial-Emotional Human Security Analytical Framework was created 

by the authors to focus our field research and clinical engagement with external 

refugee communities, internally displaced populations, and traumatized families and villages in ongoing violent conflict zones. The framework provides a 

structured assessment tool for interventionists to use in diagnosing vulnerability 

threats as part of our violent extremism epidemiology.

13. Carl Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). As used here, archaic typologies of human identity 

are psychological prototypes of fundamental human characteristics as expressed 

within a specific cultural context. Archaic types of masculinity, femininity, heroism, and sacrifice (as well as thousands of others) inform members of a collective 

identity how to express themselves in thought and emotion in order to achieve 

psychosocial placement within family, community, and ultimately, within their 

own self-assessment of worth. 

14. Figure 2 is adapted from the following publication: The Foundations of the Human 

Domain in Unconventional and Irregular Warfare, used by the Special Warfare 

Education Group, Language Regional Expertise & Culture department, U.S. 

Army, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center of Excellence, Ft. Bragg, NC.

15. Richard F. Mollica, “The trauma story: the psychiatric care of refugee survivors 

of violence and torture” in Post Traumatic Therapy and Victims of Violence, Ed. 

Frank M. Ochberg (New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1988), 295–314.

16. Mollica, “The trauma story,” 300.

17. Figure 2 is a graphic illustration created by Valka-Mir Human Security research 

team of the process of extremization of an individual’s mental reality that has 

been broken by trauma. The concepts of psychological trauma, transference, and 

countertransference, are all consistent with the 5th Edition of the Diagnostic and 

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric 

Association, Arlington, VA (2013). 

18. Mollica, “The trauma story,” 302.

19. Maurice Eisenbruch, “From Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to Cultural Bereavement: Diagnosis of Southeast Asian Refugees,” Social Science & Medicine 33, no. 

6 (1991): 673-80.

20. Sigmund Freud, Observations on Transference-love.

21. Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 1982).

22. Figure 3 is adapted from the following publication: The Foundations of the Human 

Domain in Unconventional and Irregular Warfare, used by the Special Warfare 

Education Group, Language Regional Expertise & Culture department, U.S. 

Army, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center of Excellence, Ft. Bragg, NC. 
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23. Tajfel, Social Identity.

24. Tajfel, Social Identity.

25. An important aspect of the success of ISIS is its purposeful dismantling and 

destruction of the existing social order which shorts their claims to religious 

social authority over that of hereditary family origination.
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Dawe: Countering Transregional Terror, A Canadian Perspective

Chapter 8. Countering Transregional 

Terror: A Canadian Perspective

Peter Dawe

Since the attacks of 9/11, enhanced globalization spurred by economic, 

political, social, and especially technological developments has created a confluence of factors that have transformed the international security 

landscape. Competing states wrestling for advantage within an established 

internationally recognized—albeit at times informal—set of norms and 

rules has been supplanted by a chaotic world order that now includes rogue 

nuclear states, shifting alliances and economic blocks, and non-state actors 

that have access to increasingly lethal weaponry, including weapons of mass 

destruction. 

Terrorism, although not a new phenomenon, has also significantly 

evolved. The left-wing anarchist movements and liberation organizations 

vying for publicity in the 1960 to 1980s have given way to ideological and 

religious extremist groups whose intolerance of those deemed to be nonbelievers is equaled only by their apparent lust for violence. This modern 

battle of ideology has become the catalyst for mass casualty attacks most 

often targeting innocent civilians. Today’s terrorist organizations have perverted the advantages of globalization, which have led to the empowerment 

of non-state actors and the democratization of technology, thus granting 

these groups the ability to communicate, innovate and wreak havoc on a 

scale never before seen. Terrorists have exploited globalization to strengthen 

their ability to develop networks, plan operations, communicate between 

cells, organizations, and networks (with encryption), raise finances, access 

Major-General Peter S. Dawe is the Commander, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command. He earned a bachelor’s degree in military arts and 

science, a master’s degree in defence studies, and a second master’s degree 

in public administration from the Royal Military College of Canada. MajorGeneral Dawe has commanded at every level from platoon to brigade. He 

was appointed an officer of the Order of Military Merit in 2015.
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weapons, and lessons learned, collaborate with criminal organizations, as 

well as recruit and radicalize individuals across the globe. 

Consequently, countering transregional terrorism has become a truly 

international undertaking shared by the majority of law abiding nations. 

As a result, the problem requires a global approach. In this fight, Canada is 

prepared to do its part. In fact, the newly released Canadian Defence Policy 

specifically noted, “Canada must address the threat stemming from terrorism and the actions of violent extremist organizations, including in ungoverned spaces.”1

 The Canadian response is a whole-of-government approach 

that mobilizes its national security agencies as well as its military, particularly the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM).

The Threat

Despite the fact that terrorist attacks and fatalities have declined for the last 

two years, terrorism remains a pervasive concern for the international community.2

 Organizations such as Daesh, al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, 

to name a few, have demonstrated the ability to exploit ungoverned spaces, 

and at-risk states, as well as extend their reach to industrialized Western 

nations through the radicalization of individuals via the internet. These terrorist organizations have shown themselves able to compete with states in 

the ability to cause large scale destruction and violence. Whether through 

the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), firearms, vehicles, or even 

knives, they have been able to spread panic and chaos throughout much of 

Western Europe.

The ability to radicalize individuals through the internet and social media 

has provided another means by which terrorist organizations can extend 

their reach. These indoctrinated individuals can sometimes go on to conduct lone-wolf attacks, yet, they are often coached and enabled by terrorists 

providing instruction and material aid. A recent undercover study revealed 

that the terrorist organizations are most concerned with obtaining video 

footage of the attacker’s pledge of allegiance and suicide video for propaganda purposes. Moreover, they prefer the attacks to be done as quickly as 

possible with minimal planning. As one terrorist handler advised, “Don’t 

plan too much. I mean, once the basic idea is made, the important thing is 

that you put your trust in Allah.”3
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The emphasis on quick, simple attacks carried out by radicalized individuals has had a significant impact. These types of terrorist attacks in public 

places have resulted in mass casualties. For example, in Nice, France, a 

Daesh-inspired individual drove a 19-ton cargo truck through crowds celebrating Bastille Day, killing 86 and injuring hundreds before police were 

able to neutralize the threat. Similarly, in Berlin, Germany, another Daesh 

inspired attacker using a commercial truck killed 12 in a crowded Christmas 

market. And on two separate incidents in London, England, vehicles were 

used to run down pedestrians in March and in June of 2017. In each case, 

the vehicular attacks were followed by assaults using knives. Both attacks 

resulted in numerous dead and wounded.

Nick Rasmussen, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center 

captured the trepidation felt by governments and their publics when he stated 

the following:

One of the concerning things about London and Manchester is 

that these have not necessarily involved large cells with months 

and months or years and years of preparation, but individuals with 

relatively modest capability who are able to mount these kinds of 

terrible attacks on their own. We worry about the idea of a copy-cat 

attack—someone jumping into a car and driving into a crowd or 

using a knife or a firearm in an indiscriminate way.4

Further amplifying the concern was the fact that in May of 2017, Europol 

was tracking 173 potential suicide bombers in Europe alone.5

The threat of transregional terrorism is heightened even more by the 

return of foreign fighters, who according to Dr. David Malet, an internationally recognized expert on the subject, can best be described as “non-citizens 

of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflict.”6 These foreign 

fighters pose a significant threat because not only are they increasingly radicalized, they are also trained and experienced in combat. These same fighters 

create a “blowback effect” by returning home, or traveling to a third country 

and committing violent acts, often in the name of jihad. A research study 

revealed that between 1990 and 2010, one-in-nine returned foreign fighters 

were involved in domestic terrorist plots. The study concluded, “these plots 

tended to be more effective and lethal, thanks both to the skills learned 

and the indoctrinated zeal provided at radical training camps.”7 To put this 

threat in scale with an example of a single country, France’s interior minister 
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revealed that an “estimated 271 radical Islamists who fought for militant 

groups have returned [to France] from war zones after being members of 

the Islamic State militant group [Daesh].”8

Additionally, the threat is further exacerbated by the deep and dark web 

that provides a vehicle for terrorist networks to conduct their nefarious 

business. Sites, such as the recently dismantled AlphaBay and Hansa sites, 

provide access to illicit material such as weapons, toxic chemicals, malware, 

stolen data, and illegal drugs.9 The growing criminal nexus with terrorist 

organizations allows for financing, as well as access to smuggling “rat-lines,” 

or in simpler terms, networks. Recent incidents such as the theft of a veritable 

arsenal of grenades, small arms ammunition and various explosive components from a military installation in Portugal in June 2017, as well as the 

theft of a van loaded with nitroglycerin two days later in Spain only add to 

the terrorist / criminal threat facing European security services.10

As of July 2017, 39 people had been killed in 11 terrorist attacks in Western Europe, while seven individuals were killed in the United States in five 

attacks.11 Although these numbers are, objectively speaking, negligible relative to other causes of fatalities, the psychological impact of terrorist attacks 

are entirely disproportionate. The immediacy of modern communications 

due to a pervasive media, where anyone with a cell phone can become a 

purveyor of events, has created a reality where single incidents can have 

a very broad and deep impact within societies. As Henry Kissinger once 

observed, “events whose effects once would have taken months to unfold, 

ricochet globally within seconds.”12

As a result of the ongoing threat of transregional terrorism, countries 

are forced to remain vigilant, proactive, and invest substantial resources to 

defend their citizens at home and abroad. For example, France mobilized 

more than 10,000 soldiers to increase security in the aftermath of the Paris 

attacks in November 2015, which represented the deadliest terrorist attacks 

in France in half a century.13 And the French are not alone in deploying military forces domestically to assist with the maintenance of security against 

the threat of terrorism. 

The Direct Threat to Canada

Canada is in no way immune from the scourge of terrorism. The issue of 

foreign fighters poses a clear and present danger to the nation. University of 
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Waterloo professor Lorne Dawson, co-director of the Canadian Network for 

Research on Terrorism, Security and Society asserts that the foreign fighter 

issue is the “most serious threat Canada has faced.” He explained that not 

only are individuals returning with training and experience, they also often 

exhibit symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and are therefore more 

prone to violence.14 The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization estimates that by the end of 2013, up to 100 Canadians may have been 

involved in the conflict in Syria.15 And, in February 2014, the Director of the 

Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), Michel Coulombe, testified in front of the Senate National Security and Defence Committee that 130 

Canadians went overseas to fight in Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa. This 

number also included 30 individuals who have either fought in Syria and 

returned or are still there. Of note is that these same security agencies readily 

admit that the actual number of Canadians traveling overseas to engage in 

terrorist activities is likely higher. Among those 130 Canadians being tracked 

by the Canadian Government, 80 are known to have returned to Canada.16 

Not surprisingly, Canada has faced a robust domestic terrorist threat. 

In 2006, a group of Canadian homegrown terrorists, who would eventually 

become known as the Toronto 18, set about plotting to terrorize and intimidate (with the hope of eventually dissuading) the Canadian government from 

maintaining its military commitment in Afghanistan. The plan called for 

targeting the Toronto Stock Exchange with vehicle-borne IEDs, thus paralyzing Canadians with fear and destabilizing the economy. Although the attacks 

were thwarted, a test of the terrorist plans demonstrated “the blast effect 

from the bomb was equivalent to 768 kilograms of TNT, and would have 

caused catastrophic damage to a multi-story glass and steel frame building 

35 meters from the bomb site, as well as killing or causing serious injuries 

to people in the path of the blast waves and force.”17

In April 2013, “Project Smooth Arrests” resulted in the apprehension 

of two Canadians who conspired to attack a VIA Rail (national Canadian 

railway) passenger train traveling between New York and Toronto. Chiheb 

Esseghaier and Raed Jaser were arrested and charged. Months later, in July 

2013, John Nuttall and Amanda Korody were charged with conspiring to 

use improvised explosives built using pressure cookers to bomb the British 

Columbia legislature building during Canada Day festivities.18

The following year, in May 2014, as a result of the Royal Canadian 

Mounted Police (RCMP) Operation “Samossa,” two Canadians were 
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convicted of possession of explosives and intent to do harm. The RCMP 

arrested three individuals who embraced a “radical Islamist Jihadist ideology” and planned to detonate IEDs at repatriation ceremonies for deceased 

Canadian soldiers.19

Five months later, in October 2014, Martin Rouleau, a 25 year-old radicalized Muslim convert who was identified by the RCMP as a “high-risk” 

traveler, ran over two military personnel with his car as they walked across 

a parking lot, killing one and seriously injuring the other. Weeks later, on 22 

October 2014, another radicalized Muslim convert, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, 

struck in the nation’s capital. He first shot and killed Corporal Nathan 

Cirillo, who had been standing guard at the National War Memorial, and 

then quickly moved to Parliament Hill where he entered the House of Commons, penetrating deep inside until he reached the party Caucus rooms, 

which were in session. Fortunately, Zehaf-Bibeau was gunned down by security forces before he could do further harm.

The prevalence of the above-mentioned attacks prompted Prime Minister 

Stephen Harper to assert that the threat posed to Canada and the U.S. by this 

most troubling trend had become “very, very real.”20 The RCMP commissioner further reinforced the gravity of the situation by stating that his force 

was at that time dealing with 63 active national security investigations on 90 

individuals who either intended to go to fight with terrorist organizations 

like Daesh in Iraq and Syria or had returned from a similar experience.21

Shortly thereafter in 2015, the director of the CSIS added, “in the last three 

to four months numbers of Canadians traveling for extremism in Iraq and 

Syria has increased by 50 percent.”22

“The phenomenon of Canadians participating in extremist activities 

abroad,” Tahera Mufti, a CSIS spokeswoman, voiced, “is a serious one.”23 

Her statement is not surprising. Within the last few years alone, Canadian 

terrorists have been implicated in attacks in Algeria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, 

Somalia and South East Asia, as well as Syria and Iraq. In addition, Canadians have been implicated in planned attacks in Austria and Saudi Arabia.24 

For instance, Hassan El Hajj Hassan is wanted by Bulgarian authorities 

in connection with a bomb attack, on behalf of Hezbollah, on a bus that 

killed six people and injured 35 in July 2012. Additionally, two Canadian 

extremists participated in the January 2013 terrorist attack on the Algerian 

gas plant near Amenas, Algeria; a Canadian was involved in the April 2013 

attack on the Supreme Court of Somalia, which killed more than 35 people 
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and injured dozens more;25 a Calgarian, Salman Ashrafi, conducted a suicide 

bomb attack in a Daesh operation in Iraq in November 2013 that killed 46 

people;26 and Tamim Chowdhury, killed by Bangladeshi security authorities 

during a raid, was the apparent mastermind behind a deadly attack in Dhaka 

that left 20 dead.27 Moreover, in April 2017, the U.S. added Canadians Farah 

Mohamed Sirdon and Tarek Sakr to their list of “most-wanted” terrorists.28 

Most recently, a Canadian, Amor Ftouhi from Quebec, stabbed an officer 

at Bishop International Airport in Flint, Michigan on 21 June 2017, in yet 

another terrorist related attack.29

In sum, the threat of transregional terrorism to Canada’s security is real, 

whether most Canadians are prepared to admit it or not. To that end, Canada’s national security community is heavily engaged in countering domestic 

threats, preventing Canadians from committing terrorism abroad, or assisting in the international fight to counter transregional terrorism.

The Canadian Approach 

The release of the most recent Canadian Defence Policy (Strong, Secure, 

Engaged. Canada’s Defence Policy) in April 2017 marks a major step in the 

Canadian Government’s campaign against transregional terrorism. Importantly, the policy asserts that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) “will work 

with allies to identify, confront and defeat transregional threats, including 

from violent extremist organizations.” It clearly articulates that “successfully 

disrupting terrorist networks requires a multifaceted approach, including 

efforts to stop the flow of terrorist financing and counter the communication 

strategies employed by violent extremists” and identifies that “countries, like 

Canada, that are committed to combating terrorism will require sound intelligence on potential threats.” Importantly, it also explains that “traditional 

concepts of deterrence may also not apply to non-state actors who calculate 

risks and rewards in radically different ways and do not ascribe to the universal values enshrined in the United Nations Charter.”30

The policy does more than just identify the problem, it spells out tangible 

and meaningful steps that will enhance the CAF’s ability to contribute to 

the global counter-Violent Extremist Organization campaign. The policy 

includes increases to both the CAF personnel strength, as well as its funding 

levels. In fact, the Regular Force will grow from 68,250 to 71,500 members 

and the Reserve Forces will expand from 27,000 to 30,000 members. Defense 
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spending, in turn, will increase from $18.9 billion (2016/2017) to $32.7 billion 

in 2026/27. This represents a 70 percent increase in funding, or $497 billion 

over the next 20 years.31

The policy also unveils important advancements in capabilities relevant 

to addressing the current threats. For example, investments in equipment, 

research and manning will be made in the areas of cyber operations, space, 

joint intelligence surveillance & reconnaissance (ISR), and enhanced defence 

intelligence. This focus includes an emphasis on defence innovation to 

ensure the CAF maintains its competitive advantage over its adversaries. 

In addition, it also includes the commitment to modernize warships and 

fighter jets, as well as confirming Canada’s commitment to working with the 

United States to modernize North American Aerospace Defense Command 

(NORAD) and the Northern Warning System.32

For CANSOFCOM specifically, the Defence Policy provides for the 

growth of our Force (approximately 600 positions, or roughly 30 percent) and 

it affirms the Command’s Strategic Plan. It further enables the Command’s 

efforts to strengthen its methods, structures, procurements, and culture. 

For example, the Policy confirms the Government will invest in critical 

“shoot, move, communicate” capabilities that we require, including manned 

airborne ISR platforms, armored SUVs, command & control backbone infrastructure and “soldier systems.” Of particular importance in the context of 

combating transregional terrorism is that the Policy enhances the manner 

in which the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) can employ CANSOFCOM 

to become better oriented to potential trouble spots in a more timely and 

substantive manner for the benefit of Canada’s national interest.33

The Government’s national counterterrorism (CT) strategy is another 

major factor in the Canadian role in countering transregional terrorism. The 

Canadian Government has a broad whole-of-government approach that has 

been designed to tackle the problem and its related issues. For instance, the 

RCMP leads a High Risk Travel Case Management Group, which involves 

a number of other government departments and law enforcement agencies. 

The group examines cases of extremist travelers and works to find the best 

tailored response to the most pressing cases through a continuum of actions.

The RCMP created the National Security Joint Operations Centre (NS 

JOC), which was originally established to allow for a whole-of-government 

approach to High Risk Travelers but also serves as a vehicle for collaborative 

work on counter-terrorism writ large. The NS JOC includes members from 
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across the national security landscape, specifically CSIS, CAF, Immigration, 

Refugee and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), Border Services Agency (CBSA), 

Passport Canada, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA), 

Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and Public Safety.

The Canadian Government is equally committed to working with international organizations such as the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization, G-7, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum and Interpol, as 

well as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to CT. Additionally, the 

government has leveraged the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis 

Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) to great effect, having released more than 200 

financial intelligence disclosures to authorities relating to terrorist financing.

In 2012, then-Public Safety Minister Vic Towes unveiled Canada’s first 

comprehensive CT strategy, which includes response plans in the event of 

a major attack and strategies for de-radicalizing homegrown terrorists. 

Entitled Building Resistance Against Terrorism, the strategy encompasses 

a four step methodology that includes preventing, detecting, denying, and 

responding to possible threats.34 Linked to the government’s strategy was 

the implementation of Bill S-7, the Combating Terrorism Act, which came 

into force in July 2013. This legislation created four new offences intended 

to prevent and deter persons from leaving Canada for certain terrorismrelated purposes. Specifically, an individual commits an offence by leaving 

or attempting to leave Canada for the purpose of:

1. Knowingly participating in or contributing to any activity of a terrorist 

group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group 

to commit a terrorist activity. This categorization includes providing 

training, receiving training, or recruiting a person to receive training;

2. Knowingly facilitating a terrorist activity;

3. Committing an indictable offense on behalf of, at the direction of or 

in association with a terrorist group; and 

4. Committing an indictable offence that constitutes a terrorist activity. 

The offenses described in the first bullet carry a maximum penalty 

of 10 years imprisonment. The remaining offenses carry a maximum 

penalty of 14 years.35
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Reflecting a desire to continue to enhance national security legislation, 

the Canadian government tabled Bill C-51, (Anti-Terrorism Act) in January of 2015, which facilitates information sharing among a large number 

of federal departments and institutions; provides enhanced police powers 

that would allow them to detain or restrict terror suspects in a preventative 

manner; bans the “promotion of terrorism;” allows the Minister of Public 

Safety to add individuals to Canada’s “no-fly list;” and it enhances the powers 

of CSIS. 

More recently, the current liberal government has enhanced the CT program with its Bill C-59, the new National Security Act, which provides CSIS 

with the ability to disrupt threats in a proactive, rather than reactive manner. 

It also gives the CSE—Canada’s electronic spy agency—the power to engage 

in offensive cyber strikes. Bill C-59 also calls for the creation of an umbrella 

watchdog agency that will oversee 17 federal agencies and departments.36

Of note, Canada has successfully tried Ismael Habib, the first adult to 

proceed to trial on charges of attempting to leave Canada to participate in 

the activities of a terrorist group. He now faces a maximum 10-year sentence 

under the Anti-Terrorism Act.37

CANSOFCOM’s Role

Given its mandate and structure, CANSOFCOM is uniquely positioned 

within the CAF to serve as the interface between national defence and the 

government’s national security apparatus, and is therefore a key contributor 

to the national campaign to counter transregional terrorism on a multitude 

of levels. In particular, CANSOFCOM delivers the following:

1. The maintenance of a very high readiness composite Special Operations 

Task Force (SOTF) postured to respond to and/or pre-empt domestic 

and global terrorist events. These SOTFs are tactically self-contained 

and task-tailored to operate across the spectrum of Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) tasks to include chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear threats;

2. The active maintenance of close partnerships with other Canadian 

national security agencies that facilitate sharing of intelligence and 

the coordination of activities;
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3. Membership in the Global SOF network, which allows for collaboration 

on exercises, training and operations, as well as intelligence sharing 

and assisting in shaping the global security landscape;

4. Provision of SOTFs and SOF teams conducting military assistance to 

allies, friends and at-risk nations; 

5. Participation in Coalitions to combat terrorist organizations; and

6. Provision of SOF educational and training material, as well as seminars, working groups and collaborative research. As a complement to 

training, exercises and operations, the educational component is seen 

as critical in preparing Canadian, as well as allied and friendly nations’ 

SOF warriors with the knowledge and skill sets required to succeed 

in the ambiguous, complex and ever changing security environment.

Conclusion

Transregional terrorism represents a threat to all nations. Its insidious, 

opaque and networked nature makes it a complex and difficult problem to 

solve. As has often been said, it takes a network to fight a network. As such, 

the international community must work together to disrupt, dismantle and 

destroy transregional terrorist organizations. In this difficult fight, Canada 

continues to show its determination and commitment to be a credible and 

reliable partner. 

Endnotes

1. Canada, Strong, Secure, Engaged. Canada’s Defence Policy (Ottawa: DND, 2017), 57.

2. Anthony H. Cordesman, Trends in Extremist Violence & Terrorism in Europe 

through End-2016, 22 June 2012, www.csis.org/burke/reports.

3. Jack Moore, “How ISIS remote-controls its European operatives to commit 

an attack: ‘be quick,’” Newsweek, 25 July 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/

be-quick-how-isis-remotely-directs-its-operatives-commit-attack-europe-641448.

4. Suzanne Kelly, “Today’s Terror Threat Poses Array of New Challenges,” The 

Cipher Brief, 5 July 2017, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column/state-secrets/

todays-terror-threat-poses-array-new-challenges-1089. According to University 

of California Los Angeles (UCLA) lone wolf terrorism expert Jeffery D. Simon, 

what makes lone wolves so dangerous is their ability to think outside the box. 

Since they operate by themselves, there is no group pressure or decision-making 

process that might stifle creativity. Lone wolves are free to act upon any scenario 
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they can dream up. Jeffery D. Simon, “What Makes Lone-Wolf Terrorists so 

Dangerous?” UCLA Newsroom, 18 April 2013, http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/

what-makes-lone-wolfe-terrorists-245316.

5. Moore, “How ISIS remote-controls its European operatives to commit an attack: 

‘be quick.’” 

6. David S. Malet, “Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts,” 

Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 2009, 9.

7. Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in 

Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” American 

Political Science Review, February 2013, 10.

8. Jack Moore, “French Minister: Hundreds of Jihadis Have Returned from 

Iraq and Syria,” Newsweek, 6 August 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/

french-minister-hundreds-jihadis-have-returned-iraq-and-syria-647022.

9. Chris Baraniuk, “AlphaBay and Hansa dark web markets shut down,” BBC News, 

20 July 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40670010.

10. Itxu Diaz, “The Great Explosives Heist That Has Europe on Edge,” The Daily 

Beast, 25 July 2017, http://www.thedailybeast.com/the-great-explosives-heist-thathas-europe-on-edge.

11. Kim Hjelmgaard, “Why Europe has a greater terror problem than the United 

States,” USA Today, 10 July 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/

world/2017/07/10/europe-terror-problem-united-states-isis/463554001/.

12. James B. Binder, “The Battlefield of Tomorrow Fought Today: Winning in the Human 

Domain,” The Small Wars Journal, 6 August 2017, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/

art/the-battlefield-of-tomorrow-fought-today-winning-in-the-human-domain.

13. “France deploys 10,000 troops amid hunt for attack accomplices,” France 24, 

12 January 2015, http://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/france-deploys10000-troops-amid-hunt-for-attack-accomplices/ar-AA84rMF.

14. CBC News, “What’s Behind Homegrown Extremism,” 3 September 2014, http://news.

ca.msn.com/canada/video/?videoid=cbcc2014-0309-1409-0015-250595555400.

15. Canada, 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada (Ottawa: Public 

Safety Canada, 2014), 3.

16. Canada, 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat, 14.

17. Romina Maurino, “Foiled terrorism plot targeted TSX, CSIS,” Globe and Mail, 

accessed 6 January 2010, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/.

18. Canada, 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat, 31.

19. Phil Gurski, The Threat From Within (New York: Rowman &Littlefield, 2016), 

101–102.

20. Jordan Press, “Harper promises new terror measures,” The National Post, 10 

October 2014, A4.

21. Daniel Leblanc and Colin Freeze, “RCMP CSIS track foreign fighters,” The Globe 

and Mail, 10 October 2014, A1.
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22. CTV Nightly News, 20 April 2015.

23. Stewart Bell, “As Many as 100 Canadians Could be Fighting in Syria Against 

Assad Regime, Think Tank Says,” 17 December 2013, http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/12/17/as-many-as-100-canadians-could-be-fighting-in-syriaagainst-assad-regime-think-tank-says/.

24. Bell, “100 Canadians Could be Fighting in Syria.” Among Canadians in Syria 

was Ali Dirie, who traveled there once he completed a prison sentence for his 

role in the Toronto 18 plot. He reportedly joined the al-Nusrah Front until his 

death in August 2014.

25. Canada, 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, 27.

26. Nadim Roberts, “Gregory and Collin Gordon, Calgary brothers, join ranks of 

Canadians fighting for ISIS,” CBC News, 28 August 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/

news/gregory-and-collin-gordon-calgary-brothers-join-ranks-of-canadiansfighting-for-isis-1.2749673.

27. Associated Press, “Bangladesh police kill Canadian suspect in restaurant attack,” CBC News, 28 August 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/

bangladesh-restaurant-attack-1.3738298.

28. “Two Canadians added to United States’ List of most-wanted terrorists,” National 

Post, 23 April 2017, http://nationalpost.com/news/canada/two-canadians-addedto-united-states-list-of-most-wanted-terrorists/wcm/55052ebe-20e4-46f7-bd81-

436babf3f590.

29. Stephen Smith, “Montreal man suspected in stabbing of police officer at Michigan 

airport,” CBC News, 21 June 2017, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/policeraid-montreal-apartment-in-operation-connected-to-stabbing-at-us-airport1.4172103.

30. Canada, Strong, Secure, Engaged. Canada’s Defence Policy (Ottawa: DND, 2017), 53.

31. Canada, Strong, Secure, 11, 13.

32. Canada, Strong, Secure, 14, 17, 81.

33. Canada, Strong, Secure, 13, 34, 103.

34. Canada, Building Resilience Against Terrorism. Canada’s Counter-Terrorism 

Strategy (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2013), 4, 13-26; Canada, 2014 Public 

Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, 35.

35. Canada, 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, 13.

36. Editorial, “Liberals New Security Bill Keeps It Tough,” Postmedia Network, 21 June 2017, http://www.torontosun.com/2017/06/21/liberals-newsecurity-bill-keeps-it-tough.

37. Kate McKenna, “Quebec man found guilty of trying to join ISIS,” CBC 

News, 19 January 2017, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/

ismael-habib-decision-quebec-1.4148057.

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Chapter 9. SOF Success, Political 

Success and the Murky Middle: Potential 

Benchmarks for SOF in Countering 

Transregional Terrorism

Bernd Horn

Navy Admiral William (Bill) McRaven, a former commander of United 

States Special Operations Command, on retirement in 2014 declared 

that we are currently in the “Golden Age of SOF.”1

 It is hard to argue otherwise. In an era of shrinking military budgets and a reluctance to deploy 

military troops, Special Operations Forces (SOF) find themselves with 

an embarrassment of riches as their budgets and manning levels are left 

untouched or even increased. Their operational tempo remains high and 

politicians, strategic analysts, scholars and journalists speak of SOF in terms 

of “force of choice” and “SOF power.”2 For risk averse politicians, SOF represent the “easy button” since they are rapidly deployable, work in relatively 

small teams, and operate in the shadows out of the media or public spotlight. 

They are seen as low risk both in fiscal and political terms. 

Based on this narrative one could argue that SOF has been relatively successful. Its reputation, public image, often enhanced by Hollywood, literature 

and the media, as well as its continued favored deployment and resource 

Bernd Horn, OMM, MSM, CD, Ph.D., is a retired infantry colonel who has 

held key command and staff appointments in the Canadian Armed Forces, 

including Deputy Commander of the Canadian Special Operations Forces 

Command, Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian 

Regiment and Officer Commanding 3 Commando, the Canadian Airborne 

Regiment. Dr. Horn is also an adjunct professor of the Centre for Military 

and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, as well as an adjunct professor of 

history at the Royal Military College of Canada. He is a JSOU Senior Fellow 

and currently the command historian working out of the Canadian Special 

Operations Forces Command Education and Research Centre.
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allocations by political and military decision-makers, are arguably all indicators of its achievements. As such, it is not surprising that governments look 

to SOF to solve more and more of the complex problems that confront them, 

such as countering transregional terrorism. 

However, not everyone agrees that the efforts of SOF have been unquestionably rewarding. Despite the continued global engagement and list of 

accomplishments of SOF, many critics question their level of success. These 

detractors argue that SOF at best has achieved tactical, perhaps at times 

operational, success. They contend that SOF largely practices “whack-a-mole” 

targeting and elimination of enemy leadership and combatants. These critics point out that SOF fail to achieve strategic objectives or national policy. 

As proof, they highlight that after more than a decade in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, despite the impressive kill/capture statistics, and the larger war against 

terrorism, that those respective countries—or the world for that matter—are 

no safer now than they were before the wide scale engagement of SOF.3

This quandary raises the question: how is success measured? Particularly, if SOF are responsible for countering transregional terrorism, how can 

we determine if SOF is having a positive effect? Whether it’s successful or 

not? How can one articulate what success looks like in the battle to counter transregional terrorism. After all, it is a multifaceted, complex problem 

that is contingent on a vast number of variables. And, the problem of how 

you measure success is fraught with a myriad of challenges, including the 

objectiveness of the assessor.

One major challenge is defining success itself. What does it actually look 

like? This is particularly difficult in light of the complex security operating 

environment that is contextual and fluid. Moreover, it is often difficult to 

identify the actual threat, or who exactly are the opponents? Or, their motivations, objectives, and methodologies?

As such, determining success begins with a sound understanding of the 

context and details of each particular threat stream. For example, who are 

opponents; what is driving their behaviour and decision-making (e.g. social, 

economic, political, ideological, religious factors); who is supporting their 

efforts and why? Once these dynamics are well understood it becomes easier 

to define what success or “victory” looks like, which in turn can drive the 

necessary national policy/strategy and the subsequent lines of operation. 

Once a strategy is undertaken, an assessment of factors can assist in providing benchmarks/pathways to measuring success in countering transregional 
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terrorism. However, the benchmarks themselves must constantly be weighed 

for utility and relevance. Throughout the process an agile and fluid approach 

must be taken that rapidly adapts to the everevolving security environment, as well as terrorist networks. 

The tertiary problem is the objectiveness of 

the assessor. Those who see SOF as the force 

of choice for the contemporary operating environment will interpret the number of missions, 

personnel deployed, capture/kill numbers as 

evidence of its effectiveness. Conversely, those 

who are critical of SOF will see those results as 

meaningless tactical achievements that fail to contribute to the larger strategic goals set by political masters. 

Defining Success

The Oxford Dictionary defines success as “the accomplishment of an aim; 

the attainment of wealth, fame, or position; a thing or person that turns out 

well.”4 This definition is fairly straightforward and easily understood, but it 

does not necessarily capture the “intangibles.” From a military perspective, 

success can entail a wide range of outcomes that may not intuitively leap out 

as success, however, based on the circumstances and, at times an ambiguous 

security environment, may represent victory (of a sort). As such, the following are arguably factors that can denote success: 

1. Achievement of a specific assigned mission/task;

2. Cost effectiveness (level/contribution/cost of resources versus desired/

acceptable impact/outcome);

3. Minimization/avoidance of casualties;

4. Cause disruption to opponent(s);

5. Reception of favorable publicity;

6. Reception of accolades/awards;

7. Frustrate opponent intentions/freedom of maneuver/initiative;

Once a strategy is 

undertaken, an assessment of factors 

can assist in providing 

benchmarks/pathways 

to measuring success in 

countering transregional 

terrorism.
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8. Non-quantifiable—public morale, psychological dislocation of opponent, displaying support for allies and friends;

9. Contribution to the larger effort (national/international/joint/alliance/

coalition);

10. Avoidance of failure;

11. Retention of favoured status e.g. force of choice; and

12. Provision of a wide range of options for political/military-decision 

makers/assist with achieving the national interest/objectives.

It must be realized, however, that this shopping list of factors that can 

signal success is often subjective. Using such a catalogue can allow interest 

groups/organizations to rationalize their contribution in a positive light and 

declare success. But, as in the current case of SOF, not everyone will necessarily accept the argument. By framing the definition of success, one can 

change the outcome of what has, or has not, been achieved. 

The Difficulty in Defining Success

A short historical analysis of examples of SOF performance in conflict provides insight into the difficulty of defining success. Some point to SOF contributions as major achievements, others deride them as misplaced resources. 

For instance, WWII provides an excellent example to start. Throughout 

the conflict SOF arguably achieved great success. They killed and wounded, 

as well as tied down hundreds of thousands of enemy troops for defensive 

tasks; captured strategic materials such as German Wurzburg radar components, enemy codes and enigma encryption equipment; destroyed enemy 

material (e.g. vehicles, aircraft, ships, locomotives and railway cars) and 

infrastructure (e.g. factories, bridges, rail lines); shut down the German 

atomic weapon program; provided valuable intelligence and raised, trained, 

and equipped, as well as in some instances led, secret armies and resistance 

networks.5

These achievements did not go unrecognized in some camps. A report 

written by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force staff at the end 

of the war noted, “SOE [Special Operations Executive] operations made a 

substantial contribution to the victory of the Allied Expeditionary Force.”6 In 

fact, General Dwight D. “Ike” Eisenhower himself lauded the efforts of SOF 
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organizations and their resistance networks, writing in his memoir, “without 

their great assistance the liberation of France and the defeat of the enemy 

in Western Europe would have consumed a much longer time and meant 

greater losses to ourselves.”7 Speaking only of the SOF resistance program in 

France, Eisenhower insisted it “shortened the war by nine months.”8 Similarly, Lieutenant General F.A.M. Browning referring exclusively to the British 

Special Air Service (SAS), asserted, “It is considered that the operations you 

[SAS] have carried out have had more effect in hastening the disintegration 

of the German Seventh and Fifth Armies than any other single effort in the 

Army.”9 Indeed, another formal report assessed, “The SAS idea is as yet only 

in its infancy. The very fact that such operations have already paid dividends 

with the application of a very small allocation of troops, aircraft and naval 

craft should encourage us to enlarge the scope of this type of operation in 

the future.” It went on to add, “Our experiences in this war, prove that we 

shall want SAS troops from the very start of the next war.”10

Despite the achievements and testimonials, others have disputed the value 

of SOF in WWII. A war office study completed 10 July 1945, noted that most 

conventional organizations and their senior leadership disagreed with the 

SOF concept.11 For these conventional military commanders SOF had no perceived role in the defeat of Germany or Japan. For example, Major General 

Julian Thompson, captured the essence of the traditional argument when 

he stated, “descending on the enemy, killing a few guards, blowing up the 

odd pillbox, and taking a handful of prisoners was not a cost-effective use 

of ships, craft and highly trained soldiers.”12 Major General Orde Wingate 

agreed. He believed, “all evidence goes to show that well trained infantry 

units would be just as suitable as special troops.”13 According to military 

historian Douglas Porch, “[Field Marshal Viscount William] Slim concluded 

that British special operations had become a cult, whose doctrinal proponents in mass persuasion evangelized their tactics as the path to strategic 

salvation, when in fact their modest achievements were bought at great cost 

to the rest of the army.”14

Significantly, a War Office study looking specifically at the Special Operations Executive (SOE) appraised, “the strategic effect of SOE operations was 

negligible.”15 More recently, military historian Max Boot wrote that SOF had 

a negligible impact on the outcome of WWII.16 However, the most compelling evidence of the perspective that SOF were less than successful is the fact 
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that almost all SOF organizations were dismantled or relegated to reserve 

status at the end of the war.

Importantly, WWII was a total war and the Allies achieved a clear victory 

in the end. As such, the SOF contribution vis-à-vis its conventional counterparts’ efforts could be assessed in terms of its role in bringing the defeat of 

the Axis powers. Notably, depending on perspective, the contribution was 

seen as critical in shaping and facilitating conventional force success or as an 

unimportant side-show that was of negligible value. Nonetheless, for politicians it was a win and institutional infighting over who contributed what was 

of little interest. The only issue that mattered was the fact that the national 

interest/political objectives were achieved. This dichotomy of interpretations 

is not limited to WWII. Not all conflicts and wars, however, lend themselves 

to such decisive victories and clear winners and losers.

The conflict in Afghanistan is another insightful example. Arguably, 

SOF accomplishments were the catalyst for the current stature of SOF as the 

force of choice. Analysts, scholars, and politicians, including the American 

Secretary of Defense believed SOF, combined with technology and precision airpower, working with indigenous forces, represented a more efficient 

manner of making war. For instance, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom 

in Afghanistan, it took only 49 days from the insertion of the first American 

special forces (SF) teams with Northern Alliance forces to the fall of Kandahar and the ouster of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.17 This was achieved with 

U.S. SF, some operatives, and precision close air support.18 The SF operators 

rallied and forged cohesive teams out of the unorganized anti-Taliban opposition groups and more importantly, using a small amount of sophisticated 

targeting equipment brought the weight of American airpower down on 

Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. 

Specific examples highlight why many became enamored by SOF accomplishments. Air strikes brought down by one of the first SF teams in the 

country, aided by a lone Air Force combat controller, are credited with killing 

as many as 3,500 fighters and destroying up to 450 vehicles.19 Another Team, 

“Tiger Team 2,” was attributed with 2,500 enemy killed, over 50 vehicles 

destroyed and over 3,500 prisoners captured, as well as the liberation of over 

50 towns and cities.20 At one time, a mere 10 American SF sergeants were 

responsible for 120 miles of battlefront.21

SOF action was also responsible for removing large numbers of leadership and gunfighters, disrupting enemy command and control, dismantling 
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improvised explosive device factories and networks, training and mentoring 

Afghan forces, conducting village security operations, and assisting other 

government agencies. 

Once again, statistics can tell an impressive tale. In August 2011, the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command reported, “there were 

675 [SOF] raids in 2009, 1,780 in 2010, and 1,879 by August 2011. In total, 49 

percent of the raids captured or killed the principal target. The success rate 

was 45 percent in 2009/2010. In sum, 84 percent of the raids achieved some 

success, whether capturing or killing their target.”22 Moreover, in 2011 alone, 

Allied SOF mounted more than 1,600 missions in the first three months of 

the year. They captured and killed close to 3,000 insurgents. That same year 

coalition SOF conducted approximately 2,800 raids against insurgent targets. 

In 85 percent of the operations no shots were fired and civilian casualties 

were less than 1 percent.23

How can these results be ignored? Clearly, SOF was successful in Afghanistan. Its contribution is clearly documented by both tasks undertaken and 

results of its efforts. Yet, critics lament that despite assertions of success by 

SOF, Afghanistan, after more than sixteen years of conflict is more restive 

and arguably less secure and stable than it was immediately post 9/11. As of 

March 2017, the Taliban fully controlled 34 districts out of 400 districts in 

the country; contested another 167 (controlling between 40–99 percent of the 

territory) and had a significant presence in another 52 districts (controlling 

10–97 percent of the territory). Furthermore, the Taliban controlled areas in 

16 of the 34 provinces (controlling 10–97 percent of the territory).24 Moreover, 

according to U.S. intelligence estimates, the Taliban’s strength in 2002 stood 

at 7,000 fighters. As of 2016, it was reassessed at 25,000.25

The questions become: despite impressive SOF statistics, how did SOF 

contribute to national policy? To national objectives? If SOF was so successful, why are we still at war in Afghanistan? Why have Taliban numbers and 

control of territory increased?

The obvious retort is that SOF can only achieve what is in its capacity 

and power to accomplish. Questions of governance, reconstruction, social 

justice, trust in host nation institutions, political leadership, are beyond the 

SOF purview of reach. Yet, not everyone sees it that way. Unlike WWII, there 

is no clear victory. Afghanistan is that ugly limited war that becomes a black 

hole for resources and public patience. With no clear victory, measurements 
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of success become muddy. How do you sell continuing efforts to an impatient 

and unforgiving voting public? 

Moreover, as governments rely more and more on SOF to solve their 

complex problems, and, as SOF is given broader mandates to assist host 

nation countries achieve security and stability, the expectations of SOF will 

increase and the definitions of SOF success will expand. In essence, it is a 

case of perspective. As one American general observed, “the U.S. leadership 

is looking at SOF as a strategic solution to different policy problems.”26

A final example reinforces this issue. The war on terrorism is yet another 

perfect case of perspective and the difficulty with defining success. Since the 

terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York City on 9/11, SOF has had 

tremendous impact disrupting and attriting terrorist leaders, organizations 

and networks throughout the world. Yet, individuals feel less safe now than 

ever before. A 2014 NBC poll revealed, “nearly half of Americans now believe 

their country is less safe today than before the 9/11 attacks.”27 That number is 

almost double from a similar poll taken the previous year. Significantly, since 

then there have been a number of high profile terrorist attacks in Europe and 

North America. Predictably in the wake of this terrorist onslaught countries 

across the globe are increasing their security forces, infrastructures, procedures, powers for law enforcement and security agencies, as well as legislation 

to deal with the perceived spike in terrorism. Billions of dollars are being 

sunk in the fight to combat terrorism.

Yet, the fact is that terrorist incidents have actually declined. In 2014, 

there were 226 terrorist attacks (attempted/foiled/executed) and 774 terrorism arrests. In 2015, there were 193 and 1,077 respectively, and in 2016 

the numbers dropped further to 142 and 1,002 respectively.28 As one analyst 

noted:

In 2016, Western Europeans were 85 times more likely to die of a heat 

wave than from terrorism, 50 times more likely to die in a biking 

or water-sports accident and 39 times more likely to be killed by 

consuming a toxic product. They were 433 times more likely to die 

of suicide and 32 times more likely to die by homicide.29

Despite the statistical evidence, the actions of governments, the graphic 

and sensational reporting that saturates the media in the aftermath of an 

attack or attempted attack, has fueled the perception that terrorism is on the 

rise and that SOF and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies are 
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not successful. In fact, at a recent SOF conference a senior American commander lamented, “as impressive as the targeting process is, an incredible, 

agile and effective engine for dismantling and destroying terrorist organizations, how is it we can’t succeed?” The point is this, despite the accolades and the monikers of force of choice and golden age of SOF, not all are 

convinced of the record of SOF success. Moreover, perspectives driven by 

sensational media reporting support this assessment. Despite its increased 

budgets, global deployments and ceaseless raids, for many, the perception 

is that SOF has not been effective in countering transregional terrorism. If 

SOF are to lead and not only be successful, but be seen as being successful, 

what can it do to ensure its effectiveness, both in real terms and in the battle 

of perception?

The Larger Problem

The pursuit of success, particularly in the nebulous concept of countering 

transregional terrorism, must be framed within a larger context of a political 

objective(s) and desired end-state(s), which then drives the creation of a strategy. A simple program of decapitation—namely removing the leadership of 

terrorist organizations—will never be successful. Terrorist organizations the 

world over have shown incredible resilience and the ability to grow both leaders and fighters at a rate equal to, or greater than, 

the ability to remove them from the battlespace. 

Furthermore, it does not address the root of what 

is driving their behaviour or support base. 

As such, a political objective(s) that lays out 

what is the intended end-state is primordial. This 

can allow for the required strategy to be designed. 

Specifically, what resources are necessary? Despite 

the agility and breadth of SOF capabilities, is it realistic to expect SOF to 

deal with the issue on its own? If so, the political objective(s) and desired 

endstate(s) should coincide with the limitation of what SOF alone can 

achieve. 

The political objective(s) and subsequent strategy must also allow for the 

complexity of the problem set. Defining and understanding opponents (both 

state and non-state, as well as homegrown lone wolves) and allies, specifically, their behavior/decision-making, objectives, agendas and interests, as 

A simple program 

of decapitation—

namely removing the 

leadership of terrorist 

organizations—will 

never be successful.
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well as the threat they pose, is important. Moreover, their methodologies 

and alliances can evolve and change over time or as a result of circumstance/

events. As a result, strategies must be equally nimble and agile to adjust and 

adapt to the changing threats, security environment, alliance structure, and 

methodologies. 

As has become evident in the current security environment, globalization, a pervasive media, the cheap proliferation of technology, particularly 

information technology and encryption, as well the access to advanced weaponry and the impact of online recruitment and radicalization has changed 

the impact terrorist organizations can achieve. However, the greatest challenge still resides in the nature of transregional terrorist organizations. As 

journalist Rosa Brooks so eloquently observed, “When you wage war against 

a nameless, stateless, formless enemy—an enemy with goals as uncertain as 

its methods—it’s hard to see how that war can ever end.”30

Benchmarks to Measure Success? 

How can that war ever end? This is a very pertinent question. Particularly, 

since not all the opponents are similar; not all the allies have the same political objective(s) or endstates; each specific opponent/threat stream/region of 

interest has different cultural, geo-political, ideological context and drivers. 

As a result, the strategy must allow for a harmonized approach that allows 

for the necessary campaigns to be waged at the operational level. 

However, this brings the issue back to the topic at hand. How can SOF 

know it is having success in achieving its assigned mission countering transregional terrorism in real terms and from the perspective of public perception? The author suggests a number of benchmarks that may assist in 

evaluating SOF success. Whether made public or not, these benchmarks 

reflect SOF success in the campaign to countering transregional terrorism:

a. Achieve assigned tasks (both direct and implied). This assessment 

is simple enough for tactical missions such as a capture/kill mission. 

Either the target is achieved or not. However, it becomes more opaque 

when looking at the larger strategic picture. What does that actually 

mean? It is based on the particular region, opponent, and threat. Clear 

political direction is required;
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b. Removal (kill/capture/convert) of leadership and gunfighters. As 

noted earlier, this approach by itself is not necessarily successful as it 

does not address the resiliency of the organization or the foundational 

cause(s) of the organization. It does, however, weaken its leadership 

and the experiential base, which in turn can make the respective 

organization(s) less effective. In addition, promulgation of statistics 

can also provide confidence to domestic populations that something 

is being done and it may dissuade recruiting to the terrorist cause;

c. Dismantling networks. This benchmark goes beyond decapitation and 

strikes at the root of an organizations’ ability to operate and regenerate. 

By attacking every facet of its administrative, financial, operational and 

informational foundation, its ability to function effectively internally 

or externally (internationally) will be minimized; 

d. Disrupt/shut down financing, planning, and communications. Much 

like the previous benchmark any inroads should be assessed as a success if it slows down and limits the ability of an entity to operate or 

have a substantive effect; 

e. Identifying and removing key facilitators (financiers, planners, 

strategists, propaganda disseminators, and recruiters). This benchmark will have a direct effect on the ability of terrorist organizations to 

operate. As such, any headway made in removing these actors should 

be tallied as success;

f. Decrease in successful attacks. Much like body counts and kill-ratios 

this benchmark has its limitations. For instance, what is defined as an 

attack? A lone extremist with a knife threatening a crowd? A vehicle 

attack killing x individuals? A suicide bombing/long gun attack? 

Regardless, it is a metric of success, although the opposite will definitely be seen as a metric of failure; 

g. Number of thwarted attacks. As above, although this benchmark is 

more substantive as it indicates an actual planned hostile intent was 

stopped prior to execution; 

h. Decrease in directed, enabled, and inspired attacks. From the 

domestic perspective this becomes important and is complementary 
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to some of the benchmarks above. In fact, many of the benchmarks 

are mutually supportive;

i. Increase in number of informants/converts. This benchmark is selfexplanatory. If the campaign is successful some followers will begin 

to desert what is seen as a lost cause/sinking ship; 

j. Increased integration with Other Government Departments 

(OGDs). This is an intangible. The battle to counter transregional 

terrorism cannot be waged by SOF alone as there are a complex array 

of social, political, economic, informational, etc. factors that drive 

the multitude of players involved. As such, if SOF can develop and 

maintain the close partnerships and cooperation of other OGDs to 

assist with the task, this is a measure of success;

k. Increase in coalition partners. Same as above; 

l. Increase in effective judiciary/professional law enforcement. The 

development of an effective and credible judiciary and a professional, 

respected police institution in at risk countries is a definite success 

indicator as this is one of the fundamental drivers to setting the conditions for a stable state; 

m. Increase in policy and more effective rule of law. Same as above;

n. Increased ability to disrupt the deep/dark web. Making strides in, 

and actually dismantling, the vehicle for terrorist related planning, 

recruiting, communicating, purchasing of illegal weapons, explosives, 

equipment, etc., should be a major benchmark of success;

o. Change in opponent methodologies. The fact that an adversary has 

been forced to change their methodologies should be seen as a sign 

of success as well based on the fact that their existing methods have 

been thwarted;

p. Decrease ability to use criminal nexus. Shutting down/disrupting 

the ability for terrorists to take advantage of criminal rat-lines, access 

to weapons, or other material or services will impact on terrorist 

effectiveness;

q. Decrease/elimination of foreign fighters. Disrupting the ability of 

terrorist organizations to recruit, train and deploy foreign fighters is 
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Horn: SOF Success, Political Success and the Murky Middle

a major success criteria. This will impact on the number of gunfighters they have available, as well as their ability to deploy foreigners to 

conduct attacks in their home countries;

r. Disrupt the narrative. Effectively challenging and disrupting the 

terrorist narratives by countering them with factual information and 

expert input will potentially impact recruitment and support. As such, 

any headway here is a win; 

s. Reduction of terrorist footprint on the internet/social media. Locating, identifying, and shutting down/restricting terrorist access to these 

platforms is an important indicator of success as it limits the organization’s ability to distribute their narrative and recruit supporters; 

t. Creation of a strong narrative (pervasive, relevant, consistent, 

and fluid). One that provides a vehicle for individuals to understand 

their society and respective place within it will, as above, help deter 

recruitment to terrorist organizations; and 

u. Greater support for challenging extremists by moderates (domestically and internationally). Mobilizing specific target groups to take 

a larger role in challenging narratives/creating counter-narratives, 

speaking out against violence, identifying radicalized or extremist 

individuals to authorities is an effective manner to counter terrorist 

organizations. Any ability to gain greater support should be seen as 

a win. 

Importantly, as is evident from the benchmarks, they may not be indicative of a victory declaring moment. However, as Rosa Brooks expounded, 

based on the “formless enemy—an enemy with goals as uncertain as its 

methods,” there may never be a formal “victory.” It may be the “endless 

war.”31 As such, it is important to be able to track accomplishments in order 

to determine whether the campaign to counter transregional terrorism is 

meeting with success. 

Conclusion

There will always be conflicting views on success. This reality is a function 

of perspective, bias and specific agendas. Nonetheless, it is critically important to ensure that conditions of success are defined up front. However, this 
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assessment cannot be accomplished until there are clear political objectives articulated, a strategy developed and lines of operations with endstates 

defined. Once this groundwork is laid, only then can criteria for success be 

developed. Benchmarks, as outlined above, can assist with laying out and 

measuring success criteria. However, importantly, much of the battle of 

defining success is perception based. As such, a conscious effort must be 

made to ensure that strategic messaging is done to share the narrative of 

success with others. Without a counter to that next sensational, violent, terrorist attack, the perception of failure will always be pervasive.

Endnotes

1. Dan Lamothe, “Retiring SOCOM Chief: ‘We are in the Golden Age of Special 

Operations,’” The Washington Post, 29 August 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.

com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/08/29/retiring-top-navy-seal-we-are-in-thegolden-age-of-special-operations-2/?utm_term=.a8663dc140d9.

2. These terms are most often heard from commanders describing how politicians 

see SOF. See Lamothe, “Retiring SOCOM Chief: ‘We are in the Golden Age of 

Special Operations;’” Jacob Siegel, “How Special Forces Bury the True Cost of 

America’s Wars,” Vice.Com, 11 December 2017, https://www.vice.com/en_ca/

article/evax3a/how-special-forces-bury-the-true-cost-of-americas-wars; and Gitte 

Højstrup Christensen, ed., Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Special Operations 

Forces (Copenhagen: Danish Defence College, 2017), 43-45.

3. This commentary is repeatedly heard at SOF conferences and in evaluations of historic SOF performance. For example, see Max Boot, Invisible Armies (New York: 

Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), 313-317; Thomas K. Adams, US Special 

Operations Forces in Action. The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (London: 

Frank Cass, 1998), 162. For another example of criticism see also Sadcom via 

Haycom, “What’s Wrong With SOCOM?” Small Wars Journal, 25 December 2016, 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what%E2%80%99s-wrong-with-socom.

4. Katherine Barber, Canadian Oxford Dictionary (Toronto: Oxford University 

Press, 2004), 1553.

5. Bernd Horn, A Most Ungentlemanly Way of War. The SOE and the Canadian 

Connection (Toronto: Dundurn, 2016), Chapter 10; William H. McRaven, Spec 

Ops. Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: 

Presidio, 1996); James Ladd, Commandos and Rangers of World War II (New 

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978).

6. “Annex - The Value of SOE Operations in the Supreme Commander’s Sphere,” 

7, United Kingdom National Archives (NA), Air Ministry (AIR), file 20/7958.

7. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948), 

296.
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Horn: SOF Success, Political Success and the Murky Middle

8. E.H. Cookridge, They Came From the Sky (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1965), vi.

9. Broadcast by Lieutenant-General F.A.M. Browning to SAS troops behind the 

German lines, 8 September 1944, reproduced in D.I. Harrison, These Men are 

Dangerous: The Special Air Service at War (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 

1957), 234, Appendix C. 

10. “Precis of a Memorandum by Commander 1 Airborne Corps on the Value and 

Future Use of SAS Regiment,” 2, United Kingdom National Archives (NA), War 

Office (WO), file 193/705, “Future of SAS Regiment.”

11. “Precis of a Memorandum by Commander 1 Airborne Corps on the Value and 

Future Use of SAS Regiment,” 6. 

12. Julian Thompson, War Behind Enemy Lines (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2001), 2.

13. “Precis of a Memorandum by Commander 1 Airborne Corps on the Value and 

Future Use of SAS Regiment,” 3.

14. William Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: Cassell, 1956), 546-549, quoted in 

Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War

(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2013), 143. 

15. “SOE Activities in Greece, Crete and the Aegean, from June 42-Sep 44,” 8 Nov 

45. NA, AIR 20/7958.

16. Boot, Invisible Armies, 313-317.

17. Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda 

(New York: Berkley Books, 2005), 14.

18. Naylor, 2005, 14.

19. Glenn Goodman, “Tip of the Spear,” Armed Forces Journal International, June 

2002, 35; Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden. Task Force Dagger (New York: 

Ballentine Books, 2003), xix, 2; and John T. Carney and Benjamin F. Schemmer, 

No Room For Error. The Covert Operations of America’s Special Tactics Units from 

Iran to Afghanistan (New York: Presidio Press, 2002), 7. 

20. Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden, 103–104, 139.

21. Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden, 136.

22. Sean Naylor, “Chinook crash highlights rise in spec ops raids,” Army News, 21 

August 2011.

23. Rafael Epstein, “Diggers in Afghan hit squads,” The Age, 5 May 2011.

24. Bill Roggio, “Afghan Taliban lists ‘Percent of Country under the control of 

Mujahideen,’” Long War Journal, 28 March 2017, http://www.longwarjournal.

org/archives/2017/03/afghan-taliban-lists-percent-of-country-under-the-controlof-mujahideen.php.

25. C. August Elliot, “Land, kill and leave: How Australian special forces helped 

lose the war in Afghanistan,” ABC Net News, 12 July 2017, http://www.abc.net.

au/news/2017-07-12/how-australian-special-forces-helped-lose-the-afghan-war/

8700272. 
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26. Upon assuming command of USSOCOM in 2011, Admiral McRaven asserted, 

“The world today is as unpredictable as ever. As such, the American people will 

expect us to be prepared for every contingency, to answer every call to arms, to 

venture where other forces cannot and to win every fight no matter how long or 

how tough. They will expect it, because we are the nation’s special operations 

force ... and we will not let them down.” Corporal Kyle McNally, “MARSOC 

graduates newest special operators, grows fast,” 19 December 2011, https://www.

dvidshub.net/news/printable/81570. 

27. Luiza Ch. Savage, “The return of fear on the U.S.-Canada border,” Macleans, 

5 October 2014, http://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/the-return-of-fearon-the-us-canada-border/ar-BB7D7vU.

28. Anthony H. Cordesman, Trends in Extremist Violence. As a comparison, in 1979 

and 1980, there were 1,615 terrorist incidents in Europe that killed at least 719 

people. 

29. Kim Hjelmgaard, “You’d be surprised by the trend in Europe’s terrorist attacks,” 

USA Today, 10 July 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/07/10/

europe-terrorism-attacks-islamist-extremists/454836001/. 

30. Rosa Brooks, How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything

(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 12.

31. Brooks, How Everything Became War.
153

Acronym List

Acronym List

AAR after action report

AQ al-Qaeda 

AQI al-Qaeda in Iraq

AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

CAF Canadian Armed Forces

CANSOFCOM Canadian Special Operations Forces Command

CATSA Canadian Air Transport Security Authority

CBSA Canadian Border Services 

CDS Chief of Defence Staff

COIN counterinsurgency

CSE Communications Security Establishment

CSIS Canadian Security and Intelligence Service

CT counterterrorism

CVE countering violent extremism

FATF Financial Action Task Force

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FINTRAC Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis 

 Centre of Canada 

GSG9 Grenzschultzgruppe 9 (Border Guard Group 9)

GoC government of Canada

IED improvised explosive devices

IRCC Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
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ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JSOU Joint Special Operations University

NGO nongovernmental organization

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

NSJOC National Security Joint Operations Centre

NSS National Security Strategy 

OGD Other Government Department

RAF Red Army Faction

RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police

SAS Special Air Service

SF special forces

SOCNORTH Special Operations Command North

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOP standard operating procedure

SOTF Special Operations Task Force

TCO transnational criminal organization

TSOC Theater Special Operations Command

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command

VEO violent extremist organization

WMD weapons of mass destruction