alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
07-01-039 2-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L B OCTOBER 15, 2001 EX PARTE CRISELDA ESPINOSA, Relator
ORIGINAL PROCE

EDING Before Boyd, C.J., Quinn and Johnson, JJ. Pending before the Court is a petition for w rit of habeas co rpus filed by Criselda Espinosa. Therein, she contends that her liber ty i s be ing u nlaw

fully res tra ined via a vo id enforcem ent order. By letter d ate d Oc

tob er 4 , 20 01, this

cou rt in for m ed t he r

eal p art y in interest, Shannon Sepeda, to respond to the petition “nolater than Octobe r 11, 200 1.” To date, no response has been recei ved. W e grant the writ for th e reason which fol lows. Through her first point, Espinosa argues that t he e nfor cement order which manda ted her

inca rce rat ion w

as void. It

w as a llege dly

so because she w

as not inform ed of her right to counsel when she appe are d pro se at the hearing on Sepeda’s motion to enforce. See T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . §157.163 (b) (Vernon 1996) (obligating the trial court to inform a res pondentnot represented by coun sel of the righ t tosuc h re pre sen tat ion if it determines that in carcerati on is a pos sibleres ult fromenterta ining a m otion to e nforce)

.2

Sepeda had m oved toenforce the te rm s of a p ri or court ord er specifying his visitation rights viz-a -v

iz his child. Espinosa allegedly imped e d his enjoym ent of those rights on
numerous

occasions and requested t hat she be “held in contempt, jailed, and fined for each violat ion . . . . ” Again, Espinosa appeared atthe hearing without couns el. That the trial court was
awa re of this situa tion is indisputable because Espinosa had m oved to continue the hearing so that she could obtain counsel, and w hether to grant that m otion was discus sed in open court. The m otion to continue was denied, and Espinosa w as not inform ed of her right to appointed counsel. Because thatadm onishment w as not afforded her, the “Order of Contem pt” subsequently executed by the trial court is void. Ex pa rte Acker , 949 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. 1 997) (holding that the failure to provide such a n adm onishm ent rend ers the ensuing com mitm ent void). Accordingl y, we conc lude that the “Order of Contem pt” signed o n Septem ber 26, 2001 is void, and we order C riselda Espinosa discharged.

Brian Quinn Justice
Do not publish.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">Right Aid Medical Supply Corp., as Assignee of Quezada, Mery M., Respondent,<br><br>against<br><br>Hereford Insurance Co., Appellant.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Law Office of Lawrence R. Miles (Thomas Wolf of counsel), for appellant.The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Oleg Rybak of counsel), for respondent (no brief filed).</p><p>Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Devin P. Cohen, J.), entered January 27, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.</p><p>ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.</p><p>In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied defendant's motion for summary judgment which sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action was premature because plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification.</p><p>While defendant made a prima facie showing that it had not received the requested verification, the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in opposition to defendant's motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the requested verification had been mailed to, and received by, defendant (<a href="../2008/2008_04072.htm" target="_blank"><i>see St. Vincent's Hosp. of Richmond v. Government Empls. Ins. Co.</i>, 50 AD3d 1123</a> [2008]). As a triable issue of fact exists as to whether this action is premature (<a href="../2015/2015_51776.htm" target="_blank"><i>see Compas Med., P.C. v. Praetorian Ins. Co.</i>, 49 Misc 3d 152</a>[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51776[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th &amp; 13th Jud Dists 2015]), the Civil Court properly denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.</p><p>Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed. </p><p>PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.</p><br>ENTER:<br>Paul Kenny<br>Chief Clerk<br>Decision Date: November 16, 2018<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
----

|   | (1) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Oconee Financial Corporation (the “Corporation”) for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2010 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Corporation. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Dated: August 16, 2010 | /s/ B. Amrey HardenB. Amrey HardenChief Executive Officer   |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
|                   |                                                        |
| Dated: August 16, 2010 | /s/ Steven A. RogersSteven A. RogersChief Financial Officer |
No. 00-551.

#### Russell *v.*American Airlines, Inc., et al.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### William GORMAN, Earl Gorman, and Ernest Rapp, Appellants, v. ROYAL AMERICAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Inc., a corporation, Appellee.

No. O-455.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 20, 1971.

Louis J. Ferris, Jr., and Gerald S. Rut-berg, Orlando, for appellants.

Urquhart & Chapman, Panama City, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants, who were defendants in the trial court, seek review by interlocutory appeal of an order denying their motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue or, in the alternative, to transfer the action to the Circuit Court of Orange County for further proceedings.1

This action was instituted in the Circuit Court of Bay County. In support of their motion appellants filed an affidavit averring that the promissory note sued upon was signed by them as makers in Orange County where all of appellants reside and, therefore, the proper venue of the action is Orange County.2

In opposition to the motion filed by appellants, appellee filed an affidavit executed by one of its officers averring that the indebtedness for which judgment is sought in this action grew out of a building construction and real estate transaction between the parties which was consummated in Bay County and was originally evi*67denced by a promissory note made and signed in Bay County but which was later replaced by the substitute promissory note sued upon in this action.

We find this appeal to be without substantial merit so the challenged order is affirmed and the appeal dismissed.3

JOHNSON, C. J., and WIGGINTON and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.

1

. Rule 1.060(b), R.C.P., 30 F.S.A.

2

. F.S. § 47.061, F.S.A.

> “Actions on unsecured negotiable or nonnegotiable promissory notes shall be brought only in the county or district in which such notes were signed by the maker or one of the makers, or in which the maker resides or one of the makers resides. When any such note was signed by the makers in more than one county or district action may be brought thereon in any such county or district. This section shall be liberally construed in favor of the makers of such notes.”

3

. Papy v. Munroe and Chambliss Nat. Bank of Ocala (Fla.App.1967) 204 So.2d 42.
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 180 (Wednesday, September 17, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48828-48829]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-24616]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. ER97-3745-000]


EnergyEXPRESS, Inc.; Notice of Issuance of Order

September 11, 1997.
    EnergyEXPRESS, Inc. (EnergyEXPRESS) submitted for filing a rate 
schedule under which EnergyEXPRESS will engage in wholesale electric 
power and energy transactions as a marketer. EnergyEXPRESS also 
requested waiver of various Commission regulations. In particular, 
EnergyEXPRESS requested that the Commission grant blanket approval 
under 18 CFR Part 34 of all future issuances of securities and 
assumptions of liability by EnergyEXPRESS.
    On August 26, 1997, pursuant to delegated authority, the Director, 
Division of Applications, Office of Electric Power Regulation, granted 
requests for blanket approval under Part 34, subject to the following:
    Within thirty days of the date of the order, any person desiring to 
be heard or to protest the blanket approval of issuances of securities 
or assumptions of liability by EnergyEXPRESS, should file a motion to 
intervene or protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 
First Street, NE, Washington, D.C. 20426, in accordance with Rules 211 
and 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 
385.211 and 385.214).
    Absent a request for hearing with this period, EnergyEXPRESS is 
authorized to

[[Page 48829]]

issue securities and assume obligations or liabilities as a guarantor, 
endorser, surety, or otherwise in respect of any security of another 
person; provided that such issuance or assumption is for some lawful 
object within the corporate purposes of the applicant, and compatible 
with the public interest, and is reasonably necessary or appropriate 
for such purposes.
    The Commission reserves the right to require a further showing that 
neither public nor private interests will be adversely affected by 
continued approval of EnergyEXPRESS's issuances of securities or 
assumptions of liability.
    Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing motions to 
intervene or protests, as set forth above, is September 25, 1997. 
Copies of the full text of the order are available from the 
Commission's Public Reference Branch, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, 
D.C. 20426.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-24616 Filed 9-16-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
#### Herbert Leroy JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-1068.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 24, 1971.

Appeal from Court of Record, Broward County; Russell E. Seay, Jr., Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JESUS HERRERA REYES, )

)

Petitioner, )

) Civil Action No. 03-407 Erie

v. )

)

WARDEN LAMANNA, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This habeas corpus action was received by the Clerk of Court on December 11,

2003 and was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan for report

and recommendation in accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1),

and Rules 72.1.3 and 72.1.4 of the Local Rules for Magistrates. 

The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 9], filed on

August 29, 2006, recommended that Petitioner’s Petition be dismissed. The parties

were allowed ten (10) days from the date of service to file objections. Service was

made on Petitioner by certified mail and on Respondents. No objections were filed. 

After de novo review of the petition and documents in the case, together with the

Report and Recommendation, the following order is entered:

AND NOW, this 19th day of September, 2006; 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus is DISMISSED. 

The Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 9] of Magistrate Judge Lenihan,

filed on August 29, 2006, is adopted as the opinion of the Court.

 s/ Sean J. McLaughlin

United States District Judge

cm: All parties of record

Lisa Pupo Lenihan, U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 1:03-cv-00407-SJM-LPL Document 10 Filed 09/19/06 Page 1 of 1
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.33


                        AMENDMENT TO SEVERANCE AGREEMENT

     THIS AMENDMENT TO SEVERANCE AGREEMENT (this "Amendment") is made this 31st
day of December, 1998, by and between ENCORE ORTHOPEDICS, INC., a Delaware
corporation, with its principal office located at 9800 Metric Blvd., Austin,
Texas 78758 (the "Company") and GREG KASEESKA, an individual resident at 8102
Cantura Mills, Converse, Texas 78109 (the "Employee").

     WHEREAS, the Employee and the Company entered into a Severance Agreement
dated March 1, 1998 (the "Agreement") which provided, inter alia, for certain
payments to be made in the event that certain events occurred with respect to
the Employee's employment relationship with the Company;

     WHEREAS, the Employee and the Company desire that there be certain changes
made with respect to the Agreement; and

     WHEREAS, the Company and the Employee want to memorialize in this Amendment
their agreements regarding such changes to the Agreement.

     NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and other mutual promises
and covenants contained in this Amendment and for other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, the
parties, intending legally to be bound, agree as follows:

     1. Section 2(c) of the Agreement shall be deleted and shall have no further
force and effect.

     2. Except as specifically changed by the Amendment, all other terms and
provisions of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be executed by
its duly authorized officer and the Employee has hereunto set its hand as of the
date and year first written above.

                                       ENCORE:

                                       ENCORE ORTHOPEDICS, INC.


                                       By:/s/ NICK CINDRICH
                                          --------------------------------------
                                          Nick Cindrich, Chief Executive Officer


                                       EMPLOYEE:

                                       /s/ GREG KASEESKA
                                       -----------------------------------------
                                       GREG KASEESKA
From: Keith Barnett/RTP/USEPA/US

To: "Stuart Sessions" <sessions@environomics.com> Cc: Torres.Elineth@epamail.epa.gov Date: 09/28/2009 02:06 PM Subject: Re: Portland Cement NESHAP -- CEM Cost Information Dear Stu: I seem to recall you had some questions the sources of the monitoring costs. Cost for Mercury CEMs were taken from the CAMR rule - see attached excerpt:

The rest came from a cost model tat you may access at: http://www.epa.gov/ttnemc01/cem.html Let me know if you have further questions.

Keith W . Barnett USEPA/OAQPS/SPPD/MMG Mail Code D243 - 02 Research Triangle Park, NC 27711 919- 541 - 5605 barnett.keith@epa.gov
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TAMMY KITZMILLER, et al. : Case No. 04cv2688

Plaintiffs :

:

v. : Judge Jones

:

DOVER AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, :

et al. :

Defendants. :

ORDER

June 20, 2005

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOW:

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Quash Subpoena or for Protective

Order (doc. 80) filed by non-party subpoenaed witnesses, Joseph Maldonado and

Heidi Bernhard-Bubb on June 14, 2005. We also have before us a Motion to

Compel Nonparties, Maldonado, Bernhard-Bubb, York Dispatch, and York County

Daily Record, to Comply with Subpoenas (doc. 85) filed by Defendants on June

15, 2005. 

Oral argument on the Motion to Quash Subpoena or for Protective Order

(doc. 80) and on the Motion to Compel (doc. 85) will be held on July 14, 2005, in

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, following the previously scheduled hearing on the

Motion to Intervene filed by the Foundation for Thought and Ethics (doc. 61). We

Case 4:04-cv-02688-JEJ Document 88 Filed 06/20/05 Page 1 of 3
2

will therefore order an expedited briefing schedule on the above-referenced

Motions. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants shall respond to the Motion to Quash Subpoena or for

Protective Order within seven (7) days from the date of this Order. 

The non-party subpoenaed witnesses, Joseph Maldonado and Heidi

Bernhard-Bubb may file a reply brief within seven (7) days from the

date of Defendants’ submission.

2. Joseph Maldonado and Heidi Bernhard-Bubb shall respond to the

Motion to Compel within seven (7) days from the date of this Order. 

Defendants may file a reply brief within seven (7) days from the date

of the submission filed by Joseph Maldonado and Heidi BernardBubb.

3. Oral argument will be held on the Motion to Quash Subpoena or for

Protective Order (doc. 80) and on the Motion to Compel (doc. 85) on

July 14, 2005, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, following the previously

scheduled hearing on the Motion to Intervene filed by the Foundation

for Thought and Ethics (doc. 61) in the case sub judice. 

Case 4:04-cv-02688-JEJ Document 88 Filed 06/20/05 Page 2 of 3
3

s/ John E. Jones III

John E. Jones III

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-02688-JEJ Document 88 Filed 06/20/05 Page 3 of 3
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.30

                                PROMISSORY NOTE

                                                       Dated: January 31, 2000

Principal Amount:  $67,099.42                                 State of Colorado

     FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby jointly and severally promise to
pay to the order of Matrix Bancorp, Inc.

The sum of Sixty Seven Thousand Ninety Nine and 42/100, Dollars ($67,099.42),
together with interest thereon at the rate of Prime per annum on the unpaid
balance. Said sum shall be paid in the manner following:

     All principal and interest shall be due on January 31, 2001.

     All payments shall be first applied to interest and the balance to
principal. This note may be prepaid, at any time, in whole or in part, without
penalty. All prepayments shall be applied in reverse order of maturity.

     This note shall at the option of any holder hereof be immediately due and
payable upon the failure to make any payment due hereunder within five (5) days
of its due date.

     This note at the option of any holder hereof may be extended on an annual
basis for increments of one (1) year. The terms and interest rate will remain
constant.

     In the event this note shall be in default, and placed with an attorney for
collection, then the undersigned agree to pay all reasonable attorney's fees and
costs of collection. Payments not made within five (5) days of due date shall be
subject to a late charge of 2% of said payment. All payments hereunder shall be
made to such address as may from time to time be designed by any holder hereof.

     The undersigned and all other parties to this note, whether as endorsers,
guarantors or sureties, agree to remain fully bound hereunder until this note
shall be fully paid and waive demand, presentment and protest and all notices
thereto and further agree to remain bound, notwithstanding any extension,
renewal, modification, waiver, or other indulgence by any holder or upon the
discharge or release of any obligor hereunder to this note, or upon the
exchange, substitution, or release of any collateral granted as security for
this note. No modification or indulgence by any holder hereof shall be binding
unless in writing: and any indulgence on any one occasion shall not be an
indulgence for any other or future occasion. Any modification or change of
terms, hereunder granted by any holder hereof, shall be valid and binding upon
each of the undersigned, notwithstanding the acknowledgment of any of the
undersigned, and each of the undersigned does hereby irrevocably grant to each
of the others a power of attorney to enter into any such modification on their
behalf. The rights of any holder hereof shall be cumulative and not necessarily
successive. This note shall take effect as sealed instrument and shall be
construed, governed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State first
appearing

<PAGE>


at the head of this note. The undersigned hereby execute this note as principals
and not as sureties.

Maker:

         /s/
--------------------------
Thomas P. Cronin
Case 4:06-cv-00696-JEJ Document 21 Filed 08/28/06 Page 1 of 9
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Case 4:06-cv-00696-JEJ Document 21 Filed 08/28/06 Page 5 of 9
Case 4:06-cv-00696-JEJ Document 21 Filed 08/28/06 Page 6 of 9
Case 4:06-cv-00696-JEJ Document 21 Filed 08/28/06 Page 7 of 9
Case 4:06-cv-00696-JEJ Document 21 Filed 08/28/06 Page 8 of 9
Case 4:06-cv-00696-JEJ Document 21 Filed 08/28/06 Page 9 of 9
#### Roy Eugene CRADDUCK, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 53565.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 9, 1978.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Marc E. Kirk, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

*417Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Basil S. Diamond, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.

HATCHETT, Justice.

The district court, 356 So.2d 323, has certified to us the question:

> Whether the speedy trial time provisions of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(b)(1) apply to a defendant who, after being arrested or charged, is thereafter imprisoned on an unrelated charge?

We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution (1968) and answer this question in the negative. See *Lewis v. State,*357 So.2d 725 (Fla.1978).

Therefore, we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with our decision in *Lewis.*

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.