IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

DANIELLE JOHNSON, : Civil No. 4:23-CV-1159 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : (Judge Mannion) 

 v. : 

 : (Magistrate Judge Bloom) 

 : 

LYCOMING COUNTY : 

CHILDREN AND YOUTH, et al., : 

 : 

 Defendants. : 

 

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

I. Factual Background 

 

 This case comes before us for a screening review of the plaintiff’s 

pro se civil complaint. The plaintiff, Danielle Johnson, brought this action 

against Lycoming County Children and Youth, several of its employees, 

and a state court judge. (Doc. 1). Johnson’s claims stem from an incident 

in which she allegedly left her 8-month-old child alone in her home, was 

arrested by police, and ultimately had custody of her children taken from 

her by the state courts. (Id.). Johnson brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and several state tort claims, 

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and requests that she be reunited with her children and awarded 50 

million dollars in damages. (Id.). 

 Along with this complaint, Johnson filed a motion for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 4). This motion for IFP status was 

granted, and the complaint was deemed filed pending an initial screening 

review of the complaint. (Doc. 6). The case was then reassigned to the 

undersigned. For the following reasons, we recommend that this 

complaint be dismissed. 

II. Discussion 

A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints – Standard of Review 

We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se

complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review such complaints to determine 

whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. This statutory 

preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for 

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6). 

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With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading 

standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief 

under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations 

in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 

them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 

1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal 

conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 

Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice”). 

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized: 

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a twopart analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim 

should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the 

complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any 

legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then 

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are 

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for 

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relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more 

than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint 

has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 

515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, 

“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer 

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint 

has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” 

determination will be “a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. 

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). 

 Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on 

the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public 

record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court 

can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant 

attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are 

based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. 

White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if 

the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically 

attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the 

court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. 

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). 

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However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when 

deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. 

Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that 

such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial 

justice.’” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(f)). We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff 

does not mention it by name. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d 

Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)). 

B. This Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May 

Be Granted. 

 

After review, we conclude that Johnson’s complaint fails as a 

matter of law. At the outset, the state court judge that Johnson has sued 

is entitled to immunity from the claims against him. Additionally, 

Johnson’s claims inviting us to overturn state court custody orders are 

barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. Finally, because we conclude 

that the plaintiff’s federal claims fail, the court should decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law tort claims alleged in the 

complaint. 

 At the outset, it is well settled that state judges are entitled to 

immunity from civil liability for claims arising out of acts taken in their 

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official capacities. As the Third Circuit has explained, “[a] judicial officer 

in the performance of his or her duties has absolute immunity from suit.” 

Kwasnik v. LeBlon, 228 F. App’x 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Mireles 

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)). Here, Johnson’s complaint asserts that 

Judge Tira ordered her children removed from her custody. This claim 

plainly arises out of the judge’s role in the judicial process in family court 

against Johnson. Accordingly, Judge Tira is entitled to absolute 

immunity from these claims. 

 In addition, to the extent Johnson invites us to overturn the state 

court custody order and reunite her with her children, this claim runs 

afoul of the Younger abstention doctrine and should be dismissed. As the 

Third Circuit has explained, “Younger abstention is a legal doctrine 

granting federal courts discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction 

over a claim when resolution of that claim would interfere with an 

ongoing state proceeding.” Kendal v Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 

2009) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971)). The doctrine 

contemplates three legal requirements that must be met before a court 

exercises its discretion to abstain: “(1) there are ongoing state 

proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings 

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implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford 

an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.” Kendall, 572 F.3d at 

131 (citing Matusow v. Trans–County Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 

248 (3d Cir. 2008)). Courts have frequently abstained from hearing 

claims that necessarily interfere with ongoing state criminal cases. See

Lui v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 369 F.3d 

319 (3d Cir. 2004); Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2002). 

 Here, the complaint indicates that Johnson is currently involved in 

state court custody proceedings in Lycoming County, and that her 

children were ordered removed from her care after Children and Youth 

determined that the children should be removed from the home. (Doc. 1). 

Thus, the requirements for Younger abstention—ongoing state 

proceedings that implicate important state interests and give the 

plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his claims—are met here. 

Given the paramount importance to the state of the enforcement and 

resolution of state custody proceedings, we believe that we should 

exercise our discretion to abstain from these claims involving Johnson’s 

ongoing state custody matters. 

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 Additionally, the complaint appears to assert broad and conclusory 

claims of race and disability discrimination. However, the complaint does 

nothing more than allege just that—that the plaintiff believes she was 

discriminated against because of her disability and her race. She does not 

allege any further factual support for these claims. In fact, the complaint 

does not even identify plaintiff’s race or a disability. Accordingly, this 

complaint runs afoul of Rule 8’s basic requirement that a complaint must 

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Because the complaint 

contains no more than vague, conclusory allegations, these claims should 

be dismissed. 

 Finally, the plaintiff has alleged a host of state law tort claims, 

including intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and 

intentional misrepresentation. Because we have concluded that the 

plaintiff’s federal claims fail as a matter of law, this court should decline 

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims. 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if- ... the 

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district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

 Finally, while we recognize that pro se plaintiffs should generally 

be permitted to amend their complaints, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. 

Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston v. 

Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004), this complaint is materially 

flawed in a number of ways, and thus, we believe leave to amend would 

be futile. Accordingly, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed 

with prejudice. 

III. Recommendation

 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED 

that the plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice. 

 The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 

72.3: 

Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed 

findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or 

matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a 

recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a 

habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being 

served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk 

of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, 

written objections which shall specifically identify the 

portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report 

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to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. 

The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall 

apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 

recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, 

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, 

however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her 

discretion or where required by law, and may consider the 

record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or 

her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge 

may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or 

recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with 

instructions. 

 Submitted this 25th day of October 2023. 

 s/ Daryl F. Bloom 

Daryl F. Bloom 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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