1

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SADRICK DONALDSON )

Plaintiff, )

v. ) C.A. No. 04-257 Erie

)

) District Judge McLaughlin

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) Magistrate Judge Baxter

Defendant. )

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended that the motion to dismiss or in the alternative for

summary judgment [Document # 30] be granted.

II. REPORT

A. Relevant Procedural History

On September 13, 2004, Plaintiff Sadrick Donaldson, a federal inmate formerly

incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at McKean, filed this action pursuant to the

Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States of America. In his complaint, Plaintiff

alleges that the government was negligent in that federal prison employees failed to protect him

from assault by a fellow inmate. 

Presently before this Court is a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary

judgment filed by the United States of America. Plaintiff has filed an Opposition to the pending

motion. This matter is ripe for disposition by this Court.

B. Statement of Facts

Plaintiff alleges that on August 29, 2003, he was assaulted by another inmate, Eric

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Drayton, with whom Plaintiff had a history. Plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly complained to

prison staff about harassment by Drayton and repeatedly sought protection from him. Plaintiff

claims that the attack was sexually motivated and that Drayton assaulted him by pouring a “hot

liquid chemical mixture in his face.” As a result of the incident, Plaintiff suffered first and

second degree chemical burns to his face, neck and shoulders.

C. Standards of Review

1. Pro se litigants

Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim

if it appears “<beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief.’” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521(1972), quoting

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state

a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper

legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant’s

unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United

States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969)(petition prepared by a

prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”); Smith v.

U.S. District Court, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C.Cir. 1992); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949

F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of

litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the

complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d

63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)(discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land

Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990)(same). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this

Court will consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate. 

2. Motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)

When a motion to dismiss is made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for

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lack of subject matter jurisdiction which attacks the as deficient on its face, the Court must take

all allegations in the complaints as true. Mortensen v. First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n., 549

F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). However, when the motion attacks the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction in fact, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations and the Court

may weigh the evidence to satisfy itself that subject matter jurisdiction exists in fact. Id. at 891. 

See also Carpet Group Intern. v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass’n, Inc., 227 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir.

2000); Poling v. K. Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 515 (D.N.J. 2000).

3. Motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all the well-pleaded allegations of

the complaint must be accepted as true. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The motion cannot be granted unless the court is satisfied “that no

relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The issue is not whether the

plaintiff will prevail at the end but only whether he should be entitled to offer evidence to

support his claim. Neitzke; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 419 U.S. 232 (1974). Rule 8(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure states that a pleading must set forth a claim for relief which contains a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Therefore, in

order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must set forth

sufficient information to suggest that there is some recognized legal theory upon which relief

can be granted.

4. Motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56

The United States has submitted exhibits and a declaration in support of its motion to

dismiss. Therefore, this Court will convert the motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56. See Burns v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 139 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir.1998).

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("When matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the district court, the

district court must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment."); Greer v.

Smith, 2003 WL 1090708, *1 (3d Cir. (Pa.) March 10, 2003) (“the District Court considered

material outside of the pleadings and, therefore, should have converted the motion for dismissal

to a summary judgment motion, allowing the plaintiff an opportunity for appropriate discovery

and a reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to the motion.”).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted

if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(e) further provides that when

a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, “an adverse party may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if

appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.” Id. 

A district court may grant summary judgment for the defendant when the plaintiff has

failed to present any genuine issues of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Krouse v.

American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997). The moving party has the initial

burden of proving to the district court the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving

party’s claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Country Floors, Inc. v.

Partnership Composed of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir. 1990). Further,

“[R]ule 56 enables a party contending that there is no genuine dispute as to a specific, essential

fact <to demand at least one sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process of litigation

continues.’” Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) quoting

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 

The burden then shifts to the non-movant to come forward with specific facts showing a

genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986);

Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460-461 (3d Cir. 1989)(the nonCase 1:04-cv-00257-SJM-SPB Document 38 Filed 04/28/06 Page 4 of 8
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 Under the principle of sovereign immunity, the United States cannot be sued for

damages unless it consents to being sued. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). 

 The Federal Tort Claims Act grants jurisdiction to the federal courts to hear suits against the

United States Government for torts committed by its employees while in the scope of their

employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The FTCA sets forth the government's consent to be

sued for the negligent conduct of its employees "in the same manner and to the same extent as a

private individual under like circumstances." Howell v. United States, 932 F.2d 915, 917 (11th

Cir.1991) (citations omitted). The terms of the government's consent define the federal court's

jurisdiction over the case. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981).

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movant must present affirmative evidence - more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance -

which supports each element of his claim to defeat a properly presented motion for summary

judgment). The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show specific facts by

affidavit or by information contained in the filed documents (i.e., depositions, answers to

interrogatories and admissions) to meet his burden of proving elements essential to his claim. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Country Floors, 930 F.2d at 1061.

A material fact is a fact whose resolution will affect the outcome of the case under

applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Although the court

must resolve any doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of fact against the party moving for

summary judgment, Rule 56 “does not allow a party resisting the motion to rely merely upon

bare assertions, conclusory allegation or suspicions.” Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v.

DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982). Summary judgment is only precluded if the

dispute about a material fact is “genuine,” i.e., if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-249. 

D. The Discretionary Function Exception to the FTCA

The United States moves to dismiss this action because it is excluded from the FTCA’s

waiver of sovereign immunity by the discretionary function exception.

While the FTCA generally grants jurisdiction to the tort plaintiff1, there are some notable

exceptions to the Act that put certain actions by government employees beyond the jurisdiction

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of the federal courts. One such exception that the government raises here is the discretionary

function exception. Specifically, the United States is immune from liability for any act or

omission “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a

discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,

whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) (1988). The

discretionary function exception to the FTCA “marks the boundary between Congress’s

willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain

governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals.” United States v. S.A.

Empresa Biacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984). The purpose

of the exception to liability is to avoid judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative

decisions that are grounded in social, economic, and political policies. United States v. Gaubert,

499 U.S. 315, 323 (1991).

Complaints that fall within the discretionary function exception must be dismissed for a

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776, 783 (1st Cir. 1992). 

The Supreme Court has provided a two-part inquiry to guide the application of the discretionary

function exception. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322. First, a district court must determine whether the

nature of the conduct involves an “element of judgment or choice.” Mitchell v. United States,

225 F.3d 361, 363 (3d Cir. 2000), citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322. “Government conduct does

not involve an element of judgment or choice, and thus is not discretionary, if a federal statute,

regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow,

because the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.” Ochran v. United

States, 117 F.3d 495, 499 (11th Cir. 1997), citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322. In other words,

when the conduct is specifically mandated by statute or regulation and does not provide any

employee discretion, the challenged conduct is not entitled to immunity and thus, subject matter

jurisdiction exists. Second, “even if the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment,

the court must determine ‘whether the judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function

exception was designed to shield.’” Mitchell, 225 F.3d at 363, quoting Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-

23. The “focus of the inquiry is not on the agent’s subjective intent in exercising the discretion

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2 Title 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2), (3) provides:

The Bureau of Prisons ... shall ... provide ... for the safekeeping, care and

subsistence of all persons charges with or convicted of offenses against the

United States ... [and] provide for the protection ... of all persons charged with or

convicted of offenses against the United States. 

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conferred by the statute, but on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are

susceptible to policy analysis.” Id.

Although the Third Circuit has not directly spoken on this issue, numerous courts have

found that as a result of the discretionary function exception, the United States is not liable

under the FTCA for failing to protect a federal inmate from an attack by another prisoner. 

Graham v. U.S., 2002 WL 188573 (E.D.Pa. Feb 05, 2002), affirmed without opinion by

Graham v. U.S., 47 Fed.Appx. 198, --- F.3d ----, 2002 WL 31207712 (3rd Cir. 2002) (Table) (“It

may be tragically unwise for Allenwood prison officials to allow inmates access to razor blades

or foolish for them to allow inmates to view violent films. But these choices are within the

discretion that Congress has committed solely to prison officials.”). See also Cohen v. United

States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1340-45 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999) (charge of

negligence for improperly classifying assailant inmate at the lowest security level within

discretionary function exception); Dykstra v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 140 F.3d 791,

795-97 (8th Cir. 1998) (charges of negligence for failing to warn inmate that his youthful

appearance made him vulnerable to sexual attack and failure to act on plaintiff’s complaint that

other inmate was staring at him in a sexual manner within the discretionary function exception);

Calderon v. United States, 123 F.3d 947, 948-51 (7th Cir. 1997) (charge of negligence for

ignoring repeated information about threats against plaintiff by another inmate prior to attack

within discretionary function exception); and Buchanan v. United States, 915 F.2d 969 (5th Cir.

1990) (discretionary function exception applied to prisoners’ FTCA claim for damages sustained

while prisoners were held hostage by Cuban detainees during a prison uprising). 

Although the prison officials of the United States have a statutory duty2 to protect

inmates from harm, decisions regarding the best way to safeguard prisoners and the safety of the

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institution are discretionary in nature and do not provide subject matter jurisdiction to this Court

for negligence claims against the United States. The government’s motion to dismiss pursuant

to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) should be granted as this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court respectfully recommends that the motion to dismiss

or in the alternative for summary judgment [Document # 30] be granted.

In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Local

Rule 72.1.4 B, the parties are allowed ten (10) days from the date of service to file written

objections to this report. Any party opposing the objections shall have seven (7) days from the

date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to timely file objections may constitute a

waiver of any appellate rights. 

S/ Susan Paradise Baxter 

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: April 28, 2006

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