This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 Opinion Number: 2 Filing Date: September 23, 2013 3 No. 31,595 4 JEFFERY POTTER, 5 Plaintiff-Appellant, 6

v. 7 CHRIS PIERCE, WILLIAM DAVIS, 8 DAVIS & PIERCE, P.C., and JOHN DOE LAW FIRM, 9 Defendants-Appellees. 10 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 11 Carl J. Butkus, District Judge 12 William G. Gilstrap, P.C. 13 William G. Gilstrap 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 Law Offices of Daymon B. Ely 16 Daymon B. Ely 17 Albuquerque, NM 18 for Appellants 19Domenici Law Firm 1 Pete V. Domenici, Jr. 2 Lorraine Hollingsworth 3 Albuquerque, NM 4 for Appellees 5 OPINION 6 HANISEE, J

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{1} In this case we examine whether Jeffery Potter (Plaintiff) may bring a 8 malpractice action against his former bankruptcy attorneys (Defendants) after Plaintiff 9 objected to Defendants’ fee applications with allegations of malpractice and the 10 bankruptcy court awarded fees in a final order. The district court dismissed the 11 malpractice claim on the ground that it wa s barred by the prin ciples of claim 12 preclusion because Plaintiff did or could have brought the malpractice claim in 13 response to Defendants’ fee applications. We agree that Plaintiff’s claim is barred 14 because the elements of cl aim preclusion are met, and Plaintiff had a full and fair 15 opportunity to litigate the malpractice clai m but failed to successfully do so. We 16 affirm. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18
{2} With Defendant Chris Pierce as his leadattorney, Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy 19 under Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. The action wa s later converted to 20 a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. During the proceedi ngs, Plaintiff purchased at auction any 212 malpractice and related claims hemight have against Defendants. 1
{3} Pierce represented Plaintiff in the bankruptcy proceedings for approximately 2 one year. Plaintiff also employed Martin Friedlander, a California attorney, to 3 represent him in all matters other thanthe bankruptcy. Eventually, citing “a 4 fundamental disagreement” with Plainti ff, Defendants, including Pierce, filed a 5 motion to withdraw as Plaintiff’s counsel, which was granted. Defendants then filed 6 two applications for attorney fees with the bankruptcy court. 7
{4} Before the fee application hearing, Plai ntiff, acting pro se, filed objections to 8 the fee application within which Plaintiff accused Defendants of malpractice. At the 9 hearing, Plaintiff was represented by replacement counsel and Friedlander appeared 10 at the hearing as a creditor. Pierce testified with respect to the fee applications, and 11 Friedlander questioned Pierce about alleged failures in his representation of Plaintiff. 12 Plaintiff elected not to cross-examine Pierce on any topic, including the pertinent basis 13 on which he countered Defendants’ fee applications: Pierce’s malpractice. Following 14 the hearing, the bankruptcy court allowed so me fees, but disallowed others that the 15 court concluded were premised on work that was duplicative, administrative, 16 excessive, or not beneficial to the bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court made no express 17 findings or conclusions related to Plainti ff’s malpractice allegations. Plaintiff’s 18 bankruptcy was ultimately denied. 191 We recognize that the term “res j udicata” encompasses both claim and issue 13 preclusion. See18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 14 Federal Practice & Procedure § 4402 (2d ed. 2002). We also acknowledge that New 15 Mexico and federal cases sometimes us e the terms “res judicata” and “claim 16 preclusion” interchangeably. See, e.g. , Petromanagement Corp. v. Acme-Thomas 17 Joint Venture , 835 F.2d 1329, 1335 (10th Cir. 1988); Computer One, Inc. v. Grisham 18 & Lawless , P.A., 2008-NMSC-038, ¶ 30, 144 N.M. 424, 188 P.3d 1175. For clarity, 19 we use the term “claim preclusion” when po ssible to signify application to a claim that 20 has been fairly and fully litigated. When used in quotations, the term “res judicata” 21 “refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing litigation of a matter that never has 22 been litigated, because of a determination that it should have been advanced in an 23 earlier suit.” Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 24 (1984). 25 3 {5} Almost ten months following this denial , Plaintiff filed the malpractice claim 1 that is the subject of this appeal. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for 2 summary judgment on the ground that the claim was barred by claim preclusion 1 3 because the bankruptcy court’s grant of f ees constituted a final order on Defendants’ 4 fee applications and the bankruptcy court’ s decision necessarily incorporated that 5 court’s assessment of Defendant s’ representation of Plaintiff. Plaintiff now appeals. 6 II. DISCUSSION 7
{6} On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in concluding that his 8 malpractice claim was precluded, and instead maintains that the court should have 9 proceeded to the merits of the case. “S ummary judgment is appropriate where there 10 are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 11 matter of law. . . .We review . . . legal questions de novo.” Self v. United Parcel Serv., 124 Inc. , 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582 (citation omitted); Rosette, 1 Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 2007-NMCA-136, ¶ 31, 142 N.M. 717, 169 P.3d 704 2 (“When the facts are not in dispute, the preclusive effect of a prior judgment is a 3 question of law reviewed de novo.”). 4 A. The Elements of Claim Preclusion Have Been Satisfied 5
{7} In general, “[t]he purpos e of our application of res judicata is to protect 6 individuals from multiple lawsuits, to promote judicial economy, and to minimize the 7 possibility of inconsistent judgments.” Moffat v. Branch , 2002-NMCA-067, ¶ 14, 132 8 N.M. 412, 49 P.3d 673. “Res judicata applies if three elements are met: (1) a final 9 judgment on the merits in an earlier action, (2 ) identity of parties or privies in the two 10 suits, and (3) identity of the cause of action in both suits.” Rosette, Inc. , 2007- 11 NMCA-136, ¶ 33. At the outset, we note that the re quirements for res judicata are the 12 same under both New Mexico and federal law. See Edwards v. First Fed. Sav. & 13 Loan Ass’n , 1985-NMCA-015, ¶ 40, 102 N.M. 396, 696 P.2d 484 (“Unless obliged 14 to follow a contrary decision of our [S] upreme [C]ourt,” we apply federal law to 15 “determin[e] the preclusive effect of a Federal court’s judgment[.]”). 16
{8} With regard to the third element, both New Mexico and the Court of Appeals 17 for the Tenth Circuit have adopted the “transactional approach” set out in the 18 Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 24-25 (1982) for determining whether a later 195 cause of action is the same as an earlier one. Petromanagement Corp. , 835 F.2d at 1 1335 (adopted in the Tenth Circuit); Computer One , Inc. , 2008-NMSC-038, ¶ 31 2 (adopted in New Mexico). Under this approach, two issues are the “same claim” for 3 purposes of claim preclusion when “they involve a common nucleus of operative 4 facts.” Rosette, Inc. , 2007-NMCA-136, ¶¶ 23, 33 (internal quotation marks and 5 citation omitted). A common nucleus might be identified by examining “(1) how the 6 facts relate in time, space, origin, or motivation; (2) whether, taken together, the facts 7 form a convenient trial unit; and (3) whether treatment of the facts as a single unit 8 conforms to the parties’ expectations , or business understanding or usage.” Chavez 9 v. City of Albuquerque , 1998-NMCA-004, ¶ 23, 124 N.M. 479, 952 P.2d 474. 10
{9} Notably, claim preclusion applies only when “the claimant [has] had a full and 11 fair opportunity to litigate the cl aim in the original action.” Moffat, 2002-NMCA-067, 12 ¶ 17; see Grausz v. Englander , 321 F.3d 467, 474 (4th Cir. 2003) (considering 13 “whether [a] fee proceeding in bankruptcy court provided [the plaintiff] with an 14 effective opportunity to litigate his malpracti ce claim”). Finally, “[r]es judicata bars 15 not only claims that were raised in the prior proceeding, but also claims that could 16 have been raised.” City of Sunland Park v. Macias , 2003-NMCA-098, ¶ 18, 134 N.M. 17 216, 75 P.3d 816; Grausz , 321 F.3d at 473-74 (considering whether the plaintiff 18 “knew or should have known” of his malpractice claim at the time of a fee 196 adjudication in bankruptcy court). 1
{10} At issue in this case is whether the district court correctly found that the 2 elements of claim preclusion were satisfi ed. Under de novo review, we consider each 3 element in turn. The first element of our analysis is whether there was a final 4 judgment on the merits in the earlier proceedings. Rosette, Inc. , 2007-NMCA-136, 5 ¶ 33. Although “an interim award of attorney[] fees . . . is not final because [it] . . . 6 leav[es] open the possibility that the claim will later be enlarged through future fee 7 applications[,] . . . a[n] award that determines all of the compensation owed to an 8 attorney . . . [is] final.” In re Iannochino , 242 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal 9 quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Defendants’ fee applications were 10 adjudicated after Defendants had withdraw n from representation of Plaintiff on May 11 22, 2006. The second and final fee appli cation covered the period from May 25, 2005 12 through May 18, 2006. Thus, there was no possibility of further fee applications. The 13 fee award was a final order. 14
{11} The second question in the claim preclusi on analysis is whether the parties in 15 the two suits are identical. Rosette, Inc. , 2007-NMCA-136, ¶ 33. This element is 16 satisfied because Plaintiff is both a party to the malpractice claim and a party in 17 interest to the fee proceedings. See11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2006) (including “the 18 debtor” among a list of parties in interest); 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2006) (same); In re 197 Alpex Computer Corp. , 71 F.3d 353, 356 (10th Cir. 1995) (s tating that party in interest 1 is “generally understood to include all pers ons whose pecuniary interests are[] directly 2 affected by the bankruptcy proceedings” (internal quotation marks and citation 3 omitted)); Grausz , 321 F.3d at 473 (holding that the pl aintiff was a party in interest 4 to fee proceedings because he“had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the fee 5 applications”). 6
{12} Most vigorously disputed by the parties is whether the third element of claim 7 preclusion was satisfied, i.e. whether the district court correctly determined that the 8 dispute over attorney fees and malpracti ce in bankruptcy court was the “same claim” 9 as Plaintiff’s subsequent malpractice claim instate court. This particular fact pattern 10 has yet to be addressed by Ne w Mexico appellate courts. Nonetheless, we find helpful 11 cases from the Courts of App eals for the First, Fourth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits, which 12 addressed fact patterns congruent to the le gally operative facts in this case, and found 13 that claim preclusion bars malpracti ce claims following fee adjudications in 14 bankruptcy court. See, e.g., Capitol Hill Grp. v. Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, 15 LLC, 569 F.3d 485, 491-93 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Grausz , 321 F.3d at 475-76; In re 16 Intelogic Trace, Inc. , 200 F.3d 382, 391 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Iannochino , 242 F.3d 17 at 41-49. 18
{13} In Grausz , the plaintiff filed for bankruptcy with the assistance of his counsel. 198 321 F.3d at 469. Counsel later withdrew and filed two fee applications; both were 1 approved without objection from the plaintiff. Id. at 470. Subsequently, the 2 plaintiff’s bankruptcy discharge was denied and the plaintiff filed a malpractice claim 3 against his counsel. Id. at 471. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s malpractice 4 claims were precluded because approval of th e fee applications was a final order. Id. 5 at 472. The plaintiff was a “party in interest” to the fee dispute since he “ha[d] a 6 pecuniary interest in the distribution of assets to creditors[,]” id . at 472-73, and “[t]he 7 core of operative facts in th e . . . fee application proceeding and the malpractice action 8 . . . are the same. Id . at 473. Both actions relate[d] to the nature and quality of legal 9 services the [firm] provided to [the plai ntiff] in connection with the bankruptcy 10 proceeding.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 11
{14} The Court recognized that the bankruptcy code “necessarily included an inquiry 12 by the bankruptcy court into the quality of professional services rendered by the 13 [firm].” Id . at 473 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3) (2003)). “By granting [the] firm’s 14 . . . fee application[s], the bankruptcy court impliedly found that the firm’s services 15 were acceptable throughout its representation of [the plaintiff].” Id. Having 16 determined that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the malpractice claim under 17 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2005), because it “arose in” the bankruptcy case, the Court 18 determined that “[p]roceduralmechanisms were . . . available [in bankruptcy court] 192Rule 3007 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure was amended in 15 2007, altering the procedures related to adversary proceedings like fee applications. 16 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 advisory committee’ s notes; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001 (defining 17 claims that initiate adversary proceedings); 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 7001.01 (Alan 18 N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed .); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7042. Although the 19 procedures under Rule 3007 have changed, the fundamental point in Grausz—that the 20 bankruptcy court has mechanisms for adjudi cating malpractice claims—remains true. 21 See 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3007.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 22 16th ed.) (“The effect of the [amendment] in substitution for the predecessor language 23 does not appear to be significant.”). 24 9 for [the plaintiff] to raise his malpracti ce claim in connection w ith the fee proceeding” 1 under Bankruptcy Rule 3007. Grausz , 321 F.3d at 469, 474; seeFed. R. Bankr. P. 2 3007(b) (stating procedures for adversarial proceedings) 2 . The Court also determined 3 that the plaintiff “knew or should have know n there was a real likelihood that he had 4 a malpractice claim against . . . firm.” Id. at 474. 5
{15} The same conclusion was reached by the First, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits. See 6 In re Iannochino , 242 F.3d at 47-49 (concluding that (1 ) “the central factual question 7 in both claims is the same: What advice did the defendants give to the [the plaintiffs] 8 during the bankruptcy, and what was the qualityand value of that advice?”; (2) there 9 was “substantial overlap of the . . . proofs required to determine the essential issue in 10 both claims[;]” and (3) “the [plaintiffs] knew all the facts necessary for bringing their 11 malpractice claim at the time of the fee application, and we think it reasonable for [the 12 defendants] to expect that all concerns about the quality of their services would have 13 been raised in response to the fee appli cation” (internal quotation marks and citation 1410 omitted)); In re Intelogic Trace Inc. , 200 F.3d at 388 (holding that “the award of 1 professional fees and the . . . malpractice cl aims concern the same nucleus of operative 2 facts and meet the transactional test,” b ecause the bankruptcy court considered the 3 quality and nature of counsel’s services in the fee adjudication (internal quotation 4 marks and citation omitted)); Capitol Hill Grp. , 569 F.3d 485, 490-93 (same). 5
{16} Notably, in each of the aforementi oned cases, each court found that the 6 “identity of claims” element of the cl aim preclusion test was met because the 7 questions presented to the bankruptcy court in a fee proceeding inherently involve an 8 assessment of the quality of the professionals ’ work similar to the assessment required 9 in a malpractice action. See Capitol Hill Grp. , 569 F.3d at 491 (stating that “the 10 bankruptcy court was in a position to judge th e quality of [the attorneys’] services”); 11 Grausz , 321 F.3d at 473; In re Intelogic Trace, Inc. , 200 F.3d at 388; In re 12 Iannochino , 242 F.3d at 47 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(A) as requiring the 13 bankruptcy court to “undertake a comprehens ive evaluation of the services listed in 14 a fee application”). In addition, each court relied on the f acts of the case to determine 15 that the plaintiffs were sufficiently aware of their malpractice clai ms at the time of the 16 fee proceedings to have th en raised those claims. See Capitol Hill Grp. , 569 F.3d at 17 491; Grausz , 321 F.3d at 474; In re Intelogic Trace, Inc. , 200 F.3d at 389; In re 18 Iannochino , 242 F.3d at 49. Finally, each of thes e cases either explicitly or implicitly 1911 relied on the ability of the bankruptcy court to hear the malpractice claim through an 1 adversary proceeding. See Capitol Hill Grp. , 569 F.3d at 492 ; Grausz , 321 F.3d at 2 474-75; In re Intelogic Trace, Inc. , 200 F.3d at 389-90; In re Iannochino , 242 F.3d at 3 48. 4
{17} We likewise conclude that the cause of action within each proceeding at issue 5 in this case arises from the same“nucleus of operative facts.” Rosette , 2007-NMCA6 136, ¶ 33. Both the fee proceedings and malpractice claim address the same conduct 7 during the same period of representation. In addition, under 11 U.S.C. § 330, the 8 bankruptcy court was required to considerthe quality of Defendants’ professional 9 services in order to determine whether the fees requested were appropriate. See 10 Grausz , 321 F.3d at 473. Similarly, adjudication of malpractice claims requires an 11 assessment of whether Defendants’ services were rendered “withthe skill, prudence, 12 and diligence that an ordinary and reasonable lawyer would use under similar 13 circumstances.” Black’s Law Dictionary1044 (9th ed. 2009) (defining legal 14 malpractice). The bankruptcy court’s rejection of Plaintiff’s allegations of malpractice 15 is implicit in its approval of Defendants’ fee request. 16
{18} We agree with the district court that the “practical considerations” addressed 17 in Grauszand In re Intelogic Trace, Inc. also support preclusion of Plaintiff’s claim. 18 See Grausz , 321 F.3d at 473-74; In re Intelogic Trace , 200 F.3d at 388-89. In addition 1912 to establishing the elements of claim preclusion, which wehave determined were met, 1 these considerations address whether Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 2 his malpractice claim. As discussed above, Plaintiff could have brought and pursued 3 his malpractice claim in an adversarial proceeding in th e bankruptcy court, where a 4 final judgment was reached between these parties that provided a determinative 5 finding regarding the Defendants’ quality of representation. In sum, we conclude that 6 all of the elements of claim preclusion are satisfied here. 7 B. Computer One Does Not Bar Claim Preclusion in this Case 8
{19} Plaintiff makes several arguments as to why his malpractice claim should not 9 be precluded. Plaintiff first argues that Computer One , Inc. , 2008-NMSC-038, stands 10 for the proposition that “[claim preclusion] . . . cannot be based on an application for 11 fees by way of an attorney charging lien or motion for fees as occurred in [his] 12 bankruptcy case[,]” and that “approval [of attorney fees] cannot operate [to preclude] 13 a later malpractice claim.” For reasons explained below, we disagree. 14
{20} Our Supreme Court in Computer One, Inc. relied on the same basic claim 15 preclusion test stated above to conclude th at the malpractice claim before it differed 16 from the issues addressed in the charging lien that proceeded it. Notably, the 17 Computer One Court assumed that the first two claim preclusion elements—a final 18 order and identity of parties—were met. See 2008-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 31-36 (not 1913 addressing those elements). It then focuse d on the facts of the cas e as they related to 1 the third element: whether th e claims were identical. Id. 2
{21} In that case, Computer One filed suit against Sandia Corporation for breach of 3 contract and misrepresentation. Computer One , 2008-NMSC-038, ¶ 2. Computer 4 One was represented by Grisham & Lawless, P.A. (the Firm) Id. ¶ 3. The Firm 5 entered into a settlement agreement with Sandia Corporation, but Computer One 6 maintained that the absence of its own ratification of the agreement meant that the 7 settlement was unauthorized. Id. The Firm withdrew as counsel for Computer One 8 and filed notice of an attorney chargi ng lien against the settlement proceeds, id. , which 9 the district court enforced. Id. ¶ 4. After a series of proceedings in which Computer 10 One filed objections to the charging lien, th e “[district] court ordered disbursement of 11 the settlement funds including payment of the Firm’s charging lien.” Id. ¶ 7. 12
{22} Over a year later, Computer One filed a legal malpractice cl aim against the Firm 13 “arguing that the Firm had been negligent in the manner in which it had evaluated 14 Computer One’s claims against Sandia [Corporation] and their potential settlement 15 value.” Id. ¶ 8. The Firm moved for summaryjudgment on the ground that Computer 16 One’s claims were barred because they werecompulsory counterclaims to the Firm’s 17 motion for a charging lien under Rule 1-013( A) NMRA and because claim preclusion 18 applied. Computer One, Inc. , 2008-NMSC-038 ¶¶ 9-10. The district court agreed and 1914 granted the motion, id ., and this Court affirmed that the claim was a compulsory 1 counterclaim. Id. ¶ 1. 2
{23} Our Supreme Court reversed on both grounds. Id. ¶ 38. Relying on Bennett v. 3 Kisluk , 1991-NMSC-060, 112 N.M. 221, 814 P.2d 89, and Rule 1-013(A) (stating the 4 elements of a compulsory counterclaim), it first determined that Computer One’s 5 malpractice claim was not a compulsory counterclaim to the Firm’s motion for a 6 charging lien because there was no adversarial relationship betw een Computer One 7 and the Firm sufficient “to impose upon the c lient the preclusive effect of Rule 1- 8 013(A).” Computer One , Inc. , 2008-NMSC-038 ¶¶ 20, 25, 28. The Court reasoned 9 that Rule 1-013(A)’s requirement that the parties be “opposing part[ies]” rests on a 10 “notion of fair notice.” Computer One, Inc. , 2008-NMSC-038 ¶ 25. “Without an 11 adversarial relationship, a party would not be on notice and would not necessarily 12 know that he or she would have to assert all defenses or claims against a party who 13 has filed a motion.” Id. ¶ 23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 14
{24} Indeed, “[t]he preclusive effect of Ru le 1-013(A) is premised on the formality 15 of an opposing party, because that very status fairly alerts litigants that all claims and 16 counterclaims arising out of the transacti on or occurrence must be brought at one time 17 under penalty of waiver.” Id. ¶ 24 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation 18 omitted). Our Supreme Court held “one mustfirst be a ‘party’ before one can be an 193 The parties here appear to agree that Plaintiff’s claim was not a compulsory 18 counterclaim to Defendants’ fee applications. We discuss this aspect of Computer 19 One, Inc. in order to highlight the distincti on between the application of Rule 1- 20 013(A) and claim preclusion principles. 21 15 ‘opposing party[,]’” and that “an attorney does not transform his former client into 1 either, merely by taking steps to secureattorney fees in the same underlying 2 proceeding.” Id. ¶ 25; see Bennett , 1991-NMSC-060, ¶ 10 (“An ‘opposing party’ 3 must be one who asserts a claim against th e prospective counterclaimant in the first 4 instance.”). In sum, the Court concluded th at “the compulsory counterclaim rule does 5 not apply to an attorney’s charging lien,” and as such, would not apply to bar a later 6 malpractice claim. Computer One , Inc. , 2008-NMSC-038 ¶ 28. 3 7
{25} Our Supreme Court next examined whether Computer One’s claim was barred 8 by claim preclusion “[i]ndependent of any preclusive effects of Rule 1-013(A).” Id. 9 ¶ 30; see Adams v. Key , 2008-NMCA-135, ¶ 15, 145 N.M. 52, 193 P.3d 599 10 (distinguishing between compulsory counterclaims under Rule 1-013(A) and claim 11 preclusion principles). The relevant dispute was over the third prong of claim 12 preclusion: whether the malpractice claim was the “same claim” as the fee request. 13 Computer One, Inc. , 2008-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 32-36. The Court’s analysis focused 14 chiefly on whether Computer One had a full and fair opportunity to litigate its claim. 15 See id. ¶¶ 32-35. It noted that a motion for a charging lien invokes the equitable 16 powers of the court and does not limit an attorney from “assert[ing] all claims the 1716 attorney may have against the client” at law. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16. The Court compared 1 Computer One’s argument against the charging lien with that asserted in the 2 malpractice claim, id. ¶¶ 33, 34, and concluded that “Computer One’s objections to 3 the charging lien reflect the limited nature of such a lien.” Id. ¶ 35. Ultimately, 4 “[b]ecause the objections to th e charging lien were distinct from the claim asserted in 5 Computer One’s malpractice lawsuit, [our Supreme Court] re ject[ed] the Firm’s 6 argument that the issues in Computer One’s malpractice claim were necessarily 7 litigated below.” Id. 8
{26} Furthermore, the Court relied on the facts of that case to determine that even if 9 Computer One could have raised the malpr actice claim in the context of the charging 10 lien motion, it “would not change our result in this particular case.” Id. ¶ 36. Because 11 the Firm had “affirmatively acknowledg[ed] that the charging lien was not related to 12 the malpractice claim, [it could not] change course and claim an opportunity for 13 Computer One to do the very thing it urged Computer One not to do below.” Id. ; 14

see City of Sunland Park , 2003-NMCA-098, ¶ 18 (stating claim preclusion bars claims 15 that could have been brought in prior proceedings). 16
{27} Thus, Computer One , Inc. rests in part on claim preclusion and in part on 17 principles of equity. It concluded that because the malpractice claim sought damages 18 amounting to the difference between the actual settlement amount and the potential 1917 settlement had the Firm’s representation been more effective, rather than recovery of 1 fees awarded, the malprac tice claim was “distinct” fro m Computer One’s objections 2 to the charging lien. 2008-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 34-35. Much of this analysis rests on “the 3 limited nature of . . . a [charging] lien.” Id. ¶ 35. There is no clear statement that 4 claim preclusion never applies to bar malpractice claims after adjudication of broader 5 fee applications. 6
{28} In sum, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Computer One , Inc. does not stand for 7 the proposition that malpractice claims are never barred by ad judication of fee 8 applications. Rather, we conclude that wh en a plaintiff actually argues or could have 9 argued, or asserted but did not substantivel y pursue malpractice as a defense to a fee 10 application or as a separate claim, claim preclusion may apply to bar later malpractice 11 claims. As the district court noted, this holding is not in consistent with federal law. 12
{29} Moreover, Computer One , Inc. is specific to the facts and circumstances of that 13 case. For instance, the C ourt grounded its holding in the context of charging liens. 14 See id. ¶ 12 (“We begin our discu ssion with . . . the history of attorney charging liens, 15 because the resolution of the issue presented here become s clear when the historical 16 basis for the charging lien is considered.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and 17 citation omitted)). New Mexico cases have recognized that a charging lien “is a 18 peculiar lien, to be enforced by peculiar methods.” Prichard v. Fulmer, 1916-NMSC- 1918 046, ¶ 29, 22 N.M. 134, 159 P. 39 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 1 Sowder v. Sowder, 1999-NMCA-058, ¶ 8, 127 N.M. 114, 977 P.2d 1034 (calling a 2 charging lien “a unique method of protecting attorneys” and stati ng that “an attorney 3 charging lien functions in a very limited manner”). The fees in question here were not 4 sought through a charging lien. Finally, to the extent that Computer Onerelied on the 5 fact that the damages sought by Computer One were not related to the fees paid to the 6 attorneys, that case is further distinguishab le because here Plaintiff specifically seeks 7 “disgorgement of [attorney] fees.” See Computer One , 2008-NMSC-038, ¶ 34 8 (stating, “[s]ignificantly, in [its] complaint Co mputer One [did] not . . . seek to recover 9 its fees paid to the Firm”). 10
{30} Finally, Computer One , Inc. does not in any way address the preclusive effect 11 of fee adjudications in bankruptcy c ourt. The requirements and capabilities of 12 bankruptcy courts make Computer One , Inc. inapposite in at least two ways. First, 13 unlike analysis of charging liens, analysis of fee applications in bankruptcy 14 proceedings “necessarily include[s] an inquiry . . . into the quality of professional 15 services rendered.” Grausz , 321 F.3d at 473; 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(C), (D), (E) 16 (stating some of the factors the bankruptcy court may consider in determining fees). 17 Second, Computer One , Inc. relies in significant part on the Court’s doubt that a 18 malpractice claim could be addressed in the context of a charging lien. 2008-NMSC- 1919 038, ¶ 36. In stark contrast, the rules governing bankruptcy proceedings permit a 1 claim for malpractice to be broughtas an adversary proceeding. SeeFed. R. Bankr. 2 P. 3007; Grausz , 321 F.3d at 474. Thus, unlike in Computer One , Inc. , in this case 3 there were readily available avenues for Pl aintiff to pursue his malpractice contention 4 in bankruptcy court. 5
{31} Computer One Inc. ’s only categorical statement is that a fee adjudication does 6 not make an attorney and hi s or her client (or former client) into “opposing parties” 7 such that malpractice claims related to the attorney’s representation of the client are 8 compulsory under Rule 1-013(A) NMRA. Although Computer One , Inc. held that the 9 plaintiff’s malpractice claim was not barred by claim preclusion, its holding was 10 specific to the facts and circumstances of that case, and in our view, not a blanket 11 directive regarding the preclusive effects of fee adjudications. We conclude that the 12 present case is analogous to the federal cases we discussed above, and for reasons 13 explained in the previous section of this Opinion, all of the elements of claim 14 preclusion have been met. Computer Onedoes not change the outcome of this case. 15 C. Plaintiff’s Remaining Arguments Regarding the Elements of Claim 16 Preclusion Fail 17
{32} Plaintiff additionally argues that he could not have brought his malpractice 18 claim at the time of the fee proceeding because at that juncture his bankruptcy petition 19 had not yet been denied, citing Sharts v. Natelson , 1994-NMSC-114, 118 N.M. 721, 2020 885 P.2d 642. The district court rejected th is argument, stating that it “fails on the 1 facts.” We agree that this argument is unavailing. Plai ntiff’s reliance on Shartsis 2 misplaced. In that case, ourSupreme Court considered th e statute of limitations for 3 attorney malpractice claims. Id. ¶ 10. It stated that “a cause of action for legal 4 malpractice does not accrue until the client discovers, or through reasonable diligence 5 should discover, the facts essential to the client’s claim.” Id. ¶ 15. 6
{33} Plaintiff contends that the Shartsholding means that “a cau se of action for legal 7 malpractie can only exist when the pl aintiff suffers damages.” While the ShartsCourt 8 held that “the ‘actual injury’ standard . . . accurately describes th e nature of the harm 9 the client must suffer before the statute of limitations begins to run[,]” it also stated 10 that “the focus . . . should be on discovery of the fact of damage, not the amount.” Id. 11 ¶¶ 11, 12 (internal quotation marks and c itation omitted). The Court expressly 12 rejected the position that a malpractice clai m did not accrue “until [the client’s] rights 13 were fixed by entry of [an] adverse . . . judgment.” Id. ¶ 14. It is clear here that 14 Plaintiff had discovered the fact of his damage and knew before the fee proceedings 15 that he might have a claim for malpractice. In fact, he alleged malpractice multiple 16 times in his objections to the fee applications, asserting that Pierce had forged his 17 signature on documents, failed to prosecute a suit, and facilitated a fraudulent 18 conveyance. Plaintiff stated, “[t]he damage s attributable to this malpractice greatly 194The district court noted that “New Mexico has not ruled on the validity or 17 invalidity of the assignment of a legal malpractice claim” and that it would 18 “approach[] this case from the apparent pers pective of the partie s that the purchase at 19 auction of the malpractice cl aims . . . was valid.” Sin ce neither party challenges the 20 validity of the sale on appeal, we too do not address that issue. 21 21 exceed the fees that [Defendants are] seeking in [the] [m ]otion for [f]ees.” Thus, at 1 the time of the fee proceedings Plainti ff was aware of both the conduct he later 2 complained of and the potential impact of that conduct. See Grausz , 321 F.3d at 474 3 (rejecting Grausz’s argument that “he coul d not have understood that he would have 4 a malpractice claim against [his attorneys] before the fi nal fee order was entered”). 5
{34} Plaintiff also argues that the fact that he purchased the malpractice claim at 6 auction militates against application of claim preclusion. 4This argument is unavailing 7 because the right Plaintiff purchased at auction––his rightto litigate his malpractice 8 claim—has not been impeded. Plaintiff in fact filed a complaint, initiating the present 9 suit. Defendants raised a legitimate defense to the complaint consistent with the terms 10 of the sale that reserved to them “all right s, defenses, counterclaims, crossclaims, and 11 other rights or claims of any kind whatso ever arising out of or related to any 12 malpractice claims against them.” As the district court noted, it was Plaintiff’s 13 obligation to be aware of any “negative baggage [that] might . . . be attached to the 14 claims” including possible defenses to them. The fact of the sale of the malpractice 15 claim presents no barrier to Defendants’ a ssertion of claim preclusion, nor does the 1622 purchase of something valueless bestow worth. 1
{35} Therefore, we conclude that all of th e elements of claim preclusion have been 2 satisfied and Plaintiff was sufficiently aware of the facts of his claim at the time of the 3 fee adjudication such that preclusion of them in later proceedings is fair. We thus 4 affirm the district court. 5 CONCLUSION 6
{36} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm th e grant of summary judgment in favor 7 of Defendants. 8
{37} IT IS SO ORDERED. 9

________________________ 10 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 11 WE CONCUR: 12

13 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 14

15 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 16