J-S20020-16 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

MERI JANE WOODS, 

 Appellant No. 990 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of December 15, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-32-CR-0000078-2014 

BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and PLATT,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 11, 2016 

Appellant, Meri Jane Woods, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on December 15, 2014, as made final by the denial of Appellant’s 

post-sentence motion on May 19, 2015. We affirm. 

The trial court ably summarized the evidence presented during the 

suppression hearing: 

On August 14, 2013, [Appellant voluntarily] went to the 

Pennsylvania State Police, Indiana [Barracks], to complain 

of her husband’s alleged involvement in child pornography. . 

. . [Appellant] brought a home computer [with her that 

day, and she claimed that the computer] contained 

evidence [that] support[ed] her allegations. . . . 

[Appellant] met with Corporal John Roche, the Coordinator 

of the Southwest Computer Crime Task Force, and filled out 

a six-page written statement. At this meeting, Corporal 

Roche requested [Appellant’s] permission to do a preview 

examination of the computer and [Appellant] agreed. Once 

the preview was conducted, images were found on the

computer depicting possible child pornography, and 
J-S20020-16 

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[Appellant] was agreeable when Corporal Roche indicated 

he would need to keep [the computer] as a result [of his 

findings. The interview ended and Appellant left the 

barracks.] 

[Both Appellant and Corporal Roche characterized the police 

station interview as “friendly.” See Appellant’s Motion to 

Suppress, 7/10/14, at ¶¶ 15-16; N.T. Suppression Hearing, 

8/7/14, at 10. Moreover, Corporal Roche testified: that 

Appellant “was free to leave at any time” during the 

interview; that he never read Appellant Miranda1 warnings; 

that, although Appellant’s story “seemed unusual,” Corporal 

Roche “had no reason to disbelieve the main portion of 

[Appellant’s] child pornography accusations” against her 

husband; and that, during the interview, he “had no belief 

that criminal activity by [Appellant] had occurred.” N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 8/7/14, at 10-11 and 24]. . . . 

Following a [later,] full [forensic] review [of the computer,] 

Corporal Roche noted that [the] times when the images 

were created or accessed were inconsistent with [the] time 

periods that [Appellant’s] husband would have had access 

to the computer because they occurred after he had moved 

from the residence. . . . 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/12/14, at 1-2. 

On December 19, 2013, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with 

sexual abuse of children and unsworn falsification to authorities.2 With 

respect to the sexual abuse of children charge, the Commonwealth’s laterfiled Information declared: 

COUNT 1: Child Pornography – (F3) 

____________________________________________ 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

2

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1) (effective from December 24, 2012 to 

December 31, 2013) and 4904(a)(1), respectively. 
J-S20020-16 

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Offense Date: 08/14/13 18 § 6312 §§ D1

Knowingly possessed or controlled a book, magazine,

pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape, computer 

depiction, or other material depicting a child under the age 

of 18 years engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the 

simulation of such act, to wit, the defendant did possess via 

a computer system/storage medium, files that depicted 

child pornography, an example of one of these is a file 

[name], “F7pzSGKQdk[1].jpg”, which is a picture of an 

approximately 9-11 year old female, providing oral 

copulation to an adult male penis. The image was written 

to the internal hard disk drive on the defendant’s computer 

on 8/11/13. 

. . . 

Citation of Statute and Section 1[:] 18 § 6312 §§ D1 (F3) 

. . . 

Commonwealth’s Information, 2/18/14, at 1. 

Of note, the above description of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1) 

constitutes only a partial quotation of the statute. At the time Appellant 

committed the charged crime, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1) read in full: 

§ 6312. Sexual abuse of children 

. . . 

(d) Child pornography.-- 

(1) Any person who intentionally views or knowingly

possesses or controls any book, magazine, 

pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape, 

computer depiction or other material depicting a 

child under the age of 18 engaging in a prohibited 

sexual act or in the simulation of such act commits

an offense. 
J-S20020-16 

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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1) (effective from December 24, 2012 to December 

31, 2013).3, 4

Appellant, however, did not contest the sufficiency of the Information. 

Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the verbal and 

written statements she made during the August 14, 2013 police station 

interview. Within her suppression motion, Appellant admitted that she 

“voluntarily and of her own free will” went to the police station on August 

14, 2013 and that the interview between herself and Corporal Roche on 

August 14, 2013 was “friendly.” Appellant’s Motion to Suppress, 7/10/14, at 

¶¶ 8 and 15-16. However, Appellant claimed that her “verbal and written 

statements [] were unlawfully obtained” because, during the interview, 

Corporal Roche harbored an unarticulated and hidden suspicion that she 

actually committed the crime. Id. at ¶¶ 11-21. The trial court denied 

Appellant’s suppression motion after a hearing. Trial Court Order, 8/12/14, 

at 1. 

____________________________________________ 

3

 At the time Appellant committed the crime, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(2) 

declared: “[a] first offense under this subsection is a felony of the third 

degree, and a second or subsequent offense under this subsection is a felony 

of the second degree.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(2) (effective from December 

24, 2012 to December 31, 2013). 

4

 On January 1, 2014, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1) was renumbered; the 

crime of child pornography is currently located at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d). 

However, the 2014 amendment did not alter the definition of the crime. 
J-S20020-16 

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Appellant proceeded to a one-day jury trial, where the Commonwealth 

presented Corporal Roche as both a lay witness and as an expert witness in 

the field of computer forensics. N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 29. Corporal Roche 

testified that on August 14, 2013, Appellant appeared at the Pennsylvania 

State Police, Indiana Barracks to report that her husband, Matthew Woods, 

had committed a crime. Id. at 30. Appellant carried her personal computer 

into the barracks. Id. at 31. Corporal Roche testified that, after he and 

Appellant went back into his office: 

[Appellant said] she had been having difficulties and 

problems with her husband, Matthew Woods. And she 

essentially was bringing me the computer because she 

wanted me to take a look at what was on it because she 

wanted to tell me that there was child pornography images 

on the computer and that they were put there by her

husband, Matthew Woods. 

Id. 

Since Appellant was “providing [the Corporal] with a lot of 

information,” Corporal Roche asked Appellant to fill out a written statement. 

Appellant did so. Id. As Corporal Roche testified, Appellant wrote the 

following in her written statement:5 

Well, she started to say that her husband worked a lot and 

that she was starting to feel as if she wasn’t close to him 

anymore. She felt that he was not himself and that he 

maybe had a girlfriend. So she took some of her phone 

____________________________________________ 

5

 Appellant failed to include a copy of the written statement in the certified 

record to this Court. 
J-S20020-16 

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records and she started conducting searches on the internet 

with his particular cell phone number to see what would 

come up. She said she felt that he was using prostitutes 

and I believe he was involved in escort services, he was 

involved in . . . some type of drug organization, he was 

running it. She stated that the IP address from her 

computer was seen all over the world and was used for 

pornography websites and child pornography websites. She 

said that he was selling sexual toys on eBay. She said that 

she had found on some websites pictures of him, pictures of 

his niece, pictures of their daughter. 

. . . 

[S]he said also that her husband . . . was running multiple 

websites. He was running pornography websites . . . and 

doing so at least to some extent from the computer that she 

had brought to me. 

. . . 

[S]he says . . . there is one . . . picture[] showing a man’s 

private area on a child’s mouth. I believe that in this photo 

is my husband, Matthew [] Woods. 

. . . 

[S]he [also] said [that her husband] left the residence on 

July 23[,] 2013, and . . . has not been back since.

Id. at 34-35, 42, and 56. 

During trial, Appellant’s written statement was admitted into evidence 

without objection. Id. at 60. 

Corporal Roche further testified that, after Appellant completed her 

written statement, Appellant directed him “to various websites to show . . . 

where she said her husband [or daughter] was depicted.” Id. at 37. 

However, as Corporal Roche testified, he did not believe that any of the 

pornographic images Appellant showed him depicted either Appellant’s 
J-S20020-16 

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husband or daughter. Id. at 37-42. Moreover, and contrary to Appellant’s 

written declaration, Corporal Roche testified that a review of the computer 

revealed no evidence that Matthew Woods was “running any type of 

website.” Id. at 58. 

Further, during the trial: 

Corporal Roche provided testimony regarding his experience 

with the Pennsylvania State Police, and in particular, his 

training and experience in computer forensics. Corporal 

Roche testified that he received training from EnCase,[6] and 

that he is an EnCase certified examiner. He also testified 

that he is an AccessData certified examiner.[fn.1] . . . [N.T. 

Trial, 8/19/14, at 25-26]. 

[fn.1] AccessData is the maker of the Forensic Tool Kit 

[(hereinafter “FTK”)]. [Corporal Roche testified that: 

“AccessData is another company in competition with 

EnCase. And they make a similar tool. It works 

perhaps a little bit differently, but its mission and 

function are the same, the forensic examination of 

storage media of computers and any type of storage 

media, flash drive, what have you.” N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, 

at 26.] 

With regard to determining “date stamps” or “time stamps” 

relevant to this matter, Corporal Roche testified that he first 

used the EnCase program to search the hard drive of the 

____________________________________________ 

6

 As Corporal Roche testified: 

EnCase is a company that makes a software forensic sweep 

for use by law enforcement and industry. It’s a very 

expensive program that’s used to be able to look into some 

type of media, generally speaking a computer’s hard drive, 

and start searching for evidence. 

N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 25. 
J-S20020-16 

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computer brought to the police barracks by [Appellant]. 

The gallery function of the EnCase software allowed

Corporal Roche to search through a thumbnail gallery of 

photographs in a timely fashion. Corporal Roche testified 

that he identified 43 images that he believed depicted 

images of child pornography.[7] Corporal Roche then used 

EnCase to create [an] “exact bit for bit copy of every piece 

of information on the [computer’s] hard drive.” [Id. at 50]. 

Corporal Roche then was able to examine each image to 

determine when it was placed on the computer. 

Corporal Roche testified that the created date and time for 

“[j]ust about all of the images” was “August 11, 2013, 

between the times of about [nine] o’clock and 12 o’clock 

a.m.” [Id. at 51]. He then testified that the created date 

and time “is the absolute most accurate time to use of when 

it was first put there.” [Id.] Corporal Roche [testified] that 

“the original created date and time will always stay the 

same on the host computer.” [Id. at 52]. In conclusion, 

Corporal Roche [testified] that he [was] “[a]bsolutely 

scientifically certain that the dates and times are that which 

was when the computer was used to look at these images 

and download these images depicting child pornography.” 

[Id. at 56. Moreover, Corporal Roche testified that the 

images of child pornography on the computer “were all 

created [and] accessed on or after the period of time that 

Matthew Woods left the house.”8 Id. at 69]. 

Corporal Roche then testified that he used the . . . FTK from 

AccessData as a separate method of determining the 

created date and time for the pornographic images. Using 

this forensic tool, and comparing the results to the results 

reached using EnCase, “[t]he created, the modified, the last 

accessed, the entry modified, all these dates and times 

____________________________________________ 

7

 During trial, the parties stipulated that “the photos found on the computer 

depicted children between the ages of [nine] to 11 engaging in a prohibited 

sexual act or simulation of such an act.” N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 76. 

8

 Again, in her August 14, 2013 written statement to the police, Appellant 

admitted that Matthew Woods “left the residence on July 23[,] 2013, and . . 

. [had] not been back since.” N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 42. 
J-S20020-16 

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were exactly the same to the hundredths of a second on 

each and every photograph.” [Id. at 57]. 

[Appellant] called Dr. Linda Volonino to testify [on her 

behalf]. Dr. Volonino holds a Ph.D. and an MBA in 

Information Systems. She is a full professor at Canisius 

College and an associate with Robson Forensics. Dr. 

Volonino testified that she trained with FTK in New York 

City, and she teaches FTK to her students. Dr. Volonino 

[testified] that she has minimal training with EnCase. The 

[trial] court accepted Dr. Volonino as an expert in the field 

of computer forensics. [Id. at 78-83]. 

With regard to the reliability of the time stamps of the 

images at issue in this matter, Dr. Volonino testified that 

the time stamps “have no meaning.” [Id. at 87]. She 

explained this opinion by [testifying:] “[b]ecause the way 

EnCase treats deleted files, the software, specifically EnCase 

software, will create a folder called logged files. And when 

it does, it puts all of these deleted files into the lost files 

folder because it doesn’t know what to do with them, that 

is, it cannot associate it with any folder. And EnCase admits 

that once files are deleted the time stamps are unreliable.” 

[Id.] Dr. Volonino concluded that the time stamps on the 

jpeg files that came to her in this case [were] unreliable. 

[Id. at 88]. 

When questioned about Corporal Roche’s use of FTK, and 

the fact that the time stamp results were identical to the 

time stamp results using EnCase, Dr. Volonino [testified] 

that she “was not provided with any of [Corporal Roche’s] 

results from FTK.” [Id. at 89]. Dr. Volonino then [testified] 

that the time stamp results using FTK would be unreliable[] 

because whether a technician is using EnCase or FTK, when 

a file is deleted, the file system deletes the time stamp, and 

the tool kit cannot recreate it. [Id. at 88]. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/15, at 6-9 (some internal citations and internal 

capitalization omitted). 

In addition to the above evidence, Corporal Roche testified that, in his 

opinion, the child pornography did not “inadvertently” appear on Appellant’s 
J-S20020-16 

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computer. N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 58. Rather, Corporal Roche testified: that 

the child pornography on the computer was the result of “at least [three] 

hours of searching the internet for these images” and that “it [was] a fair 

statement [to say] that on August 11[, 2013,] between th[e] hours of [nine] 

and 11, [Appellant] went to th[e child pornography] websites.” Id. at 58-59 

and 74-75. 

The trial court then charged the jury. With respect to the sexual 

abuse of children count, the court charged the jury as follows: 

to find [Appellant] guilty of this offense, you must find that 

each of the following [four] elements have been proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt, first, that [Appellant] 

possessed, controlled, [or] intentionally viewed the 

computer depiction. And we’re going to say that the term 

intentionally viewed means that [Appellant] deliberately, 

purposely and voluntarily viewed material depicting a child 

of under 18 years of age engaged in a prohibited sexual act 

or the simulation of such an act. The term does not mean 

the inadvertent or accidental viewing of such material. 

Second, that the item depicted a child engaging in a 

prohibited sexual act or the simulation of such an act. 

Third, that the child was at the time under the age of 18. 

And, fourth, that [Appellant] did so knowingly, in other 

words, [Appellant] was aware of what she possessed or 

controlled, she was aware of the nature of its contents and 

that the child involved was under the age of 18. 

N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 136-137. 

Appellant did not object to any portion of the trial court’s jury charge. 

Id. at 143.9

____________________________________________ 

9

 We note that, in response to a jury question, the trial court recharged the 

jury on the elements for both charges. See N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 146-147. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
J-S20020-16 

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The jury found Appellant guilty of both sexual abuse of children and 

unsworn falsification to authorities. 

On December 15, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a 

jail term of not less than nine months nor more than two years less one day, 

followed by two years of probation. The trial court denied Appellant’s timely 

post-sentence motion on May 19, 2015 and Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal.10 Appellant raises three claims on appeal: 

[1.] Whether the trial court erred by denying the motion to 

suppress statements inasmuch as the statements of 

[Appellant] below were involuntary under the special 

circumstances of the interrogation when obtained? 

[2.] Whether the trial court erred by denying the motion for 

judgment of acquittal on the conviction for child 

pornography inasmuch as the information only charged such 

crime for knowing possession or control of child 

pornography, but not for intentional viewing of child 

pornography, and the evidence did not suffice to prove 

knowing possession or control of child pornography?

[3.] Whether the trial court erred by denying the motion for 

judgment of acquittal on the conviction for unsworn

falsification to authorities inasmuch as the evidence did not 

suffice to prove the element that [Appellant] made a written 

false statement which she did not believe to be true? 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

The recharge was, for all intents and purposes, identical to the original 

charge and Appellant did not object to the trial court’s recharge. Id. 

10 On April 23, 2015, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion to extend the 

deadline for deciding the post-sentence motion. Trial Court Order, 4/23/15, 

at 1; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(b) (“[u]pon motion of the defendant 

within the 120-day disposition period, for good cause shown, the judge may 

grant one 30-day extension for decision on the [post-sentence] motion”). 
J-S20020-16 

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Appellant’s Brief at 5 (some internal capitalization omitted).11

Appellant first claims that the trial court erred when it denied her 

motion to suppress the oral and written statements she made to Corporal 

Roche on August 14, 2013. This claim fails. 

“Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it is the 

Commonwealth’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant’s 

rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047-1048 (Pa. 

Super. 2012) (en banc); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). With respect to an 

appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, our Supreme Court has 

declared: 

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial 

court’s denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. When 

reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, we must 

consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much 

of the evidence of the defense as remains uncontradicted 

when read in the context of the record. . . . Where the 

record supports the findings of the suppression court, we 

are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal 

conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. 

Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007) (internal 

citations omitted). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as 

____________________________________________ 

11 For ease of discussion, we have re-numbered Appellant’s claims on 

appeal. 
J-S20020-16 

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factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given 

their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). Moreover, we note that our scope of review from a 

suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record that was created at 

the suppression hearing.12 In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013). 

“To safeguard an uncounseled individual’s Fifth Amendment privilege 

against self-incrimination, suspects subject to custodial interrogation by law 

enforcement officers must be warned that they have the right to remain 

silent, that anything they say may be used against them in court, and that 

they are entitled to the presence of an attorney.” In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 

333 (Pa. 2002) (plurality); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-445. “If a person is 

not advised of his Miranda rights prior to custodial interrogation by law 

enforcement officers, evidence resulting from such interrogation cannot be 

used against him.” In re R.H., 791 A.2d at 333; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-

____________________________________________ 

12 On October 30, 2013, our Supreme Court decided In re L.J. In L.J., our 

Supreme Court held that our scope of review from a suppression ruling is 

limited to the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression 

hearing. In re L.J., 79 A.3d at 1087. Prior to L.J., this Court routinely held 

that, when reviewing a suppression court’s ruling, our scope of review 

included “the evidence presented both at the suppression hearing and at 

trial.” See Commonwealth v. Charleston, 16 A.3d 505, 516 (Pa. Super. 

2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Chacko, 459 A.2d 311, 317 n.5 (Pa. 

1983). L.J. thus narrowed our scope of review of suppression court rulings 

to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. In this case, 

Appellant’s suppression hearing occurred after L.J. was decided. Therefore, 

the procedural rule announced in L.J. applies to the case at bar. 
J-S20020-16 

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445. However, “[a]n officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings 

attaches . . . only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s 

freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” In re V.H., 788 A.2d 976, 980 (Pa. 

Super. 2001), quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322-323 

(1994) (some internal quotations omitted). As this Court has summarized: 

The warnings articulated by [Miranda] become mandatory 

whenever one is subjected to custodial interrogation. The 

United States Supreme Court has defined custodial 

interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement 

officers after a person has been taken into custody or 

otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 

significant way.” [Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-445]. 

Police detentions only become custodial when, under the 

totality of the circumstances, the conditions and/or duration 

of the detention become so coercive as to constitute the 

functional equivalent of formal arrest. 

Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes 

depends on whether the person is physically deprived of his 

freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a 

situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom 

of action or movement is restricted by the interrogation. 

Moreover, the test for custodial interrogation does not 

depend upon the subjective intent of the law enforcement 

officer interrogator. Rather, the test focuses on whether 

the individual being interrogated reasonably believes his 

freedom of action is being restricted. 

The factors a court utilizes to determine, under the totality 

of the circumstances, whether a detention has become so 

coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest 

include: the basis for the detention; its length; its location; 

whether the suspect was transported against his or her will, 

how far, and why; whether restraints were used; whether 

the law enforcement officer showed, threatened or used 

force; and the investigative methods employed to confirm 

or dispel suspicions. The fact that a police investigation has 
J-S20020-16 

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focused on a particular individual does not automatically 

trigger “custody,” thus requiring Miranda warnings. 

Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 500-501 (some internal citations, 

quotations, and corrections omitted). 

Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it failed to suppress 

the oral and written statements that she made to Corporal Roche on August 

14, 2013. As noted above, on August 14, 2013, Appellant “voluntarily and 

of her own free will” appeared at the police station and then engaged in a 

“friendly” interview with Corporal Roche. Appellant’s Motion to Suppress, 

7/10/14, at ¶¶ 8 and 15-16. However, during this interview, Appellant 

proffered oral and written statements that were eventually used against her 

at trial. 

On appeal, Appellant concedes that her interview with Corporal Roche 

that day was non-custodial in nature. Appellant’s Brief at 20-21 (conceding 

that the interview was non-custodial). Nevertheless, Appellant claims that 

the “special circumstances” of this case resulted in her statements being 

involuntary and subject to suppression. Specifically, Appellant claims: 

even a non-custodial interrogation may result in an

involuntary statement. A non-custodial interrogation might 

possibly in some situations by virtue of some special 

circumstances result in an involuntary statement. See 

Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-348 [] 

(1976). It is submitted that Appellant’s circumstances were 

special in that Corporal Roche formed the opinion that she 

was reporting child pornography and that it existed on the 

computer, but that he questioned her motivation. The 

interrogation became, at that point, a game of cat-andmouse regardless of how it began. Thus, the trial court 

erred by failing to suppress the statements as involuntary. 
J-S20020-16 

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Id. at 21-22 (some internal citations omitted). 

As Appellant correctly notes, in Beckwith, the United States Supreme 

Court recognized “that non[-]custodial interrogation might possibly in some 

situations, by virtue of some special circumstances, be characterized as one 

where the behavior of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the 

defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely selfdetermined.” Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 347-348 (internal quotations, 

citations, and corrections omitted). However, the “special circumstances” 

referenced in Beckwith do not exist in the case at bar. Indeed, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the relevant 

evidence in this case demonstrates that: Appellant “voluntarily and of her 

own free will” went to the police station on August 14, 2013 to report that 

her husband committed a crime; Corporal Roche spoke to Appellant in “the 

main area of [his] office,” at “a large conference table;” Appellant “was free 

to leave at any time” during the interview; Corporal Roche never read 

Appellant Miranda warnings; although Appellant’s story “seemed unusual,” 

Corporal Roche “had no reason to disbelieve the main portion of 

[Appellant’s] child pornography accusations” against her husband; during 

the interview, Corporal Roche “had no belief that criminal activity by 

[Appellant] had occurred;” the entire interaction between Corporal Roche 

and Appellant on August 14, 2013 was “friendly;” and, Appellant left the 

police station at the end of the interview. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/7/14, 
J-S20020-16 

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at 7, 10-11 and 24; Appellant’s Motion to Suppress, 7/10/14, at ¶¶ 8 and 

15-16. 

To quote Beckwith, “the entire interview [in this case] was free of 

coercion.” Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 348. As such, Appellant’s claim that the 

trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress fails. 

Next, Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support 

her conviction for sexual abuse of children, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1). This 

claim fails. 

We review Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge under the 

following standard: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there 

is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In

applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of 

law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden 

of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must 

be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence 

produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the 

evidence. 
J-S20020-16 

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Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 559-560 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en 

banc), quoting Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 947 A.2d 800, 805-806 

(Pa. Super. 2008). 

According to Appellant, although the Commonwealth charged her with 

violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1), the Commonwealth’s Information only 

quoted a portion of the statute. In particular, Appellant notes, the 

Information only declared that Appellant had “[k]nowingly possessed or 

controlled” child pornography. Appellant’s Brief at 12. However, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1) not only criminalizes the knowing “possess[ion] or 

control[]” of child pornography, but it also criminalizes the “intentional[] 

view[ing]” of child pornography. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1). Appellant 

argues that, since the Information failed to charge her with “intentionally 

view[ing]” child pornography, she could not have been lawfully convicted of 

this aspect of the crime. Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant then claims that 

the “Commonwealth presented no competent evidence of [Appellant’s] 

knowing possession or control of the files on or about August 14, 2013” – 

and that the evidence was thus insufficient to support her conviction for 

violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1). See id. Appellant’s claim fails for at 

least two independent reasons. 

First, Appellant never challenged the sufficiency of the 

Commonwealth’s Information at the trial level. Moreover, during trial, the 

trial court charged the jury on all aspects of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1). 

Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury that, to find Appellant guilty of 
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violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1), the jury must find “that [Appellant] 

possessed, controlled, [or] intentionally viewed the computer 

depiction” of child pornography. N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 137 (emphasis 

added); see also N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 146-147 (during the recharge to 

the jury, the trial court stated: “[t]o find [Appellant] guilty of [sexual abuse 

of children,] you must find . . . first, that [Appellant] possessed, controlled, 

or intentionally viewed a computer depiction” of child pornography). 

Appellant did not object to this jury instruction. 

On appeal, Appellant acknowledges that she failed to object to the trial 

court’s jury charge. Appellant’s Brief at 15. However, she claims that she 

still could not have been convicted of “intentionally viewing” child 

pornography because “due process does not permit [her to be] convicted of 

an uncharged classification of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1). Id. This claim 

fails. 

Our Supreme Court has long-since abrogated the “basic and 

fundamental error” doctrine in the criminal law arena. See 

Commonwealth v. Clair, 326 A.2d 272, 274 (Pa. 1974). To preserve an 

issue for appellate review, it is axiomatic that the issue must first be raised 

in the trial court. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Indeed, with respect to erroneous jury 

instructions, our Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly declare: “[n]o 

portions of the charge nor omissions from the charge may be assigned as 

error, unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to 

deliberate.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(b). 
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In the case at bar, Appellant failed to object to the erroneous jury 

charge and the trial court was thus never given the opportunity to correct its 

mistake. This results in waiver of the issue, notwithstanding the fact that 

the error implicated Appellant’s due process rights. Certainly, when our 

Supreme Court eliminated the basic and fundamental error doctrine from our 

jurisprudence, our high Court anticipated that due process violations would 

and could be waived on direct appeal. As our Supreme Court declared: 

“abrogating the [basic and fundamental error] doctrine in the criminal area 

may be even more compelling [than eliminating the doctrine from our civil 

law] since any error that deprives a defendant of due process can 

more properly be remedied by a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” 

Clair, 326 A.2d at 274 (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. 

Matty, 619 A.2d 1383, 1386-87 (Pa. Super. 1993) (where the information 

charged the defendant with solicitation to commit theft by receiving stolen 

property, but where the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of 

solicitation to commit theft of services, the defendant “waived [the] issue 

regarding the legality of his conviction for solicitation when he failed to 

object to the court’s instructions to the jury on the elements of the 

offense”). 

Thus, since Appellant failed to object to the trial court’s jury 

instruction, Appellant “waived [the] issue regarding the legality of [her] 

conviction for” “intentionally viewing” child pornography. Matty, 619 A.2d 

at 1386-87. Moreover, since Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim 
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was logically dependent upon this Court concluding that the defect in the 

Information precluded her conviction for “intentionally viewing” child 

pornography, Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim necessarily fails. 

At any rate, Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails because the evidence 

was sufficient to prove that Appellant “[k]nowingly possessed or controlled” 

child pornography. As the trial court cogently explained: 

Corporal Roche testified that [Appellant] presented herself 

at the [Pennsylvania] State Police Barracks on August 14, 

2013, with the subject computer. Corporal Roche further 

testified that [Appellant] “was essentially bringing me the 

computer because she wanted me to take a look at what 

was on it because she wanted to tell me that there was 

child pornography images on the computer and that they 

were put there by her husband, Matthew Woods.” [N.T. 

Trial, 8/19/14, at 31]. Finally, with regard to Corporal 

Roche’s opinion about the nature of the images that he 

found, he stated that he “found in excess of 40 images and 

specifically 43 images of what I believed depicted child 

pornography of some sort, whether it be the focal point of 

the genital area of a person under the age of 18, certainly a 

prepubescent person or they are engaged in sex of some 

sort or simulation thereof or masturbation. These would all 

meet the definition of child pornography. [Id. at 49]. 

Given the testimony of Corporal Roche, and viewing that 

testimony in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

it is easy to see how the jury believed that [Appellant] 

purposely downloaded images of child pornography on the 

family’s computer for the purpose of reporting the presence 

of the images to the Pennsylvania State Police, and all with 

the goal of having Matthew Woods, her estranged husband, 

charged with criminal offenses of a sexual nature. By 

necessity, such a finding means that [Appellant] knowingly, 

as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 302(b),] downloaded and 

possessed images containing child pornography. In other 

words, [Appellant] was aware of her conduct and the nature 

of her conduct, because it was her express purpose to 
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download child pornography, possess these images, and 

take these images to the Pennsylvania State Police; her 

plan would not [have] work[ed] without these actions. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/15, at 14-15 (some internal citations omitted). 

We agree with the trial court. Therefore, we conclude that the 

evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for sexual abuse of 

children under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1). Appellant’s claim to the contrary 

fails. 

For Appellant’s final claim on appeal, Appellant contends that the 

evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for unsworn falsification 

to authorities; the conviction was based upon the written statement that 

Appellant made on August 14, 2013, in the Pennsylvania State Police 

Barracks. Appellant’s claim on appeal is waived. 

Appellant was convicted of unsworn falsification to authorities under 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4904(a)(1). This section declares: 

(a) In general.--A person commits a misdemeanor of the 

second degree if, with intent to mislead a public servant in 

performing his official function, he: 

(1) makes any written false statement which he does

not believe to be true.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4904(a)(1). 

As is apparent, before this Court may consider Appellant’s claim that 

the evidence was insufficient to support her Section 4904(a)(1) conviction, 

this Court must be able to review the entire written statement that Appellant 

made on August 14, 2013. Yet, Appellant has failed to include the written 
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statement in the certified record to this Court. Therefore, we must conclude 

that Appellant’s final claim on appeal is waived. Commonwealth v. 

Saranchak, 675 A.2d 268, 275 (Pa. 1996) (“[i]t is appellant’s responsibility 

to ensure that any relevant related matter be filed or made part of the 

original record” and, where appellant fails to ensure that the certified record 

is sufficient to review the claims raised on appeal, the claims are waived); 

Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 868 A.2d 582, 593 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“this 

Court may not consider anything that is not part of the official certified 

record: [a]ny document which is not part of the official certified record is 

considered to be non-existent”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Panella, J. joins the decision. 

Platt, J. concurs in the result. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 3/11/2016 
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