FILED

November 14, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

RICK HOLLOWAY, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellee, ) Maury Circuit

) No. 7188

VS. )

) Appeal No.

JOHN R. COLLIER, JR., ) 01A01-9704-CV-00153

)

Defendant/Appellant. )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT OF MAURY COUNTY

AT COLUMBIA, TENNESSEE

HONORABLE WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE

John S. Colley, III #12029

COLLEY & COLLEY

P.O. Box 1476

Columbia, Tennessee 38402-1476

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

 

Robert L. Trentham, #2257

Mark Tyler Seitz, #11868

TRABUE STURDIVANT & DEWITT

2500 Nashville City Center

511 Union Street

Nashville, Tennessee 37219

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

HENRY F. TODD

PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION

CONCUR:

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE

CONCUR IN SEPARATE OPINION:

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
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RICK HOLLOWAY, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellee, ) Maury Circuit

) No. 7188

VS. )

) Appeal No.

JOHN R. COLLIER, JR., ) 01A01-9704-CV-00153

)

Defendant/Appellant. )

O P I N I O N

The defendant, John R. Collier, Jr., has appealed from a jury verdict and judgment

awarding the plaintiff, Rick Holloway, $17,000.00 compensatory damages for a tort described

in the complaint as follows:

2. In June, 1995, Rick Holloway was an at-will

employee of Centex-Rogers Construction Company.

3. Centex-Rogers Construction Company was

providing materials and services to Maury Regional Hospital

in the first half of 1995 in the form of a construction project

at Maury Regional Hospital.

4. Plaintiff Rick Holloway worked at and on the

Maury Regional Hospital construction project for CentexRogers Construction Company several months prior to June

1995.

5. In May and/or June 1995, Defendant John R.

Collier, Jr. contacted one or more individuals at CentexRogers Construction Company regarding Plaintiff Rick

Holloway.

6. Defendant John R. Collier, Jr. communicated

to Centex-Rogers ConstructionCompany in May and/or June,

1995 that Plaintiff Rick Holloway had improperly reroofed a

Maury Regional Hospital employee’s home, and in doing so,

had violated the trust of Maury Regional Hospital

management.

7. The statements communicated to CentexRogers Construction Company by Defendant John R. Collier,

Jr. as set forth in the preceding paragraph were not true, and

Defendant John R. Collier, Jr. either knew or should have

known that said statements were untrue.

8. The statements communicated by Defendant

John R. Collier, Jr. to Centex-Rogers Construction Company

as set forth in the preceding two paragraphs were made

maliciously, and were made intentionally or recklessly, with

the intent to procure the termination of Plaintiff Rick
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Holloway’s employment with Centex-Rogers Construction

Company.

9. In communicating the aforementioned

statements to Centex-Rogers Construction Company,

Defendant John R. Collier, Jr. did, by inducement,persuasion,

misrepresentation, and/or other means, wrongfully interfere

with the at-will employment between Centex-Rogers

Construction Company and Plaintiff Rick Holloway.

Defendant John R. Collier, Jr. is therefore liable for Plaintiff’s

lost wages since his termination on June 11, 1995.

The defendant answered, denying the material portions of the complaint and stating:

14. The Complaint fails to state a claim.

15. The Defendant is immune from suit under the

provisions of Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act

because at all times material to the Complaint, he was acting

within the course and scope of his employment as Assistant

Administrator at Maury Regional Hospital.

16. The Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by the applicable

statute of limitations.

17. The Defendant’s communications to Centex-Rogers

Construction Company concerning the Plaintiff are protected

by a qualified privilege.

WHEREFORE, having fullyanswered, the Defendant

demands a jury of twelve (12) to try the case against him;

prays that the Complaint filed against him be dismissed; and

prays that he be awarded his discretionary costs incurred in

conjunction with the defense of this matter.

The cause was tried to a jury with the result stated above.

Upon appeal to this Court, the defendant appellant presents a single issue as follows:

1. Whether the plaintiff presented material

evidence to support the jury’s verdict that the defendant is

liable under the theory of intentional interference with an

employment relationship.

The verdict of a jury may be set aside only if there is no material evidence to support

the verdict. TRAP Rule 13d, Smith County v. Eatherly, Tenn. App. 1991, 820 S.W.2d 366.
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A verdict may be reversed on appeal if, after taking the strongest legitimate view of

the evidence in favor of the successful party, the appellate court finds that a reasonable mind

could reach only one conclusion and that conclusion is contrary to the verdict. Wharton

Transport v. Bridges, Tenn. App. 1980, 606 S.W.2d 521; Holmes v. Wilson, Tenn. App.

1977, 551 S.W.2d 682; Flynn v. Shoney’s Inc., Tenn. App. 1992, 850 S.W.2d 458.

In Forrester v. Stockstill, Tenn. App. 1994, 869 S.W.2d 328, the employee at-will

sued his corporate employer and its directors who made the decision to discharge him. The

Supreme Court held that the employee had no contractual right to continued employment and

thus no claim for procurement of breach of contract and that the directors were not liable for

intentionally interfering with plaintiff’s employment.

There is a statutory tort of inducement or procurement of breach of contract. T.C.A.

§ 47-50-109. The elements of the cause of action are, knowledge of the wrongdoer of a legal

contract, malicious intent of wrongdoer, and a resultant breach of the contract with damages.

TSC Indus. Inc. v. Tomlin, Tenn. App. 1987, 743 2d 169.

There is evidence from which a reasonable jury might find the following:

1. Centex-Rogers Construction Company was engaged as general contractor to

construct a building for Maury Regional Hospital.

2. John R. Collier, assistant administrator of the hospital had oversight of

security of the hospital and the construction being performed by Centex.

3. In September 1994, Micky Jenkins, job superintendent for Centex, hired

plaintiff temporarily to work as a carpenter on the job as an “at will” employee of Centex.
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4. In February 1995, while still employed by Centex on the same project,

plaintiff agreed with Doug Johnston, a hospital security guard under the supervision of

Collier, the assistant hospital administrator, to repair a roof for Johnston, the security guard.

5. This was “spare time” work, and did not interfere with plaintiff’s work on the

hospital building.

6. Johnston became dissatisfied with the delay in completion of the roof job by

plaintiff and, on several occasions, Johnston complained about the delay to his supervisor,

Charles Perkins, chief of security of the hospital.

7. Both plaintiff and Johnston had volatile personalities, and Johnston’s

superiors were concerned about the possibility of an altercation between the two on hospital

premises.

8. Hospital authorities informed a Centex supervisor of their concern about the

difficulty between plaintiff and Johnston, but did not suggest that any action be taken. 

9. On June 9, 1995, plaintiff was discharged by Centex.

Moreover, there is no evidence that defendant published any statement that there was

danger of an altercation on the job between plaintiff and defendant. This was a conclusion

reached from reports received from others by the hospital authorities who in turn reported

their concerns to the plaintiff’s employer. The report of their concerns by the hospital

authorities was the obvious cause of plaintiff’s discharge, and none of the hospital authorities

is a party to this action.
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No evidence is found in this record to support a verdict for plaintiff against defendant.

The verdict and judgment of the Trial Court are therefore vacated and reversed and plaintiff’s

suit is dismissed. Costs of this appeal are taxed against the plaintiff appellee. The cause is

remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

___________________________________

HENRY F. TODD

PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION

CONCURS:

____________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE

CONCUR IN SEPARATE OPINION:

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE