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SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND 

GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 4, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

LESTER MUNSON III, Staff Director

JODI B. HERMAN, Democratic Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND

GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona, Chairman

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

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FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Jeff Flake, U.S. Senator From Arizona ........................................................ 1 

Hon. Edward J. Markey, U.S. Senator From Massachusetts .............................. 2 

Hon. Linda Thomas–Greenfield, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, U.S. 

Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Hon. Puneet Talwar, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political–Military Affairs, 

U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ...................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Amanda J. Dory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, 

Department of Defense, Washington, DC .......................................................... 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16 

Statement of Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC ......................................................... 27 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Response of Linda Thomas Greenfield to Question Submitted by Senator 

Bob Corker ............................................................................................................ 50 

Responses of Linda Thomas Greenfield and Puneet Talwar to Questions 

Submitted by Senator Bob Corker ...................................................................... 50 

Responses of Amanda J. Dory to Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Corker 52 

Response of Puneet Talwar to Question Submitted by Senator James E. 

Risch ...................................................................................................................... 53 

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FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

(1) 

SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA 

THURSDAY, JUNE 4, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeff Flake (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Flake and Markey. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF FLAKE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA 

Senator FLAKE. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on African Affairs and Global Health Policy will 

come to order. 

U.S. security assistance to Africa is especially relevant today 

given the complex security climate on the continent. According to 

the United Nations, conflicts have displaced more than 3.5 million 

people in the Sahel alone. That is double the number at this time 

last year. 

At the same time, unrest continues to plague the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Sudan, South Sudan. 

Groups such as al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and the Lord’s Resistance Army continue to threaten partners in the region. That insecurity poses a threat to our own national security by creating a potential safe haven for terror groups. It also undermines efforts to 

foster economic growth and development by destabilizing institutions, discouraging investment, and destroying communities. 

From peacemaking, to counterterrorism, to promoting better civilian control of the military, the United States is heavily invested 

in fostering stability in Africa. Today we will examine the various 

components of this assistance. 

Now, in addition to existing programs, the administration announced two new security initiatives at the Africa Leaders Summit 

last August: the Security Governance Initiative and the African 

Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership, or APRRP. We look forward to hearing about how these new initiatives compare to existing training efforts and how the State Department guards against 

redundancy across accounts. 

We also look forward to hearing about the effectiveness of our efforts to promote security on the continent and the receptivity of Africa’s civilian and military leadership to security cooperation. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

2 

Each of the witnesses today brings a unique perspective to the 

issue at hand, and I have no doubt that they will contribute greatly 

to the debate. I thank all of you for your time and for sharing your 

experience with all of us. We look forward to your testimony. 

With that, I would like to recognize the distinguished minority 

member, Mr. Markey, for any comments he might have. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. And 

thank all of you for the time you are going to give us today to discuss U.S. security sector assistance to Africa, which is an increasingly critical element of our efforts there. From Somalia to Nigeria, 

U.S. security sector assistance is part of our effort to combat terrorism and enable our partners to establish and secure governance. 

We rely on the State Department’s leadership to explain and account for the overall strategic policy approach to security sector assistance in Africa. And we recognize that the State Department 

works closely with the Department of Defense and other agencies 

to form an integrated approach, and we value this cooperation. 

We are pleased to have representatives from both agencies here 

today in order to have as complete a discussion about our strategic 

approach to this topic. 

Security sector efforts have a real impact on the ground, and 

interagency coordination is essential to ensure that we are covering 

all the bases. Improving the safety and security of a society require 

many different players. Law enforcement and judicial reform, for 

example, are critical to reassuring people that their government 

takes everyday safety seriously. In outright conflict, the role of a 

peacekeeper can mean the difference between life and death for a 

civilian in need of protection. 

In fiscal year 2014, the State Department’s budget for all of the 

accounts that contribute to the security sector in Africa total approximately just under $400 million. In fiscal year 2016, the request is closer to $500 million before we factor in this new fund, 

the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund. I understand our private 

panel will attempt to untangle the various funding sources that 

make up this total, and I look forward to that testimony. Broadly 

speaking, these funds cover traditional peacekeeping assistance 

funds, law enforcement funds, and professional military training 

and assistance. And the bottom line is that the amount of funds requested and required for these purposes is increasing. 

At last year’s Africa Leaders Summit, President Obama announced several security sector-focused initiatives for Africa. There 

is APRRP, the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership, 

and the Security and Governance Initiative, for example. I look forward to hearing from our State Department witnesses how these 

new programs combine with existing ones to keep us moving toward a clear and articulated strategy on U.S. security assistance 

in Africa. 

As we tackle this issue today, I want to be clear about three 

basic requirements for U.S. security sector assistance in Africa. 

One, it must represent the very best of U.S. ideals abroad. Our 

support must reinforce the importance of strong democratic instituFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

3 

tions. It must insist on the very highest standards in human 

rights, and it must never be used for the abuse of a population. 

Second, it must serve to mitigate threats against the United 

States and American citizens overseas. Where we can help our allies counter violent extremism within their borders, we are contributing to our mutual security. 

And three, it must promote the ability of African countries and 

the African Union to account for their own domestic and regional 

security needs with growing independence from the donor community. We need the buy-in of our partners in the future of their security, and our programming must reflect this need. 

So I, again, thank you all for being here today, and I am looking 

forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Markey. 

We will go through this panel. Let me just tell you we have votes 

that will start in a couple of minutes. We are hoping to be able to 

just stagger it so we can keep this going. One of us will go vote 

and then the other so we can keep going. We have this panel and 

then one on the other one. But if all things go okay, we should be 

able to wrap up in the time that we told you. 

Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield is the Assistant Secretary 

for the Bureau of African Affairs. She is making a return trip— 

many return trips—before this committee or subcommittee, and we 

appreciate that. Prior to this appointment, she served as Director 

General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources. 

She has a 32-year Foreign Service career, including several posts 

in Washington, the ambassadorship to Liberia, foreign postings in 

Switzerland, Pakistan, Kenya, the Gambia, Nigeria, and Jamaica. 

Now, Assistant Secretary Puneet Talwar oversees the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and he manages 

the State Department’s global security relationships and international security assistance and the negotiation of international security agreements. Mr. Talwar is also the State Department’s principal liaison with the Department of Defense. Before this current 

appointment, he served as Special Assistant to the President and 

senior director for Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf States at the National 

Security Council. If you are wondering how he knew which doors 

to walk in here, it is because he served as chief Middle East adviser for the Foreign Relations Committee for a number of years. 

So welcome back. 

Amanda Dory currently serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for African Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Prior to this position, she was Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Strategy. Ms. Dory has also been chief of staff for the 

Irregular Warfare and Building Partnership Capacity QDR Execution Roadmaps. She previously served as Country Director for 

southern Africa and for west Africa in the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense. 

Now, on the next panel, Lauren Blanchard is the specialist in African Affairs with CRS where she provides a nonpartisan analysis 

for the African political, military, and diplomatic affairs. She has 

written extensively on security assistance and security issues with 

U.S. military engagement on the continent. Prior to joining CRS, 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

4 

she managed democracy support initiatives in east and southern 

Africa. She has also consulted on constitutional reform efforts in 

Kenya and on developments of democratic institutions in southern 

Sudan. 

Welcome to all of you, and if you could please keep your comments to about 5 minutes. Obviously, your testimony is entered 

into the record, and if you could summarize, we would appreciate 

it. Thank you. 

Ms. Greenfield. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LINDA THOMAS–GREENFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you, Chairman and 

Ranking Member Markey, for inviting me to testify at this hearing 

today on security assistance in Africa. I also very much appreciate 

your asking my colleagues from the Department of Defense and the 

Department of State’s Bureau of Political and Military Affairs to 

join me at the witness table. Our partnership and our coordination 

are essential to any success that we achieve in Africa. 

Given fragility, conflict, and transnational security issues, the 

promotion of peace and security in Africa remains one of the 

United States highest priorities and is critical to reaching our democracy and governance, economic, and development and security 

goals on the continent. We are actively pursuing policies of partnership and ways to promote solutions that yield long-term results. 

In fiscal year 2104, the Department of State committed approxi- mately $496 million in bilateral peace and security assistance to 

sub-Saharan Africa. With the overarching goal of helping our African partners, our security policy addresses three broad priorities. 

These are peacekeeping and the prevention of additional conflict, 

strengthening the security sector in partner states, and countering 

terrorism and other transnational threats. 

Through our bilateral and regional relationships, as well as 

through our engagement in the U.N. Security Council, we are focused on enhancing the capabilities of our African partners to prevent and respond to crises. 

The administration remains committed to building African peacekeeping capacity at the regional, subregional, as well as national 

levels, including through the provision of advisors, training, equipment, and other assistance. Peacekeeping operations contribute to 

stability within the respective subregions, as well as on the entire 

continent. We will continue to build the capacity of African military 

and police peacekeepers through programs like the International 

Police Peacekeeping Operations Support program, the Global Peace 

Operations Initiative—GPOI— and the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, which is primarily funded 

through GPOI. These initiatives, along with the new and complementary African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership— 

APRRP that you referred to—which focuses on strengthening critical gaps in rapid response capabilities, are critical for the longterm success of peace-building on the continent. 

In the African context, we know that achieving our shared peace 

and security goals depends on cooperating with and strengthening 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

5 

our partners’ security institutions. That is why President Obama 

launched the Security Governance Initiative—SGI—at the Africa 

Leaders Summit last August. SGI is a multiyear effort that will 

initially focus on six partner countries: Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, 

Nigeria, and Tunisia. SGI provides us the opportunity to support 

partners to improve the management and accountability of the security sector, which is linked to their ability to more effectively and 

efficiently deliver security and justice to their citizens. SGI also 

features a more holistic interagency approach for assisting our 

partners to more strategically and comprehensively address shared 

security challenges and emerging threats. 

The continued violence perpetrated by al-Shabaab, Al Qaeda in 

the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, and other terrorist groups on 

the continent of Africa continues to be of concern. We are strongly 

committed to assisting African countries to increase their capacity 

to address the immediate threats posed by terrorist organizations 

and to prevent terrorists from using the region to recruit, seek 

sanctuary and secure resources and financing from their people. 

We are pursuing these goals primarily through the Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership and the Partnership for Regional 

East Africa Counterterrorism. 

Other transnational issues such as drug trafficking, maritime 

crime, and wildlife trafficking are key issues that also demand our 

attention. Through U.S. assistance, African partners will be better 

able to adhere to international commitments and to contribute to 

global security. 

Mr. Chairman, on the Gulf of Guinea maritime security, we truly 

appreciate the resolution you sponsored last Congress condemning 

maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. And we continue to work 

with our international and African partners in their efforts to implement the Yaounde Process out of the 2013 West and Central African States Maritime Summit in Cameroon. 

Finally, as I noted during my confirmation hearing in 2013, governments that respect human rights, including women’s rights, and 

democratic norms make stronger and more stable partners for economic growth, development, peace, and prosperity. This remains a 

critical issue for us. We continue to encourage security services to 

respect human rights and hold violators of human rights accountable, because doing so promotes the legitimacy of these services. It 

improves the rule of law, and it undermines the extremist rhetoric 

calling on people to seek alternative justice systems. 

I look forward to receiving your questions. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD

Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing on security 

assistance to Africa. Thank you also for asking my colleagues from the Department 

of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the Department of Defense to join 

me at the witness table. Our partnership and coordination are essential to any 

success. 

SUPPORT TO U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Given state fragility, conflict, and transnational security issues, the promotion of 

peace and security in Africa remains one of the United States highest priorities, and 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

6 

is critical to attainment of our democracy and governance, economic, and development goals. We are actively pursuing policies of partnership and ways to promote 

solutions that yield long-term results. In fiscal year 2014, the Department of State 

committed approximately $496 million in bilateral peace and security assistance to 

sub-Saharan Africa. Resources are used to support conflict prevention and mitigation, atrocity prevention, stabilization operations, security sector reform, peacekeeping operations, targeted counterterrorism and counternarcotics initiatives, 

counterwildlife trafficking, nonproliferation, conventional weapons destruction, and 

maritime safety and security programs throughout the region. With the overarching 

goal of helping our African partners, our security policy addresses three broad priorities: peacekeeping and the prevention of additional conflicts, strengthening the 

security sector in partner states, and countering terrorism and other transnational 

threats. 

Through our bilateral and regional relationships as well as through our engagement in the U.N. Security Council, we are focused on enhancing the capabilities of 

our African partners to prevent and respond to crises. And as much as our approach 

encompasses traditional security sector partnerships, it also reflects a commitment 

to integrated security, to include women in the military and in the military’s relationship with communities because it is accompanied by strategic initiatives that 

engage communities keeping and maintaining peace. 

The administration remains committed to building African peacekeeping capacity 

at the regional, subregional, and national levels, including through the provision of 

advisors, training, equipment, and other assistance. Peacekeeping operations in 

Mali, the Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, 

Liberia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan contribute to stability within the respective subregions, as well as the entire continent. In South Sudan, the U.N. peacekeeping operation saved tens of thousands of lives since conflict erupted in December 2013, by taking the unprecedented step of allowing vulnerable civilians to shelter in its bases. More than 130,000 civilians continue to shelter at U.N. compounds 

across South Sudan. We will continue to build the capacity of African military and 

police peacekeepers through programs like the International Police Peacekeeping 

Operations Support (IPPOS) program, the Global Peace Operations Initiative 

(GPOI), and the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) 

program, which is primarily funded through GPOI. These initiatives, along with the 

new and complementary African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership 

(APRRP), which focuses on strengthening critical gaps in rapid response capabilities, are critical for the long-term success of peace-building in Africa. 

Through the Early Warning and Response Partnership (EWARP), a Presidential 

initiative announced at the August 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, we will continue to develop a full-spectrum of crisis management capabilities and strengthen 

the capacity of West African states and the African Union to not only improve their 

response mechanisms once a crisis develops, but to also proactively identify and prevent crises in a more proactive manner. Through consultations with the Economic 

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United States Mission to 

The African Union (USAU), and an extensive needs assessment, State and USAID 

have identified concrete lines of effort to be implemented over the next 5 years 

which meet U.S. objectives, respond to ECOWAS and African Union requests, and 

will enhance the long-term early warning and response assets and capabilities of 

ECOWAS, its 15 member states and the African Union. 

In the African context, we know that cooperating with and strengthening our 

partners’ security institutions is a critical element, along with civilian assistance, 

of achieving our shared peace and security goals. That’s why President Obama 

launched the Security Governance Initiative (SGI) at the U.S.–Africa Leaders Summit last August. SGI is a multiyear effort that will initially focus on six partner 

countries—Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia. SGI provides us the 

opportunity to support partners to improve the management and accountability of 

the justice and security sectors, which are linked to their ability to more effectively 

and efficiently deliver security and justice to citizens. Through SGI we work together with partner countries to identify priority focus areas that will have a significant impact on citizen security and to jointly develop objectives and intended outcomes from the SGI partnership. SGI features a more holistic interagency approach 

for assisting our partners to more strategically and comprehensively address shared 

security challenges and emerging threats. SGI also emphasizes the importance of 

joint assessment and analysis to ensure that partner countries are actively engaged 

in identifying the security governance challenges and opportunities that shape SGI 

engagement. 

The continued violence perpetrated by al-Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and other terrorist groups is concerning. In too 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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many places the aspirations of Africa’s young people are thwarted by political instability, armed conflict, and violent extremism. The al-Shabaab attack on Garissa 

University College in Kenya is a recent example of the horrific brutality of these 

violent extremists, where young people who were pursuing an education in hopes 

of contributing to their communities and their country, were targeted and killed. We 

are strongly committed to assisting African countries to increase their capacity to 

address the immediate threats posed by terrorist organizations and to prevent terrorists from using the region to recruit, seek sanctuary, or secure resources and 

financing. 

We are pursuing these goals primarily through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT). These programs mobilize resources and expertise from multiple U.S. Government agencies to assist our African partners in building security 

sector capacity, extending effective government control over remote areas terrorists 

may seek to exploit as safe havens, addressing the underlying causes of radicalization, and increasing the capacity of moderate leaders to positively influence populations that could be vulnerable to radicalization. Programming has strengthened 

the ability of partners to collect and analyze intelligence, support longer range 

patrolling, and understand strategies required to counter the violent extremist 

message. 

Other transnational issues such as drug trafficking, maritime crime, and wildlife 

trafficking are key issues that also demand attention. U.S. programming in all these 

areas focuses on increasing national capacity and promoting regional cooperation. 

Through U.S. assistance, African partners will be better able to adhere to international commitments and contribute to global security. On Gulf of Guinea maritime security, I appreciate the resolution you sponsored last Congress, Mr. Chairman, condemning maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. We continue to work with 

our international partners to support our African colleagues in their effort to implement the Yaounde ́ Process out of the 2013 West and Central African States’ Maritime Summit in Cameroon. 

Finally, as I noted during my confirmation hearing in 2013, ‘‘governments that 

respect human rights, including women’s rights, and democratic norms make 

stronger and more stable partners for economic growth, development, peace, and 

prosperity.’’ This remains a critical issue for me. We continue to encourage security 

services to respect human rights and hold violators of human rights accountable, 

because doing so promotes the legitimacy of these services, improves the rule of law, 

and undermines extremist rhetoric calling on people to seek alternative justice. 

Additionally, as expressly targeted through SGI, our programs focus on developing 

accountability and oversight to mitigate corruption and bolster citizen input to the 

security system. 

EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE

While the full impact of U.S. security assistance to help build the military, police, 

and other security service capacity of sub-Saharan African countries may not be 

fully apparent for a generation, a persistent investment does provide near-term successes and will provide long-term effects. Our assistance aims to contribute toward 

building the indigenous military and police capacity of our African partners to 

ensure a more professional security apparatus that respects civilian control and 

human rights. Those professional African forces are critical to support our security 

policy interests on the continent. 

Conflict in Africa threatens U.S. national security interests. Nowhere is that more 

evident than in the Horn of Africa. Our engagement in Somalia, where we have supported the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in their efforts to stabilize the country and expand the reach of legitimate governance is a sign of our commitment to addressing conflict in the region. 

The success of AMISOM in reducing the territory held by al-Shabaab and stabilizing 

the Government of Somalia has come after years of investment from the international community in equipment, advisory support, and predeployment training. 

AMISOM has played a pivotal role, but long-term stability in Somalia depends on 

the creation of capable and regionally representative national security forces and a 

stronger Somali National Army. The Somali National Army is in its formative 

stages today, but the integration of regional security forces into the National Army 

in parallel with the political reconciliation will help bolster security to all regions 

of the country. 

We cannot prevent every terrorist attack, but we can ensure that states are better 

prepared to work together and respond. For example, in 2012 and 2013, African 

forces—many of them U.S.-trained—responded to the crisis in Mali created by an 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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internal conflict, coup d’etat, and the seizure of territory by terrorists, working 

alongside the French military to push back AQIM from safe havens in northern 

Mali. The intervention left AQIM scattered, fractured, and demoralized. And then, 

in 2013, the Malians took to the polls in a democratic election—an election that was 

a powerful rebuke to the restrictive rule and violent extremist ideology that AQIM 

and its allies imposed. 

In addition, U.S. programming addresses new and present threats to stability and 

security in Africa. For example, IEDs used by Boko Haram pose an increasingly 

deadly threat to Nigeria and its neighbors. The United States stands out as the only 

donor partner providing counter-IED training to the law enforcement community 

and security forces in Nigeria, and we have found that this training has been paying 

dividends. Upon returning from Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) training, Post-Blast 

Investigation and Explosive Incident Countermeasure students recommended more 

practical exercises to their academy leadership for bomb technician training and 

worked with ATA to develop train-the-trainer curriculum to foster sustainable 

counter-IED capabilities for Nigerian security forces. 

U.S. support for African Union-led efforts to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army 

(LRA) is another good example of how we can leverage our involvement to enhance 

regional cooperation and capacity to counter cross-border threats. Prior to the transition to DOD funds in late FY 2012, State provided approximately $57 million in 

State Department funds, primarily to support Uganda’s ability to counter the LRA. 

As part of holistic support from State, DOD, and USAID and working in an 

extremely difficult operating environment across three countries, the forces of the 

AU Regional Task Force, national security forces, and LRA-affected communities, 

local and regional actors have significantly degraded the LRA’s capabilities, increased defections, and improved protection and resilience of local communities. 

U.S. support for the criminal justice sector in Africa, including for police and the 

courts, has registered successes as well. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

a U.S.-funded project has helped to improve the investigation and prosecution of 

cases of sexual and gender-based violence. It trains police officers and investigators 

with doctors and lawyers, helping them to understand the terms and procedures 

that each uses in an instance of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), facilitating coordination between them. As a result, police, doctors, and prosecutors have 

formed networks in their own communities to better address and process SGBV 

cases. In the Central African Republic, the Department is supporting the reestablishment of criminal justice institutions with training, technical assistance, and basic 

equipment for police, gendarmerie, investigators, prosecutors, judicial staff, and corrections officers. We are already seeing success. U.S. technical assistance, equipment, and support are aiding the investigation and preparation of more than 50 

cases for the upcoming Criminal Court Session, the first for Bangui in more than 

2 years. The Court session will enable dozens of individuals and parties to obtain 

a long-needed decision of justice on their cases. 

Security sector reform efforts in Liberia have also borne fruit. The Armed Forces 

of Liberia (AFL) and the Liberian National Police (LNP)—were both largely rebuilt 

from the ground up following the devastating civil war. Both of these institutions 

are now preparing for the withdrawal of the United Nations Mission in Liberia 

(UNMIL) and currently provide for nearly all internal security requirements in 

Liberia. The LNP has proven capable of providing internal security under normal 

conditions and also during some unexpected and extraordinary ones, including the 

Ebola outbreak. Timely training, equipping, and mentorship of civilian law enforcement enabled the LNP to maintain security during the outbreak. Throughout the 

crisis, the LNP showed its increasing competency by using force judiciously, increasing community participation, and generally deescalating conflict as it occurred. 

With the urging of the United States, the Government of Liberia has removed corrupt and obstructive senior officials within the LNP and the Liberian Drug Enforcement Agency (LDEA), and replaced them with honest and professional officers. 

These important steps have led to key reforms and progress in organizational development and capacity within both organizations. As part of the U.S. West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI), U.S. assistance also resulted in the first 

meaningful Liberian Drug Law and DEA Act being signed into law by President 

Johnson-Sirleaf. Both pieces of legislation are ground-breaking in their scope and 

aim to prevent Liberia from becoming a transshipment location or target destination 

for international narcotics traffickers. The United States has similarly supported 

specialized law enforcement units that are disrupting drug networks and other illicit 

trafficking across West Africa, including operationalizing a Transnational Crime 

Unit in Liberia and in neighboring Sierra Leone and creating Sensitive Investigations Units (SIU) in Ghana and Nigeria. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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We continue working to increase African states’ institutional capacity to analyze 

transnational organized crime trends, cooperate across borders, and conduct thorough investigations that facilitate prosecutions. As a result of U.S. assistance, several African states have joined the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, 

which encourages successful prosecutions and successful information-sharing resulting in assets forfeited. Our Regional Training Center (RTC) in Accra has trained 

over 2,000 officials since its inception in 2011, and recent evaluation findings indicate that nearly 40 percent of respondents reported cooperating with fellow RTC 

alumni across borders, as well as nearly 60 percent reporting that use of skills 

learned at the RTC has resulted in successful criminal prosecutions in their countries. We receive letters and emails from individuals sharing these successes as well, 

such as a female police officer from Ghana who listed the various RTC-taught skills 

and technological approaches she used to conduct a successful antihuman trafficking 

operation. We are encouraged to see such tangible results from a program that is 

less than 5 years old, and will use this feedback to continue adjusting and improving our training approaches. 

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, 

largely funded by GPOI, is critical to our effort to build peace operations capacity 

among African partners. ACOTA provides training to contingents deploying to U.N. 

and AU operations, while building the capacity of our African partners to take over 

training themselves. Of the 26 current ACOTA partners, 22 are currently engaged 

in U.N. and AU peace support operations. ACOTA has trained and deployed 

approximately a quarter of a million military peacekeepers since 2003 and continues 

to be the premier predeployment program by training 77 battalions per year. In 

addition, U.S. Africa Command has conducted specialized and critically needed 

peacekeeping training for several GPOI partner countries in Africa, including but 

not limited to logistics, higher level staff, counter-IED, and gender in peace operations training. 

The important role of policing and rule of law in peacekeeping and stabilization 

operations in Africa and the need to fill a critical gap there cannot be overstated. 

Since 2010, the United States, through the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ (INL) IPPOS program, has 

trained 5,619 police (35 Formed Police Units (FPU) and 699 Individual Police Officers (IPOs) for deployments to five U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa, including 

Darfur, Liberia, South Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic. The African 

Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) who have benefited from IPPOS training 

assistance include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon Ghana, Togo, and Senegal. 

African countries have made clear that rapidly responding to crises is at the top 

of their peace and security agenda. As mentioned earlier in the testimony, APRRP 

is a new investment of $110 million to build the capacity of African forces to deploy 

peacekeepers rapidly in response to emerging conflicts. Such rapid deployments are 

critical to saving lives amidst emerging crises. 

APRRP builds on our long-standing commitment to developing partner capacity 

to support African countries and regional organizations to meet the challenges they 

face. The United States will initially partner with six countries—Ghana, Ethiopia, 

Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda—to develop a rapid response capability 

program. This program will focus on improving capacity in areas such as mission 

management, transportation, equipment maintenance and repair, logistics, engineering, and interoperability with other Africa-based peacekeeping forces. Under 

this program, African partner nations will commit to maintaining forces and equipment ready to rapidly deploy as part of U.N. or AU missions seeking to respond to 

emerging crises. 

I look forward to hearing from my colleagues, listening to your insights, and consulting you further as we address these serious security issues. Thank you for your 

invitation, and for your consideration and support. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Mr. Talwar. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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STATEMENT OF HON. PUNEET TALWAR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL–MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. TALWAR. Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, thank 

you very much. And I commend you for focusing on this critical 

topic. 

It is a pleasure to be back before the committee today, and as 

you mentioned, I spent a considerable amount of time here, about 

a dozen years or more, sitting on the benches behind you actually 

staffing the Vice President. If I could just add as a personal note, 

as I sit on this side of the dais, the tragic loss of Beau weighs very 

heavily. Beau was simply one of the finest human beings I have 

known, and I join all of you in mourning his loss. 

Mr. Chairman, in Africa, we see a region that is increasingly taking charge of its own security. We welcome the efforts to provide 

African solutions to African security challenges. We have made 

substantial progress in addressing instability in Africa. Yet, challenges remain. 

As you mentioned, conflict persists in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan. 

Terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, alShabaab, and Boko Haram threaten the regional and international 

order. Many countries have difficulty monitoring their maritime domain, leading to piracy and illegal fishing. Narcotics trafficking 

fuels corruption and undermines governments. 

These challenges point to the need for strong government institutions. And we are committed to helping our African partners build 

these institutions and reform their security sectors. 

We want to work closely with you to achieve four main goals for 

our security assistance in Africa. 

First, we want to build peacekeeping capacity. 

Second, we want to build military capabilities related to counterterrorism operations. 

Third, we want to support the professionalization efforts of African militaries to have greater respect for human rights, the rule of 

law, and civilian control of the military. 

And fourth, we want to help African partners police their maritime domain and combat other transnational threats like poaching. 

The challenges are complex, and the goals we have set require 

that we work together across our Government. And I would like to 

take a quick moment to describe how we coordinate our efforts. 

Our planning process begins with the Joint Regional Strategies, 

which are developed in Washington in consultation with our embassies abroad. Under the Joint Regional Strategy, each embassy 

creates its own integrated country strategy which outlines the U.S. 

Government’s goals and objectives in each country, country by 

country. The Department of Defense also makes its recommendations for most security assistance programs based on its own planning. And then my Bureau convenes annually in the spring 

roundtables where we bring together all the key players in the 

interagency and we set our priorities, we define our roles and our 

responsibilities. And this process ultimately yields the budget request that makes its way to you. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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Now, there are a number of mechanisms by which we deliver security assistance to Africa. This means that we not only need to 

stay coordinated but also that we carefully monitor and evaluate 

the impact of our security assistance. Mr. Chairman, let me highlight briefly a few examples of where our security assistance has 

made a difference. 

First, in response to the 2013 insurgency in Mali, we provided 

food, fuel, and water to African troops within a month of their deployment to ensure they could operate in the harsh desert environment. 

Second, the United States has provided airlift and refueling services for French counterterrorism operations across the Sahel. This 

is a good example of burden-sharing and it is one that ultimately 

means less expenditures for the United States. 

Third, for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership program, we are providing critical training and equipment to our partners so they can fight the terrorist threats in the Lake Chad Basin 

and the Sahel. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to take this opportunity to ask for 

your continued support in two areas. 

First, major procurements such as aircraft require years of 

sustainment, including spare parts, maintenance, and training. The 

costs of sustainment can actually and often are actually much 

greater than the initial investment. We do not have sufficient funding to sustain major systems in Africa. So we are asking for a $9 

million increase in foreign military financing for Africa counterterrorism sustainment in fiscal year 2016 to meet part of this requirement. 

Second, I would also greatly appreciate your support to fully fund our request for a $2.4 million increase in IMET, which allows us 

to train future military leaders who understand the United States 

and our values. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Markey, I look forward to working closely with the committee on security assistance programs in 

Africa, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Talwar follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PUNEET TALWAR

Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for allowing me to speak with you today about security assistance in Africa. I commend the committee for its focus on this critical topic. Thank 

you also for inviting my colleagues from the Department of State’s African Affairs 

Bureau and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Our teams work hand in hand 

to help our partners in Africa manage security and stability problems. 

My statement will discuss the nature of security challenges in Africa, how U.S. 

security assistance addresses these problems, how different agencies in the U.S. 

Government work together to plan and implement security assistance in Africa, how 

we measure the impact of our assistance, and our requests of Congress moving 

forward. 

SECURITY CHALLENGES IN AFRICA

We have made substantial progress addressing instability in Africa over the last 

decade. Our African partners are increasingly taking charge of their own security. 

We welcome these efforts to provide African solutions to African security challenges. 

However, significant and complex security challenges remain. Conflict persists in 

the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, and 

South Sudan. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 

al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram threaten the regional and international order. Many 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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African countries have difficulty monitoring their maritime domain, leading to 

piracy and other significant economic and security threats. Narcotics trafficking 

fuels corruption and undermine governments. And while some sub-Saharan African 

countries have achieved rapid economic growth in recent years, nearly 70 percent 

of sub-Saharan Africans live in extreme poverty—contributing to insecurity by feeding the desperation that can drive individuals toward crime and terrorism. 

All of these problems point to the need for strong government institutions. We are 

committed to helping our African partners build institutions and reform security 

sectors, so that they can manage these challenges over the long term. 

GOALS FOR U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA

We want to work closely with you to achieve four main goals: 

• First, we want to continue strong support for support peacekeeping operations 

throughout Africa, including in the Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, 

Liberia, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. We provide urgently needed 

logistics support, training, and equipment for African troops participating in 

these missions. We also build the long-term peacekeeping capabilities of our 

African partners through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the 

new Africa Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP)—or ‘‘A–PREP’’ 

for short. 

• Second, we want to build the military capabilities of our partners to conduct 

counterterrorism operations. Through the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism 

Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for East Africa Counterterrorism 

(PREACT), we provide counterterrorism training and equipment to African militaries in East and West Africa. 

• Third, we support the professionalization efforts of African militaries with training and advisory support, including through the Security and Governance Initiative (SGI) and the African Military Education Program (AMEP). Through our 

educational programs, we are helping to build African military forces that have 

a greater respect for human rights, the rule of law, and civilian control of the 

military. 

• And fourth, we help African partners police their maritime domain and combat 

other transnational threats like poaching. Our Africa Maritime Security Initiative (AMSI) and Africa Conflict and Stabilization Border Security (ACSBS) programs, respectively, provide training to select African security forces to police 

their maritime borders and counter poaching. 

Formulating, Planning, and Implementing Security Assistance in Africa 

The Departments of State and Defense work closely to formulate, plan and implement security assistance in Africa. The Presidential Policy Directive on Security 

Sector Assistance (PPD–23), released by the administration in 2013, guides this 

process. The directive mandates an inclusive, deliberate, whole-of-government approach to U.S. security sector assistance, which aligns activities and resources with 

our national security priorities. The directive calls for transparency and coordination 

across the U.S. Government to develop long-term strategies for security sector assistance, which build the capacity of our partners in a way that is strategic and sustainable. 

In real terms, this means that our planning process begins with the Joint 

Regional Strategy, which are strategic plans developed in Washington by regional 

bureaus in consultation with functional bureaus and our missions abroad. Under the 

Joint Regional Strategy, each mission creates an Integrated Country Strategy, 

which includes input from other agencies at posts and in Washington. These strategies outline the U.S. Government’s goals and objectives in a particular country and 

region. 

Based on the goals and objectives of the Joint Regional Strategy, the Integrated 

Country Strategy, and Department of Defense theater campaign plans, the Department of Defense develops recommendations for most security assistance programs, 

and submits them to the Department of State for consideration. My Bureau then 

convenes annual roundtables on security assistance each spring. At these roundtables, State Department and interagency counterparts come together to discuss the 

needs of a particular region and the status of existing programs. These roundtables 

inform our resourcing requests, which we coordinate with our regional bureau counterparts and submit to the Department of State’s Office of Foreign Assistance for 

consideration. This process ultimately yields the requests submitted to the Office of 

Management and Budget and later to Congress. 

Within the State Department, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) manages for of the main security assistance accounts: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), 

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Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)—the last 

of which DOD and my Bureau comanage. 

Proposals for specific programs are developed and coordinated in different ways, 

through mechanisms that are both formal and informal. GPOI, APRRP, TSCTP and 

PREACT program proposals—funded by PKO—are developed through cables and 

proposal forms. For TSCTP—DOD, State and USAID participate in an annual conference to ensure effective coordination. Proposals for GSCF programs originate 

from Combatant Commands, Posts, and State and Defense senior leadership. 

Coordination with DOD on Africa security assistance is perhaps most important 

in the counterterrorism (CT) realm, where DOD has its own authorities but still requires State concurrence. My Bureau works closely with the relevant regional 

bureau and the Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) to ensure a consolidated State 

position. In considering whether to support DOD proposals for counterterrorism 

assistance, State examines whether the assistance is consistent with foreign policy 

and is complementary with State’s programs. 

Security assistance in Africa is implemented through DOD, through contracts 

managed by State, or some combination of the two. While State has the overall policy lead on FMF and IMET, both accounts are currently implemented entirely by 

DOD. 

For PKO-funded programs, the State Department determines the most efficient 

mechanism for implementing programs, based on assessments of cost, timeliness, 

host government preferences, and the implementer’s capabilities. Possible options 

for implementation include DOD, State Department contracts, and grantee organizations. 

GPOI programs are implemented either through the State-managed Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, or through U.S. 

Africa Command (USAFRICOM). USAFRICOM will also serve as the primary implementer for APRRP activities. 

The TSCTP program is the best example of a hybrid approach to implementation—the bulk of equipment and training for new equipment is implemented 

through State contracts, while skills-based training activities are generally implemented through DOD. 

For GSCF, an authority that permits State and DOD to pool funding and expertise to address emergent and urgent challenges in the security and justice sectors, 

State and DOD jointly formulate, fund, implement, and evaluate programs. 

The Impact of Assistance in Africa 

The State Department measures the impact of our security assistance in Africa 

through a variety of mechanisms. We are working to develop a monitoring and evaluation program for FMF and IMET programs worldwide. Right now, our Embassy 

country teams formally track IMET graduates that are in ‘‘Positions of Prominence’’ 

(such as General Officers and Chiefs of Defense). This allows State and DOD to 

maintain relationships with military leaders that understand the United States and 

appreciate the emphasis we place on professionalization, civilian control of the military, respect for human rights, and success on the battlefield. 

For PKO, the State Department generally relies on contractors to implement monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities by program. We currently have M&E efforts 

ongoing for the GPOI, TSCTP, and PREACT programs. Since the inception of GPOI, 

for example, my Bureau has contracted a metrics and evaluation team. This team 

collects extensive data to enable our program management office to track outputs, 

outcomes, and other performance-related measures. PM is working with AF to develop M&E programs for the other PKO funded programs. 

Similar to PKO, State and the Defense Department contract out to a third-party 

to conduct M&E for GSCF projects. As GSCF is a new program, M&E efforts are 

still in the nascent stages. 

I would like to take a minute to highlight a few examples of our successes across 

the continent. 

The GPOI program’s capacity-building efforts are enabling partner countries to 

train, sustain, and deploy peacekeepers. We have worked hand in hand with our 

African partners to develop instruction programs and training centers. Our progress 

is most evident among the six APRRP countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, 

Tanzania, and Uganda), all of which are GPOI partners, and represent some of the 

most capable peacekeeping contributors on the continent. Ethiopia, for example, is 

the largest single contributor of peacekeepers in the world, deploying a critical stabilizing force into the contested Abyei region between South Sudan, as well as providing peacekeepers to missions in South Sudan, the Darfur region of Sudan, and 

Somalia. Similarly, Tanzania responded to an urgent request for forces to establish 

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the Force Intervention Brigade to strengthen the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo. This force has played an integral role in enhancing civilian security and helping stabilize the eastern DRC. 

In response to the 2013 insurgency in Mali, we provided food, fuel, and water to 

help African troops operate in the harsh desert environment. We did this within a 

month of African peacekeepers arriving in country. 

For a relatively small amount of funding, the United States provided airlift and 

refueling services for French counterterrorism operations across the Sahel. The U.S. 

Government has spent roughly $3.5 million per month to support the French. The 

Defense Department estimates that conducting these operations on our own would 

cost $120 million per month. While the situation on the ground remains challenging, 

French operations helped create the conditions for last month’s signing of Mali’s 

peace agreement by the government and some armed groups. This is an important 

step on the path toward sustainable peace, and we are watching closely as talks 

continue. Bolstering this fragile effort to ensure peace remains the best hope for 

long-term stability in the region. 

For the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership program, we are providing 

critical training and equipment capabilities to directly help partner nations actively 

fighting the terrorist threats in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel. We recently provided 850 sets of body armor to Cameroonian forces that are actively fighting Boko 

Haram on their borders. This protective equipment helps to limit the number of 

casualties that Cameroonian military forces are incurring, inherently fostering a 

greater willingness among these forces to more robustly execute mission tasks. In Somalia, we have spent over $430 million in PKO funds to provide logistics 

support, training, equipment and advisory support for African troops participating 

in the African Union Mission in Somalia. Since AMISOM first deployed in 2007, the 

force has grown from 4,000 troops to over 22,000 and has made tremendous strides 

in the past several years by bringing Mogadishu and other key urban areas (such 

as Baidoa, Beletweyne, and Kismaayo) under its control, in cooperation with the 

emerging Somali National Army (SNA). Most recently, Operation Indian Ocean, a 

joint-AMISOM–SNA offensive, succeeded in liberating Baarawe, the last major alShabaab stronghold in the country. 

Sustaining our Assistance 

One of our foremost challenges is sustaining counterterrorism programs, and for 

that we seek your support. Major procurements—such as aircraft—often require 

years of sustainment, including spare parts and follow-on operational and maintenance training. The costs of sustainment are generally much more than the initial 

investment. While State Department funds, such as FMF, can be used to sustain 

major systems in Africa, we do not have sufficient funding to do so. Accordingly, we 

ask for a $9 million increase in FMF for Africa counterterrorism sustainment, which 

we requested in FY16. This extra funding—while critical—will not sustain all of our 

programs, and we are working with the Defense to address this problem. 

CONCLUSION

More than ever before, we share security responsibilities with other nations to 

help address security challenges in their countries and regions, whether fighting 

alongside our forces; countering terrorist and international criminal networks; participating in international peacekeeping operations; or building institutions capable 

of maintaining security, law, and order. While we have enjoyed broad support from 

Congress on security assistance in Africa, I ask that you fully fund our request for 

FY16—which includes a $2.4 million increase for IMET. 

We look forward to working with you to continue supporting our security assistance goals in Africa and improving the effectiveness of the programs. Thank you 

again for your continued support for security assistance in Africa. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Ms. Dory. 

STATEMENT OF AMANDA J. DORY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. DORY. Thank you, Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey. It is a pleasure to be here today alongside my State Department colleagues to speak to the critical importance of security assistance for Africa. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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The Department of Defense implements security assistance in accordance with the Presidential Policy Directive 16, which is the 

U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance. 

We focus the majority of our assistance in Africa on building African security force capacity and defense institutions to support 

peacekeeping, crisis response, as well as combating transnational 

threats. These threats, if left unchecked, could potentially negatively impact the safety and economic prosperity of U.S. citizens 

and international partners. Modest, proactive investments in the 

development of professional security forces are an essential component of establishing strong, effective, and prosperous partner states 

with shared values and interests. 

The Department of Defense has embraced security cooperation in 

Africa as a practical tool for addressing a range of security challenges. Our strategic approach continues to focus on working by, 

with, and through African partners and international organizations 

to address these challenges. 

Over the past 5 years, Congress has substantially increased security cooperation appropriations related to Africa. And within the 

Department of Defense, allocations for Africa have also increased. 

Together, this resulted in an increased allocation of core title 10 security cooperation funds in Africa from approximately $50 million 

in fiscal year 2010 to approximately $380 million in fiscal year 

2014. This funding increase was principally driven by increased efforts to enhance African counterterrorism capacity through train 

and equip authorities. You have also seen increased support for security partners during crisis response, for example, in Mali and in 

the Central African Republic through DOD support under Presidential drawdown authority. 

But to put these resources in context, DOD-appropriated security 

assistance represents about 30 percent and Department of State 

approximately 70 percent of total security sector assistance over 

this period from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2014. 

Additionally, security assistance represents about one-sixth of all 

U.S. Government foreign assistance in Africa, with the majority of 

our assistance going to economic development and public health. 

In fiscal year 2015, the Department of Defense has also participated in the development of three White House security cooperation initiatives in Africa. We have already touched briefly on the 

Security Governance Initiative and the African Peacekeeping Rapid 

Response Partnership. Additionally, we are working closely with 

the State Department and the White House on the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, or CTPF. We fully support the broader 

U.S. Government commitment to develop African partners’ and regional organizations’ ability to rapidly and effectively respond to 

crises through APRRP. And DOD is working closely with the State 

Department and other Government agencies on the Security Governance Initiative to support development of African security sector 

establishments. SGI, along with the African Military Education 

Program, and other defense institution-building programs, are increasingly important as we look to reinforce our capacity-building 

efforts to yield long-term partnerships with capable African militaries. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

16 

Also this fiscal year, the Department of Defense is implementing 

the President’s Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund. DOD intends, 

pending congressional notification, to spend approximately $466 

million in fiscal year 2015 in the Sahel, Maghreb, Lake Chad 

Basin, and Horn of Africa on both key U.S. enablers and capacity 

building efforts with partners. The Department is seeking an additional request in fiscal year 2016 funds for both Africa and the 

Middle East. And as you are aware, the State Department also has 

a fiscal year 2016 CTPF request that would focus on strengthening 

partner nation law enforcement and judicial responses. CTPF is an 

indispensable tool for assisting resource-challenged but willing 

partners with sufficient resources and expertise to counter a shared 

and growing terrorist threat. 

In no area is the importance of close and continual DOD coordination with the State Department more important than counterterrorism. We must ensure that our efforts to build partner nation 

military capacity are balanced with other security sector priorities. 

A strengthened military fully proficient and capable of conducting 

counterterrorism operations cannot take the place of African law 

enforcement, border security forces, and criminal justice systems 

that deliver justice in the eyes of their populations. Likewise, it 

cannot substitute for USAID-led activities to generate economic opportunities and alternative narratives to extremist ideologies. DOD 

also relies heavily on the State Department with respect to longterm sustainment of its counterterrorism capacity-building. 

In closing, DOD relies on essential day-to-day support provided 

by U.S. Embassies in Africa and America’s unsung heroes, the 

front line Foreign Service officers and Embassy teams serving 

alongside uniformed service members in harm’s way to keep America safe. Effective security cooperation requires a balanced approach with other sectors of the partner security enterprise and 

right sizing of State and USAID funding to ensure our efforts are 

aligned and proportional to achieve desired policy goals. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to the conversation 

and discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dory follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMANDA J. DORY

Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for inviting the Department of Defense to testify with our 

Department of State colleagues on security assistance to Africa. Close partnership 

between the Department of Defense and Department of State is essential for successful security cooperation in Africa and I am appreciative of the opportunity to 

provide an overview of how the Department of Defense works closely with the 

Department of State to employ security assistance as a tool of statecraft in achieving our policy goals in Africa. 

The Department of Defense implements security assistance in accordance with the 

Presidential Policy Directive on Security Sector Assistance (SSA), PPD–23 and U.S. 

Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, PPD–16 in support of its four goals which are 

to help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges, promote partner support for U.S. interests, promote universal values, and 

strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and organizations. DOD focuses the majority of its security assistance in Africa on building 

African security force capacity, defense institutions, preparedness to support peacekeeping and crisis response, and capacity to combat transnational threats, to 

include: terrorism, illicit trafficking of narcotics, proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, regional instability, piracy, and communicative diseases. These threats, 

if left unchecked, could potentially negatively impact the safety and economic prosFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

17 

perity of U.S. citizens and international partners within the United States and 

abroad. A modest, proactive investment in the development of effective security 

forces that abide by international human rights standards and the rule of law can 

be an essential component in establishing a security environment that encourage 

terrorism, and equally important, encourages the development of strong, effective, 

and prosperous partner states with shared values and interests. 

The Department of Defense has embraced security cooperation in Africa as a practical tool for addressing emerging challenges posed by the security environment. 

Many of the conflicts in Africa which we hope to help address through security cooperation arise from a combination of local and international grievances and power 

struggles which often have an outsized impact on fragile countries. DOD realizes 

that going it alone is simply not a feasible, effective, or cost-effective solution which 

is why the Department of Defense continues to focus on working by, with, and 

through African partners and international organizations as our primary approach 

to address security challenges in Africa. 

Over the past 5 years, Congress has substantially increased security cooperation 

appropriations related to Africa. Within the Department of Defense, allocations have 

increased as well in response to growing security challenges. Together, this resulted 

in an increased allocation of core title 10 security cooperation funds in Africa from 

$53.7 million in FY10 to $379.6 million in FY14. This funding increase was principally driven by increased efforts to enhance African counterterrorism capacity 

through East Africa and Yemen Counterterrorism (1203), Global Train and Equip 

(1206 and 2282), and Global Security Contingency Fund (1207) authorities. We have 

also seen increased support for security partners during crisis response through 

DOD support under Presidential Drawdown authority. In FY15, the Department of 

Defense, in close coordination with the Department of State, has also participated 

in the development of three White House security cooperation initiatives in Africa: 

the Security Governance Initiative (SGI), the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response 

Partnership (APRRP), and the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF). 

For context, DOD appropriated security assistance represents 29 percent and 

Department of State 71 percent of total security assistance from FY10 to FY14. Further security assistance remains approximately one-sixth of all U.S. Government 

foreign assistance in Africa with the majority going to economic development and 

public health. Within title 22 programs, DOD believes the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account is a particularly important program, providing flexibility to build 

and sustain our African partners with long-enough expenditure horizons to support 

our shared goals. DOD also finds particular value in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program which is essential for building professionalism 

and establishing bonds and common understanding between future U.S. and African 

senior military leadership. 

The Department of Defense fully supports the broader U.S. Government commitment to develop African partners and regional organizations’ ability to rapidly and 

effectively respond to crises through APRRP. The Department of Defense is working 

closely with the Department of State to determine requirements and identify priority capabilities that will provide the greatest return on investment for improving 

African crisis response capabilities. DOD through U.S. Africa Command will also 

play a key role in implementing APRRP capacity-building efforts to include, military 

equipment, training, and technical and advisory assistance. DOD will further continue to partner with State to implement broader peace operations capacity-building 

activities through exercises and other authorities such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative. 

DOD is also working closely with the State Department and other government 

agencies on the Security Governance Initiative to support the development of African security sector establishments. SGI, the Africa Military Education Program 

(AMEP), and other supporting title 10 defense institution building programs such 

as the Ministry of Defense Advisor Program and Defense Institution Reform Initiative will become increasing important as we look to buttress our near-term capacitybuilding efforts into long-term partnerships with capable African militaries. These 

efforts help our African partners develop and expand the technical proficiency to 

effectivelyand efficiently governance and oversee their own militaries. In the long 

run, this will lead to more professional and effective African militaries and protect 

U.S. taxpayer’s investments in training and equipping security forces capable of 

independently managing security threats on the continent. 

Beginning this fiscal year, the Department of Defense is also implementing the 

President’s Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) to support a broader 

approach to a sustainable and partnership-focused approach to counterterrorism. 

This effort builds on existing tools and authorities such as the Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Partnership for Regional East Africa 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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Counterterrorism (PREACT) to provide direct support to partner nations through 

building partner counterterrorism capacity and the provision of increased U.S. enabling support for African partners. DOD intends, pending congressional notification, 

to spend approximately $466 million in FY15 CTPF money in Africa and is seeking 

an additional $1.269 billion in FY16 funds to build partner capacity to counter terrorist threats in the Sahel/Maghreb, Lake Chad Basin, and Horn of Africa.As you 

are aware, State Department has a FY16 CTPF request as well that would focus 

on strengthening partner nation law enforcement and judicial responses. These 

funds will focus on enhancing our African partners’ intelligence, mobility, and logistics capabilities and ensuring their ability to operate within international counterterrorism coalitions and in accordance with international human rights norms. 

CTPF is an indispensable tool for assisting some of our most resource challenged, 

but willing partners, with sufficient resources and expertise to counter a shared and 

growing terrorism threat. 

In no area is the importance of close and continual Department of Defense coordination and cooperation with the Department of State more important than counterterrorism. DOD relies on State to ensure that its efforts to build partner nation military counterterrorism capacity are balanced with other security sector priorities and 

integrated into effective host nation and multilateral strategies. A strengthened 

military fully proficient and capable of conducting counterterrorism operations cannot take the place of African police, border security forces, and a criminal justice 

system that delivers justice in the eyes of its population. Likewise, it cannot substitute for economic opportunities and alternative narratives to the ideologies of 

hate and revenge proffered by our shared adversaries. The Department of Defense 

also relies on the Department of State to help ensure the long-term value of its 

counterterrorism capacity-building capacity efforts. State provides critical sustainment funding through Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and DOD supports the 

request to increase Africa FMF in FY 2016 in support of this end. However, even 

with increased funds State and DOD agree that the FMF funding levels are currently insufficient for sustainment needs and are working together to try to address 

this issue. 

The Department of Defense also relies on essential day-to-day support provided 

by the U.S. Embassies in Africa and America’s unsung heroes, the front line Foreign 

Service officers and broader embassy teams serving alongside our uniformed 

servicemembers in harm’s way to keep Americans safe. Effective security cooperation in the military sector requires a balanced approach with other sectors of the 

security enterprise and right sizing of State funding and support to ensure that 

Defense and State efforts are not only aligned, but proportional to achieve the desired policy goals. I encourage Congress to consider these issues of proportionality, 

State’s large comparative advantage in security cooperation in the nonmilitary security sectors, and the importance of State foreign assistance funding for capacity 

building and long-term sustainment of U.S. Government security sector capacitybuilding efforts in Africa when considering future funding levels for State FMF and 

CTPF. 

I look forward to listening to your insights, answering any questions you may 

have, and providing additional thoughts from a defense perspective as part of what 

I hope will be a continued dialogue on how best to employ security cooperation as 

an effective diplomatic tool in Africa. Thank you again for the invitation and interest in hearing a defense perspective on this important issue. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you all. It looks like votes are supposed 

to start about now. So we will see how they come and see how we 

can move forward. But I will start the questioning and thank you 

for your testimony. 

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield, you recently traveled to Nigeria 

to witness the installation of the new President. And it looks as if 

we will have a better security arrangement and agreement with 

that country now. Can you talk about that and explain where you 

think we are going? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you very much. It really was an honor to attend the inauguration of the new President 

of Nigeria. 

And let me just say here that the successful election in Nigeria 

bodes well for us on the continent of Africa. Nigeria is the sixth 

largest democracy in the world. It is the largest democracy on the 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

19 

continent of Africa, and I think seeing Nigeria work as a democracy 

will send very positive messages across the continent. 

We have been working very closely with the Nigerian Government on addressing the threats that they face from Boko Haram. 

It was a complicated relationship during the previous administration that did not always work well. But we were cooperating with 

that government and doing our best to assist them in addressing 

the terrorist threat that they were facing. Given the complications 

of the relationship working with the Nigerians directly, we also 

worked with Nigeria’s neighbors in the Lake Chad Basin providing 

assistance to the Government of Chad, to the Government of Niger, 

as well as the Government of Cameroon bilaterally, and we supported AU efforts to set up the multinational task force and worked 

closely with our French and U.K. P–3 European partners. 

We are optimistic that we can reset the relationship with the 

new government. As you may have heard, in the speech that President Buhari gave, he indicated that addressing the situation in the 

north with Boko Haram, addressing security is his highest priority. 

We want to work with him, and we have expressed that to him. 

Secretary Kerry had a bilateral meeting with him during the inauguration, and we are looking to send a team out to Nigeria early 

in the next few weeks to start working with the new government 

on how we might better coordinate our efforts in addressing Boko 

Haram. 

Senator FLAKE. Have they made a commitment to increase their 

resources in terms of their own military? It was quite, I am sure, 

embarrassing for them when it seemed neighboring countries with 

a fraction of the resources that Nigeria has seemed to be more effective against Boko Haram than they were. And what kind of internal commitments is the new President making? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. He has certainly committed 

both publicly and privately that he intends to do everything possible to address the situation in terms of resources, as well as staff. 

He has just appointed the new person who will be in the multinational task force from Nigeria. He is someone we have worked 

with and we feel that he will be a positive force on the multinational task force. I think he has been in office for less than a 

week, and I think he is still looking at his resources. But I think 

it bodes well that President Buhari’s first trip out of Nigeria was 

to Chad and Niger to work with those two countries, and I understand he plans to go to Cameroon as well to see how they can better coordinate. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Mr. Talwar, you mentioned maritime security. I think all of you 

have. The concern has been, obviously, that it was a real problem 

for an extended period of time in the Horn of Africa. That has been 

abated somewhat, but the concern has been that it would move to 

the Gulf of Guinea. What is the trajectory, as you see it right now, 

for lawlessness or piracy in that area? I know that is a concern of 

ours. It was mentioned that we passed a resolution on that topic. 

Where do you see that going? Do we have sufficient resources and 

focus there? 

Mr. TALWAR. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And I do commend you for 

the work on that resolution, pointing to a really important problem. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

20 

Sometimes the comparison is made between the Horn of Africa 

and the Gulf of Guinea. In fact, they are very different problems. 

Off the Horn of Africa thankfully—and thanks to our efforts and 

the efforts of the international community—we have not had a successful boarding of commercial vessel in over 2 years now. But the 

focus has to remain there because those folks could come back any 

time. But it is largely a problem in international waters that we 

face there. 

In the Gulf of Guinea, the problem, as you know, is primarily in 

territorial waters. And what it points to is what my colleagues and 

I talked about this morning and what you flagged, and that is the 

question of governing institutions and the ability to tackle this as 

a criminal enterprise largely. And there are efforts that we have 

underway on that front, but that is really where the focus needs 

to be because, as you pointed out in your resolution, this sort of activity is undercutting revenues and economic growth and investment opportunities and an overall sense of law and order in the 

countries that are affected. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Ms. Dory, much of our military assistance in Africa obviously is 

directed at international organizations and other regional groups 

that already exist. How is that working out in your view? Do we 

have the cooperation that we need? What areas do we need to work 

on in terms of our international partners? Because there are very 

few examples where we are acting alone in Africa. 

Ms. DORY. Senator Flake, maybe I would pick up from where my 

colleague left off to answer your question thinking about the challenge of transnational threats that have to be addressed in a regional fashion for coherence, but our partnerships are implemented 

and executed on a bilateral basis. And so the necessity as the U.S. 

Government of operating at a continental scale at times and a regional scale at times and then certainly always at the bilateral 

level. 

Just in the Gulf Guinea context, for example, we are tackling 

both at the regional level with respect to the two regional organizations, ECOWAS and the ECAS, to harmonize institutional frameworks and codes of conduct with respect to the issues of piracy in 

the gulf. So an institutional work at a regional level even while we 

are working at a bilateral level on individual maritime capacitybuilding efforts whether it is maritime domain awareness, whether 

it is the ability to project power to address particular incidents. 

And there have been a number of successes where we can point to 

partner nations who are using vessels that have been provided by 

the United States or making use of maritime domain awareness 

equipment to interdict successfully various pirate incidents and 

others in the Gulf of Guinea. But that type of model is the type 

of model that we see time and again, whether it is at sea or on 

land. 

Senator FLAKE. Is there a 3-month course over at State just to 

learn all the acronyms for all these security arrangements? That is 

what I am wondering because I need to take that one. [Laughter.] 

But anyway, I will turn to Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

21 

And you know what I would like, Mr. Chairman? You know, I 

chaired telecommunications over in the House for many years, and 

what I did was I actually declared an acronym-free zone in our 

committee—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MARKEY [continuing]. Just so that everyone would be 

forced to speak in easily understandable English because it is easily understandable. But the acronyms make it inaccessible. 

So I would ask each of our witnesses to try to stay out of acronyms and to try to put it in English so that even the least wellinformed American who is watching this on C–SPAN can understand it. And so please be mindful of that. 

Senator FLAKE. And if the ranking member will excuse me for a 

minute—— 

Senator MARKEY. Absolutely. 

Senator FLAKE [continuing]. And promises not to stage a 

coup—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FLAKE [continuing]. I will go and vote and return. Thank 

you. 

Senator MARKEY. We are creating the kind of harmony here that 

we are encouraging to exist between State and Defense. 

So let me ask you this, Secretary Dory. I would like to go back 

to Nigeria and Boko Haram. We have had limited results in our cooperation with Nigeria in the past, but we might be seeing a turn 

toward a more proactive approach against Boko Haram, given Nigeria’s recently elected president. The Nigerian military has acted, 

taking the fight to Boko Haram in their strongest territories, freeing hundreds of kidnapped Nigerian citizens in the process. While 

this is seen as a helpful development, we still need to closely examine the kind of partnership we hope to have with those we support, 

particularly when we are discussing military partnerships. 

In a recent Amnesty International report, Nigeria’s military is alleged to be committing war crimes against their own citizens under 

the veil of combating Boko Haram. Supporting partners in an effort 

to combat violence and human rights violations when they themselves are committing similar acts against innocents is not a recipe 

for success by any measure. 

What are DOD short-term and long-term goals in supporting the 

Nigerian Government’s efforts against Boko Haram? How do the 

recent reports of the Nigerian military’s human rights abuses impact or affect these goals in our partnership with Nigeria? 

Ms. DORY. Thank you, Senator. We are very aware of the report 

recently released by Amnesty International and the allegations 

that have persisted for some time with respect to human rights 

abuses by elements of the Nigerian military and other elements of 

the security services. I think as Assistant Secretary Thomas-Greenfield mentioned, this has been part of our dialogue over time both 

privately and publicly with all elements of the Nigerian Government. And it will be fundamental to our ability to work together 

going forward because the shared interests and the shared values 

have to be there at the foundation of our relationship with the Nigerians going forward. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

22 

So I think in the very near term, we are giving time and space 

for the new President to put in place his leadership team to see 

what changes are made, if any, with respect to the Nigerian military leadership. Depending on how that settles out, it will give us 

then opportunities to begin to reengage with the new leadership 

team and to understand what their priorities are, if their priorities 

include, in addition to, of course, addressing robustly the issue of 

Boko Haram within their borders and beyond, but whether there 

is also a commitment to addressing these long-standing concerns 

and our ability as the Department of Defense or State Department 

to engage in a security relationship. As you know, sir, the Leahy 

human rights considerations would prevent us from working and 

collaborating in a training relationship or in an equipping relationship with military members who have any accusations with respect 

to human rights. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Secretary. 

Let me go back over to you, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. 

What are we doing to improve how the African Union deals with 

sexual abuse and exploitation by its peacekeeping troops? How do 

the training programs we fund for these peacekeepers address that 

issue? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you. We have just 

dealt with a case like that with the African Union related to Burundian and Ugandan troops in Somalia. And our immediate approach is to demarche the African Union and those countries that 

are involved to ensure that they investigate and hold accountable 

anyone who is involved in sexual abuse. Peacekeepers are there to 

protect, and any abuse of that authority has to be addressed very 

quickly or they lose the confidence of the people. 

In the recent case, the African Union did carry out a very thorough investigation, and we were pleased in the case of Uganda that 

Uganda also carried out an investigation and held their troops accountable. We also worked with the Burundi Government. They did 

not respond as we would have wanted them to respond, but DOD 

sent out a team to work with the Burundi army in the training elements to ensure that they got the kind of training that they needed 

to address human rights concerns and that is built into our training, the idea of sexual exploitation, the training that we do with 

all of the troops that we are working with on the continent of Africa. This is a very serious concern for us, and it is something that 

we immediately respond to when we hear reports. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, I think it is just an important issue for 

them to understand that we are dead serious about it. 

Secretary Dory, I am growing more concerned about the potential 

for militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. By that, I mean 

are we obscuring the importance of issues like democratic growth 

and good governance as we continue to tackle the real security concerns on the continent. 

In 2015, the administration sought creation of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund. In fiscal year 2015, the Counterterrorism 

Partnership Fund totaled $1.3 billion. And DOD plans to spend 

$460 million of that amount in Africa. 

In the fiscal year 2016 request, the Counterterrorism Partner- ship Fund request for DOD is now $2.1 billion, and $1.27 billion 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

23 

of that is meant for Africa, East Africa, the Lake Chad Basin, and 

Northwest Africa terrorist hotspots. 

For the State Department in fiscal year 2016, security sector 

funds hover somewhere around the $400 million to $500 million 

range for its primary programs. 

If Congress grants DOD’s Counterterrorism Partnership Fund request and the funds are ultimately obligated as the administration 

proposes, then this one fund will outsize all of the State Department-administered security sector funds, and that is by a large 

amount. 

I realize it is not always easy to compare funding levels like apples to apples, but from where you sit overseeing DOD’s policy in 

Africa, can you understand my concern? Do you see this dramatic 

imbalance between State and DOD as a good thing for our approach to Africa? 

Secretary Dory. 

Ms. DORY. Thank you, Senator. 

I share you concern, which is part of the reason in my statement 

where I have drawn attention to the request for the State Department CTPF request as well. And there was a fiscal year 2015 

CTPF request for the State Department too. And the concern is 

that if we focus exclusively on militaries and we neglect the other 

elements referred to in terms of law enforcement, judicial systems, 

civilian engagement, then we will, indeed, have an imbalance in 

terms of our approach. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

Just so that I will be able to make this rollcall on the Senate 

floor with some confidence, what I am going to do is just declare 

a brief recess. The chairman will be returning momentarily, and 

then we will just recontinue the hearing. So this committee stands 

in a brief recess. 

[Recess.] 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. No coup happened while I was gone. 

Okay. I am still in charge here. All right, good. Thank you. 

When the bell sounds over there, we are like Pavlov’s dogs. We 

just run over and then vote. So thank you for waiting. 

I am not sure what all Senator Markey touched on, but let me 

ask a little bit about—we have long provided security assistance on 

the continent—and this is for you, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield—under the premise that exposure to U.S. best practices in our 

civilian-led military will lead to great security in the region. And, 

Mr. Talwar, you mentioned also the value of training programs. 

And we have certainly seen that in the past. Yet, in Mali, Burkina 

Faso, and possibly Burundi, United States-trained actors were involved in, shall we say, extrademocratic transitions. 

How can we be confident that U.S. assistance will foster stability 

rather than aid to the problems? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Those are examples where it 

did not work and we have lots of examples where it has worked. 

But let me say on those three examples, sir, we actually were 

able to communicate directly with those individuals who were involved because we know them, having gone through training or 

having had contacts with them. And we were able, particularly in 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

24 

the Burundi case, to say that you have to turn over authority to 

civilians. We have made clear in every case where there has been 

an unlawful attempt to obtain power that we do not support that. 

In the case of Burundi recently, I think we have been somewhat 

astonished at the restraint that the military has shown, despite the 

attempted coup attempt, but in dealing with the other military that 

we are working with, that they have shown some restraint, and we 

certainly have seen that because Burundian military are participating in peacekeeping operations, and they do not want anything 

to interfere with their ability to continue to be part of that because 

that is in jeopardy if they do not act in a way that reflects the values that we have tried to share with them through the training. 

But this is a concern and it is a concern that these militaries are 

aware of, and they know that if they carry out acts of violence, that 

they jeopardize any possibility of any support from the U.S. Government. 

Senator FLAKE. Burundi has, in fact, suspended their participation in the peacekeeping operations in Somalia? Have they not? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. No, sir, they have not. They 

are still participating in the peacekeeping operations, but we have 

also let them know that as the military continues—that we are 

watching the military very closely. And it is in jeopardy if the military in Burundi take any actions that will raise some questions 

about how much they are participating in the violence, what kinds 

of human rights violations they are involved in. But they are very 

much a part of the and an essential part of our Somali AMISOM 

operation. 

Senator FLAKE. Great. 

You talk about some successes. We have seen some modicum of 

success at least in the eastern Congo. Mr. Talwar, do you want to 

talk about the situation there and where you feel it is going? 

Mr. TALWAR. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I actually would defer to 

my colleague, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield, who can talk more 

specifically about the situation in eastern Congo. I would say that 

we do have some ongoing efforts in that area on the security side, 

but I think I would defer to her on the diplomatic piece. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. It has been a work in 

progress in dealing with the DRC military. We have seen some behavioral changes on the positive side. At the same time, we still 

continue to be concerned about their approach, particularly in dealing with the civilian population. As you know, the statistics have 

shown that the number of rapes and attacks on civilians there have 

been extraordinary, and we are continuing to work with the government and we were pleased that they actually carried out an investigation recently, signed an MOU that indicated that they would 

no longer be involved in attacks against civilian populations, particularly using rape as a tool of war. 

Senator FLAKE. The Lord’s Resistance Army a couple of years ago 

was the talk of the town. There is a lot more focus on it now. Can 

you talk about what the current status is and if we can declare success there? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. We are not ready to declare 

success, but we are very, very proud of the accomplishments we 

have made thus far. They are no longer attacking villages. The secFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

25 

ond in command has been taken to the ICC in The Hague, and it 

is only the top leader who is left. And we will continue our efforts 

working closely with the Ugandan Government and other governments in the region until he is captured. 

Amanda, would you like to add something on that? 

Ms. DORY. Thank you. If I could, Senator. As Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield was indicating, four of the five top leaders are no 

longer on the battlefield for a variety of reasons. And the core fighting force of the LRA has been shrunken considerably and has really discarded many of the family members and is down to a relatively small core, maybe a tenth of its original size. So from that 

perspective, I think we feel very pleased with the effort. It of course 

relies on the regional militaries in the first instance with the U.S. 

role in an advisory and assistance capacity, and as long as the 

partner will is there to persist, we will be there as well. 

Senator FLAKE. Some in the NGO community have asserted that 

Uganda is playing a less than helpful role in South Sudan. They 

are one of the six APRRP partners. Can you address that? What 

are we doing? Are we putting pressure on them, if need be, to play 

a positive role? One, would you agree with the assertion that they 

have played a complicating role? Put it that way. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I would say they are playing 

a complicating role. I think all of the countries in the region have 

interests that are being played out in South Sudan. And, yes, we 

have been in regular contact with the Government of Uganda, as 

well as other governments in the region, to urge that they be more 

proactive in trying to find a solution to peace in the region. 

The real problem are the two fighters, the two leaders on both 

sides, getting them to the negotiating table. But it would help to 

get them to the negotiating table if they know that they have lost 

the support of regional partners. And that is a challenge that we 

will continue to push these leaders on addressing. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Mr. Talwar or Ms. Dory, we signed a long-term agreement with 

Djibouti. We have a base there or make use of the base there. I 

have a brother that just spent, I think, 4 months stationed there. 

How is that arrangement going? There was a ‘‘Washington Post’’ 

article a while ago about the challenges in terms of safety at that 

airfield and whatnot. Can you talk about that and how important 

that is for the region? 

Ms. DORY. Senator, I would be glad to. The Camp Lemonnier location, our only enduring location on the African Continent, is critical, as you know, based on its geographic location and the support 

it provides to multiple departments, agencies, and combatant commands. 

Our relationship with the Djiboutians has really been strengthened in the course of working together to update the implementing 

agreement that relates to our presence at Camp Lemonnier. And 

I would characterize our relationship at this point as very strong 

and productive. We welcomed a very senior ministerial level delegation from Djibouti early in the calendar year to Washington for 

the first time as part of a new binational forum that we have established with Djibouti that brings Defense, the State Department, 

and USAID to the table to address the range of partnerships that 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

26 

we have with the Djiboutians. The military piece is perhaps the 

most visible, but the part that is really the most important to the 

government of Djibouti is the potential for jobs creation in an economy that is really struggling and being able to provide jobs for a 

growing population. 

Thank you. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Turning now for a minute to the budget request, much of the 

U.S. assistance is intended to build African capacity, as we have 

talked about, carrying out peacekeeping and stability operations. 

But given the prevalence of instability in many of the countries 

that we deal with—we mentioned some here, Nigeria, Burundi, 

Mali—how confident can we be that these countries can absorb 

U.S. assistance and reliably protect what we want protected? We 

have talked about some of this already, but from our perspective 

here, that is an assurance that we have to feel comfortable with. 

Like you said, with a lot of the instability going on, it is sometimes 

a difficult sell to our constituents. Do you want to talk about that, 

Ambassador? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. For me and for the Africa Bureau, the important element of security that we do not get enough 

funding for is stability and democracy because it is stable countries 

that respect democratic values and rule of law where you will see 

less conflict and less insecurity. 

So I would like to see us put more effort, as we did in the case 

of Nigeria in supporting their election, helping to build the capacity 

of the election commission and their NGO monitoring teams to 

monitor the election so that they could deliver a free and fair and 

transparent election that all of the people of Nigeria felt comfortable with. That is the key to security all over Africa. 

And so no amount of money we put into security assistance that 

is just building up militaries will have complete success until governments are stable and respect the rule of law. 

That said, there are countries we are working to help them build 

their capacity to handle the security assistance that we are providing them. They are willing partners in almost all the cases that 

we work with them on because they see the threat that terrorism 

and insecurity—the threat that that is to their society and to their 

people. And they want to work with us. They have worked very 

closely with the AU in terms of standing up an AU capacity to provide support for security assistance, and we are working closely 

with the AU in terms of developing that capacity as well. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. 

How can we assure that—you know, we hear these new security 

initiatives, a few rolled out at the African Leaders Summit. How 

can we be sure that they are just not repackaging of old programs? 

I can tell you we talked about the acronyms from us here. We have 

got several going that we are contributing to, and all of a sudden, 

we roll out a few more. Do they take the place of? Are they consistent with? Are they in addition to? It is sometimes difficult on 

this side to understand why a new initiative is needed and if it is 

simply draining resources away from others. Why are these new 

initiatives needed, the Rapid Response, for example? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you for that question. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

27 

Actually we consulted very closely with our African partners as 

we developed these new initiatives, and we looked at areas where 

we could complement our already existing programs. And these two 

new programs complement those. 

The Security Governance Initiative gives us the opportunity to 

work on security governance, actually building the capacity for the 

justice sector. It is broader than military. It is broader than equipment. It is about building the government’s capacity to govern its 

own security apparatus. And we think it complements our other 

programs. 

On APRRP, that is being managed by the PM Bureau. African 

countries have always stood up when we have needed peacekeeping 

troops. But we cannot deploy them fast enough. They are not 

trained. They are not equipped, and APRRP helps us in responding 

to needs that are not being addressed through our other programs. 

Senator FLAKE. Let us talk a minute about the Central African 

Republic. It has been a long slog there. Can you give a current assessment of where we are? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I am guardedly optimistic 

about the Central African Republic. And the ‘‘guardedly’’ is in bold 

and highlighted. They had a dialogue that was sponsored by the 

government recently, and it was relatively successful. They have 

agreed to delay the elections because they are not ready for the 

elections, to be very frank. And the elections will take place at the 

end of the year. But I think broadly what we heard during the dialogue from the vast majority of people is that they want peace, and 

they are prepared to invest in peace, keep the transitional government in place now to hopefully lead to peaceful elections and a 

transition. 

There are still some negative forces out there who are trying 

their best to scuttle any efforts to bring peace to the country, and 

we are working to address that as well with our partners from the 

AU, as well as EU and French and U.K. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, the committee thanks you for your testimony here today and willingness to answer questions. I am sorry 

about the schedule that we have here. But this is very illuminating 

and very helpful to us, and we appreciate your testimony and look 

forward to the second panel. So you are dismissed. Thank you. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you. 

Ms. Blanchard, please proceed. You have been introduced. Thank 

you for being here and we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF LAUREN PLOCH BLANCHARD, SPECIALIST IN 

AFRICAN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. BLANCHARD. Chairman Flake, thank you for inviting CRS to 

testify. I would ask that my written statement, which has a lot 

more detail on the security assistance programs, trends, and funding levels be submitted for the record. 

Today’s discussion is very timely, and I really appreciate the 

committee’s effort to bring this issue some attention. We spent a 

lot of time on it. 

Driven by growing counterterrorism concerns and other security 

priorities, we are now seeing a major increase in U.S. security asFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

28 

sistance to Africa. Long considered an important foreign policy tool, 

U.S. officials increasingly view security assistance as a strategic instrument to mitigate potential national security threats and to reduce the possibility that U.S. forces might be required to intervene 

overseas. From northeast Nigeria and Libya to Somalia, state 

weakness and instability have contributed to environments in 

which we are seeing violent extremists able to expand their reach 

across borders and share tactics, training, and weapons with 

likeminded groups in the region. 

Three years ago, there were four African based groups that were 

designated by the State Department as foreign terrorist organizations. Today there are 12. At least one, al-Shabaab, has attracted 

Western recruits, including U.S. citizens. 

Fragile states and undergoverned spaces present the international community with other potential threats from maritime piracy to illicit trafficking. Recent conflicts have taken a massive 

human toll, and they were very costly. In South Sudan, the United 

States has provided over $1 billion so far in emergency relief aid 

in the past year and a half to stem the humanitarian crisis caused 

by that country’s return to conflict. Conflicts like these threaten to 

erode or erase the development investments that the United States 

and other donors have made, and they place a broader strain on 

neighboring countries. African conflicts dominate the U.N. Security 

Council agenda, and more than 80 percent of the U.N. peacekeepers deployed today are serving in operations in Africa. 

Twenty years ago, DOD saw little traditional strategic security 

interests in Africa. Large military aid allocations were made in the 

1980s to counter Soviet influence, but United States military casualties in Somalia in 1993 took a toll on American willingness to 

intervene directly in African conflicts. By the 1990s, security assistance was shifting toward a focus on conflict prevention and building African forces’ capacity to keep the peace. But the 1998 Embassy bombings in East Africa and the 9/11 attacks, along with 

subsequent terrorist activity in the region, changed U.S. perceptions. Security assistance spending in Africa has since been on the 

rise, notably in response to perceived terrorist threats. 

Security assistance still comprises a small percentage of the overall U.S. foreign aid to Africa, but both have grown considerably. In 

1985, security assistance comprised about 17 percent of total aid to 

Africa, but at the time, the total was just under $1 billion, or 

roughly $2 billion in today’s dollars. In fiscal year 2014, in comparison, total aid to Africa was about $7.8 billion or more, with security 

assistance comprising roughly 10 percent of total aid, but about 

$800 million. Of that figure, about $500 million right now or in fiscal year 2014 came from the State Department funds and about 

$300 million came under DOD authorities. 

Security assistance figures do not tell the whole story, of course. 

U.S. military engagement on the continent has been growing in the 

past decade, and African militaries benefit from a growing range 

of activities and joint exercises with U.S. forces that are very difficult to quantify in dollar terms. 

A large portion of security assistance today supports efforts to 

counter violent extremist groups on the continent. The largest 

share supports African forces fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia. U.S. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

29 

support for that effort has totaled more than $1.4 billion in the 

past decade, primarily through the State Department’s peacekeeping operations, or PKO, account but increasingly supplemented 

by DOD using legal authorities that Congress has given DOD to 

build the capacity of counterterrorism partners around the world 

and particularly in East Africa. 

Without donor support, the security gains against al-Shabaab in 

the past 5 years would likely not have been possible. But the mission is not over. Al-Shabaab continues to pose a threat increasingly 

in neighboring Kenya and other parts of East Africa, and Somalia 

is far from stable. DOD counterterrorism aid to East African countries has averaged between $40 million and $60 million annually 

in the past 5 years. Planned and proposed assistance to Nigeria 

and its neighbors to counter Boko Haram appears set to represent 

a sizeable new DOD infusion of military aid to that region, and 

DOD and the State Department both continue to allocate significant counterterrorism resources to the Sahel. 

The new Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, or CTPF, could 

represent a doubling of the U.S. security assistance spending in Africa relative to fiscal year 2014 if the funds requested are appropriated and obligated as proposed. If Congress concurs with the administration’s assessment of the threats in Africa, questions for 

oversight center on whether the U.S. response is appropriately calibrated to meet them. In a tight budget environment, questions on 

the return on investment also arise. 

For answers, Congress may look at how region-specific assistance 

information is reported by the executive branch. In the 1980s, for 

example, State and DOD principals routinely testified side by side, 

as they did today, and provided regional specific assistance requests and reporting information broken down by security assistance and nonsecurity assistance. Such reporting does not occur 

today, leaving appropriators, authorizers, and executive branch implementers without a clear and common operating picture of current programs, priorities, and proposals. 

Security assistance programs in Africa to date have had mixed 

results. There are some clear successes, but there are also indications of challenges related to absorption, sustainment, and accountability. The State Department’s PKO budget is being used as one 

of the primary vehicles for counterterrorism assistance in Africa 

and for important contingencies beyond its origins as a peacekeeping support mechanism. Congress originally drafted PKO with 

broad authorities for crisis response but may wish to reexamine its 

current uses and scope given these trends. More broadly, it is extremely challenging to compile a comprehensive picture of how 

much security aid is being provided to each African country, given 

the complex patchwork of legal authorities and programs under 

which the State Department and DOD currently operate. This 

poses a potential challenge to oversight efforts regarding appropriations and overarching policy issues. 

I want to raise a couple of other potential considerations for Congress today. 

In addressing extremist threats, to what extent should the U.S. 

focus on improving partners’ ability to meet near-term counterterFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

30 

rorism objectives versus longer term efforts to counter 

radicalization through various development programs? 

Does the current approach strike the right balance between military aid and support to law enforcement and justice sector, or between tactical training or long-term institutional development from 

ministries of defense and ministers of the interior? 

Is U.S. foreign aid to support improved governance and local 

service delivery keeping pace with security sector enhancements? 

While military aid can provide windows of opportunity and facilitate operations that shrink terrorist space, if the host government 

is unable to come in and provide assistance and services to the population and improve their conditions or they are unwilling or unable to hold territory, what have we invested in? 

And finally, what happens to U.S. security sector investments 

when partner governments’ objectives diverge from those of the 

United States? 

Many African countries face governance challenges that present 

potential risks. You have discussed of them today. I would point 

out that some security cooperation relationships may also complicate the United States ability to press other foreign policy objectives, including the promotion of human rights. Notably, the administration has continued to partner closely with the Ugandan 

military while stridently criticizing its record on LGBT rights. 

And finally, there are questions about partner nations’ capacity 

to absorb and willingness to sustain and secure security assistance. 

You have raised a question about this. In Africa, these challenges 

are particularly pronounced. Donor-funded security assistance rivals or outweighs the defense budgets of some of our key partners. 

And questions arise about partners’ capacity to secure equipment 

transfers, which may present additional risks, as we saw in Mali 

where soldiers who had defected to insurgent or terrorist groups in 

2012 reportedly took equipment provided by the United States with 

them. Recent developments in Iraq and Yemen highlight the inherent dangers in defense transfers to fragile states. 

I will stop here and thank you for your attention. I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Blanchard follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT LAUREN PLOCH BLANCHARD

Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, Thank you for inviting the Congressional Research Service to testify 

today. I will begin with a summary of some of the key trends and questions for U.S. 

policy and congressional oversight of security assistance in Africa. My prepared 

statement below also includes a more detailed discussion of current U.S. security 

assistance programs on the continent, with information on funding levels, where 

available, and the broad policy objectives behind them.1

Today’s discussion is timely. Driven by growing terrorism concerns and other 

security priorities, we are now seeing a major increase in U.S. security assistance 

to sub-Saharan Africa. While security assistance has long been considered an important foreign policy tool, both to build relationships and to address foreign policy priorities, U.S. officials have also increasingly viewed such assistance as a strategic 

instrument for mitigating potential national security threats and reducing the possibility that U.S. forces might be required to intervene overseas.2 From northeastern 

Nigeria and Libya to Somalia, state weakness and instability have contributed to 

environments in parts of Africa in which violent Islamist extremist groups have 

been able to expand their reach across borders and share tactics, training, and 

weapons with other like-minded groups. Three years ago, there were four Africabased groups designated by the State Department as Foreign Terrorist OrganizaFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

31 

tions. Today, there are 12. At least one, al-Shabaab in Somalia, has attracted Western recruits, including U.S. citizens. 

Fragile states and undergoverned spaces present the international community 

with other potential threats, such as maritime piracy and illicit trafficking. Recent 

conflicts on the continent have taken a massive human toll, and they have been 

costly. In South Sudan, for example, the United States has provided more than $1 

billion in emergency relief aid in the past year and a half to stem a humanitarian 

crisis caused by that country’s return to conflict. Conflicts like South Sudan’s 

threaten to erode or erase the development investments the United States and other 

donors have made, and they place a broader strain on neighboring countries. As an 

indication of international concern with such conflicts, which dominate the U.N. 

Security Council’s agenda, more than 80 percent of the U.N. peacekeepers deployed 

around the world today are serving in operations in Africa. 

Twenty years ago, the U.S. Department of Defense saw few traditional strategic 

security interests in Africa.3 After large U.S. military aid allocations were made in 

the 1980s to counter Soviet influence (including via reportedly large arms transfers), 

U.S. military casualties in Somalia in 1993 took a toll on American willingness to 

intervene directly in African conflicts. By the mid-1990s, U.S. security assistance 

allocations were shifting toward a focus on conflict prevention and on building the 

capacity of African forces to keep the peace. The 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in 

East Africa and the 9/11 attacks, along with subsequent terrorist activity on the 

continent, changed U.S. perceptions. 

U.S. security assistance spending on the continent has since been on the rise, notably to respond to perceived threats from transnational violent Islamist extremist 

groups. U.S. security assistance still comprises a small percentage of overall U.S. 

foreign aid to Africa, but both have grown considerably. Total U.S. aid to Africa in 

FY 1985, for example, was just under $1 billion, or roughly $2 billion in today’s dollars. Total U.S. aid provided by the State Department, USAID, and DOD for subSaharan Africa in FY 2014 was at least $7.8 billion, not including certain types of 

humanitarian aid or Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) funding. Security 

assistance in FY 1985 for Africa was $168 million, or about 17 percent of all U.S. 

aid for Africa at that time, according to testimony by State and Defense Department 

officials.4 In FY 2014, security assistance, by CRS calculations, may have been roughly $800 million, of which almost $500 million was provided through State 

Department funds and almost $300 million under DOD authorities, representing 

approximately 10 percent of the aid total for Africa. 

Security assistance figures do not tell the whole story, though—U.S. military engagement on the continent has been growing over the past decade, and African militaries are benefiting from a growing range of activities and joint exercises with U.S. 

forces that are difficult to quantify in dollar terms. 

A large proportion of U.S. security assistance today supports efforts to counter 

violent extremist groups on the continent, representing a broadening of U.S. security interests beyond the 1990s-era focus on peacekeeping capacity-building. The 

largest share supports the African forces fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia. That 

effort, for which U.S. funding has totaled more than $1.4 billion in the past decade, 

has been primarily funded through the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations 

(PKO) account, but PKO funds have been increasingly supplemented by DOD, using 

legal authorities granted by Congress to build the capacity of counterterrorism partners around the world and particularly in East Africa.5 Without U.S. and other 

donor support, the security gains against al-Shabaab in the past 5 years would likely not have been possible.6 But the mission is not over—al-Shabaab continues to 

pose a threat, increasingly in neighboring Kenya and other parts of East Africa, and 

Somalia is far from stable. Additional funds have been provided to build the 

counterterrorism capacity of Somalia’s neighbors, namely Kenya, Djibouti, and to a 

lesser extent, Ethiopia. DOD counterterrorism assistance to East African countries, 

under the so-called ‘‘Section 1206’’ (10 U.S.C. 2282) and related regional ‘‘train-andequip’’ authorities, has averaged between $40–$60 million annually in the past 5 

years (some but not all of which has supported AMISOM deployments by these 

countries). Planned and proposed assistance to Nigeria and its neighbors to counter 

Boko Haram appear set to represent a sizeable new DOD infusion of military aid 

to that subregion, and DOD and the State Department both continue to allocate significant counterterrorism resources in the Sahel region of West Africa. 

President Obama’s new Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), proposed by 

the administration and authorized and funded by Congress on a limited basis in 

2014, could represent a doubling of the United States security assistance spending 

in Africa relative to FY 2014 totals, if the funds requested in FY 2016 are appropriated and obligated as the administration has proposed. If Congress concurs with 

the administration’s assessment of the threats and security challenges on the conFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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tinent, questions for congressional oversight center on whether the U.S. response is 

appropriately calibrated to meet them. In a tight budget environment, questions 

about the return on investment also arise. In order to make such assessments and 

answer such questions, Congress may examine the ways in which region-specific 

assistance information is reported by the executive branch. In the 1980s, for example, State and Defense Department principals routinely testified side by side and 

provided region specific assistance request and reporting information broken down 

by security and nonsecurity assistance. Such reporting does not occur today for a 

variety of reasons. This leaves appropriators, authorizers, and executive branch implementers without a clear and common operating picture on current programs, priorities, and proposals. 

Security assistance programs in Africa to date have produced mixed results. There 

are some clear successes, but there are also indications of challenges related to 

absorption, sustainment, and accountability. The State Department’s PKO budget is 

also being used as one of the primary vehicles for counterterrorism assistance in 

Africa, and for important contingencies beyond its origins as a peacekeeping support 

mechanism. Congress originally drafted PKO with broad authorities, but Congress 

may wish to examine its current uses and scope given these trends. More broadly, 

it is extremely challenging to compile a comprehensive picture of how much security 

assistance is being provided to each African country, given the complex patchwork 

of legal authorities and programs under which the State Department and DOD are 

currently operating. This poses a potential challenge to congressional oversight 

efforts regarding both appropriations and overarching policy issues. 

Potential additional considerations for Congress include the following: In addressing violent Islamist extremist threats, to what extent should the United States focus 

on improving partners’ ability to meet near-term counterterrorism objectives versus 

longer term efforts to counter radicalization? Does the current approach strike the 

right balance between military aid and law enforcement and justice sector investments? Between tactical training and long-term institutional development? Is U.S. 

foreign assistance to support improved governance and local service delivery keeping 

pace with security sector enhancements? While military aid may be able to facilitate 

operations that shrink terrorist safe havens and create a window of opportunity to 

improve stability, are such efforts sustainable if host governments are unable or unwilling to hold territory and improve conditions for their populations? And finally, 

what happens to U.S. security sector ‘‘investments’’ when partner governments’ 

objectives diverge from those of the United States? 

Many African countries face governance challenges that present potential risks for 

a partnership approach. For example, the political and security crisis in Burundi, 

which has been a major troop contributor in Somalia, presents U.S. policymakers 

with a dilemma, as there appear to be few options for replacing the more than 5,000 

Burundian troops currently deployed in and around Mogadishu, who rely heavily on 

U.S., U.N., and European assistance. Uganda and Chad, both viewed as capable 

counterterrorism partners, are led by two of Africa’s longest serving Presidents and 

have governance challenges of their own. Some U.S. security cooperation relationships may complicate the United States ability to press other foreign policy priorities, including the promotion of human rights. Notably, the administration has continued to partner closely with the Ugandan military while stridently criticizing its 

record on gay rights. 

Finally, any broad examination of U.S. security assistance raises questions about 

partner nations’ capacity to absorb and willingness to sustain and secure this assistance. In sub-Saharan Africa, these challenges are particularly pronounced. Donorfunded security assistance rivals or outweighs the defense budgets of several key 

African security partners (notably Burundi, Djibouti, Mauritania, and Niger, which 

all reportedly have defense budgets under $50 million annually).7 Further, questions 

arise about partner countries’ capacity to secure equipment transfers, which may 

present additional risks, as exhibited for example in Mali, where news reports suggest that soldiers who defected to insurgent and/or terrorist groups in 2012 took 

U.S.-origin equipment with them. Indeed, recent developments in Iraq and Yemen 

highlight the inherent dangers in defense transfers to fragile states. 

OVERVIEW: SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA

Security assistance has long been viewed as an important foreign policy tool, and 

building partnership capacity and supporting stability operations have become 

increasingly important components of U.S. security strategy since September 11, 

2001. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance states that ‘‘across the globe we will 

seek to be the security partner of choice, pursue new partnerships with a growing 

number of nations—including those in Africa and Latin America—whose interests 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity.’’ Recent U.S. official documents and statements have described a shifting, 

and increasingly volatile, global security landscape, with parts of the world experiencing unrest that is contributing to ‘‘a fertile environment for violent extremism 

and sectarian conflict, especially in fragile states, stretching from the Sahel to South 

Asia.’’ 8 The Obama administration’s 2015 National Security Strategy states that 

‘‘we embrace our responsibilities for underwriting international security because it 

serves our interest, upholds our commitments to allies and partners, and addresses 

threats that are truly global.’’ 

Sub-Saharan Africa is an area of growing focus for U.S. national security policy. 

In 2007, President George W. Bush established U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), 

the U.S. military’s first geographic command entirely focused on engagement in 

Africa.9 In 2012, President Obama issued the first U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, identifying the advancement of peace and security on the continent 

among four main objectives.10 The 2015 National Security Strategy declares that 

‘‘ongoing conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

and the Central African Republic, as well as violent extremists fighting governments in Somalia, Nigeria, and across the Sahel all pose threats to innocent civilians, regional stability, and our national security.’’ The proliferation of violent 

Islamist extremist groups in North and sub-Saharan Africa is of major concern to 

U.S. officials: 12 groups on the continent are currently designated by the State 

Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, of which 8 have been listed since 

2013. Despite notable economic progress in some countries and a popular narrative 

in recent years of ‘‘Africa rising,’’ instability in parts of the continent continues to 

cause large-scale human suffering and displacement, and remains a major challenge 

to development. 

Out of more than 106,000 United Nations (U.N.) peacekeepers currently deployed 

around the world, more than 80 percent are serving in operations in Africa.11 One 

of the world’s largest multilateral stability operations today is not a U.N. mission— 

it is the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), comprised of more than 

22,000 African troops, most of them U.S.-trained and equipped. Many African countries are prominent troop contributors to other peace operations. Half of the U.N.’s 

10-largest troop contributors are African countries, and Ethiopia has become the 

world’s largest troop contributor to such operations between its personnel in U.N. 

missions and AMISOM. 

The proliferation of stability operations on the continent (12, including the U.N. 

operations, AMISOM, the nascent multinational task force to counter the Nigerian 

violent extremist group Boko Haram, and the AU regional task force to counter the 

Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA) highlights the extent of ongoing conflict and state 

fragility in Africa. However, the increasing contributions of African forces to those 

missions also emphasize the growing capacity, and will, of many African countries 

to respond to these challenges.12 Notable is the willingness of several African troop 

contributors (some in pursuit of their own perceived interests) to take on stabilization mandates that go far beyond traditional peacekeeping, deploying in an offensive 

capacity to countries with ongoing hostilities, like Somalia, where there is no peace 

to keep. Amid ongoing debates about the extent to which peacekeeping operations 

should become engaged in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism activities, the 

African Union has, to date, authorized three missions—in Somalia, Mali, and Boko 

Haram-affected areas—explicitly to counter violent Islamist extremist threats.13

With extremely limited AU financial resources, such deployments have required significant voluntary external assistance to troop-contributing countries, much of which 

has come from the United States and European donors. 

In its FY 2016 Foreign Operations budget request, the State Department describes the promotion of peace and security as ‘‘one of the United States highest 

priorities’’ in sub-Saharan Africa, citing state fragility, conflict, and transnational 

security issues. The request includes almost $470 million in base budget funding 

specifically for Africa to support security sector reforms and capacity-building; stabilization operations; counterterrorism and counternarcotics initiatives; maritime 

safety and security programs; and other conflict prevention and mitigation efforts. 

Significant additional funding is being sought for Africa in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request for the Administration’s Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF). 

DOD’s security cooperation funding for Africa also appears set to expand substantially under its FY 2016 request, primarily through its global request of more than 

$2.1 billion in CTPF funding, to build on funds appropriated in FY 2015. According 

to DOD, the CTPF request reflects ‘‘the vital role that our allies and partners play 

in countering terrorism that could threaten U.S. citizens.’’ 14 In testimony on the FY 

2016 DOD budget request, AFRICOM Commander Gen. David Rodriguez described 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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the command’s efforts to work with African partners and build their capacity as 

‘‘vital to advancing our national interests of security, prosperity, international order, 

and the promotion of universal values.’’ He also argued that ‘‘Africa’s growing importance to allies and emerging powers presents opportunities to reinforce U.S. 

global security objectives through our engagement on the continent.’’ 15

The State Department and DOD’s FY 2016 requests for security assistance in 

Africa are discussed below, following a summary of the various authorities and programs under which that support is provided. 

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACCOUNTS, AUTHORITIES, AND PROGRAMS

The U.S. Government provides assistance to foreign security forces through both 

bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Congress has authorized many of these efforts 

under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export 

Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended. Pursuant to these statutes, the State 

Department takes a prominent role in determining U.S. security assistance policy, 

its role as a foreign policy tool, and its possible impact on broader U.S. foreign policy. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23, issued by President Obama in 2013, outlines policy guidelines for planning and implementing security assistance and 

strengthening coordination among agencies. It reaffirms the State Department’s 

lead in policy, supervision, and general management of security assistance. The 

State Department administers the programs authorized under the FAA and the 

AECA, although DOD implements several of them. In recent years, however, Congress has also supported an increasing role for the Defense Department in shaping 

U.S. security assistance, often with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, 

through the authorization and appropriation of funds to conduct certain security cooperation activities, primarily for, but not limited to, counterterrorism purposes. The 

majority of U.S. security assistance in Africa is military aid; assistance to police and 

other law enforcement agencies is comparatively small. These programs and authorities are discussed below. 

U.S. Assistance to African Militaries 

State Department Authorities 

The most widely known of the State Department’s military assistance programs 

are the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). These programs are 

implemented by DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and are managed at the U.S. Embassy in the recipient country by AFRICOM’s Offices of Security 

Cooperation (OSCs) or Defense Attache ́ Offices (DAOs).16 IMET provides training at 

U.S. military schools and other training assistance for foreign military personnel on 

a grant basis, and is primarily designed to build bilateral relationships and introduce participants to elements of U.S. democracy, such as the American judicial system, legislative oversight, free speech, equality, and respect for human rights. A 

subset of IMET training, Expanded IMET (E–IMET), provides courses on defense 

management, civil-military relations, law enforcement cooperation, and military justice for both military and civilian personnel. Other programs for which the State 

Department provides policy guidance are Foreign Military Sales (FMS), which 

allows countries to purchase U.S. defense articles, services, and training, and the 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, which allows foreign militaries to acquire such items through grants. 

Globally, the FMF program is the largest grant-based U.S. security assistance 

program, having risen from just over $3 billion in the late 1990s to more than $5 

billion today. Congress appropriates the bulk of FMF for Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, 

in support of Middle East peace treaties and other U.S. policy objectives. Sub-Saharan African countries are minor recipients of FMF (see Figure 1), totaling an average of under $18 million annually over the past 15 years. For FY 2016, the State 

Department has requested $19 million in total FMF for sub-Saharan Africa, with 

just under $7 million in bilateral requests spread across nine countries, and another 

$12 million requested in regional funds from which other African countries may 

benefit. Africa’s share of global IMET funding is proportionally larger, averaging 

$12 million out of roughly $100 million globally in the past 15 years. IMET funding 

is spread across a larger number of countries, with most African countries receiving 

at least $100,000 in IMET assistance per year. 

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The bulk of U.S. military assistance to African partners, however, comes through 

an often-misunderstood foreign assistance account known as Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Not to be confused with the Contributions to International Peacekeeping Operations (CIPA) account, which funds assessed contributions to U.N. 

operations and tribunals, PKO is often understood to finance voluntary assistance 

to peace operations, including training, equipment, and deployment support for 

troop contributors.17 But the legal authority for the account is broader, allowing for 

support to a range of stabilization and crisis response initiatives: ‘‘The President is 

authorized to furnish assistance to friendly countries and international organizations on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States.’’ 18 Unlike FMF and IMET, which are implemented by the 

U.S. military with State Department guidance, PKO programs in Africa are often 

implemented by contractors overseen by the State Department, although U.S. military personnel sometimes participate in certain programs. PKO appropriations have grown substantially in the past 15 years, from $150 mil- lion in FY 2000 to nearly $500 million today (see Figure 2 for the FY 2016 PKO 

request). Unlike other security assistance accounts, PKO funding has gone primarily 

to sub-Saharan African countries in the past decade, with funding levels for Africa 

ranging from $200 to $400 million annually. PKO funds have been the primary 

vehicle for U.S. support to AMISOM and other regional stability operations, including the original AU mission in Darfur in the mid-2000s, the early years of the Ugandan-led counter-LRA mission in Central Africa (beginning in late 2008), and the initial AU deployments into Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013 and 

2014. PKO is also used to build international peacekeeping capacity through the 

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which has largely focused on training, 

equipping, and supporting African peacekeepers.19 According to State Department 

officials, roughly 60 percent of GPOI funding goes to African recipients, depending 

on requirements and available resources in a given year. 

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Beyond support for peacekeeping, PKO has also funded several major security sector reform initiatives in countries transitioning from conflict, including Liberia, the 

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Somalia. Prior to the outbreak of South Sudan’s internal conflict in December 2013, the United States had 

invested almost $330 million in PKO funds since 2005 to support the transformation 

of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the former rebel movement that 

with South Sudan’s independence became the new country’s national armed forces. 

In Liberia, more than $200 million in PKO funds, along with some FMF and IMET, 

have been obligated in the past decade to support the standup of that country’s new 

military after years of civil war. Military reform efforts in the DRC totaling more 

than $120 million in PKO in the past 10 years are ongoing, and in Somalia, the 

United States has, to date, invested more than $220 million in PKO to help the wartorn country’s new army build its capacity to fight al-Shabaab alongside AMISOM 

and eventually assume responsibility for the country’s security. 

The PKO account is also the primary State Department vehicle for counterterrorism assistance for African militaries through two regional programs, the TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for East Africa 

Counterterrorism (PREACT).20 These receive roughly $20 and $10 million in PKO 

funding per year, respectively. Unlike many PKO-funded programs in Africa, which 

are implemented by contractors, these initiatives are primarily implemented by 

AFRICOM. TSCTP, the older and more established of the programs, began in FY 

2005; it is an interagency initiative funded through various accounts to counter extremism in the Sahel and the Maghreb.21 PKO-funded counterterrorism assistance 

in most TSCTP and PREACT partner countries is complemented by DOD-funded 

assistance, as discussed below. 

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The State Department also uses the PKO account to fund several other smaller 

regional security programs, including the Africa Maritime Security Initiative (AMSI) 

and the Africa Conflict Stabilization and Border Security (ACSBS) program. The latter was the main vehicle for supporting the counter-LRA mission until FY 2012, 

when Congress authorized DOD to begin funding it. More recently, ACSBS has 

served as a vehicle to fund security sector reform efforts in Guinea and Cote 

d’Ivoire, and to train some of the AU troops that deployed to Mali and the CAR. 

Another regional PKO initiative is the Africa Military Education Program (AMEP), 

which aims to build military professionalization through instructor and curriculum 

development at African countries’ military education institutions. Since 2014, the 

State Department has used the PKO account to fund training and equipment for 

African military and nonlaw enforcement security forces to counter wildlife poaching.22 Funding for this effort draws from prior fiscal year PKO funds dating back 

at least to FY 2010, highlighting the flexibility of the PKO account—funds appropriated under PKO, unlike many other accounts, are authorized to remain available 

until expended. 

DOD Authorities 

Ten years ago, DOD, identifying instability in foreign countries as a threat to U.S. 

interests, issued DOD Directive 3000.05, charging the U.S. military with two broad 

missions—building a ‘‘sustainable peace’’ and advancing U.S. interests—and defining stability operations 23 for the first time as a core U.S. military mission with priority comparable to combat operations. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review subsequently articulated a growing emphasis on building partner capabilities to achieve 

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common national security objectives, and expressed the need for new authorities 

and resources to do so. While serving as Secretary of Defense (2006–2011), Robert 

Gates made the case for an ‘‘indirect approach’’ to the war on terror, in which the 

United States would not rely on another large-scale deployment of U.S. forces, but 

instead work, where possible, ‘‘with and through’’ allies and partners to counter 

terrorism.24

Congress has authorized new DOD authorities for security cooperation almost 

every year since FY 2005, and the amount of DOD-funded security assistance programming has risen dramatically, including in Africa. The most prominent of these 

authorities has been the Global Train and Equip program, popularly known as ‘‘Section 1206’’ (of the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act or NDAA, P.L. 109– 

163, under which it was first authorized), which was codified in the FY 2015 NDAA 

(P.L.113–291) as 10 U.S.C. 2282.25 Other authorities have followed, including a 3- 

year Section-1206-like authority specifically targeting East Africa and Yemen, which 

recently expired, and another specifically focused on funding the counter-LRA effort.26 Section 1206 and related funding to build sub-Saharan African countries’ 

counterterrorism capabilities has increased steadily in recent years, totaling almost 

$800 million in notified funding since the authority’s inception 10 years ago.27 Two 

East African countries, Kenya and Uganda, have been the largest recipients of this 

assistance in Africa, totaling more than $100 million each; with DOD assistance to 

counter the LRA factored in, Uganda is the largest cumulative recipient of DOD 

security assistance. Mauritania, Niger, Burundi, and Djibouti have also been major 

African recipients (see Figures 3 and 4). 

Congress has also authorized DOD to support an initiative jointly administered 

by the Departments of State and Defense known as the Global Security Contingency 

Fund (GSCF).28 Designed as a pilot project to pool the Departments’ respective 

funds and expertise to provide security sector assistance to partner countries, the 

authority requires State to contribute at least 20 percent and DOD not more than 

80 percent of the funding for a given project.29 The first GSCF project proposed for 

Africa, a $10 million counterterrorism and border security project in Nigeria originally notified to Congress in FY 2012, was put on hold and later rescoped and renotified in July 2014, with an additional $30 million in DOD funds, to also include 

Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, with a focus on building their capacity to counter Boko 

Haram. 

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Older DOD security cooperation authorities include Section 1004 of the FY 1998 

NDAA and Section 1033 of the FY 1991 NDAA, which authorize DOD to provide 

counternarcotics assistance to foreign partners (including civilian security forces 

such as police), and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP; not to be 

confused with the newer, and larger, CTPF initiative).30 Funding for African countries under these counternarcotics authorities has varied from year to year, ranging 

from $12 million to $38 million annually in the past 5 years, spread across more 

than 20 countries. Congress has also authorized DOD to support foreign forces that 

assist counterterrorism operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces under Section 

1208 of the FY 2005 NDAA, as amended (information on this assistance is classified). African countries have also benefited from assistance through smaller DODfunded programs to build more effective and accountable defense institutions, such 

as the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program and the Defense Institutional 

Reform Initiative (DIRI), each funded at between $10 million and $12 million 

globally.31

In addition to these programs, AFRICOM conducts a range of other engagements 

with African partners, many of which are also intended, at least in part, to contribute to building their capacity to address shared security objectives.32 In the 

Sahel, in addition to assistance received through ‘‘Section 1206’’ and TSCTP, partner forces may also benefit from engagements with U.S. military personnel deployed 

in support of Operation Juniper Shield/Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara 

(OEF–TS). In Central Africa, AFRICOM has supported the deployment of U.S. military advisors and military aircraft to facilitate Ugandan-led regional military operations against the Lord’s Resistance Army, on top of the authorized DOD-funded 

logistics support and equipment referenced above.33 In Liberia, AFRICOM has provided mentors and advisors to support the development of the Liberian Armed 

Forces since 2010 through Operation Onward Liberty. In Somalia, AFRICOM has 

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deployed U.S. military advisors to advise African troops fighting al-Shabaab. And 

in May 2014, AFRICOM deployed a small advisory team to Nigeria to offer assistance in efforts to support the rescue of more than 200 schoolgirls kidnapped by Boko 

Haram. That effort was reportedly stymied by limited cooperation on the part of 

Nigerian security officials and other challenges, but Nigeria’s new President, 

Muhammadu Buhari, has expressed support for U.S. assistance to address the Boko 

Haram threat. Obama administration officials have suggested a new offer of advisory support may be imminent.34 In the meantime, U.S. military advisors are assisting the nascent Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the Chadian-led regional 

effort to counter Boko Haram. 

In addition to training and exchange programs and exercises, some African countries benefit from DOD transfers of excess defense articles (EDA) and drawdowns 

of in-stock defense articles. In Africa, EDA is often provided as a grant, with the 

recipient nation paying for the articles’ transport and refurbishment, except in certain cases where the State Department has provided funding for refurbishment. One 

recent example of an EDA transfer in Africa is the provision of a C–130 transport 

aircraft to Ethiopia. Given the administration’s intent that the aircraft be used for 

the primary purpose of supporting regional peacekeeping operations, the State 

Department recently notified $15 million in PKO funding, through its new African 

Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP), discussed below, to repair and 

refurbish the aircraft and provide spare parts and training for its operation and 

maintenance. 

Police and Justice Sector Assistance 

U.S. security assistance in Africa also includes support for nonmilitary forces, including police, border security officers, and justice sector officials. The State Department administers most nonmilitary security assistance, much of which is funded 

through the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) accounts.35

INCLE funds support a range of country-specific, regional, and global programs that 

aim to build partner-country capacity to combat transnational crime, disrupt illicit 

trafficking, and extend the rule of law. In Africa, some INCLE programs work exclusively with police and/or focus on counternarcotics capacity-building, while others 

focus on police and justice sector reform, border security, efforts to counter wildlife 

poaching, and other aims. NADR-funded Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) and 

Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) programs, among others, are key vehicles of U.S. 

counterterrorism assistance on the continent, and NADR funding supports components of TSCTP and PREACT.36 Programs funded through NADR and Economic 

Support Fund (ESF)—which can be administered by either the State Department 

or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—also support efforts to 

counter violent extremist ideology and recruitment among vulnerable populations in 

several African countries. 

OBAMA ADMINISTRATION SECURITY INITIATIVES & THE FY 2016 BUDGET REQUEST

The Obama administration has overseen a significant increase in security assistance spending in sub-Saharan Africa and has proposed even more sizable increases 

in FY 2015–FY 2016—notably through the new Counterterrorism Partnerships 

Fund (CTPF), first proposed in 2014, and through new security initiatives rolled out 

during the U.S.-African Leaders Summit (ALS) hosted by President Obama in 

August 2014 in Washington, DC. 

New Programs Announced During the 2014 U.S.-African Leaders Summit 

Security assistance initiatives announced during the August 2014 U.S.-African 

Leaders Summit are expected to be funded through a mix of State Department and 

DOD accounts. Sometimes referred to as ‘‘ALS Deliverables,’’ these include the following: 

Security Governance Initiative (SGI). SGI is ‘‘a new joint adventure between the 

United States and six African partners that offers a comprehensive approach to improving security sector governance and capacity to address threats.’’ 37 The initiative 

is focused on both civilian (e.g., police) and military security institutions, and on the 

ministerial functions that oversee the security sector. The partners are Ghana, 

Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia. The administration has committed $65 

million for SGI in FY 2015 and $83 million per year thereafter, with no specified 

end-date. The State Department’s FY 2016 request includes $16.9 million in PKO 

funding for SGI, and SGI is mentioned as a target for an unidentified amount of 

Africa Regional INCLE funding (which totals $17 million). DOD Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds have been identified as a major source of requested 

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SGI funding—the FY 2016 request includes $47 million for SGI in its CTPF request 

(see below). 

African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP).38 APRRP is a new 

program to provide specific African countries with relatively high-level military capabilities for use in AU and U.N. peacekeeping deployments. Such capabilities may 

include military logistics, airlift, field hospitals, and formed police units; equipment 

transfers are expected to be a significant component.39 In the near-term, APRRP is 

focused on six countries: Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. 

The administration has committed to $110 million per year for APRRP, starting in 

FY 2015 and ending no later than FY 2019. Initial funding in FY 2015 is expected 

to be notified through FMF and PKO; the FY 2016 request includes $110 million 

in PKO funding for APRRP.40

African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC). ACIRC is a planned 

AU military force intended to provide rapid intervention capacity for peacekeeping, 

crisis-response, and disaster relief efforts on the continent. The administration committed to provide ‘‘support, including training for headquarters staff and key enabler functions, such as engineers,’’ to ‘‘catalyze’’ the AU’s efforts to establish 

ACIRC.41 The administration pledged $3 million per year for ACIRC, starting in FY 

2016, although a specific funding request is not included in the FY 2016 request. 

U.S. support to ACIRC appears to be on hold due to disagreement among AU member states over whether to proceed with the concept.42

The Administration’s FY 2016 Budget Request 

DOD Funding 

DOD’s FY 2016 budget request for the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund 

(CTPF) would represent a dramatic increase in overall security assistance for Africa 

and would dwarf State Department-administered funds for the region if authorized, 

appropriated, and obligated as proposed. The request, which totals $2.1 billion globally, includes approximately $1.27 billion for East Africa, the Lake Chad Basin, and 

Northwest Africa, building on planned, but yet to be notified or obligated, DOD 

CTPF funding of more than $460 million for these areas in FY 2015 (see Table 1 

below). The planned FY 2015 funding would appear to be in addition to more than 

$180 million in 10 U.S.C. 2282 (i.e., ‘‘Section 1206’’ counterterrorism train-andequip) funding already notified to Congress for programs on the continent in this 

fiscal year ($39 million of which was notified for Tunisia). Planned and proposed initiatives for FY 2015 and FY 2016 include border security enhancements and various 

training and equipment programs, including, for East African partners, potential 

fixed wing and rotary lift capacity. Efforts to build counter-IED (improvised explosive device); command and control; logistics; medical; and intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) and other capabilities are also envisioned. Approximately $25 million of the proposed FY 2016 funding for the Africa regional 

CTPF programs could be used, according to the request, to fund the lift and sustainment of allies, potentially France, a key partner leading counterterrorism missions 

on the continent. The Senate draft NDAA for FY 2016 would authorize the provision 

of up to $100 million in nonreimbursable logistical support per year to allied military forces conducting counterterrorism operations in Africa, an authority similar to 

DOD’s existing Global Lift and Sustain (10 U.S.C.127d). 

TABLE 1. THE COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP FUND: DOD’S FY 2016 OCO REQUEST 

[Dollars in millions] 

Region FY 2015 Plan FY 2016 Request 

Sahel/Maghreb ......................................................................................................................... 113 262 

Lake Chad Basin ..................................................................................................................... 133 338 

East Africa ............................................................................................................................... 220 669 

TOTAL, for Africa ................................................................................................................. 460 1,270 

TOTAL, Global ...................................................................................................................... 1,300 2,100 

Source: FY 2016 DOD Congressional Budget Justification 

State Department Funding 

PKO. The State Department has requested almost $340 million in PKO specifically for Africa in FY 2016 (68 percent of the global total, including OCO).43 This 

includes $131 million for Africa regional programs, under which $110 million would 

go to APRRP, with the remainder divided among PREACT, ACSBS, AMEP, and 

AMSI. In addition, $115 million is requested to support AMISOM and the Somali 

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military. With the conflict ongoing in South Sudan, $30 million requested in PKO 

funds for that country would likely go to supporting efforts to resolve or enforce stability there, including through support for a regional conflict monitoring mechanism. 

Funds for security sector reform initiatives in the DRC ($14 million), CAR ($10 million), and Liberia ($2 million) are also included, as is a $19 million request for 

TSCTP. In addition to the $340 million requested for Africa-specific programs, a significant portion of the $64 million request for GPOI would likely benefit African 

countries contributing to peacekeeping missions and AMISOM. 

The FY 2016 global PKO request reflects a significant increase from the FY 2015 

request, notably to support the new APRRP initiative. Requested funding for Africa 

would be an increase from appropriated FY 2014 levels ($157 million for African 

programs, not including approximately $143 million for the assessed U.S. contribution to the U.N. logistics support mission for AMISOM, known as UNSOA). 

FMF. The FY 2016 request includes $19 million in FMF for Africa (less than 1 

percent of the global total), compared to $16 million in FY 2014 (ibid). Top African 

FMF recipients in FY 2014 were Liberia ($4 million), Niger ($2 million), Kenya ($1.7 

million), Nigeria ($1.7 million), and Djibouti ($1.4 million). Some of this funding was 

provided through two regional FMF programs (totaling $5 million), for maritime 

security and to sustain counterterrorism equipment provided with PKO and DOD 

funds. 

IMET. The FY 2016 request includes $16 million in IMET for African countries 

(14 percent of the global total), roughly the same as in FY 2014 (which amounted 

to 15 percent of the total). Top African IMET recipients in FY 2014 were Senegal 

($901,000), Nigeria ($779,000), Kenya ($748,000), South Africa ($715,000), Ghana 

($668,000), Mozambique ($630,000), Ethiopia ($589,000), Botswana ($576,000), 

Uganda ($569,000), and Burundi ($504,000). 

NADR. The FY 2016 request includes $45 million in NADR for Africa in the 

enduring budget (7.4 percent of the global total, not including OCO). In FY 2014, 

Africa received $42 million in NADR funding (6 percent of the global total, including 

OCO), with top African recipients including Kenya ($7 million for counterterrorism 

and border security), Angola ($6 million for post-conflict demining assistance), and 

South Sudan ($2 million for demining and conventional weapons destruction). However, the majority of NADR funding appropriated specifically for Africa ($23 million) 

was allocated as ‘‘regional’’ funding, for which a breakdown by country is not publicly available. 

In addition to the FY 2016 enduring budget request for NADR, the State Department is requesting $390 million in NADR–OCO funding for its portion of the President’s Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (Congress did not appropriate funds for 

the CTPF for the State Department in FY 2015). This request, if appropriated, 

would represent the most significant increase in recent years in U.S. efforts to build 

civilian counterterrorism capabilities and to counter violent extremism and 

radicalization in Africa, with up to $250 million proposed to prevent and counter 

terrorist safe havens in the Horn of Africa ($90 million), the Sahel ($90 million), 

and in Libya and neighboring countries ($70 million). Another portion of funding 

under this request, $60 million to address foreign terrorist fighters, could focus, in 

part, on North Africa, which has been a significant source of foreign fighters, but 

also potentially on East Africa. Further, West Africa has been identified as one of 

several focus regions for a $20 million initiative requested under the CTPF to 

counter Iranian-sponsored terrorism. These initiatives would be managed by the 

State Department Counterterrorism Bureau, in collaboration with regional and 

other functional bureaus. 

INCLE. The FY 2016 request includes $49 million in INCLE for Africa (4.1 percent of the global INCLE request, including OCO funding). This would represent a 

decrease compared to $66 million in FY 2014 (4.8 percent of the global total). Top 

INCLE recipients in Africa in FY 2014 were South Sudan ($21 million), Liberia ($12 

million), and DRC ($3 million). Nearly $24 million was allocated to the State 

Department’s ‘‘Africa Regional’’ program, from which multiple countries may benefit. 

Peace Operations Response Mechanism—OCO. In addition to funds requested 

under these accounts, the administration has requested $150 million in FY 2016 for 

a new OCO account, the proposed Peace Operations Response Mechanism, to support potential peacekeeping requirements in Africa or Syria. The request is driven 

in part by unanticipated missions that have emerged in Africa in recent years, 

namely in CAR, South Sudan, and Mali. Congress did not appropriate funds in FY 

2015 for a similar request, then called the Peacekeeping Response Mechanism, 

although it did provide transfer authority of up to $380 million to support such 

requirements, as required beyond funding made available in CIPA and PKO.44

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U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE: EVALUATING PROGRESS AND MITIGATING RISK

Assessing the impact and effectiveness of U.S. security assistance is difficult. Neither the State Department nor DOD have used consistent metrics to systematically 

measure progress or evaluate the results of such assistance over time. Instead, for 

some State Department programs, such as PREACT and TSCTP, the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) reports that the agencies appear to have relied primarily on informal feedback from U.S. embassy staff to determine progress.45 Other 

programs, like GPOI, which has its own evaluation team, have considered the number of individuals trained as one of several measures of success. DOD developed a 

qualitative assessment framework for evaluating Section 1206 programs and first 

reported on its results in 2013; its internal assessments, however, have not been 

publicly released. The lack of comprehensive assessment criteria, analysis, and supporting documentation poses challenges not only for conducting qualitative assessments, but also for the Departments’ decisionmaking on future programming and 

resource allocation, and for congressional oversight. Several assessments have 

raised concerns with the timeliness of security cooperation programs, the ‘‘patchwork’’ nature of current authorities, programs, and resources; and some partner nations’ capacity to absorb such assistance.46 Analysts have identified other shortfalls 

in the planning and implementation of U.S. security assistance programs in Africa, 

including insufficient efforts to track the trajectory of participants in military training engagements and persistent interagency disagreements as to where identified 

threats rank among U.S. national security priorities.47 Both Departments have undertaken efforts to improve program monitoring and evaluation, although the result 

of those efforts, and the extent to which they are coordinated among agencies, are 

unclear at this time.48 Measuring longer term impacts for some capacity-building 

programs may remain a challenge, given varying degrees of capability and political 

will on the part of recipient countries to bear sustainment costs, and limited U.S. 

resources and authorities for maintaining the capabilities built under programs like 

those funded under 10 U.S.C. 2282 authority.49

Mitigating the potential risks associated with the provision of security assistance 

to fragile states in Africa is another challenge for the administration and Congress. 

A recent RAND study suggests that U.S. officials face a major policy dilemma in 

Africa, where ‘‘the countries that are most in need of assistance are usually the ones 

least able to make positive use of it.’’ 50 That study, which assessed quantitative and 

qualitative research on the impact of security assistance in fragile states, found significant overlap between ‘‘countries of concern’’ in Africa (i.e., countries with low 

scores on indicators of state reach) and key U.S. counterterrorism partners (the 

TSCTP and PREACT partner countries). Democratic trends in Africa have raised 

concerns. Freedom House, which ranks levels of freedom around the world, suggests 

that the region has experienced backsliding over the past decade, with 43 percent 

of sub-Saharan African countries ranking Not Free and another 37 percent ranking 

Partially Free in its 2015 Freedom in the World index. From Burkina Faso to Burundi, a number of incumbent African leaders have taken steps to extend their 

terms in office, often prompting mass protests and, in some cases, violent responses 

from security forces. Several top security assistance recipients under current 

counterterrorism programs and proposed ALS deliverables have leaders who have 

been in office for more than 15 years, namely Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Rwanda, 

and Uganda. Armed forces reportedly continue to play a significant role in politics 

and governance in several top U.S. security partner countries, including Ethiopia, 

Mauritania, and Uganda, and the State Department’s own annual human rights reports have raised concerns with security force abuses in many of the countries considered ‘‘partners’’ in security cooperation programs. 

The United States has taken measures to limit the potential for U.S. security 

assistance to be associated with abusive foreign governments and security forces 

through policy determinations and legal restrictions on aid. Among such restrictions 

are the so-called ‘‘Leahy laws,’’ which prohibit the provision of U.S. security assistance to foreign security force units that have been credibly implicated in gross violations of human rights.51 Congress also prohibits foreign assistance to governments 

that have overthrown elected governments through military coups, and has enacted 

various other country-specific legal provisions related to security assistance and 

human rights concerns through provisions in annual appropriations and countryspecific or issue-specific legislation. The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 

(CSPA, P.L. 110–457), as amended, for example, restricts IMET, FMF, PKO for certain purposes, and the licensing of EDA and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) to 

countries implicated in the use of child soldiers. Six of the nine countries currently 

implicated are in Africa. Among them, however, the President has determined it to 

be in the national interest to waive the restriction for Rwanda and Somalia, and 

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to provide a partial waiver for certain types of military aid in CAR, DRC, and South 

Sudan. Only Sudan (along with Myanmar and Syria) did not receive a Presidential 

waiver.52 Some critics suggest that such waivers limit the effectiveness of the law 

and discourage accountability.53 The administration contends, however, that such 

waivers allow the United States to support military professionalization and participation in peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations. These considerations highlight the challenges U.S. policymakers face as they weigh the opportunities and 

potential consequences of security assistance in the region. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify about these issues. I look forward 

to your questions. 

———————— 

End Notes 

1This prepared statement includes contributions from CRS Analyst in African Affairs Alexis 

Arieff and Specialist in Middle East Affairs Christopher M. Blanchard. 2See, e.g., The White House, ‘‘Fact Sheet, U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy,’’ April 5, 

2015. 3The document asserted that ‘‘ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in 

Africa,’’ but did note significant U.S. political and humanitarian interests. DOD Office of International Security Affairs, ‘‘United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa,’’ August 

1995. 4 Hearing of the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 

‘‘Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1987,’’ March 18, 1986. 5Of the more than $1.4 billion provided to date to counter al-Shabaab and protect Somalia’s 

emergent national government since 2007, $1.2 billion has supported the African Union Mission 

in Somalia (AMISOM) and $220 million has supported the Somali National Army. The AMISOM 

assistance funded through the State Department includes almost $440 million in voluntary support and almost $500 million in assessed contributions to the U.N. logistics support mission for 

AMISOM (UNSOA). DOD funding for AMISOM forces has totaled almost $300 million, to date. 6See, e.g., Bronwyn Bruton and Paul D. Williams, ‘‘Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons 

Learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007–2013,’’ Joint Special Operations University Report 14.5, September 2014. 7 Estimates of African countries’ defense spending data obtained from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘‘The Military Balance 2015.’’ 8Department of Defense, ‘‘2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,’’ March 2014. 

9Prior to AFRICOM becoming a stand-alone command in October 2008, U.S. military involvement in Africa was divided among European, Central, and Pacific Commands. AFRICOM’s area 

of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries except Egypt, which remains in the area 

of operations of Central Command (CENTCOM). 10The four pillars are: strengthen democratic institutions; spur economic growth, trade, and 

investment; advance peace and security; and promote opportunity and development. Within the 

peace and security pillar, the administration identified five main lines of effort: counter alQaeda and other terrorist groups; advance regional security cooperation and security sector reform; prevent transnational criminal threats; prevent conflict and, where necessary, mitigate 

mass atrocities and hold perpetrators responsible; and support initiatives to promote peace and 

security. 11 U.N. Peacekeeping Troop Statistics for U.N. Missions in April 2015, available at 

www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources. 12For more information, see, e.g., Paul D. Williams, ‘‘Peace Operations in Africa: Lessons 

Learned since 2000,’’ Africa Security Brief no. 25, National Defense University, July 2013. 13The AU mission in Mali transitioned into a U.N. peacekeeping mission in 2013, and no 

longer has a specific mandate to conduct counterterrorism operations. 14Testimony of Defense Secretary Ash Carter, Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, 

‘‘Hearing on the FY 2016 Budget Request for the Department of Defense,’’ May 6, 2015. 15Testimony of Gen. David Rodriguez, Senate Armed Services Committee, ‘‘AFRICOM 2015 

Posture Statement,’’ March 26, 2015. 16For more information on DOD’s management of security assistance programs, see the 

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management’s manual, ‘‘The Management of Security 

Cooperation’’ (The Green Book), available at www.disam.dsca.mil. 17Funds for CIPA are appropriated in the legislation that funds State Department operations, 

rather than in the Foreign Operations appropriation, which governs foreign assistance, including PKO funds. 18PKO was first authorized under the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 (P.L. 95– 

384) as Sec. 551 of the FAA. 19GPOI, created in FY 2005, built on and incorporated a preexisting peacekeeping capacity 

program for African countries, known as the African Contingency Operations Training and 

Assistance (ACOTA) program. From FY 1997 to FY 2005, the United States spent just over $120 

million on ACOTA and its predecessor, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). An 

additional $33 million in FMF funding supported classroom training under the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) initiative from FY 1998 to FY 2005. GPOI was originally intended to be a $660 million, five-year program to train 75,000 troops by 2010; it surpassed that target, training nearly 87,000 peacekeepers during that time, 77,000 of them African. GPOI has been extended, with a new goal of training an additional 242,500 troops and 

building sustainable partner nation training capabilities. 

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20TSCTP partner countries are Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, 

Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. PREACT partner countries are Burundi, 

Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Uganda. 21TSCTP builds on an earlier program known as the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI, 2002–2004). 22To date, the State Department has notified its intent to support the following countries 

under this counter-poaching effort: Tanzania, Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, and South 

Africa. 23DOD defines stability operations as ‘‘military and civilian activities conducted across the 

spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.’’ 24 Robert M. Gates, ‘‘A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,’’ Foreign Affairs, January–February 2009. 25Section 2282 of P.L. 113–291. Congress initially authorized Section 1206 in part to address 

lengthy administrative and procurement delays in similar State Department-funded programs, 

notably FMF. Section 1206, which requires the concurrence of the Secretary of State, was designed to improve the capabilities of foreign forces to conduct counterterrorism operations or to 

participate in stabilization operations with U.S. forces. For more information see CRS Report 

RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: ‘‘Section 1206’’ Background and Issues for Congress, by 

Nina Serafino. 26Section 1207(n) of the FY 2012 NDAA (P.L. 112–81) and Section 1203 of the FY 2013 NDAA 

(P.L. 112–239) authorize DOD to provide up to $75 million annually from FY 2012 through FY 

2014 to build the capacity of foreign militaries serving in AMISOM. Section 1206 of the FY 2012 

NDAA (P.L. 112–81), not to be confused with the original ‘‘Section 1206’’ (of the FY 2006 NDAA) 

authority, authorized DOD to provide up to $35 million per year in FY 2012 and FY 2013 to 

support Ugandan-led counter-LRA operations. The latter authority was followed by Section 1208 

of the FY 2014 NDAA (P.L. 113–66), which authorizes up to $50 million per year through FY 

2017. 27 AFRICOM’s AOR also includes Tunisia, which has received more than $80 million in additional Section 1206 assistance. 28First authorized as Sec. 1207 of the FY 2012 NDAA (P.L. 112–81), the GSCF authority was 

codified as 22 U.S.C. 2151. The authority was extended through September 30, 2017, under the 

FY 2015 NDAA. 29For more information, see, e.g., U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), ‘‘Building 

Partner Capacity: State and DOD Need to Define Time Frames to Guide and Track Global Security Contingency Fund Projects,’’ GAO–15–75, November 20, 2014 and CRS Report R42641, 

‘‘Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Issue Overview,’’ by Nina M. Serafino. 30The Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTPF) is authorized under 10 U.S.C. Section 2249c. 31MoDA was developed as a result of lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, where security 

assistance had focused largely on building tactical proficiencies, with little focus on ministerial 

capacity building. DOD civilians serve as advisors to their foreign counterparts in partner nation defense ministries. DIRI, established in FY 2010, also supports the development of partner 

defense ministries through the provision of subject matter experts. 32Some African militaries benefit from training through interaction with U.S. Special Operations Forces in Joint Combined Exchange Training events (JCETs). U.S. forces routinely conduct a variety of bilateral and multilateral joint exercises with African militaries, such as 

African Endeavor, an annual communications and interoperability exercise with more than 30 

African nations. Operation Flintlock, hosted annually in a Sahel country, is a multinational exercise that supports counterterrorism, rapid-response, and interoperability capacity among West 

and North African countries, similar objectives to TSCTP. African Lion, an annual exercise in 

Morocco that involves over 1,000 U.S. troops, has expanded since 2014 to include military forces 

from neighboring states and Europe in addition to Moroccan and U.S. soldiers. Offshore, the Africa Partnership Station (APS) is U.S. Naval Forces Africa’s flagship maritime security program, 

which aims to increase partner naval forces’ maritime awareness, response capabilities and infrastructure. DOD also conducts educational and academic exchange programs through several 

regional centers, including the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), and DOD’s service 

academies. The U.S. National Guard also engages with African militaries through its State Partnership Program, in which U.S. National Guard units pair with foreign countries to conduct a 

variety of security cooperation and civil affairs activities. 33For more information, see CRS Report R42094, ‘‘The Lord’s Resistance Army: The U.S. 

Response.’’ 34Michael R. Gordon, ‘‘U.S. Signals Willingness to Expand Military Cooperation with Nigeria,’’ 

New York Times, May 29, 2015. 35 As noted above, DOD’s ‘‘Section 1004’’ and ‘‘Section 1033’’ authorities also authorize DOD 

to provide counternarcotics assistance to civilian security forces. 36For further information on ATA, RSI, and other NADR-funded counterterrorism programs, 

see State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, ‘‘Annual Report on Assistance Related to 

international Terrorism: Fiscal Year 2013’’ [latest available], February 11, 2014. 37White House, ‘‘Fact Sheet: Security Governance Initiative,’’ August 6, 2014. 38See White House, Fact Sheet: ‘‘U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa,’’ August 6, 2014. 39 In congressional staff briefings, administration officials have portrayed APRRP as filling 

gaps in existing U.S. military capacity-building programs in Africa, including military grants 

provided through FMF and peacekeeping training and equipment provided through the ACOTA 

program. 40To date, the State Department has notified $15.5 million in FY 2015 PKO funds for APRRP, 

for Ethiopia. 41 ‘‘Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa,’’ op. cit. 

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42See, e.g., Jason Warner, ‘‘Complements or Competitors? The African Standby Force, the 

African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, and the Future of Rapid Reaction Forces 

in Africa,’’ African Security, March 2015. 43This figure is based on CRS calculations from the PKO request in the FY 2016 Congressional Budget Justification. It may include some limited funding for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia through TSCTP and SGI. 44Section 8003(d) of P.L. 113–235. 45See GAO, ‘‘Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa Would be Strengthened 

by Enhanced Program Management,’’ GAO–14–518, June 2014 and ‘‘Combating Terrorism: State 

Department Can Improve Management of East Africa Program,’’ GAO–14–502, June 17, 2014. 46See, e.g., Jennifer D.P. Moroney, David E. Thaler, and Joe Hogler, ‘‘Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity,’’ RAND Corporation, 2013 and Christopher Paul, et al., ‘‘What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity 

and Under What Circumstances?,’’ RAND Corporation, 2013. 47Lesley Anne Warner, ‘‘The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, Center for Naval 

Analysis,’’ March 2014. 48The State Department’s Political-Military Bureau is leading its efforts to expand monitoring 

and evaluation of FMF and IMET programs. A brief overview of this effort is described in the 

Department’s FY 2016 Congressional Budget Justification. 49See GAO, ‘‘Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage Department of 

Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation,’’ GAO–13–335T, February 14, 2013. 50The RAND study cites quantitative studies on the aggregate effect of U.S. security assistance, noting that ‘‘material assistance (particularly arms transfers) has generally been found to 

be more problematic than assistance focused on training and education. Weak and autocratic 

states have difficulty making positive use of security sector assistance, and in many studies, 

such assistance was found to have potentially destabilizing effects.’’ Stephen Watts, ‘‘Identifying 

and Mitigating Risks in Security Sector Assistance for Africa’s Fragile States,’’ RAND Corporation, 2015. 51The original Leahy law was codified in 1976 in 2007 in Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2378d). It applies to assistance provided through 

State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations. The DOD Leahy law, which applies 

to DOD appropriations and had appeared in annual appropriations acts since 1998, was codified 

in the FY 2015 NDAA as 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2249e. For more information, see CRS Report R43361, 

‘‘Leahy Law Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview,’’ by Nina M. 

Serafino, et al. 52The most recent was released in June 2014; it includes the CAR, DRC, Rwanda, South 

Sudan, Sudan, and Somalia. 53See, e.g., World Vision, ‘‘Child Soldier Prevention Law: Partial Enforcement Lets Some Offending Countries Off the Hook,’’ October 2, 2014 and Human Rights Watch, ‘‘U.S.: Don’t 

Finance Child Soldiers,’’ October 3, 2011. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you for that testimony. You touched on 

some of what was spoken on before. Let me follow up on that. 

What differences exist between the reporting done by the State 

Department and reporting done by DOD? It is more robust, I think, 

with DOD. And what needs to change to give us a better picture 

and be able to, as you mentioned, look at some return on investment. 

Ms. BLANCHARD. The reporting requirements are different. Some 

of that may be, in part, because some of the DOD authorities are 

newer. When they were created, they were created specifically with 

these reporting requirements. For section 1206 and GSCF, for example, the Global Security Contingency Fund, which are two of the 

larger DOD building partner capacity initiatives, global train and 

equip—there is a lot of lingo that goes along with these acronyms— 

those reports require specific country breakdowns. They require 

identification of units to be trained, identification of specific equipment/ammunition transfers, whereas on the State Department 

side, particularly for some of the PKO programs, you do not get 

that level of breakdown. 

For the GPOI program, the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, when the State Department notifies, they notify with fairly 

large lump sums with a large description of the types of equipment—or not the types of equipment. But there will be equipment 

provided, possibly ammunition, types of training. And then they 

will list, depending on the program, 5 to 20 countries. That is not 

always the case. Sometimes there are direct sort of country-specific 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

48 

notifications, but the level of detail is greater in the DOD notifications. 

The DOD notifications also, by the way, indicate past related assistance, both from DOD and from the State Department. So they 

give a better sense of sort of the picture of overall security assistance engagement on these initiatives. 

Senator FLAKE. We have seen over time a decrease in State Department assistance and an increase in defense funding. Is that a 

function of where it is easiest to get the money, or is there a strategic reason for that? What is your assessment? 

Ms. BLANCHARD. Well, State Department security assistance, at 

least to Africa, has been rising. I cannot say that that is the same 

for democracy and governance assistance or some of those efforts. 

Senator FLAKE. I should say I guess Defense has risen much 

faster. Put it that way. 

Ms. BLANCHARD. Defense is rising faster. These are newer authorities and they do reflect a changing perception of the use of security assistance by DOD and by congressional authorizers and appropriators about the appropriate role of DOD in providing that assistance. But, yes, as very much indicated by the CTPF in particular, but also the growth of 1206, those are larger sums of 

money than the State Department is potentially going to be dealing 

with. 

Senator FLAKE. You mentioned the problem of some of our military hardware ending up in the wrong hands. How prevalent has 

that been in Africa? Obviously, we are seeing it in Iraq in a big 

way. Some of the training mentioned in the previous panel, some 

of the folks that we have trained then move on and go to the dark 

side, if you will. What do we know in terms of military hardware 

that has ended up with those who want to bring down the governments that we support? 

Ms. BLANCHARD. Well, the public domain reporting on this is 

pretty challenging. We rely on groups like the Small Arms Survey 

and other independent monitoring groups to report on weapons/ammunition origins when they find them. So a lot of this is anecdotal. 

We do, for both the State Department and DOD, have end-user 

monitoring requirements. I think there is probably some debate 

about the extent to which those are really stringently followed up. 

Particularly in the case of some of the smaller transfers, it is easier 

to monitor whether or not a foreign military is keeping track of its 

helicopters than it is smaller things. They do track particularly, for 

example, with AMISOM serial numbers of weapons. In the early 

years of AMISOM, you did have diversion, and I think that that 

has been something that the State Department has worked pretty 

hard to address. But willingness of partner nations to have their 

stocks routinely monitored is difficult, and we do have some cases 

on the continent where the State Department and DOD have found 

that our partner nations have not been securing equipment, important equipment, in the way that we would like to see it. 

Senator FLAKE. With Nigeria now looking like they will be more 

cooperative and more willing to work on security, what should we 

be concerned about going ahead? It looks as if, given the rise of 

Boko Haram, there is a need to help there with a willing government, which we have not had a capable government to work with. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

49 

As we launch into probably more robust partnerships there, what 

are some of the things we need to keep in mind and start from the 

beginning? 

Ms. BLANCHARD. Well, President Buhari faces a number of challenges in turning the ship around on the military effort against 

Boko Haram. Human rights abuses, such as those raised in the 

Amnesty International report, are a very important part of that. 

There are a number of very senior Nigerian military officials that 

were named in that report, some of whom attended his inauguration. And I think it will be telling to see how quickly he deals with 

the charges against those individuals and proceeds potentially with 

cases against them. 

Beyond the human rights abuses, which is a very serious challenge and apparently fairly widespread in the northeast, there are 

very serious questions about corruption within the security forces. 

This is something that President Buhari has put a lot of attention 

and rhetoric into, but it is going to be very difficult for him to turn 

that around in a way that ensures that guns and ammunition and 

protective gear are getting out to the front lines. But it is something that he has committed to. 

I think the challenge, in terms of U.S. engagement, is how quickly do we engage knowing that those processes, both on the corruption side and human rights side, could take a little while to take 

effect. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

You mentioned in your testimony the difficulty in working along 

with partners who we have problems with on human rights and on 

another side. We do that everywhere in the world, obviously. You 

cannot always pick your partners. Is this a more difficult scenario 

in Africa than elsewhere? 

Ms. BLANCHARD. I cannot say whether it is more difficult in Africa than it is elsewhere. 

Senator FLAKE. But we have seen examples over in the Horn 

particularly with South Sudan, Uganda, and some of the other 

partner countries. That has been a difficult arrangement. 

Ms. BLANCHARD. I think some of the biggest challenges and concerns center around cases where human rights abuses by security 

forces may undermine some of our very strategic objectives. Kenya 

is a case that comes to mind where allegations against law enforcement officials in the context of antiterrorism operations have created a public perception that al-Shabaab uses for recruitment and 

radicalization. And the extent to which the United States is associated with that assistance and with that engagement with those 

units, it poses a challenge and those alleged abuses also contribute 

to the extremist narrative. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. Chairman Markey is detained 

elsewhere, and so he will not be able to proffer any questions. But 

he has read the testimony. We appreciate your service and your 

testimony here today, and we will certainly be following up as we 

look for ways to have reporting at least that will allow us to better 

do our job here and protect taxpayers’ money and make sure that 

we have the return on investment that we are expected to have. 

So thank you for your testimony here today. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

50 

The record will remain open until close of business Friday, June 

5, for any questions for the record or additional material. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF LINDA THOMAS GREENFIELD TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. Describe the range of non-U.S. bilateral investment in Djibouti and its 

relevance in relation to U.S. assistance and investment both from a diplomatic as 

well as security interest perspective. 

Answer. Chinese and gulf investment flows in Djibouti are substantially larger 

than U.S. investment and assistance flows. 

The People’s Republic of China is the most active bilateral investor in Djibouti 

today. China is financing railroads, ports, water projects, stadiums, and other large 

projects in Djibouti. The value of the two largest projects—approximately $850 million for a transnational railway and water pipeline from the Djiboutian Port to Ethiopia—is equivalent to almost half of the country’s annual gross domestic product. 

China could leverage its important economic role and sizeable investments in other 

areas. 

The Gulf States are also significant investors in Djibouti. Emirati conglomerate 

Dubai Ports World built the Doraleh Container Terminal and the Kempinski Hotel 

in Djibouti. Concessionary loans from several Arab States financed the ongoing construction of a modern port in Tadjoura, which could help to revitalize the northern 

part of Djibouti. None of the Gulf States have a permanent military presence in 

Djibouti. 

The United States and the Republic of Djibouti enjoy a strong, close relationship. 

Djibouti is an indispensable partner on regional security, counterterrorism, and 

counterpiracy issues. President Obama’s May 2014 meeting with President Guelleh, 

as well as Secretary Kerry’s May 2015 visit to Djibouti, reflected our broadening 

bilateral partnership with Djibouti and our collaboration in advancing our shared 

vision for a secure, stable, and prosperous Horn of Africa. One of the Oval Office 

meeting’s outcomes was the establishment of the annual U.S.-Djibouti Binational 

Forum (BNF). This ministerial-level strategic dialogue provides senior U.S. and 

Djiboutian officials the opportunity to discuss our areas of mutual interest, including economic development, regional security, and enhancing our bilateral relationship. 

RESPONSES OF LINDA THOMAS GREENFIELD AND PUNEET TALWAR TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. 1a. Is the dramatic growth in security funding in the FY16 budget for 

DOD programs a result of incapacity to organize and manage such funding in the 

traditional State Department Political Military Affairs account programs? 

Answer. No. It is the case that the FY 2015 DOD budget expanded in the area 

of security assistance programs not related to combat operations, including the 

establishment of the $1.3 billion Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, the permanent codification and authority expansion of the scope of section 2282, and $175 million for the European Reassurance Initiative. And for FY 2016, the Senate Armed 

Services Committee’s proposed FY 2016 NDAA includes $750 million more, including assistance for Ukraine, Southeast Asia, and military intelligence programs. 

However, the growth of DOD’s budget in these areas does not signify any incapacity 

on the part of State’s security assistance programs, even though it may reflect the 

reality of the latitude the respective budgets have to grow quickly to address certain 

security-related events. 

The Secretary of State has long had primary responsibility to direct and administer foreign assistance programs, on behalf of the President, including security 

assistance programs not related to combat operations, given their profound foreign 

policy ramifications. 

Efforts by the U.S. Government to strengthen the security forces of any foreign 

government should always be fully embedded within and consistent with our 

broader foreign policy aims and objectives. This administration affirmed this policy 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

51 

preference as emphasized in Presidential Policy Directive 23 of April 2013, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act. Still, 

since 9/11, there have been an emergence of new DOD foreign security assistance 

authorities, in part to address areas wracked by crisis and conflict, reflecting in part 

the involvement of U.S. forces and the ability of the Defense budget to grow to meet 

the mixed needs of funding forces and reconstruction assistance, for the most part 

renewed for stated periods. 

Still State’s ongoing security assistance programs are important, and State has 

taken steps to ensure they remain effective in the face of evolving and complex challenges. For example, since 2009 State has made the FMF program more flexible, 

including through the creation of regional funds that are distributed bilaterally during the year of appropriation according to immediate priorities. In addition to 

regionalized funding, the State Department has instituted mandatory reviews of 

countries demonstrating absorption challenges or the ability to self-sustain, along 

with more rigorous joint development of long-term security assistance plans that 

account for political will and program sustainability. Leveraging our assistance to 

secure political commitment and contributions from our partners will strengthen 

security sector outcomes and help ensure we achieve our foreign policy objectives. 

The State Department is also instituting the development of specific, measurable, 

and time-bound objectives for the security assistance it oversees, moving away from 

intuitive, sometimes ambiguous, and unending objectives (e.g., ‘‘enhance counterterrorism capabilities’’) toward concrete end states that demonstrate what we and the 

partner nation should expect from our investment of assistance dollars. 

These efforts have paid dividends. For example, in Africa, State was able to shift 

approximately $250 million to address emerging crises in Mali and Central African 

Republic, including logistics support for troops in Mali and equipment for Cameroon 

to support counter-Boko-Haram efforts. The State Department is also complementing assistance with major professionalization and defense reform efforts that 

are necessary to the long-term success of our security efforts in Africa, particularly 

in key partner countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, 

Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, and more recently in Somalia, and CAR. The creation of the 

Africa Military Education Program (AMEP) in 2013 (which provides for instructor 

and curriculum development and select African military education institutions) and 

the new Security Governance Initiative (SGI) in 2015 are increasing resources for 

defense reform to complement our other efforts. 

Question. 1b. Is the DOD growth rate a function of jointly perceived necessity and 

agreed purpose between State and DOD? 

Answer. The Departments of State and Defense agree that security assistance is 

an essential tool for building our partners’ capacity to address mutual security concerns, and both Departments believe that additional funding supports our foreign 

policy and national security objectives. Per Presidential Policy Directive 23, the 

administration supports a State Department lead on security assistance to ensure 

a holistic approach to advancing our foreign policy objectives. Where Defense 

authorities are developed in this realm, the administration has typically agreed that 

the Secretary of State must concur in the exercise of such authorities. 

Question. 1c. To what degree is the request a function of difficulty of gaining congressional support for 150 vs 050 account funding? 

Answer. The International Affairs budget function, from which State Department 

programs are funded, is realistically not as expansive as the Defense budget. But 

it should be noted that the Defense budget supports not only our troops, but also 

all of the current and future equipment they may require, which we know is very 

expensive. There are cases in which the Congress has provided more for security 

programs than to State. For example, in 2015, Congress appropriated $1.3 billion 

to DOD (out of its $4 billion request) for the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, 

but declined to fund the administration’s request for $1 billion in complementary 

funding for State. We appreciate that House’s efforts to provide some funding to 

State for important CT activities in FY 2016 and hope that the Senate will follow 

suit. 

Question. 2a. What is the status of the effort to update/reform the Security Assistance portfolio to better define responsibility and integration of such assistance with 

United States foreign policy goals and expectations? 

Answer. In line with Presidential Policy Directive 23, the administration continually reviews the security sector assistance authorities available to it to ensure we 

have the right mix of tools to best advance our foreign policy and national security 

interests. Currently, the Department is re-looking at this issue in detail given the 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

52 

new or expanded security sector assistance authorities provided in the FY 2015 

NDAA, some of which were not formally requested by the administration. 

Question. 2b. What is the vehicle that is/has been used to align the interagency 

on decisions surrounding the security sector assistance portion of the annual budget 

submission to Congress? 

Answer. As is the case with all agencies’ legislative proposals, DOD proposals are 

submitted for interagency review through OMB, and the process of interagency 

review results in many legislative proposals being approved and some not. The 

former are submitted through official DOD channels to the Congress. Other new 

authorities are not the result of this review process. 

Question. 2c. What is the State Department position regarding the primacy of 

State Department responsibility and jurisdiction in security sector assistance decisionmaking as it relates to programs, funding levels, and authorities? 

Answer. The Secretary of State has long exercised, for the President, primary 

responsibility for the supervision and direction of all major USG foreign assistance, 

under the long-standing key comprehensive authorities under the basic foreign 

assistance statutes, as specifically provided in Section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2382(c)), and section 2 of the Arms Export Control Act 

(22 U.S.C. 2752). The administration like prior successive ones, has reaffirmed the 

importance of the Secretary of State exercising these authorities robustly in order 

to ensure that such assistance best serves the broader foreign policy interests of the 

United States and is effectively integrated both at home and abroad. 

RESPONSES OF AMANDA J. DORY TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

NON-U.S. BILATERAL INVESTMENT IN DJIBOUTI

Question. Describe the range of non-U.S. bilateral investment in Djibouti and its 

relevance in relation to U.S. assistance and investment both from a diplomatic as 

well as security interest perspective. 

Answer. The People’s Republic of China and the Gulf States are Djibouti’s top foreign investors, investing substantially larger amounts than the United States 

invests in Djibouti. China is financing railroads, ports, water projects, stadiums, and 

other large projects. The value of the two largest projects—approximately $850 million for a transnational railway and a water pipeline from the Djiboutian port to 

Ethiopia—is equivalent to almost one-half of the country’s annual gross domestic 

product. 

The Gulf States are also significant investors in Djibouti. Emirati conglomerate 

Dubai Ports World built the Doraleh Container Terminal and the Kempinski Hotel 

in Djibouti. Concessionary loans from several Arab States financed the ongoing construction of a modern port in Tadjoura, which could help to revitalize the northern 

part of Djibouti. 

With respect to security, the Gulf States, China, France, Japan, and the United 

States all share with Djibouti an interest in freedom of navigation in the Gulf of 

Aden and Red Sea, including countering the threat of piracy. 

The United States and the Republic of Djibouti enjoy a strong, close relationship. 

Djibouti is an indispensable partner on regional security, counterterrorism, and 

counterpiracy issues. U.S. investment in Djibouti is significantly less than that of 

other countries. One way in which the United States contributes to the economy of 

Djibouti is through the U.S. forces’ presence at Camp Lemonnier, which is the only 

DOD facility in the U.S. Africa Command area of operations that hosts a sustained, 

significant presence of U.S. forces. Through a lease agreement with the Government 

of Djibouti, the U.S. Government makes a $63 million annual payment for use of 

Camp Lemonnier and other facilities; local purchases in support of Camp’s operations also contribute to the economy. 

President Obama’s May 2014 meeting with President Guelleh, as well as Secretary Kerry’s May 2015 visit to Djibouti, reflect the importance of our bilateral 

partnership with Djibouti and our collaboration in advancing a shared vision for a 

secure, stable, and prosperous Horn of Africa region. A new U.S.-Djibouti Binational 

Forum (BNF) was established in 2015. This ministerial-level strategic dialogue provides senior U.S. and Djiboutian officials the opportunity to engage across the 

breadth of areas of mutual interest, including regional diplomacy, investment and 

economic development, and security. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

53 

BILATERAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Question. What is the Department of Defense position on the expanding number 

and cost of its bilateral and regional security related assistance programs and their 

coherence with broad U.S. foreign policy goals? 

Answer. Building bilateral and regional partner capacity is a foundation of our 

national security and defense strategies. Both, the Departments of State and 

Defense, rely on the funding and authorities granted by Congress to help achieve 

strategic objectives. Together, the Departments have established processes and 

mechanisms to ensure that our security cooperation programs are executed in a 

manner consistent with the broader foreign policy goals and objectives established 

by the Department of State. In this way, we ensure that Department of Defense 

resources and authorities are applied in a manner that is complementary with the 

way the State Department uses its resources and authorities. 

SECURITY FUNDING GROWTH IN THE FY16 BUDGET FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Question. Is the dramatic growth in security funding in the FY16 budget for DOD 

programs a result of incapacity to organize and manage such funding in the traditional State Department Political Military Affairs account programs? 

Answer. No. The expansion in security-related assistance is a result of the 

increasing need for the U.S. Government to help build the capacity of our partners 

to participate in coalitions and as regional contributors to address shared security 

challenges. The Department of Defense relies on these partners to assist in the 

accomplishment of U.S. security-related objectives, and we rely on our partners to 

contribute to and to help maintain the security that our foreign and security policy 

seeks to promote. The Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has 

a long history of successfully and effectively managing security assistance funding 

under State Department authorities and providing foreign policy oversight for 

Department of Defense security-related assistance programs designed to help build 

partner capacity. 

Question. Is the DOD growth rate a function of jointly perceived necessity and 

agreed purpose between State and DOD? 

Answer. The Departments of State and Defense agree that building partner 

capacity is a core part of both our national security and defense strategies. The 

President’s budget requests consistently call for increases in foreign assistance 

funding. Congress has seen fit to provide the Department of Defense with capacitybuilding authorities, which are implemented in concert with the Department of 

State and directly support the Department’s missions and broader U.S. national 

security objectives. 

Question. To what degree is the request a function of difficulty of gaining congressional support for 150 vs. 050 account funding? 

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) strongly supports increases in funding 

of Department of State (DOS) foreign assistance programs, including security assistance. DOD also has requirements for funding and authorities to build partner capacity in support of defense objectives. We view the funding for these DOD and DOS 

programs as entirely complementary. These mutually reinforcing programs build on 

the strengths of each of our Departments in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy and security objectives. 

RESPONSE OF PUNEET TALWAR TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. The U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit Joint Statement said, 

‘‘the leaders discussed a new U.S.-GCC strategic partnership to enhance their work 

to improve security cooperation, especially on fast-tracking arms transfers, as well 

as on counterterrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity, and ballistic missile 

defense.’’ As a member of the GCC, please explain the administration’s policy in 

regard to weapons transfers to Bahrain, and what limitations, if any, still exist in 

light of the Joint Statement. 

Answer. The administration’s arms transfer policy toward Bahrain remains 

unchanged since 2012. The issue remains under review, but we have made no decision at this time to resume the shipment of restricted items. We will consult with 

Congress if and when there is a change in the policy. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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The U.S. Government continues to approve exports to Bahrain, on a normal caseby-case basis, of items related to external defense, counterterrorism and the protection of U.S. forces. At this time, the U.S. Government continues to withhold exports 

to Bahrain of crowd control items and other items that have a potential internal 

security use. 

Æ 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER