Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

CASE STUDY IN GUERRILLA WAR:

GREECE DURING WORLD WAR II

REVISED EDITION

United States Army Special Operations Command

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

CASE STUDY IN GUERRILLA WAR: 

GREECE DURING WORLD WAR II

REVISED EDITION

Paul J. Tompkins Jr., Project Lead

Erin M. Richardson, Editor

United States Army Special Operations Command

Layout by The Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory
This publication is a work of the United States Government in accordance with Title 17, United States Code, sections 101 and 105. 

Published by:

The United States Army Special Operations Command

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Revised Edition 

First Edition published by Special Operations Research Office, 

American University, December 1962

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of 

the US government.

Nonmateriel research on special warfare is performed in support 

of the requirements stated by the US Army Special Operations Command, Department of the Army.

Comments correcting errors of fact and opinion, filling or indicating gaps of information, and suggesting other changes that may be 

appropriate should be addressed to:

United States Army Special Operations Command

G-3X, Special Programs Division

2929 Desert Storm Drive

Fort Bragg, NC 28310 

When citing this book, please refer to the version available at 

www.soc.mil. 

All ARIS products are available from USASOC at www.soc.mil

under the ARIS link. 
ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND 

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series 

consists of a set of case studies and research conducted for the US Army 

Special Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

The purpose of the ARIS series is to produce a collection of academically rigorous yet operationally relevant research materials to develop 

and illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and revolution. 

This research, intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of the Special Forces, will allow users to distill vast amounts of 

material from a wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons, 

thereby enabling the development of future doctrine, professional education, and training.

From its inception, ARIS has been focused on exploring historical and current revolutions and insurgencies for the purpose of identifying emerging trends in operational designs and patterns. ARIS 

encompasses research and studies on the general characteristics of 

revolutionary movements and insurgencies and examines unique adaptations by specific organizations or groups to overcome various environmental and contextual challenges.

The ARIS series follows in the tradition of research conducted by 

the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University in the 1950s and 1960s, by adding new research to that body of work 

and in several instances releasing updated editions of original SORO 

studies.

VOLUMES IN THE ARIS SERIES

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume I: 1927–1962 (Rev. Ed.)

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (2nd Ed.)

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (2nd Ed.)

Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography

The Legal Status of Personnel in Resistance

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia (1964–2009)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka (1976–2009)

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (pub. 1961)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953–1959 (pub. 1963)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala 1944–1954 (pub. 1964)

SORO STUDIES

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941–1954 (pub. 1964)
INTRODUCTION TO REVISED EDITION

This case study was originally published by the US Army Special 

Operations Research Office in 1961. As we developed the Assessing 

Resistance and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project and work began 

on the new studies, we determined that this text is still important and 

relevant and thus should be republished. As noted in the Foreword to 

the original edition, this case study considers many aspects of tactical 

operations, offering a glimpse of the complexities in working relationships between individuals and groups with diverse backgrounds and 

aspirations. The record of the German performance against the Greek 

guerrillas gives insight into the reasons for the Germans’ tactical success in antiguerrilla combat and their simultaneous failure to eradicate 

the guerrilla movement. The description and analysis of these events 

are quite relevant to study of today’s movements and operations.

The majority of the book was reproduced exactly as it appeared 

originally, with some minor spelling and punctuation corrections as 

well as changes in formatting to conform to modern typesetting conventions and to match the new ARIS studies in presentation. The process for creating this revised edition entailed scanning the pages from 

a copy of the original book; using an optical character recognition 

(OCR) function to convert the text on the scanned pages to computerreadable, editable text; refining the scanned figures to ensure appropriate resolution and contrast; and composing the document using 

professional typesetting software. Then, word by word, the revised text 

was compared to the original text to ensure that no errors were introduced during the OCR and composition processes. In addition, the 

original edition included two fold-out maps that were re-created at a 

smaller scale for this updated edition.

These efforts resulted in the creation of this revised edition in the 

following formats: a softbound book, a hardbound book, a PDF, and an 

EPUB. The EPUB was generated by creating a new set of files from the 

print-ready files, adjusting various settings in the files to facilitate maximum compatibility with e-readers, exporting the files to .epub, and 

reviewing and revising the code to allow for optimal viewing on standard e-reading devices. The final step was to test the book on multiple 

e-readers and then repeat the entire process as necessary to address 

any remaining issues in the code.

Although the processes for creating the various formats of this edition are for the most part straightforward, they take several weeks to 

complete and require considerable attention to detail. Several staff 

members from the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory devoted time and effort to making the various formats of this 
revised edition possible: Kelly Livieratos, Annie Marcotte, Magda Saina, 

and Erin Richardson.

This study and the other products from the ARIS project are essential learning tools developed to enhance Special Operations Forces personnel’s understanding of resistances and insurgencies. For more than 

fifty years, Special Operations Forces have conducted missions to support resistances or insurgencies (unconventional warfare); to counter 

them (counterinsurgency operations); or to support a partner nation 

in eliminating them (foreign internal defense). These operations are 

collectively referred to as special warfare. Special Operations doctrine 

gives general principles and strategies for accomplishing these operations but in most cases describes the resistance or insurgency only in 

generalities. The ARIS project was designed to serve as an anatomy 

lesson. It provides the necessary foundational material for the special 

warfare practitioner to learn the elemental structure, form, and function of rebellions, thus enabling him or her to better adapt and apply 

the doctrine professionally. Additionally, these products inform doctrine, ensuring that it is adapted to meet modern social and technological changes.

When citing this study in scholarly work, please refer to the PDF version available at www.soc.mil.

Paul J. Tompkins Jr.

USASOC Project Lead

CASE STUDY IN GUERRILLA WAR: 

GREECE DURING WORLD WAR II

by

D. M. Condit

Approved

William A. Lybrand, Chief 

Unconventional Warfare Branch

Earl H. De Long 

Technical Director

Kai E. Rasmussen 

Director, SORO

Special Warfare Research Division 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE 

The American University

Operating under contract with the 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

1961
ii

FOREWORD

Because of recent developments in Southeast Asia and other areas where 

Communists have exploited guerrilla movements to the detriment of the 

non-Communist world, interest in the United States is focused on guerrilla 

warfare as seldom before. Several facts about guerrilla movements—a field 

of activity too long regarded as “adventure”—have emerged from these 

experiences of the 20th century. One is that world communism has systematically utilized guerrilla warfare to extend its power and that the West has 

not always been able to counter these thrusts. China and Indochina are 

classic examples. Another point is that the Communists frequently attempt 

to subvert resistance and guerrilla movements not originally Communist, 

so that they will become the tools of communism.

The Special Operations Research Office is convinced that this case 

study of guerrilla warfare, utilizing the example of Greece during World 

War II, holds many lessons for the 1960’s, from both a military and political 

standpoint. While many of the lessons may be known to a few United States 

experts, it is also true that not all persons who will be intimately concerned 

with guerrilla warfare in the near future have this expert knowledge at 

their fingertips. In this sense, this study should prove most useful to a variety of military and non-military audiences.

For the policy maker, this study represents a detailed and comprehensive review of the major aspects of a guerrilla campaign, including its political implications and long-range effects. For the military planner, the study 

indicates not only many of the problems inherent in such a campaign—of 

selection and training of men, of logistics and communication, for example, but also some possible solutions. For persons who may someday be in 

the same position as that handful of Allied men in Greece during World 

War II, the study considers many aspects of tactical operations and affords 

a glimpse of the complexities in working relationships between individuals 

and groups with diverse backgrounds and aspirations. For those responsible for countering guerrilla operations in the future, the record of the 

German performance against the Greek guerrillas gives insight into the 

reasons for their tactical success in antiguerrilla combat and their simultaneous failure to eradicate the guerrilla movement.

In presenting this study, I feel confident that it will aid in the understanding of a subject of telling importance.

Kai E. Rasmussen

Director

Special Operations Research Office

October 1961
iii

PREFACE

Greece was selected as a logical subject for a pilot study on a guerrilla campaign by this Office for a number of reasons. Many similarities 

and cogent analogies exist between the guerrilla war in Greece in the 

early 1940’s and those conflicts which have since broken out in other 

areas. On the other hand, certain aspects of the Greek situation are 

unique and of specific value. A study of the guerrilla warfare in Greece 

provides extremely useful insights into various perplexing problems 

concerning the exploitation and countering of guerrilla groups.

A specific example may clarify how certain similarities in guerrilla 

warfare, even in diverse situations, appear and reappear, thus making even “old” experience pertinent. Although guerrilla warfare in 

Greece during World War II differed from that in Cuba during the 

latter 1950’s—if for no other reasons than that the one campaign was 

directed against a foreign occupier and the other against a repressive 

indigenous government—there were a number of likenesses. In both 

instances, the main base of operations was in the mountains. Despite 

the time interval between the two campaigns, the tactics were remarkably similar—night fighting, sabotage, and attack on lines of communication, utilizing mobility, flexibility, and surprise. In Greece, the 

Germans found encirclement the best counterguerrilla tactic; in Cuba, 

according to “Che” Guevara, guerrillas feared encirclement as the one 

way they might be “forced into a decisive battle that can be very unfavorable.  .  .  .” Not only military but political tactics in the two situations appeared similar in concept. In both cases, Communist groups 

adopted as their avowed objectives the social aspirations of the people and were careful at first not to betray any other intent. In Greece, 

indoctrination of the people was a standard procedure of the Communist-dominated guerrilla group; in Cuba, the revolutionary movement, 

according to Guevara, found it “necessary to undertake intensive work 

among the people . . . .”

Despite these similarities, the example of Greece during World War 

II is probably most important because of its specific lessons. One aspect 

that is examined in this study with particular care is the technique used 

by the British to manage, support, and control the guerrilla movement. 

Once they became aware of the Communist element in the strongest 

guerrilla force, they worked to keep it from establishing complete military and political control over the country during a period of extreme 

political weakness. Their success in this undertaking was certainly an 

outstanding accomplishment. Another interesting point is that the 

British took special care to legitimize sending their own troops into 

the country as the Germans left. Having parried the Communist thrust 
iv

until then, at that crucial moment they determinedly and effectively 

countered an expected Communist bid for power.

This study is also particularly concerned with certain continuing 

problems in both the exploitation and the countering of guerrilla warfare. For example, some of the data on interpersonal relations between 

staff and field members of the British Special Operations Executive and 

between the British liaison men and local guerrillas provide very useful 

and pertinent information. The German counterguerrilla operations 

are at once a model of what to do and what not to do. The Germans, 

with a minimum of resources, exhibited defensive and offensive tactics 

which went far toward destroying the guerrillas. At the same time, their 

brutality toward the civilian population earned them its hatred and 

generally strengthened its support of the guerrillas. Hence, the Germans were never able to eradicate resistance; when they left, guerrilla 

groups harassed their departure.

Some brief explanation needs to be made as to the general focus of 

this study. Since the work was undertaken with the possible future role 

of an Allied army in mind, the experience in Greece has been viewed 

from the perspective of a sponsoring power—in this case the British. 

This viewpoint has two corollaries. One is that, since British control 

involved many political factors, these quickly became the dominating 

feature of a study of the Greek guerrilla war. The other corollary is that 

this dominance of the political made it advisable and logical to limit 

the study’s attention to those elements of the resistance movement that 

played a major political role.

Although political events are covered in this study only insofar as 

they concerned the guerrilla war, it is difficult to say what political happenings were not pertinent, or indeed what guerrilla operations did 

not have political repercussions. The first British officers who worked 

with the Greek guerrillas quickly learned that the prime factor in controlling them was the political one. In time, politics came to permeate 

every aspect of the guerrilla war, even its technical details. It follows 

therefore that political understanding is essential to comprehension 

even of the operational war. The study treats the political side of the 

guerrilla war first and develops it chronologically. This sequential treatment of events allows the user to follow the play and counterplay of 

Greek politics and provides a time frame for the later analysis of operational elements in the guerrilla war.

Since the major political and operational aspects of the Greek 

guerrilla war involved only a few of the very many resistance groups 

that operated in Greece during World War II, this study has had to be 

delimited to consider only the most important groups. Those that were 

outside the mainstream of events, as for example the gallant resistance 
v

on Crete or the Andon Tsaous band in Macedonia, have been given 

only the briefest mention. Where pertinent, however, data based on 

British experience with these bands have been utilized in the later, 

nonpolitical chapters.

The study has utilized historical methods and techniques as the 

most appropriate and feasible. On the other hand, this report is not a 

simple attempt to recreate past events. The focus has been placed on 

the significant features of guerrilla warfare as it occurred in Greece 

during World War II. In short, the study has treated those aspects of 

guerrilla warfare that would have been treated had any method other 

than the historical—e.g., a social science technique of interrogation or 

experimentation—been possible.

The report is mainly based on the remarkably frank memoirs and 

accounts published by a number of the principal military participants, 

including Brigadier Myers, commander of the British mission to the 

Greek guerrillas; Colonel Woodhouse, his successor; and a number of 

the other British liaison officers. The memoirs of major political participants, for example, Prime Minister Churchill and Ambassador Leeper 

on the British side and Prime Minister Papandhreou on the Greek 

side, have been utilized. Of the Greek guerrillas, Colonel Saraphis has 

given us his account of the Communist group, and lesser figures such 

as George Psychoundakis and Chris Jecchinis have added the flavor of 

guerrilla warfare as seen by the non-Communist tactical practitioner. A 

manuscript written by Maj. Matthew J. Vlissides, formerly of the Greek 

Army, detailing his firsthand experience with guerrilla warfare in the 

Greek islands, has been useful to this study. Comments by another 

Greek observer have also been helpful. Accounts of antiguerrilla warfare in Greece by German commanders have been used, as have some 

captured German war records. It should be noted that this study has 

not exploited any official classified records. A complete, annotated list 

of the literature from which data were obtained is given in the Bibliography at the end of the report.

Only a final mention needs now to be made of the organization 

of this report. The first chapter deals with the opening British moves 

in Greece and gives the economic, political, and military background 

necessary to understand what later occurred. Chapter II develops the 

political and strategic aspects of the guerrilla campaign. Chapter III 

concerns some of the functional problems inherent in supporting a 

guerrilla war from outside the area. The focus in Chapter IV is on 

the non-tactical aspects of life behind the lines in Greece—guerrilla 

structure, command, organization, working relationships with liaison 

officers, etc.; Chapter V, on the other hand, treats tactical military 

operations, giving a number of specific examples. Chapter VI, making 
vi

an about-face, views the guerrilla effort from the German side—not 

as a movement to support or control but as a thing to destroy. Finally, 

for the benefit of the reader who must restrict his reading, a Summary 

of the entire study, giving its Conclusions and Implications, has been 

placed at the beginning of the report.
vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD ..........................................................................................ii

PREFACE...............................................................................................iii

SUMMARY

Problem ...........................................................................................3

Background of Events.....................................................................3

Discussion........................................................................................3

Conclusions.....................................................................................6

Implications...................................................................................22

CHAPTER I. THE GREEK STAGE

Gorgopotamos ..............................................................................29

War and Occupation.....................................................................33

First Greek Resistance...................................................................39

CHAPTER II. STRATEGY AND POLITICS IN 

 GUERRILLA WARFARE

Introduction..................................................................................49

Gaining Guerrilla Cooperation ...................................................51

Politics and Disillusionment.........................................................60

Guerrillas Fight Guerrillas ...........................................................70

New Communist Moves for Control ............................................79

Indian Summer and the December War .....................................87

Strategic Recapitulation .............................................................100

CHAPTER III. SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS

“The Firm”...................................................................................107

Selection and Training ............................................................... 110

Communication..........................................................................122

Supply and Money.......................................................................125

Transportation............................................................................130

CHAPTER IV. BEHIND ENEMY LINES—VILLAGERS, 

GUERRILLAS, AND LIAISON OFFICERS

Mountain Greece ........................................................................ 141

ELAS, Guerrilla Arm of EAM....................................................146

EDES, Guerrillas of Zervas.........................................................159

Allied Troops with the Guerrillas..............................................168

CHAPTER V. TACTICAL GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

A Quick Overview .......................................................................185

The Major Target........................................................................187

Examples of Guerrilla Operations.............................................189
viii

Table of Contents

What Military Value? ..................................................................213

What Cost? ..................................................................................218

CHAPTER VI. ANTIGUERRILLA WARFARE

End of the Italian Occupation...................................................223

German Organization for Control ............................................226

Finding Sufficient Troops...........................................................230

Securing the Transportation Network ...................................... 237

Minor Operations.......................................................................242

Major Operations........................................................................244

Results of Major Operations ......................................................259

The Missing Key to Success........................................................262

APPENDIXES

A. The “National Bands” Agreements....................................269

B. The Italian Armistice..........................................................271

C. Denunciation of the Security Battalions...........................272

D. The Plaka Armistice ...........................................................273

E. The Lebanon Charter.........................................................275

F. The Caserta Agreement .....................................................277

G. Estimate of Air Transportation Cost .................................279

NOTES ........................................................................................................ 281

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................... 301

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................... 317

INDEX ......................................................................................................... 321
Table of Contents

ix

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. The Gorgopotamos Party ....................................................30

Figure 2. Occupation Zones in Greece (1941–43) .............................37

Figure 3. Some Victims of the Famine................................................38

Figure 4. King George II of Greece ....................................................65

Figure 5. General Infante and Colonel Woodhouse..........................73

Figure 6. Colonel Woodhouse and Major Wine.................................75

Figure 7. Street in the Plaka District of Athens..................................95

Figure 8. Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens 

and Regent of Greece. .........................................................99

Figure 9. British Officer with Cretan Resistance Workers............... 126

Figure 10. Greek Terrain Map........................................................... 143

Figure 11. Mountain Paths ................................................................ 145

Figure 12. Aris and Friend................................................................. 147

Figure 13. General Saraphis.............................................................. 149

Figure 14. “A Typical ELAS Officer” ................................................ 153

Figure 15. General Zervas ................................................................. 162

Figure 16. Maj. George Agoros of EDES........................................... 166

Figure 17. Transportation Problems ................................................. 173

Figure 18. Transportation Problems Solved..................................... 174

Figure 19. Greek Village Women ...................................................... 176

Figure 20. Greek Transportation System.......................................... 188

Figure 21. The Gorgopotamos Railway Bridge ................................ 193

Figure 22. The Gorgopotamos Diagram Used by the British ......... 194

Figure 23. The Asopos Railway Bridge ............................................. 199

Figure 24. The Asopos Diagram Used by the British.......................200

Figure 25. General Kreipe Surrounded by His Kidnapers.............. 217

Figure 26. Occupation Zones in Greece after September 1943 ......225

Figure 27. Field Marshal von Weichs.................................................227

Figure 28. General Loehr..................................................................228

Figure 29. German Organization after September 1943................. 231

Figure 30. Bulgarian Troops in Greece............................................234

Figure 31. German Fortifications at Key Transportation Points.....238
x

Table of Contents

Figure 32. Hostage Cages.................................................................. 241

Figure 33. Lieutenant General Felmy ...............................................254

Figure 34. Lieutenant General Lanz.................................................255

Figure 35. Reprisal Victims ...............................................................263

Figure 36. Burning Village................................................................264

Figure 37. Map of Burned Villages ...................................................266
SUMMARY

PROBLEM

BACKGROUND OF EVENTS

DISCUSSION

CONCLUSIONS

IMPLICATIONS

Summary

3

SUMMARY

Problem

To prepare a case study of guerrilla warfare, using the experience 

of Greece during World War II in order to—(1) increase knowledge of 

resistance and guerrilla warfare; (2) describe and evaluate German antiguerrilla measures and tactics; (3) derive conclusions relevant to operational concepts of waging guerrilla warfare; and (4) provide a basis for 

eliciting or suggesting general principles for guerrilla warfare doctrine.

Background of Events

In September 1942 German victories were at their height. The German war machine was in high gear and the summer campaigns still 

going strong. In Europe, only Great Britain and Russia were actively 

fighting,a

 the latter in a desperate struggle on her own soil. In Africa, 

German forces under General Rommel had recaptured Tobruk and 

advanced into Egypt to the El Alamein line, only 70 miles west of Alexandria. The British breakout attempt from El Alamein was still a month 

away. Allied fortunes of war were at low ebb.

One of the major supply routes for General Rommel’s forces in 

Africa was from Germany through Greece. There was only one northsouth railway line through Greece, but the British, lacking sufficient 

naval or air forces, were unable to interdict it. To prevent Rommel from 

being supplied via Greece, the British therefore turned to a desperate 

expedient: they planned to send a behind-the-lines party to cut this 

important rail line.

Discussion

In late September 1942 the British airdropped a small, uniformed 

party under Col. (Brig.) E. C. W. Myers into the mountains of Greece 

with orders to enlist the help of guerrilla groups believed to be operating and, with their aid, to cut the north-south rail line by blowing up 

one of three major railway bridges. The demolition was successfully 

accomplished with guerrilla help; the rail line was cut for 6 weeks. The 

a Austria and Czechoslovakia had been bloodlessly incorporated into the Reich; Albania had been annexed by Italy. Vichy France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and 

Turkey were officially neutral. Northern France, the Benelux countries, Norway, Denmark, 

Poland, the Baltic countries, much of Russia to Stalingrad, Yugoslavia, and Greece had 

been overrun and occupied. Italy, Finland, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria were actively 

supporting Germany.
4

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

success of this operation led the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in Cairo not to exfiltrate the sabotage party, as had been 

planned, but to leave it in Greece to build up and work with the guerrilla forces.

Myers, now Brigadier and leader of the British Military Mission to 

the Greek guerrillas, soon found that he faced problems more complex 

than any he had previously encountered as a professional soldier. The 

resistance movement was split into a number of factions of varying political views. Though the two largest guerrilla groups had collaborated in 

the bridge demolition, they were bitter rivals. EAM/ELAS, ostensibly 

a coalition of republican elements dedicated to fighting the occupying 

forces and working for a freely elected postwar government, was actually controlled by Communists. EDES, largely the personal instrument 

of a former regular Greek army officer, Col. (Gen.) Napoleon Zervas, 

was originally republican in politics but moved to the far right as the 

war progressed.

The British faced all the usual technical problems encountered in 

supporting guerrilla warfare. The major question confronting Brigadier Myers, however, was how to reconcile conflicting military and 

political needs. In order to get military results from the Greek guerrillas, he felt that Britain had to use—and therefore support—EAM/

ELAS, since it controlled the largest amount of territory and the areas 

containing the main targets, and was the strongest guerrilla group. On 

the other hand, if the British were to prevent Greece from falling into 

the Communist orbit at the end of the war, they would also have to keep 

EAM/ELAS from growing powerful enough to absorb the entire guerrilla movement, which was clearly its aim.

Meanwhile, at its highest level, His Majesty’s Government was apparently unaware of Myers’ dilemma or the dangers on the Greek scene, 

and British policy in Greece remained unclear until Myers and some 

of the resistance leaders were exfiltrated to Cairo in midsummer 1943. 

A constitutional crisis involving the Greek monarch and governmentin-exile then occurred, alerting Prime Minister Churchill to the Greek 

problem. He soon clarified British policy: from this time forward, the 

military value of the Greek guerrillas was subordinate to the fact that 

they posed a postwar political danger.

At this point, the mission of the British liaison officers (supported 

by the Americans, who now entered the scene) was clear but still complex: to support and work with the guerrilla forces, to get them to 

fight the enemy rather than each other, and to keep EAM/ELAS from 

becoming strong enough to seize political control in Greece when the 

Germans left. This was easier said than done.
Summary

5

The means that the British used to sustain the guerrillas, while at 

the same time trying to prevent EAM/ELAS from obtaining hegemony 

of power, involved off-stage political maneuvering combined with military measures in Greece itself. As much was accomplished at the conference table—in Egypt, Lebanon, Italy, Greece—as in the field. The 

role of the liaison officers in maintaining some degree of control over 

the guerrillas in Greece, particularly in sustaining EDES against the 

military attack of EAM/ELAS, was essential to final British success. 

The complicated story of these political-military maneuvers—their 

effect upon guerrilla warfare and its effect on them—is examined in 

Chapter II of this study,

The problems of supporting guerrilla warfare in a foreign country 

are considered and analyzed in Chapter III. The British agency responsible for supporting the Greek guerrillas was SOE Cairo. It reported to 

its London office, which was under the Ministry of Economic Warfare; 

in the Middle East Command, SOE Cairo was eventually brought under 

Army control. It underwent its own growing pains at the very same time 

its workload was at its peak. Frequent reorganizations, staffing problems, and friction between staff and field members also contributed to 

the agency’s difficulties. However, SOE Cairo managed to select and 

train future liaison officers, maintain communication with them once 

they were in the field, and get supplies and money to them. The transportation of men and supplies provided few difficulties. Airdrops were 

remarkably successful; sea deliveries were maintained with fair regularity. In early summer 1943, the first airstrip was built in guerrilla Greece, 

making it possible to land Allied aircraft behind enemy lines.

The internal organization and administrative problems of EAM/

ELAS and EDES, and the working relationships of the liaison officers with these two groups and the Greek people are examined in 

Chapter IV.

The military role of the guerrillas, though weakened by their involvement in politics, was still substantial. Twice they were called upon to 

undertake large-scale coordinated sabotage, and twice they responded: 

in Operation ANIMALS, intended to convince the Germans in the early 

summer of 1943 that the Allies meant to invade Greece rather than Sicily; and in Operation NOAH’S ARK, designed to harass and retard the 

German withdrawal in 1944. Guerrilla operations were directed mainly 

at the enemy’s lines of communications. In addition to an overall view 

of operations, Chapter V contains descriptions of a number of specific 

operations. Military value and the cost of the guerrilla operations are 

also assessed. Although no specific values can be assigned, the parameters are indicated.
6

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Finally, the antiguerrilla warfare waged by the occupying forces is 

described and appraised in Chapter VI. After the fall of 1943, when the 

Italians withdrew from the war, the main forces of occupation left in 

Greece were German. With thoroughness and ruthlessness, the Germans set out to destroy the guerrillas. Although their tactical defensive 

operations and their large-scale offensive encirclement tactics particularly, were well planned and executed, they never succeeded in stamping out the guerrilla forces. The principal reason for this failure was 

that German terror tactics used against the population were not effective in suppressing popular support of the guerrillas.

Conclusions

Conclusions are grouped according to the following topics: Strategic Significance, Political Aspects, Tactical Aspects, Command and 

Control, External Support, Role of the Underground, and Antiguerrilla Warfare.

Strategic Significance

1. Guerrilla operations in Greece did not defeat the Axis troops in that 

country in terms of “closing with the enemy and destroying his military 

power.” The guerrillas, however, did perform valuable military services 

for the Allied cause.

2. Accomplishments:

a. Greek guerrilla forces were responsible for a partial tiedown of 

German troops within Greece.

(1) The ratio of Greek guerrillas to Axis forces in Greece in mid1944 was, roughly, 1 to 3. At the most, therefore, the Greek 

guerrillas could have possessed only a 1:3 tiedown value.

(2) Even this 1:3 ratio, however, did not reflect a Greek guerrilla 

tiedown of Axis troops. Since the Germans also had to 

protect the Greek coast against any Allied landing attempt, 

some Axis troops would have been in Greece even if there 

had been no guerrillas.

(3) The British credited the Greek guerrillas with the tiedown of 

at least one and possibly two German divisions in Greece for 

the short but crucial period of the Allied invasion of Sicily 

in the summer of 1943. They felt that this was the major 

military contribution of the Greek guerrillas.
Summary

7

b. Since the only significant fighting in Greece between June 

1941 and September 1944 was between Axis troops and Greek 

guerrillas and Allied auxiliaries, Axis casualties in Greece for 

this period may be attributed mainly to guerrilla activity.

(1) EAM/ELAS claimed to have produced a German casualty 

rate of 1 of every 4 troops. This claim is dismissed as 

unjustifiably high.

(2) For the Balkan theater as a whole, the German casualty ratio 

has been estimated as 1 of every 7 troops. Using this ratio as 

the maximum possibility, it is estimated that Greek guerrillas 

produced German casualties ranging from 1 of 20 to 1 of 

7 troops, or between 5,000 and 15,000 dead, wounded, or 

missing.

c. Greek guerrillas aided both directly and indirectly in the 

interdiction of German supply routes.

(1) The Gorgopotamos Bridge demolition, in which the 

guerrillas participated directly, stopped through rail traffic 

for a period of 6 weeks.

(2) The demolition of the Asopos bridge was performed by 

an all-British party, but its success was indirectly owing to 

guerrilla control of the area. Its demolition stopped German 

rail traffic for approximately 16 weeks.

(3) “Trainbusting” attacks by combined parties of guerrillas and 

small units of Allied troops impeded German usage of the 

few railroads in Greece.

(4) Great precautions—expensive in manpower and materiel— 

were required of the Germans to protect their roads in 

Greece.

(5) Nonetheless, despite an all-out guerrilla effort to interdict 

lines of communication during the German withdrawal in 

the fall of 1944, the Germans were able to fight their way 

north and to protect their orderly withdrawal from Greece.

d. Along with the interdiction effect, the guerrillas cost the Germans 

supply and equipment losses.

(1) Much of the materiel thus lost, however, was Greek in 

origin—e.g., the railroad rolling stock.

(2) The mounting of counterguerrilla operations did, however, 

put a drain on German materiel resources, particularly 

trucks and gasoline, both of which were in short supply.

e. The guerrillas provided a number of miscellaneous services to 

the Allies.
8

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

(1) They provided safe places and escape routes for downed 

airmen and escaped Allied prisoners of war.

(2) They just about stopped production in the Greek chrome 

mines.

(3) They helped in the collection of intelligence.

(4) Losses inflicted by the guerrillas on senior German 

commanders affected German troop morale and aggravated 

the shortage of German leaders.

f. Guerrilla warfare in Greece represented a psychological 

operation against German power.

3. Costs:

a. Allied costs in men and materiel—although the evidence 

examined for this study does not set these definitively—were 

apparently low as compared with other military operations.

(1) In the summer of 1944 there were fewer than 400 Allied 

troops in Greece.

(2) A total of 2,514 tons of supplies were airdropped to Greek 

guerrillas by Allied planes, at a transportation cost estimated 

to be in the vicinity of $2,550,000. This includes operating 

cost, operational attrition, and nonoperational attrition (see 

Appendix G). Since transportation was generally the greatest 

cost in supplying guerrillas, it is probable that the cost of 

the supplies themselves was somewhat less than this figure. 

In addition, some supplies came into Greece by sea, both in 

British and Greek craft.

(3) Even in comparison with Allied support of other resistance 

movements, the cost for support of the Greek guerrillas was 

low. Compared with the 2,514 tons of supplies airdropped to 

Greece, 6,000 tons went to Italian guerrillas, 16,500 to the 

Yugoslav guerrillas.

(4) The British supplied gold sovereigns to the Greek guerrillas, 

partly to aid in supporting the guerrillas, partly to help 

sustain homeless and destitute Greeks. Extremely rough 

estimates indicate that this effort cost in the range of £22,000 

to £44,000 per month for a period up to 18 months—or a 

total in the range of $1,600,000 to $3,200,000.

b. Guerrilla casualties were considerable.

(1) EAM/ELAS set its own casualty figure at 4,500 dead and 

6,000 wounded, or one out of four ELAS guerrillas. There is 

little reason to doubt this figure.
Summary

9

(2) It has not been possible to estimate the casualties in EDES. 

It would be surprising, however, if EDES casualties were 

proportionately as high as those of EAM/ELAS.

c. The effect of the occupation and the guerrilla war on the 

Greek community was disastrous—in executions, destruction of 

villages, galloping inflation, and economic devastation.

(1) During the occupation alone, 70,000 Greeks were killed as 

reprisal victims by the Axis occupiers; in comparison, there 

were a total of only 72,000 Greek casualties for the period of 

active war operations in 1940–1941.

(2) At war’s end, only 415 miles of the original 1,700 miles of 

Greek railway track was usable; over 1,300 bridges had been 

destroyed.

(3) Whereas the aggregate corporate value of about 1,300 Greek 

corporations was estimated to be about 12 billion drachmae in 

1941, it took approximately 170 trillion drachmae to purchase 

one gold sovereign in November 1944. Gold sovereigns used 

to help finance the guerrillas also helped to increase the 

inflationary spiral.

Political Aspects

4. Although political aspects became the most important factor in the 

guerrilla war in Greece, they were not initially recognized as such by 

the British.

a. The initial decision to support the Greek guerrillas was made on 

a purely military basis without thought of any possible political 

repercussions. The single consideration was opposition to the 

common enemy.

b. The head of the original British mission had no background in 

Greek affairs, nor was he given any political briefing.

c. The original orders to centralize control of the guerrillas worked 

to the advantage of the Communist-dominated group.

d. Political-military coordination on Greek affairs was not initially 

provided for although trouble should have been expected; Great 

Britain was giving political support to the Greek monarch but 

there were only predominantly antimonarchist guerrilla groups, 

whether Communist or non-Communist, to which to give 

military support.

5. The British paid a price for not immediately recognizing the political 

aspects of the Greek situation. When upper echelons of the British government did become aware of these, policy was quickly changed—but 

only at a cost.
10

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

a. The first head of the Mission became a casualty in the bureaucratic 

struggle that accompanied the policy change. This in turn 

resulted in disruption of personal relationships in the field.

b. SOE Cairo, which viewed EAM/ELAS as a military arm to support, 

was brought under policy control of the Foreign Office, which 

saw EAM/ELAS as a political force to oppose. Thus the situation 

existed in which the organization supporting the guerrillas and 

selecting men to go into Greece was not completely in harmony 

with its own country’s political objectives.

6. British personnel failures had political repercussions in Greece.

a. Both British commanders in Greece recognized quite clearly 

that the Greek people viewed every liaison officer—no matter 

how low in rank—as the embodiment of his country. A single 

indiscreet or foolish remark was taken quite seriously; for 

example, if a liaison officer made a statement supporting EAM/

ELAS objectives, it was taken as an expression of British policy 

rather than of individual opinion.

b. The personal failure of a British liaison officer to hew to the 

proper line of conduct similarly reflected discredit upon his 

country in Greek eyes, clouding acceptance of British political 

intentions.

c. Personal failures of British liaison officers were used by the 

Communists of EAM/ELAS to discredit Great Britain politically.

7. Through a combination of political-military action, the British kept 

the situation in Greece fluid until they found the time and opportunity 

to use purely conventional military measures to curb EAM/ELAS.

a. The British were quite astute, once they recognized the political 

dangers in the Greek situation, in maneuvering the Greek 

government-in-exile to make it more representative in nature 

and more acceptable to Greek moderate opinion.

b. Action (e.g., curtailment of supplies to EAM/ELAS and increased 

support of EDES) by the liaison officers helped to keep EAM/

ELAS off balance until the German withdrawal occurred.

8. If the British had been unable to use conventional military forces to 

suppress EAM/ELAS in December 1944, there seems little doubt that 

EAM/ELAS would have achieved political control of Greece at that 

time.

a. It already controlled most of the countryside.

b. It would have been able, by political pressure, to bring about the 

downfall of the first government in liberated Greece. In fact, 

only intensive British support kept this from occurring anyway.
Summary

11

c. It was at the height of its popularity in Greece and many observers 

felt that it could easily have won a free election at that moment.

Tactical Aspects

9. Indigenous leadership was a crucial element in Greek guerrilla operations; however, it was insufficient to meet the military needs of the 

guerrilla war.

a. EDES guerrillas were more capable than those of EAM/ELAS, 

mainly because the first organization had attracted a larger 

number of officers from the former regular Greek Army. For a 

number of reasons, however, EDES was engaged with enemy forces 

less often than EAM/ELAS and thus had less overall impact.

b. EAM/ELAS realized its own lack of trained military leadership 

and took strenuous steps to fill the gap by attracting trained 

leaders and training new leaders. These steps helped considerably 

but never did quite fill its needs.

c. Liaison officers often had to assume the responsibility of 

commanding specific guerrilla operations.

d. Lack of trained leadership resulted in lack of training and battle 

discipline on the part of the guerrilla rank and file. Liaison 

officers were sometimes called upon to help with training, 

although this was nominally outside their area of responsibility. 

It is noteworthy that EAM/ELAS was less inclined than EDES to 

solicit or accept British tactical training.

e. To support guerrilla operations, the Allies sent in small 

detachments of specially trained, well-armed British and 

American troops. These units helped considerably in making the 

guerrillas more effective, particularly those groups whose military 

competence was initially low. The guerrillas’ political affiliation 

had little bearing on this particular aspect of operations.

10. The technical proficiency of the Greek guerrillas was low.

a. Liaison officers usually handled and laid the demolitions during 

guerrilla operations.

b. The British acknowledged the technical deficiency and supplied 

simple destructive devices for use by the guerrillas. Rock mines, 

which resembled local stones and were laid by merely placing them 

on the road, were used very successfully in Greece. According to 

German accounts, these mines caused much trouble and were 

difficult to clear off the roads, since they looked like any other 

stones and contained so little metal that mine detection devices 

were ineffective.
12

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

11. Greek guerrillas proved vulnerable to German large-scale encirclement tactics.

a. Such tactics forced the guerrillas into large-scale defensive and 

offensive tactics, about which they knew little and which they 

were not particularly successful in executing.

b. Nonetheless, despite large casualties, the guerrillas were usually 

able to extricate the majority of their encircled forces.

12. No evidence has been found to indicate that the guerrillas were 

able to use psychological warfare tactics as such against Axis troops 

with any appreciable degree of success. (The fact that guerrilla warfare existed in Greece was, of course, in itself a psychological operation 

against the occupying forces.)

Command and Control

13. Although the British had no way to impose direct field control over 

the Greek guerrillas, they utilized at least five major means to obtain 

indirect control: manipulation of supply delivery, simultaneous support 

of rival guerrillas, imposition of new operations with deadlines, use of 

information reported by liaison officers to manipulate political events, 

and the personal effectiveness of liaison officers.

a. Over EDES, entirely dependent on British support for survival 

against attack by EAM/ELAS, the British maintained almost 

complete control through these means.

b. Over EAM/ELAS, Communist-dominated and unwilling to 

accept any measure of British control, the British managed to 

obtain only a minimal degree of control. This was sufficient, 

however, to keep the situation unsettled so that EAM/ELAS 

could not obtain hegemony of power and take over political 

control in Greece as the Germans withdrew.

14. Greece provides an interesting example of the limits within which 

an external power can manipulate supply deliveries to enforce control 

over guerrilla behavior. Certain dangers in applying the supply “stick” 

become apparent.

a. During the period of internecine guerrilla fighting in Greece, 

the British stopped supplies to EAM/ELAS—an action which 

had some effect in bringing about an armistice. Poor relations 

still prevailed between the British and EAM/ELAS, however, 

even after deliveries were resumed. Curtailment or stoppage of 

supplies bred a certain amount of ill will that was not automatically 

replaced by good will when deliveries were resumed.
Summary

13

b. The British, in stopping supply deliveries, took the calculated risk 

that EAM/ELAS would not be able to find a new, independent 

source of supply from another external power.

15. The British did not originally support rival groups of guerrillas with 

the idea that they would be useful pawns to parlay against each other; 

events conspired, however, to make this come about.

a. Had there been no EAM/ELAS to threaten the life of EDES, it is 

uncertain whether the commander of EDES would have been so 

responsive to British desires.

b. The fact that there was an EDES completely responsive to British 

control was a major factor to worry EAM/ELAS.

16. In order to give EAM/ELAS something else to think about besides 

its political objectives in Greece, the British in early 1944 pressed for 

planning on Operation NOAH’S ARK, guerrilla harassment of the 

German withdrawal. To make NOAH’S ARK seem urgent, the British 

set its expected operational date for the spring of 1944, even though 

the German withdrawal was not expected that soon.

a. There was, however, a boomerang effect: EAM/ELAS apparently 

reasoned that it must step up work to obtain its political objectives 

if the German withdrawal was to take place so soon.

b. It is possible that, in stepping up its political work, EAM/ELAS 

was guilty of mistiming. If so, the British imposition of early 

planning for NOAH’S ARK was successful.

17. The British found that the information reported back by the liaison 

officers was vitally useful as a gauge of the true state of EAM/ELAS 

power in Greece, its hold over the Greek people, its weaknesses, and 

its intent. Such information was extremely helpful in making off-thescene political adjustments to undercut EAM/ELAS in Greece.

a. Since British influence was high with the Greek people, EAM/

ELAS could not totally ignore or betray the British liaison 

officers. In this sense, they could not “shake” these reporters.

b. There is no evidence to suggest that liaison officers were selected 

because of their ability to observe and obtain such information, 

or that scientific survey techniques were used for this purpose.

18. The personal characteristics of the liaison officers and their relations 

with the Greeks had an important bearing on their control function.

a. The age and high rank of the first British Mission Commander 

appear to have been distinct aids in his relations with guerrilla 

commanders. There is some evidence to support the contention 

that the youth and lower rank of the second commander were 

factors in the bad personal feeling that marked his relationship 

with EAM/ELAS.
14

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

b. The Greeks showed a marked preference for British liaison 

officers who looked British. Liaison officers of Greek descent, 

despite their language proficiency, appear to have been resented 

by the Greeks and were unable to maintain as much control over 

the guerrillas as officers who were obviously Anglo-Saxon.

c. Evidence examined in this study has not disclosed any instance 

where the personal characteristics of any British or American 

liaison officer had a critical effect on the decision process of a 

Communist guerrilla leader. There are indications, however, 

that the actions of non-Communist Greeks may have been 

swayed by their personal relations with the British. For example, 

it is probable that not only British supply but excellent personal 

relations with the liaison officers helped to keep Zervas from 

casting his lot with EAM/ELAS.

d. On the whole, the British appear to have adjusted easily to most 

of the customs, values, and mores of the Greek people.

e. The Greek guerrillas’ acceptance of torture as “sport” apparently 

upset many liaison officers; it was the outstanding trait to which 

the British did not easily adjust.

f. There is noted in this study some tendency among Greek guerrillas 

to see the liaison officer as a father-figure. For his part, the liaison 

officer does not appear to have expected, sought, or wanted this 

role. It speaks well for the liaison officers that they often appear 

to have accepted the role as a necessary responsibility in order to 

fulfill their control function.

g. An extreme sense of tact on the part of the Greek guerrilla, a 

reluctance to say anything that might not be what the liaison 

officer wanted to hear, tended to impede communication between 

the two groups. In this regard, such reluctance increased the 

problem of control.

h. There were many temptations for the liaison officer to linger in 

the pleasant company of upper class Greeks. When this occurred, 

the control value of the liaison officer was largely destroyed, 

since guerrilla warfare was taking place among the more simple 

mountain people.

19. The value of the liaison officer as an instrument for control was 

diminished when the British could not maintain a clearcut line of command authority among themselves.

a. Where the authority of the mission commander was not quite 

clear—as was the case for a short time—the situation became 

intolerably confused.
Summary

15

b. Distance, isolation, and abnormal living conditions made ordinary 

command and control in Greece extremely difficult. The British 

commander utilized regional mission headquarters to keep check 

on subordinate liaison officers, and the commander himself 

made frequent visits to missions. Conferences of liaison officers 

apparently also aided in maintaining a sense of responsibility 

and discipline.

c. Inspection trips from SOE Cairo were sometimes made to check 

on the situation in Greece. There is no indication that any system 

of undercover traveling inspectors was used to check up on the 

liaison officers.

d. The nature of behind-the-lines duty—the close contact among 

officers and men in the same mission and their isolation from 

other missions—underlined the need for personal compatibility 

within a mission headquarters. At the same time, there was 

obviously little difficulty in keeping useful but incompatible 

personnel separated.

e. When difficulties arose between liaison officers and the guerrillas 

they were with, it was relatively easy to change the assignment 

of the liaison officer. Most liaison officers apparently liked the 

guerrillas they were with.

f. The difficulties of maintaining command control over British 

liaison officers in the field emphasized the importance of the 

process by which such officers were initially selected.

External Support

20. Critical organizational problems affected the stability of the agency 

set up by the British to support resistance movements in the Middle 

East Command, Special Operations Executive (SOE) Cairo.

a. No peacetime agency had existed which could form the nucleus 

of SOE Cairo, or upon whose work that of SOE Cairo could 

be patterned. There was no peacetime work which adequately 

trained a man for wartime service in SOE Cairo.

b. The work of SOE Cairo was not even clearly coordinated into 

the military command chain at first. This was accomplished, 

however, without undue difficulty.

c. The early lack of definition of British policy in Greece and the 

initial failure to provide for political-military coordination of the 

work of SOE Cairo had highly disruptive effects on the agency 

when, as the result of the Greek crisis in August 1943, SOE Cairo 

lost policy direction in Greece, had its senior officers recalled, 

and was internally reorganized.
16

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

d. There is some evidence to indicate interagency friction between 

SOE Cairo and its American counterpart, the Office of Strategic 

Services (OSS), at the administrative and organizational level 

(not in the field).

e. The rapid growth in the resistance movements which SOE 

Cairo was responsible for supporting resulted in the agency’s 

undergoing frequent organizational changes and extremely 

rapid expansion, all of which had to be affected at the peak of 

its workload.

21. The organizational problems of SOE Cairo decreased its efficiency, 

which in turn increased hostility between its administrative staff and 

the liaison officers behind the lines in Greece.

a. Actual mistakes by SOE Cairo—e.g., the loss of all record of 

who was in Greece at one point—exacerbated the latent hostility 

between men behind the lines and men at agency headquarters.

b. Some improvement in staff-field relations was noted when men 

scheduled for field duty were given semistaff jobs in order to 

familiarize them with administrative problems.

22. The selection process might best be termed a consensus of intuitive 

judgments.

a. This study yielded no evidence that a scientifically constructed 

evaluation program was used in Cairo to assess and select 

potential British liaison officers for Greece.

b. There are some indications that motivation did not have a direct 

bearing on field performance. Men who were eager to go to 

Greece did not always work out well, whereas men who apparently 

did not particularly want to go sometimes worked out quite well.

c. Peer judgments appear to have generally been a fairly good index 

of a man’s abilities.

d. Despite the informal nature of the selection process, apparently 

most of the men sent into Greece worked out well.

e. Some liaison officers of leftwing political orientation were 

selected, although British policy in Greece was to support the 

Greek monarch.

23. Training of future liaison officers, limited by both time and facilities, was insufficient to overcome their general ignorance of guerrilla 

warfare problems and tactics, of means of handling groups of foreign 

nationals, or of the Greek language, customs, and terrain.

a. Most liaison officers learned their job by doing it.

b. Most had to depend on interpreters, which was not always 

satisfactory.
Summary

17

c. Many liaison officers were unprepared for the fact that any 

training of the guerrilla had to start at a level much lower than 

that necessary for a recruit in the British Army. For example, they 

were amazed at Greek casualness with regard to time, either in 

the sense of the length of time it would take for something to be 

done or of setting a time for meeting. Again, the low mechanical 

skill level of the average Greek also appears to have surprised the 

liaison officer.

24. Liaison officers were not trained to recognize the political overtones of the guerrilla war.

a. A number of the liaison officers appear to have been politically 

naive. Some appear to have carried over from their own culture 

the mistaken assumption that Greek military leaders were also 

non-political.

b. The ragged, dirty, undisciplined guerrilla appeared to some of 

the liaison officers as completely unimportant, either militarily 

or politically. Some liaison officers seemed unable to realize that 

the guerrillas had become a tool of the highest importance in 

relation to the potential political position of Greece.

25. Few technical problems were experienced in logistically supporting 

the Greek guerrillas.

a. The political decision to hold down supplies to EAM/ELAS 

made it easy for SOE Cairo to meet the logistical requirements 

without difficulty.

b. Air delivery of supplies was the major means of getting support to 

the mainland Greek guerrillas. Of 1,333 sorties flown to Greece, 

1,040—78 percent—were listed as successful from the air side; 

that is, a drop was made. Only three planes were lost.

c. Although the percentage of sorties successful from the ground 

side—that is, sorties from which supplies were collected—was 

lower than 78, it is apparently true that the guerrillas were 

supplied to the extent that the British wished them to be.

d. Although many liaison men parachuted into Greece under 

conditions that would today seem somewhat primitive—

improvised static release mechanisms, ejection through 

emergency hatch, containers attached to a man’s rigging—

the casualty rate was low. In over 200 jumps into Greece, only 

2 deaths are known to be directly attributable to the jump—a 

safety record of 99 percent.
18

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

26. The major technical problem was in the field of communications.

a. Message traffic between SOE Cairo and Greece increased 

tremendously at the same time that message traffic between 

Cairo and other resistance movements expanded. Furthermore, 

stations within Greece did not communicate directly but through 

SOE Cairo, again increasing the headquarters’ message load.

b. This inability to handle communications expeditiously had 

important ramifications in the August 1943 crisis: SOE Cairo 

had not decoded and delivered the messages from Greece of the 

political observer of the Foreign Office to the British Ambassador 

to the Greek government-in-exile. This lapse aroused the British 

Ambassador’s hostility towards SOE Cairo and was a factor in the 

bureaucratic struggle that followed the crisis.

c. Army facilities eventually had to be provided to assist SOE Cairo 

with communications.

Role of the Underground

27. The resistance group in Greece that had the best underground 

organization—by all odds, Communist-dominated EAM/ELAS—was 

the best equipped to field guerrillas.

a. Prior experience in clandestine activity under a repressive Greek 

regime gave Greek Communists important practical experience 

in organizing a viable underground apparatus. Those Greeks 

without such experience were apparently never able to catch up 

and successfully compete with the Communists.

b. The underground behind EAM/ELAS made it possible for that 

organization to postpone fielding guerrillas but still assured its 

ability to put guerrillas into the field at the time it chose.

c. The underground organization of EAM/ELAS was the major 

factor in that group’s dominance of the whole resistance 

movement.

d. The underground strength of EAM/ELAS was largely responsible 

for that group’s ability to remain almost independent of British 

control measures.

e. The underground strength of EAM/ELAS was a major reason 

behind its ability to survive both the internecine fighting and the 

German encirclement operations.

28. The Greek experience does not suggest any formula regarding the 

degree of underground organization and popular support needed to 

maintain effective guerrilla forces.
Summary

19

a. It does indicate that 100 percent support is not necessary. The 

Greek guerrillas never had this degree of support, even in those 

areas where they were most active and militarily most successful.

b. The study gives some indication that the lower limit for support 

may vary considerably, depending on local conditions.

c. Mass opinion could not be disregarded with impunity. EAM/

ELAS was successful in its underground organizational 

moves when it identified itself with the national Greek aim of 

resistance to the occupier. When it destroyed this identification 

(e.g., by attacks on other guerrilla groups) it faced unpleasant 

repercussions. When it proved itself unfeeling and cruel to fellow 

Greeks in December, 1944, it was discredited.

29. The appeals used by EAM/ELAS to attract persons into its underground apparatus were based on its desire to create the broadest possible underground support structure.

a. EAM/ELAS utilized the symbol of universal hatred: the occupiers 

of Greece.

b. It suggested positive action against the symbol of hatred: 

resistance to the occupiers.

c. It completely identified itself with national aims and accused all 

other groups of being unpatriotic, if not treasonable.

d. It took in and gave prestige to repressed elements in the Greek 

population: in a patriarchal society, women and young people 

were low on the social totem pole. In the underground of EAM/

ELAS, both groups were welcomed.

e. At the same time, the role of men and elders was also upheld, 

so that the offense to these groups from d above, was held to a 

minimum.

f. Where persuasion alone did not work, EAM/ELAS did not 

hesitate to use force. Surprisingly enough, persons upon whom 

force was used appear to have often become faithful supporters 

of EAM/ELAS.

Antiguerrilla Warfare

30. The Germans in Greece were not able to destroy the guerrillas 

entirely; but they were able, with forces approximating only three times 

the strength of the guerrillas, to contain them and prevent their becoming a crucial military factor.

a. The Germans did not attempt to dominate the entire area of 

Greece but limited their effort to control of the major towns and 

villages and the transportation network.
20

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

b. This acceptance of a limited control function was possible since 

the German strategy in Greece was limited—the Germans did 

not need to maintain an orderly government throughout Greece 

or to protect the Greek people themselves from the guerrillas.

c. German military policy within Greece was therefore dominated 

by the following major elements: (1) defense of lines of 

communications; (2) immediate reaction to and punishment of 

any guerrilla activity; (3) destruction of known guerrilla bands 

by large-scale encirclement operations; and (4) subjugation of 

the population, by terror if necessary.

31. The Germans used psychological measures in the antiguerrilla 

fight, with differing results.

a. Using the theme of fighting against Communist-dominated 

EAM/ELAS, they were extremely successful in recruiting Greeks 

into antiguerrilla security battalions. The battalions helped to 

alleviate the German troop shortage, as well as being, per se, a 

psychological triumph in the antiguerrilla fight.

b. The Germans successfully exploited the theme of Communism in 

EAM/ELAS to make the schism between EDES and EAM/ELAS 

extremely severe. They chose a time of internecine guerrilla 

fighting to begin their own counterguerrilla operations.

c. The Germans were unsuccessful, however, in the larger effort 

of converting the majority of the Greek people to the German 

rather than the Allied view of the war.

32. Although German commanders viewed the separation of the Greek 

people from the guerrillas as a tactical necessity (in order to identify 

the guerrillas, to prevent guerrilla recruitment to make up battle losses; 

etc.), they did not take effective steps to obtain such separation—either 

by physical or psychological means.

a. The Germans apparently felt that they lacked the necessary 

resources to effect a physical separation of the guerrillas and 

the population. This left only the possibility of a psychological 

separation.

b. Needless German brutality toward the Greek population was a 

major factor in preventing a psychological separation of Greek 

guerrillas and inhabitants.

(1) For example, the indiscriminate selection of retaliation 

victims meant that pro-German Greek families suffered as 

much as anti-German Greeks and increased resentment 

against the occupier.
Summary

21

(2) Also, the indiscriminate destruction of villages and shooting 

of villagers for events over which the latter had absolutely 

no control tended to induce hatred for the Germans greater 

than any fear of Communist domination of EAM/ELAS.

c. German actions toward the Greek inhabitants seemed to prove 

to the villagers that their own actions had no effect on their fate 

at German hands. It was actually safer to be a guerrilla than to be 

a villager living near the place where a guerrilla attack occurred. 

This helped rather than hindered the recruitment of guerrillas.

33. The Germans found the use of special guerrilla-hunting units 

extremely helpful in counterguerrilla operations.

a. These units were able to get quite close to guerrilla groups, since 

their troops were not in uniform but dressed as guerrillas. They 

accepted their illegal status as immaterial since they expected 

death if captured, whether or not they were in uniform.

b. The units were better trained in guerrilla tactics than the 

guerrillas. They were extremely proficient in “dirty” fighting 

and in exploiting the mountainous terrain. They also used local 

guides when possible, to help overcome any guerrilla advantage 

in terrain knowledge.

c. The units were useful either used alone or in conjunction 

with regularly uniformed troops, and in both minor and 

major operations.

34. The Germans found large-scale encirclements to be their most successful means of destroying the guerrilla groups.

a. The major lesson they learned was to make the initial encirclement 

area so large that the guerrillas, despite their maneuvers, would 

still be within the circle.

b. The Germans found—even during active operations—a daily 

review of the past day’s fighting and tactics to be a useful training 

and operations technique.

c. A number of the specific tactical lessons that the Germans felt 

they had learned during large-scale encirclement operations 

are individually listed beginning on page 259. These lessons 

concern:

Operating Information Combat Force

Planning Combat Communication

Secrecy Combat Intelligence

Tactics Unit Boundaries

Area Combing Passed-Over Terrain

Troops Flank Attacks
22

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Flexibility Alarm Devices

Time versus Accuracy Artillery

Gaps in Line Psychological Warfare

Reserves Civilians

Breakout Routes

Implications

Whereas the conclusions given above were derived strictly from the 

facts of the Greek case, the implications stated below, while stemming 

from this study, also reflect previous study in the field of resistance warfare, general knowledge of world affairs, and applied commonsense. 

Two things need to be noted concerning these implications. First, 

although these seemed to be the most compelling ones, no attempt 

has been made to be exhaustive in treatment. The careful reader will 

find others implicit in the conclusions or derivable from the text of 

this study. Second, the reader should understand that the implications 

form principles of a tentative nature rather than proven laws. Analytic 

studies of guerrilla warfare similar to this one are much needed to further test and refine these implications. Until such work has been done, 

the military user will find them most helpful only after careful consideration of the unique factors in the situation to which he is applying 

the findings.

The Strategic Aspect

1. The “single criterion” problem. It has been common practice, in unconventional as in conventional warfare, to accept as an ally any group willing to fight the common enemy. Sometimes circumstances make this 

practice necessary, but such acceptance, indiscriminately accorded, 

may also have dangerous repercussions, as was the case in Greece.

a. Fighting the common enemy may be the only shared goal—with 

the possibility that once this goal is met, there will be serious 

difficulties and political embarrassment for the supporting 

power.

b. While acceptance of a politically incompatible group as an 

unconventional warfare ally may postpone interallied difficulties 

for later settlement, it may also make these problems more serious 

and even create new ones.

c. Careful consideration of nonmilitary (e.g., political) criteria is 

critical to making a wise decision on the matter of giving support 

to a resistance group.
Summary

23

2. The escalation problem. The employment of conventional forces by a 

supporting power in a follow-on operation to unconventional warfare 

may not be feasible in view of the danger of escalating a limited conflict 

to general war.

a. It seems highly unwise to make the use of conventional forces a 

fixed planning assumption in unconventional warfare strategy.

b. To prepare for the contingency that conventional forces may 

eventually have to be involved, it is wise to create a legal basis 

that sanctions such use. This legal framework is a necessity if 

such use is to be defended before world opinion and condoned 

by the international community of nations.

3. The integrated command problem. One of the most pressing problems 

for a power supporting unconventional warfare is to create a truly 

integrated and functioning military-political command for the unconventional warfare area. This implication refers only to the command 

structure of the supporting power and not to any combined command 

created of elements of the supporting power and the indigenous guerrilla forces; the latter is an entirely separate question.

a. Creation of such a command will permit due consideration of 

both military and political problems in the decision-making 

process.

b. The supporting power will be able to speak with a single voice to 

indigenous groups. Conversely, it will be less likely that resistance 

leaders will be able to play one element of the support group 

against another.

c. The effective functioning of an integrated command for 

unconventional warfare needs to be assured before it goes into 

the field.

d. Consideration might be given to attaching political advisers to 

lower level military commanders with unconventional forces.

4. The control problem. Supply manipulation and the personal effectiveness of officers in the field have been widely accepted as instruments 

of indirect control of an indigenous resistance by a supporting power. 

There are strong indications that popular opinion within the area of 

unconventional warfare operations also acts as an indirect control.

a. If, within the area of operations the population perceives the 

supporting power in a favorable manner and believes in its 

eventual victory, it will be easier for representatives of that power 

to exert indirect control and more difficult for indigenous groups 

to oppose that power.
24

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

b. A psychological operations effort to help the forces of a 

supporting power in an unconventional conflict might well use 

these themes: the strong, benign, and compatible nature of the 

supporting power and the inevitability of final victory for the side 

it represents.

c. These themes must, of course, be reinforced by the actions and 

attitudes of representatives within the area.

5. The underground problem. Doctrine that states, quite correctly, that 

guerrilla forces cannot survive as an effective organization in an area 

of unconventional conflict without some degree of underground support from the population needs to be more specifically delineated. 

Studies of Communist methods of creating and using undergrounds 

have been or are currently being done. However, the minimal degree 

of support required for the successful operation of guerrilla warfare 

and the means of obtaining and maintaining that degree of support 

are still not known with any certainty.

The Tactical Aspect

6. The officer qualifications problem. There is a special need for the supporting power to choose for unconventional warfare duty, officers possessing not only the necessary physical and technical qualifications for 

leadership, but also the equally essential qualifications of psychological 

fortitude, general social and cultural insight, political skills, and specific area knowledge.

a. The emphasis placed on physical stamina in selection of 

unconventional force members has led to what may be an 

overemphasis on youth—at the expense of other equally or more 

important qualifications.

b. Selection instruments and training techniques are needed to 

identify men possessing the necessary qualifications and to train 

them to use these attributes effectively.

c. It is suggested that proficiency testing of unconventional 

forces might include scientifically developed and standardized 

intermediate field criteria for nonphysical and nontechnical 

skills (e.g., role playing with foreign personnel).

7. The indigenous forces qualifications problem. Guerrillas have often 

proved to be unskilled in military tactics and technology. Furthermore, local leadership, even with supporting power help, may not be 

adequate to bring guerrilla operations up to the minimum military 

standards required.
Summary

25

a. It is suggested that indigenous skill levels be determined before 

unconventional warfare plans are made for an area, that realistic 

training plans be made for raising the skill level, and that the 

unconventional warfare plan for the area take into account the 

probable indigenous skill level that may eventually be attained 

after training.

b. In addition to supplying cadres for training guerrillas, the 

supporting power might create small detachments of specially 

trained, highly armed men, dependable in battle situations, to 

stiffen the guerrilla operational effort.

c. A study throwing light on the ratio of untrained guerrillas 

that can be gradually absorbed into a trained guerrilla group 

without loss of its military efficiency would be of considerable 

value for planning purposes. This study should take into account 

the degree and kind of relationship obtaining between the 

indigenous guerrilla group and the supporting power.

8. The weapons problem. The weapons problem is traditionally associated 

with a number of conflicting philosophies, viz., (1) guerrillas should 

use the weapons they can find and capture—but this leads to a problem in supplying the proper ammunition; (2) guerrillas should use the 

regular arms of the supporting power—but these are often too complex for use by the technically backward guerrilla and he is burdened 

by being over-armed; (3) guerrillas should use extremely simple, durable weapons and the variety of ammunition supplied should be kept 

to a minimum—but this requires that such weapons be designed and 

produced in quantity by the supporting power and it probably further 

means that the guerrillas will be dependent upon the supporting power 

for all their ammunition. Measures that may help resolve the problem 

are suggested below.

a. A supporting power planning to utilize unconventional warfare 

to a considerable degree might develop, standardize, and be ready 

to produce in quantity a simple, tough, durable, nonrusting, light 

weapon suitable for use by nontechnical personnel.

b. Where highly specialized equipment and weapons would be of 

value in unconventional warfare, they might be supplied with 

trained crews, to assure maximum utilization.

c. Since in an area of unconventional warfare the civilian 

population is committed, whether or not it wants to be, some 

thought might be given to a weapon (e.g., the rock mine used 

in Greece) that could be supplied to all friendly persons. This 

weapon should appear innocuous, so that its possession would 

not arouse suspicion.
26

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

The Antiguerrilla Aspect

9. The population problem. This problem, of primary importance in a 

guerrilla area because of the close conjunction of guerrilla success and 

popular support, may be solved by physical or psychological separation 

of the two elements—guerrillas and population.

a. The policy of resettling the population in safe areas is one way 

of handling the problem and has been used successfully in a 

number of cases. Such a policy requires careful planning and 

continued work in the resettled area if any initial unfavorable 

reactions of the population are to be overcome and their 

successful adjustment to the new situation achieved. Otherwise, 

the policy is in danger of producing a boomerang effect at 

some later date. Along with other measures, a concerted and 

continuing psychological operations effort will be needed.

b. Psychological separation of the guerrilla from the population 

must be depended upon when it is not feasible to move the 

population. It is, however, extremely difficult to achieve. It 

means that the antiguerrilla power must be clever enough to 

exploit every guerrilla mistake, show care for the population, 

avoid provocation or brutality, and successfully safeguard the 

population from guerrilla reprisals.

10. Troop strength problem. Antiguerrilla warfare places great drains on 

defending troop strength and the following measures may be taken to 

optimize available strength.

a. Inadequately trained or physically unready troops can be used in 

antiguerrilla operations when necessary, even in difficult terrain, 

by placing them in stationary positions for blocking operations. 

Firstline troops are then used for attack operations.

b. Indigenous persons may be recruited to serve as antiguerrilla 

troops provided that they are reliable and that their families can 

be protected against reprisals.

c. The antiguerrilla commander may want to consider forming 

guerrilla-hunting units which dress and act like guerrillas. 

Such units have proved very effective, acting both alone and in 

conjunction with regular troops, and have been much feared 

by guerrillas.
CHAPTER I. 

THE GREEK STAGE

GORGOPOTAMOS

WAR AND OCCUPATION

FIRST GREEK RESISTANCE

The Greek Stage

29

THE GREEK STAGE

Gorgopotamos

On the night of 30 September–1 October 1942 three British planes 

winged across the mountains of Axis-occupied Greece. They were 

carrying 12 uniformed British—9 officers and 3 enlisted men—who 

had accepted a daring and dangerous mission behind enemy lines in 

Greece. None of the planes could sight the expected signals. One group 

of four men therefore jumped to fires that turned out to be merely shepherds’ bonfires; the second group dropped to the triangular signals of 

a Greek agent expecting some supplies but not a British party; and the 

third group, seeing no fires at all, returned home. This last group did 

not successfully drop until almost a month later, when, frustrated three 

previous times, it jumped blind. Floating down near an enemy garrison 

town, it met Italian mortar and small-arms fire before landing, and had 

to scatter and hide immediately to avoid capture.

Miraculously all 12 men survived unhurt and were able to join up. 

The first party assembled within one day, its members having landed 

fairly close together. After a few days they learned from a Greek shepherd that the second group was only 2 hours’ journey away; within 

5 days, the first and second parties were united. The third group joined 

the first two within 2 weeks of its drop into Greece. Its arrival was discovered “by pure chance” by a member of the united party during a 

trip across the mountains; he sent directions and orders to the third 

group to join the others. By mid-November, the 12 men were together 

and making plans to undertake their mission.

The original task of these 12 behind-the-lines British was to demolish any 1 of 3 railway bridges that carried the only north-south railway 

in Greece across the deep mountain chasms of Roumeli. In September 1942 this railway was transporting enemy supplies from Europe 

through Greece to the port of Piraeus. From there, the supplies were 

shipped to Crete and from Crete were transferred nightly by boat to 

North Africa, where they reinforced General Rommel’s crack German 

troops facing the British Eighth Army. According to British estimates, 

80 percent of Rommel’s supplies were traveling this route. Because the 

British lacked either naval or air forces sufficient to overcome the German air cover for the sea run from Crete to Africa, they were trying a 

daring expedient—to go behind enemy lines and cut the railway line 

carrying the supplies through Greece. The risk seemed worthwhile, 

since cutting Rommel’s supply lines might well have major significance 

in helping the British to break out of the El Alamein line. The mission 

of the British dropped into Greece was thus a one-shot job, but it had 

strategic military value of a high order. Even though British forces in 
30

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Africa had broken out from El Alamein by mid-November, the men in 

enemy-held Greece received no orders countermanding their original 

instructions and they continued with their dangerous mission.1

Figure 1. The Gorgopotamos Party. Colonel (Brigadier) Myers is standing, fourth 

from right.

Fortune smiled upon these British. Not only did they find each other 

after a difficult drop, but they found friendly Greeks who offered information, sustenance, and guidance. No one betrayed them to enemy 

troops. Finally, the British were able to make contact with two groups 

of guerrilla bands whose leaders both agreed to help them in the attack 

on the selected bridge.

The British personally reconnoitered the three bridges—the Papadhia, the Asopos, and the Gorgopotamos—to decide which one should 

be attacked. The selection of the northernmost of the three, the Gorgopotamos, was made on the basis that it was the most accessible to 

approach and that its defending Italian garrison appeared weak and 

vulnerable to surprise.2
The Greek Stage

31

By the end of November, a plan of operations had been made by 

the British leader, Col. E.C.W. Myers, and agreed to by the guerrilla 

leaders. One of these was Col. (Gen.) Napoleon Zervas, whose republican forces had just taken to the mountains; the other was the Communist, Athanasios Klaras, known as Aris, who had been operating in the 

mountains for several months. Both men agreed to cooperate and to 

supply about 150 andarte (guerrilla) fighters who would neutralize the 

Italian garrisons at either end of the bridge before the British demolitions party started its work.3

On 24 and 25 November 1942, the entire party—now consisting 

of the 12 British, approximately 150 guerrillas, and 3 colonial British 

troops who were left over from the British expedition of 1941 and had 

been living undetected in Greece until Myers arrived—marched to the 

take-off point. Here they waited in the cold, drizzling, cloudy weather 

for night to come.4

 One of the British officers later recalled that he had 

the sensation of being “in a cold gymnasium, in vest and shorts, before 

going into the ring to fight someone I had never seen before.”5

If the British felt miserable even in their uniforms, the guerrillas 

were far worse off. Their clothes were rags, and some lacked shoes. 

Their arms were a hodgepodge and ammunition was scarce. To the 

British, the young, shy, suspicious men under the Communist Aris 

seemed hardly trustworthy. Aris himself estimated that his men could 

fight for only 30 to 45 minutes; he did not think they would make 

another attempt if the attack that night should fail. The men under 

Zervas, although they seemed older and friendlier, were hardly better 

armed, and the British did not know how they would react to combat. 

Nevertheless, the guerrillas were the key to the entire operation: unless 

they neutralized the guard posts, the demolitions party would not even 

start to work.6

At 1800 hours on 25 November the final approach was begun. In 

place some hours later, the men waited for H-Hour at 2300, when the 

two guerrilla groups were to attack the Italian garrisons. A last train 

rumbled across the bridge, the mist cleared slightly, and a full moon 

gave sufficient light for the operations. Myers, waiting at an improvised 

headquarters, saw 2300 hours come and go; about 15 minutes later the 

assault began. Within a few minutes, however, the attack at the north 

end was failing. Myers, in desperate straits, had to throw in all guerrilla reserves. After an hour’s fighting, the south end of the bridge was 

in andarte hands, and word came that the north end too was falling. 

Because time was short, and the target pier was under the safe south 

guard post, Myers ordered the demolition party in.7

The party went to work immediately. It completed its work at the 

same time the fighting at the bridge guard posts ended. The signal to 
32

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

take cover was given, all firing ceased, the explosion occurred. A first 

look at the now-leaning bridge reassured both British and Greeks; nonetheless, the bridge was blown again to assure its demolition and make 

it harder to repair. Then the signal was given for a general withdrawal.a

At their mountain rendezvous the parties exchanged news and 

counted heads. The second explosion had twisted the already broken 

spans, but had failed to bring down the pier. Nonetheless, German use 

of the only railway from Europe through Greece would be halted for 

6 weeks to come. Of the enemy garrison, numbering perhaps 80 Italians, 20 to 30 were reported killed by the guerrillas. Myers himself had 

seen more than six Italian bodies. Within 24 hours Myers was able to 

account for every man who had taken part in the attack. None of the 

British party of 12 had even been hurt. No guerrilla had been killed, 

but a few were wounded.8

Myers now expressed his gratitude to both Zervas and Aris for the 

support they had provided: without the guerrilla attack the Gorgopotamos could not have been demolished. Since three of the British were 

scheduled to remain in Greece with Zervas, Myers sent a runner to 

Athens to ask that a supply drop of boots, clothing, arms, and whiskey 

be made to Zervas. Aris requested that he also be assigned a liaison 

officer and given a supply drop, but Myers had no authority to agree to 

this. Instead, he gave Aris 250 gold sovereigns.9

Myers and most of his party now considered their work in Greece 

finished and prepared to set out for their rendezvous with the submarine scheduled to evacuate them. Little did they think, as they began 

this long, cold march across occupied Greece to the western coast that 

their one-shot operation was really only the first of many operations 

to come.

Back in Cairo, however, the British, once they were informed of 

the success of the Gorgopotamos operation, were considering what further value the Greek guerrillas might have in support of Allied military 

strategy. A quick policy decision was therefore made—to keep Myers 

and his party in Greece in order to build up guerrilla strength and 

direct guerrilla operations behind the enemy lines.10 It was a decision 

that would give rise to many complications, both strategic and tactical, 

not only for the Greeks and the Germans in Greece, but for the British 

themselves. But before one can understand these complications, one 

must examine the setting of the Greek stage on which Myers and his 

party were to play their new roles.

a For a detailed discussion of the tactics of this operation see Chapter V.
The Greek Stage

33

War and Occupation

At the Outbreak of World War II

The generation of Greeks from among whom Myers had found civilian aid and succor and drawn his guerrilla attack parties had undergone a succession of difficulties in the period between the two world 

wars. A disastrous war with Turkey in the early 1920’s had brought an 

influx of more than a million extraterritorial Greeks into the country, 

creating problems of clothing, feeding, and assimilating the newcomers. This influx was accompanied by an exodus of non-Greeks. The 

net effect of the population exchange, however, was advantageous for 

Greece. It gave her an extremely homogeneous population, of whom 

96 percent spoke Greek and 97 percent were Eastern Orthodox. Ethnic 

minorities—the Jews, Turks, Chams, Vlachs, and Slavophone Greeks—

constituted less than five percent of the total population.11

This homogeneous population numbered approximately 7,300,000 

individuals—fewer than reside in New York City. It had a high birth rate 

and a high death rate. At the time of the last prewar census, in 1928, 

over 40 percent of the Greeks could neither read nor write. Even in 

1936–37, educational opportunities were rare beyond the elementary 

school years. The universities had fewer than 11,000 undergraduates.12

Greece’s people had to forge a living on 50,000 square miles of territory, more than half of which is mountainous, a quarter of which is 

forest or poor pasturage, and only a fifth of which is suitable for farming—upon which 60 percent of the population depended. Lacking 

adequate water and livestock, using primitive tools, and ignorant of 

modern methods of agriculture, the average Greek farmer strove to eke 

out his family’s living on a farm of twelve and a half acres or less, the 

size of almost 90 percent of the nation’s 953,000 prewar farms.13

Although most of the arable land was used for growing cereals, 

Greece was unable to support her own population, but was forced to 

import about 40 percent of her grain needs. Unfortunately, the crops 

for which Greece possessed ideal growing conditions—tobacco, currants, wine, olives, fruits—were those for which world demand was 

elastic; thus her position in the world market had been extremely vulnerable to the depression of the 1930’s.14

The situation with regard to manufacturing and industry was 

almost as bad. Although Greece had more industry than the other Balkan countries, she was able to meet only two-thirds of her own modest 

needs for manufactured goods. To redress the unfavorable economic 

balance, she depended on income from her merchant marine. Under 

these circumstances, it is not surprising that the general standard of 
34

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

living in Greece, by Western European or American standards, was very 

low at the outbreak of World War II.15

Politically, Greece had gone through a period of great instability in 

the interwar years. In 1935 the monarchy under George II had finally 

been restored; the following year the King acceded to a dictatorship 

under Gen. Ioannis Metaxas. The dictator suspended personal liberties 

when they interfered with his economic and political measures. Antiroyalists of all shades of opinion were repressed; many of them were 

interned in jails or sent into semi-exile on the Greek islands. Despite 

their inability to stand alone, the liberal and republican parties could 

find no common ground for cooperative effort during the Metaxas 

era. Only the Communists, disciplined and accustomed to operating 

illegally, were able to cope with the situation. The Party went underground, thus giving its members experience in clandestine activity that 

was later to stand them in good stead.16

These facts were to have their effect in the later period this study will 

consider. It was never possible for the Greek parties of the center to cooperate in forming a resistance nucleus. The Communists, on the other 

hand, were able to form a coalition of resistance parties. Partially, at 

least, this was the result of their clandestine experience, and the opportunity was enhanced by the inactivity of the middle-of-the-road groups.17

At the outbreak of World War II, Greece was a poor country, predominantly agricultural, with a large segment of her population uneducated, poverty-stricken, and living under primitive conditions. It was 

furthermore a land where political dictatorship had alienated a number of groups from the monarchy and had given practical experience 

in clandestine activity to the Communists.

The Greeks at War

In October 1940 Mussolini, in a unilateral decision, ordered the 

Italian armies in Albania to invade Greece, unless Metaxas would allow 

Italian troops to occupy strategic points in Greek territory. The Greek 

dictator was given three hours to reply. Surprisingly—because he was 

known to be pro-Axis—Metaxas, backed by the King, rejected the 

Italian ultimatum. Untrained and unready as they were, the Greeksb

immediately rallied to the call to arms, walking over the mountains 

b The role of the Greek Communist Party during this period apparently varied. A 

letter of 2 November 1940 by the imprisoned leader of the party, Nicholas Zakhariadhis, 

called for Communist support of the Metaxas government. According to Papandhreou, 

however, in a second letter of 15 January 1941 Zakhariadhis termed the war “fascist” and 

“colonial” and called for a separate truce under the mediation of the U.S.S.R. This was 

before German intervention in Greece or their attack on Russia. (George Papandhreou, 

The Liberation of Greece [3d ed., Athens: Greek Publishing Co., 1948], p. 17. In Greek.)
The Greek Stage

35

to the battlefields. By the end of the year the Italian Eleventh Army 

had been driven out of Greece and 30 miles back inside Albania. By 

February 1941, the Italian units were fighting for their very lives. For a 

number of reasons, particularly because of an inadequate supply system and the defensive point of view of the command staff, the Greek 

counteroffensive stalled in Albania.18

During this period of Greek victories, several events occurred that 

had a bearing on the later period of resistance. First, the popularity of 

King George II soared along with that of Metaxas. While Metaxas died 

in January 1941 at the height of his fame, George II was forced to flee 

the country in the spring of 1941, and the absent monarch’s popularity 

in Greece sharply declined during the occupation. Second, Metaxas 

refused to permit several hundred republican senior officers purged in 

the 1930’s to come back and fight for their country. This left a nucleus 

of trained men, latently antimonarchical, who were spoiling to prove 

their patriotism and accordingly were a ready-made cadre for a resistance movement. Third, since the Greek Army was equipped mainly 

with German-type weapons, the men of Greece had great familiarity 

with German arms, another factor which was to have its effect on the 

later guerrilla war.19

With the Greeks and Italians stalemated in Albania, Hitler decided 

in the spring of 1941 that he would have to intervene. In his plans for 

the coming offensive against Russia, Hitler regarded domination of the 

entire Balkan peninsula, including Greece and the Greek islands, as vital 

to the future security of the southern flank of the German armies. The 

Balkans also represented a supply route to the vital African theater; and 

they would provide Germany with airbases for the Mediterranean area. 

Those countries that did not voluntarily join the German side would 

therefore be forced into cooperation. By spring of 1941, German plans 

were ready. Yugoslavia and Greece were to be invaded immediately.20

As German intentions became obvious, the British decided they 

must buttress Balkan resistance and fulfill their treaty commitment to 

defend Greek territorial security. They increased the token force they 

had sent into Greece, even though to do so meant recalling troops 

from North Africa. But when, on 6 April 1941, the Germans attacked 

through the Balkans with 27 divisions, the situation was hopeless. Yugoslavia capitulated on 17 April and Greece on 23 April. The main force 

of the British troops, some Greek troops, and the Greek Government, 

including the King, withdrew to the Greek island of Crete. A number of 

British forces, however, and the 5th Cretan Division, which contained 

most of the island’s population of military age, could not be evacuated 

from the mainland.21
36

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Nonetheless, Crete was a formidable fortress for the Germans to 

assault, buttressed not only by the remnants of British forces from 

Greece but by a heavy contingent of British Dominion troops. On 

20 May the Germans attacked in great strength, using airborne troops. 

The fighting was fierce and lasted for 10 rather than the scheduled 4 

days. In addition to the regular forces, the Cretans themselves took 

up arms against the invader. Old men, boys, and even women, using 

their own rusty weapons and later picking up arms on the battlefield, 

engaged in direct combat with the German airborne troops. The “epic 

of Albania,” which that winter had fired the imagination and national 

pride of the mainland Greeks, was thus matched by the insular Cretans’ 

own heroic defense. Their sense of pride and personal fulfillment was 

swelled by the high price they made the enemy pay for Crete, for the 

striking power of the German airborne troops was definitely blunted 

in the attack. By the end of May 1941, however, Axis troops controlled 

both Greece and its islands.22

Start of the Occupation

To the Germans, control of defeated Greece was necessary, but, 

insofar as it required a commitment of German manpower, it was a 

liability. Every effort was therefore bent to minimize the cost of occupying Greece. The immediate problem of what to do with the defeated 

Greek Army was solved by paroling it on the battlefield—a gesture that 

appeared both psychologically and economically sound. By its generosity, the parole was designed to show German admiration for Greek 

valor and to establish rapport with the Greek people. At the same time, 

the parole obviated any need to shelter, clothe, or feed a large body of 

men who would have prisoner-of-war status.23

To minimize their troop commitment in the occupation of Greece, 

the Germans retained control only in areas in northeastern Greece 

either surrounding the key transportation point of Salonika or bordering Turkey; and in southern Greece adjacent to and including the key 

port of Piraeus. They also took over the occupation of most of Crete, 

which was important to them as a supply base for North Africa and for 

possible future operations in the Mediterranean.24

Much of the psychological value of these moves was offset, however, 

when, in the spring of 1941, the Germans divided the rest of Greece 

into three zones to be occupied by hereditary or beaten enemies. The 

hated Bulgarians on the northeast received two islands and a mainland 

area adjacent to their Greek boundary. The largest share of the occupied mainland area, various islands, eastern Crete, and the capital city 

of Athens went to the despised Italian Eleventh Army, which the Greeks 

had beaten the previous winter. To administer most of the Greek 

mainland, the Axis established a Greek puppet government. These 
The Greek Stage

37

arrangements lasted until the surrender of Italy in the fall of 1943, 

when the Bulgarian occupation was extended and German troops took 

over the majority of the Italian posts.25

Figure 2. Occupation Zones in Greece (1941–43).

The occupational policies followed by the victors were sufficiently 

rigorous to drive many Greeks to desperation. Bulgaria annexed her 

share of Greek territory, most of it farmland, and began a brutal policy 

of colonization; within a year 100,000 Greeks had been driven out of 

Western Thrace alone and those remaining were subject to decrees 

that amounted to extreme or even total economic deprivation. Italy 

looked towards annexation of the Ionian Islands. In Crete the Germans 
38

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

alienated any latent sympathy among the population by their food policy and by reprisals against the people for their participation in the 

battle of Crete.26

Figure 3. Some Victims of the Famine. Greek sources noted that the moral deterioration, which could not be photographed, was greater than the physical.

Economic conditions, bad as they had been for many before the 

war, rapidly deteriorated under the occupation. By May 1942 over half 

of Greece’s ocean-going cargo vessels had been lost; the rest were at 

the disposal of Allied powers and not producing income for occupied 

Greece. Industrial production was controlled by the Axis powers for the 

benefit of their own national and individual interests. They used Greek 

food, already scarce, to feed their own troops and civilian populations. 

Fiscal matters, complicated by occupation costs, were so handled by 

Axis and puppet authorities as to ruinously increase the galloping 

inflation. As more and more money went chasing after fewer and fewer 

products and less and less food, only the black market could operate. 

Its prices were beyond the reach of the average man. After two years of 

occupation, prices had climbed to a thousand times the prewar level. 

The wage level meanwhile was only a hundred times the prewar level; 

in addition there was considerable unemployment.27

This statistical expression of the difficulties faced by the Greek 

population, particularly those in urban areas, does not begin to convey conditions under the occupation. In the Athens-Piraeus area, as 
The Greek Stage

39

early as the winter of 1941–42, hunger and starvation were not unusual. 

About 500,000 persons depended on soup kitchens for their daily 

meals. The bread ration, normally 406 grams per day in peacetime, 

averaged between 84 and 137 grams that winter; on some days there 

was no bread to ration. The fuel supply gave out. Each morning the 

government collected in carts the corpses of those who had died on 

the streets the night before from cold and hunger. The young, the old, 

and the homeless veterans of the Albanian battlefields were the first 

to die. Some Greeks estimated that of every 10 children born during 

this time, only 1 lived more than a month. Even the Germans reported 

that infant mortality had risen from 6 to 50 percent. Those who did not 

starve faced the ravages of disease. Conditions were almost as bad in 

many of the smaller cities.28

First Greek Resistance

The conditions of Greek life in 1941 and early 1942 were conducive 

to a spirit of resistance. It had been hard for the Greeks, flushed with 

their first victories over the Italians, to accept defeat at the hands of the 

Germans. This was followed in turn by the greater humiliation of the 

occupation. The famine that assailed Athens and the nationwide hunger that began at the end of 1941 did nothing to foster better relations 

between the Greeks and their occupiers. Although Hitler himself had 

gone to pains to pay tribute to Greek heroism and to assure the Greeks 

that he respected their classical heritage, Axis food policies made it 

only too obvious that the victor was willing to see the Greeks starve.29

It was in the cities that conditions were the worst, and it was in the 

cities that resistance started. Its development was facilitated by the fact 

that the cities had always been centers of political awareness. Reaction 

to events there was traditionally swift and volatile.30

By the end of May 1941, while the Germans were still consolidating 

their victory in Crete, the people of Athens had already shown a disinclination to accept the occupation. The German High Command, in 

fact, published a notice that those Greeks found guilty of pulling down 

German flags, hoarding foodstuffs, or helping British soldiers would be 

shot. In Italian-occupied areas much the same sort of activity went on. 

By August the Italians were imposing severe penalties for those Greeks 

passing communist propaganda, wearing badges of enemy countries, 

listening to foreign broadcasts, or meeting on the streets in groups of 

more than two persons. Many civil servants refused to serve under the 

puppet government, and those who stayed on appear to have engaged 

in slowdowns.31
40

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Rumors and stories symbolic of resistance floated across Athens, 

probably untrue but symptomatic of Greek feelings. One such story 

concerned a Greek guard who, rather than replace the Greek flag with 

the Swastika, wrapped his flag around himself and jumped over the 

side of the Acropolis. The Greek press, of course, was Axis-controlled, 

but editors and printers often managed to overstate the Axis news to 

the point of ridicule or to print it carelessly while printing Allied news 

neatly. Illegal or stenciled news sheets were soon circulating in Athens, although the penalty for distributing them was death. Inscriptions 

appeared overnight on walls and pavements. “Zito R.A.F.” was one of the 

first. “AERA,” a famous Greek battle cry, came to mean, in resistance 

parlance: Anglia (England), Ellas (Greece), Rossia (Russia), Ameriki 

(the United States).32

Responding to the spirit of the people and the temper of the times, 

a number of resistance groups were organized beginning in the summer of 1941. These groups were originally small; they originated mostly 

in Athens; they all had political orientation and aspirations; many were 

influenced by the needs of a large unemployed officer corps; and only 

a few of them ever fielded forces of sufficient size to be accorded any 

stature as guerrilla groups.

Merely to give some idea of the number and variety of resistance 

groups started in Greece, a few of the organizations formed during 

the occupation are listed below: (1) the Committee of Six Colonels, 

(2) PEAN (the Patriotic Union of Fighting Youth), (3) RAN (whose initials stand for northern areas that Greek irredentists wished to add to 

their country), (4) “X,” (5) SAN (the League of Young Officers), (6) 

LAE, (7) EDEM, (8) AAA (the Liberation Struggle Command), (9) 

National Committee, (10) the Sacred Brigade, (11) Union of Enslaved 

Victors, (12) EOA (National Organization of Officers), (13) ES (the 

Greek Army), (14) EOK (National Organization of Cretans), (15) Athos 

Roumeliotis’ band (Roumeliotis standing for the area of Roumeli), (16) 

Andon Tsaous’ band, (17) YVE (Protectors of Northern Greece, later 

the PAO, Panhellenic Liberation Organization), (18) PEK (Panhellenic 

National Party).33

Some of these minor organizations, like the Committee of Six 

Colonels, never actually fielded guerrilla forces, but restricted themselves to intelligence activity. Some, like PEAN, died with their first 

overt act of sabotage, the destruction of the headquarters of the Greek 

Nazi Party in Athens. Some, like the Athos Roumeliotis band, were 

the work of an eccentric individual who took on the “functions of a 

medieval chieftain.” A number of the organizations, such as the Sacred 

Brigade (its name refers to the senior officers of the regular Army) 

or SAN, represented the wartime efforts of the Greek officer corps to 
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41

find a respectably non-Communist resistance activity to their liking. 

The “X” organization (pronounced “Khee” in Greek) contained many 

unemployed officers in Athens, but was unknown as a wartime resistance group. After the Germans left Athens, it acquired “the sinister 

significance of a Ku Klux Klan.” Two groups, Andon Tsaous’ band in 

Northeastern Greece and the EOK in Crete, are remarkable in that 

they survived the war intact, being eliminated by neither the Axis occupiers nor rival Communist-led bands.34

Of these minor groups that actually put guerrilla forces in the 

mountains, many were eliminated, not by the enemy but by attack from 

the larger, stronger Greek guerrilla bands fielded by the Communists. 

This happened to EOA and ES in the Peloponnesus, to AAA and Athos 

Roumeliotis’ band in Central Greece, and to PAO (originally YVE) in 

Macedonia, to name a few.

Major Resistance Parties

Extermination at the hands of the Communists was the eventual 

fate of the first sizable resistance group to be formed—EKKA, standing for National and Social Liberation, but it survived for nearly three 

years. EKKA was organized in July 1941. Its political views were those of 

the center; it opposed not only Communism but the Monarchy, which 

it associated with the Metaxas dictatorship.  EKKA did not field any 

guerrilla forces until March 1943, when Col. Dimitrios Psaros took to 

the mountains with British support. Psaros’ band was destroyed by the 

Communist guerrillas under Aris in the spring of 1944. Its most lasting achievement was not military but political: it left a rallying point in 

Athenian politics—the Eleftheria (Liberty) group—for a centrist point 

of view that existed long after EKKA itself had died.35

The second most powerful resistance group, one that survived both 

the war with the enemy and the war with its Communist rival, was also 

formed in 1941. EDES, the National Republican Greek League, was 

founded in Athens, with the dual aim of resisting the Axis occupiers 

and restoring a measure of republicanism in Greece after the war. During 1941 it appears to have been inactive in the field, but in 1942, having received promise of support from the British, it put guerrillas into 

the field under the leadership of Col. Napoleon Zervas. Three of the 

British party that demolished the Gorgopotamos Bridge were, from the 

very first, scheduled to stay with Zervas’ group. Zervas, of course, was 

instrumental in the British and Greek success at Gorgopotamos. He 

and the men of EDES formed one of the major contenders in the story 

of the Greek guerrillas.36

The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) was not far behind in its 

work of organizing a resistance group. Drawing on its experience in 
42

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

clandestine organization from the days of Metaxas, the KKE in September 1941 took the lead in forming a coalition of Communist and 

leftist parties called the National Liberation Front, to be known by its 

Greek initials as EAM. Of the parties that joined EAM, only two were 

really independent—the Socialist Party of Greece (SKE) and the Popular Democratic Union (ELD); the others were the KKE and two nominally independent but actually KKE-satellite parties.37

The aims of EAM were expressed in the broadest military and political terms—resistance to the occupiers, and government based on the 

people’s will as shown in free postwar elections. These aims, so generally stated, not only subsumed those of most other resistance groups 

but indeed came to express the will of most Greek people during World 

War II. The aims were universally acceptable: for such aims, all political parties could collaborate in a Popular Front movement, and all 

classes of people from workers to landowners could participate in the 

national struggle.38

It has been said that there was a Communist corollary for each of 

these broadly stated aims. For the aim of resistance to the occupiers, 

the Communist version was that EAM and its subsidiaries should be the 

only resistance; for the aim of “government based on the people’s will 

as shown in free postwar elections,” this government was to follow the 

pattern of social revolution, and Greece would be a Communist state in 

the postwar world.

If its aims were expressed in broad and beguiling generalities, EAM 

left no vagueness in the organization that it built to realize those aims. 

Taking advantage of the training and experience of its members, EAM 

devoted its first year of existence—most of 1942—to setting up or tying 

into EAM a series of subordinate agencies which would give EAM a 

voice in the total structure of Greek society. The most important agency 

of EAM was its Central Committee of 25 members, drawn from representatives of functional groups, urban centers, and rural community 

life. This was the supreme policy-making body of EAM and it was KKE- 

(i.e., Communist-) controlled. Each of the political parties comprising 

EAM held one seat on the EAM Central Committee; the others were to 

be held by functional urban and rural organizations.39

The most important urban organization of EAM was EEAM, the 

Workers’ National Liberation Front, which contained, even by the 

account of an unsympathetic observer, “all that was best of organized 

labor in Greece.”40 EEAM was entitled to nominate one of the 25 members on the EAM Central Committee. In addition to representation on 

the Central Committee through EEAM, the large cities of Greece were 

entitled to send one representative each to the Central Committee. 
The Greek Stage

43

These were chosen from a base of neighborhood and functional EAM 

organizations.41

EAM organized the rural life of Greece through another series of 

organizations operating on a local level—where necessary in an underground fashion, where possible openly. Sometimes EAM was represented in a village by only one man, often the schoolmaster. From this 

base, EAM set up in each village four groups: EA, for relief work; ETA, a 

commissariat and tax-collecting body; EPON, an organization of Greek 

youth; and a local EAM committee. A less attractive subsidiary, OPLA, 

performed the “functions of Gestapo and SS.” Although EAM in any 

village contained many non-Communist members, the local organizer 

was usually a Communist; and the secretary of the local EAM committee, or Ipefthinos, was almost always one. From among a group of village 

Ipefthinoi, the next highest official, a district representative, was chosen. 

From the district representatives, a prefectural representative was in 

turn chosen. Finally, from this last group was chosen a regional representative who sat, along with the functional and urban representatives, 

on the EAM Central Committee.42

It is thus obvious that the KKE worked to build an underground 

apparatus by which a small Communist minority, controlling the allimportant EAM Central Committee, could control EAM. In turn, EAM 

was to exert a dominating influence on both rural and urban life. 

According to independent estimates, from 500,000 to 700,000 Greeks 

participated in some form of EAM organization during the occupation; EAM estimated that, in late 1944 at the height of its strength, its 

enrollment reached 1,500,000.43

Although most of its efforts in 1941 and 1942 were devoted to organizing an apparatus for controlling Greece, EAM did foster civil disturbances in the cities. As a first measure it established a large number of 

underground printing presses, which flooded Greece with resistance 

literature. Through its affiliated labor organization, EEAM, which was 

strong in Athens, Piraeus, Salonika, and other industrial and commercial centers, EAM supported a number of strikes. Between October 

1941 and March 1942 a number of small-scale strikes and demonstrations occurred. In April 1942, the first EAM-supported strike on a large 

scale took place when the civil servants went out. They demanded an 

increase in pay and the organization of soup kitchens and other means 

of maintaining themselves under the stressful economic situation. The 

strike ended when the Greek puppet government agreed to meet the 

conditions. The government later reneged, however, and in September 

1942, a second large-scale strike was called. This time the puppet government did meet the conditions.44
44

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

By mid-1942 resistance had spread and taken a more serious form. 

In June there were frequent acts of sabotage, both on the mainland 

and on Crete. In August, the first German recruitment of workers to 

go to Germany netted fewer than 8,000 men, a small number under 

the circumstances.45

Guerrilla bands were now operating in the mountains. The EDES 

bands, under the leadership of Zervas, numbered several hundred men 

and were recruiting more. Under Aris there were a number of small 

bands, loosely affiliated with EAM. Aris himself was under EAM discipline. Both groups assisted Colonel Myers in the Gorgopotamos demolition, although Aris claimed to have done so in contravention of his 

standing orders “not to attack formed bodies of the enemy.” In December 1942, just after the success of Gorgopotamos, EAM took the step of 

forming its National Popular Liberation Army, usually designated by its 

Greek initials, ELAS.46 Hereafter, these inseparable components will be 

referred to as EAM/ELAS.

The Meaning of Gorgopotamos

By the time of Gorgopotamos, the spirit of resistance had taken 

overt guerrilla form; it was at the point where, with only a little encouragement, it would grow and expand. The success at Gorgopotamos was 

the catalyst for future growth. British support was to provide the necessary sustenance.

British support was peculiarly welcome in Greece. The traditional 

ties of friendship between the two countries had been strengthened by 

their common disaster in 1941. Growing Greek hatred for the occupiers nourished growing empathy for the British. One of the major signs 

of the spirit of the resistance during the period between the German 

defeat of the Greeks in April 1941 and Gorgopotamos in November 

1942, was the sympathy and aid that the Greeks gave to the British who 

had been left behind when the British Expeditionary Force pulled out. 

From the very first, people cheered British prisoners of war when they 

were marched through the streets. Those British who escaped capture 

were able to count on the Greeks to hide and feed them even during 

the worst days of the famine. Almost as soon as Myers dropped into 

Greece, he was joined by three British colonial soldiers who had been 

living on Greek hospitality since the spring of 1941. Recounting those 

hard days, one British officer reported, “I saw the famine in the winter 

of 1941, when people were dying in the streets of Athens, and ate grass 

and thistles myself; but everyone would share with me what he had; I 

had nothing but kindness from these people . . . .”47

The cumulative effect of these developments—the defeat of 1941, 

the occupation, the stirrings of resistance, the early guerrilla operations 
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45

culminating in Gorgopotamos, and finally the British decision to continue support of the guerrillas—brought about a radical change in 

Greece’s war role. Passive resistance and minor sabotage gave way to 

full-scale guerrilla warfare in the mountains, which continued for two 

years. This in turn had tremendous impact, not only on such tactical 

problems as organization and logistics for guerrilla warfare but also on 

the strategic situation of Greece during and after the war. This study 

will consider each of these major areas; it will review first the greatest, 

the most complex, the all-pervasive problem—the strategy and politics 

of the guerrilla war in Greece.

CHAPTER II. 

STRATEGY AND POLITICS IN 

 GUERRILLA WARFARE

INTRODUCTION

GAINING GUERRILLA COOPERATION

POLITICS AND DISILLUSIONMENT

GUERRILLAS FIGHT GUERRILLAS

NEW COMMUNIST MOVES FOR CONTROL

INDIAN SUMMER AND THE DECEMBER WAR

STRATEGIC RECAPITULATION

Strategy and Politics

49

STRATEGY AND POLITICS IN 

GUERRILLA WARFARE

Introduction

In November 1942, when Myers’ party destroyed the Gorgopotamos 

Bridge, Greece was playing a not inconsiderable strategic role. It represented a major supply and staging area for its occupiers and a possible 

target for a future landing by the Allies.

During 1943, the Mediterranean was the major Allied theater of the 

war in Europe, and Greece’s importance rose and declined as the year 

wore on. By the end of May, Greece was no longer so important to the 

Germans as a supply route, since Rommel had by then been defeated 

in North Africa. On the other hand, throughout 1943, the Germans 

anticipated Allied landings in the Balkans, particularly Greece. After 

the Allies captured Sicily in July, thereby obtaining an airbase to cover 

a Mediterranean landing, the Germans rushed troops into Greece to 

meet any invasion threat. However, an insufficiency of landing craft, 

as well as other factors, precluded major Allied landings in more than 

one area of the Mediterranean throughout 1943, and the choice fell on 

Italy, not Greece. At the end of 1943, still plagued by lack of landing 

craft, the Allies agreed that, except for the already planned landing at 

Anzio, Italy, there would be no additional large scale forays into the 

Mediterranean or Balkans—that all resources would go into the landings planned for France.1

The Germans, however, did not know or immediately deduce these 

Allied decisions. The German Commander of the Southeast Theater, 

which included Greece, continued to have the dual mission of defending the coast against a possible landing and of securing the occupied 

area. Control of Greece was important to the Germans not only as a still 

vital link in the defense of the Balkans, but as a means of maintaining 

pressure on Turkey. After D-Day in Northern France on 6 June 1944, 

however, it became clear enough that the Germans in Greece were in 

a backwater. Since they faced no Allied landing attempt, their major 

problem was to secure their lines of withdrawal from their outposts on 

Crete, the other Greek islands, and southern Greece. As for the Allies, 

Greece had become unimportant in their military strategy even earlier, 

by the end of 1943; in 1944 it was simply an area from which the Germans would retire in due course.

This decline in Greece’s military importance was offset by a growing British realization that the country would play an important role in 

post-war political strategy. Great Britain could not afford to have Greece 

fall into the Communist orbit. Yet the strongest guerrilla groups were 
50

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

those backed by the Communist party, and there appeared to be a very 

real possibility that they would be able to seize control of the country at 

the very moment of its liberation.

The British commitment of special forces to work with the guerrillas therefore took on major political significance. As it developed, 

the Communists’ determination to take over postwar control became 

increasingly evident. To this end they used both political infiltration 

and military aggression, simultaneously or alternatively. In the process, 

they involved the entire guerrilla movement, both Communist and 

non-Communist, and the Allied officers and men who worked with 

the guerrillas.

This section of the study reviews the strategic phases of the guerrilla war in Greece in both its military and its political aspects. It was 

a war of wits. It was a war where the key policy decisions were made by 

Prime Minister Winston Churchill, of Great Britain, and by George 

Siantos,a

 who headed the Greek Communist party (KKE) during World 

War II. It was the war of Brigadier E. C. W. Myers, head of the British 

Military Mission; of Maj. (later Lt. Col. and Col.) Christopher Woodhouse, second-in-command who later replaced Myers; of Maj. G. K. 

Wines, the American officer who backed up Woodhouse when the Mission became Allied; of Napoleon Zervas, military leader of the nationalistic guerrillas of EDES; of Stephanos Saraphis, the non-Communist 

who became the military commander in chief of the Communist EAM/

ELAS guerrillas.

This story of political maneuvering, so far from the military ken, 

came to be the all-engrossing work of the Allied soldiers who dropped 

into Greece in the fall of 1942 for that “one-shot” operation, the Gorgopotamos—and for those men who followed them. Myers, for example, 

in August 1942 a Major in the regular British Army ready for home 

leave, an engineer by training, with no knowledge of the Greek language and little understanding of Greece, was to be catapulted within 

the year to a pre-eminent position on the Greek stage. It was Myers who 

would tell King George II that he could not safely return to his own 

country.2 The fact was that the guerrillas’ operations had both military 

and political purposes and results; and the Allied men who dealt with 

the guerrillas had to deal with political as well as military strategy.

For purposes of clarity, this strategic review has been divided into 

five phases.

a Siantos was deputizing for Nicholas Zakhariadhis, Secretary General of the KKE, 

who was in a German concentration camp and did not return to Greece until after World 

War II, when he resumed control of the KKE. (Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 65, 

114–15.)
Strategy and Politics

51

The first, extending from Gorgopotamos in November 1942 to 

ANIMALS, the large-scale sabotage operation devised to cover the 

Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943, was a period in which the British 

were beginning to assess correctly the political complications of the 

guerrilla movement and the difficulties of controlling it strategically. 

It was a time, however, when the military value of guerrillas remained 

foremost. They were making distinct military contributions to Allied 

strategy in the Mediterranean Theater. It was therefore a time when 

the major problem was to secure guerrilla cooperation.

The second phase, from August through September of 1943, was 

marked by the political disillusionment or disappointment of all parties 

concerned with guerrilla warfare in Greece. The third phase ended all 

hope of amalgamating the guerrilla effort. Internecine guerrilla war 

had broken out and EAM/ELAS was earnestly seeking to eliminate all 

non-communist guerrilla bands. This phase came to an end with the 

Plaka Armistice of February 1944. The fourth phase, from February to 

August 1944, was characterized by a restless, insistent attempt by the 

communists, through political infiltration and military action, to consolidate their gains.

The fifth phase, the final one in which this study has a legitimate 

interest, began in August 1944. It started with an era of good feeling, 

the German retreat, and the orderly takeover of the Athens area by 

British Expeditionary Forces. By November the last of the Germans had 

departed, soon to be followed by the Allied Military Mission. They left 

Greece, it must be said, not in communist but in British hands. Then a 

postlude, one more communist try, their military defeat by the British, 

and an armistice. The communist guerrilla army was disbanded and 

war ended, for a while, in Greece.

These were the problems that Myers and his party so unknowingly 

were to face after they had demolished the Gorgopotamos Bridge.

Gaining Guerrilla Cooperation

(November 1942–July 1943)

With the destruction of the Gorgopotamos Bridge, it will be 

recalled, Colonel Myers felt that his party’s task in Greece had been 

completed. Following orders, they set out for their coastal rendezvous 

with the British submarine that was to take them out of Greece—all 

except the three men detailed to remain with Zervas.

Before the party reached the coast, however, British headquarters 

for special operations in Cairo, Special Operations Executive (SOE) 

had rapidly reappraised the situation in the light of the success of 
52

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Gorgopotamos. SOE Cairo cancelled the evacuation; the mission was 

to stay in Greece. Myers was to head it, with the rank of brigadier. The 

other officers under him would become British liaison officers (BLO’s) 

to guerrilla bands. Some additional officers would be dropped into 

Greece. Guerrilla forces were to be expanded and centralized, if possible, under the control of Myers and a royalist group in Athens known 

as the Six Colonels, to whom Myers’ second in command, Maj. Christopher Woodhouse was to be sent to make arrangements. An officer 

bearing specific instructions for implementing this change of policy 

would be dropped.3

These orders were delivered to Woodhouse, who had remained 

behind with Zervas. He sent a runner after Myers, who when found, was 

anxiously waiting at the coast for the submarine. On 3 January 1943, 

the British party reassembled after an extremely difficult and exhausting month of marching. They immediately established a headquarters, 

and Woodhouse set out to meet the Six Colonels in Athens.4

First, however, Myers reviewed with Woodhouse the situation as 

they then knew it. While waiting for Myers’ return, Woodhouse had 

discovered that relations between Aris’ and Zervas’ groups were not 

the best. Aris thought that the entire mission, rather than Woodhouse 

alone, had remained with Zervas and resented the situation. He also 

resented the fact that Zervas had received British supplies by airdrop. 

Aris, in fact, had sent Zervas threatening letters and invaded his territory. A conference of all parties, arranged by Woodhouse at the end of 

December 1942, ended with an agreement between the two guerrilla 

groups not to fight each other, but no arrangements were possible at 

that time to coordinate their efforts against the enemy.5

Coordination of the guerrillas looked difficult not only because of 

the mutual antipathy of Aris and Zervas, but also because of the political affiliations and background of the two groups. Aris was an avowed 

Communist with political backing from EAM, nominally a coalition of 

left-of-center parties presenting a united front against the occupiers 

of Greece. The guerrilla arm of EAM, of which the Aris-led guerrillas were the earliest band, was ELAS. Zervas assured both Woodhouse 

and Myers that EAM was Communist-dominated. EAM, said Zervas, 

had asked him to be commander in chief of ELAS, but he had refused. 

The guerrillas Zervas headed were backed politically by a group in Athens known as EDES, which was non-Communist and republican. There 

were no royalist guerrillas in the mountains. At the beginning of 1943, 

Aris and Zervas were in agreement on one point only: neither wanted 

the return of the monarch at the end of the war.6

Myers, with Woodhouse’s help, radioed his headquarters on 13 January 1943, acknowledging the SOE change in policy and accepting 
Strategy and Politics

53

his new responsibilities. In this message he pointed out some of the 

political difficulties in obtaining military cooperation between the two 

guerrilla bands and the possibility of an EAM/ELAS coup d’etat under 

certain conditions. In order to secure cooperation and avoid a future 

civil war, he suggested that guarantees of a free plebiscite on the question of the monarchy at the war’s end would be helpful. Finally, he 

asked for specific military targets.7

Myers was already convinced that he would have to make use of 

EAM/ELAS to attain military results of any value, for they controlled 

the area where sabotage targets existed. Using EAM/ELAS, however, 

raised problems, because, if Myers adhered to his orders to get a centralized guerrilla movement, it would mean the dominance of the 

strongest element. This meant the Communist-backed EAM/ELAS. 

And one could hardly expect Communists to accept control by six royalist colonels.8

It was imperative, under any conditions, to find some way to coordinate and control the resistance movement. Myers was bound by SOE’s 

instructions to pursue its idea of using the Six Colonels as a controlling 

body; should this plan fail, as it was likely to, he was on his own to find 

other means.

National Bands

While Woodhouse was on his trip to Athens to meet with the Six 

Colonels, Myers struck upon an alternative to the SOE plan for centralized control of the guerrilla movements. On 4 February 1943 he met 

Col. Stephanos Saraphis, who had recently left Athens to organize a 

third band of guerrillas in the mountains, and who was seeking British support. Saraphis represented another non-Communist, non-royalist political group. In conversations with him, Myers voiced his worry 

about the multiplication of bands of varying political coloration. Saraphis agreed and suggested that “purely national bands” could be unified under Gen. Nicholas Plastiras, a republican leader then in France. 

Myers was “immediately struck” by the idea. He discussed it with both 

Saraphis and Zervas, who agreed that SOE should be asked to give support to all such nonpolitical bands as their own. When the National 

Bands became sufficiently strong, ELAS would be invited to join them.9

Myers was pleased that the plan would also provide a ready-made 

place for Colonel Psaros, who was just getting ready to take the field 

as the military representative of EKKA, yet another political group 

of republican leanings, whose guerrillas the British were agreeing 

to support.10

On 8 February 1943, Myers wired Cairo concerning his National 

Bands plan. Three days later, Cairo gave its approval, except for the 
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

idea of a leader “too politically trained as a Republican.” SOE wanted 

the organization to have national aims and to act “under military 

orders, in conjunction with other forces in the Middle East.” With this, 

Myers entirely agreed.11

When Woodhouse returned from Athens on 20 February, Myers 

found that their early conclusions concerning Greek politics and their 

doubts about the Six Colonels as a control group were well founded. 

According to Myers, Woodhouse reported that the Six Colonels— 

.  .  .  knew little about the resistance movements 

and . . . had few practical ideas about directing them. 

They appeared to have little conception of guerrilla 

life in the mountains . . . they disliked what they called 

the “pin-pricks” of Zervas and Aris, in spite of the fact 

that they themselves had contributed nothing to the 

andarte movements.12

In Athens, Woodhouse had also met five members of EAM’s Central 

Committee, two of whom were high-ranking members of the Greek 

Communist party. They were very willing to cooperate with the Middle 

East Command, but showed clearly their desire to control all resistance 

groups in Greece.13

The lines of future controversy on at least one plane were now fairly 

apparent: EAM/ELAS was seeking hegemony over the resistance; and 

Myers, representing British policy, was trying to substitute for this a 

federation of National Bands operating on a basis of equality under the 

orders of the Middle East Command.

Before Myers could do much to implement the National Bands 

idea, EAM/ELAS made its first bid for complete power. During the 

spring of 1943, ELAS bands captured Saraphis by a ruse and dispersed 

his band; threats were made to Zervas, and some EDES bands were 

disarmed; somewhat later, an ultimatum was given Psaros, who on 

the same day was taken prisoner and whose band was scattered; other 

minor bands were eliminated. Although EAM/ELAS had previously 

showed little interest in the Peloponnesus, it started organizing there 

in earnest as soon as the British began to pay attention to that area. 

The method of operation routinely included liquidation or absorption 

of rival guerrilla bands. In many cases, EAM/ELAS units elsewhere 

imposed a reign of terror over local inhabitants and recruited by force. 

One EAM paper stated that “anyone not joining EAM [not necessarily 

ELAS] would be regarded as a traitor to Greece”; but obviously, anyone 

joining EAM could hardly join any guerrilla group except EAM’s own 

army of ELAS.14
Strategy and Politics

55

Aware by the end of March 1943 not only of the aims but of the 

methods of EAM/ELAS, Myers nevertheless had to maintain relations 

with it. For one thing, SOE Cairo was receiving glowing accounts of 

the military prowess and nonpolitical nature of EAM/ELAS from Lt. 

Col. Rufus Sheppard, the British officer who had been parachuted to 

that group. Sheppard was not under Brigadier Myers’ direct command 

at that time, and had the only other functioning radio contact with 

Cairo.b

 With this conflicting testimony at hand as to the “true nature” 

of EAM/ELAS, and with the complete agreement of all parties as to the 

necessity for using that organization in any military operations against 

the Germans, SOE Cairo instructed Myers not to break off contact.15

Had he summarily broken off relations with EAM/ELAS, Myers 

would not only have disobeyed orders but would have lost touch with 

the area in which major guerrilla targets existed. The only railway line 

connecting Athens with the rest of Europe ran along the eastern coast 

of Greece, and it was in this very part of Greece that EAM/ELAS was 

effectively entrenched and would allow no other band to enter. Myers’ 

position was made more difficult by the fact that, on 21 February, 

he had received instructions to organize, train, and equip andartes 

throughout Greece and to prepare sabotage plans, using the guerrillas in various military eventualities. Given the two almost irreconcilable facts—the challenge EAM/ELAS was posing to British postwar 

political considerations and the need to use EAM/ELAS to accomplish 

immediate military ends—Myers felt there were only two alternatives: 

to stop using ELAS and reduce sabotage targets by about four-fifths, 

or to “try and keep ELAS under some sort of control, with a measure 

of allegiance by them to the Middle East Command.” He preferred 

the latter course: “Rightly or wrongly, I considered that our maximum 

contribution towards the war effort was of primary importance. . . .”16

Myers therefore devoted his energies in the spring of 1943 to coping 

with events as they arose and to bringing EAM/ELAS under control. 

He embarked in March on a series of journeys to visit various of the 

10 British liaison teams then operating in Greece. He wanted to coordinate their local sabotage plans, to tighten his relations with the now 

expanding British mission, to meet some new officers, and to check on 

general conditions. He also visited guerrilla groups, particularly EAM/

b Even after Sheppard was placed under Myers’ command, he continued to laud 

EAM/ELAS. SOE Cairo sent Myers repeats of Sheppard’s telegrams, and, to the disgust 

of Myers, “almost insinuated that I had got hold of the wrong end of the stick.” Myers 

did not backtrack: he replied that he thought Sheppard “was having dust thrown in his 

eyes.” Sheppard apparently never changed his opinion of EAM/ELAS. He was one of the 

few BLO’s killed in Greece in the December 1944 war, by a mine placed by EAM/ELAS. 

(Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 127, 282; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 38–39.)
56

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

ELAS, in order to aid rival guerrilla leaders captured by that organization and to pursue the National Bands idea.17

In his effort to save captured leaders, Myers had limited success. 

He put forth great effort to save Saraphis’ life, for example, only to 

find that that gentleman had decided in captivity to join EAM/ELAS. 

Myers was “dumbfounded.” He was “even further taken aback” to find 

that Saraphis had been offered and had accepted the post of military 

commander in chief. Psaros and some others were, however, eventually 

freed to resume their own guerrilla activities in a diminished form.18

Myers was also stumped in his effort to have the National Bands 

idea agreed upon. Known in its documented form as “The First Military Agreement of the Greek Resistance Forces with the Middle East,” 

it provided for the division of Greece into guerrilla areas, in each of 

which there would be a military commander to be recognized both 

by Brigadier Myers (representing the Middle East Command) and by 

the Greeks. All bands would cooperate under the area commander. 

Bands in one area would respect the territory of other bands and assist 

each other. Furthermore, bands would be nonpolitical, and enlistment 

would be voluntary. Zervas, who by this time had declared his band 

nonpolitical and had, at Woodhouse’s direct request, sent a message of 

loyalty to the King, signed the First Military Agreement immediately, 

in March. In an ironic twist, Saraphis, originator of the idea, now supported the EAM/ELAS position. By a runaround technique, EAM/

ELAS stalled for time. First Myers could find no one to disagree with 

the agreement but could find no one with authority to sign it. Then, 

when persons with authority to sign appeared, they could not agree 

with certain provisions of the document.19

It was not until May that Myers was told the specific EAM/ELAS 

position. The two major points were rejection of British influence 

over its commands and a demand that the National Bands have a joint 

general headquarters, in which EAM/ELAS would hold three of five 

seats. “EAM and their inseparable army, ELAS,” wrote Myers, “would 

be pleased to accept general instructions from the Middle East Command (MEC); but the method of their execution and the selection of 

targets for attack must he left to the discretion and decision of the new 

ELAS GHQ.”20

Myers now wanted to get an agreement without further delay. He 

knew that he needed the help of EAM/ELAS; he thought that any concessions would be short-lived, as Greece would surely soon be liberated 

by Allied forces; and finally, he felt he held a trump card in his control 

of airdropped supplies. He therefore recommended that SOE empower 

him to sign the amended version.21
Strategy and Politics

57

At the beginning of June 1943, however, Myers faced an impasse: 

SOE definitely ordered him not to sign the EAM/ELAS version of the 

National Bands Agreement, and EAM/ELAS would not sign his version. 

To complicate matters, he had already been given, on 29 May, the date 

of the forthcoming Allied invasion of Sicily and had been instructed to 

begin widespread sabotage throughout Greece toward the end of June, 

in order to make the Germans think that Greece rather than Sicily 

was to be the invasion target. Without an agreement with EAM/ELAS, 

however, Myers could not even begin to control its activities in the now 

all-important areas where the main north-south communications ran.22

The time factor was crucial. Myers therefore arranged to meet with 

Aris, Saraphis, and Tzimas, the three top men on GHQ ELAS;c

 and 

with Zervas and his second in command Pyromaglou, of EDES. After 

two lengthy meetings on 4 and 5 June, in which Myers found Zervas 

“obstreperous” and GHQ ELAS “obstinate,” he admitted failure. The 

conference ended.23

Myers was stopped and now asked SOE for further instructions. 

Nevertheless, he determined to get the maximum sabotage possible. 

He therefore went directly to ELAS headquarters and had an “earnest 

conversation” with Saraphis, pointing out that unless some agreement 

was signed MEC would probably not continue supplying ELAS. On the 

other hand, Myers said, it had been his intent to allocate to ELAS areas 

over two-thirds of the supplies dropped in the next 70 sorties. This 

argument apparently was persuasive, for that same day, 14 June 1943, 

Saraphis signed a document saying that ELAS bands would obey all 

MEC orders issued them through GHQ ELAS. Three days later, SOE 

gave Myers a free hand “to get the best possible terms of ELAS” to 

ensure their cooperation with other guerrilla groups operating for 

MEC. After another period of waiting, EAM/ELAS finally on 5 July 

signed the amended version of the National Bands Agreement offered 

by Myers.24

The final Agreementd represented a compromise, mostly on the 

part of Myers. The two major points of contention—the position of the 

BLO’s and the Joint General Headquarters—were covered by sections 

11 and 12. A Joint General Headquarters (JGHQ) was to be formed, 

composed of representatives of all those guerrilla bands either “recognized throughout Greece or occupying large areas” and of a representative of the Middle East Command (Myers, at that time). Smaller 

areas and districts were to have similar joint headquarters. Section 12 

provided that “the role of the British officers attached to Joint HQ’s 

c See Chapter IV for organization of ELAS.

d See Appendix A.
58

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

shall be that of liaison officers to Middle East.” Under pressure from 

the British and disliking the JGHQ, in which ELAS would have three 

representatives to his one, Zervas reluctantly signed the Agreement 

for EDES. Psaros of EKKA was allowed to sign it, at Brigadier Myers’ 

instance, on 20 July, making the representation of non-ELAS to ELAS 

on JGHQ three to three. Thus the guerrillas of Greece became recognized forces of the Middle East Command.25

By this time, however, the major need for the agreement was past: 

the sabotage cover plan, code named ANIMALS, was almost finished.

Operation ANIMALS

From its brilliant opening with the destruction of the important 

Asopos railway bridge on 21 June 1943 to the order to cease sabotage 

given by MEC on 11 July, the sabotage cover operation remained a sustained endeavor on the part of British and Greeks alike. Its purposes 

were to cover the Allied invasion of Sicily by deceiving the enemy as 

to Allied intent, to draw off enemy troops into Greece, and to keep 

them from leaving Greece promptly. In some measure, it did all of 

these things.

The destruction of the Asopos viaduct was probably the single most 

spectacular exploit of its kind in World War II. Asopos was the sister 

of the Gorgopotamos viaduct, carrying the same rail line. Its destruction was planned by Myers almost as soon as he heard that the Gorgopotamos had been repaired and reopened in early 1943, but Asopos 

presented even greater problems. “There were only three practicable 

approaches, two of them being through the tunnels,” wrote Myers. 

“The third was from below the bridge, from the east, where the gorge 

opened out into a wide valley. From all other directions the faces of 

the gorge were too steep for any man or beast.” Furthermore, German 

troops had taken over sentry duty on the bridge.26

Myers originally planned to use ELAS guerrillas for an assault 

through the tunnel. EAM/ELAS, however, refused to participate, 

because of possible enemy retaliation and the guerrilla losses that 

might ensue. Saraphis claimed the Asopos operation could have “no 

hope of success unless at least 1,500 men were used, with artillery and 

machine guns . . . .” Six British officers and men therefore undertook 

the job alone, making their attack through the gorge. On the night of 

20–21 June they demolishede

 the bridge.27

It took the Germans, using Polish and Greek labor, 2 months to 

make repairs. The first engine to go across the repaired Asopos viaduct fell into the gorge, however, when a pier collapsed, either through 

e For a discussion of the tactical aspects of this operation, see Chapter V.
Strategy and Politics

59

sabotage or faulty workmanship, and 2 more months were required 

to get the Asopos in working order. Myers could truthfully brag, “The 

operation had thus caused the main line to Athens to be cut for over 

four months.”28

The Asopos operation was, by timing, the opening shot of the Greek 

sabotage operations designed to divert German attention from Sicily. 

Throughout Greece, telephone communications were cut, and widespread interdiction of transportation facilities was generally achieved. 

Myers reported 44 major cuts, at least 16 of which were on the vital 

railway lines. A number of minor bridges were blown.29

In these operations, both ELAS and EDES bands did their share and 

separately cooperated with British Liaison Officers. One ELAS band 

ambushed an enemy motorized column on the road through Sarandaporou Pass and held the road against counterattack for 2 weeks; two 

German battalions, with supporting artillery, were finally required to 

reopen it. EDES bands in Valtos, under an outstanding leader, were 

extremely successful in attacks on enemy personnel; in straightforward 

fighting they accounted, according to Myers, “for more enemy killed in 

action” than any other bands during the period of ANIMALS.30

On 30 June, 10 days before Sicily was attacked, the three Service 

Commanders in Chief in the Middle East acknowledged the effect of 

guerrilla and British sabotage in Greece in dislocating enemy supply 

and troop movements in the Balkans.31 Prime Minister Churchill later 

claimed that two German divisions “were moved into Greece which 

might have been used in Sicily.”32 Enemy soldiers captured by Greek 

guerrillas reported that internal travel in Greece was much disrupted. 

One enemy unit had taken 17 days to reach southwestern Epirus from 

Athens, a distance of approximately 170 miles. Distances usually requiring 3 days to travel by divisional convoy were now reported to take 11. 

General Wilson of MEC congratulated the guerrilla army of Greece. 

“The Axis was misled and presumed on an attack in the Balkans. The 

reinforcements in men and aircraft intended for Italy were occupied 

in the Balkans. Their attention was turned towards Greece and a large 

convoy passed unmolested into the Mediterranean.”33

These sabotage operations were sparked by the 30-odd British Liaison Officers under Myers, operating in conjunction with the Greek 

guerrillas. Of these, only the EAM/ELAS and EDES bands were of an 

important size. Myers estimated that, at that time, ELAS had 16,000 

guerrillas in arms, with another 16,000 armed men in the village 

reserves. Zervas had 5,000 armed men in the EDES bands and another 

5,000 village reservists. EKKA guerrillas under Psaros numbered only 

several hundred; their top strength of 1,000 men was not reached until 
60

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

August 1943,34 well after the end of the sabotage operations.f Myers has 

reported that he was often asked how many guerrillas actually participated in these operations; his report put the number at a tenth of those 

in the mountains. Other estimates have put the number as low as 1,000, 

leading some to question the wisdom of arming so many men. To Myers 

the answer was simple—it was necessary, not because all the guerrillas 

set the demolition charges, but because they secured the areag in which 

these things took place:

Indirectly, practically every andarte band of ELAS, 

EDES and EKKA had contributed towards them [the 

sabotage operations of June–July 1943]: for, even in 

districts where they did not actually carry out the 

destruction of telephone lines, bridges, enemy convoys or trains, the fact that they were in the district 

afforded the essential freedom of movement and security to British officers and small parties of picked andartes engaged upon tricky sabotage work.35

In addition, Myers felt that civilian morale would never sustain the 

cost in reprisals for these operations if local resistance forces were not 

actively operating. And loss of morale would, he felt, mean betrayal of 

all guerrilla activity.

The summer of 1943 thus opened auspiciously. Both British liaison teams and Greek guerrillas had contributed to the Allied victory 

in Sicily. Throughout Greece the belief spread that Allied liberation 

of Greece was imminent. Among the guerrilla groups themselves, a 

new spirit of cooperation seemed possible. Myers had the satisfaction of 

hearing a Communist member of the General Headquarters of EAM/ 

ELAS publicly state that EAM’s “past intolerance of other Resistance 

Movements had been wrong and that now they must all cooperate.”36 It 

was a good omen, but not an accurate one.

Politics and Disillusionment

(August–September 1943)

“In the maintenance of military control over the various Resistance 

Movements, in particular over ELAS,” Myers was to write after the war, 

“political problems were the greatest ones which faced me.”37 Even 

before the sabotage cover plan had been initiated, Myers had had to 

f Saraphis estimated guerrilla strength in June 1943 as follows: ELAS, 12,500; EDES, 

500; and EKKA, 200. (Greek Resistance Army, p. 67.)

g On this point, Woodhouse shared Myers’ belief. (Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, 

p. 142.)
Strategy and Politics

61

meet situations and make decisions with far-reaching political implications. In the months following, he was confronted with some of the 

most difficult political problems ever to face a military commander.

The success of the sabotage cover plan was followed immediately, in 

July 1943, by new SOE Cairo instructions to Myers. All guerrilla groups 

were to lie low for the time being and limit their activities to the training 

of recruits and reconnaissance of future sabotage targets. Only minor 

sabotage in support of training and morale was sanctioned. At this 

time, however, Greeks and even the British liaison officers expected an 

Allied invasion of Greece at almost any moment. When Brigadier Myers 

discovered that it was not now foreseen “before the winter of 1943; possibly early 1944,” he became gravely concerned.38

In a country where the internal balance of the resistance movement 

could only be maintained by careful management, enforced inactivity 

meant major problems. Maintaining and feeding both guerrillas and 

the civil populations of guerrilla territories through the coming winter 

would be difficult, for the Germans planned to take over all crops at 

harvest time and allot food only to districts that were entirely peaceable. 

There was also the prospect that, should the expected Italian capitulation take place, idle guerrilla bands would enforce the surrender of the 

Italian units in Greece, and thus acquire a windfall of both light arms 

and divisional artillery. The bands that gained these arms would have 

clear superiority in firepower over any other guerrilla group. If these 

arms fell to bands other than EAM/ELAS, they might well be used to 

redress the score of the spring fighting; even without such firepower, 

EDES units often provoked EAM/ELAS units into acts of aggression. 

If the arms fell to EAM/ELAS, as was more likely to be the case, Myers 

would be left without his supply “stick.” With a clear superiority in arms 

over other bands, EAM/ELAS might well resume the effort to eliminate all rivals. Myers also worried that civilian morale might not sustain 

prolonged guerrilla inactivity, in which case the guerrillas would lose 

their support base. Finally, and not without reason, Myers feared that 

EAM/ELAS would take this opportunity to turn more and more to 

political endeavor.39

Politics came almost too easily, Myers thought, to Greeks. It was hard 

to find a Greek military man who was not also a politician. Whereas the 

rank and file of every andarte organization seemed much the same, 

whether they were ELAS, EDES, or EKKA guerrillas, the leaders each 

represented a limited segment of the political spectrum, and they dealt 

daily with both political and civil matters. EAM/ELAS wanted complete control of the movement, but the issue of Communism represented in EAM/ELAS was repugnant to the other guerrilla leaders. 

Zervas himself argued with Myers in July 1943 that British support of 
62

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

EAM/ELAS would lead to civil war later in Greece. At about this time, 

however, Zervas began accepting into his group, officers tinged with 

collaborationist activity, thus making himself vulnerable to political 

recriminations. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1943, EAM/ELAS was 

already considering setting up a civil government for the mountain 

areas it controlled.40

The political question was intensified by the matter of prestige. 

Because the National Bands Agreement set up a Joint General Headquarters (JGHQ) on which EAM/ELAS held three seats and EDES and 

EKKA only one each, Zervas and Psaros rarely appeared themselves 

but sent deputies. Zervas paid a visit to JGHQ on 27 July, but only in 

response to Myers’ direct request. Since EAM/ELAS was represented 

on JGHQ by the three officers forming its own General Headquarters, these men had the prestige of principals as against deputies. The 

result was that JGHQ of the National Bands began to sound very like 

GHQ ELAS.41

Feeling that he had too little guidance from headquarters in this 

politically charged atmosphere, Myers requested that he be allowed 

to return to Cairo for briefing and instructions. Meanwhile he called 

in all senior liaison officers for a conference, held from 18 to 20 July, 

at which he congratulated them on their past performance, outlined 

the instructions he had received from the Middle East Command, and 

“explained the internal political problems as I saw them and the general 

methods by which I wanted them kept under control.” In particular, he 

detailed the need for the British to obtain the surrender of Italian units 

and to keep Italian arms from falling to guerrillas.42

The problems of control were nonetheless increasing, as was evidenced a week later. A pan-Thessaly conference arranged by EAM/

ELAS, at which over 3,000 people simply converged on a small town for 

two days, gave a visible demonstration of EAM/ELAS control over territory, its organizational ability, and the value it placed on propaganda. 

Myers, invited to speak at this meeting, prepared his speech carefully 

and had it checked by Maj. David Wallace, who had been dropped into 

Greece a few weeks previously as an official representative of the Foreign Office and who was now acting, at Myers’ request, as his political 

adviser. Myers’ speech was aimed at securing the continued good behavior of EAM/ELAS and at raising the morale of the unarmed masses; in 

particular, Myers pointed out the falsity of EAM’s propaganda against 

the British and the Greek monarchy.43
Strategy and Politics

63

Once Myers’ request that he return to Cairo had been granted, he 

prepared to leave Greece in August 1943 by airplane.h As soon as the 

trip was mentioned, however, representatives of EAM/ELAS expressed 

the desire to go along “to explain their political and other views,” to 

the Middle East Command and to the Greek government-in-exile. 

EDES and EKKA soon followed with similar requests. As finally constituted, the official party consisted of Myers, his political adviser Wallace, and three other British officers; Komninos Pyromaglou, second 

in command and chief staff officer to Zervas; George Kartalis, political 

adviser to Psaros; and four members of EAM—three from the Central 

Committee in Athensi

 and Andhreas Tzimas, the political commander 

of GHQ ELAS.44

Myers regarded the forthcoming talks in Cairo as a possible means 

of preventing civil war; he wrote, in fact, that “the whole future of 

Greece might be bound up in this visit.” With the help of Woodhouse 

and Wallace, he therefore prepared an agenda for the forthcoming 

discussions and cleared it with representatives of EDES, EKKA, and 

EAM/ELAS. They agreed to take up, in the given order, the major 

problems of guerrilla Greece: prevention of internecine guerrilla fighting, civil administration of Greece before liberation, and the means of 

peaceably changing from guerrilla law to constitutional government at 

the time of liberation. In addition, Myers was fortified by having jointly 

hammered out with Woodhouse and Wallace his own positions within 

these three major problem areas.45

Back in Cairo

The air trip from guerrilla Greece to Cairo was a change, not so 

much in location as in worlds. As complicated as life in the mountains 

had been, Myers and the andarte delegates now found themselves, on 

10 August 1943, in a world where the verities of mountain life were not 

only untested but unknown. It was a world with its own complexities, 

not the least being its many layers of organization. There were three 

echelons of British organization that now came, for Myers, directly into 

the picture—his headquarters, SOE Cairo; General Headquarters, 

Middle East Command; and the British Foreign Office. In addition 

to the Greek guerrilla delegates, there were the Greek King and his 

government-in-exile, returned from London the previous spring, to be 

reckoned with.

h Exfiltration was possible because a complete airfield had been constructed behind 

enemy lines in Greece under the supervision of a liaison officer. See Chapter III.

i Constantine Despotopoulos, Petros Roussos, and Elias Tsirimokos. The first two, 

like Tzimas, were Communists; the third was of the Popular Democratic Union (ELD), a 

Socialist party which had joined EAM. (Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 241.)
64

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Myers found Cairo, despite his messages, less than fully informed 

about politics in Greece. Although in March 1943 the head of the 

Greek Section of SOE Cairo had dropped into Greece to report firsthand on conditions there, he had been delayed in Turkey and had not 

yet returned. Wallace, the only other independent observer to Greece, 

came back with Myers, but owed allegiance, not to SOE, but to the British Foreign Office. Reginald Leeper, British Ambassador to the Greek 

government-in-exile, did not even know who the delegates were. He was 

concerned, angry, and unprepared because Wallace’s personal reports 

from inside Greece had not yet reached him.46 (It did not help that 

the delay was due to the SOE decoding staff.) General Headquarters 

of Middle East Command was even less aware of the serious political 

problems facing Myers. Some of the officers there who had witnessed 

the loyalty of the Greeks to their King in 1941, could not believe that 

George II had since become a most unpopular man.47 The result was 

that no adequate preparation had been made for the andarte delegates’ 

visit: “It had not even been decided whether they would be allowed to 

see members of their own government.”48

The Greek government-in-exile was equally unprepared and in an 

even more difficult position. The antiroyalist mutinies of March 1943 

in the Greek forces in the Middle East had had several results. For 

one thing they had brought the King and his government from London back to Cairo. Although the mutinies had been dealt with summarily, they had also brought into the government-in-exile a number 

of republicans.49

Not one member of this government-in-exile, however, had, in 

August 1943, been in touch with mainland Greece for over two years, 

with the result that it was highly unrepresentative of its homeland. In 

Greece, royalist parties were mainly confined to Athens, and no royalist 

band controlled any guerrilla territory. In Athens, new republican and 

liberal parties had grown up which had drawn off many members from 

the old parties. Furthermore, the leaders of the older parties thought 

it impolitic to back the government-in-exile before the King gave assurances of a plebiscite, lest they lose more followers to the new republican 

or resistance leaders. Because the government-in-exile was vastly concerned about developments in Greece, its members, particularly the 

republicans, wanted to meet the andarte delegates. The meeting could 

hardly be denied.50

On the second day after their arrival the guerrilla delegates met 

officially with the government-in-exile. Almost immediately, Andhreas 

Tzimas, political commander in GHQ ELAS, got down to his own order 

of business. Sweeping aside Myers’ agenda, he went directly to the 

third and major issue confronting postwar Greece—the constitutional 
Strategy and Politics

65

question of the monarchy. As later analysis of this master stroke showed, 

Tzimas had bypassed the preliminary phases of Myers’ agenda, on 

which there might have been internal disagreement in the guerrilla 

delegations, and “confined the issue to the King’s matter, on which 

all the delegates from the Greek mountains were formally agreed.” 

Two Greek politicians of note, who had recently escaped from Greece, 

joined the guerrilla delegates. Eight signatures thus graced the ultimatum handed to the government-in-exile on the fourth day of the 

delegates’ visit.51

Figure 4. King George II of Greece.

The major point of the ultimatum was that, since presumably 90 

percent of the people in Greece were against the monarchy, the government should guarantee that a plebiscite would be held to determine 

the continuance of the monarchy before George II should return to 

Greece. The issue revolved around the timing of the King’s return. 

It was a crucial point. Greek royalists feared that, if the King did not 

return before the plebiscite, antiroyalist elements would consolidate 

their power and the vote would go against the monarchy. On the other 
66

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

hand, republicans and Communists alike feared that, should the King 

return with the invasion forces and before the plebiscite, there would 

be a reversion to the practices of the dictatorship and the vote would 

inevitably confirm the monarchy.52

The issue of the ultimatum reinforced the political divergence in 

the government. In quick order, more than half of the Cabinet immediately sided with the delegates and threatened to resign. Only a few members, including the republican Prime Minister Tsoudheros, remained 

loyal to the King in this crisis.53

The man around whom this controversy raged concealed his anger 

behind regal stoicism and cold reserve. George II saw Myers the second 

day after his return. Myers told him quite frankly, that in his “humble 

opinion,” the King’s return to Greece at the head of his forces would be 

followed by a sequence of unfortunate events. The King would be supported by Zervas, opposed by EAM/ELAS, and civil war would begin. 

Myers felt that the King, unless protected by British forces on his return, 

would be in great personal danger. On the other hand, protection itself 

would be regarded as interference, leading to the revolt of EAM/ELAS 

and civil war. Myers wanted the King to give public assurance that he 

would remain outside of Greece until after a plebiscite.54

The conversation was continued 2 days later at a private meeting 

after a dinner party. Myers suggested then that the King might visit 

the guerrillas in the mountains in order to restore popular confidence 

in himself. The King, “long past middle age,” felt himself too old for 

this. And he declined to accept Myers’ next suggestion, that he remain 

“as his country’s Ambassador during peace negotiations, and until the 

plebiscite . . . .” George II considered it his duty to return to his country 

with his army, his prerogative to return at the moment of liberation. He 

resented the fact that the British were supporting republican, let alone 

Communist, guerrillas.55

The King’s problem was insolvable until British policy became clear. 

In the first place, the King was totally dependent on British support. 

In the second place, while the British had previously been supporting 

George II, they had also been supporting antimonarchical elements 

in Greece. It was on British advice that George II was in Cairo and 

had accepted a compromise government that he did not like and that 

was now an embarrassment. Through British military policy, the Greek 

guerrillas, largely antimonarchical, had been supported and their delegation brought to Cairo. These two elements, the government-in-exile 

and the guerrilla delegation—both British supported—had now combined to try to force the King’s acceptance of an ultimatum dictating 

that he would not return to Greece until a plebiscite had reaffirmed 

the monarchy.
Strategy and Politics

67

If the King agreed, he was only a step from abdication. If he did 

not agree, his government might resign and he might not be able to 

reconstitute it. Of the three British agencies in Cairo that were involved 

in Greek affairs, two (GHQ Middle East and SOE) seemed to be in 

agreement with the ultimatum. Myers had made his unwanted and 

un-acceptable observations. Not even the British Ambassador could 

give George II an absolutely firm commitment of support. The King 

therefore turned directly to Prime Minister Churchill and to President 

Roosevelt, both at the Quebec Conference, for advice on this “most 

curious situation.”56

Support for the King

The King got the support he needed. He was advised not to accede 

to the ultimatum; and the British Ambassador, Mr. Leeper, already in 

sympathy with the King, received a clear mandate to back the monarchy and to prevent the resignation of the government-in-exile.

The arguments for these decisions were many. In the first place, Mr. 

Churchill felt that he had “a special obligation” to the monarch of a 

country that had fought “as our Ally in 1941.” Then also, since the guerrilla delegates probably represented only one-fourth of the people of 

Greece, the British Prime Minister refused to concede that most mainland Greeks were really antimonarchical, or that they would be at the 

time of liberation.57 “To concede the King’s legitimate position to the 

clamour of an acknowledged minority” was therefore considered both 

unconstitutional and undemocratic.58

Since it was generally agreed back in Cairo that a compromise 

Greek government could probably not be recreated, the question of 

the current government’s resignation raised three possible alternatives, 

equally unpalatable: a new all-republican government, which might 

well become the tool of EAM/ELAS; a new all-royalist government, 

which would be both unrepresentative of mainland Greece and grist 

for Communist propaganda; or complete dissolution of the government-in-exile, which would leave Greece with no clear political authority or representation in world affairs—a vacuum for the Communists 

to fill. Under these circumstances, it appeared desirable to uphold the 

existing compromise—a predominantly republican government with a 

legitimate monarch.59

It became easier to uphold the compromise at this time because the 

EAM/ELAS delegates, pressing their initial advantage, demanded that 

three ministries—war, interior, and justice—be held inside Greece. 

These demands alienated the members of the government-in-exile. 

They did not resign. All eyes now turned to the British to end the situation, at least to return the andarte delegates to the mountains from 
68

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

which the British had brought them.60 The constitutional crisis of the 

government-in-exile and the King was over for the summer.j

The dichotomy in British policy was also over, and military ends were 

now made clearly subservient to political ones. But the transition was 

not effected smoothly. A spirit of recrimination pervaded the British 

agencies dealing with the Greek guerrillas. The Foreign Office blamed 

Myers and SOE, not only for bringing out the delegates and thus precipitating the crisis, but for encouraging groups in Greece that might 

adversely affect the return of the King. SOE replied that its agents were 

not responsible for what Greek nationals said to their own government, 

and it defended the policy of supporting guerrilla bands without regard 

to political affiliation, pointing to the impossibility of controlling the 

Greek resistance without dealing with its strongest element. General 

Wilson, Army Commander in Chief of the Middle East, wanted only to 

get on with the war, using to the utmost whatever weapon he could lay 

hands on, including the Greek guerrillas. Meanwhile, amid the bickering, there were still the Greek guerrilla delegates in Cairo.61

The men of EDES, EKKA, and EAM/ELAS were a major source of 

embarrassment. When SOE Cairo received instructions from the British Embassy that the delegates be sent back as soon as possible, Myers, 

“thoroughly alarmed about the consequences,” protested to the Ambassador. By turning away the delegates and supporting the King, the British had made it appear to EAM/ELAS, he said, that they intended to 

reimpose the King when Greece was liberated. This would give EAM 

propaganda for further expansion in the mountains and lead to a 

dictatorship of the left. Myers feared the breakdown of his hard-won 

National Bands Agreement and the resumption of internecine war. He 

was supported by the head of SOE Cairo and had the sympathies of 

General Wilson, who could not, however, overrule his instructions.62

It fell to the Army Commander in Chief to persuade the delegates 

to leave. “They came to my office,” Wilson wrote later, “and after much 

exhortation on my part on their duty to their country and the need to 

j It was to recur periodically. In December 1943, “it was the view of the British Government that the King should delegate to Damaskinos, the Archbishop of Athens, the 

authority to act as head of a Regency Committee as soon as the Germans quitted Athens.” 

The King, presumably supported by President Roosevelt, refused. In the spring of 1944, 

the King again refused to appoint a regent, thus causing the fall of Tsoudheros, his Prime 

Minister, who had supported him against the andarte delegation in August 1943. In 

September 1944, the King repeated his refusal to name a regent, even though he had to 

accept the fact that he could not return to Greece with the liberating troops. When the 

Regency of the Council of Ministers failed 2 months after the liberation, Mr. Leeper himself urged the appointment of a regent. The unwilling King finally accepted his fate and 

on 30 December 1944 appointed Damaskinos as Regent, “being ourselves resolved not to 

return to Greece unless summoned by a free and fair expression of the national will . . . .” 

(Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 34–35, 40–41, 72–73, 111–20, 126–27.)
Strategy and Politics

69

get on with the war they agreed to and everything was laid on.”63 On 

their way to the airport several days later, however, the delegates visited 

Prime Minister Tsoudberos, who had supported the King throughout 

the crisis, and actually persuaded him to demand that they remain in 

Cairo. The delegates therefore stayed on, presumably in order to conclude the military aspects of their mission. These were accomplished 

within a week, and in mid-September they finally returned to Greece.64

Myers himself was ordered to London, where he saw representatives of the various agencies and a number of highly placed people, 

including Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, Prime Minister Churchill, 

and King George VI. He got back to Cairo on 10 October; 9 days later 

he heard that civil war had again broken out in Greece. In November 

he finally learned that he would not be returning to Greece: he was 

persona non grata to the King of Greecek

 and the British Foreign Office. 

The news came to him “almost with relief . . .; but at heart, I was miserably disappointed because I was being denied the opportunity of completing the task which I had begun among a people whom I had grown 

to love and whom I believed I understood.”65 Myers thus leaves the story 

of the Greek resistance at this crucial point, but not without a final 

accolade from General Wilson: “I therefore recommended the return 

of Myers, who was most likely to get them [the Greek guerrillas] round 

to the right way of thinking; the diplomats, however, were too strong for 

me and I was overruled.”66

The auspiciously begun summer was now nearly over; it had proved 

a turning point and disillusionment in many ways. For the British, the 

policy of supporting the Greek guerrillas because of their military 

value now became a policy of controlling the Greek guerrillas because 

of their latent political value. The repercussions of this policy change 

were internally significant: not only Myers but the head of SOE Cairo 

and several subordinates were recalled to London and replaced. SOE 

lost all control of policy-making in regard to the Greek resistance, and 

the military needs of the Middle East Command became secondary. 

For the Greek government-in-exile, the strong Communist position in 

the resistance on the mainland was now apparent, but not fully comprehended. The difficulties inherent in the government’s own position 

were also clear, and its lack of ability to cope with the situation had 

become apparent. Having no policy or means of controlling the guerrillas, the government-in-exile had become, in fact, totally dependent 

on the British. Meanwhile the guerrilla delegates, full of bitterness, 

were back in Greece, reviewing the causes of their failure.

k “. . . . the single thread of decision which stood out from the tangle was that King 

George II declared his intention to abdicate if Brigadier Myers returned to Greece.” 

(Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 157.)
70

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Guerrillas Fight Guerrillas

(October 1943–February 1944)

Whether Myers could in fact have brought the guerrillas round to 

the “right way of thinking” is at best doubtful, but there is little doubt 

that the British decision not to send him back to Greece was interpreted by EAM/ELAS as essentially unfriendly.67 Saraphis, professional 

soldier that he was, wrote that—

We had the impression that Brigadier Eddie’s [Myers’] 

replacement was due to the fact that in Cairo he had 

shown himself sincere and objective and that he was 

a professional soldier and, as such, took a realistic 

view and transmitted it in his reports and he wanted 

to show himself impartial in the disputes between the 

different organizations. . . .68

Impartiality could not be the stock in trade of Lt. Col. Woodhouse, 

Myers’ second in command, who had become acting commander of the 

BMM while Myers was in Cairo. “From . . . [the middle of August], the 

EAM/ELAS members of JGHQ had noticed in the acting commander 

of the BMM,” wrote Woodhouse himself, “a propensity to take the side 

of anyone but themselves in any dispute that arose.”69 The situation that 

had arisen in Cairo and the problems in Greece had had their effect 

on the orders that Woodhouse received. It was not “a personal matter,” 

continued Woodhouse, “it was because the intentions of EAM/ELAS 

directly contradicted the intentions of the British authorities.”70 The 

difficulties imposed by the atmosphere of mutual suspicion were compounded for Woodhouse by his lack of information about the situation 

in Cairo, Myers’ troubles, and the serious political ramifications of the 

problem. On the other hand, both Aris and Saraphis were adequately 

briefed by the returning and indignant EAM/ELAS delegation.71

In the stocktaking that followed the return of the guerrilla delegation in mid-September 1943, EAM/ELAS was bound to reach a number 

of conclusions. First, the debacle in Cairo, the dismissal of the delegation by the British authorities, the absence of Myers, and the upgrading 

of Woodhouse—all combined to confirm the EAM/ELAS impression 

that the British intended to reimpose the monarchy at the moment of 

liberation. A second conclusion was that liberation was near. (It was 

expected from week to week throughout 1943.) If the monarchy were 

going to be reimposed by the British at liberation, and liberation was 

almost here, EAM/ELAS had little time to carry out its plan to be in 

complete control of the resistance movement and thus be able to cope 

with the King’s return. It was clear that the time had come to clear the 

decks and eliminate all possible postwar rivals.72
Strategy and Politics

71

A decision to act, however, depended not only on logical necessity 

but on feasibility. This seemed close, however, as a possible means of 

managing the British had now appeared. On the plane bringing back 

the guerrilla delegations were two American officers, the first to enter 

occupied Greece; and Woodhouse informed the guerrilla leaders that 

the BMM had now become the Allied Military Mission (AMM). He 

would himself be acting commander of the AMM, but there would be 

an American component in Greece. EAM/ELAS, having already seen 

a small wedge driven in Allied policy on Greece, especially in Cairo, 

therefore “hoped that the arrival of the Americans might do something 

to change the situation and that they would inform the service which 

had sent them of the true state of affairs.”73

The senior American officer, Capt. Winston W. Ehrgott, a cavalryman who was marked for duty with an ELAS cavalry unit, did not, 

however, share command responsibility at JGHQ level. Although this 

lessened his value as a possible tool, EAM/ELAS handled him very 

cleverly. It renamed the ELAS 3rd Cavalry Regiment the 3/7th, after 

Ehrgott’s own regiment in the U.S. Army, the 7th Cavalry, and appointed 

him honorary commander. Both Saraphis and Woodhouse were under 

the impression that the American officer was extremely sympathetic to 

the EAM/ELAS guerrillas. In the fall of 1943, the relationship between 

Woodhouse and the American must have been quite bitter. “Although 

his declared interests were confined to cavalry warfare,” Woodhouse 

wrote, “the KKE convinced him that crusading for EAM/ELAS against 

the British was practically the same thing.”74

The attempt to eliminate rivals was feasible for EAM/ELAS in the 

fall of 1943 because its own organization was strong. It held the territory 

of greatest strategic importance to both the Germans and the Allies. 

Despite this fact, it had not exhausted its resources during operations 

for the Sicily cover plan in June and July of that year. From that operation, in fact, EAM/ELAS had emerged by all standards the largest and 

best organized of the guerrilla groups. In early September, GHQ ELAS 

had organized divisions, regiments, battalions, etc., with a hierarchical 

command structure. While these echelons were in no way comparable 

in strength to their conventional army counterparts, the fact that they 

could even be simulated said much for ELAS growth. With a number of 

new officers and recruits, ELAS claimed strength of 20,000 active guerrillas. Their tactical deployment was made more efficient by the fact 

that telephone communication between major commands was in operation and a start had been made on establishing radio connections. 

Furthermore, EAM/ELAS enjoyed strong popular support throughout 

the country.75
72

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Arms for EAM/ELAS

The one factor lacking in EAM/ELAS strength was sufficient arms 

and ammunition for an all-out offensive against their rivals. Events in 

the autumn of 1943 remedied even this defect. It will be remembered 

that in the organization of the occupation, Italian units held the largest 

amount of Greek territory and were mainly responsible for the security 

of the country. In the summer of 1943, however, the Italian government 

was deep in negotiations with the Allies over the possibility of surrender. 

During the summer there were some lower-level negotiations among 

various Italian commanders, the guerrillas, and British liaison officers 

over the possibility of individual Italian units in Greece surrendering 

to the guerrillas or the BMM. These early negotiations were abortive; 

however, they alerted all parties to the importance of the issue. The 

BMM could not itself control such large bodies of men, and Woodhouse could not be sure either of getting the Italians out of Greece or 

controlling the guerrillas to whom they might surrender. Whichever 

guerrilla group received the surrender would, of course, get a windfall 

of trained fighting men and both light and heavy arms. Neither EDES, 

EKKA, nor EAM/ELAS was under the slightest misapprehension as to 

the value of these arms to itself or to its rivals. Neither were the Germans. Neither was Woodhouse, who had “categorical instructions from 

General Wilson to acquire every possible Italian weapon; to reserve to 

itself [his mission] the responsibility for realloting them; and on no 

account to allow the whole booty to fall into the hands of ELAS.”76

When Italy capitulated on 9 September 1943, most Italian units in 

Greece surrendered to the Germans and were disarmed. The major 

exception was the Pinerolo Division, commanded by the pro-British 

General Infante. On 11 September, at a meeting with JGHQ, General 

Infante laid down the conditions of his surrender to the guerrillas—

that his action be approved by his High Command and that Woodhouse 

guarantee the surrender terms. These stated that Infante’s troops 

would come over to the guerrillas in formed units with their weapons, 

that Italians willing to fight the Germans would keep their weapons, 

and that only the division’s surplus arms would be turned over to the 

guerrillas. Since most of the men chose to remain in formation, the 

surplus arms had little importance for the guerrillas. However, since 

the Italians were concentrated in Thessaly, the prize was still within 

EAM/ELAS’ reach: in Thessaly, EAM/ELAS held a monopoly of guerrilla power. Although the terms of the armisticel

 were hardly satisfactory to anyone but EAM (and not entirely to them), it was signed at once 

(12 September) in order to keep German forces from overtaking the 

l See Appendix B.
Strategy and Politics

73

Pinerolo Division. The delegations returning from Cairo thus found 

approximately 12,000 surrendering Italian soldiers with divisional 

weapons in EAM/ELAS territory.77

Figure 5. General Infante and Colonel Woodhouse. The Commander of the Italian 

Pinerolo Division signed an armistice with the guerrillas and the British Military 

Mission in September 1943.

Neither Woodhouse nor Infante could save the Pinerolo Division. 

“By presenting ridiculous excuses for scattered dispositions, by insinuating Communist propaganda among the bewildered Italians, by 

borrowing specialists and weapons that were never returned,” wrote 

Woodhouse, “the commanders of ELAS from the first set about preparing the Pinerolo Division for despoliation when the time was ripe.” 

By the end of September the Pinerolo had become a paper division. In 

October EAM/ELAS urged what was left of the Italian Division on to 

an attack on Larisa Airfield, an operation requested by the Middle East 

Command as part of a plan to destroy six airfields simultaneously in 

order to help the Allies defend the Aegean Islands against a new German onslaught. On 10 October the Pinerolo attack was repulsed, and 

EAM/ELAS complained that the Italians had “no will to fight.” On the 

14th EAM/ELAS agreed to General Infante’s request that the division 

be concentrated and given a definite sector. Later that day, however, 

ELAS proceeded to disarm the entire division. The Pinerolo was no 

longer even a paper command, and EAM/ELAS had gained not only 

its weapons but the entire Aosta Cavalry Regiment. Woodhouse had, at 

least for a time, completely lost his supply “stick.”78
74

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Winter Fighting

For EAM/ELAS, the disarming of the Pinerolo Division came at 

a good time, for the opening actions of the internecine guerrilla war 

had already taken place. The weapons collected from the Pinerolo were 

needed immediately and were carried over the Pindus Mountains for 

Aris to use against Zervas. It is almost impossible to determine who 

really struck the opening blow of this war. Saraphis has accused EDES 

of open collaboration with the Germans, invasion of ELAS territory, 

provocative actions against ELAS troops, armed interference against 

ELAS candidates in village elections and, finally, armed assault on 

ELAS forces. Colonel Woodhouse, on the other hand, has written that 

“on 8th October ELAS attacked units of EDES in Thessaly,” as well as 

other minor bands. On 12 and 13 October ELAS enlarged the attack 

to include all rivals, except EKKA with whom they had at that time 

reached temporary agreement.79

According to Woodhouse, these actions had followed a great many 

other signs of EAM/ELAS intransigence, including “judicial murder of 

several heroes of the Gorgopotamos operation” and of some EDES men; 

a request that the BMM pay all maintenance money for several months 

ahead; and refusal to take part in the airfields operation. (Although 

they later consented to take part, they never did so.) It is probable that 

there was always enough happening between the two groups of guerrillas to give either side an excuse to attack the other almost any time. 

Whichever side started the fight, it is clear that EAM/ELAS found the 

time ripe to press the attack.80

The week that saw the outbreak of general fighting between Greek 

guerrillas and the EAM/ELAS disarmament of the Pinerolo Division 

proved to be perhaps the most disastrous in the history of the British 

mission. While Greek was maneuvering against Greek, the Germans 

struck. On 17 October they began a major drive against the feuding 

guerrilla forces, who were caught completely by surprise. The joint 

headquarters was overrun and disintegrated. All of Myers’ work for the 

National Bands agreement was now undone.81

For the next 3 months a three-cornered war went on, fought 

by the Germans, EAM/ELAS, and EDES. In a series of three major 

mopping-up operations—in which they used aircraft, artillery, tanks, 

and motorized troop transports; burned villages and shot hostages; 

and played guerrilla force against guerrilla force in a most successful 

propaganda war—the Germans regained control of the major lines 

of communication.82
Strategy and Politics

75

Figure 6. Colonel Woodhouse and Major Wines. The Commander of the Allied 

Military Mission with the head of its American component.

They did not, however, eliminate ELAS. In an exchange with Woodhouse that well illustrates the relationship between the two men, Saraphis recalled that, “Lt. Colonel Chris [Woodhouse] said to me, ‘The 

Germans will at last have been convinced that they cannot eliminate 

ELAS.’ I replied that not only the Germans but others, too, must have 

been convinced that they could not eliminate ELAS. By this I meant 

the British . . . .”83

Indeed, despite the German operations, EAM/ELAS pressed its 

fight with EDES. By December 1943 EDES was desperate and had to 

withdraw to a small area in Epirus to regroup. At this point, Zervas 

was in such a precarious position that Woodhouse recommended that 

the British discontinue support of him “as the only hope of making 

further resistance to the Germans possible, even on terms chosen by 

EAM/ELAS.”84
76

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

The British, however, declined to accept such terms. As early as 

22 October, General Wilson had broadcast to the guerrillas an appeal 

for unity, blaming “unspecified” guerrillas for the civil war. Allied leaflets dropped in Greece, however, placed the blame squarely on ELAS. 

On 28 October the King and the ministers of the government-in-exile 

added their appeals for cessation of the war between Greeks. All British military support for ELAS was discontinued for the duration of its 

attacks on other guerrillas.85

In December the Allies made an additional show of their determination to stand up to the ELAS threat by designating the unpopular 

Woodhouse as commander of the Allied Military Mission. Woodhouse 

received further moral support when the Americans sent Maj. G. K. 

Wines to represent them on the AMM. Without offending EAM/ELAS 

or Saraphis, Wines gave Woodhouse his support. Allied policy now 

spoke with one voice. Also in December, the British disregarded Woodhouse’s reluctant recommendation to drop Zervas and instead doubled 

their support.86

The decision made at the time of the Cairo conference to treat 

Greece as a political rather than a military objective now became 

apparent even in Greece. “This was a decisive moment in the history 

of British relations with Zervas,” wrote Woodhouse, “because hitherto 

the military motive for supporting him had predominated over the 

political; but now the former had all but disappeared. Although Zervas’ military power could be resurrected, the motive for doing so must 

henceforth be nakedly political.”87

Determination paid off. On 19 December, EAM/ELAS requested 

the Allies to mediate between them and Zervas. There followed a series 

of highly complex moves. The guerrilla leaders were asked to listen 

to and comment on a speech by the Prime Minister in exile, who on 

21 December, speaking for General Wilson as well as the Greek government, appealed for unity. Giving cognizance to one of EAM/ELAS’ 

major points, he stated that collaborators should be expelled from the 

guerrilla bands. But he also said that the bands should either unite or 

go home.88

A couple of days later, the Allied Military Mission suggested a ceasefire in Greece for the Christmas and New Year holiday season. About 

this time also, in order to suggest a reason for another kind of fighting, 

Middle East Command instructed the AMM to prepare a plan (code 

named NOAH’S ARK) for guerrilla harassment of German troops at 

the time of their withdrawal from Greece. The plan was timed for the 

spring of 1944, mainly to make it appear urgent. Woodhouse broached 

it to EAM/ELAS early in January 1944.89
Strategy and Politics

77

Before an armistice could be agreed on, however, Zervas attacked 

EAM/ELAS forces in an attempt to regain lost ground and improve 

his bargaining position in the discussion of truce terms.m EAM/ELAS, 

out, raged by the attack and by Zervas’ silence on the matter of collaborators in EDES, turned its anger on the Allied Mission also. On 

31 December, the Prime Minister in exile added fuel to the fire by 

charges that EAM/ELAS used dictatorial methods. Appeals for Greek 

unity broadcast on New Year’s Day by both King George II and Radio 

Moscow had no effect.90

Late in January, ELAS counterattacked and drove the EDES guerrillas back. In response to Woodhouse’s request for an immediate 

armistice, EAM/ELAS now stated its terms. Zervas was to repudiate 

all collaborators in EDES; guerrillas were to remain in their positions 

at the moment of armistice; and a conference of representatives of the 

guerrillas and of the Allied Military Mission was to be held to discuss 

a united guerrilla army and a government of national unity. The AMM 

relayed these terms to Zervas. Pressed militarily by ELAS and politically by the AMM, Zervas could only accept. On 4 February 1944 the 

ceasefire finally took effect.91

Plaka Armistice

Conferences in southern Epirus took the rest of the month. First 

came preliminary talks between EAM/ELAS and the AMM; then the 

talks moved to Mirofillon, where the EDES delegation—without Zervas—joined the group. The armistice conference opened officially on 

15 February. On the question of repudiating collaborators, EDES complied. All the delegations joined in a statement condemning all armed 

Greeks in the service of the Germans.n The question of territorial status quo was also quickly settled in the affirmative. Since Woodhouse 

refused to go into political questions, discussion now centered upon 

other military questions—the creation of the united army that ELAS 

wanted, integration of guerrilla units in a united army, the choice of a 

commander in chief for a united army. But even these basically military 

questions raised a new political specter. “We pointed out,” said Saraphis, “that, in order for there to be a commander in chief, there must 

be a political authority to give him his instructions; but that no political 

authority existed, and therefore a political committee would have to 

be created . . . .” Woodhouse told the guerrillas he was incompetent to 

make political decisions and refused to discuss the political committee. 

The talks again reverted to military matters.92

m Woodhouse puts the date of Zervas’ attack before 31 December 1943; Saraphis 

gives the date of 4 January 1944.

n See Appendix C.
78

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Thus the meeting dragged on, with only Woodhouse reassured, 

since he felt confident that the guerrillas could never agree on any 

matter that the British would find unpleasant. The longer the delegates 

talked, therefore, “the less likely the civil war was to break out again.” 

By 23 February, the conference was deadlocked and ready to dissolve. 

A further meeting between Aris and Zervas personally was, however, 

arranged for at Plaka, on the eastern bank of the Arakhthos River, 

which divided EDES and EAM/ELAS territory. It was eventually broadened to include all the conferees. On the 27th the conference reconvened at Plaka and “simply began again from the beginning.” Within 

2 days, another deadlock was reached.93

In the face of the new deadlock, EAM/ELAS now proposed a definite armistice: all ELAS and EDES forces were to remain in current 

positions with the line separating them to be the new ELAS-EDES 

boundary; in the future they would cooperate in actions against the 

Germans. With enemy gunfire as a backdrop, a Protocol of Agreemento

was drawn up to this effect and signed the same day, 29 February 1944. 

The Agreement also asked the Allied Military Mission to secure supplies for guerrilla bands “on the basis of their operations against the 

Germans and in proportion to the real requirements of the war.” The 

armistice provided, further, that prisoners or political hostages held 

by either side would be released. A secret clause, inserted at Colonel 

Woodhouse’s request, stated that the guerrillas of EAM/ELAS, EDES, 

and EKKA would cooperate closely to implement NOAH’S ARK and 

would accept the infiltration of special British and American units that 

were scheduled to participate. This clause, Woodhouse has said, being 

freely negotiated, provided a legal basis for “subsequent agreements” 

and “the eventual restoration of a recognized government from exile.”94

The Plaka Armistice put an end to a civil war that was as unpopular 

with Greeks as with the British. It had never involved many casualties, 

possibly a few hundred. “The cost of killing a man was incalculable.” 

Woodhouse has written somewhat bitterly; “it had taken several thousand rounds at slightly more than extreme range even to frighten 

one.”95 The truth is that, below the leadership level, Greeks were not 

pleased to be killing or to be killed by other Greeks. Saraphis, in fact, 

recognized and even emphasized the common bondage of all Greek 

guerrillas in the Plaka talks when he pushed the concept of a united 

army.96 At the leadership level, also, EAM/ELAS failed to win friends 

by the civil war: Athenian politicians were disturbed at a national resistance movement turned so sour. Even within EAM/ELAS there were 

persons who felt that the military violence advocated by men like Aris 

o See Appendix D.
Strategy and Politics

79

was less effective than political infiltration. The Plaka Armistice, in the 

view of EAM/ELAS, thus represented a turning point—an end to one 

attempt for control of Greece. In Communist terms, the end of one 

attempt is always prelude to the next.97

New Communist Moves for Control

(March–August 1944)

Although the Plaka Agreement had officially ended hostilities 

between the two guerrilla camps, it had not really settled anything with 

finality. Both EAM/ELAS and EDES still existed and the differences 

between them remained as acute as ever. On the personal level, in fact, 

rapprochement was well-nigh impossible.

From the point of view of EAM/ELAS, the winter war had been a 

disappointment. Whereas EAM/ELAS had regrouped and was almost 

30,000 strong in the spring of 1944, the major rival, EDES, still existed. 

True, EDES had been driven into a small and relatively unimportant 

area for operations, but that area represented a hard core which the 

army of ELAS had been unable to annihilate. In addition, bands in 

Macedonia under Andon Tsaousp were flourishing; and in Eastern 

Roumeli, Psaros’ EKKA still existed independently. These bands were 

being liberally supplied by the British. EAM/ELAS, on the other hand, 

could not pry any arms out of His Majesty’s Government.98

In addition to the guerrilla armies which EAM/ELAS wished to dispose of, it now faced a new and imposing array of power. The Germans 

had recruited Greeks to fight the guerrillas. These Greeks, organized 

by the Greek puppet government into security battalions, had proved 

their mettle against the guerrillas and had been joined by members 

of the guerrilla bands that EAM/ELAS had broken up. EAM/ELAS 

thought that the security battalions fought with tacit British approval. 

Saraphis has written that they used the claim of British sanction as an 

inducement in recruiting; he was inclined to blame the British secret 

intelligence service, rather than the Allied Military Mission under 

Woodhouse.99 It was Woodhouse’s opinion that the security battalions 

flourished because of the excesses of EAM/ELAS. Knowing that the 

British were anti-ELAS, the security battalions expected sympathy from 

the AMM. Woodhouse has called the security battalions “the gravest 

problem which exercised the Communist leaders of 1944.” Their existence provided a source of potent anti-EAM/ELAS propaganda, and 

p An alias for Andonios Fosteridhis, Tsaous standing for sergeant; thus Andon the 

Sergeant. His bands were the right-wing Greek Nationalist Guerrilla Groups.
80

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

they augmented the “handful of Germans and second-rate satellite 

troops” in Greece.100

The problems of EAM/ELAS, however, were not only military. 

Given their objectives and the setback they had received in the winter 

fighting, they needed now to accomplish certain political aims—to reestablish their integrity, retrieve their position with non-Communists 

at home and abroad, and place themselves in such a position that no 

postwar government could overlook their claims to participation in, if 

not domination of, such a government.

Given time, the leaders of EAM/ELAS probably would not have 

regarded the problems as too difficult, but in March of 1944, time 

seemed of the essence. With NOAH’S ARK scheduled for April, EAM/

ELAS thought it had only another month to prepare for the German 

departure from Greece. The spring of 1944 was therefore a time of 

major activity on both political and military fronts.101

Politically, the leaders of EAM/ELAS had, by their anti-Zervas war, 

exposed the Communist nature of their organization. As a result, EAM 

could no longer “front” as a coalition of left-of-center parties. What the 

Communists now needed was “a more ambitious device for drawing 

recruits . . . from the respectable and professional classes, and from the 

newer generation of politicians.” The plan coincided with the need, 

and on 11 March 1944 the political Committee for National Liberation 

hereinafter called Political Committee, or PEEA, from its Greek initials) was inaugurated under the sole sponsorship of EAM/ELAS and 

without participation by EDES or EKKA102

The Political Committee for governing mountain Greece was composed of both Communist and non-Communists. President and Secretary for Foreign Affairs was Col. Euripides Bakirdzis, friend of Psaros 

and formerly, under the cover name Prometheus I, the most successful 

secret agent of the British. He had returned to Greece on the same 

plane that brought the guerrilla delegations from the Cairo talks in 

September 1943. Secretary for War was Col. Emmanuel Mandakas, a 

Cretan resistance leader, formerly (like Saraphis and Bakirdzis) an able 

officer of the regular Army. The posts of justice, home affairs, and agriculture were filled by former members of EAM, the last two being also 

Communists. A number of cabinet offices were held dually until men 

could be found to fill them. The oath of office was given by the parish 

priest of Viniani, where the Political Committee established itself.103

Respectability flowed over the Political Committee. Elections were 

held in Guerrilla Greece for a national council, which, with members 

of the 1936 Parliament, actually assembled in May 1944. The Political Committee, meanwhile, invited EKKA and EDES to participate. 

New men joined PEEA, still further enlarging the proportion of 
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non-Communists to Communists. With the demotion of Bakirdzis to 

Vice President and Secretary for Food, Alexander Svolos, a mild and 

cultivated Professor of Constitutional Law at Athens University, against 

whom “there could be no cavil,” became President and Secretary for 

Foreign Affairs. Other men also came into PEEA, and “the new names,” 

wrote Woodhouse, “raised the political quality of the resistance movement to a new level.”104

The Political Committee embarrassed both the Greek governmentin-exile and the British. The exile government was now clearly unrepresentative, because PEEA was actually performing the functions of 

government within Greece. In early April, mutinies supporting PEEA 

broke out in the Greek army and navy forces in Egypt, precipitating the usual crisis: Prime Minister Tsoudheros resigned, but, when 

a new government-in-exile could not be formed, agreed to carry on. 

King George II was recalled from England. The Political Committee 

in Greece was asked for assurances that it indeed intended to work for 

national unity.105

Finally, on 13 April 1944, a new cabinet was formed in Cairo under 

Sophocles Venizelos, son of the great Cretan statesman. On 17 April 

it announced that both EAM/ELAS and EDES would send representatives from Greece to discuss a new Government of National Unity, 

which would subsume the Political Committee. This conference was to 

meet the next month in Lebanon.106

Back in Greece the political offensive was again inextricably mixed 

with military affairs. Difficulties over the boundaries between EDES, 

EKKA, and EAM/ELAS had continued despite the Plaka Agreement; 

and the Allied Military Mission called another conference within 

Greece. It was scheduled to take place at Koutsaina in May, at the same 

time as the forthcoming political conference. Before it could meet, 

however, EAM/ELAS gave Psaros an ultimatum. When he rejected it, 

he was attacked on 17 April and was killed in the fight. His forces were 

dispersed in what had become by then a classic Greek pattern—some 

were killed, some joined EAM/ELAS, and some escaped to the security battalions. At the Koutsaina Conference, Woodhouse reported, the 

Communists were triumphant over EKKA’s annihilation and refused 

any compromise on the boundary with EDES. Within Greece, the Communists felt the spring military offensive was going well.107

Lebanon Conference

The Greek delegation to the political conference being held in Lebanon with the government-in-exile was meanwhile pursuing Communist political objectives, although the seven-man delegation was itself 

mainly composed of non-Communists. The delegates included Svolos 
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

and two other non-Communist members of PEEA, one Communist 

and one non-Communist member of EAM, one representative of KKE, 

and Saraphis, military Commander in Chief of ELAS, who served as 

technical adviser. They left Viniani on 25 April, and some days later 

enplaned from Greece. The first stop was at Brindisi, Italy, where all 

the delegates except Saraphis were taken to Bari for rest. Saraphis was 

flown immediately to Middle East headquarters in Cairo, where he was 

asked to bring his influence to bear on the conduct of EAM/ELAS at 

the Koutsaina Conference back in Greece. This, he claimed, he was 

unable to do because he had delegated all his military responsibilities 

for the period when he would be out of Greece. Feeling as usual quite 

antagonistic toward the British, Saraphis rejoined Svolos and the rest 

of the delegation at the Grand Hotel du Bois de Boulogne in a remote 

village of Lebanon, where the political conference was scheduled to 

take place.108

In Lebanon the Svolos delegation did not meet quite the reception 

it had expected. The month that had intervened between the eager 

sending of the invitation and the conference itself had seen a number 

of changes in the lineup of Greek politics. The Greek democrats in the 

exile Cabinet, by supporting the mutinies of the Greek forces in Egypt, 

had brought about the downfall of Prime Minister Tsoudheros and had 

put their own man, Sophocles Venizelos, into power. But when Venizelos proved unable to stop the mutinies,q

 they became a major source 

of embarrassment to the government. It was also apparent that much of 

the propaganda being given to the mutineers and in turn issuing from 

them emanated from EAM/ELAS. Determined Greeks supported by 

the British put down the navy mutiny, and British troops stopped the 

army mutiny.

On 26 April Venizelos resigned. He was succeeded by George 

Papandhreou, a Social Democrat who had only recently made the trip 

from Athens, along with a number of other Greeks who were also coming to the conference. The new Prime Minister, although temporarily 

unable to form a government, was a determined foe of EAM/ELAS. 

With strong backing from the British, he was ready to take on the job of 

converting the army of EAM/ELAS into a national army and of absorbing PEEA into a Government of National Unity. Thus for the first time 

there was a possibility that the favorite tactics of the Communists would 

be used against them.109

q Since the war, Greek sources have indicated that EAM/ELAS obtained power in the 

Greek forces in the Middle East through its control of the escape routes from that country. 

It is claimed that only those persons known to be pro-EAM/ELAS were allowed to escape 

to join the free Greek forces.
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When the conference opened on 17 May—belatedly, as a result 

of Papandhreou’s illness—the Svolos delegation was surprised and 

alarmed by their treatment. “We expected him [Papandhreou] to begin 

in a friendly atmosphere . . . ,” complained Saraphis. “Instead . . . he 

began a violent attack on EAM and ELAS, saying that they were not 

fighting a war but were exercising terrorism and that their first victim 

had been Saraphis, who was present, and their latest the absent Psaros. 

Venizelos spoke next . . . . He too attacked EAM and ELAS.”110 And so 

it went.r

After two and a half days devoted either to castigation or defense 

of EAM/ELAS, the conference finally settled down to work on a plan 

Papandhreou had outlined. This included eight points, substantially 

comprising what later became the Lebanon Charter: (1) reorganization and re-establishment of discipline in the Greek armed forces in 

the Middle East; (2) unification of all guerrilla bands under a central 

government; (3) end of terror in Greece; (4) adequate relief for Greece; 

(5) restoration of order and liberty in liberated Greece and a quick 

decision on the question of the government; (6) punishment for traitors; (7) arrangements for reconstruction measures; and (8) satisfaction of Greece’s national claims. In addition, Papandhreou stood ready 

to offer the Svolos delegation 25 percent of the cabinet portfolios in a 

Government of National Unity.111

The Svolos delegation found this program hard to swallow, but they 

were unable to extract any major concessions. Possibly because they 

were non-Communists sent to do Communists’ work, at least partly 

because the other delegates had closed ranks, Svolos and his colleagues 

were forced into major concessions.

On the matter of the mutinies, Svolos found feeling so high that his 

delegation added its own condemnation to that of the others, thereby 

strengthening Papandhreou’s position on the rest of his points. Point 

three, concerning terror in Greece, was an insult to EAM/ELAS but it 

was swallowed whole. Point six, concerning traitors, adopted a major 

demand of EAM/ELAS. Points four, five, seven, and eight did not 

arouse great controversy.112

The mountain delegation found itself in an awkward position 

concerning the Government of National Unity, since its instructions 

were to insist on 50 percent of the portfolios, not 25, and specified 

the ministries.113

r Preliminary conversations, Saraphis wrote, had already indicated complete disinterest in the guerrillas; he was especially indignant, according to his own report, when Venizelos asked him if he kept a mistress in the mountains. (Greek Resistance Army, pp. 194–95.)
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

On Point two, concerning unification of guerrilla bands, the Svolos 

delegation fought hard. They could not allow such a serious matter to 

be settled against themselves. “We declared,” wrote Saraphis, “that we 

would not consent to the disbanding of ELAS unless the army which 

was to take over its task was ready first. Regarding that army, we said we 

would consent to the integration of all guerrillas in a united national 

army under a commander who inspired general confidence.” The only 

man acceptable to all parties was General Othonaios, whose name was 

kept secret, since he was still in Athens and in danger.114

In the end, the Svolos delegation accommodated itself to the situation as soon as a compromise on the matter of ELAS was reached. 

The accepted phrasing provided that the transformation of ELAS to 

a national army was to be accomplished in such a way as not to “lead 

to a reduction of resistance,” and it was to be undertaken by consultation between the Greek government and British military forces. On 

20 May 1944 the mountain delegation joined the rest of the conferees 

in signing the Lebanon Charter,s

 virtually the whole of Papandhreou’s 

program. “This agreement,” wrote Woodhouse, “had been achieved by 

battering the delegates of PEEA, EAM, ELAS and the KKE into a mental daze in which they were hardly responsible for their actions.”115

The delegation itself was aware of its predicament, for it had “made 

many concessions,” as Saraphis conceded, “and departed very far from 

the Political Committee’s instructions.” It telegraphed to the Political 

Committee, asking that the Charter be approved, but the answer was 

almost a repudiation. Svolos was extremely hurt at this cavalier treatment and Saraphis was sent back alone to Greece to explain.116

Meanwhile, in early June, Woodhouse was called out of Greece to 

advise British authorities on the Greek situation and to be briefed on 

future plans. He did not return to Greece until September.117

Holding the Line Against EAM/ELAS

As time went on, it looked more and more as if the Government 

of National Unity would be without EAM/ELAS, PEEA, or KKE participation. Early in June, Papandhreou formed the new government, 

including representatives of EDES and the defunct EKKA and leaving five seats vacant for EAM/ELAS. Early in July, EAM made its 

demands known; the major ones were that it should nominate not 5 

but 7 of a total of 15 cabinet members and that ELAS should remain 

separate from the national army. On 13 July, PEEA President Svolos 

came back into the orbit of the Political Committee. Complaining that 

he had been treated “like an accused person,” Svolos announced that 

s See Appendix E.
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his delegation could not join the Papandhreou government and would 

return to Greece. Before the end of July, an ultimatum came from the 

mountains demanding that the Prime Minister resign.118

All of these demands were rejected. Backed by a unified Government and the determined British, the strengthened Prime Minister 

filled the five seats that had been saved for the Svolos delegation. There 

was no giving way on the matter of the army. Svolos was allowed to 

return to Greece. Papandhreou did not resign.119

Furthermore, a number of plans for dealing militarily with EAM/

ELAS were now considered. Papandhreou suggested that the Allied 

Military Mission be pulled out of Greece and that EAM/ELAS be publicly denounced. This plan—like one considered in April, when EKKA 

was annihilated—was rejected, as before, on the basis that it might 

jeopardize British and Greek-royalist lives and that it would certainly 

leave the British without information on EAM/ELAS and its attempts 

to take over Greece. By withdrawing, the British might even help EAM/

ELAS to gain in popularity. They would also most certainly be unable 

to have any direction over affairs during the German withdrawal.120

Another proposal, made by the Allied Military Mission, and sanctioned, as Woodhouse pointed out, by the Plaka Armistice, was to build 

up Allied troops in Greece. To some limited extent this had already 

begun, since several American Operational Groups from OSS and elements of the (British) Raiding Support Regiment had been sent in to 

perform interdiction sabotage. Allied troops in sufficient numbers to 

counterbalance EAM/ELAS were simply not available, however.121

The most important military measure taken against EAM/ELAS at 

this time was the stepping-up of supplies to Zervas, well in excess of his 

needs. By the summer of 1944, in fact, EDES had grown to about 10,000 

to 12,000 men, concentrated in a small section of the country, whereas 

EAM/ELAS had to spread 40,000 guerrilla troops over an area considerably more than four times the size of Zervas’ territory. Now Zervas began attacks on the ELAS 24th Regiment, without, according to 

Woodhouse, protest from the Allied Military Mission.122 These attacks, 

as well as what it had learned of other Allied plans, made EAM/ELAS 

apprehensive. Saraphis, for example, saw a great anti-EAM/ELAS strategy in every move. Concerning the EDES attacks on the 24th Regiment, 

he wrote—

Their object had been achieved; the whole area west of 

the Arakhthos had been cleared of ELAS. Thus they 

[the British] would have a base for reinforcing Zervas 

with Greek troops from the Middle East and, in case of 

need, would be able to transfer the Papandhreou Government to Epirus, and from there to wipe us out. It 
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

was rumored that a British landing was contemplated, 

with military seizure and occupation of Greece and 

imposition of British policy as its object.123

Faced with this growing threat, EAM/ELAS decided to eliminate EDES 

once and for all. Saraphis, however, pointed out that ELAS could not 

take on this task so long as the Germans remained strong in Epirus, 

the EDES stronghold. He was ordered, however, to take the first steps 

toward attack and spent 3 weeks in visiting the units that were to make 

the fight.124

Meanwhile the Germans began a whole new series of mopping-up 

operations, directed mainly against ELAS. Not only did the 9th ELAS 

Division suffer heavy losses, but the Germans burned and plundered 

villages and carried off cattle. Even worse was the behavior of the Eastern troop units in the German Army and the Greek collaborators. To

get arms and ammunition ELAS carried out new operations against 

the Germans and security battalions, with some success. Its calls to the 

British for supply drops of arms, however, fell on deaf ears.125

The question of arms was never more important to EAM/ELAS 

than in the summer of 1944. In the previous January EAM/ELAS had 

established contact with Tito in Yugoslavia and had requested ammunition from him or from Russia, but without result. Now at this crucial 

point (the fight over the Government of National Unity and the decision to annihilate EDES), EAM/ELAS received good news: a Russian 

Military Mission was to arrive in Greece. Consisting of 11 officers, the 

Russian Mission arrived by plane from Italy on 28 July 1944. The plane 

left Italy surreptitiously and landed in Greece without the knowledge 

of the British.126

With Russian supplies EAM/ELAS might have had a good chance 

of annihilating EDES before its forces could join a National Army and 

before anyone could build a counterforce. This hope, however, turned 

out to be a pipe dream. Lt. Colonel Popov, head of the Russian Mission, 

soon informed Saraphis that he had no mandate to promise supplies, 

although he would forward requests to Moscow. “He asked for a list of 

what we needed,” wrote Saraphis, “and, within two days, lists were provided. But, to the very end, we never received any assistance.”127

The failure of the Russian Military Mission to provide supplies was 

only one of the disappointments that the Communists in EAM/ELAS 

received throughout the summer of 1944. Unlike the other Balkan 

states, which expected to be overtaken by the Russian Army, Greece was 

to be, by Allied-Russian agreement, in the British sphere of interest. (In 

October, Churchill and Stalin agreed in Moscow, among other things, 

to trade 90 percent Russian predominance in Rumania for 90 percent 

British predominance in Greece.) Since Russian military forces would 
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stop at her northern boundaries, Greek Communists could not expect 

supplies or military aid from the Northern giant. Within Greece, the 

Germans, expected momentarily to leave ever since 1942, still threatened, now abetted by the Greek security battalions. Anti-ELAS guerrillas, even EDES, were still in existence and “the reactionary thugs 

of X under Colonel Grivas” were making their first appearance. Furthermore, the British at last could rely on a strong Greek governmentin-exile, in which all anti-EAM/ELAS voices were united. They had 

American support for their policy, and in the field, Woodhouse and 

Wines were in entire accord.

Finally, it seemed to EAM/ELAS that the Allies were tired of Greek 

antics: they now appeared ready to fight fire with fire. Above and beyond 

any or all of these reasons, however, the one suggested by Woodhouse 

for the sudden about-face in EAM/ELAS policy—that the Greek Communists lost their nerve in the summer of 1944—may supply the key to 

the situation.128

At any rate, the Political Committee now ruled out, at least temporarily, the possibility of successful military action. The balance in the 

inner councils, as always, shifted immediately to the advocates of peaceful penetration. Since it was important to hold the non-Communist 

fellow-travelers, it is probable that the moderating words of Svolos were 

listened to. At any rate, the planned ELAS offensive against EDES was 

called off. Saraphis, who felt he had finally found a successful plan for 

destroying EDES, was called in by the Political Committee and told 

that PEEA and EAM/ELAS had reversed their position—they would 

send five, not seven, members to participate in the government of 

Papandhreou, who had suddenly become respectable. Saraphis was “a 

little distressed” that his work had been for nothing. But by now he had 

learned to flow with the tide; he was “pleased with the solution. . . .” 

On 2 September the new ministers joined the Government of National 

Unity in Cairo.129

The fourth phase of the wartime resistance movement in Greece 

was, from the standpoint of the future of the country, the time of greatest moment. In the words of Woodhouse, the communists tried both 

“political and military blitzkrieg,” and almost captured the grand prize. 

But the opposition also became stiffer than it had ever been before, 

and control of Greece thus remained just beyond their grasp.

Indian Summer and the December War

(September 6, 1944—V–E Day)

The decision to enter the Papandhreou government on its terms 

marked the beginning of what Woodhouse has called the “Indian 
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

summer of the well meaning” between EAM/ELAS and the Allied Military Mission.130 Saraphis took steps to improve the unfriendly relations 

of the Allied Military Mission with specific EAM/ELAS divisions. He 

actually undertook to convince the commanding colonel of the EAM/

ELAS 9th Division, for example, that some of the responsibility for friction with the AMM was his. When Brigadier Benfield, current head of 

SOE Cairo, visited guerrilla Greece in order to avert civil war between 

the guerrillas of Saraphis and Zervas, he found the leaders of EAM/

ELAS rational, agreeable, and friendly. They became even more so, as 

they discovered that he was well disposed toward them. The threat of 

war between Saraphis and Zervas had, of course, already disappeared. 

Benfield presented Saraphis with a gift from British General Alexander, a pair of English field glasses which had been engraved in 1943 

for the “loyal ally of Great Britain and my close colleague in the common struggle for the liberation of all peoples.” The gift, “forgotten” 

during the black days of 1943 and early 1944, was now remembered. 

“Our relations with the Allied Mission,” wrote Saraphis, “. . . became 

really friendly.”131

Brigadier Benfield’s entry into Greece coincided with the beginning 

of the German withdrawal. At this point, before the Germans speeded 

up their retreat, General Wilson summoned both Zervas and Saraphis 

to his headquarters at Caserta, Italy, for another conference.132

Caserta Conference

The era of good feeling was continued at the Caserta conference. 

One of the main points made by EAM/ELAS at the Lebanon Conference in May had been that its guerrillas should be disbanded only 

when the national army was ready to take over the task of defeating the 

Germans. “Regarding that army,” wrote Saraphis, “we said we would 

consent to the integration of all guerrillas in a united national army 

under a commander who inspired general confidence.”133 The commander discussed at Lebanon and generally agreed upon had been the 

Greek General Othonaios. Before Saraphis left for Caserta, however, 

he received an Allied order presenting British Lt. Gen. Ronald Scobie “in the character of commander of Greek forces.” Since Saraphis 

had orders from EAM/ELAS to insist on the appointment of General 

Othonaios, he now asked for instructions. He was surprised to discover that EAM/ELAS would cooperate and honor Scobie’s order, thus 

accepting an Allied commander. In Caserta, Saraphis received more 

advice to cooperate from Professor Svolos, who was now in Papandhreou’s Government of National Unity.134

Saraphis accepted most of the British conditions. Although he 

insisted that General Scobie should not be considered a commander in 
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89

chief in the Greek sense, “with political authority in domestic matters,” 

but only as a “military commander for operations,” Saraphis did place 

all his guerrilla units under the orders of Papandhreou’s Government 

of National Unity with full knowledge that they would be immediately 

signed over to General Scobie. Saraphis then accepted Scobie’s operational orders. In the matter of delineating the boundaries of EDES and 

EAM/ELAS, Saraphis refused to give up the important area around 

Metsovon, but he accepted a boundary that EAM/ELAS had refused in 

May at Koutsaina. He also agreed to articles in the Caserta Agreement 

forbidding any attempt by the guerrillas to seize power, barring guerrilla units from the Athens area, and promising coordination of action 

between EDES and EAM/ELAS.135

The signing of the Caserta Agreementt on 26 September 1944 was 

extremely important from the British point of view, for it legitimized 

their coming military action in Greece and left EAM/ELAS with no 

ground to claim governing authority. “The agreement,” Woodhouse 

noted with satisfaction, “completed the work, begun at Plaka seven 

months earlier, of ensuring that the return of the Allies (and with 

them Papandhreou’s Government) should be unchallenged by EAM/

ELAS.”136 From Plaka to Lebanon to Caserta—the conference table 

had been fruitful. The conferences could, of course, resolve the issue of 

legality, but they could not enforce the law. It is therefore interesting to 

note that both EDES and EAM/ELAS honored the Caserta provisions 

in the main during the German withdrawal. No guerrillas entered the 

Athens area; there was no attempt to seize power.137

Liberation of Greece

By now Operation NOAH’S ARK, officially begun on 10 September, 

was in full swing, for the Germans were pulling back into the cities and 

to the north, preparatory to final withdrawal from Greece. In harassing 

this withdrawal, the guerrillas of both EDES and EAM/ELAS operated 

with considerable success. According to Woodhouse, many guerrilla 

units distinguished themselves in the fighting, and both Zervas and 

Saraphis did their individual best.138

Despite the activity of the guerrillas and the Allied Military Mission, 

however, the Germans were able to pull out in an orderly fashion. They 

left the Peloponnesus by early October. Athens was evacuated on 12 

October; Salonika, on the 30th. The Germans were completely out of 

mainland Greece by early November. In Crete, Rhodes, and the Aegean 

Islands, some German forces lingered until the final Allied victory in 

t See Appendix F.
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Europe, but no matter. General Scobie’s forces in Operation MANNAu

entered Greece beginning 1 October; Papandhreou came into Athens 

on 18 October; EAM/ELAS installed itself at Lamia on 23 October.139

During, this period EAM/ELAS appeared quite sincere. Its guerrillas stayed out of Athens,v

 and the Greek communists’ handling of the 

so-called Macedonian question left little to be desired. Even before the 

summer of 1944, when autonomist activity started in earnest in Macedonia, rumors had persisted in Greece that EAM/ELAS had made an 

agreement with the Bulgars, who had occupied parts of Macedonia and 

Thrace for 3 years, whereby a part of Greece would remain in Bulgarian hands and another part become the separate state of Macedonia. 

Members of EAM were even termed the “Eamobulgarians.” Whether 

such an agreement existed is not known; it was categorically denied a 

number of times. In September 1944, when the Bulgarians changed 

from Axis to Russian hangers-on, their army was strong enough both 

to fight the Germans and to maintain internal law and order in Macedonia. Nonetheless, they did not take over any Greek territory. Bulgarian troops left Greece by 25 October to help the Russians fight 

Germans in Yugoslavia and Hungary. On the 28th, the armistice with 

Bulgaria was signed. Meanwhile the various guerrilla bands in Macedonia had remained politically quiet. Not only had the Macedonian 

Group of Divisions of EAM/ELAS not participated in autonomist activity, but Saraphis claimed that they had even attacked a Macedo-Slav 

battalion belonging to themselves. “From the Greek point of view,” 

wrote Woodhouse, “the satisfaction of being rid of the Bulgarian occupation was almost equalled by the relief of finding the sincerity of 

PEEA vindicated.”140

In that same October, the Allied Military Mission ceased to be an 

important factor in Greece. It handed over the country to the returning 

Papandhreou Government and British forces with satisfaction but little 

confidence. The Communist threat had been parried; would it continue 

to be? Woodhouse has stated fairly enough that “If there had been no 

AMM in Greece from 1942, the Communists would have been in total 

control of Greece when the Germans left.” He could hardly believe, 

u Operation MANNA, complementing NOAH’S ARK, was the landing of British and 

proroyalist Greek forces in the south of Greece after the German withdrawal from Athens. 

It was planned, according to British official sources, “to prevent, not to counter, a seizure 

of power by the Communists, and to hold the ring until a representative Greek Government had arranged a settlement of the constitutional question.” (Ehrman, Grand Strategy, 

VI, 45, 61.)

v At the time the Germans left, three English officers and a handful of men were in 

Athens. “These three, although remarkable men,” observed ‘Woodhouse, “did not constitute an insuperable obstacle to the immediate seizure of Athens by ELAS.” (Apple of Discord, n. 1, p. 211.)
Strategy and Politics

91

however, in the lasting sincerity of EAM/ELAS or PEEA. Certainly 

General Scobie’s force knew of the Communist threat. Its main reason 

for being was, in fact, to prevent a coup d’état. On the actions taken to 

prevent such an occurrence, however, the AMM was not consulted. “Of 

responsibility for the decisions taken after that date [12 October 1944] 

and their consequences,” Woodhouse wrote, “the AMM alone must be 

entirely acquitted, because it was entirely excluded.”141

With the liberation of Greece and the disappearance of both the 

Germans and the Allied Military Mission,w this story logically comes 

to a close. Yet the exclusion of the Allied Military Mission from the 

command scene in October 1944 did not end the Greek problem, any 

more than sending the guerrilla delegation from Cairo back to the 

mountains had ended it in September 1943. In essence, this problem 

was that the force controlling most of Greece was EAM/ELAS, whereas 

the incoming Government and the British force were anti-EAM/ELAS. 

Something would have to be done to accommodate these two irreconcilable facts of life, or war would undoubtedly result. For the sake of 

continuity and coherence, therefore, the postlude to the guerrilla war 

is treated here.

A “Discreet Threat of Force”

By the end of November 1944, EAM/ELAS knew that political 

infiltration would not necessarily serve to obtain political control in 

Greece. Saraphis was convinced that Papandhreou was “playing a cynical game” against EAM/ELAS.142 Owing his office to British support, 

Papandhreou relied upon British advisers. And British intent appeared 

to be constantly anti-EAM/ELAS. Such actions as the sudden demobilization of small ELAS units and Scobie’s decision against ELAS in favor 

of EDES in the area of Levkos appeared to be more than straws in the 

wind. General Scobie’s attitude annoyed Saraphis immensely. From the 

point of view of EAM/ELAS, in fact, the exchange of Woodhouse and 

the Allied liaison officers for Scobie and his conventional forces had 

produced surprisingly ungratifying results. It was an added irritation 

that General Scobie had shared with EAM/ELAS not a single experience of the past 2 years and had little understanding of the intricacies 

of the Greek situation. EAM/ELAS now realized that participation in 

the Government of National Unity had given it very little control over 

the course of action taken by that government.143

The most pressing problem for EAM/ELAS in November 1944 was 

that it faced the loss of the ELAS army: by the Lebanon Agreement, 

w Some ALO’s remained in Greece to disband guerrilla forces. The last liaison officers left early in January 1945. (Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VI, 64.)
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

EAM/ELAS had acquiesced in the principle that the guerrilla army 

was temporary. Now the Papandhreou Government took steps to set up 

a Greek army under the command of General Othonaios. In the formation of this army, however, ELAS was allowed practically no role. The 

British reviewed the politics of candidates for the top officer jobs. This 

point, indeed, brought about the resignation of General Othonaios, 

who demanded that he have equality with General Scobie, that the latter control only British forces, and particularly that he not interfere 

with individual appointments in the Greek army. The role of Saraphis was one of the points of friction. After Othonaios left, Saraphis 

found, in conversations with Scobie, that the new Chief of Staff would 

be General Vendiris, a promonarchist who had been unacceptable to 

Othonaios, and who Saraphis “did not imagine . . . could very well act 

as my superior officer. . . .” On down the line, monarchists were favored 

by the British over leftist officers.144

The same discrimination prevailed against ELAS troops. The 

nucleus of the new National Guard was the Mountain Brigade (also 

known as the 3rd, or Rimini, Brigade) which was brought into Greece 

in early November.x

 This brigade had been formed of Greek troops 

who had taken no part in the Middle East mutinies of 1944 and were 

therefore safely promonarchist. EAM/ELAS guerrillas were alarmed 

at the thought of a strong, well-trained, right-wing brigade presumably 

ready to act against them as soon as they were demobilized. They also 

complained that collaborators, even former members of the security 

battalions, were being taken into the National Guard, whereas ELAS 

troops were not called up. They foresaw that, when the guerrilla armies 

were demobilized, the troops of EDES would be called up in preference 

to those of ELAS. By the end of November ELAS faced the doubleedged situation of demobilization of its own force and simultaneous 

growth of a strongly anti-EAM/ELAS army.145

To counter this unfavorable trend of events, EAM/ELAS contended, through its Cabinet Ministers, that the Mountain Brigade 

should be demobilized at the same time as ELAS. In lieu of this, it 

proposed the integration of ELAS with government forces down to the 

section level, with ELAS troops equal in number to all right-wing elements. Neither Papandhreou nor the British would agree. Meanwhile, 

the British insisted that demobilization of the guerrilla armies begin 

on 10 December.146

As the policy of political infiltration again seemed to be failing, the 

proponents of force in EAM/ELAS now took a stronger stand. Chief 

x Against the advice of Woodhouse 3 months earlier. He later wrote that this was “the 

most important single factor contributory to the loss of faith by EAM/ELAS.” (See Apple of 

Discord, p. 215, n. 2.)
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among them was Saraphis, who appeared as eager as any Communist 

to get at the British. For example, when Scobie complained to Saraphis 

that Greek relations with the British no longer seemed friendly, blamed 

ELAS, and reminded Saraphis that guerrillas could not stand up to 

regular troops, Saraphis took it as a prime insult. He repeated Scobie’s 

words to his Communist backers and told them that “it constituted an 

open threat which they ought to bear in mind.” Saraphis as a military 

man was, of course, cognizant that the British forces in Greece were 

extremely thin, that they had little armament, and that British forces 

elsewhere were busy fighting the still active enemy. Outside of Athens, 

the army of ELAS controlled the countryside.147

Still, political action continued. On the question of demobilization, 

the EAM/ELAS ministers in the Papandhreou Government at first 

agreed to a government plan, then changed their minds and refused to 

sign the draft agreement they themselves had prepared. At this point, 

Scobie went over their heads, proclaimed that demobilization would 

begin on 10 December, and distributed leaflets of the proclamation by 

aircraft to hinterland units of EAM/ELAS. This action consolidated 

behind EAM/ELAS its Cabinet Ministers, who were already annoyed 

with Papandhreou for his lack of decision and dependence on British 

Ambassador Leeper. On 1 and 2 December the EAM/ELAS ministers 

left the government. Presumably this maneuver was aimed at bringing 

on a government crisis and overthrowing the Papandhreou Government. By this move and by a “discreet threat of force” the British were 

to be forced into amenability.148

The “discreet threat of force” took several forms that early December. Outside Athens, the Communists put GHQ ELAS on the alert and 

ordered ELAS troops to move nearer to the capital. In Athens a general 

strike was called for Monday, December 4; the ELAS Reserve was called 

up; and the old ELAS Central Committee, superior to GHQ ELAS, was 

re-established. On 2 December, EAM/ELAS requested permission to 

hold a demonstration in Athens the very next day, a Sunday. Permission was granted and preparations went ahead on a mammoth scale. 

Although the British tried to withdraw the permission later, EAM/

ELAS was able to say, plausibly and truthfully enough, that it was too 

late to recall its followers. The demonstration was designed to support 

the resignations from the government. By showing its vast popular base 

in a mammoth rally, EAM/ELAS would prove that no government 

without it could be representative; Papandhreou’s Government would 

fall, and a new one would then be created in which EAM/ELAS would 

presumably take a leading role.149

The plan misfired: instead of leading to political action, it led to 

military operations. The Athenian police, ordered to keep the crowds 
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out of Constitution Square in the heart of Athens, were unable to do 

so, became afraid, and fired. Although they were supposed to have had 

only blank ammunition, some of it must have been exchanged for live, 

for seven persons were killed and as many more wounded. The excitement became frenzy; girls dipped their skirts in the blood and paraded; 

papers were bloodied and carried as flags; some of the police who did 

not get away were literally torn limb from limb. Finally, worn out, the 

crowd dispersed peaceably when British soldiers arrived. But newspapers around the world suddenly became interested in the question of 

Greece; and EAM/ELAS became, in most instances, an international 

hero, with the British playing the role of blackguards trying to enforce 

the return of an unpopular and undemocratic King. Clearly, the Left 

now had its martyrs, its cause, its excuse, and even its propaganda.150

EAM/ELAS pressed its advantage. In Athens, the ELAS Central 

Committee ordered the capture of police stations; a number were 

taken and the police in them executed before the British could rescue 

them. The next day, 4 December, the general strike began. In addition, 

EAM/ELAS attacked the right-wing X organization.151

Without British intervention, the events of 3 and 4 December would 

undoubtedly have brought the political results desired by EAM/ELAS. 

Prime Minister Papandhreou, alarmed by the Sunday tragedy and the 

reaction of EAM, offered his resignation the next day, and arrangements were made to form a new government under a man more acceptable to EAM/ELAS. King George II, who had to give his approval, was 

in London, however, and this delay gave Churchill time to bring pressure on Papandhreou to change his mind. The Prime Minister withdrew his resignation.152

The British also took military measures. On 4 December, General 

Scobie, in the name of the Greek Government, ordered that all ELAS 

units leave the Athens area peaceably within 72 hours, midnight of 

6–7 December. EAM/ELAS, still undecided about war with the British, 

answered that the Papandhreou Government hardly represented the 

will of the Greek people, and asked that the British remain neutral.153

December War

Within the EAM/ELAS leadership, the question of open warfare 

with the British was now being thrashed out behind closed doors. It is 

reported that the moderates wanted to compromise with Papandhreou 

and the British and that the Communists now wanted battle. The final 

decision was “a sort of compromise”—ELAS would defy Scobie and stay 

in Athens, but would not attack British troops. In addition, EAM/ELAS 

would quietly take over the main government buildings on Wednesday 
Strategy and Politics

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morning, 6 December, so as to be in a position to claim that it was in 

fact the government.

This compromise plan was foiled when the attackers on Wednesday 

found one British sentry in front of each government building. Few in 

number and with no orders to attack British troops, the ELAS retreated 

or acted half-heartedly. In those cases where ELAS pressed forward, 

however, British soldiers joined Greek police in firing on the attackers. General Scobie followed up with an air attack on an Athens park 

where ELAS had concentrated some troops. The strafing killed not 

only ELAS troops but civilians living nearby. Both Leftists and moderates reacted strongly to this attack. The war was on.154

Figure 7. Street in the Plaka District of Athens. Heavy fighting occurred in this district during the December War between EAM/ELAS and the British.

Neither side, however, was ready for action. British forces in the Athens area totaled about 10,000 men, of whom about 6,000 were combat troops, organized in three brigades. They were, however, scattered 

throughout Athens in small groups. Scobie’s other resources included 

24 tanks, 2 squadrons of armored cars, and an air squadron of Spitfires. EAM/ELAS had in Athens only about 2,000 trained men. The 

ELAS reserves in Athens numbered between 10,000 and 15,000 men, 

but these were completely unseasoned—just called up, untrained, and 

unorganized. Near Athens there were two divisions of about 8,000 

ELAS guerrillas that could be called upon. They, of course, had no 
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

tanks, armored cars, or aircraft; they did, however, have arms picked 

up from German supply dumps. ELAS forces in this Athens fighting 

were commanded by General Emmanuel Mandakas.155

At first, EAM/ELAS was able to apply increasing pressure. Its command shaped up reserves, mined the streets, brought seasoned guerrillas into the city, and took up positions. It repulsed the Greek Mountain 

Brigade (also known as Rimini Brigade) when it was brought out to 

clear the guerrilla-controlled suburbs. ELAS also put up a sharp fight 

when British troops, using armored cars and tanks, undertook the 

same task on 10–11 December. By the 12th, the British were confined 

to an area approximately two miles long by five or six blocks wide. The 

Mountain Brigade was under constant pressure and unable to leave 

its quarters outside of Athens, getting supplies and maintaining communication only with difficulty. The British themselves were in trouble 

over supply, with only 3 days’ ammunition available. A rumor circulated that General Scobie had decided against withdrawing because 

he lacked the trucks to do it speedily and safely. On 15–16 December, 

ELAS made a major attack against the British but was repulsed. On 

the 18th, it attacked an RAF Detachment outside the British perimeter 

and, after 2 days of fighting, overran it and took several hundred British airmen prisoner.156

A combination of events turned the tide, Scobie refused to make 

any concessions and all negotiations between the British and ELAS 

were fruitless. Meanwhile, General Alexander, now Commander in 

Chief of the Mediterranean Theater, came to Athens on the 11th to 

assess the situation. He sent reinforcements of more than two British 

divisions over the period of 13–27 December. When the ELAS attack 

on the night of 15–16 broke down in its timing and the British were 

able to repulse it, a turning point was unknowingly reached. British 

units in Athens had maintained themselves and relief was on the way.157

While the British were bringing in reinforcements, the Greek 

National Guard, formation of which had begun the month before, was 

being rapidly expanded. By the end of December, 19,000 men had been 

formed into 36 of these “Athens Battalions.” These men, taken without 

question and including rowdies, criminals, collaborators, and even former security battalion members, were of great assistance in the British 

fight against ELAS street snipers. Another measure, that of taking all 

“suspicious” persons into custody, was also helpful. In the December 

fight against EAM/ELAS, therefore, the forces of the political right 

were very much increased.158

ELAS was unable to reinforce itself in Athens to the same extent. Its 

main forces were concentrated in Thessaly, 11 days’ march away. British 

aircraft patrolled the roads and the guerrillas could move only at night. 
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97

Not only that, but ELAS had other matters to attend to: it used many of 

its guerrilla troops to disband what was left of the Andon Tsaous forces 

in Eastern Macedonia, to eliminate EDES finally and completely, to 

keep British garrisons pinned down in the north of Greece, and to protect the coast against possible British landings. During the latter half 

of December, the balance of military power in the Athens area shifted 

from ELAS to the British.159

At the same time, the swing was psychologically away from the Left. 

At the beginning of December, emotions were with EAM/ELAS. In 

power, however, EAM/ELAS looked consistently less attractive. That it 

was Communist-dominated became public knowledge as its spokesman 

shifted from its moderate or leftist fellow-travelers to its real head— 

George Siantos, Secretary-General of the Political Bureau of the Greek 

Communist Party and wartime leader of the Party. In various parts of 

the Athenian suburbs, EAM/ELAS had set up People’s Courts, where 

judgment was often based on slight evidence and always severe. Punishment was carried out summarily and, although at that time there was 

no definite proof, there were rumors of atrocities. Even some of the 

ELAS guerrillas became disillusioned when they learned that they had 

been brought to Athens to fight their ally of October. Some of these 

ELAS men deserted to the British; others allowed themselves to be 

taken prisoner. In eliminating the bands of Andon Tsaous and Zervas,y

ELAS visibly demonstrated an unpleasant policy of Greek-eat-Greek 

not lost on Athenian politicians. Control of the Athens area would have 

consolidated the EAM/ELAS grip on Greece, but the chance was fast 

slipping away.160

Despite their new strength, the British moved carefully in Athens, 

probably because of the pressure of world opinion. Churchill himself, 

with Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, flew in on Christmas Day 1944 

and called a conference of all Greek parties, including EAM/ELAS. He 

was now ready to allow Papandhreou to resign and to support a Greek 

government headed by a more neutral person, Gen. Nicholas Plastiras.z

Late in December 1944, representatives of the various Greek parties met in a cold British Embassy to thrash out their problems at the 

conference table. The only agreement was, as usual, on the question 

of the monarchy: all parties agreed that a Regent should be appointed 

to take the place of George II until a plebiscite could be held. Siantos, shocking the British by appearing in British battle dress, spoke for 

y Zervas’ forces were attacked on 10 December and within 2 weeks were driven into 

the sea. Approximately half of his followers were saved by British evacuation to the island 

of Corfu.

z The man originally nominated by Saraphis before his connection with EAM/ELAS, 

in the spring of 1943.
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EAM/ELAS. He demanded a purge of collaborators, demobilization 

of the right-wing Army forces before demobilization of ELAS, and 40 

to 50 percent of the ministries in a Plastiras government. The liberals, 

disillusioned by Communists, joined the Right in refusing to compromise with EAM/ELAS. The British demands, that ELAS demobilize 

and evacuate the Athens area, were in turn refused by Siantos. In two 

days the conference came to a deadlock. Churchill, muttering about 

Greek politicians and the possibility of an international trusteeship 

for Greece, decided immediately on two things: to persuade the King 

to appoint a Regent, and to begin an all-out British offensive against 

EAM/ELAS in the Athens area, even at the expense of the winter war 

in Italy.161

Once Churchill had made his decisions, British political action 

was immediate and dynamic. The Prime Minister returned home on 

the 29th, and within hours had George II’s reluctant appointment of 

a Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, who was uniquely acceptable to all 

Greeks. Damaskinos had been a figure of greatness in wartime Greece, 

never giving in to the Germans and constantly aiding Greeks of all 

parties. Forced by the Germans to make out a list of possible hostages, 

he had placed his own name at its head. Never a leftist, he still had 

never denounced EAM/ELAS, even under pressure. EAM/ELAS, on 

the other hand, never denounced Damaskinos, and many of the rank 

and file were, in fact, his loyal supporters. On 4 January 1945 Plastiras 

took office as Prime Minister and formed a coalition government that, 

although anti-EAM, was also antiroyalist. These moves gave the moderates in EAM/ELAS a political home to retreat to and helped undermine that organization.162

Meanwhile the British had reinforced their troop strength to about 

60,000 men and had moved against EAM/ELAS. By 30 December 1944, 

the southern half of Athens and much of its port of Piraeus was clear 

of EAM/ELAS forces. By 6 January 1945, ELAS was out of Athens: the 

reserves had gone home and the regulars were retreating. By 11 January ELAS was beaten and suing for an armistice. Hostilities came to an 

end on the 15th.163

EAM/ELAS was not only dead but discredited. The bodies of those 

punished by the People’s Courts had been uncovered in a horribly 

mutilated condition. Furthermore, public opinion both in politically 

conscious urban Greece and in the world was revolted by the treatment of hostages. In retaliation for British arrest of suspicious civilians 

in early December, ELAS had officially decided on 16 December to 

take hostages. On the retreat from Athens, it had carried these poor 

souls along. Forced to march in bitterly cold weather with inadequate 

clothing and food, many had given out. Those who fell behind were 
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99

sometimes shot out-of-hand, and many others died of exposure. In 

all, about 4,000 of the 15,000 hostages are estimated to have perished 

during the ELAS retreat. Furthermore, ELAS refused to release the 

hostages at the time of the armistice. Its treatment of hostages probably did more to discredit it than any other single thing between 1941 

and 1945.164

Figure 8. Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens and Regent of Greece.

Varkiza Agreement

Beginning in February 1945, peace negotiations were held between 

the British and the Greek governments on one side and EAM/ELAS on 

the other. This time, at British insistence, the Communist members of 

EAM/ELAS were forced to the front in negotiations. On 12 February at 

Varkiza, a sea coast resort near Athens, an agreement was signed.

EAM/ELAS agreed to demobilize its forces immediately and to surrender all arms. It also submitted to the Mountain Brigade’s remaining 
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

part of the National Army.”aa On these two points EAM/ELAS suffered 

major losses. Furthermore, hostages held by ELAS were to be freed.

In return, the government agreed to maintain civil liberties; to 

publish an amnesty for political crimes committed after 3 December; 

to purge the civil service, the security services, the gendarmerie; and 

to hold a plebiscite on the constitutional question “within the current 

year,” to be followed by general elections.165

It is generally admitted that EAM/ELAS lived up to the terms of 

the Varkiza Agreement. Arms were turned over to the British in excess 

of expectations, and most guerrilla troops were formally discharged 

and sent home. ELAS, the army that in December had driven Zervas 

into the sea and that, Saraphis claimed, was “ready to face any fresh 

attack” at the beginning of February, ceased to exist on 28 February 

1945. Thus one by one the contestants in the guerrilla war of 1942–

1944 disappeared from the scene.166

As they left, the rightwing Greek forces took over the country, staging a small counterrevolution. In most of Greece, followers of EAM/

ELAS, whether or not Communists, faced a period of harassment. 

Right-wing organizations flourished, led by the X Organization. The 

followers of Zervas returned from Corfu, again taking over in Epirus, 

their old stronghold. In Eastern Macedonia, what was left of the Andon 

Tsaous bands returned to control several towns. Only in Western and 

Central Macedonia did the Left retain any considerable influence. It 

was now a Left composed mainly of Communists, for in the spring of 

1945 the moderates, including Svolos, stalked out of EAM; the National 

Front days were over.167

The counterrevolution, however, did not solve the problems of 

Greece. As Allied victory and V–E Day came and went, these problems 

went on and on: instability of the central government, economic poverty, civilian distress, ruinous inflation, foreign influence, political 

immoderation—and, threaded throughout Greece, the strong hatred 

of Right for Left and Left for Right.168

Strategic Recapitulation

British strategy in Greece during World War II has been sharply 

criticized by elements of all political coloration—in Greece, Great Britain, and the United States.

The political right has charged that by giving support to EAM/

ELAS, the British themselves created the problem of communism in 

aa In the oblique wording of the Agreement, that men “specially trained in modern 

weapons, shall remain in service so long as there is a formation requiring them.”
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Greece and thus made civil war inevitable. Some right-wing elements 

further claim that support should have been withheld from any guerrilla group; others believe; that the British should have supported only 

anti-EAM/ELAS groups and should have openly fought EAM/ELAS. 

One group within Greece goes so far as to claim that the British supported EAM/ELAS only in order to lessen Greek prestige and to avoid 

the need to act on Greek demands at war’s end.169

The political left has maintained that EAM/ELAS was the only 

organization able to fight the Germans, that the British should, therefore, have supported EAM/ELAS exclusively, and that the British, 

by supporting right-wing elements in Greece, precipitated a civil war 

which diverted EAM/ELAS from its potentially greater efforts against 

the Germans.

Moderates have claimed that the British, by supporting the highly 

unpopular Greek monarchy, drove Greek moderates into EAM/ELAS 

and thus under Communist domination; that, instead, the British 

should have supported EAM/ELAS, with the intent of encouraging 

still more moderates to join the organization and gain control over it.

In light of these differing views, it is pertinent to review the conceivable strategies that the British might have followed in Greece during 

World War II. These may be briefly posited as follows:

1. Stay out entirely; send in neither liaison officers nor supply.

2. Send in supply but no liaison officers.

3. Send in liaison officers but no supply.

4. Send in liaison officers and supply to all groups except EAM/ 

ELAS—i.e., resist EAM/ELAS.

5. Send in liaison officers and supply, mainly to the strongest 

group—i.e., support EAM/ELAS.

6. Send in liaison officers and attempt, by discriminate 

apportionment of supply, to harness the power of EAM/

ELAS.

The first choice, staying out of Greece entirely, was not feasible in 

view of the importance in 1942 of the German supply lines running 

through Greece to Gen. Rommel’s forces in Africa, and the fact that 

these lines could be attacked only from inside Greece. The original 

drop into Greece under Myers’ command had the highest military support. Before Rommel was thrown out of Africa in May 1943, in fact, no 

effort to help the British army facing him could be classed as unimportant. Furthermore, staying out of Greece would have been of little help 

to British postwar plans for that country. There is little doubt that, left 

alone, EAM/ELAS could have eliminated all other guerrilla groups. 

By the time the Germans left in late 1944, it would undoubtedly have 
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

consolidated its military and political control over the country. With no 

Allied mission in Greece to report back what was happening, the British government and the Greek government-in-exile would have been 

faced at the time of liberation with an EAM/ELAS fait accompli, without 

any plans of their own to counter it.

The second strategy, sending in support without liaison officers, is 

included merely to complete the list of conceivable choices. It is not 

a serious suggestion, since such action would merely have hastened 

EAM/ELAS domination of Greece.

Had the third strategy been adopted, sending in liaison officers but 

giving no supplies to any of the guerrilla groups, it is highly unlikely that 

the officers would have been tolerated. Even if they had been, EAM/

ELAS would probably have wiped out EDES—as almost happened in 

December 1943—and consolidated its military and political power. The 

liaison officers would have been able to report what was happening but 

unable to affect the course of events as, in fact, they did. Although 

preparations could have been made, outside Greece, to overthrow an 

EAM-sponsored Greek government, such an undertaking would have 

been fraught with the greatest difficulties and embarrassments.

The fourth possibility, sending in liaison officers and openly fighting EAM/ELAS, was tested briefly and proved unsuccessful. Colonel 

Woodhouse has written that its effect, when tried, was “to consolidate 

EAM/ELAS, and to convince even waverers that it was better to cling to 

an organization that was at least Greek, rather than submit to foreign 

dictation.”170 Furthermore, as Brigadier Myers and Colonel Woodhouse 

both noted, without EAM/ELAS and the “operational background” 

it provided, guerrilla operations in Greece could hardly have been 

effective. Merely by withdrawing from an area, EAM/ELAS could have 

allowed the Germans to take over or could have openly betrayed the 

British.171 Since EAM/ELAS did wage war on the Axis, it would have 

appeared at least ridiculous and possibly a breach of faith for the British to have deliberately fought EAM/ELAS during the war when Russia 

herself was an Allied partner.

The fifth strategy, supporting mainly EAM/ELAS as the strongest 

military element in wartime Greece, had obvious limitations. In the 

first place, British support for EAM/ELAS would have meant increasing its bona fides as an organization, and hence its value as a tool of 

Communist power. Other organizations would have been discouraged 

from entering the field and after EAM/ELAS had reached a certain 

size, there would have been no way for the British to ensure any return 

on their investment. Furthermore, the idea that political moderates 

could wrest control of an organization from entrenched Communists 

appears a highly uncertain proposition upon which to base a major 
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103

policy. In all probability such a strategic choice on the part of the British would only have helped the Communists in EAM/ELAS to achieve 

all their own political objectives, directly contrary to British desires, 

without assuming any obligation even to help in military operations.172

The last strategic choice, sending in liaison officers and attempting by discriminate apportionment of support to harness EAM/ELAS, 

was the one the British made, or more correctly, fell into. This is the 

strategy that draws wrath from political right, left, and center. From the 

British government’s point of view, also, the difficulties of the policy 

were obvious; but it was the only one that reconciled their two opposing 

desires, each of which appeared strong in turn—to get on with the war 

against the Axis and to assure a non-Communist and friendly government in Greece at the war’s end.

The wisdom of the British choice seems apparent from their standpoint: EAM/ELAS was closely supervised, even curbed to some extent, 

during the occupation; Greek political leaders outside of Greece were 

made aware of their predicament and readied for action; British forces 

went into Greece in the fall of 1944 prepared to prevent a Communist 

coup. When the coup seemed inevitable, the British were ready to send 

troops in strength sufficient to defeat EAM/ELAS. Greece remained in 

pro-British hands. Given British aims, serious questions on the choice 

of strategy appear to concern less the policy than the means by which 

it was implemented.

CHAPTER III. 

SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS

“THE FIRM”

SELECTION AND TRAINING

COMMUNICATION

SUPPLY AND MONEY

TRANSPORTATION

Support for the Guerrillas

107

SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS

“The Firm”

The wartime agency that the British created for the purpose of furnishing men and materiel to aid the clandestine and overt resistance 

that sprang up wherever Axis forces had occupied formerly independent nations was the Special Operations Executive (SOE). The headquarters of SOE was in London, reporting to the Minister of Economic 

Warfare rather than the War Cabinet. A separate regional office set 

up in 1941 to operate in the Middle East Command, SOE Cairo, was 

responsible for supporting the resistance in Greece. During most of the 

war SOE Cairo was located in Rustom Building. It was known to the 

city’s taxi drivers as Secret House; to insiders, it was “the firm.”1

Because SOE was a wartime agency operating on an ad hoc basis 

and continuously experiencing growing pains, the relations of its local 

offices with the military forces with whom they were ostensibly cooperating were not always clear. SOE Cairo reported to SOE in London 

and received instructions from its parent organization without always 

informing the Service commanders in chief of the Middle East Command. SOE Cairo, in fact, had only “sporadic relations” with the Middle East Command during 1942 and into 1943, according to the Army 

Commander in Chief, General (Field Marshal) Henry Maitland Wilson. 

Early in 1943, he took steps to regularize these relations by directing 

the SOE Cairo staff to attend the daily conferences of the commanders 

in chief and to brief, when necessary, on their activities. It was not until 

autumn 1943, however, that SOE Cairo was brought directly under the 

commanders in chief.2

Equally unclear at the start of the war were SOE’s relations with the 

British diplomatic corps, the Foreign Office, and the Prime Minister. 

Since SOE’s work inevitably involved both the internal politics of the 

country in which it was working and the international relations of that 

country, it was perhaps not surprising that the Foreign Office and SOE 

would come into conflict. As already noted, Greece provided the occasion for a showdown. Following the unexpected arrival of the guerrilla 

delegation in Cairo in August 1943 and the political confusion that 

resulted, SOE Cairo was firmly harnessed by British diplomacy. Not 

even the efforts of General Wilson could change matters. By the end 

of 1943, it could be said that “the firm” was under the orders of the 

Middle East Command and both were subservient to the dictates of 

British foreign policy.3

Not only was the authority of SOE Cairo restricted by limits 

imposed from above, but the staff working with resistance groups was 
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continually fighting a peripheral battle with other British staffs concerned with intelligence activities, escape and evasion nets, political 

propaganda, subversion of enemy troops, and small-boat raids. The 

rivalry was sometimes so keen that British liaison officers would be 

warned by SOE Cairo staff members not to “fraternize” with British 

intelligence men being infiltrated behind the lines by the same small 

boat to the same country.4

Hemmed in from top and side, SOE Cairo soon found a new organization coming in from the other side. This was its American equivalent, 

the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which in 1943 set up a branch in 

Cairo and prepared to send men into Greece. Its first two men entered 

Greece on the plane returning the guerrilla delegation in September 

1943, and, as has been seen, converted the British Military Mission into 

the Allied Military Mission, British liaison officers into Allied liaison 

officers. On the whole, and despite the fact that EAM/ELAS was always 

looking for an exploitable SOE–OSS difference, the British and Americans in the field got along.a

 Back in Cairo, the relations between SOE 

and OSS were more precarious. SOE Cairo tended to withhold information from OSS, and the latter turned to its own private sources in 

the Greek government-in-exile. This tended to upset the relations of 

SOE Cairo with members of the government-in-exile, possibly making 

the latter feel less dependent on the British and less amendable to British control. It might be said that, in Cairo, SOE and OSS cooperated, 

with some mutual suspicion.5

As if SOE Cairo did not already have enough problems for any one 

organization, it was continuously seeking to develop a working internal 

organization and find personnel able to do its jobs. Since it was a wartime organization, there were no established rules, no standing operating procedure, no experienced staff, no administrative experience—in 

short, no nucleus to build upon. Set up in 1941, SOE Cairo reached a 

peak strength during the war of 4000 men.6

 It was reorganized eight 

times, while it was sending men behind the lines and supplying resistance groups. It had eight different names and eight different directors, 

whose terms in office had no necessary coincidence with the organizational changes. “Three of them were civilians who did not entirely trust 

soldiers, and five were senior officers who did not entirely trust politicians or diplomats.”7

SOE’s organizational problem, complicated by the constant change, 

was made critical by the growth of its responsibilities during the war. 

In 1941 the only area to which SOE Cairo was regularly operating was 

the Greek island of Crete, a very small commitment. The addition 

a For the major exception, see page 71.
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of Greece to its responsibilities in late 1942, the growth of aid to the 

Yugoslavian resistance, the addition of Italy in late 1943, and the tremendous increase in clandestine message traffic all compounded SOE 

Cairo’s problems. By 1944 the supply problem alone had reached such 

proportions that the main body of SOE Cairo was moved to Italy. Special operations in Greece, however, remained mainly under the control 

of SOE in Cairo under the Middle East Command until August 1944, 

when they too were moved to the Mediterranean Theater in Italy.8

Even by the fall of 1942 SOE Cairo had added a great number of 

departments, sections, and subsections and assigned a number of new 

people. Rather than combining the work for Greece with that for Crete, 

SOE created a separate desk for Greece. The administrative separation 

of Crete and Greece in SOE Cairob

 amazed many liaison officers. The 

superior of both sections, the head of the Balkan Department, was a 

classic example of misassignment; he was an expert on the Baltic states. 

This sort of thing did not make for the easiest comprehension of the 

problems the field might be facing.9

One of the problems of SOE Cairo was the matter of relationships 

between staff members who stayed in Cairo and field members who 

parachuted or sailed behind the lines. Field and staff were often partly 

envious, partly suspicious of each other. The feelings of the liaison officer were not often assuaged by either “enthusiastic amateurism” or the 

“business as usual” approach. On the one hand, there was no prewar 

civilian or military job that would have adequately prepared a man for 

a staff post in SOE Cairo, and there was little chance to learn on the 

job since the turnover rate was so high. On the other hand, the liaison 

officer was behind enemy lines and his life depended on the adequacy 

of the support he got.10

Even making allowances for human frailty, the liaison men in 

Greece had many legitimate complaints. It has been reported that Brigadier Myers was outraged to learn, several months after he had been 

dropped into Greece, that not one of the cables he and his men had 

prepared for delivery to their families while they were away had been 

sent. These messages had, as a matter of fact, originally been written 

at the insistence of the SOE Cairo staff and edited by that staff. Brigadier Myers complained bitterly and asked for a court of inquiry. In his 

cable, he used the code names of the men in Greece. SOE Cairo was 

compelled to admit that, in the latest reorganization, they had mislaid 

their records. They therefore asked Myers to identify his men by their 

proper names.11

b This may have been justified by the fact that Crete was always a clandestine operation, whereas Greece was an overt one.
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Charges that have, since the war, been made against some of the 

SOE Cairo staff by liaison officers are even more serious. One British 

captain who went behind the lines to the Cretan resistance has publicly charged the senior staff officer in SOE Cairo in 1942, a brigadier, 

with “total disregard for the agents in the field, whom he treated like 

so many expendable commodities.” The captain backed this charge 

with the case of a 40-year-old staff officer assigned to go to Crete for 

the express purpose of blowing up H.M.S. Yorkc

 by marine sabotage—

meaning that he would have to swim at least a mile and attach to the 

ship some six limpets “so heavy that even with one strapped to our chest 

neither Arthur nor I could struggle more than fifty yards without beginning to sink.” Some months later, the brigadier was reported to have 

asked “Hasn’t that fellow . . . been bumped off yet?” The head of the 

Cretan Section presumably offered his resignation and the brigadier 

apologized. Nonetheless, “that fellow” was, after exfiltration, forced to 

resign his commission as a result of a psychiatric report; only later, after 

his superiors in the field had returned, was he reinstated in the Army.12

That even one such serious case of misunderstanding and possible 

malfeasance should have existed hurt the SOE organization. Under 

the best of conditions there would have been some natural animosity among the field against men who lived in the comfort and relative 

safety of Cairo. In one sense, Cairo seemed to men behind the lines 

in Greece and Crete like a “quasi-divine power”; in another, even the 

slightest staff mistake took on the appearance of terrible stupidity if 

not malevolence. One real case lent credence to a hundred fancied 

ones. It would be unsafe, however, to generalize that personal animosities between field and staff men were rampant, or always owing 

to staff fault. Colonel Woodhouse felt that “the same thing would have 

occurred in reverse if the individuals had changed places.” It was the 

system that produced the problems—“the multiplicity, the perpetual 

flux, the deficiency of internal cohesion” of SOE Cairo.13

It was with this background and these problems that SOE Cairo 

faced its responsibilities to the liaison officers in Greece—selecting 

and training men to go behind the lines and maintaining the missions 

once they had been infiltrated.

Selection and Training

Although there were liaison officers who fell a good deal short of 

perfection, who antagonized Greeks, who drank too much, and who 

c This British ship, damaged and left in Soudha harbor, was being refloated and reoutfitted by the Germans. The British were most anxious to prevent a capital ship of theirs 

from being used against them; this, in fact, would have been the first such instance.
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forgot the elementary rules of safety,d a surprisingly large number of 

the officers and men who went behind the lines to Greece or Crete 

proved of high caliber and worth. Consequently it is of interest to review 

the standards SOE Cairo set for the men it sent behind the lines, how 

it chose them, the motives of the men themselves, and the training 

they received. Finally, some individual cases will be reviewed to attempt 

a closer view of the success or failure of the selection process. Since 

the operations in Greece and Crete were essentially different—the one 

being an overt guerrilla war and the other a covert, clandestine resistance—and were handled by different desks in SOE Cairo, the methods and criteria used in the two operations will be compared insofar 

as possible.

Selection

When operations to Crete started in 1941, SOE Cairo had little 

experience in sending men behind the lines or in picking them for the 

job of working with local clandestine resistance groups. It was a new 

business and there were few guidelines. Men knew it would be dangerous, physically taxing, and lonely. The head of the Cretan Section in 

SOE Cairo had himself, however, been one of the British left on that 

island earlier in the year and thus had personal experience of the place 

to guide him. Judging from the background of the men sent over during that first year of operation, the desired attributes appear to have 

been, first, ability to withstand physical hardship; second, experience 

in operating alone and at some risk; third, general intelligence and 

some familiarity with the country, its people, and its language; fourth, 

emotional toughness. The head of the Cretan section in SOE Cairo 

often weeded out recruits by casually asking, “Have you any personal 

objection to committing murder?” The attribute to which all selection 

led was, of course, the tacit question of whether a given man would be 

able to get along with the inhabitants and do his job of controlling, 

guiding, and indirectly directing a clandestine resistance movement. 

Finally, the selected man had to be willing—he had to volunteer.14

The motives that impelled men to volunteer for duty behind the lines 

were many. Among these were boredom in deadend military posts, distaste for militarism in general, the fear of appearing cowardly, love for 

the adventure and camaraderie to be found or sought behind the lines, 

and the appeal of the primitive life. Examples may be cited of liaison 

officers who volunteered for any one or a mixture of these reasons. On 

the negative side, behind the lines duty also appealed to the antisocial, 

d For example, the liaison officer who, upon hearing shots outside during the night, 

flung open the door and fired into the dark. He was promptly killed. (Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 267; and Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 124.)
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the childish, the unstable individual, and to the misanthrope and the 

misfit. The necessity of volunteering therefore had mainly the positive 

value of screening out those who for reasons of risk, morality, or personal feelings, consciously rejected a life behind enemy lines. It did not 

constitute any guarantee of individual suitability for that life.

One of the earliest groups infiltrated into Crete, consisting of two 

officers and two noncommissioned officers, illustrated in some detail 

the problems involved in finding the right men for the job. Of the four 

men in the mission, one returned home because of circumstances not 

under his control, one successfully worked with the resistance forces for 

over 2 years, and two men failed.

The senior officer, a captain, was one of those who failed. He had 

served in World War I and had come into service again in World War 

II. Somewhat earlier that very year, he had won the Military Cross as a 

platoon leader in Abyssinia; thus it seems safe to assume that, despite 

his age, he was physically strong. Since he had spent most of his life in 

the more remote parts of Central Africa and South America, he was 

familiar with and had proved his ability to live on his own in strange 

lands and away from his own people. He did not speak Greek and was 

unfamiliar with Crete. He seemed emotionally tough.

His mission to Crete was to sabotage enemy shipping; to help with 

this task, four Cretan youths had been trained in Egypt. They shipped 

out with him; but, since he could speak no Greek, nor they English, 

there was little communication between them and the captain. To his 

British comrades, with whom he could speak, the captain was something of a trial. He offered unnecessary and unwanted advice to the 

master of the small boat that was going to infiltrate the group. At sailing time, he proved his individuality by appearing in full battle dress, 

carrying camp equipment and a sun helmet. Everyone else, of course, 

wore Cretan dress since the operation was clandestine. The sun helmet 

would probably have been as obvious as an elephant in Crete; the captain possibly owed his life to the fellow officer who threw it overboard 

at the first opportunity during the crossing.

In Crete the captain’s troubles increased. He remained in uniform, and to almost universal amazement, had “pyjamas, a wash basin, 

and . . . a row of medals on his breast.” The officer spent much time collecting stones. His Cretan guide complained that he was made to carry 

stones until he was forced to hide and throw some away so that he could 

continue to walk. Even using sign language, the captain offended one 

of his guides to such an extent that the man left him stranded a half 

mile from a strange village—an unheard of thing. Instead of retracing 

his steps, the captain used no judgment and walked alone into the village. Then he was annoyed that no one could understand him when 
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he spoke English or French. At this point he was in some danger. Since 

the Germans sometimes used spies who pretended to be British, the 

Cretans had a custom of roughing up such people and turning them 

over to the Germans with the remark that here were British spies! Luckily for the captain, no one did this to him although he could easily 

have been mistaken for the German idea of a British agent. Apparently, 

however, the experience upset the captain and convinced him that he 

should leave Crete immediately. He returned to the coast, waited until 

the next boat appeared, and returned to SOE Cairo. To other liaison 

officers on Crete, the captain appeared to have “simply abandoned his 

mission,” although they excused his idiosyncrasies to the Cretans by 

explaining that he “had been wounded in the head in some battle, and, 

it seemed, never quite got over it.” The Cretan reaction was probably 

summed up by one of the guerrillas: “He was a most peculiar man . . . . 

Fortunately he only remained a little while . . . .”15

The second failure was an Australian staff sergeant. Although over 

50 years old, he had been in the Battle of Crete earlier in 1941 and had 

been evacuated after the main British withdrawal. He volunteered to 

return behind the lines with the mission of reporting on the condition of the weapons on Crete, a job for which, as an expert armorer, 

he was well qualified. Among the other men of the group, he was not 

disliked, but he was not taken seriously. With a “clownish instinct for 

exaggeration and gesture,” the sergeant appeared the buffoon. He also 

appeared unreliable. His difficulty on Crete was the exact opposite of 

the captain’s. Instead of being taciturn and unfriendly, he found a host 

of friends that he had made in his short stay there earlier in the year 

and got along fabulously well with the villagers. The problem was that 

on Crete life seemed sunny and pleasant and the war far away. The sergeant spent his time with his Cretan friends, drunk on wine and raki, 

enjoying a respite from the battlefield—apparently his real reason for 

volunteering for duty behind the lines. After a few months he reported 

that he had examined and repaired all the arms “to be found in the 

length and breadth of Crete” and that his mission was completed. Thus 

he left the island.16

The man who lasted over 2 years on the job was a young officer 

who was promoted to captain as he left for his post in order to enhance 

his status with the Cretans. He was physically strong, he gave indication of ability to operate alone, he spoke Greek and was familiar with 

the people, and someone evidently correctly assessed his emotional 

toughness. In his early twenties, this officer had lived in prewar Cyprus, 

where he had worked first as an editor and then tried running a bar. 

He had joined the Cyprus Regiment in the fall of 1940 and in that 

unit had had a chance to implement a deception plan concerning a 
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fictional division, the purpose of which was to deter the Germans from 

planning a Cypriot invasion. Thus when he was offered a chance to go 

behind the lines, this young man knew what he was getting into and 

the kind of work involved. “Even if I had not known,” he has written, “I 

would have accepted without hesitation; for I recognized in the offer a 

God-sent release, not only from the military deadend I had reached, 

but from militarism itself.”17 This dislike of the military pattern, of conforming to a group, this individualism, even eccentricity, appears as 

a continuing thread in the motives of many men who volunteered for 

duty behind the lines.

In addition, the young captain was emotionally sympathetic to the 

idea of resistance, “this simple urge to defend home and property.” 

Immediate, personal resistance to the invader made sense to him. “I 

felt that if I had to fight, the least ignoble purpose and most personally 

satisfying method would be the purpose and method of the Cretans.”18

During his time on the island, the young captain had an opportunity to vindicate the judgment of the man who had sent him. He 

had an opportunity to test both his physical and emotional capacity 

and toughness. He managed to survive a number of close brushes 

with the Germans. He proved to himself, by performing the deed, 

that he had answered correctly that early question about murder. He 

also proved able to adapt himself to the conditions of life in Crete, to 

maintain friendly relations with Cretans in general and the loyalty of 

close associates, and to sustain the inconveniences, the hardships, and 

the boredom that were even harder on the spirit than the dangers of 

enemy entrapment.

Ironically, however, it was his very emotional involvement with the 

Cretan cause and identification with Cretan aspirations that caused 

him trouble. By 1944 it had become “quite clear that the Greek Government’s promise to recognize all resistance groups as members of 

the regular armed forces would never be implemented.” He was forced 

to recognize the impossibility of any fulfillment of “the dreams I had 

cherished of a glorious internal uprising supported by a British invasion.” The realization that Crete had become a backwater of the war 

was a further blow. Without questioning the wisdom of the Allied strategy, he “could not help feeling that because of it our efforts . . . had all 
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been in vain.”19 He therefore asked to leave Crete, volunteering for duty 

behind the lines in France. His request was granted.e

Although it has been possible to track down the names of some 

30-odd officers and men sent at various times to Crete, the number of 

British on the island was, at any one time, small. In early 1942 there 

were 3 officers regularly there; during part of 1943, 5 officers; at the 

time of the partial German evacuation in the fall of 1944, 10 officers. 

There were also a number of enlisted men working mainly as radio 

operators. It was a young man’s club: the average age was in the early 

twenties; only two men were “rather older,” in their later thirties or 

early forties. Almost all of them were reservists. In general they were of 

superior intelligence and education. A number were or became scholars, lawyers, writers; one became a priest. Most of these men were well 

regarded by other liaison officers. One of the enlisted men was considered, by at least several of the officers, the most capable man of them 

all. Interestingly enough, he had little education of the classic British 

variety and could speak no Greek. With several exceptions, most were 

well liked by the Cretans; and most returned the compliment. The success of the selection process, however, appears to have been mainly 

the success of intuition—either that of the head of the Cretan Section, who, an exception to the rule in SOE Cairo, remained in this post 

from late 1941 until the end of the occupation; or of the liaison officers 

who were later asked, while on rest leave, to approach likely prospects 

they knew.20

In contrast to the job on Crete, which was to work directly with 

resistance leaders and to avoid overt activity, the first mission to the 

Greek mainland was sent in to attack and demolish the Gorgopotamos 

bridge. Although the British group was expected to get in touch with 

Zervas and to receive his help, its prime duty was not to work with the 

Greeks but to blow up the bridge. As a result the men were picked to 

work as a team. They were selected, not because they had proved able 

to work on their own in difficult situations or because they knew Greek, 

or because they were skilled in interpersonal relations, but because 

they had certain technical skills the team required to perform its job. 

Of the nine officers that were dropped into Greece in the fall of 1942, 

e His experience in France provides an interesting corollary and sidelight to the process of selecting men for behind-the-lines duty. Despite more than 2 years in Crete, the 

captain was caught by the Germans almost immediately after his drop into France, owing 

in large part to an error on his part. His life was saved only through a brilliant rescue 

engineered by a woman agent (who in turn was so unable to readjust to civilian life that 

she later became a prostitute). Obviously experience behind the lines in one area did not 

guarantee success for a liaison officer or agent in another area. (Fielding, Hide and Seek, 

pp. 236–41.)
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eight had had either commando or demolitions training and four could 

serve as interpreters. The three enlisted men were all radio operators.21

Myers was tapped as leader of the group during a conversation 

between him and a friend on the staff of SOE Cairo, SOE Cairo wanted 

Myers, at this time a major, because he was an engineer officer who 

had made five parachute jumps. Myers demurred. He pointed out that 

he was just ending his seventh year in the Middle East and was due to 

go home in 2 weeks, that he did not speak Greekf

 or any other Balkan 

language, and that he knew nothing of the Balkans except for a “few 

hours in Athens and Dubrovnik.” His friend tried to convince him that 

he could command the Gorgopotamos mission and be back in a few 

weeks and then go home “on the crest of a wave.”22

“I said I was not really interested,” wrote Myers. “It was not my line. 

I was a regular soldier.’ “That’s just why you are so suitable for this particular job,” replied the friend. “We want somebody who is a trained 

staff officer, who could impress the guerrilla leaders, and who could 

organize their forces for a concerted attack.”

Still not keen on the assignment, Myers pondered his physical unfitness: he was in his late thirties and had spent the last 4 months in 

a staff job. During the next few days he decided that “if I was really 

wanted, I ought to go . . . , but . . . I was not going to move a hand’s turn 

about going.”

Finally, Myers was told that “It’s all right. We have got you. The C.-

in-C. says, ‘You will go.’”

“That’s all very well,” Myers answered, “but this is surely a job for 

volunteers, and not a question of ordering people to go.”

“Oh, yes,” Myers’ friend replied. “I meant that, but the C.-in-C. is 

very keen that you should go. You have been personally selected.”

“Many thoughts—of home, parents, duty and of my longing to 

return to England—rushed, all jumbled up, through my mind,” Myers 

later wrote. “But I replied, I hope calmly: ‘All right.’”23

Obviously Myers was more a selectee than a volunteer.g At this point 

he had 4 days to prepare. The following morning he was taken to SOE 

Cairo offices and briefed; and, for the rest of that day and the next, he 

f “I know only two words of Greek, ‘Imi Inglesos’—‘I’m English.’” (Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 32.)

g The same pressure was put upon some of the other men, even if more indirectly. 

One of the commando officers, on being told that he had been selected, was then asked if 

he would go: “I gasped inwardly. The proposition was crazier than any I had ever imagined 

in my wildest dreams . . . . The room was very silent, out of the corner of my eye I noticed 

that the other two officers had stopped working and were watching me. I was being sized 

up. As casually as I could, I said, ‘It sounds all right to me.’” (Hamson, We Fell Among 

Greeks, p. 17.)
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prepared a plan for the demolition and collected his personal equipment and clothing.

Myers, who was to command the Gorgopotamos operation with the 

rank of colonel, was now introduced to Maj. (later Lt. Col. and Col.) 

Christopher Woodhouse, who was to be his second in command. Woodhouse was 25 years old and had already spent some time in 1941 and 

early in 1942 behind the lines in Crete—the only man on the mission 

to have this type of experience. He was well educated, a product of the 

British schools of Wykeham and Oxford, spoke Greek, and was knowledgeable in Greek affairs. Since he was scheduled to stay in Greece 

after the mission was completed, he spent some time during that last 

period with some Greek authorities in Cairo. (The King of Greece and 

his government were still in London.) Myers, not knowing what the 

future had in store, did not have any such interviews.24

On the second night, Myers motored to the Parachute School near 

the Suez Canal and met the rest of the men who had been selected 

for the adventure. Since there were 13 men, of whom only 11 could 

be accommodated on the 3 planes that were allotted, Myers had to 

weed out 2 men. He kept all those who could speak Greek and the 

three radio operators, one for each plane group. This meant there were 

five Engineer officers, of whom only three could go. In a tactful move, 

Myers asked his young second in command to help with the selection, 

because he had seen more of the men than Myers, who had only just 

met them. One officer was rejected because he seemed to lack stamina 

and the other because he appeared “highly strung.” All the officers 

except Myers held reserve commissions.25

Even with only several days’ acquaintanceship, the group had begun 

to arrive at its own peer judgments, some of which were not entirely 

complimentary. One of the commando officers, for example, took a 

dim view of several of the group: an interpreter officer had “a fluent 

command of kitchen Greek”; another officer seemed “a most amusing 

soul, if ineffectual”; and one of the enlisted men was “young, sullen and 

silent.” Nonetheless, the group forbore self-criticism; “like or dislike at 

first sight, we were all in the same adventure together, and we were out 

to discover the best in one another.”26

On the basis of the job it had to do, the mission proved itself. Myers 

managed to contain the frictions that developed within the group during the long period of waiting that preceded the operation. He organized the party well and saw the Gorgopotamos demolition through to 

its successful conclusion. When orders were changed and the mission 

remained in Greece, Myers responded heroically in attempting to rally 

the group’s support. When some of the men became disaffected during 

the disastrous return march, Myers’ rank and experience as a regular 
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officer were probably effective aids in maintaining internal group discipline. Myers’ later role became controversial because of politics, but 

both his immediate subordinate, Woodhouse, and his theater commander, General Wilson, respected and approved his judgment.27

Woodhouse proved to be liked and respected by almost everyone 

on the mission. His bravery, strength, energy, diplomacy, and resourcefulness were outstanding. Tall, red-headed, and only lightly bearded 

in a land of short, swarthy men, he was easily distinguished from the 

Greeks. Yet he volunteered to walk into enemy-occupied Athens and 

did it successfully, earning the respect of all hands. Though he was 

loyal to Myers, Woodhouse could still work effectively with members of 

the group who appeared to dislike his superior. Among the Greeks he 

became a legendary figure. Those who liked him viewed him as a new 

Byron; those who disliked him endowed him with almost satanic qualities. In short, to Zervas’ men, he was heroic, whereas to EAM/ELAS 

he was anathema. This reaction was not necessarily personal—it was 

Greek politics.28

Of the seven other officers on the original mission, all worked 

bravely during the Gorgopotamos operation. At least one performed in 

an extraordinarily outstanding fashion. Although he had been difficult 

and unhappy during periods of inactivity, this man was superb on the 

Gorgopotamos operation, not only in handling the demolitions work, 

but in general leadership. Myers gave him a battlefield promotion in 

recognition of his gallantry. He later worked successfully with Zervas’ 

group until the end of the war. Another officer, who had previously 

been selected as a leader of one of the jump groups, proved of little 

value in the field, “through no fault of his own,” according to Myers. 

Nonetheless, Myers demoted him at the time that he promoted the former officer. There are indications that this officer may have continued 

to be less effective than the rest of the group. Another of the Gorgopotamos officers proved effective, although he seemed always to carry 

a chip on his shoulder. He was the sole final holdout against Myers’ 

request that the mission “volunteer” to stay in Greece. His annoyance 

at this “double-cross” and his latent dislike for Myers made him want 

to leave Greece. He had no great fondness for the Greeks and hated 

EAM/ELAS. Surprisingly, however, when sent out on his own as a liaison officer with EAM/ELAS bands, he proved able to work effectively 

with the guerrillas.29

Myers was frankly disappointed in the enlisted radiomen. According to him, radio communication was in a “state of almost continuous failure,” until a special officer from SOE Cairo was dropped in. In 

extenuation of this seeming incompetence, it should be noted that it 
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was highly unlikely that the three enlisted men had had a chance to 

inspect their equipment before they left for Greece.30

The selection of the Gorgopotamos men had been made on the 

basis of their value as a team. But the time they had been able to spend 

together before dropping into Greece had not allowed for the development of group spirit. Nonetheless, the group survived the ordeals 

of boredom and inactivity previous to Gorgopotamos and of extreme 

physical hardship afterward. Its members then went on to act in smaller, 

separate units as liaison with various Greek guerrilla groups. In general, it was a successful group; several officers remained with the guerrillas until the very end. The selection process, however, had indicated 

only that the men had the physical attributes without which success was 

impossible: it had not been able to guarantee that all members of the 

group could survive the emotional strains of the operation; it had not 

attempted to predict which men, if any, would be useful as liaison with 

the guerrillas.

Men dropped into Greece later knew, of course, that they were 

going in for the duration, as liaison men with the guerrilla groups. 

There is, unfortunately, not sufficient evidence to indicate exactly what 

changes this circumstance may have entailed in the selection process. 

Most of the men sent to Greece were reserve officers with wartime commissions, which may or may not have been a result of the selection process. Experience in a similarly risky undertaking seems to have been 

dropped as a criterion. From the evidence available, it appears that 

reliance continued to be placed upon the qualities of youth and physical condition; intelligence and education, including military training; 

area familiarity and language ability. The situation with regard to selection of men for Greece was apparently that SOE Cairo did not know 

exactly what sort of men would make the best liaison officer with the 

guerrillas. Nor could they always get the characteristics they thought 

they needed. Most liaison officers, wrote Colonel Woodhouse, “entered 

Greece for the first time with no previous knowledge of the country, 

the people or the language.” Thus, although the above characteristics 

could all be measured, they were dropped when necessary. In addition, 

liaison officers also needed to possess integrity, self-discipline, leadership, tact, adaptability, and patience. But these latter qualities seem to 

have been only intuitively assessed, if at all.31

It is interesting to compare the characteristics that SOE Cairo 

appeared to be seeking in the men it sent behind the lines with the 

characteristics that OSS set up as general qualifications for its field 

staff. These were: “(1) Motivation for Assignment: war morale, interest 

in proposed job; (2) Energy and Initiative: activity level, zest, effort . . . ; 

(3) Effective Intelligence:  .  .  .  resourcefulness, originality, good 
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judgment . . . ; (4) Emotional Stability: . . . ; (5) Social Relations: ability 

to get along well with other people, good will, team play, tact, freedom 

from disturbing influences, freedom from annoying traits; (6) Leadership: . . . ; (7) Security: . . . caution, discretion, ability to bluff and to 

mislead.” Physical ability, observing and reporting ability, and propaganda skills were regarded as special qualifications for certain jobs.32

It seems likely that this list of qualifications includes the things that 

SOE Cairo was seeking. It also seems likely that Americans and British 

would put different stress on various characteristics. For example, motivation is at the head of the OSS list. Myers’ motivation appears to have 

been slight, yet once in Greece he was highly desirous of doing a good 

job. Was it wrong to have selected him?

Another point to be raised before the off-the-cuff selection process 

used by SOE Cairo is criticized is this: OSS assessment by psychologists 

and psychiatrists did not even start until the end of 1943—more than a 

year after the Gorgopotamos team under Myers dropped into Greece.33

Furthermore, there is some question as to whether the psychologists’ 

assessment was much more objective than that of the SOE Cairo staff’s. 

In their own self-assessment, the OSS psychologists have written that 

they had “. . . the strong impression that, by and large, the administration had been furnished with meaningful descriptions of the traits 

and abilities of the recruits, which were of considerable service in winnowing the wheat from the chaff and in placing the wheat where it 

belonged. But how valuable is an impression?”34

Searching for a more definitive standard for evaluating the assessment program, OSS turned to a number of appraisal checks. These 

were, on the whole, unsatisfactory. Appraisal methods were unscientific at best; and “our final over-all correlations between assessment ratings and appraisal ratings are of a low order, a result which proves that 

errors of considerable magnitude entered into the assessment process, 

or into the appraisal process, or into both.” Moreover, although certain 

errors had to be accepted as inherent, owing to conditions which could 

not be controlled, it is impossible to say what the minimal error rate 

would have been, if assessment had been perfect. Thus it is impossible 

to know how far above this minimal rate and therefore how erroneous 

the assessment judgments of professional psychologists were.35

Granting these factors and the conditions of stress and haste under 

which SOE Cairo operated, it is not surprising that some liaison officers proved to be duds. That SOE Cairo fielded many effective liaison 

men is more the miracle.
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Training

One of the reasons that SOE Cairo stressed education and previous military training in its selection of men for work behind the lines 

was that, in the beginning, it had few facilities and little time to spare 

for additional training. The four men who set out for Crete in December 1941, for example, were given very little direct training after being 

selected. The captain who proved so successful had reported for an 

interview with the head of the Cretan Section on one day, had met the 

other members of his team the next day, had been sent to the Middle 

East Command Depot for a short sabotage course, and had sailed to 

Crete with a total of 3 days’ training—much of it spent learning how 

to demolish railways, of which Crete possessed none. In the autumn of 

1942, he returned to Egypt for a rest period and went for a week’s emergency course in marine sabotage at the school establishment at Haifa 

before returning to Crete.36

The Gorgopotamos mission, setting out in the fall of 1942, was 

given a total of one-half to 2 days’ training per man, following assembly 

of the volunteers. The 3 weeks’ parachute course was compressed into 

2 days, with two jumps scheduled and given on the second day, one to 

be at night. “Parachute training at that time,” wrote Myers, “was very 

much impeded.” The airdrome was full of bombers withdrawn from 

desert fields because of the German advance into Egypt and they flew 

day and night on continuous bombing service. Finally, after midnight, 

the group was able to practice its drop.37

By the spring of 1943 more training was available for men going 

behind the lines into Greece or Crete. At the Haifa camp, there had 

been established a course in “resistance warfare,” consisting mainly 

of training in demolitions, parachute technique, and the handling of 

enemy weapons. Unfortunately, men scheduled to go into Crete were 

still learning how to sabotage railways (which Crete still lacked) and 

finding it somewhat strange. This training was not necessarily restricted 

to British; SOE Cairo occasionally brought out Greeks and Cretans who 

were working closely with liaison men and sent them through the Haifa 

training course.38

In addition, by 1943, SOE Cairo was adding a lifelike training episode, at least for men going into Crete. To give a man some idea of what 

he was heading into when he went behind the lines, he would be posted 

as conducting officer for those going in immediately. For this trip, he 

would be responsible for preparing provisions for liaison men already 

behind the lines and for escorting the group going in; he would actually make the trip to Crete with them on the motor launch, help them 

to land and unload supplies, meet the beach party, and then return to 

the boat for the return trip. This experience taught him more than one 
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side of his operation: the return run the next morning was the danger time for the crew, when German aircraft would make their attacks 

on the small and vulnerable craft, and few officers helped the crew 

fight off the German Arado 196 seaplanes attacking from their base at 

Canea without appreciating that the crews infiltrating the missions also 

undertook a dangerous and risky business.39

Nothing, of course, replaced first-hand experience, and all the 

training in the world would not necessarily have guaranteed perfect 

performances. But it is surprising that, with so few criteria for selection, 

so offhand a selection process, and so little training, the British missions in Greece and Crete managed so well.

Communication

Integral to every activity of the liaison officer in Greece was the 

problem of communication with his home base, SOE Cairo. Without 

such communication his lifeline of supplies was threatened, his activities 

were performed in a vacuum, and his very existence was endangered.

During the “Great Flap” in 1942, when SOE was evacuated from 

Cairo, missions in Crete were without contact for months. By the fall of 

1942, however, SOE was reinstalled in Cairo and regularly communicating with its men in Crete.

Before the Myers’ mission was dropped onto the Greek mainland, 

SOE Cairo had a tenuous radio connection with Athens through a 

Greek intelligence agent code-named Prometheus II.h It was obvious; 

however, that this one contact could not take care of the combined 

load of intelligence communication and special operations messages. 

In addition, it was located in Athens far from the mountains in which 

guerrilla operations would occur. When the Gorgopotamos mission 

dropped into Greece on 30 September 1942, it carried in three radio 

sets and three trained operators, two of whom were scheduled to 

remain with Zervas’ guerrillas. Thus SOE Cairo expected to augment 

the Prometheus II link with the Greek mainland.

Two of the sets survived the parachute drop, but the operators, to 

Myers’ chagrin, were unable at first to get in touch with Cairo. Myers 

could only report his safe arrival into Greece through the Prometheus 

h Prometheus II was a young naval officer named Koutsoyiannopoulos; Prometheus I 

had been Colonel Bakirdzis, who had earlier been obliged by “German curiosity” to 

escape to Cairo. He later returned to Greece and became briefly head of PEEA and a 

high-ranking member of ELAS. On the other hand, he helped to frustrate a left-wing 

movement in Salonika during the December 1944 war. He was reinstated in the Greek 

Army as a general, but in September 1946 was exiled by the Greek government. In May 

1947 he committed suicide. (Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 35–36.)
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channel almost a month after his drop. Even after the Gorgopotamos 

bridge had been destroyed and Myers’ party was on its way to the evacuation rendezvous, the signals sergeants—combining their sets and 

their talents—could still not reach Cairo. Again a Greek runner had 

to be dispatched to Prometheus to ask him to radio the news of success and the exact place they would be waiting. In the same message, 

Cairo was informed of the whereabouts of the men who were remaining behind. Luckily Prometheus II was able to get the message through. 

SOE dropped a new radio to Woodhouse who had remained with Zervas, and along with it the message for Myers that his party would not, 

after all, be evacuated. Woodhouse immediately sent to the coast a 

Greek runner who gave Myers the unwelcome news.40

Thus the channels by which communication was maintained at 

that time between Woodhouse and Myers were complex—runner to 

Athens, radio from Athens to Cairo, airdrop from Cairo to the Greek 

mountains, and runner from the mountains to the coast. It was a difficult business to keep in touch when direct radio contact was lacking.

Steps were immediately taken, however, to remedy Myers’ communication situation. In addition to sending a radio to Woodhouse, SOE 

Cairo dropped in a new officer who was an expert on radios and, by 

the time Myers and his party had returned, the set was working well. By 

January 1943 long messages were being passed back and forth between 

Myers and Cairo.41 This new, direct communications link came none 

too soon, for in the following month Prometheus II was captured by 

the Germans.i

With his direct line to Cairo, Myers was soon sending and receiving 

a large volume of traffic, all of which had to be coded or deciphered. 

First one, then two additional radio operators were dropped in to the 

mission, then an administrative officer was parachuted in to help cope 

with the signals work. By April, Myers’ headquarters had two independent radios, operating on different wave lengths. When the headquarters moved, one set was sent ahead and radio contact established before 

the other set was dismantled. “The daily and often twice daily, schedules with Cairo worked so regularly,” wrote Myers, “that it was possible 

to maintain an extensive flow of traffic both ways on each schedule.” 

For this efficiency, he gave full credit to the officer dropped in during 

the evacuation days, a man who had been a press correspondent in 

New Zealand in peacetime.42

Myers valued his link with Cairo most highly. During a period of 

travel that spring, he felt that to be out of touch with home base for 

i He was rescued and left Greece a few months later. (Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, 

p. 134.)
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more than a day was extremely disadvantageous to him. As a result he 

requested and got an “additional wireless set with batteries and charging engine in order to form a self-contained mobile unit, on packmules, to travel with me wherever I went.”43

Signals work expanded continuously during the summer of 1943. 

Not only was Myers’ headquarters in constant touch with SOE Cairo, 

but most of the liaison officers living separately with guerrilla bands 

had their own sets and direct contact with SOE. By the summer, in fact, 

one of Myers’ officers from the Royal Corps of Signals had established 

a radio school at Perivoli to teach Greeks how to help operate Allied 

radio equipment. The rapid increase in communications between SOE 

Cairo and Greece, paralleled by similar increases between SOE and 

other resistance movements, had ramifications for the home agency. 

By that fall, according to General Wilson, SOE Cairo was unable to 

meet its signals commitments and Army Signals had to be brought in 

to help out.44

One of the interesting facts regarding communications on the 

Greek mainland was that there was very little German interference 

with the radio signals emanating from the mountains. One liaison officer who operated near German headquarters feared they would use 

direction-finding equipment. He kept an air sentry during transmissions and stopped all transmitting “if there were more than one plane 

in the air near us.” During that summer of 1943, however, the Germans 

apparently never did pinpoint the radio. In Crete, a smaller area more 

closely patrolled by the Germans, they were far more active in ferreting 

out radios and British liaison officers, with the result that sets had to be 

frequently dismantled and moved. In any case, the risk of enemy discovery was apparently far greater in urban areas than in the mountains.45

In addition to keeping in touch with SOE Cairo, liaison officers 

needed to maintain contact with each other. For this purpose the 

radios could be used, one station sending messages back to SOE Cairo 

for retransmittal to the other station in Greece—one reason for the 

communications jam in SOE Cairo. At one time, Myers hoped to be 

able to arrange for direct station-to-station radio communication in 

Greece, but this direct inter-Liaison Officer communication remained 

the exception. In general, communication within Greece depended on 

runners, who could also pick up information, find individuals forced 

into hiding, or carry things that needed to be physically transmitted, for example, gold. On the mainland, Myers not only used willing 

Greeks but was able to organize a number of the Cypriot leave-behinds 

from the British expedition of 1941 into a “Cypriot Runner Service,” 

which ran a regular circuit between the Allied officers. By the summer 

of 1943 there were about 30 of these runners. On Crete, runners had 
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been used since the very beginning of the resistance in 1941; by 1943 

local legends were already developing about certain ones.46

Communication between liaison officers and with SOE Cairo was 

essential to the mental well-being of the men behind the lines. “To be 

out of wireless communication, as I had been for the last fortnight and 

more,” wrote one liaison officer of his 1942 experience in Crete, “always 

produced a certain sense of panic and loss, as though God had ceased 

to exist.”47

Supply and Money

If radio contact with SOE Cairo was valued by the liaison officer, a 

major reason was that it was his only means of ordering supplies. To the 

man in Greece, the boxes of food or clothing or arms that came floating down by parachute or were delivered by naval craft and transported 

across Greece on donkeys seemed indispensable to survival. And in 

fact, this was often the literal truth.

The liaison officers who went to Crete in the early days carried very 

little with them. In late 1941, SOE Cairo sent one man into Crete with 

personal equipment consisting of an “electric torch, a small automatic 

pistol, a map of Crete printed on linen . . ., and a sum of money” equal 

to about 45 dollars. He also brought in approximately a ton of arms and 

ammunition.48

It was not long, however, before SOE Cairo became quite clever at 

providing special items for use in clandestine warfare. By the end of 

1942, infiltrating officers and men were offered their choice of “knives, 

coshes, brandy flasks, binoculars, cameras, compasses, and Borgia-like 

poison rings,” all made to resemble more innocent possessions. There 

were ingenious gadgets like lengths of rubber hose that, when laid 

inside a plane, were supposed to explode when the planes reached a 

given altitude. There were mines that looked like logs, or lumps of coal, 

or stones. Wireless sets were concealed in suitcases. A charging engine 

for the batteries was set in a demijohn, wicker-covered, with a winefilled, detachable top.49

For more down-to-earth business, SOE Cairo offered ether pads 

for quietly getting rid of sentries—these were more usually used for 

starting fires with wet wood—and sulfur-colored pills to put people to 

sleep. There was also a grey, rubber-covered pill for self-destruction in 

case of capture. If sucked, this was supposed to bring on death in 3 or 

4 minutes; individuals were warned that, if it were swallowed, the business of dying would be painfully prolonged for several hours. One British liaison officer was almost lost to the resistance when one of these 

pills became mixed in his pocket with some raisins he was eating.50
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SOE Cairo procured authentic Cretan clothing by the simple expedient of saving the clothes worn back to Cairo by returning liaison 

men or Cretan resistance workers. These men, by custom, left their 

shoes in Crete; their clothes were apparently whisked away from them 

upon landing in Cairo. When these did not suffice, liaison men bought 

used Greek clothing from secondhand shops. Once on the island, 

they supplemented this raiment as best they could with completely 

authentic items.51

Men going to Crete in the guise of Cretans also needed and were supplied with identity cards. Most of these appear to have been regarded as 

sufficiently authentic-appearing to pass routine checks, as on streets or 

buses; but an identity card could not make up for a non-Cretan accent, 

and few liaison men were willing to put their voices to a test. As a matter 

of lack or loss of an identification card does not appear to have worked 

a great hardship on any of the liaison officers in Crete.52

Figure 9. British Officer with Cretan Resistance Workers. The British on Crete 

aspired to complete anonymity, as did this officer (shirtless, in center).
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On the initial drop into mainland Greece, Myers’ group took the 

maximum amount of stores that the three planes would hold. This 

was a total of 36 containers, or about 5 tons of stores, consisting of 

some personal clothing, blankets, and ground-sheets; food and amenities, including bully beef, tea, sugar, tobacco, rum, etc.; medical supplies; explosives for the bridge demolition; and rifles, light automatics, 

ammunition, and hand grenades for the use of the Greek guerrillas 

they hoped to find. These supplies plus radio sets remained the prototype for most resupply deliveries to the mainland, which were entirely 

by airdrop at first. Worn battle suits were used for packing, to avoid 

wasting space and to ease the clothing shortage in Greece.53

By the summer of 1943 SOE Cairo had, through its liaison officers, 

armed something under 8,000 ELAS guerrillas (less than half the total 

number, exclusive of village reserves). It had also armed about 4,000 of 

the 5,000 EDES guerrillas that had been organized in bands. The reason for the initial discrepancy in proportional support was simply that 

of geographic accident.54

The British did regard supplies as a means of controlling the guerrillas. In the summer of 1943, they for a time made supplies conditional 

upon EAM/ELAS acceptance of the National Bands Agreement. During the ELAS-EDES fighting beginning in October 1943 and lasting 

throughout the remainder of the year, SOE Cairo supported EDES 

very heavily, even beyond its requirements, and managed to keep it 

alive. At the same time supplies to the EAM/ELAS guerrillas fighting 

EDES were practically discontinued. Although this action had some 

effect it was largely futile as a control measure, since EAM/ELAS had 

already obtained the surrender of the Italian Pinerolo Division and 

its arms. For some bands of EAM/ELAS too far away from the site of 

internecine fighting to be involved, SOE Cairo did continue to furnish supplies. Also it delivered medical supplies to EAM/ELAS guerrilla bands regardless of location. In January 1944, when the civil war 

in Greece began to quiet down, SOE Cairo resumed support of EAM/

ELAS groups.55

From this time forward, however, EDES was supported to the full 

extent of its strength, whereas deliveries to EAM/ELAS were consistently held down. When shipment of supplies from Italy to Parga in 

EDES territory on the west coast of Greece became possible in the 

spring of 1944, deliveries, mainly to EDES, were considerably increased. 

Clothing and food were in good supply in EDES and heavy arms and 

guns were also brought in, in anticipation of NOAH’S ARK. The British supported EDES not only as a means of harassing the Germans 

but also as a counterbalance to the Communist-dominated force of 

EAM/ELAS.56
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At the same time the support base for EAM/ELAS was held down. 

Saraphis has indicated that at one point in 1943 the British were supporting EAM/ELAS up to a base of 25,000 men, but by the spring of 

1944, this base had apparently been reduced to 10,000 men. At that 

time, the base represented a third of ELAS strength; by the summer, a 

quarter of their enrolled guerrillas. After September 1944 all supplies 

to EAM/ELAS were stopped.57

Most deliveries to EAM/ELAS in 1944 were, furthermore, of nonwarlike supplies. During that spring and summer the British provided 

ELAS with 8,000 uniforms and about 350 tons of food through Turkey, to be picked up by ELANj caiques and transported back to Greece. 

Despite Saraphis’ complaints to the British about the lack of arms and 

ammunition—especially the latter which he claimed was in short supply—very few deliveries of either were made to EAM/ELAS. Ammunition, even for NOAH’S ARK, was, by Saraphis’ account, to be supplied 

after the operation, and then only if the local liaison officer certified that the ammunition had actually been expended and should be 

replaced. According to Saraphis, Allied arms to ELAS totaled 10 mortars, 30 machine guns, 100 submachine guns, 300 automatic rifles, and 

3,000 rifles.58

How much support came to the guerrillas through the port of 

Parga is unknown. Some of what came in went to ELAS, some to EDES, 

and much to the support of Allied troops that supplemented guerrilla 

strength in the summer of 1944. A good idea of the magnitude of the 

supply effort may be gotten, however, by comparing the amount of supplies airdropped or air landed to the guerrillas in Greece, Italy, and 

Yugoslavia. Air effort, including both British and American planes, carried 2,514 tons of supplies to Greece, some 6,000 tons to Italy, and about 

16,500 tons to Yugoslavia. By any standard, so far as direct support to 

the guerrillas was concerned, the investment in Greece was minor.59

SOE Cairo also supplied liaison officers in Greece with money. 

From the very first, money was needed for many purposes—for bribery of local officials, or where possible, enemy troops; for supplies and 

transportation for couriers; for families made destitute as a result of 

resistance activities. Gold sovereigns,k

 the preferred form of money, 

were worth a great deal on the highly inflated Greek currency market. 

One gold sovereign, even in 1943, bought enough food on the black 

market, noted Brigadier Myers, to feed a family for many weeks. On 

the other hand, of course, the influx of gold sovereigns on the Greek 

j Greek People’s Liberation Navy, organized after the surrender of Italy (see 

Chapter IV).

k A gold coin which at that time had been withdrawn from British circulation. Its 

value depended on the local market for gold.
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market added, as Woodhouse was to note, to the inflation that already 

plagued the economy.60

Gold provided a means not only of supporting the Greek guerrillas but of gaining their support. Brigadier Myers originally carried 

with him into Greece a large number of gold sovereigns that proved 

extremely useful, although they had to be judiciously distributed, to 

avoid giving offense. Both EDES and EAM/ELAS received payments as 

early as November 1942.61

In 1943 SOE Cairo supported Myers in an arrangement for substantial financing, of the guerrilla movement. It agreed to pay one gold 

sovereign per month for the upkeep of “each armed and permanently 

embodied” guerrilla. The money was to be used to buy grain for the 

guerrillas, their families, and the vast numbers of destitute Greeks who 

had lost home and livelihood. The gold sovereigns were paid to the 

guerrilla organizations.62

The handling of the funds soon raised questions of propriety. 

Brigadier Myers suspected as early as the summer of 1943 that 

EAM/ELAS was diverting the money to uses other than relief of the 

destitute Greek people. EDES, on the other hand, apparently made 

arrangements to give one sovereign a month to the guerrillas or their 

families. Saraphis immediately complained that, contrary to prior 

arrangements with the British, EDES was paying its guerrillas, whereas 

EAM/ELAS was devoting all resources to the larger cause, the conduct 

of the guerrilla war. Thus every practical detail of guerrilla life was 

constantly converted into propaganda to fit the political controversies 

raging behind the lines.63

On the basis of Brigadier Myers’ estimates of armed guerrillas in 

units in the spring of 1943—ELAS, 16,000; EDES, 5,000; and EKKA, 

less than 1,000—the cost per month at the outset would have been 

in the neighborhood of 22,000 gold sovereigns. The guerrilla leaders at the Joint Headquarters in the summer of 1943 argued, however, that it actually took two gold sovereigns monthly to support an 

armed guerrilla.

In time SOE Cairo acquiesced, and the payments were apparently 

doubled, but the accepted support bases are unknown. Sovereigns as 

well as supplies were denied EAM/ELAS during the period of civil 

fighting in late 1943 and early 1944. Liaison officers in ELAS territory, 

attempting to alleviate the plight of the Greek people and administering the remnants of the Pinerolo Division were, however, involved in 

handling large sums of money, much of which had to be disbursed 

through the guerrilla organization.64

What the total payments to the two guerrilla groups per month 

amounted to, or how long they were continued, cannot be definitely 
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determined from the evidence available for this study. In a provocative generalization, Colonel Woodhouse noted that “Once the first sovereign had been let slip, the process became cumulative; the supply 

increased the demand . . . . When the principle of supplying gold was 

accepted, the quantity could not have been kept within lower limits.”65

Under any circumstances, the cost was moderate as compared to other 

war costs.

Transportation

Though political differences provided one reason for holding down 

supply deliveries, the plain fact of the matter was that there were also 

purely practical limitations on the amount of supplies that could be 

gotten into Greece. In 1942 and 1943, liaison men and supplies were 

delivered behind enemy lines in Crete mostly by clandestine sea craft, 

to mainland Greece mostly by airdrop. After mid-1943, aircraft could 

also be landed on at least one airfield in Greece, which meant that individuals unable to jump could be brought in and other persons taken 

out. Also, delicate supplies such as radio sets could be landed. There is 

no record, however, of any Allied plane ever landing behind the lines 

in Crete. In fact, only 10 men and 39 tons of supplies are known to have 

been dropped onto the island; the remainder were apparently infiltrated by small naval craft. On the other hand, some 200 men were 

parachuted into mainland Greece and over 2,500 tons of supplies airdropped. Also, from the spring of 1944, naval craft delivered men and 

supplies to mainland Greece through the EDES-held port of Parga on 

the west coast. Up until 1944, lack of aircraft and naval vessels would, 

quite apart from the political decision, have limited the amount of support that could have been given the Greek guerrillas.66

In 1941, sea delivery of men and supplies was by either small craft 

or submarine. Conditions on the small clandestine craft used in the 

earliest days to get SOE men to Crete were usually extremely cramped. 

There was barely room for the two officers and four men of the crew; 

the addition of passengers further reduced both comfort and safety. In 

bad weather the trip was dangerous. An early arrival in Crete described 

his infiltration experience in such a small craft under winter weather 

conditions. Of the four crewmen, only one had a sailor’s rating, and he 

was from the submarine service and became quite seasick a few miles 

out. The other three, “by temperament and inclination more suited to 

privateering,” made up in stout-heartedness for their lack of seamanship.  When a storm came up, passengers turned to and helped the 

crew to jettison supplies in an effort to keep the boat afloat and moving. Nevertheless, they had to turn back. The boat was too small to 
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make the trip from Africa to Crete under winter weather conditions, 

and the liaison group had to wait until ad hoc arrangements could 

be made with a submarine commander who “offered to go a little way 

out of his routine patrol.” This group was lucky not to have drowned 

and to have reached Crete. For some months during 1942 when the 

Germans were at Tobruk, clandestine boat service to that island was 

virtually suspended.67

By 1943 SOE Cairo had several motor launches available for trips 

to Crete. Although these boats were somewhat larger than the earlier 

craft, and carried a complement of 15 men, they were still unable to 

cope with heavy seas and had to wait for fair weather. Under good sailing conditions, a boat left for Crete every few months.68

From the base at Derna in Libya, the craft managed to make the 

approximately 200-mile trip to Crete in a day during calm weather. 

Crete was usually sighted before day’s end, but the coast was not 

approached until after nightfall. Since the run was made only in moonless periods in order to avoid being sighted by the enemy, it was quite 

dark during the approach to landfall. The engine would be throttled 

down and all hands would stand on deck waiting for the reception committee to give a proper signal, usually two Morse letters blinked out 

by torch. Having received the proper signal, the skipper of the launch 

would bring it within about 30 yards of land. In calm weather a dinghy 

was lowered, the shore party rowed to land, and the dinghy returned 

for the stores. In heavy weather, these ship-to-shore movements could 

be the hardest part of a hard trip.l

 Sometimes men had to ride a rubber boat to land literally in the face of a gale; if the boat overturned, 

as frequently occurred, the men reached shore with only those items 

secured on their persons.69

There was not always a reception committee on hand. Now and 

then—though not often—the liaison men found themselves left on 

the beach, or more likely the rocky coast—tired, exhausted, wet, cold, 

and with a sense of overwhelming loneliness and desolation. Usually, 

however, they were greeted by a local reception committee headed by 

a British officer. For men drilled to think in terms of clandestine and 

secretive action to avoid enemy notice, these receptions were often 

quite a shock. “The cave was a complete parody of the setting for a 

smugglers’ chorus,” wrote one amazed officer. “It was lit at one end with 

a fire . . . suddenly illuminating a pirate profile, and on a ledge beside 

l One submarine let its passengers off in a small boat in heavy seas a half mile from 

shore and sailed away. After several hours of struggling, the party got to shore, where the 

boat was dashed against the rocks. Most of the stores were lost and the men had to swim 

for their lives. After they landed, they were almost shot as Germans by the local villagers. 

(Psychoundakis, The Cretan Runner, p. 92.)
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the water stood some dozen Cretans  .  .  .  . [who] quivered, jumped, 

waved and welcomed with a variety of instructions to themselves, each 

other, and the boat.”70

For the crew making the trip back to Derna harbor, the time of 

greatest danger was still to come, but the crews were as game as the 

men they left behind. Usually they tried to get some rest before the next 

morning, when German air attacks were most likely to occur. On one 

occasion in 1943, when half the crew of 15 men were wounded, some 

seriously, on the trip back, the ship’s morale never wavered. “There 

was . . . a feeling of human comradeship . . . . Emotions seemed a little 

larger than life. Men . . . felt a friendship and trust . . . it was a happy 

ship.” The seriously wounded asked, when taken to the hospital, if they 

could rejoin the ship when they recovered.71 Highest praise must be 

given to the bravery of those seamen who put SOE men and supplies 

behind the lines.

Although naval craft were used to land men and supplies on the 

Greek mainland in 1944, the difficulties of reception along the coast 

and the distances involved between the SOE naval base in Africa and 

the mainland of Greece precluded any extensive use of clandestine 

naval craft throughout 1943. Support of special forces and guerrillas on 

the mainland was therefore primarily dependent in the first 18 months 

of operations on the availability of aircraft. Throughout 1942 and into 

1943, SOE Cairo had available for all special operations, including 

Yugoslavia, only four aircraft, all Liberators—and one was usually out 

of action for mechanical reasons.72

The long air trip of approximately 750 to 800 miles from Egypt to 

the Greek mainland limited the type of aircraft that could be used. In 

1942 only the American B-24 Liberator bomber, whose practical payload was 6,000 pounds to a range of approximately 1,000 miles, was 

available. It was such a plane that Myers’ group dropped from. Since 

the Liberator comfortably carried only 4 parachutists, 3 planes were 

required to drop the 12 men. Each plane also carried 12 containers of 

stores in its bomb bays.73

The Liberator was not particularly popular with the parachutists. 

It did not have a good exit, and the men had to use the small opening 

of the emergency hatch—not an easy job When they were rigged and 

loaded. The Liberator also dropped men at speeds and heights somewhat greater than other aircraft. Also, these Liberators did not have 

the built-in strong-point, to which the static lines of the parachutes 

could be attached. When one of the commando officers asked about 

the strong-point, the SOE Cairo answer was that they were getting one 

“fixed up” on each plane. “I went a little cold,” wrote the officer. “The 
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133

strong-point was the essential factor in the safety of parachuting, and I 

didn’t like any facile talk about it.”74

Jumping was made even harder for Myers’ group by the fact that 

the three radios and extra batteries did not fit into regular containers 

and had to be specially handled. This meant that they were attached to 

a man’s parachute harness, over his head, between him and the parachute. After the man eased himself through the emergency hatch, the 

dispatcher lowered the radio after him, and the parachute was then 

opened in the usual fashion by the static line. “As soon as one landed,” 

explained Myers, who carried a set in this fashion, “one was liable to be 

hit on the head by the package, and during the descent one swung like 

a pendulum below it, with no control whatever either upon swaying or 

upon direction.” Six of the twelve men had this most inconvenient rigging; later the practice was discontinued.75

The other stores for Myers’ group fitted into the Liberators easily 

and were mechanically discharged from the bomb bays. They were 

dropped on the same runs as the men—two men per run, two runs 

per plane.76

The first jump onto mainland Greece was made under difficult 

conditions. On the first attempt, the three Liberators roamed over 

Greece all night looking for the expected reception committee; not 

finding it, they finally turned back. Servicing the aircraft delayed the 

second attempt by a day. The third night, they again tried. Myers saw 

three fires and, although they were not in the right pattern, he decided 

to jump.  The second planeload of men also jumped; but the third 

returned to Africa yet again and did not make the jump until almost 

a month later. The fires to which Myers jumped turned out to be only 

shepherds’ bonfires, so that the group actually went in blind. Myers 

found the other men from his plane the next day, the men from the second plane within a week, and those from the third plane about 6 weeks 

later. All had in fact jumped blind, but none of the 12 had been hurt.77

Despite the difficulties of parachuting into the mountains of 

Greece, the record of safety was high. In fact, of all the 200-odd men 

who parachuted in, Brigadier Myers knew of only two deaths directly 

attributable to the jump.78

The four Liberators remained the only aircraft available for special 

operations until the spring of 1943. In March, 14 British Halifax bombers, with a payload of 7,500 pounds to a range of 800 miles, augmented 

the Liberators. Eventually SOE Cairo controlled a total of 40 aircraft 

used for special operations. In 1944, American C-47 transports, carrying 3,000 to 4,500 pounds and operating from a closer base in Brindisi, 

Italy, began to carry supplies to Greece. American bombers and transports, in fact, carried a little over a third of all air-delivered supplies.79
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The additional aircraft quickly resulted in increased attempts to 

deliver supplies. Whereas in February 1943, Myers reported that only 

four sorties to Greece had been successful, meeting only one-quarter 

of his current supply needs, it was possible in that month for SOE Cairo 

to make arrangements for additional deliveries. “The firm” planned for 

8 sorties in March, 12 in April, 16 in May, and 24 per month thereafter 

until bad weather. In April, SOE Cairo upped the figures from 16 to 

40 sorties for May and June; in June, it increased the number for that 

month from 40 to 70. By May 1943 some reception grounds were averaging two drops a week.80

Although sorties were not always successfully concluded, an increase 

in attempts did under normal conditions increase supply deliveries. 

Out of 1,333 sorties flown to Greece by the end of the German occupation in October 1944, 78 percent (1,040) were listed as successful. This 

percentage of success was, however, a reflection simply of the air point 

of view. It means that, on 78 percent of the sorties, weather conditions 

at the takeoff point, over target, and at return base were adequate; 

enemy action aborted neither the sortie nor the ground reception committee; and communication with a ground reception committee was 

achieved—in short, that supplies were dropped from the aircraft.81

From the ground point of view, the 78 percent figure must be scaled 

down as a measure of success. Success to the liaison officer meant that 

the drop was collected and in his hands. Often, however, supplies 

landed far adrift of the drop zone, with the result that many containers were in positions where it was impossible to salvage, or sometimes 

even to locate them. Local villagers—often near starvation—found 

the temptation to form foraging teams irresistible. Competing guerrilla bands sometimes tried to divert Allied aircraft drops by flashing 

signals to aircraft in the hope they would fool the pilot into dropping 

to the wrong reception, and they also picked up containers gone astray 

from legitimate drop zones. The Allied liaison officer undoubtedly 

felt that the percentage of successful sorties was considerably less than 

78 percent.

Because of the importance of supply deliveries, special operations 

people and the air units carrying out supply sorties worked constantly 

to raise both the percentage of successful sorties and of supplies collected. These efforts took various directions. None was more important than the assignment of skilled pilots. Good pilots could practically 

put the containers onto the signal fires, to the great delight of both 

the liaison officers and the guerrillas in the reception committees. 

Even the Greeks could soon tell the good pilots from the bad. “Their 

contempt of a plane that was afraid to come low and consequently 
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135

scattered its containers over a large area was comical to see,” wrote one 

liaison officer.82

Improvement of communication was another key to more effective 

air supply. Not only was reliable contact between Greece and Cairo necessary to make arrangements for reception and to give local weather 

conditions, but good air-ground communication was required to 

guide the plane onto target, to give directions concerning local wind 

or topographical conditions, and to identify both plane and reception 

as friendly. In general, Allied liaison officers relied on signal flares to 

guide in the pilot. Usually, the reception committee lighted a single 

fire first; when they heard the plane, they lighted other ready-stacked 

fires in the agreed-upon pattern of a circle, triangle, letter, etc. After 

one reception committee was bombed by a four-engine German plane 

masquerading as a Halifax, however, arrangements were made for 

planes to flash a signal—a different letter each day of a pre-arranged 

code sentence—before the pattern of fires was lighted.83

Fire signals were not always satisfactory from the air point of view, 

and there were some attempts in 1944 to bring in Rebecca/Eureka 

equipment. The Eureka equipment was the ground complement of an 

electronic communication device that made contact, when switched 

on, with the Rebecca component in the aircraft. Some contacts were 

made between missions on the ground and planes delivering supplies, 

but for a number of reasons this equipment did not get the complete 

test in Greece that might have conclusively proved its worth. The equipment did not become available until late in the war; some of the Eureka 

sets were not reliable; and it was found that aircrews lost interest in 

using the Rebeccas unless they were used on all missions, unless the 

weather was bad, and unless indoctrination in their use was more or 

less continuous. Mountainous terrain, in which most supply drops were 

carried out, reduced the normal 50-mile open-country range of the 

Eureka and made navigators even less willing to depend on the equipment rather than on visual signs.84 On the positive side, the sets were 

easy to use and made drops possible in bad weather, of which there 

was plenty.m

When air and ground personnel were involved in joint undertakings, each needed to understand the problems of the other; in this 

respect, special operations personnel were no different from the average. It is easy to understand the frustrations of liaison men who lost 

m S-phone equipment was employed in only a very few special operations after August 

1944 and, so far as is known, not at all in Greece. It proved in those few instances a sturdy, 

useful, and reliable adjunct to the Rebecca/Eureka equipment. Used after the latter 

equipment had brought the aircraft to the target, the Sugarphone was valuable for giving 

landing or dropping instructions or for passing intelligence information.
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needed supplies because they were dropped to the wrong reception, or 

scattered over too large an area, or not dropped at all.

Nonetheless, when liaison officers became too critical of the air 

effort, SOE Cairo sometimes arranged for them to obtain a firsthand 

view of the aircrew’s problems. One officer who wrote a critical report 

was invited, on his return to Cairo, to go on a supply sortie, to judge the 

efficiency of air delivery for himself. His complaint had been that the 

aircrews failed either to find the drop zone at all or to come low enough 

to put the supply containers on it. On this sortie, the liaison officer perceived matters through different eyes. He was appalled by the closeness 

of enemy flak as they approached land and the perilous maneuver that 

the pilot made to get out of range by edging the aircraft behind some 

mountain ridges. The liaison officer was further surprised that it was 

not so easy to find the drop zone as he had imagined. He was unable to 

distinguish shepherds’ bonfires from reception flares, and the captain 

of the plane finally picked out the correct blaze. On the drop runs, the 

liaison officer found the plane was so close to the ground that he could 

see each person in the reception crew at work. Convinced by now that 

the aircrews were doing their duty, the officer promised himself, on his 

safe return, “never again” to complain of the air effort.85

Even General Saraphis came to realize through personal experience that not all aircraft delays were due to British machinations. 

“On this journey,” he finally wrote, “on which we had made three 

attempts to land, I came to appreciate the reasons for the delay in our 

departure . . . .”86

The fact that General Saraphis had been taken out of Greece and 

landed back in Greece was the outward token of an amazing piece 

of enterprise and ingenuity—Allied aircraft were able to land safely 

behind enemy lines.

As early as June 1943 SOE Cairo asked all liaison officers in Greece 

if they knew of any area where a landing strip could be constructed, 

so that two-way traffic could be started. The major requirements for 

such a strip, according to SOE Cairo, were that it be 1,400 yards long at 

sea level, 100 yards wide, built in the direction of the prevailing wind, 

and at least 10 miles from the nearest enemy garrison. These specifications were based on the expectation that the obsolete Vickers Wellesley 

plane, which needed a long runway, would be used. Actually the C-47 

transport that was used needed only 600 yards for a takeoff, but the 

correction was never transmitted to the British liaison officer who constructed the airstrip.

The only ground that appeared feasible was near Neraidha, where 

a plateau ran north-south in an area where the prevailing summer 

breeze was northerly. It was 2,500 feet above sea level, a fact that would 
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137

necessitate adding 300 yards to the length of the airstrip. The actual 

dimensions of the completed airstrip were therefore 1,700 yards in 

length and 200 yards in width. The greatest difficulty however, was that 

the field was bisected by a large stream that, although almost dry in the 

summer, presented a fill-in problem. Early in July, SOE Cairo gave the 

go-ahead for construction of the field.

The liaison officer responsible for its construction acted with 

immense energy. Working through the local ELAS guerrilla leader 

and using large numbers of Greek laborers, many of them women, in 

two shifts per day of 350 workers each, he had the airstrip completed 

in slightly over a month. After it began to take shape and could be 

observed from the air, the liaison officer had to camouflage it. Although 

he lacked any special instructions on camouflage techniques, he did so 

well that the Middle East Air Interpretation Unit described the field, 

on the basis of photographs taken by an unscheduled Allied plane, as 

worse than useless, with hillocks, scrub, small trees, and other obstacles on it. Fortunately, Brigadier Myers himself inspected the strip and 

reported the facts to SOE Cairo. The mission was congratulated on its 

feat and the Royal Air Force accepted the field, scheduling the drop of 

a pilot to guide in the first plane.87

At 2200 hours, 11 August 1943, the first clandestine plane landed in 

Occupied Greece. A C-47 transport, it was guided onto the field by the 

ground pilot and a crew of Greeks who had been drilled in the use of 

landing flares. It went down the field and turned at the very spot where 

the stream had been filled in. One wheel bogged down, but the plane 

completed the turn and came to rest safely. Within 7 minutes, 6 men 

and various radios were unloaded, the 12 departing passengers were 

in their places, and the plane was off the ground. Five and one-half 

hours after it had landed in Greece it was coming down at an airport 

outside Cairo. This Greek landing strip is thought to have been the first 

Allied field built in its entirety in German-occupied territory in World 

War II.88

Other landing strips were in use in Greece by the late summer of 

1943, thus increasing the number of liaison men and the amount of 

supplies that could be delivered and allowing Allied aircraft to take 

out escaped prisoners of war, downed airmen, and casualties.89 This 

was a bonus of the resistance work which could hardly be translated 

into dollars.

The cost of air transportation to Greece, on the other hand, was 

one of the largest single items in the maintenance of the liaison officers 

and in support of the guerrillas. On the basis that 1,333 sorties were 

attempted to Greece and three aircraft were lost, and assuming parity 

between bomber and transport sorties and losses, it has been roughly 
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

estimated that air support added a little over $1,000 per ton in transportation costs.n

Actually, except for some of the winter months, when air transport 

practically ceased at times, transportation to Greece offered the Allies 

no insuperable problems. This was due to the fact that the decision had 

by then been made to limit supply deliveries in order to avoid a large 

build-up of guerrilla forces. The aircraft available for special operations work were thus sufficient for the degree of support allotted to the 

Greek resistance.

In reviewing the work of SOE in Cairo, much may be said both for 

and against it. It was organized quickly in an ad hoc way to take care of 

one of the most complex and most difficult of all wartime jobs. It was 

unable to cope alone with the vast communication problem that arose. 

It crossed the paths of many agencies with much conflict of interest. 

The military judgment of the work of SOE Cairo by General Wilson 

seems balanced between generosity and fairness: “. . . it was over control 

and policy that difficulties had occurred; on the training of personnel, 

the provision of special equipment for liaison teams and the organizing 

for packing and dispatch of supplies to the ‘andartes’. . . , the work of 

S.O.E. was first rate.”90

SOE Cairo got the men and the materiel into Greece. The big story, 

of course, was what happened behind enemy lines.

n See Appendix G.
CHAPTER IV. 

BEHIND ENEMY LINES—VILLAGERS,

GUERRILLAS, AND LIAISON OFFICERS

MOUNTAIN GREECE

ELAS, GUERRILLA ARM OF EAM

EDES, GUERRILLAS OF ZERVAS

ALLIED TROOPS WITH THE GUERRILLAS

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141

BEHIND ENEMY LINES—VILLAGERS, GUERRILLAS, 

AND LIAISON OFFICERS

Mountain Greece

The battlefields of the guerrilla war existed wherever guerrillas faced the soldiers of the occupation, but in the main, operations 

occurred in the mountains of Greece. It was here that transportation 

targets were most vulnerable. It was here that hideouts abounded. It 

was here that guerrillas could use terrain to neutralize the superior 

firepower of their adversary. It was in the mountains that guerrillas 

found staunch support from their countrymen who were living in what 

had become an area of military operations.

Greece’s overriding physical feature is its mountains. These comprise over 60 percent of the total land mass and have had tremendous 

influence on Greece and its people. So extensive are the mountains 

that, although there are plains in Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, and the 

Peloponnesus, the major topographic feature even in these areas is the 

mountains. In general, they are steep and their slopes are barren or 

scrubby. They contain deep caves and a number of forests that effectively 

hid bandits in prewar days and were a boon to guerrillas in time of war.1

The mountains limit the location of the villages. Most are situated 

in the valleys, consist of several hundred dwellings, and have from 500 

to 2,000 inhabitants. Many villages in Greece are so remote that no 

roads lead to them; they can be reached only by trails over the mountains. Some villages constructed during difficult times in Greece’s past 

had been built with defense in mind; these could be and often were 

turned by guerrillas into veritable strongholds. In general, however, 

the villages were vulnerable to attack; at the same time, surprise attack 

was unlikely. Shepherds on nearby mountains would see the dust cloud 

raised by the motor vehicles of the occupation troops as soon as they 

left a few paved roads; the villagers generally knew that enemy troops 

were coming long before they arrived.a Despite their vulnerability, the 

villages were used by the Greek guerrillas. Sometimes villages that had 

been burned were used again in guerrilla combat.2 “For our troops,” a 

German battalion commander testified, “every Greek settlement away 

from the supply roads was just the same as the enemy’s main line of 

resistance. It was suicide to approach them.”3

Rural Greece provided many hideouts and good camouflage for the 

guerrillas. Along the shore there were wide strips of reeds; in the valleys 

a Since Greece has generally dry summers, the dust cloud was a reliable indicator during the major season of troop action, as German commanders have testified.
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

and on the lower slopes of the mountains, there was dense underbrush; 

in the mountains, there were gorges, crevices, and caves. The mountains 

were safe only for those who knew them well. “A stranger becomes lost 

in this stony desert,” wrote a German troop commander, “because of its 

changing yet often so similar appearance.”4 Few roads and only one railway line went through these mountains, winding through high passes, 

serpentine curves, and long, lonely stretches ideal for surprise attacks.

Guerrilla operations took place not only on the mountain sides and 

in the mountain villages but right in the middle of Greek life. Mountain society formed the milieu in which the guerrillas operated. What 

kind of society was this? What sort of people lived on this battlefield?

The mountains affected most aspects of the life of their inhabitants. They kept the average Greek poor. They isolated him from the 

main currents of life. Pocketed into a small geographic area, many 

Greeks lived and died without going more than a few miles from their 

native villages. As a result, that suspicion of strangers traditional to an 

insular people was reinforced. This isolation was so complete in some 

cases that not even the central government of Greece had asserted a 

real grip over the people. Poverty, suspicion, remoteness from central 

authority, and complete exposure to the accidents of nature accentuated in the Greek mountain population two further characteristics of 

importance in the guerrilla war: a strong feeling for religion and an 

underlying primitivism.5

Religious feeling underwrote the resistance. The clergy of the 

dominant Greek Orthodox Church were generally men of the people, 

with little academic training, and very close in spirit to their parishioners. Almost without exception the clergy secretly aided the guerrillas 

and some actually joined them, without regard to political affiliation. 

Priests blessed the guerrilla bands, including those which were Communist. Individual Greeks spoke of the resistance with the imagery of 

religious devotion. “God has sent us Englishmen from heaven,” Nikolaos Beis said to himself on learning that British officers of Myers’ party 

had parachuted near his village; “it is my duty to go and help them.”6

Social forces underlined the elements of primitivism in Greek 

mountain life. In 1942 this life was organized along the same lines that 

had sustained it for hundreds of years. It was a strongly patriarchal society in which decisions by the family head bound all family members. 

A decision to join or to aid the guerrillas thus tended to bring into the 

resistance orbit all relatives, even those far removed. It stilled the voices 

of women who might have preferred not to risk the lives of husbands 

or sons. It gave to those who joined or helped the guerrillas the aura of 

respectability and morality. There were actually guerrilla bands composed entirely of members of the same family.7
Behind Enemy Lines

143

Figure 10. Greek Terrain Map.

A concomitant of the patriarchal society, reinforced by the mountain Greek’s remoteness from and distrust of his central government, 

was the system of vendetta that prevailed in many regions. By this, family members were responsible for punishing transgressions against the 

family. Vendettas had led to long-standing feuds between families. In 

many ways, vendettas and the resulting feuds complicated guerrilla life; 

for example, when members of rival families joined the same guerrilla 

band. One British liaison officer was faced with a situation wherein a 

guerrilla who had turned traitor and had been judged guilty could 

not be punished by his guerrilla group without starting a new vendetta 

against the group; the problem remained unsolved until the traitor’s 

family was persuaded to punish its own member. “Even the Occupation,” wrote one British officer who worked on Crete, “.  .  .  failed to 

suppress this minor universal warfare; private vengeance . . . laid many 
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

villagers low.” On the other hand, the vendetta was a sort of guerrilla 

war in microcosm—a training ground for 1942–44. Psychologically, it 

had accustomed Greeks to extralegal activity, resort to violence, and 

the taking of life.8

These tendencies to violence had been reinforced by history. 

Through the long years of Turkish occupation and the wars of independence, the Greek developed a tradition of individual resistance to 

oppression. One guerrilla leader of a Cretan band was a veteran of 

guerrilla warfare in Macedonia against Bulgarian komitadjis; he was not 

an exception.9

Banditry was endemic in Greece before World War II. In the Grammos Mountains, for example, bandits had successfully hidden out for 

many years. When the guerrilla bands came into regions where bandits 

lived, many joined the guerrillas in an effort to regain social status; some 

were faced with the choice of joining the group or being destroyed by 

it. In either case, the bandits, already brutalized by their vocation and 

their life, raised questions of control. But brought into guerrilla cadres 

and accepting at least the minimum discipline required by the band, 

they formed a rough-hewn addition to the ranks of villagers-turnedguerrillas.10 At the same time their presence accentuated the primitivism and brutality that often marked guerrilla life.

In addition to all of these factors, there was in Greek mountain 

life a certain passivism, an acceptance of fate, a stoicism in the face 

of disaster. Relentlessly pressed by guerrilla bands on one side and by 

enemy retaliation on the other, the Greek mountain peasant accepted 

the lot of Job without complaint. On aspect of this stoicism was what 

one liaison officer called “a happy disregard of human life.” Torture 

and execution did not seem to upset the mountain Greeks.

They also accepted their own ghastly misfortunes. When Greek peasant women watched guerrillas prepare for sabotage operations nearby, 

they did not berate the guerrillas—they loaded what family possessions 

they could on the available donkeys and went off to mountain hideouts. 

When Greek men from Kaitsa—a village that had already been burned 

twice in retaliation for sabotage—saw new preparations for interdiction operations, they visited the guerrillas. “They didn’t ask us to stop 

sabotaging the railway line, but requested modestly that if we did anything it would be on a scale comparative to the reprisals that would 

follow,” reported the British liaison officer.11 It was this uncomplaining endurance of bitter fate that encompassed and supported guerrilla 

warfare in Greece. It is not surprising that liaison officer after liaison 

officer has said, “The real heroes of the Greek war of resistance were 

the common people of the hills.”12
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145

Figure 11. Mountain Paths.

The environment of the mountains and the “peculiarity of character” of the Greek people who lived in the mountain villages formed 

a medium of uncommon support for guerrilla warfare. As one German counterguerrilla commander reflected, Greece was “an Eldorado 

for partisans.”13

Although the men who led the guerrillas generally came from the 

cities, the rank and file of the guerrilla forces were the village and 

mountain Greeks. Despite their national and racial homogeneity, they 

were divided and subdivided into many mutually exclusive groups of 

guerrillas. The two largest guerrilla armies, those of EAM/ELAS and 

EDES, could never be successfully amalgamated, either through British manipulation or the brute force exerted by EAM/ELAS. EKKA, 

the next largest group, much smaller than either of the others, was 

ruthlessly crushed by EAM/ELAS and eventually disappeared from 

the scene. It never figured seriously in guerrilla operations against the 

enemy. This was true of most of the myriads of guerrilla bands that 

appeared and then faded away. Even those that survived the war intact, 

such as the Andon Tsaous band in Macedonia or EOK in Crete, are 
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

disregarded in this study because they were local in organization or 

limited in effectiveness. Discussion of the guerrilla contestants, for the 

purposes of this study, is therefore confined to the two major organizations that were able to field guerrillas—EAM/ELAS and EDES.

The development of these two organizations differed in almost every 

significant particular. EDES guerrillas under Zervas broke away from 

their founding group, EDES in Athens; but ELAS never became independent of its founding parent, EAM. Unlike EDES, which became the child 

of one man—Zervas, ELAS never had a single outstanding and all-important commander. Whereas EDES eventually attracted too many officers 

for its own needs, ELAS always lacked a sufficient supply of trained officers. Although EDES operated mainly in Epirus, EAM/ ELAS stretched 

out to become strong in almost all areas of mainland Greece.

ELAS, Guerrilla Arm of EAM

In December 1942 EAM, the National Liberation Front, formally 

announced the formation of a guerrilla army to carry on the fight in 

occupied Greece. It was designated ELAS, the National Popular Liberation Army, a psychologically felicitous choice of titles in that it so 

closely resembled Ellas, the Greek name for Greece. At the time of its 

announced creation ELAS controlled several hundred men grouped in 

small bands.

Having bands already organized in the mountains, EAM/ELAS now 

faced the major problem of finding a suitable military commander for 

ELAS. The obvious first aspirant for such a job was Athanasios Klaras, 

alias Aris Veloukhiotis, and best known as Aris, who had already laid 

his claim to fame by helping Myers on the Gorgopotamos operation 

and who was known throughout the Greek mountainside for his implacable will.

Colonel Woodhouse regarded Aris, along with Zervas, as one of the 

two great personalities produced by the Greek resistance. By force alone, 

this small, silent, dour, and guarded man with his black beard and black 

Cossack hat merited the appellation. Although Aris’ back-ground was 

middle class, he had long since left the ranks of the bourgeoisie. He had 

been a school teacher, had become a Communist, had been trained in 

Moscow, and had presumably taken part in the Spanish Civil War. He 

was known to Denys Hamson, a British liaison officer who knew him 

well, as a practicing homosexual and pederast; he had reportedly been 

convicted for homosexual offenses. “I suppose,” wrote Hamson, “he was 

the most ruthless man I have ever met, the most cold-blooded, the cruelest . . . an intelligent, able man with no heart, without human pity, an 

excellent psychologist, a fanatical leader of men. Later, when I came to 

know him better, I had no doubt that after one of our all-day drinking 
Behind Enemy Lines

147

sessions in the most friendly atmosphere, he would have literally flayed 

me alive if it had suited his purpose.” Aris was also extremely brave 

physically, an exponent of force almost without exception.14

To the mountains of Greece, Aris brought not only guerrilla warfare 

but a primitive, elemental, brutal form of justice with many overtones 

of sadism. For example, Brigadier Myers has recorded an instance during the buildup for the Gorgopotamos operation when Aris slipped 

away for a while. He went to a near-by village to investigate a reported 

case of cattle stealing. “He had had the culprit stripped and publicly 

beaten in the village square,” wrote Myers, “by the newest recruit, a 

mere boy. It was in this way he ‘blooded’ his new adherents. He had 

then pulled out his revolver and shot the guilty man. . . . Small wonder 

that his name was on the lips of every man in the district.” It was a scene 

often repeated during the war years.15

Figure 12. Aris and Friend.
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Although Aris’ claim to high place in ELAS was first and greatest, 

it did not suit the leaders of EAM/ELAS to name him military commander of their guerrilla force. They were seeking a more respectable 

figure, not a man who would attract just the wild, eager young mountain lads, but one who would prove a rallying point for the unoccupied, 

un-employed, politically-conscious officers of the regular army. In this 

search, they were at first extremely unsuccessful. A number of offers 

were made to Zervas, for example, even in December 1942 after he was 

already involved with EDES; but he refused them because he disliked 

the idea of Communist participation in EAM/ELAS and of sharing his 

command with a political adviser. Other senior officers of the regular 

army likewise turned down the offers.16

Finally in April 1943, under rather strange circumstances, EAM/

ELAS found its military commander in Col. Stephanos Saraphis. Saraphis had proceeded to the mountains in the early months of 1943 

under the auspices of an organization known as AAA and had conferred with Brigadier Myers and General Zervas. Myers promised him 

British support. Soon after, he was captured by EAM/ELAS bands and 

charges were prepared against him. Surprisingly, during the period of 

his imprisonment, Saraphis was converted to the cause of EAM/ELAS. 

Many persons have claimed that he was the victim of force—this was 

said to his face at the Lebanon Conference in 194417—but the conviction and enthusiasm with which he fulfilled his role make this charge 

hard to credit.

Whatever motives led Saraphis to join EAM/ELAS as its military 

commander, they were strong enough to override any resentment over 

his imprisonment. On many points, indeed, he appears to have found 

a political home in EAM/ELAS. In the first place, Saraphis seems to 

have been latently anti-British, even in early 1943. He was an extreme 

nationalist, even something of a chauvinist, in his feelings concerning 

his own country; at the same time, he was a violent antimonarchist.b

The fact that Zervas was veering in the spring of 1943 towards an 

Anglophile and proroyalist position deepened what seems to have been 

a personal antagonism between these two men. Also Saraphis wanted 

to play a dominant role in the resistance, and the possibilities open 

to him as a freelance guerrilla leader appeared rather limited either 

as commander of a guerrilla band on the same level as Zervas or in a 

shared command. And Saraphis was enough of a realist to wonder how 

b Saraphis had been publicly degraded in the barrack-square in 1935, when he was 

condemned to life imprisonment for mutiny against the royalist regime. When he joined 

ELAS in 1943, he was given a suitcase containing the same uniform he had worn that day 

in 1935. He himself sewed on the republican buttons he found in one pocket. (Greek Resistance Army, p. 53.)
Behind Enemy Lines

149

the smaller organizations then in the mountains could operate without taking into account the already greater and still growing power of 

EAM/ELAS.18

Figure 13. General Saraphis, Military Commander of the EAM/ELAS guerrillas.

During his early period in the mountains, Saraphis claimed to have 

been taken aback by some of the nationalist guerrillas. “Appearance 

not good,” he noted of one Zervas group, “clothing motley, discipline 

doubtful. They were continually firing into the air and throwing handgrenades into the river to catch fish.” On the other hand, he professed 

to have found ELAS forces more to his liking: “Discipline and uniforms 

almost completely military. Cleanliness. Canteen mess and camp life.” 

The ex-regular military officer liked a military appearance.19

During his imprisonment by EAM/ELAS, Saraphis became more 

disgusted by the conduct of his fellow prisoners and more impressed by 

the conduct of ELAS guerrillas, even as they tied him and the others in 

pairs and walked them through villages where the inhabitants shouted 
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“Traitors” at them. With growing disillusionment, he wrote of his fellow 

prisoners:

There was no solidarity; nothing but petty-mindedness 

and egoism; lack of any discipline or respect. I made 

comparisons with the guerrillas, who guarded us, with 

the people in the villages through which we passed, 

and I realized that we were wrong in wanting to form a 

separate guerrilla force which would end by becoming 

an instrument of the British.20

Early in April 1943, Saraphis was told by Aris and Andhreas Tzimas 

of EAM/ELAS that the organization would give him and the majority 

of his fellow officers their freedom. At the same time, he was asked if 

he would be willing to work for ELAS. He reported that he agreed at 

once to do so. He also agreed to return to Athens with Tzimas, who 

was on the EAM Central Committee, in order to clear the matter 

with z, his former organization, and to seek the approval of the EAM 

Central Committee.21

With an acceptable and willing senior officer at hand, the EAM 

Central Committee lost little time in approving the appointment of 

Saraphis as military commander of ELAS and in setting up a General 

Headquarters (GHQ). As first organized in May 1943, this GHQ was 

a triumvirate command, consisting of military commander, capetan, 

and political adviser. (All lower commands followed this pattern down 

to the tactical level, where they became dual, dropping the political 

adviser. Since, however, the capetan was a Communist, he took on the 

duties of the political adviser at company or lower levels.) Saraphis, 

with the rank of colonel,c was military commander of ELAS, but had 

prime responsibility only in the field of military operations.22

Saraphis shared command of ELAS GHQ with two other men, Aris 

held equal responsibility in the role of capetan.d This position, sometimes confused with that of the political adviser, even by Allied liaison 

officers, was usually filled throughout the command levels by a Communist, often a man of the people who had worked himself up. The 

capetan had control of propaganda and unit morale; and, since he was 

also in charge of administration, quartermaster duties, recruitment, 

etc., he maintained relations between guerrilla forces and the civilian 

c The ELAS Central Committee promoted Saraphis to the rank of major general in 

the spring of 1944.

d Aris did not remain in this position. He was later transferred to the Peloponnesus 

in a strong EAM/ELAS drive to take over that region. In the December 1944 war with the 

British, Aris played a leading role. In 1945 he was killed under uncertain circumstances. 

One report says that his head was severed and displayed on a pole in Trikkala. (Saraphis, 

Greek Resistance Army, p. 177; McGlynn, Special Service in Greece, p. 10.)
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151

population. In 1944 capetans were given reserve officer ranks. At the 

point of ELAS’ greatest strength there were 1,070 capetans, forming 21 

percent of the officer corps, whom Saraphis found “very useful.”23

The third member of the GHQ, the political adviser, was the most 

important member of the command: he was the representative of the 

all-powerful EAM Central Committee. The political adviser was always 

a Communist. Political advisers, as well as capstans, held officer rank 

in ELAS. The first man to occupy the post of political adviser in ELAS 

GHQ was Andhreas Tzimas.e When he left in the autumn of 1943 

to take a post as EAM/ELAS liaison with Tito in Yugoslavia, he was 

replaced by George Siantos, the acting Secretary General of the Greek 

Communist Party (KKE). In the spring of 1944, the post of political 

adviser was abolished, not only in ELAS GHQ but throughout the various ELAS commands. The former holders of such posts, however, generally turned up as chief of staff or in some other position at a lower 

level. Although the triumvirate form of command was changed, the 

principle by which EAM maintained control over ELAS was never lost.24

ELAS GHQ, although comprised of the three commanders of 

ELAS, did not control all of the ELAS guerrilla forces. Some were 

directly under the ELAS Central Committee. This body was subsidiary 

to the Central Committee of EAM, but was independent of and superior to ELAS GHQ. It controlled operations in Athens and the Peloponnesus. The Greek islands, eastern Macedonia, and Thrace were also 

outside of the authority of ELAS GHQ. ELAS reserves, although organized along military lines, were used mainly for communications and 

local security purposes and were controlled in the villages by the local 

EAM organization.25

The advent of Saraphis as military commander of ELAS and the 

creation of a General Headquarters were immediately followed by a 

reorganization of the guerrilla forces to more closely resemble a regular army. In June 1943, ELAS GHQ controlled approximately 4,500 

men in Macedonia, 4,000 in Thessaly, 3,000 in Roumeli, and 500 in 

Epirus. These district forces, named either headquarters or general 

commands, were in turn divided into commands and subcommands. 

With the approval of the ELAS Central Committee, the new ELAS 

GHQ undertook in July 1943 to change this organization, giving all 

units regular army designations after 1 September. The headquarters 

e Known to Myers and Woodhouse by his code name of Evmaios, Tzimas is referred to 

in Saraphis’ memoirs as Samariniotis. Throughout this study, he is referred to as Tzimas. 

Although an avowed Communist, Tzimas seemed rather reasonable to Myers, who credited him with Woodhouse’s safe return from Athens in 1943, when the Germans almost 

captured him. (Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 145, 223–24; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, 

p. 137.)
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

or general commands became divisions; commands became regiments; 

and subcommands became battalions, which were further divided into 

companies, platoons, and sections. The strength of ELAS divisions, 

however, never reached that of conventional army division; at their 

greatest strength, they contained about 4,000 men; and battalions 

apparently contained about 400 men.26

Despite the increased complexity of the new organization of ELAS, 

Saraphis never intended to billet large groups of men together. ELAS 

guerrillas, like all others, lived in small units, sometimes in villages, 

more often in mountainside cabins, or even in caves. These units assembled for special events and for tactical operations. Then they returned 

to their own quarters, living in close contact with their immediate officers. This practice was continued throughout the occupation. Nonetheless, within these limitations, ELAS managed to conform more closely 

than before to the organizational structure of conventional forces.

Regular military regulations were also put into effect. Saluting became obligatory during duty hours, and the approved form 

of address was “fellow combatant”—for example, Fellow Combatant 

Colonel Saraphis. Discipline was rigorous. Instead of the usual army 

penalties of confinement to barracks, detention, and imprisonment, 

troops’ assemblies were held to mete out the varying guerrilla penalties 

of reprimand, public contumely, disarmament for a specified period, 

dismissal from ELAS, imprisonment, and finally death. The penalties 

were carried out after approval by the command; in case of serious difficulty, the command could act at once. Saraphis found the assemblies 

extremely strict and very effective in maintaining discipline. By 1944 

Saraphis claimed that regular courts-martial had been established, one 

in each division, observing all proprieties.27

Allied liaison officers who saw this guerrilla justice in operation 

found it harsh. A concept of justice applied by tribunals of peers, meted 

out in strictest fashion, and mercilessly executed was not very appealing in operation. It was, however, a form of law acceptable in mountain 

Greece. It is ironic that many Greeks should have learned to respect a 

legal code, roughhewn, inelastic, and even cruel as it may have been, 

while they were acting as or under guerrillas.28

By the autumn of 1943, ELAS was growing by leaps and bounds. 

The advent of Saraphis as military commander was paying off. It was 

well known in Greece that he had joined EAM/ELAS. In Athens, in 

the spring of 1943 he had even written a message calling upon other 

regular officers to join him in ELAS, and this had been circulated 

through an EAM newspaper. As a result, a number of young Army officers came out to the mountains to join EAM/ELAS. They were immediately directed to the various divisions being organized at that time. 
Behind Enemy Lines

153

In addition, regular officers belonging to other guerrilla organizations 

sometimes joined EAM/ELAS after that organization had eliminated 

their own—thus a number of EKKA officers, for example, joined ELAS 

in the spring of 1944. A total of 800 officers from the regular army of 

the days of the Greek monarchy and 1,500 from the army of the republic eventually entered ELAS, forming 44 percent of its officer corps.29

In July 1943 ELAS set up a training school: to train guerrillas to 

become reservist officers. Each district (divisional) headquarters sent 

30 or so guerrillas suitable for training and commissioning. By the end 

of September 1943, the training school openly graduated its first class, 

with festivities and a review. One hundred thirty-six men were commissioned reserve second lieutenants in the ELAS guerrilla army. The 

second course started on 1 October, with about 300 officer candidates 

in attendance. By liberation, the training school had graduated some 

1,270 reservist officers or 24 percent of all ELAS officers.30

Figure 14. “A Typical ELAS Officer,” according to Brigadier Myers.
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

With officers availablef to train and lead guerrilla units, new recruits 

could be taken in. Although there was little difficulty with recruitment 

in most cases, it is apparently true that in some areas ELAS drafted men 

without regard to their own feelings.g Sometimes village elders decided 

which men should join. However, the success of Greek guerrilla operations, the belief that Greece was soon to be liberated by an Allied invasion, and the obvious coming defection of the Italians from the Axis 

led to spontaneous increases in strength in both EDES and ELAS in 

the summer of 1943. Since ELAS controlled a far larger territory than 

its rival, it was able to recruit more men faster. From a strength of less 

than 5,000 men in the spring. ELAS claimed close to 20,000 men by the 

fall of 1943. Brigadier Myers estimated that there were 16,000 armed 

men in units and 16,000 more in the village reserves.31

For the rank and file, training usually consisted of a few days’ basic 

training in camp; tactical training took place on actual operations. 

Recruits were bound to ELAS by a fearsome oath and the penalty for 

desertion was death. Bravery, on the other hand, was rewarded by promotion and even peasants could become reserve officers. Later on, in 

the summer of 1944, awards and honors were instituted.32

ELAS also made an attempt in mid-1943 to regularize some technical services. In general, arms and ammunition were obtained mainly 

as booty from the occupiers or through Allied supply drops. After the 

surrender of the Italians in the fall of 1943, EAM/ELAS had relatively 

few arms problems and most of these concerned distribution rather 

than acquisition. Because of the variety of arms, however, ammunition 

scarcities developed.33

Quartermaster supplies came from a number of sources. Allied supply drops provided a considerable quantity. On the other hand, ELAS 

was never totally dependent on these, as was proved during the winter 

of 1943–44 when all Allied drops to ELAS were suspended. Through 

EAM control of the countryside, it was possible for ELAS to levy regular tithes of foodstuffs which were collected by the Guerrilla Commissariat (ETA) from the peasants and villagers. In addition to the tithes, 

for which no payment was made, ELAS got other foodstuffs, for which 

it paid at its own scale of prices—clearly an advantageous system.34

Clothing, particularly shoes and boots, was a more or less continuous problem for ELAS. Supply drops did not fill the need. Also, clothing 

f An additional 11 percent of ELAS officers were directly commissioned from the auxiliary services. (Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 276.)

g Mistreatment of the local population by EAM/ELAS reached major proportions in 

the Peloponnesus, where Aris had gone and where the peasants were naturally conservative. EAM already regarded anyone not taking part in one of its organizations as a traitor. 

(Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 61, n. 1.)
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155

supplied by the Allies was often old battle dress, which was incriminating and could be used only by those guerrilla forces who lived apart 

from the villagers. ELAS, through ETA, openly requisitioned clothing from prosperous civilians in its neighborhood, and it even set up 

workshops to make clothing and boots. These items were also often 

stripped from fallen enemy soldiers when time permitted. Clothing was 

taken from the Italian soldiers after their surrender in the fall of 1943. 

In 1944, when ELAS had naval resources to get Allied supplies stored 

in Turkey, it received about 8,000 uniforms and pairs of boots, which 

helped to ease the burden of finding clothing.35

In addition to a naval component, ELAS had a cavalry regiment. 

Horses were requisitioned from the peasants as they were needed. 

When during the winter of 1943–44 it became hard to feed the weak 

or sick animals, they were simply placed on farms in ELAS territory. 

The peasants were expected to feed and care for the horses during the 

winter in return for such work as the animals’ condition or the weather 

allowed. In the spring ELAS took back the animals.36

Medical care for the sick and wounded was primitive in ELAS, but 

probably not far below the general run of medical practice in the Greek 

mountains. In the summer of 1943, ELAS GHQ directed that each division should have one or two surgeries and that each regiment should 

have a sickbay and dressing station. If no volunteer doctors were available, local doctors were to be drafted. These were ambitious plans, but 

by the fall of 1943 some divisional hospitals had been established in 

houses or school buildings and were in use. In this work ELAS was 

helped by EAM control of the villages and by its ability to commandeer, 

if necessary, houses, supplies, and doctors.h In 1944 divisional hospitals 

were sometimes caring for as many as 80 or more patients. There were 

both doctors and nurses, the latter often supplied through EPON, the 

youth organization controlled by EAM in the villages. Some sickbays 

were also established at regimental level in 1944. Allied supply drops 

were a major source of medicines. It would be a mistake, however, to 

assume that these hospitals were at all similar to those of Europe or the 

United States; by such standards they would be poor substitutes. The 

remarkable thing is that they could be set up and could function at all. 

For a guerrilla army operating in the poverty-stricken Greek mountains, their mere existence was an achievement.37

h This was made very clear in one instance where a hospital, established by the Allied 

Mission and serviced by two doctors, a senior British major and an American junior medical officer, was in distress because weather precluded supply drops and no local help was 

made available until Saraphis ordered the villagers to do so. (Saraphis, Greek Resistance 

Army, p. 153.)
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Guerrilla transportation was rudimentary. Motor vehicles were 

almost unknown in the Greek mountains; the appearance of an automobile was an occasion. Guerrilla troops moved by self-propulsion. 

This limitation precluded fast relief of beleaguered units and was a 

problem ELAS never overcame.

The usual Greek manner of transporting supplies was also the guerrilla way. Village pack animals carried supplies as ‘far as the animals 

could negotiate the animal trails; after that, mountain dwellers loaded 

the supplies on their own backs and took them the rest of the way. 

ELAS made no payment for this transport, although sometimes guerrilla rations and food for the animals were furnished. According to 

Saraphis, many people said that the reason people worked in this way 

was that ELAS had established a reign of terror in the mountains. He 

denied the rumors, of course. In some places terror was certainly used, 

but the constant reiteration of Allied liaison officers that the Greek 

people showed complete devotion and loyalty to the resistance cause 

would appear to uphold Saraphis’ contention that transportation was 

freely given by the Greek people—“This they did with great good will 

and often singing.”38

Besides the problem of moving supplies within Greece, ELAS faced 

another transport problem when sufficient Allied aircraft were not 

available to bring in Allied supplies earmarked for ELAS. In early 1944 

Woodhouse informed Saraphis that ELAS would have to undertake the 

transport of Allied supplies by sea from Turkey to Pelion on the east 

coast of Greece. Although a few Greek ship captains had made isolated 

naval attacks on enemy craft in 1943, it was not until the surrender of 

Italy in the fall of 1943 that EAM/ELAS controlled sufficient shoreline 

even to think seriously about a naval section. In the spring of 1944 

the development of ELAN, the Greek People’s Liberation Navy, was 

fairly rapid. Three types of craft were used: motor sailing vessels of over 

7 knots speed and carrying over 10 tons load, small motor vessels of 

similar speed, and all other craft useful for transportation duties. The 

first two types of craft carried crews of 12 to 18 men and were armed. 

These were formed into four squadrons and one flotilla—later into five 

squadrons—under the direct orders of ELAS GHQ. The unarmed craft 

were formed into a reserve squadron. ELAN reached a final strength 

of over 100 motor-sailing vessels and other craft. Several vessels had a 

displacement of 200 or more tons. There was one large tug and one 

torpedo boat. Total ELAN strength, according to General Saraphis, 

reached about 1,200 officers, capetans, and guerrillas.39

The naval squadrons were brought under the direct orders of ELAS 

divisions controlling the shore bases. They were employed both for 

offensive action and for logistical support. In the former capacity, they 
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157

were supposed to harass and plunder enemy transport, protect ELAS 

marine transport, and keep the enemy under surveillance; in the latter 

and more important capacity, ELAN transferred friendly forces and 

transported food, equipment, and supplies. To move the Allied supplies 

from Turkey, for example, Saraphis reported that ELAN employed 20 

caiques formed into the 4th Pelion Squadron. In 8 months, this squadron made 40 successful voyages. From the coast ELAS used convoys of 

100 to 300 pack animals to carry the supplies through German lines to 

Macedonia, Thessaly, and Roumeli. Thus ELAN played a major role in 

the transport of supplies from the outside world into Greece.40 In this 

capacity it was a mainstay of ELAS’ transportation service.i

Communication was another of Saraphis’ major problems. He felt 

it important to be able to get in immediate touch with the various commanders under the orders of ELAS GHQ. Communication by courier 

was the simplest system but also took the most time and was inadequate 

for many contingencies, certainly any that required immediate action. 

The guerrillas of ELAS therefore turned to the telephone. In the summer of 1943 every division in ELAS was directed to form a communication company and each regiment was to form a communication 

platoon, in order to develop a telephone system.41

Using for lines anything and everything they could lay their hands 

on, including rusty barbed wire from entanglements, EAM/ELAS 

could claim by August 1943 that telephone communication had been 

established direct from GHQ to the four ELAS divisions then operating. This service, though good during periods of inactivity and fine for 

giving alerts, broke down during emergencies, for the Germans soon 

learned to cut telephone wires at the onset of combat.42

For this and other reasons, Saraphis was very eager that all ELAS 

divisions be interconnected by radio. In May 1943, he had been completely dependent upon the British for radio communication with his 

commands in Thessaly and Macedonia. When he saw Myers traveling 

around the Greek countryside with his wireless operator and the set 

itself installed on a donkey, thus giving him direct contact with headquarters in Cairo, Saraphis felt doubly envious. He was, of course, 

entirely dependent during his own journeys on courier and local telephone service.43

British liaison officers, however, opposed this ELAS plan for radio 

contact between stations in Greece, giving as their reason the fear of 

i In addition to the squadrons of ELAN under the control of ELAS GHQ, another 

separate section of ELAN was under the ELAS I Army Corps (Athens and Piraeus). Both 

sections of ELAN were active during the December war with the British. They were demobilized, along with ELAS, by the terms of the Varkiza Agreement in 1945. (Saraphis, Greek 

Resistance Army, pp. 284–85; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 309.)
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enemy locators. They themselves never intercommunicated, but all 

messages were radioed direct to Cairo and retransmitted from Cairo 

to other stations in Greece. It was never possible, however, to convince 

Saraphis on this point. These fears, he felt, were merely “a pretext” to 

keep ELAS GHQ from communicating easily with its units, and thus to 

keep it dependent on an Allied communications system. Even though 

he himself later complained that the Germans were “always informed 

in advance” about ELAS moves, he apparently never connected this 

fact with his communication system. Eventually, all ELAS divisions did 

obtain radio equipment, by booty, barter, or scrounging. It was never 

supplied by the British. Neither did it always work.44

Woodhouse painted a more rosy picture. “Their communications, 

including wireless, extended as far as Crete and Samos . . . ,” he wrote 

of the situation in mid-1943. “Communications in the mountains, by 

wireless, courier, and telephone have never been so good before or 

since . . . .”45

In the same way it had set up other services, ELAS GHQ in the 

summer of 1943 formed engineer companies at divisional level and 

engineer platoons at regimental level for demolition purposes and 

road maintenance. There is little evidence of their effectiveness. During the period of liberation in October 1944, one British unit requested 

that ELAS repair bridges to facilitate pursuit of the enemy. Saraphis 

pointed out, however, that without bridge-building equipment, ELAS 

could not accomplish this task. Nor is it clear that the demolitions work 

was generally well done; guerrilla demolitions do not appear to have 

ever come up to the standards of conventional forces.46

The efforts made by ELAS GHQ in the summer of 1943 to expand 

its guerrilla bands and to organize them into a regular army, to recruit 

and train a large number of men and officers and to form auxiliary 

technical services for this expanded army were tested in the fall of 

1943. At this time, the Germans began a series of mopping-up operations while ELAS was engaged in fighting with the guerrilla army of 

EDES. At the same time supplies to ELAS were stopped by the British.47

Examining this new situation, Saraphis found much wanting. 

Although he blamed his major problems on enemy advantages in firepower, transport, and aircraft, he had to admit shortcomings in his 

own organization, particularly in training.48

ELAS therefore spent the winter of 1943–44 in intensive training 

and regrouping. Incompetent, insubordinate, or disaffected guerrillas were, according to Saraphis, either brought to trial or discharged. 

The EPON youth groups were brought directly into the ELAS divisions, 

with the formation of a model EPON platoon for each regiment and 

a model group for each battalion. Other EPON members were now 
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159

enlisted in companies like any other guerrillas. Training was carried 

out on a unit basis, down to the platoon level. Limited offensives were 

carried out against easy enemy targets primarily for training purposes. 

All unit weapons were repaired, and the men were trained in their use, 

in both technical and tactical aspects. The training school took on 

additional importance.49

All this talk about divisions, regiments, battalions, technical services, and training schools might mislead one into thinking that ELAS 

was a completely disciplined army. This may have been the ELAS 

dream, but it was never the actual case. Some of the liaison officers 

with small ELAS units would have been the first to laugh at such an 

idea; what they saw was more often a rabble of men behaving in a disorganized fashion. ELAS admittedly could not control all of its elements, 

as was evidenced by guerrilla excesses that destroyed the very image it 

sought to build up. Nonetheless, despite units which did not come up 

to its own standards, EAM/ELAS was able to field a guerrilla army of 

considerable size and competence.50

By the spring of 1944, ELAS was incontrovertibly in first place in the 

resistance movement. Saraphis estimated his strength at about 30,000 

men, formed into about 10 divisions. EDES was confined mainly to Epirus. And the Germans were limited to the major transportation lines 

and the larger villages on a day-to-day basis. This strength was upheld 

until liberation, by which time ELAS had grown to about 50,000 men.j51

Despite its growth, EAM/ELAS still faced problems. Although most 

of Greece was in its orbit, the Germans could still concentrate forces 

and move into any area on mopping-up operations. The Greek security battalions working for the Germans were still going strong. Furthermore, ELAS was “faced with formidable shortages” as Saraphis was 

forced to admit.52 And the rival that EAM/ELAS had hoped to smash 

had survived the onslaught: there was still an EDES to reckon with.

EDES, Guerrillas of Zervas

EDES, the National Republican Greek League, had been founded 

in Athens in 1941 as a political resistance group. Its charter called for 

continuation of the fight against the Axis and for such political goals 

as a democratic constitution, a plebiscite on the question of the monarchy, and a postwar government containing no collaborators. Since its 

j These figures are highly credible. Colonel Woodhouse estimated ELAS strength 

at 40,000 men in the summer of 1944. In addition there was the ELAS of Athens and the 

islands which did not come under the jurisdiction of Saraphis’ GHQ. (Apple of Discord, 

p. 195.)
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political head, Gen. Nicholas Plastiras was in exile, EDES had a Central 

Government Committee of three men in Athens.53

By mid-1942, EDES had found a commander in chief for its guerrilla arm and had fielded a small force of guerrillas who had successfully drawn and tasted blood. Its commander, Gen. Napoleon Zervas,k

was one of the republican officers who had been ousted from the Greek 

Army in the 1930’s and had not been allowed to fight against the Italians and Germans in 1940 and 1941. Understandably anxious to take 

an active role in the growing resistance movement and having already 

rejected an offer to become military commander of EAM/ELAS, Zervas 

entered EDES in the spring of 1941, countersigning its political charter. 

When the British committed themselves to support EDES guerrillas, 

Zervas took to the hills.54

When Myers’ group dropped into Greece in the fall of 1942, they 

knew about Zervas and in fact expected his support in the assault on 

the Gorgopotamos Bridge. In turn, Colonel Woodhouse was scheduled 

to remain in Greece with Zervas.55 When the attack on the Gorgopotamos took place, Zervas upheld his end of the bargain: EDES guerrillas, along with those of EAM/ELAS, formed an integral part of the 

guerrilla assault wings that neutralized the enemy garrison defending 

the bridge.

From this time forward, Zervas’ fortunes were intimately connected 

with the British. He was dependent upon them for support, not only in 

the guerrilla war against the occupation troops but in the internecine 

fighting with EAM/ELAS.

Myers has described with affection his first meeting with the short, 

plump Greek general, who was wearing an old army uniform without 

insignia and was armed with a small automatic pistol and a jeweled 

dagger. “He kissed me warmly on both my now bearded checks,” wrote 

Brigadier Myers, “Undaunted, I kissed him back.” Since this immediate 

impression of Zervas was good, Myers took him fully into his confidence, describing the work that the British had dropped into Greece to 

do—at that time the single Gorgopotamos operation.56 Although Zervas and Myers later disagreed on various points, their relationship—at 

least from Myers’ point of viewl

—remained extremely friendly. His final 

comment on Zervas, “an outstanding and gallant leader,” evidenced 

his esteem.57

k The title of general was assumed; Zervas’ rank in the regular Greek Army had been 

that of colonel. During his service, he had been engaged in a number of small-scale coups 

aimed at overthrowing the unstable governments before Metaxas.

l Saraphis had claimed that Zervas’ opinion of Myers was quite low. (Greek Resistance 

Army, p. 113.)
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161

To Myers second in command and later successor, Col. Christopher 

Woodhouse, Zervas, “for all his faults,” stood out “alongside his rival, 

Aris Veloukhiotis as one of the only two great personalities that the 

Greek resistance movement produced.”58 Most liaison officers liked 

Zervas. It was a most rational reaction. Not only was Zervas good company, but he was militarily reliable, in good days and bad. He obeyed 

British orders. For some operations in the summer of 1943, even before 

Myers left Greece, Zervas gave his troops orders stating that “Between 

the dates 20th June and 14th July all units will do exactly what they are 

told by the British liaison officers attached to them.”59

If Zervas invariably complied with British requests, he exacted the 

same kind of obedience to his own orders on down the line in EDES. 

Under his leadership, EDES became a one-man organization. Brigadier 

Myers, noting Zervas’ unwillingness in early 1943 to delegate authority 

to subordinate guerrilla commanders, feared that this trait would hold 

down the growth of EDES, which he still hoped to make a counterbalance to the rising strength of EAM/ELAS.60 Within EDES, too, there 

were commanders who longed for greater autonomy. “The centralization of power which General Zervas insisted on . . . proved to be unwarranted and injurious,” later wrote his second in command, Komninos 

Pyromaglou. “Nothing was heard but the slogan ‘Faith in the Leader. 

All for the Leader. All from the Leader.’ ”61

As Zervas dominated EDES in the mountains, he also began to 

assert his increasing independence of EDES in Athens. This occurrence followed a natural sequence of events. In the first place, General 

Plastiras, the nominal head of EDES, was in exile, and there was no 

other outstanding figure in EDES in Athens with the authority to hold 

Zervas’ allegiance. Second, the fact that the British supplied the major 

portion of support for EDES in the mountains removed Zervas’ need 

for Athenian support. Also, because events in the mountains required 

immediate action for which there was no time to refer to Athens, Zervas 

took matters more and more into his own hands. In March 1943, he followed Woodhouse’s suggestion and wired greetings to King George II 

on Independence Day; at the same time, he wired the British government that he would not oppose the King’s restoration “even without the 

people’s wishes,” although one of the planks in EDES’ charter was in 

opposition to this stand. Thus Zervas cut his political bonds to EDES 

in Athens. In July 1943, the name of the guerrilla units under Zervas 

was actually changed from EDES to EOEA, National Bands of Greek 

Guerrillas, at British suggestion; but the name change was symbolic 

only—the old name of EDES stuck, and meant in effect the guerrillas 

under Zervas.62
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

At the same time that Zervas established control over EDES guerrillas independently of its original Athens affiliation, a strange set of 

circumstances arose that finally came indirectly to control him. With 

Zervas’ political declaration for the King in March 1943, EDES in the 

mountains became “respectable” in monarchical circles. Many royalist 

officers began to come to the mountains; some of these were, however, 

not only royalist but so right-wing politically that they were tinged, as it 

was said, with collaboration. Myers remembered, for example, that he 

could not accept these officers but that he sent them on to Zervas, who 

found places for them.63 These officers helped EDES tactically. They 

provided an abundance of trained leadership which gave EDES’ bands 

an early superiority over EAM/ELAS in the field. On the other hand, 

the relationship of the right-wing officer cadre with Zervas led him 

further and further into political conservatism.64

Figure 15. General Zervas, Commander of the guerrillas of EDES.
Behind Enemy Lines

163

While Zervas was becoming ever more conservative politically, the 

Athenian branch of EDES was making a political turn of its own. It 

was shifting from a centrist republican position to that of extremism, a 

part becoming very left-wing, a large part becoming an extremely rightwing, even collaborationist, organization. This, in turn, placed Zervas 

in an equivocal position: he had not only backed the King but was, for 

all intents and purposes, still allied with EDES in Athens, the majority 

of which organization was now very right-wing. The turn of events made 

him extremely vulnerable to Communist attack as a collaborator.65

The charge that Zervas and EDES collaborated with the Germans 

emanated first from EAM/ELAS, but was widely circulated throughout 

Greece. Since Zervas himself agreed in early 1944, at the talks leading to the Plaka Armistice, to repudiate various members of EDES 

as collaborators,m the charge of collaboration within EDES appears 

sustained.

Insofar as the charge directly concerned Zervas, Colonel Woodhouse has dealt with it in detail. “Only three examples,” he has written, 

“have come to my knowledge, purporting to prove collusion between 

Zervas and the Germans that are based on his actual conduct of operations.” These were (1) an armistice alleged to have been signed, in 

October 1943, between Zervas and the Germans; (2) the inactivity of 

EDES in the summer of 1944; and (3) German noninterference with 

the unloading of Allied supplies on the west coast of Greece, also in the 

summer of 1944.66

Concerning the first charge—the alleged armistice with the 

Germans—Woodhouse has pointed out that it originated with Aris, 

capetan in the GHQ of ELAS. It was based on a message from an ELAS 

commander, stating that he had been told by Red Cross representatives 

that Zervas had signed such an armistice for 14 days’ duration. On the 

basis of this example, the ELAS commander had also agreed to such an 

armistice, thus incriminating himself and leading to his repudiation by 

EAM/ELAS. As to Zervas’ collaboration, this evidence is far from conclusive. Woodhouse has stated that the meeting between Zervas and 

the Red Cross representatives was attended by a fluent Greek-speaking 

English officer,n who heard nothing of this sort. Furthermore, the meeting was followed by a long and fierce fight initiated by the Germans.67

As for EDES’ inactivity in the summer of 1944, the record indicates 

that SOE Cairo had ordered Zervas to lie low and “to refrain temporarily from operations against the Germans” in that very period. The third 

m Gonatas, Tavoularis, Voulpiotis, etc. (Named by Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, 

p. 177.)

n Woodhouse himself?
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

bit of evidence, that the Germans allowed Zervas to be resupplied without hindrance during the summer of 1944, is apparently neutralized 

by Woodhouse’s well-taken observation that it proved, not that Zervas 

collaborated, but that the Germans were fools.68

Woodhouse was commander of the Allied Military Mission and 

was in Greece during most of the period under consideration; his 

refutation of the charges that Zervas collaborated was published in 

May 1948 and bears great weight. Still the charge will not quite die. If 

one completely disregards the propaganda against Zervas put out by 

EAM/ELAS, there still occurs sporadically the evidence of the Germans, who appear to have been under the conviction that, if they did 

not have a signed armistice with Zervas, they at least had a “Balkan 

Gentleman’s Agreement.”69

Lt. Gen. (General der Gebirgstruppen) Hubert Lanz, commander 

of German forces responsible for the security of western Greece, has 

written that offers were twice made to Zervas by the local German commander in Epirus, in the fall of 1943, and again in the spring of 1944. 

In the first case, no overt agreement existed, but a modus vivendi grew 

up in which “Fighting between the two decreased and, at times, ceased 

altogether. Contact, although in a rather loose form, was maintained 

between the German commands and the EDES.”70

General Lanz recorded more success for the German overtures 

in the spring of 1944, “Hostilities ceased,” he wrote, “steady contact 

between Zervas and the German commander in Yannina was maintained and joint operations were carried out against the Communist 

bands.”71 Lanz was extremely precise in regard to an actual German 

operation against a guerrilla band of about 2,000 ELAS men located 

near Karpenision: “the Nationalist partisans entered into a temporary 

agreement with the Germans—not so much to help the latter as to 

eliminate their Red rivals. In short, aside from the superior German 

fighting power, the help of the local EDES and their familiarity with 

the region made it possible to surround and annihilate the Reds in 

their mountain fortress in the summer of 1944.”72

In July 1944, when EDES attacked some German outposts, the Germans first thought that Allied liaison officers and anti-Zervas elements 

had seized control of EDES; but they later decided, after negotiations 

with Zervas, that he had been forced by the Allies to recommence 

operations. “In several strong raids,” wrote Lanz, “Zervas attempted to 

annihilate his former ‘partner.’ ” Only then did the Germans plan to 

undertake a major operation against EDES.73

The exact degree of Zervas complicity in collaboration with the Germans is difficult to pinpoint or to prove. The fact that the Germans 

appeared so certain of their arrangements with him does not, however, 
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165

necessarily convict them of being fools. It was as much to their advantage 

as to his to maintain even a temporary truce. Other elements combined 

to lend credence to the existence of some form of agreement between 

Zervas and the Germans: the large number of royalist and rightwing 

officers who joined EDES; the bitterness of the fight between EDES and 

EAM/ELAS, which could all too easily have made the Germans seem 

the lesser enemy; and the temptation Zervas must have felt, on receiving 

SOE Cairo’s orders to lie low, to assure compliance and improve his own 

situation by striking a bargain with the Germans. The Germans’ easy 

assumption that such an agreement existed and their general toughness 

towards any enemy that really threatened them tend to raise the existence of an agreement of some sort from a possibility to a probability. 

And if it did exist, it is difficult to believe that it could have been negotiated by subordinates without Zervas’ knowledge: his one-man control of 

EDES would have made that most unlikely. In any event, the German 

belief that some form of agreement existed between them and EDES is 

a major factor in the story of guerrilla operations in Greece.

The figure of Zervas thus emerges as extraordinarily controversial. 

No light is shed by either his previous or his later record. Supporters 

have termed his career before World War II “adventurous”; detractors have referred to him as the “gambling king of Athens.” His postWorld War II career was distinctly second-rate: going into politics in the 

period after 1945, he served as Minister of Public Order in 1947. Of this 

period, his most important British supporter, Colonel Woodhouse, has 

written, “to his true friends . . . it must seem a melancholy anticlimax.” 

Zervas’ career in World War II, however, is what concerns this story, and 

any final judgment of that career must apparently rest with the bias of 

the onlooker.74

The politics of EDES had little effect on the rank and file. Below the 

level of the officer group, EDES guerrillas were recruited from among 

the mountain villagers just as were those for EAM/ELAS. The fame of 

Gorgopotamos drew a large number of volunteers. Also, officer-recruiters went from village to village haranguing the men and often succeeding in getting numbers of them to join. Allied supply drops helped 

considerably, if indirectly, in initial recruitment. In the first place, EDES 

gained prestige from the recognition implicit in the sending of Allied 

liaison officers and Allied supplies to them. In the second place, there 

was a very real chance that guerrillas getting Allied support would live 

better than the villagers. Supply drops to EDES included British battle 

dress which was used to augment the guerrillas’ own clothing. By mid1943 about two thirds of EDES had been so supplied. Allied supplies 

helped to feed EDES guerrillas. And Zervas was able to pay his men, by 

virtue of gold sovereigns given him by the British.75
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Figure 16. Maj. George Agoros of EDES. Brigadier Myers termed this a picture of 

a “typical EDES officer.”

If force was sometimes applied in the recruitment for ELAS, it is 

doubtful that EDES had to use much force or that it did. Recruitment 

became even easier when the occupation forces began to use harsh 

measures against the villagers: men whose homes had been burned 

had little alternative and a good deal of motivation to join the guerrilla 

bands. In a land where life was unbearably difficult, life in EDES was 

bearably difficult.

From a British military view of any specific type of guerrilla operation, EDES was generally tactically superior to EAM/ELAS. Particularly 

in the early days of 1943, it combined military experience with guerrilla 

techniques. Zervas managed the whole show, but he developed small 

bands of guerrillas under junior officers who were relatively independent within the small area of their operations. The officers themselves 

had usually had regular army training and were capable leaders. At 

all levels, the military background of EDES officers gave uniformity to 

its command structure. “Zervas,” wrote Woodhouse, “was the first [in 
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167

Greece] to grasp the essence of guerrilla operations.” In addition, Zervas gave great weight to the counsel of the British liaison officers who 

were assigned to his various guerrilla groups. “No decision at any level 

could be wrong,” wrote Colonel Woodhouse, “if it were sanctioned by a 

BLO.” The working policy was thus established.76

By the summer of 1943, EDES retreated from its informal organization and began to set up companies, battalions, regiments, and a higher 

structure called units or bands. Each unit contained two regiments of 

two battalions each. From the summer of 1944, they possessed rather 

heavy armament brought into Greece through the EDES-controlled 

landing port at Parga. EDES even had some new mountain guns. Leadership and training were now uniform throughout EDES. New recruits 

with previous military experience were trained for 4 to 5 days; those 

without experience attended courses for 2 to 4 weeks. They were taught 

obedience, drill, and weapons handling; they received some tactical 

instruction, although most of this occurred during actual operations. 

By midsummer 1944, the Germans had identified four EDES divisions, 

or units.77

In comparison with the strength of its rival, EAM/ELAS, the 

strength of EDES was always low. This was mainly due to two causes. 

First, Zervas’ one-man control made it difficult at first to enlarge the 

organization. Second, when the need for growth had become absolutely apparent to Zervas by the end of 1943, he was already engaged 

in internecine war with EAM/ELAS, and it was too late to overtake his 

rival. The Plaka Armistice that ended the interguerrilla war in February 1944 defined Zervas’ boundaries, and recruitment for EDES was 

limited to the area it controlled. Since this territory amounted principally to sparsely populated Epirus in northwestern Greece, there were 

obvious restrictions on the size that EDES could attain.78

Naturally EDES strength varied from time to time. When Brigadier 

Myers first met Zervas in November 1942, the latter had approximately 

150 men at his disposal and used about 50 on the Gorgopotamos operation. By early 1943 EDES had expanded to several hundred men. In 

April, Myers estimated that EDES had grown to 1,000 guerrillas.o In 

the summer of 1943, EDES’ strength, again using Myers’ estimate, had 

reached about 5,000 armed men in guerrilla groups. In the villages 

an equal number of men were in the armed EDES reserves. In late 

1943 EDES was almost destroyed by EAM/ELAS. Woodhouse himself despaired and even suggested that, if the Middle East Command 

wanted a guerrilla arm in Greece, it would probably have to drop support of EDES. The British refused, redoubled their support, and pulled 

o German estimates of that time put it at four times that figure; Saraphis estimated 

EDES’ strength at 200 men.
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

EDES through. In mid-1944, at the approach of the German withdrawal, the British sent some Greek reinforcements from the Middle 

East to enlarge the structure of EDES. In the summer of 1944, EDES 

reached a high point of about 10,000 to 12,000 armed and operative 

men. German estimates put the final strength of EDES in the fall of 

1944, after their last mopping-up operations and the start of the guerrilla offensive against the retreating Germans, at about 8,000 men.79

In summing up the guerrilla organization of EDES, it may be said 

that it was the creature of Zervas and that he was in turn a British creation. Without British support it is most unlikely that there would have 

been any EDES after 1943 at the latest. This fact had the most important ramifications, both political and military. It alone justified every 

effort of every Allied liaison officer sent to Greece.

Allied Troops with the Guerrillas

The first Allied soldiers sent to work with the Greek guerrillas were 

the eight British officers and three enlisted men under Colonel Myers. 

When they were ordered to remain in Greece after the Gorgopotamos 

operation of 25 November 1942, they became known as the British Military Mission (BMM) and the officers as British liaison officers. Myers 

was made brigadier in command at BMM headquarters and the individual liaison officers were to provide liaison with the EDES or EAM/

ELAS guerrilla groups.

In February 1943 Brigadier Myers divided Greece into four 

regions— Epirus, Roumeli, Olympus, and Macedonia.p To each region 

he sent a senior liaison officer, under whom other British would serve. 

Each group had radio contact with SOE Cairo and, through Cairo, 

with Myers. Thus Myers organized his special forces for easy expansion. 

Woodhouse, who had been with Zervas, was brought back to headquarters as second in command. By the summer of 1943 there were approximately 30 or 40 British officers with various guerrilla groups, clustered 

around “about a dozen” radio stations.80

By this time also, Brigadier Myers had managed to work out a means 

of controlling his far-flung liaison officers. He had brought Lt. Col. 

Rufus Sheppard, who had parachuted to EAM/ELAS early in 1943 and 

had immediately championed their cause, under his clear authority, 

and ended Sheppard’s ambiguous status in Greece.81 Myers maintained 

close contact with his officers by spending much of his time traveling 

through mountain Greece, not only stopping at guerrilla headquarters but going from one mission headquarters to another, discussing 

p The Peloponnesus did not come under Myers’ jurisdiction. Neither did Crete.
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169

problems, explaining policy, and smoothing guerrilla-liaison officer 

relationships. In addition, he called meetings of liaison officers. For 

example, a major meeting followed the successful conclusion of ANIMALS. At these meetings, personal relations were reaffirmed and 

command relations reestablished. Myers took such occasions to hold 

private conferences. “With each officer individually, I then went over 

his particular troubles,” he wrote, “and solved as many as I could.” 

After Myers left Greece, Woodhouse continued occasionally to hold 

such meetings.82

The liaison officers had “express instructions” not to take command 

of the Greek guerrillas in the field, but to confine their role to that of 

advisers. Their authority was therefore presumably nominal, but often 

came to be much greater. Their first undertaking, after meeting the 

local guerrillas in their area, was to organize their own living and radio 

facilities. Many liaison officers found it better to live separately from 

the guerrillas, certainly in their own quarters and often a few miles 

distant. Heeding the old dictum that “familiarity breeds contempt,” 

they felt that the separation enhanced their importance.q

 The second 

step was almost certainly to set up and instruct a guerrilla reception 

committee for supply drops. The liaison officer spent his days traveling 

his area, inspecting the guerrillas, checking their arms and equipment, 

and requesting supply drops to bring arms and equipment up to a fixed 

standard. His nights were often involved in waiting for aircraft to drop 

supplies. Depending on his relations with local guerrilla leaders, the 

liaison officer could and did discuss tactics of past and future engagements and help train the guerrillas. Most liaison officers took part in 

and they often actually led guerrilla attacks on Axis supply lines or 

troops. One of the most important jobs for the liaison officer came to 

be the prevention of incidents between different guerrilla groups in his 

area or attacks by one on the other.83

When Myers left Greece for the Cairo conference in the summer 

of 1943, Woodhouse became acting commander of the British Military 

Mission (BMM). Myers did not return with the Greek guerrilla delegation in the fall of 1943. At that time, two American officers accompanied the returning delegates and joined the BMM, which thereupon 

became the Allied Military Mission (AMM), with Woodhouse as commander. The liaison officers were now known as Allied liaison officers 

(ALO’s). In December 1944 another American officer, Maj. G. K. Wines, 

jumped into Greece and seconded Woodhouse on the AMM. The preponderance of the missions with guerrilla groups, however, remained 

q Another reason was to avoid German bombing of villages because of the presence 

of Allied officers. (Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 197.)
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

British—throughout the war Allied support of the Greek guerrillas 

remained substantially a “British show.”84

In the summer of 1944, when the German withdrawal was imminent, the Allies wanted to support guerrilla operations with small 

units of highly trained men with heavier firepower capability than the 

guerrillas possessed. Beginning in the spring of 1944 and continuing 

through the summer, the Americans infiltrated about seven Operational Groups (O.G.’s) of 20 to 30 men each, under a senior American 

commander, Col. Paul West, who replaced Major Winesr for a few weeks 

during the summer. The O.G.’s were landed at Parga and were guided 

in groups across Greece to their final destination. As a unit or sometimes in detachments, these groups acted in conjunction with the liaison officers and the guerrillas. Colonel West himself took part in these 

operations, “sometimes politely” placing himself under the orders of a 

liaison officer. The British also sent in similar groups from their Raiding Support Regiment (R.S.R.). These British and American units, 

although operating with the guerrillas, did not have the direct and 

often touchy personal relations with the latter that comprised the lot of 

the liaison officers.85 Including all ranks, Woodhouse estimated that in 

the summer of 1944 there were fewer than four hundred Allied troops 

in Greece. About a fourth of these were liaison officers. Of these, fewer 

than a tenth were Americans.86

The major problem facing the liaison officer in Greece was that of 

adjustment to constantly changing living conditions, to other liaison 

officers, to the Greek people, and to the Greek guerrillas.

In the first few months of its sojourn in Greece, Myers’ group ran 

the gamut of these adjustment difficulties. During their first month 

Myers’ men had little to do, but they had to stay close together and 

remain in hiding. Most of the time they lived in caves. Monotony and 

boredom quickly set in among these men, and nothing much seemed 

to help. First they tried to study Greek in order to pass the time, but 

that activity brought out tension between one man who studied and 

another who would not. “Tom took a poor view of these activities of his 

fellow countryman and would accuse him of further ‘arse-crawling’ in 

such endeavors. ‘Bloody chap’ he would say in Martin’s hearing, ‘Don’t 

believe he is a New Zealander at all. Gives me a pain.’ ” Playing bridge 

was also impossible because of friction between the same two men.87

Boredom and inactivity were not confined to Myers’ group, nor was 

their effect. One liaison officer in Crete remembered his weeks in a 

r Wines had been injured in a fall from a horse and was exfiltrated in July 1944 for 

hospitalization. He returned to Greece in October 1944 and remained until December. 

Colonel West was Wines’ commanding officer in OSS Cairo. (Telcon, Wines and Condit, 

11 September 1961.)
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171

cave hiding from daily German patrols as “the most frustrating period 

I ever spent.” He felt that boredom itself might have led the group to 

come out of hiding prematurely “had the Germans not withdrawn their 

raiding-forces in time to save us from such thoughtless action.”88

The sedentary life of the enlisted radio operators may be viewed 

with particular sympathy. Tied to their radio sets, they usually lived 

in a Greek house or possibly in a mountain cave—quarters apt to be 

drab, cramped, and extremely cold. For companions, they saw daily 

the same persons. Their diet, like that of the Greeks, was, if not actually insufficient, extremely monotonous. Furthermore, once they had 

coded and sent outgoing messages and received and decoded incoming ones, there was nothing else for them to do. “Though they lived in 

reasonable security,” wrote a liaison officer, “. . . they were almost anaesthetized by boredom, from which they were only occasionally roused by 

spasms of activity too violent to be really welcome.”89

Almost no one who went to Greece failed to experience, at some 

time, the hardship of dreariness and boredom brought on by lack of 

activity. Myers’ group was most fortunate, since its energies could be 

expended in the intense and exciting activity of demolishing the Gorgopotamos bridge.

After that operation, Myers’ group exchanged its alternate diet of 

boredom and excitement for one of hardship. It was winter: food supplies were at their lowest, and life out of doors was generally unpleasant. The group made its way across Greece to the western coast where 

it expected the submarine to exfiltrate it. On the march, they were able 

to billet in villages at nighttime. Although Greek hospitality provided 

its best, food was in extremely short supply in this territory; so short, in 

fact, that the men held back a little food each day against the next day’s 

fortunes. “It was the first time,” wrote Myers, “that I had experienced 

continuous hunger, and the feelings of insecurity and depression which 

accompany it.”90

Waiting on the coast—living and sleeping out of doors and existing on a slice of maize bread and some muddy, brackish water during 

the day—the men dreamed of the food they would get on the submarine. After three days of fruitless waiting, however, Myers was desperate 

and gave the Greek guide some money—it was Christmas eve—to buy 

whatever food he could. The guide returned with a large pan of boiled 

pork, a fat and greasy dish which, although it tasted delicious, gave all 

the men diarrhea for many days. This was their condition when the 

courier from Woodhouse finally reached them with the news that the 

submarine would not be coming and that they would therefore have to 

stay in Greece.91
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

They could not remain on the coast, a highly vulnerable location; 

they had to return to their starting point. To avoid detection they had 

to take an even longer route than before, so that they would not retrace 

their steps. Myers himself felt “too weak and tired” to cheer the others.92

“There were no words for what we felt,” wrote another member of 

that group, as they started the march back. “In silence and bitterness 

we looked to our packs and our boots.”93 Their boots, with the exception of one pair, privately purchased at very high cost, had already 

given out. The rubber soles of the British issue had proved extremely 

slippery on wet earth; on the march to the coast they went to pieces and 

the men were continually stitching and patching them.94 Even after the 

war, Myers recalled, the “memory of our journey back from the coast is 

still like that of a nightmare.”95

Once back in Zervas-controlled territory, Myers’ group was able to 

stay in villages again. Even then, there were often sudden alarms that 

the Italians were coming, and the group was frequently on the move. 

During one period in January 1943 Myers had to be placed on a mule 

and moved, even though he was sick with pneumonia. (As a matter of 

fact, the village doctor thought that he would die if moved, but one of 

the officers felt it wiser to chance the move than the mercy of the Italians, although Myers was in uniform.)96

By the spring of 1943, Brigadier Myers and most of his men were 

beginning to experience a few luxuries. Mission headquarters was 

ensconced in the village of Theodhoriana, which had the rare delight 

of electric light. The headquarters itself was situated in a comfortable 

house, and boasted an administrative officer who “organized messing 

on a comparatively lavish scale.” He bought special items such as chocolate, raisins, and a Greek sweet named halva on the black market. When 

the black market independently also produced three women, Myers felt 

things had gone too far. So did the local villagers, who were very upset 

and had to be reassured. The women were imprisoned, and one was 

later shot as a spy; the other two were “retired” for the rest of the war. 

Aside from this incident, Theodhoriana was a pleasant headquarters. 

Myers noted that “many days of comparative luxury and contentment 

quickly passed.”97

The other liaison officers, who were by now stationed around 

Greece in groups of one or two officers and a radio operator, often 

lived in equal or greater luxury. One luxury was the fairly independent 

existence, far removed from other groups.
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Figure 17. Transportation Problems.

One liaison officer working with ELAS guerrillas lived in a rich 

resort area in a house that was large and in good condition, with working indoor bathrooms.s

 There was adequate furniture, with beds to 

spare for guests. Meat and bread were sent weekly by the guerrillas, 

and this ration was eked out, not only by airdropped comforts, but with 

a home stock of a pig and eleven geese. The garden provided strawberries. The working staff consisted of a maid to cook, sew, wash, and 

become “a disturbing influence”; a man who acted as interpreter and 

steward; another man who was messenger and handyman; and a seamstress, who made shirts and pajamas from silk parachutes, sheets and 

tablecloths from canvas parachutes, and long silk stockings from the 

rigging lines. A horse, Freddy, allowed the run of the downstairs rooms 

at breakfast and at certain parties, completed the ménage.98 During the 

summer, upper-class Greek families on vacation made the neighborhood more attractive than usual to the hard-working liaison officer.

Ted and Inder seemed to find a good deal of attraction 

in the younger members of our new neighbors, and 

when they or other officers came through my H.Q. an 

excuse was always found to have a long drinking-party 

in the warm evenings. Ouzo and brandy were all we 

had, but they did well enough for cocktails. It seemed 

s Extremely unusual in the Greek mountains, where even outside facilities were often 

lacking.
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

slightly ridiculous and unreal to come up from a day’s 

work at the air-strip and an inspection of the guardposts in the foot-hills, to find a “cocktail party” in full 

swing at my HQ with Inder winding up an old gramophone and Ted telling a tall story to some languishing 

girls from the town.99

Because there were, even among liaison officers, men to whom this 

type of life spelled only “more,” it was probably just as well that the 

Germans ended the entire episode by burning the house, down to its 

bathtub, in the early fall.100

Most contacts that the liaison officers had with the Greek people 

were, however, not with the wealthy upper-class but with peasants 

and mountaineers. In some ways these people delighted and pleased 

them, in other ways they surprised both British and Americans. Allied 

officers and men usually saw the worst side of Greek life first. This 

was not strange or unusual, it was and remains the natural order of 

events: they were brought near to nausea by the overwhelming stench 

of human sweat or excrement; they were sickened by the death rattle of 

a sheep being butchered; they were bitten mercilessly by fleas and lice, 

entrenched residents of a soft bed alluring with white sheets; they were 

upset by an easy tolerance of cruelty.

Figure 18. Transportation Problems Solved.

One surprise to many of the Allied officers was the Greek villager’s 

attitude towards women, who were the tillers of the soil and the stevedores of the villages. “I could never get used to this habit of treating 
Behind Enemy Lines

175

women as not very valuable animals,” wrote a liaison officer adding, 

“but I could see the advantages of the system and only look forward 

with sardonic longing to the day when women get the vote in Greece.”101

When guerrilla packs had to be carried from village to village and the 

mule supply was insufficient, or the weather was too bad, the village 

president called out the women. Brigadier Myers was to remark that 

snow impeded the animals more than the women.102 They also helped 

in the summer of 1943 to build the first Allied airstrip at Neraidha.t

Despite their use as laborers, Greek mountain women lived a life of 

extreme retirement by Western European or American standards. In 

the house they stayed in the background when men were about. They 

generally ate after the men, and conversational exchange between the 

sexes except for family members, was not usual. When one liaison officer on Crete was found outdoors talking to two village schoolmistresses, 

the man in whose house he was living became abusive. “‘Women,’ he 

screamed. ‘You’re turning this place into a whorehouse!’ ”103

The reactions of Allied liaison officers to the role of lower-class 

Greek women is probably summed up by the number of expressions 

of pleasure at meeting the occasional girl from the town or the “emancipated” young village woman who did not wear the usual black dress 

with head shawl and who braved social disapproval to engage in conversation. The liaison officers themselves were, of course, also braving 

social disapproval.104

Even the magnificent hospitality of the poorest Greek was not always 

appreciated by the Allied liaison officer. Sometimes he offered gold 

and embarrassed or offended his hosts. Sometimes he did not, with the 

same results. Or perhaps, as he was offered the greatest delicacy on the 

table—often the sheep’s eyeball or pieces of genitalia—the liaison officer was hard put to play the role of perfect guest. Luckily, the Greeks 

usually understood and did not take it amiss if their guests refused. 

The liaison officer was also apt to be upset by the lice and fleas prevalent in many mountain homes. “I awoke to find that I had been bitten 

from top to toe by fleas,” is a typical comment. “I did not know whether 

to sympathize with the brothers and sisters of the house, whose beds we 

had occupied, or to be wildly envious of the immunity which they must 

t This was not strictly a wartime guerrilla custom. Greek women were in many villages 

the most usual means of moving supplies. During the war of 1940–41 both men and women 

carried guns and ammunition across the mountains to the Greek Army. EAM/ELAS, as a 

matter of fact, offered greater opportunity to Greek women than was their usual lot. Tzimas’ wife spoke in the villages on the role of Greek women in the resistance. Village girls 

could join the local EPON youth unit. There was even a fighting ELAS girl unit, which suffered casualties. Greek women first exercised the franchise in voting during the 1944 EAMsponsored PEEA elections. They had not voted previously and did not vote again until 1952. 

(Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 116 and n. 1 on p. 176; Moss, A War of Shadows, p. 102.)
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surely have cultivated against such vicious attacks. . . .” Before DDT, 

this misfortune was a keen one, both British and Americans have testified. Liaison officers have recalled that they sometimes accepted the 

hospitality of the bed of the house—to do otherwise would have been 

rude—and then slept on the floor. Even this expedient did not always 

save them.105

The average liaison officer did, nevertheless, adjust to Greek mountain life. It was one thing to complain about fleas in the bed or to 

wince at the sight of a sheep’s eyeball floating in the stew. It was quite 

another to know that one’s mere presence threatened a village with 

disaster, that every time one set up an operation, all the inhabitants 

of the area faced the destruction of their homes and possibly the loss 

of family members through enemy reprisals. “When a mountain village was about to be raided by the enemy,” Myers wrote of early 1943, 

“a fatalistic and relatively quiet terror spread through it.”106 Except for 

those too old to walk, everyone would leave, burdened down with the 

precious food and blankets needed to sustain life. And these were the 

days before the reprisals were really severe, when possibly only half of 

the houses would be burned. Not only to Myers, but to many, many 

others of the liaison officers, the heroes of the Greek war of the resistance were “the unarmed people of the mountains; the people who 

endured the full terror of enemy reprisals; who produced no traitors; 

among whom we always moved freely and by whom we were provided 

with food, shelter, guides and information. . . .”107

Figure 19. Greek Village Women.

Just as most liaison officers, without previous experience of Greece 

or Greeks, came to admire the Greek people who sustained the guerrilla 
Behind Enemy Lines

177

warfare, they also learned to get along with the guerrillas with whom 

they worked; at least in most cases. If not, Myers or Woodhouse made 

changes in assignment: “If the unit was bad, they left it; if they were 

bad, they were relieved; if the two were incompatible, an interchange 

was arranged. That was the only way the guerrilla war could work.”108

Yet it was not quite that easy. It may be questioned how much the 

political controversy in and about Greece, and especially between the 

British and EAM/ELAS, affected life in the field. Many British writers 

of memoirs have shown keen distaste for EAM/ELAS at all levels. For 

his part, Saraphis was certainly an Anglophobe, and he felt that bad 

feeling often prevailed between the ELAS commands and liaison officers. It is surprising, therefore, to find that Woodhouse thought that 

few liaison officers had political opinions, but that “their unconscious 

sympathies were rather to the left than the right.”109 It is true that some 

few British, like Rufus Sheppard, lauded EAM/ELAS to the skies. It is 

also true that the men who came to hate EAM/ELAS the most were 

often those who served with the forces of Zervas. Of particular annoyance to the British was the ELAS habit of demanding that liaison officers not travel through EAM/ELAS districts to which they were not 

accredited without obtaining travel passes from the local ELAS command. This problem was not really solved until mid-1944, when ELAS 

decided to issue permanent travel passes.110 Below the leadership level, 

however, the rank and file of guerrillas were much alike, whether they 

belonged to EDES or EAM/ELAS. At the tactical level, there was far 

less of the friction between the British and ELAS than was the case 

at headquarters. In the field, relationships were man to man. In most 

cases, Woodhouse wrote, liaison officers liked “whatever guerrillas they 

were with.”111

The process of getting to know each other was often prolonged and 

even difficult. There were honest adjustments that liaison officers had 

to make. One of the most upsetting experiences for the Allied men was 

the mountain Greek’s apparent penchant for torture as a “sport.” When 

the Greeks finished at Gorgopotamos, for example, they kept one Italian soldier as an amusement: he was finally killed by an “unblooded” 

and blundering youngster of 16 elected to do the job. “There was a 

groan,” reported a British commando officer, eyewitness to the scene, 

“echoed by the Greeks with laughter . . . . Four times the sword fell and 

the execution party joined us, laughing and joking with the boy who 

seemed half pleased and half ashamed . . . I reflected that the killing 

of the Italian ended for me the adventure of the Gorgopotamos.”112 On 

the mainland and on Crete there were numerous similar examples of 

brutality, painful to Allied eyes and ears; by the norm, the Italian got 

a quick release. Liaison officers have confessed to shooting uniformed 
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prisoners themselves, rather than leave them to the Greeks. Many men 

on the battlefields of World War II had little personal sense of direct 

involvement in bloodshed, but this was not the case for the Allied liaison officer.113

That the Greek peasant wanted to look up to and respect the Allied 

liaison officer is almost undeniable. Whereas the liaison officer had 

no real authority, he was paradoxically the living embodiment of it to 

most Greeks. “The lightest word that falls from the unguarded lips of 

the youngest second lieutenant in the British Army,” declared Colonel 

Woodhouse, “is assumed to be an inspired declaration of policy.”114 The 

British liaison officers who came to Greece first, particularly the 30 or 

40 on duty during active operations in the summer of 1943, exerted 

an influence out of all proportion to their numbers. Not only over the 

ignorant peasants, but even over educated Greeks, they had tremendous influence. It was this very influence that EAM/ELAS was constantly trying to overcome, by propaganda to its rank and file that the 

British would try to restore the King, by insisting that liaison officers 

not travel in ELAS districts without getting ELAS-issued travel warrants. Even in ELAS territory, however, the British liaison officer elicited respect. History, tradition, and legend reinforced Greek respect for 

the liaison officers. “They were on the spot; they were England.”115

If the liaison officer was England to the Greek guerrilla, he was 

also supposed to look the role. From Crete to Macedonia, the guerrilla 

“preferred to regard every Englishman as a direct descendant of Lord 

Byron.” And the Greek guerrilla expected him to look as he imagined 

Lord Byron to have looked, to act as he imagined Lord Byron to have 

acted. This aspect of the relationship between guerrilla and liaison officer helps to account for the fact that, on the whole, the man who looked 

Greek, or who was Greek, or who was descended from Greeks was not 

particularly successful, despite his command of the language. Concerning his successor, on Crete, Liaison Officer Xan Fielding wrote, “. . . I 

was not altogether happy about handing over to him. For, through no 

fault of his own, he had already proved himself unpopular. His Greek 

surname and Levantine features made him suspect in the eyes of the 

local peasants. . . .”116 Brigadier Myers had already discovered on the 

mainland that Greek officers, although in the British Army, had difficulty in maintaining any control over Greek guerrillas. “It was undesirable,” wrote Myers of a young Greek cavalryman whom he personally 

regarded as excellent, “for us to have a Greek officer in a tricky area 

where bands of both ELAS and EDES existed.”117 Asking about a new 
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179

British officer who had landed in Greece, an ELAS commander in 

Macedonia118 inquired whether he was “like Byron?”u

The same strictures did not seem to apply to Americans, particularly to members of the Operational Groups. Most of the O.G.’s were 

first-generation Americans of Greek descent and many spoke the language fluently. They fitted into the Greek scene so naturally that it 

seemed to some of the Greeks that “they had lived all their lives among 

us.” The Greeks liked the O.G.’s on the whole—their easy ways, their 

quick camaraderie, their first questions: “How far away were the Germans? Any room for a baseball-pitch? Any girls?” Luckily, the Greeks 

appeared to have expected no American Byrons. The relationship with 

American O.G.’s—even when it was a bad one—was subtly different 

from the relationship with the liaison officers. For one thing, their 

role was quite different from that of the liaison officers. The Operational Group gave support to liaison officers and guerrillas in tactical operations. Except perhaps for the greater material wealth of the 

Americans, relations between guerrillas and O.G.’s were thus on a basis 

of equality.119

The role of the Allied liaison officer was far more complex. His 

problem was essentially to maintain some control over the guerrillas 

while he possessed no authority over them. Personal relationships were 

therefore the heart of the matter.

In this relationship, there were apparently two psychological counterforces. On the one hand, the liaison officer appeared all-powerful: 

he descended by parachute; he represented one of the great nations of 

the world; he commanded, by means of his radio, instant contact with 

the outside world; he summoned supply drops and gold. How could 

the poor ragged Greek guerrilla, despite his pride, not look up to him? 

On the other hand, the Allied officers were young, daring, intensively 

trained for derring-do, invested with “a levity of outlook upon their grim 

life.”120 Sometimes this levity was admired by the Greeks, but then again 

it sometimes went beyond the bounds. For example, Greeks on Crete 

were aghast to see the Allied officers swimming and sunbathing nude, 

even in all-male company.121 Again, the Greeks who saw British liaison officers throwing overripe oranges at each other, then continuing 

(when the oranges were all spattered around) with sticks and buckets of 

water, or the Greeks who saw the British throwing stones at each other 

in horse play felt first astonishment, then chagrin, and then anger.122

The most Anglophile Greek took it amiss. Hopefully, Woodhouse was 

u One officer who went to Greece with British commandos in September 1944 was 

the only direct descendant of Byron. “The Greeks got to know this and treated him like a 

deity.” (Wilson, Flight Years Overseas, pp. 232–33.)
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right in reporting that most men engaged in such operations grew out 

of the levity.

A concomitant of their relative situations in life was that many 

Greeks apparently saw liaison officers in a haze of father-image. When 

a British major forbade a young Greek at mission headquarters to go 

visit his girl friend, angry words were exchanged. “It ended with Mac 

telling me to shut my mouth and my stomping off to bed without supper,” are the exact words of the culprit. Of the end of their association, 

when the liaison officer went home, the Greek was later to write: “For 

me Mac’s leaving represented the loss of someone I had come to look 

on as a big brother or even a father figure—when I meet him these days 

he calls me ‘son’.” Mac is five years older than his friend.123 It is a good 

guess that the guerrilla who, perhaps less consciously, sought a father 

figure was doubly offended by the liaison officer who did not allow such 

a projection.

In general, the British or Americans deplored, at least, privately, the 

guerrilla’s general lack of military training. The liaison officer saw the 

rank and file fail to attack; he saw them attack too soon, thus divulging the ambush; he saw them melt away too fast, thus leaving other 

elements uncovered. He saw guerrillas freeze, unable to pull the trigger, he saw them throw away rifles and run; he saw them fire too soon. 

He saw cowardice and hot-headed, foolish bravery.124 One young Greek 

described an operation by ELAS guerrillas: “Young guerrillas, most of 

them boys under twenty, were running wildly in all directions. None of 

them seemed afraid. They were just letting off steam like schoolboys, 

swinging in and out of carriages shooting at every shadow . . . . It was a 

wonder they didn’t shoot one another . . . . Some even went singing into 

the night sky. . . .”125

Training. Training. Training. If Saraphis admitted the need, liaison 

officers cried it to high heaven. What came to surprise the liaison officer, even to fool him, was the depth of the training that was required.126

Consider the matter of telling time. The liaison officer, at first, took 

it as a matter of course that one could agree to meet at, say 3 o’clock in 

the afternoon. Or that the hour of attack would be at, say 1500. Not in 

the Greek mountains or on the Greek islands. “I was told by Zahari,” 

begins a not unusual story, “that we should reach our hiding place in 

one and a half hours. It was midnight when we left the cove . . . and it 

was four o’clock in the morning when we at last reached our destination.” Or: “More than once I have known what was supposed to be a 

two-hour journey [to] last from breakfast till dinner.” On Crete it was 

safe for the liaison officer to treble time estimates for journeys; on the 

mainland, greater leeway had to be allowed. On the Gorgopotamos 

operation, which depended on exact timing, and on which Myers, Aris, 
Behind Enemy Lines

181

and Zervas formed the headquarters command, H-hour occurred only 

fourteen minutes late.127

Not only their cultural background but their physical condition had 

much to do with the trainability of the guerrillas. Years of hard work, 

little food, and poor conditions of life produced a wiry mountaineer but 

seldom men in top physical form. Liaison officers were often in much 

better shape. Few Greeks could keep up with Colonel Woodhouse in 

walking over their own mountains. He was known to have sent guides 

back because he had tired them out. He made it a practice to pick up 

fresh local guides from each village as he trekked over the mountains 

to Athens or back to Epirus. Physical condition obviously limited the 

pitch of training that men could sustain.128

But if training was needed, the liaison officer was also rarely able 

to give it, since the guerrillas generally came under their own leaders. 

The liaison officer had to treat the guerrilla in terms that the latter 

accepted. This meant that the liaison man often had to give way, to be 

tactful of the guerrilla leader’s extraordinary pride. Once Brigadier 

Myers, in an attempt to reprimand a guerrilla leader whom he thought 

insubordinate, refused publicly to return his salute. Seeing this, Woodhouse warned Myers, “If you weren’t an Englishman, Karalivanos would 

cut your throat for that!” “Yes,” replied the regular British officer, “But 

when I meet Aris, Karalivanos may have a job to keep his own head 

on his shoulders.” In this instance, Myers had assessed the situation 

accurately and Karalivanos was brought to heel—that is, on the Gorgopotamos operation he literally fought for his life. His bravery in turn 

was rewarded by Myers’ public congratulations. But such tactics could 

not be used indiscriminately and might not have worked had not Aris’ 

reputation been what it was; after all, he had had a man shot for stealing a chicken.129

In general, the key to the job of dealing with the guerrillas was not 

softness so much as tact and judgment—the knowledge of when to be 

severe and when to tread lightly. But tact and judgment were hard to 

exercise when they were also being practiced on one. Even in close relationships between liaison officers and Greeks, the latter often did not 

divulge their feelings.130 “I confess that I told him [the liaison officer], 

a lie,” wrote George Psychoundakis, a Cretan runner for the British, 

“because I didn’t want to upset him.”131

The secret was the ability to lead, even to criticize, without offending the intense natural dignity and pride that the often rough-shod, 

unclean, sometimes uncouth Greek possessed in abundant quantity. Snobbery, superiority, thoughtlessness did not mark the useful 

liaison officer.
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The liaison officers were, first of all, human beings subject to human 

failings, in an incredibly difficult position. This was also the case for 

the Greek people and the guerrillas, whether those of ELAS or EDES. 

It is thus to the credit of all these groups that the military purpose of 

the resistance was upheld—that tactical operations against the enemy 

were actually undertaken by the guerrillas.
CHAPTER V.

TACTICAL GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

A QUICK OVERVIEW

THE MAJOR TARGET

EXAMPLES OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

WHAT MILITARY VALUE?

WHAT COST?

Tactical Guerrilla Operations

185

TACTICAL GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

A Quick Overview

Until November 1942 Greek guerrilla operations had been pinpricks to the Axis occupiers. At that time, however, the demolition of 

the Gorgopotamos Bridge deep in Axis territory struck a major blow 

against the Axis supply system. Afterward, on orders from the Allied 

Commander, guerrilla operations subsided for the winter months, In 

June and July 1943, major guerrilla operations were resumed in Operation ANIMALS, designed to make the Axis believe that an Allied invasion would be made in Greece rather than in Sicily. The British were 

pleased with the results and grateful to the guerrillas. “Two German 

divisions,” wrote Prime Minister Churchill, “were moved into Greece 

which might have been used in Sicily.”1 Thereafter, however, the guerrillas became more and more a strategic and political problem for the 

British, and their military value was diminished.

Although Prime Minister Churchill later thought that ANIMALS 

marked “the last direct military contribution which the Greek guerrillas made to the war,”2

 the Germans had little inkling that this was the 

situation. Thoroughly alarmed about the expansion of guerrilla warfare in Greece, the defection of the Italian forces there, and the possibility that Allied landings might still be made in Greece, they began, 

in the fall and winter of 1943–44, a series of mopping-up operations 

aimed mainly at the guerrillas of EAM/ELAS.

That organization was at the time also engaged in fighting its 

smaller rival EDES. At the end of the winter of 1943–1944, the situation 

was that the Germans had not been able to eliminate the guerrillas and 

the guerrillas had not been able to eliminate each other.

Primarily to divert guerrilla attention from internecine warfare, the 

Allied liaison officers in Greece were ordered by Middle East Command to propose planning for Operation NOAH’S ARK, set for the 

spring of 1944. This operation was to be guerrilla harassment of the 

German withdrawal from Greece and was to precede and continue 

simultaneously with Operation MANNA, the landing of a token force 

of British troops at the time of the German retreat. NOAH’S ARK did 

not actually take place until the fall of 1944, by which time the Germans had begun their northward retreat from outposts in southern 

Greece and the islands.

Meanwhile, the summer of 1944 was marked by another series of 

major German actions designed to eliminate the guerrilla threat. At 

first these were directed against EAM/ELAS, but after EDES initiated 

attacks against the Germans, mopping-up operations were also planned 
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against that organization. The Germans claimed large guerrilla losses; 

however, the ability of the guerrillas to regroup and continue operations was not affected.

In late September NOAH’S ARK went into full swing as the Germans pulled back to the Corfu-Olympus line. The guerrillas tried to 

block transit on roads and rail lines leading to the north, and the Germans had to fight to keep the roads and rails open. Although they 

were slowed up, they managed to complete a fairly orderly retreat from 

Greece by November 1944.

The guerrilla war can be operationally summed up in the words 

of Woodhouse. If, in 1943, “a handful of guerrillas prevented the Germans from total occupation,” in 1944, “a handful of Germans and 

second-rate satellite troops now prevented the guerrillas from total 

occupation.”3

 However, this is not the whole story.

The Germans, of course, did not operate on a man-to-man basis. 

Not only did guerrilla strength never equal Axis strength, but Axis 

troops were on the whole in a better state of combat readiness than 

the guerrillas. Even the low-caliber troops of the fortress divisions were 

better organized, better equipped, and better trained. Their leaders 

were more uniformly trained and more advanced in tactics. German 

armament, including armored cars and tanks, had no counterpart in 

the guerrilla army. The Germans also had some aircraft for raids on 

guerrilla headquarters and drop zones, or in some instances, for tactical support in mopping-up operations. Furthermore, although the Germans found it difficult to maintain contact with the guerrillas while 

fighting in the mountains, they were more mobile and could bring up 

reinforcements quickly to obtain local combat superiority.

The Greek guerrillas, particularly EAM/ELAS, were at best an 

improvised army. They had no tactical air force. They attempted to 

establish technical support services, but these were rudimentary compared with those of a regular army. Held down by their lack of transport 

and the artificial territorial limitations imposed by their own rivalries, 

the guerrillas were hard pressed to bring up reinforcements of men 

and supply to areas of local combat. Both EAM/ELAS and EDES operated with one hand, as it were, tied behind their backs—fighting with 

each other as they tried to harass the German forces. In addition, it 

must also be realized that, from their point of view, NOAH’S ARK was 

not altogether sensible: why risk one’s life to impede the leavetaking of 

a hated enemy? The fact that both EAM/ELAS and EDES operated to 

Woodhouse’s general satisfaction4

 in this period says much for British 

control and for guerrilla efforts.
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

187

The Major Target

The most important target for guerrilla operations was the transportation system. This meant, in effect, the road and rail system, since 

the Axis lacked adequate air or sea craft to transport men and materiel 

through the Balkans and since the inland waterways were generally 

unsuitable for transportation purposes. By successfully attacking the 

roads and railways and the users of this transportation complex, the 

guerrillas could fulfill all Allied desires. They could hold down enemy 

troops that might be used elsewhere, they could inflict enemy troop 

losses, they could interdict enemy lines of communications, and they 

could cause loss of enemy supplies and equipment. Greek roads and 

rails offered an excellent target to the guerrillas.

The value of the road and rail system as a target was enhanced by 

the fact that it remained useful and necessary to the Germans throughout the occupation. Until May 1943, when German troops were thrown 

out of North Africa, the Greek transportation complex served as a 

main supply route for Rommel’s troops. After May 1943, the German 

commander charged with defending Greece still needed to control the 

country’s roads and railways. Since an Allied landing was anticipated 

in Greece throughout 1943 and into 1944, control of its transportation 

system was necessary if troops were to be brought up to the point of 

invasion quickly. German plans, in fact, were based on using secondrate troops to defend the coast and on bringing up firstline troops 

from the interior to the point of attack. After the invasion possibility 

practically evaporated in mid-1944, the Germans still had to protect 

the roads and railways in order to maintain an effective occupation, to 

supply their outposts in southern Greece and the islands, and to safeguard their eventual withdrawal routes.

The importance of the road and rail net in Greece was further 

increased by the fact that there was so little of it. In countries with 

an extensive transportation net, routing could be shifted to bypass 

breaks made by sabotage. Less important traffic could be sidelined 

and left standing in order to secure additional cars or locomotives. In 

Greece, where the transportation net was rudimentary, every break was 

a major one.

From Europe through Greece there was only one north-south railroad, the single-track broad-gauge line of the Greek State Railways. 

This led from the Yugoslav border to Salonika and thence to Athens, where it stopped. Supplies destined for the Peloponnesus had 

to be reloaded onto the cars of the narrow-gauge Piraeus-AthensPeloponnesus line.5
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Figure 20. Greek Transportation System.

The Salonika-Athens line constituted practically the whole mainland system. It wound through the eastern part of Greece with several 

spurs running a short distance to the eastern coast or through Thessaly into the central plain of Greece. The western coast was without rail 

transportation, except for a small narrow-gauge line that linked Messolongi with Agrinion in extreme southwestern Greece. At the beginning of World War II the entire rail coverage of Greece, including the 

Peloponnesus, amounted to about 1,700 miles.6

It might seem that so comparatively few miles of railroad could 

be defended by an occupation army without too much difficulty. In 

Greece, however, ordinary problems of defense were compounded 

because of the mountainous terrain. All along the railway sudden 

bends and curves created many blind spots where engineers could not 

see in time that barriers had been erected or that track had been torn 
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

189

up. Railroad bridges spanned deep mountain chasms, and bridge garrisons were not always sufficiently alert to avoid demolition sabotage. 

Trains had to go through a number of tunnels in the mountains, sometimes in approaching a bridge, and these also offered targets for sabotage. One particularly vulnerable stretch of the railway was bounded 

on both sides by mountains or high hills; it became infamous as the 

“Five Mile Area” and was particularly feared by the hapless Greek locomotive engineers.

The road system offered the Germans a poor alternative to the railway for transportation of men and supplies. In the first place, the Germans were short of both trucks and gasoline. In the second place, the 

roads themselves were extremely poor. Only a few major highways were 

paved. In the dry summer weather a cloud of dust, visible miles away, 

betrayed any usage. In the rainy season vehicles bogged down in the 

mud. At all times, holes, pockets, and bumps kept traffic slow. Even on 

the plains of Thessaly, the road system was “incredibly bad.” Once the 

major road was left, speed was limited to 10 to 15 miles per hour.7

Furthermore, the roads did not adequately cover Greece. From 

Salonika in the northeast to Athens in the south—the two largest cities—there was only one usable road paralleling the east coast railroad. 

On the western side, the Yannina-Arta-Agrinion road was the sole 

north-south highway. Across northern Greece there was only one major 

west-east road, that leading from Yannina to Trikkala to Larisa, where 

it intersected the Salonika-Athens highway. It was of such importance 

that it became a matter of constant contention between the occupiers 

and the guerrillas.8

 On Crete there was only one major lateral road, 

along the northern shore. Greece, in short, did not have a road system adequate for the motorized transport of regular troops in combat 

with fast-dissolving guerrilla forces. Furthermore, although there were 

fewer miles for the occupier to defend, each road-cut seriously reduced 

the occupier’s ability to move his supplies and personnel.

As targets for sabotage, the roads, like the railways, were ideally 

located. The north-south road, Yannina-Arta-Agrinion, for example, 

ran for some distance along a narrow coastal plain between the mountains and the sea. For vehicles caught in this spot there was little possibility of detour or deployment. Plans for guerrilla operations took full 

cognizance of the vulnerability of the transportation system.

Examples of Guerrilla Operations

Attacks on the railways took a variety of forms. Sometimes stones 

were piled on the line or a charge was laid to blow up track as a train 

passed. These crude attempts were quickly parried by the Germans 
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

and never delayed traffic for long. Some attacks involved demolition 

of major bridges, as at Gorgopotamos and Asopos. These operations, 

however, led the Germans to tighten bridge security to such an extent 

that no further attempts on this scale were feasible. As a result, in 1944 

the guerrillas and liaison officers depended upon a combined antirailroad, antipersonnel operation to delay rail traffic. If successful, this 

operation resulted not only in stoppage of rail traffic for some time, 

but in personnel and equipment losses.

Attacks on the road system were frequent. They ranged from the 

simple strewing of mines on the road to complex ambushes of supply 

convoys. The Germans came to be bitterly annoyed by the frequency of 

even simple sabotage operations. But they were far more upset by road 

ambushes which resulted in the destruction of equipment or injury to 

personnel, sometimes high-ranking. Throughout the occupation there 

was an endless succession of small-scale incidents on the roads and railways, punctuated by a number of major attacks which resulted in severe 

strain on the occupiers.9

One secondary value of the roads as a target was that the telephone 

lines so frequently followed them. Operations against the telephone 

lines were almost a daily guerrilla duty, performed with dispatch and 

ingenuity. Some care was taken to choose the sabotage site carefully— 

where repairs would be difficult and cover available. Poles were then 

sawed through and lines cut, the wire being taken for use in the guerrillas’ own system. Often the guerrillas would set an ambush for the 

repair crews that came to fix the damage. Snipers would shoot down 

the repairmen as they worked, thus causing loss of skilled technical 

personnel. The truck driver was always shot to avoid his alerting the 

German base. When ambushes were difficult or dangerous, the guerrillas were likely to plant and camouflage tread mines around the site 

so that the repair crews would be blown up.10

The Germans reversed that procedure in time by planting tread 

mines around specific poles to blow up guerrillas who might be trying 

to sabotage the poles. Dynamite charges were also planted in the poles 

themselves, to blow up when the pole was sawed through.11

In the following sections, the tactics of a number of specific guerrilla operations will be reviewed, including those of the famous bridge 

demolitions at Gorgopotamos and Asopos, as well as some lesser bridge 

operations. Three of these were against railway viaducts; one was 

against a road bridge. The operation at Asopos was accomplished by 

a six-man, all-British team, but the others all involved direct guerrilla 

cooperation.

Train ambushes, usually involving cooperation between guerrillas and liaison officers and sometimes the additional support of the 
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

191

American Operational Groups or units of the British Raiding Support 

Regiment, were an extremely important form of harassment of the Germans in 1944. One such operation the train ambush near Katerini on 

3 August 1944—is described in detail.

Also described in detail is an ambitious and successful road ambush 

during the Italian phase of the occupation, and some indication is 

given of the type of attacks that were possible after the Germans managed to restore control over the major roads in the fall of 1943.

Several examples of other types of guerrilla operations against 

enemy troops are also considered.

Tactics of the Gorgopotamos Operation12

The far-reaching results of the famous attack in November 1942 on 

the Gorgopotamos bridge carrying the Salonika-Athens railway have 

already been discussed generally, but the tactics themselves offer an 

almost classic example of a combined special forces-guerrilla operation.

Myers, then colonel in command of what was still a one-shot operation, could count on his own party of 12 British, including himself. In 

addition, he had three enlisted men of the British Army who had been 

left behind in 1941 and had lived clandestinely in Greece for the past 

18 months. He had met Aris and Zervas and had secured their cooperation, including a combined force of about 150 guerrillas. Furthermore, 

reconnaissance had shown that, although most of the piers of the Gorgopotamos were masonry and “therefore unsuitable for rapid demolition,” two of them were of steel and vulnerable to sabotage attack. 

The demolitions were to be shaped and prepared prior to the start of 

the attack.

The mechanics of the attack were fairly complex, since the bridge 

was well defended, with Italian guard posts at both ends. About 80 Italian troops were billeted near the bridge for its defense. Other enemy 

troops who were garrisoned in nearby towns could be brought up 

quickly by road or rail. No one was allowed to come within a mile of 

the railway after dusk.

Because the Gorgopotamos bridge, almost 200 yards long, spanned 

a gorge so deep that the groups attacking the garrisons at the north 

and south ends would be entirely separated during the whole operation, Colonel Myers planned to divide the forces at his disposal into 

seven groups. The enemy garrisons defending the bridge were to be 

isolated by two guerrilla groups who were to cut all telephone and 

telegraph communications at some distance beyond the guard posts, 

and prepare to destroy the railway line leading to the bridge, immediately if a train should pass, otherwise at the end of the operation. Two 

other groups of guerrilla fighters were to destroy the guard garrisons 
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at either end of the bridge. When these four groups had done their 

work, a fifth party of British engineer officers was to begin demolition 

of the bridge itself. Meanwhile, a sixth guerrilla group, stationed on 

the road between a nearby town and the bridge, was to delay any enemy 

reinforcements. Finally, a headquarters company would install itself up 

the valley, facing the center of the bridge, where it might also give some 

local protection to the demolition group.

Colonel Myers, of course, expected to command the operation himself. He was therefore a little surprised when Zervas suggested that it 

would be “tactful” to ask Aris to join the two of them in a joint command. “I was at a loss,” wrote Myers, “to see how three people could 

command the same operation, but Zervas reassured me. ‘I will command it,’ he said, ‘but the three of us will agree on all major decisions and plans beforehand.’”13 Actually, Myers found it expedient to 

go along with this advice, and the command was nominally joint. To 

succeed in the endeavor, Myers used cajolery and persuasion, not commands, with both Axis and Zervas. Naturally, he could depend on his 

own men to give instant obedience.

The final approach to the bridge was started around 1800 hours on 

25 November 1942. This allowed the group going farthest, a distance of 

about 3 miles, 4 hours to get into position. They left first, a band of 15 

ELAS guerrillas with 2 British officers, to cut the railway and telephone 

lines south of the bridge. Another band of 15 ELAS men under a British officer and a guerrilla engineer officer went to do a similar job on 

the lines north of the bridge. Then the attack guerrillas marched out 

in two groups of about 30 to 40 men, one party of EDES men and one 

of both ELAS and EDES men, both groups under EDES officers.

Next came the Joint Headquarters, in which Aris and Zervas now 

combined to outvote Myers: they stationed themselves on the near, 

instead of the far, side of the bridge valley, with the result that they 

could offer no support to the demolitions group.  A further change 

in Myers’ plan appears to have been that the road ambush party was 

converted into a reserve group under the direct control of the Headquarters, a most fortunate provision, as it turned out. Finally, the demolitions party, now responsible for its own local defense, left last, some 3 

hours after the first group.
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193

Figure 21. The Gorgopotamos Railway Bridge.

H-hour, which was, according to Myers,a at 2300 hours, was to mark 

the simultaneous assault on the bridge garrisons at either end of the 

Gorgopotamos. Colonel Myers, most tense by now, had to wait almost 15 

more minutes, however, before the operation actually started. Within 

a few minutes after the first firing, he received a message that, while 

cutting their way through the barbed wire around the guard post, the 

guerrillas at the northern end of the bridge had been spotted, fired 

upon, and had retreated in disorder. The Joint Headquarters decided 

immediately to throw in the whole of the reserve, under the leadership 

of Zervas’ second in command, Komninos Pyromaglou, to get a fresh 

attack underway. The guerrillas at the southern end of the bridge, also 

under a Zervas officer, had a vigorous attack going. After 20 minutes 

of fighting, however, Zervas himself began to worry about ammunition 

shortages and wanted to give the withdrawal signal if the attack were 

not successful within 10 more minutes. Luckily, it was discovered at this 

a On this minor point Myers is at variance with another officer participant, who set 

H-hour at 2400 hours. The time of H-hour, whichever it may have been, had no effect on 

the subsequent action.
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point that the Headquarters was without a Very pistol; Myers took the 

opportunity to order Woodhouse to fetch the pistol and allow no one 

else to handle it.

Figure 22. The Gorgopotamos Diagram Used by the British.

The leadership of the two Zervas officers in the attacks going at 

either end of the bridge appears to have been good. In addition, the 

guerrillas were spurred on by the mixture of Communist and nonCommunist elements in one of the attack parties: during the fight each 

accused the other of cowardice and, thus annoyed, each went on to 

greater endeavor. After an hour of fighting, Colonel Myers heard that 

Pyromaglou at the north end of the bridge expected to win and that 

the south end was already in possession of the guerrillas.

At this point, Colonel Myers, worried about the duration of the 

operation and the chance of enemy reinforcements arriving, ordered 

in the demolition party. Consisting of four British officers, the three 

escaped colonial personnel, and about six Greek guerrillas to carry 

explosives and to act as guards, the demolitions party shoved down the 

steep slope, “mostly on our behinds, and greatly to the detriment of our 

boots and trousers.”14 The Greek guards tended to see Italian soldiers 
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

195

in every bush and began to fire wildly. After several shots that came 

close to British ears, the officers insisted that the firing cease.

Without bothering about mines, the British officer leading the 

party cut the wire surrounding the base of the pier and the group now 

took a close look at their target. “The four great steel feet of it were 

sunk into an unshakable base of deep concrete. A hundred men could 

have stood inside the square those feet formed. It seemed to me a miniature Eiffel tower,” wrote one of the officers.15 Far more serious, the 

group now realized that their reconnaissance had proved erroneous 

in one important respect. The girders, instead of being right-angled as 

they had thought, were U-shaped; so their carefully prepared charges 

and pieces of timber could not be used. The demolitions all had to be 

reassembled, a job that was likely to take an hour or more.

There was no time to lose. The three engineer officers, with their 

assistants, went to their assigned girders, each with two charges to 

place. The Greek carriers were positioned as guards; the one British 

commando officer was assigned to supervise the guards and keep a 

general lookout, as well as to lend a hand where needed.

With the fighting still continuing on the north end of the bridge, 

the demolition party felt, with some reason, as though it were directly 

in the line of fire. Some Italians who early in the fighting had gone farther down the gorge actually “zeroed in” on the party with a mortar; the 

shells, in fact, dropped so close to the saboteurs that the Italians may 

have thought they had knocked them out, because after two shots they 

stopped firing. The party itself thought that the Greeks on the bridge 

were grenade-happy and addressed them in especially non-endearing 

terms. Meanwhile Colonel Myers, back at Headquarters, was placating 

Zervas. Now convinced that they were running out of ammunition, Zervas wanted to withdraw immediately. To break his tension, Myers went 

to see the fighting at the north end of the bridge. He found the battle 

there almost at a standstill. Within seconds, he heard the demolition 

party’s signal to take cover. All firing ceased, the explosion occurred.

A first look at the bridge reassured both British and Greeks. The 

pier’s four legs had been cut clean through; two of them had lost about 

eight feet, with the result that the pier had a tremendous lean. Two 

complete spans of the bridge had dropped into the gorge. Nevertheless, the British officer in charge of the demolition party wanted to do 

a little more work—to twist the railway spans and cut a log of the next 

pier. Myers agreed and returned to headquarters to keep Zervas from 

withdrawing for the 40 more minutes it was estimated the work would 

require.

Meanwhile, an enemy train from the north had managed to ride 

through and then back up from the explosion that the northern 
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communications party had laid. Somehow the Greek guerrillas failed 

to attack the troops in the train before they came out and engaged 

the guerrillas. Hearing the fresh fighting, the demolition party worked 

feverishly against time. In another 10 minutes they decided they had 

done all they could, for firing in the north had ceased and they suspected that the guerrillas were giving way. They lit the fuses for 90 

seconds and retired. This second explosion twisted the already broken 

spans, but failed to bring down the pier.

As the second explosion died down, three green Very shots gave 

the signal for a general withdrawal. Every man now began to follow 

instructions to make his own shortest way back up Mount Oiti. Rendezvousing along the mountainside, the guerrillas left a small liaison 

party to direct stragglers and moved off immediately for their base, the 

sawmill huts where they had had their last rest some hours previously 

and where they expected to find food and rest again.

On the way back to the sawmill, the effects of fatigue, hunger, and 

the letup of tension began to make themselves felt. Commando-trained 

British climbed the 4,000-foot Mount Oiti and went on to the sawmill 

in 4 hours, but claimed to have done it mostly in their sleep. Colonel 

Myers, not in this fit condition, had to ride part of the way on a mule 

and still took 8 hours to reach the huts. All along the way, men who 

were still on their feet kicked and prodded awake both the Greeks and 

British who dropped and fell asleep in the snow. But back at the huts 

they all found fires, hot food, and sleep.

The operation was almost a complete success. None of the 12 British had even been hurt. Although 20 to 30 Italians were reported killed 

in the fighting, no guerrillas had been killed. A few had been injured 

or wounded. The next day, however, the Italians shot 14 Greeks in reprisal. The bridge, of course, was ruined; and it was 6 weeks before the 

enemy was able to repair it and to resume using the important railway. 

“Communications between Salonika and Athens were disrupted,” wrote 

German General Lanz, “and this lifeline had now to be maintained by 

means of a tedious reloading process.”16 The demolition of the Gorgopotamos provided the Allies with a major strategic success; it gave to 

Myers’ British party and the Greek guerrillas a major tactical victory.b

Tactics of the Asopos Bridge Demolition17

Whereas the Gorgopotamos operation involved both uniformed 

British and non-uniformed Greek guerrillas, the destruction of the 

b For this operation Myers and Woodhouse received the D.S.O. and three other British the M.C. Of the Greeks, one received the M.C., one the M.B.E., and the two leaders the 

O.B.E. Aris’ award was subsequently suppressed. (Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 121.)
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

197

Asopos, sister bridge to the Gorgopotamos, was actually performed by 

a total of six British soldiers in uniform. They made the attack unassisted after ELAS, as already noted, had turned down the opportunity to participate. Because there could be no direct attack on the 

guard posts, the entire operation depended upon secrecy and surprise 

for the time required, not only to do the work, but to get away.

The Asopos had a guard detail of about 40 German soldiers, with 

6 heavy machineguns and more light automatics. The bridge was regularly patrolled, and searchlights played upon it periodically during the 

night. Its two regular approaches were through tunnels, through which 

it was impossible for the small British sabotage party to go. German 

defenses of the bridge were laid out in all directions except through 

an extraordinarily deep and narrow gorge which both Greeks and 

Germans regarded as impossible to negotiate. The party nevertheless 

undertook to go down through this very gorge, with its long drops and 

deep, freezing-cold pools and waterfalls, some 40 feet high. They carried explosives but no arms.

In May 1943 the British party made a favorable reconnaissance and 

the demolitions charges were preshaped and prepared. On 23 May, the 

explosives were wrapped in five bundles with waterproof covering, and 

taken part way down the gorge by a party of eight men. In two days’ 

time, the men had descended two-thirds of the way but were stopped by 

a particularly difficult waterfall, for which they needed extra rope ladders. They had used up their 340 feet of rope; they needed packs they 

could carry on their heads; and the moon was becoming too low for 

the operation. Leaving their explosives hidden in the gorge, the men 

returned to the top. Some of them had badly torn hands and knees and 

the entire party was exhausted. The assault was postponed to the next 

moon period.

On 16 June the final attempt was made by six men: two commando 

officers, two Royal Engineer officers, a British escaped prisoner of war 

who had joined the party, and a Palestinian Arab sergeant in the British Army who had participated with distinction at Gorgopotamos.c

Four of these men had been on the previous reconnaissance attempt: 

Using additional rope, three men started down the gorge in daylight, 

they reached a point about a hundred yards from the bridge, where 

they could see that workmen were busy on the bridge and that there 

was scaffolding leading up to it. Already confident of success, the two 

c In order, Maj. Geoffrey Gordon-Creed, Capt. Donald Stott, Maj. R. Scott, Capt. 

Henry McIntyre. Lance-Corporal Charlie Mutch, and Sgt. Michael Khuri. For this adventure the first two received the D.S.O.; the second two, the M.C.; and the two enlisted men, 

the M.M.
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officers sent a message to British Mission headquarters: “The job’s in 

the bag. . . .”18

On 19 June the other three men reached the top of the gorge and 

the next day started down. The two groups met at the place where the 

explosives had been hidden earlier and spent the day repairing and 

changing them. At this time, the two commando officers made a final 

reconnaissance and discovered that there was a path leading directly to 

the bridge scaffolding. All was ready for the final attack.

At 1830 hours on 20 June 1943, all six men began the trek down 

the last part of the gorge; at 2000 hours they reached the foot of the 

path leading to the bridge. As they went on, they found neat gaps in the 

barbed wire and a ladder leading through the scaffolding to a platform 

about 30 feet up. From here they were able to reach the bridge’s main 

girders. The two enlisted men were now sent back to the camp site in 

the gorge to prepare hot food and get everything ready to leave. The 

four officers hauled up the explosives; then the two engineers set to 

work, while the two commandos remained on the ground as guards.

During the placement of the explosives, a German guard came 

down the path. A commando officer, hidden behind a bush, jumped 

him as he passed, knocked him out with his rubber cosh, and toppled 

him over the cliff. His fall was silenced by the noise of the raging river. 

As the saboteurs worked, loose bolts were kicked off the platform and 

clanged onto the metal girders below. The men fell over themselves and 

dropped things. At times they had to stop working because the moon 

was too bright or the searchlight was played on the bridge. Although 

the British were understandably shaken by the noise they were making, the German guards pacing up and down the bridge appeared to 

hear nothing. “The enemy,” the British later wrote, “was apparently 

unsuspicious.”

After about an hour and a half, the engineers had finished their 

task. They fixed fuses for 90 minutes’ delay and the party left. At this 

moment the searchlight played right upon them, but still none of the 

guards noticed. Now that saboteurs began worrying about the explosives, which had been dragged through water on the final approach. 

At 0215 hours, however, as they were halfway back up the gorge, they 

heard the explosion. The main arch of the bridge was cut and the whole 

central span collapsed into the ravine, bringing down both the cantilevered spans attached to the main one. In 24 hours the whole British 

party was back in Anatoli, all hands safe.
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Figure 23. The Asopos Railway Bridge.
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Figure 24. The Asopos Diagram Used by the British.

Not so the German bridge garrison. The German high command 

was so convinced that the bridge could have been blown up only through 

treachery that they judged the entire defense garrison of about 40 men 

guilty of gross neglect of duty and shot the officer in charge and several 

men. Two months later the bridge was reopened for traffic. But as the 

first engine started across, a pier collapsed, hurling the engine and part 

of the bridge into the gorge. Either the repair work had been faulty or 

it had been deliberately sabotaged by Polish and Greek crews. It took 

another 2 months to complete the second repair, so that, according 
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

201

to Myers, the Salonika-Athens railway was not functioning for fully 4 

months during the summer of 1943.d

Asopos was truly an amazing feat. “For sheer endurance, determination to succeed and pluck,” wrote Brigadier Myers, “there was 

probably no more gallant achievement of its type.”19 It should not be 

forgotten, however, that many Greeks knew it was going to take place 

and no one gave it away. Without this curtain of silence it could never 

have been successful.

Other Bridge Operations

Two other operations on bridges, far less famous than the attacks 

on Gorgopotamos and Asopos but far more typical of the usual work of 

guerrillas, are described below.

In the first instance a British liaison officer and an enlisted man of 

the local mission, with a small detachment of ELAS guerrillas under 

an ELAS commanding officer, set out to destroy a road bridge at Mavroneri.20 The main purpose of the action was to keep the Germans 

from bringing up armored cars, small cannon, and infantry trucks for 

antiguerrilla operations.

The operation was planned by the British. On the day of the operation the guerrillas were told the details of the plan, and they made 

a reconnaissance during the evening hours. About 2200 hours, the 

guerrilla scouts reported that the bridge was free of patrols, absolutely 

deserted in fact. At this point the two British and the rest of the guerrilla group joined the scouts to complete the operation. Stopping in a 

nearby woods, the two British prepared their charges. They were using 

“beehive” devices which made holes in the bridge, into which explosives to cause greater damage could be tamped. Since the bridge was 

still deserted, the two liaison officers climbed onto it and attached the 

“leeches of explosive.” The guerrillas stood by in case of trouble, but 

none came. The only untoward happening was that the mules were 

brought too close and were difficult to control when the explosion 

occurred. The bridge was wrecked, and all hands were back at mission 

headquarters before morning. It was as simple as that.

Not all operations went as well as those at Gorgopotamos, Asopos, 

and Mavroneri. The last bridge operation to be described,21 one performed in the late summer of 1944 as part of Operation NOAH’S ARK, 

failed completely. Nevertheless, it was a remarkable try.

d In another account the time is given as two and a half months (McGlynn, Special 

Service in Greece, p. 29.)
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The target was a railway bridge at Choiropotamos.e It was heavily 

guarded by German troops in concrete pillboxes. These were protected 

by a minefield, which was in its turn surrounded by barbed wire fences. 

The German guard had machineguns and mortars and had evidently 

planned its field of fire carefully.

The attacking group was composed of a full ELAS company, an 

American Operational Group of some 20 men, and a British liaison 

officer more or less leading the joint group. Intelligence concerning the 

enemy posts and patrols had been acquired from a captured German 

prisoner, “an old Bavarian soldier named Hans.” The plan of attack was 

to blow up the barbed wire and then to set off the minefield to clear 

the approach and to demolish the bridge. The guerrillas also planned 

to use Hans for psychological warfare—“a ‘Lord Haw Haw’ in reverse.”

From the very start the attack got nowhere. The guerrillas apparently were ambushed before it even fully started. One line of guerrillas 

walked straight into a mortar burst, and the entire attack party was 

pinned down for half an hour.

At this point the liaison officer called on Hans to perform. He was 

supposed to get the results that force of arms had failed to achieve. He 

called to his German comrades to surrender to the British and American troops instead of the guerrillas and promised them good treatment “until the war ended in a short time.” The Germans’ answer was 

in the form of mortar and machinegun fire.

For 2 hours the guerrilla group alternated psychological and military efforts. The military assault failed completely; the psychological 

effort resulted in one surrender, a middle-aged man “pale with fear.” 

Unwanted by the Americans, the deserter remained with the guerrillas.

Under the liaison officer’s direction, all hands retreated several 

miles from the bridge. At dawn, after breakfast and the posting of 

sentries, most of the men fell asleep.  Two guerrillas were dead and 

several wounded.

A second attack several days later also ended in failure; the group 

partially compensated for this, however, by blowing up a train and 

shooting some of the troops it carried.

Train Ambush, Near Katerini, 3 August 194422

Along the Salonika-Athens railway in the east of Greece, a number of Allied missions and guerrilla groups operated in a fashion 

popularly known in 1944 as “train-busting.” One such group was 

e This is the name given in the source. It has not been verifiable in the list of “Official 

Standard Names Approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names,” for Greece, 

dated July 1951.
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

203

known as the Lapworth mission, which regularly operated in conjunction with the local ELAS 50th Guerrilla Regiment. One of its operations in the summer of 1944 may be cited as typical of such liaison 

officer-guerrilla activities.

Lapworth was commanded by British Major M. G. McAdam, a 

25-year-old Scot, a chartered accountant by profession. Also attached 

to the mission were two radio operators, an Italian cook, an interpreter, 

an English lieutenant with a Greek name, a corporal of the regular 

Greek Army, and a Greek private in the British Army. The last three 

men were operational and constituted, with himself, Major McAdam’s 

own combat group.23

Major McAdam could also count on support from elements of the 

ELAS 50th Guerrilla Regiment. The group of guerrillas it usually provided for operations was well commanded by a Capt. Andreas Arnaoutoglou, who was a teacher by profession and had fought in the Greek 

Army in 1941. McAdam regarded him as a friend “and a good and reliable officer in an operation.” It was probably to such men that McAdam 

referred when he later said there were ELAS subalterns capable of 

fanatical bravery.24

McAdam also knew that the civilian population in his area was 

trustworthy. Not only did no one pass information to the Germans 

against the “trainbusters,” but they supplied the guerrillas with much 

information about German moves of all sorts.

This particular operation was conceived by Major McAdam. He 

cleared it with his regional Allied Mission headquarters and received 

permission to carry it out. He also got in touch with the guerrillas, 

received their approval and support, and arranged a rendezvous with 

them. He informed his own Lapworth group of the operation only as 

they started out for the rendezvous.

After a couple of hours the Allied liaison group stopped to rest 

and the commanding officer and his lieutenant prepared their plan of 

assault. They studied detailed maps of the areas supplied by Allied air 

drops. The attack was to be that night, 3 August 1944. There were two 

major problems: the exact place where the demolition charges should 

be laid and the exact train they wanted to derail.

They decided to attack at a point southeast of Katerini and slightly 

north of Dhion, where the rail line lay within sight of the Aegean Sea. 

At Dhion there was a small German garrison; this station and the one 

above the point of attack, Korinos, were armed with field guns and 

heavy mortars. Furthermore, there were many German posts nearby. 

These considerations were outweighed by the advantages of the selected 

location. The terrain was ideal. At this point the rails curved and the 

train could be easily derailed by even a small explosion. There was, 
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furthermore, plenty of natural cover providing hiding places and camouflage nearby. Dried-up stream beds were readymade trenches. No 

attack had been previously tried at this point.

The choice of a train to attack was a more difficult matter. The 

major consideration was to avoid hitting one carrying Greek civilians. 

Intelligence on trains came from Greeks working for the Germans 

as personnel on the railway or doing repair work. These people gave 

information to a guerrilla contact, who informed guerrilla headquarters at either local or area level, which in turn sent the information 

on to Allied liaison officers. Often, however, conflicting information 

would be received. On the night of an operation the guerrillas provided 

a relay of runners to inform the raiding party of last-minute details 

as to the composition of the train and when it was expected to leave 

the station. At the morning parley between the commander of Lapworth and his lieutenant, however, these last-minute details were not 

available. Their information led them to believe the target would be a 

supply train.

After an hour spent in resting and consultation, Major McAdam’s 

group continued on its way, observing a certain care in proceeding. 

They trusted the Greek people not to give them away, but they were 

near German posts. There was not only the danger of accidentally running into a patrol, but the Germans were known to send out patrols or 

armored cars at night which remained camouflaged and “doggo” during the day in order to ambush guerrilla parties. In this way, the terrain 

also worked against the guerrillas. Care was always taken in crossing 

roads; a guide was sent on ahead to see if the road was clear and the 

party crossed individually.

Another stop was necessary in the afternoon, not only to rest and 

eat, but to prepare the demolitions charges. It was routine with this 

group to ready the explosives as close to the target as possible. They 

were easier to carry in bulk, were more likely to remain reliable, and 

also would not be wasted if the operation should be cancelled during 

the early part of the approach to the target area. After the charges were 

prepared—with the usual headaches to all—the liaison group reloaded 

its mules and went off to meet the guerrillas.

The rendezvous was a group of shepherds’ huts outside a small 

village. The guerrillas were already there, and their leader, Captain 

Arnaoutoglou, and the two British officers, speaking through an interpreter, held their final council of war as the sun was setting.

The plan was to lay charges so as to blow up the engine. The guerrillas would then attack the derailed cars. Since it was presumed to be a 

supply train, much booty was hoped for. Moreover, in order to prevent 

help from reaching the attacked train, two men were sent north to blow 
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

205

the line where it crossed a small ravine as soon as they heard the first 

explosion. As soon as the last runner arrived, bearing news that the rail 

line itself was clear of patrols, the guerrilla captain briefed his men. 

The British commander gave his orders to his Lapworth group, who 

were to handle all the demolitions work.

The entire group moved off in the dark to a point about a quarter 

mile from the rail line. Here they sorted themselves out. The two men 

from Lapworth who were to go to the north took their explosives and 

left. The other Lapworth men then carefully approached the rail line. 

It was imperative now not to alert the Germans lest all trains be stopped 

and patrols sent out.

Holes were dug under the rails and the explosive charges placed at 

10-yard intervals, with primer cord connecting each bundle of charges. 

The detonator was not attached immediately in case the wrong train 

came along first. Major McAdam then sent word back to the guerrilla 

captain to deploy his men. McAdam and his assistant meanwhile waited, 

lying down by the track, to fix the detonator device at the last minute.

First came the armored car, with flanged wheels, used to patrol 

the line ahead of trains and to come back to their rescue if they were 

attacked. Its searchlight did not pick up the men lying by the track. As 

the car turned the next bend, they rushed up to the track and inserted 

the primer cord into the fog signal detonator. Then they rejoined the 

guerrillas in the bushes.

The explosives worked as planned. In a tremendous fusion of noise, 

steam, and smoke, the carriages jumped the rails and piled up behind 

that engine. It was not a supply train after all, but a mixed train carrying supplies and troops. Some of the cars began to burn. Immediately the guerrilla attack began. Only a few shots were returned from 

the cars; then they stopped. There was no organized attempt to fight 

off the attack. The guerrillas approached closely and threw bakelite 

bombs into the cars; some few even went into the cars after individual 

German soldiers.

At this point the guerrillas were probably out of hand. They were 

firing wildly, running in and out of the carriages, going down the line. 

Even the young Greek member of Lapworth, who had had some training, showed the classic response of the inexperienced warrior. First he 

was paralyzed with inaction, “crying and shaking all over.” Then his 

“determination and confidence, even a sense of importance, returned 

in an instant” and he was in a mad delirium—“I was exhilarated. What 

to do next?” Unable to respond to his commanding officer’s order to 

come back, he too joined the guerrillas in their orgy of train hopping, 

wild firing, looting. Miraculously saved from death at least twice, this 

young man was brought back to his senses by the sudden sight of insane 
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guerrilla cruelty which made him physically sick and restored him to 

the cold rebuke of his superior officer.

Having recovered his errant boy, Major McAdam could now finish 

his work. He laid charges in the locomotive so that it could not be salvaged. Almost simultaneously he heard an explosion to the north; the 

armored car, returning to help the train, had backed into the northern party’s explosive charges. Meanwhile, German gun crews in the 

nearby railway station had found the range on the scene of the wreckage, restoring some sense to the guerrillas. It was time to retire.

Lighting the fuse of the charges in the engine, Major McAdam 

ordered the retreat. All hands left as fast as they could. Artillery and 

mortar fire followed them up the paths, where the Germans had accurately measured the field of fire. Nonetheless, they all got away. There 

were no guerrilla dead or injured.

German losses included a railroad engine, 20 cars, and an undetermined quantity of supplies. The armored car was in a ravine, damaged; 

and a small bridge over the river needed repair. It would take more 

than a day’s intensive work to clear the debris and repair the damage. 

In addition, an unknown number of troops being transferred to Russia 

never reached their destination.

Luck was with this operation. The explosives were well laid and 

exploded properly. The armored car was completely isolated from the 

train and was unable to help it. The train carriages were so piled up 

that the Germans were unable to get an organized defense going. Their 

usual procedure was to get the wounded out, take up positions, and 

return fire immediately. In this case, the Germans were too shaken up 

to respond in their usual fashion. Individual soldiers, however, took up 

positions within the carriages and fired at entering guerrillas. Nevertheless, the highly disorganized guerrillas suffered no casualties from 

their imbroglio.

This operation illustrates vividly the need for disciplined troops to 

lend trained support and greater fire power to such attacks. The opportunity to inflict heavy casualties among German troops was lost by the 

disorganized, inefficient, undisciplined behavior of the guerrillas. The 

Operational Groups were, on the whole, highly successful in augmenting the guerrillas on such operations, particularly when the trains were 

packed with soldiers being withdrawn from Greece. At such times, O.G. 

members were apt to speak in terms of “carnage.”

Throughout the occupation, the rail line in Greece was successfully 

attacked by guerrillas in conjunction with Allied liaison officers and, 

after mid-1944, sometimes with the aid of the Allied support groups.
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Attacking Road Traffic

A glance at the map of Greece will show that its western half contains no railroads of importance. Here the occupiers had to rely upon 

the road system for transport of men and materiel, and here the guerrillas found their prime target. In the early days of the occupation, 

from 1941 to the fall of 1943, the western roads were the main Italian communication line. Zervas, in fact, originally chose Epirus as his 

place of operations for this reason.25

The important north-south road in western Greece, leading from 

Yannina, to Arta to Agrinion, ran through EDES territory. Apparently 

“depending upon the loyalty hinted at by the leader of EDES” in the 

summer of 1943, many German officers used this road, making the trip 

in individual cars. Nonetheless, this belief could be carried too far, as 

various officers found out.26

The road leading from Igoumenitsa on the western coast to Yannina, Metsovon, Trikkala, and thence to Larisa in the east, popularly 

known as the Metsovon Highway, was the only major east-west road in 

northern Greece. It was constantly fought over by guerrillas and occupiers. In October 1943, when the Germans took over major occupation 

duties from the Italians, they found that between Yannina and Trikkala this highway had been “blocked for nearly two years,” and it took 

“almost a whole regiment to open it.” Even after that, raids occurred. 

In July 1944 a major German mopping-up operation was required to 

stabilize the situation.27

All kinds of sabotage and ambush operations were used to harass 

traffic. In 1944 these guerrilla attacks were rendered more formidable 

by support from units of the O.S.S. Operational Groups and the British Raiding Support Regiment. Although all the following examples 

occurred in the western half of Greece, they illustrate tactics typical of 

road operations all over the country.

One of the simplest operations was to dynamite some of the road 

masonry. Bridges and retaining walls offered excellent subjects for 

blasting operations, and their destruction often interrupted traffic 

for 1 or 2 days. Sometimes charges were planted in drainage systems 

of bridges or walls during the summer dry season. “Good protection 

against such sabotage was never found,” wrote General Lanz, who was 

responsible for internal security in western Greece during the latter 

period of the occupation.28

More annoying than the blasting was the guerrillas’ ingenious use 

of mines. At first, because the mines had to be well laid and camouflaged in order to be effective—and this took time—it was possible 

for the Germans to curtail sabotage activity by patrolling the roads. 

Also, mine-locating details could be sent to inspect suspicious stretches. 
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Later, however, the guerrillas were supplied with devices called “rock 

mines,” because they resembled the stones or rocks normally found on 

Greek roads. When vehicles hit them, they detonated, usually destroying parts of the vehicle, particularly wheels. Often German occupants 

of the car were hurt. It was hard to protect against these mines because 

they were difficult to detect by visual inspection and they were not easily located by mine detectors. They contained little metal and were covered by concrete. Laying these mines was absurdly simple—they were 

merely placed on the road. The only solution the Germans found to 

this problem was to clear the roads of all rocks over a certain size, an 

occupation that “claimed a great many lives.”29

Another device used to impede road traffic was a special nail, with 

an inch-long tip that automatically remained vertical. These also were 

simple devices, not so lethal to personnel as the rock mines but handsomely rewarding in wear and tear on the German motor pool.30

Almost anyone in the mountains was an incipient saboteur, as General Lanz discovered. For example, once during a stopover for inspection, the front wheel of his car was so loosened that he barely missed 

having a bad accident.31 One did not have to be a guerrilla to strew tire 

puncture pins or rock mines or even to loosen front wheels.

What marked the guerrilla attack, as distinguished from this simple 

sabotage, was the combination of sabotage with antipersonnel assault: 

in short, the road ambush. An early EDES operation against an Italian 

supply column on the Yannina-Arta road provides an example of what 

a surprise guerrilla ambush can do to easy going and unready troops.32

The guerrilla plan was to make the attack at a place where, after 

crossing the Louron Bridge, the column would have to pass through a 

deep, rocky defile along the river. Detouring would be impossible and 

deployment difficult. The supply column was to be allowed to pass the 

bridge. As its leading vehicle was stopped by road mines, the bridge 

behind it would be blown up, thus trapping, the column. Simultaneously, guerrillas hidden in the hills were to throw down hand grenades 

and rocks at the crews. Every available weapon was to be used to engage 

the enemy. After this, two groups of guerrillas were to assault the column and finish off any survivors. Meanwhile, roadblocks were to be set 

up to the south of the ambush point to stop any patrols from coming to 

the aid of the attacked column when it failed to reach its destination.

The guerrillas were warned not to have any papers or other identification on them, and they were ordered to avoid capture at any 

cost. It was expected that all the enemy would be killed; the booty was 

to be carried off on mules kept nearby. After the raid the guerrillas 

were to withdraw, except for a few scouts who were to remain to watch 

enemy reactions.
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

209

The night before the operation the minefield was laid on the road, 

ready to be hooked up with both pressure igniters and a cable. The 

bridge demolitions were also laid. The next day the guerrillas selected 

their positions on either side of the road and placed their weapons 

and ammunition—heavy rocks, hand grenades, cartridges, and two 

machineguns. Nearby telephone poles were sawed partway through, so 

that they could be quickly pulled down.

The target of this attack was an Italian supply column that every day 

covered the same distance, at the same time, and in the same formation. Two tanks, one at the head and the other to the rear, protected 20 

trucks. Crews, including drivers and assistant drivers, numbered about 

60 men. The column left Yannina, fully loaded, traveling south to Arta, 

at the same time each day.

On the day of the planned ambush the column leader was apparently alarmed by a number of tire punctures and rumors of guerrilla 

activity. At any rate, he decided to increase the escort. A truck with two 

manned machine guns and an assault detachment was placed after the 

lead tank. Then followed the leader’s vehicle and the 19 loaded trucks. 

Each had two guards with submachine guns. The final tank had two 

machine guns in a revolving turret. The column leader warned his men 

about the possibility of an attack. Delayed by these preparations, the 

column did not leave Yannina until 1600 hours.

Despite these precautions, all the guerrilla plans worked perfectly. 

The column passed the bridge and was trapped when the demolitions 

occurred. Its lead tank rolled down the embankment on one side of 

the road. The other vehicles closed up and stopped. Although the convoy leader tried to organize his men, they seemed unable to respond 

quickly. When he was felled by a bullet, no one offered any resistance 

except the crew of the rear tank. They were eventually knocked out by 

an explosive charge thrown under the tank chassis. At this point the 

guerrilla assault team rushed in and finished off the Italians who were 

still alive.

The guerrillas were now out of hand and began to loot the vehicles 

individually, but they were eventually brought under control by their 

leader. The mules were brought in and loaded; the Italian bodies were 

stripped of papers and valuables; vehicles were searched for documents, 

arms, and weapons; and the tanks were covered with gasoline and fired 

so they could not be salvaged. Guerrilla casualties were removed. The 

guards posted on the overhanging rocks were now called in and the 

guerrillas departed.

An Italian motorcycle platoon, sent out from Arta to investigate 

when the supply column failed to arrive and telephone communication with Yannina was found to be disrupted, met the road block and 
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received fire from the nearby hills. The platoon returned to base and 

no new patrols were sent out, since it was now getting dark. In the 

morning, a stronger detachment discovered the complete wreckage of 

the column in what came to be known as “Death Valley.”

“This,” wrote General Lanz, “was a tale told week after week” during 

the Italian phase of the occupation.33 After the Germans took over the 

major occupation duties in the fall of 1943, however, they put an end to 

road ambushes on such an ambitious scale. A strong guard was posted 

at the rebuilt Louron bridge and numerous strong points were set up 

along the road. German convoys travelled at varying intervals, their 

size and composition were frequently changed, and German troops 

invariably reacted with vigor and swiftness in meeting any assault.

During much of the period from the fall of 1943 to the spring of 

1944, the roads were free of large-scale guerrilla activity. There were 

several reasons for the lull: the German measures, the instructions 

from the Allies to the guerrillas to lie low, and possibly also, in Epirus, 

the tacit agreement the Germans insisted they had with EDES. Some 

German sources indicate that local commanders supplied EDES with 

small arms to keep the Yannina-Arta road open.34 Elsewhere, guerrilla 

ambushes occurred, of course, but they were mostly small-scale attacks 

on vehicles traveling individually.

In such attacks roadblocks were set up, using telephone poles and 

wires. Guerrilla scouts gave the signal that the car was approaching; 

and snipers, hidden near the roadblock, got ready to fire. By such 

means the Germans lost a colonel commanding mountain infantry in 

September 1943.35

Though the Germans hoped in the fall of 1943 that they had permanently ended guerrilla attacks on the roads, “it soon became evident that this was an error. All efforts to keep the bands away from 

these lifelines—extending from the north through Korca and from the 

east through Trikkala toward Yannina—ended in failure,” wrote General Lane.36 In the summer of 1944, two large-scale German attacks 

on EAM/ELAS guerrillas operating in southern Albania and northern 

Greece, code-named GEMSBOCK and STEINADLER, were necessary 

to ensure continued German use of these two roads.

Nevertheless, guerrilla attacks increased in the summer of 1944. 

EDES guerrillas also went into action. For example, they successfully 

attacked a German column of vehicles carrying medical supplies and 

displaying the Red Cross. In a maneuver similar to the one in the 

Louron Valley, they cut off the medical train, killed the doctors and 
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

211

medical personnel, and ransacked and burned the vehicles.f For one 

period they almost succeeded in closing the Yannina-Arta road.37

“During the entire period of the occupation,” wrote General Lanz 

of western Greece, “hardly a night and, from the summer of 1944, not a 

single day passed without a surprise attack, a mine explosion, or another 

act of sabotage occurring on one of the supply roads. Valuable materiel 

was consequently lost every time, frequently heavy casualties occurred, 

and only in a few cases did one succeed in locating and inflicting damage upon an enemy adept in clever operations.”38

Attacks on Enemy Troops

Attacks on enemy troops netted some results of value to guerrilla 

operations. While the Italians were still on duty, the guerrillas proved 

masters at harassment. EAM/ELAS alone claimed to have inflicted 

numerous Italian casualties during the spring of 1943. At the “Battle 

of Bougazi,” near Siatista, they claimed to have captured an entire battalion of 18 officers, 700 men, and all arms and equipment.39 In other 

encounters the Italians suffered heavy losses. Italian reports given to 

the Germans when the latter took over occupation duties supported 

these guerrilla claims. The success of guerrilla attacks against Italian 

columns encouraged further attacks on Italian garrisons in the smaller 

towns, with the result that the latter began to withdraw to their main 

bases. This made the great expansion of the guerrilla movement in 

Greece in early 1943 much easier.40

The guerrillas were so sure of themselves in the summer of 1943 

that ELAS forces of the Grammos Mountains area undertook to attack 

the formidable German 1st Mountain Division as it moved from Albania into Greece.41 Slipping over the border, the guerrillas invested 

the Albanian town of Leskovic, whose 1,800 inhabitants are of Greek 

descent and speak Greek. Old men, women, and children were evacuated to the safety of the mountains.

The plan was to ambush elements of the German division as it 

passed along the main road of the town. Scouts outside the village were 

to signal the approach of the troops. The advance guard was to be 

allowed to pass through unmolested and, while the main body of the 

marching troops was inside the village, the attack was to be made. Every 

house was thus to be a fortified position. If resistance proved stronger 

than expected, the guerrillas were to escape into the mountains.

f An action contrary to the laws of war and to the code governing guerrilla behavior 

as stipulated in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. EAM/ELAS was also guilty of 

such acts.
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The alarm signal was given as the German troops approached. 

However, instead of marching through the town, they first enveloped 

it from both sides. This precaution, customary with the well-trained 

and guerrilla-accustomed 1st Mountain Division, cut off the guerrillas’ retreat. The maneuver surprised and alarmed the guerrillas; lack 

of discipline added to their problem. Instead of waiting until the first 

troops had passed through the town, guerrilla hotheads at the edge of 

the village fired on the Germans as they entered. The plan was thus 

entirely upset.

The ambush was reversed, and the guerrillas now had to fight a 

defensive battle. While the Germans methodically surrounded the village and brought up heavy weapons to break through the house walls, 

the guerrillas fought stubbornly on. (Some few escaped by posing as 

civilians before the Germans became alert to this maneuver.) After 

2 hours of fighting, most of the town’s houses had been destroyed and 

many guerrillas lay dead and buried beneath the rubble. A number of 

prisoners were taken. The German division’s losses were also “considerable,” and, according to their own account, they acquired “a deep 

mistrust of the Greek population” from this encounter.

Other attacks on a small scale were not so unrewarding. Especially 

in the summer of 1944, guerrillas made a number of attacks on German installations. In May, Generalleutenant (Major General) Krech, 

commander of the 41st Fortress Division, was killed in a raid on his 

headquarters in the Peloponnesus. Small groups of Germans in outlying posts such as blockhouses or those working as foresters in wooded 

terrain were constantly prey to guerrilla attack. Early in July 1944 ELAS 

was active in two small actions against German garrisons at Amfissa 

and Amfilokhia. Both operations were undertaken mainly to get 

supplies, although the latter was also to divert German attention in 

the north.42

In the first case, EAM/ELAS broke into the town of Amfissa and 

succeeded in pinning the Germans in one quarter of the town. The 

guerrillas could not neutralize the garrison; they therefore collected 

what equipment and food supplies they could and destroyed whatever 

they could not carry away. After 8 hours they pulled out. From their 

own point of view the operation was unsuccessful. Many ELAS had 

been killed and the guerrillas had not obtained “the large quantities of 

ammunition we so badly needed.”43

The second operation was more successful from ELAS’ point of 

view. A guerrilla regiment was placed on the Arta-Amfilokhia road to 

intercept reinforcements, then two other guerrilla regiments invested 

both Amfilokhia and the surrounding area. According to ELAS claims, 

they succeeded in wiping out the German garrisons of some 400 troops. 
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

213

A German officer of the XXII Mountain Corps testified that he saw 60 

dead at Amfilokhia. The Greek security forces working for the Germans knew the fate they might expect at guerrilla hands and fought 

with extreme ferocity in house-to-house combat. For 24 hours the town 

was in guerrilla hands; in that time ELAS took “all the German equipment, ammunition, arms, horses, medical supplies, food and clothing.” Even a ship loaded with German land mines was captured. After 

this, bragged Saraphis, the Germans moved only in large columns. 

“The . . . district had become a nightmare to them.”44

But at this moment, the Germans were driving thousands of EAM/ 

ELAS troops into an encirclement. Although the Germans could not 

completely stop guerrilla attacks, the Greek guerrillas, even at the 

height of their strength, were often unable to fight their way out of German traps.

What Military Value?

What was the military value of these guerrilla operations? How 

was it estimated? The British, the Germans, and the guerrillas have all 

made estimates. In general, the major indices have been (1) tiedown 

of enemy troops that could otherwise have been used elsewhere; (2) 

infliction of enemy troop losses; (3) interdiction of enemy lines of communications; (4) infliction of enemy supply and equipment losses; and 

(5) miscellaneous services to the Allies.

Tiedown of troops was a major aim of Operation ANIMALS in the 

summer of 1943. The British have claimed that the successful completion of this operation helped to deceive the Germans as to Allied 

intent and compelled them to reinforce the unreliable Italian troops in 

Greece with two German divisions and extra air support.45 As a result, 

these divisions were not available for use in Sicily at the time of the successful Allied assault on that island. Colonel Woodhouse, who at times 

belittled the military value of Greek guerrilla activities, has stated that 

at least one German armored division was held in Greece as a result 

of  ANIMALS.46

For the period from September 1943 through September 1944, it is 

difficult to know exactly what proportion of German troop strength in 

Greece was due to German belief in the possibility of an Allied landing in Greece and what proportion was due to the need to keep the 

guerrillas under enough control to maintain an occupation and secure 

German lines of communication.

Saraphis has estimated that in 1944 there were approximately 

180,000 Axis troops in Greece—40,000 Bulgarian troops, 40,000 miscellaneous foreign troops, and the main body of about 100,000 German 
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troops.47 Comparison of these figures with the troop strength of the 

German divisions given in the Kriegsgliederungen (Order of Battle) for 

1943–44 indicates that this figure must be very close to reality and 

might even be low.48 If these figures are even approximately correct, 

they show that there were only three times as many troops of all categories as guerrillas in Greece.

The mission of the German forces was dual: to secure the coastline 

against an Allied assault and to secure the interior against the guerrillas. Since there was no Allied landing in Greece during the occupational period, the major operation was against the guerrillas. Saraphis 

claimed that four or five enemy divisions were “occupied exclusively 

with ELAS.”49 Since EDES was lying low during most of the period, 

it is true enough that German forces were primarily directed against 

EAM/ELAS. These facts, nevertheless, do not confirm Saraphis’ claim, 

nor do they establish with any definiteness what Axis troops were held 

in Greece solely because of guerrilla operations could otherwise have 

been used elsewhere—in other words, the tiedown value of the guerrillas over and above the threat of invasion. Though no tiedown figure can be assigned with accuracy, it must be conceded that, if there 

had been no guerrilla operations, some proportion of German troop 

strength in Greece could have been used elsewhere.

Neither can figures be accurately given for personnel losses 

inflicted on the enemy by guerrilla activity. For July and August 1944, 

the two months just before NOAH’S ARK, German figures indicate 

troop losses of 936 dead, 1,235 wounded, and 275 missing.50 During 

NOAH’S ARK (fall 1944), Allied reports stated that 5,000 enemy troops 

had been killed and another 5,000 wounded and captured by ground 

action alone.51 This would include help from O.G. and R.S.R. activity. 

In addition, more German troops, jammed on the roads because of 

guerrilla operations, have been claimed as victims of Allied air bombing. These figures, Woodhouse has since said, are “absurdly inflated, 

like most claims made in the heat of battle.”52

The same charge of inflation would surely be applied to Saraphis’ 

claims for ELAS victories over Axis troops for the period of May 1943 

through October 1944:

Dead Wounded Prisoner Total

German 16,062 6,504 1,878 24,444

Italian* 1,305 1,037 2,230 4,572

Bulgarian 1,988 753 1,073 3,814

TOTAL 19,355 8,294 5,181 32,830

*Not including the Pinerolo Division, which surrendered to the 

guerrillas in the fall of 1943.
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

215

These figures, if accepted, would mean that a total of almost 25,000 

Germans fell victim to ELAS guerrillas (excluding operations in Athens, on the Peloponnesus, and in Thrace), or that on the basis of Saraphis’ own estimate of German troop strength, one out of every four 

Germans in Greece was a casualty.53 Based on German records for their 

Southeast Theater, which also included Yugoslavia, where guerrilla 

fighting was far more intensive, an estimate has been made that one 

out of every seven troops in German uniform became a casualty.54 For 

Greece, even this figure seems high.

The prisoner total would be surprising under any circumstances. 

Unless these prisoners were taken in the last phase of operations when 

they could have been handed over to the incoming British forces, there 

would have been no facilities for a guerrilla army to keep them safely. 

Furthermore, it was stated ELAS policy to treat prisoners “according 

to the way in which the Germans treated our men,” and this meant 

death.55 Although some exceptions were apparently made, much more 

would need to be known concerning prisoner handling for credence to 

be accorded these claims.

The figures for enemy troops killed and wounded are indubitably 

high also. Nonetheless, guerrilla action did exact a heavy toll. When 

troop trains were derailed, troop losses did occur. In one operation in 

February 1944, derailment of a troop train caused the death of over 

500 Germans, including a general and his staff.56 Reports from American sources in Greece indicate the high cost to the Germans of guerrilla attacks. Casualties inflicted during the summer of 1944 in joint 

O.G.-guerrilla operations—which the guerrillas would naturally claim 

as part of their own successes—are estimated at several thousand. It 

would seem to be safe to put guerrilla-inflicted enemy casualties for 

the entire period, by all guerrillas, at some figure between 5,000 and 

15,000.g

The interdiction value of guerrilla operations was equally nebulous. The Germans had to fight to keep the major roads open, but they 

did keep them open most of the time. To do so, however, cost them 

time and effort and added to the tiedown value of guerrilla operations. 

Furthermore, guerrilla mines and ambushes increased enemy troop 

casualties. Blown-up road bridges closed roads for a day or more at a 

time. An Italian officer, for example, testified that his unit took 11 days 

during ANIMALS to make a journey that would ordinarily have taken 

3 days. EDES made the Germans fight hard to keep the Yannina-Arta 

road open in September 1944.57

g This latter figure is derived as being roughly one-seventh of 100,000.
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

The Greek railways were interdicted for fairly long periods as a result 

of combined guerrilla and Allied party activity. The operation against 

the Gorgopotamos bridge in November 1942 closed through traffic on 

the Athens-Salonika railway for 6 weeks. This was of undoubted military importance, since the railway was carrying supplies for Rommel’s 

troops in Africa. The demolition of the Asopos in June 1943 closed 

the same line for about 16 weeks. ELAS units kept the Germans from 

using long stretches of railway line near Salonika for various periods in 

September 1944. Demolitions and “trainbusting” attacks by combined 

guerrilla-Allied parties resulted in a great many additional, if lesser, 

delays in the enemy’s use of the Greek railroads throughout the latter 

part of the occupation.58

The enemy also lost a good deal of equipment and supplies. Saraphis claimed that ELAS destroyed 85 railway engines, 957 coaches, and 

1,007 motor vehicles. In addition, it captured and used German food 

supplies, pack animals, wireless sets, mines, and arms.59 However, these 

losses, while bothersome, were never critical, and much of the materiel 

was of Greek origin.

The guerrillas rendered many miscellaneous services to the British and the Allies. During one period EAM/ELAS guerrillas almost 

stopped production of the Greek chrome mines, a major source of Germany’s chromium. EDES guerrillas provided a safe area for British and 

American landing parties on the western coast at Parga. ELAS helped 

to build the first Allied landing field in occupied Greece. Guerrillas of 

both sides provided guides and safe areas for Allied airmen or escaped 

prisoners of war attempting to get out of Greece. ELAS saved Colonel Woodhouse’s life at least once. It also attempted to help the Greek 

Jews, who were persecuted by the Germans. The clandestine resistance 

on Crete fulfilled admirably an intelligence role; in 1942, information 

passed on by the British liaison officers there resulted in the RAF’s 

shooting down German planes bound for Rommel’s Afrika Korps and 

loaded with “troops, fresh water, and even cooked meals.” On the main 

land, Greek guerrillas augmented the efforts of clandestine intelligence 

agents in providing intelligence of value for the Allies. The Germans, 

for example, found it difficult to maintain the security of ship movements in either the Aegean or Ionian Seas. The sinking of at least one 

Crete-bound vessel carrying German arms and ammunition has been 

directly attributed to guerrilla intelligence efforts. In April 1944, Generalmajor (Brigadier General) Karl Kreipe was kidnaped on Crete by 

a party of British Commandos, a British liaison officer, and nationalist 

Cretan patriots, despite the objections of the local EAM/ELAS organization. During the last phases of the occupation, guerrillas succeeded 

in preventing some German damage to installations.60
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

217

Figure 25. General Kreipe Surrounded by His Kidnapers.

The mere fact that there was in Greece a guerrilla army, a guerrilla 

government, and a guerrilla connection with the Allies provided a challenge to the Germans. It was, in one sense, a major psychological operation. Greece had become one more area where the Germans were, to 

put it mildly, unwanted. It was one more area where the German just 

returned from hard fighting in Russia found, not rest, but bitter and 

strenuous mountain duty. It was one more place where the German 

might find injury or death. It was, above all, a place of colossal insult: 

for the Greeks’ classical heritage, Hitler himself had shown respect; for 

the Germans’ Third Reich, most Greeks seemed to prefer war to the 

death. “The Greek guerrillas,” wrote Colonel Woodhouse, “were supposed to be organized to fight the enemy occupation; the fog of political controversy has obscured the fact that they actually did so.”61

In spite of all this activity, however, it should never be thought that 

the guerrilla operations were in any sense a decisive factor. At any time 

during the occupation, German troop divisions could be mustered to go 

into any area of Greece.62 But if they did not go in sufficient strength—

then it was a different story. The lone supply convoy, the straggling car, 

the unescorted train, the small troop unit—these were in danger. For 

them the Greek mountains were a highly dangerous place.
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

What Cost?

If guerrilla operations were bothersome and costly to both the Italians and later to the Germans, they were also expensive in Allied terms. 

The cost, however, varied in ascending order for the Allies, the guerrillas, and the population that lived on the guerrilla battlefields.

For the Allies the cost was moderate. On the basis of figures available from the sources used, no definite costs can be given, but a very 

clear idea of their magnitude may be obtained. For example, less than 

one-sixth the supply tonnage for Yugoslavia went to Greece. On the 

basis of 2,514 tons of supplies air carried to Greece, air transportation 

costs have been estimated to range around $1,000 a ton or a total of 

approximately $2,500,000. It may be assumed that the cost of the supplies themselves would not exceed the cost of their air transportation. It 

is also estimated that the tonnage and transportation costs of supplies 

sent to Greece by clandestine naval craft would be far lower than those 

for air delivered supplies.

In addition to supplies, there were the gold sovereigns given to the 

organizations to help support their men and the destitute population. 

It is impossible to place this cost definitely. At first, the British supported the guerrillas at the base rate of one gold sovereign per man per 

month. Later the rate was raised to two gold sovereigns per month for a 

given level of strength. If EDES guerrillas were supported at a strength 

level of 10,000 to 12,000 men and EAM/ELAS on the limited basis of 

10,000 men from mid-1943 on—although neither case is certain from 

the evidence—the total cost would have been between approximately 

22,000 and 44,000 gold sovereigns per month for a period extending 

to the liberation of Greece. During part of this time, of course, both 

supplies and sovereigns were cut off from EAM/ELAS for bad behavior. Although the sovereign was not issued in Great Britain at the time 

and had a fluctuating value on the free market, it has been estimated 

at roughly the same worth as the pound in U.S. dollars. Calculating its 

worth at $4.03, it is therefore estimated that the cost of supplying the 

guerrilla organizations with gold sovereigns for about 18 months was 

in the range of $1,600,000 to $3,200,000. While this aid may have been 

expensive, it was hardly so in relation to other war costs.

The number of Allied troops in Greece—under 400 in all in mid1944 and far fewer before then—makes the Allied investment in manpower up to the period of liberation extremely small. Many observers, 

including Colonel Woodhouse, have noted that the casualty rate among 

Allied personnel, particularly liaison officers, was low. In the course of 

this study, total Allied casualties of 8 dead and 14 wounded have been 

noted, including the 2 parachute casualties. These figures, of course, 
Tactical Guerrilla Operations

219

are not complete. Also, many more men became disabled through sickness, particularly malaria. Under any circumstances, the commitment 

of Allied men was small.

For the Greek guerrillas, on the other hand, the cost in lives was 

considerable, although it is as difficult to reach a figure for guerrilla 

casualties as for German. The Germans claimed to have eliminated 

4,043 ELAS guerrillas, dead or captured, in only two mopping-up operations undertaken in June and July of 1944. In the 2-month period of 

July–August 1944,h in which German casualties came to almost 2,500 

dead, wounded, and missing, the Germans claimed to have killed 5,394 

guerrillas and captured 768.63 Saraphis has placed total ELAS losses 

at 4,500 dead and 6,000 wounded, of which 2,000 were permanently 

disabled.64 Using his own figures, it could be said that one out of every 

four ELAS guerrillas was a casualty.i

Although there may be good reason to believe that German figures for guerrilla casualties were high—since the Germans by their 

own admission had trouble in discerning which Greeks were guerrillas 

and which simply inhabitants—there is no reason to question that their 

figures represented Greek casualties, whether combatants or not. In 

addition to so-called combatant casualties, there were additional large 

numbers of Greeks who were shot as “Communist suspects,” because 

they were Jews or gypsies, or in measured retaliation for German losses.65

Looking over his village, half of whose dwellings had been burned by 

German reprisals, one Greek told a liaison officer that his village had 

lost no citizens through reprisals: “It was more than we had dared hope 

for,”66 he said. A Greek source has estimated that 21,000 reprisal victims were executed by the Germans, 9,000 by the Italians, and 40,000 

by the Bulgarians.j

 These 70,000 victims of execution compare with a 

total of 72,000 casualties suffered in combat or by bombing in 1940 and 

1941. Another 45,000 Greeks, including many Jews from Salonika, were 

transported to Germany, and presumably executed. Over and above all 

these figures, about 260,000 Greeksk

 are reported to have died from 

the effects of starvation between 1941 and the end of 1944.67 In all, 

447,000 Greeks were apparently the direct and indirect victims of the 

war and occupation; beside this figure, the 10,000 ELAS casualties and 

the additional casualties of EDES must seem small indeed.

h Note that these two periods overlap and casualties may therefore not be added.

i Figures for EDES losses are not available.

j Because of the complex situation in Bulgarian-occupied Greece, with the Bulgarians attempting to annex part of Greece, these last executions may not be wholly connected 

with resistance activity.

k Estimated at 300,000 at the Nuernberg Trials. (Trials of War Criminals, XI, 828.)
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

In addition to losses of men, the Greek community suffered disastrously during the occupation and the guerrilla warfare. By the end of 

the war, well over a thousand villagesl

 had been burned and destroyed 

by Axis forces. Over a million peasants were estimated to be homeless, 

destitute, and unable to farm. Greek industry, such as it was, was ravaged. Of 1,700 miles of railway in Greece at the beginning of World 

War II, only 415 miles of track remained usable in October 1944. At 

that time, over 1,300 bridges had been destroyed or damaged. The 

road system was in extremely poor shape, and the telephone and telegraph systems were also severely damaged. The state of the economy 

was reflected in the fact that, whereas aggregate corporate value of 

about 1,300 Greek corporations was estimated at 12 billion drachmae 

in 1941, it took 170 trillion drachmae to purchase one gold sovereign 

in November 1944.68

War in Europe and the disruption of the economic process would 

have caused trouble in Greece, even if it had been able to remain 

neutral. Involvement in the war of 1940–41 with Italy and Germany 

exacted some 72,000 Greek combat and bombing casualties, as well as 

economic losses. But the degree of devastation and destitution rampant in Greece at the time of liberation in November 1944 must be 

laid to the disasters of the occupation, the guerrilla war, and German 

counterguerrilla measures.

l The Paris Reparations Conference estimated that 2,000 villages and one quarter of 

all Greek buildings had been destroyed. (Forster, A Short History, p. 227.)
CHAPTER VI. 

ANTIGUERRILLA WARFARE

END OF THE ITALIAN OCCUPATION

GERMAN ORGANIZATION FOR CONTROL

FINDING SUFFICIENT TROOPS

SECURING THE TRANSPORTATION 

NETWORK

MINOR OPERATIONS

MAJOR OPERATIONS

THE MISSING KEY TO SUCCESS

Antiguerrilla Warfare

223

ANTIGUERRILLA WARFARE

Although Hitler’s original plans for the occupation of Greece had 

provided for a minimal commitment of German troops, by the summer 

of 1943, Greece had become an area of large-scale German intervention. At that time, three major problems in the Balkan area triggered 

German reactions. The most pressing was the obviously imminent 

defection from the Axis of Italy, whose troops formed the backbone 

of the occupation forces in the Balkans, including Greece. The second was the belief that an Allied landing or landings in the Mediterranean area was imminent and that Greece seemed a most likely area 

for such a landing.1

 The concomitance of the first two problems magnified the third. Guerrilla warfare, endemic throughout the Balkans, 

had assumed proportions sufficient to require direct action before an 

Allied landing in Greece offered the opportunity for critical rear-area 

damage by guerrilla forces. First, however, the Italian problem had to 

be disposed of.

End of the Italian Occupation

Italian troops on occupation duty in the Balkans in 1943 totaled 

about 500,000. Of these, about 270,000 were, in late summer 1943, 

under the Italian Eleventh Army, commanded by General Vecchiarelli, 

who was responsible for most of mainland Greece, the Peloponnesus, 

Crete, and the Ionian Islands.a

 Eight Italian divisions under Eleventh 

Army were stationed in this area. Except for 20,000 troops on Crete, 

the main forces of the Eleventh Army were on the Greek mainland.2

If Italy were to make a separate peace with the Allies, obviously the 

Germans would have to act to prevent Italian forces in the Balkans 

from surrendering to either Allied forces or guerrillas. Beginning in 

early 1943, the Germans began to prepare for this possibility. Plans 

were made for Operation ACHSE, which was to effect the surrender of 

the Italians in the event of their withdrawal from the war. The two German divisions in Greece (one on the mainland and one on Crete) were 

augmented in the spring and summer of 1943, and the German commands in the Balkans were reorganized. By 1 August 1943 there was a 

German division and brigade, as well as an Italian division, on Crete. 

On the mainland, three German divisions and one Bulgarian division were directly under German control; and two German and seven 

Italian divisions were tactically controlled by General Vecchiarelli’s 

a The Greek islands of Samos, Rhodes, and the smaller Aegean Islands came under 

Italian Army Egeo. There were in addition a few areas on mainland Greece under German 

or Bulgarian control.
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Eleventh Army. Every German division commander knew what to do 

when ACHSE was ordered. Moreover, Fuehrer Directive No. 48, issued 

on 26 July 1943, placed German theater control in the Balkans over 

Eleventh Army. General Vecchiarelli, regarded as a “good Prussian,” 

had already accepted a German chief of staff, a German supply officer, and a German administrative officer on his own Eleventh Army 

staff. The Germans expected no particular difficulty in Greece during 

Operation ACHSE.3

When the Italians withdrew from the war on 8 September 1943, the 

Germans put ACHSE into immediate effect. In Greece, they demanded 

the complete surrender and disarming of troops of the Italian Eleventh 

Army. Although protesting the dishonor, Vecchiarelli agreed both to 

the surrender and to immediate transfer of heavy divisional weapons 

to the Germans on condition that the Italians be allowed to retain their 

light arms and thus avoid “external dishonor.” In particular, Vecchiarelli ordered that Italian troops “will not, I repeat, will not make common cause with the Partisans . . . .”4

Almost 120,000 Italian troops of Eleventh Army escaped from 

Greece in one way or another;5

 however, the Germans encountered 

little trouble in effecting the surrender of those who remained on the 

mainland. On the islands, however, there was actual combat between 

Germans and Italians. On Cephalonia and Corfu off the western coast 

of Greece, Italian troops fought, but German strength prevailed by 

the end of September. General Gandin with his staff on Cephalonia 

and the Commandant of Corfu were summarily court-martialed and 

shot. On Crete there was also some difficulty, but the Germans quickly 

brought it under control.b On the Greek mainland, only elements of 

the Pinerolo Division under General Infante and the Aosta Cavalry 

Regiment under Colonel Berti (numbering approximately “twelve 

thousand well-equipped Italians”) surrendered to Colonel Woodhouse 

and the guerrillas.6

Although the Italians were to remain something of a problem to 

the Germans even after the surrender of Eleventh Army in September 

1943, the degree of the problem was quite different before and after 

that date. At the beginning of September, the Italian Army was of considerable size and armament, in formed units, under its own leadership. Had General Vecchiarelli fought, the Germans in Greece would 

have been considerably outnumbered. The fact was that he did not. 

By the end of September, the Germans had obtained the surrender of 

most Italian troops in Greece.

b On the Greek islands of Rhodes and Samos, fighting by Italian forces continued 

somewhat longer. In 48 hours of intensive fighting on Rhodes, however, approximately 

7,800 German troops enforced the surrender of about 40,000 Italians.
Antiguerrilla Warfare

225

Figure 26. Occupation Zones in Greece after September 1943.

The Germans now had to undertake the role of the major occupation force. They found the country in considerable disorder. Coastal 

defenses needed to be strengthened against an invasion threat, and 

strong measures needed to be taken internally to secure the country 

against the guerrillas of EAM/ELAS and EDES.

The Italians had never really faced the guerrilla problem in Greece. 

Their supply convoys had been successfully ambushed and their outlying troops successfully attacked. Their reaction had been ineffective: 

their combat units had gone into the mountains and, though rarely 

engaging the guerrillas, had halfheartedly burned down village houses 
226

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

and hanged villagers in retaliation for guerrilla raids. These activities, 

regarded by German General Wilhelm Speidel as “at times most irresolute and at times brutal,” had neither deterred the guerrillas nor secured 

the cooperation of the villagers. As guerrilla operations had continued 

and become more intensive during Operation ANIMALS in the summer of 1943, the Italians had withdrawn their garrisons from the outlying villages into the larger towns. In the period of flux following the 

Italian surrender, many Italian units withdrew from their posts before 

the Germans came, thus allowing guerrillas to infiltrate additional 

territory. Some Italian soldiers even sold their arms to the guerrillas. 

EAM/ELAS, it will be remembered, was immeasurably strengthened 

by the arms and equipment surrendered by the Pinerolo Division.7

As a result, the Germans found, on taking over their occupation 

posts, that the major part of Greece, variously estimated at from 67 to 

80 percent, was in the hands of the guerrillas. Italian data on the guerrillas were, according to the Germans, vague, outdated, inaccurate, and 

exaggerated and therefore of little value in estimating or meeting the 

problem. Not only had the Italians lost control of the countryside but 

they had lost control of vital supply roads. The Metsovon Highway, the 

only major east-west road in northern Greece, had been intermittently 

blocked for nearly 2 years. The Germans found it completely closed 

and supplies being detoured in the fall of 1943. The internal situation 

in Greece was intolerable to the Germans, and they meant to do something about it.8

 But first they had to consolidate the organization of 

their occupation forces.

German Organization for Control

Throughout the occupation of Greece by the Germans, their forces 

were organized in a highly complex fashion, with a number of parallel 

commands and overlapping responsibilities.

In the fall of 1943 Greece was under the operational control of 

the German Southeastern Theater, which had recently been administratively revised. As Supreme Commander Southeast, Field Marshal 

Maximilian von Weichs had overall command of the Balkan theater. 

His headquarters were in Belgrade, Yugoslavia; he reported directly 

to the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW). He was 

responsible for defense against an Allied landing attempt and for internal security against guerrilla warfare in the Balkans, including Greece. 

This responsibility was assigned to Army Group F, of which von Weichs 

was simultaneously commander, for the Balkans except Greece; and to 

Army Group E, for Greece.9
Antiguerrilla Warfare

227

Army Group E was commanded by Generaloberst (Gen.) Alexander 

Loehr, who reported directly to the theater commander, von Weichs. 

Army Group E had no armies under it. By October 1943 it had two 

German corps, the LXVIII and the XXII Mountain Corps, both available for coastal defense and for tactical operations against guerrillas. 

The first was assigned the defense and security of the area of eastern 

Greece and the Peloponnesus; the latter held the same responsibility 

for the Epirus region of southern Albania and western Greece down to 

the Gulf of Patras.10

Figure 27. Field Marshal von Weichs, Supreme Commander Southeast and Commander of Army Group F.

By the beginning of 1944 and after some further reorganization, Army Group E had brought into corps status three additional 

commands: Fortress Crete, on the island; the Administrative Area 
228

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Salonika-Aegeanc with headquarters in Salonika; and a Bulgarian 

Corps, which had its own occupation sector in Thrace and eastern 

Macedonia and whose two divisions came under General Loehr only in 

the event of an Allied landing attempt.d The mainstay of Army Group 

E’s tactical troop strength remained the LXVIII Corps under General der Flieger (Lt. Gen., AF) Helmuth Felmy and the XXII Mountain Corps under General der Gebirgstruppen (Lt Gen, Mtn Troops) 

Hubert Lanz. At the end of 1943 these two corps had a total of three 

divisions regularly assigned.11

Figure 28. General Loehr, Commander of Army Group E.

c In its tactical role, the administrative area came under Army Group E; as a military 

government area headquarters, the administrative area came under General Speidel, Military Commander in Greece (see page 229).

d This same principle applied to the independent German naval and air units in 

Greece which were to come under the Army Group Commander only in the event of an 

Allied assault. Excluded from this rule were the Air Force field divisions that were regularly assigned Army Group E.
Antiguerrilla Warfare

229

General Loehr’s position as commander of Army Group E was difficult because of the complexity of the German organization for occupied territories. In addition to the tactical organization of Army Group 

E, there was a German administrative command, really a military government, for occupied Greece, which was mainly independent of the 

Army Group Commander. This military government headquarters, 

called Military Command Greece, was situated in Athens. The Military 

Commander of Greece was General der Flieger (Lt. Gen., AF) Wilhelm 

Speidel. He reported, not to von Weichs, but to Military Commander 

Southeast, whose military government headquarters was in Belgrade, 

and who was simultaneously Military Commander (Governor) and 

Combat Commander in Serbia. Military Commander Southeast in 

turn came under theater authority. Because of his combat function in 

Serbia, Military Commander Southeast had little interest in Greece. 

Under Speidel, military government administration divided Greece 

into administrative areas quite separate from the operational areas.12

Between the two German commanders in Greece, General Loehr 

and Lieutenant General Speidel, there was friction. Speidel, who had 

previously been Military Commander of Southern Greece, with some 

tactical forces under him, had lost these to the Army Group Commander in the reorganization of German commands in Greece during the summer of 1943. Presumably General Speidel had executive 

power and “territorial authority,” while General Loehr had tactical and 

strategic military control. As the guerrilla war continued, however, the 

country was brought more and more under combat command. Using 

his power, when the tactical situation demanded it, to give instructions to military (government) commanders not subordinate to him, 

General Loehr began exercising authority over General Speidel’s command. “From then on,” wrote General Speidel, “every requirement of 

Army Group of an economic, financial or administrative nature was a 

‘tactical necessity.’ It was inadvertible [unavoidable] that these two so 

widely differing conceptions should lead to severe controversies.”13 At 

the same time, although Speidel had no voice in combat against the 

guerrillas, he was vitally affected by its existence. “Partisan warfare,” he 

wrote “paralyzed the territorial organizations of Military Commander 

[Speidel]. It is impossible to conduct warfare in a country and at the 

same time to maintain a pretense of peaceful occupation . . . .”14

The German command structure in Greece, already complicated 

by the overlapping of function between Generals Loehr and Speidel, 

was further entangled when, in September 1943, the post of Senior SS 

and Police Leader for Greece was created. The occupant of this post, a 

General Schimana, played an anomalous role. Presumably, he was subordinate to General Speidel, who was responsible for territorial control, 
230

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

but Schimana had sole responsibility in all police matters and reported 

on these matters only to the Reichs Leader SS and thus directly to Hitler. Schimana also received direct policy guidance and directives from 

the Reichs Leader SS. Furthermore, by OKW directive of 7 September 

1943, General Speidel was ordered to assign definite combat areas to 

Schimana so that the SS and police units under him (excluding the 

Wafen SS units assigned to Army Group E) could carry out combat 

against guerrilla bands and sabotage in Greece. At this same time, 

overall responsibility for guerrilla combat belonged to Army Group 

E. Speidel reported that Army Group E assigned Schimana the province of Boeotia; and that later Schimana shifted his combat activities 

to the Peloponnesus, “presumably with the approval of Army Group E.” 

Because Schimana was nominally under the military government headquarters but operated in the field as combat commander against the 

guerrillas, his functions in Greece overlapped those of both Speidel 

and Loehr. At the same time Schimana partially bypassed both of these 

commanders, since he received guidance, directives, and even tactical 

orders directly from the Reichs Leader SS.15

In addition to the overlapping functions and interests of General 

Loehr as Army Group Commander, General Schimana as Senior SS 

and Police Leader in Greece, and General Speidel as Military Commander (Governor), there was a representative of German political 

affairs in Greece who had an interest in the functions of all three military commanders. The Special Plenipotentiary, Ambassador Hermann 

Neubacher, represented both the German Foreign Office and the 

Reichs Minister for Economics. On occasion he was directly involved 

in the measures taken in the antiguerrilla campaign, particularly with 

regard to the political effects of retaliatory measures.16

The German organization in Greece, as in other occupied nations, 

reflected a very delicate balance of power between the various governmental agencies of the home country. The result was a certain internal inconsistency in applying a basic German policy of pacification. 

Prime responsibility for operations against Greek guerrillas, however, 

remained mainly in the hands of General Loehr, the commander 

of Army Group E. And since no Allied landing attempt was made in 

Greece, control of and combat against the guerrillas became General 

Loehr’s major objective.17

Finding Sufficient Troops

No matter how passive the Greek population might have been, General Loehr would have felt hard pressed for troops to man the coastal 

defenses of Greece and to repulse any Allied landing attempts. Since 

the country was not passive, the problem was the more serious.
Antiguerrilla Warfare

231

Figure 29. German Organization after September 1943.
232

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Whatever his need, General Loehr could not count on any major 

additions to his strength unless a landing took place. As a matter of 

fact, the Germans faced a growing troop shortage everywhere. In 1941, 

139 of 186 German divisions had been committed in Russia; in 1944 

they were still “bleeding to death” in that country, and the Western 

Front was about to open.18 Strategically, the Southeastern Theater in 

the Balkans represented the southern flank of the German fight in 

Russia, but it was a flank that had to be held by the smallest possible 

number of troops.

After the Italians defected in 1943, the Germans had 14 divisions 

and about 600,000 military personnel in the Balkans. At the end of 

the year, the commitment had risen to 20 German divisions and about 

700,000 men. It has been estimated that by July 1944 German strength 

had declined to about 500,000 men in the Southeastern Theater.19

Of the 20 German divisions in the Balkans at the end of 1943, five 

were assigned to Army Group E; of these, four divisions and a number of separate regiments were on the mainland. Using this ratio of 

strength as a basis, it has been estimated that at its height the German 

manpower commitment in Greece was approximately one-fifth of their 

total troop strength in the Balkans; that is, approximately 140,000 men 

on mainland Greece. By the same process, it may be estimated that, 

in the summer of 1944, German troop strength was down to about 

100,000. These figures roughly agree with estimates based on the 

German Order of Battle and with those made by General Saraphis of 

EAM/ELAS.20

Some German troops in Greece were first-rate fighting soldiers. For 

example, the 1st Mountain Division under Army Group E was a firstclass unit, mountain-trained and combat-ready. As the guerrilla war 

wore on, antiguerrilla combat schools were organized and increased 

the available number of trained troops.21

One particularly effective technique was the formation of special guerrilla-hunting details. These were detachments of young, 

battle-hardened soldiers, organized into small units and trained and 

equipped to fight guerrillas. First used in Russia, they were also effective in Greece. When possible, natives who knew guerrilla methods 

were also enlisted in these details. The details were trained and armed 

for close-in, hand-to-hand fighting in forested, mountainous terrain; 

and, though expert in the use of rifles, machine guns, pistols, and grenades, they were equally ready and able to inflict death by knife, spade, 

or bare hands. These guerrilla hunters dressed like the local population, sometimes even wearing pieces of native uniform. They accepted 

their illegal status, feeling that capture would mean sure death whether 

or not they were in uniform. These sub rosa troops were effective both 
Antiguerrilla Warfare

233

in stalking and annihilating small bands on their own and as a combat 

adjunct in larger operations.22

The unfortunate fact of the matter, however, from the German 

standpoint, was that they had too few first-class troops. Many men were 

over age or post-convalescent. In addition, there were several fortress 

regiments which were composed mainly of former general military 

prisoners. Army Group E also had some “Eastern” battalions, consisting of men of Slavic or Tatar derivation who were willing to fight on the 

German side. These men, useful for certain operations when carefully 

handled, were not completely reliable. In 1944 some of these groups 

had to be disarmed.23

The Germans tried in late 1943 and 1944 to salvage some of the surrendering Italian troops for duty in Greece. Basic German policy was 

to treat as prisoners of war all those Italians unwilling to assist the Germans, but to allow those willing to help to do so, either in non-combat 

labor or armed guard and security duties. Although many Italians soon 

tired of prison camps and elected to help, few chose active duty. Even 

those who did were not completely dependable from the German point 

of view. The Germans therefore required that each man take a personal oath of allegiance. Thirty percent of the Italians refused to do so. 

Those who did take the oath apparently feared that they would be transferred immediately to frontline service and that if they ever returned to 

Italy they would be imprisoned. Despite the oath of allegiance, lowered 

morale made the Italian volunteers unreliable. The Germans therefore 

kept them dispersed throughout their own units at the rate of one company of 40 Italians per German security battalion. Italian disaffection 

continued to increase as time went on. Army Group E never placed 

complete confidence in the Italian troops within its ranks.24

The Bulgarians, who shared the German occupation of Greece, 

had an estimated 40,000 troops there. In addition to two Bulgarian 

divisions under their own corps commander and not subject to General 

Loehr except in the emergency of an Allied landing, a third Bulgarian 

division was under the German Salonika-Aegean command. Although 

the Germans considered the Bulgarian troops good soldiers they created problems for General Loehr. The Bulgarians wished to divert 

their independent corps from defense of the Thracian coastline to the 

construction of a defensive line within their own country and to the 

security of the interior of Thrace. In early 1944, despite the protests 

of Loehr, they assigned a quarter of their troops to this latter task, 

leaving a large exposed sea front. Also, when Bulgarian units went on 

antiguerrilla operations in German territory, they tended to remain 

until “ordered to return to their own zone.” They in turn were irked 

by German demands that they turn over captured weapons and booty. 
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Bulgarian-Greek friction in the Bulgarian zone added to anti-German 

sentiment throughout Greece, since the Greeks blamed the Germans 

for inflicting the Bulgarians on them. By mid-1944 some Bulgarians 

serving in German units had to be disarmed, a symptom of the coming Bulgarian withdrawal from the Axis, which was to take place late 

that summer.25 It might be said that Bulgarian troops supported Army 

Group E quite well in tactical operations against the Greek guerrillas 

while at the same time they proved to be strategically unreliable.

Figure 30. Bulgarian Troops in Greece.

The major success of the Germans in augmenting their troop 

strength came with the creation of Greek complements—the Security 

Battalions, whose main duty was to aid the Germans in the suppression 

of the guerrilla bands.

The Security Battalions had been started in the summer of 1943 

even before the Germans took over major occupation duties from the 

Italians. With the encouragement of the Germans, John Rallis, third 

premier of the Greek puppet government, took the lead in forming 

these battalions. Behind the scenes were Gen. Theodore Pangalos, who 

had been active for years in Athenian politics and briefly dictator of 

Greece in the mid-1920’s, and Stylianos Gonatas, who somewhat earlier had been prominent in the Athens EDES. He is reported to have 

advised young Greek Army officers to join these Security Battalions.26

Woodhouse believed that Rallis saw the Security Battalions as a “bridge” 

over the period of chaos that would occur during the changeover from 
Antiguerrilla Warfare

235

German occupation to Allied liberation and that he counted on Allied 

gratitude for preserving order in Greece. “He intended to enjoy,” wrote 

Colonel Woodhouse, “the fruits of collaboration with both sides.”27 The 

Germans, at least, profited much from this collaboration.

The Security Battalions were first organized on a purely voluntary 

basis, although Rallis’ government later attempted conscription. Since 

most men were able, if they wanted, to hide out from the puppet government, by joining the guerrillas if necessary, most of the members of 

the battalions were volunteers.28 What motives led these Greeks to aid 

the occupiers and fight against their fellow citizens?

For the leaders of the Security Battalions and others whose motives 

were knowingly political, the situation and the reasons were complex. It 

was true that for some Greeks the fear of communism was greater than 

the fear of the Germans: The Germans would inevitably leave Greece, 

but the Communists might stay forever. Many Greeks felt, like Rallis, 

that the British would not be against the Security Battalions and might 

even be for them. If so, they could save Greece from communism, avoid 

German reprisals, at least against themselves, and gain British favor 

simultaneously. Saraphis has written that “Rallis himself frequently 

gave out that he had created the Security Battalions by agreement with 

and at the suggestion of Great Britain and of the King of Greece.” Some 

recruiters for the battalions, like those for EDES and EAM/ELAS, gave 

volunteers the clear impression that Great Britain looked with at least 

implicit favor on the organization. As the news got around Greece that 

the British were becoming anti-EAM/ELAS, Woodhouse noted that 

the Security Battalions began to expect Allied favor.29

For the rank and file of the Security Battalions, like the rank and 

file of EDES or EAM/ELAS or any other organization in Greece, joining the Security Battalions was probably a matter of accident. One of 

the reasons for joining them—as it was for joining the guerrillas—was 

economic necessity. But the average Greek, according to Colonel Woodhouse, had no real basis for decision as to whether to join the guerrillas 

or the security battalions. “If he lived in one part of the mountains, he 

was more likely to be in contact with the Communist influence first; if 

in another, with the non-Communist resistance; if in the plains, with 

the Security Battalions and the collaborating authorities; and so on. 

But in any case his destiny was decided for him by chance. . . .”30 It 

should not be thought however, that the average Greeks felt no emotion; they were filled with emotions; they were ridden by them. Their 

politics were reflections of these emotions, not of professional political 

calculations. “There was indeed nothing to decide them,” wrote the 

Colonel, “except the first glib tongue that reached their ears.”31
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

EAM/ELAS excesses also pushed some men into the Security Battalions. The issue of communism in EAM/ELAS and its activities in 

fighting other guerrillas alienated some Greeks from the guerrilla 

movement and made employment in the Security Battalions acceptable. The men from bands eliminated by EAM/ELAS had little choice 

except to join that organization or the Germans. They often chose the 

latter. Most of the members of the Security Battalions, in fact, started 

as members of small bands. The remnants of EKKA, for example, 

who escaped capture by EAM/ELAS joined the Security Battalions. 

These owed their popularity, Woodhouse wrote, “to the excesses of 

EAM/ELAS . . . .”32

The Security Battalions were strongest in the Peloponnesus, where 

all elements combined to bring about this development. The Germans 

regarded this region, after the loss of Africa, as practically a frontline 

and maintained proportionately more troops there than on the mainland. Their headquarters were centrally located, and they constantly 

policed the area. By early 1944, the Germans had declared martial 

law in the Peloponnesus. They were aided in control by two factors—

geography and EAM/ELAS. Since the road network through the 

mountains on the Peloponnesus was relatively well developed, it was 

easier for the Germans to maintain control and harder for the guerrillas to find safe areas. On the Peloponnesus, as on the mainland, 

EAM/ELAS waged a battle against its local affiliated rivals, EOA, the 

National Organization of Officers, and ES, an organization whose initials stood for the Greek Army and which had royalist allegiance and 

loose connections with EDES and EKKA. By the end of October 1943 

ELAS had eliminated these rivals, with the result that several of their 

commanders had joined ELAS and several had gone over to the Security Battalions. After EAM/ELAS obtained control of the guerrilla 

groups on the Peloponnesus, they took reprisals against local villagers 

whom they suspected of helping the Germans. The naturally conservative southern peasants, already alienated by the men in EAM/ELAS 

and the fact that they were not native to the Peloponnesus, were further 

antagonized by the internecine fighting and by the reprisals. Those villagers who did not want to join EAM/ELAS found no other guerrilla 

organizations to join and ended up with the Security Battalions. Thus 

events aided the Germans.33

Enrollment in the Security Battalions has been variously estimated 

at from 5,000 to 15,000. The latter figure is that of Saraphis, who put 

the strength of the battalions at 9,000 in the Peloponnesus, 3,000 in 

Athens, and 3,000 in Central Greece. These figures seem high; a German estimate is 5,000 men recruited in the Peloponnesus. The battalions had Greek military leaders—Colonel Plitzanopoulos on the 
Antiguerrilla Warfare

237

mainland and Colonel Papadhongonas on the Peloponnesus—but 

they were described by Woodhouse as “unimportant.” Although commanded by regular Greek Army officers, each unit of the Security 

Battalions had a German liaison officer serving with it. In practice, it 

was the German officer who acted as battalion commander, just as the 

Allied liaison officer often led the guerrillas. In action against their fellow Greeks, the Security Battalions showed themselves merciless, even 

taking reprisal against the helpless villagers. In the story of antiguerrilla warfare, they must be chalked up as a major German success, both 

tactically and psychologically.34 But even with this augmentation of his 

troop strength, General Loehr had difficulty in maintaining the internal security of Greece.

Securing the Transportation Network35

Lacking sufficient troops to occupy all of Greece at once, the Germans in 1943 set out to secure from guerrilla attack their lines of communications and the towns and villages strategically located along 

those lines. The basis of the German defense of the supply roads and 

railways was a system of strong points. These were used particularly to 

protect important bridges or tunnels and places where high passes or 

serpentine roads favored guerrilla tactics. They were carefully sited in a 

dominating position where the terrain could be surveyed for some distance. However, blockhouses along the important western roads were 

often 6 or more miles apart, owing mainly to lack of enough troops to 

man more of them.

Strong points were laid out to allow all-round defense of the position. They were supposed to have bulletproof, or at least splinterproof, shelters, and the approaches were defended by mine fields and 

barbed wire obstacles. Reliable communications with other strong 

points and with sector headquarters were extremely important, the 

Germans found, to prevent troops from feeling isolated and depressed 

and to enable them to summon aid in case of attack. Since wire communication were extremely vulnerable to guerrilla attack, radio was 

a necessity.
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Figure 31. German Fortifications at Key Transportation Points. The Germans constructed guardhouses at either end of many important bridges, including this one 

at Thebes.

The size of the forces defending the strong points varied according 

to the location, importance, and vulnerability of the target that was 

being defended, and the tactical mission of the troops. The Germans 

found, however, that they had a basic problem: if they tried to set up a 

large number of strong points, these could not be made strong enough 

to fight off guerrilla attacks; if they concentrated larger forces in fewer 

places, they left gaps too great to be adequately patrolled. Often in an 

effort to stretch manpower, they placed one squad of eight men under 

a noncommissioned officer in charge of such a defensive post. General Lanz discovered that this over-burdened his troops with guard and 

reconnaissance duty and invited guerrilla attacks, often quite successful. In turn, the morale of other squads in similar situations dropped, 

since they felt insecure. As a consequence, Lanz recommended that 

strong points never be staffed by less than a platoon of 40 men led by 

a carefully selected officer, even if this meant establishing fewer strong 

points: “For he who attempts to secure too much with inadequate 

forces, succeeds in securing nothing.”

Nonetheless, he could not always follow his own good advice. “Sometimes,” wrote the General, “guerrilla activity became so pronounced 

between the two points that a middle one had to be set up.” This often 

meant that the geographic location of the new strong point was far from 

ideal. Furthermore, troops had to be withdrawn from other points in 

order to man the new one. A better practice, General Lanz felt, would 

have been to have established more strong points at the outset than 
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239

were needed, leaving them unmanned until an emergency occurred. 

They could then be suddenly occupied “in a surprise move” to upset 

guerrilla plans.e

The intervals between strong points were thus areas of great vulnerability. To guard these intervals, the Germans employed two types of 

road patrols—men sent out from the blockhouse staff and divisional 

motorized road-control detachments.

Each strong point was responsible for a given security sector of the 

road and sent out patrols—often three men and a leader—to walk 

along and guard the road. The patrols operated at varying intervals, 

were occasionally reinforced, and were sometimes assigned a minelocating detail. This duty was not particularly easy or reassuring for 

four men operating alone, often at night, in guerrilla-infested territory.

The roving motorized road-control detachments assigned by divisional headquarters to supplement the road-patrol system of the strong 

points operated on staggered schedules, but on a 24-hour basis. They 

were particularly active during darkness or in weather of poor visibility. Their duties were to check Greek civilians using the roads, to 

test the combat readiness of strong points, to oversee the condition 

of the roads, and to come to the assistance of any strong point, walking patrol, or supply column that might be under attack. Operating at 

platoon strength with an officer in command, the detachments were 

mounted on armored reconnaissance cars and trucks, with machine 

guns, searchlights, and 20-mm antiaircraft artillery. They had radios 

and could report to headquarters instantly if they found any trouble; 

they could also be directed to trouble spots. The motorized road control detachments were extremely effective. It was unfortunate, from the 

German point of view, that their use was limited to the availability of 

motor vehicles and fuel.f

Another measure that proved very helpful in securing lines of communication was the establishment of barrier zones. In critical areas, all 

civilian traffic on a given road or in the area immediately adjacent to it 

would be forbidden. Sometimes entry to the zone was prohibited after 

dark; sometimes it was completely forbidden. At any rate, anyone other 

e There is some question as to how General Lanz would have prevented guerrillas 

from taking over and manning unoccupied strong points and turning their defensive 

capabilities against the Germans for at least a short time.

f General Lanz would also have liked to make extensive use of suitable aircraft to 

patrol the roads, but these were not generally available. Pilots could have instantly alerted 

strong points, motorized road control detachments, or headquarters of suspicious moves. 

Low-flying fighter bombers or helicopters could have carried emergency packages of food, 

arms, and medical equipment for beleaguered German soldiers or convoys. The motorized road control detachments with their radio equipment could easily have called for 

instant air strikes.
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than a member of the occupation force found in the zone at a forbidden time might be fired upon on sight.

Defense implied more than prevention of any incident along the 

roads; it also involved the quick cleanup of any trouble areas, so that 

the guerrillas’ opportunities for further attack were limited. The Germans used labor details to clear the roads of mines. If there was no time 

for this, a vehicle loaded with sand, gravel, or dirt, and reinforced with 

armored bottom plates beneath the driver’s seat was sent on ahead. 

Particularly in the mountains, where the breakdown of one car might 

trap all others using the road, motorized repair crews were kept constantly ready.

Road security also involved the vehicles that traveled the roads. 

General Lanz found it “inadvisable” to use Greek laborers in any of 

the workshops or depots, “no matter how dependable they may appear 

to be,” but he could not always avoid their use. Furthermore, vehicles 

left unguarded even for a moment were in danger. Single vehicles were 

always possible targets for guerrilla action. The Germans therefore 

ordered that all road traffic should be handled by convoys, and these 

were always sent out on irregular schedules. Furthermore, the position 

of defense vehicles in the convoy was frequently switched. Insignia, 

markings, and command flags were eliminated. Everything possible 

was done to avoid setting a pattern upon which guerrillas could plan 

attacks. The Germans also found it useful to camouflage or screen from 

view important facilities along the road or even sections of the road.

The security of rail lines was established in much the same way, 

measures being adapted to the peculiar qualities of the roadbed. The 

area on either side of the tracks was declared a restricted zone approximately 3 miles wide in rural areas and about 220 yards in urban areas.36

Strong points were established along the line, sometimes by fortifying 

the station houses. (Increased emphasis was put on anti-aircraft batteries in 1944 when the rail line was vulnerable not only to guerrillas but to 

Allied air attack.) The Germans used armored cars with flanged wheels 

and searchlights to patrol the railway and to search for guerrilla saboteurs. These armored cars “felt out” the way for trains and reversed to 

come to their aid in case of attack.g

 The trains themselves were almost 

always manned by Greek civilian engineers who were bound to be 

injured or killed in any attack. When they also carried Greek civilians, 

these became in effect hostages against guerrilla attack. Sometimes 

the Germans, particularly when moving their own troops, deliberately 

carried civilians as hostage prisoners in cages pushed ahead of the 

g See description of the guerrilla attack near Katerini on 3 August 1944. Chapter V.
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241

locomotive.h As a defensive measure, this last practice was moderately 

effective. Sometimes it stopped the attack; whenever possible the guerrillas released these unfortunate people from their cages as soon as 

possible after the demolition.

Figure 32. Hostage Cages. The Germans filled such cages with Greek hostages and 

pushed them ahead of trains, in order to deter guerrilla sabotage.

Responsibility for defense of urban areas belonged to the assigned 

Army post or station commander. “Outer security” for towns and villages was attempted simply by closing the roads, paths, railways, or 

streams leading out of the town—either by barbed wire obstacles or 

patrols. When the tactical situation was dubious, the population hostile, and German forces weak, the station commander sometimes built 

trenches, obstacles, observation posts, and combat installations to help 

withstand any guerrilla attacks. Incoming traffic was carefully checked. 

These German measures were not particularly effective; it was usually 

h Forty such hapless persons carried as hostages in the first coach lost their lives in 

the EAM/ELAS attack on the Kournovon tunnel in the summer of 1943. (See Myers, Greek 

Entanglement, pp. 194–95.)
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not difficult to enter or leave the towns after darkness and guerrillas 

and Allied liaison officers often did so.

The German manpower shortage precluded the use, in the larger 

towns, of all-round defenses—the only kind they regarded as adequate 

for outer security. In the area of the XXII Mountain Corps, only one 

large town received such defensive installation—Yannina, corps headquarters, strategically located at the junction of the east-west Metsovon 

Highway and the north-south Yannina-Arta road. It did not receive this 

protection until September 1944, “as the threat to this city from guerrillas [during NOAH’S ARK] became more and more apparent” to the 

corps commander. The defenses were never actually tested, however, 

since the Germans pulled out of Greece a month later.

Within the towns there were areas peculiarly vulnerable to guerrilla attack which the Germans protected to obtain “inner security.” 

All military installations—command posts, troop billets, motor pools, 

repair shops, ammunition supply points, etc.—required special protective measures. Rooms or areas were enclosed and their entrances 

guarded. Only checked individuals could enter or leave. Finding it 

unsafe to quarter troops in private homes, the XXII Mountain Corps 

Commander, wherever possible, set up barracks and surrounded them 

with barbed wire, barriers, and sentries. He was never able, however, to 

do away entirely with private quartering, a condition he deplored since 

it led to overdose contact between the population and German troops 

and to frequent intelligence leaks.

These German defensive measures, with their numerous weak spots 

did not preclude guerrilla attacks. Weakness, particularly in the isolated blockhouses, invited guerrilla action. A second point in the German system of security was, therefore, to react immediately to every 

contact with the guerrillas. This, in turn, led to a constant series of 

minor operations.37

Minor Operations

A cardinal rule of the Germans in Greece was to react swiftly and 

in force against any guerrilla activity. Since such incidents occurred 

daily, German troops were more or less constantly engaged in minor 

operations. Such operations were generally characterized by three conditions: they were carried out immediately following contact, they were 

performed independently by troop units below divisional level, and 

their mission was to destroy the guerrillas.

Most minor operations took place in response to contact with guerrillas—either German troops made contact themselves or were in the 

immediate neighborhood of a guerrilla attack or act of sabotage. Under 
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these conditions, immediate response was regarded as necessary, since 

a delay of even a few hours usually meant that the guerrillas could not 

be found. As soon as word was received of a guerrilla operation, all 

available troops would be rushed to the scene.

Once on the spot, the troops, if strong enough, would begin an 

encirclement. While they were doing this, heavy weapons were brought 

up and surveyed in on the forming pocket. Everyone seen in the pocket 

was more than likely to be treated as a guerrilla. General Lanz has 

written that “the rural population, which accidentally or intentionally was caught in the pocket, could easily be taken for enemies and 

fired upon.”38

Naturally, all the guerrillas and most male civilians about to be 

caught in such a pocket would attempt to escape. Sometimes the guerrillas would take advantage of any momentary weakness to slip through 

or to break out by force; at other times they would separate and go in as 

many directions as possible, so that at least some of them would elude 

the pocket before it was fully formed. In these latter cases, German 

troop commanders were called upon to make wise and immediate decisions. They were supposed to avoid splitting their forces and to make 

the encirclement at the point where they thought the major body of the 

guerrillas would be. At that moment, “the tactically trained eye of the 

troop commander [was] of decisive importance.”39

Once the Germans had formed the pocket, they still had to find the 

guerrillas inside it. A favorite guerrilla trick was to hide and hope the 

encircling troops would pass by, leaving the guerrilla on the outside 

of the ring. This often happened. Even when the ground was being 

searched, guerrillas were missed. “Arthur Reade, Yanni, and I hid in a 

thick cypress tree,” wrote one British liaison officer on Crete, “and over 

a hundred Germans passed underneath.” They were not captured.40

Luck played on both sides in these operations. One important guerrilla 

leader was captured when a German soldier accidentally stepped on 

his hand. The Germans appreciated the ability of the Greeks to make 

use of every bit of natural terrain to hide, every fleeting cloud of fog to 

disappear, magically as it were, from the face of the earth. Troop commanders were supposed to see that searches were thorough—tedious 

and dangerous work when a cornered guerrilla had a gun. The troops 

themselves avoided these combing operations whenever possible. Commanders were instructed, however, to do their duty “even if it meant 

repeating the maneuver.”41

Troops on minor operations were often unable to effect an encirclement. Their only possible action at these times was to comb the terrain. 

Success in this, however, was even more dubious. Most of the time the 
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guerrillas—familiar with the terrain and its many hiding places—were 

able to elude the troops and get away.

When guerrillas undertook to defend themselves in mountain 

houses or small villages, the Germans usually felt that they had the 

upper hand. “Good results were obtained,” wrote General Lanz, “by 

surrounding the village and preparing for an attack employing heavy 

weapons, antitank guns, and mortars.” By the time the Germans had 

overpowered the village, however, many of the guerrillas had usually 

managed to slip away.42

Sometimes small-scale mop-ups were planned rather than 

impromptu. Even with planning, however, German commanders 

regarded small-scale sweeps as unsatisfactory. By the time such an 

attack was mounted, several hours would have passed and the guerrillas would have been alerted and scattered far afield. Also, the number 

of troops involved in minor operations was not sufficient to encircle an 

area large enough to trap the guerrillas. Consequently, the guerrillas 

would slip away and the attack deteriorates into a reprisal operation. 

Such was the case in the LXVIII Corps area in Operation KALAVRITA, 

for example, where the tactical lesson was recorded in the corps diary: 

“It again has been demonstrated that an insufficiently mobile light regiment in the mountains is insufficient for . . . encirclement of bands.”43

In the experience of the XXII Corps Commander also, minor operations were “not fully satisfactory.” Since the area to be encircled was 

small, most of the guerrillas could get out of it too quickly to be caught. 

And it was usually impossible to deceive the Greeks about what was 

going to happen. The Germans could not bring up troops “quietly or 

quickly enough to prevent the enemy from escaping.” In short, secrecy, 

surprise, and a sufficiently large area in which to operate were lacking 

in minor operations.44

Major Operations

Whereas minor operations were generally ineffective, the Germans felt that major mop-ups achieved considerable success. From 

their experiences in Russia and Yugoslavia, they had by 1943 a broad 

background in antiguerrilla operations. The tactical maneuver of the 

major operation was invariably encirclement. The German had learned 

how to enclose a wide area and thus trap large numbers of guerrillas. 

From a wide outer encirclement, thinly manned, the ring would be 

compressed successively until an inner encirclement line was reached. 

From this point, a final attack against the guerrilla stronghold would 

be launched and the individuals within it destroyed. Provided they had 
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245

the needed number of alert, trained troops, the Germans were able to 

score significant successes in major mop-ups against the guerrillas.

Though minor operations were undertaken spontaneously on contact, major operations were always carefully planned and plans were 

based on intelligence information. Major operations were undertaken 

only against strong, identified guerrilla groups. Obtaining information 

regarding such groups, however, was a problem in itself.

Combat Intelligence

The data on guerrillas in Italian files having proved in 1943 so 

“inaccurate and exaggerated” that no credence could be put in the 

estimates of guerrilla strength, the Germans set out to collect accurate 

information. Their intelligence organization, however, was dogged by 

the same multiplicity of command chains that worried tactical commanders in Greece. “Two or three intelligence organizations overlapped one another and thus interfered with each other’s work,” wrote 

General Lanz. “Himmler’s Security Service45 needlessly operated in 

opposition to the Wehrmacht, so that our staffs and troops were not 

only watched and spied upon by the partisans but also by the agents of 

the Security Service.”

When they were not compiling information about their fellow Germans, the intelligence nets set about covering Greece with their agents. 

Apparently many of their contacts involved the same Greeks with whom 

Allied intelligence was working. As a result the communications links 

between Greece and the Allies were threatened a number of times. It 

will be remembered that the link from Athens to Cairo was compromised and captured at the time of Woodhouse’s visit to Athens in early 

1943. Other links were discovered and captured later in the war, at Yannina for example.

Spies were also sent into the mountains to obtain information 

about the guerrillas, but these poor creatures were often captured. 

One “wretched man” whose cover story was that he was an Australian, 

an escaped prisoner of war named Captain Benson, went to the mountains to seek Brigadier Myers. Brought to Myers by EAM/ELAS, he was 

exposed within the hour. “Benson was a dupe of the Gestapo,” wrote 

Myers, “and a pretty low-grade one at that. . . . It was an incredibly poor 

piece of work.” Benson paid the penalty.46 Another German spy with 

the cover story of being an escaped Frenchman from a labor corps in 

Athens had the bad luck to join a guerrilla group whose British liaison 

officer was bilingual in English and French. Unfortunately for the spy, 

his command of French was mediocre. “In point of fact,” wrote the 

British officer, “he was the first of many spies whom we were to catch 
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posing as deserters. . . . They never did us much harm, and, as in the 

case of our young ‘Frenchman,’ they got short shrift.”47

Fortunately for German troop commanders they did not rely 

entirely on the intelligence organizations for combat intelligence, but 

had their own methods of acquiring information, particularly tactical data. These included troop ground and air reconnaissance, troop 

radio and telephone monitoring, and cooperative sharing of information with equal or higher commands.48

Ground and air reconnaissance was routine, but because of the 

cooperation of the population with the guerrillas, it could rarely be 

done in secrecy. Active reconnaissance alerted the wary guerrillas and 

led to frequent shifting of their base of operations. In an effort to avoid 

detection, the Germans established camouflaged observation posts 

from which they could observe guerrilla areas over a long period of 

time. They assembled this information centrally to attempt to build up 

a big picture. On a local level, they sometimes sent out armored cars 

or tanks at night to possible places of guerrilla effort, camouflaged 

them, and from these vantage points carefully observed any activity in 

the vicinity the next day. Spotting of drop points also helped to locate 

guerrilla hideouts; the Germans wanted most, of course, to capture the 

drop points and achieve a “playback” operation, thus soaking up any 

agents or supplies they could. No instance has been found of this being 

successfully done in Greece.49

During periods of active operations, tactical air reconnaissance 

proved invaluable. It was of much less use when contact with the enemy 

had not been made; guerrilla shelters were either invisible from the air 

or were in fact civilian buildings, and the guerrillas themselves were, 

unless carrying weapons openly, indistinguishable from the population.

Monitoring of guerrilla communications, however, provided useful information. Guerrilla radio transmitters were located by means of 

direction-finding devices and then not disturbed. The monitoring service took over the job of keeping track of all guerrilla messages, breaking codes when possible, and translating message content. A captured 

code at one point helped the Germans considerably. Such information was of great use in planning tactical operations and in preparing 

propaganda appeals. On the other hand, it was difficult, during active 

operations, to decode and translate messages in time for use. Unfortunately for the guerrillas, they sometimes spoke in the clear.50

Telephone communication offered another source of intelligence 

for the Germans. Telephone wire was so scarce in the Greek mountains that when cable was found strewn along the ground, looped over 

bushes in guerrilla fashion, the Germans knew it was in use. They 

therefore let it alone and tapped the wires. Although guerrillas usually 
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247

held conversations in the clear, the Germans lacked the “trained and 

dependable military interpreters” necessary to exploit this source fully.51

Other major sources of combat intelligence were the evaluation of 

captured documents and the interrogation of prisoners, both handled 

at corps headquarters. From here also, divisions could obtain the details 

of reconnaissance by neighboring divisions and intelligence evaluations. In interrogating prisoners, the Germans rediscovered the value 

of sugar over vinegar. Greeks being interrogated “should be treated 

well,” wrote the commander of the XXII Mountain Corps. “Since these 

are for the most part a primitive people, a clever treatment and method 

of interrogating will frequently serve to obtain important statements.” 

The Germans often used a political line of questioning to arouse passion and to elicit information from EDES guerrillas about ELAS and 

vice versa. Also, persons who had been ill-treated by guerrillas were 

usually willing to talk. Such individuals, however, seldom had information of major value.52

Planning and Preparing for Major Operations

With sufficient information at hand on guerrilla strength, bases, 

and habits to make a major operation worthwhile, planning was begun. 

To avoid security leaks, the Germans used a small planning staff of two 

or three officers, usually at corps level. The plan included an assessment 

of the guerrilla strength, a study of their habits, and an outline of the 

possibilities inherent in their location for entrenchment or escape. The 

plan detailed the tactical approach for destroying the guerrilla units. 

It also considered where and when to assemble the German troops so 

that the operation would not be compromised before encirclement had 

been achieved.53

When the plan was finished, division commanders were brought in 

and briefed, and the operation was rehearsed in a map exercise. At this 

point, questions concerning the tactics were considered, and the plan 

was changed when necessary. Following the map exercises, divisional 

commanders were given operational orders. They then briefed regimental and independent unit commanders, but no others were told of 

the impending operation.

On the basis of directives included with the operational order, 

measures were taken to perform secret air reconnaissance of the area, 

to prepare command posts and communications facilities, to organize traffic control, to complete supply plans for the operation, and 

to organize security protection. This last aspect was regarded as especially important. The Germans tried to fool their own troops as to their 

intentions by starting rumors of alternate operations; sometimes they 

even assembled motor vehicles and replenished supplies to support 
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their cover operation. They also tried to throw the guerrillas off by 

sending false radio messages and by spreading rumors among the population—often accomplished most easily through the false leads given 

German troops.54

One of the planning difficulties was to find enough troops for 

major encirclement operations. Sometimes troop strength was so low 

that the outermost encirclement line could not be adequately manned. 

As the line was compressed, however, the troop strength problem lessened. After the first day of operations, planners counted on having 

both command and tactical reserves available. Command reserves were 

composed of “highly mobile units with strong fire power” placed either 

under corps headquarters or at the point of main divisional effort. Tactical reserves were spread all along the ring, at an initial rate of about 

one company for each regiment. As the ring was tightened and more 

severe fighting was to be expected, the Germans preferred to increase 

local reserves to one company for each battalion.55

Mountain operations required more than mere numbers of men; 

their combat condition was all-important. Since trained troops were 

always at a premium, however, the Germans also had to use soldiers 

untrained in mountain and forest ways. These were employed for 

blocking operations, saving their trained men for assault troops. Thus 

all men were utilized to best advantage; under the circumstances, this 

economy of force was an imperative.56

The Germans regarded light automatic weapons, machine guns, 

20-mm guns, mortars, and mountain artillery as ideal for mountain 

operations. Hand grenades were especially useful for flushing out 

guerrillas from hiding places. Tanks were used where terrain allowed. 

Combat aircraft were apparently seldom available for such operations, 

although liaison planes were available and valuable.57

Since major encirclement operations involved the expenditure of 

troops and materiel—both in short supply—the Germans were meticulous in the planning and preparation phases of such operations. And 

they felt that any later operational success was due in large part to this 

previous care and attention to every detail.

The Outer Encirclement Ring

Troop movements began as soon as the operational code word was 

passed. The men were supposed to get to the jump-off point without 

alerting either the population or the guerrillas; however, this was much 

easier said than done. The Germans found their every move watched 

and reported. Even when the prepared cover plans fooled the villagers, the guerrillas often discovered that something was afoot as soon as 

the troops moved. While it was always the German intent to assemble 
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troops inconspicuously, the ubiquitous Greek herdsman was almost 

invariably an informer on troop movements. One of the advantages 

of the major mop-up, of course, was the fact that so large an area was 

involved that specific intent could not always be deduced, even when 

guerrilla intelligence on troop movements was fast and accurate.

When the Germans reached their jump-off point, they moved 

immediately to assigned areas; sent out security and reconnaissance 

patrols, including aircraft; and prepared to reach an outer encircling 

line.58

By the end of the first day of a typical major operation, the Germans expected to have established an outer encirclement. From this 

perimeter, advance troops were to dig in and be ready to repulse any 

guerrilla attempt to break out. The various staffs were to be functioning. Radio and telephone communications were to be in operation. 

Not only was artillery to have been brought up, but troops were supposed to have obtained firing data and to have important targets in 

range. Radio monitoring of the guerrilla networks was to be constant, 

and immediate translations were to be supplied: The entire outer ring 

was to be occupied by groups of soldiers, so that no guerrillas should 

escape during the night. But the Germans could not yet be sure just 

how the guerrillas would move.59

At this point, as combat operations were about to begin, the Germans looked to their troop leaders as a major factor in the successful 

conclusion of the encirclement. In general, their leaders responded to 

the need by aggressive action. In order to maintain personal direction 

of the campaign, corps commanders would select forward headquarters, and division commanders sometimes directed operations over 

their front from a Storch aircraft. To take advantage of local situations, 

lower ranking troop commanders would be allowed some leeway in 

interpreting orders. Both officers and men were usually eager now to 

get started with the work of destroying the guerrilla enemy.60

Compressing the Ring61

By the following morning, German troops were ready to undertake 

the main work of compressing the ring and destroying any pockets 

of resistance that might show up. This work continued day after day 

until an inner encirclement was reached and the final battle occurred. 

Nights saw no end to operations, for it was then that the guerrillas 

moved and attempted most actively to break out.

A typical operational day started off with air reconnaissance by 

the troop commander or one of his aides and with reports to corps 

headquarters from lower echelons of conditions along the ring. With 

this operational data assembled, the commander faced the problem 
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of deciding whether his troops should advance to tighten the ring or 

stay put for a time and reorganize to close up any gaps. General Lanz, 

XXII Mountain Corps Commander, has indicated that once an operation was started, time was no factor. It was always better, he felt, to 

strengthen the ring than to attack prematurely. Attack would only force 

the guerrillas to launch breakout attempts, which would probably be 

successful if the line were not strong enough.62

When an advance began, it was usually by battalions. Three companies of each battalion would move, while the fourth remained in 

reserve. Machine gun platoons of the fifth company went with the forward companies, while the mortars and infantry guns remained at the 

disposal of the battalion commander. In addition to these weapons, 

each battalion commander was able to draw upon regimental artillery 

support, through an artillery liaison team attached to his headquarters. If the forward companies met with sudden resistance they could, 

by radio and telephone contact, call direct fire on target through the 

battalion liaison teams.63

The assault companies moved forward as quickly as the terrain 

permitted. In the woods they deployed in depth, advancing in squad 

columns, combat-patrol style. Forests presented so many difficulties, 

however, that squads moved behind sweeping machine gun fire and 

the area was combed for hidden guerrillas as the assault troops passed 

on. Where there were no roads and thicket was dense, the troops were 

apt to get lost. In such terrain, especially at night, German troops 

sometimes did not know where they were and got in each other’s way. 

Forests also cut down on good radio reception and made communication difficult. In open country, German troops formed a skirmish line, 

sending scouts two to three hundred yards ahead, so that the assault 

troops would not be flanked. Following the assault troops, outside the 

range of small arms fire, came the battalion staff, reserve company, 

and heavy artillery.64

Not only terrain but weather affected the German advance. Troops 

found that fog, dense snowfall, and bad weather in general impeded 

all their operations, while they helped the guerrillas. Snow, however, 

sometimes helped antiguerrilla operations: the guerrillas could move 

only at the risk of disclosing their positions and movements. The most 

desirable conditions, however, were “clear weather, long days, and bright 

nights” to facilitate observation, movement, and operations.65

During this period of forward movement, communication between 

units became extremely important. Companies, squads, and platoons 

maintained contact by messenger, hand signals, or visual observation. Companies communicated with battalions by telephone and 

portable radio. Battalions and regiments used motorcyclists, mounted 
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messengers, portable and voice radios, and telephones. Division to regiment and corps to division contact was by motor messengers, radio, 

and the ring-circuit telephone. In addition, attached to each division 

was a corps liaison officer with his own radio. Corps also used liaison 

aircraft. Contact between the corps command post and its permanent 

headquarters was often by carrier pigeon, but messages could usually 

not be relayed back by this means, since the command post was frequently moved. Tracer signals were generally used for special signals. 

For security, code names and call and frequency signs for radio and 

telephone contact were changed during the operation.66

As German troops moved forward over the plains and mountains 

they sometimes came upon villages or towns in the battle area. They 

approached such places carefully. The citizens had already been ordered 

by bulletin, leaflet, or loudspeaker to remain within the town, to stay 

inside their homes after dark, and warned that “any sort of association” 

with the guerrillas was punishable by death. Anyone who left the town 

was subject to being fired upon without warning. Despite the fact that 

the townspeople were imperiled by contact, guerrillas sometimes did 

invest the towns. When this happened, the townspeople might just as 

well collaborate with them as not—in German eyes the mere presence 

of guerrillas in a village was positive proof of collaboration.

Before German troops approached a town, their scouts reported 

whether it contained ELAS or EDES guerrillas. If there were no guerrillas, the troops marched through. If guerrillas occupied the town, the 

troops tried to envelop it to prevent anyone’s escaping. Heavy artillery 

was then brought up and the village shelled. While the artillery attack 

continued, troops prepared to assault the town. As soon as resistance 

began to slacken, artillery fire was stopped, and the assault troops 

rushed the town and cleaned up any remaining snipers. “Those civilians who participated in the fighting were dealt with mercilessly,” wrote 

General Lanz.

As soon as the towns were in German hands, either with or without 

fighting, the houses were searched for weapons, ammunition, or other 

prohibited items. Inhabitants who had not resisted were collected and 

sent to security camps outside the ring circuit until after the operation. In addition, a small detachment of troops was left in the town 

until the close of operations, to avoid reinfiltration. These forces were 

sometimes so, weak, however, that they invited guerrilla counterattack 

and were later overrun by the guerrillas. Sometimes the Germans simply burned the villages, particularly when they felt the villagers had 

collaborated. Even burned-out villages, however, offered later defensive possibilities.67
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As German troops advanced through the forests, over the mountains, past the town—always compressing the ring—they were bound 

to come upon pockets of strong guerrilla resistance. For dealing with 

such situations, the Germans worked out what was practically a standard tactical method. To prevent the guerrillas from withdrawing 

immediately, the troops engaged them in a frontal assault. Meanwhile, 

an envelopment was begun from both sides. German troops, observing complete silence, using every cover, and moving almost in Indian 

fashion, sneaked quietly in from either side and obtained data to fix an 

enveloping artillery fire. Nevertheless, guerrillas were usually able to 

extricate themselves before this small subsidiary envelopment was completed. “But, when caught in a trap,” wrote one German commander, 

“they fought with impassioned fanaticism until the end.” Even if the 

guerrillas escaped from this little trap, however, they were still in the 

larger ring and had not yet eluded the German forces.68

The Germans used every means to decrease guerrilla resistance, 

including psychological warfare. This was particularly feasible when 

they found themselves fighting both EDES and ELAS guerrillas. Using 

their knowledge of the ideological split between the two groups and 

knowing that armed clashes had already occurred between them, the 

Germans, in one operation in October 1943, dropped leaflets. These 

told EDES men that the Germans had no quarrel with them and that 

they should signal their allegiance to EDES so that the Germans would 

not attack them. Whether by mistake or design, these leaflets were airdropped over ELAS guerrillas. In either event, it was an inspired act of 

psychological warfare: ELAS took the leaflets as proof of EDES collaboration and general untrustworthiness. The guerrilla front was split.69

Even though the Germans took the offensive in these encirclements, the situation might be quickly reversed at places within or along 

the perimeter of the ring. Literally caught in a death trap as the ring 

tightened, the guerrillas made intense efforts to get away. Every weakness in the line was a vulnerability that was quickly exploited. The Germans were amazed, also, that the guerrillas could get an attack going 

so quickly. “Considering the speed of enemy attacks,” wrote General 

Lanz, “only those defensive forces can be effective that are immediately 

available and on the spot.”70 The guerrillas also sought to turn German 

tactics against them; in a number of situations, they strove to envelop 

the enveloping Germans. Such efforts enjoyed some success. In one 

battle occurring at nightfall, German troops were so hard pressed that 

“battalion commanders lost control and the lower echelons fought on 

their own and got into each other’s way.”71 By means of these lightning 

attacks launched against German troops who were momentarily in a 

weak position, numbers of guerrillas escaped the encirclement.
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253

German defenses were particularly vulnerable at night, when such 

attacks were most apt to occur and when troops were most weary. In 

an effort to prevent breakouts, troop commanders were instructed to 

reach the day’s objective before nightfall, so that there would be plenty 

of time to coordinate the assault troops’ position with that of the blocking units and take strong defensive measures. Encircling lines were 

laid out in such a way that they resembled the system of strong points 

used to secure the roads. Groups of soldiers were stationed along the 

perimeter of the ring, maintaining contact by sentries and patrols. Fire 

patterns were laid to cover the outpost areas. By this means a continuous security line was achieved during the night hours. In addition the 

Germans found they needed to patrol all roads during the night and 

to inspect them before use in the morning; otherwise they were apt to 

suffer losses from guerrilla mines laid during the night.72

The Final Battle

After several days and nights of this type of fighting, German forces 

would find themselves near the so-called inner encirclement line, the 

last compression of the circle. This would form the line of departure 

for the final assault. The Germans now began to see the end of their 

long manhunt and took additional steps to preclude any escapes. Battalions were ordered to stop as they reached interim points, and to 

close ranks and wait for artillery and regiments to come up before they 

took off for the next point. In this way gaps were prevented and the 

attack front was coordinated. Troop fatigue was by now a problem too, 

and German commanders were becoming careful not to exhaust their 

men by enforcing too rigorous time schedules before the last hand-tohand fight.73

Extreme precautions were taken at night after the inner ring was 

reached. A reconnaissance battalion combed the territory passed over 

during the day. Every available man was assigned to a position, fire 

was adjusted and communication tested. Tripwire mine fields were 

laid to avoid surprise. Also, Very signals were used to light the outpost 

patrol areas. Patrols were intensified, and advance listening posts set 

up. Irregular machine gun and mortar bursts periodically covered the 

interior of the ring. A defense in depth was set up; at some points there 

was, in effect, a double encirclement.74

Despite these measures, guerrilla attacks could be expected. Seizing upon any weak point, the guerrillas would strike out. At times some 

forces actually broke through the line, but it appears that on the whole 

the guerrillas’ communication was poor and that gaps were not effectively exploited. Instead of bringing up additional guerrillas to hold 

the breach open, some of the attack party would slip through the lines, 
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thus weakening the attack. German reserves brought up to the line 

would shortly restore the situation against the remaining guerrillas.75

The final attack on the guerrilla stronghold from the inner encirclement was made only after the most careful preparations, sometimes 

requiring a day or more. Ground, air, and radio reconnaissance of the 

guerrilla redoubt was made. Ammunition supplies were brought forward, and firing data were obtained to fix artillery positions. Observation posts were established and communications facilities double 

checked. The encirclement perimeter, although possibly 60 miles in 

circumference, was so comparatively small that the Germans usually 

possessed sufficient reserves to double their ring in all places vulnerable to breakout attempts.76

Figure 33. Lieutenant General Felmy, Commander of LXVIII Corps.
Antiguerrilla Warfare

255

Figure 34. Lieutenant General Lanz, Commander of XXII Mountain Corps.

Starting early in order to take advantage of every daylight hour, 

German troops began the final assault. This was sometimes a matter 

of as much as 9 miles. Last-ditch defenses and hand-to-hand combat 

were the order of the day. Guerrilla attacks now, however, were apt to be 

wild, and German care and preparedness began to pay off well. Using 

artillery to presoften the massed guerrillas, the Germans prepared for 

the knockout blow while air-dropped leaflets and loudspeakers delivered an ultimatum for surrender. If this ultimatum was not met, hard 

fighting resulted; but the end was usually foreordained. Numbers of 

guerrillas died and many surrendered.

As the Germans finally learned, however, many more guerrillas 

were, even at this time, still hiding. Using guerrilla prisoners to serve 

as guides, German troops therefore continued to comb the mountain 

battlefield and surrounding terrain. The search sometimes lasted many 

hours, even days and nights. Finally, at the conclusion of the operation, 

the prisoners were taken away and those civilians who were considered 

non-collaborators allowed to return home.77
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Lessons of Major Operations

German commanders not only made the most of experience 

they had gained in other areas of guerrilla activity, but they carefully 

reviewed every major antiguerrilla operation in Greece for the lessons 

to be drawn. There were daily tactical reviews while an operation was 

under way, and later a comprehensive post-mortem review of the operation as a whole.

The Germans, of course, had already learned many of the principles of antiguerrilla warfare that were retested in Greece. The lessons 

given below were particularly stressed by General Lanz.

Operating Information. No major operations were started without knowledge of the strength, position, habits, and escape avenues of 

specifically identified guerrilla groups. At first the Germans underestimated the guerrilla adversary, but they learned from experience to take 

into account the guerrillas’ strengths and weaknesses. Major operations 

were undertaken only against “strong, established guerrilla forces.”78

Careful Planning. Operations were prepared carefully and pretested with map exercises. Every detail of early troop movement, supply, 

etc., was worked out with precision before the operation was started. 

This attention to detail paid off.79

Secrecy. Guerrilla intelligence in Greece was so good that the 

Germans had to take exceptional measures to maintain the security 

of their counterguerrilla operational plans. Only a few German commanders knew of the plans before the start of operations; false rumors, 

deceptive movements of supplies and troops, etc., were used to mislead 

German troops themselves as to what was about to take place.80

Tactics. The German aim in counterguerrilla operations was not to 

take territory but to destroy guerrilla forces. They found, from experience, that encirclement on a large scale was the optimum tactic. Neither frontal attacks nor flanking movements offered an equivalent 

degree of success.81

Area. German planners learned to allow a large enough area for 

a major operation so that, even though the guerrillas might realize 

at once that an encirclement was being attempted, they would still be 

contained within its area despite their efforts to slip out. General Lanz 

stressed this point particularly.82

Troops. Highly trained combat troops in adequate number were 

needed for major operations. The Germans—never having enough 

qualified antiguerrilla troops—used their second-class troops for stationary, blocking operations and saved their first-class troops for the 

assault echelons.83
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Flexibility. During the operation, plans were changed to take into 

account local situations and troop conditions. Subordinate commanders were allowed some latitude in exploiting unforeseen opportunities.84

Time versus Accuracy. Time was of the essence at the start of an 

encirclement operation, in order to establish the cordon before the 

guerrillas could escape. Once the outer encirclement line was closed, 

General Lanz emphasized that the prime requisite for success was a 

slow, steady, uniform compression of the line—at whatever rate was 

necessary to preclude any soft spots in the ring and to avoid troop 

fatigue. Objectives for a day, wrote General Lanz, should be limited 

to troop ability. The important thing was to keep the guerrillas within 

the ring and to destroy them, not to finish the operation in a hurry. In 

short, time was not important; accuracy was.85

Gaps in Line. Germans commanders made every effort to avoid 

gaps or soft spots by coordinating and strengthening their encircling 

lines—even, as has been seen, at the expense of taking time. No assault 

was to be started until a closed front had been achieved; experience 

proved the folly of striking before the troops were completely ready. 

No unit was to be allowed to advance at a pace faster than its companion units could sustain otherwise the forward unit, the Germans 

found, might be enveloped by the guerrillas and overwhelmed, creating a major gap.86

Reserves. General Lanz found that, owing to the rapidity with 

which guerrillas were able to mount an attack—something that appears 

to have surprised him—he needed to keep his reserves available for 

instant use. He found it wise to have his assault troops immediately 

followed by reserves, so that any small, local breakthroughs would be 

intercepted. Reserves kept back under corps headquarters could not be 

brought up quickly enough to prevent local breakthroughs.87

Breakout Routes. The Germans found that it paid off to doubleprotect possible escape routes with “machine gun crews echeloned in 

depth” before an assault began.88

Combat Force. The battalion proved to be the unit best adapted for 

counterguerrilla sweeps. It was the largest unit that could be personally 

led and controlled during operations in difficult terrain.89

Combat Communication. It was very difficult to maintain communication between units during fighting in mountain terrain. This was a 

major reason for going slowly and maintaining visual contact whenever 

possible.

Combat Intelligence. In the initial stages of major operations, the 

Germans found that, because the guerrillas possessed the highest 

ground, they had an intelligence advantage. As the Germans moved to 
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higher ground they were better able to observe the battlefield and to 

fix artillery fire. Aircraft and helicopters in sufficient numbers would, 

of course, have obviated the guerrillas’ initial advantage. The Germans 

monitored guerrilla radio messages—often in the clear—to good 

advantage. Careful interrogation of prisoners also paid off.90

Unit Boundaries. Even highly trained German troops got in each 

other’s way during combat in difficult terrain. General Lanz therefore 

emphasized the obvious—that the use of natural terrain features, easily observed by the troops, as unit boundaries was highly desirable.91

Combing Passed-Over Terrain. Since a favorite guerrilla tactic was 

to hide and let German assault troops go past, the Germans instituted 

a second line of troops whose duty it was to carefully search the ground 

over which the assault troops had just passed. Through this technique 

the Germans found many guerrillas who would otherwise have escaped. 

Even after the final battle of the encirclement had been fought, the 

Germans learned it was still necessary to search trees, bushes, caves, 

rocks, etc., to find the surprisingly large numbers of guerrillas who had 

gone into hiding as a last resort. Prisoners were used to telling advantage in this work.92

Flank Attacks. The vulnerability of guerrilla units to such attacks 

suggested to General Lanz that they could be used to drive guerrillas 

along desired directions in the early stages of the encirclement.93

Alarm Devices. Under combat conditions the Germans found that 

even simple alarm devices—such as cans strung on tripwires—were 

effective in alerting troops to night breakout attempts.94

Artillery. German artillery was extremely effective against guerrilla strongholds. Enveloping fire combined with a frontal assault put 

murderous pressure on local redoubts. In order to achieve accuracy in 

mountainous and forested terrain, the Germans found it necessary to 

have their men carefully trained in the use of the compass.95

Psychological Warfare. Although General Lanz did not stress or 

apparently attach much importance to psychological warfare, it was 

apparent that the Germans were at times able to exploit effectively the 

schism between EDES and EAM/ELAS guerrillas.

Civilians. “Collaboration of the population with the partisans [guerrillas] must be eliminated at the beginning of the operation,” wrote 

General Lanz. The Germans tried to put this policy into effect during 

encirclement operations by ordering the inhabitants to remain in their 

villages until German forces entered and by temporarily removing the 

inhabitants from the battle zone once the encirclement had reached 

the town. Civilians caught in the open were treated as guerrillas. These 

measures were effective for the period of the operation. The general 
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259

support that civilians provided for the guerrillas—for example, the 

ability of the guerrillas to replace their casualties with new recruits—

tended, however, to negate, from the German point of view, the hardwon successes of the major encirclement operations.96

Results of Major Operations

With local variations, these tactics were typical of many major counterguerrilla sweeps in the Greek mountains. In Operation PANTHER, 

in the latter part of 1943, the Germans undertook to clear ELAS and 

EDES guerrillas from areas along the north-south Yannina-Arta Road, 

the east-west Yannina-Trikkala Road, and Mount Olympus. In several 

weeks of fighting, employing upwards of two divisions, the Germans 

claimed that they inflicted guerrilla losses of 1,400 men and captured 

three field guns and a large stock of small arms. EAM/ELAS admitted 

to having suffered over 500 guerrilla casualties and having abandoned 

two guns when they ran out of ammunition. This was the operation in 

which German psychological warfare, already described, was so successful. Several towns were burned. ELAS also claimed, however, that 

it inflicted over a thousand German casualties. The discrepancies are 

interesting. One may disregard the inflated guerrilla claim of German 

casualties. ELAS casualties of 500 men, however, may be rather close to 

the mark, considering that to these would be added some EDES casualties and that unknown number of civilians killed by the Germans as 

guerrillas.97

In early 1944, German sweeps in northeastern Greece were frequent; here both German and Bulgarian troops were involved. Two 

operations, code-named WOLF and HORRIDO, resulted respectively 

in guerrilla casualties of 254 dead and 400 captured, and 310 dead and 

15 captured. German casualties, meanwhile, were extremely low, being 

listed for HORRIDO as 18 dead, wounded, and missing. In Operation 

RENNTIER the Germans claimed guerrilla casualties of 96 dead and 

100 prisoners while suffering only 2 German and 7 Bulgarian casualties. Operation ILTIS resulted in only 15 guerrilla casualties.98

In the spring of 1944 the large-scale operations against EAM/ELAS 

began with a vengeance. Operation MAIGEWITTER was an attempt 

to destroy ELAS guerrillas in northern Greece. German records indicate guerrilla losses of 339 dead and 75 captured, with 200 suspects 

arrested. GEMSBOCK, undertaken by three German divisions under 

the XXII Mountain Corps, was directed against 9,000 ELAS and other 

Communist forces on the Albanian-Greek border. The operation lasted 

from 6 to 14 June 1944 and netted 2,500 guerrilla dead and prisoners, 

with German losses of only 120 dead and 300 wounded. The success of 
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the operation was the more remarkable in that gas shortages delayed 

troop arrival at assembly areas and that, at the first encirclement line, 

each man had to cover 100 yards.99

Following on the heels of GEMSBOCK, Operation STEINADLER 

began on 4 July 1944 and was aimed at the elimination of 6,000 to 

8,000 ELAS forces in the Korca-Yannina and Yannina-Trikkala triangle 

of north central Greece. The savagery of the fighting was shown by 

guerrilla murder and mutilation of 80 wounded Germans in an overrun battalion aid station. German forces comprised two divisions and 

some additional security troops under the XXII Mountain Corps, and 

were estimated by General Saraphis to number about 18,000 men. 

Compressing the guerrillas into an inner ring around Pendalofon, 

German forces killed 567 guerrillas and took as prisoners 976 guerrillas, 341 Italians, and 7 British officers.i

 Booty included 10 tons of 

explosives and 10,000 livestock. Despite these losses, the German corps 

commander noted that “strong partisan groups reappeared a few weeks 

later in this area.”100

With the renewal of activities by EDES guerrillas in the summer of 

1944, the Army Group E Commander, General Loehr, decided after 

German conversations with representatives of EDES that he would have 

to act against Zervas. Operation KREUZOTTER, begun on 5 August 

by two task forces comprised of elements of the XXII Mountain Corps, 

the LXVIII Corps, and SS troops, was therefore divided into three 

phases. The first two phases were to be directed against strong ELAS 

forces in southwestern Greece and in the province of Boeotia; the third, 

against EDES in Epirus. The first two phases of KREUZOTTER were 

carried out; but the third one, against EDES, was apparently cancelled 

by the Germans because of the deteriorating situation with regard to 

the Hungarians and Bulgarians. Although some local actions against 

EDES may have developed during the operation, no large-scale action 

was undertaken. In a final report on KREUZOTTER, the Germans 

noted guerrilla casualties of 298 dead and 260 captured against German casualties of 20 dead, 112 captured, and 1 missing. At the same 

time, an ELAS diversionary attack at Amfissa, outside of the operational boundary of KREUZOTTER, had resulted, by German account, 

in several hundred Germans killed and almost as many wounded.101

The figures assembled for these encirclement operations indicate 

that, in every case, German forces maintained supremacy of force, in 

numbers as well as in training, for the duration of the operation. In 

GEMSBOCK, three German divisions were involved, including the welltrained, hard-pressing 1st Mountain Division, against 9,000 ELAS and 

i Their fate is unknown; no mention is made of their mistreatment in the account of 

the Nuernberg trials, however.
Antiguerrilla Warfare

261

other Communist guerrillas. In STEINADLER, German forces estimated to number 18,000 men were used against 6,000 to 8,000 ELAS. 

The strengths of the forces opposing each other in KREUZOTTER are 

unfortunately unknown.

Despite the numerical superiority of the German forces, the German sweeps were never able to annihilate all the guerrillas who were 

initially surrounded. In GEMSBOCK for example, ELAS apparently 

extricated about 72 percent of its forces, while in STEINADLER it got 

out somewhere from 75 to 81 percent (depending upon the number 

committed). Although guerrilla casualties in KREUZOTTER were considerable, Army Group E noted that ELAS guerrillas immediately infiltrated searched areas as soon as German forces withdrew.

On the basis of comparative casualties for guerrillas and Germans, 

the guerrillas appear less battleworthy. In HORRIDO, the Germans 

claimed to have inflicted casualties at a ratio of 19 guerrillas to every 

German; in RENNTIER, the ratio was 22 to 1. Man for man, the 

guerrillas suffered six casualties for every German killed or wounded 

during GEMSBOCK; in STEINADLER, German casualty figures are 

unknown, but the operation was generally regarded by others as less 

successful. During the first two phases of KREUZOTTER, the ELAS 

guerrilla-German troop casualty ratio dropped almost to 4 to 1. If the 

ELAS action at Amfissa were counted, however, the casualty ratio for 

this one operation would have approached 1 to 1. A better view of the 

ratios may be gotten from a wider sampling of casualties throughout 

Greece. For the period of 5–18 August 1944, Army Group E reported 

guerrilla casualties of 1568 dead and 337 prisoners against German 

casualties of 327 dead, 304 wounded, 69 missing, and 8 deserting during antiguerrilla operations. The ratio for this period would be slightly 

under 5 guerrilla deaths for 1 German death or, on the basis of total 

casualties, slightly less than 3 to 1. It should also be remembered in 

regard to these ratios that a number of the guerrilla casualties may well 

have been civilians who were caught and treated as guerrillas. According to General Lanz, “Whenever the population was caught in the line 

of fire, severe losses were unintentionally inflicted upon them . . . . The 

troops . . . were unable to make the distinction between the civilians 

and partisans.”102

Whatever the statistical success of major operations, they did not 

end the Germans’ problems with guerrillas. After a major mop-up, the 

guerrillas were almost always able to re-form and be back in operation immediately. The Germans attributed this amazing recovery to the 

support of the local population. No definitive control of the guerrillas could be obtained, according to General Lanz, until the guerrillas 

and the people were totally separated. Since it was impossible for the 
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Germans to effect this separation by completely destroying the guerrillas, they attempted to enforce it by applying restrictive measures to 

the population.103

The Missing Key to Success

When the Germans began their occupation of Greece in 1941, they 

had wanted to maintain a liberal policy toward the inhabitants. In contrast to Russia, where Hitler welcomed the start of guerrilla warfare 

as an excuse for retaliatory measures aimed at the decimation of the 

Slavic race, the Germans in Greece had no such intentions, since they 

respected the Greeks’ untaintedj

 racial heritage. Although the Germans used the guerrilla warfare in Greece as an excuse to get at Greek 

Communists, these formed so small a minority of the population that 

a liberal policy toward the inhabitants was still possible. In return for 

liberality, it was expected that the Greeks would accept their status as 

an occupied people without reproach: they were to take short rations 

without complaint; they were to submit to exploitation as labor, either 

in Greece or in Germany; they were to maintain loyal and cordial relations with the Germans in Greece; and they were to aid the Germans in 

exterminating any guerrilla bands, particularly any Communist ones, 

that might spring up.

By the autumn of 1943, however, the Greeks had shown their disinclination to live up to these expectations. They had struck for more 

food. They had not responded to the call for labor with any enthusiasm, 

and, in collusion with EAM/EEAM,k

 had frustrated German attempts 

to draft a labor force. “A few contingents of workers were dispatched 

to Germany by press-gang methods up to November 1943; but it was 

already obvious, four months earlier,” wrote Woodhouse, “that orderly 

conscription had failed.”104 Greeks might be cordial, but the Germans 

had little reason to trust their loyalty: “Troops whenever billeted in private quarters, were exposed to espionage,” wrote General Lanz.105 And 

German troops in Greece had already learned, in the summer of 1943 

while they were still under the tactical control of the Italians, not to 

trust the population in the fight against guerrillas.

The German tactical command in western Greece felt that the only 

way it could definitely settle the problem was to separate the guerrillas 

and the population by moving the population in guerrilla territory to 

other areas. The German High Command, however, felt that this solution was not feasible.106

j Untainted, by Nazi standards, i.e., non-Slavic and non-Jewish.

k See Chapter I, section on “Major Resistance Parties.”
Antiguerrilla Warfare

263

Figure 35. Reprisal Victims.

The key to the situation, in the official German view, was firmness. 

To control the population the Germans intended to show, from the 

first, that they would brook no nonsense. Every act against the occupier 

would bring reprisals. Before the fall of 1943, reprisal measures were 

taken in the German sector of Greece both by their military government forces and by their tactical troops. The “Ten Commandments” 

printed into the paybook of every German soldier stated that commanders at divisional level or above were empowered to order reprisals. But the reprisals in Greece had not reached the 50 to 1 or 100 to 

1 ratios being applied in the Slavic countries. The theater commander 

had specified no reprisal ratio for Greece, since it was felt at theater 

headquarters that each reprisal should be individually suited to the 

act being punished. In general, the ratio in Greece was 10 to 1. Hostages were selected from the population and held in collection camps. 

Presumably they were selected for shooting or hanging on the basis of 

their political attachment to the group held responsible for the act for 

which they were paying.107

From the autumn of 1943, however, German reprisal measures 

grew in severity. With the start of active counterguerrilla operations in 

mid-October, German tactical troops began to make many on-the-spot 

reprisals. The policy was to hold local inhabitants responsible for what 

occurred in their area. If guerrillas blew up a train or attacked a supply column, the villagers nearest the place of attack were held guilty of 
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

complicity. If guerrillas ran into a town at night and demanded shelter, 

even at the point of a gun, the villagers were held guilty of aiding them. 

The policy was apparently aimed at convincing the Greeks that they 

would be punished more severely by the Germans for aiding the guerrillas than they could possibly be hurt by the guerrillas for not aiding 

them. In this way, the Greeks would learn to fear the Germans more 

than the guerrillas. And since the guerrillas were the ones who brought 

this punishment on the population, it would be alienated from them.

In October 1943, the ratio of 10 to 1 was dropped and more severe 

measures were applied, except in retaliation for attacks on pro-German 

Greeks. Retaliation ratios varied at different times and in different 

places. In active operations against the guerrillas, the XXII Mountain 

Corps of General Lanz applied a ratio of 50 to 1. In the area of the 

Corps’ 1st Mountain Division, General Stettner, division commander, 

ordered that the 50 to 1 ratio for reprisals be applied even for German 

combat losses during guerrilla mopping-up operations. Throughout 

the winter, reports of reprisal shootings continued. On 29 November 

the Germans reported that 100 hostages had been shot at the scene 

of a band attack on the Tripolis-Sparta road in the Peloponnesus. For 

one German soldier killed in Tripolis, 30 Communists were reported 

shot on 1 December. For a band attack southeast of Gytheion in the 

Peloponnesus, 25 hostages were shot on 3 December. Sometimes these 

reprisals were exacted against persons who had already been interned 

as hostages in German collection camps; sometimes the individuals 

were simply picked up at random.108

Figure 36. Burning Village.
Antiguerrilla Warfare

265

Reprisals reached a highwater mark during Operation KALAVRITA in the Peloponnesus. This began as a small-scale mopping-up 

operation by elements of General Felmy’s LXVIII Corps, initiated on 

8 December 1943, in retaliation for the killing of 78 German soldiers. 

These troops of the 5th Company of the 749th Light Regiment had 

been captured by ELAS guerrillas on 19 October and had been subsequently shot on 7 December in the mountains of Kalavrita. For the first 

2 days of the operation, German troops of the 117th Division under 

General von Le Suire did not make contact with the guerrillas. On 

10 December, however, they exchanged fire, with German losses of 

10 dead and 11 wounded. By the 12th, Operation KALAVRITA was 

concluded “without,” according to the corps’ war diary, “any notable 

success except for the continuation of reprisal measures.” These lasted 

until 14 December, by which time 24 villages and 3 monasteries had 

been destroyed and some 696 male Greeks, 511 from Kalavrita alone, 

had been shot to death.109

Not all Germans were pleased with the results. Concerned about 

the boomerang effect of this reprisal policy, not only in Greece but 

throughout the Southeast Theater, Ambassador Neubacher brought 

up the matter at theater level. As a result, the Theater Commander 

orally reprimanded General von Le Suire—he was later given a higher 

post—and on 22 December 1943 ordered that military commanders 

must take account of political considerations when ordering reprisals. 

The new policy was “to seize the perpetrator himself and take reprisal measures only as a second course, if through reprisal measures the 

prevention of future attacks is to be expected.” Nonetheless, reprisals 

were still allowed. “If such people as are guilty cannot be found,” continued the Theater Commander, “those persons must be resorted to 

who, without being connected with the actual deed, nevertheless are to 

be regarded as coresponsible.”110

Reprisal policy was now altered so that reprisals might be ordered 

only by a German commander equal in authority to a division commander with the accord of the competent administrative territorial commander under the military governor, General Speidel. If these could 

not agree, the territorial commander was to decide. For losses in the 

German air, naval, police, and labor organizations in Greece, the territorial commander was to be the principal initiator of reprisals. Thus 

General Speidel came into play in the tactical operations of the Army 

Group E. General Speidel, however, claimed that this “territorial agencies practically ceased to function” in combat zones. Furthermore, his 

policy was often actually carried out by, or under the direction of, General Schimana, the Higher SS and Police Leader, over whom the military governor had little or no authority. When Neubacher complained 
266

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

about excesses, he went to theater headquarters. Final responsibility for 

reprisals appears to have been so diffused throughout the command 

organizations that it was, in fact, more often than not the commander 

on the spot who made the decision.111

Figure 37. Map of Burned Villages. Greek Government sources state that 1,770 villages lay in ashes at the end of the occupation in 1944.

Whatever the change in policy, reprisals continued. On 23 February 1944 the Germans shot 50 hostages from a hostage camp for the 

murder of an interpreter. In March they reported 45 hostages shot in 

Corinth, 52 in Tripolis, and 44 in Sparta. A train on the Athens-Sparta 
Antiguerrilla Warfare

267

line hit mines, killing 1 and wounding 14. Seventy Greeks were executed on the site of the incident. And so on.112

In the countryside, the combined burning-killing reprisals continued. The fame of Kalavrita in the Peloponnesus was echoed at Klisoura 

in Macedonia. On 4 April 1944, two German motorcyclists were killed 

about a mile and a half from Klisoura, and the motorcycles were taken 

to the village. Guerrillas came into the village and allowed no one to 

leave. When they left the next day at about 2 p.m., all the village men 

except the aged left too, fearing German reprisals. About 4 p.m. of that 

April 5, troops of the 7th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, including 

some subordinate Bulgarians, all under tactical command of Felmy’s 

LXVIII Corps, surrounded the village, searched the houses for arms 

without success, and rounded up and immediately shot 223 old men, 

women, and children who had been left behind. Seven of these people 

were over 80; 50 of the children were under 10 years, 38 under 5, and 9 

under 1. Then the Germans burned down the village.

It was a blow to Ambassador Neubacher. He had the German consulate general report from the scene and demanded an investigation 

by the Theater Commander of what he termed the “Blood Bath of 

Klisoura.” “It is much more comfortable,” he wrote the Theater Commander with some irony, “to shoot to death entirely harmless women, 

children, and old men than to pursue an armed band . . . . The use of 

such methods must necessarily lead to the demoralization of a genuine combat morale.” Even worse, such methods interfered with Neubacher’s mission to pacify the Greek population and to implement the 

general German political fight against Communism. “It is utter insanity to murder babies . . . . because heavily armed Red bandits billeted 

themselves. overnight, by force, in their houses, and because they killed 

two German soldiers near the village. The political effect of this senseless blood bath doubtlessly by far exceeds the effect of all propaganda 

efforts in our fight against Communism.” The Commander replied 

that Neubacher’s Greek sources could not be believed, that the village 

had been stormed, and that the inhabitants had been killed by artillery 

fire. “There was no retaliation action,” he reported.113

Two months later, on 10 June 1944, the same 7th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment was involved in a reprisal raid at Dhistomon, in which 

270 inhabitants were killed. A German Secret Field Police member in 

Dhistomon at the time reported that people were not rounded up, but 

were shot wherever they happened to be standing. “As far as I could 

see,” he added in an interesting comment, “all were shot dead. I did not 

see any inhabitants being killed in any other way, i.e., beaten to death 

by rifle butt or by pouring gasoline over them and setting them on fire.” 

This time the reprisal had been initiated on the spot by a company 
268

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

commander. To protect him, his regimental commander apparently 

falsified his report and asked that he be allowed to handle the matter with disciplinary proceedings only. The company commander had, 

after all, saved the necessity of “sending at a later time a strong mission 

with corresponding high fuel consumption.” The case was closed.114

Whatever the purpose of the German policy of reprisals, it did little 

to pacify Greece, fight Communism, or control the population. In general, the result was just the opposite. Burning villages left many male 

inhabitants with little place to turn except to the guerrilla bands. Killing 

women, children, and old men fed the growing hatred of the Germans 

and the desire for vengeance. The wanton nature of the retaliation—

the picking of victims at random—meant that pro-German Greeks or 

their relatives suffered as much as anti-German Greeks. Under these 

circumstances there was little advantage in being a collaborator. As the 

reprisals continued they tended to give credence and prestige to the 

guerrillas, and especially to EAM/ELAS, as the most widespread most 

articulate, and most active guerrilla organization. As the numbers of 

homeless and dead grew, the Greek population became simultaneously 

more terror-stricken and more anti-German. Month by month, the 

guerrilla base became more secure and the fight against the guerrillas 

more difficult for the Germans.115
Appendix A

269

APPENDIX A.

THE “NATIONAL BANDS” AGREEMENTSa

1. All guerrilla bands will be known for military purposes as the 

National Guerrilla Bands of Greece, which title will be the only one 

used by Middle East. It is, of course, understood that each organisation 

may use its own names within Greece and its own system of command.

2. Greece shall be divided into military areas appointed as independent territorial districts. In an area where there are bands of only 

one organisation, all military decisions will be taken by its HQ in accordance with the orders of the Joint GHQ. In an area where there is more 

than one organisation, the different bands will co-operate fully in all 

military actions, either under the Joint HQ of the area appointed by 

the co-operating bands, or under a commander appointed by the Joint 

GHQ after consultation with the respective commanders and the British Liaison Officer of the area concerned. In special circumstances the 

Joint GHQ may itself appoint a commander to execute an operation 

ordered by the Middle East.

3. The bands of one area will not enter another area except in 

cases of emergency, or as a result of mutual agreement of the respective 

directing authorities, or as a result of an order issued by Joint GHQ in 

accordance with the military requirements of Middle East. This clause 

aims at the insurance of the proper distribution of forces with regard 

to the local military requirements.

4. All guerrillas of one organization recognize the guerrillas of 

another organization. Every guerrilla is free to voice his opinion on 

any matter in public, provided he does not denounce or say anything 

against other guerrilla bands, their principles or ideals, or against any 

member of another guerrilla organization.

5. Any organizations or persons are free to raise guerrilla bands 

in any area so long as they accept the conditions of the agreement and 

come under the orders of the Joint GHQ. All guerrillas within the same 

area have equal rights. Any disputes will be settled by common agreement of HQs of the respective bands or, if necessary, by the Joint GHQ.

6. All guerrilla bands in the plains will help guerrilla bands and 

the civil population in the mountains in the supply of food. The Joint 

GHQ reserves the right to arrange by mutual agreement between the 

different organisations the distribution of food supplies in cases of 

shortages.

a As given in C. M. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 299–300. This agreement was 

signed by representatives of EAM/ELAS, EDES, EKKA and the British Military Mission on 

various dates during July 1943.
270

Appendix A

7. The bands of different areas will give maximum assistance to 

each other in cases of military action against the enemy, either when 

asked by the commander concerned, or of their own accord when the 

situation demands it. In cases of general action, orders from Joint GHQ 

should state the extent of help to be given.

8. There must be no barbarism against anyone by any member of 

any guerrilla band. No one must be kept under permanent arrest or be 

executed without fair trial and complete proof of the facts.

9. Any Greek guerrilla who in the past or up to the date of the 

signing of this agreement has transferred his allegiance to another 

organisation will be given complete amnesty. All Greeks enlisting as 

guerrillas have been and will be free to join any organisation they wish.

10. All military stores now being sent to Greece should be accepted 

as a gesture of the United Nations’ appreciation of the great and gallant effort being made by their Greek allies to resist and overthrow the 

Axis. The distribution of stores will be undertaken by Joint GHQ. Any 

area contravening these conditions will have supplies stopped.

11. For the better direction of the struggle, and for the co-ordination of all military actions, a Joint GHQ will be formed, composed of 

representatives of all guerrilla bands recognised throughout Greece or 

occupying large areas, as well as a representative of Middle East. Similar Joint HQs may be formed for areas and smaller districts, according 

to the strength of the different bands. All smaller independent bands 

may be represented on the Joint GHQ by liaison officers.

12. The role of the British officers attached to Joint HQ’s shall be 

that of liaison officers to Middle East. In cases of disputes between cooperating bands affecting the requirements of Middle East, the nearest 

British Liaison Officer will be immediately informed.

NOTE—These terms are to be published in the Press, read to 

all guerrillas, and will be broadcast on the Cairo and London radio 

stations.
Appendix B

271

APPENDIX B.

THE ITALIAN ARMISTICEa

On this day, the 11th of September, 1943, after the armistice signed 

between the United Nations and the Italian Government and after the 

order issued by the C-in-C Mideast, General Sir Henry Maitland WILSON, 

concerning co-operation with the Italian Forces desiring to undertake the 

struggle with us against Germany, the JGHQ of the Greek Forces and the 

General commanding the PINEROLO Division, decided the following:

1. All Italian forces of the above-mentioned division will withdraw from 

their stations and will concentrate in places indicated to them by the Greek 

forces of the THESSALY area, under the cover of Greek forces.

2. The Italian units, as soon as they concentrate, will undertake, in 

small units of companies with their HQs, the task of securing the area, 

incorporated in Greek formations. Italian HQs superior to companies will 

keep their commanding authority, co-operating with their equivalent in 

the Greek forces. All officers and men desirous to undertake the struggle 

against the Germans will keep their arms.

3. All equipment which is not carried by the Italians must be transported immediately out of the garrisons to a place of security: the surplus to 

be used by the Greek units.

4. Those of the Italians not desirous of undertaking the struggle will 

surrender their arms and equipment (saddles, etc.) excluding their clothing and boots which they will keep for their own use. The above-mentioned 

equipment will be used by the Greek forces.

5. The British Military Mission undertakes to finance the feeding of 

the Italians on the same basis as that of the Greek rebels. The services concerned will fix details.

6. The JGHQ undertakes the obligation to send to Italy those of the 

officers and men so desiring when the military situation allows it.

7. When the military situation permits and the Italian units adapt 

themselves to the special type of warfare carried out in Greece, a separate 

sector of action can be entrusted to units of the Italian forces.

Signed: P. RAVTOPOULOS

COL. CHRISb

S. SARAPHIS

A. INFANTE

Joint GHQ,

Greek Forces.

12th September, 1943c

a As given in Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 301.

b Woodhouse’s pseudonym.

c Woodhouse has stated that the armistice between General Infante, GOC Pinerolo 

Division and members of the Joint General Headquarters was actually signed on 11 September 1943.
272

Appendix C

APPENDIX C.

DENUNCIATION OF THE SECURITY BATTALIONSa

The undersigned organisations, EAM/ELAS, EDES and EKKA, 

the Greek High Command of Egypt and the AMM in Greece, through 

their authorised representatives, declare and announce:

1. That they regard the Government of Rallis and all its appendages as instruments serving the purposes of the Occupation of Greece, 

supporting it in every kind of tyranny and destruction against the Greek 

people, and in the suppression of the national struggle for liberation as 

well as the struggle of the Allied Nations. As such they regard it as the 

enemy of Greece.

2. That they regard all who have enlisted in the units organised by 

the Government of Rallis and armed and directed by the Occupation, 

namely the corps of Special Security, the Battalions of the Evzones, the 

Gendarmes and any similar creation of the Occupation or Rallis, as 

enemies of the nation, war criminals, responsible to the nation for acts 

of treason.

3. That they call upon those who belong to the above-named bodies to desert them immediately. No justification of any kind will exist for 

them after this proclamation.

S. SARAPHIS K. PYROMAGLOU D. PSAROS

 NIKOLAS P. NIKOLOPOULOS G. KARTALIS

(=Petros Roussos)

 for ELAS for EDES for EKKA

 CHRIS (for Greek High Command and AMM)

 G. K. WINES (for AMM, United States component)

19th February, 1944.

a As given in Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 302.
Appendix D

273

APPENDIX D.

THE PLAKA ARMISTICEa

In the interests of the total and undivided conduct of the national 

struggle against the occupation and its instruments, and of the success 

of the Allied struggle, the liberation of Greece and the consolidation 

of democratic freedom, and finally of the creation of conditions conducive to the unification of the guerrilla army of Greece, the undersigned 

representatives, authorized to undertake negotiations for the unity of 

Greece, have resolved:

1. They accept the proposal of EAM/ELAS for the final cessation 

of hostilities between ELAS and EDES.

2. The units of EAM/ELAS and EDES will maintain the positions 

which they occupy to-day.

3. The organisations of EAM/ELAS and EDES undertake the obligation of fighting the Occupation and its collaborators with all their 

forces, either independently in their respective areas or in common by 

prearranged agreement.

4. To ensure better opposition against the Occupation, the high 

commands of both organisations (EAM and EDES) in Epirus will cooperate in drafting a common offensive and defensive plan, specifying 

the conduct of any necessary manoeuvres by either organisation under 

enemy pressure within the territory of the other, provided that military 

necessity requires it.

5. If units of either organisation withdraw from their positions 

under pressure from the Germans or their collaborators, they will 

return to them as soon as the enemy withdraw.

6. A Joint Military Committee, composed of representatives of 

ELAS, EDES and EKKA, will supervise the observation of these terms 

and resolve any disputes which may occur. This committee may function with only two members until the arrival of a representative of 

EKKA.

7. The AMM is asked to secure from GHQ Middle East the maximum possible supplies for the forces of all organisations in Greece, on 

the basis of their operations against the Germans and in proportion to 

the real requirements of the war.

8. The wish of all Greece is hereby expressed that those who have 

suffered either from German attacks or from the conflict of the organisations may receive the undivided assistance of all the organisations. 

a As given in Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 303–304.
274

Appendix D

The Allied Headquarters is especially asked to come to their immediate assistance.

9. From the signature of this agreement all those held by either 

side as prisoner, or hostages for political reasons will be released and 

assisted to go wherever they wish, with the exception of those charged 

with acts of treason or serious criminal offenses whose names will be 

notified to the organisation concerned, for trial by the established 

courts-martial, of which a representative of the organisation concerned 

will be a member. It is hoped that these cases will be completed as soon 

as possible. The release of hostages will take place at the latest within a 

fortnight.

10. This agreement takes effect forthwith.

S. SARAPHIS G. KARTALIS K. PYROMAGLOU

 NIKOLAS P. NIKOLOPOULOS

(= Petros Roussos)

 for EAM/ELAS for EKKA for EDES

 CHRIS (for Greek High Command and AMM)

 G. K. WINES (for AMM, United States component)

SECRET CLAUSE

The organisations EAM/ELAS, EDES and EKKA will co-operate 

closely in the plans for “Noah’s Ark,” and will facilitate the plans of 

GHQ, Middle East Forces, including the infiltration of special British 

and American units designed to take part in the operations.

(Signatures)
Appendix E

275

APPENDIX E.

THE LEBANON CHARTERa

1. The reorganisation and, re-establishment of discipline in the 

Greek armed forces in the Middle East under the Greek national flag 

must be carried out exclusively on a national and military basis, not on 

a political basis. The army will carry out the orders of the Government, 

and cannot possess political opinions.

2. All guerrilla bands in free Greece must be unified and disciplined under the orders of a single Government. The guerrilla principle of military organisation cannot be a permanent one; but no change 

should be made at the moment which will lead to a reduction of resistance. Consequently the present situation must be regarded as a transitional one, and the initiative in settling it can only be taken by the 

Government in consultation with GHQ, MEF.

3. The reign of terror in the Greek countryside must cease and 

the personal security and political liberty of the people must be firmly 

established when and where the invader has been driven out. Outbreaks of terrorism must also cease in the towns. Ministers of the Government will be in office in Greece to administer the armed forces and 

the liberated Greek population. As soon as the presence of the Government in Greece is possible, it must not lose a minute in proceeding 

there.

4. Adequate supplies of food and medicines must be sent to 

enslaved and mountain Greece.

5. Greece, when liberated, must be secured the state of order and 

liberty necessary to enable the people to decide, freely and without 

pressure, both on their constitution and their régime and Government:

(a) The special task of the Government of National Unity will be 

to secure order and liberty.

(b)The people must be enabled to make its decision as soon as 

possible.

(c) On the question of the sovereign power, the political 

leaders who have joined the Government of National Unity 

are understood to retain such views as they have already 

expressed.

6. Severe punishment will be imposed on traitors and those who 

have exploited the misfortunes of the people. Since this problem concerns the post-liberation period, it is necessary to make clear that the 

a As given in Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 305. This is a summary of the Eight 

Points given in Papandhreou’s final speech 20 May 1944.
276

Appendix E

Government of National Unity will continue beyond the date of liberation for such period as the conscience of the nation and its own political judgment may decide.

7. Arrangements will be made in advance, in concert with the 

Allies, for the satisfaction of Greece’s material needs in the way of 

reconstruction, including such necessities as the provision of outlets 

for Greek products and freedom of emigration.

8. Full satisfaction of Greece’s national claims is called for by the 

past services and sacrifices of the Greek people. This must include the 

security of our new frontiers.
Appendix F

277

APPENDIX F.

THE CASERTA AGREEMENTa

1. At a conference presided over by the Supreme Allied Commander, 

Mediterranean Theatre, at AFHQ, at which the Greek President of the 

Council with other members of the Greek Government and the Greek 

guerrilla leaders, Generals Saraphis and Zervas, were present, the following decisions were recorded as having been accepted unanimously:

(a) All guerrilla forces operating in Greece place themselves 

under the orders of the Greek Government of National Unity.

(b)The Greek Government places these forces under the orders 

of General Scobie who has been nominated by the Supreme 

Allied Commander as GOC Forces in Greece.

(c) In accordance with the proclamation issued by the Greek 

Government, the Greek guerrilla leaders declare that they 

will forbid any attempt by any units under their command 

to take the law into their own hands. Such action will be 

treated as a crime and will be punished accordingly.

(d) As regards Athens no action is to be taken save under the 

direct orders of General Scobie, GOC Forces in Greece.

(e) The Security Battalions are considered as instruments of the 

enemy. Unless they surrender according to orders issued by 

the GOC they will be treated as enemy formations.

(f) All Greek guerrilla forces, in order to put an end to past 

rivalries, declare that they will form a national union in 

order to co-ordinate their activities in the best interests of 

the common struggle.

2. In implementation of these decisions, General Scobie has issued 

the following orders, with which the Greek representatives agree:

(a) General Zervas will continue to operate within the 

territorial limits of the Plaka Agreement and to co-operate 

with General Saraphis in harassing the German withdrawal 

within territory between the northern Plaka boundary and 

Albania.

(b) General Saraphis will continue to operate in the remainder 

of Greece with the following exceptions:

(i) ATTICA PROVINCE. All troops in this province will 

be commanded by General Spiliotopoulos, acting in 

close co-operation with representatives of the Greek 

Government and assisted by a liaison office-[sic] 

a As given in Woodhouse. Apple of Discord, pp. 306–307.
278

Appendix F

nominated by General Sarafis. To be under Command 

Force 140.

(ii) PELOPONNESE. Troops in this area to be commanded by an officer recommended by General 

Saraphis in agreement with the Greek Government, 

assisted by a British Liaison Mission. To be under Command Force 140.

(iii) At a later stage Thrace (including Salonika) to be 

under command of an officer nominated by the Greek 

Government.

(c) The task of both commanders will be to harass the German 

withdrawal and to eliminate German garrisons.

(d) As territory is evacuated both commanders are personally 

responsible to Commander, Force 140, for:

(i) Maintenance of law and order in the territories where 

their forces are operating.

(ii) Prevention of civil war and killing of Greeks by Greeks.

(iii) Prevention of infliction of any penalty whatsoever 

and of unjustifiable arrest.

(iv) Assistance in the establishment of the legal civil 

authority and the distribution of relief.

A map showing the operational boundaries has been issued to 

both commanders.

Signed: 

H. MAITLAND WILSON G. PAPANDHREOU

General, Prime Minister of Greece

Supreme Allied Commander,

Mediterranean Theatre S. SARAPHIS

H. G. MACMILLAN N. ZERVAS

British Resident Minister

AFHQ
Appendix G

279

APPENDIX G.

ESTIMATE OF AIR TRANSPORTATION COST

Only the roughest idea of the magnitude of this cost, in 1944 dollars, may he obtained. In this estimate three major items are considered—operating cost, operational attrition, and nonoperational 

attrition. Operating cost is defined as the cost, per attempted sortie, 

of the fuel and oil, the labor and material for base and depot maintenance, and the pay of the crew—multiplied by 750 milesa

 and divided 

by the cruising speed of the aircraft. Operational attrition includes the 

fly-away costs of the lost aircraft, the training cost of the crews, and 

the insurance cost of the crews. All members of the crews, assumed to 

be five men, are considered lost if the plane is lost; and no attempt is 

made to place any valuation on a man’s life. No depreciation has been 

considered. Nonoperational attrition has been arbitrarily assigned an 

equality with operational attrition.

Operating Cost

Bomber sorties attempted 667 x $840b — $560,280

Transport 666 x 645b — 429,570

-------

Total sorties 1333

Operational Attrition

Bomber fly-away cost 11⁄2 x $193,500b — $290,250

Transport fly-away cost 11⁄2 x 81,000b — 121,500

Bomber crew, training cost 11⁄2 x 78,180b — 117,270

Transport crew, training cost 11⁄2 x 68,000b — 102,000

Insurance crew members 15 x 10,000b — 150,000

Nonoperational Attrition — 781,020

-------------------

$2,551,890

a No adjustment has been made for the fact that special operations aircraft were 

based in Italy in 1944, with reduction in this distance.

b Cost figures derived from those provided by HQ USAF and adjusted to 1944 levels 

according to the Wholesale Price Index for all Commodities, HQ USAF DCS/Comptroller, Mgt 

Analysis, two ltrs to Operations Research Office [no subj], 4 Feb and 26 Apr 54. Unclassified. See ORO-T-269, pp. 52, 71.

Notes

281

NOTES

Notes to Chapter I

1 E. C. W. Myers, Greek Entanglement (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1955), pp. 17, 22–35, 

63–66; Denys Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks (London: Jonathan Cape, [1946]), pp. 16–17; 

C. W. Woodhouse, “The Greek Resistance, 1942–44,” in European Resistance Movements 

1939–1945 (New York: Pergamon Press, 1960), p. 381; Winston S. Churchill, Closing the 

Ring, vol. 5 of The Second World War (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, [1951]), p. 534.

2 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 52–58.

3 Ibid., pp. 65–68.

4 Ibid., pp. 73–75.

5 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 106.

6 Ibid., pp. 95, 102, 104.

7 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 75–80; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 107–110.

8 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 80–86; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 110–122.

9 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 86–87.

10 John Ehrman, Grand Strategy (London: HMSO, 1956), V, 84–85.

11 Frank Smothers, W. H. McNeill, and E. D. McNeill, Report on the Greeks (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1948), pp. 16, 53; Shirley H. Weber, “Greece and Her Neighbors,” 

in Greece of Tomorrow, George H. Chase, ed. (New York: American Friends of Greece, 

(1943]); pp. 26–27; Encyclopedia Britannica (1958 ed.), X, 789; Edward S. Forster, A Short 

History of Modern Greece, 1821–1956 (3rd ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, [1958]), 

pp. 244–47; C. M. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord (London, etc.: Hutchinson & Co., [1948]), 

pp. 93–94; Bickman Sweet-Escott, Greece: A Political and Economic Survey, 1939–1953 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, [1954]), p. 3.

12 Smothers, et al., Report, pp. 117–19; Encyclopedia Britannica (1958 ed.), X, 789.

13 L. S. Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity (Chicago: Henry Regnery 

Company, 1952), pp. 24–27; Smothers, et al., Report, pp. 53–54.

14 Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, pp. 24–27.

15 Smothers, et al., Report, pp. 50–66; William M. Chadbourne, “Greece and Her Ships,” 

in Greece of Tomorrow, George H. Chase, ed. (New York: American Friends of Greece 

[1943]), pp. 64–75; Stephen G. Xydis, The Economy and Finances of Greece Under Occupation (New York: Greek Government Office of Information, [1945?]), pp. 7–9, 34–36, 37; 

Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 101.

16 Floyd A. Spencer, War and Postwar Greece: an analysis based on Greek writings (Washington: 

Library of Congress, 1952), pp. 2–6; Encyclopedia Britannica (1958 ed.), X, 787–88; Smothers, et al., Report, pp. 17–18; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 9–17; Myers. Greek Entanglement, pp. 104–106.

17 Winifred N. Hadsel, “American Policy towards Greece,” Foreign Policy Association Reports, 

23 (1 Sep 47), p. 151; Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, pp. 28–40.

18 Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, pp. 41–52.

19 Encyclopedia Britannica (1958 ed.), X, 787; Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, p. 49; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 120, 252.

20 Hermann Foertsch, (Gen der Infanterie, Chief of Staff, German 12th Army, May 1941–

Aug. 1942), testifying at the Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals . . . . October 1946–April 1949 (Washington: GPO, 1950), XI, 1039–1010; Spencer, War 

and Postwar Greece, p. 15 citing German documentary materials.

21 Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), 

pp. 77–80; William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History (Cambridge: Houghton 

Mifflin, [1956]), pp. 1150–51; Arthur S. Gould Lee, Special Duties: reminiscences of a Royal 
282

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Air Force staff officer in the Balkans, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Sampson Low, Marston, n.d.), p. 73; Patrick Leigh Fermor, in “Introduction” to The Cretan Runner by George 

Psychoundakis (London: John Murray, 1955), p. 7.

22 Leigh Fermor, “Introduction,” pp. 7–8; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 23; Spencer, War 

and Postwar Greece, pp. 19–21, 43; Theodore Stephanides, Climax in Crete (London: Faber 

and Faber, 1946), pp. 82, 96, 138–39; Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, vol. 3 of 

The Second World War (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, [1950]), pp. 301–303.

23 Hubert Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” trans. (Ms. P-955a, EUCOM Historical 

Division, 1950), pp. 11, 55.

24 Wilhelm Speidel, “Report on Greece; My Mission in Greece,” trans. (Ms. P–003, USAREUR, 1948), p. 7.

25 Ibid., pp. 7–10; Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 11–12; Weber, “Greece and 

Her Neighbors,” pp. 26–33; Xydis, The Economy and Finances of Greece under Occupation, 

pp. 13–15; Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), pp. 185, 191.

26 Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. 185–92; Symmachos [pseud.], Greece Fights On, 

vol. of Europe under the Nazis (London: L. Drummond, [1943?]), pp. 34–38, 61; Xydis, 

The Economy and Finances of Greece under Occupation, pp. 11, 14, 35–36, 38; S. A. Gialistras, 

The Greek Nation Once More Stems a Barbarian Onslaught, trans. by G. A. Trypanis (Athens: 

1950), p. 35; Leigh Fermor, “Introduction,” p. 8.

27 Chadbourne, “Greece and Her Ships,” p.  70; Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 

pp. 187–191, and n. 23, p. 190; Spencer, War and Postwar Greece, p. 34; Xydis, The Economy 

and Finances of Greece under Occupation, pp. 11, 27, 35–38, 42–46; Symmachos, Greece Fights 

On, pp. 53–60.

28 Xydis, The Economy and Finances of Greece under Occupation, pp. 24–25. 26–34, 47; Trials of 

War Criminals, XI, 991–93; Symmachos, Greece Fights On, pp. 64–75.

29 Alexander Papagos, The Battle of Greece 1940–1941, trans. by Pat. Eliascos (Athens: J. M. 

Scozikis “Alpha” Editions, 1949), p. 392.

30 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 55.

31 Symmachos, Greece Fights On, p. 91.

32 Ibid., pp. 90, 93–95; Lee, Special Duties, p. 92.

33 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 31, 86–93.

34 Ibid., pp. 31, 89–91.

35 Ibid., pp. 84–86.

36 Ibid., p. 72; Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 102; Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” 

pp. 13–14.

37 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 60–61; William Hardy McNeill, The Greek Dilemma: War 

and Aftermath (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., [1947]), p. 65; Stavrianos, Greece: American 

Dilemma and Opportunity, pp. 65, 69.

38 Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, pp. 66–68. In 1942 EAM published 

a pamphlet, “What is EAM and What Does It Want?” written by Demetrios Glenos, a Communist intellectual. This publication stressed the national character of the resistance.

39 Ibid., pp. 69–70, 71–72.

40 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 32.

41 Ibid., pp. 32–33, 61, 64; Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, pp. 69–72.

42 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 133; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 63; Stavrianos, Greece:

American Dilemma and Opportunity, pp. 70–72.

43 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 62; L. S. Stavrianos, “Greece: The War and Aftermath,” 

Foreign Policy Reports, 21, 12 (1 Sep 45), 176; Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and 

Opportunity, pp. 69, 72.
Notes

283

44 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 32, 60–61, 134; Francis [Edward] Noel-Baker, Greece:

The Whole Story (London: Hutchinson & Co., [1946]), pp. 34–35; [Greek-American Labor 

Committee], Greece Fights for Freedom (New York, Privately Printed, 1944), pp. 7–8; Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, p. 73.

45 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 134.

46 Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, p.  74; Myers, Greek Entanglement, 

pp. 72, 101. Myers estimated that guerrilla groups affiliated with EAM had put in their 

“first appearance in the field in January, 1942. . . .”

47 Richard Capell, Simiomata, A Greek Notebook, 1944–45 (London: Macdonald & Co., 

[1946]), p. 45. Author quotes Lt. Col. Macaskie.

Notes to Chapter II

1 Richard M. Leighton, “Overlord versus the Mediterranean at the Cairo Tehran Conferences (1943),” in Command Decisions, Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed. (New York: Harcourt, 

Brace, 1959), pp. 182–209; Ralph S. Mavrogordato, “Hitler’s Decision on the Defense 

of Italy” in Command Decisions, Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed. (New York: Harcourt, 

Brace, 1959), pp. 230–31, 241–43; Henry Maitland Wilson, Eight Years Overseas (London: 

Hutchinson & Co., 1948), pp. 173–82.

2 Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 165; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 98; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 14, 248–50. There is some question as to Myers’ original rank. Field Marshal 

Wilson refers to him as major, but he apparently held the rank of colonel at the time of 

the drop into Greece and was given the rank of brigadier when the mission was left in 

Greece instead of being evacuated.

3 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 143; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 95–98.

4 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 96.

5 Ibid., pp. 99–100.

6 Ibid., pp. 101–103, 108.

7 Ibid., p. 108.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., pp. 114–115.

10 Ibid., p. 115.

11 Ibid., pp. 115–116.

12 Ibid., pp. 118–119.

13 Ibid., p. 119; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 62, 136.

14 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 125, 128–30, 141, 147, 152, 172–73, 210; Woodhouse, Apple 

of Discord, p. 61.

15 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 116, 127, 129, 148; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 38–39.

16 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 148.

17 Ibid., pp. 125, 151–52.

18 Ibid., pp. 148–50, 194; Stefanos Sarafis [Stephanos Saraphis], Greek Resistance Army, the 

Story of ELAS (London: Birch Books Ltd., 1951), p. 43.

19 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 45; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 74, 76; Myers, Greek 

Entanglement, pp. 128–44, 148–50.

20 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 187.

21 Ibid., p. 196.

22 Ibid., pp. 191, 194, 196, 199, 202.

23 Ibid., pp. 195–96; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 64–69.
284

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

24 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 199–200; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 74–75, 81–84. 

According to Saraphis, he signed the original statement on 16 June rather than 14 June.

25 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 66–67, 75, 81–85, 87, 95; Myers, Greek Entanglement, 

pp. 201, 219; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 148, 299–300.

26 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 170–71, 180, 184.

27 Ibid., p. 175; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 56–58.

28 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 185.

29 Ibid., p. 204.

30 Ibid., pp. 203, 208.

31 Ibid., pp. 204–205.

32 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 535.

33 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 204; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 87.

34 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 200.

35 Ibid., pp. 207–208, 260. Woodhouse shared this opinion; see Apple of Discord, p. 142.

36 Ibid., pp. 208–209, 211; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 92–93.

37 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 216.

38 Ibid., pp. 224, 228.

39 Ibid., pp. 228–29.

40 Ibid., pp. 225–27; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 50–51.

41 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 225.

42 Ibid., pp. 224–25.

43 Ibid., pp. 216–17, 234–37; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 85–86.

44 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 195, 219, 236–37, 241; Reginald Leeper, When Greek Meets 

Greek (London: Chatto and Windus, 1950), p. 31.

45 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 238–40, 243; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 151–52.

46 Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, p. 31.

47 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 251–52, 258; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 130.

48 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 247, 250.

49 Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 2–6.

50 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 247.

51 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 151–54; Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 248.

52 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 153, 157.

53 Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 30–32; Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 248.

54 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 248–49.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p.  154; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp.  166–67; 

Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 7–8, 30–33. The King’s message of 19 August 1943 is 

reproduced in Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 536.

57 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 535.

58 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 153.

59 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 252–54; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 153–54.

60 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 254; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, p. 33.

61 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 254–55, 264; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 166–68, 179–

80; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 19–20.

62 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 254–55.

63 Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 167.
Notes

285

64 Ibid.; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 257–58.

65 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 258–65.

66 Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 179–80.

67 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 156–57.

68 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 112.

69 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 163.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., pp. 158, 165; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 101, 113, 122–23.

72 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 158–59, 165; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 266–67.

73 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 165; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 113.

74 Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, p. 102; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, 

pp. 104–105, 165; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 124–125.

75 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 97–98.

76 Ibid., pp. 99–100; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 161–63.

77 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 101, 161–63, 301; Langer, Encyclopedia, p. 1141; Saraphis, 

Greek Resistance Army, p. 108. Also see Ronald Seth, The Undaunted; The Story of Resistance 

in Western Europe (New York: Philosophical Library, [1956]), pp. 75–78, for an interesting 

account of General Infante’s activities in the summer of 1943 leading up to his surrender 

to the guerrillas and to Colonel Woodhouse, as related to the author by the General in 

an interview on 25 March 1955.

78 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp.  163 (for quotations), 166–67; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 111, 120; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 174–79; Seth, The Undaunted, 

pp. 78–79.

79 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 167; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 117–20.

80 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 166–67.

81 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 267; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 125.

82 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 125–37.

83 Ibid., pp. 136–37.

84 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 175–76.

85 Ibid., pp. 168, 170; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 267–68; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, 

p. 138.

86 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 175; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 143.

87 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 176.

88 Ibid., Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 144.

89 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 179; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 144–46.

90 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 88; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 176–77.

91 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 148–49; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 177.

92 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 156–57, 159; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 177–79, 

302.

93 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 177–79; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 162, 164.

94 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 165–67; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 179, 303–

304; Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 268.

95 Woodhouse. Apple of Discord, p. 175.

96 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 161.

97 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 182–83.

98 Ibid., pp. 183–84; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 169–71, 173, 191.

99 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 180–81.

100Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 184–85.
286

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

101 Sweet-Escott, Greece: A Political and Economic Survey, p. 27; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, 

pp. 182–83, 185–86.

102Woodhouse. Apple of Discord, p. 184; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 172.

103Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 186; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, p. 78; Saraphis, Greek 

Resistance Army, p. 172.

104Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 34, 186–87; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 175–76, 

178; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, p. 52.

105Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 187–88; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 42–44.

106Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 188.

107 Ibid.; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 174–78.

108 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 182–93; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 32–33, 65, 67 

(for political affiliation of delegates).

109Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp.  188–89, 305; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p.  190; 

Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 43–49.

110 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 190–91; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 196–204.

111 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp.  197–204, 205–208; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, 

p. 305; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 50–53.

112Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 51, 54; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 205.

113 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 206–207.

114 Ibid., pp. 205, 207–208; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 67, 215.

115 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 191, 305.

116 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 208–209; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, p. 56.

117 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VI, 58–59; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. v.

118 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 192–93; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 59–63; Forster, A Short History, p. 219.

119 Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 59–63; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 222; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 192–93.

120Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 194–95; Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VI, 60.

121Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 194–95; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 170, 224; 

W. Byford-Jones, The Greek Trilogy (London, etc.: Hutchinson & Co., [1946]), pp. 93–95.

122Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 194–96; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, p. 59.

123 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 215.

124 Ibid., pp. 216, 220–22.

125 Ibid., pp. 216–19, 223–24.

126 Ibid., p. 224; Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 369.

127 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 225; Woodhouse. Apple of Discord, pp. 197–99.

128Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 193–95, 196–99, 194 for quotation; Winston S. Churchill, 

Triumph and Tragedy, vol. 6 of The Second World War (Cambridge, Houghton Mifflin, 1953), 

pp. 226–28; Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VI, 57.

129Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VI, 60–61; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 236.

130Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 199.

131 Ibid., pp. 202, 213; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 230–31, 236–41.

132 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 241–43.

133 Ibid., p. 205.

134 Ibid., pp. 208, 244–45.

135 Ibid., pp. 248, 250–52; McNeil, The Greek Dilemma, p. 148; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord,

203.

136Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 203.
Notes

287

137 Ibid., p. 204; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 266–72.

138Woodhouse, Apple of Discord p. 204.

139 Ibid., Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VI, 45; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, p. 149; Saraphis, Greek 

Resistance Army, pp. 266, 268.

140 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp.  260–64, 265–66; Spencer, War and Postwar Greece, 

pp. 56, 58, 60; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 207–209.

141 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 213, n. 1.

142 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 299.

143 Ibid., pp. 290–91, 298; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 212–13.

144 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 287–89, 291, 298; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 215.

145 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 297–98 and n. 1, p. 298; Leeper, When Greek Meets 

Greek, pp. 93–95.

146Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 97–98; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, p. 159; Saraphis, 

Greek Resistance Army, pp. 299–300 and n. 1, p. 300.

147 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 291–92.

148 Ibid., pp. 299–300; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 97–98; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, 

pp. 159–60.

149McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 163–65.

150 Ibid., pp. 168–71; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 101–104.

151Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, p. 104; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 171–72.

152McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 172–77.

153 Ibid., p. 174; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, p. 104; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 218.

154McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 174–76, 178.

155 Ibid., pp. 176–77; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 115–16; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 216–18; Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VI, 57, 61.

156Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VI, 62; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 178–79, 182–84; Leeper, 

When Greek Meets Greek, p. 114.

157Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 114–15; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 184–85.

158McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 181–82, 184–85.

159 Ibid., pp. 176–77; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 304, 306.

160Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 218; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 111, 187, 194–95.

161 McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 185–88; Forster, A Short History, p. 223; Ehrman, Grand 

Strategy, VI, 63; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 120–26.

162Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 126–32; Arthur S. Gould Lee, The Royal House of Greece

(London: Ward Lock & Co., [1948]), pp. 182–83; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 191–94.

163McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 188–90; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 132–34.

164Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 133–34; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, p. 187; SweetEscott, Greece: A Political and Economic Survey, p. 40.

165 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp.  321–24; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp.  229–30, 

308–10; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp, 195–96.

166McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 196–97; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 321, 324.

167Chris Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus: The Thrilling Story of the ‘Trainbusters’ in Nazi-Occupied 

Greece (London: Harrap, [1960]), p. 86; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 228–29, 230.

168Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 232–35, 236 ff; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp, 197–219.

169Major Matthew Vlissides, “Comments” [on this study] (Unpublished ms. in SORO), p. 3.

170 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 142.

171 Ibid., pp. 137, 142–43, 148.
288

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

172 Ibid., pp. 54, 81–82, 137–38, 171–72, for Woodhouse’s comments on the probable effects 

of such a strategy.

Notes to Chapter III

1 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 49–50; Xan Fielding, Hide and Seek, the Story of a War-Time 

Agent (London: Secker & Warburg, 1954), pp. 22–24; M. B. McGlynn, Special Service in 

Greece, vol. of New Zealand in the Second World War, H. K. Kippenberger, ed. (Wellington, 

N. Z.: Dept. of Internal Affairs, 1953), p. 3.

2 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 44–45; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 164–65, 169.

3 Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 164–67; Myers, Greek Entanglement, 264–65.

4 Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p.  180; Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp.  24, 109, 117, 180–81; 

Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 44–45; John Lincoln, Achilles and the Tortoise: An Eastern 

Aegean Exploit (London: Heinemann, 1958), pp. 35–36; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, 

pp. 140–41.

5 Woodhouse. Apple of Discord, pp. 154–55; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 176–77, 180, 

205; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 124–25.

6 Brig. Gen. Barry, “Statement by U. K. Representatives,” in European Resistance Movements, 

1939–1945 (New York, etc.: Pergamon Press, 1960), p. 354.

7 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 45.

8 Ibid., p. 212; Barry, “Statement . . ..” pp. 254–55; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 165, 

205–206.

9 Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp. 97–100, 179; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 44–45.

10 Fielding, Hide and Seek, p. 179; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 45.

11 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 149–50; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 45.

12 Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp. 104–107, 155–56, 165, and Corrigendum.

13 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 45.

14 Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp. 22–24; Leigh Fermor, “Introduction,” p. 10; A. M. Rendel, 

Appointment in Crete, the Story of a British Agent (London: Allan Wingate, 1953), pp. 8–9.

15 Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp. 28–31, 52–53, 58–59, 73; George Psychoundakis, The Cretan 

Runner, trans. by Patrick Leigh Fermor (London: John Murray, 1955), pp. 36–37, 53–54.

16 Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp. 29, 38–39, 49–50, 73.

17 Ibid., p. 21.

18 Ibid., p. 12.

19 Ibid., pp. 222–23.

20 Leigh Fermor, “Introduction,” pp. 10–11; Rendel, Appointment in Crete, pp. 18–19; Fielding, Hide and Seek, p. 221; Psychoundakis, The Cretan Runner, p. 38, n. 1.

21 McGlynn, Special Service, p. 3; Myers. Greek Entanglement, p. 22.

22 Myers. Greek Entanglement, pp. 13–14.

23 Ibid., pp. 14–17.

24 Ibid., pp. 19, 22–23; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. V, VI.

25 Myers. Greek Entanglement, pp. 21–22.

26 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 21–22.

27 Ibid., pp. 68–69, 143–45; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 179–80; Woodhouse, Apple of 

Discord, pp. 139, 143–45.

28 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 43–44; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord. p. 141.

29 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 61–64, 85–87, 152–57, 203, 213–14; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 99, 124, 155, 231, 234.
Notes

289

30 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 160; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 59. 

31 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 99; Saraphis; Greek Resistance Army, p. 112.

32 The OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic 

Services (New York: Rinehart & Co., [1953]), pp. 30–31.

33 Ibid., p. 4.

34 Ibid., p. 392.

35 Ibid., pp. 392–93.

36 Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp. 25–27, 107.

37 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 21.

38 Rendel, Appointment in Crete, pp. 17–19.

39 Ibid., pp. 19, 21–39.

40 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 40, 42, 50, 86, 95.

41 Ibid., pp. 96, 108, 117; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 134.

42 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 120, 151, 159–60.

43 Ibid., pp. 166, 199.

44 Ibid., p. 199; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 165.

45 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 187; Fielding, Hide and Seek, p. 67.

46 Leigh Fermor, “Introduction,” p. 5; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 165, 236–37; telcon, 

Wines and Condit, 11 September 1961.

47 Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp. 79–80.

48 Ibid., 28, 30.

49 Ibid., p. 105; Rendel, Appointment in Crete, pp. 50–51; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 23.

50 Rendel, Appointment in Crete, pp. 51, 145.

51 Psychoundakis, The Cretan Runner, p. 121; Rendel, Appointment in Crete, p. 50.

52 Fielding, Hide and Seek, p. 67.

53 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 23; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 180.

54 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 220.

55 Ibid., pp. 267–68; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 144–45; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, 

pp. 175, 187; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 168; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 145, 

169–70, 213, 223.

56 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 79; Capell, Simiomata, pp. 45–46.

57 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 82; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 123, 169.

58 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp: 169–70, 213, 223, 278.

59 NAAF, SO (Air), MTO., Sec. II (Greece), pp. 30–31; (In FRC).

60 Fielding, Hide and Seek, p. 104; Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 168; Woodhouse, Apple of 

Discord, p. 146.

61 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 145, n. 1.

62 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 222; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 27.

63 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 223; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 139, 148; Saraphis, 

Greek Resistance Army, p. 170; Vlissides, “Comments,” p. 9.

64 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 220; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 102, 109, 122–23, 

137.

65 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 145–46.

66 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p.  168; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp.  165–66; NAAF SO 

(Air) MTO, Sec. II (Greece), pp. 30–31.

67 Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp. 31–33; Rendel, Appointment in Crete, p. 13.

68 Rendel, Appointment in Crete, pp. 13, 21.
290

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

69 Ibid., pp. 21–24; Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp. 31–33, 109–11.

70 Rendel, Appointment in Crete, p. 24.

71 Ibid., pp. 37–38.

72 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 19, 121; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 77, 79.

73 NAAF, p. 48.

74 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 18; NAAF, op. cit., p. 48.

75 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 24.

76 Ibid., p. 23; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 43.

77 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 26, 35, 42, 63–64.

78 Ibid., p. 168.

79 NAAF, pp. 30, 46; USAF Hist. Div., Europe: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945, 

vol. 3 of The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1951]), 

pp. 511–12; Barry, “Statement by U.K. Representatives,” p. 354.

80 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 117, 123, 163, 199; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 180.

81 NAAF, p. 30.

82 Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp. 144–45; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 180.

83 Ibid., pp. 181–84; Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 160.

84 NAAF, pp. 108–12.

85 Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp. 100–102.

86 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 210.

87 For the amazing first-hand account of building the airstrip, see Hamson, We Fell Among 

Greeks, pp. 189–202, 204–12; also, see Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 232–35.

88 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 213–21 and n. 1., p. 206; Myers, Greek Entanglement, 

pp. 243–45.

89 Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 165–66; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 210.

90 Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 165.

Notes to Chapter IV

1 Smothers, Report, pp. 5–8.

2 Trials of War Criminals, XI, 1051, 1056; Leigh Fermor, “Introduction,” p. 18; Smothers, 

Report, pp. 90–100; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 208; Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the 

Balkans,” p. 9.

3 Trials of War Criminals, XI, 1051.

4 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 8.

5 Smothers, Report, pp. 101–102; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 99–100; Lanz, “Partisan 

Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 32. Vlissides, Comments, p. 1.

6 By his own account, quoted in Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 58.

7 Rendel, Appointment in Crete, p.  65; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp.  74–75; Smothers, 

Report, pp. 104–105; W. Stanley Moss, Ill Met by Moonlight (New York: Macmillan, 1950), 

p. 151.

8 Rendel, Appointment in Crete, p. 130; Leigh Fermor, “Introduction,” p. 20.

9 Leigh Fermor, “Introduction,” p. 21.

10 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 198–99.

11 John Mulgan, Report on Experience (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 114–15.

12 Ibid., p. 99.

13 Trials of War Criminals, XI, 889, 890–92; Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 8.
Notes

291

14 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 71–72; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 98.

15 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 73.

16 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 136, 139.

17 Georgios Papandreou, [The Liberation of Greece] (3d ed.; Athens: Greek Publishing Company, 1948), p. 67; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 43, 196.

18 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 27, 29–30, 193 ff.

19 Ibid., pp. 25–26, 28 ff, 33.

20 Ibid., p. 39.

21 Ibid., pp. 42–43.

22 Ibid., pp. 49–52, 127; Vlissides, “Comments,” p. 10.

23 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 191, 220, 276.

24 Ibid., pp. xi, 51–52, 91, 127, 137; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 62, 187.

25 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. xiii, 88–89, 91; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 64.

26 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 88, 235.

27 Ibid., pp. 90–91, 198; Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, p. 76; Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the 

Balkans,” pp. 32–33.

28 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 146–47; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 198–99.

29 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 67; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 52, 176.

30 Saraphis. Greek Resistance Army, pp. 88, 114, 276.

31 Ibid., p. 222; Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 22–23; Woodhouse, Apple of 

Discord, p. 66; Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 129.

32 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 129; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 220.

33 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 230.

34 Ibid., pp. 89, 96, 122, 132, 134, 145, 171, 213; Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and 

Opportunity, p. 70

35 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 115, 134, 170; Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, p. 52.

36 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 136.

37 Ibid., pp. 89–90, 115, 153, 214, 221, 230–32; Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, p. 76.

38 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 129, 132, 153–54; Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, p. 196; 

Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 197; Mulgan, Report on Experience, pp. 99–100.

39 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 145–46, 149, 280–82, 284; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 64, 216–17, 229, 309.

40 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 170, 281–82.

41 Ibid., p. 89.

42 Klaus Goernandt, affidavit of 15 Sep. 47. Trials of War Criminals, XI. 1050; Myers, Greek 

Entanglement, p. 141; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 69, 73–74, 81, 98, 113, 116–17, 

133.

43 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 64, 111, 116; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 166, 191.

44 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 98, 133, 223; Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 125; Lanz, 

“Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 36–38, 90–91.

45 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 146.

46 Ibid.; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 89, 269.

47 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 120, 125, 132–33.

48 Ibid., pp. 132–34.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., p. 198; Stavrianos, Greece American Dilemma and Opportunity, p. 84; Mulgan, Report 

on Experience, pp. 100–101.
292

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

51 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 170, 173, 276.

52 Ibid., p. 170.

53 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 72; EDES charter reproduced in G. B. Foreign Office, 

Documents Regarding the Situation in Greece, January 1945 (Greece No. 1 [1945]; Cmd. No. 

6592) (London: HMSO, 1945), Pt. II.

54 Ibid.; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 70, 102.

55 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 20, 86.

56 Ibid., p. 69.

57 Ibid., p. 281.

58 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 83.

59 Ibid., pp. 80, 82; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 95, 97; Saraphis. Greek Resistance Army, 

p. 193.

60 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 102–103; Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 19.

61 Komninos Pyromaglou in The National Resistance (Athens, 1947), p.  167, trans. and 

quoted in Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, p. 67; Woodhouse, Apple 

of Discord, p. 73, gives political position of Pyromaglou, who turned to the far left as Zervas turned to the right.

62 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 102; Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 15: Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 72–75.

63 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 227.

64 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 74–75, 80–81.

65 Ibid., pp. 72, 75–78, 83.

66 Ibid., p. 77.

67 Ibid., p. 78; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 119.

68 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 79–80.

69 Arthur Piske, “Logistical Problems of the German Air Force in Greece: 1941–1943,” 

trans. by A. Rosenwald (Ms. B–645; USAREUR Hist. Div., 1953), p. 50; Goernandt affidavit, Trials of War Criminals, XI, 1049–50.

70 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 17–18.

71 Ibid., p. 18.

72 Ibid., p. 99.

73 Ibid., p. 19; [Robert M. Kennedy], German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (DA Pamphlet No. 20–243, August 1954), pp. 59–60.

74 Vlissides, Comments, p. 11; Smothers, Report, p. 31; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 75, 83.

75 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 15; Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 113; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 55–59, 139.

76 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 139–40.

77 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 61, map 5; Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the 

Balkans,” pp. 14–15.

78 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 179, 303–304.

79 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 68, 148, 220; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 139–40; Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, pp. 38, 59–61; Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VI, 45; Lanz, 

“Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 19–20; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 28, 277.

80 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 208, 222.

81 Ibid., pp. 116, 140.

82 Ibid., pp. 158, 224–25; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 144.

83 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 153, 168, 170, 175; Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, p. 154.

84 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VI, 57; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 104–105.
Notes

293

85 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 105; Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, pp. 108–10, 153–54, 156, 

158, 160; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 170; Byford-Jones, The Greek Trilogy, pp. 93–95; 

Francis Reid, I Was in Noah’s Ark (London: W & R Chambers, 1957), pp. 58, 83, 86, 143; W. 

Stanley Moss, A War of Shadows (New York: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 120, 126.

86 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 99, n. 1 and p. 195; Wines, Jerry [Maj. Gerald K.], A Lesson 

in Greek (Unpublished ms; [Dallas, Texas, c. 1948], pp. 46, 203.

87 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 85–87.

88 Fielding, Hide and Seek, p. 208.

89 Ibid., 131–32.

90 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 93–94.

91 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 138–39.

92 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 95.

93 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 140.

94 Ibid., pp. 111, 137.

95 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 95.

96 Ibid., pp. 96, 111.

97 Ibid., pp. 160–62.

98 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 165, 171–73, 178–81.

99 Ibid., p. 196.

100 Ibid., pp. 215, 221.

101 Mulgan, Report on Experience, p. 102.

102 Ibid., Myers, Greek Entanglement, caption under illus., p. 208.

103Fielding, Hide and Seek, p. 78 and also p. 50.

104 Ibid., p. 159; Reid, I Was in Noah’s Ark, pp. 95–96; Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, pp. 123–25, 

141–44.

105Moss, Ill Met by Moonlight, pp. 42–43, quotation on p. 46; Moss, A War of Shadows, pp. 104–

105, 106–10, 126; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 57, 231–32.

106Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 111.

107 Ibid., p. 11; Mulgan, Report on Experience, pp. 99–100.

108Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 99.

109 Ibid.; for instances of bad relations, see also Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 84, 136–

37, 199, 225, 231, 260 ff.

110 Moss, A War of Shadows, p. 107; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 241.

111 Saraphis made quite a point of the essential likeness of the rank and file in the various 

guerrilla groups—e.g., see Greek Resistance Army, p.  163; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, 

pp. 99, 199.

112 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 125; Geoffrey Chandler, The Divided Land: An AngloGreek Tragedy (London: Macmillan, 1959), p. 75.

113 Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp. 146–50; Mulgan, Report on Experience, p. 111; Jecchinis, Beyond 

Olympus, pp. 160–61.

114 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 39.

115 Ibid.

116 Fielding, Hide and Seek, pp. 220–21.

117 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 223.

118 Moss, A War of Shadows, p. 129.

119 Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, pp. 119–22; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 105, felt that the 

O.G.’s became “an innocent channel for KKE propaganda.”

120Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 99.
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Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

121Rendel, Appointment in Crete, p. 58.

122 In Psychoundakis, The Cretan Runner, pp. 150–51, 185–86.

123 Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, pp. 145, 169.

124 Fielding, Hide and Seek, p. 197; Mulgan, Report on Experience, pp. 106–108.

125 Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, p. 91.

126For one example, Moss, A War of Shadows, pp. 105–106.

127Moss, Ill Met by Moonlight, pp. 32–33; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 74, 78.

128Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 56, 58.

129 Ibid., pp. 71, 76, 86; Woodhouse. Apple of Discord, p. 66.

130Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 105; Chandler, The Divided Land, p. 51.

131 Psychoundakis, The Cretan Runner, p. 61.

Notes to Chapter V

1 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p, 535.

2 Ibid.

3 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 185.

4 Ibid., pp. 203–204.

5 Encyclopedia Britannica (1958 ed.), X, 792; Trials of War Criminals, XI, 891.

6 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 8; Encyclopedia Britannica (1958 ed.), X, 792.

7 Piske, “Logistical Problems,” pp.  6–7; Smothers, Report, p.  6; Hamson, We Fell Among 

Greeks, pp. 75–76.

8 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,“ pp. 67–72.

9 Ibid., p. 13.

10 Ibid., pp. 65–66.

11 Ibid., pp. 117–18; Moss, A War of Shadows, p. 125.

12 This account is derived mainly from three sources, the first two being accounts by participants: Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 69–87; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 89–125; 

and McGlynn, Special Service in Greece, pp. 3–22.

13 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 70.

14 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 110.

15 Ibid., p. 111.

16 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 54.

17 The account of the Asopos bridge demolition is mainly based on Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 169–86; and McGlynn, Special Service in Greece, pp. 23–29.

18 McGlynn, Special Service in Greece, p. 27.

19 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 185.

20 Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, pp. 97, 100–101.

21 Ibid., pp. 162–68.

22 Ibid., pp. 80–96.

23 Ibid., pp. 68, 74, 76.

24 Capell, Simiomata, pp. 46–47, 61.

25 Also, because there were no EAM/ELAS bands there. Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the 

Balkans,” p. 14; Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 112–13.

26 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 60.

27 Ibid., pp. 4, 16, 68, 69.
Notes

295

28 Ibid., p. 115.

29 Ibid., p. 117.

30 Ibid., p. 67.

31 Ibid., pp. 135–36.

32 Ibid., pp. 41–53, 60.

33 Ibid., p. 53.

34 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 56.

35 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 60–61.

36 Ibid., p. 106.

37 Ibid., pp. 64–65.

38 Ibid., pp. 7–8.

39 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 200–201.

40 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 54.

41 Ibid., pp. 56–58.

42 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 58.

43 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 218–19.

44 Ibid., p. 219; Klaus Goernandt, affidavit of 15 Sep. 47, Trials of War Criminals, XI, 1052.

45 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 535.

46 Woodhouse, “The Greek Resistance, 1942–44,” p. 382.

47 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 277.

48 German Army, Gen. Staff der Heere, Op. Abt. III, Schematische Kriegsgliederungen, dated 

1, 12, and 23 Jan. 43; 16 Feb. 43; 4 Mar. 43; 18 Apr. 43; 1 May 43; 21 June 43; 7 and 25 July 

43; 5, 14, 21, and 27 Aug. 43; 26 Dec. 43; 15 July 44; 13 Oct. 44. (Photostats of captured 

German records in OCMH.)

49 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 277.

50 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 62.

51 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VI, 45.

52 Woodhouse, “The Greek Resistance, 1942–44,” p. 376.

53 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 277–78.

54 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 74.

55 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 144.

56 Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 206; Trials of War Criminals, XI, 1051–53.

57 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 63.

58 Ibid.

59 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 278.

60 Ibid., pp.  199–200; Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, pp.  110–16; Fielding, Hide and Seek, 

pp. 79–80; Moss, Ill Met by Moonlight, pp. 83–87, 93; Kennedy. German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 57.

61 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 139.

62 Trials of War Criminals, XI, 1243.

63 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, pp. 58–59, 62, 70–71.

64 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 278.

65 Trials of War Criminals, XI, 830–34, 1308.

66 Moss, A War of Shadows, p. 107.

67 Gialistras, The Greek Nation, chart app.
296

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

68 Trials of War Criminals, XI, 830; Xydis, The Economy and Finances of Greece Under Occupation, 

pp. 36, 46; Encyclopedia Britannica (1958 ed.), X, 792.

Notes on Chapter VI

1 Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 173.

2 USDA, OCMH, Operation ACHSE, A Documented Narrative (Unpublished ms. R–2; OCMH), 

pp. 11–12; this source cites German Army Group E, Kriegstagebuch, entries of 11 and 18 

Sep. 43; USDA, OCMH, Work Notes for Dissolution of the Italian Army in the Balkans, Sep.–Dec. 

43 (Unpublished ms. R–1; OCMH) citing S.M.R.E. Situations Complessiva Sommaria 

Della Unita data del 1.IX.43.

3 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, pp. 30, 42; OCMH, Operation ACHSE, pp. 5–9, 

23–24; Churchill, Closing the Ring, App. F. pp. 674–75.

4 OCMH, Operation ACHSE, pp. 23–24.

5 Ibid., p. 26.

6 Hubert Lanz, testifying at Nuernberg, 19–21, 24–26 Nov. and 1 Dec. 1947, in Trials of War 

Criminals, XI, 1088–1110; Wolf Christian von Loeben, affidavit of 7 Nov. 47, in Trials of 

War Criminals, XI, 1110–12; Daily repts. from CinC SE to Ops Sec. OKH, 19–28 Sep. 43, 

trans. and extracted in Trials of War Criminals, XI, 1084–85; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, 

p. 101.

7 Speidel, “Report on Greece,” pp. 26–27; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 41, 45, 51–57, 88 

ff; Walter Goerlitz, “War Without Mercy, Partisan Warfare, 1939–1945,” in Der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1952), II, 57–171, FDD trans. report, p. 114; Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 40; Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 15, 54–55, 59.

8 Speidel, “Report on Greece,” p.  31; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p.  135; Myers, Greek 

Entanglement, pp. 41, 45, 51–57, 98; Goerlitz, “War Without Mercy,” p. 114; Lanz, “Partisan 

Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 15, 41–55, 67–68, 80.

9 Trials of War Criminals, XI, 818–20, 821–22, 909.

10 Ibid., p. 1310; Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, pp. 39, 41; Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 55; Goerlitz, “War Without Mercy,” p. 116.

11 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 76; Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, 

pp. 50–52; Trials of War Criminals, XI, 909, 1231; Speidel, “Report on Greece,” pp. 32–33, 

38, chart II on p. 68.

12 Trials of War Criminals, XI, 821, 829; Speidel, “Report on Greece,” pp. 36–37.

13 Speidel, “Report on Greece,” p. 36 for quotation, pp. 32–33, 35–37, 39, 41, 51–53, chart 

II on p. 68; Trials of War Criminals, XI, 1313–14.

14 Speidel, “Report on Greece,” p. 67.

15 Chief OKW, order of 7 Sep. 43, subj.: Directive for the Higher SS and Police Leader in 

Greece, trans. and quoted in Trials of War Criminals, XI, 929–30; Speidel, “Report on 

Greece,” pp. 32, 42–44, 59; Goerlitz, “War Without Mercy,” p. 116.

16 Speidel, “Report on Greece,” pp. 32–35.

17 Ibid., pp. 9–11, 13–14; OCMH, Operation ACHSE, p. 59.

18 Axis forces in Russia lost over 500,000 men killed and captured in three months fighting, 

winter 1942–43; Langer, Encyclopedia, p. 1153.

19 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, pp.  49–50; Charles von Leuttichau, The 

Ardennes Offensive: Germany’s Situation in the Fall of 1944 (Unpublished ms. R-19, OCMH), 

pt. 3, pp. 94–95.

20 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 51; German Army, Gen. Staff der Heere. 

Op. Abt III, Schematische Kriegsgliederung, 15 Jul. 44; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 277.

21 Goerlitz, “War Without; Mercy,” p. 118.
Notes

297

22 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 156–58.

23 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, pp. 49–50, 54, 59.

24 Ibid.; Chief OKW, order of 15 Sep. 43, subj.: Basic policy concerning the treatment of 

soldiers of the Italian armed forces and of the militia, trans. and extracted in Trials of War 

Criminals, XI, 1081–83; also see pp. 822–24.

25 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 277; Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, pp. 55, 

57, 59, 60–62.

26 McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 25–26, 64–65, 103.

27 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 28.

28 McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, p. 59.

29 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 180–81; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 184.

30 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 59.

31 Ibid., p. 56.

32 Ibid., p. 184 for quotation; also pp. 96, 186, 191, 196; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, p. 59; 

Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 178, 180.

33 McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, p. 59; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 205–207; Woodhouse, 

Apple of Discord, pp. 86–87, 164, 196; Goerlitz, “War Without Mercy,” p. 118.

34 McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 58–59, 143; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 277; Goerlitz, “War Without Mercy,” p. 117; Woodhouse. Apple of Discord, pp. 28, 96–97.

35 Unless otherwise noted, material for this section was derived from Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 81–86, 130–36, 141–42.

36 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 56.

37 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 93.

38 Ibid., pp. 94–95.

39 Ibid., p. 96.

40 Patrick Leigh Fermor in footnote to Psychoundakis, The Cretan Runner, p. 105, n. 1.

41 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 96–97; Psychoundakis, The Cretan Runner, 

pp. 104–109.

42 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 95–96.

43 LXVIII Army Corps, War Diary No. 3, 1 Jul.–31 Dec. 1943, trans. and extracted in Trials 

of War Criminals, XI, 1030–32.

44 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 99–100.

45 Ibid., pp. 80, 90, quotation on p. 148.

46 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 142–44.

47 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 157.

48 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 90.

49 Ibid., pp. 90–91, 139, 146–47; Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, p. 83.

50 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 91, 109, 138–39.

51 Ibid., pp. 37, 91, 138–39.

52 Ibid., pp. 91–92, 139–40, 146.

53 Ibid., pp. 176, 178–83.

54 Ibid., pp. 183–84.

55 Ibid., pp. 174–75.

56 Ibid., pp. 156–58, 175.

57 Ibid., p. 175.

58 Ibid., pp. 185–86.

59 Ibid., pp. 186–87.
298

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

60 Ibid., pp. 194, 200, 215.

61 This section is based on Lanz’s manuscript, mainly pp. 159–65 and 187–227.

62 Ibid., pp. 204–205.

63 Ibid., pp. 187–88.

64 Ibid., pp. 188–89, 194–96.

65 Ibid., pp. 177–78.

66 Ibid., pp. 188, 200, 208.

67 Ibid., pp. 209–11, 223–24; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 125–27.

68 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 189–90, 197.

69 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 126.

70 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 201–202.

71 Ibid., pp. 195–96.

72 Ibid., pp. 193, 198–99, 207, 211–12, 217.

73 Ibid., pp. 212–13, 218–19, 221.

74 Ibid., pp. 217, 221–22, 229, 231–33.

75 Ibid., pp. 223–26.

76 Ibid., pp. 230–31, 236, 249, sketch map #9.

77 Ibid., pp. 234, 236–40.

78 Ibid., p. 176.

79 Ibid., p. 150.

80 Ibid., p. 161.

81 Ibid., p. 159.

82 Ibid., pp. 160–61.

83 Ibid., p. 175.

84 Ibid., p. 215.

85 Ibid., pp. 160, 203, 226, 231.

86 Ibid., p. 205.

87 Ibid., pp. 174–75, 201–02, 207–08, 227.

88 Ibid., pp. 225, 227.

89 Ibid., p. 204.

90 Ibid., pp. 206–07, 227.

91 Ibid., p. 204.

92 Ibid., pp. 197, 227.

93 Ibid., pp. 214, 226.

94 Ibid., p. 227.

95 Ibid., p. 204.

96 Ibid., pp. 105, 120–21, 210–11.

97 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 52; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 125–31.

98 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, pp. 55–56.

99 Ibid., pp. 57–59, 70–71; Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 100–105.

100Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, pp. 59, 71–72; Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the 

Balkans,” pp. 105–114, (p. 105 for quotation); Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 216–17.

101Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 60; [German] Army Group E, Extracts from 

War Diary, 16 July–25 August 1944, Doc. No. 65035/2, OCMH.

102Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 126.

103 Ibid., pp. 120–21, 123–24.
Notes

299

104Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp, 134–35.

105Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 87.

106 Ibid., p. 126.

107Chief OKW, order of 16 Sep. 41, subj.: Communist insurgent movement in the occupied 

territories, trans. and extracted in Trials of War Criminals, XI, 971–72; also see pp. 828–

29, 1039, 1046–47.

108Trials of War Criminals, XI, 826, 829, 830, 1031, 1310–11.

109 Ibid., pp. 830–31, 1307; LXVIII Army Corps, War Diary No. 3; 1 July–31 Dec. 1943, trans. 

and extracted in Trials of War Criminals, XI, 1030–32.

110 Trials of War Criminals, XI, 826–27.

111 Ibid., pp. 1314–17; Speidel, “Report on Greece,” p. 66.

112Trials of War Criminals, XI, 830.

113 Ibid., pp. 831–32, 1034–36.

114 Ibid., pp. 832–34, 1309.

115 Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 39–40; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, p. 58 ff. 

Bibliography

301

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This case study is based upon a number of memoirs, histories, 

and documents, most of which have been published. Some, although 

unpublished, are available through the Department of the Army or the 

National Archives. None of these sources bears a security classification.

Primary Sources

Chandler, Geoffrey. The Divided Land: An Anglo-Greek Tragedy. London 

and New York: Macmillan, 1959. 214 pp. No index. Author entered 

Greece only in September 1944, by air, landing to a reception of 

British officers and Greek guerrillas on Corfu. He was attached to 

a British mission in the mountains, and was scheduled to remain 

after liberation as a member of the Anglo-Greek Information Service. Although he arrived late on the scene, Chandler qualifies as 

an on-the-spot reporter. He observed that the British liaison officers disliked the EAM/ELAS organization but were personally fond 

of the men as individuals. His comments on events of the December 

1944 war, the false peace, and the second civil war are interesting 

and useful.

Churchill, Winston S. Their Finest Hour, The Grand Alliance, Closing the 

Ring, and Triumph and Tragedy, (The Second World War, vols. II, III, V, 

VI.). Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin [1949, 1950, 1951, 1953]. Maps, 

diagrams, apps., index. As Prime Minister of Great Britain during 

World War II, the author played a decisive role in the affairs of occupied Greece. Their Finest Hour gives interesting background information on the outbreak and course of Greek-Italian war through 

1940. The Grand Alliance continues the story, with data on the British 

decision to aid Greece after the Germans showed intent to intervene in behalf of the Italians. The decision to defend Crete, the 

German attack, and forced evacuation of British forces are also 

covered. Chapter 13, pp. 532–52, of Closing the Ring briefly reviews 

events in the Greek resistance movement leading up to the crucial 

summer of 1943; there is a discussion of the evolution of British 

policy in relation to EAM/ELAS up through the spring of 1944 and 

the mutinies of the Greek forces in the Middle East. Chapters 18 

and 19, pp. 283–325, of Triumph and Tragedy review the British liberation of Greece in the fall of 1944, the EAM/ELAS bid for power, 

and the December 1944 war. Churchill fully documents (p. 287) his 

determination to reach a military show-down with EAM/ELAS.

Fielding, Xan. Hide and Seek: The Story of a War-Time Agent. London: 

Secker & Warburg, 1954. 255 pp. Illus. The author, known as Aleko, 
302

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

was on Crete from early 1942 to early 1944 and was responsible 

for organizing Cretan resistance on the western half of the island. 

Fielding gives an unusually frank account of his reactions to SOE 

Cairo, other British personnel, and the Greeks he dealt with.

Gosewisch, Walter. “Luftwaffe Communications (Greece and Crete).” 

Trans. Unpublished ms. B–644; USAREUR Historical Division. 42 

pp. This account by Generalmajor a. D. (Brig. Gen.) Gosewisch deals 

largely with German administrative and technical communications 

problems between December 1941 and July 1942. Some indication 

of the Greek habit of “listening in” is given, but the period covered 

is too early to show any German difficulties owing to overt resistance. Of minimal value for this study.

G. B. Foreign Office. Documents Regarding the Situation in Greece, January 1945 (Greece No. 1 [1945], Cmd. No. 6592). London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1945. 14 pp. This collection of documents 

includes nine on ELAS brutality to hostages in Nov-Dec 1944 (Pt. 

I), and the EDES charter plus four disclaimers of ELAS policy made 

in Dec 1944 by various political parties (Pt. II).

Great Britain. House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates. 37th Parl., 

10th Sess.; Fifth Series, vols. 406 and 407. London: His Majesty’s 

Stationery Office, 1945. These volumes record the long and bitter 

debate in Parliament over British policy in Greece during and after 

the liberation in October 1944. The record shows that the British were in great internal discord on their Government’s policy in 

Greece, particularly over the matter of the conflict between British 

troops and EAM/ELAS.

Hamson, Denys. We Fell Among Greeks. London: Jonathan Cape, [1946]. 

221 pp. Maps. The author, trained as a commando, parachuted into 

Greece as a member of Myers’ original party and reluctantly stayed 

on. He was sent to work with EAM/ELAS guerrillas and was in 

charge of constructing the first airfield built in its entirety behind 

enemy lines in that country. Hamson did not think highly of the 

guerrillas or of some of the liaison officers. His account is candid 

and interesting. It should be noted that he refers to a number of the 

British by names other than their own.

Jecchinis, Chris. Beyond Olympus: The Thrilling Story of the ‘Train-Busters’ 

in Nazi-Occupied Greece. London., etc.: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 

[1960]. 219 pp. Illus., epilogue, index. Foreword by Col. Woodhouse. 

The author, a Greek schoolboy at the beginning of World War II, 

joined a British military mission in eastern Greece and worked with 

British liaison officers, an American Operational Group, and the 

EAM/ELAS guerrillas. He describes various operations undertaken 
Bibliography

303

in 1944 and also offers insight into personal relations among the 

men in Greece.

Lanz, Hubert. “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans.” Trans. by Franke and 

Luetzkendorf. Unpublished ms., P-055a; Koenigstein: EUCOM Historical Div., 1950. 249 pp. Maps. General der Gebirgstruppen (Lt 

Gen) Lanz was (from late 1943 to 1945) commanding general of 

the German XXII Mountain Corps which was responsible for the 

security of western Greece. In this capacity, Lanz directed several 

major antiguerrilla operations. Later imprisoned under sentence 

by the U.S. Military Tribunal, Lanz was commissioned by the U.S. 

Army to write this study while in Landsberg Prison. This work, written entirely without reference to source materials, is still extremely 

valuable in view of the author’s experience in the field.

Leeper, Reginald. When Greek Meets Greek. London: Chatto and Windus, 1950. xxii, 244 pp. Illus., index. This memoir deals primarily 

with the political aspects of the Greek resistance, particularly as 

seen from the author’s vantage place as British ambassador to the 

Greek Government-in-exile in Cairo. One interesting point is that 

Leeper, while almost totally anti-EAM/ELAS, felt that “while the 

war [World War] was still in progress, the Soviet Government occupied itself very little with Greece.”

Lincoln, John. Achilles and the Tortoise: An Eastern Aegean Exploit. London, Melbourne, Toronto: Heinemann, [1958]. 256 pp. The author 

worked in the outlying Greek islands, his primary mission being 

subversion of Axis troops. His account gives information on SOE 

training, on rivalry between British organizations, and on the relations between various guerrilla bands on the islands. The Italian 

role in the islands is superbly re-created. Lincoln apparently became 

disillusioned with his life towards the end of the war, withdrew into 

himself, and took to drink.

Moss, W. Stanley. Ill Met By Moonlight. New York: Macmillan, 1950. 192 

pp. Illus., maps, glossary. This book, partly in narrative and partly 

in diary form, is by one of the two men who were mainly responsible 

for carrying out the brilliant kidnapping of General Karl Kreipe 

from Crete. The part of the nationalist guerrillas in helping with 

this exploit is made clear.

 . A War of Shadows. New York: Macmillan, 1952. 239 pp. Illus., 

maps. In the first part of this memoir, Moss deals with his plan 

to kidnap General Kreipe’s successor on Crete—a plan blocked by 

EAM/ELAS. Later, Moss went to Macedonia in northern Greece, 

where his experience with the local ELAS group was equally frustrating. The book contains a good description of guerrilla-liaison 

officer operations undertaken as the Germans were withdrawing.
304

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Mulgan, John. Report on Experience. London: Oxford University Press, 

1947. 150 pp. The author, a New Zealander, served as a liaison officer with EAM/ELAS forces in northern Greece from 1943 to 1944. 

He held a low opinion of the military value of guerrilla operations 

and questioned the humanity of supporting a resistance movement 

because its every operation caused such severe reprisals against the 

civilian population. Mulgan died in an accident in Cairo in 1945; 

the book is a more or less unfinished product.

Myers, E. C. W. Greek Entanglement. London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1955. 

289 pp. Illus., maps, index. Brigadier Myers, who parachuted into 

Greece in September 1942, commanded the British Military Mission 

to the Greek guerrillas from January 1943 until he was exfiltrated 

in August 1943 and replaced that autumn. Although he was antiCommunist, Myers believed he had no choice but to support EAM/

ELAS in an effort to make the Greek resistance an effective military 

instrument. This memoir contains a great deal of information on 

Myers’ problems in control, his organization of the British mission 

headquarters and field establishment, and on guerrilla operations. 

His account, written in 1945 but, because of its controversial nature, 

only publishable 10 years later, is indispensable to this study.

National Liberation Front (EAM). White Book, May 1944–March 1945. 

Trans. New York: Greek-American Council, 1945. [ix], 137 pp. This 

volume gives the Communist side of the British-Greek controversy 

and war in the winter of 1944–45. This source should be used with 

caution; not only is this propaganda, but documents originally 

written in English have been retranslated from the Greek. Among 

other points, the EAM/ELAS claim is put forth that all other guerrilla groups did not number over 10,000 men (p. 28) and “proof” is 

offered (pp. 28–33) that EDES and the British cooperated with the 

Bulgarians.

Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF). Special Operations (Air) in the Mediterranean Theater 1942–1944. (Unclassified ms.; in FRC, Alexandria, 

Va.). Basic report on air supplies to Greece.

The OSS Assessment Staff. Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for 

the Office of Strategic Services. New York: Rinehart, [1953]. xv, 541 

pp. Illus., app., index. This valuable report, written by psychologists 

of the OSS assessment staff, gives the rationale behind their testing 

procedures, describes the testing situations, and evaluates the ways 

in which the staff attempted to assess the testing.

Papagos, Alexander. The Battle of Greece 1940–1941. Trans. by Pat Eliascos, Athens: The J. M. Scazikis “Alpha” Editions, 1949. 406 pp. Maps, 

illus., apps., errata. The Commander in Chief of the Greek Armed 

Forces during the campaign against the Italians and Germans 
Bibliography

305

wrote his memoirs in the period 1943–1945 while he was held in 

German detention camps. The author extols Greek heroism during 

the active campaigns and criticizes the limited nature of the British 

effort to aid the Greeks.

Papandreou, Georgios. [The Liberation of Greece]. 3d ed.; Athens: 

Greek Publishing Co., 301 pp. In Greek. Author played a major role 

in the Greek government-in-exile in 1944–45. It was he who presided at the Lebanon Conference in May 1944. This work, parts of 

which were privately translated for use in this case study, consists 

of brief sections on events, followed by long passages giving Papandreou’s remarks or memoranda on various occasions.

Piske, Arthur. “Logistical Problems of the German Air Force in Greece: 

1941–1943.” Trans. by A. Rosenwald. Unpublished ms. B–645; USAREUR Historical Div., 1953. 88 pp. Dr. Piske deals largely with German Air Force supply, administrative, and labor problems, but gives 

some indication of the results of guerrilla operations. On p. 50 he 

states that the Germans were able to get a “Balkan gentleman’s 

agreement” with guerrilla bands in Epirus (where Zervas operated).

Praun, Albert. “Signal Communications in the East: the Balkans and 

Finland: Supplement.” Trans. Unpublished ms. P–132 (Supplement). 68 pp. General der Nachrichtentruppen (Lt. Gen.) Praun 

noted that Balkan partisans caused losses of wire networks, but his 

comments are not particularly helpful for this study since he was 

not specific as to losses caused by Greek guerrillas.

Psychoundakis, George. The Cretan Runner. Trans. and intro. by Patrick 

Leigh Fermor and annotations by Leigh Fermor and Xan Fielding. 

London: John Murray, 1955. xi, 242 pp. Maps, illus., index. This book 

is, as Leigh Fermor noted when he read the manuscript, “Something 

unique in the literature of Resistance: a sort of primitive, DouanierRousseau war book.” Psychoundakis was a courier for Leigh Fermor 

and Fielding, both British liaison officers on Crete. His descriptions 

of resistance operations and his opinions of various British liaison 

officers and other members of the Greek resistance are valuable in 

themselves. Because these opinions may be contrasted with those 

of the British, who have also published their memoirs, they offered 

great insight into the interpersonal relations of liaison officers and 

indigenous resistance workers.

Reid, Francis. I Was in Noah’s Ark. London and Edinburgh: W. & R. 

Chambers Ltd., [1957]. 143 pp. Illus. Author was a member of one 

of the units of the British Raiding Support Regiment which went 

into Greece from the island of Vis by naval craft in May 1944. His 

unit worked with EAM/ELAS guerrillas, but this account is uninformative and almost useless.
306

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Rendel, A. M. Appointment in Crete: The Story of a British Agent. London: 

Allan Wingate, 1953. 240 pp. Rendel was a British liaison officer on 

Crete from 1943 to the end of the war in May 1945, when General 

Benthak signed an unconditional surrender for the German forces 

left on that island. The author recounts his recruitment, his training, the naval infiltration technique, etc.; he also gives much useful 

information concerning life in the resistance on Crete.

Sarafis, Stefanos [Saraphis, Stephanos]. Greek Resistance Army: The Story 

of ELAS. Trans. and abridged by Marion Pascoe. London: Birch 

Books, 1951. xxvii, 324 pp.  Glossary. Preface by Compton Mackenzie. Published in Greece in 1946, this English account has been 

called “a quite arbitrary abridgment, done along Leftist lines” by a 

student of Greek literature. Saraphis’ role as military commander 

of ELAS, a command shared by two other men, both Communists, 

has been highly controversial; still he remained a figure of respect 

in Greece up until his death. Saraphis details his imprisonment 

by EAM/ELAS and conversion to their side, his Anglophobia, his 

efforts to re-create the hands of EAM/ELAS into the image of a 

regular army, and the problems that confronted him during the 

days of the resistance. If Myers and Woodhouse recount the story 

of their difficulties in controlling EAM/ELAS, Saraphis provides 

the same story—told from the opponent’s viewpoint. An extremely 

valuable source for this study.

Speidel, Wilhelm. “Report on Greece (1942–1944); My Mission in 

Greece.” Trans. by H. Heitmann. Unpublished ms. P–003; USAREUR, 1948. 102 pp. General der Flieger (Lt. Gen.) Speidel headed 

the German military government organization in Greece. Written while the author was in Landsberg prison, this study contains 

a description of German organization in Greece and outlines the 

problems of German military government in an occupied country 

where German tactical forces and separate SS troops simultaneously operated. Author is clear and frank about interagency friction 

within German organization.

Stephanides, Theodore. Climax in Crete. London: Faber and Faber, 1946. 

166 pp. Maps. Dr. Stephanides took part in the Greek campaign in 

1941, was evacuated to Crete, and then rescued from Crete on 31 

May 1941. Although its value for this study is limited, this book provides an eye-witness account of Cretan resistance to the German 

invaders.

Thomas, W. B. Dare To Be Free. London: Allan Wingate, 1951. 256 pp. The 

author describes his experiences in 1941 during his many attempts 

to escape from German POW camps in Greece. This work is useful 

to this study primarily as a first-hand account of public opinion in 
Bibliography

307

Greece during 1941 and the nascent resistance to the occupier that 

was already evident. Thomas spells out German measures to make 

the Greeks stop helping British escapees.

U. S. Military Tribunal. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, Under Control Council Law No. 10. Nuernberg, October 

1946–April 1949. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950. 

Vol. XI. 1332 pp.  Case No. 7, officially known as United States of 

America vs. Wilhelm List et al., and also called the “Hostage Case,” 

had as defendants a number of German officers who had served in 

Greece, including General der Flieger (Lt. Gen.) Helmuth Felmy, 

commander of the LXVIII Corps, General der Gebirgstruppen (Lt. 

Gen.) Hubert Lanz, commander of the XXII Mountain Corps, and 

General der Flieger (Lt. Gen.) Speidel, military governor in Greece. 

This abridged version of the trial proceedings includes a number 

of translated German documents and some of the testimony by the 

defendants. A supplementary mimeo transcript for Case No. 7 is 

available to users at the National Archives.

Vlissides, Matthew J. “Greek Study Task.” Unpublished ms; Special 

Operations Research Office, 1 June 1961. 25 pp. Map. Major Vlissides, retired Greek Army officer, has written especially for this 

Office a first-hand narrative of his work with the underground in 

the Greek islands of the Aegean during World War II. This manuscript covers some of the political aspects of the resistance and 

details of the Underground Military Group of Naxos. Underground 

organizational matters, security measures, intelligence collection, 

and combined raiding operations are discussed.

Wilson, Henry Maitland. Eight Years Overseas. London: Hutchinson 

& Co., 1948. xiii, 285 pp.  Maps, illus., index. Field-Marshal Lord 

Wilson was first Army Commander-in-Chief Middle East and 

then Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean Theater 

of Operations during the period 1943–1944. He provides a great 

deal of interesting and high level information on SOE Cairo and 

on the Greek resistance. Wilson is very frank about inter-agency 

difficulties among the British in Cairo, and about his personal feelings with regard to Brigadier Myers and British treatment of EAM/

ELAS. This account is useful and informative, supplementing or 

confirming much of the data obtained from the memoirs of British 

officers in Greece.

Wines, Jerry [Maj. Gerald K.] A Lesson in Greek. (Unpublished ms.; [Dallas, Texas: c. 1948].) iv, 259 pp. Foreword by Col. C. M. Woodhouse. 

Major Wines was head of the American contingent of the Allied 

Military Mission (AMM) in Greece during World War II and was 

second in command to Colonel Woodhouse, commander of the 
308

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

AMM. Major Wines wrote this story of his experiences shortly after 

the end of the war and was kind enough to lend his copy to the 

Special Operations Research Office. Unfortunately, at the time 

the manuscript was received, this study was already edited and it 

was impossible to make as full use of Wines’ study as one would 

have liked. Its great value lies in the author’s vantage point at mission headquarters and his close personal contact with all the major 

actors on the Greek scene. The present case study has emphasized 

the political nature of the liaison officers’ duty; Major Wines reaffirms this point with great precision. In general, Wines’ manuscript 

has served to confirm the point of view of this study, while adding 

many interesting first-hand details. It is extremely unfortunate that 

no American publishing house has sought out this account of an 

American’s work with a guerrilla group.

Woodhouse, C[hristopher] M. Apple of Discord; A Survey of Recent Greek 

Politics in Their International Setting. London: Hutchinson & Co., 

1948. viii, 320 pp. Apps., index. The author dropped into Greece 

with Myers’ group in September 1942 as second-in-command of 

the party; he remained as second-in-command of the mission until 

August 1943, when he became its acting commander. In December 

1943 he became commander of the new Allied Military Mission and 

remained in Greece until June 1944. In this role, he and the men 

under him worked directly with the Greek guerrillas. Woodhouse’s 

book is not a memoir in the usual sense but a study of the political 

aspects of the resistance, the author making full use of his special 

experience and knowledge. Monarchist in sympathies, Woodhouse 

was forced by his job to deal on a daily basis with the Communistdominated EAM/ELAS. Unfortunately there is very little in this 

account on Greek guerrilla operations.

 . “The Greek Resistance, 1942–44,” in European Resistance Movements. (First International Conference on the History of the Resistance Movements Held at Liege—Bruxelles, Breendonk, 14–17 

September 1958.) New York, etc.: Pergamon Press, 1960. Pp. 374–90. 

This is a brief, cogent, capsule account of the Greek guerrilla resistance to the Germans during World War II. Woodhouse comments 

on the relative military and political value of the resistance. He attributes the fact that Greece escaped from the Communist orbit in 

1944–45 to the work of the liaison officers whom he commanded.

Secondary Sources

Almond, Gabriel A. “The Resistance and Political Parties of Western 

Europe,” Political Science Quarterly, 62, 1 (March 1947), 27–61. Author 
Bibliography

309

attempts to survey the entire European resistance and the political 

effects of resistance. Some information on Greece.

Borkenau, Franz. European Communism. New York: Harper, [1953]. 564 

pp. Index. Author devotes chapter XVI, pp. 409–37, to Greece during World War II. Borkenau’s thesis is that Greek Communism followed the dictates of the Russians during this period down to the 

smallest details. In this belief, the author takes issue with a number 

of British on-the-spot observers. The only sources of information 

cited for this account are books by Woodhouse (see above) and 

McNeill (see below).

Byford-Jones, W. The Greek Trilogy. London, etc.: Hutchinson, [1946]. 

270 pp. Appendix. The author served in Greece, going in with the 

forces of liberation in October 1944. It is sometimes difficult to tell 

whether Byford-Jones is speaking from experience or hearsay. He 

met a number of liaison officers and reports on what they have said.

Capell, Richard. Simiomata, A Greek Notebook 1944–5. London: Macdonald & Co., Ltd., [1946]. 224 pp.  A newspaper correspondent, 

Capell reports in journal form the results of a series of interviews 

conducted in Greece as the Germans were withdrawing. This is an 

excellent source for the names and reported opinions of individual 

liaison officers. Capell, once called “more Tory than John Bull himself,” was very much against EAM/ELAS but was somewhat sympathetic to EDES.

Chase, George H., ed. Greece of Tomorrow. New York: American Friends 

of Greece, [1943]. 93 pp. Map. This collection of eight essays reviews 

the past role of Greece and the problems awaiting that country 

upon her liberation. Good for general background.

De Guingand, Francis. Operation Victory. New York: Charles Scribner’s 

Sons, 1947. xii, 488 pp. Maps, index. The author, who was chief of 

staff of the British Eighth Army in 1942–43, gives an extremely clear 

statement of the difficulties facing the British during the period of 

their intervention in Greek behalf in early 1941.

Ehrman, John. Grand Strategy. (History of the Second World War, ed. J. R. 

M. Butler), Vol. V, August 1943–September 1944, and Vol. VI, October 

1944–August 1945. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956. 

Scattered but useful references to Greek guerrilla warfare during 

World War II. Author states official British position. The figures 

given for casualties caused by guerrilla operations during Operation NOAH’S ARK (VI, 45) have, however, been criticized by Colonel Woodhouse (see p. 376, “The Greek Resistance, 1942–44” cited 

above).
310

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Forster, Edward S. A Short History of Modern Greece: 1821–1956. 3d ed., 

rev. and enlarged by Douglas Dakin. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, [1957]. x., 268 pp. Maps, bibliog, index. In chapters XXIV and 

XXV, pp. 213–26, the author briefly reviews the years 1941–45. This 

is a useful background text. The author’s position is anti-EAM/

ELAS.

Gialistras, S.A. The Greek Nation Once More Stems a Barbarian Onslaught. 

Trans. by G. A. Trypanis. Athens: 1950. 89 pp. This is a Greek discussion of the losses sustained by Greece because of war, resistance, 

and the occupation from 1879–1949. There may be some exaggeration in the figures for World War II but non-Greek sources sustain 

the general thesis of overwhelming losses. The author, anti-EAM/

ELAS and promonarchist in sympathies, gives little data on the 

resistance. He claims that the British supported only the Communist resistance and that Colonel Woodhouse was a “victim to communist fiendishness” (see pp. 43–44).

Goerlitz, Walter. “War Without Mercy, Partisan Warfare 1939–1945,” 

in Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Stuttgart: 1952. This excerpt from vol. II, 

pp. 57–171, was trans. by the Central Intelligence Agency. Pp. 113–

120 of the FDD document concern guerrilla warfare in Greece. 

Goerlitz’s information on Greek and British organization and 

operations should be viewed with caution; his remarks concerning 

German actions and views appear far more reliable. Of the great 

German reprisals he remarks, “These stern collective measures certainly also affected the innocent; but the seed, which now bore such 

bloody fruit, was not sown by the German soldiers, not even by the 

SS, which now in some cases . . . employed particularly ruthless collective measures.”

[Greek-American Labor Committee.] Greece Fights for Freedom. New York: 

Privately printed, 1944. 29 pp. This is unadulterated propaganda 

for EAM/ELAS. Its author claims all operational achievements in 

Greece, including demolition of the Gorgopotamos and Asopos 

bridges, as EAM/ELAS victories. Demolition of the former, it will 

be recalled, was a combined British-EDES-EAM/ELAS operation; 

the Asopos was demolished by an all-British team.

 “Greek Political Parties,” The Economist, 147 (December 23, 1944), 837–

38. This short note, sympathetic to EAM/ELAS, attempts to place 

the civil war in Greece in context with recent Greek political history.

Hadsel, Winifred N. “American Policy Towards Greece,” Foreign Policy 

Association Reports, 23 (September 1, 1947), 146–60. One section of 

this article, subtitled “Sources of Communists’ Strength in Resistance,” offers an excellent résumé of the situation. The author shows 

how a previous dictatorship of the Right drove Greek Communists 
Bibliography

311

underground, reinforcing their party organization and discipline. 

By the spring of 1942, author claims there were EAM cells “in nearly 

every village of Greece.” This article summarizes the main events in 

Greece during World War II.

[Kennedy, Robert M.] German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans 

(1941–1944). (U. S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 20–243.) 

Washington: USDA, 1954. vi, 82 pp.  Maps, charts. This study is 

based upon extensive use of captured German records, including the war diaries of the Commander in Chief and Armed Forces 

Commander Southeast, of Army Groups E and F, and of the territorial commanders. It also utilizes German manuscripts prepared 

for the U.S. Army. For a German view of the guerrilla war in the 

Balkans, including Greece, this pamphlet is very useful. Nonetheless, for information on British and Greek activities, other sources 

should be checked. One difficulty in using Kennedy’s work is that 

the focus is on the larger picture of the Balkans, with the result that 

the story of the guerrilla war in Greece is quite abbreviated and 

scattered in the text.

Kousoulas, Dimitrios G. The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 

1939–1953. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1953. xi, 

210 pp. This is a general account of the resistance and the civil wars, 

emphasizing political factors and containing little information on 

operations. On specific points, there are a number of errors, e.g., 

Saraphis’ first band was attacked by EAM/ELAS in early 1943, 

not 1942; Aris was capetan on the EAM/ELAS Headquarters, not 

political commissar—Andhreas Tzimas was the first and George 

Siantos the second political adviser on that triumvirate headquarters. Author claims that the Kremlin avoided open intervention in 

Greece (p. 87) and that “by the end of July [1944], the First Counselor of the Soviet Embassy [in Cairo] forwarded official instructions to the EAM representatives in Cairo, advising them to show 

less obstructionism and enter the Papandreou Government. . . .” 

(p.  113). For this latter fact, the present user of this work would 

have been grateful for some indication of the author’s source of 

information.

Lee, Arthur S. Gould. The Royal House of Greece. London and Melbourne: Ward Lock [1948]. x, 296 pp.  Illus., index. This book is 

indispensable for the royalist version of events in Greece. A close-up 

of King George II is given on pp. 206–18; the account, pp. 182–83, 

of the meeting between the King and Churchill on the night of 

29–30, December 1944—when the Prime Minister pressured the 

King into appointing a Regent for Greece—is quite interesting. The 

author recounts (p. 206) that Zervas once told him why he had been 
312

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

anti-monarchist in 1941–42: because of an unfavorable impression 

of King Constantine which Zervas received as a cadet in 1912, he 

“turned violently” against the Greek monarchy as an institution.

Leighton, Richard M. “Overlord versus the Mediterranean at the CairoTehran Conferences (1943),” in Command Decisions, Kent Roberts 

Greenfield, ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959. Pp.  182–209. 

This article provides valuable background material on the question of the strategic value placed by the Allies on various proposals 

for major landings. By the end of 1943 and the conferences, the 

Mediterranean was no longer the main European theater and the 

planned landing in Northern France was primary in Allied considerations; furthermore the European theater held priority over the 

Pacific in Allied strategy.

Lemkin, Raphael. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation— 

Analysis of Government—Proposals for Redress. Washington: Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, 1944. xxxviii, 674 pp. App., list 

of works cited, index. Useful reference for German occupational 

policy and practice. Greece is discussed on pp. 185–92 and 412–18.

Lodwick, John. The Filibusters: The Story of the Special Boat Service. London: 

Methuen & Co., (1947). v, 189 pp. Illus., maps. The author, a member of the SBS, discusses its small, amphibious raiding operations, 

some of which took place on the outlying Greek islands. He indicates some cooperation with guerrillas and confirms interagency 

rivalry with Special Operations Executive.

McGlynn, M. B. Special Service in Greece: New Zealand in the Second World 

War. H. K. Kippenberger, ed. Wellington: Department of Internal 

Affairs, War Histories Branch, 1953. 32 pp. Illus., apps. This official 

account of the guerrilla war in Greece is mainly concerned with the 

role of the New Zealand officers and men who went into Greece 

to perform coup de main feats or to work as liaison officers with the 

Greek guerrillas. A manuscript by Lt. Col. Arthur Edmunds, who 

went into Greece with Brigadier Myers in 1942 and stayed on to take 

over after Woodhouse left in June 1944, was used for the account of 

the Gorgopotamos and Asopos operations. Other first-hand reports 

and personal interviews with participants were used by the author 

as a basis for his work.

McNeill, William Hardy. The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath. New 

York: J. B. Lippincott, [1947]. 291 pp. App., index. The author served 

as Assistant U. S. Military Attaché in Greece, 1944–46, and served 

in Athens with the United States Information Agency after the war. 

This work which, according to one student, “leans heavily on Allied 

military intelligence reports,” emphasizes political developments 

in the resistance. According to Col. Woodhouse, McNeill’s account 
Bibliography

313

of the British-Greek war in the winter of 1944–45 is painstakingly 

impartial . . . but his version of earlier events . . . is misinformed.” 

(Apple of Discord, p. 214, n. 1.) Under these circumstances, McNeill’s 

work has been heavily relied upon for the Nov 1944-Jan 1945 period 

in Chapter II of this case study.

Morrell, Sydney. Spheres of Influence. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 

[1946]. xii, 339 pp. Glossary. The author treats Greece on pp. 103–

54. He states that there were more than 160 right-wing resistance 

organizations recorded in Greece during the period of the German 

occupation; his section on sub-agencies of the left-wing EAM organization gives a good idea of the complexity and depth of its underground apparatus. Morrell takes the highly controversial point of 

view that the British during the war years pursued a vigorously proEAM/ELAS attitude and thus permitted “Greek affairs to reach a 

stage where civil war was inevitable.”

Noel-Baker, Francis [Edward]. Greece: The Whole Story. London, etc.: 

Hutchinson & Co., [1946]. 64 pp. Maps, chronology. Brief, general 

account of the resistance, emphasizing political events. The author 

feels that the British should have encouraged non-Communists to 

join EAM and thus swing it to a more moderate and democratic 

position, instead of aiding its political opponents outside of EAM. 

This position was mildly echoed by Field-Marshal Wilson in Eight 

Years Overseas.

Playfair, I.S.O. The Early Successes Against Italy (to May 1941) and “The Germans Come to the Help of Their Ally” (1941). (The Mediterranean and the 

Middle East, vols. 1 and 2.) London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 

1954 and 1956. Useful for broad background material on early part 

of the war.

Sacker, David. “The Background of the Greek Crisis,” Contemporary 

Review, 963 (March, 1946), 155–59. This article is a review of events 

from the liberation of Greece in October 1944 through the BritishGreek war of December 1944 and up to the time of writing. Sacker 

presents his conclusions as to the root of Greek troubles and a fourpoint program for relief.

Seth, Ronald. The Undaunted: The Story of the Resistance in Western Europe. 

New York: Philosophical Library [1956]. 327 pp.  Illus.; bibliog., 

index. There is a brief general account of the Greek resistance on 

pp. 65–85 of this work, in which the author attempts to assess its 

military significance. A major contribution to information on Greek 

affairs comes as a result of the author’s interview of 25 March 1955 

with the Italian General Infante, commander of the Pinerolo Division in Greece. According to Seth, General Infante claimed that 

he was able to avoid taking a single reprisal while in Greece, The 
314

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

General’s account of the hectic days of September 1943, when the 

Germans sought the surrender of the Pinerolo Division, confirms 

that about 12,000 of the Division’s 20,000 men eventually reached 

the mountains and the guerrillas. Other Italians joined them 

there until the Italian force reached a strength of 30,000 officers 

and men. Apparently the General did not explain to Seth how the 

EAM/ELAS guerrillas were able to effect the disarming of so large 

a group of trained soldiers on 14 October 1943.

Smothers, Frank, William Hardy McNeil and Elizabeth Darbishire 

McNeill. Report on the Greeks; Findings of a Twentieth Century Fund Team 

Which Surveyed Conditions in Greece in 1947. New York: The Twentieth 

Century Fund, 1948. xvi, 226 pp. Chronology, illus. This work is useful for background purposes particularly for economic and social 

conditions in Greece.

Spencer, Floyd A. War and Postwar Greece: An Analysis Based on Greek 

Writings. Washington: Library of Congress, 1952. xv, 175 pp. This 

extremely valuable work takes the form of a series of bibliographic 

essays and is based very much on the use of Greek texts, although 

writings in other languages are also commented upon. This book 

gives comprehensive coverage of what is available only in the Greek 

language. Spencer frequently summarizes the authors’ major findings or theses.

Stavrianos, L. S. Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity. Chicago: 

Henry Regnery, 1952. ix, 246 pp.  Index. Although Stavrianos 

addresses himself primarily to the question of a proper American 

policy in postwar Greece, almost half of his book is concerned with 

the resistance during World War II. On the whole he looks with disfavor on the “old order” in Greece and regards British policy there 

as unworkable. According to Spencer (see above) this is “the most 

complete [book] which we now have in any language on the recent 

background and current problems of Greece until the present. It is 

also the only work of its kind which makes use of Greek sources.” 

Despite this lavish praise, it may be wise to approach some parts of 

this work with caution: Stavrianos appears to see things in absolute 

terms and, just as the British policy was bad, EAM/ELAS is viewed 

as the lost hope of Greece.

Stavrianos, L. S. “Greece: The War and Aftermath,” Foreign Policy Reports. 

21, 12 (September 1, 1945), 174–87. A very pro-ELAS article, concerned primarily with the political aspects of the Greek resistance.

 . “The Greek National Liberation Front (EAM); A Study in 

Resistance Organization and Resistance,” Journal of Modern History, 

24 (March, 1952), 42–55. The author considers that the Greek Communist Party set up EAM to organize the resistance and to use as a 
Bibliography

315

tool for social revolution. Stavrianos deals with EAM’s organization 

and administration of local government and the financing of the 

guerrilla war; he develops useful information on the formal relations between the guerrillas and the population. It is sometimes 

difficult to tell, however, whether he is describing how things were 

supposed to be done or how things actually were done.

 , and L. S. and E. P. Panagopoulos. “Present-day Greece,” Journal of Modern History, 20 (1948), 149–58. A bibliography on developments in Greece from the beginning of World War II until 1947. 

This is an excellent account of sources, particularly Greek ones.

Sweet-Escott, Bickham. Greece: A Political and Economic Survey: 1939–

1953. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, [1954]. vii, 

206 pp. Maps, apps., bibliog., abbrev., index. In part I of this volume, the author, brother-in-law of Brigadier Myers, undertakes a 

76-page survey of the politics of the war and resistance period, the 

interval of postwar peace, and the guerrilla war of 1946–49. On the 

whole this is a balanced and sensible account, telescoping the main 

events to present an overall picture. The military side of the story 

is briefly indicated. There is another equally long section on Greek 

economic and financial problems.

“Symmachos” [pseud.] Greece Fights On. (Europe Under the Nazis.) London: L. Drummond, [1943?]. 143 pp. Illus., apps. One of the better 

books in this series, this concerns the war of 1941, German occupation policies, conditions in Greece, and the beginnings of resistance. Although a few events in early 1943 are described, this book 

deals mainly in local happenings through 1942. No evidence of 

British special forces is given, but the book is useful for the subjects 

noted above.

Toppe, Alfred. “German Military Government.” 2 vol. Trans. Unpublished ms P–033; EUCOM, 1949. 122 pp. (combined vol.). See 

pp. 38, 46–47 for Generalmajor (Brig. Gen.) Toppe’s discussion of 

the organization of German military government in Greece.

U.S. Air Force, Historical Division. Europe: Argument to V–E Day, January 1944 to May 1945. (The Army Air Forces in World War II, W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, eds., vol. 3,) Chicago: The University of Chicago 

Press, [1951]. xxxix, 948 pp.  Maps, charts, illus., notes, glossary, 

index. A brief and useful reference to air aid to the Greek guerrillas is given in Chapter 14.

Voight, F. A. “Greece, the Empire, and the United States,” Nineteenth 

Century and After, 141, 842 (April, 1947), 186–90. A brief general 

article dealing with political aspects of the resistance.
316

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Weller, George. The Crack in the Column. New York: Random House, 

[1949]. 370 pp. A novel concerning Greek resistance by a Chicago 

newspaperman who was in Greece shortly after its liberation. This 

work correctly names and locates many of the Greek resistance leaders and gives considerable insight into the extraordinary complexity 

of Greek resistance politics.

Wolff, Robert Lee. The Balkans in Our Time. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. xxi, 618 pp. Maps, epilogue, app., index. In Part 

II, pp. 191–266, Wolff reviews Balkan politics during World War II, 

with scattered references to Greece. He deals in some detail with 

the famous “percentages” agreement between Stalin and Churchill 

in Moscow in October 1944 and its repercussions in American-British relations.

Woodhouse, C[hristopher] M. “Five Weeks That Changed World History: A Comment,” Nineteenth Century and After, 143 (January 1948), 

55–58. The author addresses himself to the argument that the German campaign in Yugoslavia upset their time table for invasion 

of Russia and thus caused the critical delay resulting in the final 

Russian success. Woodhouse, after demolishing this argument, 

advances the theory that any delay caused the Germans in 1941 was 

due to the Greek and British defense of Greece. This theory has in 

turn been questioned by German historians. Useful only for background purposes.

Xydis, Stephen G. The Economy and Finances of Greece Under the Occupation. New York: Greek Government Office of Information. [1945?]. 

48 pp. Xydis’ report specifies the economic troubles Greece experienced during the occupation and shows how these problems were 

multiplied by occupational policies and guerrilla warfare. Although 

there may be some exaggeration in this work, neutral observers 

have confirmed the totality of economic devastation visited upon 

Greece.
Acknowledgments

317

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although this study is primarily the responsibility of the author, a 

number of other persons in the Special Operations Research Office 

aided considerably in its completion. Mr. Seymour Shapiro did the 

initial research and wrote useful drafts giving information which 

was incorporated into Chapter I. Dr. Earl De Long and Dr. William 

Lybrand were very helpful in the work of formulating conclusions and 

implications.

A number of staff members read the text of the study, either in 

sections or in its entirety, and made constructive suggestions. These 

include Mrs. Helen Bronheim, Dr. John Killigrew, Mr. Ralph Mavrogordato, and Mr. James Taylor.

Editing of the manuscript was the work of Mrs. Mary Dell Uliassi 

and Mr. Theodore Olson. Copyreading was performed by Mrs. Cameron Byrd.

A series of specialists furthered the completion of this study. Mr. 

Ernest Will advised on illustrations, maps, and topography. Mrs. Mary 

Coyne and Miss June Barton were of assistance in obtaining books, 

documents, and other reference materials.

Acknowledgment must also be made to Mr. Nicholas Pagonis, who 

translated a number of passages from Greek into English. Major (ret.) 

Matthew Vlissides, a veteran of service with the Greek underground in 

the Cyclades Islands during World War II and an antiguerrilla fighter 

with the Greek Army in the postwar period, made two contributions to 

the study. He prepared a manuscript giving an account of his firsthand 

wartime experiences (see Bibliography), and he read and commented 

upon the draft of this study, making a number of valuable suggestions.

The Office of the Chief of Military History aided the work by making available a number of manuscripts written by German general 

officers who had served in Greece. Mr. Detmar Finke of that office 

assisted in the use of the Kriegsgliederungen for the German order of battle in Greece, and Mr. Charles von Leuttichau was very helpful on the 

period of the Italian capitulation. Mr. Hugh Gardiner was particularly 

cooperative, both in discussing Greek problems and in bringing the 

author’s attention to OCMH translations of certain extracts from Army 

Group E War Diary. Staff members of the Federal Records Center, the 

National Archives, and the Central Intelligence Agency were also helpful in making pertinent unclassified records available.

A number of publishers have been kind enough to give this Office 

permission to use illustrative material. These are listed below.
318

Acknowledgments

Illustrations Nos. 1, 11, 14, 16, 17, and 18 are from Greek Entanglement by Brigadier E. C. W. Myers; by permission of the author and the 

publishers, Rupert Hart-Davis, Limited, 36 Soho Square, London W. 1.

Illustrations Nos. 7 and 19 are from Report on the Greeks by Frank 

Smothers, William Hardy McNeil, and Elizabeth Darbishire McNeill, 

by permission of the publishers, The Twentieth Century Fund, 330 

West 42nd Street, New York 18.

Photograph of the late King George II of Greece (Ill. 4) is from 

When Greek Meets Greek by Reginald Leeper, published by Chatto & Windus, Ltd., 40–42 William IV Street, London W.C. 2; reprinted by permission of the Messrs. Fayer, 66 Grosvenor Street, London W. 1., with 

the consent of the Great Marshal of the Court at the Royal Palace, 

Athens.

Illustration No. 8 is from When Greek Meets Greek by Reginald Leeper, 

reprinted by permission of the publisher, Chatto & Windus, Ltd., 40–42 

William IV Street, London W.C. 2.

Illustration No. 9 is from Hide and Seek by Xan Fielding; published 

by Martin Secker and Warburg, Ltd., London, 1954; reprinted by special permission of the author and the publishers; Copyright Xan Fielding, 1954.

Illustrations Nos. 5, 6, 13, and 15 are taken from Beyond Olympus by 

Chris Jecchinis, an account of the Greek resistance to the Nazi occupation in Athens and Mt. Olympus; by permission of the publishers, 

George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., of 182 High Holborn, London W.C. 1.

Illustration No. 25 is taken from Ill Met By Moonlight by W. Stanley 

Moss, an account of the kidnaping of German General Kreipe from 

Crete, published in England by George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., and in 

the United States by the Macmillan Company, by permission of the 

publishers, George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., of 182 High Holborn, London W.C. 1.

Illustrations Nos. 12, 21, 22, 23, and 24 are from Special Service in 

Greece by M. B. McGlynn in the official series, New Zealand in the Second 

World War, ed. by H. K. Kippenberger, and published by the New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, War Histories Branch, 1953.

Illustrations Nos. 27, 28, 33, and 34 were supplied by the Office of 

the Chief of Military History, United States Department of the Army.

Illustrations Nos. 2, 3, 26, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, and 37 are from The 

Sacrifices of Greece in the Second World War, produced and published by 

the Greek Government, Ministry of Public Works.
INDEX

Index

321

INDEX

A

AAA (Liberation Struggle Command), 

40–41, 148, 150

ACHSE (German operation to insure 

surrender of Italian forces in 

Greece), 223–224

Acropolis, 40

Aegean Islands, 73, 89

Africa, 236

Afrika Korps, 216

Agrinion, 188, 189, 190

Albania, 3, 35, 211

Alexander, Field Marshal Harold 

R.L.G., 88, 96

Allied Military Strategy, 32, 49, 51–52, 

53–56, 58–59, 61, 68, 73–74, 85, 

101

Ambushes, 190, 190–191, 215, 216

American-British relations, 71, 76, 108

American Liaison Officers, 71, 76, 87, 

169; See also liaison officers

Amfilokhia, 212, 213

Amfissa, 212, 260, 261

Anatoli, 198

Andon Tsaous’ Band, 40, 41, 79, 97, 

100, 145

ANIMALS (Allied cover operation for 

Sicily campaign), 51, 58–60, 169, 

185, 213, 215

Antiguerrilla operations:

casualties, 259

command and leadership, 243, 

248–249

communication, 237–238, 239–240, 

249–251, 253

counterintelligence, 124, 135, 247

defensive measures, 189–190, 196, 

201, 203–207, 209–210, 211, 236, 

237–242

denial operations, 246

elimination operations, 74, 86, 158, 

164, 185–186, 210, 219, 244–262

lessons, 255–258

results of, 259–262

intelligence, 204, 245–247, 249–250, 

254

lessons, 21, 26, 244, 250, 255–258, 

262

organization and training for, 186, 

232

planning, 247–248, 256–257

psychological measures, 74, 79, 

247–248, 252, 255

reaction operations, 204, 242–244, 

263–264

reprisals, 86, 263–267, 264–268

urban combat, 211–213, 251–252

weapons, 186, 239, 244, 248, 250–

251

Antipersonnel operations, 59, 207–217

Antiscorch, 216

Anzio, 49

Arakhthos River, 78, 85

Aris (Athanasios Klaras, alias Aris 

Veloukhiotis), 31–32, 41, 44, 52, 

54, 57, 70, 74, 78, 146–147, 150–

151, 161, 163, 180, 191–193, 196

Arms and ammunition, 25, 61–62, 72–

74, 86, 96, 99–100, 125, 127–128, 

154, 212, 213, 216, 224

Arnaoutoglou, Captain Andreas, 203, 

204

Arta, 189, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 

215, 242, 259

Asopos Bridge, 30, 58–59, 190, 190–

191, 196, 197, 201, 216

tactics of attack on, 196–200

Athens, 32, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 51, 

52, 53, 54, 55, 59, 63, 64, 82, 84, 

89, 90, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 

118, 122, 123, 151, 152, 159, 160, 

161, 162, 163, 181, 189, 191, 196, 

201, 215, 187, 236, 237, 245, 266

Athens Battalions, 96

Athens University, 81

Athos Roumeliotis’s Band, 40–41
322

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Attacks on communication facilities, 

190

Attacks on military installations, 73, 

202, 210–212

Attacks on transportation targets, 29–

32, 58–60, 186–208, 209–210, 

215, 226, 241

Axis military strategy, 49, 187

B

Bakirdzis, Colonel Euripides, 80, 81, 

122

Bandits, 141, 144

Bari, 82

Beis, Nikolaos, 142

Belgrade, 226, 229

Benfield, Brigadier, 88

Berti, Colonel, 224

Black market, 38, 128

Blind drops, 29

Blockhouses, 237

Boeotia, 230, 260

Bougazi, 211

Brindisi, 82

British Eighth Army, 29

British Forces in Greece:

1941, 35–36, 44

1944, 51, 91, 95–98

commandos, 216

raiding support regiment, 78, 85, 

128, 170, 190, 207, 214

British Foreign Office, 62–64, 68–69, 

107

British Liaison Officers; See Liaison 

Officers

British Military Mission, 50–51, 70–71, 

74, 76–79, 81, 85, 88–89, 90–91, 

108, 168, 169

becomes AMM, 71, 169

casualties, 218

conclusion of mission, 91

coordination and control of 

guerrillas, 49–104, 72–73, 128, 

168, 179, 180–181, 185

growth, 123

mission of, 32, 52, 55, 60–61

organization of, 167–169, 171–173

policy guidance, 62–63, 117

strength, 55, 59, 168–170, 218–219

British political policy in Greece, 66–

70, 76, 78, 85–86, 89, 94, 97–98, 

100–103

British Secret Intelligence Service, 79

British War Cabinet, 107

Bulgarian Forces, 90, 213, 223, 233

casualties, 214

occupation policy, 36–38

reprisals, 219

C

C-47 transports, 133, 136, 137

Cages, 241–242

Cairo, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 

91, 122, 123, 126, 135, 168, 245

Cairo Conference 1943, 63–64, 66–70, 

76, 169

Camouflage, 137, 204, 207

Canea, 122

Capetan, 150

Caserta Agreement, 89, 277–278

Caserta Conference, 88

Cavalry, 155

Cephalonia, 224

Chams, 33

Choiropotamos, 202

Chrome mines, 216

Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 50, 

59, 67, 69, 94, 97–98, 107, 185

Civil war in Greece:

spring 1943, 54

autumn 1943, 69, 74–79, 93–101

December 1944, 93–101

Clothing, 31, 125–126, 127–128, 154, 

172–173, 194, 165

Collaboration, 62, 74, 76–77, 83, 86, 

92, 96, 98, 162–164, 232, 235, 

251–252, 268, 275

Combat intelligence, 245–247
Index

323

Committee of Six Colonels, 40, 52–54

Communication

air–ground, 29, 133–136

between Greece and Cairo, 52, 55, 

64, 118, 122–125, 157, 168, 245

within Greece, 71, 96, 123–124, 

157–158, 168, 190, 246–247

Communist Party of Greece (KKE), 34, 

41–42, 50–51, 54, 61, 71, 80, 84, 

97, 150

Comparative casualty ratios, 214

Comparative force ratios, 213

Constitution Square, 94

Convoys, 240

Corfu, 97, 100, 186, 224

Corinth, 266

Counterrevolution of the right, 100

Couriers, 123–124, 128, 157, 171, 204

Crete, 29, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 44, 49, 89, 

108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 

115, 117, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 

130, 131, 145, 158, 168, 170, 175, 

177, 178, 180, 189, 216, 223, 224, 

243

battle of, 113

resistance to German assault, 36

Cypriot Runner Service, 124

Cyprus Regiment, 113

D

Damaskinos (Archbishop of Athens, 

Regent of Greece), 68, 98, 99

D-Day, 49

Defensive operations (guerrilla), 

212–213, 243–244, 246, 251–255, 

259–262

Demobilization of guerrillas, 51, 63, 

83–84, 88, 91–93, 98, 99–100

Demolitions, 31–32, 110, 118, 121, 158, 

185, 190, 191, 192, 194–196, 200, 

203–205, 207–209

Derna, 131

Despotopoulos, Constantine, 63

Dhion, 203

Dhistomon, 267

E

EAM (National Liberation Front, 

Communist-dominated 

resistance organization);

See EAM/ELAS

EAM/ELAS, 42, 44, 54–58, 62–63, 68, 

72–73, 78, 81, 84, 90, 98, 129, 

145, 146, 175, 235, 236

aid in construction of landing strip, 

136–137

area control, 53–55, 57, 61–62, 72, 

77–78, 81, 93, 102, 146–147, 151, 

154, 155

attempts to control liaison officers, 

55, 71, 74, 156, 177

British support of, 127–129, 218–219

casualties, 219, 259–262

cavalry, 71, 155

communications, 157

conflict with other Greek guerrillas, 

41, 51–54, 61, 70–71, 74–78, 81, 

85–87, 89, 94, 97, 158, 185, 236, 

252

demobilization fight, 77, 83–84, 

91–92, 98, 100

EAM Central Committee, 42–43, 

54, 63, 150, 151

guerrillas, 53–54, 57–58, 60–61, 

146, 152, 259–260

guerrilla strength, 44, 59, 71, 79, 

95, 151–152, 152, 156, 158–159

guerrilla training and discipline, 

31, 158, 180, 196, 149–153

leadership, 11–12, 56, 146–147, 

149–150, 152–153, 203

logistics, 31, 72–73, 86, 154–156, 

158, 212

Macedonian question, 90

naval operations, 156; See also ELAN

operations against enemy, 31–32, 

59, 89, 202, 211, 214, 215–216, 

259–262

organization of EAM subsidiaries, 

42–44

organization of ELAS, 44, 52, 57, 

62, 71, 202, 149–159
324

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

3rd Cavalry Regiment, 71

9th Division, 86, 88

50th Guerrilla Regiment, 203

participation in National Bands 

Agreement, 57

political aims, 42, 51, 53–56, 60–62, 

64, 66–67, 70–71, 79–82, 84, 87–

88, 91, 93–94, 97–98, 148–149

popular support of, 71, 78–80, 85, 

90, 95, 97–100, 102, 152–153, 

236, 268

propaganda, 19, 68, 73, 82, 94, 146, 

149, 152, 162–163

recruitment, 81, 152–153

relations with branch, 51, 55–56, 

70–71, 75, 85, 87–89, 92–98, 100, 

157–158, 177, 197, 216

relation with government-in-exile, 

63–69, 76, 81–85, 87–88

relation with Government of 

National Unity, 87, 91–93

relation with Greek government, 98

relation with Greek people, 154–

155

reprisals, 54, 83, 97–99, 156, 236

security, 157

strength, 43, 59, 62, 127–129

training and discipline, 153, 158, 

211

underground organization of, 18–

19, 24, 42–44, 52, 62, 150

underground resistance operations, 

43, 54, 62

Eamobulgarians, 90

“Eastern” battalions, 233

Eastern Orthodox Church, 33, 142

Economic situation of Greece, 33, 

37–39, 43, 220

EDEM (minor resistance organization), 

40

Anthony Eden, 69, 97

EDES (the National Republican Greek 

League), 41, 57, 60–63, 68, 72, 

77–78, 84, 86–87, 89, 127, 129, 

145, 146, 154, 234, 258

area control, 167

arms and equipment, 31, 167

British support of, 75–76, 79, 127–

128, 161–162, 218

charges of collaboration, 62, 163–

165, 207, 210

conflict with EAM/ELAS, 52, 54, 

61, 74–79, 81, 86, 97, 167, 209–

210, 252

guerrilla bands, 41, 44

guerrilla operations, 31–32, 59, 89, 

159–160, 164, 207–208, 210, 215, 

260

leadership, 159–160, 161, 166, 194

organization of, 41, 166–167

political aims, 41, 52, 56, 63, 159–

162, 164

recruitment, 165–166

relation with branch, 56, 160–161, 

161, 164, 165

strength, 41, 44, 167

training and discipline, 31, 149, 161, 

166, 196, 210

EEAM (Workers’ National Liberation 

Front. A subsidiary organization 

of EAM), 42, 43, 262

Ehrgott, Captain Winston W., 71

EKKA (National and Social 

Liberation), 41, 53, 58, 59–63, 

68, 72, 74, 78–80, 84–85, 145, 

236

destruction by EAM/ELAS, 41, 81, 

236

organization of, 41

political aims, 41, 63

strength, 41, 59–60, 129

El Alamein line, 29–30

ELAN (Greek People’s Liberation 

Navy. Naval Section of ELAS), 

128, 155, 156

4th Pelion Squadron, 157

ELAS (Greek People’s Liberation 

Army. Guerrilla arm of EAM);

See EAM/ELAS

ELD (Popular Democratic Union. 

Socialist party started by 
Index

325

Elias Tsirimokos during the 

occupation. It was affiliated with 

EAM until March 1945.), 42

Elections, 80

Eleftheria (Liberty) Group, 41

Encirclement tactics (German), 244–

262

EOA (National Organization of 

Officers. A minor resistance 

organization), 40, 41, 236

EOEA (National Bands of Greek 

Guerrillas), 161; See also EDES 

(the National Republican Greek 

League)

EOK (National Organization of 

Cretans), 40–41, 145

Epirus, 59, 75, 77, 85, 86, 100, 146, 151, 

159, 164, 167, 168, 181, 207, 210, 

227, 260

EPON (United Panhellenic Youth 

Organization. A subsidiary of 

EAM), 43, 155, 158, 175

ES (A minor resistance organization 

whose initials stood for the 

Greek Army), 40–41, 236

ETA (Guerrilla commissariat set up by 

the EAM/ELAS), 43, 154, 155

Evasion and escape, 44, 82, 108, 137, 

191, 206, 215–216

Evmaios (code name by which 

Andhreas Tzimas was known 

to Brigadier Myers); See Tzimas, 

Andhreas

Exfiltration, air, 63

Exfiltration, sea, 32, 51, 171

F

Famine, 38, 39, 44, 219

Felmy, General der Flieger Helmuth, 

228, 254, 265, 267

Fielding, Xan, 178

Food, 125, 127–128, 154, 171–172, 175–

176, 213, 216

Fosteridhis, Andonios, 79

France, 53

G

Gandin, General (Italian commander 

on Cephalonia), 224

Gasoline, 189

GEMSBOCK (major German 

antiguerrilla operation), 210, 

259–260

George II, 34–35, 50, 56, 64–69, 76–77, 

81, 94, 97–98, 117, 161, 235

George VI (British monarch), 69

German forces:

1st Mountain Division, 211, 232, 

260, 264

7th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 

267–268

117th Division, 265

749th Light Regiment, 265

agreement with EDES, 163–164

antiresistance measures, 39

Army Group E, 226–231, 233, 261, 

265

Army Group F, 226

assault on Crete, 36

Balkan strategy, 19–20, 35, 49, 223, 

232

casualties, 214, 259–260

control of food, 61

eastern troop units, 86

Fortress Crete, 227

intervention in Italo-Greek Ware, 

1941, 35

LXVIII Corps, 227–228, 244, 260, 

265–266, 267

Military Commander Southeast, 

229

Military Command Greece, 229

mission, 49, 187, 214, 226–227, 230

occupation policy, 36, 37–39, 44, 

262–265, 266–267

Operation ACHSE, 72, 223–224

operations against guerrillas;

See antiguerrilla operations

organization of, 226–227, 229–231

psychological operations, 20
326

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

reprisals, 219

Salonika-Aegean command, 228, 

233

Senior SS and Police Leader, 229–

230

ship security, 216–217

Southeastern Theater, 226, 232

SS troops, 260

strength, 213, 223, 227, 232, 232–

235, 248

supply, 189

treatment of civilians, 20, 25, 38, 

166, 240, 243, 251–252, 261–267

troop security measures, 212

withdrawal from Greece, 51, 89, 

185–186

XXII Mountain Corps, 227–228, 

242, 247, 250, 259, 260, 264

Gonatas, Stylianos, 163, 234

Gordon-Creed, Geoffrey, 197

Gorgopotamos Bridge, 29–32, 41, 

44–45, 49–51, 58, 115–117, 123, 

146, 160, 171, 177, 180, 185, 196, 

201, 165

attack on, 74, 118, 146, 167, 191–197

Government-in-exile, 63–69, 76, 81–85, 

87, 90, 102, 108

Government of National Unity, 77, 

81–84, 86–89, 91, 93

Grammos Mountains, 144, 211

Greek Army, 36, 160

5th Cretan Division, 35

Mountain Brigade, 92, 96, 99

mutiny of forces in Middle East, 64, 

81–83, 92

National Guard, 96

re-creation of in postwar period, 77, 

82, 88, 91–93, 100

Sacred Brigade, 40–41

War of 1940–41, 35

Greek Nazi Party, 40

Greek people, 33–34

attitude toward British, 44 et passim

attitude toward liaison offices, 173

attitude toward monarchy, 64–67

attitude toward resistance and 

guerrilla operations, 60, 62, 155, 

200, 175–176, 201, 203, 142–144, 

234–235

casualties, 219

of mountains, 142–145, 174–176, 181

reaction to occupation, 20, 39, 

61, 113, 176–177, 234–235, 247, 

262–263, 268

Greek Puppet Government, 36–38, 39, 

79, 234–235

Greek State Railways, 187

Grivas, Colonel (head of the X 

organization which operated in 

Athens during the later phases 

of the occupation), 87

guerrilla-hunting details, 232

guerrilla operations; See also ambushes; 

ANIMALS; antipersonnel 

operations; antiscorch; attacks 

on communication facilities;

attacks on military installations; 

attacks on transportation 

targets; comparative casualty 

ratios; comparative force ratios; 

evasion and escape; intelligence; 

NOAH’S ARK; sabotage; safe 

areas

evaluation of, 6–9, 12, 51, 59–60, 

185–187, 196, 206–207, 212–217, 

229

growth of, 44–45, 53

political ramifications of, 9–11, 

49–104

Gytheion, 264

H

Hague Conventions, 211

Haifa, 121

Halifax bombers, 133, 135

Hamson, Denys, 146

Handling of enemy weapons, 121

Hitler, Adolf (Dictator of Germany), 

35, 39, 217, 223, 230, 262
Index

327

HORRIDO (German antiguerrilla 

operation), 259, 261

Hostages, 78, 98–100, 240, 241, 263, 

264, 266

I

Identity cards, 126

Igoumenitsa, 207

ILTIS (German antiguerrilla 

operation), 259

Infante, General (Commander of the 

Italian Pinerolo Division), 72–73, 

224

Infant mortality, 39

Infiltration, air, 29, 132–133, 135

cost estimate, 8–9, 137

landing strip, 136–137, 174

signals, 135–136

success of, 17, 133–135

Infiltration, sea, 108, 121–122, 128, 

130–132, 156, 170–171

Inflation, 129

Intelligence, 108, 201–204, 216, 245, 

249

leaks, 246–247

Interdiction; See attacks on 

transportation targets

Ionian Islands, 37, 223

Ipefthinos (key man in EAM system of 

control of population), 43

Italian forces, 31–32, 39, 209

Aosta Cavalry Regiment, 73, 224

armistice with Greek guerrillas, 73, 

271

attack on Greece, 34–35

casualties, 32, 214

defensive measures, 191, 195–196, 

209–212, 236

Eleventh Army, 35–36, 223–224

in German Army, 233

intelligence, 226, 245

occupation policy, 36–37

Pinerolo Division, 72–74, 127, 129, 

214, 224, 226

reaction operation, 209–210, 236

reprisals, 219, 236

strength, 223

withdrawal from the war, 61–62, 

72–73, 154, 185, 223–224, 271

J

Jews, 33, 216, 219

Joint General Headquarters (created 

by the National Bands 

Agreement), 56–57, 62, 70–71

Joint headquarters, 74, 129

K

Kaitsa, 144

KALAVRITA (German antiguerrilla 

operation), 244, 265–266, 267

Karalivanos, 181

Karpenision, 164

Kartalis, George (political adviser in 

EKKA), 63

Katerini, 191, 202–203, 240

Khuri, Sergeant Michael, 197

KKE; See Communist Party of Greece

Klaras, Athanasios; See Aris

Klisoura, 267

Komitadjis, 144

Korca, 210, 260

Korinos, 203

Kournovon Tunnel, 241

Koutsaina, 89

conference, 81–82

Koutsoyiannopoulos, 122

Krech, Generalleutenant (Major 

General), 212

Kreipe, Generalmajor (Brigadier 

General) Karl, 216, 217

KREUZOTTER (major German 

antiguerrilla operation), 260–261

L

Labor conscription, 44, 58, 262

LAE (minor resistance organization), 40
328

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Lamia, 90

Landing craft, 49

Landing strip, 136–137, 216

Lanz, General der Gebirgstruppen 

(Lt. General, Mountain Troops) 

Hubert (commanding XXII 

Mountain Corps), 164–165, 196, 

208, 210–211, 228, 238–240, 245, 

250, 252, 258, 261–264

Lapworth, 203–206

Larisa, 189, 207

Larisa Airfield, 73

Leaflets, 76, 93, 251–252, 255

Lebanon Charter, 83–84, 91, 275–276

Lebanon Conference, 81–84, 88–89

Leeper, Reginald (British Ambassador 

to the Greek governmentin0exile), 64, 67–68, 93

Legality of guerrilla operations, 210

Leskovic, 211

Lessons of major antiguerrilla 

operations, 256–259

Levkos, 91

Liaison Officers, 52, 71–72, 108–109, 

146, 152, 167, 174–179, 202, 218, 

243, 245

casualties, 55, 218

command and discipline, 14–15, 

22–24, 55, 62–63, 168

control value of, 14–15, 23–24

leadership on operation, 201–202

living conditions, 169–182

motivation, 111–116, 120

relations with Greek people, 173–

175

relations with guerrillas, 13–14, 118, 

169–170, 176–181, 191, 201–205

selection of, 13–14, 16, 24, 111–112, 

120

sickness, 219

strength, 115

training of, 16–17, 117, 121–122

work of, 168

Liberator bombers, 132–133

Libya, 131

Loehr, Generaloberst Alexander 

(Commander of Army Group E), 

227–231, 233, 237, 260

London, 63, 64, 69, 94, 107

Loudspeakers, 251–255

Louron Bridge, 208–210

M

Macedonia, 41, 79, 90, 97, 100, 141, 

144, 145, 151, 157, 168, 178, 179, 

228, 267

Macedonian question, 90

MAIGEWITTER (German 

antiguerrilla operation), 259

Mandakas, General Emmanuel, 80, 96

MANNA (British operation, 

conventional counterpart of 

Operation NOAH’S ARK), 90, 

185

Mavroneri, 201–202

McAdam, Major M. G., 203, 204–205

McIntyre, Captain Henry, 197

MEC; See Middle East Command

Medical care, 127, 155, 172, 213

Mediterranean Theater, 109

Merchant Marine, 33, 38

Messolongi, 188

Metaxas, General Ioannis (Dictator of 

Greece), 34–35, 41, 42

Metsovon, 89, 207

Metsovon Highway, 207, 226, 242

Middle East Air Interpretation Unit, 

137

Middle East Command (MEC), 54–59, 

63–64, 68–69, 73, 76, 82, 107, 

109, 167, 185

depot, 121

Mines, 190–191, 207–208, 213, 215, 

240, 253

Minister of Economic Warfare 

(British), 107

Mirofillon, 77
Index

329

Monarchy, question of, 34, 41, 52–53, 

64–68, 70, 90, 97, 100

Money, 74, 125, 128–129, 175, 218–219

Moscow, 86, 146

Mountains; See terrain

Mussolini, 34

Mutch, Lance-Corporal Charlie, 197

Mutinies; See Greek Army

Myers, Brigadier E.C.W. (First 

Commander of British Military 

Mission), 31–33, 44, 49–64, 66–

70, 74, 101–102, 109, 116–118, 

121–123, 128–129, 132–133, 142, 

146, 151, 154, 157, 160, 161, 167–

169, 171, 172, 175–178, 178, 181, 

191, 193–196, 245

N

National Bands Agreement, 53–58, 62, 

68, 74, 127, 269–270

National Committee (minor resistance 

movement), 40

Neraidha, 136, 175

Neubacher, Ambassador Hermann, 

230, 265, 265–266

NOAH’S ARK (Guerrilla operation 

designed to harass German 

withdrawal from Greece. 

Guerrilla counterpart of 

MANNA.), 76, 78, 80, 89–90, 

127–128, 185–186, 201, 214, 242

O

Occupation zones, 36–37, 225

Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 108, 

119–120

operational groups, 78, 85, 128, 

168, 170, 179, 191, 202, 206, 

214–215

Oiti, Mount, 196

Olympus, Mount, 168, 186, 259

Operational Groups (OG); See Office 

of Strategic Services

OPLA (Units for the Protection of the 

People’s Struggle, police terror 

organization of EAM/ELAS), 43

OSS; See Office of Strategic Services

Othonaios, General, 84, 88, 92

P

Pack animals, 156–157

Pangalos, Gen. Theodore, 234

PANTHER (German antiguerrilla 

operation), 259

PAO (Panhellenic Liberation 

Organization, minor resistance 

organization), 40–41

Papadhia Bridge, 30

Papadhongonas, Colonel, 237

Papandhreou, George (Prime Minister 

of Government of National 

Unity), 82–85, 87–94, 97

Parachuting, 117, 121

Parga, 127, 128, 130, 167, 170, 216

Patras, Gulf of, 227

PEAN (Patriotic Union of Fighting 

Youth, minor resistance 

organization), 40

PEEA (Committee for National 

Liberation, also called Political 

Committee, set up by EAM/

ELAS to govern occupied 

Greece), 80–82, 84, 87, 90, 91, 

122, 175

PEK (Panhellenic National Party, 

minor resistance organization), 

40

Pelion, 156

Peloponnesus, 41, 54, 89, 141, 150, 151, 

154, 168, 188, 212, 215, 223, 187, 

227, 230, 236, 237, 264, 265

Pendalofon, 260

People’s Courts, 97–98

Perivoli, 124

Pindus Mountains, 74

Pinerolo Division; See Italian Forces

Piraeus, 29, 36, 38, 43, 98, 187

Plaka, 78, 89

Plaka Armistice, 51, 77–79, 81, 85, 163, 

167, 273–274
330

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Plastiras, General Nicholas, 53, 97–98, 

160–161

Plitzanopoulos, Colonel, 236

Political adviser; See EAM/EALS, 

Organization of ELAS

Political Committee; See PEEA

Popov, Lt. Colonel, 86

Popular Democratic Union (ELD), 63

Population of Greece; See Greek people

Prisoners:

guerrilla treatment of, 178–179, 215

Prometheus I, 80

Prometheus II, 122–123

Propaganda, 39–40, 43, 54, 62, 67–68, 

74–78, 94, 108, 129, 150, 164, 

202, 251–252, 255, 267

Psaros, Colonel Dimitrios (leader of 

EKKA), 41, 53–54, 56–57, 59, 

62–63, 79–81, 83

Psychological operation, 8, 20, 217

Psychoundakis, George, 181

Puppet Government; See Greek Puppet 

Government

Pyromaglou, Komninos, 57, 63, 161, 

193, 194

Q

Quebec Conference, 67

R

Radio Moscow, 77

Radio operators, 171

Radios, 71, 122–123, 127, 157, 168, 216, 

237, 246

training of operators, 118–119, 124

Raiding Support Regiment (RSR);

See British Forces in Greece

Railways, 187–189, 202, 220

Rallis, John, 234–235

RAN (minor resistance organization), 

40

Reade, Arthur, 243

Rebecca/Eureka equipment, 135

Reception committees, 29, 131–137

Reception committees., 169

Reconnaissance, 195, 197–198, 201

Red Cross, 163

Reichs Leader SS, 230

RENNTIER (German antiguerrilla 

operation), 259

Reprisals, 38, 166, 176, 219, 144, 263–

268

Restricted zones, 240

Rhodes, 89, 223, 224

Road maintenance, 158

Roads, 187–189 et passim

Rock mines, 208

Rommel, Field-Marshal Erwin, 29, 49, 

101

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 67–68

Roumeli, 79, 151, 157, 168

Roussos, Petros, 63

Royal Air Force, 137

Rumors, 40, 247

Russia, 35, 217, 232, 244, 262

policy toward Greece, 86

Russian Military Mission, 86

S

Sabotage, 44–45, 55, 57–61, 85, 110, 

112, 121, 144, 190, 200, 201, 207, 

144

Sacred Brigade; See Greek Army

Safe areas, 216

Salonika, 36, 43, 89, 122, 188, 189, 191, 

196, 201, 202, 219, 187, 228

Samariniotis; See Andhreas Tzimas

Samos, 158, 223, 224

SAN (minor resistance organization), 

40–41

Sarandaporou Pass, 59

Saraphis, 50, 53–54, 56–59, 70–71, 75, 

77–79, 82–89, 91–92, 128–129, 

136, 148–153, 156–160, 177, 180, 

213–214, 232, 235, 236, 260

Schimana, General, 229, 230, 265

Scobie, Lt. General Ronald, 88–96
Index

331

Scott R., 197

Security battalions, 79, 81, 86–87, 92, 

96, 159, 233–237, 272

Security forces, 213

Sheppard, Lt. Col. Rufus, 55, 168, 177

Siantos, George, 50, 97–98, 151

Siatista, 211

Sicily, 49, 51, 57, 59, 60, 71, 185, 213

Sick and wounded; See medical care

SKE; See Socialist Party of Greece

Slavophone Greeks, 33

Slowdowns, 39

Small-boat raids, 108

Socialist Party of Greece (SKE), 42

Spanish Civil War, 146

Sparta, 264, 266

Special Operations Executive (SOE), 

51, 52–56, 61, 63, 64, 67–68, 88, 

107–138

communication problems, 17–18, 

109, 122–125

field-staff relations, 109–110, 135–

136

infiltration of men and material, 

130–137

organization, 15–16, 107–110

policy control, 68–69, 107

selection of liaison officers, 111–120

strength, 108

supply problems, 17, 109, 125–129

training of liaison officers, 117, 

121–122

Speidel, General der Flieger Wilhelm, 

228–231, 265–266

S-phone equipment, 135

Spies, 245–246

SS troops; See German forces

STEINADLER (German antiguerrilla 

operation), 210, 260–261

Stettner, General, 264

Stott, Donald, 197

Strikes, 43, 93–94

Strong points, 237–240, 253

Submarines, 32, 131

Subversion of enemy troops, 108

Le Suire, General von, 265

Supply:

external, 12–13, 17, 25, 74, 78, 86, 

109, 125–129, 133, 216

control value of, 12–13, 56, 61, 

72–73, 76, 79, 85–86, 100–102, 

127–128, 154, 162, 165

estimates of cost, 218

estimates of transportation 

cost, 8–9, 218

magnitude, 128

local, 61–62, 72–74, 86, 96, 154, 

205–206, 209–210, 212

Svolos, Alexander, 81–85, 87–88, 100

T

Tavoularis, 163

Telephones, 157, 190, 246–247

Terrain, 33, 141–142, 243 et passim

effect on operations, 250–251

Terrorism; See German forces, 

reprisals; German forces, 

treatment of civilians; EAM/

ELAS, reprisals; torture

Theodhoriana, 172

Thessaly, 62, 72, 74, 96, 141, 151, 157, 

188, 189

Thrace, 37, 90, 141, 151, 215, 228, 233

Tiedown of troops, 6–7, 59, 213–214

Tito, 86, 151

Tobruk, 131

Torture, 144, 177, 178

Trainbusting, 203–207

Training School, 153, 159

Transportation:

to and from Greece; See exfiltration, 

air; exfiltration, sea; infiltration, 

air, infiltration, sea

within Greece, 156–157, 175

Transportation targets, 55, 141, 187–

189, 204, 207, 217, 236

Travel passes, 177
332

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Trikkala, 150, 189, 207, 210, 259, 260

Tripolis, 264, 266

Trucks, 189

Tsirimokos, Elias, 63

Tsoudheros, Emmanuel (Prime 

Minister of Greek governmentin-exile), 66, 68–69, 81–82

Turkey, 33, 36, 49, 64, 128, 155, 156, 

157

Turks, 33

Tzimas, Andhreas, 57, 63–65, 150, 151, 

175

U

Underground resistance:

causes of, 34, 38–39, 44

operations, 39, 43–44, 262–263

organization of, 18–19, 24, 40–43

political ramifications of, 18–19, 34, 

40 et passim

Union of Enslaved Victors (minor 

resistance organization), 40

V

Valtos, 59

Varkiza Agreement, 99–100

Vecchiarelli, General (Commanding 

Italian Eleventh Army), 223–224

Vendetta, 143

Vendiris, General Constantine, 92

Venizelos, Sophocles, 81–83

Vickers Wellesley aircraft, 136

Viniani, 80–81

Vlachs, 33

Voulpiotis, 163

W

Wallace, Major David, 62–64

Weather, effect on operations, 250

Weichs, Field Marshal Maximilian von, 

226–227, 229, 265–266

West, Colonel Paul, 170

Wilson, General Henry Maitland, 59, 

68–69, 72, 76, 88, 107, 118, 124, 

138, 179

Wines, Major Gerald K. Wines, 50, 75, 

76, 87, 169, 170

WOLF (German antiguerrilla 

operation), 259

Women, 137, 142–143, 172–174

Woodhouse, Colonel Christopher 

Montague, 50, 52–54, 56, 60, 63, 

70–79, 81, 84–85, 87, 89, 91, 102, 

110, 117–119, 123, 129, 130, 146, 

151, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159–163, 

167–168, 177–178, 179–180, 186, 

194, 213, 214, 216, 217, 224, 235–

236, 245, 262

X

“X” Organization (pronounced 

“Khee”), 41, 87, 94

Y

Yanni, 243

Yannina, 164, 189, 190, 207, 208, 209, 

210, 211, 215, 216, 242, 245, 259, 

260

York, H.M.S., 110

Yugoslavia, 35, 128, 132, 151, 244, 187

Yugoslavian resistance, 109

YVE (Protectors of Northern Greece, 

minor resistance organization), 

40

Z

Zakhariadhis, Nicholas, 34, 50

Zervas, General Napoleon (Military 

Commander of EDES), 31–32, 

41, 44, 50–54, 56–57, 59, 61–63, 

66, 74, 76–78, 85, 88–89, 97, 100, 

115, 118, 122, 146–150, 159–165, 

166–167, 177, 181, 191–195, 195, 

207, 260