Filed 9/29/23 J.D.F. v. Crawford CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

J.D.F

. ,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

DENNIS CYRIL CRAWFORD,

Defendant and Respondent. B321170

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 21STCP03057

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County. Gregory Keosian, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Salar Atrizadeh, Salar Atrizadeh; Jeff Lewis

Law, Jeffrey Lewis and Sean C. Rotstan for Plaintiff and

Appellant.

Mazur & Mazur and Janice R. Mazur for Defendant and

Respondent.

* * * * * * * * * *2 Plaintiff and appellant J.D.F. contends the trial court erred

in granting defendant’s Code of Civil Procedure 1 section 418.10

motion to quash . Plaintiff argues the evidence established

personal jurisdiction over defendant and respondent Dennis Cyril

Craw ford (also known as Yuan Xun). In the alternative, plaintiff

contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff

jurisdictional discovery. We disagree. Not only did plaintiff fail

to serve defendant with the summons in this action, but

p laintiff’s evidence was insufficient to meet his burden of showing

personal jurisdiction over defendant if he had been served. The

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying jurisdictional

discovery where plaintiff failed to adequately raise the issue

below

. We therefore affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We limit our recitation of the facts to those relevant to the

issues on appeal.

1. The Parties

Plaintiff is a United States citizen of Chinese descent who

frequently travels internationally for work and for personal

purposes

. He claims to live in Los Angeles with his parents, but

the record does not bear this out.

To support his claim of Los Angeles residency

, plaintiff

cites to four documents: his verifi ed complaint and his and each

of his parents’ declarations in support of his opposition to

defendant’s motion to quash.

His verified complaint alleges that he was, at all times

relevant, “an individual residing in Los Angeles

. ” But his

declaration belies this claim. P laintiff declares he “view[s]

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of

Civil Procedure.3

[him]self” as a California resident because his parents moved to

California in 2018. His parents live in Newport Coast

— a

community in Orange County, not Los Angeles County

. His

credit card statements are sent to his parents’ address in

California, which he calls his only “permanent mailing address”

in the world. He states his parents have bank accounts, pay

taxes, and are registered to vote in California, but makes no

correspond ing claims as to himself.

In their declarations, his parents echo that, aside from his

parents ’ address where they moved in 2018, plaintiff “has had no

other permanent residences .

. . for the past four years since he

traveled to Beijing, China in 2017 to pursue employment

opportunities” and his parents’ home “is where Plaintiff would

reside if/when he returns to the United States.”

Not only does plaintiff’s evidence fail to establish he has

ever lived in California, it fails to establish he has ever even been

here. The only indication that he has been to California is that

his declaration purports to have been executed in Los Angeles

.

B ut his parents’ declarations make clear that he was not in the

United States on the day it was signed. Moreover, his c redit card

statements from the preceding month show he was in Hong

Kong. They include charges at a restaurant and an optician in

Hong Kong, among other charges in Hong Kong dollars.

As to d efendant , he is the founder and operator of an entity

called Sino American Reunion (SAR). T he record establishes he

has never been to California. He denies living in China but does

not say where he lives

— except to say generally that he now lives

in “ Asia. ”4

2. SAR

SAR is a separate entity from defendant

, whose form

plaintiff does not identify. SAR’s purpose is to provide assistance

to persons of Chinese descent born outside of China who desire to

move to China. SAR operates through its own website and other

means of online communication. Defendant operates SAR’s

website and is an active participant in its various online and

social media communities. SAR has a five

- member steering

committee and one of its members goes to college in California.

SAR’s website states that its material is “largely aimed at

second

- generation American citizens of Chinese heritage

. ” SAR’s

website states that a large number of East Asian immigrants and

Chinese Americans live in California. Plaintiff offers the

following statistics to substantiate this: Calif ornia is the state

with the largest “Asian population,” at 6. 7 million, followed by

New York (1.9 million), Texas (1.6 million), New Jersey

(1 million) and Washington (0.9 million). Together, these states

are home to 55 percent of the “Asians” in the United States.

Plaintiff’s statistics do not provide a breakdown of the “Asian”

population in these states by national origin.

SAR’s intended audience is not limited to Americans,

however. A SAR

- operated “Discord server in the Reddit

subcommunity ‘r/chine seamerican’ ” offers content “for CHINESE

DIA S PORA users: Chinese Americans, Chinese Canadians,

Chinese British, Chinese Australians, Hong Kong HK

Americans/Canadians/etc., Taiwanese Americans/Canadians/etc.,

basically people of Chinese ancestry living ou tside the Greater

China Area.”

Discord is a company “based in California.” Plaintiff

presents no evidence that any of the other websites or services5

plaintiff alleges defendant and SAR used is based in California.

SAR’s domain is hosted by a Colorado co mpany, another Colorado

company provides a related service, SAR’s server is provided by a

New York company, and defendant used another web hos t ing

company based in Oregon.

3. Allegations of the Operative Complaint

Plaintiff met defendant online and met him in person in

Beijing, China, in late 2017. According to the complaint, at the

time of their meeting, defendant sought to exploit plaintiff’s

education and professional background to advance defendant’s

efforts to promote SAR.

Though plaintiff’s role with SAR is un clear

, his allegations

indicate he had some involvement at some point, because in 2018

he told defendant “he no longer wanted to participate in SAR.”

This prompted defendant to begin a campaign of stalking and

harassment against plaintiff , including public and private

communications to third parties that plaintiff claims were

defamatory or otherwise tortious

. Much, but not all, of defendant’s alleged conduct involved

private communication s between defendant and plaintiff alone

. As to communications with third parties, a t one point defendant

discussed the prospect of an in

- person meeting in Hong Kong

between plaintiff

’s “business contacts ” and defendant . Plaintiff

asserts these “ business contacts ” were “ based in California” at

th e time, and defendant knew this because, when scheduling a

call with them months earlier, he acknowledged the time

difference between his location and California.

Defendant falsely presented plaintiff as being affiliated

with SAR, using his “personal prof ile and professional credentials

to recruit new members for [SAR] to his commercial benefit

, ” and6

posted online without plaintiff’s permission a personal essay

plaintiff had written and other personal information about

plaintiff

.

In 2021

, plaintiff demanded defendant to stop publicizing

his personal information and using his essay. Defendant refused.

Plaintiff retained counsel who reiterated plaintiff’s demand to

defendant in writing. Defendant still refused to comply and

continued to ha rass plaintiff. He called plaintiff a “liar” and

“coward” in SAR’s Discord chat group and urged its members to

harass p laintiff

. He also started a new website about plaintiff in

the guise of a “fan page” that posted more of plaintiff’s personal

informati on, including that he was in Hong Kong.

4. The Proceedings Below

Plaintiff sued defendant and SAR in Los Angeles Superior

Court in September 2021

. SAR is not a party to this appeal.

Plaintiff never filed a proof of service of the summons or

complaint and does not claim to have served defendant with

those documents

. Plaintiff did , however, attempt to serve

defendant with a motion for a protective order at an address in

China. His proof of service stated that this was accomplished by

“regular United States Mail.”

Defendant specially appeared to contest service of th e

motion to quash “and any [s]ummons and [c]omplaint.”

Defendant argued he was entitled to have the court quash service

both because he was never served with the summons and

complaint and, even if he had been

, defendant would not be

subject to personal jurisdiction in California. As to the latter

ground, defendant denied having any “constitu tionally minimum

contacts whatsoever with the State of California.”7 Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion to quash. His

opposition rested primarily on the notion that he himself is a

California resident. Plaintiff also asserted there was “evidence

indica ting” he worked in California, but his only jobs referenced

in the opposition were in China. The opposition said little about

defendant’s purported contacts with California aside from his

contacts with plaintiff

. Plaintiff’s declarations in support of hi s

opposition contained substantial factual matter not referenced in

his opposition , including information about SAR’s website, its

content, and intended audience discussed above.

The trial court granted defendant’s motion to quash. First,

it found plaintiff had not served defendant with the summons

and complaint. Second, it concluded that defendant’s contacts

with California were inadequate to support the court’s exercise of

juri sdiction in any event

. The court denied plaintiff’s motion f or

additional time to conduct jurisdictional discovery because

plaintiff failed to demonstrate such discovery was likely to lead to

facts establishing jurisdiction

. Plaintiff timely appeal ed

.

D ISCUSSION

1. The T rial C ourt D id N ot E rr in G ranting Defendant’s

M otion to Q uash

a. Section 418.10

S ection 418.10 provides that a defendant may move to

quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction over

him. A court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant who was not

effectively served with a summons. ( MJS Enterprises v. Superior

Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 555, 557 ( MJS ) [“A summons is the

process by which a court acquires personal jurisdiction over a

defendant in a civil action”].) A court also lacks jurisdiction over8

a defendant who does not have constitutionally sufficient contacts

with the forum. ( International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945)

326 U.S. 310, 316 ( International Shoe ).)

When a defendant moves to quash for lack of personal

jurisdiction, t he p laintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating

facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. Where the defendant

claims a defect in service, the plaintiff must present facts to show

effective service of process

. ( Dill v. Berquist Construction Co.

(1994) 24 Ca l.App.4th 1426, 1439

– 1440.) Where the defendant

claims constitutionally insufficient contacts with the forum to

support jurisdiction, the plaintiff must present facts showing the

defendant had enough minimum contacts with the state to make

it fair and reasonable to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction

of the California courts. ( Burdick v. Superior Court (2015)

233 Cal.App.4th 8, 17 ( Burdick ).) Once evidence showing

minimum contacts with the forum state is established, “ ‘ it

becomes the defendant ’ s burden to demonstrate that the exercise

of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. ’ ” ( Ibid.

, quoting Vons

Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 44 9

( Vons ) .)

b. Standard of review

When the evidence pertaining to jurisdiction is undisputed,

whether the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction is a

legal question subject to de novo review. ( Burdick, supra

,

233 Cal.App.4th at p. 17.) When the evidence is dispute d

, we

accept the trial court ’ s resolution of factual issues, draw all

reasonable inferences in support of the trial court ’ s order, and

review the trial court ’ s determination of factual issues for

substantial evidence. ( Ibid .) Thus, we independently review

whether jurisdiction exists based on the facts which are9

undisputed and those r esolved by the court in favor of the

prevailing party. ( Ibid .)

c. Defendant was not served with the summons

.

Plaintiff does not contest the trial court’s finding that he

never served defendant with the summons in this action.

Instead, he calls his failure to serve the summons a “ [ r ] ed

[ h ] erring in [ l ] ight of the [ s ] ervice of the [ m ] otion for [ p ] rotective

[ o ] rder.” Plaintiff is wrong. Without effective service of the

summons

, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over defendant

, and

defendant’s motion to quash was properly granted on that basis.

(See MJS

, supra , 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 557 [“Notice of the

litigation does not confer personal jurisdiction absent substantial

compliance with the statu tory requirements for service of

summons”]; see also Tri

- State Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court of Los

Angeles County (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 442, 444 [noncompliance

with statutes governing service of summons adequate basis for

quashing service].) The motion was properly granted for

plaintiff’s failure to serve defendant with a summons.

d. Defendant’s contacts with California are

inadequate to support jurisdiction

.

Even if plaintiff had served defendant with the summons

and complaint , we agree with the trial court that defendant’s

contacts with California would not suffice to support the exercise

of personal jurisdiction over him.

Under section 41 0 .10

, California courts “may exercise

jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of

this state or of the United States.” The United States

Constitution allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant if the defendant has sufficient “minimum

contacts” with the forum such that “maintenance of the suit does10

not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. ’ ” ( Internat ional Shoe

, supra

, 326 U.S. at p. 316.)

Personal jurisdiction may be either genera l or specific. ( Vons,

supra

, 14 Cal.4th at p. 445 .) Only specific jurisdiction is relevant

here because plaintiff does not argue the trial court had general

jurisdiction over defendant

.

“The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant ‘focuses on “the

relationship among the defendant

, the forum, and the

litigation .” ’ ” ( Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 283

– 284 .)

The exercise of jurisdiction is permissible only if each of the

following is satisfied : (1) the defendant has purposefully availed

himself of forum benefits with respect to the matter in

controversy; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of the

defendant ’ s contacts with the forum; and (3) the exercise of

jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.

( Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262

, 269

( Pavlovich ).) Because we conclude plaintiff’s evidence was

inadequate to show purposeful availment we do not consider the

other requirements.

Ordinarily, the purposeful availment inquiry focuses on the

defendant’s intent. The defendant must have purposefully and

voluntarily directed his activities t oward the forum so that he

should expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to be subject to

the court’s jurisdiction based on his contacts with the forum.

( Pavlovich, supra

, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.) Thus, purposeful

availment occurs where a nonresiden t defendant purposefully

direct s his activities at residents of the forum, purposefully

derives benefit from his activities in the forum, creates a

“substantial connection” with the forum, deliberately engages in11

significant activities within the forum, or has created continuing

obligations between him self and residents of the forum.

( Swenberg v. dmarcian, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 280, 294

– 295.)

This avoids subjecting a defendant to jurisdiction solely as a

result of “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated” contacts. ( Id. at

p. 295

. )

Plaintiff argues the purposeful availment prong is satisfied

here based on a test commonly used in the defamation context,

even though none of his claims is for defamation. This test is

known as the “effects test.” ( Yue v. Yang (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th

539, 547 ( Yue ) .) “ Under this test, intentional conduct occurring

elsewhere may give rise to jurisdiction in California where it is

calculated to cause injury in California. The defendant must

expressly aim or target his conduct toward California, with the

knowledge that his intentional conduct would cause harm in the

forum.” ( Ibid. )

Plaintiff rests his entire purposeful availment argument on

Yue

, which states that “specific jurisdiction may be established

under the effects test where a defendant sends ‘California

focused’ social media messages ‘directly’ to California residents

‘with knowledge the recipients [are] California residents’ for the

alleged purpose of causing reputational injur y there.” ( Yue

,

supra

, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 547.) Plaintiff’s efforts to analogize

Yue fail.

In Yue

, the nonresident defendant communicated directly

with the plaintiff

, who lived in California, and posted defamatory

messages about him on a website owned and operated by another

California resident with a California audience. The defendant

threatened to travel to San Francisco to confront and bully the

plaintiff

, and he told other California resid ents he had arrived in12

California and asked them to join him. ( Yue

, supra

,

62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 547

– 548.) “Together, this evidence

demonstrated [the defendant’s] ‘suit

- related conduct created a

substantial connection between [the defendant] and California.’ ”

( Id. at p. 548.)

Unlike the plaintiff in Yue

 ̧ t he trial court concluded

plaintiff was not a California residen t

. Again on appeal, plaintiff

focuses on his own purported California residency without

explaining how that matters in deciding the question of personal

jurisdiction over defendant. Plaintiff ’s primary argument is that

the trial court lacked substantial evidence to conclude plaintiff

was not a California resident

. As the party with the burden of

proof below, the question is not one of substantial evidence to

support a finding but whether his evidence was

“ ‘(1) “uncontradicted and unimpeache d” and (2) “of such a

character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial

determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ”

( Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013)

218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838 .)

Plaintiff contends his assertion of residency was

undisputed. But m erely asserting residency is insufficient to

establish it. Rather, the claim must be supported by probative

facts. ( Bernou v. Bernou (1911) 15 Cal.App. 341, 345

– 346.)

P laintiff’s probative facts do not compel the conclusion plaintiff

was sufficiently present in or otherwise connected to California to

be a resident by any measure

.

Plaintiff’s evidence of his connection to California

establishes only that he uses his paren ts’ address in California as

his mailing address

. Contrary to his assertion in briefing that he

attested he lives with his parents in California and his parents13

declared he lives in California, too, the declarations say no such

thing. None states he has ever lived in California. None even

states he has ever been to California. H is parents ’ contacts with

California are irrelevant to whether plaintiff has any presence in

the state. P laintiff

’s and his parents ’ declarations establish that

he went to China in 2017, before his parents moved to California

in 2018, and he does not claim to have been to California since

then

. During that time, he worked for at least two companies in

China and has moved around to oth er places, none of which

plaintiff claims was California.

The only other California connections plaintiff argues show

purposeful availment are : (1) defendant knowingly arranged a

call with plaintiff’s “business contacts” in California;

(2) defendant “expressly targeted” California for recruitment to

SAR; and (3) defendant used services from Discord

, which is

based in California. These contacts

, to th e extent reflected in the

record, are too insubstantial to amount to purposeful availment.

As for the call with the “business contacts” when they were

in California, plaintiff makes no claim based on the content of

that call. The only evidence about what transpired on that call is

that plaintiff was on the call with defendant while they were both

in Asia

— plaintiff’s written messages about the call confirm he

was in the same time zone as defendant.

Plaintiff’s complaint does include allegations that

defendant wrongfully communicated with the same business

contacts a few months later in a group chat wi th plaintiff. But

this communication lacks any connection to California except

that some of the recipients were “based in ” California at the time.

There is no evidence that defendant’s communication with

plaintiff’s California “business contacts” otherwise related to14

California, much less that they had a “California focus.” In fact,

the evidence is to the contrary: t he purportedly wrongful

communic ation expressly addressed the prospect of the “business

contacts” meeting plaintiff in Hong Kong. Plaintiff was

apparently in Hong Kong at the time and, in any event, does not

claim he was in California. Under the Yue analysis, defendant’s

communications with plaintiff and the “business contacts” about

a meeting in Hong Kong had a Hong Kong focus, not a “California

focus.” (See Yue

, supra

, 62 Cal.App.5th at p p

. 547

– 548

[communications between nonresident defendant

, resident

plaintiff

, and other California residents pertaining to conduct

within California had “California focus”].)

As to the assertion that defendant “expressly targeted”

California for recruitment to SAR

, this is based solely on evidence

that many people of Chinese origin, one characteristic of SAR’s

target audience, live in California. We are unpersuaded that this

a mounts to “express target[ing]” of California. California has the

largest population of any state in the United States. Its size

alone cannot confer jurisdiction over nonresidents who post

information on the Internet

. Plaintiff offers evidence that

Cali fornia has a disproportionately large “Asian” population. If

we accept plaintiff’s evidence of “Asian” populations by state as a

proxy for persons of Chinese origin, the same evidence shows

other popul o us states in our nation also have a large population

of persons of Chinese origin

, and California amounts for less than

a third of all such persons in the United States. That an

audience exists in California does not establish that the audience

was specifically targeted among t he various other states in which

an audience also exists.15 Rather, t he evidence shows SAR sought audiences

wherever they might be living outside of China. Its website says

its “material is largely aimed at second

- generation American

citizens of Chinese h eritage.” (Italics added.) Its Discord site

invites participation by “people of Chinese ancestry living

[ anywhere ] outside the Greater China Area .” (Italics added.)

Plaintiff offers no evidence SAR’s content is tailored to a

California audience, limited in its access to California residents,

or even that it has a significant California following. Again, this

is different tha n Yue

, where plaintiff offered evidence that the

site where defendant posted his allegedly defamatory statements,

which was run by a California resident ( Yue

, supra

,

62 Cal.App.5 th at p. 543)

, “had a California audience, and that

California residents read the allegedly defamatory postings ” ( id.

at p. 549).

As to defendant’s use of the California

- based Discord web

service, this contact is incidental. California is home to many

social media companies. Plaintiff offers no authority that a

defendant’s mere use of a California

- based social media platform

to defame a plaintiff is material to the question of a California

court’s jurisdiction over the defendant

. There is no evidence that

Discord’s operator viewed, participated in

, or had any interest in

defendant’s communications about plaintiff. I n contrast

, in Yue

,

the d efendant posted about the plaintiff on a California

- based

web platform that competed with the plaintiff’s own

California

- based web platform and the owner of the competing

web

- based platform encouraged and participated in the

defendant’s attacks on the plaintiff. ( Yue

, supra

, 62 Cal.App.5 th

at p. 543.)16

2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in

Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Jurisdictional

Discovery.

“A plaintiff attempting to assert jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant is entitled to an opportunity to conduct

discovery of the jurisdictional facts necessary to sustain its

burden of proof. [Citation.] In order to prevail on a motion for a

continuanc e for jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should

demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of

evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.” ( In re Automobile

Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127

. )

The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether

to grant a continuance to allow for jurisdictional discovery and

such a ruling “will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest

abuse.” ( Beckman v. Thompson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 481, 487;

accord, In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II

, supra

,

135 Cal.App.4th at p. 127.)

Here, the trial court denied plaintiff ’s request to take

jurisdictional discovery for plaintiff’s failure to even argue that

discovery would be likely to uncover evidence of suffic ient

contacts to establish jurisdiction. We find no abuse of discretion

in that determination

. In his opposition, plaintiff requested

discovery based on the bare assertions that “ discovery is likely to

produce evidence of additional California contacts by Defendant

relating to this legal action ,” and that “[i] t’s certainly arguable

that further discovery would likely lead to the production of

evidence establishing jurisdiction. ” W ithout specifying what facts

plaintiff expected to find and how they would be relevant to his

claims that defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in

California, there can be no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

conclusion that plaintiff waived the issue.17 DISPOSITION

We affirm t he trial court’s order granting defendant’s

motion to quash and denying plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional

discovery. Costs on appeal are award ed to defendant

.

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.