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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BUWLUS MUHAMMAD )

Plaintiff )

) C.A. No. 05-243 Erie

vs. ) District Judge Cohill

) Magistrate Judge Baxter

DISTRICT MAGISTRATE JOSEPH LAFAIVER)

Defendant. )

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

I. REPORT

It is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1915(d) and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

should be denied.

II. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, presently incarcerated at the Erie County Prison in Erie, Pennsylvania, brings

this action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that Defendant “District

Magistrate Joseph Lafaiver” violated his civil rights by “imposing 8 to 9 traffic violation

citations.” Plaintiff seeks monetary relief. In addition to his complaint, Plaintiff has filed a

motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 

On April 23, 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (hereinafter, “Act”), Pub.L.No.

104-134, was enacted to amend 28 U.S.C. §1915, which establishes the criteria for allowing an

action to proceed without payment of costs. Section 1915(e) as amended, states in relevant part:

“The court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that -- ...(B) the action or

appeal -- (I) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted...” 

A claim is frivolous if it: 1) is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory and/or, 2)

contains factual contentions that are clearly baseless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327

(1989). A plaintiff has failed to allege a section 1983 claim if the court is satisfied “that no

relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegation.” Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41 (1957). This Court has discretion to dismiss frivolous or malicious in forma pauperis

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complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).

The U.S. Supreme Court has instructed that section 1915(d) provides the Court with the

authority “... to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless theory, but also the unusual

power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose

factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). In

fact, the statute not only empowers the court to screen out frivolous cases before the complaint

is served, it actually encourages it. Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1990).

A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to

state a claim if it appears “<beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-

521(1972), quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. If the court can reasonably read pleadings to

state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should be done so despite failure to cite

proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or

litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Smith v. U.S. District Court, 956 F.2d 295

(D.C.Cir. 1992); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991); Boag v.

MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); Haines. Under our liberal pleading rules, during the initial

stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the

complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d

63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir.

1990). 

Judicial officers are immune from damage suits arising out of their official duties. 

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Piskanin v. Hammer, 2005 WL 613644

(E.D.Pa.,2005) (applying judicial immunity to “district justice”). Judicial immunity is an

“immunity from suit, not just from an ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502

U.S. 9, 11 (1991). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in

error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of authority....” Sparkman 435 U.S. at 356. 

Judicial immunity may be overcome only when: (i) the challenged actions were not taken in the

judge’s judicial capacity; or (ii) the challenged actions, “though judicial in nature, were taken in

the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. In this case, the

challenged actions of Defendant were taken in his judicial capacities and were within her

respective jurisdiction. Thus, Defendant Lafaiver is absolutely immune.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this complaint should be dismissed as frivolous in accordance

with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis should be

denied.

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In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule

72.1.4(B) of the Local Rules for Magistrates, the parties are allowed ten days from the date of

service to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. 

S/ Susan Paradise Baxter

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: August 31, 2005

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