SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1758-22 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

JORDAN D. DAVIS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________

Submitted March 11, 2024 – Decided March 26, 2024 

Before Judges Sabatino and Chase. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 13-01-

0053.

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on

the brief). 

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Debra Grace Simms, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1758-22 

 Defendant Jordan Davis appeals from the July 7, 2022 order denying his 

petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). We affirm. 

 In 2012, defendant was indicted for first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-3(a)(1)(2); first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C;11-3(a)(3); firstdegree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1); second-degree conspiracy to commit 

robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:15-1(a)(1); third-degree unlawful possession 

of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(1); second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; 

and third-degree conspiracy to commit burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:18-2. 

 Defendant's charges arose from an incident which involved defendant, 

Leon Saunders, Edward Copes, and Jeremy Smith. In April 2020, the four met 

and discussed a plan that involved going to an individual's home to secure, by 

force if necessary, money allegedly owed to Saunders for drugs. The four men 

then went to the house in Bridgeton where the victim was located. Defendant 

was in possession of a shotgun and two of his co-defendants were in possession 

of other firearms. When they arrived, the victim, Kevin Pierce, was led to the 

basement. When he did not produce money, Saunders shot him three times, 

causing his death. All four defendants fled in the same vehicle. 

 In April 2015, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State, 

where in return for his guilty plea to first-degree robbery, the State would 
3 A-1758-22 

dismiss all remaining charges and recommend a term of fifteen years of 

imprisonment with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant 

to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. As part of his plea agreement, 

in paragraph twenty-one, defendant waived his right to appeal pursuant to Rule 

3:9-3(d). Regarding this waiver, the court explained: 

That does not mean you cannot file an appeal. It means 

that if you do so, you may be giving an opportunity to 

the Prosecutor to withdraw from the plea agreement and 

reinstate all of the charges against you to the position 

they held prior to the entry of your plea. 

 Defendant responded affirmatively as to understanding the court's 

explanation. 

Defendant appeared for sentencing on October 8, 2015. At sentencing, 

there was an issue with determining the appropriate amount of jail credits 

because defendant was facing other charges and sentences. At that time, 

defendant's counsel was able to re-negotiate the plea to an adjusted 

recommended sentence of fourteen and one-half years of incarceration, saving 

the defendant another six months of incarceration. As such, he was sentenced 

to that re-negotiated amount. The court again informed defendant he could 

appeal, even though the plea agreement stated he waived appeal. 
4 A-1758-22 

 Defendant did not file a direct appeal. However, defendant filed a timely 

PCR petition. In his petition, defendant contended his plea counsel had rendered 

ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to represent him adequately at 

sentencing, not raising his youthfulness as a mitigating factor, and misadvising 

him about the consequences of filing a sentencing appeal. 

 After hearing oral argument, the Honorable Joseph M. Chiarello, J.S.C.,

ordered an evidentiary hearing for the limited purpose of determining whether 

defendant was accurately instructed about his appeal rights in relation to his 

guilty plea. He reserved decision on other claims raised in defendant's petition 

until disposition of the evidentiary hearing. 

On April 13, 2022, the Honorable Kevin T. Smith, J.S.C., heard testimony 

from both defendant's attorney and defendant and on July 7, 2022, issued an 

order denying relief with an accompanying twenty-five-page opinion in which 

he found defendant's claims substantively lacked merit. He found defendant 

failed to meet the Strickland/Fritz test to establish his plea counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987) (adopting Strickland). The court found 

defendant failed to sustain his burden of showing that, under the facts of this 

case, but for counsel's missteps, defendant would not have pleaded guilty. 
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Additionally, the court found defendant elected to remain mute at sentencing 

when advised of his allocution right, thereby failing to object to the sentence to 

be imposed under the favorable plea agreement. 

 On appeal, defendant raises the following argument: 

POINT I. 

TRIAL COUNSEL DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF 

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY 

MISADVISING HIM THAT IF HE PURSUED A 

SENTENCING APPEAL, HIS GUILTY PLEA 

WOULD BE NEGATED; THEREFORE, 

DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE MUST BE VACATED 

AND THIS MATTER BE REMANDED FOR 

RESENTENCING. 

 Having considered defendant's claims, the record, and applicable legal 

principles, we affirm for the reasons set forth in Judge Smith's thorough and 

well-written opinion. We add the following comments. 

Our review of a PCR claim after a court has held an evidentiary hearing 

"is necessarily deferential to [the] PCR court's factual findings based on its

review of live witness testimony." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013); see 

also State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373 (App. Div. 2014) ("If a court 

has conducted an evidentiary hearing on a petition for PCR, we necessarily defer 

to the trial court's factual findings."). "An appellate court's reading of a cold 

record is a pale substitute for a trial judge's assessment of the credibility of a 
6 A-1758-22 

witness he has observed firsthand." Nash, 212 N.J. at 540 (citing State v.

Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Thus, where an evidentiary hearing has 

been held, we should not disturb "the PCR court's findings that are supported by

sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576

(2015) (quoting Nash, 212 N.J. at 540). "When the reviewing court is satisfied 

that the findings and result meet this criterion, its task is complete[,] and it

should not disturb the result, even though it has the feeling it might have reached 

a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146,

162 (1964). However, "we need not defer to a PCR court's interpretation of the

law[,]" which we review de novo. Nash, 212 N.J. at 540-41; see also State v.

Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415-16 (2004). 

In seeking PCR, a defendant must prove counsel was ineffective by a 

preponderance of the evidence. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012). To

establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 

must show: (1) counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the deficiency 

prejudiced the defense. Strickland 466 U.S. at 687. Failure to render adequate 

legal advice at the pleading stage can represent such inadequacy and prejudice. 

See Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 600 (App. Div. 2014). 
7 A-1758-22 

Applying these standards, and for the reasons expressed by Judge Smith, 

we are convinced defendant failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced in the 

outcome of his case, meaning he would not have accepted such a favorable plea 

offer. Therefore, defendant has not satisfied the second prong of the Strickland 

test. Defendant, facing up to life imprisonment if convicted at trial, received a 

sentence of less than fifteen years. His counsel's zealous advocacy secured him 

this sentence. 

Finally, to the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining 

arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

 Affirmed.