www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 266 1 

The Power of Uniqueness

Washington’s identification of Brazil with Latin America and the 

Third World hampers its appreciation of Brazil’s power and importance to the United States. It is true that Brazil is geographically part of Latin America, and it is also true that Brazil, a founder of the Group 

of 77, was, with India, among the original leaders of the “Third World.”

But Brazil is Brazil—as large and every bit as unique as the United States 

or China. Brazil, for many years the seat of the Portuguese empire, is the 

world’s largest Portuguese-speaking country. It never had the large settled 

Amerindian populations that became a repressed underclass in the Andes and 

Mesoamerica; Brazilians today are as diverse as their North American cousins 

but growing faster.

Brazil’s land mass is the fifth largest in the world. As in the United States, 

the possibility of expanding into large and relatively unpopulated territories 

helped to create a sense of new frontiers and optimism. Both the United States 

and Brazil have a dominant sense of pragmatism and a culture of solving problems and “making things work.” Both have governments capable of reaching beyond their borders, but are deeply inward-looking and characterized psychologically by a sense of their own exceptional nature (and, sometimes, by the hubris 

born of an excessive sense of self-worth).

But if these traits make Brazil closer to the United States than to its 

Spanish-American neighbors, its unique culture, history, and worldview also 

separate it from the United States. The “automatic alliance” of the past is 

gone; both countries need to strengthen personal, professional, and institutional relationships that will create common ground for advancing their 

Brazil and the United 

States: The Need for 

Strategic Engagement

by Luigi R. Einaudi

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

Cen

ter for S

trategi

c

ReSEARCH

About the Author

Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi is a 

Distinguished Visiting Fellow in 

the Center for Strategic Research, 

Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, at the National Defense 

University. He is also a Member of 

the Advisory Council of the Brazil 

Institute at the Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars.

Key Points

◆ Brazil’s economic performance, political stability, and cultural vitality 

ensure that Brasilia’s foreign and 

defense policies will help shape 

global as well as regional politics 

in the decades ahead. More than 

a Latin American or even Third 

World leader, Brazil has become an 

autonomous global power.

◆ U.S. relations with Brazil have 

evolved from alliance during and 

immediately after World War II to 

skeptical distance today. Distrust is 

exacerbated by outmoded stereotypes and hubris on both sides.

◆ Mutually beneficial engagement 

requires the United States to welcome Brazil’s emergence as a global 

power that is culturally and politically close to the United States; and 

for Brazil, in turn, to realize that the 

United States accepts its rise and 

that more can be achieved working 

with Washington than against it.

◆ Three practical approaches would 

have a substantial, positive 

impact. Both countries should 

consult widely on global issues, 

strengthen personal and institutional ties, and learn to cooperate more effectively on conflict 

resolution, energy, and trade.

March 2011
2 SF No. 266 www.ndu.edu/inss

different and sometimes divergent interests as Brazil 

develops and carves out its own place in the world.

Geography. U.S. citizens think of Brazil as being Rio de Janeiro and its beautiful beaches or as the 

Amazon, an endless jungle traversed by the world’s largest river system. During the Alliance for Progress years, 

Americans also became accustomed to hearing of the 

traditional rural isolation and poverty of Brazil’s northeast. Less known are Minas Gerais, fount of Brazil’s 

raw materials, mining industry, and arms production, as 

well as the great productive states from São Paulo to the 

south and west, home to both advanced mechanized agriculture and industry.

Brazil’s national infrastructure is deficient with 

regard to both its great internal distances and to the 

requirements of maximizing international commerce. 

Brazil has thousands of airports—more than any 

country other than the United States—but its road, rail, 

Mainland Areas of Brazil, China, and United States
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 266 3 

and port systems lag. One study suggests that domestic 

transportation costs and port fees for soy, Brazil’s largest 

single export, are double those of its major competitors.1

Brazil’s population is heavily concentrated near its 

Atlantic coast, and is primarily urban rather than rural. 

Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo have almost 12 and 20 

million inhabitants, respectively, making Brazil the only 

country other than the United States and China to have 

two of the world’s largest cities.

In 1960, President Juscelino Kubitscheck (1956–

1961) founded a new capital city called Brasilia in the 

interior in lands that he described as “empty but for the 

jaguar’s cry.” Brasilia has expanded rapidly, and symbolizes 

Brazil’s desire to better integrate the nation as well as to 

better link it to its neighbors, the Pacific, and the world.

Demography. The 201 million Brazilians are a people 

of striking cultural and ethnic diversity. The overwhelming 

majority, some 92 percent, are more or less evenly divided 

between whites and mulattos. They draw on the descendants of African slaves and of Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, 

German, and Polish2

 immigrants, with important leavenings from the Middle East. Brazil’s black population is 13 

million. Other key minorities include 700,000 Amerindians and about 1.5 million persons of Japanese descent, who 

make up the largest Japanese population outside of Japan.

Maldistribution of income and social injustices 

are obvious and widely recognized. During the 1950s 

and 1960s, the disparities of traditional agrarian life 

were exacerbated by a population explosion that put 

great strains on public services. But population growth 

has fallen steadily since, and is now at an annual rate 

of just over 1 percent, down from a high of 3 percent. 

Literacy has risen to 88 percent, but primary education remains famously poor,3

 and an exceptionally 

limited secondary educational system still hampers 

the acquisition of modern skills and social mobility.4

High levels of crime and growing drug consumption 

in urban areas are important additional factors retarding more rapid growth.

Less appreciated outside Brazil are the programs 

that have developed over the past generation to reduce 

unlike its neighbors, Brazil’s 

economy is highly diversified and 

driven by a rapidly developing 

internal market as well as exports

these gaps. The administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da 

Silva (2003–2010) expanded a Bolsa Escola (school allowance) program begun under President Fernando 

Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) to develop the Bolsa Familia, the family allowance program that has become the 

largest conditional cash transfer program in the world. 

Poor families receive cash subsidies for education, nutrition, and even gas on the sole condition that they prove 

their children’s school attendance. Bolsa familia now 

touches 50 million people and, with a minimum wage 

that increased 65 percent over Lula’s 8 years, is estimated 

to have helped halve poverty.5 Though a quarter of the 

population still lives in poverty, these and other measures 

have enabled millions to improve their lives.

University admissions exams in practice favor the better prepared graduates of private secondary schools, thus 

excluding many. University education is uneven but often 

excellent. In the sciences, Brazil now produces half a million 

graduates and 10,000 Ph.D.s a year, 10 times more than 

two decades ago. The facilities and research of the University of São Paulo attract students from all over the world.

Economy. Since the 1990s, Brazil has curbed the 

inflation for which it had become famous. Unlike its 

neighbors, whose economies depend on relatively few 

exports, Brazil’s economy, likely to soon become the 

world’s seventh largest, is highly diversified and driven by 

a rapidly developing internal market as well as exports.6

Agriculture, particularly in São Paulo state but extending south to the productive powerhouses of Goias, 

Parana, Santa Catarina, Mato Grosso do Sur, and Rio 

Grande, has broken radically from traditional practices 

and is highly mechanized. Brazil is the world’s top exporter of coffee, tobacco, orange juice, sugar, and beef. 
4 SF No. 266 www.ndu.edu/inss

JBS-Friboi has bought Swift and Pilgrim’s Pride and 

passed Tyson Foods to become the world’s largest meat 

packer. Embrapa research in tropical agriculture may 

soon propel Brazil from second place to first in the production of soy as well, despite the cost disadvantages imposed by poor infrastructure.7

 Already the world’s largest exporter of protein foods, Brazil occupies a strategic 

position in any discussion of global food security. In fact, 

Brazil’s potential as a food producer is limited mainly by 

U.S. and European protectionism.

The former state mining company, Vale do Rio Doce 

(privatized in 1997 and now using the simplified name 

Vale), has become a diversified multinational corporation 

operating in 6 continents as well as 16 Brazilian states. 

Vale is the world’s largest producer of iron ore and pellets, runs second in nickel, and is a major player in logistics and the generation of hydroelectric energy. Lack of 

modern port facilities has long hampered faster Brazilian 

growth, but the government and entrepreneurs are now 

taking advantage of Chinese demand for raw materials 

to improve logistics, including the construction of one 

of the world’s largest ports, scheduled to open in 2012.

Parallel advances have been achieved in industry. 

Brazil’s exports include electrical equipment, automobiles, ethanol, textiles, footwear, and steel. Embraer is 

now the world’s third largest producer of commercial 

and military aircraft, behind only Boeing and Airbus, 

and the world leader in regional jets.

Brazil became a World Trade Organization member 

in 1995. In 2009, leading trade partners were China, the 

United States, the European Union, and Argentina, with 

the United States providing the most imports (16 percent) and China the biggest export market (12 percent). 

Analysts believe that Brazil’s continued rapid expansion, 

despite the recent global economic crisis, has been significantly helped by increasing domestic demand, as a 

growing middle class buys material comforts previously 

out of reach. With inflation under control, credit, including home mortgages for the middle class, has been at 

the center of growth. This rise in internal demand is a 

major source of expectations that Brazil’s economy will 

continue to boom.

Brazil was long known as energy-deficient because 

it lacked domestic oil resources. The Organization of the 

Petroleum Exporting Countries price increase in the 

1970s starkly underscored this vulnerability. Brazil’s response then laid the foundations for its strength today. 

First, it spurred the development of its enormous water 

resources. By 2008, hydroelectric power met 34 percent of 

the country’s total energy needs. Until China fully completes the Three Gorges Dam, the Itaipu Dam on Brazil’s 

border with Paraguay has the largest electricity generating capacity in the world. Second, the search for energy 

to feed Brazil’s growing economy led to governmentsupported development of ethanol into a world-class 

industry. Third, Brazil has the domestic uranium reserves 

to fuel more than its two existing nuclear reactors, a third 

scheduled for 2015, and others under discussion. Finally, 

and most recently, major discoveries of oil in the South 

Atlantic have poised Brazil to become an important oil 

producer as well.8

 The national oil company, Petrobras, 

operates in 27 countries, is a leader in deep sea drilling 

technology, and is the largest corporation headquartered 

in the Southern Hemisphere.

The world economy is proving to be a difficult and 

even dangerous place. Brazil’s growth has led to a sharp 

rise in investment abroad—a rise in Brazil’s outward foreign direct investment stock from $52 billion in 2000 to 

$158 billion in 2009.9

 Much of this investment is concentrated in Latin America, Mozambique, and Angola, plus 

the developed countries. The amount compares to China’s 

outward foreign direct investment stock in 2009 of $230 

billion. Both countries are heavily invested in resourcebased enterprises, but Brazil has large investments in 

already the world’s largest exporter 

of protein foods, Brazil occupies a 

strategic position in any discussion 

of global food security
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 266 5 

offshore financial centers and negligible amounts in manufacturing, whereas China has significant investments in 

manufacturing and information technology.10

Brazil is not immune to difficulties brought on by international currency fluctuations and trade imbalances, and 

to problems of its own creation such as excessive government spending.11 But its turnaround over the past generation from rampant inflation to sustained growth has 

transformed it from a net debtor nation into a net creditor. 

Economic policies have been effective and predictable. The 

technical skills of top government and private managers run 

high and deep. President Lula’s administration built on the 

foundation laid by President Cardoso, and the initial appointments by President Dilma Rousseff foreshadow continuity that could lead to further administrative consolidation 

and much-needed legal and bureaucratic simplification.12

Politics. Brazil never had to fight for its independence. 

The Napoleonic Wars in Europe led the Portuguese royal 

family to flee to Brazil, where in 1808, they established in 

Rio de Janeiro the seat of the Portuguese Empire. In 1822, 

after King Joao VI returned to Portugal, his son, who had 

remained in Brazil as Regent, declared Brazil’s independence and became Dom Pedro I, Emperor of Brazil.13 The 

relative lack of violence then and later in the abolition of 

slavery and the establishment of the republic in 1889 has 

been a characteristic of Brazilian history and society.

For the past generation, Brazil has been a paradigm 

of stable politics and electoral democracy. President Cardoso was succeeded peacefully by President Lula, who 

was in turn succeeded on January 1, 2011, by Brazil’s 

first woman president, Dilma Rousseff. The entire process was “loud, messy, and imperfect,” but unabashedly 

democratic.14 Even so, the country’s regional differences, 

caciquismo (boss politics), and deep social disparities contribute to continuing and important questions about the 

quality of its democracy.15

Brazil’s technological advance is reflected politically 

in the widespread use of electronic voting. Portable computers have empowered voters in even the most remote 

areas. Brazil’s computerized voting methods, which have 

proven secure against tampering or technical problems, 

are among the most advanced in the world. Organization of American States (OAS) electoral specialists have 

facilitated their successful use in many countries of Latin 

America and the Caribbean.

Brazil’s strength is reflected in the number of firstrate and resilient institutions that help provide both 

leadership and stability to the country. In addition to 

large companies such as Vale, Embraer, and Petrobras, 

the Getulio Vargas Foundation, the University of São 

Paulo, the Federal University System in general, specialized agencies such as Embrapa, and the emerging 

Brazilian defense industry are also major regional and 

international centers of research. The foreign ministry, 

known as Itamaraty after the palace in Rio de Janeiro 

where it was first housed, is elitist, but enjoys the reputation of being one of the most effective corps of diplomats in the world. The Superior War College has long 

been a center for the development of military doctrine 

as well as professional education.

The Military. Brazil’s security policies under recent 

civilian administrations have been marked by doctrinal 

reorientation and gradual force modernization. For most 

of the second half of the 20th century, the military forces 

were focused more on internal security and an ill-defined 

anticommunism than on traditional military defense. As 

in much of Latin America in the same period, the military sometimes took over the government directly, and 

military leaders occupied the presidency from 1964 to 

1985. Official repression never reached the levels of the 

military regimes in neighboring Argentina or Chile, but 

Brazil’s military governments effectively suppressed radical opposition and the few attempts at armed resistance.

The resulting “association between security and repression—one consequence of the military period—made 

for the past generation, Brazil has 

been a paradigm of stable politics 

and electoral democracy
6 SF No. 266 www.ndu.edu/inss

it impossible to think calmly about defense policy.”16

This striking comment is not from some antiestablishment radical, but from Nelson Jobim, a former Minister 

of Justice under President Cardoso and later President of 

Brazil’s Supreme Court, who became Minister of Defense 

under President Lula. Jobim’s nomination, however, was 

less due to civilian fears of military intervention in politics 

than that the military needed to become a national asset 

if Brazil was to operate effectively in a dangerous world. 

Like his U.S. counterpart, Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates, Jobim was confirmed in his position by President 

Rousseff, providing essential competence and continuity 

from one administration to its successor.

Highlights of Brazil’s military evolution have included the creation of a Ministry of Defense in 1999, 

and, importantly, the development of a National Defense 

Strategy. This new strategy departs from the internally 

focused Doctrine of National Security that expressed the 

viewpoints of the military leaders who ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1985. A key feature is stress on domestic 

technological development to increase Brazil’s capacity 

for military deterrence.

The changed strategy does not mean that the Brazilian military no longer has internal security responsibilities.17 The military services and especially the navy have a 

long tradition of patrolling the interior. The new strategy 

will build that up, moving personnel from the east coast 

to the interior, in parts of which the military has new 

arrest authorities. In 2010, military personnel cooperated with police units in efforts to clean up drug gangs 

in Rio’s favelas.

18

Nor should the change be interpreted to imply that 

Brazil had no previous military experience abroad. A 

Brazilian military leaders have 

also long considered Brazil’s 

development as essential to 

national security

Brazilian expeditionary force fought quite effectively 

alongside the U.S. Army in Italy in 1944–1945. In 1995–

1998, a Brazilian general commanded the Ecuador-Peru 

military observer mission (MOMEP), which brought together U.S., Argentine, and Chilean forces as well as Brazilian soldiers. When the United States withdrew its Black 

Hawk helicopters from MOMEP, the Brazilian army 

bought its first Black Hawks and replaced the U.S. unit.19

Brazilian soldiers have been prominent in United Nations 

(UN) peacekeeping operations in Angola, Mozambique, 

and East Timor, all remnants of the old Portuguese empire, 

as well as in the Congo and elsewhere. In 2004, Brazil also 

took command of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 

(MINUSTAH). This decision, the first occasion that Brazil supported the use of force under UN Charter Chapter 

Seven authorities, signaled that it was ready to accept the 

responsibilities of leadership on difficult issues before the 

UN Security Council in a way not seen before.

Brazilian military leaders have also long considered 

Brazil’s development as essential to national security. The 

military provides an important government presence 

in the Amazon, from air transport to development and 

security (the Calha Norte Project) to surveillance (the 

Amazon Surveillance System). The need to protect and 

support strategic industries has also been a concern for 

the military. The initial decisions to subsidize the development of Brazil’s ethanol industry, for example, were 

made by military regimes in the 1970s.

The new National Defense Strategy brought all these 

strands explicitly together into a plan to enlarge, modernize, and reposition military forces and restore Brazil’s 

defense industry. Explaining that Brazil needed stronger 

defenses as part of its new responsibilities in a changing 

world, the strategy was announced personally by President Lula in Brasilia in 2008. Military modernization 

was linked explicitly to technology transfer and industrial development. “We are no longer interested in buying weapons off the shelf,” declared Roberto Mangabeira 

Unger, the Harvard professor turned Minister of Strategic 

Affairs.20 Even more to the point, Brazil wants to avoid 

the limitations imposed by U.S. International Traffic in 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 266 7 

Arms Regulations, which are perceived as hampering the 

achievement of an independent Brazilian defense industry.

Attempts to import technology to increase Brazilian 

industrial capacity played a part in deals on space with 

China and on naval vessels with the United Kingdom, 

and certainly played an essential role in agreements negotiated with France to help build Brazil’s Angra 3 nuclear powerplant, develop satellites for use over the Amazon, and cooperate technically in the building of Brazil’s 

planned nuclear-powered submarine, one of whose functions will be to deter possible threats to Brazil’s future 

deep-water oil-drilling operations.21

Foreign Policy. Only China and Russia have longer 

land borders than Brazil, which abuts on all but two of 

South America’s 12 countries. The Baron of Rio Branco, 

who was Foreign Minister from 1902 to 1912, gained a 

reputation as the father of Brazilian diplomacy for his 

success in negotiating treaties with the country’s neighbors to formalize its boundaries. Rio Branco’s pragmatic 

use of uti possidetis22 distinguished Brazil from SpanishAmerican countries, whose approach to each other was 

more litigious and filled with appeals to colonial boundaries and wrongs.

With its borders settled, Brazil was satisfied to keep 

its neighbors at arm’s length.23 The major exception was 

Argentina, considered Brazil’s South American rival. 

Both countries “had a lot to gain from a positive agenda 

but insisted for decades on an idiotic, irrational, and 

unproductive” relationship.24 During the 1970s and 

1980s, however, lengthy negotiations between the two 

governments led to nuclear agreements and the adoption of a “No Conflict Hypothesis” between the two 

countries. By 1985, the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement served as the backdrop to Mercosur, intended as a 

trading bloc that also included Paraguay and Uruguay. 

In 2008, Brazil championed the creation of the Union 

of South American Nations (UNASUR) formalizing 

the ideal, recognized by Brazil’s constitution, of an integrated South America.

Coming as it did at a time of messy political conditions in Venezuela and Bolivia, and severe tensions 

between Colombia and Ecuador and between Colombia and Venezuela, UNASUR was also meant to constrain tensions among Brazil’s neighbors. This was not 

a new objective for Brazilian policy. Brazil’s Foreign 

Minister, Oswaldo Aranha, played a key role in negotiating the 1942 Rio Protocol, the treaty that ended 

the Ecuador-Peru War. In 1982, Brazil remained neutral in the Falklands war between Argentina and Great 

Britain, but loaned Argentina Brazilian-manufactured, 

long-range observation aircraft to help deter any attack 

on the mainland. With the help of the United States as 

well as Argentina and Chile, Brazil successfully managed the Ecuador-Peru peace settlement of 1998 after the conflict had broken out again in 1994–1995. 

By 2009, however, a bilateral United States–Colombia 

base rights agreement led Brazil to use UNASUR as a 

forum to assert independence from the United States. 

Even more than Mexico’s 2001 formal renunciation 

of Rio Treaty obligations, UNASUR and its Defense 

Council marked the end of the Monroe Doctrine. Referring explicitly to the United States, Minister Jobim 

declared that the “defense of South America should 

only be undertaken by South America.”25

Always aware of events beyond the hemisphere, 

Brazilian diplomats have long believed their country 

deserved a rightful and leading place in the global 

system. Brazil was a founding member of the League 

of Nations but walked out in 1926 when it became 

clear that Germany would be admitted as a permanent Member of the Council while Brazil was excluded. Brazil was also a founding member of the United 

Nations, but in 1964 it helped found the Group of 

77 for the purpose of increasing the joint negotiating 

Brazilian diplomats have long 

believed their country deserved a 

rightful and leading place in the 

global system
8 SF No. 266 www.ndu.edu/inss

capacity of developing countries on major international economic issues.

Since the 1960s, some Brazilian leaders have been 

concerned that the United States could use the United Nations and the international system to “freeze” 

power relationships to its advantage and that of the 

other “have” powers. While the term BRIC (referring 

to Brazil, Russia, India, and China) was coined by an 

American financial consultant thinking in economic 

terms, Brazil has sought to operationalize it diplomatically. Brazil saw the BRIC as an opportunity, as a Brazilian diplomat wrote, “because the preexisting power 

structures did not encompass the member countries 

in a satisfactory manner and because the geometry of 

international life called for a revision of the makeup of 

the directing bodies that express world power.”26

In fact, BRIC members have little in common. 

And as Russia and China are already Permanent 

Members of the Security Council, it is not clear they 

have much to gain by shaking things up for Brazil’s 

benefit. Brazil’s focus on the BRIC may ultimately 

prove a partly illusory quest to deny the relevance of 

the United States. This said, Brazil’s expanding relationship with Europe, its deepening trade ties with 

China, its positioning as a hot emerging market, and 

historical connections to Africa certainly give it increased geopolitical scope. In 2009, The Economist reported that:

in some ways, Brazil outclasses the other BRICs. 

Unlike China, it is a democracy. Unlike India, 

it has no insurgents, no ethnic and religious 

conflicts nor hostile neighbors. Unlike Russia, it 

exports more than oil and arms, and treats foreign 

investors with respect. . . . Indeed, when it comes 

to smart social policy and boosting consumption at 

home, the developing world has much more to learn 

from Brazil than from China.27

Many countries now see in Brazil a global actor with 

which they share interests, if only to leverage engagement with third parties. In 2010, 185 countries mainthe evolution of world financial 

coordination from the G–8 to the 

G–20 reflects Brazil’s growing 

global reach

tained missions in Brasilia, exceeding Beijing’s 165 and 

almost matching Washington’s 190.

The evolution of world financial coordination from 

the G–8 to the G–20 reflects Brazil’s growing global 

reach. It is becoming a donor nation; its sovereign wealth 

funds are now in net creditor positions in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 2009 Pittsburgh 

G–20 Summit, which replaced the G–8, pledged in its 

Leaders’ Statement “candid, even-handed, and balanced 

analysis”—a probably gratuitous slap at prior G–8 analyses. The 2010 IMF reforms on quota rebalancing made 

the 10 largest shareholders the United States, Japan, the 

BRIC, and the four largest European countries (France, 

Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom).

The unfreezing of world power relationships has begun. Having contributed to the new fluidity, the question 

becomes what ends Brazil now seeks.

From Alliance to Skepticism

From World War II into the Cold War, Brazil saw 

the United States as a fundamental ally. Under President 

Getulio Vargas (1930–1946, 1951–1954), Brazil joined 

the Allied effort during World War II. A Brazilian division with its own air support joined the U.S. Army in the 

successful fight up the boot of Italy.

U.S.-Brazilian military relations remained unusually 

close for a generation after the war. Indeed, Brazilians 

themselves sometimes stated their foreign policy seemed 

based on “automatic alliance” with the United States. 

Brazil hosted the negotiations for the 1947 Rio Treaty, 

whose key Article 5—calling for collective action against 

an external attack on any member—set the precedent 

for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 1965, 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 266 9 

Brazilian troops participated in the occupation of the 

Dominican Republic, helping to legitimize what started 

as a unilateral U.S. intervention.

During the 1960s and 1970s, however, the sense of 

alliance with the United States gradually eroded. The 

1964 military coup, human rights issues, trade, and nuclear concerns became sources of tension with successive 

U.S. administrations.

In 1975, the author, then a member of Secretary of 

State Henry Kissinger’s Policy Planning Staff, met alone 

with Brazil’s Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira to explore whether Brazil might, with its highly professional 

diplomacy, be prepared to take on broader responsibilities appropriate to a regional power. Silveira’s answer was 

that an activist foreign policy would inevitably encounter “acidentes de percurso”: accidents along the way. The 

United States had the wealth and power to absorb such 

accidents, he said; Brazil did not.28

With the passage of time and Brazil’s own growth 

and changed international conditions, Silveira’s cautious 

pragmatism increasingly gave way to what might be called 

a policy of “critical independence.” The election of Jimmy 

Carter brought immediate clashes with Brazil over human 

rights and nuclear policies. In early 1977, Vice President 

Walter Mondale visited Brazil to oppose possible Brazilian development of nuclear weapons capabilities. Brazil’s 

military leaders were deeply offended at the idea that the 

United States and other major powers could maintain nuclear arsenals, but their country could not. Brazilian diplomats played a major role in supporting the regional denuclearization of South America through the 1967 Treaty 

of Tlatelolco, and Brazil was later to ratify the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty, but relations with the United 

States were never to be the same.

U.S. opposition to Brazil’s development of a nuclear 

weapons capability confirmed previous Brazilian fears that 

the United States sought to “freeze” global power relationships to its advantage, relegating Brazil to subordinate 

status.29 Spurred by a long list of bilateral irritations and 

feeling that U.S. foreign policy had become bogged down 

in the war against terror, Brazilians became increasingly 

critical of the United States. According to Raul Jungmann, “With the end of the Cold War, South America lost 

whatever residual importance it had had for U.S. leaders, 

and disappeared into a vacuum of strategic irrelevance.”30

A new generation of Brazilian leaders has emerged 

who tend to see U.S., and generally Western, political 

and economic influence as a generic obstacle to Brazil’s 

rise, and therefore as something to be checked when 

possible.31 Sentiments of this kind fed UNASUR and 

the “inter-regional mechanisms” of the South-South 

Dialogue, India–Brazil–South Africa, and the BRIC. 

Unobjectionable and even positive in themselves, these 

initiatives often seemed accompanied by an undercurrent 

of anti-Americanism.

President Lula’s attempt to break the impasse over 

Iran’s nuclear program had its roots partly in past tensions with the United States over Brazil’s own nuclear 

programs.32 But it also derived from the conviction that 

the United States is often part of the problem and that 

Brazil can help achieve solutions that others, including 

the United States, have let slip away.

The negative reactions of the United States and 

other major powers to the initiatives taken with Iran by 

Brazil and Turkey show that global involvement for Brazil is not without costs. Brazilian policy was criticized 

at home and abroad for overreaching, hubris, and inadequate preparation. U.S. views of Brazil as an unreliable 

partner unwilling to make the difficult choices necessary 

to sustain world order suddenly mirrored Brazilian views 

of the United States as dedicated to military adventurism 

by flaunting the UN Security Council on Iraq.

Whether Brazil’s future policies will, like those of the 

United States, reflect greater caution and sensitivity to third 

whether Brazil’s future policies 

will reflect greater caution and 

sensitivity to third party interests 

remains an open question
10 SF No. 266 www.ndu.edu/inss

party interests remains an open question. But there can be 

no question that Brazil’s global activism is here to stay. “The 

days when domestic weaknesses [an acumulo de vulnerabilidades] limited our scope of action abroad have been left behind,” stated Antonio de Aguiar Patriota in his first speech 

as the new Foreign Minister under President Rousseff on 

January 2, 2011.33 Brazilians cannot underestimate what is 

left to be done domestically, he argued, but they now expect 

“to engage on all major international debates.”

The United States and Brazil, concludes one American observer, seem destined to keep bumping into each 

other all over the world.34 The key requirement for both 

countries is therefore to give strategic shape and rationality to these otherwise random interactions.

Prospects and Policy 

Recommendations

The United States has a basic national security interest in Brazil’s continuing democratic and marketoriented success, which improves its will and capacity to 

help address pressing global problems. We are in a rapidly changing period of international relations, in which 

a high premium is put on skilled and effective diplomacy 

in order to provide a measure of management to situations that could spin out of control. We are still haunted 

by nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, Brazil plays 

an important role. It is in the U.S. interest to find as 

many ways as possible not only to cooperate with Brazil, 

but also to engage with Brasilia as a regional and global 

partner in the maintenance of peace and prosperity.

A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will 

be changes in perspective on both sides. Mutually beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome 

Brazil’s emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than 

a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to 

the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to 

realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also 

needs to recognize that the United States still matters 

greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved working with Washington than against it.

The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping interests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably out of 

the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil 

must compete for policy attention with China, India, Russia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses 

no security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite 

Brazil’s importance in multilateral organizations, particularly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance 

at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazil’s 

interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to 

distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, 

this means neither country can expect automatic agreement 

from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically necessary to highlight differences even when interests are similar. But both countries should make every effort to develop a 

habit of “permanent consultation” in an effort to coordinate 

policies, work pragmatically together where interests are 

common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that 

specific interests and policies often may differ.

A first operational step, therefore, is for both countries to hold regular policy-level consultations, increase 

exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on 

multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. 

The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a 

major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of 

energy, including nuclear matters, all types of trade, the 

environment, space, and the development of international law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation. To 

share information and ensure effective consultation on so 

many functional issues will require finding ways to lessen 

the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The 

U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically 

organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible 

for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving 

the United States and Brazil have 

vast overlapping interests, but a 

formal strategic partnership is 

probably out of the question
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 266 11 

functional issues to offices organized globally. This organization hampers the exchange of information and consultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and 

policies go beyond their particular geographic region. 

One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an 

isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there 

things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bilaterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would 

offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on 

manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the 

question reveals the complexity of the task.

U.S. efforts to consult with Brazil on global issues 

would be more effective if accompanied by greater U.S. 

acceptance of multilateral alternatives to unilateral action. Brazil’s campaign for a permanent UN Security 

Council seat is anchored in its own history of seeking negotiated solutions. Argentina and Mexico also aspire to 

that seat, but Brazil’s candidacy is not just an expression 

of its growing global reach, but of its diplomatic record as 

well. This writer believes the United States should support Brazil’s candidacy.37

Ratification of key international treaties already 

pending before the U.S. Senate would also improve 

American standing and reduce suspicion about U.S. purposes. The failure of the United States to ratify the Convention on Law of the Sea, for example, gave a backdrop 

of credibility to unrealistic but politically popular concerns articulated by Defense Minister Jobim in November 2010 about a possible out-of-area “NATO threat” to 

Brazil’s oil claims in the South Atlantic. Similarly, the 

failure of the United States to ratify the Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing of and 

Trafficking in Firearms, while not of much immediate 

operational consequence, gives ammunition to those 

who argue the United States is not interested in combating violence, gangs, and illegal drugs.

A necessary and parallel second step forward would 

be to develop a cadre of U.S. and Brazilian professionals 

who are comfortable working with each other. Personal, 

professional, and institutional ties should be considered 

a high priority for both countries and should not be 

conditioned on particular policies or immediate payoffs. 

Both governments should invest in executive exchange 

programs, particularly in Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Justice, and State. Congress, universities, and the 

press should also be encouraged to seek opportunities 

for joint ventures.

Recent bilateral relationships between the United 

States and Brazil are littered with partnership agreements, memoranda of understanding, working groups, 

and joint action plans. President George W. Bush’s visit 

to Brazil in November 2005 led to a series of attempts 

to engage on a variety of issues. In March 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton launched an initiative 

that envisions an annual meeting between the Secretary and Foreign Minister. Such efforts can bear fruit. 

A forum in which chief executive officers from top U.S. 

and Brazilian corporations meet regularly to make doing business with each other easier has evidently had 

some success.38

In general, however, one has the impression of two 

vibrant societies with more in common than either realizes, but with neither a common language nor enough 

persons to interpret. How many people understand the 

cultural differences and similarities between Brazil and 

the United States? To whom can a policymaker turn 

to learn whether the fact that harvests in the Northern 

and Southern Hemispheres are calendar opposites can 

be used to develop agricultural policies that are complementary and not merely competitive?

The democratization of foreign policy compounds 

these difficulties. Foreign policy has been routinely 

messy in the United States for a generation or more. 

In addition to the constitutionally prescribed foreign 

Brazil’s campaign for a permanent 

UN Security Council seat is 

anchored in a record of seeking 

negotiated solutions
12 SF No. 266 www.ndu.edu/inss

policy roles of the U.S. Congress (which far exceed 

practices normal in most other countries), the participation of lobbies, nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), interest groups, individual Members of Congress, and the press generally bewilders outside observers. Brazil was once neater because its foreign policy 

was a national consensus monopolized by Itamaraty

diplomatic globalists. All that is now changing. Brazil’s 

expanded reach (more embassies in the Caribbean than 

the United States and more in Africa than the United 

Kingdom) has put new strains on both its policies and 

its diplomats.39 With a vigorous free press behind them, 

Brazilian NGOs (or the Third Sector as they are often called), businessmen, and other interest groups now 

openly participate in the market of foreign policy ideas. 

Their views do not necessarily converge with those in 

power in Brasilia or Washington.40

Moreover, it is not clear that there are many political issues that both countries see the same way. Brazilian 

foreign policy officials are aware of the shortcomings and 

vulnerabilities of U.S. policy. Many admire American society, technology, and culture, but the war on terror and 

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan evoke little attention 

and less sympathy. Brazil gets much credit in official 

Washington for leading MINUSTAH, but it is not clear 

that the two governments are seriously engaged on the 

way forward.

Both countries need to take a new look at 

each other, recognize their mutual interest in more 

intimate relations, and make achieving them a priority. Institutions that seek to promote U.S.-Brazil 

dialogue deserve much greater support. The Brazil 

Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is one such venue, as is the Council 

of the Americas. Strengthened ties between the National Defense University and Superior War College 

are under discussion, as are increased reciprocal academic exchanges in the wake of the bilateral Defense 

Cooperation Agreement and a Security of Military 

Information Agreement signed in 2010 by the United 

States and Brazil.

Some may object that such activities require resources and that they should be considered foreign assistance. Indeed, in the financially multipolar world in 

which we now live, one of the most critical strategic 

challenges the United States faces today is to get rising 

powers such as Brazil to shoulder a greater share of the 

costs of cooperation. Burdensharing is important—so is 

learning how to cooperate.

The ultimate objective should be for the United 

States and Brazil to direct their bilateral efforts toward 

maximizing both regional and global cooperation, with 

particular emphasis on conflict resolution, energy, and 

trade. On assuming office, President Rousseff ’s new Foreign Minister stated that Brazil:

will continue to emphasize dialogue and 

negotiation as the preferred method to resolve 

tensions and conflicts; to defend respect for 

international law, nonintervention, and 

multilateralism; to champion a world free of 

nuclear weapons; to fight prejudice, discrimination, 

and arbitrary imposition; and to reject recourse 

to coercion not rooted in the commitments of 

international brotherhood.41

These words cannot be read simply as rhetoric 

rooted in the Third World trade unionism of the weak. 

Brazil is no longer weak. It is the only BRIC without a 

nuclear bomb not because it could not produce one, but 

because it has chosen not to, and its security doctrines 

are focused on protecting its borders and on deterrence, not on projecting global power. President Lula’s 

grandstanding with Turkey in Iran damaged his country’s credibility, but as Brazil’s global reach matures, its 

multilateral skills and record of autonomy could prove 

Brazil’s expanded reach has put 

new strains on both its policies 

and its diplomats
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 266 13 

important assets in efforts against the risks of nuclear 

terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

Like Canada and only a few other countries, Brazil 

has a tradition of good UN citizenship. This characteristic is an important asset for the United States to find 

in a friend nowadays. The author believes it was no accident that Sérgio Vieira de Mello, the much admired UN 

peacemaker who lost his life in Iraq in 2003, was Brazilian. Brazil’s generally violence-free domestic history, the 

absence of conflicts with neighbors, and its longstanding 

commitment to UN principles and peacekeeping without the imposition of force are an important reservoir for 

conflict resolution.42

The United States and Brazil face similar problems 

in their immediate neighborhoods. Notable among these 

is trafficking in illegal drugs and arms, which contributes 

to citizen insecurity, migration, and unaccustomed messiness along parts of their borders. These issues should 

all be included in a permanent consultation process, but 

Brazil’s approach of “South America for South Americans” does not encourage effective cooperation with the 

United States on even such vital issues.

Brazil’s assertion of regional power to the exclusion 

of the United States is similar to China’s “active measures 

to promote Asian organizations that exclude the United States.”43 Initiatives such as UNASUR that exclude 

the United States, but which include actively anti-U.S. 

governments, invite uncertainty. The answer for Brazil 

is not to abandon UNASUR, let alone South American 

integration, but for both the United States and Brazil to 

ensure that they each develop and sustain bilateral ties 

with individual countries in accordance with the particular interests and needs of those countries. (Will anyone 

deny that Mexico is on some matters more important to 

the United States than Brazil?)

Both the United States and Brazil should actively 

support inter-American institutions like the OAS that 

bring both of them together with other countries of 

the hemisphere. Most Latin American and Caribbean 

countries want good relations with both the United 

States and Brazil, and multilateral activities are a key 

way to set and observe rules for everyone. Multilateral formats also are useful to offset the asymmetries 

of power, which have long hampered the United States 

in dealing with its neighbors, and which now are beginning to bedevil Brazil as it grows more rapidly than 

most countries around it.

As much as both countries need it, however, improved cooperation may require them to make changes 

for which they are not yet ready.44 Depending somewhat on their politics, many Brazilians will be dubious about cooperation with the United States as long 

as it continues to massively subsidize and protect key 

agricultural products, maintains an embargo on Cuba, 

is thought by important political groups to have ambitions on the Amazon or troops in South America, or 

fails to endorse Brazil’s UN Security Council ambitions. Similarly, some in the United States will question 

working closely with a Brazil that they see as enjoying 

the luxuries of the irresponsible until it accepts greater 

responsibility on nuclear nonproliferation (including 

more UN monitoring of its facilities), distances itself 

from Iran, is more present on democracy and human 

rights issues (in the Middle East, Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela), is more active on these issues at the UN and 

OAS, and generally treats the United States better in its 

diplomacy than it has often done recently.

Finally, the foreign policies of both the United 

States and Brazil are likely to be increasingly limited by 

internal factors in the future. In the United States, concerns over debt and weakening internal competitiveness 

are increasing.45 Brazil has had two successive presidents 

whose charisma helped them to mask domestic vulnerabilities; in doing so, they handed President Rousseff the 

enormous challenge of institutionalizing their success. 

Yet the world will not go away. Neither the United States 

Washington and Brasilia must learn 

to play to each other’s strengths
14 SF No. 266 www.ndu.edu/inss

nor Brazil is powerful enough to solve alone many of the 

problems directly affecting its national security.

Washington and Brasilia must learn to play to each 

other’s strengths. Failure to work together will result in 

lost opportunities and damage the national interests of 

both countries.

The author wishes to thank many colleagues, particularly Eva S. Baker, Luis Bitencourt, John A. Cope, Thomaz 

Guedes da Costa, Eric Farnsworth, Albert Fishlow, Patrice Franko, Bruce Friedman, Peter Hakim, Margaret Daly Hayes, Alexandra Kerr, Bill McIlhenny, Frank 

Mora, Nicholas Rostow, Phillip C. Saunders, and Paulo 

Sotero for their support and criticism, but the views expressed are his own.

Notes

1 Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Manufacturers, 2000, 

available at <www.v-brazil.com/business/transportation.html>.

2 In 1906, my wife’s grandparents came to the New World to 

flee political repression in Poland. Her grandfather settled in Lynn, 

Massachusetts, working at General Electric’s original plant; her 

grandmother’s sister settled in Curitiba, Parana, Brazil, second only to 

Chicago in population of Polish origin and today a world model for 

green public transportation.

3 In a report on “Education in Brazil,” December 9, 2010, The 

Economist reported that “recent progress merely upgrades Brazil’s 

schools from disastrous to very bad.”

4 A 2009 report on global competitiveness ranks Brazil behind 

India, China, and Russia, suggesting that lags in education help 

explain difficulties in satisfying the growing demand for skilled workers. See Paulo Sotero, “Brazil’s Rising Ambition in a Shifting Global 

Balance of Power,” Politics: 2010, vol. 30 (Supplement 1), 77.

5 World Bank, “Lifting Families Out of Poverty in Brazil—Bolsa Familia Program,” 2010, available at <http://web.worldbank.org/

WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/BRAZILEXTN

/0,,contentMDK:20754490~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSite

PK:322341,00.html>.

6 Financial stabilization helped differentiate Brazil from its 

neighbors. Claudio Frischtak has calculated that Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) has gone from 34 percent of the GDP of South 

America in 1990 to 56 percent in 2008. If accurate, these astonishing 

numbers in themselves tell the story of Brazil’s explosive growth.

7 Embrapa is short for Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, or the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation. The innovations that it pioneered and their extraordinary results are detailed 

in “Brazilian Agriculture: The Miracle of the Cerrado,” The Economist, 

August 26, 2010.

8 Albert Fishlow notes the “understandable preference for 

counting the gains rather than recognizing the costs deriving from the 

sub-salt oil deposits” that are so deep that the difficulties of extraction are still unknown. See “Brazil: What’s Next?” Americas Quarterly, 

Winter 2011.

9 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 

(UNCTAD), World Investment Report, 2010, annex II.

10 In addition to UNCTAD reports on world investment, see 

Peter Gammeltoft, “Emerging Multinationals: Outward FDI from 

the BRICS countries,” paper presented at the GLOBELICS 6th

International Conference, September 22–24, 2008, Mexico City, 

Mexico.

11 Bad currency bets using derivatives cost three Brazilian transnational companies several billion dollars in 2008. See UNCTAD, 

World Investment Report, 2009, 66.

12 Fishlow makes clear, however, that a rosy future is not to be 

casually assumed. He highlights unknowns dealing with Congress, 

public financing, foreign policy, and the preparations to host the 2014 

World Cup in soccer and the 2016 Olympic Games.

13 For a balance sheet of the 77 years during which Brazil was 

governed by emperors under a constitutional regime, see C.H. Haring,

Empire in Brazil (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).

14 See Larry Rohter, Brazil on the Rise (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 276.

15 Corruption in Brazilian politics is sometimes so blatant as to 

be demoralizing. Transparency International ranks Brazil well below 

the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development average (but ahead of India, Russia, and China) on its corruption index.

16 Nelson A. Jobim, Segurança Internacional: Perspectivas Brasileiras (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2010), 15.

17 Article 142 of Brazil’s constitution still gives the military the 

obligation to maintain constitutional order on request.

18 Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez, “Lessons from the Carioca War,” O 

Estado de Sao Paulo, December 1, 2010.

19 Luigi R. Einaudi, “The Ecuador-Peru Peace Process,” in 

Herding Cats, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela 

Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 

chapter 16, 405–429.

20 Alexei Barrionuevo, “President of Brazil Unveils Plan to 

Upgrade Military,” The New York Times, December 19, 2008.

21 Brazilian elites often identify with French culture and independence, but a primary reason for Brazilian interest in a “strategic” 

relationship with Paris is French willingness to transfer proprietary 

defense technology. Even this, however, has not yet been enough to 

convince Brazil to choose French fighter aircraft over U.S. and Swedish competitors.

22 The principle in international law is that territory remains 

with its possessor unless otherwise provided for by treaty: in this case, 

Rio Branco successfully gave the force of law to Brazil’s prior territorial expansion, which had made a mockery of the 1494 Tordesillas 

division of lands between Spain and Portugal.

23 Cynthia Arnson and Paulo Sotero, eds., Brazil as a Regional 

Power: Views from the Hemisphere (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010).

24 Luis Bitencourt, private communication with author, January 

4, 2011.

25 Agencia Estado, São Paolo, November 3, 2010.

26 Marcos Azambuja, “The BRIC Club, Where Good Things Do 

Come in Large Packages,” in Brazilian Foreign Policy (Washington, 

DC: Ed. Fundação Liberdade e Cidadania, 2010), 33.

27 “Brazil Takes Off,” The Economist, November 12, 2009.

28 Matias Spektor, Kissinger e o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 

2009).

29 The original “freezing of power” formulation is that of former 

Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the United Nations and United 

States, Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro. See “The United Nations 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 266 15 

and the Freezing of the International Power Structure,” International 

Organization 26, no. 1 (Winter 1972).

30 See Raul Jungmann, “Estrategia Nacional de Defesa (END),” 

in Jobim, 477.

31 An excellent analysis of formative experiences and strategic 

calculations is that of Thomaz Guedes da Costa, “Grand Strategy 

for Assertiveness: International Security and U.S.-Brazil Relations,” 

Challenges to Security in the Hemisphere Task Force, October–December 

2009, available at <https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/

Task_Force_Papers/Costa-Grand_Strategy_for_Assertiveness.pdf>.

32 Julia E. Sweig stresses Brazilian rationales in “A New Global 

Player: Brazil’s Far-Flung Agenda,” Foreign Affairs, November–December 2010, 176–178.

33 Available at <www.itamaraty.gov.br>.

34 Peter Hakim, “U.S.-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict,” 

Infolatam, October 25, 2010.

35 The image of a tropical China is that of the great Brazilian 

sociologist Gilberto Freyre, New World in the Tropics: The Culture of 

Modern Brazil (New York: Knopf, 1959), 257 ff.

36 Sotero notes the uncertain impact of Brazil-China trade, 

78–79.

37 The United States publicly supports India’s accession to the 

United Nations (UN) Security Council while remaining silent about 

Brazil’s aspirations. India, like Brazil, is a functioning democracy. Unlike Brazil, however, India is a non–Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear 

power and has none of Brazil’s commitment to international law. See 

Barbara Crosette, “The Elephant in the Room,” Foreign Policy, January–February 2010, 29–30, which characterizes India as a scofflaw 

from nuclear proliferation to multilateral trade to climate change.

38 An Economic Partnership Dialogue, launched in 2007, still 

meets regularly and covers issues such as investment, development 

cooperation, social inclusion, infrastructure, civil aviation, import 

safety, and telecommunications. Other bilateral sallies include combating racial discrimination, science and technology, economic policy, 

development cooperation in Africa and Haiti, empowering women 

economically and socially, food security, UN Security Council reform, 

nonproliferation, disarmament, and defending democratic institutions 

in Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Honduras. A biofuels agreement 

meant to increase cooperation on ethanol wound up focused more on 

developing biofuels capacity in Central America and the Caribbean 

and Africa.

39 Rubens Ricupero, “The Main Lineaments of Brazil’s Current Foreign Policy,” Brazilian Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Ed. 

Fundação Liberdade e Cidadania, 2010), 7–17.

40 Even more complex interactions sometimes occur. Some 

U.S. corporations in Brazil have ties with civil society organizations 

addressing social and environmental change through corporate social 

responsibility programs. The U.S. human rights emphasis under 

Jimmy Carter, which irritated many Brazilians, has been described 

as a source of “energy” for domestic human rights activists and the 

Brazilian Bar Association.

41 Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, speech of January 2, 2011, 29. 

Compare President Barack Obama’s April 2009 articulation in Prague 

of the U.S. goal to “seek the peace and security of a world without 

nuclear weapons.”

42 Brazil’s renunciation, with its neighbors Argentina and Chile, 

of weapons of mass destruction demonstrates that Latin American 

can set an example for other parts of the world in this critical area.

43 Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, 

and Tools, Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 

4 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, October 2006), 1. See also “U.S. 

Influence at Risk in Asia without More Active Role in Regional 

Organizations,” Council on Foreign Relations Report, November 4, 

2009.

44 The author is indebted to Peter Hakim for this caution and 

the examples that follow.

45 Richard N. Haass et al., “Reviving U.S. Power Abroad from 

Within,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 30, 2010, available 

at <www.cfr.org/publication/23701/reviving_us_power_abroad_from_

within.html>.

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Nicholas Rostow

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director of Studies

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS
16 SF No. 266 www.ndu.edu/inss

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