Cover Russia’s leadership has made tough decisions and instituted

sweeping change in the military ranks to the dislike of many officers.

While some Imperial and Soviet traditions remain, the reorganization of

the force and its “informatization” have produced innovations that are

“recasting the red star” that the bear has protected for so long. Forging

these pieces—tradition, technology, and toughness—is represented in the

cover artwork through the images of Russia’s historical legacy, updated

equipment, and tough civilian leadership.

The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or

position of the Department of Defense or the US government.

The author works for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. FMSO

is a component of the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The office is charged

with preparing studies and assessments based on the reading of foreign and domestic publications and

through contacts with a network of foreign and US military and civilian security specialists. FMSO

researches, writes, and publishes from unclassified sources about the military establishments,

doctrines, and practices of selected foreign armed forces. It also studies a variety of civil‐military

and transnational security issues affecting the US and its military forces. FMSO products are

prepared for the US Army and other services, the Department of Defense, as well as non-DoD

organizations to include the Treasury and Justice Departments.
DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to Dr. Jacob Kipp, mentor and coach to me and hundreds of foreign area

officers (FAOs) in the US Armed Forces. “Comrade” Kipp, as his US friends sometimes call him,

unselfishly gives of his time and wisdom to develop analytical expertise in the American force. His

love of teaching and especially of “Mother Russia” and national security affairs remain his primary

focus even in retirement. He and his beloved wife Masha, now also retired after serving as a

professor of language and theater at the University of Kansas, have hosted hundreds of students and

luminaries at their home and advised them on matters both professional and personal. For this, I and

his students and friends both foreign and domestic are eternally grateful.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author used only open-source translations for the construction of this document. Until August

2009, the author utilized the translation talents of the Open Source Center (formerly the Foreign

Broadcast Information Service or FBIS). After that date, he used government contracted Russian

translators in order to write other chapters in this book. The author is solely responsible for the

selection and analysis of the material others translated.

The author is indebted to the staff and instructors at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey,

California and at the US Army’s Russian Institute (USARI) in Garmisch, Germany. The Institute no

longer exists, having been replaced by the more comprehensive George C. Marshall European Center

for Security Studies. However, some USARI instructors remain employed at the Center. The insights

of these instructors and their patience in teaching a host of foreign area officers in the Russian

language, culture, and social and military affairs was exceptional. USARI instructors were

particularly helpful in regard to the latter subject areas.

Further, the author would like to acknowledge the local support of Mr. Charles A. Martinson III of

Fort Leavenworth who designed the cover artwork. Mr. Martinson is an exceptionally gifted graphic

artist with the unique ability to produce innovative and original, defining designs that have accurately

reflected the content of both this work and others by the author. The author would like to acknowledge

the assistance of Mr. Robert Love of the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) who translated

some of the material used in this publication and monitored commercial translations of other Russian

source material, ensuring their timely delivery as well; and Mr. Dennis Giangreco of FMSO who

edited several of the chapters. The director of FMSO, Mr. Tom Wilhelm, provided his total support

and encouragement for the project and ensured the author had adequate time to prepare this work.

Finally, the author would like to express his thanks to the Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC) G-2 at Fort Eustis for financing the second printing of this book. The 318

th Information

Operations Group within the 688

th

Information Operations Wing in San Antonio, Texas financed the

book’s first printing.
FOREWORD

Since the dissolution of the Soviet and emergence of the Russian armed forces, the country’s

leadership has worked to reestablish the military’s place among its own populace and the world

community at large. Recasting the Red Star follows Russia’s progress in accomplishing these goals

through three standards: tradition, technology, and toughness. Tradition is represented by elements of

the Tsarist and Soviet legacy that have survived (the dialectic thought process, military culture,

deception, the reconnaissance-strike complex, etc.). Technology is represented by the present effort to

introduce the necessary information- and nano-technologies into its modern weaponry and to address

the accompanying changes to organizational and conceptual issues. Toughness is represented by the

efforts of the defense ministry and political leadership to rid the armed forces of clans and corruption

and impose actual reform on the military. The cover artwork of this book includes examples of these

standards.

Recasting the Red Star describes Russia’s modernization effort in a comprehensive fashion. The

Defense Ministry’s military reform effort and the operational environment implied in Russia’s

national security strategy (2009) and military doctrine (2010) are described. The Soviet culture of

military thought is examined to include a short history of Tsarist and Soviet military traditions. These

chapters serve as a reference point for the traditions behind Russia’s modernization effort. Next the

author examines technological developments, such as Russia’s concept of high-technology deception,

information war, reconnaissance- and information-strike systems (a C4ISR equivalent), and resulting

future war construct. Finally, the book closely examines the Russian-Georgian conflict of August

2008. These chapters question why Russia and Georgia went to war, how information warfare figured

into the conflict, and, most important of all, “who set the bear trap.”

The material assembled for this publication indicates that Russia’s armed forces are on their way

back to becoming a legitimate military power. A long road lies ahead with many potential pitfalls but

under the leadership of President Dmitriy Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin a reform

course has been set. Russia has retained its nuclear capability and is modernizing its weaponry,

equipment, and organizational structure. Russia may not yet be “back” in the author’s opinion—but it

is making good progress.

Tom Wilhelm

Director

Foreign Military Studies Office

2011
INTRODUCTION

The armed forces of the Russian Federation are still regaining their strength as they emerge from

the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This has been a slow process filled with pain and

frustration over the past two decades as several reform initiatives failed to materialize. Further

exacerbating the process were Russia’s two wars fought against Chechen extremists and the war

fought against Georgia over South Ossetia. These conflicts were less successful than anticipated.

However, the military is advancing and modernizing. Weaponry and equipment updates represent

responses to the perceived impact of information-age technologies on military affairs. Russia’s

military leaders have integrated these digital processes into their operational art and strategic

planning. Further, they have reorganized the military establishment and started a serious campaign

against corruption in the force. The book Recasting the Red Star tracks the military’s modernization

through the three threads of tradition, technology, and toughness, with the latter thread represented by

the staunch support that President Dmitriy Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and Defense

Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov have provided the reform effort.

The metaphor “recasting the red star” was chosen as the title for this book since these words

emphasize the changing nature of an armed force that still relishes its legacy. The Red Star has been

the symbol of the armed forces for nearly a century. The concept of the star first appeared in the 1908

novel Red Star, Alexander Bogdanov’s science fiction novel about a communist utopia on Mars in

which a scientist travels there to learn about the Martian’s socialist system. The star’s origin within

the armed forces apparently lies in a mass political movement during the Russian civil war and the

end of the First World War. According to an English-language Wikipedia entry, the star was used to

distinguish Moscow troops from the influx of retreating Russians who had departed the Austrian and

German fronts and found themselves in Moscow in 1917 mixed with the local garrison. The officers

gave out tin stars to the Moscow garrison soldiers to wear on their hats. When those troops joined the

Red Army and the Bolsheviks they painted their tin stars red, the color of socialism, thus creating the

original Red Star.

The Red Star was soon adopted as an emblem of the Soviet Union and was often seen on awards

such as the Order of the Red Star which was awarded for “exceptional service in the cause of the

defense of the Soviet Union in both war and peace.” In Soviet times the five points of the star

represented the planet’s five continents (which was Russia’s understanding of the number of

continents at the time). Red was the color of the proletarian revolution and the Red Star was often

called the “star of Mars,” after the Roman god of war, Mars. The Military Collegium for the

Organization of the Red Army proposed the Red Star as the symbol of the Red Army. The logo’s

creator was Konstantin Eremeev, the commander of the Petrograd Military District according to the

Russian-language version of Wikipedia. Ironically, in the Soviet tradition, Mars symbolized the

protection of peaceful labor and not the Roman god of war. The Red Star symbolized the liberation of

the workers from hunger, war, poverty, and slavery. The Red Star is, of course, also closely

associated in the Russian mind with victory during the Great Patriotic War (World War II)—no more

so than the unfurling of the Soviet flag with its Red Star and Hammer and Sickle over a burning Berlin

on May 2, 1945.
The Soviet Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary) defines the

armed forces’ Red Star heritage as follows:

The Red Star is a distinctive device worn by Soviet Armed Forces personnel. It was adopted in

April 1918 as a chest badge, effective July 1918. It was also worn on headgear with the plow

and hammer emblem (hammer and sickle from April 1922) and was worn only on headgear

from 29 May 1922. The Red Star became a mandatory component element of cap badges upon

their adoption in the Soviet Army.[1]

Today, the Russian military’s main newspaper remains Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star). The star

continues as well as one of the elements of the banner of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

The image below is the banner of the armed forces as of 2003. The Red Star no longer has the

hammer and sickle in the middle, and it is no longer the center of focus. Red Stars on the current

banner are located at its corners, perhaps indicating that the armed forces now occupy a slightly more

peripheral aspect of Russia’s security and political space (it is no coincidence that the cover to this

book features three civilians and no military figures). The back side of the banner has the word

Otechestvo (Motherland) above the double-headed eagle, and the words Dolg (Duty) and Chest’

(Honor) underneath it.[2] The following image is the front side of the banner.

Recasting the Red Star is divided into three parts. Part One includes four chapters that describe

Russia’s military reform effort, the traditions and thought processes behind these reforms (including

some traditions that hampered reform), and Russia’s assessment of the current operational

environment. Part One represents the forging of “tradition” into the recasting of the red star.

Part Two also includes four chapters (five through eight). These chapters are of an operational and

technological nature. They discuss the Russian concept of high-technology deception; the issue of the

information-strike complex (a modern-day command, control, computer, intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance, or C4ISR, concept); the Russian attempt to “informatize” its armed forces; and

future war concepts promoted by the Russian military and civilian academics. Part Two represents

the forging of “technology” into the recasting of the red star.

The final four chapters comprise Part Three of the book. These chapters discuss the August 2008

war with Georgia over South Ossetia from several perspectives. First, there is a general description

of what happened. Second, there is an examination of the question “who started the conflict.” Third,

there is a list of information warfare conclusions drawn from the conflict. Finally, there is a

description of three books that describe varying perspectives on the war. One book represents

international opinions, one represents US opinions, and one represents Russian opinions about the

conflict. Part Three describes practical experiences and the forging of “toughness” through battle
experience and the resulting reform mandates that became inevitable if Russia was to remain an

international military competitor. A chapter by chapter summary follows.

Chapter One examines the Russian progress in reforming its military structure. Changes in the

nature of combat compelled Russia to review the cumbersome structure left over from the Soviet

army and geared toward frontline clashes of forces whose mobilization deployment would take a long

time according to General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov. That structure has ceased to provide

national defense capability. Fundamentally new methods of combat necessitated a shift to a new

structure and to more modern weapons and materiel linked in a single information-communication

space. The reform effort is comprehensive, involving a restructuring of the military districts and

strategic sectors of interest; and a reorganization of the officer corps and educational institutions. The

reform effort has the support of President Dmitriy Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin,

which has greatly eased the process. The military budget will be increased some 40% over the next

ten years to ensure that modern weaponry accompanies the reform effort.

Chapter Two examines Russian and Soviet military traditions. There are many similarities

between the old and the new traditions but there are also differences. Some traditions are captured in

books, some are maintained in personal testimonies or gatherings of officers, and some are relived in

classical films such as Vladimir Rogovoy’s “Ofitsery (Officers).” For example, a few similarities

between the Soviet and Tsarist period are:

· Soviet: Loyalty to the Unit Banner or Ship Flag. A 1942 “Decree on the Red Banner” was

approved by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The decree noted that “The Banner

is a symbol of military honor, valor, and glory; it is a reminder to each soldier, sergeant,

officer, and general of their sacred duty to faithfully serve and bravely and capably defend

the Soviet Homeland...” Old Russia: Peter the Great developed the banners and several

concepts that became significant for generations of soldiers. Even the Soviet writers noted

that Peter the Great did much to elevate the banner to a place of prominence in the eyes of

the Russian serviceman, as soldiers swore to the oath “I will not leave the command and

banner to which I belong, but will follow them as long as I am alive.”

· Soviet: Esprit de corps and solidarity in battle. These traits are based on the new, socialist

relations between soldiers and the people’s unity of class interests. These traits are

incompatible with lack of integrity, overlooking a comrade’s error, or concealing his

transgressions. Honesty is required in relationships. The film “Ofitsery (Officers)” focuses

on esprit de corps and underscores the importance of good morale and discipline of the

force. The film is remembered most for the line “There is such a profession—defending

one’s Motherland.” Old Russia: Dragomirov believed that the military had more to do with

will rather than intellect and thus stressed moral education’s objectives: instill fighting

spirit, patriotism, and discipline. The community (peasant-commune) had deep roots in the

Russian community as the names of many regiments (Orlov, Kozel, Tver, etc.) came from

places that sent fighters. This focus on the community and solidarity was reflected in

Suvorov’s urging that soldiers should “die yourself, but rescue your comrade!”

On the other hand, the focus on the soldier’s well-being from Imperial times as stated in historical

texts is clearly missing from today’s list of Russian traditions. The unfortunate tradition of
dedovshchina (hazing) lives on when it should have ended long ago. Treating soldiers inhumanely

goes against many Old Russian military traditions. A final addition to this chapter is a list of

traditions that will be taught to Russian conscripts over the coming year. The list includes films,

books, and lectures on Russian traditions designed to teach the force about its heritage.

Chapter Three summarizes two books on military thought from the Soviet era. They are The

Culture of Military Thought and The History of Soviet Military Thought. The thought processes

explained in these works are expected to continue to influence the Russian military’s thinking in the

decades ahead. The authors of the first work underscored the necessity of using Marxist-Leninist

ideological and methodological principles in order to look into the future, forecast military events,

and creatively implement military theory’s new postulations. Problems must be solved without a

direct reliance on practical experience gained in warfare since Russia’s most recent experiences (the

1979-1989 war against Afghan insurgents, the wars in Chechnya, and the 2008 war with Georgia)

were not high-tech versus high-tech types of conflict. Authors Colonel General F. F. Gaivoronsky and

Colonel M. I. Galkin’s work also offers a general introduction to other topics covered in Recasting

the Red Star such as future war, military traditions, and high-technology applications to military

affairs.

I.A. Korotkov wrote the second work. It canvassed the years 1917 to June of 1941. In the

introduction to his book, Korotkov noted how Friedrich Engels had stressed not simply drawing

conclusions but rather that study is what Russia’s officers need most of all. He discussed the ongoing

importance of military doctrine and the concept of a General Staff, two issues that are as timely and

important today as they were in Korotkov’s time.

Chapter Four examines the indicators that form Russia’s impression of the so-called “operational

environment.” These indicators are taken from the May 2009 National Security Strategy of the

Russian Federation and the February 2010 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. While the

operational environment is a US construct, the outline of a theoretical model that approaches the US

concept can be implied from these documents. Russian military thinking on the geostrategic

environment is included. One strategic direction of the operational environment, the Arctic region, is

given special attention since it is discussed so thoroughly in the Russian press.

Chapter Five describes the evolution and importance of the Russian concept of deception. Russian

military authors over the years have preferred the term maskirovka (concealment). However, in the

past decade the terms obman (deception), dezinformatsiya (disinformation), and vvedenie v

zabluzhdenie (mislead) have become increasingly in vogue (as well as the term “reflexive control,”

which is close in meaning to perception management). Russia will continue to stress the importance

of using deception as a “coefficient of force” (it increases the strength or power of a person or armed

force that uses it, especially if the two sides have equal capabilities or if one side is much weaker

than the other side) against an opponent while remaining vigilant in case some terrorist organization

or nation-state uses deception operations against Russia.

Chapter Six takes a look at Russian attempts to “informatize” its military. The chapter includes

new and old definitions of the term “information war” as well as the current discussion surrounding

the projected use of the concept known as network-centric warfare. The support of President Dmitriy
Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is crucial to the future success of the informationization

effort and to improving the military’s command and control system. Their demands to achieve success

in these areas are indicative of the tough approach required to make the military-industrial complex of

Russia perform as it should. Also covered in the chapter is the attention Russia’s military-industrial

complex is paying to the development of informatized weaponry and especially to unmanned aerial

vehicles (UAVs).

Chapter Seven discusses the Russian equivalent terminology for the US concept of command,

control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and how

the Russian concept has changed over time. The chapter first discusses the reconnaissance-fire and –

strike complex, then the reconnaissance-fire and –strike system, and finally the information-strike

system and operation. The latter term is especially important in that it indicates planning for a

strategic strike on an opponent’s information infrastructure and information resources. It is becoming

increasingly important in the Russian assessment of future war operations. Russian discussions in

military journals also highlight “reconnaissance-strike-maneuver” engagements. These activities

could result in one-time engagements of targets and thus eliminate neutralizing and suppressive fires

in the opinion of some Russian experts.

Chapter Eight is a look at Russian thinking regarding future war. It examines the thoughts of several

leading Russian theorists on the topic. The chapter discusses indirect strategies, informationpsychological attacks (to include the use of reflexive control operations), and the disorganization

weapon, a key component of Russia’s information warfare concept. Also examined is the progress

Russia is making in regard to nanotechnologies and the Russian use of asymmetry in future war.

Chapter Nine looks at the August conflict between Russia and Georgia solely from the vantage

point of the Russian press. The findings are instructive especially for how the Russians used the

media. The press served as a signaling or warning device, as a medium for official pronouncements,

and as a forum for criticism and praise among other issues. Russia clearly warned Georgia not to act.

When Georgia did, Russia moved in and succeeded in avenging the deaths of their peacekeepers and

in establishing control over South Ossetia, an activity it had surreptitiously carried on for the past ten

years (passing out Russian passports to residents of South Ossetia, etc.). The appraisal discusses the

problems and successes of the Russian military as well as the application of cyber and media

operations during the conflict.

Chapter Ten considers the problem of operational deception in the information age and, in the case

of the Russian-Georgian conflict, who set the bear trap, Russia or Georgia? The interesting

conclusion of both sides is that each drew the other into the fight. Who is telling the truth? Will we be

able to see through the fog of operational deception that appears to lie at the heart of this conflict? Or

for that matter, is a true rendering of those five days ever going to be discernable? Interestingly,

Russia has not held a Parliamentary hearing on the conflict as it did with regard to the war in

Chechnya.

Chapter Eleven examines the information warfare theory that Russia has developed and the

assessment of this theory after the conflict with Georgia. Opinions were divided as to who won the

information war, Russian or Georgian media? More importantly, several recommendations were
made to strengthen Russia’s information warfare techniques, procedures, and organization. The

lessons learned in this conflict should enable Russia to use practical experience to improve its

information forces and information theory for future use.

Chapter Twelve is composed of three book reviews on the fighting in South Ossetia and Georgia.

The books reviewed are The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia (Svante E. Cornell and

S. Frederick Starr, editors); A Little War That Shook the World by Ronald D. Asmus; and The Tanks

of August by Russians Mikhail Barabanov, Anton Lavrov, and Vyacheslav Tseluyko. The comparison

offers varying perspectives of the fighting as well as different timelines of how the fighting evolved.

Chapter Thirteen offers conclusions that the author draws from the study. It also updates several of

the chapters with new information obtained since the various chapters were written and cleared for

publication.

There are also five appendixes. Appendix One lists information warfare definitions and related

information security policies of the Russian Federation. Appendix Two lists Russian definitions

associated with culture and traditions. Appendix Three lists cyber attacks during the RussianGeorgian conflict. Appendix Four lists Russian definitions associated with military deception.

Appendix Five contains two maps of South Ossetia to help the reader find their place on the map as

they confront the many cities mentioned in Chapters 9-12.

Wherever possible, transliterations of Russian titles were added to the text or footnotes. If there is

no Russian transliteration, then the original Russian version of the articles were either lost or only an

English translation was available. The transliterations used the BGN/PCGN 1947 Romanization

System for Russian.

Timothy Thomas

January 2011
CHAPTER ONE: MILITARYREFORM—A “NEW LOOK” FOR REAL?

We have seen with our own eyes that military reform is heading in the right direction. Time alone is

required for its full implementation.[3]

Introduction

Ever since the creation of the Russian Armed Forces, military reform has been a topic of hot

debate among military and civilian professionals in Russia. Former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev

initiated reform proposals in the early 1990s. The discussion was heated and intense due to strong

push-back from the higher echelons of the officer corps. Soviet-era officers were the leaders of the

anti-reform protests and their positions were understandable: they were protesting to protect the only

system and benefits that they had known.

Reform efforts from 1993-2004 were so fruitless that the well-known Russian military journalist

Alexander Goltz wrote a book titled Armiya Rossii: 11 Poteryann’kh Let (The Army of Russia: 11

Lost Years) in 2004. Goltz stressed that only a solution reached by civilian society (not a solution

offered by general officers protecting their realm) could offer a profound resolution to the problem.

In 2008, however, military reform appeared to begin in earnest. The main factor in finally

overcoming the roadblocks of the officer corps was of an objective nature: the establishment (in the

words of Russian military expert Vitaliy Shlykov) of Anatoliy Serdyukov as “the first truly civilian

Defense Minister” of Russia.[4] A second, subjective reason, for reform effort successes was that

Serdyukov was able to “lift the taboo on the study and use of the foreign experience of military

organization.”[5] In this sense Serdyukov was using a reform method “repeatedly proven in Russian

history by military reformers.”[6]

Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev believes that the structural (reorganization) reform is now

complete. This reform has resulted in officer reductions, in the realignment of educational institutions,

and in the development of operational-strategic sectors. However, much work remains, particularly in

providing the Armed Forces with modern arms and equipment. This chapter will describe how a

combination of toughness and persistence has resulted in these reform achievements. It will also

describe the work that yet needs to be done.

The Appointment of Serdyukov as Defense Minister

In February 2007 then-President Vladimir Putin appointed Anatoliy Serdyukov to the position of

Defense Minister of the Russian Federation. Serdyukov was, like Putin, from St. Petersburg. From

2004-2007 he led the Tax Ministry of Russia. His initial charge from Putin was to fight corruption and

inefficiency in the military. He decided to transform the military personnel structure in the process

from an egg shape to that of a pyramid, with more officers at the bottom than at the top; and to change

the Armed Forces organizational structure, moving from a four-tier system (military district, army,

division, unit) to a three-tier system (military district, operative command, brigade). The purpose of

the latter move was to provide for a more efficient and quick reaction capability to military threats.

To date thousands of officers have been removed from service and some 85 brigades have been

created. Thus Serdyukov has provided solid movement and change in both areas.
The change in a military district system was influenced by Russia’s recent wars in Chechnya and

South Ossetia. In both conflicts the division and regimental structures hardly participated in the

planning and guidance of the conflicts since the focus was on fighting quick wars at the small unit

level. Most Russian analysts think the August 2008 conflict with Georgia was the catalyst that caused

Serdyukov to act more rapidly than originally anticipated. The Chief of the Russian General Staff,

General of the Army Nikolay Makarov, stated in December 2008 that wars will now require troops to

spring into action immediately. The lessons learned from the conflict in Georgia have become the

catalyst for speeding up the reform process. As he noted, “We had serious deficiencies. We have

made the necessary conclusions and we will eradicate them [problems encountered during the

conflict].”[7]

Ruslan Pukhov, a Director for Russia’s Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technology, thinks

Serdyukov provided common sense to an otherwise untenable situation. What didn’t hurt, of course,

was the backing of Vladimir Putin and Dmitriy Medvedev. Their support was vital if reform was to

move forward since Serdyukov had many opponents to his efforts.[8]

Retired officers, journalists, and even academics were the primary opponents to military reform.

Among the retired officers, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, now President of the Academy of

Geopolitical Problems; Major-General Alexander Vladimirov, Vice-President of the Collegium of

Military Experts; and Major-General Vladimir Isakov, an Adviser to the President on Military

Reform in the 1990s, stand out for their contentious backlash to the reform proposals. Ivashov pointed

out that there was no military organizational development in past reform efforts and there is none

now. Vladimirov stated that the reform effort does not coincide with any strategy and thus has no

chance of being successful. Isakov contended that the brigade structure will turn into an overgrown

regiment. Retired officer Anatoliy Tsyganok, head of the Military Forecasting Center, noted that there

is no foundation for military reform in the shape of a military doctrine or national security concept.

These critiques all originated in the first three months of 2009. Many other anti-reform articles had

appeared earlier. Since 2009, however, both a military doctrine and national security strategy have

been produced. These documents provided a base for reform and offset some of the criticism. More

importantly, a majority of the upper echelon of active duty officers are in agreement, it appears, with

the High Command. General Makarov stated that the reform is the most significant in the past fifty

years and consists of five phases: converting units to permanent-readiness status and cutting officer

personnel; providing 70-100% of state-of-the-art equipment by 2020; training officers and noncommissioned officers and reforming educational establishments; formulating new regulations and

training programs; and raising service member prestige through better pay and allowances.[9]

But problems do remain within the force. In January 2010 three officers were removed from their

posts and they were important positions: the commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces of the

Army, the commander of forces in the North Caucasus Military District, and the chief of the Housing

and Facilities Service. A reason provided for their dismissal was that they did not agree with

Russia’s “new look.” Further, a deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, Mikhail

Babich, stated that the “new look” is not occurring in reality. Rather in his estimation none of the 85

brigades were in a state of combat readiness.[10] The new brigade structure (and lack of a large
army) has also resulted in jokes among Russian defense pundits. According to Alexander

Khramchikhin, who works at the Institute for Political and Military Analysis, “the biggest problem for

the Chinese Army in case of war with Russia will be not to destroy the Russian Army but to find

it!”[11]

Command and Control System Reform

Russia’s General Staff Chief, General of the Army Nikolay Makarov, noted in late 2010 that

organizational reforms were required since there was a lack of conformity in the country’s Armed

Forces. Nowhere was nonconformity more apparent than in the country’s command and control

system. Previously branches of service and combat arms caused significant fragmentation of the

command and control system since each branch had its own communication system. The reform effort

has eliminated many of these redundancies and simultaneously compressed the time component

allowing for swifter decisions.[12]

Automated command and control integration increases Russia’s ability to conduct reconnaissance,

surveillance, navigation, recognition, control and guidance, and battle management. It will soon be

possible for military districts to achieve full operational readiness of all echelons in a theater of

military operation in six hours[13] thanks to these improvements.

Reform of the Officer Corps, Creation of New Commands

Defense Minister Serdyukov shocked the military establishment with a reform announcement on 14

October 2008. Serdyukov stated that he intended to reduce the number of army and naval officers

from 355,000 to 150,000 within the next three years. Colonels would be cut from 25,665 to 9,114;

majors would shrink from 99,550 to 25,000; and lieutenant colonels would decrease from 88,678 to

15,000. Captains would slide from 90,000 to 40,000. Senior lieutenants would gain from the reform,

increasing from 50,000 to 60,000. The Moscow-based administrative staff would be reduced by 2.5

times, from 21,813 to 8,500. Just a month earlier, in September, the Communist Party had demanded

Serdyukov’s resignation, noting how he had destroyed the combat effectiveness of the Defense

Ministry with his officer reductions up to that point.[14] To make such drastic cuts only a month later

indicates that Serdyukov continued to have the strong backing of the President and Prime Minister.

A little over a year later, on 1 December 2009, Serdyukov reported on progress regarding the task

of changing the structure of the Armed Forces. He stated that new strategic and operational commands

had been created as well as 85 army brigades that could be deployed to a combat area an hour after

an alert was issued. Later the extent of this reorganization was explained. The existing six military

districts were merged into four military districts and four joint strategic commands. This action was

signed by President Medvedev on 14 July 2010. The same decree created a unified logistical system

as well. Commanders will exercise control over all forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, Air Defense)

under their strategic command. The new strategic command headquarters will be located in St.

Petersburg (Western District), Yekaterinburg (Central District), Rostov-on-Don (Southern District),

and Khabarovsk (Eastern District). Russia’s strategic nuclear forces were left under central control.

Commanders of the four districts were designated as follows: Western Military District, ColonelGeneral Arkady Bakhin; Southern Military District, Lieutenant-General Alexander Galkin; Eastern

Military District, Admiral Konstantin Sidenko; and the Central Military District, Lieutenant-General
Vladimir Chirkin.[15]

Why were new commands created? Serdyukov reported that one reason was the changing nature of

warfare in that the entire country, and not just some sectors, has become a zone of combat operations.

The military-administrative division that existed did not meet the threat. There was no command and

control agency to integrate the efforts of the army, navy, and air force. Air defense military district

borders did not match the zones of air defense responsibility First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir

Popovkin noted that the changes have increased the combat potential of the Central Military District

by a factor of 2-2.4.[16]

Reform of the Educational System and other Reform Efforts

Dr. Vitaliy Shlykov, a renowned security specialist of the Russian Federation, noted that less than

3,000 students were enrolled in military educational institutions in 2009, compared with 18,000 to

19,000 in previous years.[17] This has concerned many Russian military analysts. Sergey

Kovalchenko, for example, wrote in 2008 that during the reign of Alexander II, Russian Minister of

War Dmitriy Milyutin carried out a military reform that was based on improving the quality of the

officer corps and not just the quantity. This point appears to have been ignored by the Serdyukov

administration (in Kovalchenko’s estimation) since fewer officers were being admitted to the higher

educational facilities.

Former Russian Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov agreed. He stated that cuts in military

education are extremely unfortunate at a time when modern warfare requires highly intelligent officers

capable of not only manipulating high-tech equipment but also understanding the significance of the

data provided to them. Only 16 senior officers were admitted to the General Staff Academy in 2009

as opposed to 100 being admitted each year previously. It was noted that 18 faculties would be

eliminated or reformed at the Academy, with only the military art and national security departments

exempt from change.[18]

In February 2009 Russia had 64 military universities that included 15 military academies, four

military universities, and 45 higher technical schools. By 2013 there will be three military research

centers, six military academies, and one military university according to one report.[19] Officers will

be required to become proficient in a foreign language and the ratio of theoretical to practical training

will be changed to reflect more input from the latter.

There are several other reform efforts worthy of mention. First, the reorganization of the Russian

military media appears imminent. The process of setting up the Zvezda Open Joint-Stock Company

for media affairs is nearing completion, a process organized by the Russian Ministry of Defense. This

company will provide a single information space for the coverage of Armed Forces news according

to a ministry spokesman. Zvezda Company branches will appear in each of the new military districts

as well as at Russian military sites abroad. Media outlets of the company include the Ministry of

Defense’s central TV station and radio studios, the Voyeninform (Military Information) news agency,

the MOD editorial and publishing center, nearly ten magazines and journals, and media bodies in the

military districts.[20]

Not to be forgotten among the reform efforts is the fact that as of November 2010 seven of Russia’s
nine deputies of defense are civilians. This is the first time in history that this has occurred. Of these

deputies, several are engaged in financial and tax endeavors.

Reform of the Military-Industrial Complex

Russia’s military-industrial complex or VPK (voenno-promychleniy komplex) is undergoing a

reformation in both substance and capability. The former is being aided by developments such as the

institution of an organization based on the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

(DARPA) model. The latter is being assisted via arms deals and a huge budget.

Russia’s Ministry of Defense hopes that the DARPA-equivalent organization will serve as a

structure for advanced defense research resulting in breakthrough R&D. Deputy Prime Minister

Sergei Ivanov, at one time the Russian Defense Minister, stated that research and development is a

strategic issue that must be handled quickly. It is expected that the organization will bind together the

Defense Ministry, the Academy of Sciences (the focal point for R&D during the Soviet era), and new

and old players on the market such as the Kurchatov Institute, RUSNANO, Rosatom, and Russian

Technologies. Further, this DARPA-type organization will pursue the integration of civilian

organizations with defense industries in the quest for creative ideas.[21]

To support these efforts Russia plans to spend $709 billion on its state armaments program over

the next ten years. Ivanov told reporters that this was an unprecedented amount and that the plan

included money for armament programs of other security and law enforcement agencies as well as the

defense ministry. Nearly 20% of these funds would be spent on research and development.[22] On the

other hand, Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov noted that the Armed Forces lacked the funding to

support a contract system of manning the force and therefore conscription is on the rise.[23] So

clearly a priority direction for development has been established by the high command—to produce

more high-tech weaponry.

Even a casual glance at Russia’s newspapers and Internet sites offers readers an idea of the scope

of this reform effort. Consider, for example, just a few of the developments in the armament program:

· Russia is developing combat lasers. At the moment these lasers are mounted on IL-76

aircraft in order to counter an adversary’s reconnaissance system.[24]

· The Sukhoi Company is planning to build 500 warplanes in five years. The majority (300)

will be made in conjunction with the Irkut Company and are for foreign sales. Sukhoi plans

to combine with MiG to produce up to 100 planes annually for the Russian air force.[25]

· The Vega Concern and Taganrog Beriyev Scientific and Technical Complex are planning to

build an airborne early warning and control aircraft for both domestic and foreign markets.

The name of the aircraft at the moment is Be-250.[26]

· The GLONASS satellite space system will be at full strength in December 2010. Three

GLONASS-M satellites were successfully put into space on 2 September 2010. Adding

these three make a total of 23 satellites in the space system. Other launches are planned for

December (to include the next-generation GLONASS-K satellite) to allow for a full

complement of this equipment. Navigation accuracy will be further enhanced next year with

the launch of the Luch-5A and Luch-5B satellites.[27]
Defense Minister Serdyukov has stated that 70% of Russia’s equipment will be composed of

modern weapons by 2020.[28] President Medvedev reiterated this goal a year later, noting that by

2015 at least 30% of weaponry must be modern and “in the future” 70% of Russia’s weaponry must

be modern.[29]

Testing the Reforms—Vostok-2010

On 29 June 2010 the Russian Armed Forces began a ten day exercise dubbed “Vostok-2010.” The

exercise’s insignia was a circular patch that had the insignia’s of the defense ministry and the naval,

ground, and air force troops on a green background. A gray border surrounded the green area with the

words “operational-strategic training” inscribed on it. The Russian military’s newspaper Krasnaya

Zvezda (Red Star) had the Russian slogan “Difficult in training...” posted above the insignia in its 1

July edition.

The training was reportedly designed to find out if military reform was heading in the right

direction; if tables of equipment were properly organized; if new command control equipment

functioned properly; and if the newly-formed brigades could rapidly be transported to other areas of

the country, in particular to Russia’s Far East borders. Units that were transported to the Far East

picked up their equipment at their arrival points instead of taking their equipment with them, also a

new phase of the exercise. With regard to command and control issues, Lieutenant General Vladimir

Chirkin, commander of the Central Military District, stated that the new command and control system

is being created so that “in the light of the realities of the present day and the changed international

environment the state can independently counter potential security threats against itself and its allies,

and pursue its strategic goals.”[30]

The training also sought to improve the security of the region and, if required, to help protect

Russian national interests there. Many journalists speculated that the exercise included planning for

potential operations against Japan, North Korea, and, most prominently mentioned by the journalists,

China.

Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov took part in the exercises. He noted that “the main goal at

Vostok-2010 was to test and validate the Armed Forces new organizational and personnel

structure.”[31] The exercise consisted of three phases: air defense, naval conflict, and land conflict

all against a hypothetical adversary. It was noted that an interlinked control system was being used for

the first time along with new mobile command and control equipment.[32] Not unexpectedly the

exercise started with the transition from a peacetime to a wartime footing in the form of an air attack

on Russia and the latter’s use of air defense forces to protect the nation. The forced march of units on

roads and on rail lines along with a massive air lift of troops was exercised to get personnel to the

area while air force fighters fended off the hypothetical adversary. Three zones of responsibility were

established for air defense forces. Strategic-operational commands were responsible for surface-toair missile brigades; operational commands were responsible for surface-to-air missile regiments;

and brigades were responsible for surface-to-air battalions.[33]

President Dmitriy Medvedev took part in the second phase of the exercise, a naval confrontation.

The naval exercise was comprised of six different “events:”
· The rehearsal of an antisubmarine defense

· The establishment of an air defense posture

· The establishment of a defense against ships and small surface craft

· The establishment of cover for fleet attack forces conducting an amphibious assault force

landing

· The use of attack aviation that included an intensive missile and bombing strike against an

enemy surface strike group

· And the support of ground troop operations in the coastal sector, to include assisting with

the landing of an amphibious assault force.[34]

It was reported that, for the first time, interaction with onshore groups were established via

combined control channels. The Navy also focused on several tasks other than conflict: protecting the

national interests of Russia in its economic zone; controlling fishing rights; curbing smuggling; and

countering piracy.[35]

Land forces focused on marches, engagements with potential adversary forces, and river crossings.

The land forces scenario even included the explosion of a nuclear mine in the concluding phase of the

exercise.[36] The latter event was important in that the Strategic Rocket Forces were not involved but

rather the ground forces in the nuclear explosion. This event may have been planned to indicate to its

neighbors that Russia can defend itself even without the power of intercontinental missiles. As with

air defense and naval forces, the ground forces also emphasized that there was an integration of

tactical with national command and control assets.

One problem encountered by the Armed Forces was a shortage of trained sergeants but this issue

is being worked. Other problems included improving the tactical and technical characteristics of new

combat systems and improving the single rear services material and technical supply system. The

latter two issues appeared to play a prominent role in the exercise, as might be expected. Equipment

utilized during Vostok-2010 included the An-12, Su-24, Su-34, Tu-142M3, Il-38, A-50, and Il-76

aircraft; the Mi-8, Ka-27PL, and Mi-24 helicopters; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s); Tochka-U

tactical missile systems (and Polyana-D4M1 guidance systems); and Buk-M1 and S-300PS SAM

complexes.[37]

Interagency problems were explored since Vostok-2010 exercised the interaction of several

security agencies and ministries in Russia. These agencies and ministries included the Internal Troops

(MVD), the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Ministry of Extraordinary Affairs (MChS), the

Border Guards, the Federal Protection Service, and the Federal Penal Service.[38]

An Interesting Post-Exercise Observation

On 10 July Segodnya.Rus Online (Today.Rus Online) offered the provocative assessment of

Alexander Khramchikhin, Deputy Director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis,

regarding Vostok-2010’s results and intent. He offered the following points:

· The exercise was a response to China’s exercise last year on its border with Russia, a
rehearsal for potential aggression against Russia in the eyes of the Defense Ministry (deep,

large-scale offensive operations to 2,000 km were rehearsed by army groupings).

Interestingly, the Russian press continued to rant against NATO but was silent on this rising

threat in the East.

· Russia is the main target for Chinese expansion.

· China thinks that America, the European Union, and the Middle Kingdom are the three great

powers. China does not pay as much attention to Russia, classifying it along with Japan and

India as second level powers.

· Russia will be integrated into the Atlantic concept because NATO does not want Russian

territory. China does.[39]

With regard to military reform, Khramchikhin stated that the “new look” of the Armed Forces has

been carried out with incredible speed. However, the forces that have been created cannot “repel” a

threat without the use of nuclear weapons. This is clear, he notes. Finally, due to the nation’s reliance

on imports, the destruction of its military educational schools, and the slow death of its militaryindustrial complex (VPK) the Armed Forces (according to interviewer Kotenok) are becoming a

“nanoarmy for a nanocountry.”[40]

Conclusions

So, is the “new look” for real? It does appear that the Russian Armed Forces have indeed started

down the road to reform. They have done so due to the tough approach taken by President Medvedev

and Prime Minister Putin to make hard decisions. Defense Minister Serdyukov has diligently

implemented their demands. This united approach has resulted in the arrest of hundreds of officers on

charges of corruption; in the downsizing of the officer corps; in the reorganization of departments,

educational institutes, and military districts; and in the reallocation of the federal budget to help

modernize the weaponry of the Armed Forces over the next decade.

At the same time, there are certain traditions that will remain—the culture of military thought will

still be based on the dialectic and other historical traditions and concepts will be passed on to future

generations. What will “change” is the development and utilization of technologies to ensure that

Russia’s entrance into the 21

st century is a successful one. There is also increased talk of the

integration of military and civilian technologies.

In hindsight it appears that the words of Alexander Goltz were prophetic—that only a solution

reached by civilian society (not a solution offered by general officers protecting their realm) could

offer a profound resolution to the problem. It took the Medvedev, Putin, Serdyukov triumvirate to get

the process underway.
CHAPTER TWO: FROM PETER TO POST-PUTIN: SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING

NEW IN RUSSIA’S MILITARYTRADITIONS

There is such a profession—defending one’s Motherland.[41]

Introduction

The halls of Moscow’s Military History Institute are lined with the busts of important Tsarist and

Soviet era military leaders who fostered many of Russia’s best military traditions. The institute, a

marble structure of four stories on University Square 14 in the Lenin Hills area of Moscow, houses

historically rich texts that contain the essence of Russian military culture and traditions. Access to the

building is controlled today, much as it was during Soviet times.

When the era of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (new thinking) came to fruition in the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under the rule of then Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev in

the late 1980s and early 1990s, things were different. Access to the History Institute was somewhat

easier to achieve and some of its military-historical publications began to see the light of day. Many

of the topics that these publications addressed had lain dormant since 1917. On occasion, foreigners

were presented with military-historical manuscripts and essays that included works on military

traditions.

As perestroika unfolded, other avenues became available to collect Russian military traditions.

For example, in 1992 the Russian commander of the Western Group of Forces in Germany, Colonel

General M. P. Burlakov, edited a book on Istoriya I Traditsii Rossiyskoy Armii (The History and

Traditions of the Russian Military) that Russian officers provided Western analysts. Bookstores also

began to offer new works on military traditions. As but one example, a 1991 Chief of the Soviet

General Staff, Colonel General Vladimir Lobov, edited a text on Tsarist or Imperial (not Soviet)

military traditions titled O Dolge i Chesti Voinskoy v Rossiyskoy Armii (On Duty and Honor in the

Russian Military).

Traditions were vitally important in reviving the dignity and honor of the Russian military once the

ideology of communism faded and the country fell into temporary chaos in 1991. The Soviet

military’s collapse was more significant and potentially threatening than many Americans realize.

There were times in the early 1990s when Russian Lieutenant Colonels working in the General Staff

were spotted in the subways of Moscow shining shoes to gain extra money. Other officers were paid

in “quantities” (potatoes, matches, etc.) instead of rubles which they then had to sell to get hard

currency. Thankfully Russian officers tolerated and survived these conditions instead of taking

matters into their own hands. Perhaps tradition played a role that prevented such events from

transpiring.

On the other hand, Russia may have lost one of its most important military minds, Marshal of the

Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeev, because he so fervently took to heart the tradition of a soldier’s

honor and duty to his Motherland. As he saw the Motherland swept away (in his view) from its

Communist heritage and into the hands of a new ideology and regime, he took his own life by hanging

in his Kremlin office, perhaps for his inability to defend his people from what he considered an attack
on the entire system. Such was his concept of honor.

This chapter will discuss the military traditions and culture of the Russian and Soviet militaries

and how they have changed over time. It will address training and education issues, an officer’s

honor, and the impact of technology on an officer’s professional culture among other issues. Old

Russian military traditions, Soviet military traditions, and New Russian military traditions are

compared and contrasted (from a limited number of Russian texts). Of particular interest is the

writing of military analysts in the 1990-1992 period when traditions and culture were changing

(definitions of key terms are presented such as military tradition, military culture, and culturaleducational work are attached at Appendix Two).

The ardent student of Russian affairs will be somewhat disappointed in the scarce number of

resources utilized for this chapter. Of course, these were all Russian resources so there is no

intermediate filter of, say, a Western interpretation. In total, while a host of journal and encyclopedia

articles were accessed, only four books were used extensively. They were:

· Vladimir Lobov’s O Dolge i Chesti Voinskoy v Rossiyskoy Armii (On Duty and Honor in the

Russian Military), 1991

· R. V. Tsvetkova and N. I. Britvina’s Partiyno-Politicheskaya Rabota v Sovetskoy Armii i

Voenno-Morskom Flote (Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy), 1960

· M. P. Burlakov’s Istoriya I Traditsii Rossiyskoy Armii (The History and Traditions of the

Russian Army), 1992

· Dusha Armii (Soul of the Army), compiled by I. V. Domnin, A. K. Bykova, A. B. Grigor’eva,

and Yu. T. Belova, Edited by A E. Savinkin, 1997

However, it is believed that even this truncated overview distills for the reader what is most

important for the Russian officer of today. The authors are well-known and respected and the journals

utilized were all refereed by military professionals.

As Russia moves forward in the twenty-first century, it will be interesting to watch the effect of the

reform effort of Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and see if his efforts reinvigorate discussions

of military tradition. If they do, it will be interesting to see which traditions are kept and which are

discarded.

Old Russia, Soviet Russia, New Russia

Some Russian military traditions are quite familiar to Russian and even the non-Russian specialist

and need no introduction. They include:

· The uniforms and flags of the armed forces

· Military institutions such as military academies and the military encyclopedias that have

existed for centuries[42]

· The oath of service administered to each soldier

· The professional culture of the Russian officer

· The focus on military reform over centuries
· The precision of military graphics on Russian maps

· Military toasts.

Some of these traditions have been part of the Russian military since the earliest days of Tsarist

history. Other aspects have developed over time. The oath, for example, was known as the “Formula

of Solemn Promise” in 1918, and was called the “Military Oath of the Workers-Peasants’ Red Army”

in 1939. A Soviet-worded oath was ratified by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in August

1960. It replaced the words “worker-peasants’ Red Army” with the term “Soviet.” After the collapse

of the USSR in 1991, a new military oath was approved in March 1998. It is much shorter than its

Red Army and Soviet predecessors (in the latter case, from 129 to 41 words) and states

I, (last name, first name, middle name) solemnly pledge my loyalty to my homeland—the

Russian Federation. I swear to sacredly observe its constitution and laws, strictly fulfill the

demands of military regulations and the orders of commanders and superiors. I swear to

appropriately fulfill my military duty and to bravely defend the freedom, independence, and

constitutional order of Russia, the nation, and Fatherland![43]

Today’s Informal Traditions

Some modern day informal Russian military traditions have been observed first hand by US forces

serving with Russian forces in Bosnia and by US forces conducting joint operations, conferences, or

peacekeeping missions. They are listed here as a source of contemporary informal traditions before

delving into the more formal aspects of Russian military traditions.

A tradition familiar to any US officer who has shared a drink of vodka with a Russian officer is

their tradition of military toasts. To abbreviate the process dramatically (and hopefully putting these

toasts in their correct order from memory), the first toast (if it is a serious discussion between

friends) is “to those who have gone before us in military service.” Or, if you are listening to a serious

Russian, it would be “we drink to the generations of warriors who fought and served and thus made it

possible that we are here now. We drink to our fathers and grand fathers, who did their soldiering

well.” The second toast is “to those who serve now,” or to put it more eloquently “to those who serve

with us now, but are not around the table at the moment. We drink to those who right now are out in

the minefields, on maneuvers, and performing combat tasks and their duty.” The third toast (while

standing) is to fallen comrades or “to those who are gone forever from the battlefield, those who

sacrificed their lives.” The words “the third toast” is spoken and there is no clinking of glasses or

speeches, only silence as each officer bows his head and remembers for him or herself the meaning of

those words. The fourth toast is to the ladies. In fact, every third toast thereafter is to the ladies. With

200 grams of vodka in your stomach at this point (50 grams a shot), the remaining toasts (and there

are no limits on the number) give way to greater creativity embracing an entire host of issues.

Drinking vodka is also associated with promotions and holidays. Promotions are especially

noteworthy as a drinking tradition. When promoted, an officer is handed a glass of vodka with the

new rank lying at the bottom of the glass. The officer must drink the vodka, catch the rank in his teeth,

and without touching it, gently spit it out on his epaulet. If it falls off, he has to perform the process (to

include the drinking!) all over again.
There are several traditions associated with avoiding bad luck, particularly in the Russian Navy.

When torpedoes exploded in their tubes onboard the submarine Kursk, causing it to sink and result in

the loss of life of all aboard, two elements of bad luck were listed in a newspaper article as potential

causes of the tragedy. One was that a man instead of a woman had christened the submarine, and

another was that a chain broke on a censer that a Priest was using to bless the submarine. In the US

movie about Russian submarine K-109 (starring Harrison Ford) the champagne bottle did not break

when they christened the submarine, and a sailor in the last rank remarks to a fellow seaman “we’re

doomed.”

There also appears to be a “greeting of the day” associated with informal traditions. When officers

enter a work area for the first time, they go around the room and shake hands with everyone before

starting their work.[44] Americans are more likely to walk into a room, go to their work area and sit

down, and greet their co-workers with a “good morning” as they bump into one another in the course

of the morning.

A final informal tradition observed by US officers who have conducted staff work with the

Russians is the precision of their graphic art work on a map. In all sincerity, the graphics appear to

have been printed by a machine rather than a human, they are that precise. One US officer noted that

the graphic work is “Rembrandt like” in nature whereas a US officer’s graphic work would be more

“Picasso like,” that is more abstract.

Historical Traditions

Luckily, the military history and traditions of Russia are synonymous with three elements of

national history: Tsarist, Imperial, or pre-Soviet; Soviet; and post-Soviet, which could also be termed

Old Russian, Soviet Russian, and New Russian military history.

The old Russian military history period (up to 1917) was highlighted by the exploits of great

military leaders such as Peter the Great, Aleksander V. Suvorov, and Mikhail I. Kutuzov. The SovietRussian period (1917-1991) was highlighted by the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism and the

work of some truly original and giant military theorists and commanders such as Aleksander A.

Svechin, Mikhail H. Tukachevsky, Vladimir K. Triandafillov, and Nikolay V. Ogarkov. Today, we

await the next great generation of Russian military thinkers. These theorists are likely quietly

germinating in the bowels of the General Staff today but will only be visible to outsiders after their

theories have taken root. Other great theorists from the Soviet age, such as General of the Army

Makhmut A. Gareev, who developed the concept of the operational maneuver group (OMG),[45] are

still alive today and most likely are contributing to the development of new officers.

Russian military “tradition” is a term that will be used most often in the discussion below.

Traditions make up a military’s culture, the latter a term not often used in Russian military jargon.

Russia’s military encyclopedias, for example, do not discuss military culture, only culturaleducational activities. Coverage of “culture” is spotty in Russian military journals but the wellrespected Military Thought does write on culture on occasion and those instances are included in this

discussion.

Two words will be used intermittently for the US concept of “country.” These are the Russian
words Otechesvo and Rodina. Both are used to mean Homeland by Russian authors. Otechesvo is

sometimes translated as Fatherland and even, in its adjectival form, as patriotic (such as in its use to

mean the Great Patriotic War or World War II). It has a wider meaning than Rodina, the latter

sometimes translated as Motherland. Rodina can also mean your local village or place of birth.

Russian authors tend to alternate between the uses of these two terms. This author will use the terms

interchangeably in conjunction with the usage of the terms by the authors he cites.

What follows are three general sections. The first section discusses Tsarist traditions. The second

section discusses Soviet traditions. The third section discusses contemporary Russian military

traditions.

Old (Tsarist) Russian Military Traditions

One work of prominence on Tsarist military traditions, published in early 1991 (the same year as

the August coup against Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev), that will serve as the sole Russian

military source reviewed for this chapter is Vladimir Lobov’s O Dolge i Chesti Voinskoy v

Rossiyskoy Armii (On Duty and Honor in the Russian Military).

The motivation for writing a book on Russian vice Soviet military traditions in 1991 may have

been Gorbachev’s glasnost (openness) and perestroika (new thinking) policies of the late 1980s

although this is only speculative thinking. More likely the book was completed before the fall of the

USSR and simply was awaiting publication. The book was edited by Colonel General Vladimir

Lobov (who was not a particular admirer of Gorbachev!). Perhaps Lobov’s motivation for writing the

book can be found in the second section of the book, where he writes

The example which our forefathers set through all their activity exhorts us to remember duty to

the Homeland. The more time passes, the more we appreciate the significance of their great

accomplishments in defense of the Fatherland. Today [1990] we remember with pride the

Russian generals and officers who sought the most effective ways to raise the morale and

therefore also the combat capability of the army. And perhaps now is the time that we can

understand the worth of our forefathers’ efforts.[46]

Reexamining the basic traditions of these military greats would make sense since the Soviet

military clearly was on the cusp of a major transformation in 1990. In addition to Gorbachev’s

policies of glasnost and perestroika, the Soviet armed forces had withdrawn from Afghanistan a year

earlier.

Lobov, who would become the Chief of the General Staff of Russia in September of 1991,

concentrated his attention solely on Tsarist, not Soviet, military figures and broke his book into three

sections: the eighteenth century and first half of the nineteenth century; the second half of the

nineteenth century; and the start of the twentieth century.

The book is rather narrowly focused on the concepts of duty and honor, although other traditions

are touched upon. Lobov’s introduction to the book emphasized how honor and military duty were

stressed during training and education sessions in the old Russian armed forces. These traditions

became the carriers of patriotic ideas. Lobov stated that “military honor is a soldier’s principal
virtue”[47] and cited a regimental trumpet call at cavalry muster for Russian soldiers each morning as

indicative of the emphasis on honor:

Shame will fall on the coward

Who takes one step backward without an order!

He who offends duty, honor, and the oath

Old Russia will see as the worst enemy.[48]

In addition, Lobov noted that a “Russian soldier’s heroism, tenacity in battle, capacity for selfsacrifice, loyalty to the oath, and soldierly duty remained unchanged through the centuries.”[49]

Lobov then proceeded to walk readers through the beliefs and values of a series of outstanding

military figures in the pre-Soviet period. These leaders of renown are listed below with important

points that Lobov attributed to each. The short list of points he chose to stress is interesting:

· Be an example for your soldiers

· Treat your soldiers well

· Serve with honor and courage

· Officers must be extremely knowledgeable of their duties

· Soldiers must learn how to take the initiative.

This list undoubtedly, to a US officer, sounds much like the traits that American officers stress. But

US specialists who study the Russian military would hardly ascribe some of these traditions,

especially “treat your soldiers well,” to be representative of the Soviet and even Russian military

today. Russia’s ongoing problem with “dedovshchina (hazing)” in the barracks continues yearly to

produce too many deaths or suicides among recruits. Perhaps this tradition is a rite of passage into

manhood for the military ranks, but it has as much resemblance to a Lord of the Flies[50] scenario as

it does to manhood. Recent reports of soldiers being required to perform sex acts with homosexuals

for some military leaders (a limited number, for sure) attest that the treatment of soldiers has taken on

a more dysfunctional form than ever imaginable.[51] The first bullet, “be an example for your

soldiers,” also is called into question by many Russian officers themselves. They have witnessed

corruption at the top of the military brass (several leaders have been arrested in recent months) and

some of the younger officers are upset by the overweight condition of several high ranking officers.

The comments that follow are those that Lobov made in the book’s introduction about several

prominent Russian military commanders. Perhaps Western military experts will question just who he

chose to include and who he left out of his introduction, but the work does appear to be fairly

comprehensive. Words in quotation marks are direct quotes from one of these leaders. Words not in

quotation marks are General Lobov’s comments.

The 18

th Century and First Half of the 19th Century

Petr Alekceevich Romanov, Peter the Great, Russian Tsar (1672-1725): Peter’s reforms can be

considered as the beginning of the training and education period in Russia, and his “Peter school”

was the first practical school of military life in Russia. He demonstrated concern for Fatherland
defenders and paid special attention to the relationship between officers and soldiers. “Officers are

to soldiers what fathers are to children, who should be cared for equally in a fatherly fashion.” Peter

lived on soldier rations for a month and performed military service together with soldiers to see if

their rations were adequate. He also attached importance to moral education, believing that high

moral principles depend on discipline. Finally, Peter believed that officers should be of high moral

character and fighting spirit. His ultimate concept—“there is honor in service”—is part of the flesh

and blood of a Russian officer.[52]

Catherine II (1729-1796): One of Catherine’s reforms was to “ensure that people are not needlessly

bothered in exercises and maneuvers by anything that is for adornment only.” Catherine held that a

primary responsibility of a military officer was to “hold high the honor and right of his regiment” and

his primary concerns were “the regiment’s benefit, service, honor, and preservation.” Commanders

were obliged to “explain that no fear or hardship could ever shake the Russian soldier’s bravery and

loyalty.” Respect (love) should be the primary tool for achieving order and recruits “should be bold,

not shy, when speaking to the commander.”[53]

Petr Alexanderovich Rumyantsev (1725-1796), General Fel’dmarshal: Rumyantsev had a major

impact on troop education and fought “to raise the lower ranks to a state that is proper for military

people and instill in them a decent life, manners, and cleanliness. Company officers should seek out

opportunities to speak with the lower ranks and convince them that if they profess and obey all orders

well, they will be able to do everything in a most praiseworthy fashion.” He did not believe in blind

implementation of regulations but wanted reasonable discipline and a conscientious attitude to

military duty, honor, and a soldier’s lofty calling. Soldiers should be protected from inhuman

floggings. Rumyantsev believed that officer and soldierly honor were the supreme manifestation of all

the virtues of a military person.[54]

Grigoriy Alexanderovich Potemkin (1739-1791), General Fel’dmarshal: Potemkin tried to foster

courage and resolve in soldiers, proposing various incentives and a special medal that encouraged

daring and bravery. He required his commanders to show paternal care for soldiers and “treat people

with every kind of temperance, look after their welfare, not exceed the norms of punishment, and be

as I am with them, since I love them like children.” He attached importance to a commander’s

personal example and required they be knowledgeable. He opposed everything formal and

pretentious.[55]

Mikhail Semenovich Vorontsov (1782-1856), Count, General Fel’dmarshal: Vorontsov believed that

“love and loyalty to the regiment in which he serves should be instilled in the soldier.” A soldier’s

situation relative to others “is undeniable honor and glory, since a soldier overcomes hardships that

are often unbearable and does not spare his life to safeguard his fellow citizens...” Commanders

were directed to instill self-esteem in soldiers and to consider it shameful if an officer did not care

about what pertains to the soldier.[56]

Alexander Vasil’evich Suvorov (1729-1800), Generalissimus: Suvorov believed that success in

battle depended not so much on the number of soldiers as on their morale. He felt the Russian soldier

was capable of courage and heroism and he could mobilize these characteristics in troops. He started

first with himself, with the education of the commander-educator. He thoroughly studied and
understood the soul of the Russian soldier and allowed “a junior to challenge a superior as long as it

is done decorously, in private, and not public, otherwise there will be unruliness; only school

children engage in unwarranted argument, which does not prove ability—ability is only evidenced by

action.” This attitude was unprecedented democracy for that time. Suvorov demanded that

subordinates exhibit great initiative and rely on themselves, the basis of courage. He also demanded

continuous and ceaseless self-education and that “training exercises and the like are conducted

without cruelty or haste, and with a detailed explanation of all parts individually and demonstration

of them one by one.”[57]

Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov (1745-1813), General Fel’dmarshal: Kutuzov believed that the spirit

of military service, obedience, and discipline are not based on punishment but rather on a

conscientious attitude to protect the Fatherland. Russian soldiers displayed enormous courage,

heroism, and valor in the War of 1812 and this impacted on troop education.[58]

All of the leaders listed above, Lobov adds, constantly addressed troop training and education

issues from the perspective of the application of their concepts and not as simple theoretical thought.

However, in the first quarter of the 19

th century, Voyenny Zhurnal (Military Journal) appeared and

made it possible to discuss theory and meaning publicly. Many articles stressed the need to be closer

to the people and pointed out that “frequent contact with the soldier makes him courageous, alert, and

ambitious, and also wins his love and trust...” Service should be rigorous but moderate, fair, and

humane. Only a few blows can make an innocent soldier loath with spite, the journal wrote.

Morale must come from an officer’s personal example. Strength is needed but so is greater

knowledge and valor. Even the Decembrists (an 1825 officer’s protest against Nicholas I’s

assumption of the throne in Russia) made contributions, with P. I. Pestel noting that “the military rank

is so honorable that it should not be the lot of an unworthy person.”[59] The leaders described below

thus were more affected by theory than those that preceded them.

Vladimir Kornilov (1806-1854) and Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov (1802-1855), Admiral: These

officers paid attention to a soldier’s moral upbringing and morale. Nakhimov stressed personal

example and often gave orders from the most open and dangerous spots. He noted “of the three ways

to influence subordinates—reward, fear, and example—the last is the most sure.” He felt that example

inspired confidence in subordinates and that he then did not have to micromanage people—they

would show initiative on their own. Kornilov also believed in personal example and stated that “if I

give the order to fall back, kill me.”[60]

The Second Half of the 19

th Century

Mikhail Ivanovich Dragomirov (1830-1905), General: Dragomirov’s name is linked to the

establishment of a whole military-pedagogic school for the Russian army. His training system took

into consideration historical realities of the Russian army, unique Russian national traits, and the

latest achievements of military-theoretical thought. He believed that the military had more to do with

will than intellect and thus stressed moral educational objectives: instill fighting spirit, patriotism,

and discipline. Military discipline is “the sum total of the moral, physical, and mental skills needed

for officers and soldiers of all ranks to measure up to their calling.” With regard to soldier relations,

he stated that “in peacetime officers closeness to soldiers will ensure that the latter are correctly
educated. In wartime this closeness will serve as the internal bonding in the army that makes its selfsacrifice boundless; an army in which officers enjoy the soldiers trust has on its side an advantage

that cannot be gained through numbers, sophisticated materiel, or anything else.” Dragomirov

deserves credit for reviving Suvorov’s views on troop training and education, resulting in the

republication of Suvorov’s Nauka Pobeshdat (The Science of Victory).[61]

Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev (1843-1882), General: Skobelev focused on the moral education of

officers and soldiers, much like Dragomirov. He was for iron discipline but against the application of

physical force or the humiliation of soldiers. Discipline should be attained through moral authority,

not a beating. His ideas were meant to foster mutual respect, mutual assistance, courage, and initiative

in officers and soldiers. He suggested his willingness at decisive moments to sacrifice everything for

comrades.[62]

The Start of the 20

th Century

In this section of his book, Lobov states that “in the post-Russo-Turkish War period, military

education was based on several theoretical works developed by Maslov, Butovskiy, Grulev,

Kuzminsky, Parsky, Terekhov, Shneur, Mau, and many others who focused on moral education.”[63]

Nikolay Dmitrievich Butovskiy (1850-1917), General Lieutenant: Butovskiy believed that reasonable

drill was required so that the soldier “does not act like Frederick’s machine but is a rational person

and an initiator in his small area.” Officers were encouraged to drill and educate themselves first.

Butovskiy sought the harmonious combination of moral and intellectual development since “fairness

demands equal concern for the needs of good and bad people.” He also focused on the officer’s role

in warfare at that time.[64]

Mikhail Vladimirovich Grulev (1853-1943), General Major: Grulev stressed the moral-ethical

relationship between officers and soldiers and troop fighting spirit. He even recommended calling

soldiers “Mr.” He felt that the reason commanders lacked initiative in the Russo-Japanese War was in

the commander-soldier system of interrelations, where “the opinions and viewpoints of the latter are

beaten down and brushed off by the commander’s constant challenges.”[65]

Dmitriy Pavlovich Parskiy (1866-1921), General Lieutenant: [66] Parskiy wrote three works (“Why

We Failed in the War with Japan. Needed Reforms in the Army,” “Our Soldier’s Combat Training,”

and “What Our Army Needs”) that developed a new system of Russian officer and soldier training,

education, and service.[67]

Three officers were mentioned in Lobov’s introduction to the book for this period but were not

mentioned elsewhere in the book. They were:

Josip Gurko (1828-1901), who strived to have his officers “be the first to set an example of duty

performance for the lower ranks.”[68]

Ignatii Petrovich Maslov (1840-?), who believed that self-respect should be fostered in the soldier

because, if he loses respect for himself, he will become incapable of fighting without the necessary

goodwill and energy to champion “the interests not only of his nation but also of himself
personally.”[69]

Konstantin Georgievich Kuz’minskiy (1843-?), who analyzed Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese

War and stated that the cause of the defeat was “lack of convictions.” In essence, officers had not

been prepared for combat operations from the standpoint of morale. They were not fearless but rather

just undistinguished people. He believed that “only those who know their Fatherland’s past, who feel

a kinship with that past, and who know the high price paid for the country’s prosperity can love their

Fatherland with all their heart and defend it to the last drop of blood.”[70]

Lobov summed up by stressing that these representatives of Russia’s officer corps created a school

of military education rich in traditions and patriotism. Without these moral qualities it is

inconceivable to be a defender of the Fatherland. Reading the words of these men from different

centuries makes it apparent that “the concept of duty and honor for the glory of the Russian nation was

handed down from generation to generation in the Russian army.”[71]

However, in spite of the progressive tendencies in the Russian army’s educational system in the

mid-18

th century, problems remained. There were some in the officer corps, Lobov notes, who

supported a different type of educational system, one based on severe punishments and a love of

parades and drill. But by the late 18

th century Lobov writes that the progressive education system had

gained the upper hand.[72]

The supportive attitude of the people toward the military in turn fostered the following qualities in

Russian soldiers: tenacious defense, resolute attack, courage, initiative, disregard for death, and

mutual assistance. Soldiers serve the Russian nation, not the emperor, as Peter the Great noted. Later,

Peter refused to hire mercenaries, since they were the first to surrender to the Swedes at Narva. Peter

only recruited native Russians to ensure a reliable source of men for the army and navy. This

increased the homogeneity (socially, nationally, religiously) of the force and improved morale. The

community (peasant-commune) had deep roots as well in the Russian army, as the names of many

regiments (Orlov, Kozel, Tver, etc.) represented places that sent fighters. This focus on the community

was reflected in Suvorov’s urging that soldiers should “die yourself, but rescue your comrade!”[73]

People outside Russia also noted this characteristic of the Russian soldier, Lobov notes. Frederick

Engels, for example, explained the deep rooted base for courage and self-sacrifice in the Russian

soldier this way:

The Russian soldier is indisputably very courageous. He was in his element as long as the

tactical mission called for an attack by an infantry army operating in close formation. His entire

life experience had taught him to hold on tight to his comrades. In the village—still a semicommunist commune, in the city—work in the cooperative association, and everywhere

—krugovaja poruka, that is, comrades’ mutual responsibility for each other...This trait

remains in Russia in the military as well; it is virtually impossible to break up a battalion of

Russians; the graver the danger, the more tightly they come together into a single compact

whole.[74]
These were not the only officers that Lobov singled out in his narrative. In the section on the “18

th

Century and First Half of the 19

th Century” he singled out the work of Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov,

Admiral. In the “Second Half of the 19

th Century” Lobov discussed the achievements and work of

Edmund-Leopol’d Ferdinandovich Svidzinskiy, General-Lieutenant; Vladimir Ivanovich Datsevich,

Colonel; Nikolay Ivanovich Mau, Colonel General; Alexander Anikitich Terekhov, Colonel General;

Nikolay Yakovlevich Shneur, Colonel General; and Stepan Osipovich Makarov, Vice-Admiral.

Lobov stressed that military might was dependent on how military education was progressing. In

particular, he discussed how the Russian defeat in the Crimean War led to a transformation of the

education system. He felt there was a direct relation between military might and soldier education.

Further, Lobov stressed the importance of defending the Fatherland’s cultural, historical, and spiritual

values. Fighting spirit, he wrote, is present in an army only when that spirit is present in the people.

[75]

Finally, in the section on “Beginning of the 20

th Century” Lobov addressed the achievements of 13

officers: Vyacheslav Evstaf’evich Borisov, General Major; Mikhail Sergeevich Galkin, Colonel

General; Mikhail Dmitrievich Bonch-Bruevich, General Lieutenant; Mikhail Andreevich Uvarov,

Colonel; Vladimir Alexanderovich Samonov, Lieutenant Colonel; Petr Ivanovich Izmest’ev, Colonel;

Vikentiy Logginovich Raykovskiy, Colonel; Nikolay Pavlovich Biryukov, Lieutenant Colonel;

Arkadiy Platonovich Skugarevskiy, General; Antoniy Mikhaylovich Dmitrevskiy, Lieutenant Colonel;

Maksimilian Nikolaevich Krit, Lieutenant Colonel; Nikolay Apollonovich Morozov, Lieutenant

Colonel; and D. N. Treskin (no rank provided). These officers wrote about a number of problems

affecting the Russian army at the time. Just as at the end of the 18

th century, the end of the 19th century

also witnessed a struggle between progressive forces and officers beset with what Lobov termed

ignorance, narrow-mindedness, and a bureaucratic spirit in regard to troop training and education.

The context of the officer’s plight at the time most likely influenced this situation, since material

support of officers was low and this affected their work performance. Those who did enter the

service at the time often reflected problems inherent in society, so not all new officers were worthy of

their duty. Problems included lack of initiative and the passive role of command staffs. Lobov

concludes this section by noting that through all of the evils of autocracy, the army always “remained

a bearer of lofty honor, morality, and duty.”[76]

Soviet Military Traditions

The Soviet Armed Forces developed military traditions of their own from 1917 to 1990 but they

did not automatically discard their “old” Russian military past. One book written in 1960 noted that:

The Soviet Army is the worthy inheritor of the best traditions of the military past of our

country’s people. It has absorbed and further developed all that is best, progressive, and

valuable from the combat traditions of the Russian army and navy. The heroism, fortitude, and

courage of the soldiers and sailors of the Russian army and navy, and their loyalty to the combat

banner, esprit de corps, and friendship in battle manifested in the fight against our Homeland’s

enemies have always served as an example for all Soviet soldiers.[77]

To outside observers, it appears that some of the old Russian military traditions became stagnant

or were even ignored from 1950-1990. Soviet military jargon replaced Russian military traditions
with the former’s focus on propaganda, socialist ideals, one-man rule, and party-political work. As a

result, talk of traditions faded. For example, in a review of the contents of three books (1960, 1972,

and 1989) bearing the same title, on Partiyno-Politicheskaya Rabota v Sovetskoy Armii i VoennoMorskom Flote (Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy), where military traditions might

arise, the topic appeared only in the 1960 book. That chapter, titled “The Education of Soviet

Soldiers in the Military Traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces,” did not appear in the later versions

of the book.

The book’s 1960 edition stated that it was the Soviet era’s responsibility to “critically interpret,

supplement, and expand on Russian traditions and inject in them new socialist content.”[78] While

this did not become apparent in later versions of the Party-Political Work book series, it is assumed

that some Tsarist traditions were still taught in military institutions (Frunze Academy, General Staff

Academy, etc.) as elements of Russian history, even if political commissars did not focus on them.

Courses on Russian history and the great military leaders of Russia (Peter the Great, Mikhail

Kutuzov, etc.) did appear in these academies along with discussions of military reform. Of course,

many Tsarist military traditions were also housed in the History Institute mentioned at the start of this

chapter.

In the 1960 chapter “The Education of Soviet Soldiers in the Military Traditions of the Soviet

Armed Forces,” combat traditions are defined as “the historically shaped moral rules and

conventions that impel Soviet soldiers to exemplarily fulfill their military duty and honorably and

conscientiously serve the socialist Fatherland.” Combat traditions are listed as a major factor in the

education of soldiers and sailors; as a guarantee of the great feats Soviet soldiers show the world; as

being of enormous significance in peacetime; as being progressive, heroic, and revolutionary in

nature; and as inseparable from its vanguard, the Communist Party.[79]

The character of the Soviet Army was defined as containing the following features: infinite

devotion to the Homeland, loyalty to their military duty, courage and heroism, and confidence in

victory.[80] These characteristics made certain that “Only our Soviet Army, raised in the great

irresistible ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and the armies of other socialist countries are carriers of

truly advanced and progressive combat traditions.”[81] Of course, these traditions are strikingly

similar to the Old Russian traditions that Lobov detailed in his book as the following list from the

1960 volume demonstrates:

· Personal loyalty to one’s social and military duty. Love of country motivates Soviet soldiers

to defy danger, causing one soldier to say that soldiers go to the battlefield to “defend the

holy of holies—the Homeland. I want to kneel down whenever I say that word.”[82]

· Mass heroism in battle. This occurred during the civil war, the revolution, and during the

time of foreign intervention. Cases of heroism were particularly common during the Great

Patriotic War (WWII).[83]

· Soldier’s love for their unit or ship. As one solider noted, “My regiment’s glory is my glory

and my regiment’s honor is my honor.”[84]

· Loyalty to the Unit Banner or Ship Flag. Peter the Great did much to elevate the banner to a

place of prominence in the eyes of the Russian serviceman, as soldiers swore in their oath
that “I will not leave the command and banner to which I belong, but will follow them as

long as I am alive.”[85] A 1942 “Decree on the Red Banner” was approved by the

Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The decree noted that “The Banner is a symbol of

military honor, valor, and glory; it is a reminder to each soldier, sergeant, officer, and

general of their sacred duty to faithfully serve and bravely and capably defend the Soviet

Homeland...”[86]

· Esprit de corps and solidarity in battle. These traits are based on the new, socialist

relations between soldiers and the people’s unity of class interests. These traits are

incompatible with a lack of integrity and with any attempt to overlook a comrade’s error or

conceal his transgressions. Honesty in relationships is required.

· Updating military and political knowledge. There is no place for self-complacency and no

marking time in the military.[87]

The chapter concludes with the comment that “such are the principal combat traditions of the Soviet

Armed Forces.”[88]

1990, 1991—the Years “in Between”

At the end of the Soviet era, change was definitely in the air. Gorbachev’s policies had created a

truly new wave of writing on every aspect of Soviet life to include the military. Increasingly military

authors returned to their roots and military heritage, the works of the Imperial armed forces and

renowned military leaders. Civilian writers such as Kareem Rash and Alexander Prokhanov wrote of

the Russian military’s past achievements in 1990 and 1991, emphasizing that Russian military

tradition and the Russian state were one and the same. In this sense, they were inviting the military to

take the lead and protect all that had been achieved for Russia and the USSR over the course of

history. Perhaps their writings, especially Prokhanov’s, were catalysts for the coup attempt against

Gorbachev in 1991.

V. F. Kovalevskiy, writing in the June 1990 issue of Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), offered

some keen insights into Soviet military thinking during the time of perestroika. It is not known, of

course, whether Rash or Prokhanov influenced him or other officers during this period.

Kovalevskiy’s article emphasized the need for a renewed look at military culture. First, he used

the words of the Minister of Defense in 1990, Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy T. Yazov, to open

his piece. He quoted Yazov as stating that the deepening of perestroika and qualitative improvement

of the armed forces “look toward the person, his inner world, and his ideological and moral

makeup.”[89] Further, Kovalevskiy adds that modern military technology increases the need for high

technical competence, pedagogic proficiency, moral fiber, and feelings of duty and honor. All of these

traits must move to the forefront. An officer’s culture must reflect a mastery of knowledge, abilities,

skills, and individual psychological features.[90]

The nucleus of an officer’s professional military culture is his competence, which is his reliability

and ability to make faultless decisions. Kovalevskiy believes culture is intertwined with competency.

He notes that:

General culture includes a well-grounded knowledge of history, philosophy, political science,
and law and presumes mastery of the riches of world and domestic literature, music, painting,

and the theater and the ability to distinguish genuine spiritual values from counterfeits. One can

judge general culture from whether or not an officer has a need to read the classics of literature,

whether or not he sees the depth in works of Homer, A. Dante, W. Shakespeare, A. S. Pushkin,

L. N. Tolstoy, and F. M. Dostoyevskiy, and whether or not he experiences pleasure from the

music of J. Bach, L. Beethoven, M. Mussorgsky, P. Tchaikovsky, and G. Sviridov. High

technical culture and computer literacy are inalienable facets of an officer’s personality in the

age of scientific-technical progress.[91]

Kovalevskiy states that the majority of Russian officers were distinguished by a high general

culture and that this is a national tradition. Tolstoy and Dostoyevskiy are two such examples. This

intense general cultural background is then subordinated to serving the Fatherland.[92]

However, due to the development of world events and the changes affecting Russia’s military

policy, doctrine, and national security in 1990, it “would be more correct to speak about the need for

shaping a new political culture in officers.”[93] This requires that new political thinking and military

reform must mix with an officer’s spirit of patriotism and allegiance to “the USSR Constitution, the

oath, and military duty at the center of the problems.”[94] How all-encompassing this new political

thinking was envisioned was expressed by Kovalevskiy as “a question of reviving the entire

historically formed complex of humanitarian knowledge.”[95] He goes on to add that

· An officer’s legal literacy is a necessary condition and important component of professional

military culture (many questions demand legal awareness of regulations, manuals, and

orders).

· An officer’s psychological-pedagogic preparedness is the ability to study a soldier’s

personality and capabilities and develop in them military skills.

· An officer’s proficiency resides in accomplishing training and education tasks and teaching

what is necessary in war by organizing exercises correctly.

· An officer’s operational-tactical and tactical-special literacy and ability to effectively

command and control a force, to include good, efficient staff work, is required.

· An officer’s ergonomic and ecologic education are now important.

· An officer’s task of creating a system of continuous education is required.

· An officer’s moral qualities and professional ethics must be exemplary.[96]

With respect to modern (1990) staff work, Kovalevskiy added that special education is now

required. Instead of being armed with just a map, ruler, curvometer, and pencil, staff work today

requires “automated equipment for combat command and control, computers, and diverse

communications systems, including satellite communications.”[97]

Finally, Kovalevskiy states that Soviet officers are a special community with their own traditions,

customs of official and family life, and interests. An officer subculture includes a professional

lexicon, folklore, holidays, and everyday signs and prejudices. He notes that Officer Meetings were

one such tradition whose reestablishment continues a custom that is over 200 years old.[98]
Kovalevskiy also mentioned an officer’s honor in his article, stating that it is an “acute, active

feeling prompting an officer to be jealously concerned for his good name and reputation. It is

incompatible with a bureaucratically indifferent attitude toward subordinates, unprincipled pushiness,

and subservience.”[99] Further, “an officer who possesses high professionalism and developed

military ethics considers faultless performance of his official duty, expert mastery of equipment and

weapons, improvement of his qualifications, and courage on the battlefield to be a matter of

honor.”[100]

A year later, as the Soviet Union was swept away in the grip of perestroika, Colonel B. L. Valeev

also used the journal Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) to discuss an officer’s concept of honor

which was in desperate need of refurbishment. Valeev offered a pointed appraisal of the shortcomings

of an officer’s honor in the Russian military of 1991, criticizing both Tsarist and Soviet traditions

along the way. He stated that honor means a person’s perception of his value in society and society’s

recognition of this value. He quoted the USSR’s Minister of Defense at the time, Marshal Ye. I.

Shaposhnikov, who said that “honor is a kind of integral result of an organic confluence of inner

nobility, decency, and dignity in a person.”[101] Valeev stated that a collective definition of an

officer’s honor is “the set of an individual’s moral qualities manifested in day-to-day activity and

recognized as socially significant by public opinion, as well as the officer’s attitude toward himself

and toward performance of his military duty.”[102]

An officer’s honor is a tradition that has been passed down through the ages in the Russian armed

forces. The Old Russian Army’s regiments and corps had their own officer codes of honor. Even a

slight breach of honor could result in expulsion from the unit. One of the first sets of military

regulations emphasized “it is better...to die honorably than to live with dishonor.”[103]

Valeev wrote that ethical views imposed by the Tsars crushed the honor and dignity of the Russian

soldier and the progressive thoughts of officers. Suvorov, Kutuzov, Ushakov, and Nakhimov were

singled out as progressive thinkers who cared about the soldier even if the Tsar did not and so they

developed their own military traditions. Deviations from the officer’s code did not end in

reconciliation but in duels in those days.

Valeev spared no amount of criticism for Soviet era officers either. Red Army military-ethical

views differed from past ones, he wrote, and often refuted the progressive ideas of an officer’s honor

that had formed in the old Imperial army. The revival of military honor during perestroika and the late

1980s, to Valeev, occurred at a December 1989 All-Service Officers Conference in Moscow. The

officer’s conference was expected to consider educational and moral-ethical problems to form a

sense of officer honor, dignity, and pride.[104]

Such a reconsideration of training in ethics and honor was sorely needed. Valeev noted that a short

course on the fundamentals of ethics was taught in only 10 of over 100 military schools at the time.

Realistically, Valeev wrote that honor cannot be reproduced in oneself in a stable condition for long.

When one suffers, one needs positive evaluation. Valeev believes that “moral deviations and a

display of elements of dishonor also are linked directly with the Afghan tragedy... and by other

disorders of life.” He criticized the mass media for blackening what the military did at that time.

Since an officer is a reflection of society, he has a right to count on recognition of the useful nature of
his labor, and on material, legal, and moral support of his dignity and honor. Perhaps this is the

situation that influenced Marshall Akhromeev to take his own life. His dignity and honor were no

longer supported by society in the early days of the 1990s.

An officer’s honor had to especially be protected during perestroika when there were still serious

problems in the system. For example, how can a young officer maintain his honor when his

commanding officer has control of his military rank, pay, working conditions, apartment, nursery,

travel orders, summer leave, honors, incentives, punishments, and more according to Valeev? In

conditions of such total dependence it is hard to defend one’s honor. The military requires deep

democratization of relationships, the development of culture and etiquette, regulations and social

standards, and rituals of the defense of honor. A Soviet Officer’s Code of Honor also is needed, he

wrote, which means that Valeev was unaware of the imminent change to his country’s name.[105]

Quoting the words of the 98

th

Infantry Regiment years ago on the development of military

principles, Valeev stated that “the officer’s word always must be a guarantee of truth and therefore

lies, bragging, and non-fulfillment of an obligation are vices undermining faith in the officer’s

truthfulness; they generally dishonor the officer’s rank and cannot be tolerated...Faintheartedness and

cowardice must be alien to the officer...”[106]

New Russian Military Traditions

After the dissolution of the USSR, the Russian military was in a quandary. What would the new

Russian army look like, what uniforms would it wear, and what flag would it honor? In short, what

traditions would it uphold? For starters, the Russian Federation had to eliminate the image in the mind

of Russia’s citizens of using troops in a coup attempt. Russian leaders had to work to bring back a

sense of personal honor into the officer corps after Boris Yeltsin replaced Gorbachev as President.

However this attempt did not last long. First, in 1993 General Alexander Rutskoi, Yeltsin’s Vice

President, and General Eduard Makashov led a putsch against Yeltsin. This resulted in the army

shooting tank rounds into the offices of Russia’s Parliament known as the Russian White House.

Second, only a year later, the war inside Russia (in Chechnya) unfolded, and Russian troops were

exposed as participants in a “black operation,” an undercover operation that supported one side

against another. One officer stood his ground, however, in this chain of escalating events. General

Eduard Vorobyev, deputy commander of the ground forces, declined to participate in events in

Chechnya, citing the armed forces unpreparedness to enter battle. In this way he was reenergizing an

old Russian military tradition of telling the commanding officer the truth he may not want to hear.

While Vorobyev was dismissed from service for his decision (he was later elected to the Duma,

Russia’s equivalent of Congress), he was proven correct in his estimate. After the horrific start to

combat operations in Chechnya in December of 1994, the armed forces were exposed as

undernourished, underpaid, untrained, and impoverished. The prestige of military service diminished

even further.

During the reign of Boris Yeltsin, many military traditions were laid aside. General Pavel Grachev

came to be the Minister of Defense out of loyalty to Boris Yeltsin and not due to his military

professionalism according to many estimates both inside and outside Russia. Several officers became

members of Parliament and participated directly in political affairs while on active duty. Officers
wrote books about their political views. Still, there were signs of a return to the old military

traditions of the Imperial Russian Armed Forces.

Western Group of Forces, 1992

The Western Group of Forces in 1992 under the leadership of Colonel General M. Burlakov (who

recently passed away) provided one of the more interesting early looks at Russian military traditions

in the post-Soviet period. The book Istoriya I Traditsii Rossiyskoy Armii (The History and

Traditions of the Russian Military) (edited by Burlakov but with a writer’s collective of seven other

officers) consisted of four chapters that covered: the creation of the Russian army; the development of

military art, weapons, and uniforms; traditions of the Russian army; and the renewal of the Russian

army in 1992.[107]

The chapter on traditions of the Russian army discussed the need to revive some past military

traditions. Russia’s internal situation in 1992, according to the authors, was one in which “the social

and national foundations have been shattered, morality has been shaken, ideals are crumbling, and

there is no confidence in the present or future.”[108] Burlakov continued that the seeds of enmity have

been sown between fraternal people who worked together to create a great power and, he added, we

hope that these seeds never germinate.[109] Thus there appears to have been a real split between the

army and the people in 1992 in Burlakov’s opinion. It was the close unity of the army and the people

forged through many years that he hoped to get back on track.

Based on this situation, Burlakov attached a very important role to historical-patriotic

consciousness and national traditions to nourish “the people’s strength, spirit, and conscience like a

life-giving source.”[110] He hoped to construct a barrier to cynicism, indifference, and contempt for

Russia’s best national traditions. The people’s spirit is the gold reserve of the nation, Burlakov

wrote, noting that where there is no respect for one’s own history, there are no citizens either and

irreversible degeneration will set in.[111]

The cultural traits that are typical of Russians are “boundless love for the Homeland, a lofty sense

of civic and military duty, infinite sacrifice in battle, an acute conscience, unassuming courage, and a

fraternal attitude to other peoples.”[112] The Russian Army of 1992 must become a worthy successor

to these glories and traditions of the past. It must take on the traditions of the past, love of the

Fatherland, and an understanding of military honor and dignity.

Burlakov reminded readers that for centuries people have tried to deprive Russia of its

independence. For this reason the history of Russia is above all its military history. Several features

of military history were pointed out in the book:

· Russia’s richness/abundance: Russia’s rich and abundant land enticed conquerors to invade

Russia for centuries.

· Russia’s lofty purpose: Russia has saved other nations from the Mongol yoke, to include

Europe, where “our martyrdom saved Catholic Europe’s robust development from all sorts

of trouble.”

· Russia’s noble military character: Russia has fulfilled the role of the protector of small and

oppressed nations.
· Russia’s peaceful colonization: other countries (Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, Armenia, and

Kazakhstan) united with Russia voluntarily for protection.

· Russia has been weak throughout history: in spite of military weakness Russia has prevailed

because, once attacked, Russia will not lay down its arms until it succeeds.

· Russia’s hidden enigma: Russia’s national character is the hidden enigma that other nations

have been unable to uncover. Russia’s people rise up when called upon to fight with the

professional soldiers.[113]

These features have made Russia’s military history unique and distinct. However, if national

character is Russia’s hidden enigma, it becomes more apparent why Burlakov wanted to correct this

situation because the hidden enigma was in danger of evaporating.

Burlakov wrote that traditions are historically shaped customs and rules of behavior handed down

from generation to generation. They eventually become voluntarily observed rules. The most

important of these combat traditions is the special attitude and unconditional service of the people

and the army to their nation (which again explains why Burlakov was so upset over the 1992 break in

this link). Patriotism and supreme sacrifice are powerful factors in Russia’s greatness and have

existed throughout Russian history. He added that

Another tradition is extreme tenacity in defensive positions. Tenacity was best exhibited in

World War II during the German sieges of Leningrad and Stalingrad. Russian fanatics defended

these two Russian cities in a manner that proved tenacity to be a national trait. Russians do not

give up. Tenacity, perseverance and valor in battle, and sacrifice all carry on the Russian

tradition of mass heroism (and not heroism as understood in the West, which is more like

individual heroism or an exception to the rule). [114]

When discussing the actions of Russian soldiers at Sevastopol during the Crimean War, Leo Tolstoy

noted that

They do not need effects, speeches, battle cries, songs or drums; on the contrary, they need

calm, order, and no constraints. You will never see in a Russian soldier bragging, bravado, or a

desire to become intoxicated or hot headed when in danger; on the contrary, modesty,

humbleness, and the ability to see in danger something quite different from danger are his

distinctive traits.[115]

The idea that you will never see a Russian soldier with a desire to become intoxicated, of course,

could be contested!

Another important Russian military tradition emphasized in Burlakov’s book is the importance of

banners, for they were believed to be holy and thus able to incite bravery in troops. Russian soldiers

fought over banners with glory going to the soldier who could capture an enemy banner. When

unfurled in the thick of fighting, a Russian banner had the effect of blessing its soldiers and thus

inciting new strength in them. (Note: The Russian military rank praporshchik [warrant officer] comes

from the word “prapor” or “praporets,” a name given to a small banner divided at the end into two

triangles and signifying a military leader’s caliber.) The Victory Banner raised over Berlin is an
example of what is called a “fitting crown” for the heroic accomplishments of the Russian soldiers.

Burlakov adds that “the best tradition of the Russian military has always been loyalty to the combat

banner.”[116] This phrase was underlined and bolded in the text.

Finally, Burlakov notes that the Russian military has always paid strict attention to honor, dignity,

and duty. Honor is “the supreme human value without which life is meaningless” (this phrase was

also underlined and bolded) and represents the soldiers awareness of his worth and duty to society.

[117] The discussion of a code of honor allowed Burlakov to take readers on a walk down Russian

military history and extol the achievements of Aleksander Nevsky, Dmitriy Donskoi, Peter the Great,

Aleksander Suvorov, and Mikhail Dragomirov, among other great Russian military leaders. The latter

was cited for his belief that warm relationships should be established between officers and soldiers

in order to gain access to a soldier’s heart and conscience. The chapter ends with Burlakov citing the

various aspects of a soldier’s honor (accepting personal responsibility; serving under all

circumstances; being truthful; and treating each other decently and with respect), thoughts that ring

hollow when juxtaposed against an ordinary soldier’s life of enduring the hazing ritual known as

dedovshchina.

Soul of the Army, 1997

A second text of some interest for Russian military traditions after the dissolution of the USSR is

Dusha Armii (Soul of the Army). This 1997 text was printed for the Russian Military University,

indicating that it has value for the Ministry of Defense since the university is the source of military

teaching in the following areas: law, psychology, socialism, linguistics, and journalism, among other

topics. The university is preparing people to be qualified in sociology, to be a specialist in social

work, or to be a manager or specialist in social-cultural activities associated with the armed forces.

[118] The university’s public face is more open now than during the Soviet period. In June of 2008,

the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) noted that the university now has its own journal, Vestnik

Voennogo Universiteta (Military University Bulletin).[119]

The year of publication of Dusha Armii (Soul of the Army) is important. It was written and

published during the early-mid years of the Yeltsin administration in Russia when it was easier to

offer opinions on new or even forgotten topics that were taboo under the Soviet regime. More

importantly, the book was authored by émigrés who had left Russia during the Soviet regime.

Therefore their opinions are more strictly old-Russia based.

I. Domnin, in the book’s introduction, stated that while the Imperial Army ceased to exist in 1917

the spirit of the Russian army continued under the banner of the White struggle against the Reds during

the country’s civil war. According to his statistics, more than 70% of the General Staff did not

recognize the power of Lenin. While the Whites may have lost the civil war, the soul of the Russian

army did not perish but lived on in two places: in the underground within the ranks of the Red Army

and in the military émigré community. The most important part of this legacy was that the spiritual

dominates the material. Domnin added that “this body of work reveals Russia’s distinctive military

culture and the undying creative principle of the Russian Army.”[120]

S. Dobrorolsky noted that a term related to the “soul of the army” is “spirit of the army.” “The

mental state of the troops is the result of many complex causes and is closely associated with feelings
that have swept the entire nation...The spirit of the army can be defined as the synthesis of every

aspect of the army...” However, émigrés note that “soul of the army” does not mean just the army’s

spirit. P. Krasnov used it to mean military psychology and equated it in one instance to the military

banner. A. Popov, I. Patronov, and V. Sigarev used it to mean military discipline. Ye. Messner and A.

Kersnovsky wrote that “soul of the army” meant the officer corps. Thus it is clear that a variety of

terms were applied to the meaning of “soul of the army.”[121] The concept of “soul of the army” thus

contains: discipline as the main organizing feature; military psychology as the inner, spiritual world

of the army; the qualities of the officer corps as the main ‘genetic carrier” of the army’s soul; and the

banner as the material, visual symbol of the honor, valor, and courage of soldiers. Moral virtues

comprise the spirit of the army.[122]

In the book’s conclusions (with no attribution as to who wrote them), it was stated that the best

way to break down the “soul of the army” into its components is to examine its moral and

psychological foundations. This leads to the following components: the state-political and military

consciousness of soldiers; the national character of military practice; martial spirit; military

education; military psychology; military discipline; tradition; the art of command and the moral power

of leaders; and the ideals of warfare and the “strategy of spirit.” Four of these concepts, martial

spirit, military psychology, traditions, and the ideals of battle and the strategy of the spirit, are

developed further below.

Martial spirit is one of the central moral and psychological foundations of the Russian army. It is

understood as the totality of the troops’ moral qualities and the source of their fighting power. R.

Dreiling, writing in 1925 on “Russian Military Culture,” noted that

The honorable fulfillment of a citizen’s duty to the Motherland, the spirit of bravery and honor,

military valor, and the constant display of initiative have now been propagated within the

Russian army, and under their influence it has started to improve in quality, constantly

exhibiting examples of exceptional steadfastness and extraordinary military virtues.[123]

Military psychology is the scientific study or measurement of the soul of the army, an exercise in

self-reflection. This requires work in individual psychology and in collective military psychology.

These mental circumstances must be tied to material circumstances as well, since the latter can

influence a forces’spirit on the battlefield.[124]

Traditions represent the spiritual remains and character of a nation’s forefathers. It includes

rituals, beliefs, and ways of reasoning and acting handed down over generations. These include selfsacrificing love of the Fatherland; love of history; dedication to the oath and the banner; and helping

comrades even if it means your own death. For émigrés this understanding was expressed more

through practice than theory.[125]

Finally, with regard to the ideals of battle, the émigrés note that the theater of military action has

been extended beyond the land, water, and air to a large degree, moving into a fourth element—

people’s souls. An army must be armed both ideologically and psychologically. Ye. Messner felt that

social theaters of war were just as important as military operations during the Russian civil war,

where feelings, impressions, passions, enchantment, and moods ruled over detached logic and mental
calculations. Others noted that to prepare for small-scale wars politics must assist with ideological,

political, propaganda, and social aspects of conducting this campaign, again a predominantly

psychological way of preparation. With the soul of the army as a target, a “strategy of the spirit” was

needed.[126]

Perhaps this traditional background with the focus on psychological aspects and culminating in

“land, water, air, and people’s souls” served as one of the traditional elements that caused Russia

military leaders to examine information technology not just for its information-technical but also for

its information-psychological aspects.

The book’s conclusion states very well the opinion of the émigrés who participated in the

development of this book:

The significance of the vast spiritual work of the Russian military emigration consists primarily

in that, throughout the decades of the Soviet period of our history, the exiles carefully preserved

for future generations of defenders of the Motherland the very spirit of the Russian army and its

memory. In the Soviet Union there were great leaps in the development of military psychology

and pedagogy in the 1920s and 1930s, in the power of the Communist Party, in atheism, and in

the inculcation of internationalism into the Red Army; the military emigration in contrast

supported a consistent, continuous development of the spiritual aspects of military practice, and

preached a non-party, religious, national-historical formation of the soul of the future Russian

armed forces.[127]

Since the Year 2000...

A number of military journals, most often the Russian Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal (Military

Historical Journal), Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest), or Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), have

continued to publish articles on military traditions or terms associated with it. For example, issue

number 3 of 2008 of Military Historical Journal contained an article titled “Fatherland Traditions:

Asymmetric Fighting” and issue number 4 of 2008 contained an article on “Officer Honor.” Issue 5 of

2008 of Army Digest contains a lead article on an officer’s honor. There have been other journals that

focused on social issues in the military. Orientir (Orienteer) and Soldat Rossii (Soldier of Russia)

are two that come immediately to mind.

Only a very limited number of sources since 2000 will be listed here. They represent components

of tradition-type topics covered by the journal Military Thought. Most of the topics fit the general

discussion of Russian military tradition that has been ongoing for centuries (spirit, discipline, reform,

self-development, moral, patriotism, etc.). The topics and their year of publication are:

· Moral-Psychological Support of the Counterterrorist Operation in the Republic of Daghestan

—2000

· Social and Spiritual Bases of Military Corporatism—2000

· Maintenance of Morale in the Military—2000

· Evaluating Soldier’s Moral and Psychological State—2001

· Spiritual Foundations of Military Indoctrination—2003
· Spiritual Factor in Future Wars: How to Shape It—2003

· On the Issue of the Essence of Military Discipline—2003

· A Social Approach to Military Service Reform in Democratic Russian Society—2004

· Questions on the Formation of Military Ideology—2004

· The Military–Professional Self-Development of Officers—2005

· The Human Factor as a Basic Element of National Military Power—2006

· Army Image: Problems and Solutions—2006

· Combat Service Morale—2006

· Culturological Analysis of Military Activity—2006

· Patriotic Upbringing in Russia and in its Armed Forces—2007

· On Establishing the Institution of Military Imams in the Russian Army—2008

This list demonstrates that many of the concepts that started in the time of Peter the Great are still

relevant today; and that the study of the Russian army’s spirit, patriotism, morale, and culture is still

ongoing.

Another source that includes military traditions is the journal Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk

(Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), headed by General of the Army Makhmut A. Gareev.

Issue 2, 2009 included A. A. Korabelnikov’s article titled “Army and Culture” that included

information on traditions. Since this article appeared in this unique publication, it will be used to

look at the progress that traditions have made as Russia approached 2010.

If one were to measure progress based on this article, the answer would be “minimal.” This is

because the article is a throwback to many Soviet-era concepts of an older generation. For example,

the point is made about young people that

The overwhelming majority of them wear jeans, raising the question as to whether this is a sign

of culture or of mental lameness. Probably the latter, for there are no analogies in history of a

country voluntarily and on a large scale wearing slave dress (jeans are slave dress; there is no

other way to regard them).[128]

On the other hand, the article defined culture and tradition and offered some reasonable thoughts

on retaining what Russia and other cultures have lost over time and with the introduction of

information technology—a sense of debt to military personnel. Korabelnikov reminds the reader of

Russia’s noble thoughts and ideas on the military, that service is a sacred duty or a calling. He also

calls for vigilance in times of political tranquility and an end to the present-day neglect of the army. In

line with the traditions of Russia’s Tsarist and Soviet pass, he states that commanders with combat

experience and educational qualifications should be allowed to wear a general’s uniform. Fancy

laurels should not be chased and a commander should go about his duty bravely and resolutely.

Korabelnikov proceeded to list a series of things to eliminate from the armed forces:

We ‘first name’ each other, switch to slang, patter and profanity; we no longer enter but push our
way through. We do not know how to sit or stand or give way. We take liberties with the

classics, with the past, with authority, and with the foundations. Our expression is one of either

solemnity or the giggles. We mock all that is lofty and thereby continually destroy it, for irony is

always familiar; it always watches surreptitiously, always upwards, and is always

destructive...the rituals of association contain the profound meaning of protecting human dignity

and the origins of the foundation. When our grandfathers called a young man or even a teenager

by his name and patronymic, they were protecting, elevating, and connecting him to the adult

world, preparing him, as it were, for imminent responsibilities.[129]

Korabelnikov also calls for all citizens to turn to Russian values and traditions in art and ethics.

And he reminds readers of Napoleon’s saying that victory is only 25% dependent on material factors,

the rest is spiritual. It is thus necessary to awaken in a young man’s soul the lofty feelings known as

patriotism, industry, persistence, and discipline. If we cannot, he notes, then Russians like him must

hold themselves accountable for the future of the nation.[130]

However, in the end, the tone of Korabelnikov’s article rings as coming from another age, another

time. It is everyone’s fault except the armed forces. He passes over coup attempts, dedovshchina,

corruption in the force, and other issues without mention. What is to blame is the lack of boundaries

and taboos within society, the press and TV’s destruction of the army’s spirit, and the lack of art and

culture that have destroyed the morale and spirit of unity between the people and the armed forces.

[131] Serdyukov’s reform effort does seem poised to counter the problems that Korabelnikov ignores

and perhaps for this reason there is more reason to believe that the recasting of the Red Star will

work out positively for Russia in the end.

In 2011, Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) published what may be the most up-to-date understanding of

books and films that impact current Russian armed forces traditions. That article’s main points are

attached at the end of this chapter. It is titled “2011 Program of Information-Propaganda and MilitaryPatriotic Events in the Russian Federation Armed Forces to Strengthen Ties between the Army and

Society to Raise the Stature of Military Service and Foster Social Support for Transformations in the

Army.” The topics will be taught to servicemen throughout the calendar year.

A Comparison of Traditions

On May 12, 1962 US General Douglas MacArthur gave his farewell speech to cadets at the US

Military Academy at West Point, New York. During his address, he focused on the words “duty,

honor, country,” the motto of the academy.[132] As is now obvious from the discussion of Russian

military traditions above, many of McArthur’s words would fit the Russian military tradition. Émigré

N. Kolesnikov, for example, wrote on influencing the conscience of the army, “on inculcating it with

concepts of duty, honor, Motherland...”[133] These three words are as sacred to Russian officers as

they are to US officers. In other areas of military traditions, Russia and the US differ. One major

difference is in the Russian and US understanding of caring for the soldiers under their command. The

Soviet/Russian concept of dedovshchina would not be permitted in the US armed forces.

Disregarding years of warning signs, the tradition continues under the current regime in Russia

indicating that Serdyukov still has much work ahead of him.

The analysis also demonstrated some proximity in the military traditions of the Imperial Russian
armed forces and those of the Soviet era. To demonstrate this relationship it is only necessary to

compare the traditions specified by the 1960 Party-Political book with the words of Old Russian

commanders singled out by Lobov:

· Soviet: Personal loyalty to one’s social and military duty. Love of country motivates Soviet

soldiers to defy danger, causing one soldier to say that soldiers go to the battlefield to

“defend the holy of holies—the Homeland. I want to kneel down whenever I say that word.”

Old Russia: from the time of Catherine II, commanders were obliged to “explain that no fear

or hardship could ever shake the Russian soldier’s bravery and loyalty.”

· Soviet: Mass heroism in battle. This occurred during the civil war, the revolution, and

during the time of foreign intervention. Cases of heroism were particularly common during

the Great Patriotic War (WWII). Old Russia: Suvorov believed that success in battle

depended not so much on the number of soldiers as on their morale; he felt the Russian

soldier was capable of courage and heroism and he could mobilize these characteristics in

troops. Kutuzov felt Russian soldiers displayed enormous courage, heroism, and valor in the

War of 1812.

· Soviet: Soldier’s love for their unit or ship. As one solider noted, “My regiments glory is

my glory and my regiment’s honor is my honor.” Old Russia: Mikhail S. Vorontsov believed

that “love and loyalty to the regiment in which he serves should be instilled in the soldier.”

· Soviet: Loyalty to the Unit Banner or Ship Flag. A 1942 “Decree on the Red Banner” was

approved by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The decree noted that “The Banner

is a symbol of military honor, valor, and glory; it is a reminder to each soldier, sergeant,

officer, and general of their sacred duty to faithfully serve and bravely and capably defend

the Soviet Homeland...” Old Russia: Peter the Great developed the banner and the concepts

that enveloped its significance for generations of soldiers. Even the Soviet writers noted that

Peter the Great did much to elevate the banner to a place of prominence in the eyes of the

Russian serviceman, as soldiers swore to the oath “I will not leave the command and banner

to which I belong, but will follow them as long as I am alive.”

· Soviet: Esprit de corps and solidarity in battle. These traits are based on the new, socialist

relations between soldiers and the people’s unity of class interests. These traits are

incompatible with lack of integrity and an effort to overlook a comrade’s error or conceal

his transgressions, requiring honesty in relationships. Old Russia: Dragomirov believed that

the military had more to do with will than intellect and thus stressed moral education’s

objectives: instill fighting spirit, patriotism, and discipline. The community (peasantcommune) had deep roots in the Russian community as the names of many regiments (Orlov,

Kozel, Tver, etc.) came from places that sent fighters. This focus on the community was

reflected in Suvorov’s urging that soldiers should “die yourself, but rescue your comrade!”

which is clearly another way to talk about solidarity in battle.

· Soviet: Updating military and political knowledge. There is no place for self complacency

and no marking time in the military. Old Russia: Suvorov demanded continuous and

ceaseless self-education.

That brings us to the present. At this time, there appears to be renewed interest once again in an

officer’s honor, as several publications have recently written on this issue. Clearly missing from
today’s list of old Russian traditions is the focus on the soldier that was so clearly and often stated in

Lobov’s book. The unfortunate tradition of dedovshchina lives on when it should have been

extinguished in the Soviet era. Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest) did publish one article on the topic

after 2000, as did Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought). A few newspapers have also covered the

topic but not to the extent required to extinguish this blight on Russia’s military.

Treating soldiers inhumanely goes against many Old Russian military traditions. It exposes Soviet

era propaganda as hypocritical regarding the benefits of socialism. Russian society is not this way.

People go out of their way to help one another, especially their fellow citizens. It is too bad the armed

forces haven’t inculcated this habit into their traditions as their forefathers and their citizenry have.

Conclusion

This survey of Russian military traditions has been, to be frank, brief and focused on a few select

sources. It did not encompass a host of authors and opinions, and readers should take that point away

—this is an analysis that only scratches the surface of what is happening in the Russian armed forces

as it picks its way into the 21

st century. The Russian army is handling a host of problems that require

its attention—housing, contract service, reforms, the war in Chechnya, modernizing its information

age force, and developing a military doctrine consistent with an ever-changing global environment.

As a result the military has other issues to handle in the immediate future. Traditions will develop

over time.

When Vladimir Putin emerged as Russia’s new President, things did begin to change and these

changes have continued under President Medvedev. The military began to experience some success in

Chechnya and pay and housing issues received priority. Some officers were appointed as

representatives of the president to oversee huge administrative regions as general-governors did

during the Tsarist’s time. Tactically, strategically, and organizationally, the Russian military appeared

to be on track. The military-industrial complex, which had been in disarray in the 1990s, began to

function again. However, this does not mean all is well. It is still not certain, from the standpoint of

traditions, what shape the armed forces will finally take.

What is obvious is that there is something old and something new in the traditions that have been

picked up and these traditions are helping to form the military culture of this generation of Russian

officers. There is a mix of informal and formal traditions. If the Russian military abides by the

guidance set by generations that have gone before them, they will be talented and savvy officers

capable of confronting any challenge. However, if Russia’s military leaders ignore some of the more

important lessons of the past, as it seems to have done in certain select areas, the Russian armed

forces are inviting the development of low morale and its unintended consequences on its fighting

capacity.

Or are we asking the wrong question? Are very few things lacking, and what we are witnessing is

simply a union of Old Russian and Soviet Russian traditions? Regardless, there still appears to be a

tilt in tradition toward the Soviet direction. For example, Old Russian units (Pavlovskiy, etc.) and

banners did not come back into vogue and new Russian military units still appear to use numbers and

regimental banners that are Soviet in style. New Russian medals almost look the same as Soviet

medals. The “old” Russian military’s NCO corps did not make a comeback (although change may be
afoot in that area). The glorious past is still recognized as the Soviet past, focusing heavily on World

War II achievements. “Old” Russian military experiences remain less positive than Soviet military

experiences. This is not really that unexpected, as we are always most interested in either our

immediate past or the past in which we participated. This atmosphere will last at least into the next

two decades in Russia.

It will be of interest to Russian experts to follow the progression of military traditions in the

coming years and see which ones the officer corps will choose to follow, especially as World War II

veterans pass into eternity (an excerpt from Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star] on the traditions and

military books/movies of cultural importance that are being taught to soliders in 2011 is listed at the

end of this chapter). The officers involved in the Afghanistan, Chechen, and Georgian conflicts are

bound to exert their own imprint on Russian military tradition. It is highly likely, however, that they

will follow the definition of “tradition” offered in the 2007 Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’

(Military Encyclopedic Dictionary) of Russia and many of the other refined traditions of those who

have gone before them:

TRADITIONS—the observance of the rules, customs, and standards of conduct of servicemen

related to combat missions and military service that have formed historically in the army and

navy and are handed down from generation to generation. The central combat traditions in the

Russian Armed Forces are: fidelity to the military oath and military duty, allegiance to the

Homeland, courage and heroism in its defense, esprit de corps, defense of the commander in

battle, and others. Along with those that are common to the Armed Forces, there are combat

traditions for branches and arms of the service, forces, units, and ships. Combat traditions serve

the goal of, and are a key tool for, fostering high moral and combat quality in the military.[134]

2011 Program

of Information-Propaganda and Military-Patriotic Events in the Russian Federation Armed Forces to

Strengthen Ties between the Army and Society, Raise the Stature of Military Service, and Foster

Social Support for the Transformation of the Army

Event

Stage I (January-May) under the slogan “Army of Victory”

1. Social and civic training (OGP) classes with drafted and contract

servicemen on:

· “A.V. Suvorov’s ‘The science of winning.’ The capture of the Turkish

fortress of Ismail” (1790)

· “The liberation of Leningrad from the enemy blockade” (January 27,

1944)

· “The Battle of Stalingrad and its historical significance” (February 2,

1943 – day of the German fascist troops’ defeat in the Battle of

Stalingrad)

· “February 23 – Defender of the Fatherland Day”

· “Development of the branches and arms of modern Russia’s Armed
Forces. Soldier, be proud of serving in your branch, arm, force or unit!”

· “The military collective – a family of fighters. It is a duty and obligation

of the Russian serviceman to sacredly preserve and grow the traditions

of friendship and esprit de corps”

· “Russia is a space power. On the 50

th anniversary of man’s (Yuri

Gagarin’s) first space flight” (April 12, 1961)

· “Rebuffing aggression from the West. The Battle of the Neva of 1240

and the Battle on the Ice of 1242”

· “The Berlin operation. Fascist Germany’s unconditional surrender”

(April 16 – May 9, 1945)

· The great victory of the army and people (66

th anniversary of the Soviet

people’s victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945)

2. Informing drafted and contract servicemen on:

· “The Vistula-Oder offensive of the 1

st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian

fronts” (January 12 – February 3, 1945)

· “The liberation of the Polish capital of Warsaw by troops of the 1

st

Belorussian front” (January 17, 1945)

· “Eradication of the German fascist troops’ Korsun-Shevchenkovsky

force” (January 24 – February 17, 1944)

· “Crimea (Yalta) conference of the heads of government of the USSR,

the USA and Great Britain” (February 4-11, 1945)

· “The liberation of the Hungarian capital of Budapest” (February 13,

1945)

· “Private A. Matrosov’s immortal act of courage” (February 27, 1943)

· “On the establishment of the category I and II Order of Ushakov and the

Ushakov and Nakhimov medals” (March 3, 1944)

· “The German fascist invaders’ monstrous crimes against civilians:

killing of the Katyn villagers of Belorussia” (March 22, 1943)

· “Baptism by fire of the Normandy air squadron of French airmen”

(April 1, 1943)

· “Capture of the Konigsberg fortress city by troops of the 3

rd

Belorussian front” (April 9, 1945)

· “Liberation of the Austrian capital of Vienna by troops of the 3

rd and

2

nd Ukrainian fronts” (April 13, 1945)

· “On the Russian Orthodox Church’s contribution to the militarypatriotic education of citizens and material support of the front and rear

in the years of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945”

3. Reader conferences, reviews, and discussions of books from the “Library

of patriotic literature” series on:

· The Leningrad blockade: V. Ardamatsky “Leningrad Winter”

· The Battle of Stalingrad: M. Alekseyev “My Stalingrad,” V. Nekrasov
“In the Stalingrad Trenches,” Yu. Bondaryev “Hot Snow,” B. Vasilyev

“One-Two, Soldiers Were Going”

· The navy: V. Bulatov “Admiral Kuznetsov,” V. Pikul “Requiem for the

PQ-17 Convoy”

· The 200th anniversary of the 1812 Patriotic War: S.V. Golubov

“Bagration”

· The heroic deeds of Soviet soldiers in the years of the Great

Patriotic War:

· G. Baklanov “Forever 19”

· V. Rasputin “Live and remember”

· N. Leonov “Russian forest”

· G. Zhukov “Recollections and thoughts”

4. Exhibitions of fiction and memoirs devoted to the key events of the 1941-

1945 Great Patriotic War at unit and garrison libraries

5. Viewing and discussion of films from the “100 Russian films for army and

navy servicemen” series:

· “Hot snow”

· “Liberation”

· “Torpedo carriers”

· “PQ-17 Convoy”

· “Second wind”

· “Great Patriotic War”

· “They fought for the Homeland”

· “Only the old ones are going into battle”

· “Officers”

· “The dawns are quiet here”

· “No one wanted to die”

· “Spring on the Oder”

· “Father of a soldier”

6. Ceremonial presentation of the Colors (new design) to formations and units of

the Russian Federation Armed Forces

7. Opening of the Victory Hall at the Central Museum of the Armed Forces with

exhibition of original Banners of Victory: completion of the installation of

special display cases with climate control; ceremonial opening of the

exposition.

8. Events marking the 22nd anniversary of the withdrawal of the Limited

Contingent of Soviet Troops from Afghanistan

9. Gala evening dedicated to Defender of the Fatherland Day at the Central

Academic Theater of the Russian Army.

Defender of the Fatherland Day ceremonies in forces, formations, and units

10.
Ceremonies marking the 50

th anniversary of Yuri Gagarin’s orbital flight

around the Earth

11. “Under the banner of victory!” information-propaganda campaign. Including

events on Moscow’s Suvorov Square under the auspices of the Ministry of

Defense’s central cultural organizations:

· Russian Federation Ministry of Defense reception for veteran

commanders

· Opening of a Hall and Gallery of Military Leaders at the Armed Forces

Cultural Center

· Gala evening at the Russian Army’s Central Academic Theater;

· Celebratory concert of the A.V. Aleksandrov Russian Army Academic

Song and Dance Ensemble

· Performances of military orchestras in Ekaterina Park

· Similar events under the auspices of federal military cultural authorities

in cities where military districts, fleets, and formations are

headquartered

12. Military-patriotic events with participants in the military parade on

Moscow’s Red Square and military parades in other cities where military

districts, fleets, and formations are headquartered

13.

Information-propaganda events marking the 40

th anniversary of the premier of

the movie “Officers” in Russia

14. “All-Russia Draftee Day” all-Russia patriotic youth event

15. Weekly publication of radio newspapers by unit broadcasting centers with

information on events of the Great Patriotic War and the participation of the

force (unit) in combat operations, and reading of excerpts from books on the

Great Patriotic War and recollections of veterans

16. Amateur performer competitions in formations (units) with a final concert

marking Victory Day in the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War

17. Organization of a “1941-1945 Great Patriotic War” mobile photo

exhibition in formations (units) of military arms and branches, Logistic

Services of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, central units and authorities,

and Ministry of Defense tertiary institutions (under a separate program

schedule)

18. Organization of the clean-up of monuments, commemorative signs, and

burial sites of soldiers who perished in fighting and battles of the Great

Patriotic War

19. Wrap-up of Stage I of the information-propaganda and military-patriotic

events in the Russian Federation Armed Forces to mark the 66

th anniversary of

Victory in the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War

Stage II (June-November) under the slogan: “Army and Society”

20. Social and civic training (OGP) classes with drafted and contract

servicemen on:
· “Russia’s national symbols”

· “The Armed Forces are a guarantee of Russia’s peace and security.

Lessons and conclusions from the start of the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic

War” (to mark the 70

th anniversary of the start of the 1941-1945 Great

Patriotic War)

· “Defense of the Fatherland and service in the Armed Forces are a duty

and obligation of Russian Federation citizens”

· “Peter the Great’s military reforms and strengthening of Russian

statehood. The Battle of Poltava” (1709)

· “The Russian fleet’s victory at Gangut” (1714)

· “The Battle of Kursk. Its role and significance during the Great

Patriotic War”

· “The Russian fleet’s victory under the command of F.F. Ushakov over a

Turkish squadron off Tendra” (1790)

· “State structure of the Russian Federation. The Federal Assembly

(Federation Council and State Duma) is Russia’s supreme legislative

body”

· “The army during the revolutionary events of 1917 and the civil war”

· “Russia’s Armed Forces in the national government structure”

· “On the 70

th anniversary of the battle for Moscow. Soviet troops’

counteroffensive and the start of the defeat of the German fascist troops

near Moscow” (December 5-6, 1941)

21. Informing drafted and contract servicemen on:

· “Russia’s great poet”—on Russia’s Pushkin Day

· “Russia – a great multinational country”—on Russia Day

· “The people’s great feat”. On the Day of Memory and Sorrow

· “Russia and its Armed Forces on the way to modernization”

· “The offensive operation of the troops of the South-West front in 1916”.

On the 95

th anniversary of the start of the Brusilov breakthrough

· “Day of the Russian army’s victory over the Swedes in the Battle of

Poltava” (1709)

· “On the 75th anniversary of the nonstop flight of airmen V.P. Chkalov,

G.F. Baidukov and A.V. Belyakov across the Arctic Ocean”

· “Russia’s naval might and glory”—on Navy Day

· “The valor and glory of the air infantry”—on Airborne Forces Day

· “The wings of the Homeland”—on Air Force Day

· “The fiery arc”. On the day of victory of Soviet troops in the Battle of

Kursk

· “The Russian guards”

· “The Battle of Borodino (1812) – Russia’s Day of Military Glory”
· “Day of victory of Russian regiments in the Battle of Kulikovo” 1380

· “Russia’s ground forces”—on Ground Forces Day

· “Russia’s space shield”—on Space Forces Day

· “The material basis of troop command and control.” On Signal

Operator Day

· “Liberation of the Ukraine SSR’s capital of Kiev by troops of the 1

st

Ukrainian front” (November 6, 1943)

· “On the 70

th anniversary of the parade of Soviet troops in Moscow’s

Red Square on November 7, 1941”

· “Start of the Soviet troops’ counteroffensive near Stalingrad”

(November 19-20, 1942)

· “Immortal exploit of scout Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya (executed by the

fascists on November 29, 1941)

22. Reader conferences, reviews, and discussions of books from the “100 best

national works of literature on defense of the Fatherland” series:

· On the 70

th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War:

· V.M. Kozhevnikov “Shield and sword”

· V.N. Kondratyev “Sashka”

· B.V. Polevoi “Tale of a real man”

· G.I. Sviridov “Summer of forty-one”

· On the 70

th anniversary of the defense of the Brest Fortress:

· B.L. Vasilyev “His name was not listed”

· On the 95

th anniversary of the Brusilov breakthrough (1916):

· S.A. Sergeyev-Tsensky “The Brusilov Breakthrough”

· On the Battle of Kursk:

· A.V. Ananyev “The tanks are moving in diamond formation”

· On the 15

th anniversary of the counterterrorist operation in the

Chechen Republic:

· N.F. Ivanov “The Chechen boomerang”

· V.P. Kiselev “Reconnaissance battalion”

· On the 70

th anniversary of the battle for Moscow (1941):

· K.M. Simonov “The living and the dead”

· A.A. Bek “Volokolamsk Highway”

· P.A. Belov “Moscow is behind us”

· M.A. Sholokhov “They fought for the Homeland”

23. Viewing and discussion of films from the “100 Russian films for army and

navy servicemen” series:

· “Stronger than fire”

· “The Brest Fortress”
· “The living and the dead”

· “Belorussian railway station”

· “The war in the west”

· Denisov’s documentary film “Special ops priests”

· “In August ‘44”

· “Admiral Ushakov”

· “Kutuzov”

· “War and peace”

· “Roadblock”

· “Admiral Nakhimov”

· “Saboteur”

· “Counterstrike”

24. Organization of the clean-up of monuments, commemorative signs, and

burial sites of soldiers who perished in fighting and battles of the Great

Patriotic War

25. Ceremonial mourning to mark the 70

th anniversary of the start of the

1941-1945 Great Patriotic War, including:

· Attendance at a joint meeting of the Russian Federation Federal

Assembly and Government and the Moscow city administration

· Laying of wreaths and flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in

Alexander Garden, as well as at memorials and monuments at military

bases

· Visit to Moscow’s Manezh Central Exhibition Hall’s International

Exhibition of the practical results of the work to immortalize the

memory of those who died defending the Fatherland, as well as similar

exhibitions in administrative centers where military districts and fleets

are headquartered

26. Information-propaganda events marking the 95th anniversary of the

offensive of the South-West front of Russian troops in World War One (the

Brusilov breakthrough, 1916), including:

· Research and historical conferences with officers in formations,

command echelons and tertiary institutions: “The Brusilov

breakthrough: lessons and conclusions for today”

· Film-lectures for personnel

27. Military-patriotic events marking the 70th anniversary of the Battle of

Moscow (1941)

28. “First in the Army” information-patriotic event

29. “Soldiers of the Community” competition of military-patriotic excellence

among CIS armed forces servicemen

30. Display and competition of children’s drawings of the feats of the peoples

of Russia in the 1812 Patriotic War under the slogan “Forever in the peoples’
memory” at the Suvorov (Nakhimov) military academies, Ministry of Defense

schools, and garrisons

31. Amateur performer competitions in large units, military districts (fleets), and

arms and branches of the Armed Forces with presentation of the winners at the

“Katyusha” All-Russia Competition

32. Final of the “Katyusha” All-Russia Festival of Popular Art of the Armed

Forces, other defense and law enforcement agencies, war and military service

veterans, and their families

33. Research and application conference: “Work with religious servicemen of

the Russian Federation Armed Forces: evolving practice, experience and

prospects”

34. Columns in the weekly Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper on the 70th anniversary

of events at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War (1941)

35. “Army and Society” exhibition and forum in Moscow’s Manezh Central

Exhibition Hall.

To include:

· Expositions of the progress in combat training and daily activity of the

Armed Forces

· Roundtables led by Deputy Defense Ministers

· Sessions of the Defense Ministry’s Public Council and the Armed

Forces Council of Veterans

· Similar exhibitions in large administrative centers where military

districts and fleets are headquartered

36. Joint patriotic events with Zvezda TV station with servicemen to mark the

70

th anniversary of the military parade in Red Square in 1941

37. Wrap-up of the 2011 information-propaganda and military-patriotic events in

the Russian Federation Armed Forces[135]
CHAPTER THREE: MILITARYTHOUGHT: RUSSIA’S INHERITANCE FROM THE

SOVIET PERIOD

The culture of an officer’s military thinking is inseparable from the general culture of his intellectual

activity.[136]

Introduction

It is clear from the writings of Soviet and now Russian military strategists that the influence of

Marx and Lenin on military thought has been profound. It is highly doubtful that this influence will

ever be totally erased from Russian military thinking. Even in the late 1980s, while then President

Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost issues were under discussion and military authors

were exploring new thinking in military affairs for the first time in decades, thought processes still

maintained a strong Marxist-Leninist dialectical bias.

It is thus imperative that this work include a few samples from the Soviet era archives of military

thought. These works offer clues as to what is influencing the current thought processes of Russia’s

military strategists. This chapter examines two examples of these works. They are Kul’tura Voennogo

Myshleniya (The Culture of Military Thought) by F. F. Gaivoronsky and M. I. Galkin; and Istoriya

Sovetskoy Voennoy Mysli (The History of Soviet Military Thought) by I. A. Korotkov.

The Culture of Military Thought

Two Russian military officers published the book The Culture of Military Thought in 1991. Parts

of it were most likely written during the Soviet period. The book explains in detail the theory and

development of military thought from Soviet times up to 1991. Since this book was written during

Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost movement, the authors commented

on these issues as well. The officers, Colonel General F. F. Gaivoronsky and Colonel M. I. Galkin,

also did not fail to describe Gorbachev’s movement in Marxist-Leninist terms as a revolutionary

transformation in society bringing to the fore contradictions between, on the one hand, the need for

renewal, creativity, and creative initiatives and, on the other hand, conservatism, inertia, and selfinterest. This necessitated

a much more active, creative search in developing strategy, tactics, and command and control;

improving methods for political and combat training of military forces, units, and ships; making

ideological and political-educational work more effectual; and strengthening military

discipline, that is, everything that makes our defense qualitatively more effective.[137]

The authors underscored that military people must possess the skill to use Marxist-Leninist

ideological and methodological principles in order to look into the future, forecast military events,

and creatively implement military theory’s new postulations. Problems must be solved without a

direct reliance on practical experience gained in warfare. Military leaders must make judgments

based on field tests of some weapons. The 1979-1989 war against Afghan insurgents was their most

recent experience and it was not a high-tech versus high-tech type of conflict.[138] However, the

conclusions reached by Russia’s band of educated military professionals absolutely remains worthy

of our consideration.
Gaivoronsky and Galkin’s work offers a general introduction to other topics covered in Recasting

the Red Star. These topics include future war, military traditions, and high-technology applications to

military affairs.

Military Thought

The authors define thought as “the purposive, indirect, generalized reflection in human

consciousness of the essential links and relationships of reality, an ‘instrument’ for forecasting events

and actions. It immeasurably expands human cognitive abilities and ensures that knowledge is

received about the qualities of an object that are not accessible to sensory perception.”[139]

Theoretical thought, then, is used to visualize operations, strategy, and other areas of military science.

The actual tool of thought is made up of concepts and judgments expressed as language instead of

sensory or perception images.[140] Thought involves processing the results of sensory perception

and produces knowledge. Cogitation enables a human to view battle as a complex, organized,

managed process thanks to the speed and accuracy of our perceptive processes.[141] An officer must

have the ability to recreate a picture of reality (an engagement or other type of military activity) based

on separate, fragmentary, and written or oral reports which at times may be contradictory. The

dynamics of a situation must also be envisioned.[142]

A specific feature of Russian military thought is the unity of the military’s political and militarytechnical thinking. The political aspect refers to the precise appraisal of the state’s policy on war and

peace, military posture, and the preparation of its Armed Forces personnel. The military-technical

content of military thought reflects the firing and tactical aspects of weapons and material and the

nature of the military operations that derive from them.[143] These two factors (political and

military-technical issues) are also the two factors that compose military doctrine in Russia. [Note:

“Doctrine” in the Russian language is nearly equivalent to “national military policy” in US

terminology.]

Since the goal of a military operation is to disorganize an opponent’s operation, military thought

must include knowledge of both friendly and adversarial forces. It also encourages creative thought,

good morale, psychological preparedness, and the desire to fight under extreme conditions. This

includes placing commanders in dangerous situations in peacetime training to form psychological

readiness for any test before them in real battle. Creativity is required since military operations are

dynamic, include abrupt and sometimes unexpected situations, require independent and proactive

decisions and a knack for risk taking, and possess potential communications disruptions and other

critical junctures.[144] In determining what information to use, a commander must: rely on objective

facts and actual conditions; quantitatively and qualitatively evaluate them; consider them in close

interconnection and as constantly changing and developing; unearth the contradictions of that

development; find the main link; and identify the primary factors that decisively affect the troops’

success in accomplishing their mission. The objectives that are set by the senior commander

determine the direction of a commander’s cognitive activity when assessing a situation.[145] The

ability to creatively apply knowledge in peacetime to real situations must be developed.

Military art is defined as the fusion of creative thinking and effective practical activity. In this

sense a commander’s decision is nothing more than the mental image of the ways and means for
accomplishing the objectives of an impending engagement. Creativity produces something

qualitatively new and non-existent to meet man’s needs, to include the creation of new weapons or

substances with preset properties or energy that do not directly occur in nature.[146] It is the

procurement of new knowledge outside the framework of existing ideas and the production of new,

previously unknown methods.[147] Something new can only be created by relying on knowledge

already developed, to include the forms and methods of mental activity. What is required is the unity

of the logical and the unconscious, of the exact calculation and the epiphany. The creative process is

the “synthesis of the cognitive, emotional, and volitional spheres of human consciousness. It is

inseparably linked to an individual’s character, abilities, and interests.”[148]

Objective and Subjective Thought Factors

Thought occurs due to the interaction of objective and subjective factors. The authors note that the

surrounding reality is the objective factor of thought while knowledge and a thinking person’s attitude

to it are the subjective factors. Thus defense budgets or levels of science and technology are

objective factors while their manipulation in favor of friendly forces would be the subjective

application of knowledge. Objective factors have undergone serious disruptions with the introduction

of new weapons. The initial period of war, military engagements, the expansion of electronic warfare

capabilities, and other factors have all affected military theory’s view of objectivity. The authors note

that “a new military method can only be effective if it does not contradict the objective patterns in the

development of military science and corresponds to the concrete conditions in which these patterns

are manifested.”[149]

The development of subjective thought is closely related to creativity according to Gaivoronsky

and Galkin. Creative thought requires a certain amount of knowledge about the reality of a situation,

personal experience in resolving similar issues, a desire to get to the truth, and some intuition (such

as sudden or conceptual insight, a premonition, special hunch, revelation, epiphany, etc.); and it

requires receptivity to new ideas, the ability to overcome conservatism and inertia, independent

judgment, a critical nature and daring, and tenacity and persistence in pursuing an objective. A

creative imagination is a prerequisite for developing new thought or images of what does not exist in

reality.[150] The purpose of thought becomes the ability to reveal the unknown not provided by direct

perception or measurement. This requires analysis, synthesis, generalization, and other thought

processes as the logical means to realize the interaction of the objective and subjective.[151]

The authors directed special attention toward the concept of intuition. They noted that thought is

linked to practice and interacts with the laws of the objective world. This in turn produces intuition

which is the brain’s capacity to receive and reprocess a larger volume of information than is

registered by consciousness. Intuition is expressed as sudden analogies, associations, and fantasy in

instantaneous recognition of objects and processes and a hunch about their future.[152]

Premonition in battle is a crucial component of a commander’s decision-making. The ability to

foresee events prevents catastrophic outcomes and invisible consequences. For foresight to become a

reality, both objective and subjective criteria must be understood. The laws and cause-effect links of

military activity, the weaponry and organization, capabilities, and modus operandi of one’s troops

and those of the adversary must be understood. Knowledge of the concrete and general patterns of

armed combat and military art must be understood. Situations with which a commander must deal are
divided into two groups: natural and technical factors, and human factors. Foresight also includes

how conventionally the contending sides act and the extent to which they use stratagem, operational

and tactical camouflage, and disinformation.[153]

The Laws of Formal Logic and Military Thought

Formal logic is a science of the laws of correct thought and the demands made of consistent and

evidentiary discourse. Unlike dialectical logic, formal logic is limited to formulating the laws and

rules by which ideas follow each other logically. There are four laws that the authors identified: the

law of identity, the law of contradiction, the law of the excluded middle, and the law of sufficient

grounds.[154]

· Law of Identity: notions and judgments about an object must be precisely defined and

unambiguous if they are to be used in the same sense, meaning, and relation throughout a

discourse. The law is intended to counter pointless and nebulous discourse. It is necessary

to redefine an object as it changes, shifts to a new quality, is found to have new properties,

or deepens our knowledge of an object.[155]

· Law of Contradiction: this law ensures that the properties of an object or phenomenon

cannot, at one and the same time, pertain and not pertain to it. There is no contradiction if

varying times in development or such other properties, links, or relations are used.[156]

· Law of the Excluded Middle: this law aims to exclude contradictions in thought about the

same object taken into consideration at the same time and in the same relation.[157]

· Law of Sufficient Grounds: this law notes that any correct (and objectively true) idea must

be reasoned and based on sufficient grounds. The law requires that all assertions about a

phenomenon be proven. Both the thesis and the reasons must be fully substantiated.

Dialectical and formal logic act in unity in which dialectical logic plays the leading role.

[158]

Gaivoronsky and Galkin wrote that a culture of military thought also requires that an officer must

master concepts (the essence of objects) from the general to the specific. The issue of concept

includes the content, scope, features, ideas, and judgments contained in military thought. A concept’s

content includes the essential features of an object, while a concept’s scope is the concrete totality of

objects possessing similar features. Establishing essential features means comparing the concept with

objective reality.

An idea is expressed in the form of a combination of concepts, thereby expressing knowledge

about properties and relationships between objects and military reality. The combination of concepts

about the phenomena of military affairs is called judgment.[159] A judgment combines and compares

concepts, where some property or relationship is affirmed or negated. It reflects whether a feature

does or does not belong to the object of an idea.[160]

There are also types of inferences or indirect thought where knowledge is deduced from inductive

or deductive methods or from analogy. Induction involves inference from the particular to the general.

Scientific induction is based on finding internal causation that necessitates a preliminary analysis of

objects to find essential features of certain conditions. Conclusions are formulated on the basis of

one’s knowledge of essential features common to a certain class of objects or phenomena. Deduction
involves inference from the general to the particular. Syllogism, the authors note, is the most common

form of deductive military thought. It reviews two judgment premises linked by a general term and

derives from them a conclusion. For example, “all types of maneuvers combine fire, movement, and

strike. An enveloping attack combines fire, rapid movement, and deep strike. An enveloping attack is

therefore a type of maneuver.” An analogy is the transfer of knowledge from one object to another. It

is a condition based on the establishment of similarity. Lenin called analogies slipshod and demanded

careful study of all the pros and cons used with this method.[161]

Mathematical Modeling and the Principles of Military Art

There are several reasons why modeling is so important at the present time. Combat action takes

place in time and space, it is true Gaivoronsky and Galkin note, but these are constantly changing

situations. Combat is a two-sided process and involves more than smooth, continuous change. Change

is also abrupt and there can be drastic changes in conditions (the introduction of weapons of mass

destruction to a conventional fight, for example). Combat is also random and possesses a great degree

of uncertainty (losses, pace of advance, time to reach targets, etc.). It is virtually impossible to take

all of these instances into account in a normal field exercise, but on a computer countless initiatives

(logistics, weather, terrain, time of year, etc.) can be injected at will.[162]

For participants, modeling facilitates gaining insight into cognitive processes and helps us

discover patterns intrinsic to them. It also, of course, enhances the quality of a commander’s decisionmaking, and it helps a commander’s staff to prepare better analysis and evaluation of options.

Modeling also enhances creativity, responsiveness, and confidence in running multiple engagement

options.[163]

With regard to the principles of military art, the authors suggest that the role of military-historical

thought is to “unearth the objective laws of war, discover the mechanism of their operation, and

reflect them in the laws of military science.” Such thought enables the recognition of objective laws

by officers and the creation of the means to develop foresight and the principles of modern military

art. The objective laws of war are actually military trends that develop during a particular historical

context. Each law reflects links and relationships in seclusion from the rest. The first law of

correspondence is between the objectives of war and the means of waging it. The second law of

correspondence is between the material resources of war and the methods of conducting military

actions. The third law is the balance of forces on opposing sides that determines victory or defeat.

[164] It is necessary

To define the elements that make up combat power, the effectiveness of using each of them and

their interaction, calculate the possible change of this balance during military operations, and

determine the ways to create and maintain a balance of forces that would ensure victory. It is

quite clear that this problem necessitates a thorough study of the experience of past wars.[165]

The principles of military art, on the other hand, are general demands made of the conduct of

military operations at a given stage of military science’s development. Gaivoronsky and Galkin state

that the principles consolidate the level of development of military knowledge reached through the

generalization of war experience. However, now the principles of military art can no longer be based

on empirical (observation or experience) evidence alone. Theoretical studies and mathematical
modeling now impact on the principles of military art. Activity is subordinated to subjective goals

which determine the methods and the nature of actions that are chosen. The principles of military art

reflect both the requirements of the objective laws of war and the goals of each of the opposing sides.

The principles are more fluid than the laws of military science. However, the laws of military science

and the principles of military art together determine the general direction of military activity.[166]

The History of Soviet Military Thought

I.A. Korotkov’s work canvassed the years 1917 to June of 1941. In the introduction to his book, he

noted how Friedrich Engels had stressed not simply drawing conclusions but rather stressed that

“study is what we need most of all: conclusions—they are nothing without the development of that

which has come to us...”[167] Korotkov underscored the utility of the study of history and, not

unexpectedly, Russian officers today are following this precedent. Whether it be the newspaper

Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) or the journals Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) or VoennoIstoricheskiy Zhurnal (Military Historical Journal), the lessons of history (especially World War II)

are continually used as examples and templates for thought and assessing the contemporary

environment. Lenin believed in the study of historical events from any category of international

affairs. He stated that the entire sum of wealth accumulated under capitalism, to include achievements

in knowledge, culture, and technology, should be turned from a weapon of capitalism to a weapon of

socialism.[168] That is, learn from the past and from others.

Soviet thought was further guided by the Leninist principle of “the necessity of taking into account

the struggle of ideas and views.”[169] It is the role of the history of military thought to uncover the

nature of the struggle of ideas as well as the trends associated with every period of its development.

These trends should lead to the discovery of historical truth and the exact determination of “its place

in the development of military thought during a given period.”[170] Lenin was adamant that historical

worth is judged by what was new in comparison with that offered by prior historical analysis; and

that the sum of facts, not individual facts, mattered most since the latter can lead to subjective

concoctions in place of objective discovery.[171]

Marxist-Leninist Thought

Korotkov gives full credit to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels for creating the theoretical and

methodological bases for Soviet military thought and to Lenin for expanding on their concepts. With

regard to revolutionary thought, Marx and Engels warned that once a revolt begins it is necessary to

act decisively and go on the offensive.[172] New methods of waging war are dependent on new

weapons and on the change in soldier morale inspired by the revolution.[173] Lenin noted that

strategic plans must be firmly rooted in objective conditions and that defensive operations in and of

themselves are not enough for obtaining victory. One must know how to attack but also how to retreat

when necessary. War enlarges the direction of politics that were in place before the war according to

Lenin.[174]

Internal battles took shape within the Red Army at the time of the Russian revolution, however.

Lenin felt that “old specialists” were still inspired by a bourgeois world view and made too many

generalizations and conclusions which went against Engel’s strong reliance on study. The old

specialists thus, in Lenin’s opinion, made many serious errors by not relying on a Marxist-Leninist

methodology. Beginning in 1917 this error was eliminated as military science became firmly based on
Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and society.

Military Doctrine

In Chapter Three of his book, Korotkov outlines what is now the most prominent and important

aspect of Soviet military history today—military doctrine. Korotkov relies on the testimony of the

instigator and proponent of military doctrine, Mikhail V. Frunze, often in his work. Frunze believed

that the communist party had to adopt a unified view on the defense of the country. He stated that

The State must determine ahead of time the character of general, and in particular, military

policy...it must work out and establish a specific plan of general government activities, which

takes into account future confrontations and ensures in advance their success by expediently

using the nation’s energy.[175]

Doctrine was tasked to provide common views on the nature of the mission of military activities

and how to accomplish them. It was the responsibility of the political leadership to develop both

general and military policy and thereby establish a single national defense plan. Frunze defined a

unified military doctrine in the following way:

The doctrine, adopted by the army of a given state, which establishes the character of the

development of the Armed Forces of the country, the methods of military training of the force,

their leadership based on prevailing national views concerning the nature of the missions that

lay before them, and the methods to accomplish them, which stem from the class nature of the

state and are determined by the level of development of the productive forces of the country.

[176]

Korotkov notes that Frunze’s principles have kept their value and that the political leadership even

today provides a general direction to military doctrine. From these doctrinal principles the problems

associated with military theory are examined as well as an investigation of new developments in

military affairs. New adversaries, new developments in science and technology, and changes in

international affairs (for example, new economic developments in some countries) all threatened the

Soviet Union at the time. These same issues are confronted today.

One of the reasons that military doctrine continues to thrive is the importance attached to it by

Russian officers. Perhaps doctrine’s major proponent is General of the Army Makhmut A. Gareev.

His work M. V. Frunze: Voenny Teoretik (M. V. Frunze: Military Theoretician) was a classic Soviet

book of the mid-1980s. Gareev clearly has followed the thoughts of Frunze. He lectures and writes

often on the importance of military science, history, and military doctrine (Gareev truly believes in

the veracity of military science. Trotsky’s belief that there “is no such thing as military science and

there never was” undoubtedly drove Gareev even closer to Frunze’s way of thinking). Undoubtedly he

remains an important intellectual figure in Russia even though he is in his mid-80s. One of Gareev’s

recent articles in Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) discussed three issues, the relationship between

politics and military strategy (the essence of a unified military doctrine), the importance of

forecasting the nature of future war, and the importance of the proper use of history, all aspects of

Korotkov’s work.
Value of the General Staf , Noted Soviet Theoreticians Criticized

Korotkov wrote that V. M. Shaposhnikov’s work The Brain of the Army promoted the unification

of training for the country’s defense, the development of an organization dedicated to militaryscientific work, and a focus on understanding of military history. The organization in question here

dedicated to military-scientific work was the Soviet General Staff. Korotkov wrote that this was the

correct decision to make since such a military organization could develop a wide range of questions

for the government regarding the preparation of the state for defensive activities.

Korotkov also criticized some of the Soviet era’s most prominent theoreticians. Foremost among

them is the noted strategist A. A. Svechin. Svechin was severely chastised for using the works of

Germans L. Ranke and G. Delbruck for his study of history and military history. Never once did he

mention the works of Friedrich Engels, Vladimir I. Lenin, or F. Mering regarding military history or

military art. Nor was there any mention of the historical works of Marx or any criticism of the

methodology of bourgeois historical science. Svechin was further criticized for not investigating the

question of the class nature of an army, its origin, its social character, and the contradictions inside

the army.[177]

Conclusion

It is not unusual to find many of the items discussed above reflected in the contemporary writings

of Russian military officers. For example, historical lessons learned, foresight, the initial period of

war, and other such issues are regularly discussed. General of the Army Makhmut Gareev is perhaps

the most well-known Russian officer who integrates historical and contemporary lessons learned into

forecasts of future war that are laced with warning signs. The military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda

(Red Star) and the journal Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) are two publications that often contain

such thoughts from Gareev. Colonel S. G. Chekinov, writing in issue seven of the 2010 series of

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), offered an excellent example of military thinking that took into

consideration several items from the culture of military thought. His article on “Forecasting

Tendencies in Military Art at the Initial Period of the Twenty-First Century” discussed cognition,

foresight and forecasting, and the art of war among other issues.

The Culture of Military Thought noted that practical and cognitive experiences are required for an

officer to be a good leader and commander. The authors stated strongly that

The most important prerequisite of the culture of a thought process is knowing the essence of

the processes of that reality in which both practical and cognitive activity take place.

Experience-based knowledge usually answers the question how should one act, while success

also calls for knowledge of why that way and not otherwise. It is theory that must make up for

this limitation of experience.[178]

For a Russian officer, military activity is based on knowledge, biological and social attributes,

and physical and spiritual capabilities. However, Russian officers only now are beginning to develop

and simulate human science. This endeavor is creating the material and spiritual prerequisites that

will influence the initiative and activity of officer cadres. Man acts out of military honor and military

duty as motivating factors but he also acts in keeping with his personal interests. It is necessary for

Russian scientists to provide the conditions that allow for harmoniously combining personal interest
with those of the collective. In this manner an officer’s culture is formed and perfected in accordance

with the social and military challenges confronting Russia and its Armed Forces.[179]

Many of the ideas that Gaivoronsky and Galkin expressed are important for the new generation of

officers in Russia. They adequately express Russia’s desire to create officers who think on their feet

and are adept at viewing a situation from new angles. The discussion in The Culture of Military

Thought is indicative of this with its focus on creativity, initiative, foresight, concepts, objectivesubjective considerations, and the unification of logic and the unconscious that hopefully results in an

epiphany of some sort.

The History of Military Thought suggests that constant study is of the utmost importance to Russian

officers. Soviet authors were directed to study historical lessons learned and remain vigilant. The

study of history was listed as a priority for understanding what is required of an officer if the latter is

to understand his or her operational environment. Soviet officers, as are officers today, were asked

to focus on military doctrine as the vehicle for understanding the close connection between military

policy and military theory. Officers were also reminded of the necessity to learn the principles of

Marxism-Leninism in order to have the capability to peer into the future.

Soviet officers were instructed that a close study of military technology was a requirement. Only

through such study can officers understand the importance of technology’s impact on military affairs

and correctly predict future tendencies and potential consequences (both good and bad). Once the

means and methods of present day struggles are understood, politicians can then rely on officers to

help define the direction of the application of technology as well as its possible use in war.

In short, these two books offer an interesting glimpse into the thought processes of Soviet and most

likely now Russian officers. These thoughts resemble those of their US counterparts but differ in

degrees of emphasis and of course context. Russian officers have more time to contemplate various

ways to apply new technologies and theories in modern warfare than US officers mainly due to the

persistent deployments of the latter. The culture of military thought associated with Russian military

theory promises to deliver new and varied applications of the use of force in the future.
CHAPTER FOUR: RUSSIA’S OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Geopolitical status: a nation’s place in the system of international relations based on its geopolitical

position and ability to actualize its national interests.[180]

Geostrategy: the future path to be taken by a government to actualize a country’s geopolitical interests

in the world space.[181]

Introduction

The United State’s Army’s Training and Doctrine Command defines the operational environment as

the “composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of

capabilities and bear on the decision of commanders.”[182]

Russia does not use the term “operating environment” in its military lexicon. However, Russia’s

national security strategy and military doctrine present plenty of clues that offer a picture of this

concept “by implication” for Westerners. The discussion in these documents of the trends, dangers,

and threats to Russia’s security comprise the key components that appear to shape the conditions,

circumstances, and influences affecting the employment of Russia’s military power. For the most part,

this employment of power is applied regionally. Russia is gaining strength through its international

alliances such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization but it still lacks the power to assert itself

globally. In fact, some Russians consider Russia a regional power.

This chapter first examines Russia’s concept of military policy and the functions it is designed to

perform. It then examines Russia’s national security strategy and military doctrine plus the writings of

several Russian military experts who project the form of the future military environment. The chapter

exposes some crucial elements of concern to Russia about its future operational environment, an

environment that the Russians classify as geostrategic or geopolitical. The chapter closes by

examining a specific area of concern to Russian security specialists, the Arctic.

Russia’s Military Policy

According to the 1986 Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary),

military policy is based on: an evaluation of one’s own assets and resources and those of potential

adversaries; the potential that comprises a country’s military might; and the factors determining the

course and outcome of war. Military policy is embodied in a country’s military doctrine, military

strategy, and military organizational development.[183] The term did not appear in the 2007 Voennyy

Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary).

However, it is apparent that the term is still in use. In a 2008 article in Vestnik Akademii Voennykh

Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), Lieutenant General V. S. Voloshko (retired) and

Colonel V. I. Lutovinov, wrote that Russian Federation military policy is designed to perform two

basic functions. The first function includes elaborating the National Security Concept, Military

Doctrine, and the Fundamentals of Russian Federation State Policy for Military Development to

establish: the principles of Armed Forces development; plans to equip the army and navy, and

training and rational use of personnel; greater mobilization capability of the state; better reserve
training and mobilization deployment; the guidelines for military reform; ongoing analysis and

forecast of the military-political situation; drawing up of military policy proposals for the militarypolitical leadership; and information support of plans and decisions.[184]

The second function includes: managing military development as a whole and Armed Forces

development in particular; developing military-economic, social, political, demographic and spiritual

potential for the good of the country’s defense; managing military-political relations with other states

(coalitions), armies and subjects of military policy; directing military-political actions using military

force within and outside the country; coordinating the activity of all military institutions; fostering in

the Armed Forces and the entire population a spirit of patriotism and fidelity to duty, and reliably

defending the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.[185]

The following comprise Russia’s chief military policy objectives:

· Substantiate and work up military-political solutions and prepare concrete plans for the

functioning and development of the military system since the external and domestic militarypolitical situation is subject to continual changes that affect national interests and require a

timely decision and response;

· Manage military-political relations with other countries, coalitions, and blocs, primarily

through diplomacy over border issues, arms reduction talks, military cooperation, and dialog

with military-political blocs (alliances)/countries;

· Frame a military doctrine that defines the bases of the country’s military and political

activity;

· Organize information support for decision making, plans, and military actions;

· Safeguard Russia’s independence, ensure its security and sovereignty, the inviolability of its

borders and territorial integrity, and deter wars;

· Maintain the country’s defense potential at a level adequate to existing and potential military

threats, to include socio-economic and financial capabilities.[186]

Exactly who performs the function of writing military policy is unknown. Perhaps the function is

performed by a host of analysts within the Kremlin, supported by the collective research effort of

several think tanks in Russia. It is clear, however, that military policy is the leading document that

guides Russia’s national security strategy and military doctrine from the political level.

The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy until 2020[187]

The Russian National Security Strategy of May 2009 offers a forecast of the elements of concern to

Russia’s future operating environment. A list of national priorities is the main item shaping this

forecast. These priorities help define the emerging political, social, military, and economic

transformation of Russia, a transformation designed to ensure the country’s security, stable

development, and preservation of its territory and sovereignty. The list is short and predictable:

ensure that the constitutional rights and freedoms of Russia’s citizens can be exercised; and ensure

that the stable socioeconomic development of the country, the defense of Russia’s sovereignty, and the

independence and territorial integrity of Russia are realized. The strategy lists these priorities in

more detail as follows:
· The enhancement of Russian citizens’ quality of life by providing guarantees of individual

security and also high standards of sustenance

· The assurance of economic growth, achieved first of all through the development of a

national innovation system and investments in human capital

· The development of science, technology, education, healthcare, and culture, designed by

strengthening the state’s role and improving the state-private partnership

· The development of the ecology of living systems and rational environmental management,

maintained through balanced consumption, the development of advanced technologies, and

the efficient reproduction of the country’s natural resource potential

· The maintenance of strategic stability and equal strategic partnership, consolidated on the

basis of Russia’s active participation in the development of a multipolar world order model

The strategy’s primary task is to form and maintain domestic and foreign conditions favorable to

the implementation of these national priorities. The tools to form foreign conditions include

technologies used in the national security system such as software and telecommunication channels;

and linguistic, legal, and organizational elements. These tools help shape foreign conditions.

The security strategy identified numerous trends of significance. Primary among them was global

competition over “values and models of development.” These models attempt to exploit the slow

pace of development in some areas of the world (that is, they try to take advantage of contradictions

related to the uneven progress being made in some countries due to lack of infrastructure, etc.). A

second trend is the search for “resolving problems and settling crisis situations on a regional basis”

without the participation of non-regional forces. A third trend is the “threat to international security

from the inadequacy of the existing global and regional architecture” which is oriented only on the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A fourth trend is, in the opinion of Russian security

specialists, the “increase in the vulnerability of all members of the international community to new

challenges and threats.” A final trend is the “transition from block confrontation to multi-vector

diplomacy.”

Some rather significant areas are discernable in these five trends for Russia’s national security

strategy. These areas include the following:

· A negative impact on Russia’s national interests will be caused by (1) the probable

recurrence of unilateral approaches involving the use of force in international relations, (2)

contradictions among the primary participants in world politics, (3) the threat of the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the possibility that they will end up in the

hands of terrorists, and (4) sophisticated forms of illegal activity in the cybernetic and

biological spheres and in high technology spheres.

· The global information confrontation will increase.

· Threats to the stability of the world’s industrialized and developing states and to their

socioeconomic development and democratic institutions will grow. A financial-economic

crisis could prove to be as damaging as a large-scale deployment of military force.

· Nationalist sentiments, xenophobia, separatism, and violent extremism (notably employing
the slogans of religious radicalism) will increase.

· The world’s demographic situation and environmental problems will worsen and the threats

associated with uncontrolled and illegal migration, drug and human trafficking, and other

forms of transnational organized crime will increase.

· The proliferation of epidemics caused by previously unknown viruses is probable. Fresh

water shortages will grow.

· The longer-term focus of international politics will concentrate on the possession of energy

resources, notably in the Middle East, on the Barents Sea shelf and other areas of the Arctic,

in the Caspian Sea Basin, and in Central Asia.

· The crucial state of the physical safekeeping of dangerous materials and facilities in areas

with unstable political situations must be continuously monitored.

· The competitive search for resources does not exclude the use of force.

· Stability will be lessened if US missiles are deployed in Europe.

To counter these trends, Russia intends to work closely with a host of organizations. The strategy

states that Russia will increase its cooperation with the Group of Eight, the Group of Twenty, the RIC

(Russia-India-China), and the BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China). It will promote the strengthening of

the Eurasian Economic Community and it will rely on the Collective Security Treaty Organization to

serve as a main firewall to combat illegal drug trafficking. Russia will work to strengthen the

political potential of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the mechanisms of cooperation with

the European Union. Finally, the national security strategy states that Russia will “strive to establish

an equal and full-fledged strategic partnership with the United States of America.” Russia’s work in

cooperation with NATO over the past fifteen years was not mentioned.

The primary task for strengthening Russia’s national defense was defined as the transition to a

qualitatively ‘new look’ for the Russian armed forces. This force must be able to adhere to a strategic

goal of preventing global and regional wars, apparently through the use of two principles: strategic

deterrence and rational sufficiency. Strategic deterrence would be implemented via an integrated set

of political, diplomatic, military, economic, information, and other measures that deter aggressors.

Rational sufficiency and effectiveness would be implemented via the use of methods of non-military

responses, the use of public diplomacy and peacekeeping, and international military cooperation.

Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov’s reform efforts appear to be following these principles.

Threats to military security in the national security strategy included the following:

· The policy of some foreign countries to achieve overwhelming supremacy in the military

sphere, especially in strategic nuclear forces; the development of precision-guided weapons;

information; and other high-tech means.

· Strategic weapons with non-nuclear warheads.

· Unilateral deployments of a global missile defense system.

· The militarization of near-Earth space.

· The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological technologies and their delivery

systems.
There is also a fear expressed in the national security strategy that certain issues (loss of

resources, crises in the financial world, etc.) could increase Russia’s dependence on external factors.

Such dependence would increase Russia’s strategic risks and cause uncertainty and perhaps even

temporary instability in the Russian system.

Diplomatically, the strategy notes that Russian foreign policy aims to create conditions of equal

security for all nations. This policy will ensure stability, predictability, nonmilitary methods, and

other positive security enhancements. The government, on the other hand, will draw up a system of

strategic planning documents to help defend national interests. These documents include The Russian

Federation Long-Term Socioeconomic Development Blueprint; development strategies for individual

sectors of the economy and federal districts; and development strategies and federally targeted

programs for the state defense order, blueprints, doctrines, and primary directions of state policy in

the national security sphere.

Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine[188]

Russia’s military doctrine was published closely on the heels of the country’s national security

strategy, appearing just nine months later in February of 2010. It used many of the concepts found in

the national security strategy. For example, the doctrine noted that “the existing international security

architecture...does not ensure equal security for all states.”

TRADOC’s analysis of the operational environment until 2025 contained an analysis of drivers

and trends. The eight trends were globalization and economics; culture and ideology; information;

demographics; weapons of mass destruction; science and technology; resources; and military.

Russia’s military doctrine examined dangers and threats that, in some cases, are very similar to

TRADOC’s trends.

Operational environment “dangers” (an aggregate of factors capable under certain conditions of

leading to a military threat) included the following:

· An expansion of NATO closer to Russia’s border

· Attempts to undermine strategic stability

· Deploying troops in states contiguous to Russia’s borders

· Deploying strategic missile defense systems that violate the correlation of forces in the

nuclear-missile sphere

· Territorial claims against Russia

· Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

· Violation of international accords by individual states

· Use of military force on territories contiguous with Russia

· Presence of seats of armed conflict on territories contiguous with Russia

· Spread of international terrorism

· Emergence of interethnic tension on Russia’s borders and the growth of separatism and

violent extremism in the world

Border issues were either mentioned or implied in at least five of the eleven categories. Perhaps
for this reason Russia decided to implement a system of four military districts and four strategic

commands instead of six military districts.

Operational environment “threats” (real possibility of the outbreak of a military conflict between

opposing sides involving the use of military force) include the following:

· Drastic decline in the military-political situation and the creation of conditions for the use of

military force

· Attempts to impede the operation of systems of state and military command and control of the

Russian Federation

· A show of military force with provocative objectives in the course of exercises on areas

contiguous with Russia’s borders

· The partial or complete mobilization and transitioning of the organs of individual states and

their military’s command and control to wartime operating conditions

A discussion of the features of modern day military conflicts was included in the 2010 military

doctrine. It offered another look at the conditions affecting the employment of military force. The

doctrine noted that military conflicts are unpredictable, include a broad range of military-political

and other objectives, involve highly effective weapon systems, and are marked by the use of

information warfare means that seek to achieve political objectives without the utilization of military

force. Decisive factors in the doctrine that are bound to impact a commander’s decisions include the

new-found speed of high level target destruction, the importance of possessing the strategic initiative,

the requirement to preserve both the state’s and the military’s command and control apparatus, and the

ability to secure supremacy in all warfare domains.

Russia’s military doctrine stated that the structure, composition, and strength of its armed forces

would be brought into line with several factors. These factors included military threats that can be

predicted; the projected content and nature of military conflicts; and the planning mechanisms for

current and long-term tasks (peacetime, times of the direct threat of aggression, and wartime).

One indication of this organizational change is that the existing six military districts were merged

into four military districts and four joint strategic commands. This action was signed by President

Medvedev on 14 July 2010. The same decree created a unified logistical system as well.

Commanders will exercise control over all forces (Navy, Air Force, Air Defense, Army) under their

strategic command. The new strategic command headquarters will be located in St. Petersburg

(Western Operational Strategic Command), Yekaterinburg (Central Operational Strategic Command),

Rostov-on-Don (Southern Operational Strategic Command), and Khabarovsk (Eastern Operational

Strategic Command). Russia’s strategic nuclear forces were left under central control. Commanders

of the four districts in July 2010 were: Western Military District, Colonel-General Arkady Bakhin;

Southern Military District, Lieutenant-General Alexander Galkin; Eastern Military District, Admiral

Konstantin Sidenko; and the Central Military District, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Chirkin.[189]

It is clear how these commands are arranged. The Western Command is oriented against NATO

and, due to its basing in St. Petersburg, is probably oriented to enhance Russia’s position and

influence in the Arctic (discussed in detail below). The Southern Command is oriented against the
Caucasus, Iran, and perhaps Georgia. The Central Command is oriented against Central Asia and the

drug trafficking and extremism there. The Eastern Command is oriented against China, Japan, and

Korea. Those elements that remain subordinate to the Defense Ministry (strategic nuclear forces,

space troops, strategic aviation, etc.) are oriented more globally. It is somewhat strange that these

components are not consolidated into a fifth strategic command (call it Space Command) with a

headquarters in Moscow. Air Force Commander Colonel General Alexander Zelin noted in August

2010 that Russia is developing an aircraft for use in outer space. Thus it should come as no surprise if

the space above Russia someday becomes another operational strategic command with global

implications.[190]

Command and control appears to have been enhanced with the operational strategic command

arrangement. Now all security forces in a region (border troops, Internal Affairs troops, etc.) are

under the same commanders.

(See Regional Military Command map below)

**This image was taken from the RIA-NOVOSTI website, Russia’s official news agency.

Examples of Russian Thought on the Geostrategic Environment

In a late 2010 interview, General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov noted that the main vector of

concern to Russia is now the southeast, as the near East and Central Asia are the most dangerous and

conflict-prone regions near Russia.[191] Earlier in 2010, in a speech at the Academy of Military

Science,

Makarov provided a diagram of the main threats that are shaping Russia’s geostrategic environment

(Figure 1 follows.This image was taken from the No. 2 2010 issue of Vestnik Akademii Voyennykh

Nauk [Bulletin of the Academy of Military Sciences], p. 18):
Makarov did not provide any special commentary directed toward the diagram.

Russian Colonel A. Yu. Maruyev provided another example of Russia’s interest in the geostrategic

environment. Writing in a 2009 edition of the Bulletin of the Academy of Military Sciences, he

discussed the concepts of geopolitics, geostrategy, and geoadversaries. His thoughts are anti-US. It is

not clear if Maruyev speaks for the majority of the members of the Academy nor if his thoughts are

indicative of the way in which Russia’s leadership thinks. However, his article is insightful since

several Russian military and diplomatic analysts (retired General Leonid Ivashov, Diplomatic Dean

Igor Panarin, etc.) have similar anti-US thoughts.

Maruyev defined geopolitical status as “a nation’s place in the system of international relations

based on its geopolitical position and ability to actualize its national interests.”[192] Russia is now a

regional power in Maruyev’s opinion since it has not yet attained a substantial position in the world.

This ranking implies that Russia must formulate a geostrategy to enable it to compete in the

international arena in all fields while defending its core interests.[193]

Geostrategy is defined as “the future path to be taken by a government to actualize a country’s

geopolitical interests in the world space.”[194] Several variants for framing a geostrategy were

offered:
1. The revenge concept. Under this concept, Russia supports anti-Western states and forces the

CIS into rapprochement with Russia.

2. The “new isolationist” school. This concept advocates greater authoritarianism.

3. The “voluntary submission” school. This concept advocates Russia following the West

unquestioningly.

4. The “balance” proposal. This concept proposes shaping Russia’s geostrategy through the

selective choice of its partners on a particular issue.

5. The “strategic deterrence” proposal. This concept, supported by Army General Makhmut

Gareev, President of the Academy of Military Science, supports a strategy composed of a

series of interconnected political, diplomatic, information, economic, military , and other

measures aimed at deterring, reducing, and preventing threats and aggressive actions by

other states.

6. The “multipolar” proposal. This concept is the official policy of Russia at the present time

and envisions Russia pursuing a strategy of shaping a multipolar system of international

relations.[195]

Maruyev then goes on to advocates the development of Russian “geopolitical focus principles,”

principles that focus on the US as the primary adversary (although the US is a country that Russia can

work with, he adds!). Geopolitical adversaries are “foreign political regimes and international

entities whose goal is to weaken the Russian Federation’s position in the world arena and which also

pursue a policy of determining the political, economic, cultural, and other bases of the Russian state

and its allies.”[196]

Maruyev states that Russia’s strategic directions of Russia’s policy must be able to defend its

interests and be actualized through strategic management of its geopolitical interests. Russia’s

strategy determines first what path the political leadership chooses to accomplish its objectives;

second, what limitations result from the organizational features that delineate strategic choices; and

finally what kind of state the political elite and citizens what to have.[197]

Cooperation is possible if the US takes into consideration Russia’s interests. Maruyev, however,

simultaneously shows another side of Russian strategy in the article, a side that has always resulted in

mistrust and trouble for Russia among the US and its partners. Maruyev states the following:

For Russia a good scenario is for Moscow to officially cooperate with Washington in areas of

mutual interest, while in reality pursuing a policy of preventing a further major strengthening of

the United States in the world arena and neutralizing security threats to Russia on the part of the

US.[198]

Maruyev then proposes adopting the “vector principle” for neutralizing national security threats to

Russia emanating from the US. These vectors line up with Russia’s regional commands highlighted

above. He advocates westerly, easterly, northern, and southern vector directions. Russia’s western

geostrategy should prevent a stronger united Western front that can weaken Russia. Russia should

seek out European countries (on a bilateral basis) whose interests differ from those of the US and

exacerbate conflicts over the future of NATO.[199]
In the easterly direction, Russia should counter the US’s penetration into Central Asian republics

that threaten Russia’s national security. The US’s plan is to join the Central Asian region to

Afghanistan and then integrate all of this space with the Middle East through the Caucasus-Caspian

region. In this case Maruyev’s focus on the US seems to be fostering some truly unrealistic scenarios.

[200]

In the northerly direction, Maruyev believes the Arctic is now a zone of conflict for strategic

interests (see section below, “Russia’s Arctic Policy,” for a description of Russia’s interest in the

Arctic). Energy deficits and global warming make this an area of intense interest for resources and

transportation routes. Infrastructure projects also have great potential. Here Russia must modernize its

economic and military infrastructure to safeguard Russia’s geopolitical interests. Maruyev notes that

President Medvedev stated that turning the Arctic into a resource base for twenty-first century Russia

is “our first and chief objective.” Russia must take off the table any plans to redraw Russia’s borders

or removing Russian forces from the area. It must also prevent foreign nations from strengthening its

position to the detriment of Russia’s economic interests.[201]

Finally, in the southerly direction, Russia again is faced with US plans to capture energy projects

in the Caspian region. Russia for its part must improve relations with Armenia and warn Azerbaijan

that Baku’s Western orientation is not going to pay dividends in the future since the US and its Western

partners are only pursuing their own objective in the region. Maruyev closed his article noting that

“the USA’s desire to preserve its sole superpower status, and Russia’s intention to champion its

geopolitical interests, portend a complicated period in Russian-American relations.”[202]

Russia’s Arctic Policy

Russian leaders appear to consider the Arctic region to be of major importance in their assessment

of the operational environment. They are making an all-out rush to gain influence if not control over

the region.

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has demonstrated his personal interest in the region by taking part

in an International Arctic Forum in Moscow in September 2010 (Putin also participated in the

Interregional Conference “The Development of the Far East, 2010-2012” in December 2010). He is

not the only Russian leader with an interest in the Arctic. Foreign Ministry officials in September

2008 developed the “Basic Principles of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Arctic for the

Period Up to 2020 and Beyond.” The policy is designed to support other organizations and

agreements already in place, such as the Arctic Council (the Arctic Five are Russia, Canada,

Denmark, Norway, and the United States), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Barents

Regional Council (BRC), and the Arctic Economic Forum. The military has not been left in the wake

of these diplomatic maneuvers either, keeping pace with numerous articles in their journals. The

military-industrial complex’s journal Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kur’er (Military-Industrial Courier),

the army’s Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) and Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), and the Navy’s

Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest) all have carried several articles on the topic. Perhaps of even

greater importance, a special Arctic satellite monitoring system known as Arktika Space System is

under development according to the Federal Space Agency of Russia. The system will help ensure

safe flight operations, effective navigation, and precise weather information for the Arctic.
Prime Minister Putin outlined Russia’s priorities in the Arctic in his address in September 2010 at

the Arctic Forum in Moscow. He stated that the creation of decent living conditions for people of the

Arctic, to include taking into consideration their traditions and economic realities, is his first priority.

His second priority is to support new zones of economic growth and to attract to the region new

sectors of business and investment, both foreign and domestic. Finally, he saw as another priority a

major investment in the scientific nature of the region’s conservation infrastructure.[203]

The Foreign Ministry’s September document titled “Basic Principles of the Russian Federation’s

State Policy in the Arctic for the Period Up to 2020 and Beyond” served as an example of how

Russia is adapting to its emerging operational environment. Specifically, the document describes the

conditions, circumstances, and influences that are calling for the deployment of military capabilities

to the region. The document noted that a national interest was at stake, namely the use of the Arctic

zone as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation in support of accomplishing

socioeconomic tasks of the country. In that regard, a chief objective of the policy was noted as

follows:

In the sphere of military security and protection and security of the state border of the Russian

Federation lying in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation [a priority is] providing favorable

operational conditions in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, to include maintaining the

necessary combat potential of groupings of general-purpose troops (forces) of the Armed

Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military force elements, and agencies in this

region.[204]

The policy’s principal military and security tasks to be accomplished include the following: the

establishment and provision military security under various conditions; the optimization of a system

of integrated environmental monitoring in the Arctic; the development of border agency capabilities

in line with the threats and challenges of the Arctic; the creation of an actively functioning coast guard

system to fight terrorism at sea, stop smuggling, and guard aquatic biological resources; the

development of a border infrastructure and the technical equipping of border agencies; and the

creation of a system of integrated surface monitoring.[205]

For the military, the journal Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest) has been particularly focused on the

region and the number of articles the journal carries has gradually increased. For example, the July

2010 edition published articles on “The Restoration of Control over the Air and Surface Situation in

the Arctic—The Most Important Mission of Russia” and “The Arctic 2010: Military, Political,

Transport, and Other Arctic Factors.”[206] The August 2010 edition of Morskoy Sbornik (Naval

Digest) carried three articles. They were “Ensuring the National Security of Russia Near the Border

Space of the Arctic;” “The Arctic as an Important Direction for Russia’s Naval Activity;” and “The

Strategic Development of Russia’s Arctic Zone.”[207] The September 2010 issue of Morskoy

Sbornik (Naval Digest) carried five articles on the topic. They were:

· “It is Time to Revive an Interest in the Arctic in Russia” (lead article)

· “The Geopolitical Foundations of Russia’s Regional Presence in the Arctic”

· “The Strengthening of Russia’s Economic Position in the Aquatic Region of the Arctic under

Conditions of Growing Global Contradictions”
· “The Hydrocarbon Riches of the Arctic and Russia’s Geophysical Fleet: Its State and

Perspectives”

· “The Modernization of Russia and the Preparation of Personnel for Work in the

Arctic”[208]

Two of these articles (the July issue’s “Arctic 2010: Military, Political, Transport, and Other Arctic

Factors” and the August issue’s “The Strategic Development of Russia’s Arctic Zone”) will be

examined in more detail.

In the July 2010 article, author A. Smolovsky writes that global climate change has caused more

interest in the area as sea lanes have opened and energy resources have become more accessible.

President Dmitriy Medvedev has stated “No one (no matter who) is allowed to restrict Russia’s

access to mining in the Arctic, where more than 25% of the world’s oil and gas reserves are

located”[209] indicating Russia’s focus on this area is profound. Smolovsky adds that the Russian

Security Council’s Arctic Policy’s key point is “creating a general purpose force of the armed forces,

other troops, military units, and bodies in Russia’s Arctic zone capable of assuring military security

in the fluid military and political situation.”[210] Simultaneously, Smolovsky writes that the Deputy

Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Vladimir Nazarov, says Russia is against militarization of the

Arctic and for delimiting the area pursuant to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea.[211] It is hard to understand how these two concepts will not be in constant tension with one

another.

The second article, by A. Konovalov, opens with a short paragraph describing the importance of

the Arctic from a resource standpoint. The author notes:

The Russian Federation’s Arctic Zone (RFAZ) has enormous reserves of platinum group metals,

nickel, cobalt, copper, and virtually all explored Russian deposits of titanium, tin, kohl, apatite,

phlogopite, vermiculite, barite, and others. The region contains 90% of Russian reserves of

gold, diamonds, and many other minerals that are strategically important for the country.

[212]

Konovalov adds that the area produces 80% of Russia’s natural gas and the areas bio-resources

place it only behind the Far East for food products. It is in the Arctic that “national security and socio

economic development are linked.”[213] It is an area of undeveloped transport routes that must be

developed to increase the ability to increase Russian business and infrastructure development. This

will allow for more diversification of Russian products and will result in an increase in Russian

shipbuilding and perhaps even in tourism and summertime recreation. Morskoy Sbornik’s (Naval

Digest) interest in the topic is not diminishing. The lead article of the journal’s first edition in 2011 is

titled “National Maritime Policy in the Arctic and Military Security.”

The Army also has written on Russia’s Arctic policy. Major General V. I. Sosnin, for example,

described the Arctic as a complex knot of interstate differences. He states that the Northern Sea Route

or NSR is Russia’s strategic water lane. It supplies the country’s northernmost areas with what they

need throughout the year and is operated to develop the region’s natural resources. Building

modernized icebreakers would enable navigation and defense prospects. Russia recently announced
the development of an atomic icebreaker, perhaps with the Arctic in mind.[214] Sosnin, in his

conclusions, states that Russia will be forced to make “real moves, including moves of a military

nature, to back up its serious intentions to protect its national interests” in the Arctic.[215]

Alexander Khramchikhin, a deputy director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis,

wrote that the military balance in the Arctic is represented by the Arctic Five: Russia, Canada,

Norway, Denmark, and the US. He discussed the different manner in which each nation wants to

divide up the Arctic region. For Russia he stated the following:

Moscow advocates running the borders of Arctic holdings of polar states along meridians from

the outermost points of their coastlines to the “top” of the Earth, where the borders of all

sectors converge. With that version a large part of the Arctic Ocean ends up being Russian. The

Russian Federation considers the Northern Sea Route to be its own internal waters.[216]

If this concept eventually becomes the Russian position, then the international community will

strongly contest Russia’s plans for the region. Today, various countries are conducting naval aviation

patrols of the region and there is talk of establishing an armed forces grouping in the region. These

unresolved issues may turn out to be very contentious or even dangerous for the Arctic in general.

Meanwhile, Russia continues its exploration of the Arctic. A marine expedition returned to Russia

on 14 October 2010 after 90 days at sea. Seventy-five days were spent substantiating outside

boundaries of the Russian continental shelf. Their research indicated that at the end of 2013 Russia

will be ready to submit an application requesting the expansion of its continental shelf in the Arctic.

[217] Russia’s first application was rejected by the UN due to insufficient evidence which the latest

expedition seems intent on supplying. Simultaneously Russia is working on an Antarctic strategy for

its development.[218]

The Thoughts of Russian Military Experts on the OE

In 2008 Dr. Vitaliy Shlykov served as the Chairman of the Commission on Security Policy and

Evaluation of Defense Legislation for the Public Council of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Dr.

Shlykov is a renowned expert on Russian military matters, especially the military-industrial complex.

Writing on the military-political situation in and around Russian until 2025 he noted:

Of course, this environment is not cloudless. There exists a possibility of armed conflicts

breaking out near Russian borders and the danger of getting involved in them. Failure to resolve

the problem of ‘unrecognized states’ can provoke crises around them, especially in the North

Caucasus and may even force Russian troops into the territories of these ‘states.’ Amidst the

ongoing rise of Islamic extremism Russia could witness serious instability in Central Asia.

NATO’s further eastward expansion to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia may provoke a new

Cold War and prod Russia to start reorienting its military-industrial complex to confrontation

with the West again.[219]

Russian experts also focus on other areas of concern: Pakistan due to its rogue character; North

Korea due to its apparent desire to use missiles; Iranian attempts to get the bomb, which could cause

an Israeli preemptive move against Iran; the increasing difficulty associated with deterring Beijing;
and other experts still envision a potential conflict with the US. Due to China’s proximity to Russia,

however, many military experts still think that a conflict with China is more likely than war with the

US. Perhaps most important, many Russian experts believe that the era of US domination is over and

that the world is returning to great power rivalries and the consequent struggle for influence.

Conclusions

Russia does not have an operational environment concept. However, elements extracted from its

national security strategy and military doctrine somewhat fit nicely into the US concept and

understanding of an operational environment. They offer a fairly accurate glimpse into the concerns

and focus of the Russian military in the years ahead.

It is apparent from the documents that NATO remains a concern for Russia. This reluctance to

partner with NATO remains even after years of working together to include the basing of a Russian

contingent at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, for the

purpose of coordinating efforts involving Russian military participation in Stabilization Force

(SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) operations; and the basing of a Russian diplomat at NATO

headquarters. Instead, based on understandable historical border concerns, Russia worries that

“NATO creep” to its borders endangers instead of lessening its security and continues to minimize

Russia’s influence in the global strategic security arena. As long as Russia continues to be suspicious

of NATO’s rational for existing, Russian anxiety will continue to evolve and push back at every

NATO (read US-backed) endeavor. Russia also believes that NATO influence blocks their arms

export opportunities.

Unilateral actions of the US are a concern to Russia. The primary concern remains the potential

deployment of US missiles in Poland. US activities in space, however, are becoming equally as

disconcerting. The issue at stake is that the US is a global power interested in securing its own

priorities and interests while Russia, at the moment, is more focused on regional concerns. Hopefully

both sides will talk through these issues.

The focus of the security strategy of Russia and much of its military doctrine remain entrenched in

the wording and concepts that are carry-overs from the Soviet era. These terms include equal

security, strategic deterrence, rational sufficiency, and even correlation of forces. These are not

necessarily negatives but rather the method through which the Russian national security establishment

appears to measure its strategic stability. US should keep these concepts in mind as they weigh

Russian concerns for these may be the very goals Russia is trying to achieve.

A point of concern in this regard (strategic stability) is the reference to external factors beyond the

control of Russia that could affect Russia’s operational environment. Such issues as the loss of access

to key energy or material resources or unpredicted crises in the financial world could increase

Russia’s strategic risks and introduce the uncertainty and perhaps even temporary instability that

Russian planners attempt to avoid.

Regardless, the national security strategy and military doctrine of Russia serve as key components

in establishing the outline of the operational environment before Russia as it strives to regain its

former place in the world system. Russia’s national security system is composed of critical and
creative thinkers who are working hard to accomplish this endeavor.

PART TWO: TECHNOLOGY
CHAPTER FIVE: RUSSIA AND MILITARYDECEPTION

In today’s conditions the armies of the world’s leading states stand on the threshold of a

qualitative leap in the use of military cunning. It derives above all from the development and

implementation of advanced space, aviation, computer, and other technologies and the

capabilities in transmitting and receiving information, which have increased many times over.

[220]

Introduction

Military cunning (voennaya khitrost’), according to a former Soviet Chief of the General Staff, is

a term used to describe actions designed to deceive or obtain a specific benefit. It’s essence lies in

operational surprise achieved through secret preparations and the misleading of enemy actions about

those operations. Most important of all, cunning is a “coefficient of strength”—it increases the

strength or power of a person or armed force that uses it, especially if the two sides have equal

capabilities or if one side is much weaker than the other side.[221]

Russian military authors today seldom use the term military cunning to describe deception. They

have preferred, over the years, the terms maskirovka (concealment), obman (deception),

dezinformatsiya (disinformation), and vvedenie v zabluzhdenie (mislead). Many US analysts prefer

to use the term maskirovka (camouflage) to describe Russia’s concept of deception. This preference

is understandable for two reasons. First, this is the term most often encountered in reading older

military journals. There was even a maskirovka school in Russia in 1904. Second, Soviet and now

Russian authors often attribute several meanings to this term such as camouflage, disinformation,

feints, “hide the real situation,” and deceit. With so many definitions attributed to it, maskirovka

appeared to be the proper overall term to use for discussions of deception.

However, the deception concept in Russia has undergone a change. A closer look at publications

such as the journal Military Thought from 1993-2008 indicates that the two Russian terms that

dominate discussions of deception these days are obman (deception) and vvedenie v zabluzhdenie

(mislead). They appear to have replaced the term maskirovka, with the latter now understood to be an

aspect of these two terms. The actual use or application of deception measures is understood to be

“voennaya khitrost’ (military cunning or stratagem).” Yet another popular Russian term that has both

civilian and military use as a manipulator of thought processes is reflexive control. The term

continues to be used for a variety of issues. For example, in the past five years reflexive control has

been involved in discussions of network-centric warfare, information weapons, deterrence theory,

and 21st century tactics.

The US military uses fewer terms to define deception. In its Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms (JP 1-02) deception is defined as follows: “Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by

manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner

prejudicial to the enemy's interests. See also counterdeception; military deception.”[222] Other

deception-related words in JP 1-02 are deception-action; -concept; -course of action; -event; -means;

-objective; -story; and -target.[223] One receives the impression that the Russian term vvedenie v

zabluzhdenie (mislead) is closest to the US definition. However, the US term does not imply that
deception is a coefficient of strength. The US term perception management comes closest to the

Russian concept of reflexive control, although management is a softer term than control.

This chapter will explore the Russian use of deception terminology and techniques, using practical

examples from several conflicts. The discussion begins with a short background explanation of the

term maskirovka from V. A. Matsulenko’s 1975 book titled Operativnaya Maskirovka Voysk (The

Operational Deception of Troops). This short review provides a foundation for the reader as to

maskirovka’s former importance and to the term’s meaning. The discussion then will examine more

recent changes in terminology (the use of obman and vvedenie v zabluzhdenie) through a look at

articles in Military Thought and the views of a former Soviet Chief of the General Staff, General of

the Army Vladimir Nikolaevich Lobov.

The chapter then discusses reflexive control in more detail; examines Russian views on high-tech

camouflage; and concludes with a few examples of deception used in Afghanistan and Chechnya by

Russian forces. A more extensive dictionary examination utilizing Russian and Western sources of the

terms associated with deception is located at Appendix Four.

The overall conclusion one reaches is that deception has undergone a rejuvenation in Russian

military thinking and will be used in an updated form (most likely associated with an informationrelated concept) more often as the 21st century proceeds. The goal, however, remains the same—to

mislead the decision-making of potential opponents or enemies.

The Works of V. A. Matsulenko and US Colonel (Retired) David Glantz

V. A. Matsulenko’s 1975 book titled Operativnaya Maskirovka Voysk (The Operational Deception

of Troops) is about the use of deception in World War II. However, the book’s introduction and

conclusion discuss a definition of deception that is built around the term maskirovka. The lessons one

should draw from the use of deception in WWII are also included.

Matsulenko defined maskirovka as follows:

Maskirovka [deception] is a type of support for combat operations that is designed to conceal

troops and military facilities from enemy intelligence and to mislead him regarding the location,

amount, and composition of forces and the actions and intentions of the troops. It is achieved

through the use of natural and artificial masks, equipment, and periodic changes in the areas

where troops (or naval forces) and command centers are deployed, through feigned movements

and maskirovka actions by units, combined-arms forces and formations, the concealment of

authentic and creation of fake facilities, and the destruction or modification of some of their

external features and characteristics.[224]

Maskirovka is divided into tactical (actions that are carried out among troops by the command and

staffs of combined-arms forces, units and subunits); operational (actions involving the use of

combined-arms forces and units of ground troops, the air force, anti-aircraft defense, and, in maritime

areas, naval forces); and strategic (activities that surreptitiously prepare a strategic operation or

campaign to disorient the enemy regarding the true intentions and actions of the armed forces) actions.

[225]
Matsulenko focused on operational maskirovka in his work. He wrote that operational maskirovka

is used to achieve operational surprise; is designed to disorient the enemy regarding the nature,

concept, scale, and timing of impending combat operations; and is designed to conceal the attack

force of the front and the army from the enemy. Maskirovka methods include providing disinformation

to the enemy and preserving military secrecy and the covert command of troops. A successful

maskirovka operation depends on proper planning that fits a specific situation, implementing the plan

in a timely and efficient manner, having troops adhere to maskirovka measures, and monitoring the

operation continuously. [226]

In World War II, Soviet actions were directed by the 1939 Field Regulations of the RKKA

[Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army] which required commanders to take every measure in any

situation to camouflage unit activities. The regulations required the concealment of real facilities from

reconnaissance and surveillance, the modification of a facility’s appearance, the utilization of

disinformation (fake movements, dissemination of various rumors), and so on.[227]

The Soviet’s World War II experience was that maskirovka contributed to the successful

fulfillment of combat missions in defensive and offensive operations, reduced losses of personnel and

military equipment, and caused the enemy to make erroneous decisions that led him to defeat. To be

effective, maskirovka required efficient organization and planning along with surreptitious actions

that were timely and diverse. Successful maskirovka also required strict adherence to troopcamouflage measures and continuous monitoring on land and from the air. In order to disorient the

enemy, Soviet actions included mimicking the direction of the main attack; creating fake forces and

equipment moving in secondary directions; having fake forces move toward the enemy’s flanks and

rears; creating a fake encirclement of the enemy to demoralize him; demonstrating a movement of fake

columns and forces in order to increase the scale of pursuit and to convince the enemy that his main

forces had been outflanked; concealing authentic and constructing fake facilities; widely using various

maskirovka equipment and topographic features; and carrying out actions to preserve military

secrecy.[228]

With regard to the command and control of maskirovka, the Headquarters of the Supreme

Command and the General Staff offered the centralized direction of operational maskirovka.

Headquarters defined the concept and the front commander decided when and where operational

maskirovka would be conducted. Operational maskirovka in the armies was conducted on orders

from the front commander to a small group of individuals. The front commander’s decision included:

the maskirovka concept of maneuver, the amount of forces and equipment required, the timing for

carrying out the plan, and the procedure for monitoring performance. Combat experience showed that

success in conducting operational maskirovka depended on the initiative and creativity of the

commanders.[229]

The dean of US military writers on Soviet actions in World War II, Colonel (retired) David

Glantz, published a book in 1989 titled Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. He also

used the term maskirovka to convey the concept of deception and defined it in the following way:

The means of securing combat operations and the daily activities of forces; a complexity of
measures, directed to mislead the enemy regarding the presence and disposition of forces,

various military objectives, their condition, combat readiness and operations, and also the

plans of the command...maskirovka contributes to the achievement of surprise for the actions of

forces, the preservation of combat readiness, and the increased survivability of objectives.

[230]

Glantz’s work remains the best US compendium on the topic of Soviet deception in World War II.

His emphasis on the term maskirovka was standard for the period and mirrors the emphasis the term

received from the work of Matsulenko.

The Journal Military Thought

Several articles that discussed the topic of deception appeared in Military Thought from 1993 to

2008. In each case, the Russian’s also produced an English translation which is important because the

translation renders, from a Russian perspective, an associated English term. For the Russian terms

obman and vvedenie v zabluzhdenie, English translations used the terms deception, deceive, or

mislead in nearly every case while voennaya khitrost’ (military cunning or strategy) was used on two

occasions for the word “deception.”

For example, in 1993 Colonel Yu. V. Ignatov published an article titled “Surprise Actions and

Deception: the Foundation of a Successful Operation.” He used both obman and vvedenie v

zabluzhdenie liberally in his article and each time they were translated as deception, deceive, or

mislead. Successful deception is accomplished by convincing the enemy that “the version it is being

persuaded to believe is not disinformation, but the result of analytical studies of its own intelligence

reports.”[231] To view the situation from the enemy’s perspective, one must be aware of his military

doctrine, how it uses the services and branches, historical precedents, principles for using men and

equipment during operations, and so on. To be successful, enemy forces should view the deception

activities as a logical course of events.[232]

In 1999 a few Russian officers wrote an article for Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) that

basically called into question any further use of the term maskirovka as an equivalent for the term

deception. Titled “Deception of the Enemy in Operations (Combat): Theory and Practice,” the authors

offered a diagram and accompanying explanation that placed obman as the new word for deception

and vvedenie v zabluzhdenie as the term for “to mislead.”[233] The officers wrote that

It is hard to say today when and who introduced the contradictory term of “operational

(tactical) camouflage” and the use of which over decades sparked further contradictions. This

is not accidental because the improper definition of a general (fundamental) notion, naturally,

leads to an even greater departure from logic with regard to details.[234]

The authors added that concealment is only part of the concept of “misleading,” with the latter

incorporating the former. In many diagrams and thoughts of the mid 70s and 80s, the former

incorporated the latter. The officers found this order of understanding to be wrong, resulting in “the

absence of a theoretical basis for tackling matters pertaining to deceiving the enemy in planning

operations.”[235] As a result, “no due attention is paid among the troops to deceiving the enemy, the

planning and implementation of these measures is perfunctory, and it often lacks originality,
imagination, and so on.”[236] The diagram the authors included in their article implied that the

existing explanation would be replaced by the proposed explanation, one that cited obman as the term

best defining deception and not maskirovka.

However, the argument over terminology did not go away. In 2003, the journal printed an article

by two officers that was titled “Information Warfare and the Maskirovka of Forces.” The authors

argued that the Russian use of the term maskirovka was still relevant as a way to understand

deception. They defined maskirovka as follows:

Maskirovka is a variety of support of combat operations and everyday activities of troops

(forces); a set of interconnected organizational, operational-tactical, and engineer-technical

measures, carried out with the purpose of concealing from the adversary the troops (naval

forces) and objects and misleading him as to the presence, disposition, composition, state,

actions, and intentions of the troops (naval forces), as well as the command’s plans.[237]

The authors noted that maskirovka can be characterized as a system of deceptive measures and

control activities on the command and control organs of an enemy force with the goal of having them

make decisions favorable to friendly forces.[238]

The authors then proposed comparing Russia’s definition of maskirovka with NATO’s definition

for deception. The officers stated that the NATO term for vvedenie v zabluzhdenie (mislead—

interesting that the Russian translators did not use the term maskirovka!) was “voennaya khitrost.’” A

US definition for the latter term is generally military cunning or stratagem. The Russian’s placed the

term “military deception” in parentheses after voennaya khitrost.’[239] NATO’s AAP-6 of 2010

defines deception as “Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or

falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.”[240] There

was no entry for military deception so it is uncertain where the Russian officers found the definition

to which they refer.

Almost immediately (two issues of Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) later), there was a critique

to Limno and Krysanov’s article, written by V. I. Orlyanskiy, one of the authors who in 1999 had

recommended a new way to interpret and define deception. Orlayanskiy notes in his opening

paragraph that “this journal” (meaning Military Thought) had already written that the term maskirovka

was an incorrect way to define deception. He further noted that the term had still not been

incorporated in manuals and regulations since his co-authored 1999 article. Noting that terms like

maskirovka are vague and contradictory from the perspective of plain logic, he stated that the further

development of the theory and practice of misleading an enemy is hampered by the continuous use of

the term maskirovka.[241] Orlyanskiy states his precise rejection of maskirovka as follows:

It is no secret that the absence of clear definitions and disruptions of logical relationships

between them are serious causes of disorientation in thinking resulting in a lack of

understanding between people, organizational errors, and it reduces possibilities to develop

theory and achieve success in practical activities. Therefore the abstract and extremely

provisional notion ‘operational concealment [maskirovka]’ coupled with other incorrect terms

connected with it are not as harmless as they may seem at first glance.[242]
Orlyanskiy writes that concealment should be subordinate to the term deception and not vice versa.

He states that “concealment, as a set of deliberate measures to mislead the enemy, is one of the

methods of deception”[243] and that “deception (obman) of the enemy should constitute a type of

operational support whose missions under modern conditions are: measures against enemy

reconnaissance, imitation, disinformation, and decoy actions.”[244] These actions mislead and thus

deceive an enemy force which allows for the use of surprise. Orlyanskiy ended his article stating that

not only maneuver along with coordinated strikes and fires must be carried out, but they must be

coordinated with deception measures without which the required effectiveness of combat operations

cannot be achieved.[245]

In 2006, V. N. Karankevich, at the time one of the editors of the journal Voennaya Mysl’ (Military

Thought), entered into the deception discussion with a long article in support of the term obman for

the concept of deception. In his opening paragraph, he wrote that the ability to deceive (obman) the

enemy was the most important quality of military leaders. He noted that it is possible to deceive an

enemy force by means (use of new warfare methods, use of nontraditional combat formations that

disagree with existing rules of military art, drawing the enemy into kill zones, etc.) that have little or

nothing to do with maskirovka (concealment). He stressed that concealment is of a supportive and

ancillary nature and thus only a part of deception.[246]

Karankevich noted that deception became important again once it was realized that, as the Soviet

experience in Afghanistan demonstrated, nuclear weapons can’t be used in local conflict. Soviet

documents in 1989 stated that commanders must define measures for enemy deception. Russian

documents in 2004 stated that in devising the operation plan, “separately, the commander determines

the idea of enemy deception, which shall be distributed to a limited number of persons.”[247]

Karankevich notes that the idea of enemy deception should consist of the goals, methods, and main

measures for enemy deception during the preparation for battle, during a battle’s course, and when

battle is completed. Developing techniques and methods is much more difficult than developing the

goals.[248]

Karankevich states that deception is important today to reduce losses, to protect one from

precision-guided munitions, and to lure terrorist leaders out of hiding. More importantly, for the first

time in the entire discussion of deception, he introduces readers to the concept of reflexive control,

noting that “the question must be not so much about counter actions and deceiving enemy

reconnaissance as about the reflexive control of the person making decisions about the actions of the

other side” by influencing him through the release of fake information.[249] New information

technologies are used to promote the further development of reflexive control activities. Here

Karankevich mentions the opportunity to enter computer networks, filter out information flows, limit

or forbid access to legitimate users, arranging “information roadblocks” and traps, and distorting true

information. Perhaps for this reason he also mentions that deception operations are the most important

aspect of information operations. [250] An entire section on reflexive control follows later in this

chapter.

Perhaps the highlight of Karankevich’s article is his statement that command cadres, if they wish to

command troops in any environment, must become experts in deception. The entire training system
must incorporate deception training into the curriculum at academies and especially into the

leadership of the Russian armed forces, to include the Minister of Defense. This may require the

development of a special guidance manual for the rules, practices, and operations for developing

deception techniques. Deception operations must also become the critical, obligatory element of

exercises at the strategic and operational levels, prepared as special information operations.[251]
Lobov’s Book Voennaya Khitrost’

Vladimir Lobov, a former Chief of the Russian General Staff, has written two books on the topic of

Voennaya Khitrost’ (Military Cunning), first in 1992 and then in 2001. The latter book included

sections on the use of deception in local conflicts. Lobov used two terms, vvedenie v zabluzhdenie

(mislead) and maskirovka (camouflage), in his 1992 book to describe how khitrost’ (cunning or

stratagem) is applied on the battlefield. Lobov also included the concept of surprise in his discussion

of stratagem. By 2001, however, he also was using the term obman to discuss deception.

The concept of voennaya khitrost’ (hereafter cunning or stratagem) is important to Lobov, for he

considers it the art of achieving victory over an opponent. Military stratagem includes the entire

system of views on concealing one’s own actions and deceiving the enemy.[252] Lobov notes that

“cunning in the military becomes ‘military stratagem,’ which is essentially surprise military

operations accomplished by concealing their preparation and deceiving the enemy.”[253] In his 1992

explanation, Lobov uses these three terms exclusively. The first two terms, concealment (skrytnost’)

and deceiving the enemy (vvedenie v zabluzhdenie), are the forms of military stratagem according to

Lobov. These forms of military stratagem make the third term, surprise (vnezapnost’), possible.

Lobov defines concealment as a set of measures that help erase or reduce the presence of troops

and their activities so as to ease their movement, hide them from enemy forces, and create conditions

for a surprise engagement. Plans, decisions, and intent must all be kept secret. Camouflage or

maskirovka is key to concealment. It eliminates or reduces signs of the presence of troops or their

movement. Keeping information confidential or maintaining secrecy are other concealment methods.

[254]

Military deception or vvedeniya v zabluzdenie can be achieved through disinformation,

demonstration, simulation, or deformation. The latter is the deliberate distortion of a facility,

material, or weapons.[255]

Lobov makes several points with regard to surprise, the latter a concept perceived by the other

side as “the unexpected.”[256] This is a group’s or person’s unpreparedness to perceive events as

they develop due to “subjective disorientation (that is, one does not understand how they are being

manipulated).” Lobov’s points with regard to surprise are:

· Military stratagem is determined by how long it takes an opponent to implement

countermeasures, regroup, and recoup.

· Military stratagem is a sine qua non for surprise in troop operations and for effective and

unexpected use of new materiel and weapons.

· Surprise is not an end in itself. It occupies a place in the creation of the conditions that

result in surprise.

· Surprise is the sum total of general and specialized knowledge (morale, combat techniques,

terrain, time, and weather, ability of commanders and staff to forecast the likely course of

developments).[257]

· Knowledge, skill, and expertise can be reduced to the concept of subjective orientation.

The higher the level of subjective orientation, the better the chances for surprise being
achieved. A lack of knowledge can be termed subjective disorientation.[258]

Lobov concludes his discussion of terms noting that surprise is at the front and center of militarypolitical and military-technical issues. Military stratagem (voennaya khitrost’) is the chief weapon in

attaining surprise and gaining the initiative.

Reflexive Control[259]

One of the prime goals for a commander in warfare, mentioned in the discussion above, is to

interfere with the decision-making process of an enemy commander. This goal is often accomplished

by the use of disinformation, camouflage, or some other stratagem or application of military cunning.

For Russia, one of the primary methods is through the use of the theory of reflexive control (RC). This

principle can be used against either human-mental or computer-based decision-making processors.

The theory is similar to the US concept of perception management, except that it attempts to control

more than manage a subject.

Reflexive control is defined as a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially

prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the

initiator of the action. Even though the theory was developed long ago in Russia, it is still undergoing

further refinement. For example, in the past five years there have been articles about the use of

reflexive control in network-centric warfare, in information weapons, in deterrence theory, and in

21

st century tactics.

A 2001 product of the Russian PIR center noted in a chapter on “Information Weapons as a New

Means of Warfare” that the goal of an information offensive is reflexive control of the enemy actions.

RC makes enemy actions forced, predictable, and advantageous to one’s own side.[260] A 2003

edition of Strategiskaya Stabilnost (Strategic Stability) noted that RC’s use in deterrence theory is to

control an opponent’s decision-making during a conflict. RC’s purpose here is to convince an

opponent that nuclear blackmail and military pressure won’t work.[261] A 2005 article in Voennaya

Mysl’ (Military Thought) by Colonels A. V. Raskin and V. S. Pelyak noted that in order to control an

opponent’s network-centric organization, it is necessary to affect the main people in an opponent’s

leadership who make decisions. This is accomplished by transmitting to them certain types of

information that they use to make decisions. Here the objective of RC is to create a condition

favorable to friendly forces and one’s own combat mission by affecting the other side’s decisionmaking.[262] Finally, Major General Ivan Vorobyev and Colonel Valeriy Kiselev, regular

contributors to several military journals in Russia, noted in 2008 that commanders and staffs must

master the “art of reflexive control” of enemy actions using robotized equipment, precision-guided

munitions, and weapons based on new physical principles. This must be accomplished due to the

intensification of information-psychological operations and the potential wider use of deception

operations. Key elements of deception include “double deception (make opponents believe that true

intentions are false),” “protection of key information,” “embedded concepts (generate an opponent’s

misbelief in data that contains the deception plan),” and “false luck (create a situation for successful

enemy actions that actually lead them to a trap).”[263]

There are many examples, from a Russian perspective, of the use of reflexive control theory during

conflicts. An excellent example of Soviet use of reflexive control theory during the Cold War was the
method the Soviet military chose to alter US perceptions of the nuclear balance. The aim of this

reflexive control operation was to convince the West that its missile capabilities were far more

formidable than they actually were. To do so, Soviet military authorities paraded fake ICBMs to

deceive the West. The Soviets developed the fake missiles so as to make the warheads appear huge

and to imply that the missile carried “multiple warheads.” In this case, the Soviets understood their

opponent’s “reflexes.” Soviet authorities realized that foreign attachés regularly attended these

shows, since this was one of the few opportunities to obtain military information legally. Moreover,

since the Soviet Union did not even participate in arms control fairs, the parade held special

significance for intelligence officers. After observing the parade, the Soviets knew that the attachés

would then report their findings in great detail to Western intelligence organs. In addition, the Soviets

knew that members of the Western military-industrial complex also studied the parades closely. [264]

However, the deception did not end here. The Soviets also prepared other disinformation

measures so that when Western intelligence services began to investigate the fake ICBMs, they would

find collateral proof of their existence and would be led further astray. Ultimately, the aim was to

prompt foreign scientists, who desired to copy the advanced technology, down a dead-end street,

thereby wasting precious time and money.[265]

Another RC incident that gained international notoriety was the bombing of the market square in

Sarajevo in 1995. Within minutes of the bombing, CNN and other news outlets were reporting that a

Serbian mortar attack had killed many innocent people in the square. Later, crater analysis of the

shells that exploded in the square, along with other supporting evidence, indicated that the incident

did not happen as originally reported. This evidence also threw into doubt the identities of the

perpetrators of the attack. One individual close to the investigation, Russian Colonel Andrei

Demurenko, Chief of Staff of Sector Sarajevo at the time, stated, “I am not saying the Serbs didn’t

commit this atrocity. I am saying that it didn’t happen the way it was originally reported.” A US and

Canadian officer soon backed this position. Demurenko believed that the incident was an excellent

example of reflexive control, in that the incident was made to look like it had happened in a certain

way to confuse decision-makers. This is a method of deception that should not be overlooked by

students of Russian affairs, as it lies at the heart of many deception activities either directly or

intuitively.

The concept of reflexive control (RC) has existed much longer than the concepts of information

warfare and information operations; in fact, it appeared in Soviet military literature 30 years ago. At

that time, V. A. Lefebvre, who was working within the context and logic of a reflexive game, defined

reflexive control as “a process by which one enemy transmits the reasons or bases for making

decisions to another.”[266]

The concept of reflexive control is still somewhat alien to US audiences. However, the Russians

employ it not only on the strategic and tactical levels in war but also on the strategic level in

association with internal and external politics. Equally significant, the concept has not always

benefited the Soviet Union and Russia. For example, some Russians consider that the Strategic

Defense Initiative (SDI) is a classic example of US use of reflexive control. In this case, the US

“compelled the enemy to act according to a plan favorable to the US.” By doing so, it forced the

Soviet Union to try to keep pace with America’ achievements in the SDI arena (or at least what we
said were our achievements) and ultimately exhausted the Soviet Union economically as it spent

money to develop corresponding equipment.

The Soviet and Russian armed forces have long studied the use of reflexive control theory,

particularly at the tactical and operational levels, both for deception and disinformation purposes

and, potentially, to control the enemy’s decision-making processes.[267] For example, the Russian

Army had a military maskirovka school as early as 1904 that was later disbanded in 1929. This

school, the Higher School of Maskirovka, provided the bases for maskirovka concepts and created

manuals for future generations.[268]

The foremost reflexive control theorists in the military sector include V. V. Druzhinin, M. D. Ionov,

D. S. Kontorov, S. Leonenko, and several others. RC is also considered an information warfare

means. For example, Major General N.I. Turko, an instructor at the Russian Federation’s General

Staff Academy, has established a direct connection between IW/IO and reflexive control. He noted:

The most dangerous manifestation in the tendency to rely on military power relates more

to the possible impact of the use of reflexive control by the opposing side through

developments in the theory and practice of information war rather than to the direct use of

the means of armed combat.[269]

In Turko’s judgment, RC is an information weapon that is more important in achieving military

objectives than traditional firepower. In this regard, Turko’s understanding is most likely influenced

by his belief that American use of information weapons during the Cold War did more to defeat the

Soviet Union and cause its demise than any other weapon. An excellent example was the Strategic

Defense Initiative discussed above. Finally, Turko has mentioned reflexive control as a method for

achieving geopolitical superiority and as a means for arms control negotiations. The latter area

should be one of heightened awareness for countries entering such negotiations with the Russians.

Reflexive control theory does indeed have geopolitical significance, according to Turko. For

example, he and a colleague described a new containment theory under development that portrayed

new means for coping with confrontation between new large-scale geopolitical groupings.[270] This

theory involves information warfare means; specifically, the threat of inflicting unacceptable levels of

damage against a state or group of states by attacking their information resources. Turko wrote in

1996 about RC. Interestingly, Karankevich’s article (noted above) stated ten years later that RC was a

component part of information operations. Thus, the theory remains intact.

One of the most complex ways to influence a state’s information resources is by use of reflexive

control measures against the state’s decision-making processes. This aim is best accomplished by

formulating certain information or disinformation designed to affect a specific information resource

best. In this context an information resource is defined as:

· Information and transmitters of information, to include the method or technology of

obtaining, conveying, gathering, accumulating, processing, storing, and exploiting that

information;

· Infrastructure, including information centers, means for automating information
processes, switchboard communications, and data transfer networks;

· Programming and mathematical means for managing information; and

· Administrative and organizational bodies that manage information processes, scientific

personnel, creators of databases and knowledge, as well as personnel who service the

means of informatizatsiya (informatization).[271]

Russia’s political elite also employs RC in analytical methodologies used to assess contemporary

situations. For example, during a recent conference in Moscow, a representative from President

Yeltsin’s administration noted that, when making decisions, the Kremlin pays attention to reflexive

processes. Thus, Turko’s revelation about the central role of Reflexive Control in Russian concepts of

information warfare, and RC’s potential use against information resources to destabilize the

geopolitical balance, are two important points to consider when analyzing intent.

By definition, “reflexive control” occurs when the controlling organ conveys (to the objective

system) motives and reasons that cause it to reach the desired decision,[272] according to S.

Leonenko, the nature of which is maintained in strict secrecy. The decision itself must be made

independently. A “reflex” itself involves the specific process of imitating the enemy’s reasoning or

imitating the enemy’s possible behavior and causes him to make a decision unfavorable to himself.

In fact, the enemy comes up with a decision based on the idea of the situation which he

has formed, to include the disposition of our troops and installations and the command

element’s intentions known to him. Such an idea is shaped above all by intelligence and

other factors, which rest on a stable set of concepts, knowledge, ideas and, finally,

experience. This set usually is called the “filter,” which helps a commander separate

necessary from useless information, true data from false and so on.[273]

The chief task of reflexive control is to locate the weak link of the filter and exploit it.

According to the concept of reflexive control, during a serious conflict, the two opposing actors

(countries) analyze their own and perceived enemy ideas and then attempt to influence one another by

means of reflexive control. A “reflex” refers to the creation of certain model behavioral in the system

it seeks to control (the objective system). It takes into account the fact that the objective system has a

model of the situation and assumes that it will also attempt to influence the controlling organ or

system. Reflexive control exploits moral, psychological, and other factors, as well as the personal

characteristics of commanders. In the latter case, biographical data, habits, and psychological

deficiencies could be used in deception operations.[274] In a war in which reflexive control is being

employed, the side with the highest degree of reflex (the side best able to imitate the other side’s

thoughts or predict its behavior) will have the best chances of winning. The degree of reflex depends

on many factors, the most important of which are analytical capability, general erudition and

experience, and the scope of knowledge about the enemy. Military author Colonel S. Leonenko added

that, in the past, stratagems were the principal tool of reflexive control, but today camouflage and

deception [maskirovka] have replaced stratagems, a conclusion disputed by many. For example, the

Chinese have demonstrated that electrons can be used as stratagems and operate as effectively as

camouflage and deception in the traditional sense.
Although no formal or official reflexive control terminology existed in the past, opposing sides

actually employed it intuitively as they attempted to identify and interfere with each other’s thoughts

and plans and alter impressions of one, thereby prompting an erroneous decision.[275] Leonenko’s

theories about varying degrees of reflexive control can be explained as follows. If two sides in a

serious conflict – “A” and “B” – have opposing goals, one will seek to destroy the other’s goals.

Accordingly, if side A acts independently of the behavior of side B, then his degree of reflex relative

to side B is equal to zero (0). On the other hand, if side A makes assumptions about side B’s

behavior (that is, he models side B) based on the thesis that side B is not taking side A’s behavior into

account, then side A’s degree of reflex is one (1). If side B also has a first degree reflex, and side A

takes this fact into account, then side A’s reflex is two (2), and so on.

If successfully achieved, reflexive control over the enemy makes it possible to influence his

combat plans, his view of the situation, and how he fights. In other words, one side can impose its

will on the enemy and cause him to make a decision inappropriate to a given situation. Reflexive

control methods are varied and include camouflage (at all levels), disinformation, encouragement,

blackmail by force, and the compromising of various officials and officers. Thus, the central focus of

reflexive control is on the less tangible element of “military art” rather than more objective “military

science.” Achieving successful reflexive control requires in-depth study of the enemy’s inner nature,

his ideas and concepts, which Leonenko referred to as the “filter,” through which passes all data

about the external world. Successful RC represents the culmination point of an information operation.

So defined, a filter is a collective image (termed “set”) of the enemy’s favorite combat techniques

and methods for organizing combat actions, plus a psychological portrait of the enemy. Thus, reflex

requires study of someone else’s filter and the exploitation of it for one’s own ends. In the

Information Age, this filter is represented by human and machine (computer) data processors. The

most important question then becomes, “How does one side achieve this higher degree of reflex and,

hence, more effective reflexive control over the enemy?” It does so primarily by employing a

broader range of means for achieving surprise. In turn, it achieves surprise by means of stealth,

disinformation, and avoidance of stereotypes [shablon].[276]

Major General (ret.) M. D. Ionov, one of the military specialists mentioned earlier, wrote several

articles on the subject of reflexive control in Voennaya mysl’ (Military Thought). In many of his

initial articles, Ionov simply spoke about “control” of the enemy rather than reflexive control. At the

same time, Ionov also realized the close link between advertising and reflexive control (“sell the

holes, not the drill” and “temptation by benefit” were two of the techniques he recognized) and the

combined use of various reflexive methods for waging different types of conflicts (low-intensity,

etc.).[277]

Given his advanced thinking about reflexive control, it is instructive to analyze one of his articles

from 1995. In it Ionov noted that the objective of reflexive control is to force an enemy into making

objective decisions that lead to his defeat by influencing or controlling his decision-making process.

Ionov considers this a form of high art founded of necessity on an intimate knowledge of human

thinking and psychology, military history, the roots of the particular conflict, and the capabilities of

competing combat assets. In this instance, control over the enemy is realized by undertaking a series

of measures, related by time, aim, and place, which force enemy decision-makers to abandon their
original plan, make disadvantageous decisions, or react incorrectly to their ultimate disadvantage (for

example, when facing a counter-offensive). The successful use of reflexive control becomes all the

more likely if the enemy’s original plan is known. This makes it easier for the controlling side to

force the enemy into making wrong decisions by employing reflexive control techniques such as

intimidation, enticement, disinformation, deception, concealment, and other measures designed to

shorten his decision-making time by surprising his decision-making algorithms.[278]

Ionov also stated that the content and methods employed must accord with the interrelationship

between the enemy’s thought processes and basic psychology. They also had to be realistic, and

newly-created methods had to be considered within the context of new technologies. Furthermore, he

recognized that any coalition of enemy forces represents a far more complex system, the stability of

which changes depending upon the nature of the situation in each individual state and the condition of

the coalition. Finally, because sharp differences exist in thinking, aims, politics, and ethical

approaches of each state, each side must conduct an internal appraisal to determine the possible

results of any action conducted in accordance with complex criteria reflecting the nature of the

confrontation.[279]

Ionov identified four basic methods for assisting in the transfer of information to the enemy to

promote control over him. These methods, which serve as a checklist for commanders at all levels,

include:

· Power pressure, which includes: the use of superior force, force demonstrations,

psychological attacks, ultimatums, threats of sanctions, threats of risk (developed by

focusing attention on irrational behavior or conduct, or delegating powers to an

irresponsible person), combat reconnaissance, provocative maneuvers, weapons tests,

denying enemy access to or isolating certain areas, increasing the alert status of forces,

forming coalitions, officially declaring war, support for internal forces, destabilizing the

situation in the enemy rear, limited strikes to put some forces out of action, exploiting and

playing up victory, demonstrating ruthless actions, and showing mercy toward an enemy ally

that has stopped fighting.[280]

· Measures to present false information about the situation, which includes: concealment

(displaying weakness in a strong place), creation of mock installations (to show force in a

weak place), abandoning one position to reinforce another, leaving dangerous objects at a

given position (the Trojan Horse), concealing true relationships between units or creating

false ones, maintaining the secrecy of new weapons, weapons bluffing, changing a mode of

operation, or deliberately losing critical documents. The enemy can be forced to find a new

target by conflict escalation or de-escalation, deliberate demonstration of a particular chain

of actions, striking an enemy base when the enemy is not there, acts of subversion and

provocation, leaving a route open for an enemy to withdraw from encirclement, and forcing

the enemy to take retaliatory actions involving an expenditure of forces, assets, and time.

[281]

· Influencing the enemy’s decision-making algorithm, which includes: the systematic

conduct of games according to what is perceived as routine plans, publishing a deliberately

distorted doctrine, striking control system elements and key figures, transmitting false

background data, operating in a standby mode, and taking actions to neutralize the enemy’s
operational thinking.[282]

· Altering the decision-making time, which can be done by unexpectedly starting combat

actions, transferring information about the background of an analogous conflict so that the

enemy, when working out what seems feasible and predictable, makes a hasty decision that

changes the mode and character of its operation.[283]

In another article entitled “Control of the Enemy,” which appeared in Morskoy Sbornik (Naval

Digest) in July 1995, Ionov argued that information is needed on the status of enemy forces, the nature

of their actions, and their capabilities in order to control him and, simultaneously, to halt or to retard

his counter-control efforts.[284] Ionov advanced several distinct principles necessary for control of

the enemy. First, he underscored the reflexive nature of the desired response, stating that commanders

must visualize the possible enemy response to the conditions one desires to impose. Second, the

response will be problematic, since the enemy may discover the activity and undertake his own

counter-control measures. Third, the level of technical development of combat weapons, and

especially reconnaissance, is of growing importance. This makes the exposure of an action aimed at

misinforming the enemy more likely. The final principle is the use of harsh forms of pressure on the

enemy, specifically those that consider social elements and intellectual, psychological, ethical, and

ideological factors. Deliberate cruelty toward the civilian population or prisoners of war in a

combat region, a declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare (to sink any vessels to include those

of neutral countries), and so on serve as excellent examples of the latter.[285] In short, in Ionov’s

view, reflexive control is a specific, yet traditional, Soviet and—now Russian—form of an

informational or psychological (PSYOP) attack.

Colonel S. Leonenko integrated information technologies and reflexive control theory in his

writings. He noted that the use of computers could hinder the use of reflexive control by making it

easier to process data and calculate options. This is so since an opponent can more easily “see

through” a reflexive control measure by an opposing force by simply using a computer. The

computer’s speed and accuracy in processing information can detect the reflexive control measure.

On the other hand, in some cases, this may actually improve the chances for successful reflexive

control, since a computer lacks the intuitive reasoning of a human being.[286]

Computer technology increases the effectiveness of reflexive control by offering new methods

adaptable to the modern era that can serve the same ends. Writing in 1995 from a military

perspective, Colonel S. Leonenko defined reflexive control as follows:

RC [reflexive control] consists of transmitting motives and grounds from the controlling

entity to the controlled system that stimulate the desired decision. The goal of RC is to

prompt the enemy to make a decision unfavorable to him. Naturally, one must have an

idea about how he thinks.[287]

Leonenko then assessed the new opportunities that the use of computer technology afforded to

reflexive control, stating:

In present conditions, there is a need to act not only against people but also against

technical reconnaissance assets and especially weapons guidance systems, which are
impassive in assessing what is occurring and do not perceive to what a person reacts.

[288]

If an IW or IO operation system cannot perceive what a person reacts to and is unable to assess

what is occurring, does this mean that it provides only insignificant data? Or does it mean that there

are two layers to reflexively control? The first layer consists of the “eyes, nose, and ears” of sensors,

satellites, and radars. The second layer is the “brain software” of humans, which gathers, processes,

and produces knowledge from the information or makes decisions based on it. But what happens if the

“eyes, ears, and nose” are manipulated? How does that affect the input into decisions and knowledge?

The recent use of such military activity by Yugoslav forces in the Balkans fooled NATO sensors over

Kosovo and resulted in NATO shooting at targets that were fakes.

Yet, in the end, we do leave some decisions to computers. This indicates to Leonenko that we live

in a much more frightening existence than we care to believe if, in fact, decisions are in the hands of

machines that are “incapable of assessing what is occurring and do not perceive what a person reacts

to.”

Further, Leonenko noted that “how the enemy thinks” is shaped by combat intelligence and a

collective image (set) made up of concepts, knowledge, ideas, and experience. This set, which he

calls a filter, helps a commander separate necessary from useless information. Then, the chief task of

reflexive control is to locate the weak link in the filter and find an opportunity to exploit it.

Leonenko’s definition of reflexive control fits well with Russian Major Sergei Markov’s

understanding of an information weapon. Like Markov, Leonenko defines an information weapon as a

“specially selected piece of information capable of causing changes in the information processes of

information systems (physical, biological, social, etc., in this case, decision-making information) in

accordance with the intent of the entity using the weapon.” Accordingly, it causes change in the

information processes of an opponent by persuading them to make decisions according to the design

of the controller, and it affords the information weapon a methodology for controlling an opponent.

So defined, reflexive control can be applied in the modeling and decision-making contexts of various

types of conflicts (international, military, etc.). It can also be used in social processes and systems.

Another Russian military theorist who wrote on the information impact on RC was Colonel S. A.

Komov, who was perhaps the most prolific Russian military writer on information warfare topics in

the 1990s. Writing in the journal Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), Komov supported Ionov’s

emphasis on reflexive control. He renamed reflexive control over the enemy as “intellectual”

methods of information warfare. He then listed the basic elements of an intellectual approach to

information warfare, which he described as:

· Distraction, by creating a real or imaginary threat to one of the enemy’s most vital locations

[flanks, rear, etc.] during the preparatory stages of combat operations, thereby forcing him to

reconsider the wisdom of his decisions to operate along this or that axis;

· Overload, by frequently sending the enemy a large amount of conflicting information;

· Paralysis, by creating the perception of a specific threat to a vital interest or weak spot;

· Exhaustion, by compelling the enemy to carry out useless operations, thereby entering
combat with reduced resources;

· Deception, by forcing the enemy to reallocate forces to a threatened region during the

preparatory stages of combat operations;

· Division, by convincing the enemy that he must operate in opposition to coalition interests;

· Pacification, by leading the enemy to believe that pre-planned operational training is

occurring rather than offensive preparations, thus reducing his vigilance;

· Deterrence, by creating the perception of insurmountable superiority;

· Provocation, by forcing him into taking action advantageous to your side;

· Overload, by dispatching an excessively large number of messages to the enemy during the

preparatory period;

· Suggestion, by offering information that affects the enemy legally, morally, ideologically, or

in other areas; and

· Pressure, by offering information that discredits the government in the eyes of its

population.[289]

Finally, an article by Russian Captain First Rank F. Chausov continued the discussion of reflexive

control. He defined RC as “the process of intentionally conveying to an opposing side of a certain

aggregate information (attributes) which will cause that side to make a decision appropriate to that

information.”[290] More important, Chausov discussed the risk involved with using RC:

To justify the methods of using force while taking risk into account, the numerical

measure R0 is introduced as the difference between the assessments of guaranteed

effectiveness, or Eg, and the projected (situational) effectiveness, Es. The estimate of the

guaranteed effectiveness represents the lower limit of the effectiveness indicator, given

any type of enemy action and fixed actions by our own forces. Situational effectiveness

refers to the effectiveness of a force’s action which is achieved through a certain type of

action based on a commander’s decision. Ordering or establishing preference among the

values of the risk looks like this: R0,1 > R0,1+1.[291]

Chausov listed the principles of RC as: (1) a goal-oriented process requiring a complete picture of

all RC measures needed; (2) an “actualization” of plans, that is providing a sufficiently complete

picture of the intellectual potential of commanders and staff officers (based on their reality),

especially when conditions are determined by global information space; (3) the conformity of goals,

missions, place, time and methods for RC’s conduct; (4) the modeling or forecasting of the condition

of a side at the time actions are being implemented; and (5) the anticipation of events.

High-Tech Camouflage

In today’s conditions the armies of the world’s leading states stand on the threshold of a

qualitative leap in the use of military cunning. It derives above all from the development and

implementation of advanced space, aviation, computer, and other technologies and the

capabilities in transmitting and receiving information, which have increased many times over.

[292]

Military theorists recognize that sensors and electromagnetic spectrum intrusions are making it
more difficult for forces to hide on the battlefield. Further, precision guided weapons have turned

detection into annihilation. One analyst wrote that a return to “non-transparency” methods is required

for survival in today’s conflicts. A method for doing so is through the use of high-tech maskirovka

(camouflage or concealment) developments for mockups and through the wider application of

holograms. That is, not only must targets be hidden but decoys developed to deflect enemy weaponry

and attention. Russia’s modern models “reproduce radar and infrared bands and the simulation of the

radio-technical range is planned.”[293]

Another article on maskirovka indicated that demonstrations of force and disinformation could

enhance a maskirovka effort. The actual number of decoys needed for a maskirovka effort in a

regiment’s defensive sector was estimated at 25 percent of the total number of vehicles in a regiment.

Setting up this number of decoys requires approximately 12 percent of a regiment’s personnel for 4-5

hours. For artillery batteries, the number of decoys rises to 50 percent of the number of real pieces of

artillery.[294]

Offensively, virtual attacks employing drones could reveal the position of enemy air defense

emplacements that are well-hidden. Holograms are also being developed for future use. Not only can

they confuse the human eye and perception but also infrared optics and target acquisition capabilities.

A holographic curtain of virtual smoke is also anticipated in the near future.[295]

Examples of Deception’s Use in Afghanistan and Chechnya

The journal Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest) noted that in Afghanistan there were times when

artillery strikes and superiority in strength did not produce the required result. As a result, deception

issues rose to the top of the operational list and were employed.[296]

First and foremost, the number of people engaged in the deception activity was limited, both

during preparations and during the actual operation. Second, attempts were made to give the enemy a

false impression of what was planned, arranging fake departures from assembly areas and secretive

departures for actual patrols.

In one instance, platoons moved out in the opposite direction of an upcoming operation to give the

enemy a false impression of a planned operation. Meanwhile, an armored personnel carrier that made

five or six runs every day to a town (in the direction from which an enemy attack was expected) was

used to transport troops under cover of dusk. These troops secretly departed the vehicle and hid in an

area where they could ambush an approaching enemy force. At the same time, number of armored

vehicles had departed and appeared to head toward Kabul, from where a column of vehicles had

arrived the previous day. The armored vehicles actually hid at a pass. When the enemy force arrived

as expected on foot, the ambush was sprung by the friendly forces in hiding and the armored force

was used as a mobile reserve in support of the infantry platoon’s ambush.

Another interesting use of deception occurred in January 2000. Russian forces had encircled the

famed terrorist Shamil Basayev in Chechnya’s capital, Grozny. Basayev was led to believe that his

safety out of the city could be guaranteed with a payment of a large sum of money in cash (some say

$100,000) to a military officer responsible for that sector of the city.[297] The night before the

departure of Basayev’s men, a member of his group exited the city and made the walk to the village of
Alkhan-Kala. Everything seemed to be in order.

The following night, unknown to Basayev and his men, they walked into a trap. Four minefield

strips had been laid and a firing system set up. The first group of terrorists, which included Basayev,

ran into the minefields. Then they came under intense artillery fire, multiple-launch rocket systems,

direct fire from tanks, and air strikes. It is estimated that 1700 terrorists died in the attack. Basayev

was wounded in the process and soon had his foot amputated above the ankle. Russia had named the

operation “Wolf Hunt.”[298]

The Russian commander of the operation, Gennady Troshev, tells the story this way in his book

Moya Voyna (My War):

To lure them out of the besieged city, an original plan was developed at the Combined Forces

Group. Let us say that the plan was called “Wolf Hole [a different name than Lobov used to

describe the operation].” As a part of this plan, disinformation was broadcast over the

airwaves. Using false information on the radio the bandits were given the idea that there were

gaps in the cordon around the city, gaps that they would be able to pass through. Activity was

reduced to a minimum at meeting junctures between the regiments. Human intelligence agents

were also put to work “tipping off” the field commanders as to exits through the cordon. While

we were taking these measures we also prepared unique “corridors” for the enemy in several

directions. The bandits took the bait. On the night of 29 January into the morning of 30 January

the remainder of the combat-ready detachments attempted to breach through Staraya Sunzha, at

the juncture between the 15th and 276th Motorized Rifle Regiments. More than 600 insurgents

attempted the breach. They had animals and prisoners moving in front of them. Many of the

bandits died in the mine fields, many were badly wounded, including well-known field

commanders -- Basayev among them... In addition to all the injuries, about 300 insurgents died

that night. Most of the survivors surrendered. Only a few of them managed to break out of the

city.[299]

Thus, while the name of the operation and the number of combatants varies to a significant degree,

the integrating factor of the two versions of the story is that deception played the key role in

eliminating the terrorists.

Conclusions

Successful deception is accomplished by convincing the enemy that “the version it is being

persuaded to believe is not disinformation, but the result of analytical studies of its own intelligence

reports.”[300] This requires an in-depth understanding of the thought processes of any potential

enemy to include the personality of commanders that are targeted. To view the situation from the

enemy’s perspective, one must be aware of his military doctrine, how leaders are taught to use the

services and branches, historical precedents, the nation’s principles for using men and equipment

during operations, and so on. To be successful, enemy forces must view the deception activities as a

logical course of events.[301]

Implementing this goal will require a readjustment of the educational and training system of the

Russian armed forces. V. N. Karankevich wrote that command cadres, if they wish to command troops
in any environment, must become experts in deception. The entire training system must incorporate

deception training into the curriculum at academies and especially into the leadership of the Russian

armed forces, to include the Minister of Defense. This may require the development of a special

guidance manual for the rules, practices, and operations for developing deception techniques.

Deception operations must also become the critical, obligatory element of exercises at the strategic

and operational levels, prepared as special information operations.[302]

Russian civilian and military theorists will undoubtedly continue to study the problem of reflexive

control and the associated tools of manipulation and deception. For example, the Russian Academy of

Science’s Institute of Psychology has a Psychology of Reflexive Processes Laboratory that studies

elements and applications of the “reflex” in considerable detail. It is studying not only ways to use the

concept, but ways to keep the concept under control through international discussions and awareness.

The most complex and dangerous application of reflexive control will remain its employment to

affect a state’s decision-making process by use of carefully tailored information or disinformation.

States must be protected against both deliberate and unintentional actions that can lead to the

disruption in the functioning of state and military command-and-control. The most significant of those

threatening actions is disinformation that seeks to exert an effect on public opinion or on decisionmakers.[303] Perhaps for this reason theorists and planners in Moscow believe that a detailed

information security doctrine is one of the most important deterrents or defenses against an enemy’s

use of reflexive control or similar processes against Russia. Russia’s September 2000 “Information

Security Doctrine” is a step in this direction as are several other information-related documents over

the past ten years. Russia will continue to stress the importance of using deception as a “coefficient of

force” against an opponent while maintaining vigilance against another nation or a terrorist’s use of

such operations against Russia.
CHAPTER SIX: RUSSIA INFORMATIZES ITS MILITARY

Today’s computer is a weapon, which is of no smaller importance than a rifle or a tank. To be serious,

a computer is more important.[304]

Introduction

Modernizing the military is a priority issue for the leadership of Russia. President Dmitriy

Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin both stand solidly behind the reform effort. They are

fully aware of the impact of the information age on technology and on humans. Two of Medvedev and

Putin’s goals are to “informatize” the Russian armed forces weaponry (the information-technical

aspect of Russia’s information warfare [IW] concept) and to ensure that the digital information the

populace receives is Russian-based and not destabilizing (the information-psychological aspect of

Russia’s IW concept). President Medvedev has gone so far as to state that he believes the

contemporary Russian state and its armed forces are being controlled by computers. He noted that

“today’s computer is a weapon, which is of no smaller importance than a rifle or a tank. To be

serious, a computer is more important.”[305] Medvedev also stressed how important modern

communications are for Russia’s national security agencies since without them, Russia will not be

fully protected.

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has focused on ensuring that the communications and automatic

command and control systems, among others, are updated. In the past decade, despite adequate

planning, there has been inadequate follow-up by local bosses and administrators. Putin stressed that

this will no longer be the case.[306]

The influence of Medvedev and Putin offer one motivator behind Russia’s movement into the

information technology arena. Another motivator/influence is the philosophical, economic, cultural,

historical, and scientific background of both the Soviet and Russian armed forces. They greatly

impact just how Russia perceives its approach to informatizing its armed forces. As one Russian

military analyst explained years ago:

It is false to presume that we can expediently interpret and accept for our own use, foreign

ideas about IW and their terminology in order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding at

international discussions, during information exchanges, or during contact between specialists.

Quite the opposite, it makes no sense to copy just any IW concept. Into the IW concept for

the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (RF) must be incorporated the constitutional

requirements of the RF, its basic laws, specifics of the present economic situation in the RF, and

the missions of our Armed Forces.[307]

This chapter will examine some contemporary Russian IW definitions; the input of Russia’s

General Staff regarding the informationization process; the network-centric warfare concept of

Russia; Prime Minister Putin’s influence on the defense industry; and the various informationtechnological developments that are shaping the future of the Russian armed forces.

How Do the Russians Define Information War?
Russia’s contextual situation and dialectical Marxist-Leninist cognitive process result in an IW

theory much different than that utilized in the US. A general survey of information warfare definitions

created by various Russian security organizations over the past fifteen years underscores a standard

division of labor in the IW arena into information-technical (the software and hardware aspect) and

information-psychological (the cognitive aspect) areas.

The last US definition of IW appeared in the 1998 Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information

Operations. In this publication IW is defined as “information operations conducted during time of

crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or

adversaries.”[308] Information operations at the time were defined as “actions taken to affect

adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and

information systems.”[309] Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Related Terms (as amended through 30 September 2010) defines information operations as

The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic

warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and

operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence,

disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting

our own. Also called IO. See also computer network operations; electronic warfare; military

deception; operations security; psychological operations.[310]

Russian authors still use the term information war frequently. Further, Russia’s two IW

subdivisions (information-technical and information-psychological) overlap at times. For example,

computers are information-technical devices that can have an information-psychological impact.

Another peculiarity is that different authors use different combinations of words that many translators

describe as “information war.” Among them are information struggle (borba), information

confrontation (protivoborstvo), and information war (voyna). In the examples that follow, each

particular use by an author will be highlighted in italics. Many authors, however, use the term

protivoborstvo or confrontation to refer to war.

Four recent definitions will be examined here. They are a 2009 definition offered by ColonelGeneral Anatoliy Nogovitsyn, a deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation; a 2009

definition offered by two authors from the Russian Academy of Military Science; a definition

developed by A. A. Strel’tsov, an author of the 2000 Information Security Doctrine of Russia; and a

2010 definition offered by a former Scientific Advisor to the Security Council of the Yeltsin

administration, Vladimir Semenovich Pirumov.

Colonel-General Nogovitsyn discussed threats to Russia’s information security in a lengthy 2009

interview in Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star). He defined information security as the “degree of

protection of our country’s national interests in the information sphere, which is defined by the totality

of a balance of interests of the individual, society, and the state, ensuring their formation, use, and

development in the information environment.”[311]

He defined informatsionnaya voyna (information war) (IW) as
Conflict among states in the information space with the objective of inflicting damage on

information systems, processes, and resources and on critically important structures,

undermining the political and social system, and massively brainwashing troops and the

population with the objective of destabilizing enemy society and the state as a whole.[312]

Nogovitsyn stated that the main task of IW is to “destroy the foundations of national self-awareness

and type of life of the opposing side’s state.”[313]

He added that in wars of the future, primary missions for Russia’s armed forced will be “the

disorganization of functioning of key military, industrial, and administrative facilities and systems of

the enemy and also the information-psychological effect on his military-political leadership, troops,

and population with the use of modern information technologies and means.”[314] Under the

conditions he laid out, he added

An information-psychological effect with the objective of shaping public attitudes in society

and society’s reaction to ongoing processes is acquiring ever greater importance in the political

sphere. In the economic sphere there is a growing vulnerability of economic structures to the

unreliability, delay, and illegal use of economic data. In the sphere of spiritual life and with the

help of electronic mass media, the danger arises of society developing an aggressive consumer

ideology, of the proliferation of ideas of violence and intolerance, and of other negative effects

on a person’s consciousness and mind.[315]

Nogovitsyn stated that the information weapon provides states with a method of gaining

advantages without a declaration of war. The human mind becomes the objective and it is affected by

information technologies and not force. However, in the military sphere, a war’s outcome will now

depend to a greater extent on systems that control reconnaissance, electronic warfare, command and

control, and precision-guided weapons.[316] These are the dangers to Russia in the informationpsychological and information-technical arenas.

Without information security, Russia will face many problems. These include: equal cooperation

with other countries; difficulties in making decisions; a loss of credibility in state authority and in the

international arena; creation of an atmosphere of tension and instability in society; an imbalance in the

interests of the individual, society, and state; the provocation of social, ethnic, and religious conflicts;

the initiation of strikes and mass disorder for no apparent reason; and the disruption of command and

control, military systems, and facilities.[317]

In another 2009 example, M. M. Taraskin and S. A. Cheshuin wrote an article for the journal

Vestnik Akademii Voyennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Sciences) that offered a

rather strange combination of US and Russian definitions to define IW (authors used the term,

informatsionnoe protivoborstvo). The authors began by describing the breakneck speed of

computerization and informatization that is creating, in their opinion, a single world information

space in which all the means of gathering, collecting, processing, exchanging and storing information

will be accumulated. The authors worry over unauthorized outsider access and destructive actions

that can create major problems for the information infrastructure and for information security. Further

the authors note that the cyber systems of the Russian Federation and its allies are currently being
actively targeted.[318]

Taraskin and Cheshuin note that Russia has adopted a number of key conceptual documents in

which specific information threats to national security can be found. These documents are the

National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,

and the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

The National Security Concept clearly identifies the information threats to the country as the

ambition of some countries to dominate information space and exclude Russia from the external and

domestic information markets; the application of information warfare concept by a number of

countries to build the means to compromise other countries’ information spheres; and the disruption of

information and telecommunication systems and information security breaches and unauthorized

access to those systems and information.[319]

There is much study underway in Russia on the issue. Those engaged in the study include Academy

of Military Sciences scholars Army General M.A. Gareev; retired (now deceased) Major General

V.I. Slipchenko; Doctor of Military Sciences S.A. Komov; Professor V.N. Tsygichko, Member of the

Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and Doctor of Technical Sciences; and Professor V.V.

Krysanov, Doctor of Military Sciences. Reality itself makes this area of study a priority not only in

the immediate future but also today and forces Russia to consider developmental options for its

Armed Forces.[320]

The authors define information warfare as a “struggle in the information sphere to impact the

opposing side’s information objects and protect one’s own information objects from such

impact.”[321] This definition is almost identical to a US definition from a few years ago. Further, the

authors note that information warfare uses information weapons which are defined as “all the means

and methods of impacting information, information-psychological, and information-technological

objects and information resources to achieve the objectives of the attacking side.”[322] This

breakdown is exactly how IW has been described in Russia over the past ten years.

However, Taraskin and Cheshuin then state that “the US Armed Forces Information Operations

doctrine encompasses and is being realized in two main areas (aspects) – psychological and technical

(technological).”[323] No US definition breaks IW into these two areas. Thus the authors not only

offer a Western definition of IW but then try to explain the Western model through a Russian paradigm

(information-technical and information-psychological).

The authors state that the psychological aspect of information warfare involves “wide use of the

media (the electronic media first and foremost) to impact the consciousness of social objects, which

include individuals, different size social groups, the population of various countries, and the world

community as a whole.”[324] The technical aspect involves “using specific software and various

information technologies to disrupt the mass media, automated command and control systems,

communication links, and military and civilian information networks.”[325] In short, this is an

explanation of US IW via the Russian model.

In 2010 one of the authors of Russia’s 2000 Information Security Doctrine wrote a pamphlet titled
Gosudarstvennaya Informatsionnaya Politika: Osnovy Teorii (Government Information Policy:

Basic Theory). Author A. A. Strel’tsov’s work had three sections. The first section discussed the

struggle for the right to use public authority resources for solving the most acute social development

problems based on two measurements of government information policy and its nature—social and

subjective. Strel’tsov writes that the nature of government policy in social measurement lies in the

legitimate use of public authority resources to unite people for the public good, which includes

preserving the cohesiveness of society and ensuring its effective development. Further, the nature of

government policy in subjective measurement lies in the use of legal and organizational mechanisms

of public authority to realize the ideological visions of the policy agent holding public authority on

rational mechanisms for resolving the sharpest social development conflicts.[326]

The second section offered methodological approaches to explain government information policy

through its goals, tasks, principles, and trends (the latter being the formation of a value system for

social development, information support of government policy, and methods of information warfare

against provocations and threats related to both subjective and objective factors of social existence

and development). The third section explains legal and organizational forms of government

information policy. Appendices list high-priority scientific problems related to government

information policy and basic terms used in this text.[327]

Strel’tsov defined several terms and used informatsionnoe protivoborstvo to state information

war (or more literally information confrontation). He stated that military-technical information

warfare is waged with the use of specialized information and communications technologies (called

“information weapons”) to breach the stability and security of the operations of a national information

infrastructure. The main objective of warfare is manipulating the integrity of information and

communications systems and network systems of the opposing side. What is occurring is an arms race

in the field of “information weapons.” [328]

The majority of Strel’tsov’s focus, however, was political information warfare (again,

informatsionnoe protivoborstvo). It is waged as “soft power.” Activities of legitimate policy agents

are aimed at countering threats of illegitimate political forces infringing upon policy independence.

These activities are designed to influence the development and outcome of a political struggle to help

one side either take control of public authority or use this authority to resolve specific political tasks.

The main objective of this kind of warfare is public support.[329] It follows from this that “the task

of political information warfare lies in neutralizing or reducing the danger of threats from the spread

of harmful ideologies and religious teachings, as well as from the spread of disinformation throughout

national and international communities on issues related to implementing government policy.”[330]

Strel’tsov defined a few other terms as well. He stated that an information operation was

“activities coordinated in terms of time, efforts, and objectives performed by agents to implement

government information policy over a relatively long period of time that are directed at carrying out

mid-term or short-term political tasks.”[331] This form is used to neutralize the threat of information

actions taken by foreign states and extremist organizations to discredit government policy measures.

Information warfare (informatsionnoe protivoborstvo) was defined as “conflict interaction in the

information sphere between legitimate (acting in accordance with the norms of national law) and

illegitimate (acting outside the national legal framework) policy agents; activities of government
agencies related to neutralizing or reducing the danger of threats from the spread of harmful

ideologies and religious teachings, as well as from the spread of disinformation throughout national

and international communities on issues related to implementing government policy.”[332] Strel’tsov

also listed what he termed “high-priority scientific issues related to government information policy.”

They are listed at Appendix One.

Vladimir Pirumov took a more comprehensive approach to the concept of IW. Pirumov is truly a

renowned information security specialist in Russia. Born in Armenia in 1926, his biography notes that

he “has expended, at public expense, fourteen years in satisfying his curiosity in discovering the truth

about military-naval science and art, during which time he came to understand that the primary work

of his life was cybernetics and even more, its applied aspects.”[333]

Admiral Pirumov served 39 years in the Soviet armed forces, starting his service in 1941. As a

Department Chief of “Radio-Electronic Warfare-Navy” he developed the electronic-fire concept of

naval forces during sea battles. For eleven years he served on the Navy’s General Staff as the Chief

of Radio-Electronic War (REW); and for eleven years he served as the head of the REW department

of the General Staff Academy. During this time he developed the methodology for coordinating REW

activities among the branches of the Armed Forces. [334]

In 1990, he was elected as a corresponding member of the Section on Information and Cybernetics

(in the theory of decision-making) at the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences. In 1992 he became

the Chairman of the Geopolitics and Security Section of the Academy; and on 1 November 1993 he

was appointed as the Chairman of the Scientific Committee of the Security Committee of the Russian

Federation by then President Boris Yeltsin.

His scientific writings have included work on parity, defensive sufficiency, geopolitics, national

security research methodologies, electronic warfare, command and control warfare, non-lethal

weapons, and numerous other information-related topics. He was one of the most authoritative

persons initially to define the term informatsionnaya voyna (information warfare), which he defined

as:

a new form of battle of two or more sides which consists of the goal-oriented use of special

means and methods of influencing the enemy’s information resource, and also of protecting

one’s own information resource, in order to achieve assigned goals.[335]

For strict wartime scenarios, Pirumov offered a definition of information warfare that aimed at

gaining an information advantage on the battlefield:

Information warfare in operations (combat actions) is the aggregate of all the coordinated

measures and actions of troops conducted according to a single plan in order to gain or

maintain an information advantage over the enemy during the preparation or conduct of

operations (combat actions). An information advantage assumes that one’s own troop and

weapon command and control components are informed to a greater degree than are those of the

enemy; that they possess more complete, detailed, accurate, and timely information than does

the enemy; and that the condition and capabilities of one’s own command and control system
make it possible to actualize this advantage in the combat actions of troops (forces).[336]

Admiral Pirumov played a major part in developing his academy’s dictionary of geo-political

terms. The dictionary was edited by Colonel General Valeriy Manilov, at the time the first deputy to

the Minister of Defense of Russia. The dictionary defines IW as:

An inter- or intra-state information struggle that involves methods which damage or completely

destroy the information environment of the opposing side. It is an information influence on

various spheres of societal and governmental activity, a system of measures to capture the

information resources of a state and key positions in the informatization sphere.[337]

Most recently, in 2010, Admiral Pirumov wrote a volume titled Informatsionnoe Protivoborstvo

(Information Confrontation) that deserves more focused attention due to its contemporary nature. In

this volume he still used the Russian informatsionnaya voyna for information war. General of the

Army (retired) and former Chief of the General Staff, Vladimir N. Lobov, wrote the Forward to the

book. He noted that the volume addresses

the variety of information confrontation aspects to be involved in conflict situations of the

future, the interrelations between information security on the one hand and geopolitics and

national security on the other, as well as the capabilities of the individual, society, and the state

to respond to the challenges of information crises and information terrorism...[338]

Pirumov defined information war, information confrontation, information struggle, and information

resources (among several other information-related terms such as information weapons) in his work.

These four are defined as follows:

· Informatsionnaya voyna (information war) means actions and measures used both in

preparations for and during war to achieve strategic supremacy over an enemy in the

information sphere by influencing its information and communication means, as well as state

and military control systems and objects, given the arrangements to be made to protect one’s

own information objects against similar enemy arrangements.[339]

· Informatsionnaya bor’ba (information struggle) is a set of information confrontation and

information protection measures and actions carried out to a single scheme or plan to gain

and hold possession of information superiority over the enemy in preparing for or

conducting combat in an armed conflict and in the specified information space.[340]

· Informatsionnoe protivoborstvo (information confrontation) means struggle in an

information sphere that suggests integrated destructive influence on the opposing side’s

information, information systems, and information infrastructure with simultaneous

protection of one’s own information, information systems, and information infrastructure

against such influence. Here the objective is to gain and keep information superiority over

the opposing side.[341]
· Informatsionnyy resurs (information resource) is an array of topically purposeful

information that is arranged to specific principles. Such information is acquired and built up

in the process of scientific development, practical human activities, and the operation of

special data acquisition, processing, and storage devices, recorded on various media that

enables information transmission to users in time and space for solving different tasks.[342]

Pirumov divided his book into three sections. Section One discusses the ideological aspects of

information confrontation. He begins his volume with a discussion of the historical aspects and

background of information confrontation. He traces the concept from the time of Sun Tzu through the

Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. He next discusses the general and applied aspects of the topic as

well as a host of related topics: information confrontation’s types and forms, means and goals, laws

and principles, and categories. He also discusses information weapons and non-lethal weapons.

Section One closes with a discussion of technical and psychological means of information influence.

Section Two is the most important section of the book since it is here that the topics of information

war and information struggle are discussed in more detail. Also covered are information crime and

information terrorism but not to the same extent as the other two topics. Admiral Pirumov writes that

information is a decisive factor of modern geopolitical rivalry both for its destructive power and its

ability to serve as an “influence weapon.”[343] Information war means “a combination of activities

and measures aimed at gaining information advantages over the potential or real enemy.”[344]

Information war consists in

Securing national policy objectives both in peacetime and wartime through means and techniques

of influencing the information resources of the opposing side, as well as through the protection and

effective use of one’s own information resources.[345]

Information war’s content consists of information support, influences on an enemy’s information

system or psychic condition, and protection of one’s own information systems and the psychics of the

population against enemy influences in the social psychosphere.[346] It is organized and conducted

“against a particular information object that ensures control of decision-making in a specific area of

the opposing side’s activities.”[347] This focus on the psychosphere is a very Russian approach to

the element of IW. The topic faces far less scrutiny and interest in US military and governmental

circles.

Admiral Pirumov then focuses attention on the following elements: the transformation of the human

subconscious; the increased density of information influences on human subconscious; the ability to

reproduce an individual’s action that are stereotypes of their conscious actions; and the reflexive

control (a Russian term similar in meaning to the US term “perception management”) of the

behavioral reactions of an individual to cause desired actions.[348] Pirumov describes psychological

information influence techniques as disinformation (deception), manipulation (situational or societal),

propaganda (conversion, separation, demoralization, desertion, or captivity), lobbying, crisis control,

and blackmail.[349]

When discussing the modern content of an information struggle, Admiral Pirumov states it is

“seeking to secure in as short a time as possible access to required and reliable information and its
comprehensive use while simultaneously seeking to hamper to the maximum extent an enemy’s access

to such information and thereby break down enemy information systems, as well as force the enemy

into using fake data leading to mistakes in decision-making.”[350] During peacetime the information

struggle is hidden while in wartime it is conducted full scale without any restrictions. Task-solving

information struggle techniques are accomplished by force, by intellectual means, and by combined

techniques while methods of influencing military information systems include physical elimination or

the interdiction of functions, electronic suppression, software/hardware influences, distortion of

information, and psychological influence on top officials and operators. With regard to the technical

aspect of the information confrontation, the saturation of weapons with information components helps

integrate reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire systems, to include real-time detection and

identification of enemy targets, target-designation support of weapons, and the delivery of precision

strikes.[351]

Section Three concludes the book with a description of the future of information confrontation.

Admiral Pirumov notes that future wars will be characterized by changing laws of geopolitical

competition and changing structures of armed forces and thus armed struggle.[352] At one point he

notes that “wars of the future may be started and practically ended in a protracted air and space

operation conducted in parallel with an operation of strike and naval forces and information

confrontation operations.” The offensive operation will take 10-15 days for phase one (strikes on

retaliatory systems, destruction of critical military and defense industry facilities, etc.) and the second

phase 50-70 days with targets being economic, government, and control systems among others. Other

activities include electronic strike disinformation, activities in support of information operations

(especially special psychological information operations), and so on. Air and space operations will

be conducted in conjunction with psychological operations.[353]

In the book’s conclusion, Admiral Pirumov notes that information confrontations will witness an

increase in the struggle for access to control systems, the enforcement of one’s own warfare rules on

the enemy, and a reliance on superiority in military technology. The so-called apex of information

confrontation will culminate in “the erection of a global combat strike information system of the

country and armed forces capable of controlling the status and activities of friendly troops and

reducing the efficiency of enemy armed forces operations.”[354] Perhaps this is the goal of the

information-strike complex that other Russian scientists are describing in recent works.

For historians, Pirumov’s book offers several important snapshots in time regarding the

progression of the IW concept. For practitioners, the work is full of insights as to the importance and

value of information confrontation. A truly Russian methodology of thought on the topic is presented

with the types, forms, categories, and applied science approaches integrated into the discussion.

2008-2009: Military Generals Speak at Public Forums

Press reports in early 2008 indicated that Russia was ready to put a more public face on its

information operations concept. An unattributed Internet commentary stated that General Alexander

Burutin, the assistant chief of the Russian Federation’s general staff, implied Russia’s armed forces

had begun developing conceptual solutions, elements, and techniques for the conduct of information

operations in wartime and peacetime. Other nations are doing so and Russia cannot afford to be left

behind, the general noted, adding “It [an information weapon] does not destroy the enemy, it does not
require the creation of complex structures, and in the process there is no need to cross borders.”[355]

Targets of information weapons include telecommunications equipment and “people and their world

view.”[356] Burutin believes that non-governmental organizations are using these weapons to form a

negative image of Russia around the world.[357]

ITAR-TASS, on the same day, also quoted Burutin, this time as saying “In the foreseeable future,

the final aims of wars and armed conflicts will be achieved not so much by destroying the troops and

forces of an adversary, as by suppressing its state and military command, navigation and

communications systems, and influencing other information facilities on which the stable government

of a state depends.”[358] In other words a key method to destabilize a state is through the use of

information technology. In addition, organizational weapons such as creating an enemy image of

Russia and constructing counter-propaganda against Russia’s citizenry are being attempted. Russia

must construct counters to these principles that are designed to divide and conquer Russia’s citizenry

and influence them to enjoy another way of life.[359]

A year later and some five months after Russia defeated Georgia in the 2008 conflict, Burutin

stated that the Russian general staff recommended the development of an international mechanism to

make states responsible for unleashing “information war.” Obviously, this would be a very difficult

mechanism to develop since each state has differing concepts of what information war does and does

not include. Making states responsible for developments in their information space, in an age of

anonymous attacks and the ability of actors in one state to use servers in other states, appears to be a

non-starter until technology advances to a point where the origin of attacks can be pinpointed.

Burutin’s statement that it is necessary “to move from the analysis of challenges and threats in

information security to response and prevention” may not be possible.[360]

A month after Burutin’s statement, deputy chief of the General Staff Colonel General Anatoliy

Nogovitsyn stated that it was necessary to develop a strategy of information defense for Russia since

all countries are developing such capabilities. Russia must provide for its information security or the

country will not be prepared to counter future threats. Nogovitsyn noted that

The main tasks in information warfare will be destroying the functioning of key military,

industrial, and administrative sites and systems of the enemy, as well as inflicting information

and psychological damage to his military and political leadership, troops, and population,

primarily using modern information technologies and tools.[361]

Independent journalists drew many of the same conclusions and then some. Dmitriy Litovkin,

writing in Izvestiya (News) in February 2009, stated that Russia may be drawn into an information

war in two or three years. He wrote that Nogovitsyn believed the General Staff can create a warning

system for detecting and identifying problems with the work of information networks and softwareprogramming issues. This is why Russia is drawing up a plan for information defense.[362]

Another agency, the Federal Security Service (FSB), had problems with the statements of these

generals. In what appeared to outsiders to be a turf war, the FSB asked how the General Staff can

make such statements about information defense. For the FSB, cyber issues are the purview of several

departments and not just the General Staff, especially as these decisions pertain to those made in the
Security Council. Further, the FSB has already created some information-protection mechanisms.

[363]

Network-Centric Warfare (NCW)

The network-centric warfare concept has undergone discussion for several years in the Russian

military press. The journal Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), for example, produced nine articles

on the topic or on ideas closely aligned with it. These were:

· 10/2004: A. Yu. Samarin and G. E. Knauer, “The Question about the Formation of a Single

Information Space in the Armed Forces”

· 3/2005: A. V. Raskin and V. S. Pelyak, “On Network-Centric Warfare”

· 1/2006: Yu. E. Gorbachev, “Network-Centric War: Myth or Reality?”

· 7/2006: M. M. Khamzatov, “The Network-Centric War Concept and Its Impact on the

Character of Modern Operations”

· 9/2008: B. F. Cheltsov, “Approaches to the Creation of a National Aerospace Defense

System under Conditions of Future Network-Centric Wars”

· 4/2008: A. V. Raskin and V. S. Pelyak, “Military Art: On the Question of Net Warfare”

· 12/2008: A. E. Kondrat’ev, “General Characteristics of Net Architecture, Used to Realize

the Perspective of the Netcentric Concept of Major Foreign Countries”

· 11/2009: A. E. Kondrat’ev, “Difficult Questions Regarding the Research of the New

Network-Centric Concept of the Armed Forces in Major Foreign Countries”

· 2/2010: B. I. Kazar’yan, “Operations, Military Activity, and Network-Centric War”

The ongoing debate over the concept has both advocates and protagonists. Essentially, the current

Russian military elite (to include the President and Prime Minister) are the advocates. They recognize

that in contemporary (and future) warfare speed and integration of effort matter in all aspects:

uncovering an enemy, reacting to a threat, and recovering from the expenditure of resources. Some of

the protagonists are the older military elite who are not convinced that NCW is a useful concept.

Two figures stand out as advocates: Lieutenant Colonel A. E. Kondrat’ev and Professor Vasiliy

Burenok. Kondrat’ev writes primarily for two audiences: those who want to know how NCW has

worked and helped the US, China, and other nations (with the majority of these articles appearing in

Zarubezhnoe Voennoe Obozrenie [Foreign Military Review] and Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kur’er

[Military-Industrial Courier]); and those who want to know how NCW might help Russia. He also

discusses problems associated with the informationization of the armed forces (and NCW) for

Russia.

Kondrat’ev notes that Soviet style command and control involved a low level of information

exchange. Perhaps for this reason Prime Minister Putin is so personally interested in modernizing

Russia’s command and control assets to improve this area. Kondrat’ev also stated that in the US and

Chinese armed forces, a move to NCW preceded a move to a brigade structure. In this sense, the

Russian armed forces are doing things in reverse order, struggling as they are to create a NCW

concept to fit a brigade structure already in place.[364]
Kondrat’ev states, however, that just because NCW is painful and protracted does not make it any

less important. This is a revolutionary concept that reduces the cycle of battle management in

operations. All combatants must be integrated via information space as this allows intelligence and

knowledge to be shared. Further the time phase of the observation-orientation aspect of an event is

shortened due to the digital circuitry of NCW, allowing commanders to make decisions more quickly.

The kinetic aspect of future war also would be strongly influenced by lasers and nanotechnologies

(see Chapter Eight for a further discussion of the impact of these variables on future war).[365] In

other works, Kondrat’ev wrote that Russia must keep pace or fall behind the advances made by

foreign armies in the NCW concept. He offered as an example the inability of Russia to produce

domestic unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and concluded that Russia must rely on foreign purchases

to catch up with other nations in the short term. His 11/2009 article in Voennaya Mysl’ (Military

Thought) discussed US NCW doctrine at length, especially the concept of a center of gravity on the

network.

Burenok, on the other hand, writes directly that Russia needs NCW as a priority development if

Russia is to remain competitive in the information age. He is upset that so many people try to confuse

Russia’s leadership and direct funding away from NCW. He regards the appearance of these mixed

emotions about NCW for two reasons: that Russia lacks proper theory in this area and that Russia has

little practical experience with warfare other than Chechnya over the past twenty years. For Burenok,

NCW is a war of intellects (both human and computer codes) that involves acting faster than the

enemy and making decisions before the enemy (based on accumulated evidence from sensors and

other resources). This fits with his definition of information superiority, a “game of staying a step

ahead of the other guy.” The technological components of NCW, which includes automated command

and control systems, must be integrated if the concept is to be truly useful. This appears to be

happening if one is to consider the development of Russia’s C4ISR complex into a complex designed

to deliver an information-strike (see Chapter Seven on Russia’s C4ISR concept for details). The

weakness in the NCW system, Burenok adds, is whether information streams can be interdicted.[366]

Colonel Yury Gorbachev wrote that NCW is a reality. However, he added that “only a combat

command and control system of one or another military unit can be represented as such [here he

means as a model of a war]. It is all the more so for the fact that a war is not ‘a ramified network of

well-informed but geographically dispersed forces;’ rather it is their combat employment and

information support for them in a campaign or operation.”[367] Therefore his opinion lay somewhere

between an advocate and a protagonist.

Gorbachev noted that a qualitative transformation in information technologies is causing a

fundamental change that is affecting weapon systems, combat equipment, and control systems. This in

turn leads to changes in military affairs as a whole and to new forms and methods of combat

operations. These operations are directly affected by the new amounts of information that are used in

making fast and precise decisions. Real-time information reflecting the operational situation at a

given moment is now crucial to success or failure. Contemporary problems affecting a commander’s

decision process include:

· The growing dynamics of combat operations

· The growing chance of waging “stand-off wars”
· The growing chance of control systems becoming disabled

· The chance of information becoming distorted or disrupted

· The decreased reliability of separate platforms along with low carrying capacity

· Inadequate mobility

· The tension between centralized command and lower level initiative

· The brevity of instructions versus portraying a complex situation

· The issue of prioritizing objectives versus choosing ways and means.[368]

These problems can be reduced if not alleviated in some instances by the use of command and

control techniques. Gorbachev writes that NCW is a reality, not a myth, but it is really a new form

and method of command and control using integrated information space formed in near-real time.

In closing Gorbachev asks how Russia can disorganize the command and control assets of a

potential adversary who uses this concept. In answering his own question he notes that it is necessary

To adopt measures in order to improve the systems and assets of reconnaissance, electronic

warfare, communications, command and control, and weapons and to develop information

weapons and directed energy weapons capable of disrupting the operation of automated

databases and computer networks and disabling the main enemy command and control and

reconnaissance components.[369]

Protagonists within Russian military circles debated whether the NCW concept could be

realizable before lasers or nanotechnologies become the next big element in the ongoing revolution in

military affairs. If leaders gamble and wait for the latter to appear, the interim period of stability must

be filled with some type of asymmetric (unexpected) response to offset the NCW advantage. For the

short term, the asymmetric response appears to be a combination of electronic warfare and inserting

disinformation into information flows, causing enemy forces to make decisions based on bad

information. Otherwise competing nations will continue to get just that much further ahead of Russia.

One NCW protagonist who wrote for Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) in 2010 is Colonel B. I.

Kazar’yan. He writes that war is “not a network phenomenon. It is impossible to embrace military

actions of the warring sides by a uniform network; it does not correspond to the essence of

war.”[370] Kazar’yan believes NCW emasculates the essence of armed adversary engagement.[371]

The interdependence of processes, conventions, and the use of probability, correlation, and other

assessments of events are not taken into consideration. As a result the subjective factor is

belittled[372] since NCW is almost “unmanned.” The concept regarding the forms and essence of

control is not included, and data content is fragmentary and superficial.[373] Kazar’yan offered

several new definitions and concepts: network-centric warfare, network-centric operations, networkcentric military actions, fire and strike net-centric contour, the network-centric principle “located—

crushed,” network-centric control, network-centric planning, and network-centric specific feature.

Kazar’yan concluded his article with this paragraph:

Philosophers and experts on informatics assert that the concept of NCW is a new philosophy of

war. Philosophical views on war alone are not enough for preparing and waging military
actions: the knowledge of the laws and principles of waging armed struggle is necessary. And

this is a subject of military science. This is why network-centrism in new conditions will

become a new specific feature of work of commanders and headquarters on organizing the use

of forces in operations. But emphasis on it will not exceed the significance of organizing

command and control, interaction, and the conduct of combat actions as a whole.[374]

Kazar’yan thus does not exclude the NCW concept completely but minimizes its importance.

Work is proceeding on command and control issues. A significant number of articles were

published on the topic over the past ten years, indicating that this topic was more germane to

correcting shortcomings in the Russian military. Of course, the latter topic is a key element of NCW

and should occupy a central place among theoreticians and decision-makers. General Nikolay

Makarov, Chief of the General Staff, wants Russia to have a new command and control system in

2011 that is a part of the network-centric concept. The military complex responsible for the system is

the Sozvezdiye concern.[375] Seven months later, President Medvedev offered a more realistic

timeframe for developing a new command and control system, noting that before 2012 Russia’s armed

forces must replace its analog communications with digital means.[376] The switch to a true networkcentric system where command and control assets are integrated into a single information space will

not occur until 2015 according to Makarov.[377]

Some analysts believe that NCW was a major part of Defense Minister Serdyukov’s reform effort,

tying the abandonment of the division structure and development of brigades to NCW as the US has

done. This argument makes a lot of sense to the current generation of leaders and may well be the

case as to why Russia is emphasizing this concept for its current leadership. The concept is opposed

by many of the officers of the generation who served in the 1980s and 1990s. Chief of the General

Staff Nikolay Makarov, in early 2010, stated in a speech at the Academy of Military Science that the

network-centric warfare concept is a new means of command and control using a single integrated

information-communication space formed in near real-time. NCW makes it possible “to shift away

from a war of attrition to fast moving and more effective military operations characterized by rapid

and flexible troop actions, rapid fire damage and self-synchronizing actions of troops and their

command and control.”[378]

Makarov listed three aspects of network-centric warfare. First, that troops quickly achieve

information superiority via the reception of relevant information, through an understanding of the

battlefield situation, and through the identification of friendly advantages and the adversary’s

disadvantages. Information superiority in technological terms is achieved through the adoption of new

command and control, monitoring, intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, computer simulation, and

information warfare systems. Second, it is necessary to implement the “massing of results rather than

forces” principle thanks to information superiority. Finally, an information attack denies the adversary

the opportunity to conduct successful operations and sends him into a state of shock. During the

period under consideration, combat will therefore differ significantly from the military operations of

past wars and from classic front operations. [379]

However, research continues in this area. In October 2009 at the Ladoga-2009 exercise, journalist

Olga Bozhyeva noted that the exercises were held to “study the transition to a new system of Armed
Forces command and control based above all on a transition to the system of netcentric

warfare.”[380] In mid October 2010, Russia tested its automatic command and control system with

maneuvers designed to “help assess the command’s ability to control the brigade’s units using a new

unified command system.”[381] The exercise was conducted a day after Communicator’s Day, which

falls on 19 October. On this holiday journalists were shown the First Communications Node of the

Russian Federation’s General Staff, a part of the command and control system of the armed forces. It

ensures the exchange of information between the Defense Ministry leadership and the General Staff.

The node has a 24-hour watch system that monitors command calls and issues written instructions.

[382]

In addition, the Russian armed forces expect to have in place a satellite group with advanced

signal processing capabilities by 2020, a plan to replace all radio stations by 2011-2014, and a plan

to have mobile communication centers in military districts and special troops by 2013.[383] Again,

the implementation dates for these updates indicate that Russia has a long way to go to implement

Serdyukov’s reform effort. But Prime Minister Putin is vocal in his support of implementing a true

overhaul in the command, control, and reconnaissance systems of the Russian military. His support,

especially the financial aspect, may be the most important push behind the success or failure of the

project. Regardless, the NCW concept appears a few years away from complete implementation.

The Impact of Putin

One of the clear motivators for Russia’s military to develop new technologies and equipment has

been the personal involvement of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Putin has chaired conferences and

meetings on modernizing the force. Space, reconnaissance assets, information technologies, command

and control equipment, and Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) have all been

areas of concern to Putin. His attention to detail in this regard even includes examining closely the

defense sector’s research and development results.

Another motivator has been the focus of Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov on the same issues.

Serdyukov obtained an advisor with the status of deputy minister for information and

telecommunications technologies. That advisor was Dmitriy Chushkin. Chushkin is responsible for

“increasing the effectiveness of the command and control system as well as supporting and

developing the basis of the command-and-control system.”[384]

Putin’s interest in rejuvenating Russia’s military-industrial complex began, of course, while he

was President. At one point he formed a high-technology council composed of leading designers,

scientists, and other experts. Council tasks included analyzing and formulating recommendations for

structural, innovational, and scientific technical policy; and for using Russia’s industrial potential to

develop the economy. The council also reviews technical, investment, and other programs, drafts, and

proposals of the government.[385]

One area where Putin has recently made a serious impact is in automated troop command and

control systems. The Prime Minister visited Voronezh in January 2010 to take part in a special

conference designed to provide the armed forces with new technologies and equipment. He was in a

serious mood as he had initially signed a directive to develop such systems in 2000 and very little

work had transpired in the ensuing years. It was reported that he met with researchers at the
communications scientific research institute, an enterprise associated with the Sozvezdiye

(Constellation) concern. It contracts orders for the development of unified troop command and control

systems which enables the control flow of reconnaissance, command, geospatial, and target

designation information.

Command and control equipment was identified as a major deficiency during the short August

2008 conflict with neighboring Georgia. The defense ministry immediately went to work to correct

problems associated with this equipment. The modified equipment’s first real test occurred during the

exercise known as Kavkaz-2009 which took place in July 2009. Initial reports indicated that the tests

did not go well since the system designated Akatsiya had persistent failures (of 280 computers and

palm pilots, there were 140 equipment failures and only 12 were operator errors). Akatsiya (based

on the 1998 vintage Akveduk satellite radio station) was the follow-on to the 1983 Manevr command

and control system and the 2000 Polet-K.[386].

It was reported that the command and control system is composed of two parts: the Akatsiya

automatic control system (it processes information from intelligence personnel and commanders) and

the Sozvezdiye unified tactical command and control system (it sends out orders to units). The

components display battlefield events in real time from unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles,

reconnaissance teams, forward air controllers, and others. The system is designed to integrate

intelligence. Currently each branch and combat arm has its own command and control system.

Experimental field operations are also underway for the unified tactical-link command and control

system or ESU TZ, created by Sozvezdiye.[387] It is the hope of engineers that the ESU TZ will

double or triple a unit’s capabilities and will reduce the time required to find and hit a target by a

factor of 40. The system uses fifth generation ultra-short wave digital radio stations that oscillate 100

times per second, making it difficult to detect.[388]

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Putin’s command and control modernization effort is the

amount of money allocated to the project. General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov stated in late

December 2010 that the armed forces intended to spend R300 billion (a little more than 10 billion

dollars) on a phased command and control system update to be completed by the year 2020.[389]

The Development of Information-Based Weaponry

Russian military leaders plan on providing the armed forces with high-technology weaponry. This

means equipping missile, artillery, and tank complexes with precision armaments or with new friend

or foe identification systems. Prime Minister Putin went a step further in 2009, stating that Russia

should develop offensive strike systems as well.

Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Makarov discussed one crucial area of interest. He noted in

September of 2010 that Russia continues its efforts to develop laser weaponry. Intended for mounting

on an Ilyushin IL-76 aircraft, this device is designed to counter adversarial reconnaissance systems.

The system has undergone successful testing according to Makarov.[390] Such pronouncements

indicate Russia is not only interested in laser research but turning research efforts into actual

products. In Soviet days the Almaz, Altair, and Raduga design bureaus were famous for their work on

combat lasers and that interest and expertise has continued up to today. Ruslan Pukhov, director of the

Moscow-based Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technology, noted that it would be foolish to
abandon technologies where potential adversaries rate you highly.[391]

It should be remembered that the USSR had instituted its high frequency active auroral research

program (HAARP) in 1981 at its Sura facility. With Russia’s current fear of US advances in HAARP

technology, it would not be surprising to find ongoing research dedicated to developing similar

technologies. Russian suspicion of US programs has evolved to the point where some writers have

accused the US of using its X-37B unmanned spaceship to start the forest fires in Russia in 2010.

[392]

Another area worthy of further watch is unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Vladimir Putin signed a

directive in 2009 establishing the Vega concern which was to develop UAVs. Reports indicate that

over twenty Russian-made drones were tested at a range recently.[393] Usually Russian drones fall

into one of three categories: tactical, strategic-operational (reconnaissance), or attack. They may

conduct reconnaissance or attack missions during conflict or monitor gas or oil pipelines or Russia’s

borders during peacetime.

The Istra Experimental Mechanical Works is building an electronic warfare UAV[394] while

several design bureaus are involved in the process of developing drones for the monitoring and attack

missions. The Luch Design Bureau produces the Tipchak reconnaissance system. The Kulon

Scientific Research Institute is producing the Aist UAV, a system upon which the Yuliya-E UAV is

supposedly based (the latter being the designated transmitter for the Iskander missile complex). The

Tranzas Company produces the Dozor-600 UAV, which is often compared to the US Predator. The

Bespilotney Sistemy Company is the designer of the Zala UAV. Several other companies in Russia are

also in the design business, so UAVs at the moment are a growth industry. The Pchela, BLA-07, and

Story-PD, among others, are also well-known Russian UAVs. However, from time to time Russia

either buys or attempts to buy Israeli produced UAVs so all is clearly not well within the industry.

The most advertised purchase was the sale of the Israeli Machatz-1 UAV.

Conclusions

Russia is in the process of integrating information technologies into its policies and doctrines.

Evidence of this fact is reflected in the content of national security documents and in the discussions

that military leaders are conducting on the pages of military publications. A closer look at the term

information warfare is also underway. Russia’s leaders recognize that future wars will be

characterized by changes in geopolitical competition and in the developing structures of armed forces

around the globe.

Network-centric warfare and command and control technologies are two areas in which Russia is

devoting focused attention. Russia’s leadership recognizes that these issues are key to maintaining

parity in the technological development of not just Russia but for any country. Prime Minister Putin

went a step further in 2009, stating that Russia should also develop offensive strike systems.

Russia has stated that the federal budget on defense will rise by 41% between 2011 and 2013.

[395] Much of this increase is expected to be spent on informatizing the military, whether it be

through command and control allocations or through money spent on protecting the space above

Russia (atmosphere, ionosphere, and magnetosphere). Russia needs the investment in defense
according to its leaders. President Medvedev has indicated as much as 85% of military

communications technology is outdated.

Other areas of investment will be command and control capabilities, UAVs, precision-guided

weaponry, and the GLONASS system of satellites, upon which much of the infrastructure depends.

These are not easy fixes. It will take time to implement Medvedev and Putin’s plan. But the plan is at

least underway with Defense Minister Serdyukov’s push.

Finally, some analysts believe that information space has become a theater of military operations

which is influenced by all of these developments. Whether Russia writes more on this topic remains

to be seen.[396] Regardless, progress is being made in informatizing the military but a long road

appears to be ahead of Serdyukov and his cohorts in the Defense Ministry even with the militaryindustrial complex operating at full speed.

CHAPTER SEVEN: RUSSIA’S NEW C4ISR: THE INFORMATION-STRIKE SYSTEM

All other things being equal, victory will be won by the side which has the greatest deep

reconnaissance capabilities and advantages in long-range weapons systems with information

links to reconnaissance, target designation, guidance, and command and control systems

forming precision weapons systems.[397]

Introduction

Evidence accumulated from a survey of Russian military periodicals indicates that the Russian

General Staff has worked feverishly on new-generation weaponry concepts for the past two decades.

One of the focal points of their research was the reconnaissance-strike complex, close in approach to

the US concept of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (C4ISR). The reconnaissance-strike complex conducts operational and perhaps even

strategic missions. For example, a former chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian

General Staff, Colonel General Viktor Mikhaylovich Barynkin, wrote in 1996 that operational goals

are now achievable just by the use of reconnaissance-fire operations (battles).[398] His comments

acknowledged that Desert Storm and other recent military operations demonstrated to Russian

theorists a cardinal revision of battlefield priorities. These included changes in the structure and

importance of the services of the armed forces, their technical equipment, questions of command and

control and personnel training, and the forms and methods of fire engagement. These changes enable

the further development of precision-guided weapons.

Russian Major General (retired, now deceased) Vladimir Ivanovich Slipchenko, writing on future

war in 1999, noted that any state unprepared to wage “new-generation”[399] war will be forced to

absorb the impact of an integrated precision weapon strike and electronic warfare operation. The

precision strike represents a combination of reconnaissance and command and control weapons

whose target kill effectiveness, according to Slipchenko, sometimes can surpass even that of tactical

nuclear weapons.[400]
These observations reflect the evolution of Russia’s reconnaissance-strike and fire planning. In the

past, this activity was called either the reconnaissance-strike complex (razvedyvatel’no-udarnnyy

kompleks or RUK) or the reconnaissance-fire complex (razvedyvatel’no-ognevoy kompleks or

ROK). At the start of the new century Russian theorists added the reconnaissance-strike system

(razvedyvatel’no-udarnaya sistema or RUS), the reconnaissance-fire system (razvedyvatel’noognevaya sistema or ROS), and the reconnaissance-fire operation (razvedyvatel’no-ognevaya

operatsiya or ROO)[401] to the RUK and ROK concepts. In 2009 two new concepts, the

information-strike system (informatsionno-udarnaya sistema or IUS) and the information-strike

operation (informatsionno-udarnaya operatsiya or IUO), were added to the inventory.

The discussion below explores the steady development of these concepts and serves as a

reflection of contemporary military-technical changes and their resulting impact on military art. The

polemic underscores Russia’s interest in developing effective reconnaissance- and information-strike

concepts to help them wage “new-generation” wars. The really significant section of this chapter is

the discussion of the information-strike and information-operation in the section titled “The

Information-Strike System or IUS.” Readers interested in the future of C4ISR in Russia should pay

particular attention to this section.

Background: Shifting from Complexes to Systems

One early definition of RUK and ROK is found in a 1985 Soviet-era issue of the journal Voyennyy

Vestnik (Military Bulletin). Information in the article was attributed to foreign sources, a common

Soviet practice to avoid revealing tactical-technical characteristics of their own systems. Authors M.

Belov and V. Shchukin defined these terms in the following manner:

If the strike element destroys the target by fire (for example with conventional or rocket

artillery), the complex is called a reconnaissance-fire complex (razvedyvatel’no-ognevoy

kompleks or ROK), while if it does so by a missile strike (tactical or army aviation, tactical or

operational-tactical missile launchers), it is called a reconnaissance-strike complex

(razvedyvatel’no-udarnyy kompleks or RUK). Therefore reconnaissance-fire complexes are

more of a tactical command resource while reconnaissance-strike complexes are operational

command resources.[402]

A strike as used by the Russian military refers to a massive, simultaneous attack that is like a

hammer and carries strong psychological overtones due to its destructive nature. Fire, on the other

hand, is more rhythmic and takes place over a period of time. Thus ROK appears as a conceptual

stepchild to RUK, with the latter much more mature and massive in nature.

One of the earliest formal definitions of RUK is located in the 1986 Soviet Military Encyclopedic

Dictionary. It served for many years as the Soviet and then Russian official definition of the term.

RUK was defined as:

A foreign term, abbreviated ‘RUK’. An integrated system that combines in a single system both

long-range precision weaponry and the combat assets that support it (reconnaissance, target

designation, navigation, information processing and imaging, communications, and commands).
Two types of RUKs are being developed in the United States, the Position Location Strike

System (PLSS), and the Assault Breaker (named after a program). The PLSS RUK is intended

primarily for reconnoitering and destroying enemy air-defense radar stations in a band about

300-360 miles wide. It is also used to combat other electronic assets and non-radiant targets...

The RUK Assault Breaker is intended primarily for engaging two echelons of enemy tank

groups at a depth of up to 120 miles from the line of troop contact and for guiding strike aircraft

and operational-tactical missiles to hit moving and non-moving group targets (each target may

contain up to 10-12 armored vehicles).[403]

Colonel V. G. Reznichenko, in the 1987 Soviet book Taktika (Tactics), pointed out that foreign

specialists considered RUK as the most effective way to employ high precision weapons tactically.

These complexes could detect, track, and destroy targets in real or near real time.[404] Reznichenko

indicated that RUK was intended for use against radio wave emitting targets (objectives), and it was

capable of destroying 150-180 targets in one hour. He wrote that the U.S. Armed Forces’ Assault

Breaker, the first practical attempt to create a precision weapon system in the US military, improved

that capability. It could destroy and annihilate a group of armored targets at a rate of 150-300 per

hour.

RUK subsystems usually included four integrated components according to Reznichenko: an

automated reconnaissance and guidance system; a mobile ground control center; high precision

weapons; and a system for precise determination of the locations of the system’s components. A

mobile ground control center for a RUK contained automated equipment that gathered and processed

reconnaissance data and generated commands to guide the warhead (missiles) to the target. The fire

control point used automated systems to generate fire information for artillery and rocket batteries.

High precision weapons included in reconnaissance-strike complexes were homing and guided

surface-to-surface and surface–to-air rockets and guided cluster bombs containing homing devices.

[405]

In a January 2000 article in Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest), Captains First Rank (equivalent of a

US Navy Captain) O. Berezin and B. Antonenko offered a more detailed discussion of

reconnaissance-strike definitions, defining both complexes and systems associated with

reconnaissance-strike activities. They defined a weapons complex as “a single combat module with a

specified purpose; an asset for the equipping, supporting, and training of personnel: a class of

armaments.” A weapon system was defined as “an aggregate of several combat modules of a single

or various specified purposes and consisting of the following: a part or nucleus common to all

modules; components that serve each type of weapon; the means for equipping, supporting, and

training personnel: a class of armaments.”[406]

Berezin and Antonenko did not define any “fire” related terms, focusing on only “strike” terms: a

reconnaissance-strike (defense) weapons complex and a reconnaissance defense/strike weapon (s)

system. The former was defined as follows:

Reconnaissance-strike (defense) weapons complex (razvedyvatel’no-udarnyy [oboronitel’ni]

compleks vooruzheniya)—an integrated weapons system consisting of precision weapons that

are either offensive or defensive and are combined into a single automated system; the system
uses information-guidance means to seek, detect, target and strike an enemy in real time: a subclass of armaments. Examples include the US Position Location Strike System (PLSS), the

Assault Breaker, and several kinds of anti-aircraft missile systems.[407]

This RUK concept appears capable of performing almost every mission for the Navy from surface

to surface attacks to surface to air missiles (SAM) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) defense.

The reconnaissance-strike system was defined in a slightly different manner:

Reconnaissance defense-strike weapon(s) system (razvedyvatel’naya oboronitel’no-udarnaya

sistema vooruzheniya)—a weapons system with precision and non-precision weapons that are

defensive or offensive in nature and consisting of several types; similar in its organization and

construction to a reconnaissance-strike (defense) system: a sub-class of armaments. For

example, the weapons system of a large-capacity combat ship. Their defensive and strike

weapons can wage effective combat against air, underwater, surface, or coastal targets.[408]

This concept does not appear to have a surface to surface role, only air defense artillery (ADA) and

ASW.

As can be surmised from the discussion above, Russians debate the actual wording of these

concepts. The reason for that debate is highlighted in the next section.

The RUK/ROK to RUS/ROS Evolution: Was it due to the Gulf War?

The rapid technological development and integration of precision weapons, reconnaissance assets,

and command and control systems forced armies worldwide to reexamine many of their operating

concepts. One of the catalysts for this reexamination was the Gulf War. Russia’s analysis of this

conflict found that the RUK (reconnaissance-strike complex) concept had been “intellectualized” (or

informationized) due to advancements in automated control systems and combat support systems

which assisted the multinational force fighting against Iraq. First, these advancements helped the force

make decisions almost in real time. Second, advancements allowed the force to integrate these

systems into a single reconnaissance, command, and engagement system which encouraged the

development of the RUS (reconnaissance-strike system) concept.

There are two methods of conducting a fire engagement, the selected-target engagement (engaging

targets of one or more vital combat systems) and the area-point engagement (engaging targets by

reconnaissance-fire systems at each troop level in its zone of responsibility). Russian experts

presumed that the precision fire engagement (vysokotochnyye sredstva ognevogo porazheniya or

VSOP) would represent the evolution of these concepts. It would have an operational-strategic or

even strategic character.[409]

Another catalyst that catapulted the RUS ahead of the RUK was the revolution in military affairs

(RMA) under discussion at the time. Russian analysts saw the revolution as transforming warfare

from a struggle of forces and means into a contest between systems. The term military systemology, in

wide use among Russian military systems analysts, describes the super-large, dynamic, complex

systems under consideration. The method of systemology, in fact, stands traditional analysis on its
head, emphasizing complexity and the need for models based on dynamic, evolving, self-organizing

systems and emphasizes a shift from modeling combat as force-on-force to system vs. system.[410]

The RMA’s influence was most apparent in new means of automated control of weapons systems

due to reconnaissance and electronic advancements. The combination of advanced automated

command and control systems and reconnaissance fire and strike systems negated conventional

correlation of forces methodologies (a force on force comparison of numbers) of the Soviet era by

making possible precision fire throughout the depth of enemy dispositions across a theater of military

actions. This change also was reflected in the literature of the time. For example, one source

described the tactical-technical characteristics of precision weapon complexes and the means and

methods to combat them. The discussion centered on how to use active and passive means to confuse,

disrupt, and destroy the aiming system of the weapon, that is, how to reduce the weapon system’s

accuracy.[411] General Slipchenko added another reason for the development of the ROS/RUS

concept—the appearance of strategic non-nuclear forces in a number of states. The weapons of these

forces include UAVs and long, medium, and short-range precision cruise missiles according to

Slipchenko.[412]

Discussions in the 1990s

Advancements in the systems approach was also reflected in military journals of the mid 1990s. In

a 1995 Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) article, Major General V. A. Denisenko, Colonel Ye. I.

Suvorin, and Major P. S. Romanov defined RUS as “carrying out in-depth effective engagement and

broad maneuvers of strikes, which is the main factor between success and failure in the struggle for

gaining and maintaining fire superiority over the enemy.” The Missile and Artillery Troops of the

Russian Ground Forces believed that such a mission would be assigned to integrated reconnaissancestrike complexes (RUK) to ensure autonomous reconnaissance of targets, among other issues.[413]

This could imply that the “complex” is a sub-component or element of a system since a weapon

system is defined as “an aggregate of weapons (complexes)...” (see footnote below)[414] Thus more

than one RUK may be located within the RUS, and the RUKs can retarget. Maneuver by ground forces

is replaced by maneuver by fire throughout the depth of deployment under such a concept.

There were RUK challenges to overcome in 1995. First was the ability to identify targets

accurately, quickly, and reliably. This requires high-resolution radar and a missile equipped with an

intelligence guidance system (intelektual’naya sistema upravleniya or ISU). A second problem was

the time to prepare and launch such missiles. Third, to engage moving targets, the missile’s artificial

intelligence control system must make optimum decisions to destroy a target.[415] To strike highly

mobile targets the ISU must make in-flight corrections.

The RUK had three parts to its integrated intelligence command and control system in 1995. First

was the command post that classifies targets (forces, weapons, and combat units armed with

precision guided munitions or PGMs) for destruction based on data from various reconnaissance

platforms. The second part was the integrated intelligence control of the high-precision missile

system of the RUK, which has two subcomponents: an intellectual launcher control system and an

intelligence guidance system located on the high-precision missile. The former is responsible for the

preparatory technical diagnosis of the launcher, and the latter is responsible for missions while in

flight (control over the ISU’s subsystems of flight control, target identification, and missile guidance
near the target). The third part of the RUK was the combat support operation section.[416]

The intelligence guidance system (ISU) subsystem enabled RUK to initiate an algorithmic antimissile maneuver sequence should an enemy attempt to shoot down the missile. When a target is

identified, the missile’s flight path is adjusted. If a target is not spotted, the ISU will search for

another target in the area and retarget the missile, selecting the most important target. The integrated

reconnaissance-strike complex thus allows decisions to be made in real time, the quality of command

and control is increased, and all means of reconnaissance, engagement, and other factors are

integrated into a single system. It ensures the move from automation to “intellectualization.”[417]

In 1998 Colonel General M. I. Karatuyev, commander in chief of the Russian Missile and Artillery

Forces of the Russian Federation, discussed the RUS concept. He stated that the timely

communication of reconnaissance target data is key to engaging targets effectively. This will require

the organization of reconnaissance, strike, and EW assets (and their effective interaction) in a

reconnaissance-EW and strike system within a combined arms formation. The point of the system,

Karatuyev noted, is to make optimal decisions on engaging targets effectively.

Slipchenko noted that

Reconnaissance-strike combat systems (RUS) based on space reconnaissance/information

systems as well as on ground, sea, air, and space-based precision weapons will find wide use

in future armed warfare. They will deliver effective strikes to the full depth of enemy territory

against fixed radio-frequency-emitting and heat-emitting economic installations, aerospace

defense assets, as well as targets clearly visible on radar.[418]

There were other opinions offered on varying aspects of reconnaissance issues. For example,

asked to mathematically demonstrate the integration of complex and system processes that lead from

“detection to kill” in near real time, one Russian scientist offered the following:

Destruction capability = exposure of an object (via satellite or reconnaissance asset) x strike assets

precision and speed of its components[419]

Acquiring and fixing the enemy in a manner compatible with this formula is a priority item. Even a

cursory look at Russian military writings underscores the importance placed on the acquisition of the

enemy’s location, followed by fixing the enemy through fire means. As one analyst noted:

The increase in fire capabilities of the troops, the appearance of high-precision weapons, and

the development of various types of guided missiles are objectively increasing the role of

reconnaissance and command and control systems. In conditions when the likelihood of hitting

targets with the first shot or salvo is approaching 1, reaction speed is becoming a paramount

factor. The main targets of battlefield reconnaissance are enemy artillery and armored

equipment.[420]

The Reconnaissance-Fire Operation (ROO)

Colonel General Barynkin noted that based on the importance of the ROS, future fire engagements
may take on an operational-strategic or even strategic significance. The large-scale employment of

PGMs will be coordinated by automated command and control systems that use artificial intelligence.

This allows for the introduction of the reconnaissance-fire operation (razvedyvatel’no-ognevaya

operatsiya or ROO). The ROO is the “aggregate of simultaneous and successive air, air defense, and

fire battles, engagements, and strikes coordinated and interrelated in terms of goals, missions, place,

and time and conducted jointly under a common concept and plan by groupings of reconnaissance, fire

engagement, and EW personnel and assets on one or several strategic axes for purposes of crushing

the enemy by fire.”[421] The most important goal in the reconnaissance-fire operation will be to

crush or to weaken groupings poised for combat especially in the initial period of war. Precision

weapon capabilities indicate that fire engagement methods will shift from successive engagements to

simultaneous, continuous engagement throughout the full depth of the enemy. Strategic and

operational-tactical means of long-range fire engagement and maneuver by fire will play the leading

role in the defeat of enemy forces while maneuver tactics of ground forces will play a secondary role.

[422]

Fire Destruction of the Enemy

The Russian concept “fire destruction of the enemy” (ognevoya porazheniya protivnika or OPP)

is a special topic of Russian military thought closely associated with the reconnaissance-fire and -

strike systems. Russian theoretical research in fire destruction norms and capabilities has focused on

raising the effectiveness of control during the course of military activities. This focus is necessary

due to the increased volume of impromptu fire missions; the rigid time limit allotted for decisionmaking and mission clarification; the increased intensity of information flows among various troop

command and control elements; the dynamically changing situation; and the limited amount of assets

allocated for addressing OPP missions.[423]

The OPP concept received much attention on the pages of the

Russian journal Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) in the mid 1990s. The journal carried seven

articles on OPP from 1994 through 1996. The discussion covered such aspects as whether fires

should be zonal or target oriented and how they can be integrated into successful combined arms

combat. One article noted that effective OPP “mainly depends on how quickly information from

reconnaissance agencies is transformed into command and control decisions that impact on OPP

assets.”[424] Another article noted that OPP can be used on many levels, from the strategic to the

tactical. For example, where there is superiority in long range weapon assets and time to achieve

specific military-political objectives, OPP can target an enemy’s military-economic potential, as well

as combat systems underlying its operational stability. The reconnaissance-strike operation (ROO)

would be used to accomplish this objective. It was developed for a large-scale war as a form of

employing a prototype combined-arms reconnaissance-strike system. The ROO could last from a few

weeks to a month or longer.[425]

General Colonel N.M. Dimidyuk, Commander in Chief of the Missile Forces and Artillery of the

Ground Forces, concluded the OPP discussion in Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought). He cited the

importance of OPP by drawing attention to its essence and content, noting that “under present

conditions OPP cannot be separated from the EW suppression of enemy command and control,

information, and reconnaissance systems and networks.”[426] This has led to the emergence of OPP

as “one decisive factor determining the course and outcome of an operation and often times of war as
a whole...”[427]; and to the use of OPP assets to “disrupt enemy troops and weapon command and

control systems at the very start of an operation, to inflict a decisive defeat on the main enemy forces

and logistical installations, and to seize and maintain fire superiority...”[428] through their

coordinated and massed use while attaining surprise. The main task is

coordination of the OPP plan with the operation’s objective, concept, and design, which can be

achieved only in the event that OPP planning is carried out by an operational (combined-arms)

staff command and control agency: the OPP planning and coordination group (OPP PCG)...This

will shift the center of gravity in OPP planning to the operational level...[429]

Dimidyuk concluded that “it is appropriate to use a single indicator that has a graphic physical

interpretation and is easily integrated into the operational criterion used in operation planning: the

force incapacitation rate expectation. It should objectively reflect strike, reconnaissance, maneuver,

and other capabilities of the forces in question that characterize their striking power in an offensive

and their operational sustainability in defense.” [430] In this sense not enough has been done to

substantiate the requisite correlation of the sides’ forces in operations of various types and scale,

when the combat capabilities of the forces are expressed through their combat potentials.[431]

The OPP discussion indicates that the most important targets identified through a study of military

art are those battlefield systems that work in tandem to first uncover and then destroy an object, the

reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire complexes and systems that make up the ROO.

Interestingly no stand-alone reference to a reconnaissance-strike operation (RUO) was discovered

in the literature search. A RUO would indicate an operational-strategic strike operation (perhaps

against a nation’s economic infrastructure) as compared to a ROO, a tactical-operational fire

operation. Instead, the RUO appeared to be integrated into the ROO concept. The latter concept states

that the ROO is the aggregate of fire battles and strikes.

The 2000-2010 Debate on the Evolving Nature of the RUS and ROO

In 2003 a few Russian officers began to discuss the necessity of compiling a better information

collection system for the RUS. Without such information effective strikes could not be delivered. The

following discussion is based on their proposal.

The proposed system was deemed the “reconnaissance-information field” and was defined as “the

sum total of reconnaissance information in an area of responsibility of a specific system (subsystem)

of reconnaissance forces and assets. The essence and content of a reconnaissance-information field

are either cue- or object-based.”[432] Output from a strike oriented reconnaissance system is used

for decision-making on the conduct of strikes against target locations. Missions, tasks and

capabilities, geographic and climatic features, operational-tactical standards of friendly and enemy

troops, views on the conduct of modern operations, and the current concept of organizing and carrying

out strike-oriented reconnaissance help determine the content of a reconnaissance-information field.

[433] These issues also indicate the rationale behind the operational strength and organizational

structure of such reconnaissance units.

Cue-based reconnaissance-information fields are forecasted based on modeling a potential
opponent’s combat operations. The model should

determine the location, condition, and nature of the operation of the adversary’s targets in time

and space down to a single item of materiel or a single weapon by taking into account the

adversary’s organizational structure, operational-tactical standards, and functioning and

deployment principles for forces and assets and the physical-geographical reconnaissance

conditions.[434]

Information compatibility issues arose as a significant problem area. For this reason in 2004

Colonel V. L. Komoltsev and Colonel P. I. Mikheyev discussed the requirement to create a

reconnaissance-fire system (razvedyvatel’no-ognevoy sistemy or ROS) absent of information

compatibility issues. They proposed an automated control system that would support internal

information integration. This would require an information service that would exchange data on a

planned basis; the replacement of existing manuals for ensuring information compatibility; an analysis

of the software created by Defense Ministry research establishments and defense complex

enterprises; the research and development of information-linguistic software for data exchange inside

systems; and the equipping of designers with modern certified software.[435]

In 2005, Colonel S. I. Matveyev discussed the transformation from the RUK/ROK organization to

the RUS/ROS. Reconnaissance-fire systems (ROS) will have high mobility and will be capable of

attacking targets three to seven minutes after detection with a fifty percent destruction potential. In

future operations, an obshchevoyskovoy razvedyvatel’no-ognevoy sisteme (combined-arms

reconnaissance-fire system or OROS) will be developed. The delivery of fires will be simultaneous

and not sequential and planning and target engagement will be continuous. [436]

In 2006, a specific set of tasks were offered as the main methods for improving the

reconnaissance-fire operations of missile and rocket forces. They were to develop digital processing

of reconnaissance data; to introduce new information technologies; to develop reconnaissance assets

to employ several detection channels; and to increase the secrecy of reconnaissance operations.[437]

In 2007, Colonel General Vladimir Zaritskiy, chief of the Missile Troops and Artillery, noted that

in the future his troops will meld with reconnaissance-fire systems and create a reconnaissance-firesystem configuration that includes all combined-arms levels from battalion to joint formations. This

will lead to new principles such as the reconnaissance-strike-maneuver as well as the reexamination

of topics such as exhaustion and suppression when destroying targets.[438]

In 2009, Major General Andrey Glinskiy, the Missile Troop and Artillery Commander of the Far

Eastern Military District, stated in an interview that the most serious task for his troops remained

obtaining and integrating modern reconnaissance and command and control systems into weaponry.

He hoped that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Tipchak, first introduced in 2008, would

significantly increase the size and accuracy of his zone of reconnaissance. Glinskiy noted that since

conflicts are changing from strictly contact to favor non-contact activities, that reconnaissance-fire

methods featuring deep strikes have become more important. Reconnaissance-fire systems will

encompass all combined-arms levels, from battalion to combined formations, and will include such

principles as reconnaissance strike-maneuver and salvo-target destruction. These systems will
increase a commander’s independence and initiative within their areas of reconnaissance and may

enable the operational centralization of all forces, weaponry, and equipment to resolve tasks in their

areas of operation.[439]

Movement also occurred in 2009 in the development of new concepts and terminology. This move

was influenced by the proposed nature of the use of armed forces in a future war, a move based on the

preemptive possession of information, planning, and real-time control that would enable measured

precision strikes and other activities. In early 2008, for example, four military officers wrote about a

concept known as the operating contours of reconnaissance-strike activities (operativnyy kontur

razvedyvatel’no-udarnykh deystviy or OKRUD). OKRUD is defined as

The integrated totality of various reconnaissance, software, strike, and countermeasure forces

and hardware that are covered by a common, uninterrupted, automated control in close-to-real

time. Integration creates continuity between the processes of reconnaissance of important enemy

facilities; the transmission, processing, and presentation of intelligence data; and the

identification, target indication, precision, and autonomous homing of guided weapons to toppriority targets.[440]

However, it was noted by the authors that OKRUD may not be called a network-centric or selfsynchronizing system since its functions of target recognition and strike decision-making remained

with representatives of reconnaissance and control bodies.[441] That is, they were not yet properly

integrated into a complete system.

The four authors of the OKRUD article added that the components of OKRUD are attack weapons,

software systems, planning complexes, and combat control, communications, and countermeasure

systems and hardware. OKRUD identifies targets, determines the advisability and procedure for

attacking them, assesses the conditions and capabilities of systems of attack, chooses an attack

complex, and inputs data into a missile’s onboard system.[442] Thus, OKRUD “can be viewed as a

form of organization of joint action by various weapons for attacking important targets in conditions

when initial information is not complete or precise enough and it must be refined in the course of the

attacks.”[443]

The Information-Strike System or IUS

Finally in 2009 three Russian military specialists discussed the progressive modernization of the

reconnaissance-strike complex. They noted that the topics of range and accuracy were visible in the

development of the following chain-like advancements: the reconnaissance-fire complex, the

reconnaissance-strike complex, the reconnaissance-strike system, and, most notably, the informationstrike system (IUS).[444] The latter was the result of the reconnaissance-strike complex acquiring a

“new quality.” Each of the elements of the chain was defined as follows:

· The reconnaissance-fire complex (ROK, range up to 30-40 kilometers, in the tactical zone)

is a fast reaction, standalone, artillery complex where reconnaissance, weapons, automated

fire control, and fire support complexes are integrated (for example, they are integrated in

the unmanned aerial vehicle Pchela-1 and the Smerch multiple rocket launcher system).

· The reconnaissance-strike complex (RUK, range up to 200 kilometers, in the “operational
zone”) is an automated weapons complex designed for the timely detection and fire

destruction of important enemy ground-based targets that use strike systems.

· The reconnaissance-strike system (RUS, range up to 500 kilometers [sometimes greater], in

the operational-strategic zone) is the aggregate of strike and support automated weapons and

military equipment complexes.

· The information-strike system (IUS, range over 500 kilometers, in the strategic zone) is an

automated weapon system designed for the highly-effective destruction of one, several, or

many facilities/targets using precision-guided strike weapons at great distances in

accordance with the operations plan or its concept of operations.[445]

These changes in range and accuracy are made possible by the availability of satellites and other

means of information-space support. This support allows for accurate target acquisition while

Russian units remain outside of the kill zone of the enemy’s traditional weapons. It also minimizes the

importance of the old concept of theaters of military operations that were carved out under

geographic considerations. Further, the interface between missiles and space-based systems that

improves range and accuracy is not restricted in any manner by existing treaties. Past arms control

treaties have only addressed the number of missiles, their flight range, and speed.[446]

The three military officers who wrote the article on IUS noted that the sequence of operations in

future wars will start with a preemptive information war to gain supremacy in political, legal,

psychological, and other non-military measures. Space operations will then precede air, naval, and

land offensive operations directed at gaining supremacy in near-Earth space to ensure the functioning

of Russia’s orbital constellations. The main missions of space operations will be to destroy an

enemy’s space infrastructure and to disrupt their command and control. Once the supremacy of space

information systems and independent military operations is assured in strategic space (meaning

offensive missions will predominate to gain the initiative in war), it is then possible to consider

defensive operations to defend information resources.[447]

These missions will be accomplished through the information-strike operation (IUO). The IUO is

The sum total of interrelated and coordinated operations based upon goals, missions, location,

time, and techniques for the conduct of information strike battles, information-weapon

engagements, and information strikes which are being conducted with the goal of disrupting the

enemy troops command and control and weapon control systems and the destruction of his

information resource. This is a new form of armed combat, the characteristic elements of which

are information strikes which transition in combination with fire impact into informationweapon engagements and information-strike battles.[448]

The IUO will be important in helping Russian forces gain the initiative in the information sphere.

This ensures troop and weapon complex command and control as well as reflexive command and

control of the enemy. The latter concept enables the management and control of adversary battlefield

perceptions.

The striking importance of this concept should not be overlooked. The Russian military may be

considering operational-strategic strike operations against the information infrastructure and
resources of potential adversaries. Russia’s desire to use the IUO as a reflexive control mechanism

that manages the perceptions of enemy forces is another issue worthy of future study.

Conclusions

The preceding discussion indicates the thorough manner in which the Russian military is examining

its C4ISR equivalent. It is composed of a series of confusing and overlapping terms, to include RUK,

ROK, RUS, ROS, ROO, OPP, OKRUD, OROS, ISU, IUO, and IUS.

Over the past two decades there has occurred a steady evolution from the ROK/RUK to the

ROS/RUS concept. The simple explanation for this progression is tied to two developments. The first

was the development and adaptation of new technologies and concepts in the Russian system of

military science. The second was the different situational context of the 1990s versus the 1970s. The

RUK concept was initially introduced during the time that the Soviet military leadership envisioned

nuclear combat even at the tactical level. This belief in the eventuality of a nuclear confrontation

lasted until the mid 1970s, when the Soviet military decided that conventional battle was more likely.

However, the chance of going nuclear remained. ROK was introduced to conduct the tactical fight at

the conventional breakthrough level. RUK was still needed to deal with the operational-strategic fight

and with the “conventional war under nuclear conditions” corollary.

With the introduction of a new type of weaponry, precision guided weapons, the ROS and RUS

were introduced. Precision-guided munitions were conceived as possible counters to nukes. Whole

battles between PGMs were envisioned in the 1990s when there was a desire to exploit new high

technology systems and the digitized conditions of future war. Precision weapons enable strategic or

strategic-operational results without troops ever crossing a border, as exhibited by the recent conflict

over Kosovo. This motivated Russia to develop higher-level technical systems for use at the

operational level of war. RUS and ROS appear to fit this requirement.

During the war in Chechnya, Russian troops experimented with reconnaissance-strike systems. As

one analyst noted about the Chechen test range for new weaponry:

A qualitative leap was the appearance of the ability for automated, real-time determination of

radio emission sources’ coordinates, and [the ability] to use them for target reconnaissance and

supplying targeting data for the artillery. In this way on the tactical and operational levels, in

essence for the first time, prototypes of reconnaissance-strike systems were activated,

significantly increasing the effectiveness of the fire destruction of the enemy.[449]

By 2009, however, a new system, the information-strike system, had been introduced along with

the information-strike operation. Some Russian authors believe that “in the future, a space strike

echelon which will independently accomplish combat missions and carry out combat support of the

operations of a land-based troop grouping from space, could become a new element of the

operational formation in a precision-guided battle.”[450] For these and other reasons, Russia will

continue to seek space and information supremacy. Information will become a topic of an independent

military type of comprehensive support in the sphere of military activity.[451]

Clearly the information-strike system and information-strike operation are concepts worthy of
closer examination. They offer glimpses into future war countermeasures and control systems as well

as theoretical insights into Russia’s understanding of the evolution of military art. Also worthy of

future study is the Russian concept of the reconnaissance-strike maneuver.

Other areas of consideration that Western analysts should seriously consider (repeated from the

discussion above for emphasis) include the following:

1. The importance of the old concept of theaters of military operations that were carved out

under geographic considerations has been minimized since targets can be acquired outside

of kill zones. Further, the development of an information-strike operation indicates that

Russian military planners are considering operational-strategic strikes against a potential

adversary’s information resources or infrastructure.

2. The interface between missiles and space-based systems that improves range and accuracy

is not restricted in any manner by existing treaties. Past arms control treaties have only

addressed the number of missiles, their flight range, and speed.

3. The sequence of operations in future wars will start with a preemptive information war to

gain supremacy in political, legal, psychological, and other non-military measures. Space

operations (perhaps the space strike echelon that can independently accomplish combat

support and combat missions as part of an operational formation in a precision-guided

battle) will then precede air, naval, and land offensive operations to ensure the functioning

of Russia’s orbital constellations. The main missions of space operations will be to destroy

an enemy’s space infrastructure and to disrupt their command and control. After the

supremacy of space information systems is assured, it is then possible to consider defensive

operations to defend information resources.

Thus, the conceptualization of future war by the Russian military involves interdicting and

degrading precision weapons and their digitized navigation processes while continuing to increase

the capabilities of Russian PGM systems. Maintaining space and information supremacy ensures that

strategic deterrence will remain an important component of strategic stability as the years progress. It

appears that Russia’s system of military science is methodically moving the military forward and

preparing it for future challenges and opportunities.
CHAPTER EIGHT: FROM RUSSIA, WITH ASYMMETRY: FUTURE WAR AND

NANOTECHNOLOGYBATTLES

In our time we should add the third measurement to “Napoleon’s Square”—informatics or

computer science (which is based on the army and weapons automation support and control

systems). Informatics is bound to sharply enhance intelligent and strong-willed activity

capabilities. Thus, the square turns into a cube...[452]

Introduction

One of the most important aspects of Russian military science is its tradition of predicting the

nature of future war. Future war predictions help determine the organization of Russia’s armed forces

and the types of weapons the organization will require.

This trend has continued after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russian scientists recognize that the

forms and methods of armed struggles continue to change. It is now important to examine how new

technologies have impacted war’s conduct and duration; and how these technologies are affecting

future war capabilities of potential opponents. For example, information technologies (IT) can

temporally interfere with an adversary’s coordinated moves over time as well as territory, presenting

military leaders with new challenges and consequences to consider.[453]

The following chapter examines the past decade for Russian writings on future war forecasts. First

the chapter examines the future war thoughts of several prominent Russian military scientists. Second,

some asymmetric concepts that are being floated in the Russian press are examined. These concepts

underscore Russia’s methodology for confronting superior foes when they feel they are clearly

inferior in terms of equipment and technology in future war scenarios. Finally, the chapter examines

the emerging Russian concepts for the use of nanotechnologies, an area of specific interest to Russian

futurologists. Asymmetrical approaches and nanotechnologies are important backdrop issues that

influence a Russian military scientist’s future war methods of operation, especially since the Russian

military still considers itself weaker than China and the US in the military sphere.

A Look at the Thoughts of Prominent Military Theorists

Russian military scientists’ are responsible for forecasting and projecting future threats to the

country and for developing Russia’s ensuing response. The examination in this chapter begins in 2002

and ends in 2010, covering a few selected works during this time span.

The background to Russian forecasting was discussed in a 2008 article in Voennaya Mysl’

(Military Thought). Major General (retired) I. N. Vorobyov, one of Russia’s most prominent military

theorists, discussed work by Soviet authors from the 1960s into the 1980s on the topic of forecasting.

He listed the following as the most prominent Soviet-era publications (articles and books) on the

topic:

· “Forecasting Science and Technology” by G. M. Dobrov in 1969

· A Window into the Future by I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada in 1970

· “Scientific Technical Forecasting in Industry” by V. V. Kosolapov in 1971
· “A Theory of Forecasting and Decision-Making” by S. A. Sarkisyan in 1977

· “The Theory and Practice of Military Forecasting” by M. I. Cherednichenko (no date

provided)

· Military Forecasting by Yu. V. Chuyev (no date provided)

· “A Methodology of Military Scientific Research” by Yu. B. Mikhaylov (no date provided)

· And Speed, Space, Time by I. G. Zavyalov (no date provided).[454]

Vorobyov called for the creation of a “workbook on forecasting methodology.” In his opinion the

forecasting methodologies developed to date are limited in their long-term forecasting ability. An

advanced methodology is required to correlate the interrelations and coordination of the various

elements required to produce an objective assessment of the future. He closed noting that futurology

arises from the principles of dialectics and is designed to unite theory and practice.[455]

Several well-known Russian theorists preceded Vorobyov’s thoughts on future war. After the fall

of the USSR, the impact of information technologies began to weigh heavily on analysts’ forecasts and

thinking about future war. Major General (retired, now deceased) Vladimir Slipchenko wrote often

on future war, starting soon after the coalition victory in Desert Storm in 1991. Slipchenko

immediately grasped the significance of the impact of information technology on the coalition’s

victory, on future war, and on the requirement for future forces to become highly mobile. Without

mobility, forces would be unable to avoid precision-guided weapons of the future. As a result he

wrote a book titled Beskontaktnyye Voyny (Non-Contact Wars) in 2001. In a 2002 article for the

Russian military journal Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest), he summarized some of the main points

of the book:

· Non-contact (which Slipchenko terms “sixth generation warfare”) war will acquire an

independent nature.

· The information weapon will have the ability to disable entire combat, economic, or social

systems.

· The possession of information resources will be the essential attribute of future wars.

· Information countermeasures will become a new strategic form of warfare, conducted

during periods of both peace and war.

· Information countermeasures will be closely associated with reconnaissance systems.

· Information countermeasure warfare will be conducted now and information war (“seventh

generation warfare” according to Slipchenko) will not be conducted for several decades.

· Wars will emerge to be not only operational and strategic but also planetary.

· Man will not be the primary target of destruction but an indirect target. The primary target

will be the destruction of structures and systems that support man’s lifestyle.

· Defensive components of non-contact war are operational and strategic camouflage; the

physical defense of information facilities; disinformation; and electronic warfare. Strike

(offensive) components include concepts such as information impact, information intrusion,

information aggression, and attacks on computer networks.

· Cyber war may acquire an independent character (separate but integrated into air, land, sea,

and electromagnetic forms of war).
· Electronic suppression remains the most important component of non-contact war and it

will become an independent type of countermeasure that may include new electronic models

of intelligence and the development of molecular computers based on organic materials.

[456]

General of the Army Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev, a former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of

the Soviet Union’s armed forces and currently the President of the Academy of Military Sciences, is

one of Russia’s greatest living military theoreticians. He has written or lectured often on the topic of

future war. Some of his most well-known works in the US are his 1994 lecture titled “Future Armed

Conflict” and his 1998 book If War Comes Tomorrow? The Contours of Future Armed Conflict.

Writing in Voennaya Mysl’(Military Thought) in 2003, Gareev updated his book with what he

termed the evolving characteristics of future war. He stated that Russia

· Should be ready to fight local wars and armed conflicts and, under certain circumstances, a

regional war

· Should focus on the initial period of war since a war’s beginning now may decide its

outcome

· Should be ready to use and confront indirect actions as much as direct actions due to the

enhanced nature of the information struggle that can subvert nations from within

· Should focus on the air and space theater of war as it is capable of striking deep inside a

nation and hitting all targets simultaneously (Gareev also warned not to forget the

importance of land forces)

· Should work to achieve control and coordination over all elements of its armed force

· Should realize that high-precision weapons change the nature of hostilities to a great extent

· Should place special attention on the antiterrorist struggle.[457]

Gareev was writing shortly after the US intervention in Iraq, a war that reinforced (as Desert

Storm had initially demonstrated) the prominent role of new precision technologies in completely

overwhelming an opponent.

As mentioned at the start of this chapter, the nature of future war is a very important aspect of

Russian military science, helping to determine the organization of Russia’s armed forces and the types

of weapons the organization will require. Gareev summarized the goal of military science in

forecasting future war in the following manner:

The main problem is to forecast the nature of future wars since correct forecasts alone can help

determine which armed forces and which troops will be required. It is not enough to merely

outline the nature of a typical war; there are many types of armed conflicts each of them with

unique features of its own. It is within the power of military futurologists to use extrapolation

and expert-heuristic approaches combined with forecasting and simulation of all sorts of

warfare to identify the general trends in which the nature of armed struggle is developing. One

should always bear in mind that there are objective laws according to which the art of warfare

is developing; and that each war while producing many new elements inevitably preserves
much from the past, what occurred in past conflicts.[458]

These tasks and laws, as well as Gareev’s focus on the initial period of war and on Russia’s

internal, moral-psychological state, were stressed by other writers as well in the years to come.

In 2005, Colonel P. A. Dulnev and Colonel (retired) E. A. Bryuzgin, writing in the authoritative

Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), stated that in the

past two decades, several factors had become apparent in warfare. First, wars are now asymmetrical,

that is, fought by adversaries with different technologies and different stages of development of their

armed forces in terms of weapons, forms, and methods of fighting. Second, while fought within one

theater of operations, wars are now utilizing assets from outside the theater. Third, the authors noted

that future wars will “not be caused by a single, even very weighty factor” but rather by a complex set

of issues. Finally, supporting Gareev’s conviction, Dulnev and Bryuzgin stated that future wars will

be influenced heavily by the seizure of the strategic initiative in the initial period of war when

resources will be brought into play. These resources include precision-guided weapons, information

warfare assets, and air assets. The goal will be to achieve objectives in a short period of time.

Military objectives have expanded to include a country’s economy, infrastructure, and civilian

population.[459]

Dulnev and Bryuzgin believe that future war will be determined by confrontations in aerospace

and information space, citing a growing interdependence of strategic, operational, and tactical

combat. It will be imperative to strike the enemy’s long-range weapons. Reconnaissance and guerilla

warfare will be considered as “conventional war” in the future. The four main stages of future war

will be:

· Seizing the initiative and superiority in the information sphere (to include the ability to

influence public opinion as well as troop and weapon command and control)

· Controlling aerospace

· Gaining superiority on land and sea

· Consolidating gains and creating conditions for achieving objectives.[460]

The authors write that the availability of assets to conduct information and propaganda work

among enemy troops and the population; and the ethical-psychological stability of top commanders

will also be very important.

Dulnev and Bryuzgin concluded that new principles in the art of war must be applied. They are,

first, that maneuver and the concentration of troops will be replaced with long-range weapon

“trajectory” maneuvers that deliver massive strikes against specific forces. Second, the armed forces

will be conducting extremely complicated strategic, operational, and tactical tasks simultaneously.

Third, offensive and defensive operations (to include fires and electronic attacks from the defense)

will further converge. Fourth, air assault troops will play a key role. Fifth, damage will be inflicted

on an enemy long before coming into contact with them. Sixth, it is more important than ever to

rapidly incapacitate an enemy’s political and economic system and infrastructure (as well as its

communication and electronic warfare systems). Seventh, the construction of a secure jam-proof air
defense system is vital to success. Eighth, the concealment of the onset and character of preparations

for an attack is necessary (such as through the use of an elaborate deception or disinformation

operation to mislead an opponent in regard to one’s real intent); and ninth, the massive use of ground

troops will still be necessary. These characteristics indicate that for the immediate future, war will be

a combination of traditional warfare and remote warfare.[461] Finally, the authors noted that enemy

use of non-lethal weapons and unknown methods, especially at the operational and tactical levels,

will be likely.[462]

In 2008, Lieutenant General S. A. Bogdanov and Colonel V. N. Gorbunov wrote a lengthy article

in Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) that identified future war trends. First, the authors stated that

the requirements of military science still need to be fulfilled, reiterating Gareev’s statement. These

requirements include identifying the conditions and factors affecting warfare and the patterns and

laws governing war’s origins, course, and outcome. A potential opponent’s political aims, military

potential, and the specifics of a theater of operations all influence the general character of future war.

Time has not affected the importance of these characteristics.[463]

Second, the authors believe that the exact character of future war is still not known since a new

world order and security system model have not been completed. There is still an ongoing fight for

spheres of influence, regional domination, and natural resources. This imprecise character of future

war includes the unknown final impact of information technologies on warfare.[464] These

technologies continue to inspire a new generation of weapons and ways they can be utilized. Finally,

future war also depends on a nation’s economic and military potential, on its international position

and the popularity of its policies, and on its plans for future war. These factors are still undergoing

development and change.

Some factors, however, have become identifiable to Bogdanov and Gorbunov. They listed six:

· Wars will use more artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, robot-controlled, and new

physical principle weapons, some comparable to the efficiency of nuclear weapons.

· The role of troops, forces, and weapons operating in aerospace will grow significantly,

where even the planet may be a theater of operations.

· The information component of war will grow in weight, where information superiority will

become a principal condition for successful military operations.

· Time frames of operations will change, with preparation time shortened and operations

carried out faster.

· Mobile operations will shift from rigid vertical control to automated global network systems

that control troops and weapons.

· The use of Special Forces will rise. [465]

There are few surprises in this list. The author’s stress on multi-dimensional actions involving

electronic, physical, and information warfare is expected in future struggles as is an increase in

intensity over time and space. However, it is the non-military forms of armed struggle that the authors

stress below that are of special interest. These forms of warfare may result in some armed forces

conducting no operational actions at all or playing a secondary role.
Non-military forms of actions may involve the internal weakening of a state through information,

psychological, moral, climatic (causing natural disasters, obstructing the movement of troops through

floods and other means, dispersing clouds to inhibit/enable [depending on the purpose] the proper

functioning of precision-guided weapons, etc.), and organizational measures; setting up an opposition;

or fomenting ethnic strife. Non-military forms of armed struggle could also be used to weaken the

external position of a state by ruining its international relations through political, economic, legal,

information, and other means.[466] Other new forms of warfare include psychotronic, biological, and

genetic weapons that do not rely on explosive power.[467]

Bogdanov and Gorbunov note that “future wars will definitely be influenced by the way events

develop in a country...a reliable forecast of future wars is impossible to make unless we have a

profound understanding about the exact relationship between peace and war in the twenty-first

century.”[468] Wars in the twenty-first century may be the result of geopolitical powers carving up

the globalized world by armed force and compelling countries to accept political and economic terms

dictated to them. Most likely, “the main objectives of future wars will be achieved in the opening

phase and that will become the turning point determining the fate of the war.”[469] Thus, like Gareev,

Dulnev, and Bryuzgin, Bogdanov and Gorbunov highlight success in the initial period of war as the

strongest indicator of who will achieve victory in future war.

If a conventional war unfolds, then the authors foresee the initial period of war focusing on the

destruction of military and government control centers, the disruption of the system for controlling a

country, and the targeting of the military-industrial infrastructure. Air, fire, and electronic attacks will

be followed by paratroopers, Special Forces, and then land forces in the final stage. Also included

will be strikes against the economy and civilian population. The nuclear deterrent is envisioned to be

used against an opponent who only has conventional weapons at their disposal.[470]

Finally, there is the perspective of Major General (retired) V. D. Ryabchuk. Viktor Dmitrievich

Ryabchuk is a respected military scientist who has written on control theory, deception, and

systemology, among other topics. In 2008, writing for Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), he

discussed the concept of the ongoing intellectual-information confrontation.

Ryabchuk’s primary focus was on the fact that “thought” is the first issue or thing to join a battle. In

this sense, he added, the main thing is still intellectual confrontation aimed at confronting the enemy’s

thought and at protecting friendly ideas and designs. That is why the intellectual-information

confrontation is so important today. Commanders must understand the components of battle control

and how to win against smart, powerful enemies. He stated that a long time ago Napoleon compared a

commander’s talent with a square, with its base being the commander’s will and its height being the

commander’s brains. If base exceeded height, then the commander operated more courageously. If

height exceeded base, then the commander operated smartly.[471] Ryabchuk then noted:

In our time we should add the third measurement to “Napoleon’s Square”—informatics or

computer science (which is based on the army and weapons automation support and control

systems). Informatics is bound to sharply enhance intelligent and strong-willed activity

capabilities. Thus, the square turns into a cube...[472]
Informatics allows for better management and perhaps the achievement of superiority over an

enemy. The management “vehicle” is a high-performance reconnaissance system that ensures the side

with the better system will achieve control over the situation during an information confrontation.

[473] Information is the “nourishment” that provides life to reconnaissance, command and control,

support, and strike systems.[474]

These six perspectives (Vorobyov, Slipchenko, Gareev, Bogdanov and Gorbunov, Dulnev and

Bryuzgin, and Ryabchuk) are among the literally hundreds of projections for future war in Russia.

However, their thoughts are among the most important.

Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Makarov

In a speech at the Academy of Military Science in early 2010, Makarov stated that the

distinguishing feature of warfare in the coming decades will be new forms of military operations that

are multifacited, with electronic, force, and information attacks carried out with increasing intensity

in time and space. He added that the potential for conflict is growing due to economic instability and

the expansion of activities involving international terrorist organizations and could unpredictably lead

to a large-scale war involving unforeseen adversaries.[475]

The armed forces of many countries are “preparing for military action in multiple concurrent

regional conflicts in separate theaters of operation” and these countries could operate within

temporary “coalitions of interested states.”

Strategic deployments will utilize enhanced strategic mobility and long-range strike capabilities from

frontline military bases, aerospace, and the world’s oceans.[476] In Makarov’s opinion, the use of

artificial intelligence, nanotechnologies, robotized systems, and weapons based on new physical

principles could become comparable to the use of nuclear weapons in terms of combat effectiveness.

Complete mobilization will not be required in future war due to the impact of time-cutting measures

such as high-speed intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, and automated control systems

that gather, process, and communicate information on the adversary. Further, aerospace assets will

increase in use and be used for target designation and guidance of precision weapons, turning the

entire planet into a theater of operations.[477]

Makarov adds that several factors dictate the tight deadlines for converting Russia’s armed forces

to a future-oriented organizational makeup. These challenges include not just the military-political

situation in the world but especially those situations along the Russian Federation’s borders. Other

factors include the rate of development of the leading countries’ armies and the emergence and

universal adoption of new forms and methods of conducting military operations. These new forms and

methods of conducting military operations include the use of non-standard asymmetric (indirect)

actions which can accomplish objectives more economically than direct clashes. They also include

the use of combining different uniformed services that are able to operate autonomously in isolated

areas with no close fire support and the use of raids and maneuvers deep in the adversary’s territory

to seize and destroy critical facilities. In this regard, Makarov recommends the extensive use of

special operations forces to set up a permanent front deep in the rear area of an adversary.[478] In

this regard, the arrest of twelve Russian spies in the US in 2010 could conceivably have been the

planned development of the civilian equivalent of this deep cover force according to such thinking.
Makarov adds that the emphasis in combat is shifting to the use of political, economic, and

information pressure and subversive actions followed by the unleashing of armed conflicts or local

wars, actions that result in the loss of relatively little bloodshed. He adds that the direct initiation of

hostilities will be preceded by information warfare activities that will continue for the duration of the

conflict until it is resolved. Simultaneously, information warfare activities will be directed at other

key infrastructure facilities of the opposing state (coalition). The destruction of critical adversary

infrastructure facilities is becoming a key component of combat since destruction can destabilize an

adversary’s domestic political situation, disorganize its government and military administration, and

disrupt its economy. The direct use of military force will seek to decisively accomplish these

objectives as early as the start of a military campaign.[479]

General of the Army Makhmut Gareev addressed future war concepts in a March 2010

presentation. He noted that the contours of future armed combat have not yet been precisely defined

and, at least in the military press, they are being examined in a lopsided manner. NATO and US

operations conducted in Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan were essentially unilateral in nature. It is

unclear what will happen when these high-technology forces are engaged by like forces that employ

more active, decisive operations. Russia, Gareev noted, must create its own precision-guided

munitions and the technological base for the conduct of netcentric warfare. These capabilities are

lacking at the present time. Russia must also develop more active, decisive methods of strategic and

operational-tactical operations to include contact operations, which enemy forces want to avoid at all

costs.[480]

S. A. Modestov on the “Space of Future War” and Theaters of Information War

Sergei Modestov, a prominent Russian author on many military-related issues, shed light on the

concept of the space of future war in an article he wrote for the Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk

(Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science). He noted that the space of future war is directly linked

to the way that nations forecast the nature of future war from their national perspective. For the US,

the space of future war is “any place where they have interests” according to Modestov. For Islam it

is “any country with non-Islamic rule.”[481]

Modestov notes that it is difficult to build defenses against opponents such as non-state actors

(terrorists) and large-scale adversaries such as the United States. The space of future war in the case

of the US, for example, includes the latter’s focus on information space in order to assure

“quantitative superiority, a developed deployment infrastructure, and superiority in its transportation

capability to rapidly regroup.” Such developments increase Russia’s “spatial uncertainty” and make

mandatory a flexible response to all threats. Thus, not only intelligence, topographic-geodesic,

navigation, and other tools must be in the Russian inventory to confront challenges in the space of

future war, but also tools such as electronic warfare strike weapons; light, laser, ultra-and infrasound

weapons; and electromagnetic pulse weapons.[482] The sophistication of using such tools increases

When electromagnetic fields carry meaningful information that can strike or reallocate an

adversary’s information resource objects, and safeguard and build up one’s own information

resources. These objects could be technical systems or they could be individuals, social

(ethnic) groups, or society as a whole. In the first instance, we mean information-technological
impact, and in the second instance—information-psychological. Both constitute the essence of

information warfare.[483]

“Information space” (the environment in which information resource objects are located and

information processes occur)[484] is thus a place of competition over information resources. The US

is the only country currently possessing information superiority and the ability to significantly

manipulate this space. Due to this situation, Modestov recommends a differentiated approach to the

essence of information warfare. Armed conflict should utilize the ability to exert a special softwaretechnical impact (software and hardware bugs, combat viruses, and other destructive software

products) on an adversary’s information resource objects. These weapons impact the size,

configuration, morphology, and structure of the space of future war. The strike capability of

information weapons must be taken into account, making the quality of control, communication,

intelligence, and combat strike systems (such as reconnaissance-strike systems) the main criteria for

operating in information space.[485]

Information space must be managed in such a way as to reduce and disorganize it for the adversary

while expanding and improving friendly control over it. This may include such aspects as

operational-strategic and tactical camouflage and disinformation activities. Such thinking leads to the

development of the “theater of information warfare” concept, a way in which these information

resource goals can be controlled and manipulated on a larger scale and for a larger purpose.

In 2008, Modestov advocated specifically for the concept of strategic deterrence in a theater of

information warfare. He discussed information resources (IR) as the target of strategic deterrence. In

particular he noted the importance for Russia to develop “military-theoretical views on the forms of

deployment of forces and assets for the targeted impact on an adversary’s IR for strategic deterrence

purposes.”[486] Operational tasks supporting this goal include disorganizing governmental and

military administrations of an adversary; damaging economic potential, especially military-economic

potential; and conducting intelligence operations.[487] From Modestov’s point of view, a strategic

operation in the “theater of information warfare” includes the sum total of the following informationsupported actions:

· Operations to rebuff an aerospace attack

· Strategic nuclear forces operations

· Operations in a continental theater of war

· Operations in a maritime theater of war

· An aerial operation in a theater of war.[488]

Russia’s Asymmetric Gambit

For the past several years, Russian military theorists have made arguments in support of

developing asymmetric military and civilian approaches to confront the West’s information

superiority. For example, Gaivoronsky and Galkin’s book, discussed in Chapter Three, noted that

Russia’s military problems must be solved without reliance on direct practical experience and that

leaders must make judgments based on field tests alone of some weapons. The implication is that

asymmetric measures are required to offset this lack of practical experience. Naturally, this judgment
is no longer entirely true since these authors were writing before Russia began fighting its decade

long war in Chechnya and its short 2008 local war conflict with Georgia. However, Russia has not

conducted any military operations on the scale of US military deployments since the Soviet Union’s

operations in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Thus asymmetric actions are appealing.

This lack of combat experience and an inability to field a military-industrial complex equal to

other countries in the initial decade of the twenty-first century has had two consequences. First,

Russia is forced to work with a force that has not stressed its logistic and airlift capabilities with a

world-wide deployment. Second, this situation forces Russia to keep nuclear, nanotechnology, and

asymmetric responses on the table to counter potential threats from foreign weaponry.

Russia’s military is studying asymmetric warfare issues thoroughly.[489] This point is reflected in

their military and civilian writings. Over ten years ago, Russian Major General I. G. Korotchenko

(the Chair of Military Art at the time at the General Staff Academy) noted that Russia must “depart

from the principle of opposing force with force and move to the principle of asymmetrical

responses...”[490]

Shortly after Russia’s 1999 draft military doctrine was released, Russia’s Minister of Defense at

the time, Marshal Igor Sergeyev, discussed the importance of asymmetry to the military-technical

aspect of doctrine. He noted that

In the coming years, Russia will not be able to support military-strategic and military-technical

parity with the leading military powers of the West on a “symmetrical” basis, especially in the

area of non-nuclear armaments...it is necessary to search for a reasonable combination of

evolutionary and “revolutionary” paths and more effective asymmetrical directions for the

development of weapons and military technology and the technological outfitting of Russia’s

Armed Forces.[491]

Sergeyev noted that the Russian Armed Forces should seek

compensation for avoiding direct military-technical competition with the most developed

countries by means of creating “asymmetrical” means for armed conflict, allowing for the

destruction of the most vulnerable functional elements of the main systems and key targets of the

enemy’s infrastructure, and in this way significantly devaluing their military-technological

superiority.[492]

According to Webster’s dictionary, asymmetry is defined as “not symmetrical.”[493] Russia’s

premier dictionary, written by S. I. Ozhegov, defines asymmetry as “the absence or destruction of

symmetry.” This implies a more active role in changing symmetry’s parameters than the US

definition. This intimates (correctly) that different cultures define like terms with varying degrees of

conformity. When attempting to understand the Russian military approach to any issue it is necessary

to understand their terms in context.

In a 2007 article, Russian Mikhail Rastopshin discussed the asymmetric approach. He related the

problems facing Russia in utilizing such a concept. First is the issue of falling behind in technology.
Rastopshin wrote sarcastically that the term “asymmetric weapon” is actually used in Russia to cover

up the unsatisfactory state of the Russian rearmament process, one that is not keeping pace with

perceived threats. He added that the Russian concept of asymmetry “consists in abandoning a direct

counterforce standoff with the militarily developed states by exposing and exploiting the existing

vulnerabilities of a potential adversary’s current and new armament.”[494]

In addition to a different understanding of like terms, Russians use a philosophical thought pattern

that is different from US logic. A process known as the dialectic guides Russian thinking while US

thinking is guided by deductive and empirical logic. Former Soviet officer Oleg Penkovskiy, in the

papers provided as part of his espionage work for the West in the early 1960s, described what this

means for decision-making processes. Penkovskiy noted that if American, English, and Soviet

generals were provided with the same data and asked to conduct an analysis, the American and

English generals might come to similar answers. But the Soviet officer’s response would be quite

different because:

He begins from a completely different set of basic premises and preconceived ideas, namely

the Marxian concepts of the structure of society and the course of history. Second, the logical

process in his mind is totally unlike that of his Western counterparts, because he uses Marxist

dialectics, whereas they will use some form of deductive reasoning. Third, a different set of

moral laws governs and restricts the behavior of the Soviet. Fourth, the Soviet general’s aims

will be radically different from those of the American and the Englishman.[495]

The dialectic is an engrained thought process that survived the end of the USSR. It was at the core

of the educational process of a Soviet officer and remains alive in the minds of officers today. The

dialectic is defined by Ozhegov as “a philosophical doctrine about the general laws of the movement

and development of nature, human society, and thinking; the scientific method of knowledge of the

eternally moving and changing phenomena of nature and society by revealing internal contradictions

and a struggle of opposites, resulting in an uneven transition from one quality to another.”[496] The

dialectic introduces asymmetry into any counteraction taken by Russia from the inception of an idea.

The counter to a tank may be an anti-tank weapon or some other asymmetric response and the counter

to an anti-tank weapon may be add on armor (“up armor” in today’s lingo).

Russia’s asymmetric point of view has resulted in increased emphasis on indirect strategies, on

attempting to disorganize the information infrastructure of a potential opponent, and on the

information-psychological threat to Russia (among other things) to counter their informationtechnological deficiencies. The information-psychological threat refers to attempts to influence the

thinking of Russian citizens. Some Russians still believe that the Soviet Union fell apart because a

silent information-psychological “World War III” was fought and won for the minds of the USSR’s

citizens.

All of these asymmetric methods depend, however, on first uncovering vulnerabilities in Western

thinking and technologies. In the following discussion not only information but also other types of

asymmetries will be discussed.

(1) Indirect Strategies
Russian military specialists note with concern the growing influence of non-military actions (to

include political, economic, information, moral-psychological, and others) on international relations.

For example, a sharp change in the information confrontation/struggle was described by a Russian

security specialist in the following manner:

It penetrates all other forms of struggle and at the same time has a relatively independent

character. How can you successfully wage an information struggle if during the [conflict with]

Chechnya a significant part of the mass media is taking the side of the separatists? We need a

law on information security.[497]

In short, a new asymmetric form of war can be waged when information is moved to the forefront.

The battle to influence the mind takes on as much importance as battles to inflict damage on one

another via physical means.

An increase in these types of actions began a few years ago when nations realized that the precise

destructiveness of targets by high-technology weapons or the total annihilation of targets by nuclear

weapons made total reliance on them costly in the first sense and unreasonable in the second. As a

result, theorists began to reexamine the impact and importance of indirect operations such as the

extended use of the media and information technologies. If battles could be won without resorting to

the use of weapons or with only the use of digital devices, then such a strategy should be used.

Legal issues are another important means to use in an information struggle. The most obvious

peacetime use of a legal issue (an indirect approach) was a proposal that Russia made at the United

Nations in the early 1990s. The proposal aimed at harnessing Western technological developments

with strict definitions that limited their further expansion. This proposal was designed as much too

slow down the US and other information-technology rich nations as it was to open a dialogue on

information issues.

Other indirect asymmetric approaches include the development of techniques, technologies, and

systems that destroy or disable the eyes and ears of information-technology based equipment. Further,

Russia has learned other asymmetric methods of confronting an information-technology superior

opponent from observing the actions of US opponents in recent conflicts. For example, during the

NATO bombing of Kosovo, smoke deflected precision-guided missiles away from their intended

targets and bad weather hindered information-based operations. Turning on radars briefly or only at

the last minute was a Serbian asymmetric survival and engagement technique. Russian V. V. Kruglov,

in a 1998 Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) article, wrote that “controlled” armed conflict (conflict

organized in real time with information technology assets) is a further development of an “indirect

action” strategy.[498]

Russian General of the Army Makmut Gareev, noted earlier, listed other asymmetric offsets in his

work If War Comes Tomorrow. Gareev listed “methods to influence human psychology,”

achievements of genetic engineering and molecular biology, electromagnetic and infra-sound waves,

and lasers, microwaves, microorganisms, and other means as potential methods of attack utilizing the

indirect effect.[499] The Academy of Military Science, of which Gareev is President, called for an

“integration of efforts of a number of sectors of social, natural, and engineering sciences for research
and development of problems of information warfare” as a component part of their research effort as

long ago as 1999.[500] Undoubtedly, under Gareev’s influence, asymmetric developments were

sought out in earnest.

Finally, Russian scientists are making do in the absence of a high technology computer industrial

base and financial backing by relying on the capabilities of the plethora of quality mathematicians and

scientists that the country regularly produces. The computer age, particularly writing computer

software, strikes right at the heart of a Soviet and now Russian strength—the mathematical ability to

write the algorithms that either stable software, creative programs, or hacking requires. With hacker

assets, countries can steal secrets through the asymmetrical approach of entering a computer’s back

door. Russia and other countries can save millions if not billions of dollars on research and

development through such thefts if actuated.

The recognition by Russia and other technologically-weak nations that indirect strategies might

save the day may have a boomerang effect, however. Many Russian authors (to include some ministry

and agency chiefs) note in particular that the US’s conflicts have “changed the whole world’s attitude

about nuclear weapons...many nations have come to the conclusion that it is no longer possible to

defend their independence without nuclear weapons.”[501] Thus while indirect strategies initially

appealed to many as an answer to nuclear weapons, lately just the opposite opinion has arisen—that

nuclear weapons, especially in the hands of terrorists, can be an indirect strategy! This is a

particularly disturbing “asymmetric answer” that several Russian officials have alluded to in the past

few years. Not surprisingly, the 2010 Military Doctrine of Russia continues to underscore the

importance of nuclear deterrence concepts, especially keeping these weapons out of the hands of

terrorists.

(2) The Disorganization Weapon

A few years ago at an international conference in Moscow a Russian scientist was asked how the

Russian approach to IW fundamentally differed from the US approach. He answered that the drive for

total information dominance or superiority was presently not possible in Russia. Lacking an efficient

information-age military-industrial complex, it is simply not possible to produce the equipment to

support such an effort. Unable to meet force with force, the predominant Russian IW principle is to

find all methods and means to disorganize an opponent while reducing uncertainty on the Russian

side. Interestingly, some years later the word “disorganize” has appeared often in Russian security

policies. It is listed as an internal information threat to be monitored as well.

The January 1999 edition of Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) published a lengthy article on

disorganization. In “On the Problem of the Organization Weapon,” Colonels N. A. Sergeyev and D. A.

Lovtsov (the latter a long time command and control specialist) discussed the types of organization

weapons applicable to the information age. The very first line of their article stated that “historical

experience shows that fighting an enemy can be more effective if conditions have been created for

making it ‘disorganized’ or ‘disoriented.’”[502] Measures to accomplish this goal include the

coordination of a set of pressures (with regard to objectives, place and time, propaganda,

psychological issues, and information) to channel an enemy in a desired direction. These pressures

might lead the enemy into dead-end decisions, exhaust the economy, slow down or arrest weapon

developments, distort national culture, or create a ‘fifth column’ among intellectuals. These
developments could result in internal political chaos (and perhaps for that reason ‘disorganization’

was listed as the greatest internal threat in some security documents).[503]

Organizations can be upset or disorganized externally by a controlled ecological disaster; by

inciting ethnic strife or economic crisis; by managing the sale of obsolete, harmful, or inferior-quality

products; by promoting patterns of behavior which clash with national traditions; or by recommending

organizational forms or structures that generate unsolvable conflicts.[504] All of these methods could

be considered as asymmetric in approach.

To prevent Russia from succumbing to adversary disorganization techniques, the authors

recommended a simulation-game model of a mutual security system of organizational systems

(coalitions, corporations, alliances, etc.) to study the problem and develop solutions. The model must

contain an organization systems information domain; models of the information domains of coalitions;

and models of information relationships between organizational systems, including models of

information-psychological pressure of different systems on one another, among other factors.[505] It

is apparent that “disorganization” will be a method that Russians will study closely to see if it can be

used to attack the complex, self-organizing “system of systems” approach of the US.

In Russia’s absence of information superiority, Army Colonel Sergei Modestov offered a related

asymmetric method to offset adversary advantages on both the strategic and operational levels (to

include how to disorganize an adversary). He suggested the construction of an information “deep

defense.” Modestov’s concern is Russia’s current inability to thwart military actions directed against

her information-resources (IR). An information resource, according to IW specialist Admiral

(retired) V. S. Pirumov, is

information which is gathered and stored during the development of science, practical human

activity, and the operation of special organizations or devices for the collection, processing,

and presentation of information saved magnetically or in any other form which assures its

delivery in time and space to its consumers in order to solve scientific, manufacturing, or

management tasks.[506]

The intent of the deep defense plan is to provide a durable information resource capable of

confronting attempts by adversary’s to exert special influence on an IR of Russia; and, more troubling

for US planners, to create the threat of a full-scale deep-echelon grouping of virus measures put in

place ahead of time. According to Modestov, problems associated with constructing a deep defense

include:

1. Defending Russia—discovering in a timely manner an adversary’s complete plan for

launching a massive program strike, first and foremost determining the directions (objectives)

of his primary and other strikes;

2. Attacking an adversary—creating a defensive grouping of special-influence forces and

means deep inside the adversary’s operational structure, with deployment of the forward

Russian echelon (the fixed programming and hardware devices being managed) directed against

the facilities of the adversary’s IR;

3. Defending Russia—creating multiple concentric defense lines that cover the facility at the
users’ work stations, at network servers, and at connection points between agencies’ local-area

networks and the Internet;

4. Defending Russia—restoring a disrupted information infrastructure through timely

duplication of the asset disrupted (while holding key facilities in reserve) and linking them with

communication lines;

5. Defending Russia—seeking optimal forms and means of conducting asymmetrical defensive

actions in defending one’s own IR;

6. Defending Russia—using a pro-active approach in protecting IR facilities, making this one of

the primary conditions for maintaining its stability; and

7. Attacking an adversary—organizing and supporting an uninterrupted operational-strategic

coordination and C2 of the forces and means for carrying out a virus attack against an adversary

IR.[507]

In order to exert control over a potential enemy’s information-resource, Modestov states that

efforts must begin in peacetime. On the strategic level, this includes group and individual

mathematical-program (virus) strikes; special operations and systematic actions to identify data

regarding an enemy’s most important IR objectives; and timely establishment of surreptitious control

over adversary IR components in order to redistribute it and/or strike it. The minimum goal would be

to create a threat to prevent an adversary from taking similar actions against Russian IR objectives.

On the operational level, special influences can be exerted on an adversary’s IR by causing

disorganization in the government and military command and control systems; undermining economic

and/or military-economic potential; and carrying out intelligence activities.[508]

Another asymmetric method that Modestov recommended to offset US superiority in virus

production is something mentioned earlier, international legal regulation. In a somewhat caustic

approach to legal norms, Modestov noted that mutual deterrence mechanisms could help Russia exert

special influences on IRs and put a final touch on the “deep defense plan.” He added that “foreign”

experts cite the control systems of information-computer resources of energy, communications,

transport, and finance as the most likely IR objectives.[509] Thus, a UN legal proposal would fit

nicely with Modestov’s “deep defense plan.”

(3) The Information-Psychological Asymmetric Challenge

It is worth noting that for years Soviet and now Russian theorists have searched for a way to

influence the mental state of troop formations and the public. Books were written during the Soviet

and now Russian periods on psychotronic weapons; on the use of remote viewing techniques and

parapsychology; and on the use of subliminal and psycho-linguistic technologies. This effort has

continued in various forms over the years in other areas such as infrasonic-vibration weapons.

Russian theorists do not discount the fact that the use of these and other non-traditional weapons could

achieve a country’s strategic and political goals without conflict.

Russia’s focus on the brain as an IW target (in addition to hardware/software) began long ago.

Entire books are written on the subject. In 1998-99, for example, two books were released on the

topic. One was titled, appropriately enough, Informatsionnaya Voyna Information War. Author

Sergey Rastorguev thanked the Administration of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the

Center for Public Communications of the Federal Security Agency (FSB), and others for their
assistance in putting the book together. That is, Rastorguev had the support of some very high-level

organizations in the government for his work. Rastorguev examined how to manipulate the mind with

real and latent threats and how to model the algorithms that define human behavior. Humans, the

author noted, like computers, can have a “virus” inserted in their information system (reasoning

process) if the proper algorithms are manipulated. According to mathematical formulas developed by

the author, a human information virus dubbed a “psycho virus” may be inserted as a “suggestive

influence” to alter or mask objective reasoning. The other book, endorsed by the Information Security

Committee of the State Duma, is titled Psychotronic Weapons and Security.[510] These books

indicate that information-psychological concerns are both a civilian and military matter, something to

be studied for their benefits and harmful effects in both peacetime and wartime.

At the Institute of the Human Brain in St. Petersburg, Russian scientists studied how to manipulate

the synaptic firings of neurons in the brain. This research has focused on the use of various

frequencies to excite or depress various areas of the brain. If successful, such research could lead to

the creation of weapons that cause lethargic (near zombified) attitudes in soldiers on the battlefield

according to Russian scientists.

In addition to these books and studies of the brain, Russia has focused on the informationpsychological stability of individuals and society for a host of reasons, not the least of which is

Russia’s change in ideologies. For example, Dr. Igor Panarin, who recently attained Western attention

for his 2009 prediction of the near-term fracturing of the US, noted in 1999 that Russia must develop

strategic and operational measures (which he calls the strategy of psychological defense) to prevent

or neutralize attempts to control the psyche of Russian society. Panarin (see Chapter Eleven for

Panarin’s focus on information-psychological issues after the Russia-Georgia conflict of August

2008) also noted the need to work with the Main Directorate in Support of Psychological Security to

ensure that the psychological component of Russian national security is addressed in the Security

Council.[511] Less attention is paid to this subject in the West since it did not undergo an ideological

transformation such as the one that took place in Russia. Recent IT developments, however, have

caused Americans to review some of these issues. For example, there have been studies conducted in

the US on the influence of CD games and the Internet on the youth of America. This has become a

subject of serious attention for law makers, parents, and national security personnel among others.

The current work of US academicians Sharon Begley, Clay Shirky, and Nicholas Carr underscore US

interest concerning the impact of information technologies on the brain.

The Russian military has excelled in the study of the information-psychological aspect of IW, to

include the information-psychological components of an information operation. For such an operation,

the armed forces look at an information model of the psyche of a person (the target); at the information

interaction among people, social groups, etc. (activity); and at information activities according to

mission, place, and time (operations). The Russian armed forces study not only the ability of IW to

affect the values, emotions, and beliefs of target audiences (traditional PSYWAR theory), but also

methods to affect their objective reasoning process. Former Security Council Chairman Andrei

Kokoshin stressed the need for Russians to study the psychological-behavioral sciences. Russia is

interested in ascertaining how to affect not only the data-processing capability of hardware and

software, but also the data-processing capability of the human mind.
Non-lethal effect weapons form the final part of the information-psychological approach. These

weapons were defined as “a complex of weapons developed in order to disrupt the functioning

process and (or) destroy technogenic objects, equipment, and materials.”[512] Elements of the

technosphere subject to destruction include construction and expendable operating materials,

industrial facilities and communications, military equipment, and the human physiological condition.

[513] One analyst noted that

a combination of precision weapons more sophisticated than now, an information control

system as well as diverse kinds of non-lethal weapons (those developed and still under

development) with precision means of delivery will lead to the creation of a powerful

conventional weapon system which will become equivalent to nuclear weapons in terms of the

capability of deterrence and destruction, and will surpass them in terms of flexibility of use.

[514]

“Non-lethal effect means” could include aerosol bombs to spray debilitating gas over an armored

column to halt it, acoustic weapons to create a defensive zone against enemy aircraft or to guarantee a

safe corridor for friendly troops, and biotechnological weapons to contaminate fuel, slow movement,

or eat wires. Of course, this is not new to Westerners, who are also preparing a host of non-lethal

technologies but of another nature. The Russians, however, may be more intent on using theirs as a

counter or asymmetric offset against an information dominant opponent.

(4) Reflexive Control Theory

Reflexive control (RC) is a theory closely related to the information-psychological component or

deception measures discussed earlier. However, the topic is listed separately to provide it the

necessary attention since it lies at the heart of many Russian activities. Writing in 1995, Colonel S.

Leonenko defined reflexive control in the following manner:

RC consists of transmitting motives and grounds from the controlling entity to the controlled

system that stimulate the desired decision. The goal of RC is to prompt the enemy to make a

decision unfavorable to himself. Naturally, one must have an idea about how he thinks.[515]

In this sense, RC is very closely related to the Chinese concept of stratagems and the US concept

of perception management. A former instructor at the General Staff Academy of the Russian

Federation, retired Major General N. I. Turko, makes a direct link between IW/IO and reflexive

control. Turko noted that

The most dangerous manifestation of the tendency to rely on military power relates not so much

to the direct use of the means of armed combat as to the possible results of the use of reflexive

control by the opposing side via developments in the theory and practice of information war.

[516]

To Turko, the RC weapon is potentially more important than firepower in achieving objectives.

His understanding most likely is based on the belief that the use of the information weapon during the

Cold War did more to defeat the USSR and bring about its demise than any weapon’s use. Reflexive

control of the geopolitical process is an achievement often referred to by Russians as “the Third
World Information-Psychological War.” Another RC example that Russians like to note is the

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the US, which many Russian’s believe was a reflexive control

operation designed to make the military-industrial complex of the USSR redirect money to curtail or

counter SDI, thus leading to the financial exhaustion of the USSR. Turko listed RC as a method for

achieving not only geopolitical superiority but also superiority in arms control negotiations.[517]

Computer technology enhances the effectiveness of reflexive control theory in the opinion of some

Russians. Leonenko offered his assessment of the new opportunities afforded RC by the use of

computer technology:

Under present conditions a need arises to act not only on people, but also on technical

reconnaissance assets and especially weapon guidance systems, which are impassive in

assessing what is occurring and do not perceive what a person reacts to.[518]

This assessment is important because it indicates that if equipment responds differently than a human

being to the same input, it can be manipulated or controlled in a far different manner. Thus the

importance of maintaining a functioning and innovative military-industrial complex capable of

producing equipment meeting such criteria is of extreme value to Russia.

(5) Some Current Asymmetric Thoughts

The Russian military-industrial complex was not always in demise, as anyone associated with the

USSR’s complex surely is aware. During the Soviet period, their military-industrial complex was

comparable to any in the world. And the system produced some truly outstanding scientists. For

example, one of Russia’s leading missile designers is Sergei Pavlovich Nepobedimyy (his last name

means invincible). Born in 1921, he developed the antitank guided missile systems Shmel, Malyutka,

Shturn, Ataka, and Krizantema; the portable missile launchers Strela-2 and Igla; and the tactical

missile launchers Tochka, Tochka-U, Oka, Oka-U, and Iskander.[519] This is an astounding array of

weaponry for any one individual to develop. Nepobedimyy is now retired but in a 1993 interview

with Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest) he noted that future weapon developments would focus on

three areas: smart, super-precise weapons; information weapons; and instruments that can see through

camouflage and see up to three meters underground.[520]

In hindsight, Nepobedimyy’s 1993 thoughts on future weapons only scratch the surface of

asymmetric Russian thinking in the future war arena. Other 1990s suggestions on asymmetric

approaches included the use of electromagnetic pulse weaponry, meteorological weapons that cause

earthquakes and flooding, genetic weapons, blinding weapons, and hypersonic unmanned aerial

vehicles (UAVs), among other suggestions. Journal and newspaper articles focused on

nanotechnologies and information and space (laser and high-frequency) technologies. There are many

asymmetric ways in which these technologies could be used.

Russia is preparing, of course, for more traditional forms of warfare as well. Trillions of rubles

are being invested in new weapon programs. This is difficult work, as all nations are finding out.

Scientists and theorists must consider not only who might be a future threat for Russia but also what

type of weaponry they might face. From this assessment, symmetric threat counters can be created if

the money and technology are available. Asymmetric threat counters are developed for situations in
which money and technology are not available or for situations where simpler solutions predominate.

Asymmetric counters also are mandatory if Russia feels new systems will bankrupt Russia’s military.

Such situations require the development and study of various scenarios for new concepts and uses for

items such as drugs, sensors, and nanotechnologies.

Georgiy Gennadievich Malenetsky, a historian and mathematician, provided an interview with

Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) in June 2008, in which he discussed some of these potential

developments. Among other things, he noted

· Russian scientists think that in 10-15 years humans may be created possessing new organs

and improvements to existing organs. This will enable them to sense magnetic fields or

radioactivity.

· Nanosatellites will replace large orbiting stations and hundreds of thousands of such

satellites will be deployed, capable of disabling any modern space apparatus.

· Bio-robots or zombies will be created in the form of humans or animals (Malenetsky

imagines a biochemistry-altered rat whose speed of reaction is 20 times faster than normal).

· Scientists are working to extract atoms from water and air to create a new type of nuclear

synthesis reaction that makes possible not thousands but millions of nuclear warheads. Thus

the idea of a nuclear martyr’s belt cannot be ruled out.

· Miniature UAVs will be developed that can take pictures, emit poison, or eavesdrop.

· Immuno-modulators are being developed that can activate or suppress certain body systems.

[521]

Malentsky’s potential projects are similar in concept to those of many scientists around the world

who are working on comparable ventures. And his musings are now three years old!

The Russian journal Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kur’er (Military-Industrial Courier) offered another

asymmetric-type suggestion. An article by Israeli Vladimir Shenk noted that meteorological weapons

are being researched around the globe not only to reduce an adversary’s agricultural output or cause

economic havoc but also to play a leading role during large-scale wars. Militarily, these weapons can

do the following: create floods to hinder troop movement; dissipate clouds over targets designated

for precision-targeting; and alter the atmosphere in combat areas. With regard to Russia, Shenk stated

that KGB defector Oleg Kalugin underscored Russia’s investigation into the use of geophysical

weapons. These developments weren’t always kept secret. For example, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy,

leader of Russia’s Liberal Democratic Party, stated some years ago that Russian scientists would

alter the earth’s gravitational field which would put the USA under the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

Russia’s defense committee considered the issue of experimenting to disturb the ionosphere and

magnetosphere.[522] Thus the issue of such weaponry has a long history that will extend into the

future as new scientific discoveries are made. What claims are true and what claims are false are for

the reader to decide as no conclusive evidence was ever produced.

Space, of course, may easily become a future theater of war (TVD) and asymmetric options

abound here as well. Future war may include the use of hypersonic aircraft or weapons using new

physical principles.[523] Or Russia may opt to combine its expertise with that of another country
with which relations develop cordially in the coming years. One such possibility is China. President

Dmitriy Medvedev recently noted with respect to China that “we plan to pay priority attention to

high-tech industries, such as civil aircraft manufacturing, nuclear energy, space, information, and

nanotechnologies.”[524] The latter topic will be considered separately in this chapter.

Nanotechnologies are clearly the modern day equivalent of the 1990s focus on information

technologies.

The development of an asymmetric approach requires a thorough study of the vulnerabilities of a

target, its “robustness,” according to Mikhail Rastopshin, mentioned earlier. The unsatisfactory

development of these parameters impacts negatively on Russia’s ability to develop symmetrical or

asymmetrical counters in the event of a future war. The identification of vulnerabilities often invokes

the use of sophisticated intelligence efforts to obtain such information.

A main goal in any future war scenario remains the elimination of an opponent’s satellite system.

Rastopshin noted that this might require the determination of the vulnerabilities of a group of

objectives united by a common operating algorithm.[525] Thus it is clear that the development of an

asymmetric set of options is not an easy chore. It requires research, intelligence, and development of

ways to take advantage of threat vulnerabilities.

In addition, some asymmetric responses are not only technological, but also operational-strategic

and operational-tactical. This implies an asymmetry in strategic thought and the use of forces on the

battlefield. One Russian source listed several asymmetric responses that are purely geopolitical or

strategic. These included:

· Get Cuba back as an ally

· Develop a friendship with another Latin American country, such as Nicaragua

· Establish a support port for the Russian Navy in Syria

· Continue to support Iran

· Reestablish Russia’s links with all nations of the Caucasus

· Form up again the Mediterranean Sea Operational Squadron.[526]

In 2008, retired General of the Army Makhmut Gareev stated that Russia must confront threats with

flexible and asymmetric measures united by a common goal and concept of actions. To achieve this

goal, Gareev introduced the concept of strategic deterrence. He defined this asymmetric approach as

part of a set of interrelated political, diplomatic, information, economic, military, and other measures

that deter, reduce, or avert threats and aggressive actions by any state or coalition of states with

threats of unacceptable consequences as a result of retaliatory actions.[527] He offered two other

areas of focus that could be termed asymmetrical. First, that Russia’s main effort will not be directed

at the destruction of every weapon but rather at the destruction of their unified information space,

sources of intelligence, navigation and guidance systems, and communications and command and

control systems. Second, he stated that only peaceful development will enable Russia to achieve its

main goal of the country’s “economic, nanotechnological, and sociopolitical modernization.”[528] It

is the nanotechnological threat that may give Russia an advantage in a future war and is the topic of

the next section.
Nanotechnology Weapons

In 2007, the Russian State Duma (on July 4!) established the Russian Corporation of

Nanotechnologies (abbreviated name is Rosnanotekh or RCNT). The establishment of this

corporation strongly endorses Russian futurologists focus on nanotechnology developments for both

society and the military. For society the introduction of nanotechnologies makes it possible to create

new materials. These include materials with special properties; new semiconductor, magnetic, and

optical materials; miniature sensors of chemical substances and biological agents; and computers that

are tens of times more efficient than current models. For the military nanotechnologies mean the

development of new firearms, uniforms, and complex military systems, among other issues. Together,

these developments are expected to change the world’s military-political landscape in the 2025-2030

timeframe. Perhaps a nanotechnology arms race will precede this five year period.[529]

Another 2007 article on nanotechnologies indicated that the military would be the first to use

nanotechnologies. The Moscow Energy Institute and the Russian Kurchatov Institute have both

indicated that the defense sector would receive priority development of nanotechnologies. The initial

defense focus would be to protect Russia’s borders and to protect against technological disasters.

However, the article also mentioned Russian progress in military robotics—and the fact that the only

way to defend against nano weaponry (small insect devices that inject people with poison, nano

remote control of unmanned military equipment and guided mortar shells, etc.) is with nano defense.

[530] Nanotechnologies will radically change the nature of combat with more speed and destructive

power.

From a layman’s perspective, one of the most frightening yet interesting articles on

nanotechnologies was written by Ivan Chichikov in Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star). According to this

article, manipulations at the atomic and molecular levels are dubbed “molecular

nanotechnologies.”[531] Chichikov predicted that “the acquisition of molecular nanotechnologies by

an individual state can change the geopolitical distribution of power on the planet in its favor more

radically than the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the USA.”[532] The following predictions were

made:

· The combat unit of the future will be a nanoarmy that employs hive tactics and acts according

to the principles of teletropism.

· Nano armaments will be able to annihilate the earth’s biosphere up to bacteria and viruses.

· The nature of war and its causes will change.

· Nanomachines will make nuclear weapons obsolete because they can detect them and make

them non-operational.

· In the nanotechnology era the preventive strike will be the only acceptable strategy for war.

The first to attack will win.

· Man will be the target of nanorobots, who aim to enter a human body and kill it.

· Nanotechnologies may block or cake the face, nasopharynx, and eyes or block fingers, arms,

or legs; or be used as a genetic weapon targeting specific DNA of an organism to

exterminate a population.

· Nanotechnologies will contain the ability to assemble into weapons while moving toward a

target.[533]
Professor Georgiy Malinetskiy, a Deputy Director of Science Research at the M. V. Keldysh

Institute of Applied Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences, offered other nanotechnology

prophesies. He stated that the combat dragonfly (smaller than the palm of your hand) will be capable

of photographing, poisoning, and eavesdropping. Further, hundreds of thousands of nano-satellites

will be capable of being put into space to destroy modern spacecraft.[534] Some nanosatellite

precursors are already being launched into space but with different missions. It was reported on 24

March that Russian cosmonauts from the International Space Station will hand launch the ARISSat-1

microsatellite (larger than a nanosatellite). Other microsatellites have been launched over the past

year.[535]

As noted in the preceding section, Russia likes to focus on cognition. Nanotechnology use did not

escape notice in this area. Russia’s military can be expected to develop nano-psychotropic weapons

“of mass control of people’s minds, which is created by combining molecular nanotechnologies and

achievements of neurological technologies.”[536]

Russia’s emphasis on nanotechnologies indicates that research on this topic will continue well into

the next decade. For example, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov has stressed that

nanotechnologies are a current focus of the defense industry, especially in the areas of military

clothing and medicine. The Defense Ministry’s Concept for the Organizational Development of the

Russian Armed Forces discussed the important role to be played by information, space, and

nanotechnologies in the future.

Conclusions

This short analysis of future war from a Russian perspective highlights several points of interest

for Western analysts. First and most important, Russian experts predict that the initial period of war

will be key to winning a future war. This implies that Russian preparations for war are underway

now as it will be too late if Russia waits until war breaks out. Second, it is imperative at the present

time for Russia to develop asymmetric counters to US digital superiority. The chapter explained a

number of ways that Russia hopes to do this. Finally, the chapter listed some of the key components of

Russia’s increased focus on developing nanotechnologies and their many uses, some of which are

truly frightening. Also of note is Sergei Modestov’s suggestion that Russia focus on information

theaters of war; and V. D. Ryabchuk’s suggestion that contemporary armed struggle is now a process

involving combat system countermeasures such as the intellectual-information confrontation.

In all cases, “thinking” is the primary criteria for advancing the Russian cause. Russia must be

creative in its approach since it is limited by resources and technology at the moment. But Russia is

rapidly regaining its footing as a major power with which to contend. And, due to their different

thought process and way of understanding and approaching future war, they will produce some truly

unexpected methods and forms for fighting.

CHAPTER NINE: THE BEAR WENT THROUGH THE MOUNTAIN—RUSSIA APPRAISES

ITS FIVE-DAYWAR IN SOUTH OSSETIA[537]

Introduction

From 8-12 August 2008 Georgia engaged in open conflict with Russian and South Ossetian forces.

Provocations on both sides in July and early August had driven the potential combatants to the verge

of war over the status of South Ossetia (see Appendix Five for South Ossetia maps). Georgia initiated

combat activities in South Ossetia, according to the Russian press, and in the process killed fifty or so

Russian peacekeepers. Perhaps Georgia’s leaders may have felt that under the cover of the Olympic

Games there existed a chance to move more aggressively to regain control over its territory (South

Ossetia), viewing the situation as a now or never proposition. Or perhaps, as the Georgian press

states, they had intercepted South Ossetian communications indicating that the Russians were about to

move in and thwart any future plans of the Georgians.[538] In any event, the Georgian attempt failed.

This chapter looks at the August conflict solely from the vantage point of the Russian press.[539]

The findings are instructive especially for how the Russians used the media. The press served as a

signaling or warning device, as a medium for official pronouncements, and as a forum for criticism

and praise among other issues. Russia clearly warned Georgia not to act. When Georgia did, Russia

moved in and succeeded in avenging the deaths of their peacekeepers and in fixing control over South

Ossetia, an activity it had surreptitiously carried on for the past ten years (passing out Russian

passports to residents of South Ossetia, etc.). Russia’s leaders later decided to recognize the areas of

South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Some outside sources supported Russia’s interpretation of who caused

the conflict. For example, the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, placed blame on the

Georgians for the conflict. He added that presenting Russia in too negative a light would again divide

the world in two. Russia is not the Soviet Union, he noted.[540] That is the good news for Russia.

The bad news is that Russia’s military performance was marred by inadequate equipment and

organization. This point was underscored many times in the press to include by some prominent

military figures. Electronic warfare systems did not work well, command and control was hampered

by radios that performed poorly, and operations were disjointed due to an inadequate Global Satellite

Navigation System (GLONASS). Night operations remained weak. In short, many of the same

problems affecting the Russian armed forces in Chechnya were once again evident. Further, Russia’s

heavy-handed approach both during and after the conflict ended did not endear it to the international

community.

Russia claimed that it used Western rules to intervene in South Ossetia. Does this imply that Russia

will now utilize a new intervention model to fight for territory it decides it properly owns and that it

will act more aggressively beyond its borders than ever before? Is the Russian recognition of South

Ossetia and Abkhazia part of a larger geo-political gambit? There is much to consider in these and

other issues related to Russia’s handling of this crisis. This review of the Russian press provides

insights into some of these issues. Specific areas highlighted are:

Russia’s clear warnings to Georgia that it was practicing a peace enforcement operation in July
due to the evolving conflict in South Ossetia

Russia’s criticism of its military operations, especially in regard to its lack of a unified command and

control system, its poor communications equipment, its misdirected subordination of army aviation to

the air force, and its current lack of responsibility among all of the agencies responsible for the

defense industry

Russia’s lack of a single information directorate on a state scale that enables the entire direction of

state policy

Russia’s reasons for supporting South Ossetia (expressed most factually as “if Georgia can break

away from the Soviet Union, why can’t South Ossetia break away from Georgia?”)

Other background issues include the 1992 agreement establishing peacekeepers in the area;

Russia’s use of Western rules for intervening; accusations against the US; Russian cyber operations;

consequences of the fighting for the region and the world; and conclusions.

Background

A pro-Russian Look at the Conflict

As the situation worsened in June and July 2008 between Georgia and its independence-minded

region known as South Ossetia, the Russians could not have been more frank and forward about their

potential plans. Georgia and the “rest of the West” just couldn’t read the tea leaves or did and ignored

them.

As early as 10 July Russian authorities stated that Russia’s armed forces were prepared to help

peacekeepers in South Ossetia. Then, in a 17 July 2008 Red Star article on Kavkaz-2008, an exercise

run in Russia at the same time that, across the border, the Georgian-American exercise Immediate

Response 2008 was being conducted at the Vaziani Military Base, author Alexander Tikhonov wrote:

According to Colonel Konashenkov, in connection with the deterioration of the situation in the

zones of the Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-Ossetia conflicts, the Kavkaz-2008 exercise will

rehearse the issues of participation in special peace enforcement operations in armed conflict

zones [italics added]. Incidentally, the inclusion in the combat training program for North Caucasus

Military District separate formations and military units of issues associated with the performance of

peacekeeping missions is one of the distinctive features of the district troops’ training in the new

instruction period.[541]

Two days earlier, on 15 July, Moscow’s Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey had also stated that a

special peace enforcement operation would be practiced.[542] When Russian military units entered

Georgia, a Russian embassy spokesperson in London stated that “there is no Russian attack. There is

peace enforcement in South Ossetia.”[543] Such prior planning and warnings nullify completely

Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev’s statement in September that the Georgian attack on South

Ossetia was Russia’s 9/11. There is no basis in fact or circumstances for his comparison since Russia

had monitored the situation and prepared a response.

In Georgia on 15 July, US, Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijanian, and Ukrainian forces gathered to

open exercise “Immediate Response 2008.” Its goals were, according to Georgian deputy defense

chief LTC Alexander Osepaishvili, to strengthen friendship and cooperation and to share experiences
among participating states. The exercise is an annual bilateral security cooperation exercise

conducted by the US with its coalition partners that focuses on interoperability and is designed to

promote understanding and cooperation.[544] Thus the US announcement of its exercise’s goals was

quite different than the goals of the Russian exercise on the other side of the border.

However, Russia’s leaders believe that US intelligence knew about Georgian plans to attack South

Ossetia and for good reason. US Ambassador to Russia John Beyrle reportedly noted in September,

nearly a month after the conflict ended, that the US tried unsuccessfully to talk Georgian President

Mikhail Saakashvili out of conducting the operation.

Russian operations to “enforce the peace” require United Nations (UN) authorization. Sergey

Karaganov, deputy director of the European Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Russia, thinks that

Georgia knew this and that they provoked Russia to send in its troops and to put Russia in an

awkward international legal position. From Russia’s (and the West’s) point of view, of course, killing

Russian peacekeepers goes well beyond a provocation.

Retired Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, former chief of the Main Directorate for International

Military Cooperation of the Russian Defense Ministry, noted that the Russian leadership did not need

UN authorization but instead utilized Article 51 of the UN Charter as the grounds for its decision to

send the 58

th Army to South Ossetia. The article notes that nothing in the charter shall impair an

individual or group to the right of collective self defense if an attack occurs against a member of the

United Nations until the UN has time to step in and restore peace and security. The peacekeeping

contingent in South Ossetia, Ivashov noted, was unable to defend itself against the Georgian

onslaught.[545]

When up to 50 of these soldiers, according to the Russian press, were killed in early August 2008

the Russians went in—in full battle armor—to conduct peace enforcement. Russia has had

peacekeepers in Georgia since 1992[546] and they were not as impartial as one would expect a

peacekeeper to be. Georgia has tried to unilaterally denounce the 1992 resolutions and accuse the

Russians of being occupiers. Russian politicians noted that Georgia cannot legally denounce these

resolutions by itself.[547] Efforts to bring all sides to the negotiating table by the UN, the European

Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) yielded no results.

An Anti-Russian Look at the Conflict by a Russian

While a pro-Russian look at the conflict is quite convincing that a warning was given and Russia

had reason to enter South Ossetia, another Russian journalist leads the reader to a different

conclusion, at least initially. Russian opposition journalist Yuliya Latynina posted an article to this

end on the anti-Kremlin current affairs website Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal (Daily Journal) on 8 August.

She noted that South Ossetia is neither a country, a territory, nor a regime but a joint venture of KGB

generals and Ossetian bandits trying to make money from fighting Georgia. Moscow has no strategic

goal except perhaps to extend its gas pipeline through the mountains to provide gas for citizens of

South Ossetia in case Georgia cuts off its supply. The citizens of South Ossetia are nothing more than

militarized refugees that form a quasi-state.[548]

Once militants in Tskhinvali began to shell Georgian villages, South Ossetia and Russia accused
Georgia of aggression. Latynina believed Georgia would win the conflict because it had a strategic

goal whereas, she wrote, Russia believed that war is won by the one who lies the most. The latest

events show that Russia is not even in control of South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity. When

Georgian Minister of State for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili arrived in Tskhinvali for

negotiations and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did all it could to set the meeting up, Kokoity

simply left Tskhinvali for Abkhazia.[549]

Latynina wrote that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili announced a unilateral ceasefire at ten

in the evening (date not provided) when the deployment of Georgian equipment was almost complete.

In response South Ossetia started shelling the Georgian villages of Prisi and Tamarasheni. This

provided Saakashvili with a future agenda free of constraints. Georgian troops razed Tskhinvali while

Kokoity called the retaliatory strike a provocation. So at that time the local population was stuck

between Saakashvili and Kokoity and the situation in the Caucuses had become destabilized.[550]

Writing on 16 August, after combat actions had ceased, Latynina changed her tune. She stated that

even though Georgia had been provoked many times, Saakashvili must bear responsibility for starting

the conflict. The fact that he launched an attack is, in her words, “a big problem for me and a great

tragedy for Georgia.” She went on to add that Saakashvili is a man who wants to solve problems

while Putin is a man who wants to create them, and here she sees a huge difference between the two.

Finally, she noted that Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland responded almost immediately to

Georgia’s troubles and supported Saakashvili. Thus the latter did achieve something: he has created a

circle of young democracies around Russia and partially isolated it.[551]

The 1992 Peacekeeping Agreement and the 2008 Increase in Tensions

There are two issues that defined the geographical and legal background to this conflict. The first

issue is the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the development of

the legal status of peacekeepers in the area, which began in 1992. The second issue is the

development of increasing tension between South Ossetian and Georgian forces in July 2008 over

both of these issues.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991 and Georgia broke away from the USSR, Russian

interest in Georgia remained high. Georgia has strategic borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, key

infrastructure roads (and now pipelines!), access to the Black Sea, and economic interests such as

access to resorts on the Black Sea and plenty of fresh fruits and vegetables. However, Georgian

nationalism ran high at the time and President Zviad Gamsakhurdia wanted a “Georgia for the

Georgians.” Unfortunately, his regime discriminated against ethnic minorities. Relations between

South Ossetia, an area incorporated into Georgia in the 1930s, and Georgia’s capital of Tbilisi broke

down when the Georgian Parliament decided to make Georgian the national language in 1989 and thus

“confronted the people’s sense of nationality” in South Ossetia. In August 1990 South Ossetia

proclaimed its independence. In December 1990 Gamsakhurdia’s coalition won the parliamentary

election and “abolished South Ossetia’s status as an autonomous oblast,” thereby blocking its

independence bid. This buildup in tension eventually led to a conflict in January 1991 when Georgian

forces entered South Ossetia’s capital of Tskhinvali. That led to a civil war with Georgian

government forces and militias on one side and South Ossetian secessionists and North Ossetian (that

is, Russian since North Ossetia is in Russia) volunteers on the other.[552]
In June 1992, the Head of the State Council of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze and Russian

President Boris Yeltsin met and agreed to a ceasefire. On 24 June 1992 the Sochi Agreement on the

Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict was signed. Both parties were to withdraw their forces

and form a corridor separating the two sides. As a result of the Sochi process the Joint Control

Commission (JCC) was formed to guarantee the cease-fire, withdraw armed forces, disband selfdefense units, and ensure a security regime in the conflict zone. The JCC became the political

mechanism to supervise the peacekeeping forces.[553] Thus, there had been trouble brewing between

the two sides for over 15 years.

Following the 1992 conflict South Ossetia created a president and parliament but the international

community did not recognize them. The JCC was the body that led the peace process and attempted to

solve the political and economic problems of the area. Russian, Georgian, South Ossetian, and OSCE

representatives participated. While the Sochi Agreement defined the principles of the conflict

resolution process the “Regulations in Joint Forces on Safeguarding Peace and Maintenance of Law

and Order in the Area of Conflict” set out the structure of the subordination of the peacekeeping

forces, to include their financing and powers.[554] The commander of the joint peacekeeping forces

(JPKF) was responsible for: planning for peace and stability; organizing JPKF activities; keeping in

touch with local legal bodies; coordinating between battalions; liaisoning with local forces; and

organizing training for JPKF battalions.[555]

For several years the peacekeepers kept events under control. However, as time progressed,

tensions continued to increase and some would say Russia’s impartiality began to evaporate to the

favor of South Ossetia, leading to the second issue defining the conflict. The size of the South

Ossetian and Georgian peacekeeping contingents dwindled but the Russian contingent of 500 or so

peacekeepers remained intact. The number of random attacks did not decrease, however, and the

situation finally reached the breaking point after a series of events in July 2008. Russia’s press

eventually reported that the reason for Georgia’s aggression was their leaders desire to enter NATO,

for which there is a mandatory condition to resolve all territorial problems.[556]

The following lengthy list provides some headlines demonstrating the rise in tension in the last

month before the fighting:

3 July—Georgia criticizes Russian peacekeepers after an attack on a pro-Tbilisi leader

4 July—two people are killed and up to 10 wounded after intensive shelling of Tskhinvali and some

other villages in the conflict zone. South Ossetia accuses Georgia of launching a planned military

operation while Georgia says it was responding to Ossetian provocations

7 July—Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev says Russia is ready to normalize relations with

Georgia; Georgia’s Foreign Minister says no concrete peace proposals received from Medvedev

8 July—detained Georgian officers were accused of organizing artillery observers; Georgia decides

to take “unilateral steps” unless Russian peacekeepers are replaced

9 July—Georgia’s Foreign Minister accuses Moscow of provocations in the conflict zone and

accuses Russian warplanes of breaching airspace over South Ossetia; Russia calls Georgia a “threat

to peace and security” in the South Caucasus

10 July—Russia says its warplanes flew “briefly” over South Ossetia on 9 July to prevent a Georgian
invasion threat; Russian troops stand ready to help peacekeepers in Georgia’s breakaway republics;

Russia’s OSCE envoy urges Georgia to stop provocations against South Ossetia

11 July—Georgia recalls its ambassador to Russia after Russia admits that four of its planes had

flown over South Ossetia on 8 July; Georgia threatens to shoot down planes if they enter Georgian

territory again; the EU calls for international mediation

12 July—Georgia’s Parliament calls for international support in its standoff with Russia; Russia says

Georgia’s appeal to the UN is “pure propaganda”

14 July—a Russian paper views prospects for a Russo-Georgian war; the US embassy in Georgia

blames Russia for provocations; Moscow tells Tbilisi to stop “undermining” JCC mechanism over

South Ossetia

15 July—Russia says NATO expansion in Georgia, Ukraine unacceptable; US, Georgia, Armenia,

Azerbaijan, and Ukraine begin exercise “Immediate Response” at the Vaziani training area

16 July—South Ossetian official accuses Georgia of rejecting peace talks; Tbilisi protests Russia’s

military exercises

19 July—South Ossetia rejects EU-proposed talks with Georgia in Brussels

21 July—UN Security Council holds closed session to review the situation in Georgia; South

Ossetian authorities accuse Georgian police of taking four Ossetian men hostage

22 July—Georgian envoy says UN Condemns Russia’s “military aggression” (concerning the 9 July

over flights by Russia of South Ossetia); Russian UN envoy slams “pro-Georgian bias” of West at

UNSC session

23 July—Georgia’s Foreign Ministry “seriously concerned” at Russian military exercises

29 July—South Ossetia accuses Georgia of shelling and firing on villages of Andisi and Sarabuki

near Tskhinvali and of firing on a Joint Peacekeeping Force monitoring group that arrived on the

scene. Georgia accuses South Ossetia of attacking the monitoring groups and of trying to seize the

strategic Sarabuki heights under control of Georgian peacekeepers where the Georgian flag was

hoisted on 28 July; Georgia to take radical measures if separatists repeat shooting; attack on

peacekeepers in South Ossetia “preplanned” according to the JPF command

31 July—South Ossetia confirms setting up military fortifications in the conflict zone

1 August—Georgian official says remote-controlled bombs that injured Georgian policemen involved

an Ossetian peacekeeping checkpoint

2-4 August—six people are killed and more than 20 injured in one of the most serious clashes in the

conflict zone in many years and both sides blame the other; Georgia says Russian peacekeepers

involved which Russia terms a “dirty provocation;” President Kokoity of South Ossetia says he is

ready to announce mobilization and threatens to strike Georgian cities

7 August—South Ossetia accuses Georgia of attacking Tskhinvali and Georgian President Saakashvili

calls for an immediate end to the “frenzy”

8 August—the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict begins[557]

From 8-12 August the conflict spread, with Russia quickly restoring its control over South Ossetia

and then driving south into Georgian territory beyond South Ossetia’s borders. By 13 August Russian

President Dmitriy Medvedev had halted the peace enforcement operation once it reached its

objectives. In his opinion, Russia had produced a prompt and efficient response to Georgia’s

aggression.[558]

Playing by Western Rules
Vladislav Inozemtsev, director of the Center for the Study of Post-Industrial Society, was one of

the first Russians to describe his country’s rational for intervening in the South Ossetian conflict. He

noted that Russia learned several lessons from watching Western powers intervene in conflicts

around the world and applied many of these lessons to the conflict in Georgia.

First, Inozemtsev notes, the Kremlin recognized that the world is tolerant of defending minorities

oppressed by the majority, a situation resembling that in regard to South Ossetia and Georgia. Second,

Moscow officials practiced humanitarian intervention for the first time, using this “Western doctrine”

to their advantage. Third, Russia acted within the confines of the doctrine of preemptive action which

is so revered by Americans, attacking those targets that might have attacked Russian forces. The

United States, Inozemtsev added, will now have to look again at its favorite assertion that democratic

countries are never the aggressor.[559]

An ITAR-TASS report noted that Western rules also take into account a proportional use of force

and the desires of the people in the region. Russia played on both of these themes as well, stating that

Russia was on the right side of both issues while Georgia was not. Russia’s permanent representative

to NATO, Dmitriy Rogozin, stated that Russia had used force in a manner more proportionately during

its peace enforcement operation than NATO did in the former Yugoslavia (the reference must be to

Kosovo).[560] Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev supported the theme of going along with the

desires of the people in the region. He stated that Russia is not against the insertion of international

peacekeepers in the zones of the Georgian-South Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts as long

as one takes into consideration the views of the affected parties. Whereas Georgia wants international

peacekeepers, the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia believe only Russian peacekeepers can

properly reflect their interests.[561]

Russia’s Armed Forces: What Went Wrong

Not surprisingly, discussions of the conflict by active military and government officials and by

retired or non-government officials differed in their views on the armed forces role and performance.

The former were much more positive in their assessments and conclusions than the latter. Russian

President Dmitriy Medvedev, for example, has appropriately covered the positive aspects of the

conflict. He awarded Russian soldiers for their achievements in semi-private ceremonies and praised

troop actions during the conflict. Medvedev noted in somewhat of an overstatement that this operation

would be written about as one of the most glorious chapters in the history of the armed forces.

It is the latter (retired or non-government journalists) that will receive the focus of this section and

includes some of the Russian armed forces greatest critics. One person, retired Colonel Anatoliy

Tsyganok, listed both strengths and weaknesses of the armed forces actions. Strength-wise, he wrote

that the armed forces solved three problems: the Roki Pass Tunnel, the limited throughput capacity of

the Vladikavkaz (the capital of North Ossetia in Russia, where movement began) to Tskhinvali (the

capital of South Ossetia) road, some 167 kilometers, and the mustering of various forces throughout

Russia. Within 24 hours the number of Russian troops in South Ossetia had doubled. Tsyganok stated

that troop actions deserved “all possible praise.”[562]

However, Tsyganok was quite adamant that there were operational and combat support issues that

left room for improvement. First, a lack of satellite support left the troops in an information deficit.
The main problem was noted as “the lack of the requisite space grouping and GLONASS

receivers.”[563] Electronic warfare systems were not used to suppress Georgia’s air defense systems

and there was an absence of aircraft controllers. This caused armored columns to advance without the

proper cover. Second, traditionally weak areas for the Russian army, such as nighttime actions,

reconnaissance, communications, and logistical support, remain weaknesses. Night sighting devices

are blinded by gunfire flashes and old tanks did not have global navigation systems or friend or foe

systems. Third, it was rare to see vehicles fitted with shields or additional armor and, as a result,

soldiers still prefer to ride on the outside of these vehicles where, if thrown off, they have a chance of

surviving. There was poor interaction between tanks and motorized infantry units and, on occasion,

units sometimes fired on one another. Fourth, there was a shortage of modern precision weapons in

the Russian air force and virtually a total lack of drones. Pchela drones used in Chechnya are

practically worn out. Finally, a 1998 decision to remove helicopters from the ground force has turned

out to be a problem. There are no experts in army air aviation in the air force that know how to

support ground troops.[564]

Recommendations by Tsyganok included creating information troops that take into account state

and military media, modernizing forces by the end of 2015, reconstituting army aviation in the

combined-arms armies and corps, and equipping aircraft and helicopter gunships with modern

systems. It is also necessary to put more satellites in orbit (24 are needed but only 13 are in orbit) and

procure more GLONASS receivers, to develop friend or foe systems, and to develop new radar

stations.[565]

Journalist Mikhail Lukanin wrote that insufficient use was made of ground attack and tactical

aviation. Other errors on the part of Russia’s armed forces were a lack of unmanned aerial vehicle

(UAV) use, inadequate organization of communications, inadequate personal gear and equipment, and

the absence of precision weapons.[566]

On 19 August the Presidium of the Globalization Problems Institute talked about South Ossetia and

the question of information. They concluded that the Russian political and military leadership

experienced indescribable panic and confusion when they realized Georgia was actually invading

South Ossetia. They also wrote that the Russian military command acted with incompetence. Soldiers

in many cases had no knowledge of how to counter Georgian guidance systems which were searching

for Russian signals from radios and mobile telephones. They concluded that the main goal of the war

was to draw the Russian army into military operations.[567]

Olga Bozhevya, a writer for Moskovskiy Komsomolets (Moscow Komsomol Member), used many

of the same arguments as Tsyganok. She noted that the West is accusing Russia of the use of excessive

force. She fixed blame for the accusation on the lack of modern precision systems in the Russian

armed forces. Without the proper digital systems, how can fires be precise? Thus high-tech satellite

reconnaissance systems and precision weaponry did not win the conflict for Russia. Rather, it took

the heroism and blood of the common soldiers who relied on weapons of the 1960s. Russian forces

were not able to fight in a non-contact style as the US does but rather only in contact style.

Russia was able to obtain several “trophies” from the conflict (Osa air-defense systems, BMP-2s,

Czech-made self-propelled artillery, US Hummer vehicles). Further, Bozhevya quotes the reliable

and intelligent Vitaliy Shlykov, a member of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council and Chairman of
the Commission for Security Policy and Expert Appraisal of Military Legislation of the Ministry of

Defense Public Council, who believes a major problem in the Russian armed forces is its lack of

unified commands. Shlykov stated that “With the current system of leadership it could not have been

otherwise not only for the armed forces but for the country’s defense as a whole.”[568] Perhaps

Georgian President Saakashvili knew this in advance and planned the operation to demonstrate

Russia’s resort to blood spilling among peaceful people, Bozhevya added. Finally she asks who is

responsible for these operations, the military or the politicians who do not provide the armed forces

with the equipment it needs?

Author Viktor Baranets, an outspoken critic of the military and former officer who writes often on

military affairs, listed eight lessons that the Russians should have learned. They are:

· Underestimating the enemy’s equipping with Israeli and Ukrainian equipment

· The delayed maneuver of the peace keepers after Georgian peacekeepers left their positions

· Sleepy control from Moscow which allowed the Georgians to set up ambushes along the

road leading to the tunnel and mining the road.

· Intelligence failures of all types in the first stage of the operation

· Tactical illiteracy on the part of air defense systems

· Old weapons and tank radios didn’t work well

· Deafness in regard to communications forced troops to use their own cellular phones to

contact staffs and command posts (one general reportedly used a satellite phone from a

Komsomolskaya Pravda correspondent)

· Passiveness of aviation to Georgia’s air defense threat resulted in the loss of four

aircraft[569]

Baranets also discussed Georgian “myths” such as how many troops they killed, how they set a

trap for Russia’s forces, and so on.[570]

Reformer journalist Alexander Goltz, who has continuously criticized Russia’s lack of reform in

the armed forces, wrote that Russia intends to leave more tanks and artillery behind once it

withdraws to Russia because Georgia now understands that its most important goal is to find a way to

block the Roki Tunnel and Russia must be able to counter any such attempt. Goltz also wrote that no

one really “won” this conflict, stating that

One can at a minimum claim that Moscow was unable to diplomatically reinforce its “victory.”

And this forces one to think about whether this was a victory at all. The winner Russia is in

factual isolation. No one supported it: not China, not Venezuela, not Father Lukashenko [the

President of Belarus]. Only Fidel remained true. As far as Moscow’s Western “partners” go,

then the main topic of discussion of the diplomats of the United States and Western Europe is

how to force Moscow to “pay” for its actions.[571]

Another criticism was leveled by former chief of the Main Tank-Automotive Directorate of the

Russian Defense Ministry, Colonel-General Vladislav Polonskiy, who noted that units went into

action without reactive armor and that this shortcoming must be corrected at once in light of improved
anti-tank weapons. Some tanks covered in reactive armor, as seen on TV, were actually reactive

armor tiles that were empty, he stated.[572] The Commander-in-Chief of Ground Troops, General

Vladimir Boldyrev, stated that it will take radical measures to “update the communication equipment

of the tank troops and drastically improve their command and control system.”[573]

With regard to equipment, even the Russian spokesman for this conflict, the deputy chief of the

General Staff of Russia Colonel General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn, stated that the General Staff will draw

serious conclusions from the use of radio-electronic measures in light of losses from the operation in

Georgia. He noted that the Georgians had been armed by Ukraine and that it was difficult to suppress

the Tor and Buk systems since Ukraine knows the strong and weak points of Russian fighters.

Nogovitsyn added that Russia’s radio-electronic systems are also “Soviet made” from which the

proper conclusions can be drawn.[574]

With regard to the success of the Georgian Buk surface-to-air missiles, Nogovitsyn stated that

these Ukrainian systems were successful against Russian aircraft because they were deployed to

Georgia just before the attack and this surprised Russian analysts. Further, the Buk system can change

its location rapidly, and the Russian and Georgian units are armed with identical air defense systems

from Soviet times. Georgian operators were informed by “foreign colleagues” Nogovitsyn noted,

adding that the IFF signal receivers on these missiles are designed to change bands. In this way, when

adjustments are made, these systems can be used to fire against Russian aircraft.[575]

Colonel General (retired) Sergey Mayev, head of the Main Armor Directorate from 1996-2004,

former Minister of Defense (1992-1996) Pavel Grachev, and former Chief of the General Staff

(1988-1991) Mikhail Moiseyev also weighed in on equipment problems. Mayev said a combat

vehicle equipped with “nine channels of firepower” (anti-tank missiles, heavy machine guns,

automatic grenade launchers, and air defense systems, etc.) was created back during the Afghan war

years but has still not been fielded today. Mayev noted that generals also need more unmanned aerial

vehicles and that armored vehicles should only advance with information-laden helicopters flying

above them. Grachev called for radio-technical reconnaissance and mobile communications systems,

and Moiseyev called for combat control systems, starting with army and regional command posts.

[576]

Finally, Russia’s Ministry of Defense was satisfied overall with the campaign in South Ossetia.

Chief of the Russian General Staff, General of the Army Nikolay Makarov stated that shortcomings

could be eliminated if more money was allocated for high-precision weapons, an orbital space

grouping, air defense, and aviation improvements. All Duma members were not as certain that all had

gone well. Deputies wanted to know why all types of reconnaissance had failed, why there were

serious organizational shortcomings, why there were such tangible losses in heavy equipment

(helicopters, jet aircraft, etc.) against such a haphazard army, and why so much equipment broke

down while the world was watching. Viktor Ilyukhin, vice-chairman of the Duma’s State Construction

Committee, went so far as to state, with regard to Minister of Defense Anatoliy Serdyukov, that “after

such a war you as an honorable man should submit your resignation.”[577]

Accusations against the United States and Other Organizations

The US waited nearly a month before openly admitting that Georgia had initiated combat
operations in South Ossetia, according to the Russian press. One of the first articles on this statement

was an ITAR-TASS report devoted to a meeting of the US Senate’s Armed Services Committee

devoted to the Georgian-Russian conflict. US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Eric Edelman,

stated that Tbilisi’s actions were the reason for the movement of Russian troops to Georgia. He noted

that “the Georgian leadership’s decision to employ force in the conflict zone was unwise.”[578]

Edelman felt that Georgia’s leadership thought they could conduct a limited military operation that

would result in the restoration of Georgian sovereignty over South Ossetia, an operation that was

hastily planned and implemented. Edelman added that the Bush Administration does not condone the

use of artillery and multiple rocket launchers into urban areas and into areas where Russian

peacekeepers were stationed. The Bush Administration, however, also does not condone Russia’s

aggressive response which will not be tolerated and will not be cost free. He also stated that the US

does not seek a new Cold War either.[579]

Another report in the Russian press implied that the US certainly knew of Georgia’s plan ahead of

time. Interfax reported that US Ambassador to Russia, John Beyrle, stated that he personally knows

how serious the US tried to deter Georgian authorities from such a move. Beyrle added that just

because the US supplied equipment and training to the Georgian military does not imply that it gave a

“green light” to the Georgian operation. Georgian soldiers serve with the US in Iraq and Afghanistan

and that was the reason for the trainers and equipment in Georgia. Countering Russian claims that the

US was complicit in the attack by airlifting Georgian troops from Iraq back to Georgia, Beyrle stated

that when the Georgian side asked for help there was a threat that Russian troops would continue

moving to Tbilisi.[580]

However, on 16 September, Russia’s permanent representative to NATO, Dmitriy Rogozin,

reenergized the issue of who attacked first. He was responding to a US State Department claim that

Russia started the conflict. The International Herald Tribune, ITAR-TASS reported, claimed Georgia

had made public a transcript of intercepted verbal messages between Ossetian border guards

regarding attack plans on the eve of the August 7-8 events. The paper claimed that Russian military

forces had entered the Roki tunnel late on the night of August 6 or in the first hours of August 7, or 24

hours before the start of hostilities. The Tribune stated that on the evening of 7 August US Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza had spoken with Georgia’s foreign minister, Eka

Tkeshelashvili, who appeared to believe in the content of the recorded Ossetian conversations

according to Bryza. Soon thereafter President Saakashvili issued his order to attack. Rogozin claimed

that the tapes, if they exist, were manufactured by Georgian or US Secret Services. He demanded

space reconnaissance data that would unambiguously prove there were no Russian troops moving

though the Roki tunnel before 8 August.[581] On the same day Russia’s foreign ministry spokesman

Andrei Nesterenko also requested satellite information on the operation.[582] Thus Russia wanted to

call the US on this charge. It appeared, however, that Russia may have over responded to the content

of this article.

In an interview with the Spanish press, Rogozin stated that according to information in Russia, the

US, since they gave weapons to Georgia, was a direct participant in the conflict. The US and not

NATO is responsible for the fighting as part of their geopolitical game. In particular, he stated

I think the problem is that Washington is jealous. The US wants a monopoly and we are
applying an anti-monopoly policy. We want to live in a world with many poles, with a balanced

system, but the Americans believe that their young democracy is the most important thing. That

kind of thinking is very naïve. The US history is shorter than the history of a horse farm near my

house in Moscow.[583]

There were many statements in the Russian press that indicated the US was involved in training

and planning the Georgian operation. Marianna Grishina, writing in Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) on

19 August, leveled one of the most poignant attacks. She stated that the US government is as

responsible for genocide as Georgia and should be held accountable. She added that even though

there is no way to prove US involvement in the invasion, the US has de facto begun a policy of acting

as an advocate of genocide. Grishina then turned her spotlight on all of the incursions involving the

US over the past fifteen years, concluding her article with the comment that today US soldiers are

“accidentally” shooting subunits of the Afghan police.[584]

Dmitriy Shalkov delivered another accusation against the US and its coalition partners. He noted

that Russia had found satellite reconnaissance data had been found abandoned by the Georgian staff

as they moved away from the fighting. Since Georgia does not have a satellite constellation of its

own, Shalkov’s implication was that a Western nation must have supplied the data to the Georgians.

[585] Adding his own personal weight to the issue, on 11 September Russian Prime Minister

Vladimir Putin also stated that the US had pushed Georgia into attacking South Ossetia by training and

funding Georgia’s armed forces.[586]

Colonel General Nogovitsyn stated that the US had trained Georgian officers and men, supplied

the Georgian side with weapons, and outfitted the Georgian army with equipment and arms. He said

that over 120 Pentagon representatives engaged in this activity for a lengthy time period (Nogovitsyn

did not, however, specify how much time was spent on partnership activities nor did he state how

much time was spent training Georgian forces for operations in Iraq. His clear implication was that

US forces were in Georgia to assist in planning the intervention into South Ossetia). He also stated

that the presence of NATO warships in the Black Sea for alleged humanitarian purposes was a ruse to

deliver other types of cargo. He stated that “spending enormous resources to convey humanitarian

help to Georgia is at the very least not inherent to Americans.”[587] Most Americans, knowledgeable

of hundreds of such actions on the part of the US, would consider that Nogovitsyn had lost much of his

credibility with this statement.

Other Russian reports supported Nogovitsyn’s view on NATO warships. An RIA-Novosti report,

for example, also stated that the US ships in the Black Sea were there on a pseudo-humanitarian

mission. The ships were accused of performing reconnaissance functions and were under suspicion of

supplying arms to Georgia.[588]

Rossiya TV reported in early September that US weapons “were used to kill Russian citizens.”

That, quite obviously, is an inflammatory phrase. The TV report itself was designed to be sensational

or enticing for its lack of detail. It is unclear which one was the actual goal of the program. After

setting the stage by stating that US weapons are “already near our borders,” the Russian TV

correspondent noted that an automatic Bushmaster rifle, a telephone intercept system “based-on”

American equipment, a vehicle made in the US in the 1960s, “American combat stress medicines” in
the pockets of dead Georgian soldiers, a high-resolution satellite imaging map and mobile telephone

(with a male voice from the US National System for Geospatial Intelligence), and Hummers were

captured by Russian forces during the conflict.[589] These are not the type of weapons that would

worry Lichtenstein, let alone Russia.

Interfax also reported that the Russian General Staff had accused OSCE observers in the conflict

zone of not warning Russian peacekeepers about Georgia’s plans. “They were notified by Georgia

that there would be an attack but they did not warn the Russian peacekeepers,” Colonel General

Nogovitsyn stated.[590] He offered no proof to support his accusation, a common Russian press

technique that even Russian journalists criticized.

Media Operations

Russian media outlets used state run agencies like ITAR-TASS and RIA-Novosti and Krasnaya

Zvezda (Red Star), the military’s newspaper, to deliver a point of view from the President, the

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russia’s Representative to NATO, the Ministry of Defense’s Public

Relations representative, and the Prime Minister. Russia used a Deputy Chief of the General Staff,

Colonel General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn, to serve as its official public relations spokesman. He

eventually gained some notoriety as a calm, level-headed yet firm representative of the opinion of the

Ministry of Defense. Criticism of the Russian media was most pronounced by independent journalists

and some retired military officers who used the national news media, although some positive stories

also appeared here.

Overcoming a Slow IW Start...

A media, public relations, or information war (all of these terms were used interchangeably) was

reported in the Russian press. Initially Russia appeared to be on the “information defensive” at the

beginning of the conflict. On 8 August, just as the fighting started, Agentura reported that the

Georgians had established a press center in Gori, a city about 30 kilometers from South Ossetia.

Operating from the Trialeti regional television company, computers were installed for journalists that

provided Internet access. The journalists were instructed how to behave during conflicts. Agentura

accused the Georgian side of launching the Os-inform.com website, which was close to the South

Ossetian news agency site of osinform.ru. The Georgian website reportedly carried a fake message

by South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity.[591]

On 9 August Russia reported the deaths of 12 to 13 peacekeepers in the past 24 hours. Russian

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused Georgia of attacking civilians, residential buildings,

finishing off the wounded, and violating humanitarian laws. Lavrov said that “Russia’s responsibility

as a peacekeeper amounts to a response to this aggression.”[592] Both Russian Defense Ministry

spokesmen and Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev declared that Russia is not in a state of war

with Georgia but was imposing a peace enforcement operation.[593]

On 11 August, Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov reproached Western media outlets for

not covering Georgia’s bombing of South Ossetia at the start of the conflict. He accused the Western

media of biased coverage.[594] A Russian TV presenter stated that Tbilisi (and by implication

Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili) was “starting to deny the obvious, trying to conduct an

information war and thus provoke the peacekeeping forces.”[595] TV stations quoted the Russian
Ministry of Defense as stating that the Georgian military was “killing off wounded Russian

peacekeepers and local inhabitants at captured posts”[596] much as Lavrov had done two days

earlier. The article ended with the statement that “the war has started, and the information war is,

unfortunately, at its height.”[597] On 12 August the state-controlled Russian TV station Channel One

showed footage of captured Georgian saboteurs testifying that they were agents of Georgia’s special

services caught preparing terrorist acts.[598]

On 13 August Colonel General Nogovitsyn reported that Russia had countered what he termed

many of the lies and misrepresentations in the West’s information war. He stated that he considered

this a media confrontation while others referred to it as an information war. He also stated that

Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili had lied when he said he had been in South Ossetia and had

personally witnessed Russia destroying Tskhinvali.[599] Thus Russia appeared to be growing

stronger in the IW area and moving toward an “information offensive” mindset.

On 14 August, in a report intended to serve as a summary of information warfare activities to date,

journalist Valeriy Vyzhutovich wrote how Georgia was initially more active in the information arena,

announcing Georgian successes every hour, describing Russia as the aggressor country, and showing

Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili on TV. Georgia blocked all information from Russia, to

include TV, radio, print publications, and the Internet, all of which are seen as a Georgian

“information expansion” act that poses a threat to Georgia’s national security. A second information

front was created by Western press agencies, he adds. Russia’s IW offensive was domestic based.

Russian bloggers, for example, suspected Reuters news agency of utilizing faked pictures from in and

around Gori and reported this to the Russian public.[600]

On 15 August Russian UN representative Vitaliy Churkin expressed regret that the West had

launched a “propagandist campaign” in connection with the Caucasus situation. In particular he

blamed the New York Times and London’s Financial Times, waving them in the air and quoting

reports about Russian attacks on Gori. Churkin claimed that all Russia had done was to guard an

abandoned ammunition dump that contained 15 tanks and some armored personnel carriers, securing

them from someone taking them and driving in any direction.[601]

As Russian journalists moved on the information offensive they covered the following points: that

firing on civilians is a violation of international law and subject to international justice; that a

humanitarian crisis was afoot and Russia needed to strengthen its peacekeeping contingent to keep it

from spreading; that Russian troops were to protect its citizens in South Ossetia in compliance with

the peacekeeping mandate; and that legally Russia’s actions were legitimate and just. Valeriy

Vyzhutovich recommended that Russia increase its information openness and expand the volume of

information it needed. Russia must insure that a lack of information doesn’t turn into a lack of support.

[602]

On 17 August Colonel General Nogovitsyn stated that Georgia had falsely accused Russia of

starting a fire near Borjomi, taking the settlements of Khashuri and Akhalgori, blowing up a railway

bridge on the approaches to Tbilisi, and sending tanks to Senaki. None of this has taken place, he

stated, accusing the Georgians of disinformation in order to erect a smoke screen and cover their

planned large scale act of provocation in Gori. The Georgians, he noted, planned to use Georgians,
Ukrainians, and Chechen terrorists dressed in Russian uniforms to conduct a raid on the city and

blame it on the Russians. However, Russian peacekeepers will not fall for this provocation.[603]

On 23 August Nogovitsyn stated that the Russian military was regularly holding news conferences

to provide relevant information as quickly and fully as possible, because Russia understands the

importance of media relations. He noted that Georgia had set the tone by appealing to the world

community from the beginning of hostilities; and had switched off all Russian broadcasting

capabilities in Tbilisi so that only the Georgian position was available to listeners. Russia is learning

from this situation, Nogovitsyn added, and will be more adept at information confrontation in the

future since information globalization is so prominent today.[604]

A 3 September summary of the information war by the paper Rossiyskiye Vesti indicated that

initially Russia was very envious of the attention the West gave to Georgian President Mikhail

Saakashvili. The paper wrote that anti-Russian propaganda dominated the media space until Georgian

troops began to suffer a crushing defeat, at which time CNN showed Colonel General Nogovitsyn

briefing reporters live for the first time. His presentations over the next few weeks enabled Russia to

win the information war because Nogovitsyn had mastered information technologies and because the

“truth” was on his side. His style was also an issue, as he appeared to be a lecturing professor who

methodically and calmly addressed the media and its questions according to the report.[605]

On 9 September Nogovitsyn stated that “information wars are even more formidable than war

itself.” He wrote, somewhat ironically it turns out, that “brainwashing people with propaganda has

been given the status of official state policy in that country [Georgia].” He added that groups of

people, not local residents, are transported to South Ossetia by bus (most likely Nogovitsyn is talking

about the pre-war period) with anti-Russian banners in English. These people insult the Russian

peacekeepers and call them occupiers. Western journalists in the bus record all of this.[606]

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin continued bashing the Western press when on 11 September he

stated that “the media’s coverage was utterly preposterous, yet they managed to get away with it. This

can be possible only in a situation where people are very persuadable, where the man in the street

does not keep track of events, and eagerly accepts other’s point of view.”[607] Or perhaps Putin

underestimates how much people still distrust the Russian press.

Some Russian Journalists Think Russia Lost the IW...

There were several Russian journalists who stated that Russia had lost the information war and

had done things improperly. On 11 August William Dunbar, a Russian correspondent in Georgia for

the English-state channel Russia Today, stated that Russia was bombing Georgia. Dunbar did not

return to the air. He told Moscow News later hat his satellite feeds had been cancelled by Russia

Today. Unable to tell the “real news” which didn’t conform to what Russia Today wanted, he said he

had no choice but to resign.[608]

Other criticisms were slower in appearing. On 22 August journalist Vladimir Shcherbakov

criticized the Ministry of Defense for its inept information warfare operations. He stated that IW is

generally understood as “a set of measures for preventing the enemy from collecting any information,

for influencing his ability to exercise command and control at a state (public) level and on the
battlefield, and for totally destroying such capabilities as well as preventing the enemy from doing the

same thing.”[609] IW has focused of late, Shcherbakov added, on special-propaganda effects on the

mass consciousness to change the behavior of a wide range of people while imposing on them goals

useful to the one using the information weapon. Methods include both constant information noise and

an information vacuum. Dissemination “means” range from military special-propaganda teams (that

is, psychological operations teams) to the public mass media. Quoting Russian Lieutenant General

Alexander Burutin, a Russian information operations proponent, Shcherbakov added that the military

is currently working on drafting concept designs, elements, and methods of conducting information

operations.[610]

Shcherbakov’s criticism focused in particular on the military’s lack of even creating a separate

section on the war on South Ossetia on its website. At the same time, he added, the Pentagon’s

website was full of news from the “Caucasus Front.” The military and special services also did little

in Shcherbakov’s opinion to block the blogs and articles in the mass media with a negative impact

and did little to create blogs and articles with a positive direction to counter them. The military made

accusations (a black soldier was found in Tskhinvali) but there was never any proof of his existence.

Much was made of the fact that foreign equipment was captured from the Georgian forces, but the

world knows that for the past several years various arms and equipment had been sent to Georgia.

The equipment doesn’t imply that forces were there. And worst of all, much was made of a name

badge found on a Georgian soldier that indicated that the person had trained at a center controlled by

the Americans. From this simple fact the Russian Federation spokesman concluded direct

responsibility of the American military for initiating the war. Such circumstantial evidence isn’t

enough, Shcherbakov added. We have to present real proof.[611]

Shcherbakov concluded his article with this admonition of the military for losing the information

war:

The answer is rather simple—the military department has practically no professionals with

high qualifications capable of competently conducting the information operations which form

information warfare. There are specialists in special propaganda but this is not one and the

same. But experts in the sphere of information warfare in Russia are nowhere to be gotten:

everything the mass media and PR services in our country have worked on was the leaking of

damaging information on each other to the press. Such methods do not work in real information

warfare—they are ineffective and did not produce the desired effect.[612]

In another critical report on information warfare, journalist Ilya Barabanov gave away her point of

view with the title “Union of Soviet Socialist Mass Media.” She believes Russia lost the

international information war. This was because Georgia allowed interviews with anyone whereas

Russia used only the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russia’s United Nations

representative, and the First Deputy of the General Staff. Further, Georgia created an international

news center in Gori which is something Russia failed to do.

Meanwhile journalists in Russia faced different circumstances. They were not allowed to cross

into Georgia via the Roki tunnel and as the war drew closer to a conclusion even Russian journalists

were suddenly required to have special accreditation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Federal Security Service. Russia’s only victory, in Barabanov’s opinion, came from Kremlin public

relation experts who used the Internet. They produced news from the front and exposed fabricated

interviews and photos. Their domestic information victory must now be extended to the international

information front in the future.[613]

In mid-September another information warfare deficiency was discussed. Journalist Pavel

Gutiontov expressed his sorrow that Russia always laments that “their” propagandists prove to be

more effective than “ours” due to the west being more cunning and unprincipled. Gutiontov stated that

it is through Russian lies that the west wins and not through cunning. He noted how various

explanations were given for the sinking of the Kursk before the truth was known; how Russian

generals misinformed the public at the start of the Chechen war; and now how General Nogovitsyn

stated that Russian troops “are not, never were, nor will be in Gori” only to have Nogovitsyn state

two days later that troops had entered Gori since the Georgian administration had fled from there. He

concluded his argument with a throwback reference to how, in Soviet times, the press would state that

the Soviet Sputnik razor was better than the American Gillette because its steel was better. The latter

produced a smoother shave only because the West coated their blades with a polymer compound of

some type. Old traditions die hard.[614]

Cyber Operations

There seem to be three separate categories of information operations in Russia and all three were

discussed during the conflict. There is the information-psychological aspect which covers the use of

the media and press; the information-technological aspect, which handles the equipping of the force

with digital products; and the cyber aspect which includes the use of military and surrogate computers

to disrupt command and control in countries Russia enters.

Since the first two issues have been addressed, only the cyber issue remains. The cyber issue took

on added importance for western analysts due to Russia’s 2007 cyber attack on Estonia that still has

not faded in the memory of many states bordering Russia. However, the cyber attack employed against

Georgia was not as debilitating.

The cyber attacks started slowly. Weeks before the conflict a security researcher in Massachusetts

watched an attack against a country in cyberspace. A stream of data was directed at Georgian sites

with the message “win+love+in+Rusia.” On 20 July other Internet experts in the US said attacks

against Georgia’s Internet infrastructure began at that time as DDOS attacks. Shadowserver tracked

some attacks. Were these attacks dress rehearsals for the actual intervention?

But these reports came from western sources and there were many more beyond the few reports

sited here. For example, much was written in the western press on the Russian Business Network’s

cyber warfare and the website stopgeorgia.ru which was hosted by AS36351 Softlayer in Plano

Texas.

The Russian press, on the other hand, focused its cyber reporting almost solely on Georgia’s use of

the Internet and bloggers who supported or attacked Russia. One of the few exceptions to this rule

was a mid-September article. In it, Interfax reported that NATO experts would help protect Georgian

web pages on the Internet from hacker attacks. Reports said that hacker attacks were organized in
Russia.[615]

A set of three articles by Maksim Zharov titled “Russia versus Georgia: War on the Net” provided

the best description of Russia’s view on cyber issues during the conflict. Journalist Zharov works for

the Effective Policy Foundation. He wrote at Pravda.ru that the main topic of 9 August on Runet, the

Russian Internet, was the attack on South Ossetia. Particular attention was being paid to shaping

public opinion on the Internet. A fierce battle over truth and lies was taking shape. South Ossetian

sites such as http://osinform.ru and http://osradio.ru did excellent work according to Zharov. Georgia

attempted to block these sites through DDoS attacks and fake sites which forced South Ossetia to

open a new site at tskhinval.ru. Georgia opened a fake site that mimicked South Ossetian site

http://osinform.ru at http://www.os-inform.com.[616]

Blogging also began immediately, according to Zharov, who stated that Ukrainian Russophobe

bloggers defended Georgian fascists. The Ru_politics community was flooded with Ukrainian and

Azerbaijani disinformation. The virtual “boris-kogatov” and the Ukrainian blogger “ultrasun” were

other anti-Russian bloggers (capitalization of blogger names is according to their use in Open Source

documents). One Russian blogger who said they were not for war (not for Russia or Georgia) was

termed a degenerate by other Russians. Russia’s Young Russia movement provided a spark of proRussian blogging, even setting up a newsreel on ZhZh (Zhivoy Zhurnal or Live Journal) that reported

about the situation in South Ossetia as did blogger “alexbred.” Zharov ended his critique of Day One

by stating that in regard to Russian bloggers this was a war of extremes. As an example, blogger

“eriklobakh” stated that Russia had won the Internet war but the military was lagging a little behind

the Internet, whereas blogger “Chukcheev” wrote that Georgia, based on the frequency of

appearances, was winning the information war.[617]

Day Two reporting by Zharov included more salvos fired back and forth from Russian and

Georgian bloggers. Russian S. Stillavin stated that he attempted to upload Beijing Olympic photos at

odnoklassniki.ru but instead had to view people with Georgian flags in place of their faces. Lenta.ru,

a Russian site, noted that someone had placed Mikhail Saakashvili and Adolf Hitler on the main page

of the Georgian foreign ministry’s web site, and morphed the images together. More dastardly,

blogger “Gastarbeiter” wrote that one of Russia’s pilots who was captured, Igor Zinov, had the label

“occupier” hung on him on the website odnoklassniki. Worse, this link was posted on Zinov’s

daughter’s homepage. The Ukrainian blogger involved later removed this posting.[618]

Photo evidence was also presented. Video clips of the Russian bombing of Gori were taken from

Western and Georgian TV and disseminated in blogs. Russia, in return, created http://war.avkhv.net/,

a collection of news reports from Russian TV about South Ossetia. Two pro-Russian bloggers,

“plutovstvo007” and “tarlith-history” turned their diaries into mini news agencies. Photos from

Reuters News Agency became the focus of attention as well. On “forum.for-ua.com” Russian

bloggers “exposed” the fact that several Reuters photos were faked or staged.[619]

Many Russian bloggers became consumed over whether Russia was winning or losing the

information war to western public opinion. Russian blogger “3-rome” wrote that too much space was

devoted to strip clubs and porno at the expense of real news. Blogger “borko” had a spate with

reporters in the conflict zone, noting that Russian reporters were not showing the burning houses, the
dead children, and the burning Georgian tanks about which people had read. “Borko” asked to see the

reason for the war. “Le9” summed up the discussion, noting that Russia does not have its own CNN

and this is felt. Further, “Medvedev needs to give an interview to the foreign media explaining the

position and further actions concerning Georgia. It would not be a bad thing if officials from South

Ossetia appeared in news and photo agencies, and also on air quickly.”[620]

The impact of Georgia shutting off all access to Russian news was also discussed. Blogger “lizavalieva” wrote that “I have just been called by relatives from Tbilisi. They were totally convinced

that South Ossetia had started the war. I managed to dissuade them of this. They were in shock when

they found out about the number of dead and wounded in South Ossetia.”[621]

On Day Three Zharov reported that Runet (the Russian Internet) activity had died down. Allegedly

the reason for this was that several sources, such as the blogger “pro-kurator,” had reported that

monetary support for Georgia on the Internet had been suspended. But this did not mean that there

were no attacks at all. Elissa, the leader of RIA Novosti’s Internet projects wrote that a DDoS attack

on www.rian.ru had taken place. A commentator for the Net publication Vebplaneta.ru stated that it is

evident that Georgia must have others helping them.[622]

Runet users think it is important to explain Russia’s position to foreigners and refute Georgian

assertions. Zharov explained how Russian bloggers began to analyze western presentations on the

war. VIF forum presented and analysis of CNN video clips, the blogger “liquid-alco” analyzed

British press articles on events, and the “luberblog” blog offered foreign bloggers’ opinions about the

war. Blogger “merzavec” stated that it is more important to win the information war inside the

country than outside it.[623]

Another site covering cyber operations, which Zharov did not mention in his reporting, was the

Russian website http://www.vesti.ru. It discussed Georgia’s attempts to block all access to Russian

TV and Internet assets during the same three day time period as Zharov. The website stated that the

motivation behind the information blockade was to instigate an information war with Russia. It was

not possible to open a website in Georgia with the ru signature, according to Vesti, unless it contained

only non-news content such as “Hunting and Fishing.” This was based on a decision by the Georgian

leadership on 9 August.[624]

On 22 August the presidium of the Union of Journalists of Moscow called on the Georgian

government to lift the information blockade. It accused Georgia of not allowing its citizens to get

truthful “first hand” information. The Union wanted to present to Georgians the impressions of

Moscow journalists who were among the first in the zone of hostilities and were fired upon by

Georgian troops.[625]

Consequences

There were significant consequences from the fighting. The two major groups that are highlighted

here are the changes to the conflict area after the peace enforcement operation; and the changes in the

thinking of Russia and the international community in their views of one another. Although the list

appears long, these are only a few examples of the many developments and thoughts that countries

began to explore. Some of the consequences may turn out to be bluff or bluster while others may turn
out to encourage cardinal changes in the geopolitical landscape of the region. Commentators on the

crisis ranged from the President of the Czech Republic to the Al-Jazeera news network.

Changes to the conflict area were:

· On 15 August Russian Defense representative Lieutenant-General Nikolay Uvarov stated

that the Russian peacekeeping group in South Ossetia will be increased and include tanks;

and that Georgian peacekeepers will not be allowed to return to South Ossetia.[626]

· On 17 August Russian troops took control over a power plant on the Georgian-Abkhaz

border. The Ingurskaya power plant provides thousands of Georgians and Abkhazians with

power.[627] It is not known how long peacekeeping forces will remain there.

· On 18 August Russian General Staff Deputy Chief Anatoliy Nogovitsyn stated that he knows

when the New Year will come but he does not know when Russian troops will withdraw

from the conflict area.[628] Fears that they will remain in Georgia for a long time begin to

take shape.

· On 18 August Federation Council speaker Sergei Mironov said Russia should insist on the

demilitarization of Georgia under international control. Further, Mironov advocated the

construction of a buffer zone along the border of South Ossetia as in Nagorno-Karabakh. A

ten-fifteen kilometer zone controlled by motorized infantry and air force units would help to

stifle the concentration of Georgian troops near the border of South Ossetia and prevent

shooting into this territory.[629] Also on 18 August Nogovitsyn noted that Russia’s

peacekeepers will never leave Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[630]

· On 19 August Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted that, unlike what the European

Union (EU) intends to do in Kosovo, that is establish a new state, Russia’s only mission in

South Ossetia is to ensure that hostilities are not resumed. He added that the agreement on

the peacekeeping status in South Ossetia does not determine the numerical strength of the

peacekeeping contingent. Further, referring to the six principles brokered by French

President Nicolas Sarkozy between Russia and Georgia that ended the fighting in August,

one principle states that Russian peacekeepers will determine the security zone, in particular

the width of the strip and the number of peacekeepers[631] (apparently Lavrov is referring

to Principle Five, which states that “prior to the establishment of international mechanisms

the Russian peacekeeping forces will take additional security measures” or Principle Six,

which notes that “an international debate on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia

and ways to ensure their lasting security will take place”).[632]

· On 19 August South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity stated that he will ask Russia to

station a military base on its territory. This will require Russia to take “an active stance” in

regard to unrecognized republics.[633]

· On 20 August Russian news outlets state that Russia may recognize South Ossetian
independence. Gleb Pavlovsky, head of the Effective Policy Foundation, said recognizing

the independence of the two territories would facilitate building a pan-Caucasus security

system.[634]

· On 20 August Interfax reported that Russia had established eight new peacekeeping outposts.

There should be 270 servicemen deployed at them. A second line of outposts will be set up

later along the administrative border of South Ossetia.[635] These eight outposts would be

40 kilometers from Gori according to Colonel General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn.[636]

Changes to the international realm:

· On 12 August Russian Aleksey Arbatov wrote that Russian attacks can cause it to lose its

moral supremacy in the region. The attacks will hasten Georgia’s path to NATO.[637]

· On 13 August it was announced that Russian-NATO relations would change after the South

Ossetian crisis. Not a word has been said by NATO to denounce Georgia’s aggression.

Russia’s envoy to NATO, Dmitriy Rogozin, stated that “this is a war for oil, no matter how

strange it may seem.” Rogozin said the US’s plans were to use Georgia to destabilize the

situation in the region, control oil deliveries, and deprive Russia of ways to really cooperate

with Europe. He added that Georgia left the Roki tunnel untouched to give the surviving

population of South Ossetia an opportunity to leave. This proves that Georgia wanted to

carry out ethnic cleansing, Rogozin added.[638]

· On 13 August Russian analyst Alexander Konovalov stated that Ukraine’s desire to enter

NATO will increase with thoughts that Russia may attempt to solve the issue of the status of

Sevastopol and Crimea through the use of coercive pressure. Konovalov writes that the

decision to halt military operations so quickly may have been influenced by Russia’s desire

to join the World Trade Organization, the conflict’s impact on the conduct of the Olympic

Games in Sochi, and other issues.[639]

· From 13-19 August Israeli press commentators questioned the reliability of the US in the

wake of the Georgian-Russian conflict.

· On 17 August Yevgeny Volk, a political analyst with the US-based Heritage Foundation

think tank, stated that the conflict will have “dramatic repercussions for Russia and the

international community as a whole for quite some time to come. It is the biggest

geopolitical turning point since the 1991 Soviet collapse.” Poland obtained US agreement on

conditions deemed necessary for Poland’s approval to host a new US missile system.[640]

· On 17 August German Ex-Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder accused Tbilisi of launching the

conflict in South Ossetia. He stated that “we witnessed the West’s blunders in its policy with

respect to Russia” adding that Europe risks losing its influence.[641]

· On 19 August a Lithuanian writer asked how an army trained by NATO could only endure a
Russian attack for two days.[642]

· On 19 August a former Estonian prime minister stated that it needed more defense against

Russian information warfare capabilities in light of Russia’s media war against Georgia.

What matters is speed and resourcefulness. Estonia also needs to build a strong defense.

[643] Ras al-Khaimah, one of the emirates of the United Arab Emirates, has invested heavily

in Poti to encourage a free economic zone. Russian damage to the port and their continued

peacekeeping occupation of the port spoils for the time being the Gulf investment in the

Caucasus.[644]

· On 20 August Syrian President Bashar al-Assad pledged support to Russia in its conflict

with Georgia and said it is ready to consider deploying Russian Iskander missile systems in

its territory in response to the US missile shield in Europe.[645]

· On 21 August NATO ships were deployed to the Black Sea immediately adjacent to the

boundary of the security area in which the Russian Black Sea Fleet operates. Russia is

worried that humanitarian assistance to Georgia via NATO ships will include Patriot missile

systems and firearms, reconnaissance in the interest of the US, and the start of a process to

determine the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[646]

· On 21 August the Russian General Staff accused the OSCE of not warning Russian

peacekeepers about Georgia’s plans to attack South Ossetia.[647]

· On 21 August the Open Source Center reported that conservative Iranian media blame

Georgia and the West for the conflict and think this could lead to the erosion of the 5+1

diplomatic initiative against Iran’s nuclear program. This will allow Iran to take advantage

of deteriorating US-Russian relations[648] and eliminates a US back channel to Iran.

· On 26 August Russian General Staff Deputy Chief Anatoliy Nogovitsyn noted that Russia

has not stopped NATO military transit to Afghanistan through its territory but may do so.

[649]

Conclusions

This analysis reviewed Russian press reports about their peace enforcement operation and its

consequences. It discussed the background and context of events leading up to the confrontation in

South Ossetia; the strengths and weaknesses of the Russian armed forces conduct of the operation; and

what the potential consequences of the conflict might be for South Ossetia, the US, and other nations.

It also discussed the three aspects of information operations (cyber, information-psychological,

information-technical) from a Russian perspective.

First, the press review revealed some strong resentment among the Russian military and some

journalists about the suspected involvement of the US military in this operation. This resentment led

to several almost inexplicable assumptions and statements from Russian leaders. Earlier it was

mentioned that Colonel General Nogovitsyn stated the US does not do well at humanitarian issues.
Another article stated that the Georgian army had weak morale since the US tradition of “ready to

fight but not to die” had rubbed off on the Georgians.[650] These and similar comments demonstrate

a real misunderstanding about the traditions, accomplishments, and methods of western forces. These

misunderstandings are understandable from the context of Russia’s approach to problems in the

Caucasus which is colored by a series of issues: Russia’s predisposed assumptions about US military

intentions (which we have helped construct) due to our actions in the vicinity of Central Asia; the

inherent ambiguity in Russian reporting (making statements that are not backed up with proof, whether

it be Georgia or events surrounding the death of a Chechen rebel leader), that seems to be a leftover

tradition from the days of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); and the restoration of

Russian dignity (payback?) for the nose thumbing on the part of its former republics as they left the

USSR.

Second, winning or losing the information war was a major theme of the press review. Papers,

radio and TV, and the Internet were filled with reports on this issue. Media operations started slowly

but eventually became effective. The interpretation of events through the Russian press was easier to

ascertain than in Soviet times but remains difficult.

The overwhelming weight of official reports from ITAR-TASS versus the more light weight

reporting of journals was quickly felt. President Medvedev’s tone was one of praise for the armed

forces achievements and capabilities. He also sounded like the optimist in light of his statements

encouraging future cooperation with not only international organizations and the US but with Georgia

as well. He directed negative comments at Georgian President Saakashvili’s fitness for office.

Medvedev’s lighter tone contrasted sharply with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s harsh and strict

deliveries which at times were laced with derision as well. This didn’t appear to be a good cop-bad

cop setup but rather the figure head Medvedev versus the actual real power authority still vested in

Putin.

On the other hand, there were also significant achievements that indicate Russia learned some

lessons in dealing with the press in Chechnya. The difference is that Chechnya was an internal

conflict and a different methodology was needed than that required to deal with an international

incident. Egon Bar, said by some to be Germany’s patriarch of foreign policy, noted that Russia’s

mistake was not bringing in the Western press right off.[651] With regard to cyber activities the press

review revealed that the Russian media focused primarily on what Georgia was doing to block

access to Russian reporting in Georgia. The US publication Defense News stated that Russia’s attacks

did little harm so perhaps there simply was nothing to crow about.

Third, the Russian press utilized the words of people outside their own country to buttress their

accusations that Georgia initiated the conflict. In particular, authoritative figures were used. They

included the US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Edelman and US Ambassador to Russia

Beyrle. However, on 18 September ITAR-TASS added more fuel to this fire. According to former

Defense Minister Irakly Okruashvili, who served as Saakashvili’s defense minister between 2004-

2006, part of the blame for the war belongs on the shoulders of the US administration which,

according to the former minister, could not contain President Saakashvili’s ambitions. He noted that in

2005 Saakashvili and he (Okruashvili) drafted plans to capture both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Saakashvili believed that the US would block Russia’s response through diplomatic channels.
Okruashvili thinks Saakashvili let Russians into Georgia so that he could avoid criticism and portray

himself as a victim. Today, Okruashvili is a political exile living in France.[652]

Fourth, there was much to add with regard to equipment failures and shortcomings. Perhaps retired

Colonel General Sergey Mayev offered the best advice. He laid the failure of equipment to the fact

that it was outdated, and he noted that equipment was outdated because of officer corruption. Money

for the military-industrial complex often was redirected to areas other than where it was intended,

that is for the modernization of equipment. He emphasized that there were over 3,000 financial

violations in fulfilling government orders in the first half of 2008 alone! Enterprises, he added, live

by the rules of the crises-ridden 1990s. These include illegal salary schedules and various

amendments. Now, he noted, there is so much money that some enterprises in the military-industrial

complex “cannot spend it all and turn to various illegal schemes.”[653] What is needed is government

will in executing decisions that have been made in the past as well as rigid control over their

execution.”[654] Equipment requirements that involve information technologies were highlighted as

priority shortcomings that must be fixed.

Other recommendations to improve shortcomings were not far behind those of Mayev. Chief of the

Main Combat Training and Troop Service Directorate, Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov,

offered an example of future offensive combat exercises (and a template for conducting offensive

operations?) during a tactical exercise conducted by the 138

th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle

Brigade. The order of offensive operations would be artillery preparation fires, air defense units

taking out enemy aircraft, Russian bomber and army aviation units joining the fight, and the use of

Smerch as the final chord in the song. Journalist Yuliya Nikitina, who wrote the report on Shamanov,

finished by stating that “the General Staff intends to place special emphasis on strengthening air

assault battalions and creating for the troops their own aviation” although the specific type was not

specified.[655] A few days later Shamanov stated that troops need equipment with up-to-date

geolocation and telecommunications instruments integrated into the fire command chain, and they need

top-notch friend –or-foe systems that differ from the old Soviet models, still used by many of the

former republics. The three main shortcomings from the war were, in his opinion, poor coordination

between the Ground Troops units and the Air Force, problems with ensuring uninterrupted

telecommunications, and the poor resolution power of reconnaissance assets.[656]

General of the Army Makmut Gareev, perhaps Russia’s finest military theoretician today, offered

further criticism of combat operations. He stated that the conflict exposed “the inexpediency of some

main commands of the armed services and the main directorates of the Defense Ministry to take

control of certain special, logistical, and even combat units and formations in military districts.”[657]

He recommended that army aviation should be under the control of combined-arms commanders and

not in the hands of an air force commander-in-chief.[658] Finally, he noted that Russia can learn a lot

from NATO military personnel by studying leading technologies, their improved command and

control systems, and how they equip their soldiers. However, Russia should NOT borrow NATO’s

personnel training methodology. He stated that

Their unit commanders still conduct exercises with their subunits; they themselves plan them,

and develop operations for themselves and for their enemy. That is like telling the players

before a chess match who must move how and later see how they move the pieces. Really, in a
combat situation, there is practically no information about the enemy, and everything is not

always known about our own troops—where they are, how many there are, who has gotten lost,

and who has ended up under fire. Therefore, Marshal Zhukov already called exercises, in

which everything is known beforehand, pampering.[659]

Gareev added that many international exercises are a sham, a senseless expenditure of ammunition

and time.[660]

Fifth, it is unfortunate that the UN, NATO, the CIS, or the EU couldn’t have found a way to stop the

confrontation. Russia points out that it warned about the possibility of conducting a peace

enforcement operation in South Ossetia in Red Star on two occasions in July. In the absence of any

success at the level of international organizations, Georgian took matters into its own hands and

Russia responded with a peace enforcement operation. The question to ask is whether this type of

peacekeeping model could be used in other areas on Russia’s periphery? Or is this a one-time use

model? Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev offered one reply to this question. He noted that

“should somebody encroach against our citizens, our peacekeepers, we shall certainly respond in the

same fashion we have done already. One should have no doubts about that.”[661] International

organizations still figure strongly in future Russian plans, however, and they will be called upon often

to help sort out complicated situations.

Finally, the Russian method of concluding this conflict indicates that Russia feels it will no longer

make easy concessions (if they ever did) in the area of peace operations. In Georgia, for example, this

new method has included staying in particular areas longer than anticipated, especially in the Poti

port vicinity. A new peacekeeping provision was added as well that, according to the Russian media,

will allow the Russian Black Sea Fleet to be used “exclusively as part of the peacekeeping

operation.”[662]

Russia’s press reported that peacekeepers will be pulled back to the temporary security zone

determined by the decision of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) of 1999 after checkpoints and

stations are completed. At the same time consultations with the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were initiated to negotiate a possible increase in the number of

military observers from the OSCE in South Ossetia.[663] Additional Russian peacekeeping

checkpoints are an additional security measure to be installed by 22 August.[664] Most important

with regard to peacekeepers, the six point plan agreed to by all parties continues to be reinterpreted

by all sides and the final shape of troop deployments may not be known for some time.

Russia will probably learn from this conflict and be even better prepared to conduct a peace

enforcement operation and to use the press to its advantage the next time around—but let’s hope there

won’t be a “next time.” Yet planning for potential future incidents has become a reality now that South

Ossetia is in the rear view mirror. That is the geo-political reality with which everyone must now

deal.
CHAPTER TEN: OPERATIONAL DECEPTION IN SOUTH OSSETIA—WHO SET THE

“BEAR TRAP”?

Introduction

The 8-12 August 2008 skirmish between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia (see Appendix

Five for South Ossetia maps) and Abkhazia has generated a plethora of articles and essays by

Russian, Georgian, and international analysts. Many of the articles address the topic “who started the

conflict?” The revelations of these journalists and professionals are insightful and encourage a

comprehensive reexamination of events. The interesting conclusion on both sides is that each drew

the other into the fight. Who is telling the truth? Will we be able to see through the fog of operational

deception that appears to lie at the heart of this conflict? Or for that matter, is a true rendering of those

five days ever going to be discernable? This analysis will offer the reader several versions of events

that transpired and attempt to answer that question.

Short Background Information

Georgia’s autonomous region of South Ossetia has sought to be independent from Georgia since

the breakup of the Soviet Union, when Georgia became a state. Sitting in the north of Georgia and

bordering on Russia, South Ossetia’s governing authorities have voiced their desire since 1988 to be

united with Russia’s North Ossetia. The government of Georgia has thwarted each effort to do so. In

1991-1992 a bloody civil war broke out between South Ossetia and Georgia resulting in an

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mediated settlement that ended the

conflict. As a result Georgian and Russian peacekeepers were deployed in South Ossetia to maintain

the peace.

A steady peace has held, although in 2004 tensions grew once again and dozens of Ossetians,

Russians, and Georgians died in clashes over local policies. Sporadic shooting has continued since

that time in the region. In July 2008 shootings and bombings escalated, resulting in a renewed conflict

in August. Georgian forces entered South Ossetia with the goal, as one Georgian peacekeeper

explained, to restore constitutional order. The environment was a chaotic one. More than eighty

villages in South Ossetia were composed of Ossetians and more than forty were designated as

Georgian. There were more than forty-six thousand Ossetians and thirty-six thousand Georgians in

South Ossetia before the conflict in August. Most of the Ossetians were pro-Russian. South Ossetian

forces seeking independence from Georgia and supported by Russia. They were led by South

Ossetian President Edward Kokoity. The Georgian population of South Ossetia that was loyal to

Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili was led by the appointed head of the South Ossetian

Provisional Administrative Entity, Dmitriy Sanakoyev. Russian and Georgian peacekeepers were also

in the region when the fighting started that eventually drew in Georgian and Russian regular forces.

The August 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia reportedly began on 8 August and ended on

12 August. An initial catalyst for the confrontation was NATO’s April 2008 meeting in Bucharest, at

which Ukraine and Georgia were offered NATO membership. This move greatly concerned Russia

since that would move NATO forces to Russia’s border. Georgia, on the other hand, wanted to

consolidate its territory (South Ossetia included) as soon as possible and thus meet all of the
territorial requirements for admission to NATO. Paragraph 23 of the Bucharest Declaration stated the

following:

NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO.

We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made

valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine

and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP

is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make

clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP.[665]

Both Russia and Georgia had different concerns and thus may have set different “bear traps” to

accomplish their goals, Russia’s being to halt Georgia’s accession to NATO and Georgia’s being to

gain admission to NATO. Setting “bear traps” involves the deceptive manipulation of opinions and

decision processes at both the strategic and operational levels. Russia refers to such manipulations in

some cases as “reflexive control” operations. They are expert in the set up and execution of this

concept. It is similar to the US concept of perception management. Reflexive control is designed to

get another party to perform specific actions or think in a particular way.[666] A Georgian official

seemed to support this possibility when he noted that “we have been dragged into this process and we

did exactly what the Russians wanted us to do.”

Georgian officials state that Russia forced Georgia to attack by using surrogates or Russian/South

Ossetian forces to strike at the homes of Georgian citizens living in South Ossetia, forcing Georgia to

defend them. This would be the “bear trap” set by Russia, an enticement that provoked Georgia to

attack. For Russia this would ensure that, after defeating Georgian forces and ensuring South Ossetia

was in Russian hands, NATO would not control access to the Roki Tunnel and in fact may not want to

admit Georgia to NATO at all for their aggressive actions. Russia, some Georgians believed, had

given indications that it would not intervene if Georgian troops entered South Ossetia. Unfortunately

for Georgia, these “indications” may have been part of Russia’s deception plan. Georgia’s armed

forces under this scenario were duped by a strategic deception plan developed and employed by

Russia that produced the required results.

Russian officials, on the other hand, state that Georgia forced Russia to intervene since they

attacked South Ossetia first, as Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has admitted and in the

process killed Russian peacekeepers. This produced an aggressive Russian response and the global

impression that Russian aggression had returned to the world stage. This would be the “bear trap” set

by Georgia.

Bottom Line Up Front

There are reporters, military men, and politicians who support or refute each of these theories. The

focus of each version of reality lies around not only who “knew what when” but more importantly

who introduced forces “when and where” and the responses these actions precipitated. For Russia,

the entry point for their forces from Russia would have to be through the Roki Tunnel that connects

Russia with South Ossetia. For Georgia, there are multiple entry points into South Ossetia along the

South Ossetian-Georgian border. The timing of the crossing of these points by Russian or Georgian

forces is one key to understanding who was deceiving whom.
There are five categories of opinions on these two versions of complicity for setting the bear trap.

They are:

· Russians who accuse Georgia of being the aggressor

· Russians who accuse Russia of being the aggressor

· Georgians who accuse Russia of being the aggressor

· Georgians who accuse Georgia of being the aggressor

· International opinions

These categories indicate that journalists and some politicians on both sides were able to express

positive and negative viewpoints on the operation. In spite of this stab at balance, there remained

many problems with the reporting of Russian and Georgian authorities and journalists. These

problems, described below, make the search for responsibility for strategic and operational deception

more difficult to pinpoint. The following discussion summarizes the main arguments of these five

categories. The first section does not use the names of the people whose opinions are expressed. The

reader will become acquainted with these names as they read more lengthy synopses of the actual

articles in the sections that follow this one.

Evidence against Russia

First, Russia’s Ministry of Defense and pro-Russian journalists all failed to provide a documented

timeline of events for Russian forces passing through the Roki Tunnel and entering Georgia. This near

total absence of information leaves the impression that Russia’s military is hiding something. Russian

officials developed a detailed Georgian timeline of events. Yet with regard to those events they knew

best, their own, they were silent.

Second, with regard to attempts to stop the conflict, it was apparent that on the evenings of 6 and 7

August Georgian officials tried to negotiate a settlement with Russia and conduct a cease fire. Russia

refused Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s offers. Most military officials interpreted this turn

of events as evidence that the Russian operation probably had already started and it was too late to

turn back and conduct further discussions. Some Georgian military officials have stated that Russian

forces entered South Ossetia on 6 and 7 August.

Some Russians were more pro-Georgian in their analyses and blamed Russia for starting the

conflict. One Russian found irony in the Russian response that blamed Georgia for conducting the

war:

To strike your fist on the table and with metal in your voice ultimately remind the world about

humanism! To turn Grozny into ruins and then talk sternly about the double standards of those

who don’t want to look at the ruins of Tskhinvali. To look firmly in the eye of the frightened

expert community and compare the Georgian enemy to Hitler, his attack on South Ossetia’s

capital to the Nazis’ attack on Poland, and the invasion of Georgia by our troops naturally to the

assault on Berlin. And if that wasn’t enough, to compare 8 August to 11 September.[667]
One Russian unearthed information in the South Ossetian press indicating that Russian forces were

in South Ossetia as early as 6 August. Unfortunately, none of those sources were listed for

independent examination. The same Russian source also stated that one of Russia’s Deputy Defense

Ministers along with the head of the military’s intelligence apparatus visited South Ossetian President

Edward Kokoity on 3 August, which could indicate final planning for an operation. But with no

documentation, just a list of dates and times that purportedly came from South Ossetian papers, this

version of events was no better than the Russians total lack of a timeline on their forces movements.

The only pieces of potential if not actual evidence that Russia entered Georgia early were a

recording of an intercepted conversation and a posting on a web site. According to one Russian

journalist, there was an electronic intercept on the evening of 7 August indicating that Russian forces

had passed through the Roki Tunnel. A voice recording of this event was played for Russian

journalists. With regard to the website, a wounded Russian officer’s interpretation of events posted

on a Russian web site stated that Russian forces had entered South Ossetia on 7 August. The post was

soon removed from the website by the Russians.

With regard to a pro-Georgian view of events, some of Georgia’s political leaders provided

detailed testimony before a parliamentary commission. They admitted attacking first but stated that

this was done to protect their citizens who were being driven from their homes in South Ossetia by

Russian and South Ossetian forces. One Georgian official noted that on 2 August pro-Russian

refugees were moved from South to North Ossetia, which is to Russian soil, indicating that Russia

was planning something. A day later some fifty Russian journalists moved into and began transmitting

from Tskhinvali. The official believes that on 7 August Russian troops rolled into Georgia while there

was a dense cloud cover and darkness over the Roki Tunnel area. The same official also played a

recording of the conversation between two South Ossetian border guards indicating that Russian

forces moved into South Ossetia on 7 August. If this Russian movement was in progress as reported,

then it seems logical that Georgia should have sent an unmanned aerial vehicle to the vicinity of the

Roki Tunnel to see whether tanks were coming through the tunnel or not. They did not need to rely on

satellite data alone. A voice intercept should have been backed up by hard visual evidence. It was

not. Verifying the intercept’s activity was important since the voice intercept could have been Russian

disinformation designed to provoke a Georgian response.

Another Georgian official stated that representatives tried to talk to Russian officials on 6 August

and hopefully end the growing tensions between the two countries. A day later that same official

informed allies in the area of the growing tension and the potential for conflict. This was because

Russian officials refused to negotiate.

Evidence against Georgia

There were several Georgians with an entirely different view of events that fingered Georgia as

the responsible culprit for the fighting. One such official noted that on 19 June a high-ranking

Georgian official said “in my presence” that Georgia could take Tskhinvali, the capital of South

Ossetia, in three hours and the Russians couldn’t lift a finger to help. Based on information from

Moscow, the official notes, people from Saakashvili’s inner circle fiercely persuaded him that Russia

would not defend South Ossetia.
A Georgian military official stated that on the night of 7 August Georgian troops were operating to

bring “constitutional order” to Tskhinvali which indicates a Georgian action that is not a

counteraction to Russian involvement but rather a civil-military operation. This statement was

deemed “not sanctioned” by Georgian officials and later was removed. Thus not only did the

Russians take a statement off the web indicating their complicity in moving into South Ossetia earlier

than officially indicated, Georgia also rejected just such a damaging statement from one of their

officials.

International opinion was split over who did what to whom. Some US journalists felt that Russia

lost the war due to the negative reaction of the international community. Others felt that no one was

the victor. Some Russian journalists felt that Russia had won the war and was now in a much better

negotiating position on other global matters as a result.

So, who was responsible? This author cannot offer a conclusive answer for which side set the

bear trap based on these fragmentary elements of information. However, for the sake of argument,

more evidence appears to point to Georgia having started the war than Russia. Georgia may have

been duped into starting the conflict by Russian reflexive control methods. The case against Russia is

buttressed by their unwillingness to offer a timeline of events from the Russian point of view while

not hesitating to offer a timeline from a Georgian point of view. Russia could have very adeptly set a

strategic and operational trap for Georgia and the latter took the bait. The Georgian side (along with

some Russians) offers evidence for Russian complicity but fails to present enough hard supporting

evidence to be conclusive, even though there are claims of having South Ossetian documents to

support the argument.

Georgian responsibility is buttressed by two elements. The first is that Georgians can cite personal

discussions with President Saakashvili and other high-ranking officials who indicated Georgian

interest in starting a conflict. The second is the comments of US officials who continued to warn

Saakashvili not to be provoked to use force or be drawn into a trap and yet he ignored the advice.

Both conclusions would rest solely on the assumption that the testimony as presented in detail below

is accurate. Perhaps it is not. However, readers may find it easier to come to a definitive conclusion

than does this author.

Russia’s plan (and there was a plan—Russian involvement didn’t appear out of thin air) was most

likely motivated by a series of events that had transpired over the previous five months. First, there

was the April decision in Bucharest mentioned above. Second, there were the small but continuous

incidents of shooting and looting between South Ossetian and Georgian forces in South Ossetia.

Finally, there was the decision to recognize the independence of Kosovo. These incidents appear to

have motivated Russia to act strategically and operationally. It is also possible that Russia had inside

knowledge of Georgia’s plans from covert operators or intercepts of communications from within the

Saakashvili regime. This is backed up by the fact that Georgia has now arrested an individual for

allegedly providing key military information to the Russians. If Russia conducted this operation as

outlined, then its leaders did a masterful job of orchestrating the operation and manipulating

Saakashvili’s geopolitical position (and perhaps his vanity). It is not easy in the information age to

fool public opinion yet Russia may have done so by enticing Georgia to take its “bear bait.”
Georgia, on the other hand, offered adequate information and rational to make Russia take a

similar action as well, in essence to avert a Georgian takeover of South Ossetia as Saakashvili had

long desired and so stated. Or perhaps Georgia, seeing Russia mobilized at its border following the

Kavkaz exercise, decided to act before Russia could put their plan into action.

One aspect of the conflict still under investigation from a Russian viewpoint is why the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers deployed in South Ossetia

had warned their superiors of a Georgian attack but this information was not transmitted to all of the

organization’s member states. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has called for an explanation

if not an inquiry into these events.[668]

It is now you, the reader, who should read through the testimonial summary of presentations by

Georgians and Russians and draw your own conclusions. It is an interesting yet convoluted set of

opinions that await your analysis. (The analysis also includes Georgian views on mistakes that their

country made during the conflict as a separate section. Chapter Nine listed Russian mistakes.)

Russians Who Accuse Georgians of Being the Aggressor

(1) Analysis of the Public Observations of Dr. Vitaliy Shlykov

Dr. Vitaliy Shlykov, the Russian Chair of the Commission on Security Policy and Evaluation of

Defense Legislation of the Public Council of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense at the time

of the conflict, offered a sober yet balanced assessment of the Russian peace enforcement operation.

He noted that far-reaching conclusions concerning the five-day conflict are “hard to reach.” It is hard

to argue with his conclusion.

Shlykov begins his analysis by offering Russian readers “Georgian views” on the fight, comments

he believes are familiar in the West but practically unknown in Russia. It is the Georgian version

(through Shlykov’s retelling) that follows.[669]

First, he notes that Georgian President Saakashvili and Defense Minister David Kezerashvili

asserted that Russia was the first to introduce troops into South Ossetia, causing Georgia to initiate

combat operations in response to Russian aggression. He offered the following timeline from a

Georgian, not Russian, perspective:

At 1400 hours on 7 August, South Ossetian artillery opened fire against the Georgian village of

Arnevi, located on South Ossetian territory and killing two peacekeepers, according to Saakashvili

and Kezerashvil. This caused Georgia to move heavy equipment into the area as a show of force.

At 1900 hours on the 7

th Saakashvili announced a unilateral cease fire. Kezerashvili stated that at

2200 South Ossetian artillery fired on the Georgian villages of Sarabuki and Korta where the head of

South Ossetia’s pro-Georgian administration is located. Saakashvili states that he received

information on the 7

th that Russian troops were concentrated near the Roki Tunnel’s northern portal.

At 2350 on the 7

th Saakashvili confirmed that Russian tanks had appeared on South Ossetia’s

territory. After that, Saakashvili felt he had no alternative but to open fire and to try to destroy the
bridge at Didi Gupta and shell the road near the Roki Tunnel to prevent further movement of the

column.

At 2400 the Roki Tunnel and the government buildings in Tskhinvali and villages around the city

came under Georgian fire. Saakashvili stated that he prohibited the shelling of civilians.

At 0200 on 8 August Georgian troops advanced to Tskhinvali’s outskirts, and at 1000, 4500

Georgian troops entered the city but withdrew two hours later under heavy Russian artillery and

aircraft fire. At 1500 they reentered the city. At 2300 they again withdrew.

Georgians reentered the city on 9 August and, already exhausted, withdrew toward Gori on 10

August, outnumbered 4500 to 15-20,000. Saakashvili describes the Georgian operation as defensive

and stated that Russia had stealthily massed military forces near Dzhava prior to the introduction of

troops on the night of 7 August. Shlykov notes that “as far as I can tell from his [Saakashvili’s] words,

the Americans explained their mistake [not detecting Russian movement through the tunnel] to him by

saying that their reconnaissance satellites had been directed toward Iraq at that time” and that “the

Roki Tunnel area was covered by clouds.”

In these reports, neither Saakashvili nor Kezerashvili ever mentioned the shelling of Russian

peacekeepers, Shlykov notes, and this is an exceptionally important omission by Saakashvili. From

the Russian point of view, it was the attack on the peacekeepers that prompted their involvement.

Shlykov adds that Russian politicians and military personnel refute Saakashvili’s assertions and

timeline.

Shlykov presented Georgia’s views, he states, to answer one question: what were Saakashvili’s

goals? His goals might provide answers as to why the West felt Russia’s reaction was

incommensurate to the situation it faced or why many Russians felt Russia’s force was inadequate to

finish off the enemy and take Tbilisi.

Shlykov then switches gears to give readers Russia’s version of events without a timeline. Many

Russians believe that Saakashvili wanted to conduct a blitzkrieg against South Ossetia, close the Roki

Tunnel, and place a fait accompli before Russia and the world. Russia’s General Staff experts have

no doubts about this version of events, Shlykov writes, since they base their assessment on captured

Georgian maps. Saakashvili apparently felt his forces were strong enough to defeat Russia in a short

and local clash. The General Staff also believes Saakashvili wanted to use the factor of surprise to

catch the Russians unaware (perhaps implying that the world would be watching the Olympics in

Beijing which began on the same day as the fighting).

Many former Russian military figures of some prominence (former Defense Ministers Marshal

Dmitriy Yazov and General of the Army Pavel Grachev, General of the Army Makhmut Gareev, and

Colonel General Gennadiy Troshev) blamed Russian military intelligence for failing to detect

Georgia’s treacherous plans. Unfortunately, the intelligence service cannot engage in open polemics

with these officers, Shlykov notes, due to their active duty status and thus cannot present their side of

the issue. As a former intelligence officer, it is certain that Shlykov has some sympathy for his former

comrades and the criticism they must endure. This also implies that Russian intelligence may have
been well informed.

Shlykov states that the longer time passes, the more doubt he throws on the blitzkrieg version of

events. If the Georgians were implementing a blitzkrieg theory, then why did the Georgians need three

days to storm the camp of the peacekeepers, who were obliged not to fire first, when they could have

bypassed it and headed straight toward the Roki Tunnel? Instead, the Georgians opened fire on them

and fought them for two days. Why did the Georgians bomb Tskhinvali’s residential districts for 18

hours? Why did they enter Tskhinvali twice on 8 August and withdraw and only engage Russian

forces in the city on 9 August? The seeming implication here is that the Georgians were trying to

entice Russia’s armed forces into an aggressive, offensive posture.

Clearly the Georgians did not catch the Russian armed forces unaware, Shlykov adds. Both sides

had been openly preparing for the conflict. So what were Saakashvili’s goals and hopes? Of course,

hope number one for Saakashvili would have been that Russia would not get involved in the conflict

and “his American advisors presumably prompted him to that assessment.” Saakashvili most likely

took into consideration the current weakness of the Russian armed forces as well. Shlykov notes that

the 58

th army, however, was in a high state of combat readiness and uses his first hand observation of

their training as his criteria. He considers that the training Russian servicemen receive is basically on

a par with the training of US servicemen.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of his article focuses around whether Russia enticed Georgia

to attack, inviting the Georgian army into a “bear trap.” First, he states that the precise time of the

introduction of Russian troops, their composition, and the timing of their exit from the Roki Tunnel

would help clarify this question, but “unfortunately, the RF Ministry of Defense has not yet published

that data.” (Shlykov was writing on 1 November 2008, almost three months after the conflict ended.

Why didn’t the Russian General Staff publish such a timeline?) Instead, Shlykov states that “based

upon the conversations of wounded servicemen, we can reconstruct the picture which provides the

basis to dismiss the conjecture about the trap, into which Russian troops allegedly enticed

Saakashvili, which is being disseminated in the West and also by some of our commentators.”

A separate comment is required here on Dr. Shlykov’s analysis. First, if the Russian Federation’s

Ministry of Defense did not publish such data, then the suspicion grows elsewhere that perhaps they

are covering something up such as the exact times they moved. An analyst of Shlykov’s renown and

with his wide range of contacts should have been able to get a bit more information out of the

Ministry of Defense than what he has offered. It is a weak argument in this day and age to state that

MOD hasn’t produced a timeline and then conduct your analysis solely based on the other side’s

information. If the Defense Ministry were innocent, as Shlykov asserts, then they should have had no

qualms about publishing a timeline. Or other sources should have provided him with information

based on his access to Russian military leaders. He is a prominent and respected MOD insider.

Second, a Russian report from a wounded Russian officer (Captain Denis Sidristy) states that “on

7 August, the command came to advance on Tskhinvali. They had us scramble—and march.” Thus

according to this Russian report (one of the very people Shlykov says he relies on for his timeline, the

wounded) the Russian 135

th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 58th Army entered South Ossetia about
the time Saakashvili was announcing a ceasefire. More interesting is that after this article appeared

on a website it was removed.[670] Dr. Shlykov is obviously aware of the suspicion that such an

action would produce. The newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) is purportedly where it first

appeared before it was taken offline. The actual website is listed here as a footnote.[671] Thus, it is

odd that Shlykov can articulate in detail what Georgia did and when, but he can’t do so for Russia.

And his reliance on wounded soldiers for Russia’s timeline was somewhat rebuffed by the report of

Captain Sidristy.

Another separate comment is required regarding Dr. Shlykov’s belief that suspicions are growing

with regard to the US role in the five day war. In spite of the words of US Special Ambassador to

Georgia Matthew Bryza, who said he warned Saakashvili not to be drawn into a trap, or US

Ambassador to Russia John Beyrle, who said US diplomats cautioned the Georgian leadership

against responding to provocations and using force, Shlykov relies on other equally intelligent but

less informed US spokesmen. For example, he cites George Friedman, President of the US based

STRATFOR Center, who wrote that it is hard to believe the Georgians would act counter to US

wishes. Friedman, according to Shlykov, states that either US intelligence failed to detect Russian

troops nearby, or the US wanted to extract a harsh response from the Russians. Canadian Piotr

Dutkiewicz, Shlykov adds, notes that Saakashvili was played masterfully by the Americans and the

Russian’s counterstrike was just what the US wanted. Russia can no longer criticize the US for its

military adventures, Dutkiewicz adds, and Russia’s political influence has been weakened.

It is also hard to comprehend how someone of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s competency

in Russian affairs would entertain such thoughts. Would she really advocate “playing” Saakashvili so

that Russia would attack and lose credibility? This sounds very farfetched. How would she have

foreseen that Russian influence would be weakened (as Dutkiewicz asserts) or that Russia could no

longer criticize the US for its military adventures? It makes little sense. That is, it makes little sense

until you read the testimony of Georgia’s Ambassador to Russia, Erosi Kitsmarishvili, who stated that

the US had given the green light to Georgia. Kitsmarishvili, a leader of the peaceful Rose Revolution

in Georgia, offers a much different version of events in his testimony as summarized below—and then

changes his mind.

Rather, Shlykov might want to argue that if the US knew of Georgian plans, then why didn’t the US

warn others? If the US tried to talk Saakashvili out of attacking, then they surely knew what he was

thinking. By warning the international community, the US could have potentially thwarted Georgian

plans through international pressure. Shlykov doesn’t mention this possibility, most likely because

Saakashvili had no such plan until he was cornered by events.

A more tit-for-tat response to Shlykov would be that if he can disregard the words of our

government spokesmen, then shouldn’t US analysts completely disregard Russian spokesmen too,

such as Prime Minister Vladimir Putin? Putin stated that Russia was searching for a compromise with

Georgia just at the time that Saakashvili acted. With his hatred for Saakashvili a known fact, are we to

think this is what the Prime Minister was really thinking? Or was Prime Minister Putin really reacting

to Georgia’s acceptance into NATO and Kosovo’s recognition of independence, and thus he drew up

a plan to entice Georgia into attacking? Naturally, such tit-for-tat responses do neither side any good.
With regard to the Russian understanding of how events transpired in an hourly fashion, Shlykov

offers his own timeline from what he has been able to ascertain from his Russian contacts, who he

does not mention. Again, this is strange. He can recount in detail the Georgian timeline with input

from the Georgian President and Minister of Defense but is unable to cite a single source from his

own Ministry of Defense. Something doesn’t add up in a country where they supposedly learned the

problems associated with “losing the information war over Chechnya.” If the Ministry of Defense is

keeping information from Shlykov, then it either hasn’t learned its lesson from the Chechen experience

or it is hiding something.

At 3 a.m. on 8 August, Shlykov writes that the 58

th Army was alerted. It emerged from the Tunnel

no earlier than noon on 8 August. At that time Russian aircraft were inactive. The force consisted of

three battalion teams of the 19

th Motorized Rifle Division, which had deployed near Dzhava and

Gufta by 1600.

Shlykov offers no other timeline data in this lengthy article.

Shlykov’s best evidence from the Russian viewpoint that Georgia started the war is that the

introduction-withdrawal of Georgians from Tskhinvali had a dual purpose—to simulate offensive

operations toward Roki Tunnel and to attribute the destruction of Tskhinvali to Russian military

operations. Finally, he notes that the two day siege of the Russian peacekeeper’s camp, which could

have been bypassed, was intended to keep the peacekeepers hostage and encourage Russian forces to

free them. When the situation developed slowly, the decision was made in Tbilisi to fire on the

peacekeepers with Grad (BM-21 multiple rocket system) launchers in order to raise Russia’s ire and

encourage them to march on Tbilisi. This version of events would be better if supplemented with a

timeline from some participants in the conflict from either the civilian or military sphere.

By 10 August, Shlykov adds, Saakashvili had “realized his plan.” Then the most powerful combatcapable division, the 42

nd, arrived from Chechnya. It is a totally permanent readiness contract

formation. The Georgians didn’t have the slightest chance of success against it. Earlier in the article,

Shlykov had stated that, in regard to the Kavkaz-2008 exercise conducted by the Russians across the

border from Georgia in late July, “the maneuvers were conducted with the goal of rehearsing the

methods for rendering assistance to the peacekeepers in South Ossetia.” It must be assumed that these

maneuvers, with “700 military vehicles and over 30 aircraft and helicopters,” were near total

readiness as the maneuvers practiced a peace enforcement operation. So did the Russians really need

the 42

nd

to guarantee success?

Thus, Shlykov’s version is that the Georgians were setting their own bear trap for the Russian

forces. Their primary goal was to present Russia as the aggressor which invaded the territory of a

small democratic country. He offers a credible rational for this story to be true although his lack of

authoritative Russian sources is a serious shortcoming in his storytelling. Or, in fairness to Dr.

Shlykov, a very credible figure widely admired and respected for his knowledge, perhaps as Chair of

the Public Council he is not as compelled to cite others. As an insider, he knows what he is talking

about.
Russians Who Accuse Georgia of Being the Aggressor (cont.)

(2) The Analysis of Reporter Zaur Alborov[672]

Zaur Alborov’s analysis was much less balanced than Shlykov’s. He wrote one of the most proRussian assessments of events. His timeline is purely from his point of view with no Georgian input.

At 2310 on 7 August, he writes that Georgian forces started their massive artillery bombardment,

adding that Georgian forces were deployed in the theater of operations before 7 August, preparing a

bridgehead for the attack. The Georgian air force regularly violated South Ossetian airspace. Russian

military intelligence learned about these plans in advance in his opinion. Thus Alborov, in contrast to

Shlykov’s analysis, felt that Russia had prior knowledge of Georgia’s plans, thus indicating that he

knew more than Yazov, Grachev, and Gareev, even though all of these former officers most likely

have much better contacts in the General Staff than the reporter.

At 0900 on 8 August, after Georgian forces got bogged down in their attempts to take Tskhinvali

and failed to address the issue of the Roki Tunnel and the Trans-Caucasus Motorway, Alborov states

that Russia decided to launch a peace enforcement operation to coerce Georgia to peace. Russia’s

MOD sent in two battalion task forces. Georgian forces, Alborov added, exhibited extreme cruelty,

finishing off the wounded, driving tanks over people, and throwing grenades into basements where

civilians were located. This was the last hourly timeline in Alborov’s discussion.

Alborov states that the interaction between Russian and Ossetian groups was well organized. They

eliminated several Georgian diversionary groups (Georgian special forces) in the tunnel area

[Shlykov said the Georgians never made it to the tunnel] and in breaking the siege of Tskhinvali.

Russian units eliminated Georgian troops on the heights around the town, suppressing Georgian

artillery and encircling Georgian-populated villages. The Chechen Vostok special-purpose battalion

of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian Armed Forces merits special attention for

the manner in which it knocked out enemy groups utilizing Shmel and RPG launchers.

On 9 August Russian troops continued pushing Georgian subunits out of the area of the peace

enforcement operation. As reinforcements continued to arrive, a grouping two regiments-strong was

deployed in South Ossetia. They were able to push back a Georgian assault on the afternoon of 9

August. By 10 August only a limited number of Georgian troops remained in South Ossetia and these

troops withdrew completely on the afternoon of the 10th. On the night of 10-11 August, Georgian

troops were only able to fire some artillery rounds into South Ossetia. By the end of 11 August

Georgian units pulled back to Gori, and were reinforced with 800 service personnel from Iraq.

Russian units pursued them in the face of strong electronic countermeasures that partially suppressed

Russian tactical communications. By noon on 12 August, the Russian President had decided to

terminate the active phase of the operation (coercing Georgia to peace). By the end of the day, the

“strongest army in the Caucasus” had disappeared like smoke.

Alborov writes that US advisors took part in the planning of the operation and were involved in

the operation, commanding subunits of the Georgian Army. Passports of US citizens were found,

Alborov writes, in the combat operation area in positions formerly held by Georgian troops. He fails

to mention that the passport “found” in a position formerly occupied by Georgians was a person who

was actually in the US at the time of the conflict, so suspicions arise that this “discovery” was
possibly a plant by either the Russians or Georgians.

Russians Who Accuse Georgia of Being the Aggressor (cont.)

(3) The Interviews with Prime Minister Putin

On 11 September, shortly after the August events, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated

that the Western propaganda machine acted “unfairly and immorally” when covering the conflict. In

his statement, Putin discussed “Georgian military aggression” and offered a detailed timeline of

Georgian activities. When discussing Russian events, he only stated that Russian troops approached

Tskhinvali on the morning of 10 August.[673] That may indeed be true, but when did they emerge

from the Roki Tunnel? On 6, 7, 8, or 9 August? Again, no timeline is offered from the Russian side.

PM Putin states that immoral politics always lose. Yet this is exactly what the Western press is

sensing from official Russian statements like Putin’s, the immorality of detailing only one side of

events.

On 4 December, Putin said Russia would have continued its effort to restore Georgian territorial

integrity if Georgia had not launched its war against Russia. He also made it clear that in his opinion,

Georgia needs new leadership.[674]

Russians Who Accuse Georgia of Being the Aggressor (cont.)

(4) Interview with Russian General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov

On 10 December 2008, some four months after the fighting ended, an official spokesman reiterated

the Russian position on the timeline of Russian forces. General Nikolay Makarov stated “As the Chief

of the General Staff I officially declare that not a single tank entered the territory of South Ossetia

before 2 p.m. on August 8.”

Russians Who Accuse Russia of Being the Aggressor

(1) The Interviews with Andrey Illarionov

Andrey Illarionov is a former economic adviser to Vladimir Putin and now a critic of Russian

policies. A former Kremlin insider, he is perhaps the most aggressive of all Russians in his

accusations that Russian authorities enticed Georgia into attacking first. Two reports he made contain

this claim. The first was a speech he made to the Cato Institute’s Summer School in Alushta, Ukraine

and posted on 21 September. The second was a telephonic interview with Sergey Buntman and

Mariya Gaydar of the radio station Ekho Moskvy on 24 October, nearly two and a half months after

the fighting stopped.

The speech in Ukraine[675]

Illarionov noted initially that the conflict is far from being over, as Russia will continue to use

every tool at its disposal to keep Georgia from becoming a member of NATO. Not only is the conflict

continuing in Georgia but Illarionov states Russia is beginning to look at other parts of the former

Soviet Union, implementing actions not clearly understood at the present time by the international

community. Points he made during his speech were as follows:

First, if Russia was only interested in recognizing the independence of people who stated they

wanted to live separately from other people—imperial or occupying—then Russia would have

recognized Chechen independence long ago. Russia also would have recognized Kosovo’s
independence under this line of reasoning. Thus it does not appear that recognizing people’s right to

national determination is a principle that Russian authorities follow but rather a double standard they

impose on others.

Second, if Russia was concerned about the rights of Russian citizens, then it would have defended

the rights of Russian citizens living in Turkmenistan, where some 200,000 Russian citizens were

abandoned and had no rights whatsoever. Thus defending Russian citizens in South Ossetia is only

“undisguised hypocrisy” used as a pretext for certain operations. The so-called genocide of the

Ossetian population did not take place. Declarations of genocide were made by Russian authorities

and they cited death tolls nearing 3,000. In Illarionov’s opinion, only 133 South Ossetians were killed

and 80% were fighters in South Ossetian President Kokoity’s South Ossetian Army.

Third, Illarionov believes that in the past four years Georgia has set up a modern European type

state that is democratic, transparent, and accountable to its people with efficient state agencies and

state institutions. Georgian economic growth was between 11-13%, higher than China, but the country

must import its oil and gas. Prior to the conflict Georgia became a net exporter of electricity to Russia

[Author’s note: which would be a reason for Russia NOT to attack Georgia]. Foreign investments

accounted for 18-20% of GDP in Georgia while foreign investments accounted for only 1% of GDP

in Russia.

Fourth, the majority of the Russian-supported population of South Ossetia has not worked in the

past four years according to Illarionov. There are few jobs and no one seems to care since people

live off Russian subsidies that approached 700 million dollars last year.

Fifth, Russia prepared the ground for the invasion over the past four or so years. They instituted a

partial and then a full economic blockade of Georgia, a port blockade, a transport blockade, a visa

blockade, and even mineral water and wine blockades. They supplied the Russian base in Dzhava,

South Ossetia, a 20 minute drive from Tskhinvali, before the active phase of the conflict began with

military hardware and food.

Sixth, the level of militarization of South Ossetia, however, bears special mention. Russia has

provided free of charge weapons and support to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Even North Korea is

not saturated with weaponry as are these areas in Illarionov’s opinion.

Finally, the Bucharest NATO summit that offered Ukraine and Georgia the go-ahead for NATO

admission, in Illarionov’s opinion, was the event that accelerated military preparations for an

operation against Georgia. A corps of Russian railway troops was moved to Abkhazia and a railway

was hastily repaired. Fifty trains with armored vehicles arrived, giving the impression that the main

attack would be launched from the West. On 1 August bombardments began from the Ossetian side

against Georgian villages, bombardments which were more severe than those carried out earlier.

Illarionov states the following with regard to the sources he is using for his analysis:

What I am telling you now is taken not from Georgian sources, but from Ossetian and Russian

sources. One of the most detailed accounts of how the war was prepared and conducted was

taken from Ossetian sources, official sources which said they would mop up Georgians from
South Ossetia and, moreover, would reach Tbilisi, seize Tbilisi, and I will not use the

terminology to say what they were going to do with the leadership of Tbilisi. According to

Ossetian journalists, our [Ossetian/Russian] tanks and our armored personnel vehicles passed

by 6 August, heading for Georgian positions. I am quoting this—here is a pile of reports by the

official Ossetian radio, Osradio, and the state committee for media and press of the Republic of

South Ossetia, with very detailed accounts.

It would have been much more useful if this “pile of reports” Illarionov referred to could be

translated and placed in the press. Otherwise, readers are forced to listen to his account of what the

South Ossetians were saying without any backup proof. Illarionov offers the following timeline of

events. Illarionov offers dates but few hourly descriptions.

He notes that between 1 and 7 August many local residents were transported out of Tskhinvali.

Contradictory reports indicate that a minimum of 17,000 and a maximum of 34,000 people were

transported out (out of a population of 40,000). The buses that took people out returned with curtains

drawn and the suspicion remains that other people were brought in (Russian military personnel).

On 3 August Illarionov writes that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov and the head

of the main intelligence directorate of the Russian army arrived in Tskhinvali to hold meetings with

South Ossetian President Kokoity and the local leadership on the acceleration of the military

operation (Illarionov does not state how he knows this information) which appeared to be scheduled

for the night of 7 August. Also on 3 August Cossack and volunteer mobilization started in the North

Caucasus.

On 6 August Russian frontier troops occupied the southern portal of the Roki Tunnel (that is, in

South Ossetia). Illarionov’s contention is even earlier than Shlykov’s Georgian timeline of events.

On 7 August, when Georgia tried to reach an agreement with Russia, Russian representative Yury

Popov did not show up to meet the Georgian negotiator, Minister for Reintegration Temur

Yakobashvili. Instead, Yakobashvili was told by the commander of the Russian peacekeeping

battalion, General Marat Kulakhmetov, that Georgia had one option, a unilateral cease-fire.

At 1830 on 7 August Georgian troops, under orders from President Saakashvili, entered into a

ceasefire.

At 2210, South Ossetian units started a massive shelling on the Georgian village of Tamarasheni,

and more fire was aimed at other Georgian villages along the Trans-Caucasus highway. Georgian

units received information at this time that 150 Russian tanks were on the way to Zaravak, which is at

the Roki pass.

At 2300 on 7 August, Russian units departed the pass. When the Georgian leadership heard of this,

they issued an order to storm Tskhinvali and Dzhava and to block the Roki Tunnel. Most of the

hostilities for the next 48 hours occurred in the area from the Roki Tunnel to Dzhava and around

Dzhava.
On the evening of 10 August, Russian army units reached Tskhinvali.

In order for the Russian Black Sea Fleet to be at the Georgian coast on 9-10 August, they would

have had to have left Sevastopol on the evening of 7 August, fully loaded with ammunition, fuel, and

assault troops. Such an operation takes a few days to prepare, with Illarionov’s suggestion that Russia

had planned the timing to coincide with the arrival of tanks from the Roki Tunnel.

Illarionov believes that no one has cancelled the strategic aims of the operation, to topple the

leadership of Georgia and change the political, economic, and foreign model in Georgia.

The Ekho Moskvy Radio Interview[676]

Illarionov stated that since 2005 Russian officers have held positions in the security and defense

agencies in South Ossetia, to include the defense ministry, the interior ministry, and emergencies

ministry. This has enabled them to exercise tight observation over events in South Ossetia. The

accumulation of arms and people in the area really began in May 2004. Officers of the South Ossetian

armed forces were undergoing special training at the Vladikavkaz military academy in North Ossetia

(Russia).

Illarionov notes that Georgia came up with several proposals for peace in the area from April to

August 2008 as did the European Union. They were all rejected by South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

On 1 August the civilian population evacuation started and on 2 and 3 August North Caucasus

mobilization (volunteers and Cossacks) started. Georgia made several appeals to Russia to establish

joint Russian-Georgian control over the number of people passing through the Roki Tunnel on 2-3

August. Russia never responded even though the US joined in the request. Illarionov states that

Russian troop exercises across the border in Russia ended on 2 August but the troops did not go

anywhere.

As of 3 August, 300-1,000 volunteers were arriving in South Ossetia every night. Also on 3

August there were reports of a “third party presence” (implying Russian involvement) in an area

where firing was taking place and where both South Ossetia and Georgia firmly denied any

involvement.

On 4 August, several Russian special units were deployed in South Ossetia. How Illarionov

knows this is unknown.

On 6 and 7 August a large group of Russian journalists arrived in South Ossetia to cover “a war.”

Also on 6 August the Federal Border Service of Russia occupied both ends of the Roki Tunnel. Some

Russian soldiers said they had been positioned on the hills around Tskhinvali for a week or before 7

August. At least four units of the Russian army were deployed in South Ossetia before 7 August,

including the 135

th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 22nd Special Task Brigade. Some tank units

also made the move into South Ossetia. Again, there are no sources cited by Illarionov for this

important information.

The Russian Migration Service indicated that 17,000 South Ossetians were evacuated from South
Ossetia as of 7 August. Russian journalists in Tskhinvali on 6 and 7 August observed that 80-90% of

the civilian population in Tskhinvali and Ossetian villages had been evacuated with only the male

population of military age remaining. Apparently most of the Georgian population was evacuated on

8, 9, and 10 August.

Illarionov implies that Russian officials, in particular Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, admit that

Russian forces were in South Ossetia on or before 7 August. Then the question of who started it and

who was the aggressor is officially admitted by Russian state officials in Illarionov’s opinion.

However, the transcript makes this accusation by Illarionov difficult to follow or understand. A few

jumbled, almost unintelligible fragments are followed by “admit that Russian armed forces were

present in South Ossetia before 7 August.”

Russians Who Accuse Russia of Being the Aggressor (cont.)

(2) The Writing of Russian Alexander Lvovich Yanov on “Why Russia Lost the Information

War”[677]

Yanov states that Europe, when it helped declare Kosovo independent, worried about the security

of the Serbian minority. Russia did not set the return of the purged Georgians as a condition of its

recognition of the independence of South Ossetia by Russia. Further, the Kosovo controversy was

analyzed by a UN commission under the chairmanship of Finland’s former President Martti Ahtisaart.

The commission decided that no solution existed for Kosovo other than independence under the

condition of guarantees to the Serbian minority. Europe tried to send this decision to the UN Security

Council for review, but Russia vetoed it. Thus the birth pains of an independent Kosovo were very

different from the birth pains of a South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Yanov’s argument is that Russia used

some very poor analogies in their attempts at information confrontation and thus failed miserably.

Russians Who Accuse Russia of Being the Aggressor (cont.)

(3) A Report in the Russian Press

Russian reporter Lev Makedonov wrote that the Georgian Internal Affairs Ministry made public an

intercepted telephone conversation between South Ossetian border guards that was supposedly

intercepted on the morning of 7 August. If true the call would confirm that the first Russian units

passed through the Roki tunnel 12 hours before a mobilization order was given to Georgian troops.

The time of the conversation was between 0341 and 0352 on the morning of the 7

th .[678] As

mentioned earlier, if the call was a planned deception event by Russia and intended for Georgian

sources to intercept, then the Russians had provided a pretext for Georgian forces to begin moving.

Russians Who Accuse Russia of Being the Aggressor (cont.)

(4) The opinion of journalist Pavel Fel’gengauer

Pavel Fel’gengauer is a noted Russian journalist who often reports on Russia’s Ministry of

Defense. He noted in a December report that Russia prepared early for full-scale war with 40,000

servicemen and that the preparation was carried out with remarkable secrecy. Since an invasion was

only possible in the summer, this required a carefully balanced and rehearsed plan. The exercise

Kavkaz-2008 allowed units to be forward deployed along the border with South Ossetia in July.

Fel’gengauer adds that, according to some participants, units may have deployed into South Ossetia

beforehand. The Black Sea Fleet was prepared for an immediate combat mission as well.[679]
Conclusions to the Russian Version of Events

The Russian discussion of both sides involvement is wide-ranging and does present a fairly

impressive accounting from different angles. The arguments of Russians supporting the Russian

position are that the Georgians drew them into the conflict, and the Russians supporting the Georgian

version of events believe that the Russians drew the Georgians into the conflict. Obviously, there are

weaknesses in the positions of both sides that could be seriously buttressed by some firsthand source

material. Some of these individuals should have had access to such materials (and some claim they

did) but they did not cite them by author and source when offering their case.

Georgians Who Accuse Russia of Being the Aggressor

(1) Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs, Vano Merabishvili[680]

The Russian paper Kommersant (Businessman) granted an interview with Georgian Internal

Affairs Ministry chief Vano Merabishvili. He is called the second-highest person in Georgia after

President Saakashvili. Kommersant correspondent Olga Allenova conducted a question and answer

session with him.

Merabishvili states that Georgian troops entered South Ossetia on the 8

th of August in response to

a Russian intervention at 3 a.m. on 7 August. He provided Allenova with what he termed an

intercepted transcript of a conversation between border servicemen on the night of the 7

th

.

Merabishvili also stated that some Russian Captains (probably the same interview cited above with

Captain Denis Sidristy) also stated that Russian troops were in South Ossetia on the 7

th.

In addition to the introduction of Russian troops, Merabishvili states that the ethnic purge of

15,000 Georgians from South Ossetia was also a factor in Georgia’s decision to intervene.

From 1 August those Georgian’s were, in actuality, South Ossetian President Edward Kokoity’s

hostages. He would not allow Georgian police into the area where they resided. These people were

not evacuated by Georgia because Saakashvili, Merabishvili adds, was hopeful of a peaceful

solution. He did not expect Russia to attack.

On 2 August pro-Russian refugees were moved from South to North Ossetia, which is Russian

territory.

On 3 August 50 Russian journalists moved into and transmitted from Tskhinvali.

On 7 August Russian troops rolled in at a time early in the morning when they couldn’t be

photographed from space due to a dense cloud cover and darkness. That is another reason this war

came as a surprise for the West, he adds.

The war was also a surprise for Merabishvili. He thought that Saakashvili’s unilateral ceasefire

was the best chance of stopping the escalation of the conflict; and he felt that Russia would not bring

tanks onto the territory of another state as the Soviets did.

Merabishvili adds that had Georgia just surrendered without resistance the population would have
never forgiven the government for not acting. Actually by fighting for two days, time was offered to

the West to start protesting over Russian actions. This eventually resulted in Russia halting their

attack before moving into Tbilisi.

In conclusion Merabishvili said what matters to him is what Georgia lost during the conflict.

Above all, it is “Abkhazians and Ossetians themselves who have lost Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

They will live by Russian standards now. If they like it, let them live by them. If not, we have not lost

them.”

Later, answering web users’ online questions, Merabishvili stated that Georgia did not press the

offensive because it did not want Russia to bomb Tbilisi. Georgia had no bombs capable of bombing

the Roki Tunnel, he added, so that is why it did not destroy it. Additionally, there is an alternative

road to South Ossetia from Russia which normally functions during the summer.[681] He stated that

the main aim of the operation was to “halt Russian aggression and rescue the besieged population of

the Didi and Patara Liakhvi Gorges.” The latter are areas of South Ossetia that were under Georgian

control until August. When Russia entered with 30,000 troops, over 3,000 armored vehicles, and 60

units of rockets the main objective became a defensive operation near Igoeti. He added that Georgian

forces used Grad missiles around Tskhinvali but not against the city, which is a rumor generated by

Russia’s propaganda machine. The population of Didi Liakhvi Gorge was not evacuated because

Georgia was not preparing for war. On the other hand, Russians evacuated Tskhinvali a week earlier.

[682]

Georgians Who Accuse Russia of Being the Aggressor (cont.)

(2) Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili

On 28 November Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili testified before the Georgian

Parliamentary Commission studying the August war. Saakashvili stated that after learning about

hundreds of tanks and heavy equipment passing into South Ossetia, he decided to take military action

in the Tskhinvali region.[683] He admitted to starting those actions but stated that his citizens were

being killed. Efforts to curb the intervention did not work. “It is wrong to ask if we had the right to

defend our citizens.”[684]

Saakashvili stated that people in the West did not believe him when he said that Russia would

attack Georgia. As a result there was no way that the US could have given a signal for Georgia to

launch military action in South Ossetia.[685] The US did not provide a green light for Georgia’s

military operation. However, Saakashvili adds, Georgia did regularly inform its friends about

Russia’s aggressive policy regarding Georgia and even asked these friends to help assist in

normalizing relations with Russia.[686]

Finally, Saakashvili stated that he tried to reach Russian President Medvedev on 6 August as well

as Russian Special Ambassador Yury Popov but neither got in touch with him. Only the Russian

Commander of the peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, Marat Kulakhmetov, talked with him and

explained that he was in no position to help or change anything. Saakashvili says he called Lithuanian,

Polish, Swedish, and NATO representatives on 7 August and told them the situation was very bad and

that he couldn’t reach the Russian President. As an aside regarding how much Russia appeared to be

itching for a fight, Saakashvili states that French President Nicolas Sarkozy told him what Russians
wanted to do to him with all of the physiological details (to hang him by a certain part of his

anatomy).[687]

Georgians Who Accuse Russia of Being the Aggressor (cont.)

(3) Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tqeshelashvili

At a session of the Georgian Parliament’s investigative commission on the conflict in August with

Russia, Foreign Minister Tqeshelashvili noted her disappointment with Russia’s refusal to interact

with Georgia and resolve the issues over which the conflict was fought. She feels that Russia’s

aggression was in response to Georgia’s steps to become a member of NATO and to Georgia’s energy

independence. The problem, she believes, is Russia’s geopolitical aspirations that work at odds with

Georgia’s conflict resolution efforts with OSCE help. Russia has procrastinated in all respects when

presented with Georgian initiatives.[688]

Georgians Who Accuse Georgians of Being the Aggressor

(1) Testimony of Georgian Ambassador to Russia, Erosi Kitsmarishvili

Erosi Kitsmarishvili is a former general director of the Rustavi-2 television channel; is considered

one of the main architects of Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” that provided a conflict free independence

for Georgia; and was a close ally of President Saakashvili. He provided perhaps the most damning

testimony of his friend at the hearing on the August conflict in South Ossetia. He noted that the

government of Georgia wanted to start the war in Abkhazia several months earlier than in South

Ossetia. Kitsmarishvili noted that in March 2008 Saakashvili stated that he wanted to move the

capital of Georgia to “Sokhumi.” He also stated that the US (President Bush and Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice) gave Georgia a “green light” to start a military operation in late April in Abkhazia

and against South Ossetia as well, and he accused the Georgian government of having dragged

Georgia into war. He stated that the August war could have been averted and that the Georgian

leadership did not do enough to normalize relations with Moscow.[689]

Also in his testimony, Kitsmarishvili noted that on 19 June the Georgian Minister for Reintegration

Temur Yakobashvili said “in my presence” that Georgia could take Tskhinvali in three hours and the

Russians couldn’t lift a finger to help. Kitsmarishvili was convinced that Russia, however, did know

of Georgia’s plans and in effect, “we have been dragged into this process and we did exactly what the

Russians wanted us to do.” Opposition leader Lean Gachechiladze supported Kitsmarishvili’s

statement.[690]

On 26 November, Kitsmarishvili changed his story. He noted that Saakashvili mistook US

messages as encouragement for aggression. Russia’s press noted that he said “The US never told the

Georgian authorities it would agree with a military operation for the purpose of restoring the

country’s territorial integrity.” He further states that he met with the US ambassador to Tbilisi and

was told that the US did not give its consent to the operation. Russian commentary at the end of this

report added that “when Saakashvili’s allies-turned-foes charge him with grave crimes, they revoke

their claims after authorities threaten them with criminal persecution or throw them into jail.”[691]

Georgia’s presidential administration denied these accusations, stating that the ambassador began

these accusations after losing his powers in the diplomatic service.[692]

Another article of great interest involving Kitsmarishvili was his statement that Russia knew the
exact time of the attack on Tskhinvali and that, “based on some kind of information from Moscow,

people from Saakashvili’s circle fiercely persuaded him that Russia would not be defending South

Ossetia.”[693] This implies that Moscow was running some type of reflexive control operation

(perception management to the US) against Saakashvili and his entourage, and the Georgians fell for

the information they were provided from Russia about the latter’s lack of interest in defending South

Ossetia.

Georgians Who Accuse Georgia of Being the Aggressor (cont.)

(2) Comments from Georgian peacekeeping force commander General Mamuka Kurashvili

Kurashvili stated late on the night of 7 August that Georgian troops were operating to bring

constitutional order to Tskhinvali. This statement “was not sanctioned” and South Ossetia was

attacked only following the “confirmation of the information” of Russian aggression, according to

Georgian Security Council Secretary Alexander Lomaia.[694]

Georgians Who Accuse Georgia of Being the Aggressor (cont.)

(3) Badri Bitsadze, former Chief of the Georgian border department, husband of ex-speaker of the

Georgian parliament Nino Burdjanadze

Badri Bitsadze led the Georgian border department in August. He said in an interview that he has

evidence that Georgia started the military action in Tskhinvali on 7 August. Saakashvili, as noted

above, stated that he did in fact start the war but only in reaction to Russian forces crossing the

border. It is the date that is crucial here. Bitsadze notes that “at around 12 p.m. on August 7, I

personally saw two yellow buses near Tskhinvali, carrying Georgian national flags and three

podiums, and the bus drivers were claiming that they would soon go to Tskhinvali, where a rally

would be held.” Clearly the date favors Moscow’s version of events but the items on the buses hardly

indicate an attack. National flags and podiums on their way to a rally? Bitsadze’s statement would

have been strong if he had indicated weapons and equipment on their way. Two yellow buses won’t

scare many Russian or South Ossetian residents.[695]

Georgians Who Accuse Georgia of Being the Aggressor (cont.)

(4) Former Georgian State Security Minister Igor Giorgadze

Giorgadze believes that the conflict started with the silent consent of the US. He asks why the US

did not prevent this conflict from arising. Perhaps, he asked, someone wanted to see how sharp are

Russia’s teeth?[696]

Georgians Cite Georgian Mistakes during the Conflict

(1) Club of Georgian Military Experts

An article in the Georgian press critiqued mistakes that Georgia made during the conflict. Military

expert Irakli Sesiashvili states that the August defeat was caused by a number of mistakes since 2004.

This includes the appointment of four defense ministers in the past four years and the complete

replacement of each staff. War with Russia was not unavoidable, as many like to think, especially

since Georgia was not ready for such a conflict.

The report of military experts cites former Defense Minister Giorgi Qarqarashvili, who noted that

even one mistake could cause military aggression from Russia. Qarqarashvili, the report notes, stated

that “the Georgians had been ordered not to open fire on the Russian peacekeepers.” He also adds
that “there was a secret deal with the commander of the Russian peacekeepers, Marat Kulakhmetov,

that the Russians would not interfere even if the Georgians seized Tskhinvali but that proved to be

deviousness.”

Journalist Koba Likikadze stated that Georgian soldiers were deceived by local officials who told

them that the US would support them. He also states that no top military official held a briefing during

the conflict to inform journalists as to what was happening. Military expert Vakhtang Maisaia stated

that the worst mistake was that Georgia did not take into account the threat of war and that Georgian

leaders were fooled by Moscow into believing that Moscow was so entwined in North Caucasus

affairs that it did not have time for events in Georgia.[697]

Georgian Mistakes during the Conflict from a Georgian Perspective (cont.)

(2) Georgian Military Expert Giorgi Tavdgiridze

Tavdgiridze questioned the commentary of the ex-Commander of the Georgian peacekeeping forces

in South Ossetia, Mamuka Kurashvili, who appeared before an investigative committee. The latter

stated that the operations of his forces were to restore constitutional order in South Ossetia.

Tavdgiridze believes that this statement is nothing but a public relations gambit to make Kurashvili

look better. Tavdgiridze asks why Kurashvili did not stand beside his peacekeeping battalion and

protect the peaceful population, as his job dictates. As Georgian forces retreated, Kurashvili should

have assisted in the evacuation of the local populace. He should also have gotten in contact with

Russian peacekeeping commander Kulakhmetov when hostilities first began. Instead of performing

his primary duty, Kurashvili states that had he done so, the Russians would have killed all of his

peacekeepers. Tavdgiridze asks who gave Kurashvili the order to restore constitutional order, and

what objective they told him to achieve?[698]

Chief of Staff Zaza Gogava stated that he received his orders by telephone. He was told to halt the

advance of forces onto Georgian territory, destroy strategic points from which Georgian forces were

being fired on, and defend the peaceful population.[699]

Conclusions to the Georgian Version of Events

There is a distinct dichotomy in the Georgian version of events. On the one hand is the testimony of

Erosi Kitsmarishvili, former Georgian ambassador to Russia, who states he was present in the

company of high-ranking people (identified in the Russian press, in a phone interview with

Kitsmarishvil, as the current parliamentary chairman and the Minister of Defense of Georgia in the

office of the President) when Saakashvili told him in April 2008 about a plan for attacking Abkhazia

in late May. Further, Georgia’s peacekeeping commander, General Mamuka Kurashvili, stated that his

goal was to bring constitutional order to South Ossetia, a statement for which he was accused of

making a statement “not sanctioned.” The main difference between Russian and Georgian dissension

is that some of Georgia’s dissension comes from Saakashvili’s inner circle. Russian dissension came

from people outside of President Medvedev’s inner circle.

On the other hand, several members of Saakashvili’s cabinet testified in an opposite manner—that

Georgia did not decide to attack South Ossetia until Russian armed forces had exited the southern end

of the Roki Tunnel. They were able to substantiate their accusations about the timeline based on two

documents, the supposed intercepts of border personnel discussing the passing of Russian units on the
night of 7 August and the testimony of a wounded Russian captain. It would have been more

conclusive had Georgia substantiated these accusations with footage from an unmanned aerial vehicle

flying along the road from Tskhinvali to the Roki Tunnel. Why this was not done is unknown, but in

hindsight it may have been a huge mistake. Georgian sources did not mention it in the mistakes they

discussed about their armed forces. Georgia also allegedly has recordings of conversations with

Russian peacekeepers on the eve of the fighting that indicate Russia’s reluctance to negotiate at that

point in time.

International Perceptions

Dr. Stephen Blank, a professor and well-known Russian expert at the US Army War College in

Carlisle Pennsylvania, wrote that Russia lost the war with Georgia. He felt that Russia’s unprovoked

use of large-scale force opened a “Pandora’s Box of cascading negative effects merely to gratify its

own imperial fantasies of resentment and revenge.”[700] These feelings of revenge include Prime

Minister Putin’s personal hatred for President Saakashvili. There are also a host of geopolitical

negatives for Russia that will affect it down the road, according to Blank, and nothing but empty

rhetoric when it comes to Russia’s actual military options. He feels Russia’s armed forces are not

suited to contemporary large-scale operations or to counterinsurgency.[701]

A Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Oksana Antonenko,

wrote that President Saakashvili may have been provoked but his decision still bears signs of a

calculated move. He had taken control of strategic positions around Tskhinvali; relocated

peacekeeping units within the conflict zone; and brought troops and weaponry into the region.

Antonenko reports visiting Georgia in July 2008 and sensing the expectations of a conflict in the near

future. She notes that Georgia gave Russia a “patina of legitimacy” by not only attacking Tskhinvali

but also by attacking Russian peacekeepers. She feels that Saakashvili underestimated Russia’s

response and feels he expected Western support in case of Russian aggression.[702]

Antonenko adds that Georgia had tried to discredit Russia as a mediator in South Ossetia for

months. However, Russian actions did more to damage its public posture than Georgia could have

done. Russia’s move into Georgia proper brought strong criticism from the West, and its public image

and credibility suffered when it failed to implement French President Sarkozy’s ceasefire plan. Its

image also suffered when it began to conduct ethnic cleansing against the Georgian population in

South Ossetia and when it conducted a unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a move

that failed to win support from either its Western partners or allies in post-Soviet Eurasia.[703]

Antonenko writes extensively about Western weaknesses as well in their handling of the

crisis. Russia’s call for an emergency Security Council meeting on the night of 8 August saw little

support from the US or Europe to offer alternatives. The interventions of the West in Iraq and Kosovo

weakened the Western hand considerably. Putin had warned the West earlier around the time of

Kosovo’s declaration for independence that Russia would establish a step-by-step formalization of

their ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[704]

Concluding her article, Antonenko writes that none of the parties—Georgia, Russia, or the West—

won this war. Instead the period of relative stability in Russian-Western relations that followed the

end of the Cold War has been challenged.
Russian Sergey Markedonov, head of the Interethnic Relations Department of the Institute of

Political and Military Analysis, wrote that “by formal criteria, Russia was the winner. Its actions

were justified, taking into account the many connections between the security of the North Caucasus

and the South Caucasus.”[705] Russia was able to destroy the status quo and unlock what had become

a frozen conflict.

So Who was responsible?

It will be of interest to see which set of events and conclusions readers will choose after reading

the points of view of Georgians, Russians, and international experts. Certainly this is not an all

inclusive set of articles and opinions and represents only a small sample. Conclusions based on

additional information from other articles could lead to very different conclusions. For example,

Nathalie Ouvaroff wrote that Russia played a dangerous game and did what it could to keep tensions

high in the region. Russia introduced Chechen fighters into the region before hostilities began, he

noted, this occurring as early as July in the case of Abkhazia, where Chechens were blamed for a

series of attacks that shook the city of Sukhumi. Such provocations, according to Ouvaroff, heated up

tensions. In South Ossetia, Chechens served as border guards and then took part in the fighting. The

Chechen Vostok battalion, under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defense and headed by Sulim

Yamadaev (who was invited to President Dmitriy Medvedev’s inauguration), was particularly

effective. It lost 40 men in the fighting.[706] Reports such as these tilt the evidence against Russia for

deliberately trying to entice Georgia to take the action it did. Other reports tilt evidence against

Georgia.

A worrying aspect in the aftermath of the conflict is an opinion expressed by Dr. Shlykov. He

hopes to be able to refute claims that the US gave Saakashvili the green light. If he can’t, then he

believes this will spell bad news for future US-Russian relations. Another, and perhaps more

worrisome aspect of the conflict for the area at large, is the potential escalation of tensions or a

renewal of the conflict. This concept is buttressed by the multitude of accusations (made by both

sides) that one side is sniping or firing at the other to this day. For example, Georgian Interior

Minister Vano Merabishvili stated in October 2008 that an additional 2,000 Russian servicemen were

moved into the Tskhinvali region.[707] Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Anatoliy

Nogovitsyn does not rule out a new Georgian foray against South Ossetia and Abkhazia since he

believes Georgia is enlarging its forces near the border with South Ossetia. If Georgia decides to

restore constitutional order at any cost, Nogovitsyn notes, then a tough Russian response will await

them.[708]

Pavel Fel’gengauer noted in his report that Georgia is now building defensive lines, shelters, and

firing positions. Georgia’s armed forces are discussing the use of lessons learned in Iraq, such as the

use of roadside bombs. Provocations and firefights continue along the cease-fire line as well.

European Union monitor Hansjoerg Haber notes that “the situation along the administrative border is

unpredictable, incidents are again occurring.”[709]

These types of events are occurring all too often and indicate that things have not really settled

down in the region. Clearly the EU and OSCE (which may end its mission in South Ossetia) have

their work cut out for them as they try to ascertain who is telling the truth and attempt to prevent the
crisis from starting all over again. The coming months will see a continuation of attempts by both

sides to continue to exert influence over the area. As a result, to use a phrase from former New York

Yankees baseball player Yogi Berra, “it ain’t over till it’s over.” And, from all appearances, it ain’t

over. When the confrontation finally does end, let’s all hope it is through diplomatic means.
CHAPTER ELEVEN: RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE THEORY AND THE

CONSEQUENCES OFAUGUST 2008

Introduction

The August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia clarified for Russian leaders the growing

influence of information warfare (IW) and exposed several deficiencies in the Russian armed forces

in regard to information-based equipment and theory. The conflict served as the primary motivator for

a Russian military reform effort that, in its procurement of new equipment, is sure to include the latest

advances in information-technologies. In short, the conflict has wide-ranging implications for future

information warfare activities.

Russia’s leadership was not taken by surprise over IW’s growing importance. For the past several

years, Russian political and military figures have written extensively about the impact of the

information age on Russian domestic, foreign, and military affairs. In the case of politicians and

diplomats, the focus has been on writing international strategies and policies designed to shape the

information environment to Russia’s liking. Considerable time and effort has gone into participation

in international forums devoted to information topics, such as the world summits on information

societies in Okinawa in 2000, Geneva in 2003, Tunis in 2005, and other such events. Efforts to inject

Russian-led information policies into United Nations discussions have also been persistent.

Domestically, politicians have written legislation to confront cybercrime and other internal issues

related to the development of an information society. President Dmitriy Medvedev is allegedly an

active Internet user who understands the net as an important information weapon and so emphasis on

this area should continue. Former President Vladimir Putin was not as enthusiastic in accepting the

net as is Medvedev.

Russia’s military remained active in a number of information-related areas and also was not taken

by surprise in the IW arena. In 2007, Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov promoted Oleg Eskin to

the position of seventh deputy defense minister, making him responsible for handling information

technology and communications. Under his direction, the military continued to write extensively on

information warfare theory, electronic warfare doctrine and equipment, satellite clusters designed for

military purposes, and reconnaissance-strike complexes. In addition, the military continued its focus

on two components of IW, its information-technical and information-psychological aspects, as they

had done since the concept was first discussed openly. However, advancement in all areas was not

performed as quickly as initially anticipated and, when theory was tested in conflict, several

weaknesses appeared immediately, most notably problems with communication equipment. The

current Russian military reform focus of Serdyukov is designed to correct this and other

shortcomings. In November 2008 he replaced Eskin with 39-year-old Dmitriy Chushkin, another sign

of his displeasure over the performance of information technologies during the crisis.[710]

This chapter will address two issues associated with these information-related topics in Russia

shortly before and after the August 2008 war. The chapter will discuss the information-related

policies of the Russian Federation and their emergence as a key factor in Russia’s spiritual and

technical development; and the impact of the recent Georgia-Russian conflict on the future of
information warfare theory, organization, and equipment in Russia. Russian leaders hope that

addressing policy and “lessons learned” now will prevent future failures in information-related

areas, especially those of the military.

Background on Information-related Strategies of the Russian Federation

Russian information warfare policy makers at the strategic level appear to have adopted a threepronged approach to information-related developments. This approach, in progress since the late

1990s, has shown steady progress in two prongs, the international and domestic fronts, where the

development of policies and doctrines has continued unabated. However, the August 2008 conflict

appears to have affected the third prong (military) the most (and provided the greatest controversy)

since the fighting ended.

The first prong of Russia’s strategic approach is that politicians and diplomats continue their

primary thrust aimed at shaping the international information environment, an approach that began

more than a decade ago. Russian leaders focused initially on shaping international opinion at the

United Nations through the definition of terms, such as information weapons, but they have

experienced little progress on this front. However, their efforts continue and in 2009 several new

information-related issues were on the UN’s agenda. Russia has also focused on shaping international

opinion at worldwide conferences on the development of an information society. Armed mentally

with the experience of losing an ideology at the end of the Cold War (described by some as “World

War III”), Russian strategists understand the important role that information and news play in

influencing the minds of its citizens. As a result Russia should not be expected to back away from this

approach.

The second prong of Russia’s strategic approach is that Russian politicians have developed

several doctrines and policies to enhance domestic information security, especially the impact of new

media on the Russian population. Politicians do not want a replay of the end of the Cold War. These

internal policies are aimed at technical issues such as cybercrime and at psychological issues such as

the information-psychological stability of society. Leaders have long recognized, from their

perspective, an information threat to Russia. In January 2000, for example, Russia’s National Security

Concept dealt with affairs in the information-technical sphere. It was noted that

There is an increased threat to the national security of the Russian Federation in the information

sphere. A serious danger arises from the desire of a number of countries to dominate the global

information domain space and to expel Russia from the external and internal information

market; and from the development by a number of states of ‘information warfare’ concepts that

entail the creation of ways of exerting a dangerous effect on other countries’ information

systems, of disrupting information and telecommunications systems and data storage systems,

and of gaining unauthorized access to them.[711]

In July 2001, Russia published a draft version of a program called “Electronic Russia 2002-

2010.” Electronic Russia 2002-2010 would enhance domestic information security by creating the

institutional and legal environment for the development of an information and communications

technology industry. This environment would assist the interaction between the state and society via

these technologies. The program was designed to supplement other federally targeted programs (to
include but not limited to: Strategy for Russia’s Social and Economic Development Until 2010;

Development of Electronic Commerce in Russia 2002-2006; the Development of a Unified

Educational Information Medium in the Russian Federation 2001-2005; and the Creation and

Development of a Special-Purpose Information and Telecommunications System in the Interests of

Governmental Bodies 2001-2007).[712]

Russian Professor Alexander Selivanov added to this discussion of information security with an

article on internal and external IW threats to Russia. He stated that Russia had lost much on the

information front in the past 25-30 years. No other “weapons” have emerged to replace the

ideological ones that buttressed the people’s souls. For that reason alone IW remains important.

Russia must clarify the direction of information attacks, methods of conducting information

operations, and methods of countering them. Without this knowledge it cannot proceed with

confidence in the realm of information security. He notes that the principle method of carrying out

information operations is ”to form a stratum of people with transformed values in society who

actually become carriers of a different culture and of the tasks and goals of other states on the

territory of one’s own country.”[713] Seizure of territory, he adds, “presumes ‘nontraditional

occupation’ as the possibility of controlling territory and making use of its resources without the

victor’s physical presence on the territory of the vanquished.”[714]

The third prong of Russia’s strategic approach is that Russia’s military continues its attempts to

modernize its military force and develop the proper military strategy for the twenty-first century. The

recent conflict with Georgia has helped this process pick up speed as the fighting indicated that

Russia needs to make significant improvement in command and control and in developing

information-based equipment if it hopes to remain competitive in the event of future war. The

military’s recent focus on military reform seems dedicated to making these adjustments happen. In

addition to improving tactics and equipment, the Russian military is determined to enhance the

psychological stability of its servicemen. The paper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) has printed a

number of recent articles dedicated to the information-psychological stability issue. One of these

articles noted that only eleven per cent of servicemen are currently satisfied with information

services the military provides.[715] The government wants to ensure that soldiers get objective

information from the new information environment that has surrounded and penetrated the country.

[716]

Professor Selivanov wrote that Russia is now obligated to speak about the need for information

subunits in the Armed Forces to shape patriotism and a fighting spirit, to counteract enemy

information-ideological operations, and to conduct information-ideological operations against an

actual or potential enemy.[717] Thus the reform effort is designed to make improvements in both the

technical and psychological components of IW.

These three avenues of approach to information security in Russia are influenced by events

worldwide and domestically. A look at just seven Russian headlines from 2007-present indicates

some of the rationale and concern behind Russia’s urgency in handling information security issues:

· “Information technical company head speculates that economic crisis will fuel information

security needs”
· “Growing dependence on computer systems may threaten Russia’s security”

· “National security implications of information warfare analyzed”

· “Internal, external threats to Russia from information warfare detailed”

· “Russian General Staff expects cyber war in 2-3 years”

· “Almost 300,000 hacker attacks on President’s website repelled in 2008”

· “Caucasus conflict prompts Russia to resume development of robotic weapons”

Three Russian Policies Designed for Domestic Stability

Russian efforts on the international stage to influence and shape the international environment will

not be addressed here, as the work on this aspect is too extensive for this analysis. Rather, the focus

will remain on Russian internal information-related policies and on military capabilities. This section

will discuss three internal policies, to be followed by the section on military issues related to the

Georgian-Russian conflict of August 2008. The first policy issue addressed in this section, Russia’s

2000 Information Security Doctrine, will be examined in more detail than the other two policies, the

2008 “Strategy of Information Society Development in Russia” and the 2009 “National Security

Strategy.”

Russia published a very specific and important information-related document in September 2000,

that being the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Signed by then President

Vladimir Putin, Russia’s Information Security Doctrine presented the purposes, objectives,

principles, and basic directions of Russia’s information security. Russia’s Information Security

Doctrine defines information security as “the state of protection of its national interests in the

information sphere defined by the totality of balanced interests of the individual, society, and the

state.” The doctrine declares that the “implementation of the guarantees of the constitutional rights and

liberties of man and citizen concerning activity in the information sphere is the most important

objective of the state in the field of information security.”[718]

Some of the main points of the doctrine are:

· First, the document discusses the national interests of the Russian Federation in the

information sphere, including the protection of information resources from unsanctioned

access.

· Second, the document examines the types of threats to Russia’s information security. These

include constitutional rights that protect one’s spiritual life, information support for state

policy, the development of the information industry, and the security of information.

· Third, the document identifies external and internal sources of threats to Russia’s

information security.

· Fourth, it outlines the state of information security in the Russian Federation and objectives

supporting it, discussing tension between the need for the free exchange of information and

the need for restrictions on dissemination of some information.

· Fifth, general methods of information security in the Russian Federation — legal,

organizational-technical, and economic — are outlined.

· Sixth, the document discusses several features of information security: economics, domestic
policy, foreign policy, science and technology, spiritual life, information and

telecommunication systems, defense, law enforcement, and emergency situations.

· Seventh, the goals of international cooperation in the field of information security are

discussed, such as a ban on information weapons and the coordination of law enforcement

activities.

· Eighth, the doctrine describes the provisions of state policy regarding information security:

guidelines for federal institutions of state power, and balancing the interests of the

individual, society, and the state in the information sphere.

· Finally, organizational elements of Russia’s information security system are described; these

include the President, Federation Council of the Federal Assembly, the State Duma of the

Federal Assembly, the government of the Russian Federation, the Security Council, and other

federal executive authorities, Presidential commissions, judiciary institutions, public

associations, and citizens.[719]

When the information security doctrine was first announced in 2000, it was supported by a series

of official proclamations. Official spokesmen reinforced this message. First Deputy of the Security

Council Vladislav Sherstyuk, who helped draft the doctrine, claimed that the doctrine would not be

used to restrict independent media or control television channels, but asserted that the state must

supervise all media, state or private.[720] Anatoliy Streltsov, another doctrine author, noted that the

components of the doctrine provide for the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens to obtain and

use information, while providing for Russia’s spiritual renewal, the development of moral values,

patriotic and humanistic traditions, and cultural and scientific potential. Most important, according to

Streltsov, was that currently Russia’s information security does not fully comply with the needs of

society and the state, lacking sufficient legal, organizational, and technical backing.[721]

Details of the Information Security Doctrine’s section on defense are described next.

Information Security in the Sphere of Defense

Information security in the defense sphere involves: (1) the information infrastructure of the central

elements of military command and control, and the elements of military command and control of the

branches of the armed forces and the scientific research institutions of the Ministry of Defense; (2) the

information resources of enterprises of the defense complex and research institutions; (3) the software

and hardware of automatic systems of command and control of the forces and weapons, arms, and

military equipment furnished with computerization facilities; and (4) information resources,

communication systems, and the information infrastructure of other forces and military components

and elements.[722]

External threats to the Defense Ministry (MOD) include the intelligence activities of foreign states;

information and technical pressure (electronic warfare, computer network penetration, etc.) by

probable enemies; sabotage and subversive activities of the security services of foreign states,

including information and psychological pressure; and activities of foreign political, economic, or

military entities directed against the interests of the Russian Federation in the defense sphere. Internal

threats included the violation of established procedure for collecting, processing, storing, and

transmitting information within MOD; premeditated actions and individual mistakes with special

information and telecommunications systems, or unreliability in their operation; information and
propaganda activities that undermine the prestige of the armed forces; unresolved questions of

protecting intellectual property of enterprises; and unresolved questions regarding social protection

of servicemen and their families.[723]

Ways to improve the system of information security for the armed forces included the refinement of

the modes and methods of strategic and operational concealment, reconnaissance, and electronic

warfare and the methods and means of active countermeasures against the information and

propaganda and psychological operations of a probable enemy.[724] The terms information-technical

and information-psychological are not used in the information security doctrine, perhaps because

military people did not write it. However, its sections on the spiritual and cultural sphere, and the

scientific research sphere, do cover the gist of the military’s concerns in information-psychological

and information-technical realms.

2008/2009 Policies

In February 2008, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the Strategiya Razvitiya

Informatsionnogo Obshchestva v Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Strategy of Information Society

Development in Russia). The strategy has both information-technical and information-psychological

overtones. Among the information-technical tasks are: developing modern information and

communication infrastructures; developing the Russian Federation economy using these

infrastructures; and developing science, technologies and engineering, and training qualified

personnel in the field of information and communication technologies. Among the informationpsychological tasks are upgrading the quality of education, health services, and social protection of

the population; improving the constitutional rights of citizens acting in the information sphere; and

preserving the culture, moral, and patriotic principles associated with the public consciousness.[725]

The strategy also discussed how the government of Russia would solve these tasks. The

government will formulate basic actions for the development of an information society and create

conditions for the implementation of these actions; will define reference values for the development

of an information society in Russia; will develop the legislation and updates for law-enforcement’s

use of information and communication technologies; will create conditions for the intensive

development of science, education, and culture (and science-driven information and communication

technologies); will enable the improvement of the quality and efficiency of public services for

business and citizens; will create conditions for equal access for citizens to information; and will use

the capabilities of information and communication technologies for strengthening the defense capacity

of the country and the security of the state.[726]

In May 2009 Russia’s National Security Strategy was published. It further addressed the concerns

expressed in the 2000 National Security Concept. The unclassified version of the strategy, in

superficial terms, mentions the global information confrontation; information as a strategic deterrent;

information as a means of conducting armed combat; the availability of information technologies

(especially telecommunications); the formation of an information and military infrastructure; the

importance of information science and information resources; the role of information networks and

systems in situation centers; and information and information-analytical support necessary for

implementing the strategy.
The Georgian-Russian Conflict: IW and Military Reform

The August 2008 conflict with Georgia occurred midway between Russia’s 2008 strategy for an

information society and the 2009 national security strategy. The conflict likely influenced the 2009

national security strategy.

Information-related aspects of the August 2008 conflict were discussed often in the press of both

countries. Russian cyber attacks, Georgians stated, neutralized Georgia’s use of the Internet and its

ability to talk internally with its citizens. Georgian attacks on Russia were less successful but still

merited consideration in the Russian press for their ability to shut down some services. With regard

to military equipment dependent on information-based technologies, the Russian military did not do

well. Equipment with information technologies were deemed a critical shortcoming that must be

fixed. Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov, at the time chief of the Main Combat Training and

Troop Service Directorate of Russia, stated that troops needed equipment with up-to-date geolocation

and telecommunications instruments (to include ensuring uninterrupted telecommunications)

integrated into the fire command chain, a top-notch friend-or-foe system, and the ability to improve

the resolution power of reconnaissance assets.[727] Command and control equipment often failed and

relegated commanders in some instances to using the cell phones of journalists. Precision-guided

weaponry did not perform well. The military’s poor performance in Georgia served as a catalyst for

change and military reform efforts, headed by Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov.

Several prominent Russian authors discussed the good and bad features of Russia’s information

warfare response months after the conflict ended. Most prominent among them are the Dean of the

Russian Foreign Ministry’s Academy for Future Diplomats, Igor Panarin; the head of the Institute for

Political and Military Analysis Center of Military Forecasting, Colonel Anatoliy Tsyganok; the

deputy chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, Anatoliy Nogovitsyn; and Russia’s first

deputy of the General Staff, Alexander Burutin. The views of these and other Russian authors follow.

Russia Lost the Information War: Three Opinions

Russian analyst Igor Panarin addressed shortcomings with what he termed information-related

reform. He offered an interesting plan to correct Russia’s information warfare deficiencies. Panarin is

a long-time information warfare specialist in Russia and thus understands quite well the ins and outs

of the problem. Overall, he was not impressed with Russia’s use of IW, noting that in regard to the

Georgian conflict “the Caucasus demonstrated our utter inability to champion our goals and interests

in the world information arena.”[728] Two public groups of Russian experts, Panarin added, had

looked at the information warfare problem against Russia in a September round table of the Russian

Federation Public Chamber (titled “Information Aggression against Russia: Methods for Countering

It”); and an October international conference sponsored by the party “A Just Russia” (titled

“Information Warfare in the Modern World”). Panarin concluded that “the geopolitical and

geoeconomic role of Russia in the world will be determined to a large extent by whether or not it can

create an effective system for information warfare.”[729]

Panarin writes that to win information war, Russia needs a specialized management system and

analytic structures that counter information aggression against Russia. The components of such a

system are:
· Council for Public Diplomacy: would include members of the state structure, media,

business, political parties, NGO’s, and so on headed by Prime Minister Putin.

· Advisor to the President of Russia for Information and Propaganda Activities: would

coordinate activities of the information analysis units of the President’s administration, the

Security Council, and several other ministries.

· State Foreign Affairs Media Holding Company (All-Russia State Television and Radio

Broadcasting Company): would be subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the

American experience can be copied.

· State Internet Holding Company: would create a domestic media holding company for the

publishing of books, video films, video games, and the like for dissemination on the Internet.

· Information Crisis Action Center: would enable the authorities to present commentaries on

unfolding events in a timely manner to the world information arena. “Homework

assignments” must be readied in advance.

· Information Countermeasure System: would create a system of resources to counter

information warfare operations by Russia’s geopolitical enemies.

· Non-Governmental Organization (NGO): would provide a network of Russian

organizations operating on CIS, EU, and USA territories.

· System for Training Personnel for Conducting Information Warfare: would define which

institutions will train individuals in this topic. Most likely candidates at the highest level are

the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Civil Service

Academy; and at the middle level, Moscow State University, the Higher Economic School,

and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.[730]

Panarin adds that these activities must be unified within the frame of an organizational and analytic

system composed of eight parts (diagnostic, analysis and forecasting, organization and management,

methodological, consultative, prevention, control, and cooperation); and that information Special

Forces must be developed to “prepare for effective operations under conditions of a possible

crisis.”[731] In summary, Panarin advocated creating his system, strengthening financing for the plan,

creating a state/private system for managing activities, creating a state/private system for formulating

a positive image of Russia overseas, and expanding the information resources of the Russian speaking

populations across the globe.[732]

While Panarin’s plan was the most complete, it was not the only one offered for consideration.

With regard to other plans like Panarin’s, an unattributed report eerily similar to Panarin’s appeared

in the paper Novyy Region (New Region). It stated that “Russia lost the information war in August

2008.”[733] This unnamed author recommended improving the information structures available to

Russia. Special organization-managerial and research entities for counteracting information

aggression should be formed by presidential decision. Information troops should be created

composed of state and military news media, people responsive to the needs and interests of Russia in

response to a crisis. Information troops would do the strategic analysis of control networks,

counterintelligence work, operational concealment measures, information security issues, and security

for one’s own men and equipment. To insure the proper information impact it is necessary to construct

an anti-crisis center, a national media holding company, work with public relations entities, and train

specialists (military press, radio, and TV) in applied journalism. To construct information
countermeasures it is necessary to develop a center for the determination of critically important

information entities of the enemy, how to eliminate them physically, and how to conduct electronic

warfare, psychological warfare, systemic counterpropaganda, and net operations to include hacker

training. Personnel of information troops would be diplomats, experts, journalists, writers, publicists,

translators, operators, communications personnel, web designers, hackers, and others.[734]

In March 2009, analyst Anatoliy Tsyganok also wrote that, at the preliminary stage of the conflict,

Georgians won the information war. In Tsyganok’s opinion, every agency was unprepared to conduct

IW against Georgia. This includes the Security Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the press

center of the Ministry of Defense. The two main goals of information warfare are to disable an

enemy’s command and control systems; and to impose on enemy citizens moral norms and cultural

traditions that are foreign to them. Tsyganok also recommended creating information troops, as did the

two previous authors. They would conduct strategic analysis, information influence, and information

countermeasures. His discussion of these categories is identical to the paragraph above, indicating it

was perhaps he and not Panarin who provided the interview to Novyy Region (New Region).[735]

Tsyganok added three other important facts that he did not cover in his Novyy Region interview.

They are that information warfare is a reality of geopolitics that Russia’s political elite does not

understand; that the Israeli Army is the technological model that Defense Minister Serdyukov’s reform

should follow; and that a military GLONASS system is badly needed, a system that did not work well

against Georgia. Thirty-six GLONASS satellites are needed. Then precision weaponry will work.

[736]

Russian IW Did Well against Georgia: Two Opinions

There were other opinions that positively assessed Russia’s information warfare effort in Georgia.

The deputy chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, Anatoliy Nogovitsyn, is representative

of someone who was not at all negative about Russia’s information warfare performance during the

conflict. He said that “Russian journalists stood united with the Russian army as never before,

displaying heroism in covering the events in South Ossetia” and that journalists helped “finding the

words and evidence to rebut torrents of lies and rejection, and helped the West to view our operations

with understanding.”[737]

Colonel P. Koayesov also found more positive than negative in Russia’s information warfare effort

against Georgia. He began by praising Georgian IW efforts. He noted that, from a Georgian

perspective, the effort began long before hostilities, with the key information warfare themes being

Georgia’s historic right to South Ossetia, Georgia’s legal right to South Ossetia, and Georgia’s

psychological information pressure on world opinion. Once conflict began, Georgia organized a

denial of service attack against South Ossetian websites carrying information about the progress of

the fighting. This occurred from 7-8 August. On 9 August Russian news agencies were attacked,

making it difficult to access RIA Novosti (RIA News) in particular (http://www.rian.ru). Concurrently

the Georgian leadership organized psychological information pressure on their population from

within the country and from abroad. Support from abroad was particularly strong from the AngloSaxon media, such as CNN, BBC, Reuter, Bloomberg, and others. Georgian President Mikhail

Saakashvili, for example, conducted all of his public statements against a backdrop of the European

Union flag.[738]
Koayesov defined information warfare in the following way in January 2009, some five months

after the conflict ended:

Information warfare consists in making an integrated impact on the opposing side’s system of

state and military command and control and its military-political leadership—an impact that

would lead even in peacetime to the adoption of decisions favorable to the party initiating the

information impact and in the course of conflict would totally paralyze the functioning of the

enemy’s command and control infrastructure.[739]

Information warfare’s two components, from a Russian military perspective, have remained

consistent through the years. These two components are information-technical and informationpsychological. Koayesov defined the former as “blocking the operation of the enemy’s state and

military command and control systems” and the latter as “exerting psychological information pressure

on its leaders, Armed Forces personnel, and the population.”[740] The pillars of US information

doctrine, on the other hand, have undergone significant change since the 1990s.

Koayesov describes the damage caused by Russian hackers against Georgia as “significantly more

serious.” Virtually all of Georgia’s national ministries and government departments (along with some

news agencies) came under attack. Georgia was forced to find other servers to host its web material.

Internet online surveys were an important information warfare field for Russia, as Russia’s actions

were viewed as peacekeeping by a majority of voters in a CNN survey, which “obviously CNN

terminated very promptly.”[741] Blog entries were also more pro-Russian than Georgian. Koayesov

summed up his research the following way:

On the whole it can be noted that whereas the Georgian side built its strategy for waging

information warfare at the official level, attempting to convince people through mass exposure

in popular, primarily Anglo-Saxon publications, the South Ossetian side gambled on involving

as many of its Internet supporters as possible in information warfare...the utilization of ‘mass

information armies’ conducting a direct dialogue with people on the Internet is more effective

than a ‘mediated’ dialogue between states’ leaders and the world’s peoples.[742]

Further IW Consequences of the Conflict

Besides plans and positives/negatives, there were rather significant consequences of the conflict

that appeared months later after the conflict’s lessons had been digested. These consequences and

second thoughts by major IW players in Russia are important to consider.

One early consequence was the Strela research and production company’s announcement in

October 2008 of a new Internet-based military intelligence system. This system will provide a

collective view of the battlefield. Strela also announced the production of a new radar known as

Aistyonok and a modified version of the Fara-1 radar. The new Fara-PV radar, with night-vision

devices, can open fire on group targets in the total absence of “optical” visibility.[743]

Another of these consequences appeared in the form of a few statements from Russia’s first deputy

of the General Staff, Alexander Burutin. He said in an interview on 29 January 2009 that it is
“essential to switch from an analysis of the challenges and threats in the sphere of information

security to a response and to their preemption.”[744] In the sense of preemption Burutin sounds more

like the Chinese. More importantly, Burutin stated that a mechanism should be developed that would

require states to “incur liability for what is happening in their information space.”[745]

The importance of Burutin’s last statement was developed further in the US journal Parameters.

Authors Stephen Korns and Joshua Kastenberg discussed the issue of cyber neutrality from the

perspective of the Georgian-Russian conflict. They asked what a neutral nation can do to remain a

cyber neutral when another nation at war (Georgia) uses the servers of a neutral (US) in order to

converse with its own nation after its servers have been neutralized or debilitated by another nation

(Russia) with whom they are at war?[746] During the Georgia-Russian conflict, a Georgian website

was relocated on a private US IT company site and the company provided a cyber conduit through

which Georgia’s leadership could talk with its population, apparently without the knowledge or

approval of the US government. Luckily, Korns and Kastenberg note, the Georgian authority sought

cyber sanctuary on a US “.com” site and not a “.gov” or “.mil” site. Korns and Kastenberg

recommended that the US government should take steps to determine if it will allow future cyber

belligerents to make use of Internet assets in the US and, if so, what protocol is appropriate to control

the situation.[747] Thus they recommend discussion about the issue of cyber neutrality much as

Burutin recommends developing a mechanism for incurring liability. Both nations should talk this

through.

Information-Psychological Stability of the Force: Recommendations after August 2008

Russia’s military leadership seems intent, in the course of its military reform effort, to prepare the

way for an infusion of new digital patriotic educational materials into the armed forces. A three stage

plan is proposed. Between 2009-2012 the expectation is that a television digital format will be

introduced into the garrisons as well as the creation of Internet sites of military print media. Between

2013-2017, Internet access will be available for eighty-five per cent of servicemen. Between 2018-

2020 all barracks will have satellite and cable TV and there will be 20 newspapers per 100

servicemen.[748]

Conclusions

Russia is working hard at shaping the international environment to its liking. Their efforts at

international conferences and at the UN are indicative of this effort. They have offered proposals on

the development of principles for information and communication technologies, discussed the

formalization of terms such as information warfare and information weapons, and have developed

government groups of experts to discuss information related topics. Russia is also interested in

developing an international conference site that will mimic the economic conferences at Davos. They

appear to have targeted Garmisch, Germany as the site for these meetings. For the past few years,

Russians have been meeting there to discuss information-related issues in April.

Domestically, Russian policy makers worry about what types of information warfare activities

other nations are running against their citizens. To thwart the further loss of patriotic and other cultural

values, Russian leaders have developed a host of policies to ensure that protection is offered to

Russia’s spiritual values.
The war with Georgia forced a host of information security issues to the fore. Communication

problems surfaced early as did the performance of precision-guided weaponry. Both issues affected

the command and control of Russian troops. These problems served as the primary motivators behind

Defense Minister Serdyukov’s military reform process.

A short confrontation on the Internet between Russian and Georgian hackers resulted in a wideranging discussion about the power of the Internet to influence public opinion during a conflict.

Russia’s leaders seem keen on harnessing this power. Recently, the Kremlin opened what is known as

a “school of bloggers,” an indication that President Medvedev’s interest in social media is taking on

new avenues of approach.[749] Evgeney Morozov, who found the site, noted that “extensive

‘googling’ for ‘Kremlin’s school of bloggers’ reveals at least one interesting project—Polit-TV.ru—a

series of ideological YouTube videos, all branded with a funny Kremlin-shaped logo, which aim to

rally up support for the Kremlin’s recent public campaigns.”[750]

Russia is addressing its military information warfare problems with more focus than at any time in

the recent past. This focus includes the proposed development of several new organizations aimed at

better control over the information-technical and information-psychological aspects of information

warfare. And for once, these reform efforts appear to have the backing of the political leadership.

Overall, one should expect that in the next ten years significant improvement will be noted in all three

prongs of Russia’s approach to IW—external, internal, and military. The West would be wise to keep

a close eye on how Russia proceeds. There is much to learn from their experiences.
CHAPTER TWELVE: THREE BOOKS ON THE CONFLICT

Introduction

Once the Russia-Georgia conflict (see Appendix Five for South Ossetia maps) ended, there were

many articles written about the conflict. After a short while, books also began to appear on the topic.

This chapter focuses on three such works that offer varying opinions as to what really happened.

The first two books favor Georgia’s view of the war, that President Mikhail Saakashvili was

caught in the middle of a real dilemma: does he allow parts of Georgia’s territorial integrity to slip

into Russian hands without a fight; or does he go against the advice of several international actors and

fight over the potential annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after attempts at negotiation fail?

The third book favors a Russian version of events.

The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War with Georgia

Editors Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr’s book The Guns of August: Russia’s War with

Georgia is, due to the number (10) and variety of its contributors, an important discussion of the

August 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia from a variety of perspectives. The work employs

the analysis of two Russians and several US and international academicians and analysts.

In Chapter One, “Introduction,” Cornell and Starr point out that the conflict was quickly

“submerged under a cloud of polemics involving both spin and disinformation.” Much of the early

reporting (and spin) emerged largely from a Russian point of view, mainly because their reporters

were the only ones with direct access to the area.[751] Before the conflict started (from 2-7 August)

Russia had slipped, by some accounts, nearly fifty journalists into South Ossetia. As a result,

policymakers and others studying the press often made premature judgments based on erroneous

information or on very little information. The editors add that, in their view, Russia engaged in

detailed planning for this war for months and maybe years. Perhaps Saakashvili fell into a trap.

Russian contributors Pavel Fel’gengauer and Andrei Illarionov suggest that “even if he had not, a

pretext would have been found to proceed with the campaign as it had been planned.”[752]

Thomas Goltz wrote Chapter Two, titled “The Paradox of Living in Paradise: Georgia’s Descent

into Chaos.” Goltz, well-known for his excellent reporting on Chechnya and the Russian periphery,

describes how a nationalistic slow-broil was underway in Georgia that exploded with Mikhail

Gorbachev’s call for glasnost and perestroika in the 1980s. There arose a desire to dissolve all

connections with the USSR.[753] South Ossetia’s more recent history, however, was closer with

Russia than with the Georgians and in 1990 the Ossetian “popular front” organization preemptively

declared their independence from Georgia and said it wanted to remain inside the USSR,[754] setting

the stage for many of Russia’s future actions to hold onto South Ossetia.

Thornike Gordadze wrote Chapter Three, titled “Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s.” He

describes how Russia tried to make viable a hybrid of its long abandoned political model in a totally

new environment.[755]

Russian aggression in South Ossetia may hearken back to the fact that the West allowed Russia to act
with some impunity in Abkhazia from August 1992 to September 1993.[756] The leaders of Russia

may have considered this a sign that they could do the same in the other regions. Russia further

retained and sustained its military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and supported various

separatist movements in neighboring countries. More importantly, Russia declared at the United

Nations that only Russia can put peacekeepers in the post-Soviet space. This strategy of

“peacekeeping” became “piece keeping” in the words of Paul Goble. This was Russia’s way to

maintain control over parts of these lost territories.[757] This peacekeeping force, which was hardly

impartial, would later be seen by the West as a major reason for the outbreak of the conflict. Russia

received the right to put military bases in these regions of Georgia and obtained influence over the

appointments of the ministers of defense, interior, and security in South Ossetia.

Edward Shevardnadze, former Foreign Minister of the USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev and

President of Georgia from 1995-2003, realized that his relation with Moscow was becoming less

profitable even though he tried to find a way to compromise with Moscow’s demands. The quasivassal relationship failed to bring any real benefit to Georgia and so he turned to the West,

welcoming American involvement in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project. Georgia became a

leading beneficiary of US foreign aid per capita globally.[758] In 1999 Shevardnadze announced his

intention to close Russia’s military bases in Georgia. Russia responded by requiring all Georgians to

obtain visas before entering Russia. For “humanitarian reasons” visas were not required for residents

of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, clearly challenging Georgia’s territorial integrity. Perhaps this can be

seen as one of Russia’s initial steps in annexing the provinces. This action was soon followed by the

broad distribution of Russian passports in the provinces.[759] Russia used energy blackmail as well

during the Shevardnadze era.

Andrei Illarionov wrote Chapter Four, titled “The Russian Leadership’s Preparation for War,

1999-2008.” Illarionov, a Russian who had served as then-President Vladimir Putin’s economic

advisor until 2005, wrote that while both sides took steps towards war it is obvious that most of those

steps were made by the Russian-Abkhazian-South Ossetian coalition in advance. It is remarkable how

detailed, precise, coordinated, and secretive was the Russian planning for military action, Illarionov

notes.[760] In his chapter he outlines the decisions Russian leaders took in chronological order. They

were:

· Several days after 9 January 2002, once Eduard Kokoity had been elected President of South

Ossetia and Gerasim Khugaev had been appointed as Prime Minister, Kokoity called a

closed meeting of the South Ossetian elite and revealed a plan to launch a war against

Georgia and gain independence.[761]

· On 23 June 2002 Tskhinvali started registering candidates for Russian citizenship. Russia

then demanded to use Georgian airspace for operations in Chechnya, which resulted in the

bombing of Georgian territory on 6 August 2002. At the end of 2002 Kokoity started filling

position in the government with representatives of the Russian power ministries. Further, the

Russian-Abkhazian railway line was reopened.[762] On 11 February 2004 the first meeting

between Russian President Putin and Georgian President Saakashvili occurred. Putin asked

Saakashvili to slow down the removal of Russian bases from Georgia and to “take care of”

Minister of State Security, Valery Khaburdzania.

· On 11 October 2004 elections in Abkhazia failed to get a Kremlin backed candidate, Raul
Khadjimba (a former KGB agent), into the Presidency of Abkhazia. Instead Putin had to

settle for a Khadjimba-Bagapsh joint victory but not before Putin had halted railway traffic,

closed the Abkhazian portion of the Russian-Georgian border, and banned the import of

Abkhazian agricultural products into Russia, moves designed to put more pressure on voters

and policy makers. Abkhazia seemed more independent than South Ossetia up to this point.

[763]

· In 2005 Russia had the telecom firm Megafon build a non-Georgian mobile communication

system in South Ossetia for military and intelligence service use. Russia also raised its

subsidies to the two regions. The primary part of the subsidies went to defense, making up

some 150% of South Ossetia’s GDP.

· On 30 May 2005 Russia agreed to withdraw its forces from its Georgian bases before the

end of 2008. The dates for withdrawing from bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki were also the

dates for setting up bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[764] From 2006-2008 South

Ossetia and Abkhazia received twice as much military equipment as Georgia possessed.

[765] On 7 July 2006 the Russian Federation Council adopted a law allowing the Russian

President to deploy the country’s military forces outside Russian territory to prevent

international terrorism.

· On 27 September 2006 Georgia uncovered a GRU coordinated spy network. The

individuals apprehended were sentenced on 29 September. Russia’s response was rapid and

aggressive. They responded by surrounding the Georgian embassy in Moscow, putting forces

on Georgia’s border, and promising to deport Georgian migrant laborers. On 2 October the

officers were released and Russia suspended all communications with Georgia, amounting

to the institution of a total embargo.[766] On 11 March 2007 Russian military helicopters

shelled Georgian administrative buildings and villages in the Kodori Gorge in Upper

Abkhazia. On 27 June 2007 Russia unexpectedly withdrew its troops from its military base

in Akhalkalaki. This may have been done to prevent their forces from being held hostage in

an upcoming war (65).

· On 13 July 2007 Putin signed a decree to terminate Russia’s participation in the Treaty on

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). This removed limits on the movement of troops and

equipment in the North Caucasus. On 4 and 7 March 2008 respectively, South Ossetia and

Abkhazia called for Russia to recognize their independence. On 13 March 2008 the Russian

State Duma and the MFA discussed a strategy for achieving Abkhazian and South Ossetian

independence.[767]

· On 3-5 April 2008, NATO denied a Georgian and Ukrainian request for membership action

plans (MAP). On 16 April Putin established direct relations with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali,

just like with his federation territories, amounting to full annexation of the two Georgian

regions. On 17 April 300 additional Russian servicemen with heavy equipment arrived in

Abkhazia. On 20 April Russian a MIG-29 shot down an unarmed Georgian Unmanned

Aerial Vehicle and withdrew into Russian airspace. In April 2008 airborne troops deployed

to Abkhazia. In May 2008 Russia’s Air Force sent out a nationwide “call to active duty” of

former military helicopter pilots with experience flying in mountainous regions.[768]

· In June-July 2008 there were a series of exercises, over flights, base construction

improvements, and movement of people and equipment. The most significant actions

indicating Russian war moves were: 2 and 8 July, Ossetia’s information agency Osinform
published articles declaring the participation of Russia’s 58

th army “in the future operation

to force Georgia to peace.” On 4 July Ossetian President Kokoity announced a total

mobilization in South Ossetia (then canceled it the same afternoon) and the Russian website

Kavkaz-center predicted a Russian attack on Georgia in August 2008, noting “preparations

for the war have been under way already for several months.”[769]

· On 7 July Russian peacekeeping battalions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia fortified their

positions. On 10 July Bagapsh and Kokoity were called to Moscow for consultations. On 8,

14, 18, 19, 22-25, 30, and 31 July the US, Germany, EU, OSCE, and Finland proposed

negotiations that Russia brushed aside. On 15 July the Russian Kavkaz-2008 exercise used a

leaflet with a description of Georgian forces. On 28 July South Ossetian forces fire at joint

peacekeeping forces and OSCE observers for the first time.[770]

· On 1 August Ossetian and Georgian forces exchanged fire. On 2 August South Ossetia began

moving civilians to Russia. By 7 August nearly 20,000 citizens had been evacuated. The

areas from which they left accounted for more than 90% of the population of the future area

of battle and about 40% of the total population of South Ossetia. From 2-7 August Russian

journalists arrived in Tskhinvali while foreign journalists were banned except for a group

from Ukraine.[771] On 3 August Russia’s Deputy Minister of Defense, along with the

Deputy Chief of Intelligence and the commander of the 58

th army, met in Tskhinvali with

Kokoity and others.[772] On 4 August 300 Cossack mercenaries arrived in South Ossetia.

By 5 August more artillery systems, an intelligence battalion, and several armored units all

moved through the Roki tunnel and into South Ossetia. More than 1200 Russian servicemen

had entered South Ossetia by that time.[773]

Niklas Nilsson wrote Chapter Five, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution: The Break with the Past.” He

notes that Saakashvili came to power in January 2004 and his top priority was territorial integrity.

[774] Saakashvili achieved success in Adjara in May 2004 and then switched his attention to South

Ossetia, hoping that Kokoity lacked legitimacy and would depart as public support came

Saakashvili’s way. He hoped that economic achievements would enable the change to occur but he

underestimated South Ossetian fears of Georgian aggression.[775]

Tbilisi criticized Russia’s mode of conflict resolution and support for separatist authorities which

Tbilisi believed were designed to keep the conflict alive and keep parts of Georgia under Russian

control. Russia, however, proved to be a biased participant in the conflict and didn’t want resolution.

Tbilisi wanted external actors brought into the conflict resolution process to neutralize Russian bias

toward the separatists. Tbilisi alternated using peace plan proposals with threats of force to attempt

to move the process forward. Georgia reestablished control over the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia and

installed the Abkhaz government-in-exile there. Georgian Minister of Defense Okruashvili said he

would celebrate New Year’s Eve in his native Tskhinvali, upping the fears in Moscow of Georgian

intentions.[776]

Most hopes for Georgian successes disappeared by 2006 as Russian authorities saw that

Saakashvili would be more Western oriented than Shevardnadze. Russia began using energy and trade

levers to attain dominance over separatist regions and bombed Georgian territory and shot down

Georgian UAVs. Instead of the elimination of Shevardnadze from the scene, the Rose Revolution came
to be viewed as a shift orchestrated by the US and one that had to be stopped.[777]

Stephen Blank wrote Chapter Six, “From Neglect to Duress: The West and the Georgian Crisis

Before the 2008 War.” He writes that in the former Soviet Union, a conflict of “imagined

geographies” and different mentalities remains in progress. Russian delivery of pressure against

former Soviet republics remains the latter’s greatest security threat. States that align with Russia must

face a future of Russian troops and Russian political and economic influence in their policymaking.

Russia wants to freeze the process of European integration and replace it with regional bipolarity.

[778]

US support for Georgia’s MAP aspiration had two consequences: it caused Russia to act more

quickly to keep NATO off its border, and it caused Georgia to believe the US had its back. Russian

actions were sped up after 16 April and resulted in the following motions: opening consular relations

with Abkhazia and South Ossetia; prepositioning logistics in Abkhazia; and building a railroad there

to connect it to its own military and logistic bases. US policy at the time was weak, advancing no

plan to resolve stalemates in disputed provinces, failing to publicly warn Moscow about the

consequences of their actions, and failing to organize a coherent Western response to Russian

pressures, all issues that Moscow exploited. Instead, the US faced consequences of its own from the

August conflict that include the likely permanent truncation of Georgia, its long-term exclusion from

NATO, further divisions within NATO, and the emboldening of Russia to undertake further military

actions in neighboring countries when it considers it necessary to do so.[779]

David Smith wrote Chapter Seven, “The Saakashvili Administration’s Reaction to Russian

Policies Before the 2008 War.” Smith notes that both Tbilisi and the West missed or misread Russian

intentions. Tbilisi somewhat suspended its belief of a possible Russian incursion due to some

Western criticism about their path to democracy. Westerners, on the other hand, missed the

approaching indicators of war and the fact that Russia was either irked by or feared Georgian

independence. The path may have begun with the inauguration of Saakashvili on 25 January 2004,

which put Georgia on an independent path that included his commitment to reintegrate South Ossetia

and Abkhazia into Georgia, use geography to establish Georgia as an energy transit state, liberalize

the economy, and gain membership into NATO.[780]

Russia, for its part, was confronted with three issues: the independence of Kosovo (which they

saw as an example and rationale for future Georgian actions), Georgia’s push toward a Western path

and NATO, and NATO’s slow approach to admitting Georgia to the MAP. Russia capitalized on the

latter point by keeping the provinces unstable and in Russia’s camp. Georgia felt the Russian analogy

of using what occurred in Kosovo as their reason to keep Abkhazia was pointless since there was no

genocide or ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia. On 6 March Russia withdrew sanctions on separatist

authorities in Abkhazia, allowing Russian arms shipments to Abkhaz separatists. On 24 March the

Duma called up the Kremlin to consider recognizing the two Georgian territories.[781]

In March 2008 Georgia’s proposal to “unfreeze” the situation in the territories was negated by the

Russians. Instead of the 1992 Sochi Agreement that put Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia, and North

Ossetia on the commission, the Georgians offered a “2+2+2” proposal of Georgia and Russia; the

Kokoity and Tbilisi-backed Sanakoyev administrations from South Ossetia; and the OSCE and EU.
Instead, Russian forces continued to position themselves on Georgian territory “to protect Russian

citizens” and to protect against a Georgian military buildup. [782]

Georgia, however, could see that conflict was perhaps imminent. Its leaders could see this process

developing better than the US. Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Yakobashvili said Georgia

and Russia were close to war since Georgia knows Russia well and sees signals of propaganda and

Russian troops entering Georgian territory under false pretenses. On 8 and 12 May Saakashvili stated

that NATO will not help Georgia and Georgia “requests the EU to study, investigate, and react on the

illegal movement of Russian peacekeeping forces.” The EU must become more involved in conflict

resolution processes. On 6 June Saakashvili met with Russian President Medvedev and said Russia

should withdraw its additional troops in Abkhazia, stop military construction there, and reverse the

16 April decision to establish ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia’s approach was

consistently diplomatic, sought the help of friends, used international organizations, and put forward

peace proposals. The reality is that “the August 2008 war was neither provoked nor a product of

miscalculation. It was initiated and waged by Russia for well-articulated geopolitical reasons.”[783]

Johanna Popjanevski wrote Chapter Eight, titled “From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali: The Path to War in

Georgia.” The chapter details some of the final decisions that led to the conflict. On 4 March Georgia

decided to withdraw from the Joint Control Commission in South Ossetia and on 6 March Russia

lifted its trade restrictions on Abkhazia. On 16 April outgoing President Putin signed a presidential

decree instructing Russia’s state agencies to establish official ties with the Abkhaz and South

Ossetian de facto administrations, to institutionalize their trade relations and to provide consular

assistance to residents of the two regions. On 20 April a Georgian UAV was shot down over

Abkhazia. Russia increased its peacekeeping numbers in Abkhazia to 2542 due to what Russia termed

the mobilization of Georgian troops in the Kodori Gorge, which UNOMIG said did not occur. In fact,

the US, EU, and UN all backed the Georgian version of events. On 31 May Russia sent 400 military

personnel to Abkhazia to repair the railway infrastructure between Sukhumi and Ochamchire,

describing the project as humanitarian assistance to Abkhazia. Georgia, NATO, and the EU objected

that the peacekeeping mandate did not authorize this.[784]

On 4 July Russian authorities stated that Georgia had staged an attack on the head of the

Provisional Administration in South Ossetia to justify a Russian military build-up in the conflict zone.

On 7 July Georgia accused South Ossetia of kidnapping four Georgian police officers. On 8 July

Russia sent four military aircraft into Georgian airspace over South Ossetia as US Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice visited Tbilisi. From 2-5 August numerous reporters from Moscow-based media

outlets started arriving in Tskhinvali. A Chechen freelance photographer stated that on 5 August he

found close to 50 Russian journalists at his hotel in Tskhinvali to cover “something big.” From 3-5

August South Ossetian authorities announced that 800 Ossetians were being evacuated to North

Ossetia. On 7 August Russian negotiator Popov failed to show up to meet Georgian Yakobashvili.

Russian peacekeeper Kulakhmetov informed Yakobashvili that the Georgian side should declare a

unilateral ceasefire, which Saakashvili did at 1910 on 7 August. A short time later on 7 August the

first media reports about Russian troops moving through the Roki tunnel from North Ossetia

appeared. At 2000 Rossiya TV showed Abkhaz leader Bagapsh telling the Abkhaz National Security

Council that a battalion from Russia had entered South Ossetia and this was based on his (Bagapsh’s)

conversation with South Ossetian President Kokoity. At 2300 Saakashvili received information that
100 vehicles were already passing through the Roki tunnel and at 2335, Saakashvili instructed the

Georgian Minister of Defense to advance towards Tskhinvali with two goals: prevent the Russian

advance on Tskhinvali and stop the shelling of the Georgian villages by separatist rebels. The cease

fire was suspended shortly after midnight on 8 August. On 8 August at 1000 the first Russian fighter

plane entered Georgian airspace from South Ossetia. The Georgian army began to withdraw on the

afternoon of 9 August. On 10 August Georgia requested a cease-fire but Russia continued attacking,

destroying a railroad bridge as late as 16 August and firebombing Borjomi National Park, a Georgian

national treasure, on 15-16 August.[785] Medvedev had ordered combat operations to cease on 12

August but a ceasefire was not signed until 15-16 August.

These facts and others point argue that Russia had preplanned the incursion, underscored by the

influx of Russian journalists, preparation of the railroad, and the absence of Russian peacekeeper

control over the South Ossetian Defense Ministry. The argument over “who fired the first shot” points

to Russia as well since Georgia has recordings of Russian advances into South Ossetia on 7 August,

which has not been refuted by Russia. Western technical experts deem the recordings to be credible.

Moscow carries the burden of proof for breaching Georgia’s sovereign border and for conducting

more than a humanitarian mission.[786]

Georgia’s move on Tskhinvali was an attempt to protect its territory based on Russia’s actions (the

buildup, etc.) since April and the credible reports (Abkhaz leader on TV, telecommunication

intercepts, etc.) that the country had been invaded. Georgia does not carry the burden of proof or need

to prove proportionality of response. Russia believed that the international community would either

ignore a Russian invasion of Georgia or excuse it as justified to prevent Georgian aggression against

South Ossetia.[787]

Russian Pavel Fel’gengauer wrote Chapter Nine, “After August 7: The Escalation of the RussiaGeorgia War.” Georgia, he writes, did not expect a full scale invasion in August, according to the

chief of staff of Georgia’s armed forces. Rather, even though several thousand Russian troops began

moving through the Roki tunnel on 7 August (according to Georgia’s National Security Council

Secretary Alexander Lomaia), Georgia expected an attack in September, October, or November 2008

and not on two fronts.[788]

Georgia’s defense minister said Georgia was not prepared for conventional war. After the war

there was a Georgian parliamentary commission to scrutinize events; no public hearings happened in

Russia about the prewar plan or course of the war. Moscow wanted its Georgian actions to be seen as

a reaction to “Georgian aggression” against Tskhinvali and against peacekeepers in the region.

Russian President Medvedev said he suspected that Saakashvili was planning military action and that

Russia “had prepared for that.” Russian General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov noted that Russia was

“forced to handpick colonels and generals from all over Russia, men who were able to command in

battle...” This could not have been done on the morning of 8 August.[789]

Georgia’s chief of staff of the armed forces during the war, General Zaza Gogava, said Saakashvili

gave the military three orders at 2335 on 7 August. First, to prevent all military vehicles from

entering Georgia via the Roki Tunnel; second, to suppress all positions attacking Georgian

peacekeepers and MVD posts or Georgian villages; and third, to protect the interests and security of
the civilian population while implementing these orders. Lomaia said the logic was to circle around

Tskhinvali and advance closer to the Roki tunnel. Georgian Minister of Defense Davit Kezerashvili

and his first deputy Batu Kutelia told Fel’gengauer in November 2008 that they had a scout at the

south end of the Roki Tunnel on 7 August who monitored Russian vehicles entering South Ossetia at

that time. At 0045 on 8 August, Georgian artillery opened fire on these advancing forces. Over

12,000 Russian troops entered South Ossetia. 15,000 Russian troops were in Abkhazia. Altogether

some 25,000 Russian troops were in Georgia with 1200 pieces of armor and artillery. 10,000-15,000

separatist militias acted as auxiliary forces. On 10 August Georgia declared a unilateral ceasefire.

[790]

Paul Goble wrote Chapter Ten, “Defining Victory and Defeat: The Information War between

Russia and Georgia.” New digital mediums have increased the calculations associated with the

conduct of information war (IW). Russia and Georgia both realized that how the media treated their

actions was important. Both assumed that control over the media was possible but neither recognized

how facts on the ground might over time overwhelm their information strategies. The two sides

engaged in an information war before, during, and after the conflict to state who won and lost and to

announce who was the aggressor and who was the victim. Russia was usually on the offensive,

Georgia on the defensive. Moscow themes were that Saakashvili was the aggressor, Moscow had to

protect its citizens, and the US actions in Kosovo were similar to Moscow’s. Georgia said that

Russia’s invasion had violated international law. Georgian authorities believe that their (Georgia’s)

introduction of troops was legitimate, and that Georgia was different than Kosovo.[791]

Moscow’s greatest success in IW was proclaiming that it had acted defensively in response to

Georgian aggression. Many criticized Saakashvili for his actions, to include international actors such

as Germany. Russia’s prepositioning of journalists in Tskhinvali is a sure sign that the Kremlin knew

that there was going to be a war to cover. Some Russians felt the coverage was so uneven that they

sought out Western coverage for leavening. Putin said Western propaganda is powerful but will fail

due to its dishonesty and amorality. He added that Russia’s response to Georgia was similar to the

USSR’s response to the German invasion of WWII. (Misinformation is the spread of completely false

reports and is less serious than disinformation which is the mixing of truths and falsehoods in a way

that will be either plausible or impossible to check. When disinformation is picked up by other news

outlets its credibility is enhanced.)[792]

Georgia had a different reporting approach, trying to restrict the flow of Russian messages and

blocking Russian Internet sites and TV. It simultaneously sought to put out its message in Western

capitals. Georgia’s use of the blogosphere enabled it to “come out better in the information war while

the conflict was going on than anyone could have expected....” Both sides eventually felt that they had

lost the information war. Russian critics said that information technology allowed the Kremlin’s

propaganda to become so transparent that “it was deceiving only those who wanted to be deceived.”

Russia offered a “smorgasbord of ‘varied and contradictory’ explanations for what it was doing....”

and explained that it was only protecting the rights of its citizens outside its borders. People were

asking about those inside Russia’s borders, whether they deserved the same rights? Russia also

implied it could act as it did because it could get away with it, more the thinking of a criminal group

than a state in Goble’s opinion. Some Russians argued for new administrative and analytic centers

and the creation of new Information Forces in the Russian Armed Forces. IW lessons learned were:
future wars will be defined by who wins the IW; clarity and consistency are more important than

ever; low-intensity conflict make the war and peace distinction less meaningful; facts on the ground

matter since they create limits as to what can reasonably be claimed; and the explosive growth of

personal media may make controlling messages almost impossible and the conduct of IW more

difficult and important than ever.[793]

James Sherr wrote the last chapter in the book, titled “The Implications of the Russia-Georgia War

for European Security.” He notes that Yeltsin, not Putin, was the first to state that “ideological

confrontation is being replaced by a struggle for spheres of influence in geopolitics.” Yeltsin did so in

1994. Russia had a long term security cooperation view with its former republics as early as 1992

when the Yeltsin administration noted that the former USSR was a zone of Russian “special interests”

to be pursued by all legitimate means including “divide and influence” policies. Western security

elites define threats in terms of intention and capability while Russia does so in terms of the

“presence” of foreign forces in the vicinity of Russian territory.[794]

Kosovo removed any pretense from Russia’s democrats that NATO was a defensive alliance. Putin

had restored national pride, established a strong geo-economic impulse to policy, and freed Russia

from its helplessness. On 12 July 2008 the Foreign Policy Concept of Russia noted that “should our

partners be unprepared for joint efforts, Russia, in order to protect its national interests, will have to

act unilaterally but always on the basis of international law.” By August 2008 Russia saw a US that

was overextended, a NATO policy with no teeth, and a NATO that was divided. This helped

embolden the Russian leadership to act. On 12 September 2008 President Medvedev stated that

Russia was “no longer weak and defenseless” and would “no longer tolerate” the West’s “unfair and

humiliating” policy in its neighborhood.[795]

Medvedev added that Saakashvili’s “reckless and unprovoked aggression” was not his own doing,

but carried out “at the instigation of forces abroad.” He added that Russia has the right to maintain

regions of “privileged interests,” i.e., “with our close neighbors.” NATO must halt its “mechanical

enlargement,” even when it occurs by invitation, and confine itself to issues of “hard security” within

the “geographical limits of the alliance.”[796]

A Little War That Shook the World

The eight chapters of Ronald Asmus’s book A Little War that Shook the World offer insights into

the world of diplomatic and military intrigue and secrecy, US-Russian and EU-Russian relations, and

Russian negotiating behavior, albeit from a US perspective. His analysis brings to the fore the

question of who started the conflict and the crucial role that international actors played in stopping the

conflict before it spun further out of control.[797]

Chapter One, “The Decision,” is perhaps the book’s most important chapter. Here Asmus lays out

a timeline of events from an insider’s perspective. Asmus was provided tapes of important

conversations and conducted personal interviews with key participants (ministers, presidents,

soldiers) of the conflict. However, he was not offered access to Russian leaders so his timeline is

influenced in that respect.

The situation that developed months before the conflict is crucial to understanding the context for
the timeline that unfolded. Context helps the analyst understand how events were perceived by both

sides. For Russia, the decision in February of 2008 to grant independence to Kosovo and the decision

taken at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April regarding Georgian access to NATO membership appear

to have precipitated a series of Russian actions. These decisions touched a raw Russian nerve:

NATO moving closer to Russia’s borders. However, Russia used the Kosovo event as a further

rationale for intervening and ensuring that self-determination voices in favor of Russia were heard

(voices directed by ethnic Russians in many cases) as NATO had recognized them in Kosovo.

It is apparent that Russia’s leaders understood fully that they were putting Saakashvili in an

untenable and unwinnable situation. Undoubtedly, they also knew that no help would be offered from

Washington or the international community if Saakashvili went to war. They appear to have been

informed about what was being said among the various parties to the conflict. Russia watched as

international leaders and the US pleaded that Saakashvili not take any action against the Russians. No

such effort was expended to ensure that Russia would not act in an aggressive manner, and this was a

mistake.[798]

Saakashvili realized, however, that if he did nothing to counter Russian moves, which were

becoming more and more aggressive, and sacrificed Abkhazian and South Ossetian sovereignty, that

he would be termed a political failure and ousted for allowing another country to take Georgian

territory. Georgians were aware that in 1921 their forefathers had not fought the Bolsheviks and lost

their independence—he didn’t want that to be his fate. As Asmus notes, “That was the gap between

Georgia and the West that Moscow was now exposing and exploiting—and where it was laying its

trap.”[799] In this sense, the conflict showed how Russia set up and took advantage of a politicaldiplomatic-military situation. Georgia’s leaders had examined Russian actions and rationalized that

Russian activities were threatening not only Georgia’s villages and citizens but perhaps Georgia’s

government itself. Saakashvili was thus placed in an unenviable situation. Russian pressure and

foresight had put him in a no win situation.

Asmus writes that Saakashvili’s order to go to war at 2335 on 7 August 2008 was influenced by

numerous Russian actions that left him no choice other than attack or sacrifice territory. A list of those

factors in Asmus’s chapter is offered here:

1. Saakashvili’s political manifesto was based on Georgia’s territorial integrity and the

recovery of the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; he did not feel he could remain

president of he failed to defend Georgian citizens; Russia used the status quo against him as

they continued to add their influence in South Ossetia with the appointment of a Russian

citizen as prime minister, Russian citizens as defense and interior ministers, and a Russian

citizen as head of the national security council. Russia also began handing out Russian

passports to South Ossetian citizens.

2. The Georgian armed forces were in no level of readiness to fight. Commanders were

allowed to grant leave in August. The elite First Brigade was in Iraq and another unit was in

training to deploy. Some commanders on 6 August were on vacation at traditional Georgian

feasts; this was not a country prepared for an invasion as Russia claims.

3. In mid-July, Georgian intelligence had reports that Russian fighters were moved to North

Ossetia.
4. In the weeks prior to the invasion, the Russians conducted a major exercise (Kavkaz 2008)

that used materials about Georgia (leaflets, etc.) as the pretext for the mock operation. It was

a de facto Georgian war game scenario.

5. South Ossetian artillery opened fire on 29 July on Georgian positions in a more systematic

and lethal manner than in previous summers; further, the Georgians had intercepted phone

calls from Russian peacekeepers that had helped South Ossetian’s target the Georgians (in

some cases, the firing came from behind Russian peacekeeping positions. If Georgians

retaliated they ran the risk of killing Russian soldiers).

6. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov and Fifty-eighth Army Commander in

Chief Anatoliy Khrulyev arrived in Tskhinvali on 2 August for consultations with President

Kokoity.

7. On 2 August South Ossetia began evacuating women and children from its capital to North

Ossetia.

8. Between 2 and 6 August some fifty Russian journalists arrived in Tskhinvali, which was

highly unusual.

9. On 3 August North Ossetian, Chechen, and Cossack “volunteers” were mobilized by

Moscow and assigned to the South Ossetian peacekeeping battalions, flouting the

peacekeeping agreements put in place in the early 1990s.

10. The movement through the Roki Tunnel (the tunnel connecting Russia with South Ossetia)

of Russian forces on 6 August, a force not authorized to be in South Ossetia.

11. The renewed shelling of Georgian villages on 7 August.

12. On 7 August, the world’s attention was focused on the opening of the Olympics in Beijing,

China and not on South Ossetia.

13. On the morning of 7 August Georgia received reports that on 4 or 5 August additional

aircraft were deployed to the Mozdok air base in North Ossetia; and that parts of the Russian

Black Sea fleet had left port several days earlier.

14. On the afternoon of 7 August, Saakashvili felt Russia had crossed a red line based on

information accumulated: heavier weaponry had been used in the conflict zone, a buildup of

air and land power had occurred, Russian forces were already deployed in South Ossetia,

there had been an influx of North Caucasian volunteers, and Russia controlled the Roki

tunnel. However, in parallel to convening his national security meeting to discuss red lines,

Saakashvili sent civilian Temur Yakovashvili to Tskhinvali to try to establish direct contact

with Russian and South Ossetian authorities. He met with Major General Kulakhmetov, the

Russian head of the joint peacekeeping forces. The latter stated he could no longer control

the South Ossetian forces and confirmed that artillery was coming from behind Russian

positions, using peacekeepers as human shields. Yakovashvili asked to establish a ceasefire

for at least a day and Kulakhmetov said he’d try. Saakashvili was for the ceasefire.

15. More South Ossetian shelling began again at 2030 on 7 August and Georgian forces did not

respond. Georgia’s National Security Council decided this was a slow motion Russian

invasion taking advantage of a situation. The corresponding Georgian decision to move was

finally made due to the lack of any Ossetian or Russian response to Saakashvili’s unilateral

ceasefire offer, fresh intelligence that other Russian units were poised to move through the

tunnel, visual confirmation of a military column moving from Java toward Tskhinvali, and

Medvedev’s refusal to return Saakashvili’s calls to discuss what was happening. At 2330 on

7 August, when Saakashvili was informed that Russian forces were moving from Java to
Tskhinvali, he ordered forces to move and open fire.

16. An important point here, however, is that Russia’s slow motion plan had been in the works

for weeks if not months; Georgia’s plan, on the other hand, was haphazard at best and an

indication that the last minute plan indicated this was not a long planned move to conquer

South Ossetia.

17. Russia’s rational for invading contained three points: there was an initial proclamation that

their invasion was to prevent a possible genocide against South Ossetia (which turned out to

be false, as the EU report of Heidi Tagliavini noted); there was an initial aim to defend

Russian citizens in South Ossetia (citizens newly minted by Russia); and there was the death

of Russian peacekeepers on 8 August, who according to one Russian journalist blog had

opened fire first and then were shot by the Georgians (with the reality being not only that

Russian peacekeepers had long since ceased to be neutral but also that Georgian

peacekeepers had been killed on 7 August). A further claim was that Georgian artillery

attacks were indiscriminate.[800]

There was, of course, evidence against Georgia. One OSCE report indicated that Georgia used

GRAD missiles against Tskhinvali; and the EU’s independent fact-finding trip headed by Ambassador

Heidi Tagliavini stated that Georgia’s decision to go to war was unjustifiable under international law.

Further, Georgia’s armed forces did engage in contingency planning and on occasion showed these

plans to US officials. Russia surely noted that at 1430 on 7 August a public mobilization order was

issued; and at 1800 forces were ordered to deploy to the edge of South Ossetia and the conflict zone.

Washington, however, had warned Saakashvili that they would not come to his rescue if he started a

conflict. Georgian forces most likely tempered their operations based on this advice. They were

ordered to fight a defensive engagement around Tskhinvali. Their plan was to destroy the Gupta

bridge and prevent Russian forces from advancing further south; Georgian peacekeeper Brigadier

General Mamuka Kurashvili stated that Georgia’s aim was different, however, that being to restore

constitutional order. This caused an international stir, especially in Russia, where Georgia’s

refutation of this claim was seen as a ruse.[801]

Asmus makes the following statement in his conclusions to the chapter:

On the evening of August 7 the ambiguity about Georgia’s future territorial integrity, the makebelieve nature of Russia’s role as peacekeeper; the marginalization of the UN and OSCE

missions; and the lack of political will and interest from the West came together with a Russian

agenda and a cornered Georgian leader to produce this war.[802]

Chapters Two, Three, and Four cover the history of the region in more detail, the impact of

Kosovo independence on Russia’s decisions, and the Russian interpretation of the Bucharest

conference for Russia’s border in the Caucasus, respectively.

Chapter Five, “Diplomacy,” discusses in some detail the give and take between Putin and

Saakashvili and offers some indication as to why the latter acted as he did in confronting Russia with

force. It also helps analysts understand Russian negotiating techniques. First, Saakashvili was

reacting to direct threats from Putin that the latter would make Abkhazia “a second Northern Cyprus if

Georgia continued to pursue its goal of going to the West.”[803] Saakashvili was also reacting to
Europeans who stated that Georgia should just accept the loss of Abkhazia, which went against his

campaign promises and inherent feeling of the importance of protecting Georgia’s territorial integrity.

Simultaneously, Russia was building up its military force in Abkhazia and Russia’s leadership was

refusing to talk to Tbilisi. Saakashvili had felt after his last meeting with Putin in February 2008 that

President Putin was preparing for war. Diplomats were encouraged to engage both sides to head off a

confrontation. However, Russia continued to move men and equipment into Abkhazia and force

Saakashvili to turn his attention there.[804]

Moscow, after watching the West support Kosovo’s declaration of independence, decided on 6

March to rescind a 1996 decision banning weapons and military aid for Abkhazia and South Ossetia;

on 21 March Moscow’s Duma adopted a resolution to recognize the regions; on 3 April Putin pledged

support for the regions via practical, not declarative means; and on 16 April Putin decreed the

establishment of direct legal and diplomatic ties with the regions. Russian aircraft on 20 April then

shot down an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying over the potential conflict zone.[805]

Washington felt the best way to cool down Saakashvili’s fears was to engage him directly. A US

plan was devised to show allies that Saakashvili was serious about peace, to provide assurances

against Russian moves and the latter’s monopoly on peacekeepers, and to start another type of

negotiating process for Abkhazia’s future. The plan did not, however, signal to Moscow that any

move against Georgia would seriously undermine present day Russian-US relations and those with

the West in general. Germany also proposed a plan that was based on a Georgian non-use of force

pledge and the use of international mediation to settle the Abkhaz issue. The differences in the plans,

a lack of western unity, and Russian attempts to sabotage the moves it did not like ensured that

Moscow would not be deterred from acting in Asmus’s opinion. Russia used the diplomatic effort to

continue to mask its preparations in the regions.[806]

On 21 June Saakashvili offered an interim solution. He offered to split Abkhazia into two areas

—“one opened to Georgian influence and the other firmly in Russian hands” in return for a Georgian

non-use of force pledge and a pledge to abandon any effort to overturn the current Russian

peacekeeping mandate. On 3 July Russia responded—negatively. It asked for more preconditions. In

Asmus’s opinion, Georgia was now losing confidence in both the US and in the EU. As National

Security Council Secretary Alexander Lomaia commented about the Russian response, “...the letter is

empty. We are going to have a hot summer.” [807]

Chapter Six is titled “The Battle.” Russia placed some 20,000 forces in Abkhazia and 20,000 in

South Ossetia, some three times the size of Georgia’s army. The preplanning had evolved over time,

as the chapters above indicate, to include weapons, bases, infrastructure, personnel, and even the

Black Sea fleet. Asmus writes that cyber forces constituted the fourth front. Cyber attacks on Georgia

began in late July. The heaviest attacks occurred on 8 August as blocking, re-routing, and seizing

Georgian cyberspace control began in earnest. Different groups attacked different targets. The attacks

included less serious defacements and more serious reductions of Georgia’s cyber capabilities.

Economic disruption of the banking system also appeared prominent among the attack vectors.

Interestingly, Asmus writes that the attacks began and ended within 30 minutes of one another,

beginning at 1715 on 8 August and ending at 1245 on 12 August. Since Moscow announced its initial

ceasefire at about this time, the attacks appear to have been well-controlled and coordinated. Thus
Asmus believes the attacks were part of a larger campaign’s political and military objectives.[808]

Of course, Asmus relates other interesting Russian recruitment issues such as bringing helicopter

pilots out of retirement and sending doctors and medics to Tskhinvali in July. All of these issues

indicate preplanning on Russia’s part. However, Asmus speculates that Russia’s plan was to strike

several days later, seize territories outright, and precipitate the fall of Saakashvili’s government. If

this was the case, the latter’s decision to move on the evening of 7 August may have further infuriated

Putin. In any event, Asmus feels the trap that Moscow set can be explained as follows: “Either you

acquiesce to the creeping annexation and run the risk of being toppled domestically—or you choose

to fight and be crushed militarily.”[809]

Russian defense correspondent Pavel Fel’gengauer offered an alternate solution. He felt the plan

was for the Ossetians to provoke the Georgians into acting against their interests. This scenario has

legs based on the Ossetian’s heavy artillery bombardment against Georgia while it hid behind the

Russian peacekeepers human shield. Any Russian deaths could then be a pretext for an intervention.

Asmus also notes how successful the Russians were in directing Georgian attention away from the

real conflict area. By developing a major buildup of forces in the open in Abkhazia Georgian

attention was directed there. Meanwhile, a surreptitious buildup of forces was occurring in South

Ossetia that wasn’t as well documented by the Georgians.

Further, in order not to provoke Russia, US training of the Georgian army was focused on counterterror capabilities and not on territorial defense. This further ensured the lack of competency on

behalf of the Georgian army to confront a Russian force. US intelligence assets monitoring the

Caucasus had been relocated to focus on Iraq and Afghanistan. So when the force moved out early on

the 8

th, they were not only undermanned and underinformed but also undertrained and handed a plan

that had been developed only the previous afternoon.[810]

Asmus notes that Kurashvili had no radios that worked with the two infantry brigades that were

deploying on the left and right flanks. He also relates that a Georgian battalion commander, Major

Shalva Dolidze, gave an order early in the fight NOT to fire on Russian peacekeepers who his unit

had just encountered. As the peacekeepers passed, they opened fire on Dolidze’s unit, killing him.

[811] On 9 August Russia attacked with SS-21 Tochka and SS-26 Iskander missiles and 28 Russian

aircraft. The following day, Russian forces entered Western Georgia from Abkhazia. That same day,

Secretary of State Condelezza Rice called Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Lavrov indicated

the fighting would halt if Tbilisi issued a non-use of force pledge and if Saakashvili was removed

from power. Rice said she would have no part of that and, against Lavrov’s protests, proceeded to

call her European counterparts to explain Russia’s actual operational goal. To Washington, this was a

turning point in the war. This occurred as Russian tanks were some two hours from Tbilisi. The US

held firm on its decision not to employ a military option. Instead it began delivering humanitarian aid

and warning Russia of the consequences of its actions if it did not reverse its course immediately.

[812] Fortunately for everyone involved, Russia’s assault did not materialize and a ceasefire plan

was developed and adopted by Russia and the West.

In Chapter Seven, “Ceasefire,” Asmus begins by noting that Saakashvili sent the army into South

Ossetia to “preempt what he feared was a larger Russian move.”[813] The chapter then explains the
diplomatic means used by Russia to get larger concessions from the conflict, Saakashvili’s anger at

the EU’s negotiating “success” that was more favorable to Russia than him, and how the eventual

compromise was reached.

A key motive behind US President George Bush’s negotiating strategy was that he did not want the

conflict to evolve into a US-Russian confrontation. For this reason he preferred to allow the

European Union to take the lead role in attempting to stop the conflict while the US supported their

moves from behind the scene. This meant Saakashvili would have to rely on actors in whom he had

less faith and he would not have the benefit of a military response if things went wrong with the US

out of the game. At that moment, the rotating chair of the Presidency of the European Union was held

by French President Nikolas Sarkozy and it thus fell on his shoulders to stop the conflict. He soon

found out this would be a difficult task as he was confronted by Russian leaders who seemed intent on

teaching Saakashvili a lesson. On the other hand, Asmus writes that Paris was blaming Saakashvili

for initiating the fighting and their goal was thus not to gain back lost territories but to stop the fighting

and save Georgia.[814]

The Russian leaders demanded a security zone that would have given Russia control over eastwest highways in Georgia and thus over Georgia’s economic recovery. In effect it could have led to

regime change. The negotiating principles that Russian implemented were interesting: first, Putin

always appeared angry and aggressive, thus setting the stage for nothing more than limited

concessions on the part of Russia. Second, other actors outside the formal setting (to include Kremlin

spin doctor Gleb Pavlovsky) were offering radio interviews that appealed to calm the restive

leadership who “reportedly” didn’t want a ceasefire but wanted to march on Tbilisi. Third, the

Russian leadership stated that South Ossetia’s claim was simply the exercise of their right to selfdetermination. Asmus describes this as “the diplomatic equivalent of blowback” from the example of

Kosovo where NATO used this logic to extract Serbian influence. However, Sarkozy was able to end

the fighting and spare Tbilisi so he felt the negotiations had ended successfully.[815]

Back in Tbilisi and even in the US, another feeling emerged, that Sarkozy had not done enough to

specify the parameters of a ceasefire (specific dates and locations) and had not included Georgia’s

non-negotiable demands (that Georgia’s territorial integrity must be mentioned). Saakashvili also did

not want the Russians to be able to address the “status” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This word

must be eliminated, he stressed. Sarkozy stressed that the negotiations had been difficult and that

Saakashvili needed to live with the agreement.[816] In the end, Sarkozy was able to negotiate with

the Russians over the points that concerned Saakashvili. However, Russian President Dmitriy

Medvedev continued his diplomatic offensive while the negotiations were underway, recognizing

Abkhazia and South Ossetia on 26 August and stating that “Russia, like other countries in the world,

has regions where it has privileged interests.”[817] This statement made it clear that Russia, Asmus

writes, had made “an unabashed claim to a renewal of a Russian sphere of influence on its

borders.”[818] For their part, the European Union upheld Georgia’s territorial integrity, stated that

Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was unacceptable, and deployed EU monitors to

the region. The EU also allowed Russia to get away with changing borders, kicking Georgians out of

parts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and not completely complying with all the measures of the

ceasefire.[819]
Chapter Eight is titled “Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West,” a chapter that serves as the

book’s conclusions. Asmus notes that the book contains two core arguments. First, that the origins of

the war do not lie in the details of local ethnic rivalries between Georgians on the one hand and

Abkhazians and South Ossetians on the other. The core conflict was over Tbilisi’s desire to break out

of its relationship with Russia and become part of the democratic West (this view, of course, does not

take into account Russia’s core concern, that its borders would align with NATO’s if South Ossetia

was part of Georgia). Second, the war was aimed against the West (especially the European security

system) as well as Georgia for the West’s granting independence to Kosovo and for considering

Ukraine and Georgia as potential members of NATO. Russia abandoned its core concept of equal

security for all countries in Europe when that security issue infringed on Russia’s border.[820]

The EU’s Tagliavini Report blames Georgia for firing the first shot. It rejects, however, many

aspects of Moscow’s actions. These include: Moscow’s allegations that Georgians committed

genocide; Moscow’s concept that its response was commensurate with the threat to its peacekeepers;

Moscow’s claim of having undertaken a humanitarian intervention; Moscow’s rational for distributing

passports to citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the years before the conflict; and Moscow’s

rational for its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which is contrary to international law.

[821] Western mistakes, in Asmus’s opinion, included an unwillingness to invest in proper

peacekeeping procedures, which allowed a prejudiced Russian force to conduct operations; the push

for Kosovo’s independence with no plan for blowback on Georgian desires; and NATO’s handling of

the Bucharest summit, a final warning sign as interpreted by Russia that motivated leaders in Moscow

to act.[822]

Asmus closes his book with a discussion of how European institutions have evolved over the last

two decades. He discusses the effort to integrate Russia into this system and how it might have been

done better. More ominously he notes that the issues that caused the August 2008 conflict have not

been resolved. Saber-rattling is still ongoing. Observer missions on the ground have not been

strengthened. What Russia, Georgia, and the West do in the coming months and years will determine

the future of the region. Asmus writes that the West must return to its principles of Western security

and recreate unity among the parties. Pulling Moscow into that debate will be difficult for two

reasons. First, it does not want to be part of the West. Second, it continues to stress its right to

intervene in governments on its borders that have security plans and foreign policy directions in

opposition to Kremlin concerns.[823]

The Tanks of August

The best (and perhaps only) Russian timeline of events was contained in a book titled The Tanks

of August.[824] The book was published by the Center for the Analysis of Strategies and

Technologies in Moscow in 2009. The Center’s research interests include both the Russian armed

forces and armed conflict on post-Soviet territories.

Authors Mikhail Barabanov, Anton Lavrov, and Vyacheslav Tseluyko’s work (Barabanov wrote

the Forward but did not take credit for any of the chapters) contained seven chapters: (1) The Reform

of the Georgian Army under Saakashvili before the Five-Day War of 2008 (2) A Chronology of

Military Operations between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 (3) The Present and Future of the

Georgian-Russian Conflict: The Military Aspect (4) Russian Air Force Losses in the Five-Day War
with Georgia in August 2008 (5) The State of the Georgian Army toward the Conclusion of Military

Operations and its Losses (6) Postwar Facilities of the Russian Armed Forces in the Newly

Recognized Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and (7) Known Deliveries of Basic Types of

Military Hardware to Georgia in 2000-2008. This last chapter will not be discussed since it consists

only of tables of equipment supplied to Georgia from 2000-2008.

In the book’s Forward, Barabanov noted that the goal of Georgia’s leaders was to “wage a

Blitzkrieg to conquer South Ossetia, which had declared its independence.” Russia intervened to act

as the guarantor of peace. The mission of the armed forces of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili

was to restore by force the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Tbilisi’s control. Georgia had

been preparing for this conflict since 2006. In spite of such preparation, Georgia proved to be only a

Third World army clothed in Western uniforms. Well-known characteristics of the Georgian national

mentality were demonstrated: narcissism, megalomania, and contempt for neighboring peoples, and a

passion for putting on a façade. Georgia remains an unstable and potentially aggressive country (its

military potential has grown over the past year) with an anti-Russian orientation in Barabanov’s

opinion.

He added that the time of arrival of Georgian troops in the zone of combat operations refutes

official Georgian statements that they were only responding to a massive Russian incursion. Russian

forces did, however, attempt to “demilitarize” Georgia. Their aim was to deprive Georgia of a

substantial portion of its military potential and to demoralize the Georgian armed forces. Russian

successes in this endeavor showed that the victor in the Five-Day War was really Russia. Russia

demonstrated its firmness and power to ensure that the people of the Caucasus understood “what had

happened to them.” If war breaks out again, Russia is ready to demonstrate this more effectively than

it did in August 2008.

In Chapter One, “The Reform of the Georgian Army under Saakashvili before the Five-Day War of

2008,” author Vyacheslav Tseluyko details with extensive footnoting some of the activities in Georgia

that worried Russia and hinted that Georgia was preparing for a future conflict. Even though Georgia

stated that it was improbable it would face large-scale aggression (which implies Russia, Tseluyko

notes, as the only force in the area capable of large-scale aggression) preparation for such an

eventuality continued in Georgia. Joining NATO was considered a guarantee against this type of

activity. However, participation in NATO operations required a small, lightly armed army of

professional forces that were highly mobile. This worked against Georgian aims of becoming selfsufficient. The number of Georgian troops grew in 2007 from 28,000 to 32,000 troops and was

projected to take an even bigger leap in 2008 to 37,000. Training of the force had improved in 2008

due to a contractual method of recruitment, the introduction of military education reforms, and the

grants of foreign aid the country had received.

Tseluyko adds that the greatest successes of the Saakashvili regime were in the sphere of weapons

and hardware purchases, particularly of foreign make. He lists these purchases in detail. Finally,

Georgia increased its infrastructure (such as stationing units nearer to the zone of anticipated

operations) and defense budget. Taking into account foreign military aid, Georgia’s actual military

expenses grew from 30 million dollars in 2003 to 940 million dollars in 2007. Tseluyko concluded

his chapter noting that by the summer of 2008, Georgia represented a threat to its autonomous regions
due to the qualitative difference in its force. Periodic purges of army personnel for political reasons

still occurred, however, and this led to the appearance of many poorly trained commanders.

Chapter Two, titled “Chronology of Military Operations between Russia and Georgia in August

2008,” is perhaps the most important chapter in the book since it highlights, for the first time in such

detail, a Russian timeline of events. The Asmus and Cornell/Starr books offer timelines from a

Western perspective (and use two Russians, Illarionov and Fel’gengauer, as sources) but neither book

covers the conflict in such detail as this one. Unfortunately, the chapter has no footnotes and thus it is

unclear how author Anton Lavrov could possibly be so well-informed about both Georgian plans

before the conflict and combat activities in general as they unfolded. This is clearly the best

description of the day to day fighting that has appeared in Russia. Perhaps one of the security services

in Russia supplied him with the information he used in this assessment.

Lavrov notes that Georgian forces were prepared for offensive operations, utilized UAVs to

conduct reconnaissance of South Ossetia, and utilized regular troops to play the part of peacekeeping

forces in the area in order to familiarize battalions with the terrain. Some battalions were only on

station for a month instead of the standard six months. Russia only had 500 peacekeepers in South

Ossetia. Thus, to resist a Georgian offensive to retake its territory, South Ossetia would require a

direct military intervention by Russian forces to thwart such an event.

Russia made no special plans to prepare for a war with Georgia. They decided to utilize the armed

forces located in the area in case of an escalation of tensions. Troops located in the North Caucasus

Military District, which bordered South Ossetia, were some of the most battle hardened forces in the

entire Russian inventory. However, the equipment of Russian units in the area was poor, mostly T-72

tanks, outdated T-62 tanks, and older BMP-2s and BTR-80s. The 4

th Air Force did maintain a strong

presence in the region. Overall, even this outdated equipment was better than Georgia’s. Russia also

had several airborne units ready to be dispatched to the region at a moment’s notice. Russian

exercises in the region included the 58

th Army and the 4th Air Force. These exercises began in 2006

and by 2008 had reached 10,000 participants.

Tensions rose early in 2008 as Georgian troops were deployed along the Abkhazian border and

Russian forces shot down three UAV Hermes 450s, Georgian UAVs supplied by Israel. Russia

increased its peacekeeping units to 3,000 personnel in Abkhazia and brought in railway troops to fix

rail tracks that would enable the movement of troops if a conflict erupted. Su-24 bombers were

moved to the Sochi Airport and a landing exercise was conducted a few kilometers from the Russian

border with Abkhazia. Lavrov states that “it was noticed that the Russian high Command was paying

more attention to Abkhazia.”

Georgia’s 2008 offensive plan was to capture the capital (Tskhinvali), block the access of Russian

troops to the area, totally occupy South Ossetian territory in three to four days, and establish a

Georgian administration under the control of Dmitriy Sanakoyev. There was no place in the Georgian

plan for the potential of Russian involvement. Lavrov contemplates that perhaps the reason for this

oversight was Georgian promises of non-aggression against Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia

or the thought that Russia would first try diplomatic means to end the conflict. However, Russia knew
of the Georgian plans ahead of time and thus a political decision was made to protect South Ossetia

in advance. Additional troops were left at the border after the Kavkaz-2008 maneuvers ended and

airborne troops remained on alert status, along with some Air Force units. Once combat operations

began, Russian forces were quickly introduced into the area and Russia’s plan to shield South Ossetia

turned into a success.

Georgian operations appeared to commence on 1 August in the form of small arms and harassing

fires. As a result, on 2 August the Ossetian leadership evacuated women and children from Tskhinvali

to safer regions of South Ossetia or to North Ossetia. On this date, the Kavkaz-2008 exercise ended

and some units remained in Russia at the mouth to the Roki Tunnel. There was calm until 6 August

when once again small arms fire erupted along with mortar fire. On the evening of 6 August Georgia’s

armed forces received orders to prepare for combat and orders were issued on the night of 6-7

August. On 7 August Georgia began evacuating women and children from the village of Ergneti near

the border with South Ossetia. At 1430 Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili issued orders to start

preparations for an assault on South Ossetia. At 1545 Georgian units fired on Khetagurovo and to the

south of Tskhinvali with tanks and artillery. At 1936 Saakashvili announced a Georgian unilateral

cease-fire. The Georgians used the cease-fire premise to move troops to the combat area and by 2300

their movement was complete. Numerous forces were concentrated on the border with South Ossetia.

Georgia planned to have the 4

th Infantry Brigade sweep around Tskhinvali on the left and the 3rd

Infantry Brigade sweep around Tskhinvali on the right. The two forces would meet up at Gufta to

complete the encirclement. Two small units were formed on the west border of South Ossetia with the

goal of cutting off the Transcaucasus highway and then occupying the Roki Tunnel.

At 2330 on 8 August, the Georgian Army received orders to open fire. At 2345 hours, in a

telephone conversation between the Commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Force, Russian Major

General Marat Kulakhmetov and the Chief of Staff of Georgia’s Peacekeeping Operations, General

Mamuka Kurashvili, the latter offered immunity to Russian peacekeepers if they would not hinder the

Georgian advance (according to certain information).

Early on 8 August the Russian Peacekeeping Forces Headquarters was struck. General Kurashvili

at 0030 announced the cancellation of the unilateral cease-fire and stated that the start of “the

operation of reestablishing constitutional order in the conflict zone” had begun. At about the same

time, at 0100 on 8 August, Russian forces in close proximity to the border were given orders to

proceed to the Roki Tunnel. At the same hour, Defense Minister Serdyukov and President Medvedev

sanctioned Russian troop movements into South Ossetia. At 0200 hours the 693

rd Motorized Infantry

Regiment crossed the Russian border. At 0600 an exchange of fire took place between a Georgian

Special Forces unit and Russian peacekeepers.

The real prize on 8 August was control of the Gufta Bridge, whose destruction would make it

difficult for Russian forces to move south to support combat operations around Tskhinvali. By 0745

Russian forces had secured the bridge. Not until 1400 did Georgian forces manage to control 30

percent of Tskhinvali. At 1415 the Georgian government offered a humanitarian cease-fire from 1500-

1800 to allow civilians to leave Tskhinvali. At the same time Russia completed the deployment of

many of its troops and continued to bomb Georgian positions. By the end of the day, the Georgian
assault on Tskhinvali had been thwarted and Georgian forces began to withdraw to the border area.

Georgian troops reorganized and began preparations for a new assault the next day.

Georgian troops reentered the city on 9 August around 1500. They were met with intense fire from

Russian units and they departed the city around 1900. These forces did not return but began a hasty

retreat back into Georgia. By 1400 on 10 August, all Georgian forces had withdrawn from South

Ossetia. On the evening of 11 August Russian troops decided to counterattack Georgian positions

across the border from South Ossetia and establish a buffer zone around it. On 12 August Russian

forces began taking Georgian settlements located between Gori and Tskhinvali without encountering

any resistance. At 1300 Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev announced the cessation of hostilities

but gave an order to suppress strongholds of opposition if required. On 15-16 August a ceasefire

agreement was signed with the help of international negotiators. On 18 August Russian troops began

leaving the area.

Lavrov’s description of the fighting is much more detailed than the description above might

indicate. He even includes in his chronology the side numbers of many vehicles that were destroyed.

Any analyst interested in an in-depth coverage of the fighting should begin with this chapter in The

Tanks of August.

Chapter Three is titled “The Present and Future of the Georgian-Russian Conflict: The Military

Aspect.” It was also written by Vyacheslav Tseluyko, is well-documented, and is instrumental in

demonstrating the direction in which Georgia’s military is now heading. Russians are instructed to

pay attention to the reorganization effort of Georgia’s reserve system (from three components,

individual, active, and National Guard to two components, regular and territorial) and to its

qualitative growth. More attention is being directed in Georgia to combined arms training instead of

low-intensity conflict. Tseluyko notes that new arms deliveries in the 2007-2008 time period were

not adequately mastered by Georgian forces and this impacted negatively on their military potential in

August 2008.

Today, Georgia’s Army has increased its military power in relation to the Five-Day War but

remains in a learning curve. Taking into account the fact that the force is learning combined arms

operations, learning how to use new equipment, and reforming its reserve, Georgia will not be able to

switch over to active combat operations aimed at the restoration of territorial integrity no earlier than

2010 or 2011. This will result in Russia increasing the size of its force in the threatened areas and in

the preliminary storage of heavy equipment there in case of another Georgian Blitzkrieg-type

operation. Russian forces in Armenia may also take part in any future operation that Georgia starts,

thereby forcing the Georgian force to fight on several fronts. The chapter concludes with a fascinating

analysis of Russia’s territorial gains in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the operational and even

strategic advantages that Russia obtained.

Tseluyko concludes that the August war did not resolve all of the contradictions between the two

countries. One may no longer speak of a Georgian-Ossetian conflict but rather a potential GeorgianRussian conflict. In this sense any conflict in the region has the potential to escalate quickly out of

control as one side or the other pushes for a final resolution over territory.
In Chapter Five, “Losses of the Russian Air Force in the Five-Day War in August 2008,” author

Anton Lavrov describes the loss of Russian aircraft due to friendly fire and the confusion that existed

between Russia’s land forces and the airspace situation. Not only did Russian and Ossetian forces

fire at Russian aircraft but Russian aircraft strafed Russian land forces on occasion. Lavrov used

footnotes extensively to support his chapter, adding further weight to the thought that he was supplied

with information from some Russian agency for Chapter Two, his timeline chronology of events.

Lavrov also wrote Chapter Six, “The State of the Georgian Army toward the Conclusion of

Military Operations and its Losses.” He notes that Georgia lost only 20 or so armored vehicles and

that the greatest losses occurred among armed forces personnel. He lists the losses by brigade and

sometimes by unit. He makes the point that if Russia had not taken much of Georgia’s equipment on 12

and 13 August that Georgia would have ended the conflict without significant losses. In this chapter

as well, Lavrov did not use footnotes. It is unclear where he received such detailed information.

Lavrov also wrote the last chapter, “Postwar Facilities of the Russian Armed Forces in the Newly

Recognized Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” again without footnotes.

Regardless of the complaints about footnotes, Lavrov’s chapters are detailed and interesting. They

represent, along with Tseluyko’s chapters, some of the best first hand military reporting on the

conflict. Without a doubt Lavrov is an authoritative research specialist on the Russian-Georgian War

of 2008.

PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: RUSSIA’S NEW VISION

The past, the present, and the future are linked inextricably, and each generation takes its own place in

the chain of history, with its own victories and defeats, gains and losses. Hopefully, the lessons

learned from the historical experience of our country will not only enable us to develop a new vision

of the tasks facing the army and the country but also to solve them to the benefit of our great nation.—

General of the Army (retired) Anatoliy Kulikov[825]

Introduction

Anatoliy Kulikov offer a fittingsummary for this book. The work attempted to illustrate the lessons

learned over the course of recent Russian history that have resulted in three elements coming together:

the traditions and conventions of the past, the technology-based present, and the forging of tradition

and technology with toughness. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is spearheading the latter effort, a

process he began when President. His continued support of President Dmitriy Medvedev ensures the

process stays on track. Taken as a whole, their new vision of Russia’s military is taking shape.

Many military traditions appear certain to be maintained. This includes aspects of both the Tsarist

and Soviet legacies. The dialectical thought process, the emphasis on military doctrine, and aspects

of the historical works of Marx and Lenin all continue to influence Russian military thinking.

Putin has personally overseen technological progress, in particular the industries of the militaryindustrial complex that are building command and control complexes for the military.

Nanotechnologies and satellites are other areas of intense focus. President Dmitriy Medvedev has

been deeply involved in the modernization effort as well, focusing on telecommunications

developments and the use and security of the Internet.

Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov has stayed the course on reform, never wavering even when

major military figures and organizations (the airborne in particular) confronted him. He has helped

change the culture of the officer corps by fighting corruption along the way, a fact that will be

important in eliminating military arrogance and clans. He has made mistakes as well, but what

Defense Minister hasn’t?

These concluding comments will describe some of the consequences (and thus future direction) of

Serdyukov’s reform effort, will update Medvedev and Putin’s technology focus, and will highlight the

continuing impact of tradition on the evolution of the Russian military. It will also examine the

consequences of the 2008 conflict with Georgia with the advantage of two and a half years of

hindsight.

Many Traditions Remain

There are numerous Imperial and Soviet traditions that have migrated to become Russian military

traditions. Some of these traditions have taken on a different appearance (new flags, different

wording to the oath, etc.) but they remain in general form. The same applies to the use of the

dialectical thought process, traditional military toasts, and so on.
Another tradition that remains is the Russian focus on its borders and immediate operational

environment. Russia maintains a consistent approach to its historic spheres of influence and appears

set to fight the emergence of any regime, whether truly democratic or not, on its borders. Security for

Russia apparently means total control over any situation that appears to impinge on its concept of

sovereignty.

Equal security is a Soviet concept that Russia is raising more often today. It was defined by

American Fritz Ermarth as “a going-in force balance in which they have an equal or better chance of

winning a central war, if they can orchestrate the right scenario and take advantage of lucky

breaks.”[826] In this sense, security appears to go beyond parity. To have a chance of winning, the

“correlation of forces” must be in Russia’s favor. That is, operating capabilities, digitalization, and

other such factors must ensure that Russia can survive a conflict or go down defending the homeland

if they can’t. Iraq did not have “equal security” in military jargon just because it had more tanks.

Coalition forces easily overcame numbers with technological advantages built into the Abrams tank

(longer range acquisition, precision, etc.). Thus the digital correlation of forces was definitely not in

Iraq’s favor. Russia’s focus on technical developments is designed to erase such imbalances in their

force. At the present time, however, Russia is depending on its nuclear deterrent as the final arbiter of

equality.

Military reform, on the other hand, is a long-standing Russian tradition that is the focus of the

recasting effort. Military reform in Russia is a traditional topic of discussion. For many years during

the Tsarist and then Soviet periods, military reform was debated in military journals. However, while

debated, none of these discussions reached the level of contention and finally achievement that has

occurred in Russia in the past three years.

The positive consequences of the reform effort have been demonstrated in the production or

acquisition abroad of new weaponry, the reorganization of the force into new military districts and

operational-strategic commands, and the informatization and digitalization of military equipment as

the force prepares for potential conflicts and future wars. Many of the purchases and equipment

developments are covered below in the section on “the modernization effort.”

The negative consequences of the reform effort were stated by Russian military analyst Alexander

Goltz in one of his postings. He noted in October 2010 that these reforms had generated growing

hatred in the officer corps for Defense Minister Serdyukov. Coming from Goltz, a Serdyukov

supporter, this is a warning to heed. Goltz adds, however, that the hatred is expected. More than

100,000 officers have been discharged from the armed forces in the two years of reform. Many have

not received the benefits that were promised to them. Others (some 40,000) were taken off the tables

of organization and received a miserly salary while waiting for promised housing, one of the benefits

at the end of a military career in Russia. Attendance at military schools has been severely cut. Finally,

general officers were cut off from their posts and in many cases their “extra” financial flows were

stopped since they were unable to maintain exclusive control over their resources.

Why did these events transpire? In Goltz’s opinion it was due to an excessive number of officers

(especially generals) in the armed forces, the stupidity of maintaining partially-manned organizations,

and the enormous amount of money allocated to defense that disappeared without a trace. Goltz
believes that Serdyukov is correct and the only course to cure the force is surgery (alas, without

anesthesia he notes). While officers will suffer and Serdyukov will be hated, the homeland will profit

in the end. Thus in Goltz’s opinion, the consequences of reform are worth the present suffering,

unbearable as it may be.[827]

Serdyukov, in an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, supported Goltz’s comments

about the excessive number of officers in the armed forces and the fact that some units were not

combat ready. He noted, for example, that Russia had one officer for each soldier in the past whereas

in Western armies the officer corps made up 9-16% of the entire army. He also stated that he had tried

to stifle corruption as much as possible.[828] The online website Tverskaya, 13 recently carried an

article about the topic of corruption, noting that some money belonging to general officers is

appearing in offshore accounts.[829]

The overall atmosphere Serdyukov attacked was described as follows: “Some members of the

armed forces feel too sure of themselves. In addition, the central administration was inflated beyond

reason. Thus, we reduced it to a fifth of its previous size.”[830] Serdyukov added that now there are

only three levels (instead of ten) at which decisions are made. The purchase of some items abroad

(unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel and the helicopter carrier Mistral from France) also did not

endear Serdyukov to the domestic military-industrial complex.

Serdyukov added, somewhat surprisingly, that he foresees NATO as a partner in the future. He

noted that the “political will” to become partners exists. This is an encouraging sign. Serdyukov

added that he hopes NATO troops do not depart Afghanistan until their mission is fulfilled.[831]

Perhaps the biggest reform development of the year, however, was the shift to four operationalstrategic commands (OSK). These commands include the forces of the previous six military districts,

all four fleets, and the Caspian Flotilla. The Strategic Missile Troops, the nuclear-powered ballistic

missile submarines, Space Troops, Long-Range Aviation, and Airborne Troops remain directly

subordinate to Moscow.

The main reasons for making this shift, according to a Deputy Head of the General Staff,

Lieutenant-General Andrey Tretyak, were to create an effective command system for different types of

troops and to establish powerful strategic groups capable of serving as a strategic deterrent.

Operational tasks were resolved as well. No longer are several strategic units operating in one War

Theater. Now one commander makes decisions for the theater.[832] It will be interesting to see if

these commands become Russian semi-equivalents of US commands except on a local basis. That is,

will the Western OSK be a partner to EUCOM and the Eastern OSK a partner to PACOM?

The overall consequence of Serdyukov’s reform efforts, in his view, is that service in the armed

forces will soon be attractive since wages will be raised[833] and the force will be more

professional at all levels with no excessive fat. Many observers around the world feel that the reform

effort is long overdue in its present form and will be an important aspect enabling Russia to regain its

military prominence. Medvedev and Putin support Serdyukov’s efforts. Nothing else need be said.

The Modernization Effort
Russia’s leadership is working diligently to bring its armed forces into the space, information, and

nanotechnology era. Both the President and Prime Minister have stressed the necessity of

accomplishing this task no later than 2020, although several programs are underway now and nearing

completion.

Three areas have received priority development according to the military press. One is the

development of sufficient command and control equipment, especially its telecommunications

component. The second is the development of satellites, space weapons, and unmanned aerial

vehicles. The third is the development of nanotechnologies. All three of these items are crucial to the

further development of the armed forces. Four communications systems are undergoing further

development. They are: Kassiopeya at the operational-strategic level; Akatsiya at the operational

level; M/YeSU TZ [tactical-echelon integrated command and control system] at the tactical level; and

Streletes at the tactical level below battalion. Command and control assets are included not only in

communication endeavors but also in essential components of Russia’s C4ISR complex and control

over armed UAVs. The latter are important for securing Russia’s borders and for specific

reconnaissance missions. Nanotechnologies are the wave of the future and will be as important in ten

years as information technologies are today in the opinion of military specialists.

General A. G. Burutin (who was removed from service by Medvedev on 22 November 2010)

stated in March 2009 that the “main challenge for contemporary war is not in disabling the enemy’s

combat forces but in disabling its command and control systems.”[834] Russian press reports indicate

that the military is putting additional emphasis on creating secure information systems.

The armaments industry will continue to work in other areas as well. General Burutin noted earlier

that one of the key directions of the armament industry remains the development of informationcontrol and information-attack systems on the basis of advanced telecommunication technologies.

[835] The armament department’s long-range goals are the following:

· The development of useful armament systems, first of all high-precision (intellectual),

informational, and other kinds of weapons, including those based on new physical principles

and the perfection of nuclear weapons. This also involves the development of space and

aviation means, antimissile complexes and air defense systems, and an expanded range of

naval and overland armaments;

· The creation of integrated systems and means of intelligence, control and communication,

navigation, and other support systems as well as achieving their compatibility;

· The development of information control systems and their integration with new generation

weapon systems;

· The development of basic and critical military technologies and dual-purpose technologies;

the introduction of robotization, microminiaturization, and nanotechnologies;

· And finally the ability to maintain the unification, standardization, and multi-functionality of

military equipment.[836]

A major incentive for Russia’s military-industrial complex remains the challenge of creating

asymmetric counters to the creation and deployment of expensive and advanced (that is, beyond
Russian capabilities at the present time) armament systems in some foreign countries.[837] One of the

most impressive foreign systems that Russia is watching closely is the US X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle

which, one Russian report noted, signifies an important aspect of space militarization. Expert Vikto

Kazimirov noted that “The long-term project marks the beginning of US positioning of powerful

armament systems in space and the creation of high-precision offensive space systems, which will

monitor space objects of other states and disable them either with space armaments or by knocking

them out of their orbit.”[838] The X-37B, in the opinion of some Russians, is designed to offset an

adversary’s C4ISR apparatus (a potential counter to the X-37B, the IUO, is discussed below).

An asymmetric counter to the US armed forces network-centric concept was discussed. This

counter was Russia’s development of a global information and communication space, the foundation

for a new troop control system. Yuriy Tuchkov, deputy head of the Military Academy of the General

Staff, stated that such a system would represent “an asymmetric response to the USA’s capability to

conduct so-called ‘network-centric’ warfare.”[839] He further noted that there is no need to design a

system like the US’s NCW concept if there are alternative, asymmetric paths that could be followed.

However, he also notes that Russia’s scientific and technological potential allows Russia to conduct

network-centric warfare at the present time if it so desires. On 22 December 2010 he reportedly took

part in a workshop devoted to trends in the development of the theory and practice of network-centric

warfare.[840] Thus Russia is studying the issue closely whether it be to implement it, to be familiar

with it, or to develop counters to the concept.

Russia may be developing counters to the X-37B with its information-strike operation or IUO. The

reconnaissance-fire operation concept evolved over the years into the information-strike system and

information-strike operation. Its further development will allow for engagements such as the

reconnaissance-strike-maneuver, and it may eventually eliminate neutralizing, harassing, and

suppressive fires. A one-time, guaranteed engagement of targets is under development. It may be all

that is required before combined-arms groupings are committed to battle in smaller conflicts.[841]

The reconnaissance-strike operation (ROO) would be used to accomplish objectives such as

targeting an enemy’s military-industrial potential. It was developed for a large-scale war as a form of

employing a prototype combined-arms reconnaissance-strike system. The ROO could last from a few

weeks to a month or longer.[842] However, the information-strike operation may now have

superseded the ROO due to its increased precision and extended reach.

Retired Major General I. N. Vorobyev, Doctor of Military Sciences and author of countless

articles in Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) on tactics and operational art, discussed the

information-strike operation (IUO) in detail in 2007. The article stresses several specifics of the

Russian concept of the IUO and information warfare, to include the importance of the informationpsychological aspect of IW and the issue of disorganizing an opponent in order to attain superiority.

Vorobyev states that electronics has taken a prominent position in determining an armed forces’

might in contemporary conflicts. Electronic and electro-optical assets are used for the detection,

identification, target location, guidance, and homing of various classes of weapons; for navigational

support of aircraft, spacecraft, and ships; and for the conveyance of orders, reports, and other military

information. It is now possible to disorganize an adversary’s troop and weapon command and control
system not only by physically destroying its command post but also by attacking wireless

communication, radar, remote control, electronic navigation, radiotelemetry, and electro-optical and

hydroacoustic equipment. Electronics are now an active offensive weapon as effective as firepower,

in Vorobyev’s opinion.[843]

Vorobyev believes that the classic triad–fire, strike, and maneuver–has been augmented with two

new forms of combat, electronic-fire and information-strike operations. An information-strike

operation (IUO) is the sum total of interconnected information-fire engagements, information-fire

battles, and information strikes coordinated in terms of targets, objectives, place, time, and methods,

conducted to disorganize an adversary’s troop and weapon command and control system and inflict a

blow on its information resources. An information strike is a short-term and powerful attack by an

information weapon on an adversary’s information resource. The attack may be selective or tailored

for a specific type of information resource or it may be a massive or combined attack (using all types

of information weapons on the entire information resource).[844]

There are several types of information strikes according to Vorobyev: information and

psychological types that misinform and mislead an adversary; psychotropic types that affect people’s

minds with special tools; electronic types that jam; and software types that attack adversary command

and control computers with special destructive or corruptive software. IUOs make it possible to seize

the initiative and gain superiority in the information sphere (troop and weapon command and control,

reflexive control of the adversary, etc.). They can be carried out independently or in combination

with multiservice, aerial and naval operations, offensively or defensively, and on a strategic or

tactical scale.[845]

Vorobyev believes the key objective of the IUO in a local war is to counteract adversary

information support of troop and weapons command and control. This includes blocking the

gathering, processing, and sharing of information and the planting of disinformation at all stages

through a set of measures that use information tools to cripple an adversary electronically or with

fires. Simultaneously, a commander must ensure that an IUO includes concealing friendly command

and control electronic assets (EA), countering adversary intelligence, and employing unexpected EA

jamming methods; setting up various electronic barriers, such as blocking radar; jamming

reconnaissance equipment; and carrying out simultaneous electronic-fire attacks on key adversary

troop and weapon command and control sites.[846]

Finally, Vorobyev stressed the importance of developing information-psychological weapons and

employing them in conjunction with information-strike weapons as this could significantly improve

IUO’s forms and methods. The combination of a fire, electronic, energy, and massive informationpsychological attack on an adversary expands the operational and strategic methods of accomplishing

IO objectives. An information-psychological attack could be carried out suddenly and

surreptitiously, taking the adversary by surprise and making it hard for him to take countermeasures.

[847]

Vorobyev adds that energy-information and somatropic-psychological weapons are under

development. Psychotropic-information, bioenergy-information, information-genetic, and virtual

information-psychological weapons are being considered as future possibilities (Vorobyev cites
foreign publications for this type of weaponry). He notes that energy-information weapons will make

it possible to generate and directionally emit simulated ultra high frequency, ultrasound, and

infrasound waves which, combined with an energy-information attack, could destroy the human

nervous system. Also considered very promising are psychotropic-information weapons which

would use pharmacological preparations, narcotic substances, and chemical compounds that have an

information-control effect on the biochemical processes in the human nervous system. They can affect

a person’s combat activity and perception of the combat environment. These technological tools have

the potential to exert information-psychological impacts on the human mind.[848]

Thinking about the topic of information warfare theory and its relation to warfare in general

continues in Russia. A recent issue of Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest) contained such an example.

Author V. Yu. Mikryukov, in the article “The Essence and Content of War,” noted the following

special characteristics of informatsionnaya voyna (information warfare):

· Information warfare includes as separate objects all kinds of information and information

systems, separating information from the environment of its use.

· Objects can act as a weapon and as the objects of protection.

· Information war expands the territory and space of the conduct of wars; it is conducted both

when war is declared and during crisis situations in different spheres of human activity.

· Information warfare is conducted by specialized military and civilian structures.[849]

Mikryukov added that, according to Russian Special Services assessments, the concept of

“information warfare” includes these additional items:

· Suppressing (in wartime) the infrastructure elements of state and military control

(destruction of command and control centers);

· Electromagnetic effects on elements of information and communication systems (electronic

warfare);

· Obtaining intelligence through the interception and decryption of information flowing over

communication channels, also via incidental transmissions, and by technical means of

electronic eavesdropping devices (electronic intelligence) that have been specially

introduced into the premises;

· Gaining unauthorized access to information resources (through the use of software and

hardware that penetrate the security layers of the enemy’s information and

telecommunication systems), and then distorting them;

· Carrying out the destruction, theft, or disruption of these systems’ normal functioning

(“hacker warfare”);

· The creation and mass dissemination, via enemy information channels or global networks, of

disinformation or tendentious information to influence the assessments, intentions, and

orientation of the public and of decision-makers (psychological warfare);

· Obtaining information of interest by intercepting and processing public information passing

over insecure channels, circulating in information systems, and published in the mass media.

Failures and Achievements
There have been two major military-technological failures over the past year. They were the

repeated test launches of the Bulava missile system (which has now been deemed successful after

several failures) and the inability to put into orbit the GLONASS-M satellites in a recent December

2010 launch of a Proton rocket. Progress, however, outweighs the failures since progress includes the

acquisition of foreign made equipment, especially Israeli-made UAVs. The Israelis have supplied

Russia’s military with the Bird Eye 400 light portable mini-UAV, the tactical I-View MK 150, and the

Searcher MkKK UAV according to press reports.[850]

Overall, the development of military technologies in Russia over the past few years has been

impressive. Some of the achievements and plans of the military-industrial complex are listed here:

· The seven-nation Collective Security Council summit in December 2010 resulted in

consideration to draft documents regulating the activities of the organization in the militarytechnological cooperation and information security fields, among others. A Collective Rapid

Reaction Force was also agreed to.[851]

· The production of wear-resistant nanocomposite materials has been exhibited.[852]

· The GLONASS orbital group of 24 satellites is expected to be operational by March 2011.

[853] GLONASS precision will increase to about three meters in 2011 and to several

centimeters by 2020.[854] Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has called GLONASS a priority

item on which the agencies must not relax their attention.[855]

· The procurement plans for 2020 indicate that the percentage of precision-guided weapons

will increase by 18 times and UAVs by 6 times; the Air Force will buy 1500 new planes and

helicopters and modernize some 400 more; and all-weather aviation systems will increase

by 4.5 times.[856]

· The Russian space defense troops will be armed with S-400 and Pantsir-S systems by 2020,

with the latter capable of responding in 5-6 seconds.[857]

· President Medvedev stated that Russia is willing to spend 20 trillion rubles (approximately

681 million dollars) on developing a high-tech army that uses breakthrough technologies.

Some seventy per cent of the funds will go to the purchase of high-technology weaponry.

[858]

· The RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile came into service in November 2010.[859]

· Russian designers built an intelligent or smart rocket propelled grenade launcher. Two

charges, cumulative and thermobaric, use time delays to strike targets depending on its

thickness, hardness, and strength. The cumulative charge smashes through the obstacle and

the thermobaric charge overcomes an enemy behind the obstacle.[860]

· Russia hopes to enter two nuclear submarines into service in 2011, the Alexander Nevsky

and the Yury Dolgoruky. The third missile carrier of the series, the Vladimir Monomakh, is

continuing to be built.[861] However, no ground-effect planes or aircraft carriers are

planned.[862]

· Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Makarov noted that a 10 billion dollar command and

control system for the armed forces is planned for completion by 2012.[863]

· Finally, an air and space defense system will be built as the next phase of army reform in

2011.[864]

Of course, much could go wrong with this military program. For example, setbacks in testing (such
as occurred with the Bulava missile system) could cause havoc with Russia’s plans. A shortage of

hard currency or the appearance of an unanticipated conflict could also affect planning.

The Impact of the War with Georgia

The impact of the war with Georgia was felt worldwide. No one appeared to be a true “winner” in

the traditional sense, that is, to win the war and win public opinion. Russia won the war, no doubt

about that, but lost credibility in the international arena for its actions. Only a few countries have

verified Russian gains from the conflict. And, as time progresses and more facts are made available,

Russia’s actions appear to be more preplanned than originally thought. As international investigations

continue, Russia is feeling the pressure and is fighting back. For example, Russia is now stating that

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is biased in its position against

Russia.

It is thus no surprise that Russia views the US Congress’s 14 December 2010 resolution

supporting Georgia’s territorial integrity with regret. A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman stated,

with reference to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, that “Seeing them as ‘Georgian regions occupied by

the Russian Federation’ is incorrect and illogical, to say the least,” he said. The spokesman noted that

the resolution ignores the new reality that emerged from Georgia’s aggression in August 2008. The

Russian Foreign Ministry statement noted that Tbilisi launched the aggression and that two

independent states emerged. They are no longer part of Georgia.[865]

What evidence exists to suggest that Russia planned to draw Georgian President Mikhail

Saakashvili into action, offering him a fait accompli if he didn’t act? Was this a masterful “strategic

reflexive control” preplanned operation on the part of Russia, a plan that integrated deception and

asymmetry in a coordinated manner and fooled the international community? One is reminded of

Vorobyev’s interest in 2007 of offering information “bait” to induce someone to make incorrect

decisions. Is this what happened?

Consider the facts. First, it has been extremely difficult to extract from Russia a timeline of events.

In many cases Russian authorities and analysts only use or refer to Georgia’s timeline. The Russian

book The Tanks of August offered an explanation of events and a timeline. However, the timeline

omitted crucial meetings and attempts of Georgia to avoid conflict and none of the events were

documented with footnotes.

Second, there were numerous examples of Russian preplanned actions such as the following:

· Russia slipped journalists and doctors into Tskhinvali weeks before the fighting started.

They also recruited pilots who had experience flying in mountainous areas. Why, if it

wasn’t to cover or participate in a conflict?

· Some Russian journalists (like Illarionov, Latynina, and Fel’gengauer), much like

Georgian and international journalists, documented the progression of events in foreign

and local (South Ossetian) media, to include the movement of Russian troops into South

Ossetia and Abkhazia days if not weeks before the fighting erupted.

· On 16 April then President Putin established official ties with South Ossetia and

Abkhazia, an incursion on Georgia’s soverignty.
· Russia had infiltrated the government of South Ossetia with Russian citizens (to include

military personnel holding key positions as ministers and national security personnel).

Russia issued Russian passports to South Ossetian citizens which is against international

law. Russia also provided military equipment to South Ossetia.

· Kavkaz-Center announced weeks before the conflict that preparations for war with

Georgia had been underway for several months. Russia shot down several unarmed

reconnaissance drones.

· Russian troops openly prepared Abkhazia for a potential conflict, lifting embargos, fixing

rail lines, working with separatists, and moving troops into the area. In hindsight,

analysts are viewing this as a deception operation to draw attention away from

preparations underway in South Ossetia.

· Russia refused to negotiate with Georgia in the crucial days before conflict erupted.

Georgia made several attempts that were rebuffed. Conversations of some of these efforts

were taped by the Georgians.

· Civilians in South Ossetia were evacuated to North Ossetia in the days before the

fighting started.

· Nearly 1200 mercenaries arrived in South Ossetia by 5 August.

· On 2 August the commander of the fifty-eighth Army arrived in Tskhinvali for

“consultations.”

· There appeared to be an attempt to instigate a fight. Artillery duels were heavier than in

the past, and some artillery positions were located behind Russian peacekeeping forces

in South Ossetia. If provoked into firing and killing a peacekeeper, then a pretext for an

intervention would have been arranged.

· Russia knew that the US and NATO had warned Saakashvili not to respond to Russian

aggression and that they would not assist him if he did. Knowing this ahead of time

allowed Russia to place Saakashvili in a no-win situation. He would be responsible

either for losing territory if he did nothing or for fighting and potentially losing a war if

he did. He underestimated Russia’s response as well.

· There were other rumors of Russian information that made its way to Saakashvili that

persuaded him to think Russia would not help Kokoity. Further, Georgia’s government

was stressed to the max at the time of the conflict, feeling isolated as peacekeeping

organizations did not seem to do enough to maintain the status quo. Georgian citizens in

South Ossetia had to be protected.

· The Kavkaz-2008 exercise in July was openly provocative, using Georgia as the

“enemy”—to include anti-Georgian leaflets.

· The deaths of Georgian policemen (and assassination attempts in South Ossetia against

officials who supported Georgia) may have served as the initial bait for Georgia to take

action.

· Russia may have known that many Georgian servicemen were on vacation in August and

thus would not be in preplanned assembly areas or at their military garrisons.

The conclusion that many analysts have reached is that the actions of the Russians were preplanned

and that they drew the Georgians into a decision dilemma: either act or lose territory.
Conversely, there were accusations from the Russian side that Georgian actions were preplanned.

In hindsight, these accusations are harder to comprehend about an armed force that had many people

on vacation, had its elite fighting force in Iraq, and had only conducted counterinsurgency training

over the past few years. However, there is a case to be made even though it does not stand up to the

circumstantial evidence that surrounds the extensive Russian plan.

Russian thoughts that Georgian actions were preplanned included the following:

· Georgian Defense Minister Okruashvili stated he would celebrate New Year’s Eve in

Tskhinvali.

· Saakashvili came to power promising to return South Ossetia and Abkhazia to Georgian

control. Russia, on the other hand, had regions of “privileged interests” in the area.

· Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” had been orchestrated by the West, in Russia’s opinion,

and had introduced a government that wasn’t legitimate.

· The decision in the West to recognize Kosovo’s independence was seen as the

legitimizing step for Russia to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and

Abkhazia.

· There had been a huge increase in Georgia’s defense budget over the past five years and

a corresponding increase in the number of soldiers in its armed forces.

· Georgia consistently alternated its peacekeeping contingent in South Ossetia in order to

allow more soldiers to acquaint themselves with the terrain for future operations.

· Georgia used Saakashvili’s ceasefire on 7 August to move forces to the border of the

conflict zone.

· Georgia fired first so it started the war. The EU’s investigation supported this fact.

Russia’s stated goal now is to prevent Georgia’s “re-militarization” but they are constructing other

deterrents as well. Russia and South Ossetia are developing a joint defense system to help make it

impossible for Georgia’s armed forces to even consider an attack. Diplomatically, Russia’s main

objective at the Geneva Discussions (that included Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia) remains

the signing of a legally binding agreement that insures Georgia’s nonuse of force against Abkhazia and

South Ossetia.

One of the problems with the Russian version of events is that it ignores all of the positive things

Georgia did to prevent fighting from ever breaking out. The books of Cornell/Starr and Asmus, on the

other hand, state the good and bad of both sides. That is, Russia’s version is much more one-sided

than the Western versions, which attempt to cover more ground.

Even though the war has ended, incidents continue to occur along the border region. Of primary

concern to Georgia is that on 7 December 2010 Russia’s leadership placed a Smerch multiple launch

rocket system in South Ossetia. This weapon system can cover an area of 67.2 hectares and has a

range of up to 70 kilometers or more. The system is being deployed near the capital of Tskhinvali,

close to Georgia’s northern border.[866] In addition, Russia is continuing its aggressive posturing in

the diplomatic community against Saakashvili.
Georgia responded with an official statement on Russia’s Smerch deployment that noted

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) imposes limitations on such

systems. Deployment of Smerch systems on the occupied territory of Georgia provides

further proof that Russia, by unlawfully declaring suspension of its participation in the CFE

Treaty, has created a prerequisite for the enhancement of its military presence in the areas to

which the Treaty applies.[867]

The statement further notes that Russia’s expulsion of UN and OSCE monitors from the occupied

regions of Georgia and the rejection of EU monitors to access these territories was carried out to

prevent the international control and monitoring of the situation.[868]

Georgia continues to claim that ethnic cleansing of Georgians is underway in South Ossetia. The

cleansing is particularly prevalent in the Akhalgori district where residents have been stripped of

their ownership rights to land and property. South Ossetian President Edward Kokoity notes that

ownership certificates issued to Georgians living in South Ossetia by Georgian authorities from 1991

to 2008 were invalid.

Further, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kapanadze told journalists that Georgia will not

sign a document on the non-use of force with the “puppet regimes” in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

[869] However, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has stated that Georgia will not use force

unless it is invaded. He has sent statements of this fact to the General Secretaries of the United

Nations, the OSCE, NATO, and to the leaders of the European Union and the US. In spite of what

Saakashvili calls Russia’s refusal to withdraw its troops from Georgian territory and where human

rights continue to be violated, Georgia will exercise its right of self-defense only if the other 80

percent of Georgia is invaded.[870] Georgia has noted, after signing an agreement with the EU, that

Russian flights to Abkhazia will be unacceptable for the EU. It will be regarded as an intrusion in the

common European air space according to Vera Kobalia, Georgian Minister for Sustained

Development.[871] Thus there is no end in sight at the end of 2010 for a final settlement of the

situation.

Conclusion

Russia’s new vision, then, is based on a combination of tradition, technology, and toughness. The

military’s “2011 Program on Information-Propaganda and Military-Patriotic Events in the Russian

Federation Armed Forces to Strengthen Ties between the Army and Society, Raise the Stature of

Military Service, and Foster Social Support for the Transformation of the Army” appears to ensure

that historic military traditions will not be lost. The program focuses on the books and movies that

have motivated Rusisan and Soviet officers and soldiers for centuries. Technological developments

are a vital part of the new vision. They are found in nanotechnologies, new generation satellites, new

command and control achievements, new concepts (such as the information-strike complex) and ideas

about future war, and the development of advanced weaponry among other issues. Toughness is found

in the focused attention that Defense Minister Serdyukov, Prime Minister Putin, and President

Medvedev (who stated on 25 November 2010 “I dare assure you, absolute resolve, steadfast resolve,

to finish and bring these reorganizations to completion”) have provided.
In hindsight, the year 2010 will be seen as a year of significant change for the Russian armed

forces. It will be thought of as the year military reform really acquired teeth after its slow beginning

in 2008 and the year the Defense Minister weathered one attack after another for his reform efforts.

Whether this will be for the eternal good of the force or not remains to be seen, but a new process of

reform has begun. This effort has resulted in the shrinking of the general officer corps, a renewed fight

against corruption in the force, the development of regional commands, the expansion of Russia’s

operational environment concept, the introduction of foreign weaponry into the force, and the further

informatization of command and control and C4ISR, among many other changes. Russia’s tradition of

creative thought and innovation in areas such as military science, military doctrine, and foresight and

forecasting remains in place. Not everything went smoothly in 2010, of course. Russian failures

included the unsuccessful testing of Bulava missiles and launching of GLONASS-M satellites.

Russian efforts to protect its national interests have also landed it in hot water in recent years. But

overall one senses that the Russian military is on its way back to regaining prominence as a legitimate

power—or at least it is getting close. In short, the recasting of the Red Star is well-underway.
APPENDIX ONE: IW DEFINITIONS AND RELATED INFORMATION SECURITY

POLICIES OFTHE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Russian definitions of IW differ by organization. Three definitions are offered here and they are all

dated concepts of the 1990s. The three examples include military definitions; an external security

service or SVR (CIA equivalent) definition; and a Foreign Ministry definition.

Information Warfare Definitions

Military definitions

Military definitions are more specific, as expected, and primarily address battlefield IW.

Battlefield IW emphasizes the information-technical aspect and is composed of elements such as

command and control and reconnaissance-strike complex systems. However, the military is acutely

aware of the potential destructiveness of peacetime IW, especially what it terms the informationpsychological component of IW capable of influencing the morale and discipline of soldiers and

citizens. Naturally, there is also a wartime aspect of this component.

Among authoritative definitions are those offered by the Russian General Staff Academy and by a

Ministry of Defense civilian. A definition provided in 1995 by a Russian General Staff Academy

student defined information war (using the Russian “informatsionnoye protivoborstvo,” literally

information confrontation) in a psychological/technical and operational-strategic sense. The former

applies more to a peacetime use and the latter to a wartime use:

Information warfare is a way of resolving a conflict between opposing sides. The goal is for

one side to gain and hold an information advantage over the other. This is achieved by exerting

a specific information/psychological and information/technical influence on a nation's

decision-making system, on the nation's populous, and on its information resource

structures, as well as by defeating the enemy’s control system and his information resource

structures with the help of additional means, such as nuclear assets, weapons, and electronic

assets.[872]

The operational-strategic version defined information war as:

Within the framework of the execution of the operational-strategic (operational) missions of

offensive and defensive troop units, information warfare consists of the specially planned and

coordinated-integrated actions of the forces and assets of intelligence and early warning,

command and control, communications, deception, and electronic warfare, whose purpose is to

guarantee the achievement of the goals of the operation (of its combat actions).[873]

Also in 1995 Ministry of Defense civilian analyst Dr. V. I. Tsymbal offered both a broad and

narrow definition of information war (he preferred the Russian “informatsionnoya voyna,” literally

information war ), noting that:

In the broad sense, information warfare is one of the varieties of the “cold

war”—countermeasures between two states implemented mainly in peacetime with respect
not only and not so much to the armed forces as much as to the civilian population and the

people’s public/social awareness, to state administrative systems, production control systems,

scientific control, cultural control, etc. It is namely in this sense that the information security of

the individual, society, and state is usually understood.

In the narrow sense, information warfare is one of the varieties of military

activity/operations/actions (or the immediate preparation for them) and has as its goal the

achievement of overwhelming superiority over the enemy in the form of efficiency,

completeness, and reliability of information upon its receipt, treatment, and use, and the

working out of effective administrative decisions and their purposeful implementation so as to

achieve combat superiority (victory) on the basis of this. The waging of information warfare in

the narrow sense is the field of responsibility of mainly the ministers of defense of modern

states.[874]

Another definition was offered by Colonel S. A. Komov. A Candidate of Technical Sciences and

Professor, Komov wrote more about the subject on IW in Military Thought in the mid ‘90s than any

other analyst. He defined information warfare (informatsionnaya bor’ba) within the context of its

wartime use:

IW is a complex of information support, information countermeasures, and information defense

measures, taken according to a single design and plan, and aimed at gaining and holding

information superiority over an enemy while launching and conducting a military action/battle.

Interconnections between information warfare and other types of operational/combat support

and activities that make up its contents should be noted as well (intelligence, information

gathering, communications, etc).[875]

Komov believes four issues are at stake in his definition: first, identifying a set of measures to do

three things: gain information about the opponent and about an engagement (electronic, weather,

engineer, etc,); gather information about friendly forces; and process and exchange information

between command and control echelons or sites; second, identifying measures to block the

information gathering processes of others and to feed deceptive information at all stages; third,

identifying friendly countermeasures; and finally, gaining information superiority over the enemy.

External Intelligence Service (SVR)

The Sluzhba Vneshnik Razvedka (SVR) defined IW in the following way:

Information war, according to the head of the external security service (SVR), is a concept that

includes establishing control over other states’ information resources, deterring the

development of information technology in countries which are potential enemies, possibly

disrupting or completely putting out of operation information networks and communication

systems, and developing information weapons and systems for safeguarding the security of a

country’s own information structure and information flows.[876]

Of all the definitions of IW, this is perhaps the most impressive for its scope and inclusion of

several geo-political issues (deterrence, etc.); and the most questionable, for its designs are to
establish control over other states information resources (and thereby attain world hegemony in this

area?). Perhaps this is just a further explanation of the idea to “attack enemy and defend friendly,” but

the verbs control, deter, and disrupt the resources and the capabilities of potential enemies (while

developing information weapons in Russia) indicates a more far reaching goal. The SVR definition is

much more active and implies peacetime missions. The SVR is one of the few services that has a

clear mission outside of Russia’s borders.

Definition of IW of ered by the Foreign Ministry at the United Nations

The Russian definition of IW provided by the highest-ranking official was that of Russian Foreign

Minister Igor Ivanov. It was far from the most comprehensive, however. In a letter to the General

Assembly of the United Nations on 23 September 1998, he defined information war as “actions taken

by one country to damage the information resources and systems of another country while at the

same time protecting its own infrastructures.” Within his definition is the object of attack

(information resources) as defined by the Russians.

It is important to understand what the Russian’s mean by an information resource (IR), and its

place in the overall understanding of Russian IW thinking. For military IW specialist Admiral

(retired) Vladimir Pirumov, an information resource is

information which is gathered and stored during the development of science, practical human

activity, and the operation of special organizations or devices for the collection, processing,

and presentation of information saved magnetically or in any other form which assures its

delivery in time and space to its consumers in order to solve scientific, manufacturing, or

management tasks.[877]

The Academy of Natural Sciences offered a slightly different definition of IR, defining it as

“information received in the process of the life of citizens, society, and the state, and registered in the

form of a document.”[878]

It is likely that the United Nations definition was purposely left vague to incite discussion in the

UN. The military, SVR, and UN definitions demonstrate a true difference in approach among the

security services in the 1990s as no two agencies openly agreed on a common meaning of IW.

Information Operations and Russia’s Military Doctrine and National Security Concept

This section will compare information operation/warfare aspects of Russia’s October 1999 draft

military doctrine and national security concept with those passed in 2010 and 2009 respectively. The

analysis will help analyze progress that Russia is making in this sphere of importance.

The 1999 draft military doctrine was divided into three parts: military-political principles,

military-strategic principles, and military-economic principles.[879] Each part reflected the influence

of information operations on national security issues.

The military-political section of the document noted that the exacerbation of the information

opposition/confrontation is an important feature of today’s international relations. The use of

information and other non-traditional means to achieve destructive military-political goals is a key-
destabilizing factor affecting current operations and the overall security environment. External threats

to the Russian Federation include information-technological (attacks on computers, nets,

infrastructure, etc.) and information-psychological threats. The greatest internal threats are actions to

disrupt or disorganize the Russian Federation’s information infrastructure.[880] Russia desires to

conduct coordinated information war. However, if the variety of definitions of IW above is any

indicator, the RF was still a few years away from this goal in 1999.

Military-strategic features of the draft doctrine focus on the features of modern war: the use of

indirect strategic operations and means of IW and the development of a massive preparatory

information (information blockades, expansion, and aggression) operation. Other important militarystrategic tasks include confusing public opinion of certain states and the world community and

achieving superiority in the information sphere in either wartime or during the initial period of war

(as the armed forces have demonstrated their total information superiority over public opinion during

the second [1999-present] conflict in Chechnya). An acute information confrontation struggle will

characterize both local and world wars, the draft noted, and providing information security will

become a basic military security mission.[881]

Finally, in the realm of information-economic principles, the priority mission remains information

support. This includes science and technology issues, information technology equipment, and resource

independence in the development of military products for all missions.[882]

In 2010 Russia passed a new military doctrine.[883] This version of military doctrine was

divided into sections that discussed military dangers and threats; the military policy of the Russian

Federation; and military-economic support for defense. Information issues were not stated to be an

express external military danger.

They were, however, an internal military danger defined as the disruption of the functioning of

organs of state power, of important state and military facilities, and of the information infrastructure

of the Russian Federation. Any impediment to the functioning of state or military command and

control systems was expressed as a main military threat. A “characteristic” feature of contemporary

military conflicts was noted to be the intensification of the role of information warfare. A “feature” of

modern military conflicts was stated to be the prior implementation of measures of information

warfare in order to achieve political objectives without the utilization of military force. Further the

ability to shape a favorable response from the world community for the use of military force was

highlighted. High technology devices to be used in future military conflicts include precision

weaponry, electromagnetic weapons, lasers, infrasound weaponry, computer-controlled systems,

drones, and robotized models of arms and military equipment.[884]

To deter conflict, Russia must possess the proper information technologies according to the

doctrine. A main task of the development of military organization was listed as improving the system

of information support for the troops. With regard to military-economic support, the main task was to

create conditions for developing the military-technical potential at a level necessary for implementing

military policy. This included developing forces and resources for information warfare, improving

the quality of means of information exchange using up-to-date technologies, creating new models of

high-precision weapons and developing information support for them.[885]
The Russian Security Council approved the country’s Concept of National Security in October

1999.[886] Various sections of the Concept addressed the country’s information security and

technology needs.

The section “Russia’s National Interests” included the following specific information interests:

observing the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens to obtain and use information; developing

modern telecommunication technologies; protecting state information resources against unauthorized

access to political, economic, S&T and military information; and preventing the use of information in

manipulating the mass consciousness of society.[887]

The section “Threats to the Russian Federation’s National Security” in the information sphere

included: attempts by a number of countries to dominate the world information space and to crowd

Russia out of the foreign and domestic information market; the development of “information warfare”

concepts by a number of states envisaging the creation of means (1) to exert a dangerous effect on the

information spheres/systems of other countries (2) to destroy the normal functioning of information

and telecommunications systems and (3) to use means to safeguard information resources or to

prevent unauthorized access to them.[888]

Finally, under the section “Ensuring the Russian Federation’s National Security” there is a list of

tasks. These include: implementing citizens’ constitutional rights and freedoms for information

activities; improving and protecting the domestic information infrastructure and integrating Russia

into the world information domain; and countering the threat of the initiation of confrontation in the

information sphere.[889]

The National Security Strategy of May 2009 listed national security tools as the technologies and

also the software, linguistic, legal, telecommunication channels, and organizational items used in the

national security system to transmit or receive information on the state of national security.[890] The

concept was divided into The Contemporary World and Russia; Russia’s National Interests and

Strategic National Priorities; and Organizational, Normative-Legal, and Information Bases for

Implementing the Present Strategy. Information issues that the document either discussed or

highlighted included the following:

· The global information confrontation

· The use of information to enhance strategic deterrence

· The ability of information to present a threat to military security

· The illegal movement of narcotics and “psychotropic substances”

· The preservation of information technologies and information focusing on the various

issues of society’s sociopolitical and spiritual life

· The development of information and telecommunications technologies such as computer

hardware and electronics

· The proper use of the information-telecommunication medium

· The implementation of a series of information measures serving as the basis of this

strategy: the harmonization of the national information infrastructure with global
information networks and systems; overcoming the technological lag in information

science; developing and introducing information security technologies in the state and

military administrative systems; increasing the level of protection of corporate and

individual information systems; and creating a single information-telecommunications

support system for the needs of the national security system.[891]

Strel’tsov’s High-Priority Scientific Issues Related to the Theory of Government Information

Policy

1. Political consciousness and public opinion as targets of government information policy.

2. Political consciousness as a factor in the competitive abilities of society and in the stability

of its development, as well as the legitimacy of the transformation of political consciousness in

a historical context.

3. Public opinion as a factor of political life in society, the legitimacy of its shaping and

influence on government policy.

4. Social institutions for education and instruction as factors in ensuring the competitive

advantages and stability of social development.

5. Social institutions for education and instruction as targets of government information policy.

Methods and means of government management to improve educational and instructional

systems.

6. The role and place of religious organizations in the educational and instructional system.

7. Everyday culture of society as a target of government information policy and a factor in

social development.

8. The meaning of information support for government policy and the forms in which it is

implemented at various stages of societal development.

9. The role and place of the ideology of the agent holding public authority in the shaping and

implementation of government information policy.

10. Indicators characteristic of public support for the policy agent at home and abroad, methods

for evaluating and predicting this support.

11. Legal and organizational mechanisms for government influence on the development of

political consciousness and the shaping of public opinion in historical and political contexts.

12. Legal and organizational mechanisms to counter the spread of ideologies of legal nihilism,

extremism, and terrorism.

13. Legal and organizational mechanisms for implementing government information policy

during information warfare.

14. Methods for researching the legitimacy of the development of political consciousness in the

context of implementing government information policy.

15. Methods and means for shaping government information policy in various historical periods

of society’s development.

16. Method and means for uncovering threats to the implementation of government information

policy brought about by the activities in the information sphere of national and foreign political

forces that oppose the agent holding public authority, and evaluating and predicting the danger

of these threats.

17. Methods and means for evaluating the socioeconomic and political effectiveness of the

implementation of government information policy measures.
18. Methods and means for using state-of-the-art information technologies to implement

government information policy.

19. Methods and means for using the potential for international cooperation to implement

government information policy.

20. Methods and means for cooperation between government officials and agencies and nongovernmental organizations and citizens in the process of implementing government information

policy.

21. Methods of evaluating and predicting the effectiveness of government policy in developing

political consciousness and influencing the sociopolitical and economic development of

society.[892]
APPENDIX TWO: DEFINITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH RUSSIAN MILITARYCULTURE

Definitions

Military traditions took shape over time in Russia and the basic elements, once developed, have

remained intact. Of course, the Soviet military tradition added other elements. Early military

traditions were instituted to ensure love of the Fatherland and a sense of duty and honor. Culturaleducational work in the armed forces, also defined here, was defined most often during the Soviet

period but continues into post-Soviet times. The term “educational (prosvetitel’naya)” carries with

it, as the definition below will demonstrate, several other associated US meanings such as

consciousness raising, enrichment, cultural awareness, and perhaps even morale, welfare, and

recreation (MWR). In addition, when discussing old Russian army traditions, Vladimir Lobov, who

served as Chief of the General Staff of Russia for a short time in 1991, stressed several times that

training and education were the most important elements of the period of Russian military history

before 1917. However, instead of prosvetitel’naya, he used the term vospitaniya for education.

Vospitaniya’s meaning is more in line with someone’s formational development, more like childrearing, an upbringing. Another term, obrazovaniya, is used when formal school education is meant,

more in the line of moulding.

Listed here are the Soviet and post-Soviet period definitions for military tradition and tradition,

respectively; 1980 and 1990 definitions of culture and military culture, respectively; and the Soviet

period definition for cultural-educational work:

Military traditions (Soviet period, from the 1983 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary)—the rules,

customs, and norms for military personnel’s conduct in connection with the completion of their

military missions and performance of military duty that have been historically established in the army

and navy and passed on from one generation to the next. The most important military traditions of the

Soviet Armed Forces are: total devotion to communism, love of country, the Communist party, and the

Soviet government; constant readiness to defend the achievements of socialism; faithfulness to one’s

military oath and military duty, strong military comradeship, and respect for and protection of one’s

commander in battle, and so on. In addition to military traditions common to the Soviet Armed

Forces, there are military traditions of the branches of service, combined units, units, and warships.

Military traditions have the goal and simultaneous important means to educate fighters with high

moral-political and military qualities.[893]

Tradition (post Soviet period, from the 1997 book Soul of the Army)—customs, norms of behavior,

views, and tastes that took shape over history (and persisted) and that were conveyed from generation

to generation; legends of military feats and victories of armies (units); everything essential that was

preserved from generation to generation; a spiritual link with the past; the remains of spirit and

character of one’s own forefathers. “Tradition consists in the customs, views, and ways of reasoning

and acting that have been taken from the times of glorious feats of one’s own forefathers.” (A. Liven).

“The traditions of the army’s feats of honor, valor, and glory play a colossal role in maintaining the

spirit of the army” (N. Krainsky). “By being attentive to its past, the army is attentive to its real

future...It is its conservativeness that makes the army truly progressive” (M. Menshikov).[894]
Culture (Dictionary of the Russian Language, S. I. Ozhegov, 1984): 1. the totality of achievements of

humanity in industrial, social, and intellectual relations. Soviet culture is nationalist in form and

socialist in content. History of culture. Culture of ancient Greeks. 2. related to cultural. A person of

high culture.[895]

Military culture (1990, just before the end of the Soviet Union and under the influence of perestroika,

in the well known Russian military journal Military Thought): the sum total of organizationaltechnical, socio-psychological, and spiritual values developed throughout all military history and

connected with and supporting military activity.[896]

Cultural-educational work (Soviet period, from the 1983 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary)—in the

USSR Armed Forces, a system of measures conducted by commanders, political agencies, party and

Komsomol organizations pertaining to Communist indoctrination, political education, satisfaction of

the spiritual/intellectual needs and organization of the leisure time of military personnel, Soviet Army

and Navy civilian workers and employees; a component part of ideological work conducted by the

Communist Party in the Armed Forces. The Party views cultural-educational work in the military as a

part of the cause of the Party and people pertaining to defense of the socialist homeland and

implementation of the cultural and educational functions of the state. The principal directions and

tasks of cultural-educational work are:

· Forming and shaping of a Communist ideological outlook, ethics, and morality

· Development of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism

· Dissemination of revolutionary, fighting, and labor traditions

· Advanced know-how, publicity on progress in and results of socialist competition

· Dissemination of military technical information

· Education in aesthetics, organization of personnel amateur entertainment, and leisure-time

activities.

Cultural-educational work is organized on the principle of involving the community and

developing servicemen’s creative abilities. Basic facilities and organizations involved include

officers’ clubs, enlisted men’s clubs, libraries, museums, theaters, ensembles, bands, and orchestras.

Practical cultural-educational activities include the extensive holding of evening events honoring

outstanding performers in combat and political training, methods conferences, advanced know-how

maneuvers, cruises by naval ships, get-togethers with persons active in science, literature, and the

arts acting as patrons of military units. Events include cultural patronship months and Soviet science,

literature, and music weeks. Special-interest clubs are expanding (for book-lovers, motion-picture

buffs, fine arts, literature, efficiency innovators, foreign languages), and various organizations for

amateur entertainers. Central cultural establishments give methods assistance to clubs, libraries, and

museums.[897]
APPENDIX THREE: CYBER ATTACKS IN THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT

Cyber attacks, Use of propaganda:

· Weeks before the conflict—a security researcher in Massachusetts watched an attack against a

country in cyberspace. A stream of data was directed at Georgian sites with the message

“win+love+in+Rusia.”

· 20 July—“other Internet experts in the US said attacks against Georgia’s Internet infrastructure

began at that time as DDOS attacks. Shadowserver tracked some attacks. Were these attacks

dress rehearsals for the actual intervention?

· 7 August—Georgia moves under cover of the Olympics, Russia responds on 8 August with

massive assault

· 9 August—RBN blog run by Jart Armin claimed there was a full cyber siege of Georgia.

Russia-based servers AS12389 Rostelecom, AS8342 Rtcomm, and AS8359 Comstar were

controlling all traffic.

· 11 August—denial of service attacks against Izvestiya and RAI Novosti

· 12 August—Georgian government and news websites seek refuge on web-servers outside of

Russia, including Google blogs, US and Estonian IP space, and the Officer of the President of

Poland.

· 13 August—Russian commercial bot-nets are attacking Georgian government websites and are

responsible for the most serious attacks after August 8; regional news portal attacks attributed

to Russia; Georgian forces allegedly used EW to strike at targets using cell/satellite phones in

Ossetia, injuring journalists; censorship of Russian media in Georgia continues to expand.

· 14 August—Ukraine writer Andrey Barbash wrote that both sides were using the Internet for

electronic disinformation. Journalists of the Russian Center of Extreme Journalism noted that

many social-political web forum have brigades operating there to form public opinion with

news such as Ukrainian criminal cyber groups are attacking Russian and Georgian web

resources.

· 15 August—the patriotic hacker site stopgeorgia.ru provides opportunities to launch denial of

service attacks against Georgian websites; website of the President of Georgia remains under

heavy denial of service even though it was moved to a service provider in the US; Global Voice

reports that attacks are in social network sites with pro-Russian messages;

· 15 August—a media and cyberspace theater appeared almost as soon as the conventional

fighting according to Moldovan analyst Dumitru Minzarari. Disinformation and propaganda

were used. Russian sources (based on accounts from South Ossetian sources) cited 2000 dead

in the early fighting while Human Rights Watch stated that hospital figures in Tskhinvali were

44 dead and 273 wounded. Georgian authorities said they were reestablishing constitutional

order which is familiar wording used by Russia in Chechnya. Without European intervention,

Russia went on an anti-American accusation campaign. Russian state TV said that black

soldiers were helping Georgia, that Georgians were using Western made weapons, and that

Washington wanted to force Russia out of the area. Ukraine was blamed as well. A CNN webbased pole on who was responsible for the war found that 92% felt Russia was the

peacekeeper and only 8% felt Georgia was the peacekeeper. However, Russian bloggers
organized a “rapid response” in which the Russian search engine Yandex.ru had a number of

links with comments like “vote yes, support Russia,” “pass the link to others,” and so on.

News@mail.ru, Securitylab.ru, and Russian bloggers at LiveJournal were also involved. Pro

Kremlin youth groups like Nashi and Molodaya Gvardiya also asked for young people to

confront Western propaganda. The Georgian government experienced denial-of-service attacks

and the Georgian Foreign Ministry’s web site was hacked. Estonia volunteered to host the

Foreign Ministry’s website.

· 15 August—Russian UN ambassador Vitaliy Churkin regrets propaganda media campaign on

the Caucasus run by Western mass media. Their facts do not conform to reality. Russia is

guarding a huge depot near Gori to keep the population safe. Everything else is a disinformation

campaign, and he waved the Washington Post and Financial Times (without stating why) as

examples of disinformation.

· 17 August—Russian general accuses Georgia of disinformation. Colonel General Anatoliy

Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, noted that Georgians had made many

false allegations, such as that Russian had blown up a railway bridge outside Tbilisi which in

fact the Georgians blew up themselves. Georgians, Ukrainians, and Chechen terrorists all plan

to wear Russian uniforms and loot Gori, blaming everything on Russian peacekeepers. We will

see if the authorities in Gori can prevent what the Georgian military is planning.

· 17 August—Vitaliy Churkin said that Russia had warned the UN about Georgia’s aggressive

policy and that if Western powers had supported them, things would have been different. On

this matter, Russia has a clear conscience.

· 17 August—Russian peacekeepers found a military map of the seizure of Abkhazia and other

combat documents in a Georgian military unit. He showed journalists a working map of the

Georgian army which reflects the tasks, areas to be taken first, as well as the timeframe for

doing so. The trophy map was obtained by the Russian 76

th Airborne Division. [Why it was

found so far forward of the General Staff in Tbilisi was not noted.] The plan was referred to as

Tskhinval-2.
APPENDIX FOUR: RUSSIAN DEFINITIONS OFDECEPTION

Russian terms that appear closest to the US meaning of deception, in this author’s opinion, are

vvedenie v zabluzhdenie (mislead), obman (mislead), voennaya khitrost’ (military cunning or

stratagem), and refleksivnoe upravlenie (reflexive control). For the sake of precision and continuity,

these terms and others associated with Russia’s understanding of deception are listed here as they

evolved in publications over time. The list mixes Soviet, Russian, and Western sources (in the latter

case when English-Russian dictionaries were published in the West):

1. The 1978 Soviet Military Encyclopedia of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian

Federation (Institute of Military History) does not define obman. It has separate definitions

for dezinformatsia and maskirovka. The dezinformatsia definition occupies one column of a

two column page. The maskirovka definition is extensive, covering four pages with photos

of camouflaged equipment.[898] Due to their length, they are not listed here.

2. The 1981 Russian-English Dictionary under the direction of A. I. Smirnitsky defined obman

as “fraud, deception.”[899] The 1981 English-Russian Dictionary under the direction of V.

K. Muller listed the following descriptors under deception: “obman (fraud, deception),

zhul’nichestvo (cheating), lozh’ (lie), khitrost’ (cunning or stratagem).”

3. The 1983 Russian-English English-Russian Military Dictionary, published by London’s Her

Majesty’s Stationery Office, states that deception is “vvod v zabluzhdenie, obman (mislead,

deceive, deception).”[900]

4. The 1983 Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary does not define obman or vvod v

zabluzhdenie but does define maskirovka and dezinformatsiya. Maskirovka is defined as a

“Complex of measures to deceive the adversary regarding the presence and disposition of

troops (forces), military objectives (targets), their status and condition, combat readiness,

and actions as well as command authority plans; category of operational (combat) support.

Maskirovka helps achieve the element of surprise in the actions of troops (forces), helps

maintain their combat readiness, and increases their survivability. Subdivided by scale of

employment and character of missions into strategic, operational, and tactical (voyskovaya).

Depending on the means of reconnaissance against which maskirovka is directed,

hydroacoustic masking, noise reduction (acoustic), magnetometric, optoelectronic, radiation,

radar, radio and electronic, thermal, and others. The greatest effect is achieved with

simultaneous employment of maskirovka measures against all hostile reconnaissance assets.

Maskirovka is conducted in the preparation and use of military activities of forces. Methods

of maskirovka: concealment, demonstration (diversionary) actions, imitations or

simulations, and disinformation.”[901] Dezinformatiya (disinformation) is defined as “a

mode of operational (strategic) camouflage, consisting in the deliberate dissemination of

false information about one’s own troops (forces), their disposition, strength, equipment,

military capabilities, and plan of military activity with the goal of leading the enemy into a

trap. Dezinformatsiya uses different means of communications, publications, radio, TV, and

so on. Dezinformatsiya is conducted as a complex of means to include demonstration

activities, imitations, and concealment.”[902]

5. The 1984 Oxford Russian-English Dictionary defined obman as “fraud, deception;”

maskirovka as “masking, disguise; (mil.) camouflage;” and dezinformatsiya as
“misinformation.”[903]

6. The Russian equivalent of Webster’s Dictionary (in terms of popularity of use) is S. I.

Ozhegov’s 1984 Slovar’ Russkogo Yazyka (Dictionary of the Russian Language). He defines

obman as “a false impression about something;” maskirovka as “an adaptive device used to

disguise or conceal;” and dezinformatsiya as “misleading through the use of false

information.”[904]

7. The 1984 Uchebnik Voennogo Perevoda, published by Moscow’s Voennoe Izdatel’stvo,

noted that deception can be translated as “vveddenie v zabluzhdenie (there was no

corresponding translation from the Russian into English).”[905]

8. The Soviet English-Russian Military Dictionary, printed by the Soviet Military Publishing

House in 1987, defined deception in the following order of descriptors: “vvedenie

protivnika v zabluzhdenie (leading the enemy into a mistake/drawing false conclusions);

dezinformatsiya (disinformation); dezinformiruyushchie mery (disinformation measures);

dezorientatsiya (disorientation); obmannye deystviya (misleading actions); maskirovka

(concealment or camouflage).”[906] Camouflage was defined with the following

descriptors: “maskirovka (masking, disguising, camouflage); maskirovochnoe imushchestvo

I materialy (camouflage equipment and material); maskirovat’ (mask, disguise,

camouflage); maskirovochnyy (masking, disguising, camouflaging).”[907] This dictionary

did not have a separate entry for disinformation.

9. The 1995 Military Encyclopedia of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

(Institute of Military History) does not define obman. It notes for dezinformatsiya

(disinformation) that one should “see maskirovka.” This definition covers one page of three

columns and two additional columns of a three column page. Like the 1978 definition, it is

not listed here due to its length.

10. The 1999 book Iskusstvo Obmana (The Art of Deception) is a civilian text that covers all

aspects of deception, from technological deception to the use of deception in politics,

military affairs, spying, religion, medicine, business, and other areas.[908] Obviously,

deception is defined by the term obman as the title indicates.

11. A Comparative Lexicon of US-Soviet Military Technical Terminology produced by the

US’s BDM Corporation (no date provided) notes that deception is rendered in Russian as

dezinformatsiya. The definition they purportedly used was from Volume Three of the Soviet

Military Encyclopedia. This definition notes that dezinformatsiya is “a method of

maskirovka, to include the dissemination of false information about one’s troops (forces),

their formations, composition, equipment, military capabilities, plans for military activity,

and so on with the goal of leading an enemy force into a trap and at the same time create

more favorable conditions for the achievement of success.”[909]

12. The 2007 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary did not have an entry for obman. It defined

disinformation in the exact same way as did the 1983 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary

noted in (4) above. It defined vvedenie v zabluzhdenie, maskirovka, and “means of

maskirovka” in the following way (the maskirovka definition is almost identical to the 1983

Military Encyclopedic Dictionary definition except it integrates s strategic, operational, and

tactical maskirovka into the definition which were separate in the 1983 edition):

Vedenie v zabluzhdenie—a form or manifestation of military cunning; disorienting the

enemy in the course of preparing and conducting combat actions; misleading the enemy in
order to induce a false impression or idea about the commander’s plans or intentions, or

about the status and nature of troop (forces’) actions. The measures taken to mislead the

enemy must appear reliable and be diverse in nature. The false impression is created

through disinformation and the use of decoy or simulated actions combined with the use of

forms and methods of conducting combat actions and means of defeat unknown to the enemy.

(See also maskirovka.)

Maskirovka—(from the Fr. masquer – to render imperceptible, unseen for someone), a

complex of undertakings aimed at concealing troops (forces) and assets[910] from the enemy

and deceiving it regarding the presence, disposition, make-up, state, actions, and intentions

of troops (forces), as well as the plans of the command; a type of battle (operational)

support. M. enables an element of surprise in the actions of troops (forces), maintenance of

their readiness and increased operability. Depending on the scale of application and nature

of objectives, M. can be strategic, operational, or tactical. Strategic M. is carried out based

on the decision of the high command and encompasses a complex of undertakings related to

the concealment of campaign preparation and strategic operations from the enemy, as well as

disorientation regarding the true intentions and actions of armed forces. Operational M. is

carried out with the goal of achieving secrecy in the preparation of operations, or

operational surprise, concealing the main thrust of actions by troops (forces) from the enemy.

It is carried out based on the decision of the command of front-line troops (army) or navy

(fleet). Tactical M. is organized and carried out in commands, units, and detachments and at

individual assets with the goal of concealing preparation for battle or the presence

(disposition) of one’s own troops (forces), firing (missile) positions for artillery and

rockets, command points, and other important targets. It is carried out in coordination with

other types of battle (operational) support based on the decision of commanders of

commands (units, detachments) by all personnel through their efforts and resources. The

most complex M., demanding the use of special resources and equipment, is carried out by

Special Forces units and detachments.

Depending on the means of reconnaissance against which M. is carried out, it could be

optical, electro-optical, radar, radio-electronic, sonic (acoustic), hydroacoustic, etc. The

greatest effect is achieved when M. is used against all means of enemy reconnaissance. M. is

carried out continuously during preparations and over the course of battle and is achieved

through the maintenance of military secrets, the secret placement of troops and assets

exploiting the screening properties of the area and conditions limiting visibility, the use of

technical means of M. and simulation, smoke, aerosol mists, deceptive actions, the staging

of false deployment of troops, positions, and assets, camouflaging of weapons, equipment,

and disinformation of the enemy.

Means of maskirovka—means of industrial and military fabrication to disguise troops

(forces) and military assets. They are divided into means of disguise and simulation. Means

of disguise can be general purpose (masks, personnel means, camouflage, aerosol, foamforming) and special (camouflage clothing and coverings, disguise outfits, vehicle-mounted

aerosols, blackouts, silencers, etc.). Simulation means are divided into mockups (kits) of

military hardware and simulators of the physical field (radar, heat radiation, magnetic
guidance, acoustic, radiation, etc.).[911]
APPENDIX FIVE: MAPS OFSOUTH OSSETIA

Crisis Group Copyright Information for use of this map and the one that follows on page 373: "Unless

otherwise specifically stated, you may freely use the Crisis Group Copyrighted Materials provided

you credit Crisis Group as the source of such materials and comply with the other terms and

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http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/about/legal/copyright-and-trademark-notice.aspx

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mr. Timothy L. Thomas (BS, Engineering Science, USMA; MA,

International Relations, University of Southern California) is a senior analyst

at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Mr.

Thomas conducts extensive research and publishing in the areas of

peacekeeping, information war, psychological operations, low intensity

conflict, and political-military affairs. Mr. Thomas was a US Army foreign

area officer who specialized in Soviet/Russian studies. His military

assignments included serving as the Director of Soviet Studies at the United

States Army Russian Institute in Garmisch, Germany; as an inspector of

Soviet tactical operations under the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and as a

brigade S-2 and company commander in the 82nd Airborne Division. He has written four books on

information warfare topics, with three of them focusing on recent developments in China. Mr. Thomas

is an adjunct professor at the US Army’s Eurasian Institute; an adjunct lecturer at the USAF Special

Operations School; and a member of two Russian organizations, the Academy of International

Information and the Academy of Natural Sciences.

[1] Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow, Military Publishing, 1983, p. 370.

[2] Banner found at http://ru.wikipedia.org.

[3] Leonid Khayremdinov, “Manevry Glazami Nablyudatelya (Maneuvers through the Eyes of an Observer),” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red

Star) Online, 14 July 2010.

[4] Vitaliy Shlykov, “Why it Took a Civilian Minister to Carry Out a Military Reform,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 1, January-March

2010, downloaded from http//eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/30/1331.html.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] “Rossiyskaya Armiya Okazalas’ ne Gotova k Voynam Budushchego (Russian Army not Ready for Wars of Future),” Izvestiya

(News), 16 December 2008, downloaded from the Eastview website.

[8] Anna Arutunyan, “Russia to Overhaul Military, Cut Troops,” The Moscow News (English edition), No. 42, 24-30 October 2008, p.

10.

[9] Nikolay Poroskov, “Voyna na Vse Chetyre Storony (Warfare in All Four Directions),” Vremya Novostey Online (News Time

Online), 15 July 2010, located at http://www.vremya.ru.

[10] Viktor Myasnikov, “Serdyukov Pridushil General’skoe Nesoglosie (Serdyukov has Smothered Generals’ Discontent),”

Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online (Independent Military Review Online), 22 January 2010 located at http://nvo.ng.ru

[11] Nabi Abdullaev, “Russia Reshapes Army Structure to US-Style Brigades,” Defense News, 5 October 2009, p. 24.

[12] Olga Kolesnichenko, “Kontseptsii: Sovet Voenachal’nikov Na Zubovskom Bul’vare (Concepts: Council of Military Leaders on

Zubovskiy Bulvar),” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review Online), 24 December 2010, at

http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-12-24/1_sovet.html.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Shlykov.

[15] Interfax, 23 July 2010.

[16] Yury Belousov and Alexander Tikhonov, “Ot Volgi Do Eniseya (From the Volga to the Yenisey),” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red

Star Online), 13 October 2010.

[17] Shlykov.

[18] Moscow Interfax-AVN Online, 2 September 2009, at http://www.militarynews.ru.

[19] Moscow Interfax, 0757 GMT, 11 February 2009.

[20] Interfax-AVN Online, 20 September 2010 located at http://www.militarynews.ru.

[21] ITAR-TASS, 22 September 2010.

[22] Interfax, 22 September 2010.

[23] Interfax, 23 September 2010.

[24] Interfax, 22 September 2010.

[25] Interfax, 23 September 2010.

[26] RIA-Novosti Online, 21 September 2010.

[27] Interfax-AVN Online, 22 September 2010 located at http://www.militarynews.ru.

[28] Interfax, 17 March 2009.

[29] RIANOVOSTI, 24 May 2010 located at http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100524.

[30] Alexander Lebedev interview with Vladimir Chirkin, “Budushchee za Professionalami (Professionals are the Future),” Krasnaya

Zvezda Online (Red Star Online), 11 August 2010, at http://www.redstar.ru.

[31] Khayremdinov.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Oleg Falichev, “Vostok-2010: Nachalo, Kul’minatsiya, Epilog (Vostok-2010: Beginning, Culmination, Epilogue),” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kurer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 14 July 2010.

[34] Khayremdinov.

[35] Falichev.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Yuriy Kotenok interview with Alexander Khramchikhin, “Osoboe Mnenie: Nanoarmiya Dlya Nanostrany (Special Opinion: A

Nanoarmy for a Nanocountry),” Segodnya.Ru (Today.Ru), 10 July 2010.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Quote taken from Vladimir Rogovoy’s film “Ofitsery (Officers).”

[42] See, for example, M. P. Kolesnikov, “The Russian Military Encyclopedia: Traditions Past and Present,” Military Thought (English

edition), September-October, 1995, pp. 2-8.

[43] Russian Federal Law “On Military Duty and Service,” N 53-F3, Article 41, 28 March, 1998, downloaded from

http://www.consultant.ru/popular/military/32-6.html#p944.
[44] Story related by P. Kent Bauman, a former Military Assistant to the

Deputy to SACEUR for Russian Forces in SFOR/KFOR.

[45] In the US the OMG was a well-known concept. During a conversation with a Russian general in 1992, this author was told that in

the Soviet General Staff the OMG was jokingly referred to as the operativnaya mychleniye Gareeva (the operational thought of

Gareev).

[46] Vladimir N. Lobov, O Dolge i Chesti Voinskoy v Rossiyskoy Armii (On Duty and Honor in the Russian Military), Moscow:

Military Publishing House, 1991, p. 100. Yu. A. Galushko and A. A. Kolesnikov assisted Lobov in writing this work. For simplicity, and

since no author credit was given for individual sections, Lobov will be referred to in the text as the principal writer for matters of

simplicity.

[47] Ibid., p. 10.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid., p. 11.

[50] Reference to a book by William Golding about boys on a deserted island who take up positions of authority. Eventually, the boys

begin to beat and even killsome of the “lower” status rank and file boys.

[51] BBC News, “Russian Soldiers Used ‘for Sex’,” 13 February 2007, at Internet site http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6356707.stm.

[52] Lobov, pp. 11-12.

[53] Ibid., p. 12.

[54] Ibid., pp. 12-13.

[55] Ibid., p. 13.

[56] Ibid., p. 14.

[57] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[58] Ibid., p. 15.

[59] Ibid., p. 16.

[60] Ibid., pp. 16-17.

[61] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[62] Ibid., p. 18.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid., p. 20.

[67] Ibid., p. 20.

[68] Ibid., p. 19.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[71] Ibid., p. 20.

[72] Ibid., p. 25.

[73] Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[74] Ibid., p. 23.

[75] Ibid., pp. 98-100.

[76] Ibid., pp. 194-196.

[77] R. V. Tsvetkova and N. I. Britvina, Partiyno-Politicheskaya Rabota v Sovetskoy Armii i Voenno-Morskom Flote (Party-Political

Work in the Soviet Army and Navy), Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, 1960, p. 154.

[78] Ibid., p. 155.

[79] Ibid., pp. 152-153.

[80] Ibid., p. 153.

[81] Ibid., p. 155.

[82] Ibid., p. 156.

[83] Ibid., p. 156.

[84] Ibid., p. 157.

[85] Ibid., p. 158.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid., pp. 159-160.

[88] Ibid., p. 160.

[89] V. F. Kovalevskiy, “Professional’naya kul’tura ofitsera (The Officer’s Professional Culture),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military

Thought), No. 6, 1990, p. 52.

[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid., p. 53.

[92] Ibid., p. 54.

[93] Ibid., p. 55.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid., pp. 56-59.

[97] Ibid., p. 57.

[98] Ibid., pp. 60-61.

[99] Ibid., p. 59.

[100] Ibid.

[101] B. L. Valeev, “Ofitserskaya chest’ (An Officer’s Honor),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 11-12, 1991, p. 76.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid., p. 75.

[104] Ibid., p. 76.

[105] Ibid., pp. 78-79.

[106] Ibid., pp. 74-75.

[107] M. P. Burlakov, Istoriya I Traditsii Rossiyskoy Armii (The History and Traditions of the Russian Army) 1992, Vyunsdorf,

Germany.

[108] Ibid., p.

122.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Ibid., p. 120.

[112] Ibid., p. 122.

[113] Ibid., pp. 105-108.

[114] Ibid., pp. 109-113.

[115] Ibid., pp. 115-116.

[116] Ibid., pp. 117-118.

[117] Ibid., p. 124.

[118] “Perechen’ Voennykh Obrazovatel’nykh Uchrezhdeniy Vysshego Professional’nogo Obrazovaniya Ministerstva Oborony

Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Osushchestvlyayushchikh Podgotovku Voennosluzhashchikh, Ne Imeyushchikh Ofitserskikh Zvaniy (List

of Military Educational Institutes for Higher Education of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to Carry Out the

Preparation of Non-Officer Military Personnel),” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest), February 2008, p. 64.

[119] “O Voiiskoy Obyazannosti i Voennoy Slushbe (On Military Requirements and Military Service),” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star),

27 June 2008, p. 4.

[120] Dusha Armii (Soul of the Army), Moscow: Military University, Russian Path, 1997, p. 11.

[121] Ibid., pp. 493-496.

[122] Ibid., p. 497.

[123] Ibid., p. 509.

[124] Ibid., pp. 514-518.

[125] Ibid., pp. 521-523.

[126] Ibid., pp. 528-531.

[127] Ibid., p. 532.

[128] A. A. Korabelnikov, “Armiya I Kul’tura (Army and Culture),” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of

Military Science), No. 2, 2009, p. 129.

[129] Ibid.

[130] Ibid., pp. 127-132.

[131] Ibid.

[132] “General Douglas MacArthur’s Farewell Speech,” downloaded on 18 July 2008 at

http://www.nationalcenter.org/MacArthurFarewell.html

[133] Dusha Armii (Soul of the Army), p. 529.

[134] Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow, EKSMO, 2007, p. 917.

[135] Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), No. 11, January 26-February 1 2011, pp. 6-9.

[136] F. F. Gaivoronsky and M. I. Galkin, Kul’tura Voennogo Myshleniya (The Culture of Military Thought), Moscow: Voennoye

Izdatelstvo, 1991, p. 21.

[137] Ibid., p. 38.

[138] Ibid., p. 39.
[139] Ibid.

[140] Ibid., p. 11.

[141] Ibid., p. 9.

[142] Ibid., p. 10.

[143] Ibid., p. 15.

[144] Ibid., p. 18.

[145] Ibid., p. 20.

[146] Ibid., p. 34.

[147] Ibid., p. 36.

[148] Ibid., p. 37.

[149] Ibid., p. 43.

[150] Ibid., pp. 43-45.

[151] Ibid., pp. 13-14.

[152] Ibid., p. 49.

[153] Ibid., pp. 82-83.

[154] Ibid., p. 123.

[155] Ibid., p. 124.

[156] Ibid., pp. 125-126.

[157] Ibid., p. 126.

[158] Ibid., pp. 127-128.

[159] Ibid., pp. 129-132.

[160] Ibid., p. 132.

[161] Ibid., pp. 134-138.

[162] Ibid., pp. 172-173.

[163] Ibid., pp. 173-176.

[164] Ibid., pp. 251-252.

[165] Ibid., p. 253.

[166] Ibid., pp. 254-255.

[167] I. A. Korotkov, Istoriya Sovetskoy Voennoy Mysli (The History of Soviet Military Thought), Moscow: Science Publishing House,

1980, p. 6.

[168] Ibid., pp. 78-80.

[169] Ibid., p. 10.

[170] Ibid., p. 13.

[171] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[172] Ibid., p. 17.

[173] Ibid., p. 19.

[174] Ibid., p. 20.

[175] Ibid., p. 59.

[176] Ibid., p. 61.

[177] Ibid., pp. 86-87.

[178] Ibid., p. 282.

[179] Ibid., pp. 284-285.

[180] A. Yu. Maruyev, “Geopoliticheskiy Status i Geostrategiya Rossii v Sovremennykh Usloviyakh (Russia’s Geopolitical Status

and Geostrategy in Today’s Context),” Vestnik Akademii Voyennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Sciences), No. 1, 2009,

p. 27.

[181] Ibid., p. 28.

[182] Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended through

April 2010, p. 344.

[183] Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow Voennoe Izdatel’stvo (Moscow Military

Publishing), 1986, p. 137.

[184] V. S. Voloshko and V. I. Lutovinov, “Voennaya Politika—Instrument Obespecheniya Natsional’noy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy

Federatsii (The Military Policy—Instrument of the Russian Federation’s National Security),” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk

(Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 2, 2008, p. 39.

[185] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[186] Ibid., p. 38.

[187] “STRATEGIYA Natsional’noy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 Goda (STRATEGY of National Security of the

Russian Federation until the Year 2020),” approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 537, 12 May 2009, located at

http://www.scrf.gov.ru. All references in this section were taken from the strategy.
[188] “Voennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation),” 5 February 2010, by order of the

President of the Russian Federation, located at http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461. All references in this section were taken from the

doctrine.

[189] Interfax, 23 July 2010.

[190] Interfax, 14 August 2010.

[191] Olga Kolesnichenko, “Kontseptsii: Sovet Voenachal’nikov Na Zubovskom Bul’vare (Concepts: Council of Military Leaders on

Zubovskiy Bulvar),” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review Online), 24 December 2010, at

http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-12-24/1_sovet.html.

[192] A. Yu. Maruyev, “Geopoliticheskiy Status i Geostrategiya Rossii v Sovremennykh Usloviyakh (Russia’s Geopolitical Status

and Geostrategy in Today’s Context),” Vestnik Akademii Voyennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Sciences), No. 1, 2009,

p. 27.

[193] Ibid.

[194] Ibid., p. 28.

[195] Ibid.

[196] Ibid., p. 29.

[197] Ibid.

[198] Ibid., p. 30.

[199] Ibid., p. 31.

[200] Ibid.

[201] Ibid., pp. 31-32.

[202] Ibid., pp. 32-33.

[203] ITAR-TASS, 23 September 2010.

[204] “Osnovy gosudarstvennoy politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii v Arktike na period do 2020 goda i dal’neyshuyu perspektivu

(Fundamental State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period Up to 2020 and Beyond),” downloaded from

http://www.scrf.gov.ru on 19 October 2010.

[205] Ibid.

[206] Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest), No. 7, 2010, p. 1, Table of Contents.

[207] Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest), No. 8, 2010, p. 1, Table of Contents.

[208] Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest), No. 9, 2010, p. 1, Table of Contents. Morskoy Sbornik No. 12, 2010, carried S. Kozmenko

and A. Shchegolkova’s article “Morskaya Politika i Ekonomicheskoe Prisutstvie Rossii v Arktike: Otzvuki Protivostoyaniya (The

Sea Politics and Economic Presence of Russia in the Arctic. Reverberations of the Opposition).”

[209] A. Smolovsky, “Arktika 2010: Voenno-Politicheskie, Transportnye, I Drugie Arkticheskie Faktory (Arctic 2010: MilitaryPolitical, Transport, and other Arctic Factors),” Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest), No. 7, 2010, p. 38.

[210] Ibid., p. 39.

[211] Ibid., p. 40.

[212] A. Konovalov, “Strategiya Razvitiya Arkticheskoy Zony Rossii (The Strategic Development of Russia’s Arctic Zone),”

Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest), No. 8, 2010, p. 70.

[213] Ibid., p. 71.

[214] V. I. Sosnin, “Arktika—Slozhnyy Uzel Mezhgosudarstvennykh Protivorechiy (The Arctic—A Complex Knot of Interstate

Differences),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 7, 2010, p. 5.

[215] Ibid., p. 9.

[216] Alexander Khramchikhin, “North Arctic Theater of Military Operations,” Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kur’er Online (MilitaryIndustrial Courier Online),” 28 April 2010.

[217] ITAR-TASS, 14 October 2010.

[218] ITAR-TASS, 21 October 2010.

[219] Vitaliy Shlykov, “The Military-Political Situation in and Around Russia until 2025,” paper prepared for the 8

th Annual Joint

Operational Environment Seminar, 19-21 March 2008, Portsmouth, Virginia.

[220] B. N. Lobov, Voennaya Khitrost’ (Military Cunning), 2001, Moscow, Logos Press, p. 9.

[221] B. N. Lobov, Voennaya Khitrost’ (Military Cunning), 1992, Moscow Military Publishing, p. 7-8.

[222] JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended through 31

October 2009, at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.dod_dictionary.

[223] Ibid.

[224] V. A. Matsulenko, Operativnaya Maskirovka Voysk, Moscow Military Publishing, 1975, p. 3. Definition of maskirovka is taken

from Kratkyy slovar’ operativno-takticheskikh I obshchevoyennykh slov (terminov) (A Concise Dictionary of Operational-Tactical

and General Military Words) (Terms), Moscow, 1958, p. 155; Tolkovyy slovar’ voyennykh terminov (An Explanatory Dictionary of

Military Terms), Moscow, 1966, p. 228.
[225] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[226] Ibid.

[227] Ibid., p. 4.

[228] Ibid., p. 179.

[229] Ibid., p. 180.

[230] David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, Frank Cass, 1989, p. 2. Taken from V. A. Yefrimov, S. G.

Chermashentsev, “Maskirovka,” Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Moscow: Voenizdat, Volume 5,

1978, p. 175.

[231] Yu. V. Ignatov, “Vnezapnost’ deystviy I vvedenie protivnika v zabluzhenie—osnova uspekha operatsii” (Surprise Actions and

Deception: the Foundation of a Successful Operation), Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 8, 1993, p. 32.

[232] Ibid.

[233] V. V. Zherebtsov, V. K. Kopytko, and V. I. Orlyanskiy, “Teoriyai i praktika obmana protivnika v operatsii (boyu) (The

Theoretical and Practical Deception of the Enemy in Operations [Combat]),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1, 1999, pp. 17-

22.

[234] Ibid., p. 18.

[235] Ibid., p. 20.

[236] Ibid.

[237] A. N. Limno and M. F. Krysanov, “Informatsionnoe Protivoborstbo I Maskirovka Voysk (Information Warfare and the

Maskirovka of Forces),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 5, 2003, p. 71.

[238] Ibid., p. 74.

[239] Ibid., p. 72.

[240] See http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap6.htm, p. 2-D-2. The definition of deception was dated 1 March 1973.

[241] V. I. Orlyanskiy, “Operativnaya Maskirovka ili Obman Protivnika? (Operational Concealment or Deception of the Enemy?),”

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 7, 2003, p. 38.

[242] Ibid., p.40.

[243] Ibid., p. 41.

[244] Ibid., p. 45.

[245] Ibid.

[246] V. N. Karankevich, “Kak Nauchit’sya Obmanyvat’ Protivnika (How to Learn to Deceive the Enemy),” Voennaya Mysl’

(Military Thought), No. 9, 2006, pp. 44-46.

[247] Ibid., p. 48.

[248] Ibid.

[249] Ibid., p. 50.

[250] Ibid., p. 51.

[251] Ibid., pp. 52-55.

[252] B. N. Lobov, Voennaya Khitrost’ (Military Cunning), 1992, Moscow Military Publishing, p. 30.

[253] Ibid., p. 31.

[254] Ibid.

[255] Ibid., pp. 32-33.

[256] Ibid., p. 37.

[257] Ibid.

[258] Ibid., p. 38.

[259] This section on reflexive control is an updated version of this topic that appeared in Cyber Silhouettes, a 2005 book by this author,

pp. 244-262.

[260] PIR Center, 2001, pp. 69-109.

[261] S. Yu. Malkov, et. al, “On the Question of a Methodology for the Selection of Rational Strategies to Safeguard Strategic Stability

and Nuclear Deterrence in the Modern Era,” Strategiskaya Stabilnost (Strategic Stability), No. 3, 2003.

[262] A. V. Raskin, V. S. Pelyak, “K Voprocu o Cetevoy Voyne (On the Question of Netcentric War),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military

Thought), No. 3, 2005, p. 27.

[263] Ivan Vorobyev and Valeriy Kiselev, “Perspektivy Taktiki v XXI Veke (Perspectives on Tactics in the 21

st Century),” Armeyskiy

Sbornik (Army Digest), No. 2 2008, p. 22.

[264] Aleksei Baranov, “Parade of Fakes,” Moskovskii Komsomolets (Moscow Komsomol Member), 8 May 1999, p. 6.

[265] Ibid.

[266] Vladimir E. Lepsky, “Refleksivnoe upravlenie v polisubektnikh i mnogoagentnikh sistemakh (Reflexive Control in Multi-object

and Multi-agent Systems),” an article given to the author, p. 1.

[267] Disinformation is a Russian technique that manipulates perceptions and information and misinforms people or groups of people.
Some disinformation procedures are quite obvious, some are unconvincing, and others work through delayed perceptions, rumors,

repetition, or arguments. Specific persons or particular social groups can serve as disinformation targets. The purpose of a disinformation

campaign is to influence the consciousness and minds of men. In Russia today, where an unstable public-political and socio-economic

situation exists, the entire population could serve as the target of influence for an enemy disinformation campaign. This is a major

Russian fear.

[268] Major General Evgenii Korotchenko and Colonel Nikolai Plotnikov, “Informatsiia -- tozhe oruzhie: O chem nel'zia zabyvat’ v

rabote s lichnym sostavom (Information is also a weapon: about which we cannot forget in working with personnel),” Krasnaya

Zvezda (Red Star), 17 February 1994, p. 2.

[269] A. A. Prokhozhev and N. I. Turko, “Osnovi informatsionnoi voini (The Basics of Information Warfare),” report at a conference

on “Systems Analysis on the Threshold of the 21st Century: Theory and Practice,” Moscow, February 1996, p. 251.

[270] See N. I. Turko and S. A. Modestov, “Refleksivnoe upravlenie razvitiem strategicheskikh sil gosudarstva kak mekhanizm

sovremennoi geopolitiki (Reflexive Control in the Development of Strategic Forces of States as a Mechanism of Geopolitics),” report

at the conference on “Systems Analysis on the Threshold of the 21

st Century: Theory and Practice,” Moscow, February 1996, p. 366.

[271] Prokhozhev and Turko, pp. 257-258.

[272] S. Leonenko, “Refleksivnoe upravlenie protivnikom (Reflexive Control of the Enemy),” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest), No.

8, 1995, p. 28.

[273] Ibid.

[274] Ibid., pp. 29-30.

[275] Ibid., p. 30.

[276] Discussion with a Russian military officer in Moscow, September 1998.

[277] M. D. Ionov, “Psikhologicheskie aspekty upravleniia protivnikom v antagonisticheskikh konfliktakh (refleksivnoe

upravlenie) (Psychological Aspects of Controlling the Enemy during Antagonistic Conflicts [Reflexive Control]),” Prikladnaia

Ergonomika (Applied Ergonomics), No. 1, January 1994, Special Issue, pp. 44-45.

[278] M. D. Ionov, “On Reflexive Control of the Enemy in Combat,” Military Thought (English edition), No. 1, January 1995, pp. 46-47.

[279] Ibid., pp. 49-50.

[280] Ibid., p. 47.

[281] Ibid., pp. 47-48.

[282] Ibid., p. 48.

[283] Ibid.

[284] M. Ionov, “Control of the Enemy,” Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest) No. 7, July 1995, pp. 29-

31.

[285] Ibid., p. 25.

[286] Leonenko, p. 29. Who can say, however, what powers computers might assume in the future?

[287] Leonenko, p. 28. This is akin to how British and American perception management theorists view the purpose of deception.

[288] Ibid.

[289] S. A. Komov, “About Methods and Forms of Conducting Information Warfare,” MilitaryThought (English edition), No. 4, JulyAugust 1997, pp. 18-22.

[290] F. Chausov, “Osnovi refleksivnogo upravleniya protivnikom (The Basics of Reflexively Controlling an Enemy),” Morskoy

Sbornik (Naval Digest]), No. 9, 1999, p. 12. The author would like to thank Mr. Robert Love of the Foreign Military Studies Office for

his help in translating this and other segments of Chausov’s article.

[291] Ibid., p. 14.

[292] B. N. Lobov, Voennaya Khitrost’ (Military Cunning), 2001, Moscow, Logos Press, p. 9.

[293] Yevgeniy Pozhidayev, “Phantoms’: From Rubber to Hologram,” Rosbalt, 4 August 2009.

[294] Sergey Lebedev, “Ot Imitatsii Do Dezinformatsii (From Imitation to Disinformation),” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest), No.

11, 2004, p. 41.

[295] Pozhidayev.

[296] Yu. A. Sinel’shchikov, “Khitrost’ privodit k Uskekhu (Cunning Leads to Success),” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest),

December 2009, pp. 40-41.

[297] Lobov, 2001, pp. 387-388.

[298] Ibid.

[299] Gennadiy Troshev, Moya Voyna ( My War), Moscow Vagrius, 2001, p. 305.

[300] Yu. V. Ignatov, “Vnezapnost’ deystviy I vvedenie protivnika v zabluzhenie—osnova uspekha operatsii (Surprise Actions and

Deception: the Foundation of a Successful Operation),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 8, 1993, p. 32.

[301] Ibid.

[302] Ibid., pp. 52-55.

[303] Prokhozhev and Turko, p. 259.
[304] Interfax, 1 September 2010.

[305] Ibid.

[306] Viktor Myasnikov, “Putin Sets the Army’s Sights on the Internet,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper), 19 January

2010.

[307] Dr. V. I. Tsymbal, “The Concept of ‘Information Warfare’,” presentation at a conference in the

Academy of State Service of the Russian Federation (Moscow), 13 September 1995, p. 2.

[308] Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, p. GL-7.

[309] Ibid.

[310] Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Related Terms (as amended through 30 September

2010), p. 225.

[311] Anatoliy Nogovitsyn, “B tsentre vnimaniya—informatsionnaya bezopasnost’ (At the Center of Attention—Information

Security),” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), No. 34, 27 February 2009, p. 1.

[312] Ibid.

[313] Ibid.

[314] Ibid.

[315] Ibid.

[316] Ibid.

[317] Ibid.

[318] M. M. Taraskin and S. A. Cheshuin, “Komp’yuternye ataki na informatsionnye i telekommunikatsionnye sistemi kak

component sovremenogo informatsionnogo oruzhia i zashchita ot nikh (Computer Attacks on Information and Telecommunication

Systems as a Component of Modern Information Weapons and Protection from Them),” Vestnik Akademii Voyennykh Nauk (Bulletin

of the Academy of Military Sciences), No. 3, 2009, p. 78.

[319] Ibid.

[320] Ibid.

[321] Ibid., p. 79.

[322] Ibid.

[323] Ibid.

[324] Ibid.

[325] Ibid.

[326] A. A. Strel’tsov, Gosudarstvennaya Informatsionnaya Politika: Osnovy Teorii (Government Information Policy: Basic Theory),

Moscow MTsNMO 2010, p. 35.

[327] Ibid., pp. 10-11.

[328] Ibid., p. 55.

[329] Ibid.

[330] Ibid., p. 56.

[331] Ibid., p. 92.

[332] Ibid., p. 106.

[333] From “Biographical Information” in commemoration of the birth date of Vladimir Semenovich Pirumov.

[334] Ibid.

[335] V. Pirumov, “Nekotorye Aspekty Informatsionnoy Voyny (Several Aspects of Information

War),” conference speech in Brussels, May 1996, p. 2.

[336] Ibid.

[337] V. L. Manilov, editor, Geopolitika i natsional’naya bezopasnost’ (Geo-politics and National

Security), Moscow 1998, p. 37.

[338] V. S. Pirumov, Informatsionnoe Protivoborstvo (Information Confrontation), Moscow, 2010, p. 3.

[339] Ibid., p. 49.

[340] Ibid., p. 50.

[341] Ibid., p. 41.

[342] Ibid., p. 39.

[343] Ibid., p. 157.

[344] Ibid.

[345] Ibid., p. 158.

[346] Ibid., p. 159.
[347] Ibid., p. 160.

[348] Ibid., p. 165.

[349] Ibid., p. 167.

[350] Ibid., p. 185.

[351] Ibid., p. 195.

[352] Ibid., p. 231.

[353] Ibid., pp. 234-239.

[354] Ibid., p. 242.

[355] Ibid.

[356] Ibid.

[357] Ibid.

[358] ITAR-TASS, 31 January 2008.

[359] Ibid.

[360] ITAR-TASS, 29 January 2009.

[361] Dmitriy Usov, “Rossiya Gotovitsya k Voynam Budushchego (Russia is Preparing for the Wars of the Future),” Vzglyad Online,

25 February 2009.

[362] Dmitriy Litovkin, “Genshtab gotovitsya k kibervoyne (The General Staff is Preparing for Cyber War),” Izvestiya (News), No.

33, 27 February 2009, p. 1.

[363] Ibid.

[364] Alexander Kondrat’ev, “Nuzhna Li Informatsionnaya Revolyutsiya v Armii? (Is an Information Revolution in the Army

Needed?),” Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kur’er (Military-Industrial Courier), No. 48, 10 December 2008, p. 10.

[365] Alexander Kondrat’ev, “Stavka na ‘Voyny Budushchego’ (Gamble on Future War),” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie

(Independent Military Review), No. 21, 27 June 2008, p. 1.

[366] Vasiliy Burenok, “Bazis setetsentricheskikh voyn—operezhenie, intellect, innovatsii... (The Basis for Network-Centric War—

Anticipation, Intellect, Innovation...),” Nezavisimaya Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review), 2 April 2010, accessed at

http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-02/1_bazis.html.

[367] Ibid.

[368] Yu. E. Gorbachev, “Setetsentricheskaya Voyna: Mif ili Real’nost’? (Network-Centric Warfare: Myth or Reality),” Voennaya

Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1, 2006, pp. 66-78, downloaded from the Eastview website.

[369] Ibid.

[370] B. I. Kazar’yan, “Operations, Combat Actions, and Network-Centric Warfare,” Military Thought, English Edition, Vol. 19, No. 1,

2010, p. 83.

[371] Ibid.

[372] Ibid., p. 84.

[373] Ibid., p. 85.

[374] Ibid., p. 97.

[375] RIA-Novosti, 17 February 2010.

[376] Vladimir Mokhov, “Voiska—na Tsifru (Troops to Go Digital!)” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) Online, 2 October 2010.

[377] RIA-Novosti, 14 July 2010.

[378] N. E. Makarov, “Kharakter Vooruzhennoy Bor’by Budushchego, Aktual’nye Problemy Stroitel’stva i Boevogo Primeneniya

Vooruzhennykh Sil RF v Sovremennykh Usloviyakh (The Character of Future Armed Conflict, Actual Problems of the Development

and Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Today),” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy

of Military Science), No. 2, 2010, p. 21.

[379] Ibid.

[380] Olga Bozhyeva, “Festival’ ‘Novaya Voyna (‘New War’ Festival),” Moskovskiy Komsomolets (Moscow Komsomol Member)

Online, 8 October 2009.

[381] Interfax-AVN Online, 20 October 2010.

[382] Infox.ru, 19 October 2010.

[383] ITAR-TASS, 20 October 2010.

[384] Ibid.

[385] Andrey Garavskiy, “Vremya sobirat’ kamni (Time to Gather Stones),” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), No. 193, 23 October 2008, p.

1.

[386] Viktor Myasnikov, “Putin Natselil Armiyu na Internet (Putin Sets the Army’s Sights on the Internet),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta

(Independent Newspaper), 19 January 2010.

[387] Nikolay Khorunshiy, “’Akatsiey i ne Pakhnet’ (The Akatsiya Didn’t Smell),” Vremya Novostey (News Time), 6 November 2009;

Denis Telmanov, “’Akatsiya ne Pastsvela’ (Akatsiya Did Not Bloom),” Gazeta (Newspaper) Online, 20 July 2009.

[388] Vesti (News) TV, 8 August 2009.
[389] Olga Kolesnichenko, “Kontseptsii: Sovet Voenachal’nikov Na Zubovskom Bul’vare (Concepts: Council of Military Leaders on

Zubovskiy Bulvar),” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review Online), 24 December 2010, at

http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-12-24/1_sovet.html.

[390] Interfax, 22 September 2010.

[391] Mikhail Timoshenko, “Ch’i Lazernye Pushki Moshchnee—amerikanskie ili nashi? (Whose Laser Guns are More Powerful—

the Americans’ or Ours?)” Komsomol’skaya Pravda (Komsomol Truth) Online, 21 October 2010.

[392] Aleksey Sokolov, “’Bezopasnost’ (Security),” Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kur’er Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 13

October 2010.

[393] Interfax-AVN Online, 20 September 2010.

[394] Interfax-AVN Online, 4 June 2009.

[395] RIA-Novosti, 30 July 2010.

[396] Internet NEWSru.com, 31 January 2008.

[397] V. V. Kruglov, “O Vooruzhennoy Bor’be Budushchego (On Future Armed Conflict),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought),

September-October 1998, No. 5, p. 58.

[398] Viktor Mikhaylovich Barynkin, “Effect of Precision Weapons on the Nature of Combat Operations and on the Evolution of Military

Art,” Vooruzheniye, Politika, Konversiya, No. 4 (11), 1996, pp. 17-21.

[399] Vladimir Ivanovich Slipchenko, “Future War,” found on the Internet at http://users.mos.ru/boris/vb.htm, 1 January 2000.

[400] Ibid.

[401] ROO is the author’s abbreviation. It was not used in the original Russian. The terms RUS and ROS did appear in the original

Russian.

[402] M. Belov and V. Shchukin, “Reconnaissance-Strike Complexes of the U.S. Army,” Voyennyy Vestnik (Military Bulletin), No. 1,

January 1985, p. 86.

[403] Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow Voennoe Izdatel’stvo (Moscow Military

Publishing), 1986, pp. 616-617.

[404] V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika (Tactics), Moscow, 1987, pp. 24-25.

[405] Ibid.

[406] O. Berezin and B. Antonenko, “O Terminakh ‘Vooruzhenie’ i ‘Oruzhie’ i Klassifikatsii Voenno-Tekhnicheskikh Sredstv (On

the Terms ‘Armaments’ and ‘Weapons’ and the Classification of Military-Technical Means),” Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest),

January 2000, p. 25. Mr. Robert Love of FMSO provided the translation of these terms from the Morskoy Sbornik article.

[407] Ibid.

[408] Ibid.

[409] Barynkin.

[410] Comments provided by Dr. Jacob Kipp, Foreign Military Studies Office, while reviewing this article; and Vladimir Slipchenko,

discussion with the author.

[411] S. A. Golovin, Yu. G. Sizov, A.L. Skokov, and L. L. Khundanov, Precision-Guided Weapons and How to Combat Them,

Izdatelstvo Vooruzheniye. Politica. Konversiya., Moscow 1996.

[412] Author’s discussion with Major General Slipchenko in Moscow.

[413] V. A. Denisenko, Ye. I. Suvorin, and P. S. Romanov, “Intellektual’nye sistemy upravleniya Razvedyvatel’no-Udarnykh

Kompleksov Sukhoputnykh Voysk (Intelligent Command and Control Systems of the Integrated Reconnaissance and Strike Systems of

the Ground Forces),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1, January-February 1995, pp. 54-56.

[414] The 1983 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary defined a weapon system as “an aggregate of weapons (complexes) of a combat arm,

branch of service, or the armed forces as a whole designed to perform specific combat tasks. A weapons system may consist of units of

one or different weapon types, such as an artillery weapons system or an air defense weapons system.” A weapons complex was

defined as “an aggregate of military equipment items functionally related and utilized together to perform combat missions. A weapon to

inflict damage on targets is a mandatory element of any weapon complex.” Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military

Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow Military Publishing, 1983, pp. 674 and 348 respectively.

[415] Denisenko, Suvorin, and Romanov, pp. 54-55.

[416] Ibid., pp. 55-57.

[417] Ibid., pp. 58-59.

[418] Discussion with Major General Slipchenko in Moscow, January 1999.

[419] Ibid.

[420] Sergey Grigoryev, “Who Will Fire First? The Eyes, Ears, and Nervous System of the Ground

Troops,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper), No. 16 (20), 22 August 1996, p. 6.

[421] Ibid.

[422] Ibid.

[423] V. I. Vypasnyak and O. N. Kalinovskiy, “O Povyshenii Effektivnosti Upravleniya Ognevym Porazheniem Protivnika v Khode

Operatsii (Increasing the Effectiveness of Control of the Fire Destruction of the Enemy in the Course of an Operation),” Voennaya
Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3, May-June 1995, p. 50.

[424] V. Ye. Shulgin and Yu. N. Fesenko, “Problematika Obshchevoyskovogo Planirovaniya

Ognevogo Porazheniya v Operatsiyakh (Problems of Combined Arms Planning in Fire Engagement

during an Operation),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1, Jan-Feb 1996, pp. 33-34.

[425] V. Dreshchinskii, “Effective Engagement in Local Wars,” Military Thought (English Edition), Vol. 5, No. 5/6, 1996, p. 103.

[426] N. M. Dimidyuk, “Teoriya Ognevogo Porazheniya Protivnika: Nekotorye Itogi Diskussii (The

Theory of Fire Engagement of the Enemy: Some Results of the Discussion),” Voennaya Mysl’

(Military Thought), No. 3, May-June 1996, p. 16.

[427] Ibid., p. 15.

[428] Ibid.

[429] Ibid., p. 16. Dimidyuk added three pages later that “the importance of the group’s coordinating

role grows especially in implementing the zonal-target principle of OPP planning. It is called upon to

ensure, above all, an efficient coordination of fire delivery with OPP assets under the control of the

superior commander in the area of responsibility of subordinate levels; and coordination of actions

by OPP and EW assets of the air force, missile forces and artillery, air defense forces, and special

troops, and in maritime sectors those of battle front forces, in delivering massed and concentrated

strikes. The need for coordinating the OPP plan with the operation’s overall objective and concept

highlights the necessity to relate the indicators characterizing the expected OPP results with the

results of the operation as a whole. Furthermore, it is key to provide for the possibility of ensuring the

integration of the OPP indicator (measure) into the operational criterion used in elaborating the

concept and objectives of an operation and in decision-making. Considering that this indicator is the

correlation of the sides’ forces, calculated through the combat capabilities of their contingents, one

indicator of the effectiveness of the engagement of enemy forces, as a number of authors pointed out

during the discussion, can be the extent to which their (the forces’) combat potentials are reduced—a

measure that in the present situation is assumed as their combat incapacitation rate expectation.”

[430] Ibid.

[431] Ibid.

[432] V. Bochkarev and A. Barabanov, “Postroenie Sistemy Razvedki v Interesakh Ognevogo Porazheniya Protivnika na Osnove

Razvedyvatel’no-Informatsionnykh Poley (Building a Strike Oriented Reconnaissance System Based on Reconnaissance-Information

Fields),” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 2 (3), 2003, p. 158.

[433] Ibid.

[434] Ibid., p. 159.

[435] V. Komoltsev and P. Mikheyev, “Ob Obespechenii Informatsionnoy Sovmestimosti Pri Sozdanii ASU PViA (On Supporting

Information Compatibility in the Development of the Automated Control System of Missile Forces and Artillery),” Voennaya Mysl’

(Military Thought), No. 6, 2004, pp. 19-22.

[436] S. Matveyev, “Vysokotochnye Sistemy RViA: Perspektivy i Osnovnye Napravleniya Rabot po Sozdaniyu Razvedyvatel’noudarnykh i Razvedyvatel’no-Ognevykh Kompleksov (Precision Systems of the Missile Forces and Artillery: Perspectives and Basic

Direction of Work for the Creation of Reconnaissance-Strike and Reconnaissance-Fire Complexes),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military

Thought), No. 2, 2005, pp. 22-23.

[437] S. Bogatinov and I. Sheremet, “O Sovershenstvovanii Razvedki v Interesakh Ognevogo Porazheniya Protivnika Raketnymi

Voyskami I Artilleriey (About Improving Reconnaissance in the Interests of Fire Destruction of the Enemy by Rocket Troops and

Artillery),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 11, 2006, p. 35.

[438] Vladimir Zaritskiy, “Glavnaya Udarnaya Sila (The Main Strike Force),” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 2 August 2007, p. 2.

[439] Evgenii’ Shevchenko, “Ot Perevooruzheniya k Sozdaniyu Razvedyvatel’no-Ognevykh Sistem (From Rearmament to the

Creation of the Reconnaissance-Fire System),” Suvorovskii’Natisk (Suvorov’s Charge),” No. 97, 21 November 2009, p. 3.

[440] Ye. Gribov, V. Kazaryan, D. Karimov, and V. Khlopyak, “O Primeninii V’sokotochnogo Oruzhiya v Operativnom Konture

Razvedyvatel’no-Udarnykh Deystviy (Using Precision Weapons in the Operating Contours of Reconnaissance Strike Activities),”

Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 3 (24), 2008, p. 46.

[441] Ibid.

[442] Ibid., p. 48.

[443] Ibid., p. 49.
[444] Igor Morozov, Sergey Baushev, and Oleg Kaminskiy, “Kosmos I kharakter sovremennykh voennykh deystviy (Space and the

Character of Modern Military Activities),” Vozdushno-kosmicheskaya i Oborona (Air and Space Defense), No. 4, 2009, pp. 48-56,

downloaded from the Eastview web site.

[445] Ibid.

[446] Ibid.

[447] Morozov, Baushev, and Kaminskiy.

[448] Ibid.

[449] Colonel Vasiliy Gumenniy, “War in the Airwaves,” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), Internet Version, 5 April 2000.

[450] Morozov, Baushev, Kaminskiy.

[451] Ibid.

[452] V. D. Ryabchuk, “Problemy Voennoy Hauki I Voennogo Prognozirovaniya v Usloviyakh Intellektual’no-informatsionnogo

Protivoborstva (Problems of Military Science and Military Forecasting under Conditions of an Intellectual-Information Confrontation),”

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 5, 2008, p. 69.

[453] S. A. Bogdanov and V. N. Gorbunov, “O Kharaktere Vooruzhennoy Bor’by v XXI Veke (On the Character of Armed

Confrontation in the Twenty-First Century),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3, 2009, p. 11.

[454] I. N. Voroboyov, “Eshche Raz o Voennoi Futurologii (Once More on Military Futurology),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought),

No. 5, 2008, p. 64.

[455] Ibid., p. 66. For an excellent US discussion of Soviet and Russian foresight and forecasting, see Jacob Kipp, From Foresight to

Forecasting: The Russian and Soviet Military Experience, Stratech Studies Series, Center for Strategic Technology, Texas A&M

University, College Station, Texas 1988.

[456] V. Slipchenko, “Novaya Forma Bor’y. V Nastupibshem Veke Rol’ Informatsii v Beskontaktnykh Voynakh Budet Lish’

Vozrastat’ (A New Form of War. In the Coming Century, the Role of Information in Non-Contact War Will Increase),” Armeyskiy

Sbornik (Army Digest), No. 12, December 2002, pp. 30-32.

[457] M. A. Gareev, “O Nekotorykh Kharaktern’kh Chertakh Voyn Budyshchego (On Several Characteristic Aspects of Future

War),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6, June 2003, pp. 52-59.

[458] Ibid., p. 54.

[459] P. A. Dulnev and E. A. Bryuzgin, “Vozmozhn’y Kharakter Budushchikh Voyn (The Probable Character of Future Warfare),”

Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 2, 2005, pp. 126-127.

[460] Ibid., p. 127.

[461] Ibid., pp. 128-129.

[462] Ibid., p. 130.

[463] Bogdanov and Gorbunov, p. 2.

[464] Ibid.

[465] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[466] Ibid., p. 8.

[467] Ibid., p. 7.

[468] Ibid., p. 8.

[469] Ibid., p. 13.

[470] Ibid., pp. 13-14.

[471] V. D. Ryabchuk, “Problemy Voennoy Hauki I Voennogo Prognozirovaniya v Usloviyakh Intellektual’no-informatsionnogo

Protivoborstva (Problems of Military Science and Military Forecasting under Conditions of an Intellectual-Information Confrontation),”

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 5, 2008, pp. 68-69.

[472] Ibid., p. 69.

[473] Ibid.

[474] V. D. Ryabchuk, “Warfare Science and Military Forecasting in the Conditions of Intellectual-Informational Confrontation,” Military

Thought (English Edition), No. 2, 2008, p. 154.

[475] N. E. Makarov, “Kharakter Vooruzhennoy Bor’by Budushchego, Aktual’nye Problemy Stroitel’stva i Boevogo Primeneniya

Vooruzhennykh Sil RF v Sovremennykh Usloviyakh (The Character of Future Armed Conflict, Actual Problems of the Development

and Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Today),” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy

of Military Science), No. 2, 2010, p. 19.

[476] Ibid.

[477] Ibid., p. 20.

[478] Ibid., p. 22.

[479] Ibid., p. 20.

[480] Makhmut Gareev, “Concepts: The Experience of the Victors in the Great War Cannot Become Obsolete. We Need to Find the

Roots of Future Victories in the Past,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online (Independent Military Review Online), 12 March

2010.
[481] Sergei Modestov, “Prostranstvo Budushchey Voyny (The Space of Future War),” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of

the Academy of Military Science), No. 2, 2003, p. 65.

[482] Ibid., p. 62.

[483] Ibid., pp. 62-63.

[484] Ibid., p. 63.

[485] Ibid.

[486] Sergei Modestov, “Strategicheskoe Sderzhivanie Na Teatre Informatsionnogo Protivoborstva (Strategic Deterrence in the

Theater of Information Warfare),” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1, 2009, p. 35.

[487] Ibid.

[488] Ibid., p. 34.

[489] The following discussion of asymmetry includes truncated and revised sections of the author’s chapter in another work. See

Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s Asymmetrical Approach to Information War,” first published as Chapter Five in The Russian Military into

the Twenty-first Century, Stephen J. Cimbala, editor, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, pp. 97-121.

[490] I. G. Korotchenko, “Tendentsii razvitiya sovremennogo operativnogo iskusstva (Tendencies in

the Modern Development of Military Art),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1, 1999, p. 11.

[491] I. D. Sergeev, “Osnovnyi Faktory, Opredelyayushchie Voenno-Tekhnicheskuyu Politiku Rossii

Nakanune XXI Veka (The Main Factors which Determine Russia’s Military-Technical Policy on the

Eve of the 21

st Century),” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), No. 259, 9 December 1999 downloaded

from Eastview.com on 18 March 2010. No page provided.

[492] Ibid.

[493] Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, Springfield, Mass., 1998, p. 72.

[494] Mikhail Mikhaylovich Rastopshin, “V Labirinte Asimmetrichnykh Otvetov (In the Labyrinth of Asymmetric Responses),”

Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review), No. 17, June 01, 2007, p. 6, as downloaded from Eastview.com on 17

March 2010.

[495] Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New

York, 1965, pp. 252-253.

[496] S. I. Ozhegov, Slovar’ Russkogo Yazyka (Dictionary of the Russian Language), Moscow, Russian Language, 1984, p. 141.

[497] Gennadiy Miranovich, “Voennaya Reforma: Problemy i suzhdeniya. Geopolitika i

bezopasnost’ Rossii (Military Reform: Problems and Judgment. Geopolitics and Russian Security),”

Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 31 July 1999, p. 2 as downloaded from Eastview.com on 23 March

2010.

[498] V. V. Kruglov, “O Vooruzhennoy Bor’be Budushchego (On Future Armed Conflict),” Voennaya

Mysl’ Military Thought, September-October 1998, No. 5, pp. 54-58.

[499] Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev, If War Comes Tomorrow, Frank Cass, London 1998, pp. 52-53.

[500] “Perechen’ Osnovnykh Napravleniy Fundamental’nykh Issledovaniy v Oblasti Oboronnoy

Bezonpasnosti (List of Basic Directions of Research in the Defense Security Area),” Nezavisimoye

Voyennoye Obozreniye (Independent Military Review), No. 5, 12-18 February 1999, as downloaded

from Eastview.com on 23 March 2010.

[501] Ibid.

[502] N. A. Sergeyev and D. A. Lovtsov, “O probleme ‘organizatsionnogo oruzhiya’ (On the

Problem of the ‘Organization Weapon’),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1, 1999, p. 34.

[503] Ibid.

[504] Ibid., p. 37.

[505] Ibid., p. 40.

[506] From a speech delivered in Brussels in May 1996 by Admiral Pirumov entitled “Certain

Aspects of Information Warfare,” p. 2.

[507] Sergei Modestov, “Kontseptsiya Glubokoy Oborony v Informatsionnom Protivoborstve (A

Concept for Deep Defense in Information Warfare),” Informatsionnaya Bezopasnost’ Rossii
(Information Security of Russia), Moscow 1998, pp. 154-158, paper obtained by the author in

Moscow in 1998.

[508] Ibid.

[509] Ibid.

[510] Even the military has written about the subject of psychotronic weapons in its publications. See

for example, I. Chernishev, “Polychat li poveliteli ‘zombi’ blast’ nad mirom (Can a Ruler Make

‘Zombies’ Out of the World),” Orientir (Orienteer), February 1997, pp. 58-62.

[511] Author’s discussion with Dr. Panarin in Moscow, January 1999.

[512] Vladimir Grigoryevich Andreyev, “Novye Tendentsii Razvitiya Sredstv Protivoborstva:

Netraditsionnoe Oruzhie Mozhet Okazat’ Reshayushchee Vliyanie na Iskhod ‘Voyny Budushchego’

(New Trends in the Development of Weapons: Non-traditional Weapons May Have a Decisive

Influence on the Outcome of the ‘War of the Future’),” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye

(Independent Military Review), 26 February-4 March 1999, No. 7, p.6, as downloaded from

Eastview.com on 23 March 2010.

[513] Ibid.

[514] Dmitriy Borisov and Vitaliy Koreshkov, “Voyny Menyayut Oblik: v Sposobakh Vedeniya

Boevykh Deystviy Vozrastaet Rol’ Nesmertel’nogo Oruzhiya (Wars are Changing their Look: The

Growing Role of Non-lethal Weapons in Methods of Combat Operations),” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye

Obozreniye (Independent Military Review), 22-28 May 1998, No. 19, pp. 1-2 as downloaded from

Eastview.com on 23 March 2010.

[515] S. Leonenko, “O Refleksivnoe upravlenie protivnikom (On Reflexive Control of the Enemy),”

Armeyskiy sbornik (Army Digest), No. 8, 1995, p. 28.

[516] A. A. Proxhozhev and N. I. Turko, “Osnovy Informatsionnoy Voyny (The Basics of Information

Warfare),” in Analiz Sistem na Poroge XXI Veka: Teoriya i Praktika: Tom Chetvertyy (Systems

Analysis on the Threshold of the 21

st Century: Theory and Practice: Volume Four), Moscow February

1996, p. 251, paper obtained by the author in Moscow in 1996.

[517] See N. I. Turko and S. A. Modestov, “Refleksivnoe Upravlenie Razvitiem Strategicheskikh Sil

Gosudarstva Kak Mekhanizm Sovremennoy Geopolitiki (Reflexive Control in the Development of

Strategic Forces of States as a Mechanism of Geopolitics),” in Analiz Sistem na Poroge XXI Veka:

Teoriya I Praktika: Tom Chetvertyy (Systems Analysis on the Threshold of the 21

st Century: Theory

and Practice: Volume Four), Moscow February 1996, p. 366, paper obtained by the author in

Moscow in 1996.

[518] Leonenko.

[519] Vladimir Chebakov, “Kto Tut ‘Shmel’? Leninskuyu Premiyu Emu... (Who’s the Shmel Here? Give Him the Lenin Prize),”

Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest), No. 3, 2003 as downloaded from Eastview.com on 18 February 2010.

[520] Ibid.

[521] Yevgeniy Lisanov, “Proyti Nad Propast’yu i Ne Svalit’sya (Pass Over the Abyss without Falling In),” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red

Star), 4 June 2008, as downloaded from Eastview.com on 18 February 2010.

[522] Vladimir Shenk, “Stikhiey—po Vragu: Klimaticheskoe Oruzhie Voydet v Arsenal Sovremennykh Armiy (Using Natural

Disasters against the Enemy. Climate Weapons will be Part of Modern Armies’ Arsenals),” Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kur’er (MilitaryIndustrial Courier), 8 October 2008, as downloaded from Eastview.com on 18 February 2010.

[523] RIA-Novosti from Moscow, 10 February, 2009.

[524] Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey (Military News Agency), 23 May 2008.

[525] Rastopshin.

[526] Vladimir Kozhemyakin, “Kariby, Iran, i Kavkaz—Tri Bol’nye Mozoli SShA (Caribbean, Iran, and the Caucasus—Three Painful

Calluses for the US),” Argumenty I Fakty (Arguments and Facts),” No. 38, 17 September 2008, p. 9 as downloaded from Eastview.com

on 18 March 2010.

[527] M. A. Gareev, “Strategicheskoe Sderzhivanie: Problemy i Resheniya (Strategic Deterrence: Problems and Solutions),”
Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), No. 183, 8 October 2008, p. 8 as downloaded from Eastview.com on 17 March, 2010.

[528] Ibid.

[529] Ivan Chichikov, “Nanovoina: Masshtab Ugrozy (Nanowar: The Scale of the Threat),” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 28 January

2009, as downloaded from Eastview.com on 18 February 2010.

[530] Nikolay Poroskov, “Nanogonka Vooruzheniy (Nano Arms Race),” Vremya Novostey (News Time), No. 182, 5 October 2007, p.

4 as downloaded from Eastview.com on 19 March 2010.

[531] Chichikov.

[532] Ibid.

[533] Ibid.

[534] Yevgeniy Lisanov, “Predvidenie Uchenykh—Voennomu Delu (Foresight of Scientists—Military Affairs),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta

(Independent Newspaper), No. 193, 10 September 2008, p. 9 as downloaded from Eastview.com on 22 March 2010.

[535] Moscow Interfax, 24 March 2010.

[536] P. Peresvet, “Nanovoyna-2030: Skrytaya Ugroza (Nanowar 2030: The Hidden Threat),” Ekonomicheskiye Strategii

(Economic Strategy), No. 5-6, 2009, Internet version, http://www.inesnet.ru/magazine/mag_archive/?mid=85&cid=1826

[537] This chapter first appeared as an article in The Journal of Slavic Military

Studies, 22:1, 31-67, 2009. The Journal’s web site is located at

http://www.informaworld.com.

[538] There are several references to this incident in the international media but none in the Russian press.

[539] Background material on the initial 1992 peace agreement between Georgia and Russia is not from a Russian source.

[540] ITAR-TASS, 0653 GMT 8 September 2008 CEP2008082095020908950082.

[541] Alexander Tikhonov, “Kavakz-2008: Barrier to Terror,” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 17 July 2008, as translated and downloaded

from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080718548001.

[542] Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey (Internet version-www), 0602 GMT 15 July 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open

Source website as document number CEP20080715950416.

[543] Tom Espiner, “Security Threats: Georgia Accuses Russia of Coordinated Cyberattack,” ZDNet.co.uk, 11 August 2008.

[544] Bryan Woods, “Security Cooperation Exercise ‘Immediate Response 2008’ Begins with Official Ceremony in Republic of

Georgia,” http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/07/17/10953-security-cooperation-exercise-immediate-re...

[545] “...And Why did Our Army Go into South Ossetia?” Izvestiya (Moscow Edition), 11 August 2008, p. 4 as translated and

downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080811025021.

[546] On 11 August, Russia’s newspaper Izvestiya reported that Russia’s peacekeepers had been in South Ossetia based on the Sochi,

June 1992 “Agreement on Principles for the Resolution of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict” and the December 1994 “Resolution of the

Combined Regulatory Commission for the Resolution of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict.”

[547] No United Nations (UN) intervention was required in 1992 based on then President Edward

Shevardnadze’s goodwill gesture of signing the Sochi agreement.

[548] Yuliya Latynina, “The Forced Bankruptcy of the South Ossetian Open Joint Stock Company,” Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal (Daily

Journal), 8 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080809950078.

[549] Ibid.

[550] Yuliya Latynina, “Quadripartite Aggression,” Novaya Gazeta (New Newspaper) 11 August 2008 as translated and downloaded

from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080811025002.

[551] Yuliya Latynina, “Access Code,” Ekho Moskvy, 1508 GMT 16 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source

website as document number CEP20080818950213.

[552] “Georgia vs. South Ossetia: from Conflict to Major War,” Pravda.Ru, 13 August 2008, downloaded from

http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/106081_South-Ossetia-0

[553] John Mackinlay and Peter Cross, editors, Regional Peacekeepers, United Nations University Press, 2003, p. 77.

[554] Ibid., pp. 78-79.

[555] Ibid., p. 81.

[556] ITAR-TASS, 1417 GMT 9 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080909950342.

[557] All of these headlines were taken from “Georgia-Russia Relations Timeline,” OSC Feature, as translated and downloaded from the

Open Source website as document number FEA20080430654787.

[558] ITAR-TASS, 1516 GMT 12 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080812950325.

[559] Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Peace Enforcement is a Legitimate Undertaking,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper), 13

August 2008, p. 3 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080813025002.

[560] ITAR-TASS, 1826 GMT, 15 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number
CEP20080815950338.

[561] ITAR-TASS, 1400 GMT 15 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080815950374.

[562] Anatoliy Tsyganok, “The Lessons of the 5-Day War in the Transcaucasus,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Independent

Military Review), 29 August 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080902548010.

[563] Ibid.

[564] Ibid.

[565] Ibid.

[566] Mikhail Lukanin, “Price of Victory: Military Experts on Mistakes of the Campaign in South Ossetia,” Trud, 18 August 2008, as

translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080818349001.

[567] “The Presidium of the Globalization Problems Institute (IPROG) has Clarified Some of the Information on the War in South

Ossetia,” FORUM/Moscow/Russia, 19 August, 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080819004013.

[568] Olga Bozhyeva, “Disarmed Forces of the Russian Federation: Our Army Continues to Win Only Through its Fighting Spirit,”

Moskovskiy Komsomolets (Moscow Komsomol Member), 21 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source

website as document number CEP20080821349002.

[569] Viktor Baranets, “Army Sent to Fight in Old Suit of Armor,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, 26 August 2008, as translated and

downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080826349001.

[570] Ibid.

[571] Alexander Goltz, “A Respite of Six Points,” Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal (Daily Journal), 13 August 2008, as translated and downloaded

from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080814025024.

[572] Agentsvo Voyennykh Novostey, 0905 GMT 22 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as

document number CEP20080824950111.

[573] ITAR-TASS, 0654 GMT, 13 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080915950028.

[574] ITAR-TASS, 1050 GMT, 13 August 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080813950361.

[575] Yuriy Gavrilov, interview with Anatoliy Alekseyevich Nogovitsyn, “At First Hand: Trumped Cards; General Staff and Defense

Ministry Now are Studying Experience of the Caucasus Conflict in Detail,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 9 September 2008, as translated and

downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080910358006.

[576] Viktor Safonov, “There is Money but no Weapons,” FK Novosti, 1 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open

Source website as document number CEP20080902349001.

[577] Mikhail Vinogradov, “The State Duma Criticized the Failures of the Military,” Nevskoye Vremya (Nevsky Times), 11 September

2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080912358006.

[578] ITAR-TASS, 0934 GMT, 10 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080910950149.

[579] Ibid.

[580] Interfax, 1510 GMT, 11 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080911950474.

[581] ITAR-TASS, 1418 GMT 16 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080916950364.

[582] ITAR-TASS, 1455 GMT 16 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080916950384.

[583] Laia Fores interview with Dmitriy Rogozin, “The Crisis in the Caucasus Region. Accepting Georgia as a Member of NATO is Like

Accepting Hitler or Pinochet...” La Vanguardia.es, 9 September 008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as

document number EUP20080909210005.

[584] Marina Grishina, “Who are the Judges?” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 19 August 2008, as translated and downloaded from the

Open Source website as document number CEP20080819548003

[585] Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey (Internet Version-www), 1125 GMT 20 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the

Open Source website as document number CEP20080820950209.

[586] Interfax, 1252 GMT, 11 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP200809119500352.

[587] Interfax, 0944 GMT 21 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080821950164.

[588] RIA-Novosti, 1116 GMT, 11 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080912950033.

[589] Rossiya TV, 1530 GMT 7 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number
CEP20080919950493.

[590] Interfax, 0944 GMT 21 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080821950164.

[591] “Hostilities in South Ossetia,” Agentura, 8 August 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document

number CEP20080808624001.

[592] Aliya Samigullina, Fefor Rumyantsev, and Alexander Artemyev, “War and PR,” Gazeta.ru (Newspaper.ru), 9 August 2008, as

translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080811015002.

[593] Ibid.

[594] Interfax, 1823 GMT 11 August 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080811950386.

[595] Nayaliya Rostova, “Verbal Shootout: The War has Started. And the Information War Is, Unfortunately, at its Height,” Novaya

Gazeta (New Newspaper), 11 August 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080811025001.

[596] Ibid.

[597] Ibid.

[598] Novosti news report, Channel One TV, GMT 12 August 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as

document number CEP20080812950156.

[599] Vesti (News) TV, 0900 GMT 13 August 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080813950171.

[600] Valeriy Vyzhutovich, “Telling Broadcast,” Politkom.ru, 14 August 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source

website as document number CEP20080814004003.

[601] ITAR-TASS, 0612 GMT, 15 August 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080815950068.

[602] Ibid.

[603] Interfax, 1907 GMT 17 August 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080817950163.

[604] Vesti (News) TV, 0902 GMT, 23 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080823950069.

[605] Alexander Royskiy, “Political Portrait: General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn, The Country’s Chief Military Newsmaker,” Rossiyskiye Vesti

(Russian News), 3 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080904358004.

[606] Gavrilov.

[607] ITAR-TASS, 1524 GMT 11 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080911950470.

[608] Moscow News (Electronic Version), 2359 GMT, 11 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as

document number CEP20080813950236.

[609] Vladimir Shcherbakov, “Today: Wars and Conflicts,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Independent Military Review) 22

August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080826548002.

[610] Ibid.

[611] Ibid.

[612] Ibid.

[613] Ilya Barabanov, “Union of Soviet Socialist Mass Media,” New Times, 25 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the

Open Source website as document number CEP20080826358003.

[614] Pavel Gutiontov, “Gillette and Sputnik: To Explain and propagandize Policy Convincingly, It Must Be Clear and Consistent,”

Delovoy Vtornik (Business Tuesday), 16 September 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document

number CEP20080917358004.

[615] Interfax, 1027 GMT 23 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080923950124.

[616] Maksim Zharov, “Russia versus Georgia: War on the Net. Day One,” Pravda.ru, 9 August 2008 as translated and downloaded

from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080812025005.

[617] Ibid.

[618] Maksim Zharov, “Russia versus Georgia: War on the Net. Day Two,” Pravda.ru 10 August 2008 as translated and downloaded

from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080812025004.

[619] Ibid.

[620] Ibid.

[621] Ibid.

[622] Maksim Zharov, “Russia versus Georgia: War on the Net. Day Three,” Pravda.ru 11 August 2008 as translated and downloaded

from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080812025003.
[623] Ibid.

[624] Information obtained from http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=208318.

[625] ITAR-TASS, 1525 GMT 22 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080822950298.

[626] RIA-Novosti, 1416 GMT 15 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080815950259.

[627] Interfax, 0921 GMT 17 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080817950074.

[628] Interfax, 1307 GMT 18 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080818950196.

[629] ITAR-TASS 1015 GMT 18 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source

website as document number CEP20080818950123.

[630] Mikhail Lukanin, “Price of Victory: Military Experts on Mistakes of the Campaign in South Ossetia,” Trud, 18 August 2008 as

translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080818349001.

[631] ITAR-TASS, 1413 GMT 19 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080819950293.

[632] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Internet Version-www), 0545 GMT 13 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open

Source website as document number CEP20080813950033.

[633] Marina Perevozkina and Vadim Solovyev, “Unrecognized Military Base. Russian Army Can Stay in South Ossetia Forever,”

Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper), 19 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as

document number CEP20080820380001.

[634] Interfax, 1538 GMT 20 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080820950382.

[635] Interfax, 1339 GMT 20 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080820950375.

[636] Interfax, 0952 GMT 20 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080820950125.

[637] Alexandera Samarina, Interview with Aleksey Arbatov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper), 12 August 2008 p. 4, as

translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080812025006.

[638] RIA-Novosti, 1715 GMT 13 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080814950087.

[639] Aydyn Mekhtiyev, citing Alexander Konovalov, “Hostilities Halted in Time,” Strana.ru National Information Service, 13 august

2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080813025016.

[640] “New World Order Seen as Powers Square Off on Georgia: Analysts,” AFP (North European Service) 0458 GMT 17 August

2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number EUP20080817075009.

[641] ITAR-TASS 1339 GMT 17 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080817950096.

[642] Rytas Staselis, “Two Days of the Georgian Army,” Bernardinai.it, 19 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open

Source website as document number CEP20080820070001.

[643] Mart Laar, “A Politician’s Opinion: Information Warfare,” Molodezh Estonii Online (Estonian Youth Online), 19 August 2008 as

translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080820070002.

[644] Theodore Karasik, “In Georgia, Russia Sends Clear Message that US, Israeli Influence Will Not be Tolerated,”

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition

[645] Interfax 0749 GMT 20 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080820950069.

[646] RIA-Novosti, 0855 GMT 21 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080821950185.

[647] Interfax, 0944 GMT 21 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080821950164.

[648] OSC Feature, 21 August 2008, OSC document number FEA20080822757031.

[649] Interfax, 0959 GMT 26 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080826950120.

[650] Pavel Gerasimov, “On Guard for Justice,” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 3 September 2008 as translated and downloaded from the

Open Source website as document number CEP20080905548002.

[651] Madina Shavlokhova, “Tskhinvali’s Information Field was Swept of Mines in Berlin,” Gazeta (Newspaper), 25 August 2008 as

translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP2008082095020825021008.

[652] ITAR-TASS, 0744 GMT 18 September 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number
CEP20080918950108.

[653] Safonov.

[654] Ibid.

[655] Yuliya Nikitina,” Battles of More Than Local Importance,” Fontanka.ru, 20 September 2008, as translated and downloaded from

the Open Source website as document number CEP20080922322001.

[656] ITAR-TASS, 1301 GMT 23 September 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080923950226.

[657] ITAR-TASS, 1923 GMT 24 September 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080924950548.

[658] Ibid.

[659] Denis Telmanov, interview with Makhmut Gareev, “Policy: Fighting Spirit Also Has Its Own Life Cycle,” Gazeta (Newspaper), 8

September 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number CEP20080909358003.

[660] Ibid.

[661] ITAR-TASS, 1400 GMT 15 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080815950374.

[662] RIA-Novosti, 0855 GMT 21 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080821950185.

[663] ITAR-TASS, 1935 GMT 19 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080819950387.

[664] Interfax, 1028 GMT 19 August 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source website as document number

CEP20080819950151.

[665] Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, downloaded from the following website:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.

[666] See Chapters Five and Eight of this work for a summary of the concept of reflexive control theory.

[667] Ilya Milshteyn, “A Matter of Time,” Moscow Grani.ru, 16 September 2008.

[668] Paris AFP, 1117 GMT, 5 December 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center (OSC) website, document

number EUP20081205102002.

[669] Vitaliy Shlykov, “In Uniform: A War with an Unknown Goal,” Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal (Daily Journal), 1 November 2008, as

translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number CEP20081103349010. The remainder of this

section, unless otherwise noted, is from the article.

[670] Milshteyn.

[671] http://74.125.39.104/search?q=cache:http://www.redstar.ru/2008/09/03_09/2_03.html.

[672] Zaur Alborov, “Combat Experience of War in Georgia,” Segodnya.Ru, 7 September 2008.

[673] Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey (Military News Agency), 1415 GMT, 11 September 2008.

[674] Interfax, 1135 GMT 4 December 2008.

[675] Speech of Andrey Illarionov which can be located at the following website: http://video.google.com/videoplay?

docid=2194082804891801399. All material in this section, unless otherwise noted, is from this speech.

[676] Sergey Buntman and Mariya Gaydar interview of Andrey Illarionov, Ekho Moskvy Radio, 24 October 2008, as translated and

downloaded from the Open Source Center (OSC) web site, document number CEP20081102950083. Unless otherwise noted, all of the

information in this section is from this interview.

[677] Alexander Lvovich Yanov, “Pochemu My Proigrali? (Why did We Lose?),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper), 15

October 2008, p. 7 as downloaded from the Eastview website.

[678] Lev Makedonov, “Listen, did Armored Vehicles Come or What?” Moscow Gazeta.ru (Newspaper.ru), 18 September 2008.

[679] Pavel Fel’gengauer, “Kavkazskiy Uzel: Ne Razrubit’, A Rasstrelyat’ (The Caucasian Knot: Don’t Cut It, Shoot It), Novaya

Gazeta (New Newspaper), 8 December 2008, as downloaded from the Eastview website.

[680] Olga Allenova interview with Vano Merabishvili, “My Ne Verili, Chto Russkie Vvedut Tanki (We Did Not Believe That Russians

Would Bring in Tanks),” Kommersant (Businessman), 29 October 2008, p. 10 as downloaded from the Eastview website.

[681] Interfax-AVN, 0610 GMT, 24 October 2008.

[682] 24 Saati (Rustavi-2 Independent TV), Tblisi, 24 October 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center (OSC)

website, document number CEP20081028950272.

[683] Tbilisi TV1, 1225 GMT 28 November 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document

number CEP20081128950288.

[684] Interfax, 1422 GMT 28 November 2008.

[685] Interfax, 1423 GMT 28 November 2008.

[686] ITAR-TASS, 1713 GMT, 28 November 2008.

[687] Interfax, 1753 GMT, 28 November 2008.

[688] Kavkas-Press, Tbilisi, 1611 GMT, 25 October 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center (OSC) website,

document number CEP20081028950030.
[689] OSC Feature, Georgia, 25-26 November 2008, FEA20081126796958.

[690] Ibid.

[691] Moscow ITAR-TASS, 1527 GMT 26 November 2008.

[692] Interfax, 1101 GMT, 26 November 2008.

[693] Marina Perevozkina, interview with Erosi Kitsmarishvili, “Gruziya Gotovilas’K Voyne S 2004 Goda (Georgia had been preparing

for War since 2004),” Moskovskiy Komsomolets (Moscow Komsomol Member), 27 November 2008, p. 3 as downloaded from the

Eastview website.

[694] Interfax-AVN, 1435 GMT, 27 October 2008.

[695] Interfax, 1431 GMT, 5 December 2008.

[696] Interfax, 1227 GMT 8 December 2008.

[697] Sakartvelos Respublika, Tbilisi, 29 October 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document

number CEP20081104950078.

[698] Akhali Taoba, Tbilisi, 30 October 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center (OSC) website, document

number CEP20081112950108.

[699] Ibid.

[700] Stephen J. Blank, “Georgia: The War Russia Lost,” Military Review, November-December 2008, p. 46.

[701] Ibid., pp. 40-44.

[702] Oksana Antonenko, “A War without Winners,” Survival, October-November 2008, pp. 23-24.

[703] Ibid., pp. 25-27.

[704] Ibid., pp. 30-31.

[705] Sergey Markedonov, “Caucasus Conflict Breaks Old Rules of the Game,” Russian Analytical Digest, No. 45, 4 September 2008,

located at www.res.ethz.ch or www.laender-analysen.de/russland.

[706] Nathalie Ouvaroff, “The Role of Chechens in the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict,” Russian Analytical Digest, No. 45, 4

September 2008, pp. 27-29.

[707] Interfax-AVN, 0610 GMT, 24 October 2008.

[708] ITAR-TASS, 1718 GMT, 5 December 2008.

[709] Fel’gengauer.

[710] Yuriy Gavrilov, “General Replaced by a Bureaucrat,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Russian Newspaper), 25 November 2008, as

downloaded and translated by the Open Source Center (OSC), document number CEP20081125358012.

[711] Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (Independent Military Observer), Internet version, 14 January 2000, as translated and

downloaded from the FBIS web site on 16 January 2000.

[712] “Federal Targeted Program ‘Electronic Russia 2002-2010,” Russian Government Press Release Number 869, Section Four,

Internet Government.gov.ru, 5 July 2001, as downloaded and translated by the Open Source Center (OSC), document number

CEP20010723000238.

[713] Alexander Selivanov, “How Our Land Can Become Foreign land: On the Architecture of the ‘Information War’ Against Russia,”

Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kur’er (Military-Industrial Courier), 21 March 2007, as downloaded and translated by the Open Source Center

(OSC), document number CEP20070321436006.

[714] Ibid.

[715] Nikolay Poroskov, “The ‘Brains’ Will Take by Storm,” Vremya Novostey (News Time), 7 April 2009, as downloaded and translated

by the Open Source Center (OSC), document number CEP20090408358001.

[716] Anatoliy Bashlakov, “Efficient, Objective, and Accessible,” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 18 March 2009, as downloaded and

translated by the Open Source Center (OSC), document number CEP20090325548001.

[717] Selivanov.

[718] Information Security Doctrine, Russian Federation Security Council, Internet version, September 13, 2000, translation downloaded

from the Open Source Center, document number CEP20000913000294 accessed May 28, 2007.

[719] Ibid.

[720] “Russia calls for International Information Security System,” Interfax, October 12, 2000.

[721] Mikhail Shevtsov, ITAR-TASS, 1327 GMT, September 12, 2000, translation downloaded from FBIS, accessed September 12, 2000.

[722] Information Security Doctrine.

[723] Ibid.

[724] Ibid.

[725] Strategiya Razvitiya Informatsionnogo Obshchestva v Rossiyskoy Federatsii (The Strategy of Information Society

Development in Russia), 7 February 2008, Moscow, pamphlet with both the Russian and English texts, p. 2 of the English text.

[726] Ibid., p. 2-3 of the English text.

[727] ITAR-TASS, 1301 GMT 23 September 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center (OSC) website,

document number CEP20080923950226.

[728] Igor Panarin, “The Information Warfare System: the Mechanism for Foreign Propaganda Requires Renewal,” VoennoPromyshlennyy Kur’er (Military-Industrial Courier), 15 October 2008, Open Source Center (OSC) document CEP20081016548020.
[729] Ibid.

[730] Ibid.

[731] Ibid.

[732] Ibid.

[733] “Russia is Underestimating Information Resources and Losing Out to the West,” Novyy Region, 29 October 2008, as translated by

OSC, document number CEP20081031358001.

[734] Ibid.

[735] Interview with Anatoliy Tsyganok, “Ministry of Defense Planning Information Warfare,” Svobodnaya Pressa (Free Press), 17

March 2009, as translated by OSC, document number CEP20090318358009.

[736] Ibid.

[737] ITAR-TASS, 1503 GMT, 19 February 2009, as translated by the OSC, document number CEP20090219950324.

[738] P. Koayesov, “Theater of Warfare on Distorting Airwaves. Georgia Versus South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Field of Media

Abuse. Fighting by Their Own Rules,” Voyennyy Vestnik Yuga Rossii (Military Digest of South Russia), 18 January 2009, as translated

and downloaded from the Open Source Center (OSC) website, document number CEP20090121358009.

[739] Ibid.

[740] Ibid.

[741] Ibid.

[742] Ibid.

[743] Interfax-AVN online, 0845 GMT 24 October 2008 as downloaded and translated by the Open Source Center (OSC), document

number CEP20081024950109.

[744] “An International Mechanism Requiring States to Incur Liability for ‘Information Warfare’ is Essential,” Tsentr Parlamentskikh

Kommunikatsiy, 30 January 2009, as downloaded and translated by the Open Source Center (OSC), document number

CEP20090202358007.

[745] Ibid.

[746] Stephen Korns and Joshua Kastenberg, “Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook,” Parameters, Winter 2008-2009, pp. 60-73.

[747] Ibid., p. 73.

[748] Poroskov.

[749] Nathan Hodges, “Kremlin Launches ‘School of Bloggers,’” Wired website located at

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/05/kremlin-launches-school-of-bloggers/

[750] Evgeny Morozov, “What do They Teach at the Kremlin School of Bloggers,” Foreign Policy website located at the following link

for the journal online: http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/26/what_do_they_teach_at_kremlins_school_of_bloggers

[751] Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, editors, The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, M.E. Sharpe, 2009, p. 3.

[752] Ibid., p. 9.

[753] Ibid., p. 15.

[754] Ibid., p. 18.

[755] Ibid., p. 28.

[756] Ibid., p. 32.

[757] Ibid., p. 34.

[758] Ibid., pp. 38-41.

[759] Ibid., pp. 44-45.

[760] Ibid., pp. 49-50.

[761] Ibid., p. 52.

[762] Ibid., p. 53.

[763] Ibid., p. 58.

[764] Ibid., p. 59.

[765] Ibid., p. 60.

[766] Ibid., pp. 61-63.

[767] Ibid., pp. 66-67.

[768] Ibid., pp. 68-69.

[769] Ibid., p. 70.

[770] Ibid., pp. 71-72.

[771] Ibid., p. 73.

[772] Ibid.

[773] Ibid., p. 74.

[774] Ibid., p. 89.

[775] Ibid., p. 91.

[776] Ibid., pp. 92-94.

[777] Ibid., pp. 101-102.
[778] Ibid., pp. 108-110.

[779] Ibid., pp. 116-121.

[780] Ibid., pp. 121-123.

[781] Ibid., pp. 125-129.

[782] Ibid., pp. 131-133.

[783] Ibid., pp. 138-142.

[784] Ibid., pp. 144-146.

[785] Ibid., pp. 148-153.

[786] Ibid., pp. 154-158.

[787] Ibid., pp. 160-161.

[788] Ibid., p. 163.

[789] Ibid., pp. 164-166.

[790] Ibid., pp. 169-173.

[791] Ibid., pp. 181-183.

[792] Ibid., pp. 185-190.

[793] Ibid., pp. 191-195.

[794] Ibid., pp. 202-203.

[795] Ibid., pp. 204-207.

[796] Ibid., pp. 208-209.

[797] Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

[798] Ibid., p. 48.

[799] Ibid., p. 30.

[800] Ibid., pp. 19-49.

[801] Ibid.

[802] Ibid., p. 50.

[803] Ibid., p. 142.

[804] Ibid., pp. 142-145.

[805] Ibid., pp. 146-147.

[806] Ibid., pp. 152-158.

[807] Ibid., pp. 160-161.

[808] Ibid., pp. 166-168.

[809] Ibid., p. 169.

[810] Ibid., p. 173.

[811] Ibid., pp. 174-175.

[812] Ibid., pp. 180-188.

[813] Ibid., p. 189.

[814] Ibid., pp. 190-197.

[815] Ibid., pp. 198-202.

[816] Ibid., pp. 202-207.

[817] Ibid., p. 211.

[818] Ibid.

[819] Ibid., pp. 213-214.

[820] Ibid., pp. 215-218.

[821] Ibid., pp. 220-221.

[822] Ibid., p. 222.

[823] Ibid., pp. 232-234.

[824] Mikhail Barabanov, Anton Lavrov, and Vyacheslav Tseluyko, The Tanks of August, Center for the Analysis of Strategies and

Technologies, Moscow 2009. A translated version of the text was used for this analysis that did not include page numbers from the

original text, thus none can be used in this analysis. All credit for the quotes and references utilized in this summary are given to the

authors of the book. It is their Russian point of view that is expressed.

[825] ITAR-TASS, 19 June 2010.

[826] Fritz Ermarth, “Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought,” in Soviet Military Thinking, Derek Leebaert, editor, George

Allen and Unwin (Publishers) Ltd., 1981, p. 66.

[827] Alexander Goltz, “Abscess,” The New Times Online, 25 October 2010.

[828] “Moscow Wants to Participate as an Equal Partner,” Der Spiegel, 27 October 2010, downloaded at

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,725231,00.html.

[829] “Why Missiles Aren’t Flying but Offshore Accounts Are Growing,” Tverskaya, 13 Online, 18 October 2010.

[830] “Moscow Wants...
[831] Ibid.

[832] Interfax-AVN Online, 1 December 2010.

[833] “Moscow Wants...”

[834] “Minoborony Planiruet Informatsionnye Voyny (Ministry of Defense Planning Information Warfare),” Svobodnaya Pressa

Online (Free Press Online), 17 March 2009.

[835] A. G. Burutin, “About Some Aspects of Military-Technical Policy of the State in the Light of the Redrafted Military Doctrine of

the Russian Federation,” Military Thought (English Edition), No. 2 Vol. 16, 2007, pp. 31-38.

[836] Ibid.

[837] Ibid.

[838] Interfax in English, 9 December 2010.

[839] Interfax-AVN Online, 22 December 2010.

[840] Ibid.

[841] Barynkin, “Effect of Precision Weapons...”

[842] V. Dreshchinskii, “Effective Engagement in Local Wars,” Military Thought (English edition), No. 5/6, Vol. 5 1996, p. 103.

[843] I. N. Vorobyev, “Informatsionno-Udarnaya Operatsiya (The Information-Strike Operation),” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military

Thought), No. 6, 2007, pp. 14-21, downloaded from the Eastview website.

[844] Ibid.

[845] Ibid.

[846] Ibid.

[847] Ibid.

[848] Ibid.

[849] V. Yu. Mikryukov, “Sushchnost’ I Soderzhanie Voyny (The Essence and Content of War),” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest),

November 2010, p. 35. Mr. Robert Love of the Foreign Military Studies Office translated Mkryukov’s thoughts on IW.

[850] Alina Gromova, “The Russian Army has been Equipped with Israeli Drones,” Infox.ru, 9 December 2010.

[851] Interfax-AVN Online in English, 13 December 2010.

[852] “Khabarovskie Aviastroiteli Pokazali svoi Razrabotki Gostyam iz ‘Rosnano’” (Khabarovsk Aircraft Industry Workers Have

Shown their Research Efforts to Visitors from Rosnano,” RIA-Novosti (RIA-News) Online, 1 December 2010.

[853] Interfax in English, 7 December 2010.

[854] Interfax in English, 2 December 2010.

[855] Interfax-AVN Online, 7 April 2010.

[856] Kirill Alushkov, “Russia will have 18 Times More Precision-Guided Weapons,” Infox.ru, 1 December 2010.

[857] ITAR-TASS in English, 1 December 2010.

[858] Interfax in English, 14 December 2010.

[859] RIA-Novosti, 30 November 2010.

[860] “Russia’s Armorers Have Built a Grenade with Intelligence,” RIA-Novosti (RIA-News) Online, 16 November 2010.

[861] Interfax in English, 14 December 2010.

[862] ITAR-TASS, 13 December 2010.

[863] Interfax-AVN Online, 14 December 2010.

[864] ITAR-TASS in English, 14 December 2010.

[865] Interfax in English, 14 December 2010.

[866] Georgiy Dvali and Ivan Konovalov, “Georgia Has Opened Salvo Fire in Ossetia: Tbilisi Has Learned that Russian Smerch Systems

Have Been Deployed Nearby,” Kommersant (Businessman) Online, 7 December 2010, p. 7.

[867] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, in English, 8 December 2010.

[868] Ibid.

[869] Interfax in English, 13 December 2010.

[870] Interfax in English, 1 December 2010.

[871] Interfax in English, 6 December 2010.

[872] From a discussion with a student at the General Staff Academy in Moscow, 1995.

[873] Ibid.

[874] Tsymbal.

[875] S. A. Komov, “Informatsionnaya bor’ba v sovremennoy voyne: voprosy teorii” (Information

Warfare in Modern War: Theoretical Problems), Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), May-June

1996, pp. 76-80.

[876] Vyacheslav Trubnikov, “Spectrum of Threats Aimed against Russia is Not Decreasing,”

Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Independent Military Review), 17-23 July 1998, No. 26, p. 8
as downloaded from Eastview.

[877] From a speech delivered in Brussels in May 1996 by Admiral Pirumov entitled “Certain

Aspects of Information Warfare,” p. 2.

[878] “From the Dictionary ‘Geopolitics and National Security,’” Military News Bulletin, No. 10,

October 1998, p. 14.

[879] “Documents,” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 9 October 1999, pp. 3-4.

[880] Ibid.

[881] Ibid.

[882] Ibid.

[883] See http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40266.

[884] Ibid.

[885] Ibid.

[886] Russian National Security Concept, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Independent

Military Review), 26 November 1999, as downloaded from the Eastview website.

[887] Ibid.

[888] Ibid.

[889] Ibid.

[890] Russian Federation Security Council Website, 12 May 2009.

[891] A. A. Strel’tsov, Gosudarstvennaya Informatsionnaya Politika: Osnovy Teorii (Government Information Policy: Basic Theory),

Moscow MTsNMO 2010.

[892] Ibid., pp. 102-103.

[893] S.F. Akhromeev, main editor,Voennyy Entsiclopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow Military

Publishing House, 1983, pp. 747, 748.

[894] A. E. Savinkin, editor, Dusha Armii (The Soul of the Army), Russian Way, 1997, p. 613.

[895] S. I. Ozhegov, Slovar’Russkogo Yazyka (Dictionary of the Russian Language), Moscow, 1984, p. 268.

[896] Kovalevskiy, pp. 52-61.

[897] Akhromeev, p. 383.

[898] N. V. Ogarkov, main editor, Sovetskiya Voennaya Entsiklopediya (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Volume 5, Voenizdat, 1978, pp.

175-177.

[899] A. I. Smirnitsky, et.al., Russko-Angliyskiy Slovar’ (Russian-English Dictionary), E. P. Dutton, New York, p. 355.

[900] Russian-English English-Russian Military Dictionary, published by London’s Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1983, p. 531. Vvod v

zabluzhdenie definition on page 37, obman definition on p. 210.

[901] Voyennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow, Military

Publishing, 1983, p. 430. Also listed in this dictionary were entries for strategic, operational, and

tactical maskirovka and entries for maskirovka discipline, camouflage, means, units, and jamming.

Strategic maskirovka involves decisions of the Supreme Command. It includes measures involved

with the preparation of forces for operations that are kept secret from enemy forces; and measures to

confuse the enemy about friendly force intentions. Operational maskirovka involves feints and decoys

as well as the simulations of concentrations and deployments of troops. Tactical maskirovka is

carried out at the individual troop level.

[902] Ibid., p. 226. An identical definition of dezinformatsiya was found in the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, 2007, Moscow: Eksmo

Publishers, p. 302.

[903] Marcus Wheeler, The Oxford Russian-English Dictionary, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, Second Edition, 1984, pp. 424, 337, and

153 respectively.

[904] S. I. Ozhegov, Slovar Russkogo Yazyka (Dictionary of the Russian Language), Moscow “Russian Language,” 1984, pp. 367-368.

The author would like to thank Mr. Robert Love of FMSO for translating these entries.

[905] Uchebnik Voennogo Perevoda, 1984, Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, p. 404.

[906] V. N. Shevchuk and V. M. Polioukhin, editors, Anglo-Russkiy Voennyy Slovar’ English-Russian Military Dictionary, Moscow

Military Publishing House, 1987, p. 335.

[907] Ibid., p. 166.

[908] Yuriy Shcherbatykh, Iskusstvo Obmana (The Art of Deception), EKSM Press, 1999.

[909] William Baxter, project manager, A Comparative lexicon of US-Soviet Military Technical Terminology, Foreign Broadcast

Information Service, no date provided, p. 64.
[910] “Asset” is used to translate ob’ekt, which has no exact equivalent in English and a broad range of meanings in Russian, including

target, building, installation, object, or objective – Trans.

[911] Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, 2007, Moscow: Eksmo Publishers, p. 538.