aaronaaa.opn

FILED

September 30, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

JUNE SESSION, 1997

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9608-CR-00348

)

Appellee, ) DAVIDSON COUNTY

)

) HON. J. RANDALL WYATT, JR.,

V. ) JUDGE

)

AAA AARON’S ACTION AGENCY, ) (PETITION FOR COURT

) APPROVAL TO WRITE

Appellant. ) BAIL BONDS)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

THOMAS L. WHITESIDE JOHN KNOX WALKUP 

Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter

172 Second Avenue North 

Suite 214 KATHY A. MORANTE

Nashville, TN 37201-1908 Assistant Attorney General

2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building

425 Fifth Avenue North 

Nashville, TN 37243

VICTOR S. JOHNSON, III

District Attorney General

DAN HAMM 

Assistant District Attorney General

200 Washington Square

222 Second Avenue North

Suite 500

Nashville, TN 37201-1649

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED 

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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OPINION

AAA Aaron’s Action Agency appeals as of right from the Davidson

County Criminal Court’s “Order Granting Approval to Write Bonds under Specific

Conditions.” The Appellant argues one issue in this appeal: Whether the

Davidson County Criminal Court, sitting en banc, was arbitrary and capricious in

imposing a requirement that Appellant post either a Deed of Trust to

unencumbered real estate located in Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, or

cash, certificate of deposit, letter of credit, or other liquid assets before

authorizing Appellant to perform as a professional bondsman. We affirm the

judgment of the trial court. 

The trial court’s order reads as follows:

The petitioners propose to pledge the assets of American

Banker’s Insurance Company of Florida, the assets of which are

located outside the State of Tennessee, as surety to the Court on

bonds which are written by AAA Aaron’s Action Agency Bail Bond,

Inc. under a qualifying power of attorney issued by American

Bankers.

The Court recognizes that the petitioners have complied with

the requirements and conditions of doing business as a surety

company authorized to execute bonds as set out by the Tennessee

Department of Commerce and Insurance Statute at T.C.A. § 56-15-

101, et. seq., particularly T.C.A. § 56-15-105. The Court notes,

however, that pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-11-302(b) professional bail

bondsman, as defined at T.C.A. § 40-11-301, are excluded from the

laws governing insurance companies and any regulation by the

Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance.

T.C.A. § 40-11-124(a) and Rule 35 of the Davidson County

Local Rules of Practice grant this Court authority to determine which

bonding companies shall be qualified and approved to write bonds

in this county subject to compliance with the requirements and

regulations set forth by the Court.
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In its Order of October 27, 1982, in the case of State of

Tennessee v. Athens Bonding Company, et al, No. 951, the Court

determined that the bonding capacity for a bonding company shall

be calculated yearly as the sum of A.) the current tax assessor’s

valuation of pledged property, multiplied by four (4); and B.) cash

pledged, multiplied by eight (8). The bonding capacity represents

the dollar limit of all bonds that a bonding company may properly

have pending at one time.

In the case of In re: Indemnity Insurance Company of North

America, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that, even

though an insurance company has complied with statutes requiring

posting of assets with the Department of Insurance, there is “legal

authority of local courts to require posting of additional assets to

secure bail bond obligations of any professional bondsman,

insurance carrier or otherwise.” 594 S.W.2d 705 at 708 (Tenn.

1980).

It is therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that

upon delivery to the Clerk of the Criminal Court of either a deed of

trust to unencumbered real estate located in Davidson County, or

cash, certificate of deposit, letter of credit or other liquid assets,

petitioners shall be authorized and approved to write bail bonds for

the General Sessions and Criminal Court of Davidson County,

Tennessee, in accordance with the bonding capacity described

above.

We find that the trial court’s judgment is not arbitrary and capricious.

American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida has given

Appellant a power of attorney and has agreed to guarantee performance on

bonds undertaken by the Appellant up to $500,000. The Appellant has been

approved as bail bondsman in thirteen counties and the Federal courts in

Nashville. American Bankers Insurance Company has complied with the

requirements for doing business in Tennessee. An insurance company which 
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deals in the areas that American Bankers deals in must have $200,000 of surety

on deposit. Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-2-104. This money is on deposit in Florida.

The Appellant argues that the Davidson County Criminal Court’s

order is contrary to this court’s ruling in the case of In re Dale R. Kelley, C.C.A.

No. 5, Henderson County (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Apr. 4, 1990), (no Rule 11

application filed). However, in that case, our court held that the Henderson

County Circuit Court’s policy limiting the bail bond profession to state approved

insurance companies is arbitrary. The Davison County Criminal Court relied

upon its en banc order of October 1982 wherein all bonding companies (defined

as any entity or individual engaged in the business of securing appearance bonds

in the various courts of Davidson County) must comply with the bonding capacity

described in the order appealed from in the case sub judice. In other words, this

court cannot discern that the Criminal Court of Davidson County is treating

Appellant any differently than any other petitioner seeking to be approved to write

bail bonds under similar circumstances.

This court more recently held in In re Hitt, 910 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1995) as follows:

A trial court has full authority to determine who should be allowed to

make bonds in its court. Gilbreath v. Ferguson, 195 Tenn. 528, 260

S.W.2d 276 (1953). . . . Further, a trial court has the inherent power

to administer its affairs, including the right to impose reasonable

regulations regarding the making of bonds. Taylor v. Waddey, 206

Tenn. 497, 334 S.W.2d 733 (1960).

Id. at 903-04 (quoting Hull v. State, 543 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1976).
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The trial court was concerned about collecting in the event of a final

forfeiture if the insurance company stopped doing business in Tennessee or went

out of business. We conclude that this is a valid concern on the part of the trial

court. Therefore, the requirement of a deed of trust or cash, certificate of deposit,

letter of credit, or other liquid assets to be held by the Criminal Court is not

arbitrary and capricious. Because of the sound reasoning set out above in the

trial court’s order, we find that the trial court’s judgment is not arbitrary and

capricious.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________________

THOMAS T. WOODALL, Judge 

CONCUR:

___________________________________

JOSEPH B. JONES, Presiding Judge

___________________________________

WILLIAM M. BARKER, Judge