U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

79–726 PDF 2013

‘‘REINS ACT OF 2013’’: PROMOTING JOBS, 

GROWTH AND AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

REGULATORY REFORM, 

COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON

H.R. 367 

MARCH 5, 2013 

Serial No. 113–26 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

MARK AMODEI, Nevada 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, FLORIDA 

KEITH ROTHFUS, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

JOE GARCIA, Florida 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas, Vice-Chairman 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

KEITH ROTHFUS, Pennsylvania 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

JOE GARCIA, Florida 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

DANIEL FLORES, Chief Counsel 

JAMES PARK, Minority Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 5, 2013 

Page 

THE BILL 

H.R. 367, the ‘‘Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) 

Act of 2013’’ .......................................................................................................... 6 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Spencer Bachus, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law ........................................................................................ 1 

The Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, 

Commercial and Antitrust Law .......................................................................... 27 

WITNESSES 

James L. Gattuso, Senior Research Fellow in Regulatory Policy, Thomas 

A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 33 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 35 

Eric R. Claeys, Professor of Law, George Mason University 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 44 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 47 

Ronald M. Levin, William R. Orthwein Distinguished Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 63 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 65 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Material submitted by the Honorable Spencer Bachus, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law ........................................ 3 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, Ranking Member, Committee 

on the Judiciary, and Member, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law .................................................................................. 28 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Henry C. (Hank) Johnson, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Georgia, and Member, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law ................. 31 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the 

Judiciary ............................................................................................................... 77 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Material submitted by the Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law ................................... 100 
Page

IV 

Letter from the Honorable Kevin Cramer, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of North Dakota ................................................................................... 116 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Andy Barr, a Representative in Congress from the State of Kentucky ....................................................................... 118 

Letter submitted by Kristina Butts, Executive Director, Legislative Affairs, 

National Cattlemen’s Beef Association .............................................................. 119 

Response to Questions for the Record from James L. Gattuso, Senior Research 

Fellow in Regulatory Policy, Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy 

Studies, The Heritage Foundation ...................................................................... 120 

Response to Questions for the Record from Eric R. Claeys, Professor of Law, 

George Mason University .................................................................................... 122 

Response to Questions for the Record from Ronald M. Levin, William R. 

Orthwein Distinguished Professor of Law, Washington University School 

of Law .................................................................................................................... 127 

OFFICIAL HEARING RECORD 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD BUT NOT REPRINTED

Congressional Research Service Report titled REINS Act: Number and Types of 

‘‘Major Rules’’ in Recent Years, submitted by the Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law. This report is 

available at the Subcommittee and can also be accessed at: 

http://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/UploadedFiles/ 

110830lcrslmajorrules.pdf 
(1) 

‘‘REINS ACT OF 2013’’: PROMOTING JOBS, 

GROWTH AND AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 

TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, 

COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:32 a.m., in room 

2237, Rayburn Office Building, the Honorable Spencer Bachus, 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Bachus, Goodlatte, Farenthold, Marino, 

Collins, Rothfus, Cohen, Johnson, DelBene, Garcia and Jeffries. 

Staff present: (Majority) Daniel Flores, Chief Counsel; Ashley 

Lewis, Clerk; Dave Lazar, Clerk; (Minority) James Park, Minority 

Counsel; Susan Jensen, Counsel. 

Mr. BACHUS. The Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law hearing will come to order. 

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of 

the Committee at any time. 

We welcome all of our witnesses today. 

The Chair recognizes himself for the purposes of an opening 

statement. 

Regulations help to implement policies Congress has established 

by statute. When issued, they should be reasonable, provide clear 

rules of the road for businesses, and benefit the public more than 

it hurts them. Today’s regulatory system fails the test. The cost it 

imposes and the uncertainty it creates are choking America’s economy and preventing the recovery of American jobs, growth, and 

global competitiveness. 

In its first term, the Administration imposed far more major regulations at a far greater cost than the preceding Administration. 

Just this December, the Obama administration revealed that it has 

2,387 regulatory actions in its current agenda, and the White 

House admits that at least 128 of these regulations will have an 

impact on the economy of $100 million or more. According to the 

American Action Forum, the cost of this current agenda includes 

$123 billion in planned regulations. These regulations would add 

another 13 million man-hours in just paperwork alone. 

The Small Business Administration has confirmed that small 

businesses pay a disproportionate share of this regulatory burden. 
2 

Indeed, the cost of regulatory compliance has been translated to 

about $11,000 per worker. Small businesses generate most of the 

new jobs in our economy; in fact, somewhere between two-thirds 

and 70 percent normally. However, in the past recession or the recession we are in, small businesses are lagging behind in job creation. In some estimates, they are creating less than half the new 

jobs, and I believe that that is almost entirely due to regulations, 

many of those in the financial sector. 

Imagine how much better off we would be if we could put that 

$11,000 back into the businesses to grow and hire workers. Federal 

Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke himself expressed concern about 

the impact and cost of regulations on small businesses during his 

Humphrey Hawkins testimony last week before the Financial Services Committee. Chairman Bernanke said, quoting now, ‘‘We all 

agree that the burden of regulation falls particularly heavily on 

small community banks which don’t have the resources to manage 

those regulations very effectively.’’ 

It is time for action. Just as it cannot bear the ever-mounting 

weight of the Federal debt, the economy cannot bear the non-stop 

increase of high-cost Federal regulation. The REINS Act, passed by 

the House last year and reintroduced this term by Representative 

Todd Young of Indiana, provides a critical, simple, and long overdue course correction. It says one thing: when it comes to the most 

costly new regulations that Federal regulators propose, those regulations will not go into effect unless they can pass an up or down 

vote by the people’s elected representatives. 

As an original cosponsor, I believe the REINS Act will help to restore accountability to the Federal regulatory process. It will help 

ensure that regulations are issued consistent with congressional intent and provide a needed check of the overreach that we have frequently seen from the unelected Federal bureaucracy. It will allow 

the American people to have a say in approving the most costly decisions that affect their lives and livelihoods. 

This reform could not be timelier. American workers and businesses are facing an historic regulatory tsunami from the Administration, not the least of which includes the impact of Dodd-Frank, 

Obamacare, and the Administration’s climate change agenda. In 

that regard, I would like unanimous consent to introduce Carbon 

Power Politics from the Wall Street Journal on March 4, 2013. 

Mr. COHEN. Despite such an ominous title, I will be part of the 

unanimous consent. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. I can strike the title off. Thank you, Mr. 

Cohen. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
3 
4 

Mr. BACHUS. The Administration has made plain that if it cannot 

persuade the people’s representatives to adopt its legislative agenda, it intends to force that agenda on the people through regulation, and that is actually the subject matter of that article. Unless 

Congress intervenes and passes the REINS Act and other important regulatory reforms, the increasing tide of major Federal regulations will continue to destroy jobs, harm communities, and weaken opportunities and the ability of American workers to provide for 

their families. 
5 

Enterprising small business owners like our witness from Baltimore last week will continue to face huge fines for failure to sign 

every copy of a triplicate regulatory form. Communities will continue to worry about their cement plants shutting down, as is the 

case in my district, just to clear the way for cement imports from 

dirtier plants in Mexico or China. Community banks will continue 

to be snuffed out as Dodd-Frank regulations make business possible only for banks that are big and can afford to hire an army 

of compliance officers. 

Our forefathers designed our Federal system of government to include an important system of checks and balances. The REINS Act 

is commonsense legislation that does that, and I invite all of my 

colleagues to work together to ensure it becomes law during the 

Congress and restore the sense of balance established in the Constitution. 

[The bill, H.R. 367, follows:] 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 

Mr. BACHUS. At this time, I recognize the Ranking Member of 

the Subcommittee, Mr. Steve Cohen, for his opening argument. The 

gentleman from Tennessee is recognized. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity. 

I do, though, have this weird feeling that I am somebody else 

today. I am Bill Murray, and it is February 2 again and again and 

again and again. This is the 18th time that this Subcommittee will 

have had hearings on this type of issue. It is the third time in the 

last 2 years that this Subcommittee has heard testimony on the 

REINS Act. It will be the 18th time that we have had hearings on 

the regulatory system. 

Last week I asked that the Subcommittee have limited, substantive, and nuanced discussions about ways that we can help 

with regulations, and I look forward to working with the Chairman 

on that. He mentioned small community banks. I am a big fan of 

small community banks. I bank at a small community bank. I was, 

I think, the first person in the House and one of the leaders in the 

House to suggest that FDIC insurance limits should be raised to 

$250,000 to keep small community banks’ depositors from coming 

and taking the deposits out for fear of the catastrophes that we 

were experiencing at that time, and that happened. 

So I am a big supporter of small community banks, but I am not 

a big supporter of the REINS Act, which just makes no sense to 

me. Indeed, the bureaucrats are unelected, but they are knowledgeable, and they have expertise. And to take away from them and to 

put in the Congress on the second and fourth Thursdays only, if 

and when we are here, which is becoming less and less frequent, 

and give us a very limited time to have to approve or have a onehouse veto, which is constitutionally suspect, regulations without 

expertise of the 435 of us, and we would have to approve, and the 

Senate would have to approve, and the president would have to approve, or there would be no regulation. 

That is an impossible task, and it means the end of regulations. 

And while I understand that bureaucrats are unelected, they do 

have expertise and knowledge, which we do not have. 

So this is a repeat of previous scripts, and I would love to have 

a hearing just on community banks and what we can do to help 

them. I have opposed the REINS Act. I will continue to oppose it 

because it just doesn’t make sense, just like the sequestration is 

pretty much considered dumb by both sides. I think even Speaker 

Boehner said it is not a good way to do it. This is not a good way 

to do it. If there are regulations that are a problem, you deal with 

those regulations, but you don’t give the Congress a massive ability 

to interrupt the regulatory process. 

This is mostly aimed at Affordable Care and Dodd-Frank. We 

had passed a ‘‘jobs bill’’ last time, last Congress, and it will result, 

if the rules and regulations are done in an appropriate way, in a 

lot of consumers being bilked of their finances from unscrupulous 

people trying to finance their companies, and we have a history of 

trying to look out for consumers, and should, and that is what the 

SEC has done in the past and what we will continue to do, hopefully, with rules and regulations. 
28 

I am not going to go into all the nuts and bolts of what this 

would require—both houses, the president, joint resolution within 

70 days, legislative days. It just makes no sense. I think Speaker 

Boehner used the word ‘‘silly’’ several times last week. When you 

go to the dictionary and you look up ‘‘silly,’’ it says ‘‘see REINS 

Act.’’ This is silly. 

This is also the type of legislation that I believe gives Congress 

a bad name. It is more political than it is substantive. It is not 

going to pass the Senate. And yet we could pass something to help 

community banks if we refined our subject matter, and I would like 

to see that happen. I hope we can. 

In calendar year 2010 alone, there were 94 major rules. This affects major rules, those over $100 million or so. There weren’t 

enough legislative days to consider all of this, and Congress has 

trouble getting it together. We did approve Neil Armstrong’s name 

on a space center last week, but to think we could go into these 

regulations and approve all of these with any sense of knowledge 

and certainty is dubious at best. 

So we will continue on with the hearing. It is unnecessary. Congress has many other ways to make the executive contour to what 

we would hope they would through the budget process, through 

oversight, and we have control and influence, and that is what we 

need. There needs to be a check and balance, and there needs to 

be a manageable system of implementing rules and regulations. 

Professor Levin, I am looking forward to his testimony, not that 

I am not looking forward to Mr. Gattuso’s and Professor Claeys’, 

but I know that Professor Levin is going to bring up the possible 

unconstitutionality of a one-house legislative veto. The Supreme 

Court held that to be unconstitutional. And Chief Justice Roberts, 

in discussing a law somewhat similar to this in 1983, said in a 

memorandum, ‘‘Such legislation would hobble agency rulemaking 

by requiring affirmative congressional assent to all major rules and 

would seem to impose excessive burdens on the regulatory agencies.’’ Chief Justice Roberts, who upheld the Affordable Care Act, 

is once again right. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. If I can, Mr. Chairman, introduce Mr. Conyers’ 

statement without the need to cite the outstanding arguments 

made therein but only introduce it into the record. 

Mr. BACHUS. Absolutely. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BACHUS. The full Committee Ranking Member, Mr. John 

Conyers’ opening statement will be introduced into the record at 

this time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:] 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, Ranking Member, Committee on 

the Judiciary, and Member, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law 

H.R. 367, the so-called REINS Act, is a thoroughly problematic bill. This measure 

is not only unnecessary and unworkable, but it could seriously jeopardize the health 

and safety of millions of Americans who rely on an effective regulatory system. And, 

it represents yet another partisan, shortsighted attack against regulations. 
29 

To begin with, H.R. 367 creates an unworkable process that will make it 

nearly impossible for new regulations to be enacted. The measure imposes 

unrealistic deadlines by which Congress must consider and pass exceedingly complex and technical regulations. 

Under H.R. 367, Congress would have only 70 legislative days within which to 

act after it receives a major rule. 

Now, let’s put this in some perspective. Over the past few years, the average number of major rules promulgated each year is about 80. In 2010, for instance, 94 

major rules were issued. 

But keep in mind the following fact: there were just 116 legislative days in the 

House that year. 

Worse yet, the bill restricts the days on which these major rules may be considered in the House, which, for 2012, was only 10 eligible days. 

Assuming there is just an average number of major rules, Congress would have 

to consider an average of 8 separate major rules on each of those days. 

Under H.R. 367, there is just no feasible way that Congress would have the time 

to consider all the major rules issued during the year. 

And, let’s not forget that Congress already has the tools to review both major and 

non-major rules on an individual under the Congressional Review Act of 1996. 

Under this Republican-driven initiative, Congress can disapprove a rule, a power 

that it has exercised previously. 

Another concern that I have with the bill is that it would at a minimum significantly delay rulemaking and even worse bring it to a halt. 

Major rules are often the product of an intensive, multi-year process, based on extensive input received from the public and affected entities through a notice and 

comment period. 

Agencies often spend many months, if not years, to perfect theses rules based on 

feedback from these sources and their own expertise. 

Under the bill’s short-circuited process, however, Congress will not realistically be 

able to second-guess the merits of these rules. 

When in doubt and in response to aggressive lobbying, Congress would likely decide not to approve rules. As a result, the health and safety of Americans would be 

jeopardized if needed regulations are stalled. 

Not surprisingly, more than 70 consumer groups, environmental organizations 

and labor unions, among other organizations, strenuously opposed a nearly identical 

version of this measure that was considered in the last Congress. 

In support of a veto threat, this is one of the reasons cited in the Statement of 

Administration Policy issued in the last Congress against the bill’s predecessor. 

Specifically, the White House expressed concern that bill would ‘‘throw all major 

regulations into a months-long limbo, fostering uncertainty’’ which interferes with 

the effectiveness of the federal government’s ability to protect ‘‘public health, welfare, safety, and our environment.’’ 

Finally, H.R. 367 is yet another installment on the Majority’s anti-regulatory 

agenda. 

Let’s be honest. This bill is clearly intended to take regulatory power away from 

the agencies that have the requisite expertise, and give that power to Congress 

which is ill-equipped to make highly technical decisions. 

Just last week, the Subcommittee, in what was the 17th hearing on this subject 

matter, heard the well-worn, yet thoroughly false accusation that regulations kill 

jobs. 

As I noted at last week’s hearing, if we were really serious about creating jobs, 

then we should be focusing on those measures that will actually result in creating 

jobs. 

During the last Congress, President Obama, in his address to a joint session of 

Congress, presented his American Jobs Act, a comprehensive bill that would have: 

• cut payroll taxes for qualifying employers, 

• fund a work program to provide employment opportunities for low-income 

youths and adults; 

• fund various infrastructure construction projects, including the modernization 

of public schools; and 

• start a program to rehabilitate and refurbish hundreds of thousands of foreclosed homes and businesses. 

Unfortunately, Congress chose to ignore this worthy initiative. 
30 

As many of you know, I have a measure—H.R. 4277, the ‘‘Humphrey-Hawkins 

21st Century Full Employment and Training Act’’—which aims to provide a job to 

any American who seeks work. 

My bill would create a funding mechanism to pay for job creation and training 

programs. 

These jobs would be located in the public sector, community not-for-profit organizations, and small businesses that provide community benefits. 

But, like the President’s proposal, my legislation did not receive any consideration 

during the last Congress. 

This is very unfortunate because both of these measures would have, in fact, created jobs and helped our Nation’s economic recovery. 

The American people deserve better. 

Mr. BACHUS. If you want to introduce your full opening statement, I know you didn’t take all your time, either. 

Mr. COHEN. I took enough time. Thank you. 

Mr. BACHUS. All right. 

At this time, if there are no further opening statements, without 

objection, other Members’ opening statements will be made a part 

of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:] 
31 
32 

We have a very distinguished panel today, and I will first begin 

by introducing our witnesses. Each of our witness’ written statements will be entered into the record in its entirety. I ask that each 

witness summarize his or her testimony in 5 or 6 minutes. I am 

not going to be that stringent with the time, so don’t think you 

have to read fast. Particularly to a Southerner, if you will read a 

little slower, I can follow it better. To help you stay within or just 

to know what the time is, we will have lights in front of you. 

Now, if I can have the bios of the members? I think we have had 

twice when we hadn’t had those. 

Mr. James Gattuso is a research fellow in regulatory policy for 

the Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation. Prior to joining Heritage, he was vice president for policy 

at the Competitive Enterprise Institute. In that position, he 

oversaw CEI’s policy work and supervised the overall management 

of the organization. Before joining CEI in 1997, Mr. Gattuso had 

served since 1993 as vice president for policy development with 

Citizens for a Sound Economy, where he directed the research activities of that fine organization. From 1990 to 1993, he was deputy 

chief of the Office of Plans and Policy at the Federal Communications Commission. 

We welcome you, Mr. Gattuso. 

Professor Eric Claeys is a professor at the George Mason University School of Law. The professor has taught at the University of 

Chicago School of Law and St. Louis University School of Law. 

Prior to teaching, Professor Claeys practiced appellate and tort litigation at the law firm of Kirkland and Ellis. Professor Claeys 

clerked for the Honorable Chief Justice William Rehnquist and the 

Honorable Melvin Brunetti. Professor Claeys’ scholarship focuses 

on American property in constitutional law, and particularly on the 

influence of American natural law and natural rights theory on the 

law. He graduated from Princeton University and received his J.D. 

from the University of Southern California. 

Our third witness is Professor Ronald Levin, who is a legal scholar at the Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, who 

specializes in administrative law and regulation law issues. He is 

co-author of a casebook on administrative law and has published 

numerous articles and book chapters on administrative law topics. 

Mr. Levin previously served as Washington University Law 

School’s associate dean and is currently a public member of the Administrative Conference of the United States. Prior to joining the 

faculty at Washington University in 1979, Mr. Levin worked as an 

associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Sutherland Ashbill and 

Brennan. He clerked for Judge John C. Godbold of the U.S. Court 

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Montgomery. He earned his J.D. 

degree from the University of Chicago and his B.A. magna cum 

laude from Yale University. 

This is an excellent panel that we have assembled. We will now 

proceed under the 5-minute rule with opening statements. 

So, Mr. Gattuso, you are recognized first. Then I am going to go 

to Professor Claeys, and then Professor Levin. 
33 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES L. GATTUSO, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW IN REGULATORY POLICY, THOMAS A. ROE INSTITUTE 

FOR ECONOMIC POLICY STUDIES, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. GATTUSO. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Cohen, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for having me 

here today. Over the past few weeks, all eyes have been focused on 

Federal spending in efforts to limit an out-of-control budget. Obscure policy terms like ‘‘sequestration’’ have become household 

words across the country. However, Federal spending is only part 

of the burden imposed on Americans by the Federal Government. 

Regulations impose hundreds of billions, or even trillions, of dollars 

in additional costs. These burdens not only increase consumer 

prices but keep enterprises from growing and jobs from being created. 

During the past 4 years, the regulatory burdens placed on the 

American people and the economy have grown at a breathtaking 

rate. During President Obama’s first 4 years in office, over 130 

major rules increasing regulatory burdens were issued, imposing 

some $70 billion in new annual costs according to preliminary estimates we have done at the Heritage Foundation, based on agency 

calculations of their own costs. 

I will note that these numbers exclude budgetary transfer costs. 

It excludes other rules that do not have a regulatory effect. This 

is a subset of just those rules that constrain private activity. So 

this is the core amount of regulation. By comparison, about 50 such rules worth $15 billion in new 

costs were imposed during George W. Bush’s term, and more regulation is on the way. According to the latest Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations, 131 new major regulations are already in the 

pipeline. That compares to 90 in process when President Obama 

took office, and only 56 in the spring of 2001. 

However, while regulatory growth has accelerated under President Obama, it did not start with his Administration. Each year for 

the past 30 years, according to the Office of Management and 

Budget, the burden of regulation imposed on Americans has increased. Not since 1982 have regulatory costs decreased. 

Not all regulations are unwarranted. No one is talking about 

eliminating airline safety rules or allowing contaminated meat to 

be freely distributed and sold. But there are volumes of rules not 

so well justified, ranging from the trivial—do we really need to 

paint an ‘‘F’’ at the front of the locomotive to tell which side is 

which—to the potentially catastrophic—should the Federal Communications Commission regulate the Internet. 

The constant increase in regulatory burdens is taking its toll on 

the economy at a time when the Nation can ill afford it. Firm action by Congress to rein in this growing red tape is needed. This 

should include requiring explicit approval of all new major rules by 

Congress as provided by the REINS Act, ensuring that burdens are 

not placed on Americans without the approval of their elected representatives. 

This would be a significant change in the way rules are issued. 

The effect, however, is to reinforce, not to upset, the constitutional 

balance. As a first matter, the change merely restores Congress’ 
34 

constitutional role of legislating, much of which has been delegated 

to regulators in the past. As important, the change constrains Congress as much as it empowers it by making legislators more accountable for their actions. 

Now, despite claims by opponents and some supporters of 

REINS, this legislation is not inherently anti-regulatory. Instead, 

it simply ensures scrutiny by Congress of all proposed rules, all 

proposed major rules. It would apply just as much to agency decisions that reduce regulatory burdens as it would to those that increase such burdens. 

Some critics say that the task of reviewing so many rules would 

be too burdensome for Congress. But while costly, the number of 

major regulations issued each year is in the low dozens typically, 

hardly an unmanageable number. Of these, about half are budgetary in nature, such as those setting Medicare reimbursement 

rates, and perhaps could be exempted from the REINS Act. 

In any case, it hardly makes sense to excuse Congress from the 

task of reviewing new rules because there are so many being imposed on the private sector. If anything, that would indicate a 

greater need to monitor the regulatory activity. 

Some also argue that the REINS Act would displace regulators’ 

expert judgment with political decision-making. For example, one 

critic wrote that Congressional action under the REINS Act is 

‘‘likely to be nakedly political, reflecting the raw political power of 

public interests,’’ while ‘‘agency actions are backed up with reasonable policy determinations.’’ 

Outside of political science textbooks, that is not how government 

works. Regulators have their own interests and agendas, and political considerations, shockingly, do influence the process. Spend an 

hour in front of almost any agency in Washington and watch the 

lobbyists flow in and out if you doubt that. 

Most regulatory decision-making requires more than scientific 

expertise. It involves value judgments as to what burdens will be 

placed on the American people, what those burdens are, what size 

they are, and for what benefit. Such decisions properly involve Congress. 

Now, while the REINS Act would provide an important start toward taming excessive regulations, other steps are needed as well; 

among these, imposing sunset dates for Federal regulations. The 

REINS Act is a forward-looking reform, ensuring scrutiny of newly 

proposed rules. To ensure that the existing rules are justified and 

effective, they should automatically expire after a period of, say, 10 

years if not explicitly reaffirmed by regulators through a notice of 

comment rulemaking. 

Secondly, we need to develop a congressional regulatory analysis 

capability. In order to exercise its duties under the REINS Act, 

Congress needs the capability to analyze proposed and existing 

rules independently, without reliance on the OMB or other regulatory agencies. This can be done through a new congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis, modeled on the Congressional Budget 

Office, or alternatively through existing congressional institutions 

such as the CBO or the Government Accountability Office. 

Congressional approval of proposed new rules as provided in the 

REINS Act would be an important step toward holding regulators 
35 

in Congress accountable for regulations imposed in the private sector. While it is no panacea for the increasing flood of regulations, 

it would be a powerful first step toward reform. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gattuso follows:] 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Mr. Gattuso. 

Professor Claeys? 

TESTIMONY OF ERIC R. CLAEYS, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 

GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. CLAEYS. Chairman Bachus, Ranking Member Cohen, Vice 

Chairman Farenthold, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank 

you very much for inviting me to testify. I am honored by the opportunity. With special respect to Ranking Member Cohen, I testified on this issue 2 years ago. So I, too, feel like it is Groundhog 

Day and sympathize with you. 

If I may, I would like to state orally four main points from my 

written testimony. First, Congress has constitutional authority to 

enact the REINS Act. Usually, Congress has extremely broad discretion to decide how to structure the executive administration of 

law. It may, and often does, write primary rules of conduct without 

the help of agencies and statutes. Congress can strip all executive 

agencies that currently promulgate rules of their rulemaking powers and convert those agencies into advisory committees for this 

Senate and this House’s authorizing committees. 

The power to promulgate legislative rules becomes an executive 

power if, to the extent that, and under whatever constitutionally 

proper conditions Congress establishes using the necessary and 

proper clause. Under that clause, Congress may reasonably find it 

necessary and proper to recalibrate agency rulemaking powers to 

make agencies seek pre-approval from Congress for major rules before they take on the force of law. 

Second, the REINS Act is consistent with the holding of INS v. 

Chadha. Under Chadha, when a congress charges executive agencies to administer acts of Congress, it may not reserve the power 

to second-guess agencies’ administrations of the law using so-called 

legislative vetoes. In response to such a legislative veto, Chadha 

holds, ‘‘To accomplish what has been attempted by one house of 

Congress in this case,’’ that means a legislative veto, ‘‘requires conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution’s prescription for legislative action, passage by a majority of both houses, 

and presentment to the president,’’ 462 U.S. at 958. 

This holding doesn’t say the Congress may never inject itself into 

the executive’s administration of the law. Rather, it says if Congress chooses to inject itself into the executive’s administration of 

the law, it may only do so by a legislative process respecting Article 

1, Section 7’s requirements of bicameralism and presentment. 

Under the REINS Act, joint resolutions of approval must be passed 

in both houses. By long-standing practice, it is assumed that such 

resolutions will be presented to the president. In Chadha’s words, 

that process is ‘‘in conformity with the express procedures’’ of Article 1, Section 7. 

I would like to move from my testimony about the constitutional 

issues to my testimony about the merits. So, third, Congress may 

reasonably conclude that the REINS Act is a necessary and proper 

means to protect the rights of U.S. citizens more effectively than 

current Federal administrative law does. Congress is expected to 

use its constitutional powers to, in the preamble of the Constitution, secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity; 
45 

and, in the Declaration of Independence, to secure certain 

unalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit 

of happiness. 

Like statutes, if well crafted, legislative rules can secure rights— 

health, safety, the capacity to buy goods and services free from deception or misinformation, and so on. Also like statutes, however, 

when poorly crafted, legislative rules can threaten rights. More 

than 20 years ago now, I was honored to work for Congressman 

Ron Packard, Oceanside, California. Back then, the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers was promulgating wetlands regulations that, in 

his opinion and mine, unduly threatened property rights. Poorly 

crafted airport inspection regulations can threaten the privacy of 

U.S. citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 

Poorly crafted health insurance regulations can coerce American 

citizens and American businesses to use their own salary or company accounts to cross-subsidize conduct that violates their religious consciences. 

At least for rules being scored as major rules, Members of Congress owe it to their constituents to consider carefully whether 

those rules advance their intended goals, with due respect for those 

constituents’ unalienable rights. 

Last, some critics of the REINS Act believe that if the REINS 

Act is enacted, the REINS Act’s joint resolution process will inject 

politics and special-interest groups into policymaking by apolitical 

regulatory agencies. With respect, in many cases I believe this view 

has things backwards. Now more than ever, the president closely 

supervises agency policymaking and injects a great deal of politics 

into it. 

At least as important, over the last 20 to 40 years legislators and 

policymakers have learned the theory of capture, and scholars have 

learned of the theory of public choice, and these capture and public 

choice theories teach us that special interests quite often exert 

much more influence in a regime where there is legislation and administration than in a regime where Congress were to do most of 

the legislating itself. 

I cite examples in my testimony involving flame retardant furniture regulation, benzene regulation, and a few others cases. 

There are many causes and mechanisms for special-interest group 

influence, and the REINS Act barely scratches the surface. But if 

you are concerned about special-interest influence, the REINS Act 

performs a crucial function. The joint resolution process forces public policy and special-interest politics back into the floors of Congress, and Congress must take accountability for the hard tradeoffs between the two. 

And since the Chairman gave a little bit of grace, I am just going 

to use one case example. So there is an ongoing rulemaking right 

now in the Consumer Product Safety Commission about flame retardant furniture. In this, fire marshals petition for a rule, but the 

fire marshals were funded by tobacco companies. The furniture 

companies used health and safety studies to suggest that the 

chemicals to be used to protect the furniture to make them inflammable might be carcinogenic or threatening to the environment. 
46 

I humbly submit that, first, it would be good for Congress to debate and to consider the scientific issues because the science here 

is so tentative that it becomes inescapably political. 

Second, there is a huge moral hazard issue that needs to be considered here, and I don’t think the science is capable of considering 

it. In the backdrop, what drives the fires that are set by furniture 

when people fall asleep while holding cigarettes, and Members of 

Congress I think are at least as competent as scientists to decide 

whether the law would promote irresponsibility by letting people 

have a couch that protected them from the fact that they fell asleep 

with a cigarette in their bedroom or on their couch. 

Last, if there is special-interest politics, it would be healthy for 

the political process and the administrative process for debates 

about whether the safety arguments here are motivated by tobacco 

companies, and whether the health and environment arguments 

here are motivated by furniture manufacturers. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Claeys follows:] 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Professor Claeys. 

Professor Levin, you are recognized. 

TESTIMONY OF RONALD M. LEVIN, WILLIAM R. ORTHWEIN 

DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR OF LAW, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. This hearing is being held in the shadow of the sequester. Indiscriminate budget cuts are going into effect because the 

two houses of Congress and the president don’t agree on what to 

do about the budget. The sequester is a vivid symbol of much more 

because these days the House and Senate agree on very little. It 

is well known that the 112th Congress was the least productive 

Congress in at least 60 years by a wide margin of about 100 laws, 

and the 113th has good prospects of being similar. 

And yet the bill that is before you today in this hearing would 

provide that no major rule prepared by an agency could go into effect unless both houses of Congress and the president do agree 

with it. That suggests to me that if the REINS Act were enacted, 

major rulemaking on any controversial subject would be virtually 

impossible. 

In view of the extraordinary levels of ideological polarization and 

lack of compromise that we are seeing today, now is hardly a propitious time to consider a substantial increase in the responsibilities of the legislative branch. The upshot of the REINS Act could 

be that the dysfunction we now see in the enactment of laws would 

spread to the implementation of the laws, and I do not think that 

is an attractive prospect. 

If the act were enacted this year, the interference with the rulemaking process would affect a Democratic administration, but in 

the long run we will have both Democratic and Republican presidents, and this act would pose a major barrier to any president’s 

ability to pursue the policies that he or she was elected to promote. 

In my view, gridlock in the rulemaking process is a poor idea no 

matter whether a Democrat or a Republican is in the White House. 

As Justice Scalia said about the legislative veto right after Ronald 

Reagan was elected, the legislative veto isn’t biased against regulation. It is biased against change. The REINS Act, I think, operates 

very similarly and would have a similar effect. 

Now, it is true that some major rules are much less controversial, and it is not implausible that they could get through Congress 

in a reasonable period of time. But let’s face it, these are matters 

that Congress delegated in the first place because it did not want 

to decide them on its own. Many of these matters are dry, technical, and complex, and Congress could very reasonably have 

thought that they should be left to specialized agencies because 

resolution of those questions within the legislature is not a wise or 

efficient use of congressional time. 

I see no reason why Congress should now retrospectively overturn all those judgments. It is much too late in the day to turn 

back the clock and question the legitimacy of delegation itself. We 

have a functioning system that has been evolving for generations 

and should not be lightly overthrown. That system allows the busi-
64 

ness of government to go on, but it also includes a good deal of accountability. 

Congress can be held accountable for its decision to set up new 

programs and empower agencies to implement them with rulemaking, and the executive branch is politically accountable for the 

rules themselves. I don’t find anything illegitimate about this system. On the contrary, it is the REINS Act that threatens to overthrow long-established norms and may not even survive constitutional review. 

On the surface, the procedures of the act seem to comply with 

the law-making requirements of Article 1 of the Constitution. But 

when you look at it closely, you can see that it would enable a single house of Congress to nullify an agency rule without obtaining 

the concurrence of the other house or the president. 

In the legislative veto case in 1983, INS v. Chadha, the Supreme 

Court spent several pages emphasizing that the framers of the 

Constitution regarded the safeguards of bicameralism and presentment as fundamental precisely because they feared that action by 

a single chamber could often prove arbitrary. 

I think the sponsors of the REINS Act are being too optimistic 

when they assume that the Court would overlook the fact that the 

REINS Act would revive those very same dangers that Chadha and 

subsequent cases have sought to prevent. 

In my prepared statement I show that not only the U.S. Supreme 

Court but also appellate courts in more than a dozen states have 

strongly and almost unanimously resisted attempts by Congress 

and other legislatures to expand their control over agency action 

beyond traditional boundaries. The REINS Act might suffer a similar fate if it were enacted. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, the REINS Act does have a clever 

name, suggesting reins that guide the horse along the path, but I 

believe the American people should not be saddled with it. 

That concludes my presentation, and I will be happy to respond 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levin follows:] 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Professor Levin. 

At this time, I will recognize the Chairman of the full Committee, the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Bob Goodlatte from Virginia, 

for questions. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this important hearing. I want to commend you, and I want to 

commend Congressman Young of Indiana for his efforts in introducing this legislation here, the second Congress that he has done 
77 

so. I think it is an important piece of legislation. And I apologize 

for not getting here when opening statements were given, so I will 

submit mine for the record and go right to the questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goodlatte follows:] 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary 

Economic growth is the key to recovery of job creation, the success of Main Street 

businesses and the hope of America’s global competitiveness. With robust economic 

growth, America can solve a host of the problems that confront us—from high unemployment to fading American competitiveness. 

America’s current growth rate, however, is anemic. In 2010, real GDP increased 

only 2.4 percent. In 2011, the rate of growth shrank to 1.8 percent. Although final 

figures for 2012 are not yet in, growth in the fourth quarter of 2012 was an abysmal 

0.1 percent. 

Employment figures are no better. In January 2013, real unemployment remained 

mired at 14.4 percent. Nominal unemployment rose to 7.9 percent. Behind these figures are millions upon millions of struggling American faces, many who have been 

living without work for many, many months. Economic experts have said that this 

represents, not just a lingering economic downturn, but a jobs depression. 

Other figures paint the picture still bleaker. The number of small businesses 

being created—the primary source of new jobs—has declined. America’s national 

debt is skyrocketing. Record levels of Americans are on food stamps. The number 

of Americans on Social Security disability is at record levels, too. Many say this is 

because millions are turning to disability claims to substitute for unemployment insurance. 

Poverty is knocking hard on millions of Americans’ doors. National bankruptcy, 

meanwhile, is knocking hard on America’s door. 

Everyone knows it has been this way for far too long. But the Obama Administration, instead of fixing the problem, knows only one response—increase taxes, increase spending and increase regulation. 

As a result, the Obama Administration has proven one thing better than any 

other administration in history. America cannot tax, spend and regulate its way to 

economic recovery, economic growth and durable prosperity for the American people. 

The Judiciary Committee has broad jurisdiction over one of the three major 

strands of this economic knot that the Obama Administration has tied, and America 

must untie. That strand is the federal regulatory system—a system that every day 

places more and more obstacles in the path of economic growth. It is my intention 

as Chairman to do everything that the Judiciary Committee can to achieve real regulatory reform and help provide the growth and recovery America needs. 

The REINS Act is one of the simplest, clearest and most powerful measures we 

can adopt to further that purpose. The level of new major regulation the Obama Administration has issued and plans to issue is without modern precedent. Testimony 

before the Judiciary Committee this term and during the 112th Congress has plainly shown the connection between skyrocketing levels of regulation and declining levels of jobs and growth. 

The REINS Act responds by requiring an up-or-down vote by the people’s representatives in Congress before any new major regulation can be imposed on our 

economy. It does not prohibit new major regulation. It simply establishes the principle, ‘‘No major regulation without representation.’’ 

By restoring to Members of Congress, who are accountable to the American people, the responsibility for America’s costliest regulatory decisions, the REINS Act 

provides Congress, and ultimately the people, with a desperately needed tool to 

check the one-way cost ratchet that Washington’s regulatory bureaucrats incessantly turn. 

During the 112th Congress, the Judiciary Committee originated a number of regulatory reform bills that the House passed on a bipartisan basis. The REINS Act was 

one of them. I encourage all of the Members of the Committee to assure that the 

REINS Act is reported out of this Committee once more and is passed on an even 

greater bipartisan basis in the 113th Congress. The REINS Act is not a partisan 

issue. It is a paramount institutional and national issue. All Members of Congress 

should step forward to rein in the federal government’s costliest decisions. 
78 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Professor Levin, I was interested in what you 

had to say, your observations about the intrusion of the legislative 

branch into the authority of the executive branch. Let me just say, 

and I will get to a specific question in a moment, but I quite frankly think that whether by deliberate act of the Congress writing legislation that is giving tremendous authority to the executive branch 

or, as many people think, the executive branch overstepping their 

authority and taking and reinterpreting legislation passed by the 

Congress and twisting it into new ways to do new things, either 

way, there has been a dramatic shift in power here in Washington 

between the legislative branch and the executive branch, and it 

very much concerns me. So I am all for putting the reins to that 

with legislation like this. 

I hear you say you think this may be unconstitutional. Both Justice Stephen Breyer and Professor Laurence Tribe have written articles opining that congressional pre-approval mechanisms would 

be consistent with Chadha. Can you summarize why they think 

pre-approval would be constitutional and explain why you disagree 

with them? 

Mr. LEVIN. Yes, sir. I do know Justice Breyer’s article, or Judge 

Breyer’s article, as he was then. I believe he did not endorse the 

system that he was outlining. He was explaining a method by 

which you might set up such a system. At that time, I don’t think 

you had the same problem of intense polarization that you have 

now. Justice Breyer himself got his seat on the Court with strong 

Republican support because he had worked cooperatively with 

them. He was a Democrat who had worked on deregulation, and I 

don’t think he would necessarily take the same view today, because 

Justice Breyer in his scholarship is very interested in things that 

work out well. He is a pragmatist, and under current circumstances I am not sure he would think it is a good idea. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. But he did opine at that time that a pre-approval process would be constitutional. 

I want to ask Professor Claeys if he would like to offer his observations on the same question. First of all, do you think a pre-approval process is constitutional, and do you think that Justice 

Breyer’s and Professor Tribe’s articles are consistent with your 

point of view? 

Mr. CLAEYS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do. I think that then Judge 

Breyer and Professor Tribe’s articles are persuasive on their own, 

and they are also useful to the Committee. If the Committee is trying to do a litigation assessment, how likely it is that there is going 

to be a constitutional challenge, I think that then Judge Breyer’s 

and Professor Tribe’s articles give you a sense of what the conventional wisdom is about how the Chadha case is interpreted. 

So the Chadha case has some loose language, and any good appellate lawyer can cherry-pick out a few pieces of language from 

one case and another case and another case and string those together to say that these cases all together suggest a certain result. 

But case reasoning also requires that you take some language from 

the cases more seriously than others. 

In my opening statement I gave you one of what I consider two 

or three money passages of the Chadha case, and I think those 

money passages suggest that Congress gets into trouble if Congress 
79 

tries to institute some kind of chokepoint using a Committee veto, 

a one-house veto, or a two-house veto without presenting the twohouse veto to the president. Anything beyond that is kind of the 

looser language of the dicta of the case. 

It is telling that Judge Breyer and Professor Tribe said, then, 

that it would be—Congress could accord it with a respect, the 

Chadha holding, if it enacted a system that used what Judge 

Breyer called confirmatory acts. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you very much. My time is running out. 

I do want to get one more question in to Mr. Gattuso. 

In your view, what current regulatory efforts by the Obama administration most highlight the need for reforms like those in the 

REINS Act, and why, and how do these regulations threaten jobs 

and growth? With the 30 seconds or so that is left in my time. 

Mr. GATTUSO. I think the Obama administration has been moving forward at a rapid clip on a large number of fronts, and I don’t 

think we have seen any Administration move forward on so many 

at the same time. If I had to name one, I would point to the DoddFrank implementation, where there are still hundreds of regulations yet to be made, and we have no idea what they are going to 

say. The language has been incredibly vague for some aspects, such 

as the Volcker rule. The agencies themselves don’t see any way of 

implementing it in a way that makes sense. And we have new institutions such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 

which is completely insulated from any sort of oversight from other 

sources. 

So I think that is perhaps the single biggest danger out there 

right now, although there are plenty to choose from. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

At this time I will recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Steve Cohen of Tennessee, for his round of questioning. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Gattuso, you just said to the Chairman of the full Committee 

that there were hundreds of regulations that you would be concerned about? 

Mr. GATTUSO. What I said was that under the Dodd-Frank law, 

there are still hundreds of regulations yet to be promulgated. 

Mr. COHEN. Right, and in your testimony you said that while 

costly, the number of major regulations each year is in the low dozens. And yet the data that the Government Accountability Office 

puts out says there were 237 major rules during President Bush’s 

first term, 268 plus the 11 that happened during the first months 

of the Obama administration, no more than that. 

How do you reconcile those differences in numbers? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Well, the hundreds of rules that I cite for DoddFrank include all rules. There are over 3,000, typically, in a year. 

Mr. COHEN. So how many major rules do you submit are approved each year? 

Mr. GATTUSO. It varies, but it is typically in the 60’s or 70’s. It 

goes up. Sometimes it can be over 100. Sometimes it will be less. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, that’s right. It was 70, 51, 50, 66, 56, 56, 61, 

95, 84, and 100. In your testimony it says it is in the low dozens. 
80 

Well, I guess low is low compared to 1,000 dozens, but low dozens 

is generally what you think of as one or two or three, and we are 

talking about—six may be low dozens, but that is a lot. 

Do you keep up with Congress? Are you a C-SPAN guy? 

Mr. GATTUSO. I try and watch it when going to sleep, yes. 

Mr. COHEN. It is not addictive, so that is good. You realize we 

are having problems getting things done right now. How many of 

these rules do you think that the Senate and the House and the 

president would agree on? In the low dozens, how many of those 

low dozens do you think would have a chance of getting through? 

Mr. GATTUSO. I can’t estimate that, but most are not controversial. Also, and I point this out in my testimony, close to half—I 

don’t have the exact number, but a large number of those are budgetary transfer rules, which are really outside the scope of what we 

are trying to get at with the REINS Act. 

Mr. COHEN. So if most of them are not controversial, why should 

we be burdening ourselves with this? 

Mr. GATTUSO. To find out which ones are controversial and which 

ones are objectionable. 

Mr. COHEN. And the Committee has to do this within 15 days of 

submission. Do you think the Committee, within 15 days of submission—and sometimes we aren’t even here for 15 days. But when we 

are here, we are here for maybe 1 day each of Subcommittee, 1 day 

a week. How many of these rules can we go through to find out 

which ones are substantive, and then debate those substantive 

ones in an intelligent manner? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Well, I do know that the Congress spends a lot of 

time on other issues that are not quite so important. I think there 

were over 100 post offices that were named by the Congress in the 

last session. 

Mr. COHEN. We quit doing post offices. In fact, we are going to 

quit the postal authority, probably. 

Mr. GATTUSO. I think that it is difficult to go to a small business, 

for instance, with a straight face and say that we are sorry about 

these billions of costs that we are imposing on you, but we don’t 

have time to look at them to decide whether they are worthwhile 

or not. 

Mr. COHEN. Let me ask you this question. What is your opinion 

of Congress’ work product? You mentioned that we passed all these 

post offices and we don’t do much, and you watch C-SPAN to go 

to bed. You don’t have a very high opinion of Congress, do you? 

Mr. GATTUSO. I do have a high opinion of Congress. I think that 

Congress has the responsibility to decide what rules should be applied to all Americans and has the moral authority based upon 

their election by the people to decide that. I think they should be 

limited, but they also should do their job. 

Mr. COHEN. You mentioned lobbyists, and you say that the lobbyists are involved somewhat with the regulatory agencies. Can you 

imagine the field day lobbyists would have if all they had to do was 

take one Subcommittee and one portion of the House or one Committee to defeat a rule, that one Committee could defeat a rule? Do 

you think there would be lobbyists up here trying to influence a 

Committee to not pass a rule? 
81 

Mr. GATTUSO. I think there are lobbyists up here, and there are 

also lobbyists that have one agency. It certainly is a lot easier to 

influence one agency at that chokepoint. 

Mr. COHEN. Do lobbyists make contributions to the people on the 

agencies? They don’t. And do lobbyists help endorse people that run 

for the agency? No. But they endorse, and they give contributions, 

and they could be up here trying to have their influence, and that 

is where they have their influence. That is where they do that voodoo that they do so well. So it just creates a real problem. 

Professor Levin, do you have any comments you would like to 

make in the last minute here on what has been testified to by the 

other parties? 

Mr. LEVIN. Yes. With respect to the influence of lobbyists, there 

are political science studies that show that in the legislative veto 

days, special-interest influences were substantial and had an impact on the way those operated in the states. 

Secondly, with regard to the post office bills and the like, first 

of all, the total product of this last Congress would be even lower 

if you didn’t have the post office bills building up their total. But 

more fundamentally, I think Congress could make time for major 

rules or other things if they cut out fundraisers, constituent service, district visits, and ceremonial bills, but I don’t think those are 

the things that would be eliminated, because those are matters 

that serve the political interests of Members directly. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman, can I ask for 20 seconds? 

Mr. BACHUS. Yes, sure. 

Mr. COHEN. I am just curious, and I don’t know that a lawyer 

is supposed to ask a question he knows the answer to, but when 

the Chairman was asking you about Breyer’s and Tribe’s opinion, 

was that on a similar system to where there was a veto by either 

house, or was it the pre-approval? 

Mr. LEVIN. It wasn’t anything specific. It was just a thought experiment, I would say, and it wasn’t the same as the REINS Act 

because it would not have provided that, once a matter is approved, 

it would nevertheless be subject to APA review on all grounds, 

which this bill contemplates. 

Mr. COHEN. All Judge Breyer and Mr. Tribe were saying is that 

they thought whatever that was, it was constitutional. They did not 

come to a value judgment, like Justice Roberts did, to say that it 

was bad policy. 

Mr. LEVIN. Justice Breyer, Judge Breyer said he was quite skeptical of its merit. He was putting forth an idea, but he indicated 

that he would be doubtful about it. 

Mr. COHEN. So he concurred with Justice Roberts. Thank you. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Now I would recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Tom Marino, for questions. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. 

Good afternoon, gentlemen. Thank you for being here. I love constitutional law. I was a prosecutor, but I thoroughly enjoy constitutional law. Maybe perhaps someday, each of us together, one-onone, can have lunch and I can bore you with my positions, and you 

can educate me as to what is going on. I think in my second life 
82 

I want to study more constitutional law and teach it, if possible. 

But I respect all of your opinions. You are very bright men. 

Professor Levin, am I pronouncing that right? I will start with 

you for a moment. Why not let the process work? Legislation, and 

the courts refer to it—Chadha was an opinion handed down by the 

Burger Court, and I read the case, but it was a cursory reading, 

again, not the detail that I would read it for in law school. But that 

was in 1983. 

The mood of the people has changed. Big government, invasion 

by agencies with ridiculous legislation, with administrative laws, 

for an example, the EPA trying to get control over the waterways 

by saying a rain puddle, they would have control over that because 

it is water and it is in a puddle, and they want control over it. 

Spilled milk on a farm, they wanted control over that as well. I 

could go on and on. 

But Rehnquist and White handed down a rather, I think, excellent dissenting opinion on the one-house legislative veto in violation of the separation of powers, and Rehnquist went into detail on 

specifically and very narrowly saying it is the intent of Congress. 

Can you show me where Congress did not have this intent that you 

are referring to as to why you think it is unconstitutional? 

Mr. LEVIN. Well, first, with regard to the antiquity of the Chadha 

decision, I think the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions have relied on it directly. They have never questioned it. A dozen state supreme courts have reached very similar positions under their respective state constitutions. The case law is overwhelming in suggesting that the bicameralism and presentment restraints should 

be effective in circumstances like this. I don’t think Chadha is out 

of date at all. 

Mr. MARINO. I am not saying Chadha is out of date. I am just 

saying the mood has changed since that opinion has been handed 

down. Now, I am not one to determine or to take a guess on where 

the Supreme Court is going on any decision. But let’s get back to 

the issue of intent. 

Mr. LEVIN. I am not sure what you mean by intent, though. Obviously, Congress intends to do things, but it is sometimes not constitutional to do them. 

Mr. MARINO. Well, isn’t that the way the process works, then? 

And then the courts, when they are brought in, make that determination? And don’t you think that in the Affordable Health Care 

Act, at least I inferred from Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion that, 

Congress, you legislate, and when it is necessary, then we will 

come in and make a ruling on that legislation? 

Mr. LEVIN. Well, so you could pass the REINS Act and see if it 

is constitutional or not. But I think you should, in prudence, spend 

your time on things that have a good chance of surviving review, 

as opposed to things where the prospects are poor. It is your choice. 

Mr. MARINO. I was never one to back down from a fight, whether 

the prospects are poor or not, or whether the Senate is going to 

vote on it. You certainly made it clear that Congress hasn’t done 

much, but I think the 40 pieces of legislation on Harry Reid’s desk 

in the Senate that we sent over there that haven’t been accounted 

for says a little bit that the Congress has been trying to work hard 

on both sides of the aisle here in the House. 
83 

Professor Claeys, could you respond to the intent issue concerning Chadha and where we are going with the REINS Act? 

Mr. CLAEYS. I will do my best, Congressman. I will make a few 

points. 

First, I think this Congress, forgetting about the assessment of 

the constitutional merit, should be prudent and ask itself how likely is it that the act is going to be declared unconstitutional or not, 

just because it is a significant investment of time to enact the law. 

But I think that the chances that this law would be afoul of 

Chadha are slim. I am not sure Professor Levin disagrees that 

much, because he says he is not convinced in his testimony that 

Chadha will be read narrowly, and he says courts might be disinclined to read REINS as a violation of Chadha. 

Second, this Congress, though, is an independent co-equal actor, 

and it has a responsibility to run down constitutional questions. So, 

as I said in my written testimony in my opening statement, I think 

there is no Chadha problem here. 

So last, I don’t think Chadha has to be overruled. All that needs 

to happen is for courts to say this law satisfies the expectations 

that Chadha laid down. 

Mr. MARINO. Mr. Gattuso, just briefly. My time, if not out, is 

running out. 

Mr. GATTUSO. On Chadha? 

Mr. MARINO. Yes. 

Mr. GATTUSO. I think it is an odd argument to say that REINS 

would be tantamount to a one-house veto. Frankly, that argument 

proves way too much, in my view. That would seem to cover every 

legislative action by Congress where if the House or the Senate refused to pass a bill, it is blocked, or the REINS Act itself was 

passed by the House and not the Senate, was that a one-house 

veto? I think for that argument to work, there has to be something 

in the nature of the regulations that are being reviewed that is 

particular to the executive branch where the Congress does not 

have the power to revoke that authority. 

In every one of the regulations that would be covered by REINS, 

every one of the 130 regulations that we have identified coming 

from the Obama administration are legislative. They are not executive. Congress can withdraw them completely. So I see nothing special about them that would make that different than other legislation. 

Mr. MARINO. Gentlemen, I leave here today learning something 

from each of you. I appreciate the discussion, and thank you for 

being here. I yield back. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hank Johnson, is now recognized for his questions. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gattuso from the Heritage Foundation, do you have any idea 

how much money the Koch brothers have invested in the Heritage 

Foundation since its inception? 

Mr. GATTUSO. No, I don’t. I can tell you that our total corporate 

donations are in the neighborhood of 5 percent of our income. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But that doesn’t include the Koch brothers’ money, 

though. 
84 

Mr. GATTUSO. That would include the Koch brothers’ corporate 

money. It is not a large part of our basis. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Come on. That sounds like horse poop to me. 

Mr. GATTUSO. Our donor lists are open. I can get you that information. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Claeys, how much has George Mason University Law School received from the Koch brothers? Do you have any 

idea? 

Mr. CLAEYS. No, Congressman, I don’t have any idea. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But you do know that it has been—it has taken 

money from the Koch brothers; correct? 

Mr. CLAEYS. I don’t know that it has. I would not be surprised 

if it had. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. All right. 

How about your institution, Professor Levin? 

Mr. LEVIN. I have no idea. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. All right. Well, I haven’t heard any reports 

about Koch brothers’ money into your institution. 

Mr. LEVIN. But if they know what I stand for, they would probably not contribute it, at least to me. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I would think not, based on what I have 

heard today. I will say that your analogy or your observation about 

the gridlock that is the most prominent feature of congressional activity these days, as evidenced by the sequester situation, which I 

think most folks would say is just this meat ax, meat cleaver approach to cutting the Federal Government, is not wise. I am sure 

that most would agree. I am sure that Mr. Gattuso and Mr. Claeys 

would agree with that also. 

Oh, you do not? Okay. All right. Mr. Claeys does not agree that 

the meat ax is not a good way, or the meat ax is preferable to the 

surgeon’s scalpel in terms of cutting the Federal budget. 

But I will say your analogy about the gridlock, with that being 

Exhibit A, is a good reason why, from a practical standpoint, passage of the REINS Act would be a bad idea. 

Mr. Gattuso, you would disagree with that? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Well, you said this is a meat ax approach. I don’t 

see it that way. 

Mr. JOHNSON. No, I am off of that issue. The issue I want you 

to address is the current gridlock in Congress and whether or not, 

in light of that gridlock, what would passage of the REINS Act add 

positively to the ability of Congress to get things done? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Well, to start, I don’t think that the measure of 

success for government should be the number of laws that are 

passed or the number of regulations that are enacted. That is not 

success. The success should be the value to society, the consideration and deliberation of each rule, of each action that is taken. So 

the REINS Act would add to that by requiring consideration, more 

thorough consideration of every action. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So your goal is to just cut down on the number 

of laws and the number of regulations so as to free up the free 

market system to work its will for the benefit of all. 

Let me ask you this, though. Let me ask you this. China, the pollution in Beijing, due largely to unregulated burning of fossil fuels, 

and the health impact that that has on the blood and on the lungs 
85 

of the people in China, and also the people in Japan and across the 

water, is that a regulatable situation? Is there any economic value 

in protecting people’s health? 

Mr. GATTUSO. The last I checked, Congressman, China was still 

a communist country, and a large portion, the predominant portion 

of its industry and businesses are still state owned or state controlled. It is not an example of a free market economy. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The problem we are talking about is regulations, 

though. 

Mr. GATTUSO. It is not a free market economy. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Isn’t regulation good when it comes to protecting 

people’s health? 

Mr. GATTUSO. I think you can point to China as an example of 

where the government has taken a firm hand in controlling industry, in directing industry. 

Mr. JOHNSON. They don’t have any regulations over in China, 

though. 

Mr. GATTUSO. They have government ownership. They have direct government control over these factories and these industries, 

and it is the government that has been the major polluter, not any 

independent private sector. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, you can look at a horse pile of poop on the 

trail as you ride up on a summer afternoon, and you can smell it, 

and then you tell yourself that I am not smelling horse poop. You 

can do that all day, but the bottom line is it is horse poop in the 

road. You need to step over it and move forward. 

I will yield back. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. Rothfus, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, is recognized for 

questions. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, panel, for being here today. I have enjoyed this conversation. Like Congressman Marino, it is like I am back in law 

school. 

I appreciate the comments I have heard about yet another hearing on regulatory issues. I suggest that the reason that we are here 

again is because the more people learn about how we have empowered unelected elites to micromanage us, the more they want a 

check on that power. The actions of these elites are resulting in lost 

coalminer jobs and power plant worker jobs in Western Pennsylvania. The actions of these elites are also threatening the health 

insurance plans of people in Western Pennsylvania, and therefore 

their access to healthcare. 

Criticism of rule by elites is not of recent vintage. In 1981, President Reagan in his inaugural said that from time to time we have 

been tempted to believe that society has become too complex to be 

managed by self-rule, that government by any elite group is superior to government for, by, and of the people. But if no one among 

us is capable of governing himself, then who among us has the capacity to govern someone else? 

I have long had a concern over the abdication by Congress of its 

constitutional duty to legislate. There is a belief among some that 

society is just too complex for 535 individuals, 435 here in the 

House and 100 across the Capitol in the Senate, to come up with 
86 

the legislation necessary for a properly functioning society. I reject 

that premise. 

Mr. Gattuso, I would like to just go over some of the recent regulations that we are seeing coming out and just get your opinion. Do 

you believe that 535 Members of Congress might be able to conclude whether carbon dioxide is an air pollutant under the Clean 

Air Act? 

Mr. GATTUSO. I think that they are capable of making that decision. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Would Congress be able to take hearings on that 

issue and make a deliberative decision on that? 

Mr. GATTUSO. I think you can. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Do you believe that 535 Members of Congress 

might be able to review the Secretary of Health and Human Service’s dicta of what must be in every person’s health care plan and 

make a reasoned judgment on whether that is a good idea or not? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Absolutely. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. And do you believe that 535 Members of Congress 

have the capacity to determine what a qualified mortgage should 

be, whether we should require a 10 percent down payment, a 15 

percent down payment, a 20 percent down payment? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Not only that, but they are able to decide whether 

the government can decide that for consumers. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. I would like to ask the professors a little bit about 

the constitutionality issues. Isn’t this really yet a further condition 

precedent to a regulation becoming effective? It is inchoate in the 

sense that we have requirements that a regulation should go 

through, and yet we have established one more requirement in the 

REINS Act where it will not even become effective until it has been 

approved by Congress. Can you comment on that, professors? 

Mr. LEVIN. That is exactly the argument that was made on behalf of the legislative veto in its day, that it was just a device that 

Congress attached to the Immigration and Nationality Act to be a 

condition precedent for deportation decisions, and the Supreme 

Court gave that no weight because it undermined the heart of the 

bicameralism and presentment requirements. I think the same 

would be true in this instance. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. But when we have legislation that we know is 

going to be subject to this, can’t the Congress be considerate of 

that? When we delegate to a regulatory agency to come up with a 

regulation, under REINS we would know that that is going to come 

back to the Congress for review. 

Mr. LEVIN. Well, if I may comment on your previous characterization of this as rule by elites, I think that the process that 535 

Members established is actually a pretty sound one. They make 

some decisions themselves. They leave others to the executive 

branch through a delegation, and the executive branch’s decisions 

are subject to political accountability because presidents make decisions and they run on their record, and in this instance President 

Obama ran on his record of regulation. It was squarely an issue in 

the last campaign. It was hotly debated on all sides. He was reelected, and I think the people spoke, although not everybody 

seems to have heeded that message. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Professor Claeys? 
87 

Mr. CLAEYS. So with respect to Professor Levin, I disagree on 

several points. First, there is a huge difference between Congress 

being able to—there is a huge difference between the legislative 

veto and the REINS Act. In the legislative veto, Congress is saying 

we want the administrative process always to go forward, and then 

we want discretion for one house, both houses or a Committee to 

interject and stop one particular action. 

There is a huge difference between that set of affairs and another set of affairs where Congress says even though most of the 

time rulemaking has advantages, we don’t want those advantages 

to be here because we are so worried about the impact on the economy or the threat to rights. So we want to slow things down, and 

we want to take ownership of the basic policy choices. I don’t think 

that any judge who is at all practical or is a functionalist, in the 

way that Professor Levin talks about in his testimony, would ignore that difference. 

And—well, I will just stop there. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

At this time, I would like to recognize the gentlelady from California—from the state of Washington. I am sorry. 

Ms. DELBENE. I am proud to be from the state of Washington. 

Mr. BACHUS. Ms. Susan DelBene. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. BACHUS. I want to express my appreciation to you, before 

your 5 minutes starts, for being a part of the civil rights pilgrimage 

this weekend to Alabama, where we remembered the 50th-year anniversary of the integration of the University of Alabama, but also 

some sad events, the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church, 

Martin Luther King’s imprisonment in the Birmingham jail. It was 

a very meaningful weekend for all of us. I know Mr. Cohen has 

participated in that pilgrimage on many occasions, and I want to 

express my appreciation to both of you for investing that time. I 

think you both gained valuable insight. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I was born in Alabama, as 

you know, so it was also incredibly important for me to have the 

opportunity to participate. So, thank you. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Ms. DELBENE. And thank you to all of you for being here today 

and taking your time and speaking with us. I really appreciate it. 

Mr. Gattuso, you talk in your testimony about the cost and burden of regulations, and you cite this in your submitted testimony, 

and we talked about this a bunch today. But if we really look at 

a cost-benefit analysis, do you ever think that there are benefits to 

regulations? And is it important that we take that into account? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Certainly. There are many benefits, and many regulations are well justified, as I said in my testimony. 

I think we have to look at some of the benefit estimates that 

have been made with maybe a grain of salt. For instance, there are 

quite a few recent regulations where the benefits that are claimed 

have little to do with the advertised purpose of the regulation. For 

instance, if you look at CAFE standards, the gains for the environment and reduced pollution constitute only about one-third of the 
88 

total benefits that are claimed for that rule. The other two-thirds 

of the benefits are so-called private benefits, savings to consumers 

from using less fuel. 

Now, that would be a good thing for consumers if they chose it, 

but there is no market failure that has been identified and, frankly, consumers should be able to make the trade-off between paying 

another $1,800 for a car and savings for themselves. So the benefits don’t really match the justification for the rule. 

Ms. DELBENE. But you think costs are always appropriately calculated and it is only benefits that are not? 

Mr. GATTUSO. No, although we do have to recognize that the 

agencies that do the cost-benefit analyses tend to support the rules 

that they are proposing. So I think an estimate of cost by an agency is going to be what you might call a statement against interest, 

but the benefits may be jacked up a little bit. But I think benefits 

and costs have to be compared, and also costs by themselves is a 

relevant standard to look at. The cumulative cost of regulations is 

by itself a factor to consider. 

Ms. DELBENE. Professor Claeys, in its most recent report to Congress, the Office of Management and Budget estimates that the 

total benefits of significant regulations for the past 10 years exceeded the cost by a ratio as high as 16 to 1. So how do you reconcile that with the notion that the regulatory costs are overburdening the economy if we don’t also look at the benefits involved? 

Mr. CLAEYS. Should this Congress defer to determinations by 

OMB about what the benefits or the costs are? Why shouldn’t this 

Congress decide for itself what the costs and benefits are? Because 

this Congress is responsible to the voters and answers to them in 

elections. 

Ms. DELBENE. This is a data point. So if there is data that says 

that we have benefits, shouldn’t that be taken into account? 

Mr. CLAEYS. In the House and in the Senate, yes. 

Ms. DELBENE. Mr. Levin, or Professor Levin—I’m sorry—what is 

your view? Mr. Gattuso talked about proposals to impose sunset 

dates for regulations, and I wanted to hear your feedback on that. 

Mr. LEVIN. Yes. I testified to the Subcommittee last year about 

proposals just to re-examine rules every 10 years, and I testified 

that that is too inflexible and would take up too much time of the 

agencies re-examining things, as opposed to getting on with the 

people’s business, which Congress has assigned it. 

So I would say, going even further, a sunset provision would be 

a very bad idea because it takes about 2 years to issue a major 

rule, and if you have to redo it every 10 years, you are essentially 

taking enormous amounts of time away from the agency’s ability 

to perform the functions that Congress has told it to do. It would 

be a very bad idea. 

Ms. DELBENE. So what would your proposal be if we look at the 

challenges that we face in terms of the rulemaking process? Do you 

have a proposal besides the REINS Act that we might look at to 

make it a more streamlined process? 

Mr. LEVIN. Well, with respect to—I mean, I would abandon this 

particular line of inquiry and get onto making more effective substantive decisions. But on the specific question of in what ways 

should Congress oversee agencies, I would encourage you to look at 
89 

some ABA recommendations for reform of the Congressional Review Act, which are cited in my prepared statement for today. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Mr. Gattuso, with respect to the Dodd-Frank financial rules I am 

familiar with, but even just moving beyond that into just the general condition, many prominent experts have noted that small businesses lack rent-seeking capabilities. They lack regulatory compliance staff to comply, and accordingly are at a competitive disadvantage. They also lack—many, many bigger corporations have lobbying shops that lobby both the agencies and the Congress. 

I think, just to give you two examples, in the Durbin Amendment, which applied to debit cards but not credit cards, because the 

larger banks lobbied and got credit cards exempted, so you have a 

situation where you have the large banks, the seven large banks, 

the largest banks have almost all the credit card business, where 

the community and smaller banks and regional banks have the 

debit cards, and it is much more important to their business. And 

yet, they were not successful. So the Durbin Amendment only applies to debit cards. 

I think we have many other examples. For instance, the regulators first put caps on the large banks eight or 9 months before 

they did on the smaller banks. They engineered a bailout of AIG, 

which turned around, and that money within 24 hours went into 

some of the largest banks in this country. You didn’t see the smaller banks bailed out. 

Is there a danger that large corporations can manipulate the 

process of writing new major regulations to drive their smaller 

competitors out of business? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Not only is there a danger, but it is a reality. It 

happens all the time. By the way, AIG is not just money going into 

the banks in our country, but it is going into banks in France and 

Germany and the rest of the world as well. 

But I think that small businesses do bear a heavier burden of 

regulation because of the reasons that you cite and are not as well 

represented in the rent-seeking festival in Washington. 

But even outside of small businesses, a lot of these regulations 

are less driven by the public interest, I believe, than driven by conflicts between industries. The Durbin Amendment was a conflict 

between the financial institutions and big retailers and I think was 

driven by the representations of each side. You can go down the 

list. Not every regulation, but a large number of them are just battles between different industry segments rather than something 

the public interest is behind. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Professor Claeys, since you last testified before the Committee, 

the threat that the executive branch will use the regulatory process 

to legislate unilaterally and thwart the will of Congress has increased. I just introduced an article from the Wall Street Journal 

that was published yesterday and again today where the EPA is 

going to take some pretty drastic steps, according to that article. 

But how serious a threat is this kind of what I characterized as 

an end run around Congress to our constitutional system? 
90 

Mr. CLAEYS. I am not going to presume to speak for all Americans. For myself, as a citizen and as a scholar, I am very concerned. 

Mr. BACHUS. What now? 

Mr. CLAEYS. In my own capacity as a citizen and in my own capacity as a scholar, I am concerned. But I don’t want to make it 

sound as if my concern is only about the Obama administration. I 

think this has been a trend for 30 and 40 years going across both 

parties and presidents of both parties. 

Mr. BACHUS. Oh. And listen, I think that the general public and 

most Members of Congress would agree with you that this is not 

something that originated with the Obama administration. I do 

think that it has accelerated under this Administration. Do you 

agree? 

Mr. CLAEYS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BACHUS. Okay. Does this threat increase the need for the 

REINS Act as a check on unilateral executive branch lawmaking? 

Mr. CLAEYS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Mr. Gattuso, past congresses have delegated to the executive 

branch authority to legislate regulations that are now estimated to 

consume 14 percent of the national income. Does that even remotely resemble the framers’ constitutional design? 

Mr. GATTUSO. The framers established three branches of government. Today we have four, and arguably perhaps the largest one 

is the regulatory branch, which is not in the Constitution. I am not 

saying that we don’t need some regulations. Certainly, we live in 

a more complex society than we once did. But the framers established a system of accountability and separation of powers where 

the Congress is ultimately responsible for setting the rules. I think 

the REINS Act would reinforce that original conception. 

Mr. BACHUS. Do you think that the number and the cost of regulations is inhibiting the creation of jobs, particularly in small businesses? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Definitely. We have heard from any number of 

small businessmen, from entrepreneurs, saying that either they 

were not able to hire more people or, in effect, hired fewer because 

of regulation. Only last week, the founder of Subway sandwiches 

stated that if he had been starting his restaurant chain in the current environment, it would not have succeeded. It would not exist. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Mr. Claeys, do you believe that the number and extent of regulations, the cost, if it does in fact consume 14 percent of the national 

income, is that inhibiting jobs, particularly in small businesses? 

Mr. CLAEYS. With respect, Mr. Chairman, I am a professor of law 

and an educated consumer of scholarship about the relationship between administrative agencies and courts and Congress. I don’t 

consider myself an economist. So in my testimony, I cited studies 

that seem to me reasonable. If they are true, they lay out that 

predicate. But I do not want to take a hard stand. It is not within 

my expertise. 

Mr. BACHUS. Let me close with Mr. Levin, or Professor Levin. 

Are you familiar with the financial regulations which require a 

credit rating or creditworthiness by the three largest credit rating 
91 

agencies where the government required a credit rating or a creditworthiness score, say, on securities, on securitizations from just the 

three largest? Or is that getting out of your field? 

Mr. LEVIN. I am not familiar with that specific regulation. No, 

sir. 

Mr. BACHUS. Do you believe Dodd-Frank has disadvantaged community banks and your regional bank? 

Mr. LEVIN. I am not sure. If I were talking about Dodd-Frank as 

a whole, I would say that I am not convinced that it has disadvantaged the country because I think there are strong arguments for 

doing something to repair the damage that was created without 

regulation. I can’t speak to this community banks area in particular. 

Mr. BACHUS. Are you familiar with the length of Dodd-Frank? 

Have you ever read any of it? Have you read some of the provisions? 

Mr. LEVIN. I have read much of it, not all of it. 

Mr. BACHUS. Is it somewhat confusing to you? 

Mr. LEVIN. In places. Yes, Sir. 

Mr. BACHUS. I know the regulators are struggling to try to figure 

out what Congress intended on the Volcker rule, and really, they 

are having a tremendous amount of trouble just trying to figure out 

what Congress intended. 

Mr. LEVIN. But I think that is because the area of financial regulation is complex because the phenomenon they are trying to deal 

with is complex. 

Mr. BACHUS. I would agree. 

Mr. LEVIN. So it requires specialized work more than Congress 

itself can manage in order to come to grips with it. 

Mr. BACHUS. When it gets to the point where the regulators can’t 

even figure out what Congress intended, I think it is indeed complex. 

Mr. Jeffries, the gentleman from Florida, is now recognized for 

his questions. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. From Brooklyn, New 

York. I just want to make sure we correct the record on that. 

[Laughter.] 

I always have to make sure that Brooklyn is in the house. 

Mr. BACHUS. Oh, I thought that it was Mr. Garcia. I have confused you, Mr. Jeffries. You are from New York, right? 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BACHUS. Where did Mr. Garcia go? 

Mr. COHEN. Back to Miami. [Laughter.] 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Seeking warmer weather. 

Mr. Gattuso, you testified that in your view, four branches of 

government have emerged, presumably the fourth branch of government being this amorphous administrative dynamic. Now, let’s 

go through the three branches of government that were created by 

the founders of this great country. The first branch in Article 1, of 

course, is this great Congress, given certain enumerated, specific 

powers. 

The second branch created by Article 2 is the executive. 

The third branch is the judiciary. Is that correct? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Yes. 
92 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Now, the premise of the judiciary branch, or at 

least part of its role, is to rein in unconstitutional overreach by the 

executive branch created in Article 2. Isn’t that right? 

Mr. GATTUSO. That is part of it, yes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. So the courts have already been set up in the 

framework of the Constitution. If there is regulatory overreach, as 

is claimed by some of those here today, to rein in that administrative overreach if it violates the Constitution. Isn’t that the role of 

the Article 3 judicial system that we have in this country? 

Mr. GATTUSO. If it violates the Constitution or a statute. But the 

courts do not make the substantive judgment about whether the 

overreach is in itself a good idea, a bad idea, economically sensible 

are not sensible. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Right. Well, we can agree that if there is administrative overreach that violates the Constitution of the United 

States, that the framers of this great Republic have already established a mechanism to rein in that overreach, and that is the Article 3 court system, correct? 

Mr. GATTUSO. That would be the original purpose. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Okay. Now, we have sort of an argument to be 

made, then, about the reasonableness of regulations. Some regulations are reasonable. I think you have conceded that, correct? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Yes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And then you have concluded that others are out 

of control, costly to the economy, correct? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Yes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Now, you have said that there are costs that are 

billions, if not trillions, of dollars in regulatory overreach. That is 

in your testimony, correct? Can you cite to me an example of a trillion-dollar regulatory overreach? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Well, the trillion would be the cumulative figure. 

But certainly in the last year, there were two regulations adopted 

by the Obama administration with costs over $9 billion, the boiler 

MAC regulation and the CAFE rules. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. That is in your estimation, correct? 

Mr. GATTUSO. That is the estimate of the agencies enacting the 

rule, the EPA or the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. That is not my number, that is their number. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Okay. But there is a cost-benefit analysis that 

should be put into play. You have acknowledged you have the cumulative effect. Let’s put that aside. Then you have individual regulatory actions, each of which presumably has a cost and a benefit. 

Is that right? 

Mr. GATTUSO. That is right. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Now, AIG was cited as an example where their 

outsized influence impacted perhaps the ability of them to get an 

accelerated bailout that perhaps other small banks and community 

institutions, small businesses weren’t able to get, at least in a timely fashion. Is that correct? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Well, I think that there was a lot going on in 2008 

that was more than just standard lobbying. So I won’t say the AIG 

bailout was due just to lobbying by AIG. But I think the point was 

that—the point I think the Chairman was making was that there 
93 

was disparate treatment, disparate effects between the AIGs of the 

world and the small community banks. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Right. Now, if you invest more regulatory authority in the Congress, which is subject to this lobbying behemoth, 

doesn’t it then give more power to the AIGs of the world, who don’t 

have the same ability to influence the regulators? 

Mr. GATTUSO. I think the fact remains that the Congress is the 

representative of the people, and if the Congress is not the legitimate body to make the decisions, prudential decisions as to how 

much we want to regulate, who we want to control, who should not 

be regulated, then there is really nothing the Congress does that 

can be justified. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Do you recall the size of the AIG bailout? 

Mr. GATTUSO. I don’t have a number. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. One hundred and eighty billion dollars. Why did 

we have to bail AIG out to the tune of $180 billion? Is it because 

of the absence of regulation that led to some of the activities such 

as the issuance of credit default swaps, a totally unregulated vehicle that was out of control, that AIG didn’t have the capacity to 

fund once the market fell out and the bottom dropped out of the 

economy? Isn’t that $180 billion bailout, which is somehow cited as 

an example of the evils of regulation, in reality a prime example 

of why, in many instances, particularly in terms of what DoddFrank was attempting to accomplish, regulation is necessary? 

Mr. GATTUSO. I think the financial crisis of 2008 was the effect 

of—certainly there was a private role, but a large portion of it was 

the government policies in terms of interference in the housing 

market, supporting the bubble in housing, and encouraging the creation of loans that were not appropriate. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has run out. If I 

could just allow Mr. Levin to respond? 

Mr. LEVIN. I don’t agree with that story of why we had a financial crisis, but I think the point I would make is that it does take 

a while to work through the regulatory response, and the long bill 

that the Chairman mentioned is long and confusing. That is why 

you need an extended process by which regulators can sort out 

some of the details that weren’t fully resolved at the beginning. It 

is an open process, and is participatory, and it is subject to judicial 

review not just for constitutionality but also for the reasoning of 

the decision. 

So a salient difference between the administrative process and 

the legislative is that although there is politics at the administrative level, the courts will insist that the matter be rational and defensible. They are a check. You don’t have that check on decisions 

that the legislature makes. So although there is politics on both 

sides, there is a restraint on the administrative side that doesn’t 

exist on the legislative side. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you, professor. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Would either of you gentlemen are all three of you gentlemen 

want to comment further on anything, any questions or any 

thoughts you have had that you think would be helpful? 

Mr. GATTUSO. If I can make just one comment? 
94 

Mr. BACHUS. I am going to let Mr. Collins have a round of questions. But be thinking—and this will give you five or 6 minutes to 

think about maybe if you want to have a 2-minute rebuttal or 

wrap-up or just some other thoughts. 

Mr. Collins is now recognized, the gentleman from Georgia, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the patience today. It has been sort of a crazy day. I think this is a needed proposal. I think it is something that we can look at. 

I do have a couple of questions. Professor Claeys, what are some 

other ways, in addition to REINS, that we can ensure that the 

Obama administration weeds through existing regulations and 

eliminates unnecessary burdens on job creators, something they 

said they wanted to do but obviously have not? 

Mr. CLAEYS. I will give you some thoughts off the top of my head. 

I am not sure that the question hits at my core scholarly expertise. 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, if anybody else wants to jump in after Professor Claeys, go right ahead. 

Mr. CLAEYS. I would say the appropriations process and the attempts to link things like the increase of the debt ceiling to negotiate policies that will lead to economic growth and lead to deregulation. Those are a couple of examples. 

Mr. COLLINS. Increasing the debt ceiling? Did I hear you correctly? 

Mr. CLAEYS. If the debt ceiling is going to be increased, then this 

Congress can use the leverage it has to do some other—— 

Mr. COLLINS. You are saying to use the debt ceiling, okay. 

Mr. CLAEYS. As leverage for other things that you think will 

have salutary effects on the economy. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. Does anybody else have anything that they 

would like to add to that? 

Mr. GATTUSO. I think, and this might sound surprising, but I 

think the Obama administration’s power to control and limit and 

review regulations should be preserved and expanded, specifically 

the fact that independent agencies are not reviewed or are not subject to regulatory requirements. So I think extending the Administration’s authority over independent agencies actually would be a 

plus. 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, I think extending it or not extending it, they 

are not doing anything to eliminate, is irrelevant. 

Mr. GATTUSO. I am not defending the Obama administration. 

Mr. COLLINS. But, I mean, in defending your own answer, we can 

give them all the power in the world, which we are not, give them 

all the power in the world, but if they don’t do anything, just do 

their stated claim of unnecessary in relieving these burdens, what 

is the purpose? 

Mr. GATTUSO. It is certainly not the complete answer, but I think 

putting some limits on independent agencies is appropriate. 

Mr. COLLINS. I would not disagree with that. I think maybe we 

are going about it two different ways. 

Mr. Levin. 

Mr. LEVIN. As a matter of fact, I was at a hearing of this Subcommittee last year on the subject of retrospective review of rules, 

and I would refer you to the statement I submitted then which re-
95 

viewed the Obama administration’s efforts, which I think have 

been substantial. But I also commented on ways in which Congress 

could, if it chose, set up a structure to promote retrospective review 

of rules on its own. So I would refer you to that. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. I think one of the issues that is coming up, 

and I just came from another hearing this morning, and it goes 

back to sort of your answer to your question a little bit, but there 

is approximately $67 billion, I think, give or take—and I don’t remember the number; I am going back and forth—the IGs have reported to their different departments on savings that could be had, 

okay? $67 billion has been left on the table and not implemented 

by the departments. There was much ado and gnashing of teeth, 

and you would think that truly a lot of things had come to an end 

this morning because of the sequester that everybody wanted to 

bring in. 

My question sort of tags on here. If we are not implementing— 

and let’s dig a little deeper here. If we are not implementing costcutting measures, which have been implemented by the inspector 

generals in these various agencies, if Congress does not, through 

the power of the purse, which it is supposed to have, through regular order of appropriations process to control how money is spent, 

where it goes, and how those operate, isn’t it not within the purview of Congress to continue this process given the fact that right 

now this Administration, and I’m going to say from the perspective 

the IG presented, previous Administrations as well have chosen to 

ignore those kind of issues. 

What is the difference here in the money issue and the regulatory issues if Congress sort of sits back and lets the Administration do it? Are we not, in essence, giving away our constitutional 

authority, but also putting a hands-off approach and then complaining about it in the long run? 

Mr. GATTUSO. I think that is entirely correct. Congress both has 

the responsibility and the power to review and scrutinize and ensure that regulations are sensible and justified. 

Mr. CLAEYS. I agree with Mr. Gattuso on the regulation. As a 

scholar, I don’t have any opinion on the spending issues. As a taxpayer and a citizen, I support what you say. 

Mr. LEVIN. Well, I think the power of oversight is longstanding 

and traditional, and I think Congress has a legitimate role over 

time to examine expenditures and decide whether it thinks they 

are being made wisely. I think it would be well for Congress to pursue these traditional areas of oversight, as opposed to exploring 

these rather novel alternatives such as the ones that are before us 

today. 

Mr. COLLINS. I take great exception to saying ‘‘novel’’ when you 

actually look at the constitutional authority of Congress is to watch 

over and pass the laws and regulations, and it also then, from 

purse strings to other things, to make sure that the American people and small businesses are protected and taken care of. To say 

it is a novel approach to simply look at regulations in a way that 

we can actually rein that in to me is not framing this question very 

much. 

Mr. LEVIN. Excuse me. I was unclear. I met the REINS Act is 

novel, but regular oversight of rules is not. 
96 

Mr. COLLINS. It may be novel in its approach, but at this point, 

with lack of it going on, I think there is an issue here to where 

Congress does need to look at this and find the proper way to make 

sure that we are in an environment in which we are not cutting 

out our own businesses and others from regulation that are either 

being done with political agendas or other things. 

Mr. Chairman, I see my time is over. I apologize. I yield back. 

Mr. BACHUS. I appreciate that, Mr. Collins. 

Gentlemen, each of you are recognized for one or 2 minutes, if 

you wish. 

Mr. GATTUSO. Well, I will start. I just want to make two points. 

Through most of this hearing, there may be an impression left that 

there is a dichotomy, a choice that needs to be made between relying on experts and Congress taking direct control over regulatory 

policy. I think that is a false choice. I know nothing about electrical 

systems, but if I needed an electrician, I can hire one. But if I disagree with what he recommends, I get to have the final say. 

So I think Congress can review regulations, but that does not 

mean that they do it without knowledge, without expert advice and 

a knowledge of the facts on the ground. 

Also, a question was asked about the respect for Congress, and 

I have been very critical of Congress. I don’t agree with everything 

Congress does. I doubt whether any of you agree with everything 

Congress does. But it is the only representative national body that 

we have, and it is imbued by the Constitution with the responsibility to oversee these policy matters, and I think the proper respect for the Constitution and for Congress would demand that 

that be accommodated. 

Mr. CLAEYS. Mr. Chairman, I have three points. One has to do 

with this argument about gridlock. I think that the argument for 

gridlock cuts in the direction opposite to the one it has been suggested to cut throughout this hearing. To me, the analogy that 

comes to mind is imagine that there is a group of people who are 

partners, and they have irretrievable or irreconcilable differences. 

There are circumstances in which it is okay to appoint a receiver, 

but a receiver is really an option of last resort because if the partners have really deep differences, they won’t trust a receiver any 

more than they will trust each other, because they don’t trust each 

other. 

In our polarized climate, the worst thing to do is for people in 

the minority right now to try to watch the agencies make Democratic policy, and then if the Administrations were to switch, the 

Democrats watch the Republicans make policy. It is better to have 

these kinds of deep, visceral disputes in Congress. 

My second point is very similar to Mr. Gattuso’s. I don’t think 

we have heard enough today about the way in which the REINS 

Act improves regulatory processes by making the agencies more accountable to Congress, and by making the agencies educate Members of Congress the way the electrical engineer would educate Mr. 

Gattuso. 

On this, I recommend that Members of the Committee consult 

David Schoenbrod’s testimony last Congress on this point. He was 

a former NRDC lawyer, and he thought that environmental laws 
97 

were made best when Congress got actively involved with the EPA 

regulation. 

And last point that Mr. Jeffries made about the courts, this Congress has an independent duty to consult the Constitution, and a 

lot of the statutes that courts enforce in administrative law are 

written by Congress. Well, they all are written by Congress, but 

courts don’t look at them very closely. This Congress owes a duty 

to make sure that it thinks that these statutes are constitutional. 

There are other situations where courts were not the best arbiters 

or protectors of individual rights, and the best example I can think 

of is Dred Scott. It was a Republican Congress and a Republican 

president that went to the people and said that the court system 

has messed up our individual rights. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Professor Levin? 

Mr. LEVIN. Yes. I would like to use the example of greenhouse 

gas regulation, which has been mentioned during this hearing, to 

try to draw some points together. One, of course, is that the Supreme Court itself told the EPA to get moving in dealing with climate change issues. 

But beyond that, the greenhouse gas situation is one in which 

EPA is now proceeding to come up with regulations to address this 

matter. The Clean Air Act is probably not the ideal way in which 

to do it, but the Administration is taking the initiative because 

Congress has been unable to take any action to further action on 

climate change. Because of the inaction at that level, the EPA has 

gone forward on its own. 

Now, if you have a system like REINS in which you have not 

only the ability—Congress is not only gridlocked on its own, but 

also is able to block the Administration, the upshot is nothing gets 

done on climate change. The climate is going to just keep getting 

worse. The climate is not a regulated entity such that if you remove the yoke of burdensome regulations, the climate can breathe 

free and produce jobs. The climate just keeps getting worse, so 

something should be done. 

If the EPA proceeds with rules, those will be subject to judicial 

review, and have been to some extent already, and there is some 

hope of something getting done. But I think the REINS Act would 

simply generate policy paralysis with no action taken. I think that 

is not in the interest of the country, and it is an example of the 

problems that this legislation would bring about. 

Mr. BACHUS. I thank all the gentlemen. I think you have all 

three given thoughtful testimony. 

Mr. Cohen, if you have a final word, you are welcome. 

Mr. COHEN. I just thank the Chairman for his courtesies in extending time and for his other activities, engaging in the retreat 

this past weekend in Alabama. His heart is obviously in the right 

place. Thank you. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Mr. Cohen and I are in agreement that the gridlock here is—we 

are making a bunch of cuts in discretionary spending when some 

of our mandatory spending programs are driving our debt and deficit, and I think we are both disappointed that we have come to 

what I think we all agree is a dreadful situation. 
98 

At this time, our hearing is concluded. Each of the witness’ written statements will be entered into the record in its entirety, and 

I ask that each witness—well, we have already done that. 

This concludes the hearing. Thanks to all of our witnesses for attending. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit additional written questions for the witnesses or additional 

materials for the record. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:17 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(99) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
100 

Material submitted by the Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 

f 
116 

Letter from the Honorable Kevin Cramer, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of North Dakota 
117 

f 
118 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Andy Barr, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Kentucky 

f 
119 

Letter submitted by Kristina Butts, Executive Director, Legislative Affairs, 

National Cattlemen’s Beef Association 

f 
120 

Response to Questions for the Record from James L. Gattuso, Senior Research Fellow in Regulatory Policy, Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation 
121 

f 
122 

Response to Questions for the Record from Eric R. Claeys, 

Professor of Law, George Mason University 
123 
124 
125 
126 

f 
127 

Response to Questions for the Record from Ronald M. Levin, William R. 

Orthwein Distinguished Professor of Law, Washington University School 

of Law 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 

Æ