IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIGUEL A. QUINNONES, :

:

Plaintiff :

:

v. : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-14-1059

:

SCI-HUNTINGDON : (Judge Brann)

ADMINISTRATION, ET AL., :

:

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

September 6, 2016

Background

Miguel A. Quinnones, an inmate presently confined at the State

Correctional Institution, Somerset, Pennsylvania (SCI-Somerset) filed this pro se

civil rights action. By Order dated March 31, 2015, Plaintiff’s amended complaint

(Doc. 17) was accepted and the claims against Plaintiff’s prior place of

confinement, the State Correctional Institution Huntingdon, Pennsylvania (SCIHuntingdon) Administration were deemed withdrawn.

Named as Defendants are the following SCI-Huntingdon officials: 

Superintendent Bickell, Deputy Superintendent R. Moore, Unit Manager Cook,

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and Security Captain Harris. According to the Amended Complaint, the

Defendants failed to protect Quinnones from being attacked by another inmate. 

Specifically, on January 13, 2014, Plaintiff allegedly informed Unit Manager

Cook that a threat to his life existed in general population. See Doc. 17, ¶ 9. As a

result, Quinnones was moved to the prison’s Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) and

placed on administrative custody status. 

The next day, Quinnones asserts that he told Security Captain Harris that a

prisoner, whose name he did not know, wanted to harm him. On January 15,

2014, Plaintiff purportedly met with a Program Review Committee (PRC)

consisting of Defendants Moore and Cook as well as Deputy Superintendent

Eckard. Quinnones explained that he was in fear for his life because he had

received information that “someone supposed to have paid” another general

population prisoner to hurt him. Id. at ¶ 14. The PRC agreed to leave Plaintiff in

administrative custody until February 12, 2014. Later that evening, however,

Quinnones was allegedly returned to general population.

On January 29, 2014, Plaintiff avers that he requested a transfer due to the

same safety concerns. The Amended Complaint next asserts that Quinnones was

removed from the RHU and placed back into general population for a second time

by Defendants Harris and Moore. However, Quinnones maintains that he returned

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to the RHU on self lock up after advising prison staff that he received another

threat of imminent assault.

On March 7, 2014, Plaintiff claims that he was again released from the

RHU by Deputy Superintendent Moore pursuant to a recommendation by Captain

Harris. See id. at ¶ 21. Quinnones thereafter purportedly submitted written

statements to the prison’s security office and Superintendent Bickell stating that

he was scared that someone was going to harm him.1

 He was temporarily 

returned to the RHU.

On April 10, 2014, Plaintiff contends that an unidentifed prisoner attacked

him with a razor. See id. at ¶ 25. He allegedly suffered a facial laceration near his

chin that left a scar. Following this incident, Plaintiff was returned to

administrative custody for his own protection where he apparently remained until

his transfer to another correctional facility. Quinnones’s pending action seeks

declaratory relief as well as punitive and compensatory damages.

Presently pending is Defendants’ motion seeking entry of summary

judgment. See Doc. 33. A review of the docket entries shows that the motion is

unopposed.

1

 Plaintiff’s correspondence noted that he kept on going back and forth to the

RHU because of his fears of being harmed.

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Discussion

Defendants acknowledge that while confined at SCI-Huntingdon from

January-March, 2014 the Plaintiff made a series of complaints to prison officials

expressing fear for his safety. As a result of those complaints, Quinonnes had

three separate RHU placements (January 15, 2014, January 22, 2014, and

February 25, 2014) during the relevant time period. Plaintiff was eventually

released back to general population when his safety concerns could not be

substantiated via internal investigations. 

On April 10, 2014 (eight days after being released from administrative

custody), Plaintiff alleged that he had been assaulted, specifically, that he was cut

with a razor in the prison dining hall. He was treated for s superficial cut near his

chin which required a butterfly band aid. Defendants note that Quinnones

provided conflicting version as to why he was being targeted and could not

provide officials with the name of his alleged assailant or any witnesses to that

incident.

Defendants claim that they are entitled to entry of summary judgment on the

grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies and

his amended complaint fails to establish that they were deliberately indifferent to

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an excessive risk to his safety.2

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); See also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d

Cir. 2001). A factual dispute is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the

suit under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). A factual dispute is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient evidentiary

basis that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248. The court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of

a genuine issue of material fact in favor of the non-moving party. Saldana, 260

F.3d at 232; see also Reeder v. Sybron Transition Corp., 142 F.R.D. 607, 609

(M.D. Pa. 1992). Unsubstantiated arguments made in briefs are not considered

evidence of asserted facts. Versarge v. Township of Clinton, 984 F.2d 1359, 1370

(3d Cir. 1993).

Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to

2 A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he acts with

deliberate indifference to a known objectively serious risk to a prisoner’s safety. See

Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F. 3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001). 

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support the claims of the non-moving party, the non-moving party may not simply

sit back and rest on the allegations in its complaint. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Instead, it must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its]

own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.

(internal quotations omitted); see also Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (citations omitted). 

Summary judgment should be granted where a party “fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and

on which that party will bear the burden at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. 

“‘Such affirmative evidence – regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial –

must amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in the evaluation of

the court) than a preponderance.’” Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (quoting Williams v.

Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989)).

Administrative Exhaustion

Defendants’ first argument contends that although Quinnonnes filed two

grievances “that might be construed to relate to his claims,” neither was properly

exhausted. Doc. 35, p. 8. As previously noted, this argument is unopposed. 

In support of their argument Defendants have provided declarations under

penalty of perjury by SCI-Huntingdon Grievance Coordinator Connie Green

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(Doc. 36-13); SOIGA Grievance Review Officer Amanda West (Doc. 36-16); and

copies of the relevant grievances, filings, and responses. Also submitted for

consideration are copies of the relevant DOC grievance system policies.

Section 1997e(a) of title 42 U.S.C. provides:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under Section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of

the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983), or any other federal

law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies

as are available are exhausted. 

Section 1997e(a) requires administrative exhaustion “irrespective of the

forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues.” Porter v.

Nussle, 122 S.Ct. 983, 992 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n. 6

(2001). Claims for monetary relief are not excused from the exhaustion

requirement. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 74 (3d Cir. 2000). Dismissal of an

inmate’s claim is appropriate when a prisoner has failed to exhaust his available

administrative remedies before bringing a civil rights action. Ahmed v.

Sromovski, 103 F. Supp. 2d 838, 843 (E.D. Pa. 2000). “[E]xhaustion must occur

prior to filing suit, not while the suit is pending.” Tribe v. Harvey, 248 F.3d 1152,

2000 WL 167468, *2 (6th Cir. 2000)(citing Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645

(6th Cir. 1999)); Oriakhi v. United States, 165 Fed. Appx. 991, 993 (3d Cir. 2006).

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The United States Supreme Court in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007),

stated that the primary purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to allow “a prison

to address complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to

suit, reducing litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and

improving litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful

record.” Id. at 219. The administrative exhaustion mandate also implies a

procedural default component. Spruill v. Gillis 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).

As explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a

procedural default rule “prevents an end-run around the exhaustion requirement.” 

Id. at 230. It also ensures “prisoner compliance with the specific requirements of

the grievance system” and encourages inmates to pursue their administrative

grievances “to the fullest.” Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court has observed that

proper exhaustion of available administrative remedies is mandatory, meaning that

prisoners must comply with the grievance system’s procedural rules, including

time limitations. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).

A Consolidated Inmate Grievance Review System has been established by

the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”).3

 Section V of DC-ADM

804 (effective May 1, 2014) states that “every individual committed to its custody

3 The DOC’s grievance system has been periodically amended.

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shall have access to a formal procedure through which to seek the resolution of

problems or other issues of concern arising during the course of confinement.” 

Doc. 36-12, p. 2. It adds that the formal procedure shall be known as the Inmate

Grievance System and provides a forum of review and two (2) avenues of appeal. 

After attempted informal resolution of the problem, a written grievance may be

submitted to the Facility Grievance Coordinator within fifteen (15) working days

after the events upon which the claims are based, but allowances of extensions of

time will be granted under certain circumstances. 

An appeal from the Grievance Coordinator's Initial Review decision may be

made in writing within fifteen (15) working days to the Facility Manager or

Superintendent. A final written appeal may be presented within fifteen (15)

working days to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals

(SOIGA). A prisoner, in seeking review through the DOC grievance system, may

include reasonable requests for compensation or other legal relief normally

available from a court. However, an improperly submitted grievance will not be

reviewed.

Based upon Green’s unopposed declaration, Plaintiff filed two grievances

relating to the claims set forth in this action. Grievance No. 502483 was initiated

on March 19, 2014 (prior to the alleged April 10, 2014 assault) and challenged a

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misconduct charge which had been issued to the inmate for refusing to lock up.4

 

Defendants have provided the Court with a copy of the grievance. See Doc. 36-9. 

Therein, Plaintiff asserted that he refused to be locked into his cell because he felt

that his safety was in danger. The grievance was rejected because since it

addressed the validity of a misconduct charge the matter had to be addressed

through the DOC’s inmate discipline policy. See id. Green clearly states that no

administrative appeal of the rejection was pursued. See Doc. 36-13, ¶ 16

Grievance No. 505257 was initiated by Plaintiff following the assault and

requested that the incident be investigated and again asserted that he was in

danger. See Doc. 36-10. Green notes the matter was assigned to Major

Wakefield, a non-defendant, for a response. See id. at ¶ 18. The grievance was

denied at the initial level because Quinnones could not identify his assailant,

provide any witnesses; the actions taken by prison staff were found to be

appropriate under DOC policy. Furthermore, the response noted that Plaintiff

was transferred back to the RHU after he reported the alleged attack and the matter

remained under review. The denial of the grievance was not properly appealed to

the prison Superintendent.

4 A copy of the misconduct charge issued March 7, 2014 has been submitted

to this Court. See Doc. 36-8.

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Green clarifies that a vague request slip from Quinnones to the

Superintendent was returned to Plaintiff with a note informing him that if he

wished to pursue an appeal to the Superintendent of Grievance No. 505257 it

needed to be clearly marked as such. See id. at ¶ 26. No such appeal to the

Superintendent was ever initiated.

SOIGA Review Officer West’s declaration states that the only

correspondence Plaintiff sent to SOIGA during the relevant time period was a

document dated May 14, 2014. Quinnones’ submission was construed as an

improper initiation of an appeal of Grievance No. 505257 given that the inmate

had bypassed the initially required appeal to the SCI-Huntingdon Superintendent

and also because he had failed to include required documentation. See Doc. 36-

16, ¶ 16. West adds that although Plaintiff was provided with the reasons for the

rejection of his SOIGA filing he “never filed a proper appeal of Grievance No.

505257 to SOIGA.” Id. at ¶ 16.

The undisputed record establishes that the DOC had an established

grievance procedure in place at SCI-Huntingdon during the relevant time period. 

Second, Plaintiff was aware of the procedure and pursued grievances. Third,

Quinnones failed to initiate proper administrative appeals of any grievance relating

to any of his pending claims. Based upon those factors as well as Plaintiff’s

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failure to oppose the request for summary judgment, a finding of non-exhaustion

and entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants under the well settled

Spruill and Woodford standards is appropriate.

Conclusion

Pursuant to the above discussion, it has been determined that the 

Defendants’ unopposed request for of summary judgment should be granted on the

basis of non-exhaustion. In light of that conclusion, a discussion of the

Defendants’ additional argument of failure to set forth a viable unconstitutional

deliberate indifference claim is not required. An appropriate Order will enter.

BY THE COURT:

 s/ Matthew W. Brann 

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

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