IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

JANE DOE, a minor, by her mother : Civ. No. 3:23-CV-1118 

and natural guardian, Jennifer Nied, : 

and JENNIFER NIED, individually, : 

 : 

 Plaintiffs, : 

 : 

v. : (Magistrate Judge Bloom) 

 : 

RIVERSIDE SCHOOL DISTRICT, : 

d/b/a Riverside Junior/Senior : 

High School, et al., : 

 : 

Defendants. : 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

I. Introduction 

This case comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss 

filed by Defendants Bryan and Nicole Pica. (Doc. 20). Jennifer Nied filed 

this action on behalf of herself and her daughter Jane Doe, a minor 

student in the Riverside School District. (Doc. 1). The complaint alleges 

that Jane Doe was sexually assaulted off school grounds by A.P., the 

Picas’ minor child, and that A.P. was permitted to attend school with 

Jane Doe following the assault. (Id.). The plaintiffs contend that the Picas 

failed to notify the school of A.P.’s adjudication of guilt for sexual assault, 

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and that they otherwise failed to intervene when A.P. subsequently 

harassed Jane Doe during school hours and at school functions. 

Thus, the complaint asserts claims of negligence and negligence per 

se against the Picas. (Doc. 1). The plaintiffs contend that the Picas had a 

statutory duty to report A.P.’s adjudication to the school and/or remove 

him from the school environment. Further, the plaintiffs assert that the 

Picas knew or should have known of A.P.’s ongoing harassment of Jane 

Doe and failed to intervene to stop the behavior. The Picas have now filed 

a motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint fails to state negligence 

claims against them. (Doc. 20).1 

The motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. (Docs. 26, 29, 35). 

After consideration, the defendants’ motion will be granted. 

II. Background 

 

The factual background of this Memorandum Opinion is taken from 

the well-pleaded facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaint (Doc. 1), which 

we must accept as true for purposes of the instant motion to dismiss. The 

minor plaintiff, Jane Doe, was enrolled as a student in the Riverside 

1 The District Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss, which we 

addressed through a separate Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Docs. 

36, 37). 

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School District (“the District”) at Riverside Junior/Senior High School, 

located in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1 ¶ 9). Jane Doe was 

a student with a disability and had a 504 Service Agreement with the 

District that outlined the accommodations she needed. (Id. ¶ 27). 

In January of 2021, Jane Doe was sexually assaulted by A.P., a 

minor who was also enrolled at Riverside Junior/Senior High School. (Id.

¶ 28). The assault occurred outside of the school setting in Luzerne 

County, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 29). Following the assault, the Luzerne 

County District Attorney’s Office filed a Petition Alleging Delinquency, 

claiming that A.P. raped and/or sexually assaulted Jane Doe. (Doc. 1 ¶ 

30). After a hearing, the Court adjudicated A.P. delinquent of Felony 2 

Sexual Assault pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3124.1. (Id. ¶ 31). 

The complaint alleges that throughout the pendency of the juvenile 

proceedings against A.P., Jane Doe’s mother, Jennifer Nied, was in direct 

communication with the District regarding the proceedings. (Id. ¶ 33). 

Specifically, Jennifer Nied alleges that she informed the District of A.P.’s 

delinquency adjudication at the conclusion of the juvenile case. (Id. ¶ 36). 

However, the complaint asserts that despite her concerns voiced to the 

District regarding A.P. having contact with Jane Doe during school, the 

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District told Jennifer Nied that there was nothing that could be done to 

protect Jane Doe from A.P. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 37-38). 

Thus, following the juvenile adjudication, A.P. was permitted to 

attend the same lunch period as Jane Doe. (Doc. 1 ¶ 39). It is further 

alleged that A.P. was permitted to attend the semi-formal dance in 

January of 2022. (Id. ¶ 42). At the dance, A.P. sat at a table directly 

behind Jane Doe and her friends and allegedly harassed, embarrassed, 

and threatened Jane Doe, causing her to spend most of the evening crying 

in the restroom. (Id. ¶¶ 43, 45). Some time after the semi-formal dance, 

the complaint alleges that A.P. verbally harassed Jane Doe in the 

hallway during school, mockingly shouting at her. (Id. ¶ 46). Accordingly, 

Nied contacted the District, informed individuals within the District of 

the ongoing issues, and requested a meeting with the principals and 

guidance counselor. (Id. ¶ 48). 

 At the meeting on February 23, 2022, the District informed Nied 

that it was unaware of A.P.’s juvenile adjudication or that A.P. was on 

juvenile probation, although the complaint alleges that the District was 

made aware not only by Nied but by A.P.’s juvenile probation officer. 

(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 49, 50). The District further informed Nied that there was 

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nothing the District could do to protect Jane Doe during school hours. (Id.

¶ 49). Thus, it is alleged that school continued to be a threatening and 

hostile environment for Jane Doe due to the District’s failure to protect 

her from A.P. (Id. ¶ 54). As an example, the complaint asserts that Jane 

Doe was forced to remain in a class taught by a teacher who created a 

hostile environment for her, despite her request to be transferred to 

another class, which was denied by the District. (Id. ¶ 56). However, 

notably missing from the complaint are any allegations that the Picas 

were in attendance at this meeting or were otherwise made aware of Jane 

Doe’s complaints of harassment against their son. 

The plaintiffs filed this complaint on July 5, 2023. (Doc. 1). The 

complaint names the District, the School Board, Robert Presley, 

Christopher Lazor, and Paul Brennan as defendants, as well as Bryan 

and Nicole Pica, the parents and guardians of A.P. (Id.). As to the Picas, 

the complaint asserts claims of negligence per se and negligence based 

on the Picas’ alleged failure to notify the school of A.P.’s adjudication and 

their failure to intervene in his harassing behavior. (Id.). The Picas have 

now filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the plaintiffs have failed to 

state negligence claims against them. (Doc. 20). 

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This motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. (Docs. 26, 29, 

35). After consideration, the motion will be granted. 

III. Discussion 

 

A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review 

The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 

12(b)(6) permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

Under federal pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a “short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under 

this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the 

complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 

them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 

1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal 

conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 

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Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice”). 

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized: 

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a twopart analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim 

should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the 

complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any 

legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then 

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are 

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for 

relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more 

than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint 

has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 

515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, 

“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer 

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint 

has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” 

determination will be “a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. 

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). 

 Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on 

the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public 

record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court 

can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant 

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attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are 

based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. 

White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if 

the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically 

attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the 

court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. 

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). 

However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when 

deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. 

B. The Motion to Dismiss will be Granted. 

 

As we have noted, the plaintiffs assert negligence and negligence 

per se claims against the Picas. The complaint alleges that the Picas, as 

the parents of A.P., had a statutory duty to notify the school of A.P.’s 

juvenile adjudication for sexually assaulting Jane Doe. The plaintiffs 

contend that the Picas’ failure to notify the school of the adjudication was 

the cause of Jane Doe’s injuries. They further assert a general negligence 

claim, arguing that the Picas failed to intervene in the ongoing 

harassment of Jane Doe when they knew or should have known it was 

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occurring. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that these claims 

fail as currently pleaded and will be dismissed. 

1. Negligence Per Se 

To state a claim for negligence per se, a plaintiff must plead facts 

to establish four requirements: 

(1) The purpose of the statute must be, at least in part, to 

protect the interest of a group of individuals, as opposed to the 

public generally; 

(2) The statute or regulation must clearly apply to the conduct 

of the defendant; 

(3) The defendant must violate the statute or regulation; 

(4) The violation of the statute or regulation must be the 

proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 

Schemberg v. Smicherko, 85 A.3d 1071, 1074 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) 

(citations omitted). 

The plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim is based on Act 110 of the 

Public School Code, which was enacted in 2021 regarding students who 

are convicted or adjudicated delinquent of sexual assault. 24 P.S. § 13-

1318.1. This provision, in relevant part, provides that a student enrolled 

in a public school, who is adjudicated delinquent of sexually assaulting a 

student in the same school, must notify the school of the adjudication no 

later than 72 hours after the adjudication. § 13-1318.1(e). The plaintiffs 

contend that neither A.P., nor the Picas, notified the school of the 

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adjudication, which resulted in Jane Doe’s alleged injuries. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 

168, 172). For their part, the Picas contend that as the parents of A.P., 

they had no duty under the statute because the statute places the duty 

to notify on the student, rather than the parents. Further, they argue 

that the plaintiffs cannot show that their failure to notify the school was 

the proximate cause of Jane Doe’s alleged injuries, as the plaintiffs have 

alleged the school did, in fact, have notice of the adjudication. 

At the outset, we note that no Pennsylvania court has yet addressed 

negligence claims based on Act 110, including the issue of who owes the 

duty to notify and to whom that duty is owed. For their part, the plaintiffs 

contend that the student, as well as the parents of the student, owe a 

duty to victims of sexual assault to notify the school of an adjudication of 

guilt for sexual assault. (Doc. 29 at 6-7). The defendants, on the other 

hand, argue that the statute clearly imposes the duty to notify upon the 

student, and in any event, the duty is one owed to the school, rather than 

a minor victim. (Doc. 26 at 5). 

However, we conclude that even if the Picas had a duty to notify the 

school under Act 110, the plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts to 

establish that the Picas’ failure to notify the school was the proximate 

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cause of Jane Doe’s injuries. “To determine whether any breach of duty 

proximately caused a plaintiff’s damages, this Court looks to whether a 

reasonable person would infer that the injury was the natural and 

probable result of defendant’s breach of duty.” Kirschner v. K & L Gates 

LLP, 46 A.3d 737, 754 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 

Here, the plaintiffs affirmatively plead that Jennifer Nied, Jane 

Doe’s mother, informed the District of A.P.’s juvenile adjudication: “ . . . 

Jennifer Nied, specifically informed the District Defendants, by and 

through their agents, servants, administration and/or employees, of 

A.P.’s delinquency adjudication an/or admission at the conclusion of the 

Juvenile case.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 36). Taking this factual averment as true, the 

District had knowledge of A.P.’s juvenile adjudication. Accordingly, we 

cannot conclude that a reasonable person would infer that, absent 

additional notification by A.P. or the Picas, Jane Doe would not have 

suffered her alleged injuries. In fact, the complaint alleges that despite 

the District’s knowledge of the sexual assault adjudication, A.P.’s 

harassment resulted in injury to Jane Doe. 

The plaintiffs argue that they have pleaded these facts in the 

alternative, and that the inconsistent facts in the complaint are 

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nonetheless sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss. It is true that 

“as a general matter, pleading inconsistent claims is permissible[.]” 

Dorley v. South Fayette Twp. Sch. Dist., 129 F. Supp. 3d 220, 236 (W.D. 

Pa. 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(3)). However, “where one factual 

allegation negates an essential element of a contrary assertion, that 

conflict cannot stand, absent sufficient explanation.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Here, the plaintiffs’ factual assertion that Jennifer Nied 

informed the school of A.P.’s adjudication negates the proximate cause 

element of the negligence per se claim; that is, the assertion that but for 

the Picas’ failure to notify the school, Jane Doe would not have suffered 

her injuries. As we have explained, the complaint affirmatively pleads 

that the District knew of the adjudication, and despite this knowledge, 

Jane Doe suffered her alleged injuries. Thus, we cannot conclude that the 

complaint sufficiently asserts that the Picas’ failure to notify the school 

of the adjudication was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. 

Accordingly, this claim fails as a matter of law, and we will dismiss this 

claim with prejudice. 

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2. Negligence 

The plaintiffs also bring a general negligence claim against the 

Picas, asserting that the Picas failed to notify the school of the sexual 

assault, and were aware of A.P.’s ongoing harassment of Jane Doe but 

failed to intervene and stop it. They contend that the Picas knew or 

should have known that the failure to notify the school, as well as the 

failure to remove A.P. from the school, would result in injury to Jane Doe. 

The plaintiffs’ negligence claim suffers from the same fatal flaw as 

their negligence per se claim—they cannot establish that the Picas’ 

actions or inactions were the proximate cause of Jane Doe’s injuries. To 

state a negligence claim, the plaintiffs must plead facts to establish: “(1) 

the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty or obligation recognized by law; 

(2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) a causal connection existed 

between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual 

damages occurred.” Sodders v. Fry, 32 A.3d 882, 887 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 

2011). A plaintiff asserting a negligence claim must show that “such 

negligence is the ‘proximate’ or ‘legal’ cause of the injury.” Id. (citations 

omitted). 

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In this case, the plaintiffs’ negligence claim based on the Picas’ 

failure to notify the school fails because the plaintiffs have not pleaded 

facts to establish that the Picas’ failure to notify the school was the 

proximate cause of the alleged injuries. As we have explained, the 

complaint affirmatively asserts that the school did, in fact, have notice of 

A.P.’s sexual assault adjudication. Accordingly, this negligence claim 

fails as a matter of law. 

To the extent the plaintiffs assert this claim based on the Picas’ 

alleged failure to either remove A.P. from the school or intervene in A.P.’s 

harassing conduct, it appears this claim attempts to impose vicarious 

liability on the Picas for the actions of their son, A.P. Generally, a parentchild relationship does not automatically impose liability on the parents 

for the acts of the child. Condel v. Savo, 39 A.2d 51, 52 (Pa. 1944). 

However, parents may be liable if their negligence makes the alleged 

injury possible. J.H. ex rel. Hoffman v. Pellak, 764 A.2d 64, 66 (Pa. Super. 

Ct. 2000). Pennsylvania has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 

which provides that: 

A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to 

control his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally 

harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an 

unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent 

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(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability 

to control his child, and 

(b) knows or should know of the necessity and 

opportunity for exercising such control. 

Restatement (Second) of Torts 316. 

 Here, the complaint fails to assert any facts from which we can infer 

that the Picas were notified or were otherwise aware of A.P.’s harassment 

of Jane Doe. Rather, the plaintiffs assert in a conclusory fashion that the 

Picas knew or should have known that A.P. was harassing Jane Doe. 

(Doc. 1 ¶ 176(i)). However, nowhere in the complaint do the plaintiffs 

assert that they personally notified the Picas of the harassment, that the 

school notified the Picas, or that the Picas were present at the February 

meeting with the principals and guidance counselors, such that they 

would have been made aware of Jane Doe’s complaints. 

Further, all A.P.’s alleged conduct occurred at school or at school 

functions. The complaint asserts that Jane Doe was harassed in the 

hallway during school hours and at the semi-formal dance. Nothing in 

the complaint indicates that the Picas had the ability and opportunity to 

control A.P.’s actions while he was in school and at the school dance 

under the supervision of school officials. See Dorley, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 

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248 (dismissing a negligence claim against parents where the complaint 

failed to plead allegations “to indicate that the Parent Defendants had 

the ‘ability and opportunity to control’ their child when he was under the 

supervision of his coaches at practice.”). Accordingly, this negligence 

claim fails as currently pleaded and will be dismissed without prejudice 

to the plaintiffs endeavoring to amend their complaint as to this claim. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 

20) will be GRANTED. The plaintiff’s negligence per se claim against the 

Picas (Count IX) will be dismissed WITH PREJUDICE, and the general 

negligence claim (Count X) will be dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE to 

the plaintiffs endeavoring to amend their complaint as to this claim. 

An appropriate order follows. 

 s/ Daryl F. Bloom 

Daryl F. Bloom 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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