LAW AND 

MILITARY 

OPERATIONS 

IN HAITI 

1994-1995 

LESSONS 


LEARNED 


FOR 


JUDGE 


ADVOCATES 


Center for Law and Military Operations 

The Judge Advocate General's School 

United States Army · 

Charlottesville, Virginia 
CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERA TIO NS 


Director 

Colonel David E. Graham 

Deputy Director Inter-Service Secretariat 

Major Mark S. Martins Captain David G. Bolgiano 

Observer-Controllers 

Combat Maneuver Training Center 

Major Michael E. Sainsbury 

Joint Readiness Training Center Battle Command Training Program 

Captain James M Patterson Captain Roger C. Cartwright 

Reserve Component Liaisons 

United States Army Reserve Army National Guard ofthe United States 

Colonel Keith H. Harnack, USAR Lieutenant Colonel Peter Menk, ARNGUS 

The Judge Advocate General established the Center for Law and Military Operations in 

1988 at the direction ofthe Secretary of the Army. 

The purpose ofthe Center is to examine legal issues that arise during all phases of 

military operations and to devise training strategies for addressing those issues. It seeks to fulfill 

this purpose in five ways. First, it is the central repository within The Judge Advocate General's 

Corps for memoranda, lessons learned, and after-action materials pertaining to legal support for 

deployed forces. Second, it serves as the Secretariat for the Inter-Service Committee on 

International Legal Education, which coordinates legal training provided by the separate military 

services to foreign countries under several statutory programs. Third, it supports judge advocates 

in the field by disseminating key lessons learned, by building a database of legal issues 

encountered by previously deployed judge advocates, by creating guides to successful operational 

law training and evaluation, and by recommending refinements to doctrine for legal operations. 

Fourth, it integrates lessons learned from deployments into the curriculum of all relevant courses, 

workshops, orientations, and seminars held at The Judge Advocate General's School. Fifth, with 

The Judge Advocate General's School, it sponsors conferences and symposia on topics of interest 

to operational lawyers. 

The Director ofthe Center also serves as Chief, International and Operational Law 

Division, Office ofThe Judge Advocate General. The Deputy Director heads the main office in 

Charlottesville, where the Center forms an important part ofThe Judge Advocate General's 

School and represents the Corps' growing commitment to excellence in operational law. 

The contents of this report are not to be construed as official positions, policies, or 

decisions ofthe Department ofthe Army or The Judge Advocate General. The Center welcomes 

and solicits suggestions and contributions ofrelevant operational law materials from the field. 

Please call 934-7115, ext. 339 (DSN) or (804) 972-6339 (commercial); send electronic mail to 

martinsm@otjag.army.mil; post a message to Major Mark Martins on the Legal Automation 

Army-Wide Systems (LAA WS) electronic bulletin board service (BBS); or write Major Martins, 

Center for Law and Military Operations, The Judge Advocate General's School, 600 Massie 

Road, Charlottesville, Virginia, 22903-1781. 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


IN HAITI, 1994-95: 


LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE 


ADVOCATES 


CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

11 DECEMBER 1995 


LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95: 


LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 


CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. Introduction ............................................................................... . 1 


II. 	The Military Operations and Their Context.................... . 7 


A. Situation Before the Military Operation ...................... 7 


B. 	Operation Uphold Democracy ..-................................... . 13 


u. 	• d 1\T " "III" • • rr • • 
 C• mte Hatzons 1u.1ss1on zn na1t1 ................................... 22 


D. 	 Judge Advocate Support .............................................. . 25 


III. Lessons Learned ............................................................. . 30 


A. Rules ofEngagement .................................................... . 34 


1. 	Be Preparedfor Controversy Over Protection of 


Foreign Nationals ..................................................... 37 


2. 	 Use Situational Training .......................................... . 40 


3. 	Be Willing to Take the Lead in Multinational ROE 


Development .............................................................. 43 


B. International Law ......................................................... . 45 


1. 	 Understand the International Justification for Use 


ofForce and the Impact ofDomestic Legislation ..... 47 


2. 	Expect to Practice Law Without the Benefit ofa 


SOFA ........................................................................ . 50 


3. 	 Understand When The Law ofArmed Conflict 


Does Not Strictly Apply ............................................ . 53 


C. 	 Intelligence Law ........................................................... . 57 


1. 	Know That Force Protection Can Justify Collecting 


Information on United States Persons ..................... . 58 


2. 	 Understand the Different Roles ofMilitary 


Intelligence and Military Police ............................... . 59 


3. 	 Monitor Counter-Intelligence Force Protection and 


Use ofIntelligence Contingency Funds ................... . 62 


1 
u CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

D. 	Detention ofNon-members ofthe Force....................... 63 


1. 	Begin Planning Early for Detention Issues .............. 65 


2. 	 Give Two Judge Advocates Independent Roles in 


the Release Determination Process ........ .. ...... .. .. .. .. .. . 67 


3. 	Encourage the Commander to Delegate Authority 


to Release ........ .. .. .... .. .. . . .... ...... .. ... . . . ... . . . ..... .. . . . ...... . ... 70 


E. 	 Weapons Buyback and Control..................................... 72 


1. 	Know and Coordinate With All the Key Players in 


the Weapons Program............................................... 74 


2. 	 Be Prepared to Advise Commanders About 


Disarming Threats to the Force ..... .'.......................... 76 


3. 	 Understand Applicable Search and Seizure Law ...... 77 


F. 	Media Relations............................................................. 78 


1. 	Describe the Processes and Legal Authorities that 


Explain Military Actions ................ . . .......... . . .... .. .. ..... 80 


2. 	Acknowledge the Legitimacy ofthe Media's 


Presence in Operations Other Than War.................. 82 


G. 	 Joint, Inter-Agency, and Nongovernmental 


Coordination . . . . . . . ... . . ... . . . ... . .. .. ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . ... . ... . . . . . . . 84 


1. 	 Use Technical Judge Advocate Channels ................. 85 


2. 	 Develop Skills/or Inter-Agency Coordination ... ~...... 89 


3. 	Maintain Close and Open Communications With 


the ICRC and other Nongovernmental Agencies ..... 93 


H. Civil Affairs ...... . . .............. .. ....................... . ... . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 97 


1. 	Ensure That the StaffJudge Advocate is the Sole 


Advisor to the Command on Its Legal Obligations ... 99 


2. 	 Understand All Three Legs in the Stool of the 

Justice System ... . ......... . ... .... .. .. ....... . ........ .. .. ..... .. . . . . ... I02 

3. 	 Be Prepared to Mentor Foreign Judges and 


Ministry Officials ...................................................... 105 


L Criminal Law ...... . ....... .. .... .. .. .. .... .. .... . ...... ... .. .. .. .. . .... .. .. ... 107 


1. Seek Court-Martial Convening Authority for the 


Joint Task Force Commander Over All Members 


ofthe Joint Task Force ............................................. 109 

LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITL 1994-95 m 

2. 	 Emphasize to Soldiers That Neither General 


Guidancefrom the President Nor Personal 


Feelings Will Justify Disobedience........................... 112 


3. 	 Be Prepared to Conduct Courts-Martial in the Area 


ofOperations............................................................. 115 


J. 	Legal Assistance . . . ... . . . . . ... . . . . ... . . . . . ... . ... . . . ... . . . . . ... . ... . . . . . ... .. 116 


1. 	Expect the Rush in Demand for Wills .............. .... ..... 118 


2. 	Educate Soldiers That Deployment Does Not 


Dissolve Their Debts ... . . . ... . . . ... . . . ... . . . . . ..... . ... . . . . . ... . . . . .. 119 


3. 	Discourage General Powers ofAttorney ................... 122 


K. 	Administrative Law........................................................ 124 


1. 	Advise Commander to Announce Clear and 


Straightforward Guidance on "War Trophies" ........ . 127 


2. 	Brace/or the Flood o/Questions About Eligibility 


to Obtain Medical Care, Use the Post Exchange, 


and Travel in Military Aircraft ................................ . 129 


3. 	 Take Initiative to Assist Officers Conducting 


Official Investigations .............................................. . 131 


L. Procurement Law and Fiscal Constraints .................... . 132 


1. 	Know the Terms and Conditions ofthe LOGCAP ... . 134 


2. 	Expect Second-Guessing About Advance Payments ... on Acqu1s1t1ons ......................................................... . 136 


3. 	 Step Forward to Ensure that Operational Funds 


are not Expended for Unauthorized Purposes ......... . 138 


4. 	 Understand the Status ofCivilian Contractor 


Employees ................................................................ . 142 


M. Claims .......................................................................... . 144 


1. 	Appoint Many Judge Advocates to Foreign Claims 


Commissions ............................................................ . 146 


2. 	 Make Linguist Support and Protection of 


Claimants Leadership Priorities ............................... . 148 


3. 	Expect Misdirected and Exaggerated Claims .......... . 150 

CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IV 

N. 	 Reserve Components ... . . . . . ..... .. . . .... .. .. ........... . . . . . ... . ..... . . . 152 


1. 	Assist the Command in Developing a Knowledge 


Base About Individual Mobilization Augmentees 


and in Securing Individual Reservists With Special 


Skills.......................................................................... 154 


2. 	 Forge Strong Training and Mutual Support 


Relationships with Reserve Units.............................. 157 


0. 	Equipment and Military Training................................. 158 


1. 	Pack Footlockers Ahead ofTime With Forms and 


References, to Include Fiscal Law and Intelligence 


Law Materials ... .. ............ . ... . ... . .. . . ... . . . ... . . ... .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . 160 


2. 	Deploy With 486 Laptops Having Software Used 


By the Rest ofthe Staffand Having 


Communications and CD-ROM Reading 


Capability ....... . . . .................... . ... . . . . . . . ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 


3. 	 Conduct Individual Soldier and Officer Training 


on Such Things as First Aid, Vehicle and Weapon 


Primary Maintenance, and Writing Messages ..... ..... 166 


P. 	 StaffProcedures and Operations . . . . . . ... . . . . ... . . .. .. .. . ... . . . . . .. 167 


1. 	Keep a Log ofAll Significant Actions ....................... 168 


2. 	 Maintain a Binder With Messages and Other 


Authorities Relating to the Operation ........ ...... ...... ... 169 


3. 	 Obtain Top-Secret Security Clearances for the 


StaffJudge Advocate, Deputy StaffJudge 


Advocate, and Operational Law Attorneys . . . ... . . ... . . . . . 170 


IV. Conclusion ........................................................................ 171 


Appendix A: Governors Island Agreement ............................. 174 


Appendix B: Security Council Resolution 940 ............... ..... ... . 177 


Appendix C: Carter-Jonassaint Agreement ... .. .... ...... ............. 182 


Appendix D: President Clinton Speech of31March1995 ..... 184 


Appendix E: Legal Personnel Deployed.................................. 189 


Appendix F: Judge Advocates Significantly Involved............. 197 

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 v 

Appendix G: ROE Soldier Card for Nonpermissive Entry .... . 200 


Appendix H: ROE Operation Plan Annex ............................. . 203 


Appendix I: ROE Soldier Card, 6September1994 ................ . 213 


Appendix J: ROE Soldier Card, 23September1994 ............. . 215 


Appendix K: ROE Vignette Training Sheets ........................... . 217 


Appendix L: ROE Training Card, 82d Airborne Div ............. . 235 


Appendix M: Full Text ROEfor UNMIH .............................. 237 


Appendix N: ROE Soldier Card for UNMIH ......................... . 250 


Appendix 0: SOFA/or MNF ................................................. . 255 


Appendix P: SOMA/or United Nations Mission in Haiti ...... . 273 


Appendix Q: Bilateral SOFA Between United States and 


Haiti .................................................................. . 292 


Appendix R: Memorandum ofAgreement on Detention 


Facility .............................................................. . 295 


Appendix T: Correspondence Pertaining to Appointment of 


Appendix W: Form Used to Process Requests for Air 


Appendix X: Section 607 Agreement Between the United 


Appendix BB: Responses to Survey on Equipment and 


Appendix S: Nongovernmental Organizations in Haiti .......... 297 


Force Commander, UNMIH ............................. 299 


Appendix U: General Order Number 1 .................................. . 312 


Appendix V: Congressional Testimony on Rockwood Case ... 332 


Transport .......................................................... . 344 


States and Haiti ................................................. . 347 


Appendix Y: Claims Accident SOP ......................................... 354 


Appendix Z: Claims Accident Form ...................................... . 356 


Appendix AA: Presidential Cal/up ofSelected Reserve .......... 357 


,.,.. . . ..1.ra1n1ng ............................................................. . 359 


Appendix CC: Excerpt From Daily Events Log Maintained 


Appendix DD: Excerpt From Daily Events Log Maintained 


Appendix EE: Extract ofEvents Recorded in SJA Office 


by the 10th Mountain Division ............................ 373 


by the 25th Infantry Division ............................. . 402 


Log ofthe United States Forces Haiti ................. . 415 

v1 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

Figures 

Figure 1: Deployment ofForces Into Haiti ............................ 19 

Figure 2: UNMIH Regions ........ .......... ...... ............. .............. ... 22 

Figure 3: CJTF-180 Legal Organization (D+l) ...................... 27 

Figure 4: CJTF-190 Legal Organization (D+4) ...................... 28 

Figure 5: MNF Legal Organization (D+35) ............................. 29 

Figure 6: MNF Legal Organization (D+l20) .......................... 29 

Figure 7: UNMIH Legal Organization.................................... 30 

Figure 8: Categories ofLessons Learned................................. 31 

Figure 9: Three Legs ofthe Stool ofJustice System................. 102 

Summary 

With this report, the Center for Law and Military Operations 

identifies lessons learned for judge advocates from United States 

military operations in Haiti during 1994and1995. The report focuses 

on providing guidance andpractical considerations within the sphere 

ofcontrol ofjudge advocates who may be deployed. The Center 

prepared the report based on after action reports submitted by judge 

advocate sections involved in the operation, on materials gathered 

during a three-day conference attended by participants, on interviews 

ofindividualjudge advocates who deployed, and on other sources. 

The Center finds that the Corps delivered legal services well in every 

functional area, and that doctrine for legal operations is fundamentally 

sound. Among other suggestions, the Center recommends that judge 

advocates help develop situational training on rules ofengagement, 

make frequent use oftechnical channels, step forward to ensure 

operational funds are not expended for unauthorized purposes, acquire 

and study legal references pertaining to fiscal law, and keep a log of 

all significant actions. 
ERRATA 


1. In note 123, the word "number" should not appear. 

2. In note 174, the phrase "it is true" should be removed. 

3. On page 58, line 14, replace "divers" with "diverse." 

4. On page 6B, line 17, replace "three" with "four." 

5. On page 79, line 9, replace "broadcast" with the word 


"broadcasted." 


6. On page Bl, line 11, the semi-colon should be replaced 


with a comma. 


7. Note 289, should read; See Interview with Admiral Paul 


David Miller, United States Atlantic Command, in 


Charlottesville, Virginia. (May 18, 1995). 


8. On page 151, line 6, replace the phrase "to resemblP." 


with "they were determined to be." 


9. In note 555, replace the phone number (202) 512-1356 

with (202) 512-2250. Also, replace the phrase "or sending to 

the Government" with "or sending a fax to the Government." 

10. On page 173, line 4, replace "perform" with 


"performed." 


11. On page 255, line 31, the letter "s" should be removed. 

12. On page 261, line 29, the word "ex" should be removed. 

13. On page 267, line 33, replace "nay" with "may." 

14. On page 32B, line 23, replace "restraints" with the 

word "restaurants." 

15. On page 370, line 4, replace "loss" with "lots." 

16. On page 408, line 2, replace "Exhume" with "resume." 

17. On page 411, line 8, replace "Solders" with "Soldiers.n 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95: 


LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 


I. Introduction 

United States military operations in the Republic ofHaiti in 1994 

and 1995 represented a comprehensive and stwmingly successful 

application oflaw to fluid and challenging circumstances. Many 

Americans will recall the tense beginning, when a large combat force 

entered Haiti peacefully on terms negotiated in the 11th hour by duly 

empowered civilian representatives ofthe United States. Many Americans 

also will recall how these operations soon achieved the ouster ofa dictator, 

the return to power ofan elected Haitian president, and the removal ofa 

threat to regional peace and security.1 These aspects ofthe Haiti 

deployment not only reaffirmed the rule oflaw, 2 they also held a symbolic 

and political importance that aroused great popular interest 

Yet other significant applications of law took place day-to-day, at 

the individual and unit level. Infantry privates balanced initiative with 

restraint under the rules ofengagement while confronting potentially hostile 

1 See infra notes 140-142 and accompanying text. 

2 In this report, "law" and the "rule of law" refer to notions ofjustice generally taken for 

granted today among western developed nations but not necessarily found in underdeveloped 

countries, such as Haiti. Hereinafter "law," when used outside the context of a specific rule or 

statute, will connote any or all of three meanings: an autonomous body of rules, independent from 

(though influenced by) religion, morality, and other social norms; a vehicle for ordering society 

and resolving disputes; something which regulates the conduct ofgovernments as well as of 

individuals. See RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 80 

(Supp. 1994 to 5th ed.). "Rule of law" will connote the notion of a "law-governed" state or 

community, which in addition to institutional arrangements-such as judicial review oflegislative 

acts or civilian control of the military-demands "a disposition to take law seriously, a concern 

with process and with following forms, as much as with substantive results." Id. at 77. In finding 

that the Haiti intervention reaffirmed the rule oflaw, this report directly contradicts the view that 

respect for laws will cripple future military operations. See, e.g., Ralph Peters, After the 

Revolution, PARAMETERS, Summer 1995, at 7, 13 ("Attempts to bring our wonderful, comfortable, 

painstakingly humane laws and rules to bear on broken countries drunk with blood and anarchy 

constitute the ass end ofimperialism."). 

1 

2 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Haitians. Supply clerks distributed food and other items that had been 

purchased strictly in accordance with acquisition and appropriations laws. 

Military policemen treated Haitian detainees pursuant both to internal rules 

and to standards derived from international treaties. Investigating officers 

performed their duties thoroughly and fairly in gathering evidence about 

incidents ofalleged misconduct. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines 

remained undistracted by personal concerns, enjoying a sense ofsecurity 

provided by statutory programs oflife insurance and legal assistance. With 

very few exceptions, these men and women in uniform also scrupulously 

followed orders given by their chain ofcommand, justifying a disciplinary 

system acknowledged by Congress and the courts to be essential to 

mission accomplishment. Although policy and operational concerns also 

held sway when appropriate, law governed or influenced these and 

countless other examples ofindividual and unit conduct. 

For their contributions to this thorough application oflaw during 

military operations in Haiti, attorneys ofall services shared in the 

remarkable success ofthose operations. lbis report recounts successes of 

judge advocates who participated. More important, however, it seeks to 

capture knowledge gained by those judge advocates so that future 

deploying attorneys and soldiers may learn without having to receive hard 

lessons from experience. Personal experience will inevitably teach its own 

lessons; careful study ofrecent history, however, will enable the 

operational lawyers oftomorrow to stand on the shoulders oftheir 

predecessors.3 

3 The team ofjudge advocates that reviewed legal support provided during 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm stated the need for capturing lessons learned 

in strong terms: 

If[Desert Storm and this report] teach anything to the Army legal 


community, let it be to confirm the need for a continuing system of 


gathering, analyzing, and storing in retrievable form, the activities, 


accomplishments, shortcomings, and lessons learned ofthe JAGC in 


peace and throughout the operational continuum. 

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 3 

Some ofwhat follows will seem blindingly obvious. Other portions will trigger questions deserving ofdetailed answers. Is there a systemic 

response that can fix this problem? Which office should be the proponent 

for resolving that issue? This narrative cannot fully answer these and other 

important questions. In pursuing the approach ofthe Desert Storm 

Assessment Team Report and The Army Lessons Learned Program,5 this 

report neither avoids restating basic principles nor proposes final solutions. 

The simplest lessons are often the most important to reinforce. Also, the 

time lag required to complete an exhaustive analysis can frustrate universal 

dissemmation of these crucial, ifsimple, lessons. 

A goal ofthe Center for Law and Military Operations6 over the 

medium term is to develop and make available to judge advocates in the 

field a database ofoperational legal issues. 7 Such a database would permit 

research ofthe entire range ofissues arising in a specific operation; 

alternatively, it would permit research ofspecific legal issues arising across 

a series ofoperations. At present, CLAMO's automated database contains 

See UNITED STATES ARMY LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY' DESERT STORM AsSESSMENT TEAM'S 

REPORT TO THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY at Intro-4 (22 Apr. 1992) (copy on file 

with CLAMO) [hereinafter DSAT REPORT]; see also id at Oral History Program-4 (''TJAG 

should establish, with quality resources, a JAGC version ofthe Center for Army Lessons Learned 

(CALL) to capture lessons learned from contingency operations like [Desert Storm]."). 

4 See id. Frequent references to the Desert Storm Assessment Team Report are not 

intended to imply that the Persian Gulf conflict is ideal as a model for the types of military 

operations judge advocates are likely to see. Surely it is not. These references merely 

acknowledge that many aspects oflegal support are constant throughout the operational 

continuum and that the last comprehensive collection and examination of lessons learned dealt 

with that conflict. 

s See DEP'TOF ARMY, REG. 11-33, ARMY LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM: SYSTEM 

DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION (10 Oct. 1989) [hereinafter AR 11-33]. 

6 Hereinafter referred to in text and notes as either "CLAMO" or "the Center." 

7 See Major Mark S. Martins, Responding to the Challenge ofan Enhanced OPLA W 

Mission: CLAMO Moves Forward with a Full-Time Staff, ARMY L, Aug. 1995, at 3, 7 & n. 45. 
4 CENTER FOR LAWAND WLITARY OPERATIONS 

659 issues identified by the Desert Storm Assessment Team8 and 48 issues 

thus far identified by the Center itself pertaining to legal support for 

operations in Haiti. Just as law reporters and modem databases have 

facilitated the development oftraditional bodies oflaw, the CLAMO 

database seeks to facilitate the emergence and sharper definition of 

operational law.9 

A goal ofthe Center over the longer term is to serve as a focal point 

within a document imaging and retrieval system presently being planned 

for judge advocate community. The Center would scan opinions, 

memoranda, standard operating procedures, declassified operations plan 

annexes, as well as useful forms, cards, and training aids. It would then 

upload these electronic files into the system, categorize them,10 and 

8

With the help ofautomation specialists at the Office of The Judge Advocate General and 

at The Judge Advocate General's School, CLAMO recently imported the entire DSAT database-­

developed by DSAT using Enable software-into Microsoft Access, a software now widely used in 

The Judge Advocate General's Corps. 

9 Operational law is "that body ofdomestic, foreign, and international law that impacts 

specifically upon the activities ofU.S. forces in war and operations other than war." See INT'L & 

OPERATIONAL L. DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S ScHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, 

OPERATIONAL LAwHANDBOOK at 1-1 (4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter OP. LAwHANDBOOK]. See also 

DEP'TOF ARMY, FIELDMANuAL27-100, LEGAL OPERATIONS at para. l-9g (3 Sept. 1991) 

[hereinafter FM 27-100] ("Operational law is the application of domestic, international, and 

foreign law to the planning for, training for, deployment of, and employment of United States 

military forces."). 

Development of a useful database will require refinements in the system by which afteraction reports oflegal support to military operations are written and submitted, see Memorandum, 

The Judge Advocate General ofthe Army, DAJA-IO, to Command and Staff Judge Advocates, 

subject: After Action Reporting Policy-Policy Memorandum 95-5, para. 3b(4) (3 Oct. 1994) 

(tasking the senior judge advocate to produce a report for the JAG Corps and specifying no 

particular format for lessons learned), as well as stable development ofthe subcategories 

constituting operational law. See, e.g .• WEST'S MILITARY JUSTICE DIGEST (1995) (employing the 

system of "key numbers" and "digest topics" within the area of military justice). Specifically, 

CLAMO itself should prepare reports for Corps-wide dissemination, establish subcategories of 

issues, and guide the orderly evolution of additional subcategories. See infra note 80. 

10 The categories would be those developed according to the process described in note 9, 

supra. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHAITL 1994-95 5 

replicate them to other seivers on a wide area network that would include 

legal offices at installations around the globe. 11 

In issuing this report, the Center has the worthy but more modest 

aim ofsummarizing two to four useful lessons learned from the Haiti 

deployment in each functional area ofoperational law. According to 

United States Army doctrine, the mission ofthe Judge Advocate General's 

Corps is to support the battlefield commander by providing professional 

legal services as far forward as possible at all echelons ofcommand 

throughout the operational continuum. 12 In surveying a wide variety of 

lessons learned, the report permits an overall assessment ofwhether the 

legal services provided-and the method ofdelivery-support Army 

doctrine for conducting operations other than war. 13 In short, CLAMO 

11 See generally Lieutenant Colonel Robert Van Hooser, Regimental Technology Plan, at 

Section IX, in THE JUDGE AovocATE GENERAL's SCHOOL, DESKBOOK FOR PLENARY SESSIONS OF 

THE 1995 JAG CLE at 105, 113 (1-6 Oct. 1995) (describing the plan for work product retrieval 

(WPR) within the Judge Advocate General's Corps Wide Area Network (JAGC WAN)) (copy on 

file with CLAMO). 

12 See FM 27-100, supra note 9, at para. 1-4 (3 Sept. 1991). 

13 See DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANuAL 100-5, OPERATIONS at 13-4 to 13-8 (14 June 

1993) (listing noncombatant evacuation operations, civil disturbance operations, humanitarian 

assistance, disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance or peace building, counterdrug 

operations, counterterrorism operations, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, shows offorce, attacks, 

raids, and support for insurgencies or counterinsurgencies), Glossary-6 (defining operations other 

than war as "military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve 

armed clashes between two organized forces") [hereinafter FM 100-5]; JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PuBLICATION 3-0, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS 1-3 to 1-4 (9 Sept. 1993). The term 

"operations other than war" is relatively young. 

Yet even as this report was being prepared, the Army strongly indicated that the term 

itself will drop out ofusage, although the missions described by the term will remain a focus of 

doctrinal development. See Memorandum, Commander, United States Army Training and 

Doctrine Command to 35 Senior Addressees within the Command, subject: Commander 

TRADOC's Philosophy on the Term "Operations Other Than War" (2 Nov. 1992) (copy on file 

with CLAMO) ("As U.S. military forces became increasingly involved in worldwide operations 

following the breakup ofthe Soviet Union, the U.S. Army coined the term "OOTW" to provide an 

overarching concept for our doctrine as we entered a new historical period for the U.S. Army. 

The term "OOTW" has served us well to provide increased visibility for new types ofoperations 

over the past several years ... We have reached a point in our post-cold war doctrinal development 

so we can now speak with more precision about Army operations in peacekeeping, humanitarian 
6 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

finds that in the context ofHaiti, the Corps delivered legal services well in 

every functional area, and that doctrine for legal operations is 

fundamentally sound. 

The Center's methodology is straightforward. Gather and read 

all available after action reports from legal offices world-wide that 

supported the mission. Examine input made by judge advocates to 

unit after action reports collected by the Center for Army Lessons 

Leamed. 14 Study the videotapes of briefings and subsequent 

discussions conducted at The Judge Advocate General's School by 

those who provided legal support before and during the operations. 15 

Review submissions on legal issues made to the Joint Uniform 

assistance, ... and other specific missions. Since "OOTW" has served its purpose, we should 

begin to retire the term, while maintaining and enlarging the vital lessons learned in specific 

areas."). Because this report was in final draft form when the shift in official terminology 

occurred, it continues to use the overarching term "operations other than war" when discussing 

this diverse class of operations. 

As used here, doctrine is "the authoritative guide to how [land forces] fight wars and 

conduct operations other than war." See FM l 00-5, supra, at v . Doctrine seeks to bulld on 

collective knowledge within the military, to reflect wisdom that has been gained in past 

operations, and to incorporate informed reasoning about how new technologies may best be used 

and new threats may best be resisted. See generally MAJOR PAULH. HERBERT, COMBAT STUDIES 

INSTITUTE, LEAVENWORTH PAPER No. 16, DECIDING WHAT HAS TO BE DONE: GENERAL WILLIAM 

E. DEPUY AND THE 1976 EDITION OFFM 100-5, OPERATIONS 3-9 (1988) (describing the function 

ofdoctrine in an army and charting the modem practice of publishing doctrine in manuals). 

14 See AR 11-33, supra note 5, at para. 1-5 (establishing the Center for Anny Lessons 

Learned, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the focal point for the Anny Lessons Learned System). 

The various products ofthe Center for Army Lessons Learned frequently contain information of 

value to deploying judge advocates, as is reflected by the frequent references to them in this report. 

Obtain a listing and copies of these products by dialing DSN 552-2255/3035 or (913) 684­

2266/3035, faxing a request to DSN 552-9564 or (913) 684-9564, or e-mailing a request to 

call@leav-emh.army.mil. 

15 See Memorandum, Assistant Judge Advocate General for Military Law and 

Operations, DAJA-ZD, to StaffJudge Advocate, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg and other 

addressees, subject: After Action Report for Operation Uphold Democracy (2 Feb. 1995) 

(directing that the conference take place). The conference was held and videotaped at 

Charlottesville between 8 and 10 May 1995. This report at several points cites to remarks made at 

this conference, the videotapes ofwhich are on file with CLAMO. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHAITL 1994-95 7 

Lessons Learned System. 16 Personally interview a representative 

sample ofjudge advocate personnel involved in the operations, and 

solicit additional documents and materials from them. Execute searches 

on commercial legal and news databases to confirm factual matters, 

such as dates and places, and to probe alternative perspectives of 

mission performance. Consult authoritative legal and doctrinal sources 

to determine whether field solutions differ from textbook solutions. 

Write the narrative report. Certify the most illuminating issues for entry 

into the database. Without claiming that this methodology is 

exhaustive, the remarkable recurrence ofissues across the wide variety 

ofsources gives the Center confidence it has identified all significant 

lessons learned. 

This is a report ofkey lessons, not a history ofjudge advocate 

participation in the Haiti deployment. Nevertheless, full appreciation of 

any legal or practical issue requires some knowledge ofthe historical 

setting which gave rise to that issue. Accordingly, Part II ofthis report 

briefly describes the situation in Haiti prior to recent United States 

involvement, recounts how United States forces and coalition partners 

executed operations in Haiti, and outlines the organization within which 

judge advocates supported those operations. Part III then summarizes 

lessons learned according to functional areas. 

II. The Military Operations and Their Context 

A. Situation Before the Military Operation. 

A flood ofmigrants departing Haiti for foreign shores in 

unseaworthy vessels furnished the immediate cause for recent United 

States and international involvement in this poor Caribbean country. 17 

16 See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE DATA CENTER, JOINT UNIFORM 

LESSONS LEARNED SYSTEM (JULLS), VERSION 3.10 USER's MANuAL ( 1990). 

17 President William Clinton, Address Broadcast Live to the Nation (Sept. 15, 1994), 

reprinted in WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1994, at A31 ("Three hundred thousand more Haitians, 5 
8 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Increasing despair and perceptions ofpersonal danger among growing 

numbers of Haitians, however, reflected deeper causes that combined in 

1994 to precipitate the flood of migrants. Haiti's history ofpolitical 

instability, brutal repression, and economic hardship records these 

deeper causes. 18 

Haiti was the first Caribbean state to achieve independence, 

which occurred in 1804 after ex-slave Toussaint l'Ouverture's rebellion 

brought an end to French rule. Since that time, the country has never 

enjoyed a prolonged period ofinternal calm without outside 

intervention and has never developed institutions capable of sustained 

democratic government. Between 1915 and 1934, the United States 

occupied Haiti to quell disorder and protect strategic interests along the 

Windward Passage, the strait between Cuba and Haiti that leads to the 

Panama Canal. In 1920, the United States launched Operation Uplift, 

an ambitious program involving construction ofroads, bridges, a dam, 

electrical and communications systems, hospitals, civic buildings, parks, 

and sanitation facilities. 19 Until 1934, when the last United States 

forces left, Haitians enjoyed the benefits ofthese investments in 

infrastructure. 

Soon thereafter, however, turmoil returned, and a series of 

dictators used the army-which had been established and armed by 

United States marines early in the occupation-to put down political 

opponents. The most repressive of these was Francois "Papa Doc" 

Duvalier, who gained power in 1957, ruled for 14 years, and then left 

percent oftheir entire population, are in hiding in their own country. Ifwe don't act, they could 

be the next wave ofrefugees at our door."). 

18 Unless otherwise noted, the next 12 paragraphs of the text-which overview Haitian 

history, the events leading up to international intervention, and various demographic, geographic, 

and economic factors are based upon DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 

PRACTICES FOR 1993 at 467-74 (1994); The United Nations and the Situation in Haiti, U.N. Dep't 

of Public Information, DPl/1668 (1995) [hereinafter Situation in Hait11; THE DoRLING 

KINDERSLEY WORLD REFERENCE ATLAS 258-59 (Ian Castello-Cortes ed., 1994) [hereinafter 

KINDERSLEY]; Mission to Haiti: Chronology, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1994, at 18 [hereinafter Haiti 

Chronology] ; UNITED STATES ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER, CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS 

LEARNED, NEWSLEITER No. 94-3, HAITI (Jul. 1994) [hereinafter CALL NEWSLEITER 94-3]. 

19 See Francis Maclean, Haiti Replays Its Tragic Drama of1915, NEWSDAY, Sept. 29, 

1994, at A4l. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 9 

control over the government in 1971 to his son, Jean-Claude "Baby 

Doc" Duvalier. Although the latter Duvalier's rule occasioned some 

liberalization ofthe government, Haiti had taken no significant steps 

toward democracy when he fled into exile in 1986 during an uprising. 

The army chief at the time, Lieutenant General Henri Namphy assumed 

power, but despite the enactment in 1987 ofa democratic constitution, 

Haiti experienced a series of coups that prevented its implementation. 

Then on December 16, 1990, in a presidential election deemed 

by observers to have been free and peaceful, the Reverend JeanBertrand Aristide captured an overwhelming majority ofvotes. 

Immediately after assuming office on February 7, 1991, the new, 

populist President announced a major reorganization ofthe army. The 

wealthy businessmen who had controlled Haitian politics since the 

Baby Doc years felt threatened by President Aristide and his followers, 

and they supported a violent military coup led by Lieutenant General 

Raoul Cedras on 30 September 1991. They also approved the 

installation ofJoseph Nerette, a supreme court justice, as provisional 

president. More than three years would pass before this latest and most 

disturbing military coup could be undone. 

In 1993, the junta rebuffed a series ofdiplomatic efforts to 

restore Aristide to power. On 16 June, the United Nations Security 

Council declared an oil and arms embargo on Haiti.20 On 3 July at 

20 S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., S/RES/841 (1993). Between 16 June 

1994 and 30 January 1995, the Security Council would eventually adopt 14 resolutions 

directly relating to the situation in Haiti, and over this time period, the President ofthe 

Security Council would issue nine statements pertaining to Haiti: 

1993 Activity 1994 Activity 

S.C. Res. 841 16 June 1993 S.C. Res. 905 23 Mar. 1994 

S.C. Res. 861 27 Aug. 1993 S.C. Res. 917 6 May 1994 

S.C. Res. 862 31 Aug. 1993 Pres. Statement 11 May 1994 


Pres. Statement 17 Sept. 1993 S.C. Res. 933 30 June 1994 

10 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

Governors Island, New York, General Cedras and President Aristide 

signed an agreement calling for Cedras to resign and Aristide to return 

by 30 October. Appendix A reprints this agreement. Pursuant to the 

Governors Island plan for the return ofAristide, about 200 lightly 

armed United States troops arrived in Port-au-Prince, Haiti's capital 

city, on 11 October. The ship carrying the soldiers, the U.S.S. Harlan 

County, turned around that day and left Haitian waters after a small 

group ofgunmen demonstrated in the harbor. In response to this 

episode and to two days of violence instigated by the same group of 

gunmen, the United Nations on 13 October declared renewed sanctions 

against Haiti.21 The next day, assassins killed Justice Minister Guy 

Malary, an Aristide supporter, and two days later still, a group of . 

international human rights monitors felt compelled to leave the country. 

On 19 October, the United Nations embargo on arms, military and 

police supplies, and oil shipments began, with United States and 

Canadian naval vessels and aircraft enforcing the embargo. The United 

States also froze assets and revoked visas ofjunta members. At the end 

of 1993, the scheduled return of Aristide had not occurred. 

During the first half of 1994, a steadily growing number of 

Haitians boarded boats and set out for the United States. Even as the 

international community was imposing ever-tighter trade sanctions 

against the de facto Haitian leaders,22 those leaders presided over an 

S.C. Res. 867 23 Sept 1993 Pres. Statement 12 July 1994 

Pres. Statement 11 Oct. 1993 S.C. Res. 940 31July1994 

S.C. Res. 873 13 Oct 1993 Pres. Statement 30Aug. 1994 

S.C. Res. 875 16 Oct. 1993 S.C. Res. 944 29 Sept. 1994 

Pres. Statement 25 Oct. 1993 S.C. Res. 948 15 Oct. 1994 

Pres. Statement 30 Oct. 1993 S.C. Res. 964 29Nov.1994 

Pres. Statement 15 Nov. 1993 1995 Activity 

Pres. Statement 10 Jan. 1993 S.C. Res. 975 30 Jan. 1995 

See Situation in Haiti, supra note 18. 

21 S.C. Res. 873, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., SIRES/873 (1993). 

22 S.C. Res. 917, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., S/RES/917 (1994). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHAITI, 1994-95 11 

increase in politically motivated intimidation and repression against 

Aristide supporters. The first instrument ofrepression was the Haitian 

armed forces, or Forces Armees d'Haiti (FAd'H), which had 

constitutional responsibility for public security and law enforcement and 

which included a police force. The second was a group ofparamilitary 

personnel in civilian clothes known as "attaches." The third was a 

group ofprovincial section chiefs known as "Tons Tons Macoutes," 

whom military regulations declared to be adjuncts to the FAd'H. The 

fourth, known as the Revolutionary Front for Advancement and 

Progress ofHaiti (FRAPH), was a group that had emerged in 1993 and 

that since that time had opened offices in most towns and villages and 

infiltrated poorer neighborhoods. 

On 8 May 1994, President Clinton announced that the United 

States would not refuse entry to Haitian boat people without hearing 

their claims for asylum. 23 Haitian migrants would be permitted to claim 

asylum aboard United States vessels or in other countries. On 29 June, 

in response to the growing number ofmigrants, the United States 

opened a processing center at Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba. On 

5 July, the still rising flood ofHaitian boat people impelled a change in 

United States policy: Haitian migrants would be returned to Haiti or 

taken to "safe havens" at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in Panama, and 

elsewhere. Two days later, the United States announced that the U.S.S. 

Wasp, with 

23 This was a shift in United States policy. In May of 1992, Executive Order 12807 had 

directed the Coast Guard to intercept on the high seas vessels illegally transporting passengers 

from Haiti to the United States and to return those passengers to Haiti without first determining 

whether they might qualify as refugees. Policy had been determinative in this matter, despite the 

fact that a binding treaty provision, see United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 

Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33.1, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, and a section ofthe 

Immigration and Nationality Act of l 952, see 8 U.S.C. §1253(h), prohibit the United States from 

expelling or returning a refugee to a country in which his life or freedom would be threatened on 

account ofrace, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 

opinion. The Supreme Court ruled on 21 June 1993 that neither the treaty provision nor the 

statutory section provided a judicial remedy for the Coast Guard's return ofHaitians intercepted 

on the high seas. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 125 L.Ed. 128 (1993). 
12 CENTERFORLAWANDAf/LITARYOPERATIONS 

1,800 marines on board, would sail into the waters offHaiti and 


practice drills required for invasion. 


On 31July1994 the United Nations Security Council cleared the 

way for an invasion. In Resolution 940, it voted 12 to 0-with two 

abstentions-to authorize member states 

to form a multinational force under unified command and 

control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means 

to facilitate the departure from Haiti ofthe military 

leadership, consistent with the Governors Island 

Agreement, the prompt return ofthe legitimately elected 

President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of 

the Government ofHaiti, and to establish and maintain a 

secure and stable environment that will permit 

implementation ofthe Governors Island agreement .... 24 

Appendix B reprints the entire text of this resolution. The month of 

August resulted only in further tension, as Father Jean-Marie Vincent, 

an Aristide loyalist and prominent Catholic priest, was murdered by 

gunmen in Port-au-Prince. 

In September of 1994, Haiti captured the full attention ofthe 

United States and the world. President Clinton stated in a nationally 

televised address on 15 September that the United States would use 

military force to oust the Cedras regime from power. On 17 September, 

in a final attempt to persuade the junta to step down without massive 

bloodshed, President Clinton dispatched a team consisting of former 

President Jimmy Carter, General Colin L. Powell, and Senator Sam 

Nunn to Haiti. On 18 September, in the very hour that paratroopers 

from the 82d Airborne Division were flying toward designated drop 

zones within Haiti, 25 the junta blinked. The Haitian military leaders 

24 S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., S/RES/940 (1994). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 13 

agreed to step down when the Parliament passed an amnesty law or on 

15 October, whichever came first. Appendix C reprints the terms of 

their agreement, which was signed by President Carter and Emile 

Jonassaint, the military-appointed president ofHaiti. 

Far from trusting the restoration ofPresident Aristide to another 

promise by the junta, United States forces entered Haiti in large 

numbers beginning 19 September. These troops led the United States 

contingent ofthe multinational force that had been formed pursuant to 

Security Council Resolution 940. This was D-Day ofOperation 

Uphold Democracy. 

B. Operation Uphold Democracy 

The Haiti encountered by soldiers and marines participating in 

Uphold Democracy was a country ofabout 6.5 million people 

inhabiting a landmass about the size ofthe state ofMaryland.26 The 

population was predominantly rural, roman catholic, black, French 

Creole-speaking, and extremely poor, Haiti having earned the 

distinction ofbeing the poorest country in the western hemisphere. 27 

Although a few Haitians descended from Europeans rather than African 

slaves, and although many ofthe former were affluent, social tensions 

focused on class rather than race. 

One-third ofthe Haitian landscape had suffered serious soil 

erosion as result ofgenerations ofindifference to ecological problems. 

Most Haitians could not afford health care, and in rural areas, sick 

persons often sought help from voodoo priests. The masses lived 

25 See infra note 74, and accompanying text 


26 
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC ATLAS OF THE WORLD 120 

(6th ed. 1990). 

27 See KlNDERSLEY supra note 18, at 258-59 (noting that in remote villages, most houses 

are made of earth and have no windows). 
14 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

without running water or proper sanitation, and AIDS was among the 

many diseases afflicting them. Paved roads were rare, and ferries from 

Port-au-Prince provided the main transportation to the southern 

peninsula ofthe country. Coffee exports, light manufacturing, and 

tourism, which had been among the few bright spots in the Haiti 

economy, all had come close to collapse as a result of the embargoes 

imposed following the coup. 28 

Operation Uphold Democracy was the most decisive in a series 

ofmilitary operations to support United States policy aims in Haiti. In 

October of 1993, in the wake of General Cedras' failure to comply with 

the terms of the Governors Island accord, United States Atlantic 

Command (USACOM)29 formed Joint Task Force (JTF) 120 and gave 

28 Two sources report that trafficking of illicit drugs, however, was on the increase. See 

CALL NEWSLETIER 94-3, supra note 18, at 11-8to11-9 (noting that Haiti's many social and 

economic ills make it well-suited as a cocaine trans-shipment point); KINDERSLEY supra note 18, 

at 259 ("The military makes large profits from the transportation of narcotics to the USA."). 

29 United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) is one of the unified combatant 

commands around which worldwide projection ofUnited States military power is organized. A 

unified command is "a military command which has broad continuing missions and which is 

composed of forces from two or more military departments." 10 U.S.C. § 16l(c)(l). The 

President, acting through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the 

Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), establishes unified commands, see 10 U.S.C. § 

16l(a), ofwhich there are presently nine: 

United States Atlantic Command USACOM Norfolk, VA 

United States European Command USEUCOM Stuttgart, FRG 

United States Pacific Command USPACOM Camp Smith, HI 

United States Southern Command USSOUTHCOM Quarry Heights,Panama 

United States Central Command USCENTCOM MacDill AFB, FL 

United States Transportation Command USTRANSCOM Scott AFB, IL 

United States Special Operations Command USSOCOM MacDill AFB, FL 

United States Space Command USSPACECOM Peterson AFB, CO 

United States Strategic Command USSTRATCOM Offut AFB, NE 

See DEP'ToFDEFENSE, DEFENSE ALMANAC '94, Issue 5, at 11 (1994). More than seven major 

pieces oflegislation over the past forty-six years have molded the defense organization of the 

United States, DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE PuBLICATION 1, THE JOINT 

STAFF OFFICER'S GUIDE 32 (1993) [hereinafter AFSC Pus. 1 ]. but the definition ofa unified 

command has not changed since Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947. See id. at 

42. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 15 

it the mission to protect and evacuate American citizens and key Haitian 

nationals.30 Built around a United States Navy Cruiser-Destroyer 

group, this Joint Task Force provided off-shore protection and 

evacuation support and also directed United Nations maritime embargo 

operations around Haiti. In June of 1994, USACOM formed JTF-160 

to address the flood of Haitian migrants, which in turn had resulted from 

the worsening situation on the island and President Clinton's decision to 

suspend direct repatriation. This second JTF, though activated aboard a 

hospital ship in Kingston, Jamaica, soon moved to Naval Station 

Guantanamo Bay, where it established safe havens for roughly 15,000 

Haitians.31 

The third and fourth JTF's corresponded to two separate plans 

for ending the junta's reign in Haiti. A plan for forced entry into Haiti 

The purpose of the National Security Act of 1947 was to incorporate into law the lessons 

World War II had taught about the hazards of parochialism among the military services and thus 

"provide for the effective strategic direction ofthe armed forces and for their operation under 

unified control and for their integration into an efficient team ofland, naval, and air forces." See 

id. The most recent significant development in the trend toward a unified command structure 

occurred in 1986, when Congress designated the Chairman, JCS the principal military adviser to 

the President, transferred duties ofthe corporate JCS to the Chairman, specified that the 

operational chain of command shall run from the President to the Secretary of Defense directly to 

the combatant commanders, and authorized the President to communicate with the combatant 

commanders through the Chairman. See Dep't ofDefense Reorganization (Goldwater-Nichols) 

Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 1012-17 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 161-66 (1988)); see 

also DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE s100.1, FUNCTIONS OF THE DEP'T OF DEFENSE AND ITS MAJOR 

COMPONENTS (2S Sept. 1987) (exercising the President's authority by directing that the Chairman 

"function[] within the chain of command by transmitting communications to the commanders of 

the combatant commands from the President and the Secretary of Defense"). See generally AFSC 

PuB. 1 at 32-4S. 

30 The Secretary of Defense as well as the commanders in chief (CINCs) of unified 

commands may establish joint task forces. See, e.g .. FM 100-S, supra note 13, at 4-4. A joint 

task force consists of elements oftwo or more services operating under a single commander. It 

performs missions having specific limited objectives or missions ofshort duration. See id. 

Because Haiti is within the geographic area of responsibility (AOR) ofUSACOM, the CINC of 

USACOM was the establishing authority for JTF 120. 

31 The safe havens also housed some 30,000 Cubans. See Rear Admiral Thomas R. 

Wilson, Joint Intelligence and Uphold Democracy, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, Spring 199S, at S4, 

SS. 
16 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

would be executed, if appropriate, by Combined JTF-180 (CJTF-180),32 

under the command ofLieutenant General Henry H. Shelton, 

Commander ofXVIII th Airborne Corps. 33 The 82d Airborne Division 

would be the divisional element leading the assault, and about 1800 

marines would participate by conducting an amphibious landing in Cap 

Haitien.34 A plan for semi-permissive entry would be executed, if 

appropriate, by Combined JTF-190 (CJTF-190), under the command of 

Major General David C. Meade, Commander of 10th Mountain 

Division.35 One infantry brigade would seize control ofPort-au-Prince 

while another would air assault separate elements into Cap Haitien and 

Jeremie, cities on the northern and southern claws ofthe Haitien 

landmass.36 During the summer of 1994, as the political situation 

worsened, the staff ofUSA COM and the staffs of component 

commands of all services feverishly refined these two alternative plans 

for the same operation. The codename for the forced entry was Uphold 

Democracy; the codename for the semi-permissive entry was Maintain 

Democracy.37 

32 A combined task force "involves the military forces oftwo or more nations acting 

together in common purpose." See FM 100-5, supra note 13, at 5-1. The lines of command for 

combined task forces created pursuant to formal, stable alliance relationships between nations will 

generally follow principles predetermined by the alliance agreement. The lines ofcommand for 

combined task forces arising from a temporary coalition follow no set principles and are 

negotiated on an ad hoc basis. The delicacy of coalition operations-arising from differences in 

goals, culture, military doctrine and training, equipment, and language-almost guarantee that 

the President and the State Department will remain involved in setting guidelines for a combined 

task force that includes United States forces. See generally id. at 5-1to5-5. 

33 See Wilson, supra note 31, at 55. 

34 Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Carl Woods, Office ofthe Staff Judge 

Advocate, USACOM and Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic, (Aug. 24, 1995) [hereinafter 

Woods Interview]. 

35 See Memorandum, Major Bradley P. Stai, Chief, Civil Law, Office ofthe StaffJudge 

Advocate, XVIIIth Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, AFZA-JA-CV, to Staff Judge Advocate, 

subject: After Action Report (AAR}-Operation Uphold Democracy, at 20 (2 Feb. 1995) (copy on 

file with CLAMO) [hereinafter Stai Memorandum]. 

36 Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Combined JTF Haiti 

Operation Plan 2380, para. 3a (16 Aug. 1994) (copy ofdeclassified extract on file with CLAMO) 

[hereinafter OPLAN 2380]. 

37 See Stai Memorandum, supra note 35, at l, 18. A fifth joint task force would also 

deploy in support ofthe Haiti intervention. This was JTF 188, a joint special operations task 

force, designated by CJNCUSACOM on 13 September 1994, and comprising about 2200 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHA/TL 1994-95 17 

Yet the Uphold Democracy that occurred was actually a blend of 

the two alternative plans, and both CJTF-180 and CJTF-190 had pieces 

ofthe resulting operation. 38 When former President Carter announced 

that General Cedras and his de facto regime had agreed to step down, 

the plan for forced entry was already underway. The Commander-inChiefofUSA COM, Admiral Paul D. Miller, quickly halted the forced 

entry, organized CJTF-190 as a subordinate command to CJTF-180, 

and ordered a semi-permissive entry.39 General Shelton, at the 

headquarters ofCJTF-180, promptly recalled the 82d Airborne Division 

to Fort Bragg and directed CJTF-190 to land at Port-au-Prince airport.40 

personnel from elements ofUSSOCOM. These USSOCOM forces included elements ofthe 15th 

Ranger Regiment, the l 60th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the United States Army 

Special Operations Command, the United States Air Force Special Operations Command, and the 

Naval Special Warfare Command. They deployed on the U.S.S. America, and their equipment 

included standard light weapons, high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), CH47 Chinook helicopters, several variants ofthe UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, and light 

observation helicopters. The U.S.S. America, with JTF 188 operating from it, was positioned in 

the joint operations area near the coast ofHaiti until it was ordered back to the United States on 

19 October 1995. See generally Headquarters, United States Atlantic Command, Briefing 

Viewgraphs (8 May 1995) (copies deposited with CLAMO during conference mentioned in note 

15, supra) [hereinafter USACOM Briefing Viewgraphs]. 

38 Headquarters, Joint Task Force 180, Briefing Viewgraphs (8 May 1995) (depicting 

"Planning Flexibility" and describing the resulting plan variously as "2375" and "2380 'Plus"') 

(copy on file with CLAMO) [hereinafter JTF 180 Viewgraphs]. 

39 Woods Interview, supra note 34. 

40 Telephone Interview with Major Kyle D. Smith, Operational Law Attorney, XVIIIth 

Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg (Sept. 5, 1995) [hereinafter Smith Interview]. The CJTF-180 

Commander's intent for the hybrid mission was as follows: 

The purpose ofthis operation is to expand the security operations and set 

conditions for decisive civil-military operations (CMO). We will deter violence 

and promote stability by creating a highly visible force presence ofmobile and 

stationary security operations. We must set objectives that result in steady 

progress and measurable success in the eyes ofthe Haitian people, enlist the 

cooperation ofthe FAd'H, police, and civilians without sacrificing our neutrality 

or authority. The assistance provided to NGOs and PVOs to establish essential 

services must be balanced against potential mission creep. Success is defined as 

the freedom of action for multi-national forces to transition from expansion of 

initial security operations to decisive CMO. 
18 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Two brigades of the 10th Mountain Division--one aviation and one 

infantry-began executing this modified plan on 19 September from the 

U.S.S. Eisenhower, where Army infantry and helicopters had been 

loaded onto the aircraft carrier. By nightfall of 19 September, about 

2,000 soldiers were on the ground near Port-au-Prince.41 

The next day, 20 September, another 3,000 soldiers from the 

10th Mountain Division deployed in Port-au-Prince while about 1,800 

marines launched an amphibious landing into Cap Haitien from the 

U.S.S. Wasp.42 This was D + 1, the end ofwhich found nearly 7,000 

United States soldiers and marines ashore, having suffered no 

casualties. By 21 September, D + 2, the number was over 10,000.43 

Within days, this number had swelled to more than 15,000, including 

two battalions from 3d Special Forces Group. Close to 21,000 United 

States soldiers and marines were in Haiti on 4 October, when the first 

group of soldiers from the other coalition nations arrived.44 Figure 1 

depicts the deployment offorces into Haiti. 

JTF 180 Viewgraphs, supra note 38 (depicting "2380 'Plus' Intent''). 

" 1 A 'Cordial' Reception as Americans Take Control; Peacekeeping Troops Met No 

Resistance-and Some Cheers-As They Took Haitian Ports and Airfields, But Risks Remain 

High, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept 20, 1994, at Al (citing Lieutenant General Shelton). 

"

2 See Julian Beltrame, U.S. Troops Watch as Haitians Beaten; At Least One Killed, THE 

MoNTREALGAZEITE, Sept 21, 1994, at Al (citing spokesman Colonel Barry Willy). 

•

3 See Douglas Farah, U.S. Warns Haitian Leaders on Abuses; GIPatrols Stepped Up to 

Stop Civilian Beatings, WASH. POST, Sept 21, 1994, at Al (citing Lieutenant General Shelton). 

«See Chris Black, US Troops Storm Haiti Militia Headquarters; Crowd Cheers Arrest 

ofFRAPH Members, BosTON GLOBE, Oct 4, 1994, at l (citing Lieutenant General Shelton). 

Other nations' coalition forces-which would eventually number about 3600 personnel from 32 

different countries -formed a diverse group. During 1994, contributions came from Argentina (2 

ships, 100 police), Bangladesh (1000 military, 100 police), Belgium (30 police}, Benin (25-30 

personnel), Netherlands (20 police), Costa Rica (20 civilian specialists), Bolivia (100 police), 

United Kingdom (12 ships, 12 trainers), Israel (30 police), Panama (60 police, 120 civilian 

specialists), and 12 nations ofthe Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (266 military, 90 police). 

See JTF 180 Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 38 (depicting "Forming the Coalition''). 
19 

Marine Air-Ground TF------------" 

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITl 1994-95 

INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 


Army Brigade 


Combat Team 


From Deck of USS 


Eisenhower 

Figure 1 

Cedras soon resigned and left the country, and President Aristide 

returned.45 On or about 6 October, the marines departed Cap Haitien to 

be replaced by the second infantry brigade from the 10th Mountain 

Division.46 On 24 October, CJTF 180 stood down, handing command 

ofthe multinational force in Haiti (MNF) to the commander ofCJTF190.47 By January 1995, the role ofthe 10th Mountain Division within 

this MNF would be replaced by the 25th Infantry Division, 48 and by the 

•s See Haiti Chronology, supra note 18, at 18 (reporting that Cedras resigned on 10 

October 1994 and that President Aristide returned on 15 October). 

46 Interview with Captain E.J. O'Brien, former Trial Counsel for the 2d Brigade Combat 

Team, in Charlottesville, VA (Aug. 25, 1995) [hereinafter O'Brien Interview]. 

47 Id 

48 See Memorandum, Staff Judge Advocate, Multinational Force Haiti, MNF-SJA, to 

MNF Historian, subject: Unit Historian After Action Review, para. 3s (recording that transition 

occurred on 14 January 1995) [hereinafter MNF Historian Memorandum]. 
20 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

end ofMarch 1995 the MNF itself would eventually be replaced by a 

peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).49 

Reflecting broad international support for the deployment, some 32 

nations would eventually contribute forces to either MNF or UNMIH.50 

Also, most ofthe migrants in safe havens at Guantanamo Bay would 

eventually return to Haiti.51 

Yet Uphold Democracy did not unfold without tense moments. 

Compelled by the terms ofthe Carter-Jonassaint agreement to co-exist 

with the Haitian police force,52 newly arrived United States troops 

concerned themselves with maintaining essential civic order rather than 

with policing crimes committed by Haitians against Haitians. After 20 

September, when police who were loyal to the Cedras regime brutally 

beat pro-Aristide demonstrators in the streets ofPort-au-Prince, the 

maintenance of civic order demanded that United States troops 

intervene to stop violent crimes. 53 

Tension would escalate further before it subsided. On 25 

September a Marine Corps lieutenant opened fire and shot a threatening 

49 See id The UNMIH was initially conceived in August of 1993, see S.C. Res. 862, 

U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/862 (1993), and it was a contingent ofUNMIH that was 

aboard the U.S.S. Harlan County when that ship turned around on 11 October 1993. See 

Statement By the President, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3289th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/26567. 

50 See, e.g., President William Clinton, Remarks at United Nations Transition Ceremony 

{Mar. 31, 1995), reprinted at Appendix D. 

51 Telephone Interview with Captain Daniel J. Cowhig, former judge advocate assigned 

to JTF 160 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, (Aug. 28, 1995) (stating that by early 1995, only about 700 

Haitian migrants remained at Guantanamo Bay) [hereinafter Cowhig Interview]; Telephone 

Interview with Captain Jeffrey Pederson, former judge advocates assigned to JTF Safe Haven in 

Panama (Aug. 24, 1995) (hereinafter Pederson Interview] (stating that soon after the start ofthe 

Haiti intervention the command shelved plans for "Operation Distant Haven," which would have 

established a camp in Belize for Haitians). 

52 See infra Appendix C, para. 2 ("To implement this agreement, the Haitian military and 

police forces will work in close cooperation with the U.S. Military Mission. This cooperation, 

conducted with mutual respect, will last during the transitional period required for insuring vital 

institutions ofthe country."). 

53 See part III.A. l infra. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHAITI, 1994-95 21 

policeman, initiating a barrage offire-from members of2d platoon, E 


Company, 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 2d Marine Division-that left 10 


Haitian security men dead in Cap Haitien.54 This incident emboldened 


Aristide supporters and intimidated the police forces. On 30 


September, in Port-au-Prince, six Haitian demonstrators died and about 


a dozen received injuries at the hands ofgunmen loyal to the junta. 55 


Months later, even after violent confrontations had indeed subsided and 


a stable environment had been achieved, assassins killed Mireille 


Durocher Bertin, a political opponent ofPresident Aristide. 56 


The assassination, occurring just days before the MNF 

transferred responsibilities to UNMIH, served to remind all outside 

parties that Haiti's problems could not be solved overnight. 

Nevertheless, despite these tense episodes, President Clinton justly 

termed Operation Uphold Democracy a "remarkable success" during a 

ceremony on 31 March marking the transfer ofresponsibilities to the 

United Nations. Appendix D reprints the text ofhis speech as well as 

those of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and President Aristide. 57 

s

4 See Tom Rhodes & Ian Brodie, Americans Admit They Fired First, THE TIMES, Sept. 


26, 1994, at 1. 


ss See T.J. Milling, The Haiti Crisis; Haiti March Against Regime Turns Deadly; 


Confrontation Leaves 6 Slain, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 1, 1994, at Al. 


s

6 See Kathy Lewis, Clinton Visit Heralds Haiti Democracy; U.S. Troops Thanked as 

U.N. Takes Over, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. l, 1995, at IA. 

57 Although the combat forces it deployed to Haiti consisted mostly oflight infantry, the 

United States also deployed a small mechanized infantry force as insurance against a the sort of 

emergency that arose in Mogadishu, Somalia on 3 and 4 October 1993, when mechanized infantry 

perhaps could have averted the tragedy that befell some ofthe 18 soldiers who were killed by 

forces ofMohammed Farah Aideed. See, e.g., Rick Atkinson, Night ofa Thousand Casualties: 

Battle Triggered the U.S. Decision to Withdraw from Somalia, WASH. POST., Jan. 31, 1994, at 

Al, Al 1 (quoting Major General William F. Garrison's urgent request on the evening of3 

October for "some tanks and some APCs" and describing Major General Thomas M. 

Montgomery's subsequent attempts to borrow armored and mechanized forces from Pakistani, 

Malaysian, and Italian forces). This force consisted of a mechanized infantry company from the 

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), which deployed from Fort Stewart, Georgia. See generally 

Telephone Interview with COL Waldo W. Brooks, Staff Judge Advocate, 24th Infantry Division 

(Mech) & Fort Stewart (27 Oct. 1995) (identifying the unit as B Company, 3-15th Infantry, a 

company equipped with M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles). 
22 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

UNMIHZONES 


Zone ResponsjblUties 

I-Pakistan 

II-Nepal 

Ill· Netherlands 

IV-CARICOM 

V-U.S. 

VI - Bangladesh 

Figure 2 

C United Nations Mission in Haiti 

The force that continued the international presence in Haiti on 31 

March 1995 consisted of about 6,000 military personnel from 33 

countries, including about 2,400 from the United States. 58 United 

States Army Major General Joseph Kinzer commanded this United 

tions force, which had the mission ofmaintaining the stable and 

58 See USACOM Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 37. As ofApril 1995, the breakdown 

ofpersonnel was as follows: 

United States 2400 Canada 474 

Cari com 275 Honduras 120 

Bangladesh 1050 Pakistan 850 

Guatemala 121 India 120 

Nepal 410 Argentina 15 

Netherlands 150 Surinam 36 

See Headquarters, Multinational Force Haiti and 25th Infantry Division (Light), Briefing 

Viewgraphs (9 May 1995) (copies deposited with CLAMO during the conference mentioned in 

note 15, supra) [hereinafter 25th ID Briefing Viewgraphs]. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 23 

secure environment that had been established by the MNF. 59 In such an 

environment, the international community hoped that Haitians could 

begin to establish a lasting democracy. Figure 2 depicts the regions of 

Haiti into which UNMIH forces deployed. 

About 1300 soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division stayed in 

Haiti and either donned the blue berets ofthe UNMIH or participated in 

bilateral programs authorized under United States security assistance 

laws.60 These included medical, logistics, military police, aviation, and 

infantry personnel. About 600 soldiers from United States Army 

Special Operations Command, including 550 special forces soldiers and 

50 members ofpsychological operations units, also contributed to the 

international presence after the 31 March transfer.61 Another 400 

personnel ofall services, including United States Navy engineers and 

medical personnel, rounded out the American contingent. 62 

In June of 1995, soldiers from the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment 

out ofFort Polk replaced the remaining members ofthe 25th Infantry 

Division, who returned to their home in Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.63 

Then in September of 1995, a smaller number ofsoldiers from the 

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), replaced the 2d Armored 

59 The most important criterion to be fulfilled prior to completion ofthe MNF-UNMIH 

transition was the adoption of a Security Council resolution that declared a "stable and secure 

environment" in Haiti. See USACOM Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 37. 

60 See USACOM Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 37. 

61 See id. 

62 See id. 

63 See Major Mark Ackerman, Legal Support to Current Operations in Haiti, ARMY 

LAw., Aug. 1995, at 41 n.118. 
24 CENTER FOR LAWANDMJUTARYOPERATIONS 

Cavalry Regiment soldiers.64 Numbers ofUnited States soldiers in 

Haiti continue to drop, in fulfillment ofthe scheduled February 1996 

departure date for all remaining United States forces. 65 Major 

milestones during the UNMIH presence included the June 1995 

parliamentary elections, which occurred peacefully and fairly but with 

organizational difficulties, and will include the December 1995 

presidential election. 66 Throughout the UNMIH presence, efforts to 

create a professional civilian police force built upon groundwork laid 

during Uphold Democracy.67 

Other programs begun during Uphold Democracy also continued, 

such as those to establish a functioning judicial system. Spearheaded 

by a team ofjudicial mentors, attached to the United States Embassy 

and consisting of 18 attorneys with broad judicial, administrative, and 

practical experience, these efforts sought to make both short and longerterm contributions to the Haitian legal infrastructure.68 This project 

complemented other civic work being done by eight United Nations 

agencies and hundreds ofprivate voluntary organizations in the 

country.69 

64 Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Bolger, Commander of 1st 

Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, IOlst Airborne Division (Air Assault) (Jul. 26, 1995). 

Mention ofspecific units in the text is intended merely to provide some flavor ofthe variety of 

units that participated. The other units-both active and reserve component-that contributed 

soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are too numerous to list here. It is a function ofthe task 

organization principle that the Haiti intervention involved so many different units. 

6

s Telephone Interview with Major William Hudson, Senior UNMIH Staff Legal Officer, 

(Sept. 8, 1995) [hereinafter Hudson Interview]. 

66 See id. 

67 See id. 

68 See Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel Philip A. Savoie to Brigadier General Walter 

B. Huffman, subject: Interim Report, Haitian Judicial Mentorship Program (7 Apr. 1995) (copy on 

file with CLAMO) [hereinafter Savoie Memorandum]. Lieutenant Colonel Savoie was the Center 

Judge Advocate ofFitzsimons Army Medical Center, Aurora, Colorado, when he served as 

judicial mentor in Haiti on a temporary duty status. See generally part III.H.3, infra. 

69 See part IIl.G.3 and Appendix S, infra. 
LAWANDWLITARYOPERATIONSINHAITI, 1994-95 25 

D. Judge Advocate Support 

Uphold Democracy and subsequent operations in Haiti profited 

from heavy judge advocate support. The peak number ofjudge 

advocates in the area of operations at any one time was 23. The peak 

total number oflegal personnel, officer and enlisted, was 32. 

Altogether, 54 different judge advocates and 39 different legal 

noncommissioned officers and specialists deployed to Haiti for some 

period between September 1994 and September 1995. Among these 

were representatives of each military service, and ofthe active as well 

as reserve components. Appendix E lists these personnel. Another 29 

judge advocates in key staff positions did considerable work on Haiti 

issues, and some ofthese officers traveled to Haiti in furtherance ofthat 

work. Appendix F lists these judge advocates. 

Other legal personnel deployed to the field in support of 

operations in Haiti. These included participants in JTF-160, who 

deployed to Guantanamo Bay Cuba, and in JTF-Safe Haven, who 

deployed to Panama. These operations accommodated or prepared to 

accommodate Haitian boat people who left their country in the summer 

of 1994, as the junta clung to power. Altogether, 8 different judge 

advocates and 4 different legal specialists deployed to camps in Cuba or 

Panama.70 A much larger number ofjudge advocates supported the 

various Haiti operations less directly-by pulling shifts in emergency 

operations centers at installations where soldiers were deploying, by 

rendering predeployment legal assistance, or by assisting with other 

numerous and diverse legal issues generated by the deployment.71 

70 These are conservative estimates based on Cowhig and Pederson Interviews, supra note 

51, which also are the bases for the other information in this paragraph pertaining to JTFs 160 

and Safe Haven. 

71 Contrast these numbers with the number deployed to Desert Storm: 

JA presence in SWA built from 46 on 3 Sep 90 to about 270 by G Day. There 


were 92 other RC JA's on active duty around the world at the same time, 33 


serving as individuals and 59 as members ofunits. Ultimately, 12 JAG 


Detachments (or JAGSOs) were called; ofthese, 5 deployed. There were 

26 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

From January to June of 1994, individual operational lawyers on 

key staffs actively participated in planning the operations that would 

unfold72 An Army judge advocate at XVIIIth Airborne Corps received 

access to the classified forced entry plan, as did a counterpart in the 82d 

Airborne Division. An air force judge advocate on the 12th Air Force 

staff similarly involved himself in the planning process. Two judge 

advocates at United States Atlantic Command---0ne Navy and the other 

Marine Corps--contributed to the forced entry plan, as well as to the 

maritime interdiction operations that had been underway since October 

of 1993. An operational lawyer in the 10th Mountain Division 

contributed to the development ofthat unit's plans for both the forced 

and semi-permissive entries. Members ofthe coordinating staff group73 

especially welcomed judge advocate involvement in writing rules of 

engagement, general orders, foreign claims procedures, and procedures 

for seizing property. 

On D-Day, two judge advocates were among the soldiers in 

military aircraft sweeping toward Haiti. Ninety minutes before the 

approximately 18 non-civil affairs units called with organic JA's. Five were 

deployed. 

Dep't ofArmy, Office ofThe Judge Advocate General, The Judge Advocate General 

After Action Report: Operation Desert Shield & Operation Desert Storm at 1-1-2 (1991) 

(copy on file with CLAMO). 

72 The information in this paragraph is based on the following sources: Stai 

Memorandum, supra note 35; Major Bradley P. Stai, Chief, Civil Law, Office ofthe Staff Judge 

Advocate, XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Remarks Before the Haiti After Action Review Conference in 

Charlottesville, VA (May 8, 1995) (videotape on file with CLAMO); Woods Interview, supra note 

34; Telephone Interview with Captain Darryl Wishard, Operational Law Judge Advocate, 10th 

Mountain Division (Light Infantry) (Aug. 3, 1995) [hereinafter Wishard Interview]. 

73 The coordinating staff group consists ofthe commander's principal staff assistants, 

each concerned with a broad field ofinterest. A large joint staff organization, for instance, will 

typically have a coordinating staff that includes a J-1 (Personnel), J-2 (Intelligence), J-3 

(Operations), J4 (Logistics), J-5 (Plans), J-6 (Communications-Electronics), and J-7 (CivilMilitary Operations). See, e.g., DEP'T OF ARMY. FIELD MANuAL 101-5, STAFF ORGANIZATIONS 

AND OPERATIONS 2-1, 2-2 & 2-13 (25 May 1984). The Staff Judge Advocate is a member ofthe 

commander's special and personal staffs. See id. at 2-9. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 21 

scheduled parachute assault was to begin, these attorneys--one aboard 

a C-141 with the XVIIIth Airborne Corps Assault Command Post 

(ACP) and the other aboard an EC-135, with the airborne command and 

control element-were diverted from their destinations. 74 When the 

two CJTF 's then executed their entry into Haiti unopposed, judge 

advocates deployed to the area ofoperations according to the 

organization depicted in Figures 3 and 4. Although they were certainly 

crucial to the operation, legal specialists and junior noncommissioned 

officers are not included in any ofthe following Figures, but one or 

more supported each ofthe brigade elements depicted. 

COL 

CDR 

MAJ 

MAJ 

CPT 

CPT 

CPT 

CPT 

'D+l 

CPT 

74 See Smith Interview, supra note 40. 
28 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Fi2ure 4-CJTF-190 Le2al Or2anization (D+4) 

Staff Judge Advocate LTC 

Deputy Staff Judge Advocate MAJ 

Operations Law Judge Advocate CPT 

Claims Judge Advocate CPT 

Criminal Law Judge Advocate CPT 

Legal Assistance Judge Advocate CPT 

Chief Legal NCO MSG 

Claims NCO SSG 

Legal NCO SGT 

1st Brigade Legal Adviser CPT 

2d Brigade Legal Adviser CPT 

These initial legal support structures were larger than what is 

contemplated in Judge Advocate General's Corps doctrine, but they 

were fully consistent with evolving Army doctrine.75 They were also 

certainly appropriate given the multifaceted nature ofthe operations. 

Within five weeks, in early October 1994, legal support in Haiti 

corresponded to the organization at Figure 5. By the end ofJanuary 

1995, when the 25th Infantry Division had replaced the 10th Mountain 

Division in the MNF, organization for legal support resembled Figure 

6. After 31 March, when the MNF transferred functions to UNMIH, 

judge advocate support corresponded to Figure 7. 

75 See FM 27-100, supra note 9, at para. 7-4; DEP'TOF ARMY, FIELDMANuAL 71-100-2, 

INFANTRY DIVISION OPERATIONS, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES 2-83 (1993) (''The SJA 

is a critical element in the assault CP during the early stages ofthe deployment."). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 29 

Fif[ure 5-MNFLef[al Orf[anization (D+35) 

Staff Judge Advocate LTC 

Deputy Staff Judge Advocate MAJ 

Operations Law Judge Advocate CPT 

Claims Judge Advocate CPT 

Criminal Law Judge Advocate CPT 

Legal Assistance Judge Advocate CPT 

Chief Legal NCO MSG 

Claims NCO SSG 

Legal NCO SGT 

1st Brigade Legal Adviser CPT 

2d Brigade Legal Adviser CPT 

Joint Logistics Support Command Judge Adv 

16th MP Brigade Judge Advocate 

Civ 

CPT 

Joint Interrogation Facility Judge Advocate 

20th Engineer Brigade Judge Advocate 

CPT 

CPT 

3d Special Forces Group Judge Advocate CPT 

COL 

MAJ 

CPT 

CPT 

Defense Counsel CPT 

SSG 

CPT 

CPT 

LTC 

CPT 

+120 

30 CENTERFORLAWANDMIUTARYOPERATIONS 

'D+210 

MAJ 

MAJ 

SSG 

United States Forces Haiti Jud e Advocate CPT 

United States Forces Haiti Le al NCO SSG 

III. Lessons Learned 

A few terms and distinctions from the military art may help 

readers understand the purpose and scope of this part of the report. 

According to The Army Lessons Learned Program, an "observation" is 

"raw information from any source which has not been refined through 

analysis." 76 A "lesson learned" is "validated knowledge and 

experience derived from observations and historical study ofmilitary 

training, exercises, and . . . operations. " 77 An "issue" is "a category of 

lessons learned that requires action by the subject matter proponent to 

change, develop, resolve, or refine doctrine, training, organization, 

material, and leadership development or exercise design."78 Although 

these definitions may seem over-technical, they do convey important 

distinctions. Put simply, observations are raw data, lessons learned are 

confirmed observations that have undergone analysis and are worthy of 

dissemination, and issues are those lessons learned that lend themselves 

to some systemic action or resolution and that should therefore be made 

the responsibility of a proponent. 

Besides issues, another category of lessons learned merits 

attention. "Combat relevant lessons learned" are "[ c ]onclusions 

derived from analysis ofobservations obtained from military operations 

76 See AR 11-33, supra note 5, at 10. 

77 Id. 

78 Id. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 31 

and training exercises that are useful to commanders in preparing their 

units for combat by identifying successful doctrine, tactics, techniques, 

and procedures or problems thereto."79 In nontechnical terms, these are 

lessons learned that give commanders useful "how to" guidance or that 

highlight practical considerations bearing on their decisions. Although 

the categories overlap, combat relevant lessons learned differ from 

issues in that the consumers ofthe former are commanders, while the 

consumers ofthe latter are proponent offices or agencies. 

This part ofthe report records more than raw information 

(observations) and defers most discussion oflessons learned requiring 

systemic action by proponent offices (issues).80 It provides for the 

CATEGORIES OF LESSONS LEARNED 

Figure& 

79 Id. 

80 Again, following the commendable lead ofthe Desert Storm Assessment Team Report, 

the key document guiding Corps-wide action will be the database, which will identify issues, 

proponents, and systemic resolutions. See DSAT REPORT, supra note 3, at Introduction-6. Note 

9, supra discusses the CLAMO database. 
32 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

judge advocate what combat relevant lessons learned provide for the 

commander: useful guidance and practical considerations that can help 

get the mission accomplished. See Figure 8. 

It is important to note that combat relevant lessons learned-and 

the analogous category oflessons learned for judge advocates-are not 

restricted to the tactical level ofmilitary operations. Although military 

doctrine distinguishes between the tactical, operational, and strategic 

levels,81 it also acknowledges that these levels "are defined more by the 

consequences of their outcome than ... by the echelon ofinvolvement . 

• • • " 82 This means that while a judge advocate on the joint staffmay 

deal more often with operational concerns than may the deployed judge 

advocate captain, 83 the captain may also occasionally deal with 

problems, decisions, and legal rules that have operational or strategic 

implications for present and future deployments. 

An example is the trial defense counsel who represents clients 

receiving vastly different treatment for violations ofa general order 

because the joint task force commander is the convening authority for 

one but not the other.84 Although this particular judge advocate's daily 

concerns are mostly at the tactical level, he or she is wrestling with a 

principle-unity of command-that cuts across operational and 

strategic levels. 85 Any attempt to catalogue useful lessons learned must 

81 See FM 100-5, supra note 13, at 1-3, ch. 6, glossary-8 (defining "tactics" as ''the art 

and science of employing available means to win battles and engagements"). glossary-6 (defining 

the "operational art" as "the employment ofmilitary forces to attain strategic goals through the 

design, organization, integration, and execution of battles and engagements into campaigns and 

major operations") & glossary-8 (defining strategy as "the art and science of employing the anned 

forces and other elements of national power during peace, conflict, and war to secure national 

security objectives"). 

82 See id. at 1-3. 

83 See, e.g., infra note 314 (discussing guidance provided by judge advocates on the joint 

staffwith respect to a sensitive diplomatic matter with potential to influence relations with the 

United Nations). 

M See infra note 362. 

85 See infra subpart III.I. I. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 33 

focus on the problems, rules, and procedures that deployed and 


supporting judge advocates actually face, not on an abstract distinction 


between levels of warfare. s

6 


It is also important to note that this report-usefully but perhaps 


somewhat artificially--0rganizes the lessons learned according to 


discrete topics or subdisciplines rather than to chronological sequence. 


As a result, readers might conclude that issues which arose late in the 


deployment were considered and resolved identically to those which 


arose early on, when the area ofoperations was still fluid and the fate of 


the mission uncertain. In the words ofone judge advocate who arrived 


in Haiti on 19 September 1994, 


[t]here is a[n] ... impact on legal operations when, for the 

first three weeks ofthe operation, everybody (lawyers 

included) are eating nothing but MREs, fighting for scarce 

water supplies, scrounging for a place to sleep, not having 

electricity, digging slit trenches, wearing full battle dress 

(flak vests, Kevlar, and locked and loaded weapons), and 

otherwise concerned with survival while trying to also 

provide legal services. s

7 

Readers must read the lessons in this report with this important truth in 

mind. Issues arising in a fairly well-developed and mature theater will 

benefit from the infrastructure-logistical, administrative, operational, 

and legal--created earlier. Moreover, they may not have the same 

capacity to ruin the entire mission if handled poorly.ss 

86 See Major Mark S. Martins, Rules ofEngagement/or LandForces: A Matter of 

Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MILL. REv. l, n.274 (1994) (discussing the unhelpfulness of the 

strategic-operational-tactical distinction in the context ofrules of engagement). 

87 See Facsimile Message, StaffJudge Advocate, l 0th Mountain Division and Fort Drum, 

AFZS-JA, to Deputy Director, Center for Law and Military Operations, subject: Draft Lessons 

Leamed--Haiti (13 Oct 1995) (copy on file with CLAMO). 

88 An example ofan early problem for the MNF resolved throug~1 judge advocate efforts 

was that ofpersuading commanders from disparate units ofCITF 190 to share their scarce water 
34 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

A. Rules ofEngagement89 

Nowhere during military operations in Haiti were legal 

considerations more visible than in the area ofrules ofengagement 

(ROE). In operations other than war, some of the hardest yet most 

important questions involve "who can shoot at what, with which 

weapons, when, and where?"90 Both tentativeness and its oppositesupplies with soldiers not in their units. This was scarcely a "legal" problem, but judge advocates 

assertively and correctly got involved, and the mode ofresolution was far different from the 

writing of an administrative law opinion on a military installation. and the morale and discipline 

ofthe entire force hung in the balance. See generally id The Center for Law and Military 

Operations recognizes the inherent differences in lessons stemming from when they arise. 

Accordingly, a goal for the longer term is to bring together judge advocates from diverse military 

operations to compare notes and assemble wisdom concerning appropriate priorities in the early 

hours after arrival in the area ofoperations. 

89 Readers may debate whether the categories represented in this report are optimal. For 

instance, there is herein no separate category of"operational law," which other authorities have 

sometimes used to denote a relatively narrow set oftopics, such as rules of engagement, treatment 

ofdetainees, civil affairs, and law ofwar. See, e.g., FM 27-100, supra note 9, at l-9g; DSAT 

REPORT, supra note 3, at Operational Law-I and Operational Law-2. Instead, the topics 

traditionally gathered under this category are broken out into their own categories, and the term 

"operational law" is used as an umbrella term under which all of the categories in this report will 

fit Similarly, whereas other authorities have created special categories for environmental law 

and labor and employment law, the Haiti intervention did not frequently implicate these areas; as 

a result, this report collapses these tremendously important areas ofoperational law back into the 

topic ofAdministrative and Civil Law. See infra note 415 (discussing isolated instances in which 

environmental law and labor law issues arose). During its internal debates over the merits of 

various schemes ofclassification. CLAMO has been guided by the famous words of Mr. Justice 

Holmes: "The life ofthe law has not been logic: it has been experience." OLIVER WENDELL 

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW xxi-xxii (Mark Dewolfe Howe ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1963) 

(1881). 

90 Colonel Fred Green, An Address to the American Society ofInternational Law, on the 

Subject ofImplementing Limitations on the Use ofForce: The Doctrine ofProportionality and 

Necessity (1992) (using this informal definition of ROE), reprinted in 86 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 

PROC. 39, 62-67 ( 1992); see also DEP'T OF ARMY, SUBJECT ScHEDULE 27-1, THE GENEVA 

CoNVENTIONS OF 1949 AND THE HAGUE CONVENTION No. IV OF 1907, para. 3a (29 Aug. 1975) 

(using this definition ofROE). Formally, ROE are "directives issued by competent authority that 

delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or 

continue combat engagement with other forces encountered." JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 

PuBLICATION 1-02, DEP'T OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND AsSOCIATED TERMS 317 (1 

Dec. 1989) [hereinafter JOINT Pus. 1-02]. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 35 

over-aggressiveness-can hinder mission accomplishment in such 

operations. Moreover, the mission will involve achievement of 

diplomatic or policy aims rather than prosecution of a war. 

Accordingly, ROE will be "conduct-based," in that decisions to use 

force must respond to hostile acts or intentions, rather than "statusbased," in which pre-declared enemy forces may be shot on sight.91 

Judge advocate involvement in drafting and disseminating ROE 

is heaviest in operations other than war,92 and the Haiti deployment 

confirmed this modem trend. Rules of engagement serve three distinct 

yet overlapping types ofpurposes-legal, policy, and military.93 The 

legal purposes that ROE serve include fulfillment ofUnited Nations 

Security Council resolutions, compliance with international agreements 

applicable in peacetime, and respect for host nation laws. Executive 

branch policy purposes may not be apparent in the face ofconflicting 

directives. Achievement ofmilitary purposes requires familiarity with 

weapons systems and tactics. Consequently, judge advocates are well 

equipped to provide the inteipretive and other assistance Commanders 

need to issue effective rules. 

Uphold Democracy marked the full integration ofjoint ROE 

terms, concepts, and procedures into a land force operation other than 

91 See JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER, JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK FOR 

PEACE Operations 75 (28 Feb. 1995) [hereinafter JTF COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK]. 

92 See Martins, supra note 86, at 27, 52-54 (charting essential differences between 

wartime and peacetime rules of engagement, noting the large base ofdoctrinal and training 

materials available for wartime rules, and citing modem operations in which wartime ROE issues 

''when they finally arose, were relatively simple to resolve"); see also Colonel W.H. Parks, 

USCMR, No More Vietnams, UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Mar. 1991, at 27­

28 (noting the contrast between Vietnam, in which rules ofengagement were complicated by 

policy constraints far more complex and restrictive than the law ofwar, and Desert Storm, in 

which battlefield commanders were returned the responsibility to prosecute operations within the 

law ofwar); FM 100-5, supra note 13, at 13-4 ("In operations other than war, these ROE will be 

more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Moreover, these rules 

may change frequently."). 

93 See Captain Ashley Roach, USN, Rules ofEngagement, NAVAL WAR C. REv. 46, 48 

(1983). 
36 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

war. Although standing joint peacetime rules had been in effect since 

1986,94 their security classification (secret), orientation (naval and air 

force), and applicability (superseded in times of conflict) frustrated 

widespread use by land forces. 95 The technical terms "hostile act," 

"hostile intent," and "proportionality'' might or might not have appeared 

in a corps or division operations plan in the early 1990's.96 The joint 

system ofROE supplementation might or might not have received 

emphasis in land force exercises and evaluations. 97 

Two particularly telling facts reflect the incompleteness ofjoint 

ROE integration in land forces before the Haiti deployment. First, 

keystone Anny doctrine as late as 1993 included no mention ofthe 

existence of a standing set ofrules in several passages discussing 

ROE.98 Second, the Anny's rapid deployment corps continued to 

employ its own unique terminology as late as early 1994.99 By D-Day 

ofOperation Uphold Democracy, however, United States land forces 

had assimilated the joint ROE apparatus. 100 

94 SECRET Memorandum, Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: Peacetime Rules ofEngagement 

(PROE) (28 Oct 1988) {superseding 1986 Memorandum ofidentical subject). See generally 

Martins, supra note 86, at 33-45 {charting the development ofstanding rules). 

95 See, e.g. International Law Note, "Land Forces" Rules ofEngagement Symposium: 

The CLAMO Revises the Peacetime Rules ofEngagement, ARMY LAw., Dec. 1993, at 48. 

96 See Martins, supra note 86, at 57-58. 

97 See id. at 54. 

98 See FM 100-5, supra note 13, at 2-3 to 2-4, 13-4. 

99 See Stai Memorandum, supra note 35, at 6 ("XVIII Abn Corps had long used its own 

terms, such as 'suspicious actor" and "hostile actor"; its own unclassified definitions of"hostile 

act" and "hostile intent"; and its own OPLAN format rather than the Joint Operation Planning 

and Execution System (JOPES) format."). 

100 See, e.g., Wishard Interview, supra note 72 (describing numerous examples in which 

infantry privates deployed to Haiti understand the meaning of"hostile act" and "hostile intent"). 

Three reasons explain the recent assimilation. First, the core ofthe new standing rules of 

engagement is unclassified. See SECRET CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 

INSTRUCTION 3121.01, STANDING RuLES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES (1 Oct. 1994) 

(including a unclassified portion, Enclosure A, intended for wide distribution). Second, recent 

missions for land forces in Somalia and northern Iraq have accustomed judge advocates and 

commanders to use the supplemental structure ofthe joint ROE apparatus. Third, the placement 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 37 

1. Be Preparedfor Controversy Over Protection ofForeign 

Nationals. This apparatus received great public scrutiny in the initial 

phase ofthe deployment. Prior to D-Day, commanders, judge 

advocates, and other staff officers concentrated on two alternative sets 

ofROE, corresponding to the two plans for entry into Haiti. 101 The 

forced-entry plan was to employ ROE in which the FAd'H was 

declared a hostile force. Appendix G reprints the card summarizing the 

ROE for soldiers. The permissive entry plan was to employ ROE that 

declared no forces hostile, but that permitted use offorce in response to 

hostile acts or indications ofhostile intent. Appendix H contains the 

ROE for the permissive entry plan, while Appendix I reprints the soldier 

card for that plan. After the Carter-Jonassaint agreement was signed, 

the two plans were melded, and various portions of each plan survived 

in the melded version. The ROE and card for the permissive entry plan 

were among the portions that survived. 102 

Prior to D-Day, judge advocates and other officers at United 

States Atlantic Command and the 10th Mountain Division recognized a 

lack of express guidance in the ROE with respect to violence committed 

by one Haitian against another. 103 The mission was to establish a 

secure and stable environment, and in the context ofa permissive entry, 

the Joint Chiefs ofStaff understandably believed that conducting police 

duties in the streets of Port-au-Prince could defeat rather than help 

create such an environment.104 Nevertheless, on 18 September, D-1, 

USACOM requested, and JCS ultimately approved, additional guidance 

ofoperations other than war into keystone Anny doctrine has created unprecedented emphasis 

upon ROE within the land forces. See, e.g., Dep't ofAnny, Training Circ. 7-98-1, Brigade and 

Battalion Operations Other Than War Training Support Package, Ch. 2, Lesson 4 (May 1995) (as 

yet unapproved draft, a copy ofwhich is on file with CLAMO) (containing 32 pages entitled 

"Rules ofEngagement Application''). 

101 See Stai Memorandum, supra note 35, at 1-32. 

102 See Wishard Interview, supra note 72. 

103 Id; Woods Interview, supra note 34. 

104 Woods Interview, supra note 34. 
38 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

that expressly permitted soldiers to use deadly force against persons 

committing serious criminal acts. 105 USACOM transmitted this 

additional guidance to CJTF 180, and the latter headquarters 

transmitted same to CJTF 190 headquarters. 106 Meanwhile, 10th 

Mountain Division soldiers who would eventually enter Haiti continued 

to carry and study the card containing permissive-entry ROE but 

lacking the additional guidance on Haitian violence against Haitians.107 

This card, Appendix I, bore the date 6 September 1995. 

Cards containing the additional guidance were not issued until 21 

September.108 In the meantime, ROE had jumped into news headlines 

around the United States. As recounted in part II.A above, on 20 

September Haitian police and militia brutally beat demonstrating 

Aristide supporters. Among the persons beaten was a coconut vender, 

who died after about five minutes of continuous clubbing, in view of 

United States soldiers, and after some of the fatal attack had been 

videotaped. Networks and newspapers in the United States widely 

reported the killing and the decision of the soldiers not to intervene.109 

IOS Id. 

106 See Message, Headquarters, Combined Joint Task Force 180, subject: Change One to 

Rules of Engagement ISO OPORD 2380-95 (211008 Sep 94). 

107 Woods Interview, supra note 34. 

108 Coordination of printing ROE cards required great energy and attention to detail, 

given the rapid pace of events. See Stai Memorandum, supra note 35, at 28 (describing events on 

15 Sept. 1994) ("With time running out, MAJ [Kyle] Smith recommended that we print the ROE 

cards based on our best assessment ofwhat the final changes would be. The total cost ofprinting 

43,000 hostilities ROE cards, 43,000 CMO ROE cards, and 1,000 air ROE cards was about 

$1,000."); Office ofthe Staff Judge Advocate, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Operation 

Uphold Democracy, Multinational Force Haiti After-Action Report, 29 July 1994-13 January 

1995, at 5-6 (May 1995) [hereinafter 10th Mountain Div. AAR] ("Although we produced 

sufficient cards for all soldiers in the operational area, imperfect distribution, unexpected unit 

arrival, and individual loss of cards led to shortages. Future ROE card production should aim for 

three times the number of soldiers in theater. This amount should cover the need for replacement 

cards."). 

109 See, e.g., Kenneth Freed, Haitian Police Attack Crowds as American Troops Look on: 

At Least One is Killed and Dozens Injured as Local Forces Disperse Demonstrators Welcoming 

Arriving Soldiers: U.S. Policy Leaves Issue ofCivil Order to Haitian Authorities, Los ANGELES 

TIMES, Sept. 21, 1994, at Al; T.J. Milling, Haitian Police Savagely Club Demonstrators; Man 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATJONSJNHAITl 1994-95 39 

Then, on 21 September, units in CJTF 180 distributed on new cards the 

additional guidance pertaining to violence by Haitians against 

Haitians. 110 News reports widely attributed this "change" in the ROE 

to embarrassment over media coverage from the day before.111 

Spokesmen and commanders, advised by judge advocates, 

appropriately stressed the mission to establish a "stable and secure 

environment," and to maintain "essential civic order."112 They also 

emphasized troops' obligation to respect the Carter-Jonassaint 

agreement, which had reserved a role for the FAd'H.113 Although these 

responses effectively defused the criticism and media attention soon 

turned toward other aspects ofthe operation, the visibility and potential 

controversy ofROE provide an important lesson learned for judge 

advocates in operations other than war. 

Beaten to Death at Port; Disgusted G.l. 's Forced to Watch, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 21, 1994, at 

Al; Julian Beltrame, U.S. Troops Watch as Haitians Beaten; At Least One Killed, N.Y. TIMES, 

Sept. 21, 1994, at Al; Mark Matthews, U.S. Forces' Failure to Intervene in Haitian-on-Haitian 

Violence Raises Questions, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 21, 1994, at I lA. 

110 See Appendix J to this report, at para. 7 ("Persons observed committing serious 


criminal acts will be detained using minimal force necessary up to and including deadly force. 


Serious criminal acts include homicide, aggravated assault, rape, arson and robbery."). 


111 See, e.g., Douglas Farah, U.S. Warns Haitian Leaders on Abuses; GI Patrols Stepped 

Up to Stop Civilian Beatings, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1994, at Al; T.J. Milling, U.S. Troops 

Clearedfor Deadly Force, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 23, 1994, at Al ("The rules of engagement 

have been changed five times since a delegation led by former President Carter struck an 11thhour peace accord Sunday. The latest changes have given troops more latitude in dealing with 

civil unrest. They were apparently in response to public criticism ofthe troops' inaction while 

Haitian military and police brutally beat demonstrators calling for the return ofdemocratically 

elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide."); Geordie Greig & James Adams, Sleeping with the 

Enemy, SUNDAY TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994 ("Rules of engagement which did not permit American 

forces to open fire unless they were threatened were too narrow and were changed the next day."). 

112 See, e.g., Freed, supra note 109 (quoting spokesman Colonel Barry Willey); Brigadier 

General John Altenburg, StaffJudge Advocate, XVIII th Airborne Corps, Remarks Before the 

· Haiti After Action Review Conference in Charlottesville, VA (May 8, 1995) (videotape on file 

with CLAMO) [hereinafter Altenburg Remarks]; see also infra notes 269-274 and accompanying 

text. 

113 See Altenburg Remarks, supra note 112. 
40 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

2. Use Situational Training. Judge advocates who deployed or 

prepared to deploy to Haiti agree that soldiers benefit from situational 

training on the ROE. According to Army training doctrine, situational 

training exercises (STX's) focus on one or a small group oftaskswithin a particular mission scenario-and require that soldiers practice 

until the tasks can be executed to some preestablished standard.114 

Some authorities refer to these scenarios as ''vignettes," and to this type 

oftraining as "lane training."115 To conduct STX's on ROE, a 

commander, judge advocate, or other trainer places a soldier in a 

particular simulated METT-T116 and then confronts him with an event, 

such as the crashing of a traffic checkpoint barrier by a speeding 

vehicle. The trainer evaluates the soldier's response, and afterward 

discusses alternative responses available within the ROE. The STX 

brings to life abstract rules on the ROE card, giving the soldier concrete 

terms ofreference within which to determine his response. In this way, 

the soldier achieves the balance between intitiative and restraint so 

important to success in operations other than war. 117 

A debate continues over whether it would be wise to establish 

default rules in the form of a common task upon which soldiers could 

train-before the deployment. Some senior judge advocates express 

principled concerns that to do so risks oversimplifying responses that 

must be based on judgment, or creates a false sense of security in 

commanders who have concerns about ROE, or causes too much 

emphasis to be placed on restraint and thus erodes the warrior spirit 

114 DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANuAL 25-101, BATILE FOCUSED TRAINING at C-7 (Sept. 

1990) [hereinafter FM 25-101]. 

m See, e.g., JTF COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 91, at 76; FM 25-101, supra 

note 114, at 3-20, 4-8, 4-13, 4-22, 4-23, 4-24, 4-37, 4-42 & 4-46. 

116 See, e.g., DEP'roFARMY, SOLDIER TRAININGPuBLICATIONNo. 21-II-MQS, 

MILITARY QUALIFICATION SrANDARDS II: MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS FOR LIEUTENANTS AND 

CAPTAINS 3-86 (31 Jan. 1991) (Task 04-3303.02-0014, Prepare Platoon or Company Combat 

Orders) (describing the factors of "mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available"). 

117 See generally Martins, supra note 86, at 90-92 (extolling the virtues of scenario 

training). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 41 

essential for victory in combat. 118 Other judge advocates maintain that 


truly effective STX's require some standard against which to evaluate 


the soldier's response, and that even a nicely worded ROE card has 


limited value as a training tool ifit arrives on the scene during the 


deployment. 119 The former group generally has reservations about 


mnemonics that some unit commanders have adopted in efforts to make 


STX's more effective; the latter group generally supports the use of 


such mnemonics. 120 


Both sides ofthe debate agree, however, that before and during 


the operations in Haiti, vignette training made a positive difference in 


soldier preparedness. The most elaborate ROE training took place in 


118 See, e.g., Altenburg Remarks, supra note 112; Brigadier General Walter Huffman, 


Assistant Judge Advocate General for Military Law & Operations, Remarks Before the Haiti After 


Action Review Conference in Charlottesville, VA (May 8, 1995) (videotape on file with CLAMO) 


[hereinafter Huffman Remarks]. 


119 See, e.g., Mr. W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant to The Judge Advocate General, 


United States, for Law ofWar Matters, Remarks Before the 2d Annual Rules ofEngagement 


Conference in Fort Bragg, NC (Nov. 10, 1994); Martins, supra note 86; Colonel F. M. Lorenz, 


USMC, Rules ofEngagement in Operation United Shield, at 8 (l 6 May 1995) (draft manuscript of 


article soon to appear in Military Review); l 0th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note l 08, at 5. 


120 See, e.g., Martins, supra note 86, at 86-90 (proposing "R-A-M-P"); infra Appendix L 

(utilizing "A-R-M-E-D''). The idea of putting notes onto a card that soldiers may carry with them 

is a popular response to many operational challenges. See, e.g., Memorandum, StaffJudge 

Advocate, 25th Infantry Division (Light) and U.S. Army, Hawaii, APVG-JA, to G-3 Plans, 

subject: Haiti and Uphold Democracy Lessons Learned, para. lf(2) (28 Apr. 1995) [hereinafter 

25th ID Lessons Learned Memorandum] ("A medical ROE card should be published and 

disseminated in the same manner as the use offorce ROE card, and medical ROE vignettes should 

be added to the use offorce training scenarios.") (copy on file with CLAMO); Memorandum, LTC 

Arthur L. Passar, AMSMI-GC-AL-D, to Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Material Command, 

subject: After Action Report, Legal Support to Joint Logistics Support Command, Joint Task 

Force 190, Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy, September 1994-March 1995, at para. 6h(iv) (l l 

May 1995) [hereinafter Passar AAR] (''Though [soldier claims ofignorance ofthe prohibition 

against souvenir-taking] were not necessarily credible, and without legal significance even iftrue, 

I would advise minimizing such claims by providing each soldier in a deployment with a card 

summarizing any similar punitive order just as we do rules of engagement."). Nevertheless, no 

·one advocating use ofsoldier cards harbors illusions that such cards are a panacea. See, e.g., 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL W.R. PEERS, THE MY LAI INQUIRY 230 (1979) (noting that "[s]everal ofthe 

men [ofTask Force Barker] testified that they were given [Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam's) "Nine Rules" and other pocket cards, but ... they had put the cards in their pockets 

unread and never had any idea oftheir contents ... .''). 
42 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Camp Santiago, Puerto Rico, where a judge advocate and other soldiers 

from 194th Armored Brigade conducted STX's for a battalion of 

Combined Caribbean soldiers, a Bangladeshi battalion, a Guatemalan 

battalion, and a group of international police monitors that eventually 

deployed to Haiti as part of the MNF.121 This meticulously planned and 

well-resourced training consisted of a circuit of six lanes, comprising 18 

different vignettes. The availability of a 9-day block in which to 

conduct the STX's permitted soldiers to experience repetitive 

reinforcement ofkey rules, and to practice until their performance 

achieved the high standard set by the trainers. Appendix K reprints the 

sheets used by trainers as they evaluated soldiers' responses during the 

vignette. Even when lack of time made full STX's impossible, soldiers 

benefited from briefback sessions based on vignettes. 122 Appendix L 

reprints a card used as a basis for briefbacks by the 82d Airborne 

Division prior to D-Day. 123 

121 See Memorandum, Brigade Judge Advocate, 194th Armored Brigade (Separate), 

AFVL-JA to Staff Judge Advocate, XVIII Airborne Corps, subject: After Action Report for Judge 

Advocate Participation in Uphold Democracy (19 Dec. 1994) (hereinafter 194th Armored Brigade 

AAR] (on file with the CLAMO). 

122 See, e.g .• UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DocTRINE CoMMAND, CENTER FOR 

ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL), NEWSLETIER No. 95-2, PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING 

VIGNETIES (Mar. l 995) (including l 8 vignettes developed by CALL in conjunction with the 25th 

Infantry Division (Light) in preparation for that unit's deployment to Haiti in January of 1995); 

Passar AAR, supra note 120, at 12-13 (describing ROE briefback sessions); Office of the Staff 

Judge Advocate, XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Conduct Combat Operations According to the Rules of 

Engagement (July 1994) (consisting of23 pages ofperformance-oriented training materials 

prepared by Major Brad Stai and Captain Query Erisman) (copy on file with CLAMO); Office of 

the Staff Judge Advocate, 10th Mountain Div. (Light Infantry), Combined JTF Haiti ROE 

Training Lesson Plan and Vignettes (Aug. 1994) (including 38 vignettes anticipating conditions 

in Haiti). 

123 It is difficult to overstate the success a wide range of units have experienced 

with situational training on ROE. One staff judge advocate heavily involved with Operation Safe 

Haven, see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text, and with subsequent migrant operations 

offered the following comments: 

From our experience in Panama in Operations Safe Haven and Safe Passage, we 

realized that situational training plays a major role in the successful execution of 

an operational mission. Our situational training for Operation Safe Passage was 

created with combined efforts ofJudge Advocates (JA's) and lOlst Airborne 

Division officers to ensure realistic scenarios and practical responses. Classes 
LAWAND WLITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 43 

3. Be Willing to Take the Lead in Multinational ROE 

Development. The Haiti deployment provided unique opportunities for 

United States forces to develop ROE in conjunction with forces from 

other nations and with civil authorities from the United Nations. Prior 

to the arrival in Haiti of the international components ofthe MNF, 

commanders ofUnited States forces sought to ensure that all members 

ofthe MNF would be implementing the same guidance on the use of 

force. 124 Commanders of international units, meanwhile, occasionally 

expressed concerns about whether the ROE were consistent with their 

countries' national policies or military doctrine regarding the use of 

force. 125 Later, in early 1995, during the transition from the MNF to 

UNMIH, officials in the United Nations sought to create ROE that 

resemble those used in peacekeeping operations elsewhere in the world, 

while the United States component ofthe UNMIH force articulated its 

interest in rules consistent with a peace enforcement mission. 126 

Energetic participation by judge advocates in the drafting process 

helped ensure that final products reflected the legitimate interests of all 

were taught by JA's and Airborne officers. After the classes, each commander 

practiced the situational training in the field with his/her troops. the soldiers felt 

well-prepared and thoroughly understood the ROE. The soldiers were sensitized 

to potential problem situations, and had rehearsed their responses to them. That, 

in tum, reduced reaction time during the actual operation. The operation was 

executed with precision and confidence .... Situational training is not just 

beneficial, it is vital. When properly prepared, taught, and practiced, situational 

training can save lives because soldiers can swiftly and instinctively react to all 

situations within the guidelines of the ROE. 

Memorandum, Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, United States Army South, Unit 7104 SOJA, 

subject: Review of the Draft Law and Military Operations in Haiti, 1994-95: Lessons Learned for 

Judge Advocates, paras. 2-3 (16 Nov. 1995) (copy on file with CLAMO) (recommending revision 

of the draft to place greater emphasis on the value ofsituational training). 

124 See 194th Armored Brigade, supra note 121, at Observation Number I. 

125 See id. 

126 Letter from Colonel David Petraeus, U-3 ofUnited Nations Mission in Haiti, to Major 

Mark Martins (Mar. 17, 1995) (on file with CLAMO). 
44 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

sides. 127 These judge advocates benefited by having a completed draft 

available as a basis for discussion, particularly in circumstances when a 

nation's military doctrine or experience have never incorporated ROE. 

When developing ROE in conjunction with the United Nations, 

diplomatic or policy constraints occasionally dictated language peculiar 

to United Nations operations. 128 In these cases, the availability of a 

complete, preferred alternative gave United States judge advocates and 

commanders a medium with which to communicate their concerns. 

129 

Appendix Mreprints the full text ofthe ROE eventually issued for 

UNMIH. Appendix N reprints the soldier card. 

After the drafting stage had passed, judge advocates participated 

in developing situational training exercises effective in reinforcing the 

UNMIH ROE. 130 As the June 1995 parliamentary elections approached, 

vignettes pertaining to balloting sites received particular training 

emphasis. 131 Also, once newly trained police forces had been deployed 

127 Id.; Hudson Interview, supra note 65; Telephone Interview with Major Mark 

Ackerman, International & Operational Law Division, Office ofthe Judge Advocate General 

(Mar. 29, I995). 

12s Id. 

129 Id Frequent areas of friction include the question whether deadly force may be used 

to protect any property, even mission-essential property, and whether troops may intervene to 

prevent harm to civilians; see also Office ofthe Staff Judge Advocate, United States Atlantic 

Command, Transition to UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH): Uphold Democracy AAR, at 2c (May 

I995) (unpublished issue sheet on file with CLAMO) ("Good result obtained by US UN 

commander, US JA advisor, and more aggressive UNSR 940 mandate."). 

130 See generally Headquarters, United Nations Mission in Haiti, United Nations Forces 

In Haiti: Force Training Program, Annex C (3 Mar. I995) (consisting of59 pages oftraining 

viewgraphs on rules of engagement, including discussions of I I vignettes) (copy on file with 

CLAMO). 

131 See HEADQUARTERS, UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI, ELECTION DAY TRAINING 

VIGNETTES (May I 995) (I0 page document containing 8 vignettes labeled as follows: Vignette 

I-Routine, Peaceful, Organized Electoral Operations; Vignette 2-BIV [registration and voting 

bureau] Runs Out ofBallots or Time; Vignette 3-BIV Fails to Open; Vignette 4--Political Party 

or Candidate Complain ofFraud (Name Not on Ballot or Some Other Injustice); Vignette 5­

Voters Complain ofIntimidation; Vignette 6-Noisy Demonstration Outside BEC [departmental 

electoral bureau] or BIV; Vignette 7-Violent Demonstration Outside BEC or BIV; Vignette 8­

Shots Fired at a BIV or BEC) (copy on file with CLAMO). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 45 

in Port-au-Prince and other communities, vignettes relating to instances 


ofHaitian violence against other Haitians received added emphasis. 132 


These police forces in many instances still wore civilian clothes while 


executing law enforcement missions, requiring UNMIH soldiers to be 


extremely alert when facing an apparent situation of Haitian-on-Haitian 


violence. 


B. International Law 

Military operations other than war such as those undertaken by 

the MNF and UNMIH in Haiti challenge traditional categories of 

international law. In one respect, the United States was acting as an 

agent ofthe United Nations and was exercising authority granted to it 

by that body. United States troops in Uphold Democracy were 

contributing to a "peace enforcement" action, authorized by a Security 

Council resolution that expressly invoked Chapter VII ofthe United 

Nations Charter.133 United States soldiers participating in UNMIH 

were "peacekeepers," members of a type of force authorized under 

Chapter VI of the Charter. 134 

132 Memorandum, COL K. M. Huber, U-3, United Nations Mission in Haiti, to 

Distribution C, subject: Rules ofEngagement Training, at para. 3 and encls (1 Nov. 1995) 

(enclosing 3 situational training exercises). 

133 See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., at para. 4, U.N. Doc. 

S.RES/940 (l 994); An Agenda For Peace-Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and 

Peacekeeping: Report ofthe Secretary-Genera/, para. 44, U.N.G.A., 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A 

47/277 (1992) ("[Peace enforcement units] would have to be more heavily anned than peacekeeping forces and would have to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national 

forces.... I consider such peace-enforcement units to be warranted as a provisional measure 

under Article 40 ofthe Charter. Such peace-enforcement units should not be confused with the 

forces that may eventually be constituted under Article 43 to deal with acts ofaggression ...."). 

134 See, e.g., Salley Morphet, UN Peacekeeping and 

Monitoring, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD 183, 201 (1994) (stating the guiding 

principles ofpeacekeeping to be "the important role ofthe UN Secretary-General and ofUN 

command-albeit one that the Permanent Members [of the Security Council] had to keep an eye 

on; the necessity for agreement, both at the UN and on the ground, of the political parameters of 
46 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

In another respect, the United States and Haiti were acting as 

separate sovereign states in the international community ofstates, 

subject to the law-treaty-based and customary-that governs relations 

between states. 135 Because the deployment was permissive and did not 

involve international armed conflict, a body oflaw applicable to states 

in wartime did not strictly apply, 136 even though the presence of 

thousands of armed troops and the displacement ofthousands of 

civilians and noncombatants created compelling analogies to that body 

oflaw. The prevailing regime was the international law ofpeace, and 

under this regime a sovereign host nation applies its domestic laws 

within its territory.137 This is part ofthe meaning ofsovereignty. 138 

the operation, including the need for consent of the host states, and also, in some cases, ofthe 

other main parties involved; the fact that those engaged in peacekeeping had to maintain 

neutrality and impartiality (as peacekeepers not peace enforcers) so that they could contribute to 

the management ofthe problem rather than risk becoming part ofit; the fact that the military 

should not use force except in self-defence or to defend their positions; and the importance of 

creative flexibility (e.g. through use ofpolice and administrators) in response to the varying 

situations that faced them on the ground"). 

135 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 

101(2) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("Customary international law results from a general 

and consistent practice ofstates followed by them from a sense oflegal obligation.''). 

136 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners ofWar, Aug. 12, 

1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Theodore 

Meron, Extraterritoriality ofHuman Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78-82 (1995) (''The 

agreement ofSeptember 18, 1994, negotiated in Port-au-Prince between President Jimmy Carter 

and General Raoul Cedras, and its acceptance by the Aristide government, led to the consentbased, nonviolent, hostilities-free entry ofU.S. forces and their peaceful deployment In such 

circumstances, the Geneva Conventions on the Protection ofVictims ofWar ofAugust 12, 1949, 

are not, strictly speaking applicable.") (citing authorities). 

137 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 135, at§ 206 ("Under international law, a state 

has ... sovereignty over its territory and general authority over its nationals."). 

138 See id. at cmt. b ("As used here, ('sovereignty'] implies a state's lawful control over 

its territory generally to the exclusion ofother states, authority to govern in that territory, and 

authority to apply law there."). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 41 

The prevailing Haitian legal system-to the extent that a 


"system" can be said to have survived the long history ofrepression and 


arbitrary rule-was part ofthe romano-germanic or civil law tradition, 


which it received from France.139 In 1825, Haiti had adopted the 


French Napoleanic Code with minor changes. It had continued to build 


its legal system on the French pattern, a development reflected in the 


adoption ofthe French Commercial, Criminal, Civil, Civil and 


Commercial Procedure, and Criminal Procedure Codes. 


In Haiti, as under other civil law systems, the principal sources of 

law are legislative codes rather than cases decided by judges. Haiti's 

1987 constitution called for a bicameral legislature consisting of a 

Chamber ofDeputies and a Senate, a judiciary consisting of courts of 

first instance, courts of appeal, and a supreme court, and an executive 

branch headed by a popularly elected president Haiti was divided into 

nine administrative departments, each possessing a "prefet" who 

implemented decisions ofthe central government. Following the French 

model-and unlike the United States model offederalism-Haiti's 

administrative departments had no independent legislative power. 

I. Understand the International Justification/or Use ofForce 

and the Impact ofDomestic Legislation. By repudiating the 

Governors Island Agreement and frightening thousands ofcitizens to 

take to the high seas, the junta threatened international peace and 

security and thus justified a temporary displacement ofHaitian law and 

sovereignty. Despite the fact that the Haitian migrants created 

particular burdens for the United States, any forceful unilateral 

remedies taken against the de facto Haitian regime would have been 

legally questionable. The United Nations Charter generally outlaws the 

threat or use offorce by one state against another,140 and the exception 

139 This two paragraph discussion ofHaiti's legal system is based on Chantal Hudicourt 

Ewald, The Legal System ofHaiti, in 7 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA at 7.210.3 to 

7.210.35 (Kenneth R. Redden ed. 1985). 
48 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

permitting use offorce in individual or collective selfdefense is 

narrow. 141 However, a multilateral response pursued through duly 

constituted organs ofthe United Nations provided an international 

justification for use offorce. The member states ofthe United Nations, 

in signing the Charter, clearly gave the Security Council broad power to 

act with respect to "any threat to the peace."142 

The series of Security Council resolutions addressing the crisis 

in Haiti put abundant meat on the legal framework justifying the 

deployment and provided useful guideposts to judge advocates on the 

ground. Resolution 940 authorized the MNF "to use all necessary 

means" to restore the Aristide government and "to establish and 

maintain a secure and stable environment."143 Resolution 944 provided 

further direction to the MNF and guided the timing of UNMIH's 

deployment.144 Resolutions 841, 873, 875, 905, and 917 gave 

operational lawyers a detailed account of the international response to 

the Haiti crisis and a helpful historical context for their counsel to 

commanders. The Carter-Jonassaint agreement of 18 September-on 

its face a bilateral instrument-incorporated Resolutions 940 and 917 

by reference. 145 This agreement further instructed United States forces 

that "the Haitian military and police forces will work in close 

140 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 

141 U.N. CHARTER art. 51; RESTATEMENT, supra note 135, at§ 904. 

142 U.N. CHARTER art. 39; Conrad K. Harper, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, Legal 

Authority for Peace Operations, Statement Before the Legislation and National Security 

Subcommittee ofthe House Government Operations Committee (Mar. 3, 1994) (copy on file with 

CLAMO) ("To begin with, the United Nations Charter provides an extensive and flexible 

international legal framework for the conduct ofpeace operations .... Chapter VII ofthe Charter 

authorizes the Security Council to determine the existence ofa threat or breach ofthe peace or act 

ofaggression and to make recommendations or decide on measures ofa mandatory character to 

restore or maintain the peace ....UN Member States are required by the UN Charter to carry out 

decisions ofthe Council."). 

143 See supra quotation in text accompanying note 24 and Appendix B. 

144 See S.C. Res. 944, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3430th mtg., at paras. l & 2, U.N. 

Resolution provided additional guidance for the MNF."). 

14s See Appendix C infra. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 49 

cooperation with the U.S. Military Mission" and that "[t]his 

cooperation, conducted with mutual respect, will last during the 

transitional period required for insuring vital institutions of the 

country."146 These texts, because they were continuously consulted by 

judge advocates, ensured that the Haiti deployment followed the rule of 

international law.147 

It is important to distinguish these international constraints on the 

operation from certain closely related constraints that stem from 

domestic United States law. The United Nations Participation Act 

limits to 1000 the number ofUnited States military personnel that may 

be assigned to United Nations peacekeeping operations worldwide. 148 

Because more than 800 United States soldiers were serving in other 

peacekeeping operations prior to the constitution ofUNMIH, this cap 

imposed a severe constraint on the latter phases ofthe Haiti 

deployment. 149 

Other domestic laws also imposed constraints that merited the 

attention ofoperational lawyers. The War Powers Resolution contains 

reporting requirements with respect to deployed United States forces 

that are "equipped for combat;"150 accordingly, while War Powers 

146 Id. 

147 See, e.g., Smith Interview, supra note 40. 

148 United Nations Participation Act of 1945, § 7(a)(l), Pub. L. No. 79-264, 59 Stat. 619 

(amended by legislation and codified at 22 U.S.C. § 287d-l(a)(l) (1988 & Supp)) [hereinafter 

UNPA] (comprising one ofthe nine sections of the Act that are codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 287 to 

287e-l). 

149 Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Jackson, Office ofthe Staff Judge Advocate, United 

States Atlantic Command, Remarks Before the Haiti After Action Review Conference in 

Charlottesville, VA (May 9, 1995) [hereinafter Jackson Remarks] (videotape on file with 

CLAMO); Memorandum, Office ofthe Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office ofthe Legal 

Advisor, to The Legal Advisors and Staff Judge Advocates ofthe Combatant Commands, subject: 

Chairman's Legal Counsel Newsletter #7, para. 4 (22 Mar. 1995) [hereinafter Chairman's Legal 

Counsel Newsletter]. 

150 War Powers Resolution of 1973, sec. 4 (2), Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified 

at 50 U.S.C. § 1543(2) (1988 & Supp.)). 
50 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

reports became unnecessary when the United States deployed lightly 

armed UNMIH peacekeepers, 151 deployment ofsoldiers with the MNF 

arguably triggered such reports. On the other hand, because MNF 

soldiers performed their duties under the operational control of United 

States leadership, the United Nations Participation Act limit did not 

apply. During all phases of the deployment, meanwhile, the purpose 

statute152 in conjunction with the Foreign Assistance Act 153 and the 

Arms Export Control Act154 placed limits on the extent to which United 

States forces could provide defense articles, military training, or other 

defense related services to either Haiti or other participant states. 155 

2. Expect to Practice Law Without the Benefit ofa SOFA. As 

soon as the MNF had established a secure and stable environment and 

the Aristide government had resumed power, some agreement became 

necessary to define the legal status ofUnited States troops on Haitian 

151 In addition to light armament, peacekeepers also have ROE that stress the 


maintenance ofneutrality vis a vis the warring factions. See supra note 134. This is a another 


factor militating against applying the War Powers reporting provisions. 


152 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 130l(a). 

153 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 15 Stat. 434 (amended by more than 15 subsequent 

pieces oflegislation and codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2349aa-9 (1988 & Supp.) (comprising ch. 

32 ("Foreign Assistance"), subch. II ("Military Assistance and Sales")) [hereinafter FAA]. 

154 Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 734, (amended by more than 8 subsequent 

pieces oflegislation and codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796c (1988 & Supp.) (comprising ch. 39 

("Arms Export Control")) [hereinafter AECA]. 

iss Note that section 628 ofthe Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the President to detail 

personnel to international organizations "to render any technical, scientific, or professional advice 

or service to ... such organization." 22 U.S.C. § 2388. Given the 1000 person restriction in the 

United Nations Participation Act, see note 148 supra, the majority ofpersonnel constituting the 

2400 person United States contribution to UNMlli needed to fall under this description. See, e.g., 

Chairman's Legal Counsel Newsletter, supra note 149, at para. 4 (stating that "the 24oo+ troops 

required ofthe United States for the UNMlli operation must be detailed to the UN under a 

combination ofthese two authorities"); Memorandum, Mr. John McNeill, Acting Principal 

Deputy General Counsel, Dep't ofDefense, to The Deputy Assistant Secretary ofDefense for 

Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Policy, subject: Authorities for Assignment ofU.S. Military 

Personnel to Peace Operations (27 Sept. 1993) (opining that a MASH unit deployed to the former 

Yugoslavia could properly be deemed ''technical, scientific, or professional"). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 51 

soil. Otherwise, these troops would be subject to Haitian laws that 


could impede their activities and frustrate the political, diplomatic, and 


strategic objectives that impelled their deployment. In prior centuries, 


no express agreement was necessary to establish the status of military 


forces stationed in foreign lands. A sovereign state automatically ceded 


a portion of its territorial jurisdiction to another when the latter state 


placed troops on the former state's soil. 156 This was the doctrine of 


"extra-territoriality," under which a grant ofpermission by a state to 


station foreign troops in its territory implicitly contained a broad waiver 


ofjurisdiction. Today, however, this doctrine is in doubt. 157 


Yet for four reasons, modem operations other than war often 

make the rapid conclusion of a comprehensive and detailed status of 

forces agreement difficult. First, the hope that the deployment will be 

short in duration and the presence ofmany other pressing demands on 

diplomatic resources tend to make the conclusion ofa SOFA a lessthan-urgent priority. 158 Second, the host nation-ifit has a functioning 

government at all-often may have no well-developed or efficient 

apparatus with authority to negotiate and conclude agreements. Third, 

even if the host nation is ready, willing, and able to become party to a 

156 Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 515 (1878). 

157 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-85 (1952); see also DEP'TOF ARMY, 

PAMPHLET 27-161-1, LAW OF PEACE at 11-1 (Sept. 1979) [hereinafter DA PAM 27-161-1]. But see 

MANuALFOR COURTS-MARTIAL, United States, R.C.M. 201(d) analysis, app. 21, at A21-8 (1984) 

[hereinafter MCM] ("With respect to the exercise ofjurisdiction by the United States or a foreign 

government, Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957), establishes that the determination ofwhich 

nation will exercise jurisdiction is not a right ofthe accused."); infra notes 351-352 and 

accompanying text (finding vitality in the doctrine of extra-territoriality). 

158 For small missions ofa short duration, standing authority exists for the Department of 

Defense to negotiate and conclude simple status offorces agreements that provide members ofthe 

contingent the same status as members ofthe technical and administrative staffofthe United 

States Embassy, who are granted criminal immunity and a few other limited privileges by 

preexisting international law. See Dep't ofState, Action Memorandum, Circular 175 Procedure: 

Request for Blanket Authority to Negotiate and Conclude Temporary Status ofForces Agreements 

with the Sudan and Other Countries (Nov. 4, 1981) (approved by Ambassador Stoessel on Nov. 6, 

1981) (citing Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, arts. 27, 29-35, 23 

U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95). 
52 CENTER FOR LAWAND MJUTARYOPERATIONS 

SOP A, our own laws and regulations place significant though 

understandable constraints on who may negotiate and conclude 

international agreements with foreign states and on how that process 

must occur. 159 Fourth, United States forces may be present in Haiti 

representing either the nation or a variety ofmultinational entities, 

creating a need for bilateral as well as multilateral instruments. 

Eventually, three different agreements governed the legal status 

ofdifferent United States soldiers in Haiti. The status offorces 

agreement reprinted at Appendix 0 defined the privileges, immunities, 

and responsibilities ofthe MNF. A United Nations Status ofMission 

agreement, reprinted at Appendix P, defined the status ofAmericans 

serving with UNMIH. A bilateral agreement between the United States 

and Haiti, reprinted at Appendix Q, governed those individuals who 

served in Haiti outside the umbrella ofthese international forces. 160 

Although numerous existing agreements were available to provide 

models for judge advocates and diplomats seeking to articulate United 

States interests in negotiations, and although several dedicated and 

resourceful professionals led the United States effort, no SOP A was 

concluded before 22 December 1994. When this agreement-the MNF 

SOPA-went into effect, early issues that arose included the questions 

is9 See, e.g., Case Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 

112b); UNITED STATESDEP'TOF STATE, CIRC. No. 175 PROCEDURE(l974); DEP'TOFDEFENSE, 

DIR. 5530.3, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (June 11, 1987); DEP'T OF ARMY' REG. 550.51, 

AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGOTIATING, CONCLUDING, FORWARDING, AND DEPOSITING 

OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (1 May 1985). 

160 See also Convention on the Privileges and Immunities ofthe United Nations, Feb. 13, 

1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 (Convention acceded to by Haiti on 6 Aug. 1947). 

Note that there existed other agreements between the United States and the many 

nations and international organizations represented in Haiti. See, e.g., Agreement Between the 

United States ofAmerica and the United Nations Organization Concerning the Provision of 

Assistance on a Reimbursable Basis in support ofthe Operations ofthe UN in Haiti (Sept. 19, 

1994), cited in Memorandum, CPT Fred K. Ford, Chief of Claims and Legal Assistance, 

Multinational Forces Haiti, MNF-SJA, to Director ofthe Combined Joint Staff, subject: Treatment 

ofUN Personnel at MNF Medical Facilities ( 16 Feb. 1995) (copy on file with CLAMO). 
LAWAND .MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 53 

whether locally hired Haitians could use the Post Exchange and whether 

certain United States servicemembers on military flights need pay a $25 

"departure fee" to Haitian authorities. 161 

When advising commanders or soldiers on legal issues in a 

foreign country without the benefit of a SOFA, appreciation of that 

country's legal system takes on practical significance. Operational 

lawyers in Haiti appreciated the need for legal materials on Haiti and 

resourcefully solicited them from a variety ofplaces; however, the 

paucity ofmaterial written in English limited the extent to which judge 

advocates could become knowledgeable ofHaitian law. 162 The need 

for attorneys in the force to have such knowledge-for example in the 

areas of claims and civil affairs-is distinct from the need for troops to 

be aware of local laws and customs.163 Both needs, however, reaffirm 

the wisdom of having pre-prepared and current country law studies and 

country studies available for distribution to deploying units. 164 

3. Understand When The Law ofArmed Conflict Does Not 

Strictly Apply. The mandate of the MNF in Haiti was not military 

161 See, e.g., Passar AAR, supra note 120, at para. 6g(ii). 

162 See, e.g., Stai Memorandum supra note 35, at 7-8, 19-21 (reporting that one judge 

advocate translated several Haitian statutes into English); see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 

891-98 (describing bibliographies and other research tools for locating foreign law materials). 

See also Ewald, supra note 139 (representing the only Haiti country law study in English). 

163 See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO 

CONGRESS 489-90 (1992) [hereinafter DOD FINAL REPORT] ("It is a tribute to American service 

men and women that, under conditions of considerable stress and hardship, they demonstrated 

impeccable respect for a culture much different than their own. They recognized the importance 

to their mission of the overall relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States."). 

164 See DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 27-50: STATUS OF FORCES POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND 

INFORMATION, para. 1-4, 1-6, App. B (15 Dec. 1989) (requiring and explaining the importance of 

conducting formal criminal law studies for countries where United States forces may be stationed). 

Unfortunately, none of the commercial electronic legal databases contains foreign legal materials 

for smaller developing countries. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc., LEXIS-NEXIS Directory of 

Online Services (1995) (limiting coverage to materials from the United States, Canada, certain 

British Commonwealth countries, the European Community organization, France, and specific 

Middle East, African, and South American countries with developed commercial legal practices). 
54 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

victory or occupation ofhostile territory; rather it was "to establish and 

maintain a secure and stable environment ...." 165 Moreover, the 

Carter-Jonassaint agreement-and the Aristide government's assent to 

that agreement-resulted in an entry that was based on consent and not 

hostilities between nations. Under these circumstances, the treaties and 

customary legal rules constituting the law ofarmed conflict do not 

strictly apply. 166 The law ofarmed conflict includes rules pertaining to 

the conduct of combat and safeguards that must be provided in time of 

war to the wounded and sick, to prisoners of war, and to civilians.167 

As a matter ofpolicy rather than legal obligation, United States 

forces elected to treat potentially hostile persons detained during the 

operation as ifthey were prisoners of war. Humanitarian organizations 

and scholars commended this approach, given the overarching purpose 

ofthe Geneva Conventions of 1949 to accord basic fairness and other 

protections to persons taking no part in ongoing hostilities and to 

eliminate unnecessary suffering associated with conflict.168 Still, the 

details of this policy raised very practical issues for the judge 

advocates, military police, and soldiers in the intelligence community 

who dealt with the several hundred persons who were detained at some 

point in the operations. This report addresses some ofthese specific 

issues below, in subpart III.D, in the context of detention issues. At 

this point, it suffices to note that quite a few ofthe 143 articles of the 

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners ofWar do 

not neatly translate from their intended context ofwar into an operation 

other than war. 169 

165 S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., at para. 4, U.N. Doc. S.RES/940 

(1994). 

166 See supra note 136. 

167 See, e.g., DA PAM 27-161-1, supra note 157, at 1-1to1-2. 

168 See, e.g., Meron, supra note 136, at 78 ("This attitude deserves to be commended 

because the Geneva Convention ensures humane treatment and judicial guarantees."). 

169 See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 136, at art. 60 (providing a monthly pay 

schedule for prisoners), art. 79 (providing for prisoner ofwar representatives), art. 84 (requiring 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITI, 1994-95 55 

With respect to the law ofoccupation-that subset ofthe law of 

armed conflict that presumes an invader has rendered an invaded state 

incapable ofself-govemment170-translation ofthe rules to operations 

in Haiti was still more problematic. United States policy maintained that 

the MNF was not an occupying force, with good reason. 171 Treaties 

place affirmative duties on the occupying power to protect civilian 

inhabitants. An occupying force has a comprehensive duty to restore 

and maintain public order, 172 an obligation in tension with a specific 

provision ofthe Carter-Jonassaint agreement. Such a force must 

provide food and medical supplies to the general population, 173 a 

massive requirement that makes sense following an invasion by one 

prisoners to be tried for offenses by a military court ofthe detaining power); Larry Rohter, Legal 

Vacuum is Testing U.S. Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at A32. 

170 See, e.g .• DEP'T OF ARMY. FIELD MANuAL 27-10, THE LAw OF LAND wARFARE at para. 

352 (18 July 1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10] ("Occupation ... is invasion plus talcing firm 

possession of enemy territory for the purpose ofholding it."); id. at para. 355 ("Military 

occupation is a question of fact. It presupposes a hostile invasion, resisted or unresisted, as a 

result ofwhich the invader has rendered the invaded government incapable ofpublicly exercising 

its authority, and that the invader has successfully substituted its own authority for that ofthe 

legitimate government in the territory invaded."). Cf. DOD FINAL REPORT, supra note 163, at 610 

("Coalition forces [in the Persian Gulf conflict] acted briefly as an occupying power."). 

171 Lieutenant General Henry H. Shelton, Commander ofCombined Joint Task Force 

180, Remarks During Press Conference at the United States Embassy in Port-au-Prince Haiti 

(Sept. 19, 1994) ("We have stressed from the beginning that this is not an occupation force."), 

quoted in A 'Cordial' Reception as Americans Take Control; Peacekeeping Troops Met No 

Resistance-and Some Cheers-As They Took Haitian Ports and Airfields. But Risks Remain 

High, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 20, 1994, at Al. 

172 Annex to Hague Convention No. IV Embodying the Regulations Respecting the Laws 

and Customs ofWar on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2295, 205 Consol. T.S. 289 

[hereinafter Hague Regulations] (stating that the occupying power "shall talce all the measures in 

his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, 

unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.") reprinted in FM 27-10, supra note 

170, at para. 363. 

173 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection ofCivilians in Time ofWar, Aug. 12, 

1949, art. 55, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Civilians Convention] ("To the 

fullest extent ofthe means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty ofef!Suring the food 

and medical supplies ofthe population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, 

medical stores and other articles ifthe resources ofthe occupied territory are inadequate.") 

reprinted in FM 27-10, supra note 170, at para 384. 
56 CENTER FOR LAWAND MJUTARYOPERATIONS 

belligerent of another but that conflicts with the more limited 

contributions member states are requested to make when they assist in 

peace operations under United Nations auspices. These and other 

burdens borne by occupiers address material resources that the 

inhabitants of every underdeveloped country-not merely occupied 

populations-desire. Yet while the plight ofthese inhabitants arouses 

our sympathy and may be the basis for voluntary humanitarian aid, it 

does not give rise to an international legal duty to intervene.174 

174 Nor does any treaty outside ofthe law ofanned conflict impose such a duty. 

Defenders ofCaptain Lawrence Rockwood, see infra subpart III.1.2, have construed a peacetime 

treaty as imposing an obligation on individual members ofthe armed forces to investigate and 

police human rights violations committed by foreign officials on their own citizens. Lawyers 

Committee for Human Rights, Protect or Obey: The United States Army versus CPT Lawrence 

Rockwood 5(1995) (hereinafter Lawyers' Committee] (invoking International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 61.L.M. 368, entered into force for 

the United States Sept. 8, 1992 (hereinafter Covenant] ) (reprinting an amicus brief submitted in 

opposition to a prosecution pretrial motion). Examination ofthe text ofthe treaty, however, 

reveals a more restrictive meaning. The treaty establishes a procedural apparatus under which a 

Human Rights Committee shall be formed and shall study and take action on reports of human 

rights practices submitted to it by states. However, the Covenant's language also reflects the 

understanding ofthe states party to it that the Covenant will not create new individual obligations 

or rights that tear at the fabric ofdiscipline and good order essential to military operations: 

"Everyone shall have the right to freedom ofassociation with others .... This article shall not 

prevent the imposition oflawful restrictions on members ofthe anned forces and ofthe police in 

their exercise ofthis right." See Covenant, supra, at art 22. 

Nor can customary international law serve as an authority for such an obligation. 

Captain Rockwood's defenders have also invoked this source oflaw. See Lawyers Committee, 

supra, at 5 ("These duties derive not from the UN Charter or from the treaties themselves, but 

from customary rules, acknowledged as firmly established law, ofwhich the treaties are a concrete 

manifestation."); Id. (" ... there is growing support for the view that even without separate 

warring sides, violence in a contested political situation may trigger customary humanitarian law 

governing non-international armed conflicts."). The United States Supreme Court has 

long recognized the binding character ofcustomary international law. See The Paquette Habana, 

175 U.S. 677 (1900) (holding that even in the absence ofa treaty, "an ancient usage among 

civilized nations" had ripened into a rule ofinternational law that exempted coast fishing vessels 

from capture as prize ofwar). Nevertheless, recall that "[c]ustomary international law results 

from a general and consistent practice ofstates followed by them from a sense oflegal 

obligation." RESTATEMENT, supra note 135, at§ 102(2) (emphasis added). The United States 

government is careful to maintain that treaties applicable to armed conflict do not apply to 

particular operations other than war, despite the fact that United States forces as a matter of policy 

follow all relevant rules and protections from those treaties during their operations. See, e.g. 

Letter from Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser to the United States Dep't of State, to Richard L. 

Thornburgh, United States Attorney General (Jan. 31, 1990) (explaining that "[p ]risoner ofwar 
LAWAND .MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 57 

C. Intelligence Law 

No issues from the body of law regulating intelligence activities 

received wide attention during.the Persian GulfWar.175 "Intelligence 

Law" is not one ofthe functional areas addressed in the Desert Storm 

Assessment Team Report. 116 Nor does official army doctrine for legal 

operations-written at the end of the cold war in support of AirLand 

Battle doctrine-list any aspect of intelligence law among the seven 

functional areas oflegal services provided by the Judge Advocate 

General's Corps. 177 Legal concerns with intelligence functions during 

military operations are a modem outgrowth oftwo factors: first, the 

strong public and political reaction against military intelligence 

activities that targeted Americans in dissident groups and that came to 

light in the mid-1970's; 178 second, the dramatic change in the military 

threat away from an advancing Soviet column oftanks and artillery 

pieces toward a diverse collection ofbad actors capable of harming 

national security through sporadic acts ofviolence at home or abroad.179 

status is generally sought by captured individuals because persons entitled to such status may not 

be prosecuted for legitimate acts ofwar," and reporting that on December 20, 1989 the 

Departments of State and Defense had elected to extended protected treatment to members ofthe 

Panamanian Defense Force "even if they might not be entitled to these protections under the terms 

ofArticle 4 of Geneva Convention III"). 

17s In this subpart, "intelligence law" will refer to rules governing intelligence activi~ies. 

See Daniel B. Silver, Intelligence and Counterinte//igence, in JOHN NORTON MOORE, FREDERICK 

s. TIPSON & ROBERT F. TURNER, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 913 (1990) [hereinafter NATIONAL 

SECURITY LAw] (also including in the body of intelligence law relations between branches of 

government in controlling intelligence and having access to it, secrecy in the judicial process, and 

internal discipline in the intelligence community). 

· 176 See DSAT REPORT, supra note 3. 

177 See FM 27-100, supra note 9, at para. 1-9 (listing administrative law, claims, contract 

law, criminal law, international law, legal assistance and operational law). 

178 See Silver, supra note 175, at 920. 

179 See, e.g., Peters, supra note 2. 
58 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Even the open society can easily accommodate intelligence 

activities on the traditional battlefield. Intelligence collection, analysis, 

and dissemination coexist hannoniously with any urgent need to defeat 

an enemy anny locked in mortal combat with our own forces. Yet the 

open society-at least in its American form-grows concerned at 

spying and kindred activities in peacetime. This truth complicates 

military operations other than war, increasing the demand for judge 

advocates to ensure that intelligence and counterintelligence assets are 

not so paralyzed by rules meant to protect basic liberties that the entire 

operation fails. 180 

Knowledgeable observers attribute part ofthe military success in 

Haiti to ''joint intelligence."181 This term refers to a series ofmeasures 

designed to bring the diverse military and nonmilitary assets in the 

intelligence community to bear upon the Joint Task Force Commander's 

needs. Despite changes in intelligence law designed to unify 

intelligence efforts, 182 many regarded intelligence support to the Persian 

Gulfwar as fragmented and suboptimal. 183 Among the successful 

corrective measures fielded in Haiti was a joint intelligence staffin 

support ofthe MNF Commander in Port-au-Prince. Judge advocates 

who supported this joint intelligence apparatus also deserve a portion of 

the credit. 

I. Know That Force Protection Can Justify Collecting 

Information on United States Persons. One example ofthe role 

operational lawyers serve occurred when members ofthe 519th Military 

180 Intelligence law for the military community largely involves interpretation of 

regulatory materials subordinate to a fourteen year-old executive order. Executive Order No. 

12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981) ("United States Intelligence Activities."). 

181 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 31. 

182 See, e.g .. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION No. 5240.10, DoD COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 

SUPPORT TO UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED CoMMANDS (May 18, 1990) (C1, 4 Aug. 1992). 

183 See Wilson, supra note 31, at 57. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITI, 1994-95 59 

Intelligence Battalion told their supporting judge advocate that they 

were unwilling to interrogate someone who claimed to be a United 

States person. 184 Eye witnesses had linked this individual to violent 

crimes committed by the extreme right wing ofFRAPH, and his 

interrogation would have contributed to force protection and to the 

mission of creating a secure and stable environment. 

Telephone conferences with judge advocates in his technical 

chain,185 confirmed the initial opinion ofthe 519th's legal advisor on the 

ground: the individual could be interrogated. The regulation governing 

Army intelligence activities contains a clear exception to the general 

rule prohibiting intelligence components from gathering information 

about United States persons. That exception states that "information 

may be collected about a United States person who is reasonably 

believed to threaten the physical security ofDepartment ofDefense 

employees, installations, operations, or official visitors."186 

The tendency ofmilitary intelligence personnel to read the rules 

restrictively is understandable. Rigorous training, such as that provided 

to Army intelligence specialties at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 

commendably stresses caution with respect to many intelligence 

activities that can threaten basic civil liberties ifabused. Judge 

advocates can and must contribute their ability to see particular rules in 

the context ofthe entire architecture ofintelligence law, and thus advise 

as to when exceptions apply. 

2. Understand the Different Roles ofMilitary Intelligence and 

Military Police. The Joint Detention Facility in Port-au-Prince was a 

source ofintelligence for the MNF as it sought to stabilize the country 

184 Unless otherwise stated, the information in the next twenty paragraphs is based upon 

Interviews with Major Peter G. Becker, Former Legal Advisor to the Joint Intelligence Facility in 

Port-au-Prince, in Charlottesville, Aug. 22-25, 1995 (hereinafter Becker Interviews]. 

185 See infra notes 283-284 and accompanying text. 

186 DEP'TOF ARMY, REo. 381-10, U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, at 2-2 (1 Jul. 

1984). 
60 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

in the early months of the operation. At one point in the first few weeks 

after entry, the facility housed more than 200 persons. 187 

Notwithstanding their commitment to staying within the law, military 

intelligence personnel sought to assemble for the commander an 

accurate picture of the threats he, his forces, and the fragile democratic 

structures of the Haitian government faced. To interrogate those 

persons who were detained pursuant to clearly established and 

reasonable criteria would support this crucial intelligence mission. 

Furthermore, the doctrinal manual for military intelligence interrogators 

properly urged techniques that, while respecting basic humanity and 

dignity, might cause a judge to rule a confession inadmissible were they 

used to elicit statements from an accused soldier prior to a courtmartial. 188 

From the perspective of the military police who administered it, 

the Joint Detention Facility was a prisoner ofwar camp. As subpart 

III.B.3 above explained, because the Haiti deployment was not 


international armed conflict, the protections ofthe Geneva Convention 


Relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners of War did not strictly apply,189 


nor did service implementing policies.190 Yet broadly worded 


187 See Becker Interviews, supra note 184; Rohter, supra note 169 (citing American 

military authorities for a cumulative figure ofmore than 200 persons as ofearly November 1994). 

188 See DEP'T OF AR.MY' FIELD MANuAL 34-52, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATIONS, 1-11, 

Fig. 1-4 (28 Sept. 1992) (describing the "ego-down" approach). So long as not used arbitrarily 

and inhumanely, such techniques are defensible in light ofthe fact that use for intelligence 

purposes (i.e., corroborating a much larger collection of data pointing to the time and place that a 

violent attack might occur) differs from use for prosecution (i.e., establishing criminal guilt and 

punishment against a particular individual). 

189 The Haiti intervention was not "international armed conflict." See Geneva 

Convention III, supra note 136, at art. 2. It also was not a "Common Article 3" armed conflict. 

Id, at art. 3; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON III GENEVA 

CoNVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF PRISONERS OF wAR OF 12 AUGUST 1949 at 27-44 (Jean s. 

Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter III PICTET] (construing article 3's reference to "armed conflict not of 

an international character"). 

190 DEP'TOF ARMY, REG. 190-8, ENEMYPRISONERSOFWARADMINISTRATION, 

EMPLOYMENT, AND COMPENSATION' para. l-5a(l) (2December1985) [hereinafter AR 190-8] 

("All persons captured, interned, or otherwise held in U.S. Army custody during the course of 

conflict.... ") (emphasis added). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHAITL 1994-95 61 

commitments in a diplomatic note and in military operations plans to 

accord "prisoner ofwar treatment" to detained persons, 191 resulted in 

disagreements between military policemen and intelligence personnel 

over whether interrogation procedures constituted a form ofcoercion 

forbidden under the Geneva Convention and under the implementing 

policies. 192 Despite the fact that even the Convention and the policies 

contemplate noncoercive questioning ofprisoners and a robust 

apparatus for collecting intelligence both before and after camp inprocessing has occurred, 193 military police are apt to take a conservative 

approach by discouraging good faith interrogation measures that an 

outside observer might challenge. 

The judge advocate often inherits the duty ofreconciling legal 

and doctrinal references that to the two sides in disagreement seem 

irreconcilable.194 The judge advocate assigned to the Joint Intelligence 

Facility discharged this duty by explaining that the rules, though 

191 See United States Permanent Mission in Geneva, Diplomatic Note to the International 

Committee ofthe Red Cross (Sept. I9, I994) ("Ifit becomes necessary to use force and engage in 

hostilities, the United States will, upon any engagement of forces, apply all ofthe provisions ofthe 

Geneva Conventions and the customary international law dealing with armed conflict Further, 

the United States will accord prisoner ofwar treatment to any detained member ofthe Haitian 

armed forces. Any member ofthe U.S. armed forces who is detained by Haitian forces must be 

accorded prisoner ofwar treatment."), quoted in Meron, supra note 136, at 78; Headquarters, 

XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Combined JTF-I80, Operation Plan 2370, Tab D to Appendix 4 to 

Annex E, para. Sb (I 0 Sept. I 994) (copy ofdeclassified appendix entitled "ICRC Inspections of 

Detention Facilities," on file with CLAMO) ("The JTF Provost Marshal will ensure that ..• 

[d]etainees are treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions."). 

192 See AR 190-8, supra note I90, at para. I-Sd (''No form of coercion may be inflicted 

on persons to obtain information of any kind. Those who refuse to answer questions may not be 

threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment ofany kind."). 

Operational lawyers readily discern that the drafters ofthe regulation intended this paragraph to 

incorporate Geneva Convention III, supra note I36, at art. I 7 . 

. 193 See, e.g .• DEP'TOF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL I9-40, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, 

CIVILIAN INTERNEES, AND DETAINED PERSONS, paras., 2-2, 2-5, 3-2, 3-62 to 3-65 (27 Feb. I 976) 

[hereinafter FM I9-40]; PICTET III, supra note 189, at 163-64; HowARD S. LEVIE, PRISONERS OF 

WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CoNFLICT I08-09 (I976). 

194 Put simply, the texts in question are an executive order which charges the military 

intelligence community with the responsibility ofconducting intelligence activities, see Exec. 

Order I2,333, supra note ISO, at subparts I.I I, 1.12 (d), 1.12 (e), and a regulatory provision 

seeking to implement a binding treaty. See AR 190-8, supra note 190, at l-5(a)(l). 
62 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

ultimately compatible, are intended to constrain each other. The 

interrogators must be brought to understand that treatment ofindividual 

detainees may not be arbitrary, and that absent articulable bases, the 

schedules for feeding, sleeping, and so on will be enforced as to all 

prisoners. 195 Military police must accept that rules are meant to 

accommodate the collection ofvaluable intelligence, and that the 

questioning of a detainee may sometimes call for a reasonable, 

minimally intrusive variation ofthe camp's regimen. 196 

3. Monitor Use ofIntelligence Contingency Funds and 

Counter-Intelligence Force Protection Operations. During Uphold 

Democracy, local informants provided the MNF Commander perishable 

information on potential terrorists, saboteurs, and other activities hostile 

to the MNF.197 Supporting intelligence units procured the services of 

these local informants using intelligence contingency funds (ICF). 

Regulations carefully circumscribe the use ofinformants for force 

protection purposes.198 Intelligence experts today refer to such 

operations as "counterintelligence force protection operations 

(CIFPO)," a term that recently replaced "defensive source 

operations."199 Regulations also carefully circumscribe the use ofICF, 

195 See, e.g., DEP'T OF ARMY, TRAINING AND DoCTRINE COMMAND, FIELD MANuAL 30­

96C, SOLDIER'S MANUAL FOR INTERROGATOR, MILITARY OccuPATIONAL SPECIALTY 96C, Task# 

301-96C-I 102 (11 Feb. 1977) (training interrogators to comply with Geneva Convention III 

strictures). 

196 See Becker Interviews, supra note 184 (discussing situations in which interrogators 

sought to wake detainees thought to have time-sensitive information and in which military police 

objected to particular detainees being fed scalloped potatoes). 

197 See, e.g., Stai Memorandum, supra note 35, at 14 (reviewing operation plan for lowlevel source operations); 25th ID Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 58 (discussing 

counterintelligence operations); cf. Major General S.L. Arnold & Major David T. Stahl, A Power 

Projection Army in Operations Other Than War, PARAMETERS, Winter 1993-94, at 4, 21 ("In 

Somalia our counterintelligence agents were our major source ofthe intelligence information that 

shaped maneuver operations."). 

198 DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 381-175, CoUNTERINTELLIGENCE FORCE PROTECTION 

OPERATIONS AND Low LEVEL SOURCE OPERATIONS (30 Dec. 1994) (S/NF/WN). 

199 See id. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 63 

for CIFPO as well as other uses. 200 In isolated but important instances, 


the military intelligence brigade judge advocate in Port-au-Prince 


referred intelligence personnel to provisions ofthese regulations.201 


D. Detention ofNon-members ofthe Force 

United States troops did not fight their way into Haiti and did not 

capture prisoners ofwar. Nevertheless, within 72 hours ofthe United 

States' arrival in the country, the need for a facility to house detained 

persons became apparent. 202 Intelligence sources indicated that certain 

Haitians posed threats to the force, and soldier eyewitness accounts 

established that certain Haitians were seriously harming other Haitians. 

The newly arrived military forces had ample international legal 

authority to detain such persons. 203 Moreover, the Haitian jails and 

prisons were not reliable places to transfer these individuals.204 

The CJTF 180 staff initially considered removing the first 

individuals detained to the brig aboard the U.S.S. America. 205 This 

course of action held several disadvantages. The ship would have been 

tied to Haitian waters. It would have been deprived ofbrig space for 

sailors accused of crimes because the brig's layout would not permit 

segregation ofdetainees. Visitation by representatives ofthe 

International Committee ofthe Red Cross would have been 

200 0EP1

T OF ARMY, REG. 381-141, INTELLIGENCE CONTINGENCY FUNDS (30 Jul. 1990) 

(C). 

201 See Becker Interviews, supra note 184 (declining to discuss classified details). 

202 See Wishard Interview, supra note 72. 

203 At the time, deployed judge advocates were expressly relying upon Security Council 

Resolution 940 and article 51 ofthe United Nations Charter. See Headquarters, Multinational 

Force Haiti and 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Briefing Viewgraphs (9 May 1995) 

(copies deposited with CLAMO during the conference mentioned in note 15, supra) [hereinafter 

10th Mountain Div. Briefing Viewgraphs]. 

204 See JTF-180 Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 38. 

205 See Smith Interview, supra note 40; USACOM Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 37. 
64 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

cumbersome. Moreover, the Secretary ofDefense would need to 

approve the plan. 206 In light ofthese disadvantages, the CJTF 

constructed a small, temporary facility at the Light Industrial Complex 

in Port-au-Prince and began detaining individuals there on 30 

September.207 Within a few days, the detention operation, termed the 

Joint Detention Facility, moved to a larger building nearby. A military 

police company commander commanded this larger facility, and his 

company provided the manpower for daily operations.208 A small 

military intelligence cell operated in the Facility. This cell consisted of 

several interrogation teams. 

The Joint Detention Facility became one ofthe most conspicuous 

successes of Uphold Democracy. Beyond removing threats to the 

force, to President Aristide's restoration, and to other Haitians, the 

Facility instituted the rule oflaw in a land that had rarely before seen it. 

The Facility's standards of humane treatment and due process stood in 

marked contrast to Haiti's legacy of arbitrary and sometimes brutal 

detention. These standards also convinced the International Committee 

ofthe Red Cross-ifnot all members of the news media or human 

rights groups-ofthe discipline, good faith, and essential justice of the 

multinational force. As one judge advocate remarked, "ICRC 

personnel became strong supporters ofthe JDF when criticism arose 

from the media and several detainee family members."209 

206 See DEP'T OF THE NAVY, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY INSTRUCTION 3461.3, PROGRAM 

FOR PRISONERS OF wAR AND OTHER DETAINEES (19xx); UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND 

DoCTRINE COMMAND, CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL), OPERATION UPHOLD 

DEMOCRACY. INITIAL IMPRESSIONS: HAITI D-20 TO D+120, VOLUME II, at 123 (Apr. 1995) 

[hereinafter CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VOL. II]; see also Geneva Convention m, supra note 136, 

at art. 22 ("Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every 

guarantee ofhygiene and healthfulness.") (emphasis added). 

207 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 7-9. 

208 See id. 

209 ld 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITJ, 1994-95 65 

J. Begin Planning Early for Detention Issues. Operational 

lawyers and other staff officers in the 10th Mountain Division began 

planning for a detention facility on 29 July 1994. The model on which 

they based their plans was the 10th Mountain Division's detention 

facility in Somalia in 1993.210 Planners must make detailed 

arrangements for locating a building ofappropriate size and sturdiness, 

for processing, safeguarding, feeding, and clothing the detainees. Plans 

must also consider providing health care, questioning detainees for 

intelligence purposes, and responding to requests for access made by 

attorneys, human rights groups, and members ofthe media. Operations 

in Grenada and Panama provided useful precedents for some ofthese 

planning factors.211 Given the ultimate responsibility they bear in 

administering the facility, military police must be involved at every 

stage of the planning process. 

Peculiarities ofthe locale must receive careful attention. Will 

there be any buildings suitable to house the detainees? Ifnot, when will 

the flow ofmaterial into the country permit the erection of a shelter? 

What is the extent ofthe disparity between United States standards of 

detention and local living conditions?212 Will the detainees likely be 

210 Id; cf. Colonel F.M. Lorenz, Law andAnarchy in Somalia, PARAMETERS, Winter 

1993-94, at 27, 34-35 (summarizing issues pertaining to detention ofcivilians during the early 

phases ofRestore Hope) ("A military detention facility with a capacity of20 prisoners was 

established at the U.S. Support Command Headquarters. It never held more than six prisoners at 

once, and it was not equipped to handle long-term detainees."). 

211 See, e.g., Colonel Ted B. Borek, Legal Services in War, 120 MIL. L. REv. 19, 47 

(1988) (describing judge advocate involvement in detention issues in Grenada); Center for Law 

and Military Operations, Just Cause After-Action Seminar Executive Summary, para. III.C (26­

27 Feb. 1990) ("Over 4100 persons were detained during the first few days ofJust Cause.") (copy 

on file with CLAMO). 

212 The Staff Judge Advocate for the MNF discussed the implications ofthis question as 

follows: 

The material on detention facilities in [the draft Haiti Lessons Learnedreport] is 


crucial, especially when we are not an occupying force. Much work needs to be 


done in this area. However, a problem we really need to look at is the difference 


between what we as Americans consider acceptable physical standards and what 


the local populace is experiencing. More specifically, when detainees were 

66 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

afflicted with any unusual diseases? With regard to this last question, 

those who planned the detention facility and those who executed the 

plan grappled with how to provide medical care to HIV-infected 

Haitians.213 Given that the Geneva Conventions served as the baseline 

for treatment, detainees would receive a level of care equal to that 

provided United States servicemembers. Yet field surgery upon a 

detainee whose HIV status was unknown could result in the infection of 

other detainees as well as members of the force. Because United States 

servicemembers undergo regular HIV testing, medical workers elected 

to set aside a surgical bed for detainees. They also stressed the 

importance offield sterilization techniques.214 

released and spread the word about our clean, safe detention facilities with 

decent food and medical check-ups/treatment, we were flooded with petty 

"criminals" doing just enough to get detained-they admitted doing this to 

receive the benefits ofour detention. What ... are we supposed to do when 

humane detention standards far exceed average living conditions? This is a very 

serious problem." 

See Memorandum, Staff Judge Advocate, 10th Mountain Division (LI), Fort Drum, AFZB-JA, to 

Deputy Director, Center for Law and Military Operations, subject: Haiti AAR-Duty Loge/1st 

Week-10th Mtn (19 Oct. 1995). 

213 See, e.g., USACOM Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 37. 

214 Captain Warren Reardon, Recorder for the Haiti After Action Review Conference in 

Charlottesville, VA, at para. 4-5 (May 9, 1995) [hereinafter Reardon Notes] (recorder's notes on 

file with CLAMO) (recording the conclusion ofthe conference participants that "for future 

contingencies, the Army must have superior field sterilization procedures in place"). 

It would be a mistake to conclude that because operations took place in a "legal vacuum," 

see Rohter, supra note 169, plans for the treatment of detainees lacked specificity. These plans 

properly built upon techniques, procedures, and training that, while created to support wartime 

operations, nevertheless provided detailed and orderly guidelines to camp guards. See, e.g., 

UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DoCTRINE COMMAND, CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED 

(CALL), OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, INITIAL IMPRESSIONS: HAITI D-20 TO D+40, at 145-47 

(Dec. 1994) [hereinafter CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VoL. I] (concluding that the military police 

company "had no problems reaching mission success with this [detention facility] mission because 

this is on their Mission Essential Task List {METL) and they train it to standard'') (also noting, 

nonetheless, that innovations were developed: "A young NCO developed the method used to 

secure and distribute the personal hygiene packets which is being considered for incorporation 

into the new FM 19-XX (MP Support to OOTW)"). 
LAWAND A11LITARYOPERATIONS/N HAITI, 1994-95 67 

The plan should anticipate transfer ofresponsibility for the facility to 

the host government. Bolstering the legitimacy ofthat government militates in 

favor ofsuch a transfer, as does relieving scarce military police assets from a 

burdensome mission. In circumstances such as those in Haiti, the transfer will 

likely occur in phases. The detainee population crested at about 200 during 

the first month ofthe deployment,215 but by 9 January 1995, only 24 detainees 

remained in the facility.216 On this day, the Commander ofthe MNF sent a 

letter to the Haitian government proposing a plan for transfer.217 The MNF 

would turn over the physical structure and would continue for several weeks 

to provide outer security, to assist in record-keeping and interrogation, and to 

supply food, water, and medical care. 218 Release authority and overall 

responsibility would immediately vest in the Haitian government, though MNF 

staff officers recommended that 12 ofthe 24 detainees be released.219 

Appendix R reprints the Memorandum ofAgreement between the MNF and 

the government ofHaiti that effected the transfer.220 

2. Give Two Judge Advocates Independent Roles In the 

Release Determination Process. Upon the arrival ofdetainees in the 

Facility, military police would prepare a Detainee Personnel Record 

form for each individual 

215 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 

216 See 25th ID Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 58; Telephone Interview with Major 

Mark Sposato, Chief Criminal Law, Office ofthe Staff Judge Advocate and former Deputy Staff 

Judge Advocate for MNF Haiti, (Sept. 5, 1995) [hereinafter Sposato Interview]. 

217 Letter from Major General David C. Meade, Commander, Multinational Force to 

Prime Minister Smarck Michel (Jan. 9, 1995). 

218 /d 

219 Id; See also Memorandum For Record, Staff Judge Advocate, Multinational Force 

Haiti, subject: Detention Facility, paras. 3-4 (13 Feb. 1995). 

220 Planning for detention of facilities also extended to coordinating with federal 

prosecutors in Florida concerning potential trials ofHaitians alleged to have committed United 

States federal offenses. See, e.g .. JTF-180 Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 38; Telephone 

Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Gordon, Former Deputy Staff Judge Advocate for 

MNF Haiti (Sept. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Gordon Interview]._ 
68 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

detained.221 The 52 fields ofthis form are automated in a database 

maintained as part ofthe Prisoner ofWar Information System (PWIS), 

which captures and reports available and pertinent facts such as name, 

date ofbirth, nationality, sex, place, date, and circumstances of 

detention, and medical information.222 Facility personnel would collect, 

inventory, and safeguard detainee personal effects, conduct a medical 

examination, and perform several other tasks ofinprocessing.223 

Interrogators would compile additional information pertaining to the 

intelligence provided by the detainee, to biographical information about 

the detainee, and to the circumstances and legal bases for detention. 224 

The legal adviser to the Facility, a judge advocate captain, would 

review detainee files within 72 hours ofthe detainee's arrival to prepare 

a recommendation as to whether further detention was warranted. 225 

Continued detention could rest on one or more ofthe following four 

grounds: 

1. 	 the individual is a member ofthe Haitian military or 

police, or is armed, and threatens essential civic order; 

221 See CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VOL. I, supra note 214, at 146; Becker Interviews, 

supra note 184. 

222 AR 190-8, supra note 190, at para. 2-10. Because the Privacy Act requires safeguards 

only for individuals who are citizens ofthe United States or aliens lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2) (1988), this database raises no Privacy Act issues. 

223 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 8 (noting also that "[d]etainees were 

permitted access on a limited basis to family members, religious services, and to retain legal 

counsel and private medical treatment"); CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VOL. I, supra note 214, at 

144-45. 

224 See Becker Interviews, supra note 184. 

225 See id. Every attempt was made to comply with the letter and intent ofthe 

Constitution ofHaiti. HAITI CONST. art. 26 (1987) ("No one may be kept under arrest more than 

forty-eight (48) hours unless he has appeared before a judge asked to rule on the legality ofthe 

arrest and the judge has confirmed the arrest by a well-founded decision."); I 0th Mountain Div. 

AAR, supra note 108, at 9 (stating that the MNF afforded detainees treatment ofprisoners ofwar 

and due process protections of human rights instruments and also that "we crafted a system 

similar to Haitian law''). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHA/TL 1994-95 69 

2. 	 the individual poses a threat to United States forces, 


other protected persons, key facilities, or property 


designated mission-essential by the Combined Joint 


Task Force Commander; 


3. the individual has committed a serious criminal act, 


meaning homicide, aggravated assault, rape, arson, 


robbery, burglary, or larceny; 


4. 	 the individual has valuable information pertaining to 


individuals not yet detained to whom one or more of 


grounds 1through3 apply.226 


A separate judge advocate captain would interview each detainee. 

Each detainee was given the opportunity to make a statement through 

an interpreter and to present facts rebutting the command's stated basis 

for detention. The interviewing judge advocate did not establish an 

attorney-client relationship with the detainee, but rather served as an 

independent source ofinformation for the command by articulating the 

argument against further detention.227 

Throughout the period ofdetention, detainees were permitted 

access on a limited basis to family members and to private legal 

226 See Becker Interviews, supra note 184 (stating that Detention Facility authorities 

derived grounds I, 2, and 3 from the ROE card reprinted at Appendix J and ground 4 from 

Resolution 940's mandate to "use all necessary means to ... establish and maintain a stable and 

secure environment"). Operational lawyers in the MNF fully understood that it was an 

extraordinary situation-an environment that was far from stable and secure, a broken judicial 

and prison system, the need to ensure safety for the newly reinstalled government-that justified 

ground 4, and even then that ground 4 detentions should be as brief as possible in light, inter alia, 

ofprovisions ofthe Haitian Constitution. See HAITI CoNST., art. 24 ( 1987) (''No one may be 

prosecuted, arrested, or detained except in cases determined by law and in the manner it 

prescribes.... Except where the perpetrator ofa crime is caught in the act, no one may be 

arrested or detained other than by written order of a legally competent official."); id. at art. 25 

("Any unnecessary force or restraint in the apprehension of a person or in keeping him under 

arrest, or any psychological pressure or physical brutality, especially during interrogation, is 

forbidden.... No one may be interrogated without his attorney or a witness ofhis choice being 

present."); see also supra note 188 (discussing the defensibility ofinterrogation for intelligence 

rather than criminal prosecution). 

227 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 8. 
70 CENTERFORLAWANDMIUTARYOPERATIONS 

counsel, ifretained.228 Several detainees hired Haitian and United 

States lawyers to argue for their release. Two other judge advocates, 

including the Staff Judge Advocate for the MNF, would coordinate 

visits by representatives ofthe ICRC, human rights groups, and outside 

observers.229 All ofthese safeguards resulted in numerous releases, as 

the grounds for detention no longer applied. These fair and orderly 

procedures not only had a calming effect upon the detainee 

population,230 they deeply impressed Haitians who were not detained. 

According to one judge advocate, "[t]he ICRC credited this program 

with giving Haitians the first real lesson on fairness, real due process, 

and the right to be heard. "231 

3. Encourage Commander to Delegate Authority to Release. 

After receiving the separate recommendations ofthe judge advocate for 

the Facility and the judge advocate who interviewed the detainees, the 

Staff Judge Advocate would create a report for the MNF 

Commander.232 Th.e report would list each detainee, in priority ofthe 

strength ofthe recommendation to retain. Thus, for instance, those who 

had been caught committing violent crimes would be at the top ofthe 

list, and those recommended for release would be at the bottom. The 

MNF Commander would receive separate recommendations from the J2 and the Provost Marshal before deciding whom to retain and whom to 

release. This reporting and decision-making process would occur 

daily.233 

228 See Gilbert A. Lewthwaite & Bill Glauber, American Woman Accuses U.S. Troops in 

Haiti ofM'zstreating Her Husband in Jail, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 17, 1994, at 3A (reporting 

that Mrs. Michele McGurk Mourra was allowed to visit her husband, Gerry Mourra, a detainee). 

229 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR. supra note 108, at 11-12. 

230 Id at 8 ("The International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC) and detention 

personnel remarked that this provision ofminimal due process allowed detainees to let offsteam. 

As detainees were released, other detainees knew they were being heard and their cases were 

being considered"). 

231 /dat 8. 

232 See Becker Interviews, supra note 184. 

233 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 8. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 71 

Due to the sensitivity ofinadvertently releasing a murderer or a 

potential assassin, the MNF Commander in Haiti elected to retain 

release authority.234 Given the resemblance ofthe release decision to 

the duties of a military magistrate orjudge and the difficulties in 

arranging a daily decision by the Commander in charge of all military 

activities in the country, delegation ofthe release decision to the Staff 

Judge Advocate would have been warranted and appropriate. 235 

Discomfort of commanders to delegate release authority may 

persist until the development of a comprehensive set ofguidelines for 

establishing and operating a detention facility during operations other 

than war. Although judge advocates, military police, medical 

personnel, and interrogators gleaned many useful and specific forms, 

techniques, procedures, and approaches from disparate treaties, 

regulations, and field manuals, 236 these dedicated professionals clearly 

would have preferred a single source ofstandards. The demand for a 

unified approach has led the International and Operational Law 

Department ofThe Judge Advocate General's School to coin the term 

"Civilian Protection Law" to embrace all ofthe international legal 

sources that bear upon the recurring problems associated with 

detention.237 The United Nations could perhaps fill this demand by 

234 See Wishard Interview, supra note 68. 

235 See Becker Interviews, supra note 184; Altenburg Remarks, supra note 112 (noting 

that early in the operation, the Commander ofCJTF-180 had delegated release authority to the 

Staff Judge Advocate). 

236 See, e.g., supra note 214. 

237 See Qp. LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at ch. 13 (4th ed. 1995) (proposing an 

approach consisting of "four tiers of protection" that attempt to provide a practical summary of 

the numerous and varied legal materials that bear upon detention of civilians). 
72 CENTER FOR LAWAND lvf/LITARYOPERATIONS 

supplementing its Standard Operating Procedures for Peacekeeping 

Operations with specific guidelines for detention.238 

E. Weapons Buyback and Control. 

Members ofthe CJTF 180 staff identified at an early stage that 

establishing a stable and secure environment in Haiti would require a 

comprehensive plan for getting firearms and explosives offthe street 

and out ofthe countryside.239 The plan as originally conceived would 

have comprised four elements. First, the MNF would purchase 

weapons from Haitians who had them or found them. Second, MNF 

soldiers and military police would seize or confiscate weapons. 240 

Third, Haitians legitimately possessing small arms would register them. 

Fourth, the MNF would issue picture identification cards to each 

person authorized to carry a weapon. 

The first element ofthe plan came to be known as the "Weapons 

Buyback" Program.241 This program consisted of four partially 

238 See, e.g., MNF Historian Memorandum, supra note 48 (submission to the Joint 

Uniform Lessons Learned System entitled ''UN-Mandated Detention Facilities'') (recommending 

that "[t]he UN should establish a model set of guidelines for the establishment ofa detention 

facility and then establish administrative and operational rules to ensure humane treatment of 

detainees. Further, the UN should create a working group to create and support the detention 

facility once it becomes operational.''). 

239 See Stai Memorandum, supra note 35, at 14. Unless otherwise noted, the remainder 

ofthis paragraph relies upon this memorandum. 

240 The law ofarmed conflict employs various terms to denote the taking ofproperty, see, 

e.g.. Hague Regulations, supra note 172, at art. 23(g) (relating to "seiz[ure of] the enemy's 

property''); id. at art. 53 (relating to "seiz[ure]" of "all movable property belonging to the State 

which may be used for operations ofthe war" and ofsimilar items "even ifthey belong to private 

individuals''); id. at art. 46 ("Private property cannot be confiscated."). Some authorities 

recognize a hard distinction between "confiscation" and "seizure." See, e.g., OP. LAW 

HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 9-1 (defining confiscation as ''the permanent taking or destruction of 

enemypublic property found on the battlefield," and seizure as ''the temporary taking ofprivate 

property''). The use ofthese terms in the text is not intended to imply such a distinction. 

241 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 6; 25th ID Briefing Viewgraphs, 

supra note 58. Unless otherwise noted, the information in this paragraph is based upon ITF-180 

Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 38 (viewgraph entitled "Cash for Guns Concept"). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 13 

overlapping phases. Phase 1, which lasted from 23 to 26 September, 

involved efforts to obtain existing registration lists from the Haitian 

police. Phase 2, which lasted from 26 September to 24 October, 

consisted ofpsychological operations to inform and explain the program 

to Haitians. Phase 3, which lasted from 27 September to 17 October, 

was the collection phase, in which Haitians turned weapons in at 

designated collection points and received cash payments according the 

following schedule: 

Weapon Payment 

Handguns $ 100 

Rifles $ 200 

Automatic Weapons $400 

Large Caliber Machineguns $ 600 

Heavy Weapons $ 600 

Explosives $ 200 

Phase 4, which lasted from 17 to 24 October, marked the initial ending 

ofthe program, the passage of an amnesty period during which Haitians 

could reconsider a decision to retain weapons, and a formal assessment 

ofthe impact ofthe program.242 The MNF then chose to continue the 

program in substantially the same form.243 

Although the program initially drew mixed reviews, in the end 

most observers cited it among the MNF's accomplishments. The early 

concern was that not enough Haitians were coming to the collection 

points, but continued efforts to publicize the program and the 

distribution of chits by roving weapons collection teams partially 

242 Prices were adjusted over time to respond to Haitians' willingness to sell particular 

types ofweapons. See, e.g., CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VoL. I, supra note 214, at 104 (listing the 

purchase price of handguns at $50, semi-automatic rifles at $100, automatic weapons at $200, any 

large caliber machinegun at $300, heavy weapons at $300, and high explosives at $300). 

243 See Sposato Interview, supra note 216. 
74 CENTER FOR LAWAND A.f/LITARYOPERATIONS 

allayed this concem.244 The command also maintained realistic 

expectations for the program, which had never been expected to be the 

sole means ofgetting weapons off the street.245 The overall plan had 

foreseen many important details, such as the need for photographic 

identity cards, a lesson that had been well-learned from experiences in 

Somalia.246 As of 2 January, the MNF had collected more than 15,000 

weapons and explosive devices via cash payments or street sweeps. 247 

By 31 March, the total was more than 30,000, when President Clinton 

touted the success ofthe program in his speech during the United 

Nations transition ceremony in Port-au-Prince.248 

1. Know and Coordinate With All the Key Players in the 

Weapons Program. During the planning and implementation phases of 

the plan for purchasing and controlling weapons, judge advocates 

benefited by knowing, in detail, what the plan entailed and which 

244 See CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VoL. I, supra note 214, at 104-05. 

245 See CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VoL. II, supra note 206, at 49 ("The [weapons 

buyback programs in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti] have had mixed results, but, indeed, ifthey do 

not prove productive that tells the peacekeeping force something about the levels ofweapons that 

could still be at large. Knowing what was on the street and what has been turned in provides the 

delta as to what is remaining. F Ad'H armories and stores were fairly known quantities at the time 

ofentry."). 

246 Colonel F.M. Lorenz, Weapons Confiscation Policy During the First Phase of 

Operation 'Restore Hope'. SMALL wARS AND INSURGENCIES, Winter 1994, at 409, 421 (describing 

a weapons policy that included no buyback component given the greater risk of banditry and 

noting that photographic identification cards reduced falsification and abuse). 

247 CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VoL. II., supra note 206, at ix. 

248 See Appendix D infra; 25th ID Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 55 (listing a total of 

33,088 handguns, shotguns, rifles, automatic weapons, heavy weapons, explosives). The buyback 

program in Panama had recovered about 4,000 weapons at a cost of about $800,000. See Lorenz, 

supra note 246, at 415. 

The recovered weapons ultimately became a source of arms for the Interim Public 

Security Force (IPSF), for the new army, and for the new permanent police. See 25th ID Briefing 

Viewgraphs, supra note 55. See also infra note 338 and accompanying text. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 75 

elements ofthe MNF were involved.249 The J-2 and intelligence 

elements played an important role in locating weapons and existing 

registration lists and in answering questions concerning collected 

Haitian military equipment. Civil affairs and psychological operations 

elements spread word that the program was in place as well as evidence 

that its effects were making the streets safer. The J-3 directed military 

police to secure the collection point and tasked a detachment ofthe 

foreign material exploitation battalion to control the weapons turn-in. 

The J-4 and the joint logistics support command coordinated myriad 

aspects of accountability, testing, demilitarization, storage, ship 

transport to Norfolk, truck transport to Letterkenny Army Depot, 

smelting, and certification ofdestruction. 

Knowing the "what's" and "who's" ofthis process proved 

indispensable as the temptation oflarge amounts offirearms soon 

resulted in a formal investigation into procedural irregularities, the 

court-martial of a soldier, and a host of questions about proper 

disposition ofmaterial that some units sought to keep for historical 

purposes. When international advisers sought to return many ofthe 

weapons collected to the newly constituted Haitian police force, 

knowledge ofhow particular weapons had been acquired became 

central to determining their proper disposition. Judge advocates at all 

levels of command assisted in working through the difficult issues of 

identifying statutory authority for transferring material back to the 

Haitian government. 250 

249 The information from this paragraph and the next is based upon 10th Mountain Div. 

AAR, supr~ note 108, at 6, upon Gordon Interview, supra note 220, and upon 25th ID Briefing 

Viewgraphs, supra note 58. 

250 These issues are difficult ones, in general, because Congress comprehensively 

regulates the sale or transfer of defense articles, military training, and other defense related 

services through the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. See supra notes 

153-154; Sposato Interview, supra note 216 (discussing contemplated use ofFAA§ 552(c),22 

U.S.C. § 2348a(c) "drawdown" authority and ofFAA§ 607, 22 U.S.C. § 2357 authority and 

recalling the urgency with which Mr. Ray Kelly was requesting weapons for the fledgling police 

force). Given the anxiousness with which representatives ofother agencies solicit transfers of 

Department ofDefense material to other countries, judge advocates will likely be the first to 
76 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

2. Be Prepared to Advise Commanders About Disarming 

Threats to the Force. Judge advocates proved to be the main advisors 

to commanders and soldiers on the threshold question ofwhether and 

how much force the MNF could use to disarm Haitians.251 As discussed 

above, the rules of engagement were "conduct-based," in the sense that 

soldiers could use force ifthey identified a hostile act or hostile 

intent.252 What if a Haitian is not attacking a soldier (no hostile act), 

and is merely carrying his weapon from one point to another (no hostile 

intent)? The question whether the soldier should use force to disarm the 

Haitian in this case requires a clear picture ofthe mission and other 

mission guidance as well as complete understanding ofthe rules of 

engagement. 

The mission statement did not contemplate disarming the entire 

Haitian population. Yet the MNF commander issued mission guidance 

that a Haitian in possession of an automatic weapon was a "threat to the 

force," even in the absence ofhostile act or hostile intent.253 Resolution 

940, because it mandated the use of "all necessary means" to 

"establish a secure and stable environment,"254 provided ample 

authority for this guidance, which in turn permitted soldiers to use 

necessary and reasonable force to disarm Haitians with automatic 

initiate the process of seeking the Presidential detenninations necessary to invoke available 

statutory authorities. See, e.g., Presidential Determination Number 94-16 ofMarch 16, 1994, 59 

Fed. Reg. 14081 (1994), reprinted ins. CoMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & HOUSE COMM. ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1994, vol. I-A, at 

211-12 n. 638 (1995) [hereinafter LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1994] (invoking 

§ 552(c) and directing drawdown ofup to $13.5 million "to maintain Egypt's military readiness 

and security in view ofthe dedication ofEgyptian resources to the United Nations Operation in 

Somalia (UNOSOM IQ"). 

251 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 6. 

252 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 

253 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 6; Wishard Interview, supra note 

68. 

254 See Appendix B infra. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHAITI, 1994-95 77 

weapons. Military police and other soldiers came to understand the 

extent and limits oftheir authority through situational training. 255 

3. · Understand Applicable Search and Seizure Law. The 

search ofHaitian dwellings and the establishment of traffic checkpoints 

for weapons raised a related but distinct issue. On one hand, 

Resolution 940 would seem to authorize searches ofprivate homes and 

vehicles, ifseizing the firearms suspected to be inside are deemed 

necessary to establishing a secure and stable environment. On the other 

hand, a secure and stable environment was merely a means to the end of 

restoring Aristide to power. Given that President Aristide had 

consented to the entry ofthe MNF, Haitian law would seem to bear 

upon the question whether MNF soldiers could intrude upon Haitian 

homes and vehicles. 

The Haitian Constitution guarantees each Haitian citizen "the 

right to armed self-defence, within the bounds ofhis domicile," though 

it also states that he "has no right to bear arms without the express wellfounded authorization from the Chief ofPolice."256 The Constitution 

further states that "[p]ossession of a firearm be reported to the police," 

and that "[t]he Armed Forces have a monopoly on the manufacture, 

import, export, use, and possession ofweapons ofwar and their 

munitions, as well as war materiel."257 The approach taken by the 

MNF respected these principles ofHaitian law, as Haitians were 

permitted to maintain individual small arms in their homes for security 

258 purposes. 

The increased risk presented by armed Haitians in vehicles and 

the absence of a Haitian legal prohibition on vehicular searches 

compelled MNF forces to man checkpoints throughout Port-au-Prince. 

255 See Wishard Interview, supra note 72 

256 HAITI CONST. art. 268-1 (1987). 

251 Id. at art. 268-2 to 268-3. 

m See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 6. 
78 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Military police stopped vehicles and searched for weapons. 

Intelligence personnel provided likely profiles ofvehicles and drivers 

bearing arms, and police acted upon this information.259 Judge 

advocates correctly identified to commanders that any implications such 

procedures might have in the United States, under the Fourth 

Amendment and related statutory and case law, were irrelevant, so long 

as the procedures did not violate international and domestic Haitian 

law.260 

F. Media Relations. 

The deployment to Haiti could scarcely have been more public. 

On 16 September 1994, two days before the scheduled invasion, over 

200 American reporters were in the country, including the anchor for 

one ofthe major television networks.261 As the delegation headed by 

former President Carter consulted with members ofthe junta on 18 

September, television cameras from the Cable News Network (CNN) 

carried more than 12 hours oflive, continuous coverage to a captivated 

audience in the United States and around the world.262 After the junta 

agreed not to combat the entry ofthe MNF, viewers on 19 September 

received the thrill ofwatching helicopters from the U.S.S. Eisenhower 

deposit troops onto the Port-au-Prince airport.263 During the ensuing 

weeks and months, an aggressive, mobile, and well-equipped news 

media continued to transmit reporters' views and cameras' images to an 

m See Becker Interviews, supra note 184. 


260 See l 0th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note l 08, at 6. 


261 See Howard Kurtz, Administration Acts to Soothe News Media, WASH. POST, Sept. 


16, 1994, at A30. 

262 See Ed Siegel, At End ofThe Day, CNN Was a Lifeline, BoSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 

1994, at 3. 

263 See Interview with Sadie M. Martins, Resident ofVirginia Who Was at Home on 

Monday, 19 September, in Charlottesville, VA (Sept. 19, 1995). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 19 

American citizenry that was ambivalent about the entire deployment. 

The media's participation in the operation was never as 


disruptive or potentially dangerous as it had been during the early hours 


of Operation Restore Hope, when bright television lights illuminated the 


amphibious landing ofUnited States forces.264 Although major news 


organizations had knowledge ofthe departure ofaircraft from Fort 


Bragg on 18 September, none broadcasted or published this information 


until they confirmed that the junta already had learned ofthe 


departure.265 These and other instances of restraint were voluntary. 


Reporters were not subject to the long-term press pools and other 


restrictions ofthe Persian Gulf War, an arrangement that elicited howls 


ofmedia protest and led to postwar conferences.266 Nor were they even 


subject to the temporary pools and more relaxed guidelines that resulted 


from those conferences.267 


From the start, judge advocates in Haiti heavily and favorably 

influenced the military's relations with the media. They gave wellreasoned advice to commanders and public affairs officers on news 

items or stepped forward into microphones and cameras to answer 

questions themselves. Particular media interest during the deployment 

264 See, e.g., Ben Macintyre, The Networks Have Landed, THE TIMES, Dec. 10, 1992 

(reporting Secretary ofDefense Richard Cheney's anger at the media's having exposed soldiers to 

danger by the lights ofthe cameras); Jonathan Clayton, Lots ofGood Shots for Media, FINANCIAL 

TIMES, Dec. 9, 1992, at 4; Keith Richburg, U.S. Vanguard Lands in Somalia; Marine Combat 

Troops Follow to Secure Port, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 9, 1992, at Al; Jonathan Clayton, 

Reporters Provide the First Hurdle, THE IRISH TIMES, Dec. 9, 1992, at 9. 

265 Jon Lafayette, Networks Cover Haiti on Own Terms, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Sept. 26, 

1994, at 52.· 

266 See, e.g., Vicki Kemper and Deborah Baldwin, War Stories: Between the Pentagon's 

Restrictions and the Media's Failings, the Public Doesn't Get the Full Picture, COMMON CAUSE 

MAGAZINE, Mar.-Apr. 1991 (describing media irritation following the Persian Gulf war and 

recounting how the press pools ofthat conflict grew out ofearlier protests following operations in 

Grenada and in Panama). 

267 Lafayette. supra note 265; DEP'T OF DEFENSE AND MAJOR NEWS ORGANIZATIONS, 

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONS (May 1992), reprinted in OP. LAw 

HANDBOOK. supra note 9, at F-1. 
80 CENTER FOR LAWAND A!ILITARYOPERATIONS 

often coincided with areas where the rule oflaw was most challenged: 

the intervention by United States soldiers to protect Haitians from 

violence by other Haitians; the treatment ofpersons detained in the 

Joint Detention Facility; and the maintenance ofdiscipline over 

members ofthe multinational force. In these and other areas, judge 

advocates had the training and the balanced viewpoint to serve as 

spokesmen for the military and for the interests ofthe United States and 

the participating nations. 268 

1. Describe the Processes and Legal Authorities that Explain 

Military Actions. Whether they were speaking to the news media or 

helping to prepare others to do so, judge advocates in Haiti found that 

standard public affairs guidance is sound. 269 Thus, it proved prudent to 

find out who the reporter was and why he wanted to interview the 

command, to establish ground rules on what would be covered, and to 

agree upon how many minutes the interview would last. It proved 

valuable to anticipate questions and think through responses, to have 

other staff experts play devil's advocate before the interview, and to 

read or listen to late-breaking news stories that might affect the 

questions or responses. Devices such as the "five and five" rule were 

handy, as were the admonitions to avoid saying "no comment" to 

acknowledge not being sure offacts, and to decline making "offthe 

record" remarks.270 

268 Note that judge advocates need appropriate clearance in order to serve this role. See 

Dep't ofArmy, Office ofThe Judge Advocate General, TJAG Policy Memo 91-2, para. 3 

("Generally, no member ofyour office should, without your approval, prepare a written statement 

for publication or permit himself or herself to be quoted by the media on official matters within 

the purview of your office. Similarly, unless first cleared through the Executive, neither you nor 

any member ofyour office should be interviewed by, or provide statements to, representatives of 

the media on issues or subjects having Army-wide, national or international implications."). 

269 The information in the next three paragraphs, unless otherwise noted, is based upon 

Altenburg Remarks, supra note 112; Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Karl K. 

Warner, StaffJudge Advocate, 10th Mountain Division (Sept. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Warner 

Interview]; Smith Interview, supra note 38. 

270 The OP. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at F-1 to F-7, reprints these and other helpful 

tips. The "five and five" rule is "Know the five best and worst things about your agency-and be 

able to discuss them in detail any time." Id. at F-3. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 81 

Yet beyond following tips on interview methodology, judge 

advocates had a crucial educative role. Reporters are often ignorant of 

legal bases and procedures that explain actions taken by commanders 

and troops, and forceful restatement ofthe pertinent substantive or 

procedural rule can change the entire character of a reported story. 

Even ifthe tone ofthe piece remains skeptical or critical, quoted 

remarks will transmit the military's commitment to following rules, the 

ultimate authority for which are Congress, civilian officials, in the 

executive branch, and international law. 

Four examples help illustrate the suasive power oflegal 

authorities and processes. First, on 22 September 1995, when the 

media remained frenzied over attacks by police on pro-Aristide 

demonstrators, the Staff Judge Advocate for CJTF 190 explained that 

the rules of engagement implemented Resolution 940 and the CarterJonaissant agreement.271 Second, on 16 October, when the wife of a 

detained Haitian aroused the interest ofseveral reporters, the same Staff 

Judge Advocate calmly explained the detainee's connections to a 

violent pro-Cedras group, the language in Resolution 940 that justified 

271 See Altenburg Remarks, supra note 112; cf. U.S. Armed Forces Extend their Control 

over Haiti, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 23, 1994, at 8A ("The chieflegal officer for the U.S.-led 

multinational force said yesterday that there has been no change in the military's rules of 

engagement but that the 'focus' has changed from unloading troops and supplies to protection of 

Haitian civilians. Col. John Altenburg, staff judge advocate for the multinational force, said that 

in the initial phase, the mission had to give the Haitian military time to demonstrate whether it 

could keep peace. Now the 'focus' has shifted and 'soldiers will be expected to intervene on 

behalfofHaitians,' Colonel Altenburg said."); Paul Quinn-Judge and Diego Ribadeneira, US 

Troops in Haiti Given OK on Force; Soldiers May Intervene to Curb Police, Military, BoSTON 

GLOBE, Sept. 23, 1994, at 1 ("IfLt. Gen. Raoul Cedras does not curb his police and military, "we 

will intervene," warned Col. John Altenburg, the US Task Force's staff judge advocate. He said 

US troops would be allowed to use deadly force ifthe situation warranted it."). 
82 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

his detention, and the procedure by which the military police battalion 

commander was investigating allegations that interrogators had 

mistreated the detainee. On the basis ofinitial inquiries, he also denied 

that the detainee had been mistreated. 272 Third, in early November, the 

Staff Judge Advocate for the MNF explained that the Geneva 

Conventions did not strictly apply to those being held in the Joint 

Detention Facility while describing how their treatment nevertheless 

met the dictates offundamental fairness and due process.

273 Fourth, on 

4 May 1995, newspapers reported the testimony before Congress of a 

retired judge advocate, who supported the court-martial of an officer in 

the MNF by explaining pertinent provisions ofthe Uniform Code of 

Military Justice.274 

2. Acknowledge the Legitimacy ofthe Media's Presence in 

Operations Other Than War. "Information operations" demanded and 

received effective command emphasis in Haiti.275 Even as soldiers 

were doing their duty on the ground, senior officials reevaluated 

272 See Gilbert A. Lewthwaite and Bill Glauber, supra note 228 ("Col. John Altenburg, 

the staffjudge advocate for the intervention force and its top lawyer, denied any physical 

mistreatment ofMr. Mourra but said yesterday that he had been blindfolded and gagged when 

first apprehended. His sleep was 'strictly controlled,' to enable shifts of interrogators to question 

him, he said. 'He was never denied sleep.' ... 'There has been no mistreatment ofMr. Mourra,' 

said Colonel Altenburg in a statement responding to questions submitted by The Sun. Despite the 

immediate official denial, Colonel Altenburg said that there would be a full investigation ofMrs. 

Mourra's allegations and that the findings would be reported to the Red Cross. 'The Military 

Police battalion commander is currently looking into the allegations,' Colonel Altenburg said."). 

273 See Rohter, supra note 169 (quoting Lieutenant Colonel Kasey Warner at length). 

274 See, e.g., Prepared Testimony ofColonel Richard H. Black (USA Ret.) to the House 

Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, FEDERAL NEWS 

SERVICE (May 4, 1995), reprinted in Appendix V, infra. 

215 DEP'TOF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-23, PEACE OPERATIONS 14 (30 Dec. 1994) 

[hereinafter FM 100-23] ("In peace operations, national and international news media coverage 

plays a major role in quickly framing public debate and shaping public opinion. The news media 

serves as a forum for the analysis and critique ofgoals, objectives, and actions. It can impact 

political, strategic, and operational planning; decisions; and mission success and failure. 

Therefore, commanders should involve themselves in information operations."); see also 

USACOM Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 37 (depicting 7 principles for "Winning the 

Information War"); Smith Interview, supra note 40. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITI, 1994-95 83 

political and strategic objectives based on the way the media presented 

the military deployment. The relatively lower levels ofviolence 

inherent in this operation other than war guaranteed greater media 

access to all parts of the theater, and judge advocates assisted all 

members ofthe command to acknowledge both the inevitability and the 

legitimacy ofthat access. 

In strict constitutional terms, the press does not have a right of 

access to military operations under the First Amendment. 276 

Nevertheless, any constraints on the media imposed by the military in a 

foreign area ofoperations must be reasonable time, place, and manner 

restrictions based upon an important governmental interest. 277 Legal 

training and experience do not give judge advocates a unique ability to 

articulate important governmental interests-such as operational 

security or preservation ofsurprise. Commanders and other staff 

experts may be far better equipped to identify which parts of an 

operational plan require secrecy. Yet judge advocates do have a unique 

ability to judge whether proposed restrictions upon media access are 

reasonable in light of all the circumstances. 

The ability to judge whether a restriction is reasonable stems in 

part from a willingness to recognize the role ofthe media in a 

participatory democracy. It also stems from a recognition that 

reporters-like soldiers-tend to be motivated by a mixture ofselfinterest and noble ideals. Although many ofthem have no prior 

exposure to the military, reporters will often work hard to gather facts 

276 Cf Nation Magazine v. United States, 762 F.Supp. 1558, 1572 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("If 

the reasoning of[Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. 564, 515 (1979); Globe Newspaper Co. v. 

Superior Court for County ofNorfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982); First National Bank v. Bellotti, 

435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)] were followed in a military context, there is support for the proposition 

that the press has at least some minimal right of access to view and report about major events that 

affect the functioning ofgovernment, including, for example, an overt combat operation. As such, 

the government could not wholly exclude the press from a land area where a war is occurring that 

involves this country. But this conclusion is far from certain since military operations are not 

closely akin to a building such as a prison, nor to a park or a courtroom."). 

277 See id. at 1573-75. 
84 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

and present an accurate story. Their questions may seem unfairly 

critical in both substance and tone; still, the best approach is to 

encourage all soldiers and commanders to treat them with unfailing 

respect and to remember that the military's credibility with the reading 

and viewing public depends upon truthful responses.278 

G. Joint, Inter-Agency, and Nongovernmental Coordination. 

Modem military operations demand judge advocates who will 

take initiative to coordinate with the legal advisors of other service 

component commands, with officials in other executive branch 

agencies, and with representatives ofnongovernmental or private 

voluntary organizations. At least two recent developments make the 

spirit ofinitiative necessary. First, profound changes to the national 

security structure foreshadowed by the passage ofthe Goldwater 

Nichols Act in the 1986 have strengthened unified commands279 without 

eliminating numerous forms ofinterservice competition-some of 

which are durable as well as beneficial.280 Among other things, the 

separate services retain control over the programming and spending of 

appropriated funds, and they continue to staff separate judge advocate 

generals' corps in order to satisfy the distinctive needs of commands 

possessing vastly different missions and resources. 

Second, the military operations themselves are different. As this 

report emphasizes at several junctures, operations other than war place 

the military in an environment where decisive combat victory does not 

278 See CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VoL. I, supra note 214, at 6 (describing training in 

the 10th Mountain Division for conducting the mission with a strong media presence). 

279 See supra note 29. 

280 See Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion o/Civilian 

Control ofthe U.S. Military, 29 WAKEFORESTL. REv. 341, 375-77 (1994); Harry Summers, 

Weakened Checks and Balances, WASH. TIMES, May 27, 1993, at G-3. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 85 

describe success.281 Nonmilitary agencies and organizations will often 

have the lead in these operations in order to bolster the legitimacy of a 

fragile government receiving United States support. 

Aided by the phenomenal advances in communications, dataprocessing, and print reproduction that have occurred over the past 

decade, judge advocates supporting operations in Haiti coordinated 

legal issues at a breathtaking pace. Satellite telephone links, facsimile 

machines, electronic mail, computer graphics software, and photocopy 

equipment allowed instantaneous transmission and wide distribution of 

complex and detailed problems, plans, and advice. Faced with a body 

of "law" that might change with a new message from higher 

headquarters, judge advocates wisely spurned attempts at independently 

divining answers in favor ofconsulting the most knowledgeable fellow 

attorney-wherever in the world he or she might be. Yet some ofthe 

coordination employed the ancient technology ofshoe leather. For 

instance, contact with a human rights organization in Port-au-Prince 

required only an emphasis on such contact and a willingness to walk to 

meet a representative ofthe organization. 282 

1. Use Technical Judge Advocate Channels. The command 

channel is the direct, official link through which one headquarters 

passes orders and instructions to subordinate headquarters. 283 The 

command channel links one commanding officer to another. A 

technical channel is a link between two headquarters that transmits 

orders, instructions, advice, recommendations, and information 

inappropriate for the command channel because oftheir volume, 

281 See, e.g., FM 100-5, supra note 13, at 13-4 ("In [operations other than war], other 

government agencies will often have the lead. Commanders may answer to a civilian chief, such 

as an ambassador, or may themselves employ the resources ofa civilian agency."). 

282 See Wishard Interview, supra note 72. 

283 See FM 101-5, supra note 73, at 1-6. 
86 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

specificity, or routine nature.284 When judge advocates from different 

command headquarters consult with each other, they are using a 

technical channel. On certain highly sensitive matters, judge advocates 

may not have the authority to use technical channels, as when XVIIlth 

Airborne Corps was planning for the semi-permissive entry in the 

summer of 1994 without informing the staffofthe 10th Mountain 

Division.285 

Technical judge advocate channels received heavy use 

concerning the Haiti operation beginning in February of 1994, a full 

seven months before the deployment. 286 At that time, an operational 

lawyer assigned to XVIIIth Airborne Corps began drafting rules of 

engagement and legal appendices to an operations plan in close 

coordination with a Marine Corps judge advocate assigned to United 

States Atlantic Command (USACOM). By June 1994, Navy, Air 

Force, Coast Guard, and Special Operations representatives were 

discussing operations plan matters with the XVIIIth Airborne Corps 

judge advocate, who later would note that he particularly valued 

expertise gained on rules of engagement for air forces. In July 1994, 

the Staff Judge Advocate for Headquarters, United States Army Forces 

Command provided a useful summary ofthe possible legal bases for 

military deployment to then Colonel John Altenburg, who would 

eventually become the Staff Judge Advocate for CJTF-180. 

Throughout the summer of 1994, operational lawyers in these 

headquarters were sending through technical channels copies ofthe 

Governors Island agreement, key Security Council resolutions, results 

ofresearch on Haitian law, and other materials. 

284 See id; DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY, para. 2-2 (29 Apr. 

1988) [hereinafter AR 600-20). 

285 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 5 ("XVIII Corps was not permitted 

to share valuable ROE information with us until a few days before execution. Because ofthis, 

division soldiers had no knowledge ofthe combat operations ROE until D-1, and the transition 

from forced entry ROE to civil-military operations ROE became cumbersome."). 

286 The information in this paragraph and the next is based on Stai Memorandum, supra 

note 33 and Woods Interview, supra note 34 . 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL I994-95 87 

In the weeks immediately prior to deployment, the use of 

technical channels grew heavier still. On 19 July, XVIIIth Airborne 

Corps turned responsibility for planning the semi-permissive entry over 

to the 10th Mountain Division, an event which authorized a technical 

link between operational lawyers in the two headquarters. Examples of 

information transmitted during this phase included a legal opinion that 

pepper spray is a riot control agent within the meaning of a recent 

international convention, a paper outlining a proposed cash-forweapons program, and numerous aspects ofrules of engagement. 

Participating headquarters involved ranged from the Chairman ofthe 

Joint Chiefs, the Chief of Staffofthe Army, and the Office ofthe 

General Counsel to the Secretary ofthe Army, in addition to those 

already named. 

After deployment, technical judge advocate channels remained 

crucial. From the perspective ofoperational lawyers at USACOM, 

[ o ]perational directives require close coordination 

between SJA's for ROE's, law ofwar issues, and 

international and domestic law as it applies to operations. 

-ROE changes-bridge strategic/tactical 

gap 

-LOAC/Human Rights issues are high vis 

-War Powers notification and international 

law authority must be clearly articulated to 

the field .... 
88 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Technical chain provides a real-time forum for resolving 

operational and administrative issues which arise during 

contingency operations. 287 

Many ofthese issues persisted or arose after arrival offorces in Haiti. 


Issues pertaining to military justice, rotation ofpersonnel, and claims 


adjudication were among those that could not have been resolved 


without technical channels. 288 


The heavy and effective use of technical channels between 

unified and component headquarters mirrored the high degree of 

cooperation that took place in command channels. Senior commanders 

and outside observers agree that Operation Uphold Democracy stands 

as a model ofjoint cooperation.289 The Operation integrated medical, 

intelligence, logistics, search-and-rescue, and installation support. 290 It 

involved deployment ofAnny troops from the U.S.S. Eisenhower and 

the U.S.S. America and the use ofthe U.S.S. Mt. Whitney as a joint 

flagship.291 Moreover, it relied upon swift and detailed planning to shift 

from a forced entry to a permissive entry without losing momentum. 

The flow oftechnical information between operational lawyers 

contributed to and epitomized these achievements.292 

287 See Office ofthe Staff Judge Advocate, United States Atlantic Command, Technical 

Chain ofCommand (8 May 1995) (fact sheet deposited with CLAMO during conference 

mentioned in note 15, supra) [hereinafter USACOM Technical Chain Fact Sheet]. 

288 See 194th Armored Brigade AAR, supra note 121, at para. 5 ("Coordination with the 

technical JAG channels early and often is the most important element in a successful JAG 

deployment, and Uphold Democracy proved no exception.''). 

289 See Interview with Admiral Paul David Miller, United States Atlantic Command, in 

Charlottesville, Virginia. (May 18, 1995). 

290 See JTF-180 Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 38. 

291 See, e.g., CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VOL. I, supra note 214, at 49 (finding that JTF 

180's use ofthe U.S.S. Mount Whitney as the main headquarters "greatly enhanced command and 

control ofthe entry operation"). 

292 See, e.g.. id. at 38-39 (describing the provision by the theater tactical signal brigade of 

a Mobile Gateway Van (MGV) to meet the demand for unclassified DON e-mail and MILNET 

access, the most frequent medium for technical communications). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 89 

The flow oftechnical information also contributed to smooth 


rotations ofunits into and out ofthe area ofoperations. The highly 


successful transitions between the 10th Mountain Division and the 25th 


Infantry Division and between the MNF and UNMIH are the two most 


important examples. 293 


2. Develop Skills for Inter-Agency Coordination. In Haiti, as 


in allcountries not subject to military invasion or occupation, the Chief 


ofMission was the senior representative ofthe President. He remained 


responsible for policy decisions and for the activities ofUnited States 


personnel in Haiti, though military commanders retained command and 


control over soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines serving in the various 


joint task forces.294 The ambassador, through the Country Team, 295 


293 See, e.g., Colonel Brian Bush, StaffJudge Advocate, 25th Infantry Division (Light), 


Remarks Before the Haiti After Action Review Conference in Charlottesville, VA (May 9, 1995) 


(videotape on file with CLAMO) [hereinafter Bush Remarks] (emphasizing the value oftechnical 


communications and also of a leader's reconnaissance prior to transition). 


294 A federal statute defines the duties ofthe Chiefofa United States Diplomatic Mission 


to a foreign country: 


Under the direction ofthe President, the ChiefofMission to a foreign country­

(1) shall have full responsibility for the direction, 

coordination, and supervision ofall Government executive 

branch employees in that country (except for employees under 

the command ofa United States area military commander); 

and 

(2) shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all 

activities and operations ofthe Government within that 

country, and shall insure that all Government executive branch 

employees (except for employees under the command ofa 

United States area military commander) comply fully with all 

applicable directives ofthe ChiefofMission. 

22 U.S.C. § 3927(a); JTF CoMMANDER'sHANDBOOK,supra note 91, at 37-38 (discussing 

interagency and political coordination). 

295 Since the 1950s, Presidents have declared what is now enshrined as law in 22 U.S.C. 

§ 3927, namely that the Ambassador is in charge of all elements in the United States Government 

in a host country (excluding military forces under command of a United States military 

commander, such as military units in Korea and Germany, or the forces in Haiti). Some 
90 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

worked with the CINCUSACOM, the CJTF commanders, the Agency 

for International Development, the Department ofJustice, and other 

agencies, to integrate the diplomatic, economic, informational, and 

military aspects of United States policy toward Haiti. 

The central role of the Ambassador, and the significant 

participation ofmany executive branch agencies, summoned skills that 

judge advocates traditionally have not needed. For instance, a judge 

advocate who deployed to train forces ofcoalition nations on rules of 

engagement discovered that officials from the Department of State had 

led participating foreign countries to believe that the MNF could 

accommodate different nations' rules on the use of force. 296 Because he 

understood the delicate diplomatic constraints under which State 

Department officials were operating, the judge advocate pursued a 

Ambassadors invoke this principle more aggressively than others, but almost all utilize the 

management device ofthe "country team." 

The country team, with the Chief of Mission at its head, is the principal means by which 

a mission bonds itself together as a cooperative, coordinated, well-informed staff: 

In its broadest sense, the "team" is all the elements-and all the men 

and women-of the American mission in a foreign country. More 

narrowly, it is a management tool-a council of senior officers, heads 

ofthe various sections ofthe mission, working together under the 

Ambassador's direction to pool their skills, resources, and problems in 

the national interest. 

United States Foreign Service Institute, The Team: The Ambassador Sets the Pace 1 (undated 3 

page information paper widely distributed to individuals receiving foreign service training). No 

formal directive delineates the composition or functions of the Country Team. The Ambassador 

determines the type of team that best suits the needs of a particular country. Typical membership 

at large posts includes the Deputy Chief ofthe Diplomatic Mission, the chiefs of the political and 

economic sections ofthe embassy, the Security Assistance Officer, the Agency for International 

Development mission, and the United States Information Service (USIS). It also usually includes 

one or more ofthe military attaches and the agricultural attache. See generally DEFENSE 

INSTITUTE OF SECURITY AssJSTANCE MANAGEMENT, THE MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY AssISTANCE 

105-06 (14th ed., 1994) [hereinafter MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY AsSISTANCE]. 

296 See 194th Armored Brigade AAR, supra note 121, at Observation Number I ("The 

CARICOM deployed with a verbal agreement that they would be allowed to develop their own 

ROE."); cf. Gordon Interview, supra note 220 (describing as routine instances in which foreign 

government representatives asked the MNF to provide items promised them by other agencies) 

("One time, a commander in the French contingent impatiently asked me why the MNF had not 

yet provided him the 9mm pistols he had been promised."). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 91 

course of action that eschewed formal interagency haggling and further 

intergovernmental negotiations. Over a period ofseveral days, he 

succeeded in persuading the foreign commander ofthe benefits ofusing 

existing MNF rules. 297 In this way, he eliminated a potential source of 

friction and even danger for military units on the ground in Haiti. 

Other judge advocates report similar instances in which an 

awareness ofpolitical and diplomatic objectives served them well in 

dealings with representatives ofUnited States governmental agencies. 

Some ofthese instances involved representatives in Haiti, as when 

military units were compelled to explain to Department ofJustice and 

Agency for International Development personnel that inter-agency 

logistical support would violate fiscal laws.298 Others involved 

297 See id. {"I met with the CARICOM commander early and often and gradually 

developed a dialog and relationship which would allow me to draft his ROE for him. As we 

worked together to hone a set ofROE, I gradually steered him towards the standing JTF ROE. 

Eventually, he agreed with me totally that his unit was bound by the JTF ROE, and he understood 

the rules themselves very well."). 

298 USACOM Technical Chain Fact Sheet, supra note 287; Passar AAR, supra note 120, 

at para. 6d(iii) ("We were also requested on a number ofoccasions to provide supplies or other 

support to ICIT AP, the US Department ofJustice organization training a new Haitian police force. 

Absent funding ofsuch requests by that agency pursuant to the Economy Act, I disapproved such 

support."). The recorder to the Haiti After Action Review Conference held in May of 1995 

described the sense ofthe conference participants this way: 

Congressional-executive branch struggles over the power ofthe purse have 

driven the contingency funding process to near melt-down. Byzantine rules 

govern nation building and coalition support operations. The duration ofthe 

funding and the funding sources for such operations are held hostage to political 

conflict between the branches ofgovernment. 

The interagency process for assuming fiscal responsibility generates 

difficulties even when all parties cooperate; the system turns nearly impossible 

when executive agencies compete for standing and conflict over mission 

requirements and goals. Pol/mil plans outline fiscal responsibility, but the U.S. 

agencies tasked with certain functions are either incapable or unwilling to tap 

their own resources, even after their top level leadership have made 

"commitments" at interagency Washington meetings. This forces the dominant 

player, DoD, and its components, to make some hard calls concerning fiscal law. 

The interagency dispute resolution is unwieldy, and even then, the resulting 

commitments are not rigorously "enforced." ... 
92 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

representatives who remained in the United States, as when the Staff 

Judge Advocate for the 25th Infantry Division persuaded an official in 

the Internal Revenue Service to permit servicemembers to file 

individual tax returns early and contributed to the successful 

Department ofDefense effort to obtain an extension for the filing of 

individual tax returns for the 1994 calendar year. 

299 

Effective interagency coordination requires patience and an 

awareness of cultural differences between soldiers and executive branch 

civilians.300 Military officers are accustomed to directing efforts toward 

a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective, to outlining 

milestones, and to establishing unity ofcommand.301 Other agencies 

are accustomed to multiple conflicting objectives, ill-defined 

milestones, and disunity ofcommand.302 In the absence ofreform in the 

nature of an "Inter-agency Goldwater-Nichols Act," which one senior 

The interagency mix results in a continuous improvisational challenge 

for military leaders in the field Fiscal authority lines are blurred as operators 

seek to accomplish their mission [Examples: Operation Light Switch, IPSF 

Uniforms and Equipment, and Training of the Palace Guard]. Contingencies 

devolve into accounting nightmares for logistics/resource management; 

commanders are forced to rely on marginal legal authority to meet mission 

requirements and so "step into the breach" in the sense of risking anti-deficiency 

violations, GAO opprobrium, and perhaps even criminal sanctions." 

Reardon Notes, supra note 214, at para. 5. 

299 Office ofthe Staff Judge Advocate, 25th Infantry Division (Light Infantry) and MNFHaiti, Information Paper, Automatic Extension to File 1994 Taxes (1 Mar. 1995) (copy on file 

with CLAMO) (stating that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had granted an automatic 

extension until 15 December for servicemembers to file their 1994 tax returns); Bush Remarks, 

supra note 293 (describing coordination with IRS officials). For a more complete account of the 

coordination ofthe extension and other tax return filing issues, see infra note 405. 

• 300 ~ee, e.g., Joint Chiefs of Staff, Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During 

Jomt Operations at I-IO (3 I Jan. I 995)(first draft) [hereinafter Draft Joint Pub. 3-08]; RooER 

FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GEITING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 23-25 

(1988). 

301 See, e.g., FM l 00-5, supra note 13, at 2-4 to 2-6. 

302 See, e.g., id at 13-4. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 93 

judge advocate deems necessary, 303 lesser initiatives must suffice. 


These include augmentation ofthe Ambassador's staff with military 


experts, the augmentation ofthe combatant commander's staff with 


civilian officials from a variety ofagencies, and a program of 


interagency exercises to practice unified action at the operational and 


even tactical levels. 304 


3. Maintain Close and Open Communications With the ICRC 

and other Nongovernmental Agencies. Numerous nongovernmental 

agencies and private voluntary organizations accompanied the 

multinational military forces to Haiti. Indeed, some ofthese 

organizations arrived in Haiti well before the MNF.305 Appendix S lists 

the organizations with representatives in the country. 

In accordance with United States military doctrine, the MNF 


established a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). 306 A 


subordinate element ofthe CMOC served as the primary interface 


between all humanitarian organizations and military forces. 307 The 


303 Colonel Joseph R. Barnes, Staff Judge Advocate, United States Army Forces 

Command, Unity ofCommand and Non-traditional Missions: Do We Need an Inter-agency 

''Goldwater-Nichols''? at 8-9 (1994) (manuscript on file with CLAMO) ("As was the case in 1986 

when the Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed, only the blunt force ofsuch legislation can smash 

through the vested interests and deeply-ingrained patterns ofthought and behavior of both the 

military and ofthe relevant civilian agencies concerning their respective roles and authorities 

during military-civil operations."). 

304 See id. at 7-8. 

305 See United States Agency for International Development, Haiti: PVO Profile at I (July 

I, 1993) (copy on file with CLAMO) (''NGOs, both indigenous and expatriate, have since the 

1950s implemented a significant number ofdonor-funded development assistance projects in the 

agricul~e, health, population, and education sectors in Haiti."). 

306 See DEP'T OF ARMY' FIELD MANuAL 41-10, CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS at C-1 (11 Jan. 

1993) [hereinafter FM 41-10]; Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Colonel John F. McNeill, 

USAR, Former Team Chief, Tactical Planning Team 3601, 360th Civil Affairs Brigade, in Portau-Prince from 19 Sept. 1994 to 22 Nov. 1994 (Aug. 24, 1995) [McNeill Interview]. Unless 

otherwise noted the information in this paragraph is based on the McNeill Interview. 

307 This was the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), an organ that is 

not yet doctrinally recognized, but one that served the important function ofprioritizing the flood 

ofrequests for military assistance made by non-government and private organizations. See id; cf. 
94 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

CMOC consisted ofkey staff members from the United States JTF and 

military liaison personnel from other countries, as well as 

representatives from the Agency for International Development and the 

Office ofForeign Disaster Assistance, from the International Committee 

of the Red Cross (ICRC), from various United Nations agencies, from 

agencies of foreign governments, and from various private voluntary 

organizations. Among the United States members was a reserve 

component attorney assigned to the civil affairs unit in Port-au-Prince. 

This diverse group met daily to discuss problems and coordinate both 

short and long-term actions. The MNF staff judge advocate attended 

these meetings at least once a week. 308 

JTF CoMMANDER's HANDBOOK, supra note 91, at 23 (describing the CMOC itselfas the primary 

interface between all humanitarian organizations and military forces). The CMOC then reviewed 

the requests. It is instructive to note how the United States Agency for International Development 

perceived the purpose and functioning of the HACC and the CMOC: 

Shortly after its arrival in Haiti, the U.S. military established a 


Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) to identify 


needs and facilitate military/civilian cooperation. To relieve the 


logistical constraints that hampered the import ofrelief supplies, the 


U.S. military and USAID negotiated to allow one humanitarian flight a 

day into the Port-au-Prince airport and to open some ofthe city's port 

facilities to NGO and commercial shipping. A system was instituted 

whereby NGOs, PVO's, and U.N. agencies could issue requests for 

assistance (RFA) from the military for a variety ofneeds. Most concern 

the use ofharbor and airport facilities, transport for food and medical 

supplies, and security needs. Requests are prioritized by the CivilianMilitary Operations Center (CMOC) according to the resources 

available. 

United State~ Agency for In~mat~onal Deve!opment, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, 

Office ofUmted States Foreign Disaster Assistance, Haiti-Emergency, Situation Report 

No. 2 (Nov. 1, 1994) (copy on file with the CLAMO). 

308 See Gordon I~te~iew, supra note 220. Frequently, judge advocate concerns 

addressed whether authonzauons and appropriations existed to support the missions coordinated 

by the CMOC. See supra note 250 and infra subpart ID.L.3 for discussions of fiscal constraints 

and authorities. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHAITI, 1994-95 95 

In addition, other judge advocates performed liaison duties with 


specific organizations.309 The ICRC proved to be the most important of 


these organizations. Within a short time, a positive, constructive, even 


friendly relationship developed between the MNF operational lawyer 


serving as liaison and his ICRC counterparts. Efforts to communicate 


on a daily basis and to accommodate every reasonable request paid 


dividends, as ICRC officials used quiet persuasion and avoided 


publicity in their efforts to protect the wounded, inquire after captives, 


reunite families, and assist displaced persons. Other human rights 


organizations, however, did not display the neutrality and impartiality of 


the ICRC. These disparate organizations tended to be poorly informed, 


biased against military forces, and hungry for publicity. Although 


designation of a judge advocate to serve as liaison minimized 


distractions to the command,310 the nature ofthese latter organizations 


impelled them to voice dissatisfaction. 311 


Because it employs officials and organs that perform 

governmental functions, the United Nations cannot strictly be termed a 

"nongovernmental" organization. Because its reach and authority are 

supranational, United Nations dealings with the United States military 

cannot be termed "inter-agency." Still, diplomacy, tact, and awareness 

ofinstitutional values and constraints are required ofthe judge advocate 

when he or she interacts with the United Nations. These skills are 

309 Unless otherwise noted, the infonnation in this paragraphs is based on 10th Mountain 

Div. AAR,supranote 108, at 8-10, 12. 

310 See also MNF Historian Memorandum, supra note 48 (submission to the Joint 

Uniform Lessons Learned System entitled "Human Rights, International Agencies") ("The 

command should designate the OSJA as the lead agency for dealing with all human rights 

agencies. Further, an officer within the OSJA should be trained and appointed to coordinate with 

these agencies."); CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VOL. II, at 119 (recommended that "(d]uring the 

deliberate planning process, [the command should] have a human rights cell, comprised ofthe 

SJA planner, the PMO planner, and the Surgeon planner, to formulate a human rights 

investigation plan for all OPLANs."). 

311 The need for judge advocates to conduct interagency and international-as well as 

interservice--relations, spawned a descriptive phrase for the operations: "Beyond Purple." See 

JTF-180 Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 38. 
96 CENTER FOR LAWAND lvflLITARY OPERATIONS 

identical to those required when dealing with other United States 

agencies or with nongovernmental organizations. 

The detailing of Major General Kinzer as the Force Commander 

of the UNMIH is only one of numerous examples in which interactions 

with the United Nations required skill and care on all sides. Because 

UNMIH is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations established 

pursuant to a Security Council resolution,312 the Secretary General and 

the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations expect that 

the Force Commander will keep them fully informed about 

organizational, deployment, and operational matters. These 

expectations ofprompt and thorough reports are consistent with a 

relationship that the United Nations describes as a "chain of command" 

between it and the Force Commander.313 The United Nations 

perspective of the relationship between its political and policy organs 

and the Force Commanders ofUnited Nations operations causes it to 

seek various guarantees of loyalty: an employment contract; a letter of 

appointment; a loyalty oath.314 Can or should a serving United States 

Army general sign such instruments? 

The answer is no,315 but the details are important, and the 

legitimate interests of both the United States and the United Nations can 

be honored if communications and legal opinions are crafted with 

attention to those details. Law and policy precluded Major General 

Kinzer from signing an employment contract or letter of appointment 

312 See S.C. Res. 867, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 (1993), at paras. 2, 

3 & 4; See S.C. Res. 867, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 (1994), at paras. 5,9,10 

& 11. See S.C. Res. 964, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/964 ( 1994), at para. 5. 

313 See Letter from Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, 

the United Nations, to Major-General Joseph W. Kinzer, Force Commander, UNMIH, subject: 

General Guidelines for the Force Commander, paras. 5-7 (l Mar. 1995), reprinted at Appendix T. 

314 

See Memorandwn from Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 

MG Kinzer, subject: Legal Issues Involving Your Detail as UNMIH Commander (3 Feb. 1995). 

m See id 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 97 

with the United Nations.316 The same sources also appear to prohibit 

his swearing a loyalty oath to the United Nations.317 Judge advocates 

on the joint staff provided timely and accurate advice to Major General 

Kinzer on this matter and thus prevented an awkward situation from 

developing.318 A high level exchange of communications between the 

United States government and the United Nations subsequently satisfied 

all parties and cleared the way for Kinzer' s assumption ofduties. 

Appendix T contains these communications. 

H. Civil Affairs. 

Civil affairs operations played a central role in the Haiti 

deployment. That role was to support the MNF's relationship with 

Haitian civil authorities and the civilian populace, promote the 

legitimacy ofthe mission, and enhance the effectiveness ofthe military 

forces in the country. Civil affairs operations comprise two distinct 

types of missions. The first-to conduct civil-military operationsinvolves a complex of activities and interactions with civilian authorities 

directed toward eliciting favorable behavior from civilian inhabitants of 

316 See Message, Office ofUnited States Secretary of State to United States Mission to the 

United Nations, subject: Military Assistant for United Nations Senior Military Advisor Major 

General Baril (190153Z Oct 93) ("There is no legal authority that allows U.S. Military Personnel 

to contract with the UN for the perfonnance ofofficial duties."); UNPA, supra note 148, at§ 7 

(pennitting individuals detailed to the United Nations, on approval ofthe President, to receive 

direct payment of allowances and other perquisites); Exec. Order No. 10,206, 3 C.F.R. (1951) 

(delegating approval authority to the Secretary ofDefense); Memorandum, Secretary ofDefense, 

subject: Policy on United Nations (UN) Allowances (27 Jan. 1994) (establishing general policy 

that unless authorized on a case by case basis, United States personnel may not receive direct 

supplemental allowances from the United Nations); Memorandum, Secretary ofDefense to 

Secretaries ofthe Military Departments and Chainnan ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: Receipt 

ofUN Allowances and Perquisites by the Commanding General, Military Forces, United Nations 

Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) (29 Mar. 1995) (authorizing MG Kinzer to receive direct payment 

from the UN for the purpose of fulfilling UN representational responsibilities, payable based on 

completion ofthe representational duties and upon presentation ofreceipts, but also stating that 

"[n]o other allowances or perquisites offered by the UN incident to that detail are allowed"). 

317 See Memorandum, supra note 314, at para. 2b. 


318 See id. 

98 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

a war zone or area of operations.319 The second-to support civil 

administration-consists of direct military involvement with executive, 

legislative, and judicial branches of a foreign government so as to 

stabilize it.320 In addition to describing these two types ofmissions, the 

term "civil affairs" denotes military personnel and units trained to plan, 

support, or conduct these missions.321 

Elements of four different civil affairs units-all of them United 

States Anny Reser\re component units-supported the MNF in Haiti.322 

Because the MNF sought to restore the democratically elected 

president and leave the reins ofgovernment with his administration, 

these elements limited their activities to the first type of mission (civilmilitary operations).323 The second type of civil affairs mission 

(support to civil administration) would have implied a degree of 

involvement with the inner workings of the Haitian government that 

might have frustrated rather than fulfilled Resolution 940.324 Civil 

affairs personnel planned and coordinated numerous humanitarian 

assistance and military civic action projects. They supported the J-3 

civil affairs officer, an army major who had staff responsibility for 

tasking elements of the MNF, such as the Joint Logistics Support 

Command, or the separate military police brigade to support civil affairs 

projects.325 

319 See FM 41-10, supra note 306, at Glossary 5. 

320 See id 

321 See id. 

322 These were the 450th Civil Affairs Battalion, the 416th Civil Affairs Battalion, the 

360th Civil Affairs Brigade, and the 358th Civil Affairs Command. See McNeill Interview, supra 

note 306; see also FM 41-10, supra note 306, at 4-1 to 4-13 (describing civil affairs organization). 

323 See id. at ch. 10 (describing the five major civil-military organization missions as 

foreign nation support, populace and resource control, humanitarian assistance, military civic 

action, and civil defense). 

324 See id. at ch. I I. 

325 See McNeill Interview, supra note 306. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 99 

The terms "civil affairs," "civil-military operations," and "civil 


administration" are creatures of United States military doctrine rather 


than law. The rule of law is so important to legitimacy and stable 


government, however, that judge advocates inevitably become deeply 


involved in civil affairs operations. For example, because formal 


support to civil administration, as doctrinally defined, did not strictly 


serve the purposes of the MNF's presence in Haiti, the Ambassador and 


the country team developed a program of "legal mentorship. "326 Judge 


advocates in the reserve and active components were ideal participants 


in this program, which was so close in method and intent to civil affairs 


operations as to be indistinguishable from them. 


1. Ensure That the StaffJudge Advocate is the Sole Advisor to 

the Command on Its Legal Obligations. Civil affairs doctrine further 

implicates judge advocates because it purports to give civil affairs 

officers a role in advising the command on legal obligations to the 

foreign civilian populace. Recall that the mission ofThe Judge 

Advocate General's Corps is to support the commander by providing 

legal services as far forward as possible throughout the operational 

continuum.327 This mission implies that judge advocates are the 

command's legal advisors, and the field manual guiding judge 

advocates expressly reinforces this role. 328 Yet the Army's civil affairs 

field manual states that the civil affairs personnel and related staff 

officers "[r ]ecommend[] command policy concerning obligations to the 

population in the [area of operations] and obligations relative to treaties, 

agreements, international law, and U.S. policies."329 This apparent 

conflict between the role ofjudge advocates and the role of civil affairs 

· 326 See infra at subpart H.2 and H.3. 

327 See FM 27-100, supra note 9, at para. 1-4. 

328 See, e.g .. id. at para. l l-6a ("The staff judge advocate is the commander's primary 

legal advisor and supervises legal operations in support of civil affairs. The G5 coordinates with 

the SIA on all legal matters related to civil affairs."). - 329 See FM 41-10, supra note 306, at 4-9; See also id. at 4-3, 4-4, 4-5 ("Advises and 

assists the commander to meet legal obligations and moral considerations."). 
I 00 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

personnel need never become a problem. Indeed, professionalism and 

careful coordination on the part ofthe individual officers involved can 

obviate confusion and ensure that the command has single source for its 

legal advice.330 

The staff judge advocate for the MNF eliminated potential 

confusion ofroles at an early stage, primarily in the area of fiscal law 

issues. Humanitarian assistance projects and military civic action 

programs employ military personnel and require the expenditure of 

military operations and maintenance and construction appropriations. 331 

These civil affairs operations in Haiti took the form of medical care, 

food distribution, and rudimentary construction ofroads and sanitation 

facilities. 332 By designating three judge advocates, including himself, as 

the sole advisors on the propriety ofusing military resources for such 

operations, the staff judge advocate prevented misallocation of funds 

and protected the command. 333 

330 See generally DSAT REPORT, supra note 3, at Operational Law-6, I I, I 2, Issues 520, 

573, 626, and 627 (discussing the potential friction arising from overlapping roles); Lieutenant 

Colonel Rudolph C. Barnes, Jr., Legitimacy and the Lawyer in Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC): Civil 

Affairs Legal Support, ARMY LAW., Oct. 1988, at 5, 7 ("Because many issues in LIC are mixed 

legal and political issues, however, there is no clear line ofdemarcation between the support 

requirements ofthe SJA and the civil affairs staff support element."). 

331 See FM 41-IO, supra note 306, at IO-I9 (reprinting IO U.S.C. §§ 40I-402, which 

prescribe fiscal and other limitations on conduct of humanitarian and civic assistance by military 

units) 

332 See, e.g., Passar AAR, supra note I20, at para. 6d; Gordon Interview, supra note 220; 

Warner Interview, supra note 269. 

333 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 7; 25th ID Lessons Learned 

Memorandum, supra note I20; cf Memorandum, Major General George A. Fisher, Commander 

ofMultinational Forces Haiti, MNF-CG, to Distribution A, subject: Medical-Civil Action 

Guidelines (25 Jan. I 995) ("Refrain from independent Medical Civic-Action (MEDCAP) 

activities unless specifically approved by the CMOC or MNF Surgeon."). 

Provision of humanitarian and civic assistance by military units is likely to be scrutinized 

by the General Accounting Office (GAO). See infra note 468 (describing the functions ofthe 

GAO). A recent GAO report on Department ofDefense humanitarian and civic assistance 

projects was critical in tone and substance: 

Program coordination between the U.S. military and the U.S. embassies and 

AID missions in two of the countries we visited-Panama and Honduras-was 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 101 

Civil affairs officers cooperated in this arrangement. The civil 

affairs mission in a country such as Haiti is challenging enough without 

the added responsibility of advising the command on its legal 

obligations. Coordinating the work of nongovernmental and private 

voluntary organizations, planning and executing those humanitarian 

assistance and civic action projects deemed by judge advocates to be 

proper uses of funds, and persuading Haitian officials and citizens ofthe 

benefits of orderly and rule-governed processes-these and related 

activities easily absorbed the full attention of available civil affairs 

resources. For example, in September and early October, civil affairs 

officers in the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center devoted 

much time and energy to conferences with Haitian merchants. The port 

director ofPort-au-Prince, a corrupt official allied with the junta, 

continued to charge tariffs and storage charges these merchants deemed 

unjust. The civil affairs officers, in full coordination with the Staff 

Judge Advocate, assisted the merchants in devising a plan to engage in 

commerce while respecting Haitian law.334 

minimal. We found projects that were not designed to contribute to U.S. foreign 

policy objectives, did not appear to enhance U.S. military training, and either 

lacked the support ofthe host country or were not being used. Finally, the two 

commands we visited have not systematically evaluated HCA projects to 

determine their success or failure. HCA program officials at the command level 

had not performed routine follow-up visits. 

See UNITED STA TES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, 

DEP'T OF DEFENSE: CHANGES NEEDED TO THE HUMANITARIAN AND C1v1c ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, B248270, GAO/NSIAD-94-57 (Nov. 2, 1993) at 3. 

334 See McNeill Interview, supra note 306 (also noting that civil affairs missions 

multiplied in the immediate aftermath ofTropical Storm Gordon, which wracked Haiti on 17 

November); Electronic Message, Lieutenant Colonel Karl K. Warner, StaffJudge Advocate, I 0th 

Mountain Division (LI), to Deputy Director, Center for Law and Military Operations (19 Oct. 

1995) (opining that when the de facto government is illegitimate, and the United States controls 

the port on behalf ofthe de jure government, customs should be paid to the de jure government 

upon its arrival and assumption of port control rather than to the outgoing de facto government). 
------

102 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

2. Understand All Three Legs in the Stool of the Justice 

System. The efforts of other United States agencies supplemented the 

MNF's civil affairs operations in Haiti. Officials from the United States 

Agency for International Development (AID) and from the International 

Criminal Investigation and Training Assistance Program (ICIT AP) of 

the Department ofJustice joined with the MNF in addressing a cluster 

of problems known as the "three-legged stool." Figu.re 9 graphically 

depicts this interrelated set of problems.335 

THE JUSTICE CHALLENGE 

1>1m-6"O.YI";; - -. TrainIn& I I > No Equipment 

+Bau 

System 

+ Administration 

of Docketl I >nu..::. Ri;buAi.us';' >No Food 1

I > Deadly Saolllltlon I 

> Police Academy Shirted I I"; c:.;'ru Backl7gged I > Overcrowdln& I Rlot1 1 

>C11e1 Not Heard I >S'Yo Servin& I I 

I >$ •Jusdce I I Sentence 

>ln1ufOclentJud&•• !.No!oo:_!or~oo!:_ I I >Jud&ea Not Paid I 

Figure > Lq:al Reform 9 I Needed 

Operational lawyers figured prominently in efforts to fix each of 

the three legs. With narrow exceptions, the law precludes the United 

States military from training and equipping foreign police forces. 336 

33s This figure is a slightly modified version of that contained in 25th ID Briefing 

Viewgraphs, supra note 58. 

336 Programs that furnish training to foreign personnel must not be supported by 

appropriations intended to be used elsewhere, such as operation and maintenance (O&M) 

appropriations ofUnited States forces. See 3 l U.S.C. §§ l30l(a). Training of foreign forces 

should occur through the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET}, see 

FAA, supra note 153, at §§ 541-45, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2347-47d, a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, 

see AECA, supra note 154, at§§ 21-22, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2761-62, or some other specifically 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 103 

Accordingly, the main responsibility for helping the Haitian government 

build a competent police force free from corruption fell to Mr. Ray 

Kelly and officials from ICITAP.337 Still, judge advocates advised on 

whether and which weapons collected from the city streets and from the 

countryside could be turned over to the fledgling police force. 338 They 

authorized program. See also The Honorable Bill Alexander, House ofRepresentatives, 

B-21313 7 at Enclosure-I, Enclosure-20 to Enclosure-27 (Jan. 30, 1986) (holding that lengthy, 

elaborate instruction of foreign forces in artillery fire-direction practices and counterinsurgency 

techniques was not authorized to be financed with operation and maintenance appropriations) 

([unpublished letter ruling ofthe Comptroller General) [hereinafter Honduras//]. Moreover, 

Congress has specifically prohibited the training ofpolice forces. FAA§ 660(a), 22 U.S.C. § 

2420(a). The exemption for longtime democracies with no standing armed forces and with good 

human rights records, see FAA§ 660(c), 22 U.S.C. § 2420(c), does not seem to apply to Haiti. 

Operational lawyers have been quick to point out that section 660 ofthe Foreign 

Assistance Act says only that foreign police forces may not be trained with "the funds made 

available to carry out this Act." See, e.g .• Stai Memorandum, supra note 35, at 15 (implicitly and 

resourcefully arguing thereby that section 660 places no prohibition on the use ofDepartment of 

Defense funds). The more defensible position is that section 660, in conjunction with the purpose 

statute, see 31 U.S.C. § 130l(a), prevents any support ofthe Congressional scheme for police 

training by any appropriations intended to be used elsewhere. A wise approach, which was 

employed in Somalia, is to bring these statutory prohibitions to the Ambassador's attention so as 

to seek a Presidential invocation of special authority. See Presidential Determination No. 93-43 of 

Sept. 30, 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 52207 (1993), reprinted ins. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & 

HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1993, vol. 

I-A, at 613-14 n. 696 (1994) [hereinafter LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1993] 

(invoking FAA§ 614(a), 22 U.S.C. § 2364(a) and directing use ofDepartment ofDefense 

resources to assist the United Nations in training police forces in Somalia "without regard to ... 

section[] ... 660 ofthe Foreign Assistance Act of 1961"). Pending the Presidential 

determination, ensure that all uses of military funds can be clearly linked to the mission statement. 

See Interview with Brigadier General Walter B. Huffman, Staff Judge Advocate for 

USCENTCOM during Operation Restore Hope, in Charlottesville, Virginia (Sept. 6, 1995). 

Interestingly, this is one sense in which it is helpful to have an expansive mission statement. The 

countervailing consideration is that expansive mission statements lend themselves to ''mission 

creep," the process by which well-equipped, responsive, efficient military forces are dedicated to 

tasks that are not specifically identified in the mission statement. See, e.g .• Major General S.L. 

Arnold and Major David T. Stahl, A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War, 

PARAMETERS, Winter 1993-94, at 4, 12-13 (describing the process ofmission creep during 10th 

Mountain Division operations in Florida and Somalia and noting that "broad mission statements 

with unclear end states may be necessary in a crisis; they certainly provide the maximum 

flexibility to the operational and tactical commanders"). 

337 See, e.g., Raymond W. Kelly, Learning When to Wear Gloves, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 

1995, at 4:1 (providing an account of how Mr. Kelly perceived his mission). 

338 See supra note 250. 
104 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

helped commanders and military police plan and execute operations to 

quell vigilante violence that resulted from frustration over the early 

inability ofthat force to fight crime.339 They advised military police 

investigating and tracking Haitian criminals during the trainup period for 

the Haitian police force. 340 

Judge advocate contributions toward strengthening the "prisons" 

leg ofthe stool were equally varied and important. A judge advocate 

served in the human rights investigation cell, and prisons were a 

frequent source of alleged human rights abuses.34 Unsanitary 

conditions and the lack offood in Haitian prisons demanded welldrilling and minor construction, which judge advocates advised were 

appropriate expenditures ofmilitary appropriations to the extent they 

contributed to a secure and stable environment. 342 Noting that the vast 

majority ofprisoners in the overcrowded prisons had never appeared 

before a judge, judge advocates invoked the Haitian constitutional 

provision requiring an appearance before a judge within 48 hours of 

detention.343 When on 19 February 1995 a riot broke out at the 

National Penitentiary, a judge advocate major was a Erincipal adviser to 

the MNF Commander in controlling the disturbance. 44 An active 

339 See 25th ID Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 58; Bush Remarks, supra note 293. 

340 See Sposato Interview, supra note 216. 

341 See Wishard Interview, supra note 72; 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 9 

("Because ofthe lack of dependable communications systems and a Haitian penchant for 

exaggerating rumor, many human rights allegations became difficult to investigate. Upon 

questioning, persons claiming to have witnessed human rights violations usually had only heard 

of them. Although many human rights violations were thought to have occurred after the ouster 

ofAristide in 1991, finding evidence ofsuch violations became a difficult process."). 

342 See Gordon Interview, supra note 220. 

343 See Sposato Interview, supra note 216. 

344 See Memorandum For Record, Major Mark Sposato, former Deputy Staff Judge 

Advocate ofMultinational Forces Haiti, MNF-SJA, subject: Disturbance at the Federal 

Penitentiary (19 Feb. 1995) (reporting that the MNF Commander on the evening ofthe 

disturbance convinced the official from the Haitian Ministry ofJustice to confront the problem of 

long pretrial detention periods). Of course, judge advocates were not alone in efforts to improve 

conditions at the prisons. See, e.g., Captain Robert Burns, Automated Prisoner Tracking 

System-Haiti, CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL) NEWS FROM THE FRONT, Jul.-Aug. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 105 

component judge advocate fluent in French and reserve component 

attorneys served on the ministerial advisory team that conducted on-site 

evaluations of all Haitian prisons and developed a comprehensive 

program ofreform. That team also arranged a judicial review of 

detainee cases that resulted in the release ofover 300 individuals, 

greatly easing the overcrowding problem. 

3. Be Prepared to Mentor Foreign Judges and Ministry 

Officials. 345 The ministerial advisory team also served as ''judicial 

mentors," evidence that the "courts" leg of the stool demands elaborate 

and sophisticated support. During the assessment phase of the 

mentorship program, the team conducted on-site evaluations of 178 

justices of the peace, 15 prosecutors, 15 courts of first instance, 15 

investigating judges, and over 100 civil registrars. It completed a 

photographic survey of courthouses. The team brought about the first 

direct contact between the Ministry of Justice and the justices of the 

peace. It audited the skills of court personnel, and court records, 

inventoried supplies, surveyed caseload distribution, and evaluated the 

1995, at 17-19 (describing the database for tracking prisoners developed by Second Lieutenant 


Jincy R. Pace, the platoon leader for lst Platoon, 66th Military Police Company). 


345 The infonnation in this paragraph and the two that follow it is based upon the 

following sources: Memorandum, Colonel Daniel Laurence Rubini & Lieutenant Colonel Michael 

Cleary, to Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, subject: After-action Report Operation Uphold 

Democracy Ministry Advisory Team-Justice, 30 Oct. 1994 to 15 Dec. 1994 (Dec. 1994) (copy on 

file with CLAMO); Colonel Daniel Laurence Rubini & Lieutenant Colonel Michael Cleary, to 

Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, subject: After-action Report-TTAD Haiti l April to 15 

May 1995 (May 1995) (copy on file with CLAMO); Savoie Memorandum, supra note 68; 

Lieutenant Colonel Philip A. Savoie, Fonner Member ofthe Team of Ministerial Advisors in 

Haiti, Before the Haiti After Action Review Conference in Charlottesville, VA (May 9, 1995) 

[hereinafter Savoie Remarks] (videotape on file with CLAMO);United States Anny Civil Affairs 

and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) Ministerial Advisory Team, Census 

Report: Justice of the Peace Courts-Republic ofHaiti (15 April 1995); Memorandum, Mark L. 

Schneider, U.S. Agency for International Development, to Mr. Walter B. Slocombe, Lieutenant 

General Wesley Clark, and Vice Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., subject: Judicial 

Monitors/Mentors Program (9 Jan. 1995) (copy on file with CLAMO); Message, Ambassador 

Swing to United States Dep't. of State, subject: Haiti Justice System: Problems and Prospects 

(Dec. 1, 1994) copy on file with CLAMO); Major Lawrence K. Peterson, U.S.A.R., Mentoring 

Justice in an Unjust Land, OREGON STATE BAR BULLETIN, Jul. 1995, at 13-16; Lieutenant Colonel 

Bill Maddox, Haiti Recovers, ARMY RESERVE MAGAZINE, Spring 1995, at 18-19; Mike Doming, 

Justice Eludes Aristide 's Haiti; Slow-Moving Reforms Bring Little Change to Corrupt Courts, 

THE RECORD, Mar. 3, 1995, at B9; Eric Schmitt, Judge Who is Also a General Repairs Haitian 

Judicial System,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, at 34. 
106 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

scheme of compensation for judicial officers. The team also assessed 

the ability ofthe ministry ofjustice to supervise the judicial system. 

During the recommendation phase, the team encouraged the 

Ministry ofJustice to establish a program for court security. The team 

recommended a program of construction and renovation of courthouses 

and identified 20 courthouses for immediate action. It advocated the 

establishment of a national judicial training center on the grounds ofthe 

former military academy and the creation of a supervision program to 

audit judicial processes, investigate corruption complaints, monitor 

training, and develop a code ofjudicial ethics. 

During the implementation phase, the team planned and 

coordinated the transformation ofthe military academy into a national 

judicial training center. It obtained and distributed 208 sets oflegal 

codes containing Haitian laws. The team created, reproduced, and 

distributed more than 25,000 legal forms. It coordinated the 

construction and renovation plan for the 20 courthouses identified for 

immediate action, and prepared a feasibility study on a plan to purchase 

and install prefabricated courthouses. The team printed and distributed 

5000 copies ofthe Constitution ofHaiti and 900 civil registers. The 

team also identified local suppliers for 200 manual typewriters for 

distribution to justices ofthe peace and arranged for distribution.346 

346 These activities ofjudge advocates also served the campaign objectives ofthe Joint 

Psychological Operations Task Force. See USACOM Briefing Viewgraphs, supra note 37 (listing 

among the objectives "increase awareness of democracy," "present positive image ofU.S. intent," 

and "increase support for Government"). 

This report elaborates the formal program of mentoring that began months into the 

deployment. However, as the Staff Judge Advocate for the MNF during the first month observes, 

a similar, rudimentary program can be instituted early in an operation. By the 

second week ofthe operation, with the help ofour Port-au-Prince born 

interpreter, we were in a courthouse in north PAP, meeting the clerks and the 

judge. It was real interesting: The judge wanted to quit but was told she would 

be imprisoned ifshe quit. We worked with her, told her about our system of 
LAWAND JvfILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 107 

I. Criminal Law. 

The state of good order and discipline in an armed force 

determines whether it is capable ofupholding the rule oflaw. During 

military operations in Haiti-as during other deployments in recent 

years -United States units displayed a level ofdiscipline that is 

possible only when a responsive and fair system ofcriminal justice 

undergirds effective training and leadership.347 Military service in a 

squalid, impoverished, and politically unstable country is arduous and 

stressful. Although good logistical support and resourceful leaders can 

do much to mitigate these hard conditions, commanders must 

sometimes resort to punitive sanctions to ensure that soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, and marines do not pursue unlawful alternatives to dutiful 

service. 

justice, brought her in to view our court-martial, and discussed the Haitian 

system. This worked very well, ... The point, I think, for JAs, is that you 

don't have to wait for Dept of State or Justice to come in and start a program. 

JAs are particularly well-suited to start up a simplified criminal court system 

in a less-developed country. We also started showing up at the Palace of 

Justice in downtown PAP just to observe appellate proceedings. Many Haitian 

lawyers credited our simple presence and discussions with judges with giving 

their system legitimacy with the Haitian people, with showing US respect for 

Haitian institutions, and with "effecting a flight of bad elements: from the 

courthouses. Also, in travels around the country, we always visited 

courthouses and police stations where local magistrates often handled judicial 

matters. By doing this ... and doing it early in the operation ... JAs can 

obtain valuable information for later, more formal programs, build good will 

with the local populace, and begin helping the country's legal system much 

earlier. 

See Electronic Mail Message, Staff Judge Advocate, 10th Mountain Division (LD and Fort Drum, 

wamerk@drum-emhl.army.mil, to Deputy Director, Center for Law and Military Operations (24 

Oct. 1995) (copy on file with CLAMO). 

347 See, e.g., General William C. Westmoreland, Military Justice-A Commander's 

Viewpoint,lO AM. CRIM. L. REv. 5, 9 (1971). 
108 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Some might argue that the small number of courts-martial for 

misconduct in Haiti indicates a decreased need for a system ofmilitary 

justice that gives such a central role to the commander.348 Such an 

argument would be specious for at least six reasons. First, although 

commanders convened only six courts-martial relating to conduct in 

Haiti,349 hundreds of servicemembers received nonjudicial punishment 

for minor offenses.350 Second, most charged offenses were distinctly 

military crimes, such as disrespect, failure to repair, and failure to obey 

lawful orders. Third, a low rate of indiscipline is precisely the object of 

the military justice system and reflects its success, not a need for 

change. Fourth, the duration of any single soldier's stay in Haiti was 

almost always less than six months, hardly a period long enough to 

demonstrate the full utility of a system built for potential long-term 

wartime deployments. Fifth, although arduous, conditions in Haiti 

rarely threw soldiers into the crucible of hostile fire, which must remain 

the ultimate context for the system's assessment. 

The criminal prosecutions that did occur not only ensured 

discipline, they demonstrated vitality in the doctrine of extraterritoriality ofjurisdiction.351 Although academic skepticism ofthe 

348 Cf Charles W. Schiesser & Daniel H. Benson, A Proposal to Make Courts-Martial 

Courts: The Removal ofthe Commander From Military Justice, 7 TEXAS TECH L. REv. SS9, 600 

(1976); Jonathan Lurie, Military Justice SO Years After Nuremberg: Some Reflections on 

Appearance v. Reality 13-lS (1995) (draft of article presented to conference held in 

Charlottesville, Virginia on 18 November 199S, to be published in volume 149 of the Military 

Law Review) (copy on file with CLAMO) (approvingly referring to several authors' suggestions 

that the commander's role in the military justice system be reduced). 

349 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 13; O'Brien Interview, supra note 

46; Passar AAR, supra note 120 at paras. Se & 6h; Sposato Interview, supra note 216. 

350 Activity in nonjudicial punishment was substantial even after numbers ofUnited 

States troops dropped to the 2,400 participating in the UNMIH. See Memorandum, Captain Carl 

0. Graham, Defense Counsel in United States Army Trial Defense Service Supporting Soldiers in 

United States Forces Haiti, USFORHAITI-JA-TDS, to MAJ Michael Hargis, Senior Defense 

Counsel, United States Army Trial Defense Service, Fort Hood, Texas, subject: Clients and Hours 

(21July1995) (reporting 9 Article 15 clients for April, 6 for May, 9 for June, and 5 for July). 

351 See supra note 1S7 and accompanying text. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 109 

doctrine wisely acknowledges the interests ofstate sovereignty, 


punctures a dubious legal fiction ofimplied consent, and encourages 


states to put their agreements in writing, the doctrine nevertheless offers 


a principled and useful approach to achieving accountability and order 


in the ranks. This approach is simply to apply, on foreign soil, United 


States military criminal law and process, which commanders, 


operational lawyers, and soldiers know well.352 The doctrine supports a 


commander's decision to discipline a soldier who commits an offense 


10 days after the deployment but before President Aristide has returned 


to power and before a status offorces agreement can be signed. 


1. Seek Court-Martial Convening Authority for the Joint Task 


Force Commander Over All Members ofthe Joint Task Force. 


Discipline and effectiveness in a military force are achieved through 

unity of command. Unity of command means "that all the forces are 

under one responsible commander," and "[i]t requires a single 

commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of 

a unified purpose."353 This time-honored principle ofmilitary 

operations provided much ofthe motive force behind the move toward 

joint commands in the United States military.354 It also accounts for the 

long tradition by which the senior military commander in an area of 

operations has been empowered to convene military tribunals to hear all 

cases arising in that area and to enforce general orders throughout his 

command.355 The successive joint task force commanders of United 

m See DEP'TOF ARMY, PAMPHLET27-173, TRIAL PROCEDURE, para. 7-3 (31Dec.1992) 

(construing The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7Cranch)l16, 144, 147 (1812), and 

explaining that case as the basis for implying-in MCM, supra note 157, R.C.M. 20l(d)(3}­

immunity of visiting forces from criminal jurisdiction ofa foreign power during peacetime). 

353 See FM 100-5, supra note 13, at 2-5. Military doctrine modifies but does not scrap 

this principle during operations other than war. See id. at 13-4 (describing the principle of"unity 

of effort"). 

354 See supra note 29. 

355See, e.g., 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 299, 305 (1865) ("The commander ofan army in time of 

war has the same power to organize military tribunals and execute their judgments that he has to 

set his squadrons in the field and fight battles."); 2 w. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND 

PRECEDENTS 798-830 (2d ed. 1896); JOHN A. APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND 
110 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

States servicemembers in Haiti-Lieutenant General Shelton, Major 

General Meade, and Major General Fisher-sought unity of command 

by issuing or reissuing General Order Number 1, reprinted at Appendix 

U. By creating a uniform set ofrules pertaining to things such as 

alcohol consumption, sexual contact with the Haitian populace, and the 

taking of souvenirs, a general order also serves the related but distinct 

interests ofjustice and troop morale, as soldiers situated equally are 

treated equally.356 

Operational and political factors will often be the most important 

influences in establishing a task force structure, but judge advocates 

must advise on the legal considerations and rules bearing upon unity of 

command. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, General 

Schwartzkopf was the senior commander in the area of operations and 

the signer of an earlier version of General Order Number 1.357 As a 

unified combatant commander, he possessed statutory authority to 

convene courts-martial for trial ofmembers from every service and 

assigned to every subordinate headquarters. 358 Thus, if a marine corps 

corporal or an Army special forces sergeant had violated General 

Order Number I by consuming alcohol, General Schwartzkopf could 

have, ifhe deemed necessary, withheld the authority ofsubordinate 

commanders over the offense and disposed ofthe offense himself. This 

arrangement fully served the interests of unity of command. 

INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 320-21 ( 1954); A. Wigfall Green, The Military Commission, 42 AM. J. 

INT'L L. 832, 834 ( 1948). 

356 See RoGER SCRUTON, DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 244 ( 1983) (attributing to 

Aristotle the notion that justice means 'treating equals equally'). 

357 See Huffman Remarks, supra note 118. Brigadier General Huffman was StaffJudge 

Advocate, United States Army Vllth Corps, a unit subject to General Order 1 during the Persian 

Gulf Conflict, and later was StaffJudge Advocate for CENTCOM, which continued to use the 

identical order in later operations. 

358 See UCMJ art. 22(a)(3); MCM, supra note 157, R.C.M. 20l(e)(2)(A). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 111 

By contrast, the senior commanders in the area of operations in 


Haiti were joint task force commanders, whose authority to convene 


general courts-martial over members of sister services must come from 


the Secretary of Defense, and whose authority to convene lesser. courts 


must come from the unified combatant commander-in-chief.359 These 


joint task force commanders retained authority in their capacity as corps 


or division commanders over soldiers in their original commands,360 but 


the marine corps corporal and the special forces sergeant assigned to, 


attached to, or under the operational control of the joint task force fell 


outside their reach.361 While the original chain of command ofthese 


servicemembers could choose to enforce the joint task force 


commander's general order, unity of command was frustrated on 


several occasions. 362 


359 MCM, supra note 157, R.C.M. 20l(e)(2)(B) & (C). 

360 See UCMJ, art 22(a)(5); see also Memorandum, Major General George A. Fisher, 

Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division (Light) and U.S. Anny, Hawaii, APVG-CG, to The 

Judge Advocate General, subject: Request for Designation as General Court-Martial Convening 

Authority (13 Dec. 1994) (seeking general court-martial convening authority for a brigadier 

general to be placed in temporary command of 25th Infantry Division (Light) (Rear) and U.S. 

Anny, Hawaii), request granted by Action, Secretary ofthe Anny Togo West (Jan. 6, 1995) (''The 

Commander, 25th Infantry Division (Light) (Rear). is designated by me, pursuant to the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice, Article 22(a)(8), a general court-martial convening authority, effective 2 

January 1995.") (copies on file with CLAMO). When deploying commanders take their 

convening authority with them, it becomes attractive, if not necessary, to seek separate convening 

authority for the commander remaining in the rear. 361 See 600-20, supra note 284, para. 2-l 2b ("In general, court-martial jurisdiction by a 

member of one Armed Force over members of another should be exercised only when the accused 

cannot be delivered to the Armed Force ofwhich the individual is a member without injury to the 

Service. Commanders ofjoint commands or joint task forces who have authority to convene 

general courts-martial may convene a court-martial for the trial of members of another Armed 

Force when specifically empowered by the President or Secretary of Defense to refer such cases for 

trial by courts-martial."). 

362 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 14 ("Commanders of future joint 

operations need UCMJ authority over all military members ofthe joint command in order to 

enforce their general orders and to maintain morale, good order, and discipline."); Memorandum 

from Captain John Bickers, Senior Defense Counsel, United States Anny Trial Defense Service, 

Fort Drum Field Office, AFZA-IDS, to Regional Defense Counsel, Region I, Fort Meade, 

Maryland, subject: After-Action Report-Operation Uphold/Maintain Democracy, para. 4 (2 Feb. 

1995) [hereinafter Bickers Memorandum] (copy on file with CLAMO) ("There was an additional 

problem with the application of the general order: there was a widespread belief, unfortunately 

supported by the facts, that it was applied unevenly."); Interview with Captain John M. Bickers, 
112 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Early dialogue between the StaffJudge Advocates for the task 

force and the combatant command can identify and address these 

issues. The Commander-in-Chief ofthe combatant command has the 

power and duty to structure court-martial convening authority with 

respect to a joint task force.363 His StaffJudge Advocate will thus 

consider the myriad unique factors pertinent to command structure and 

court-martial convening authority within a particular concept of 

operation. Consultation with the StaffJudge Advocate for the task 

force commander will provide valuable information on some ofthese 

unique factors. In addition, both ofthese staff officers can increase the 

likelihood that the structure of convening authority ultimately adopted 

respects the principle of unity of command. 

2. Emphasize to Soldiers That Neither General Guidance 

from the President Nor Personal Feelings About Atrocities Will 

Justify Disobedience. The deployment to Haiti was not the first and 

will not be the last deployment in which American soldiers may 

encounter evidence of war crimes364 or violations of humanitarian laws 

committed by a regime against its own citizens.365 Yet a court-martial 

Fonner Trial Defense Counsel in Haiti, in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (October 16, 1995); O'Brien 

Interview, supra note 46; cf Bob Schacochis, Our Two Armies in Haiti: Green Berets and 

Infantry, TALLAHASSEE STAR TRIBUNE, Jan. 10, 1995, at 9A (discerning two armies, one 

conventional the other unconventional, in the same task force); Interview with Colonel Joe 

Graves, Fonner StaffJudge Advocate for 21st Theater Anny Area Command and for the Joint 

Task Force carrying out Operation Provide Comfort in 1991, in Charlottesville, VA (Sept. 6, 

1995) (noting that commanders ofspecial operations forces during that operation sought to use 

preexisting UCMJ authority for military justice matters). 

363 See 10 U.S.C. § 164 (c)(G) (1988). 

364 As used here, the term "war crimes" denotes only violations ofthe laws or customs of 

war, see, e.g., 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW§§ 252-52 (7th ed., H. Lauterpacht, 1955), 

as opposed to "Crimes Against Peace" and "Crimes Against Humanity" as those terms have been 

defined since 1945, see Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6, annexed to the 

Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment ofthe Major War Criminals ofthe European 

Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter]. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 113 


arising out ofmilitary operations in Haiti squarely raised the issue 

whether a soldier's personal interpretation ofbroad policy 

pronouncements about human rights violations or his own religious and 

philosophical views could justify disregard of command orders. They 

cannot. 

The accused was United States Army Captain Lawrence 

Rockwood, a counterintelligence officer assigned to the I 0th Mountain 

Division with place ofduty in Haiti at the Combined Joint Task Force 

190 Headquarters, located in the Light Industrial Complex in Port-auPrince.366 On the evening of 30 September 1994, Captain Rockwood 

was scheduled for duty as the senior officer in charge ofthe J-2 

Counter-Intelligence Human Intelligence Cell in the Headquarters. A 

perimeter wall surrounded the secure compound that included the 

Headquarters, and security guards imposed on those seeking to leave 

the compound a minimum oftwo vehicles per convoy and two persons 

per vehicle. Captain Rockwood, armed with a loaded M-16 rifle, 

avoided the security guards by jumping over the perimeter wall. Then 

he traveled about six kilometers to the National Penitentiary, where 

Haitian authorities had remained responsible for the prisoners, and 

demanded entry. After learning that Captain Rockwood was making an 

unannounced appearance at the prison, Major Lane, the military attache 

at the United States embassy, went to the prison in order to prevent an 

altercation. Captain Rockwood then insulted Major Lane and 

denounced the chain of command, claiming that President Clinton's 

televised speech on 15 September gave him authority to prevent human 

rights abuses. About two hours later, Major Lane succeeded in calming 

365 See London Charter, supra note 364, at art. 6 (defining Crimes Against Humanity); 

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime of Genocide, opened for signature 

Dec. 11, 1948, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, reprinted in 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (Supp. 1951) [hereinafter 

Genocide Convention] (defining genocide as killing and other acts "committed with intent to 

destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group"). 

366 Unless otherwise noted, the information in this paragraph and the two following it is 

based upon the 14 volume record of trial ofUnited States v. Rockwood (10th Mountain Div. 22 

Apr. & 8-14 May 1995) (copy on file with CLAMO). 
114 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Captain Rockwood down, convinced him to unchamber the round in his 

rifle, and got him to leave the prison. 

The charges consisted offailure to go to his place of duty at the 

Headquarters on the evening of30 September;367 violation of an order 

not to leave the compound without the proper convoy;368 dereliction in 

performance of duty to leave only in a proper convoy;369 going from his 

place of duty at the hospital ward to which he was taken after leaving 

the prison;370 disrespect to Lieutenant Colonel Bragg, whom he 

confronted and shouted down after leaving the hospital;371 disobedience 

to Lieutenant Colonel Bragg, who repeatedly had ordered him to "stop 

talking," and to "lower his voice" during the post-hospital 

confrontation;372 and conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman for 

the entire course of events leading up to his departure from the 

prison.373 On 14 May 1995, a general court-martial in Fort Drum, New 

York found Captain Rockwood guilty of all but the two charges 

pertaining to the convoy procedures. It sentenced him to dismissal and 

total forfeiture ofpay and allowances. 

The case is instructive, and its facts and legal principles bear 

emphasis with deploying soldiers. 374 The transcript ofCaptain 

Rockwood's May 1995 statement before a Congressional 

subcommittee, reprinted at Appendix V, contains many ofthe arguments 

the accused and counsel forwarded at his court-martial. Appendix V 

367 See VCMJ art. 86. 

368 See VCMJ art 92. 

369 See UCMJ art 92. 

370 See VCMJ art 86. 

371 See VCMJ art 89. 

372 See VCMJ art. 90. 

373 See UCMJ art. 133. 

374 See UCMJ art. 137 (requiring explanation ofthe UCMJ to enlisted members upon 

entrance on active duty, 6 months later, and then again upon reenlistment). Many commands 

require periodic briefings of all personnel to ensure compliance with article 137. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 115 


also reprints contrasting testimony from a retired judge advocate 

Colonel, who provided the subcommittee a well-reasoned summary of 

why, in the end, Captain Rockwood's affirmative defenses of duress 

and justification failed. 375 

3. Be Prepared to Conduct Courts-Martial in the Area of 

Operations. Five of the six courts-martial arising out ofthe Haiti 

deployment were held in the United States.376 The decision as to where 

the courts should be held must take into account the location of 

witnesses and other evidence, the likely duration of deployment and the 

concomitant effect that duration will have on witness availability, the 

ability of counsel, military judge, and court reporters to complete their 

myriad pre-trial and trial duties in primitive facilities that must be 

equipped and prepared from scratch, and the alternative demands on the 

court personnel and resources proposed for deployment. 377 Primarily 

because the deployment was short for any given unit and because 

essential witnesses generally did not include Haitian nationals, these 

factors militated in favor of trials back in the United States. 

375 The case has stirred great media interest, further establishing the Haiti intervention as 

a media extravaganza. See, e.g. Lawrence Di Rita, Court martial With Haitian Policy Links, THE 

WASHINGTON TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at Al7; Bob Gorman, The Beatification ofCapt. Lawrence 

Rockwood, WATERTOWN DAILY NEWS, May 7, 1995, at GI; Captain Won't Let Charges Be 

Dropped, THEWASHINGTON TIMES, May 9, 1995, at A 7; Francis X. Clines, American Officer's 

Mission for Haitian Rights Backfires, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1995, at Al; Incident in Haiti Brings 

Dismissal ofArmy Captain, WASH. POST, May 16, 1995, at AlO; The Real Lesson ofthe 

Rockwood Case: U.S. Military Interventions Wi/J Require Special Human Rights Training, Los 

ANGELES TIMES, May 16, 1995; Court-Martialed Officer Gets Rights Award, N.Y. TIMES, May 

19, 1995, at 22; Colonel David H. Hackworth, When Duty and Conscience Clash: Why Warriors 

Shouldn't Follow Blindly, NEWSWEEK, May 22, 1995, at 38; David H. Hackworth, 'Kangaroo 

Court' Ends Career ofExemplary Officer, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, May 25, 1995, at 

27A; Ron Lajoie, A Soldier's Story, AMNESTY ACTION, Summer 1995, at 6; Harry Summers, The 

ACLU and the 'Dogs ofWar,' WASH. TIMES, June 1, 1995, at Al9. 

376 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 13-14; O'Brien Interview, supra 

note 46. 

377 See OP. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 17-1to17-2. 
116 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Yet our doctrine encourages courts-martial to be held as far 

f01ward as possible, throughout the operational continuum.378 The 

design ofthe military justice system supports that doctrine. 379 

Discipline and justice may depend on the ability to convene a courtmartial and try an accused in a foreign host nation, where the court can 

hear all relevant and available testimony, and where the visibility ofthe 

process can encourage lawful conduct in the other soldiers in the 

command. The court-martial held in Haiti also served the salutary 

purpose of exercising the personnel and procedures ofthe military 

justice system that must continue to be used so that due process can be 

achieved in harsh and demanding conditions. 380 

J. Legal Assistance. 

The deployment ofthousands of military personnel to Haiti 

confirmed that legal assistance is a key readiness tool. A soldier's 

effectiveness during a military operation is a function oftraining, 

physical fitness, leadership, weaponry, intelligence, and supply. Yet it 

378 See FM 27-100, supra note 9, at para. 6-4c ("Usually, courts-martial will be 


conducted in the accused's unit's area ofoperations. Trying courts-martial as far forward as 


possible will minimize disruption ofthe unit, provide better availability ofwitnesses, and speed 


the administration of military justice."). 


379 See, e.g .. UCMJ art. 26 (stating that "(a] military judge shall be a commissioned 


officer of the armed forces"); UCMJ art. 27 (b) (stating that trial counsel and defense counsel 


detailed for a general court-martial must be judge advocates). 


380 This was United States v. Pacheco (10th Mountain Div. 1-3 Jan. 1995) (copy ofrecord 

on file with the Office ofthe Staff Judge Advocate, l 0th Mountain Div., Fort Drum, NY). A 

general court-martial found Specialist Pacheco guilty of larceny of a .357 caliber Desert Eagle 

pistol and dereliction ofduty in that he stole the pistol while on guard duty. The court-martial 

·sentenced him to be reduced to the grade of El, to forfeit all pay and allowances, to be confined 

for six months, and to be discharged from the service with a Bad Conduct Discharge. The trial 

counsel in the case observed that trial of Specialist Pacheco in Port-au-Prince had a visible and 

favorable impact on discipline in the command. See O'Brien Interview, supra note 46. But cf 

generally Bickers Memorandum, supra note 362, at para. 6 (The trial went fairly smoothly, but 

there may be a built-in ineffectiveness claim in that the soldier represented by a TDS counsel went 

to trial in Haiti (over strong objection) while the soldier who retained civilian counsel was able to 

avoid trial there."). See also generally Colonel Keith H. Hodges, former Circuit Judge, Second 

Judicial Circuit, United States Army Trial Judiciary, Notes on Trying Cases in Haiti (5 Dec. 1994) 

(copy on file with CLAMO) (describing practical aspects of conducting the trial). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 117 


is also a function of his or her ability to focus undivided attention on the 

mission. Disputes with landlords or creditors, marital difficulties, tax 

filing deadlines, fears about a potentially adverse or costly 

administrative action, concerns about the hardships that death might 

bring to surviving family members-these and other personal legal 

problems can consume the attention of soldiers, reduce individual 

efficiency, and create discipline problems. 

In addition, as with other benefits provided to soldiers, legal 

assistance makes a small but significant contribution to the military's 

efforts to retain experienced and skilled soldiers. Observers have 

emphasized that success in Haiti was due in part to the base of 

experience many deployed soldiers and units enjoyed.381 Success in 

future operations may depend upon how well the package ofpay, 

advancement opportunities, and other benefits affects retention rates. 

The majority of Americans are unwilling to endure the sacrifices the 

military demands ofits uniformed men and women. According to 

Department ofDefense surveys, less than 25 percent of eligible males 

are interested in joining the military.382 Only 17 percent ofthose who 

do join are willing to serve for 20 years.383 

Along with pay and entitlements, a sound apparatus of group life 

insurance, free medical care, counseling services, and recreational 

opportunities for families, legal assistance helped mitigate the great 

personal and family sacrifices the deployment to Haiti entailed. It may 

have been the most important contribution judge advocates made to the 

operations, and it consisted of thousands of individual letters, 

381 See, e.g., CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VOL. I, supra note 214, at l; cf. UNITED STATES 

ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND, CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL), THE 

U.S. ARMY AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: HAITI INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VOL. III, at 224 (Jul. 

1995) [hereinafter CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VOL. III] ("The JAG operation with the MNF 

benefited greatly by having attorneys assigned with experience in OOTW and intelligence law."). 

382 THE RETIRED OFFICERS AsSOCIA TION, SHEDDING LIGHT ON THE FACTS: READINESS, 

ENTITLEMENTS, AND THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 4 (Dec. 1994). 

383 See id. 
118 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

documents, interviews, filings, and other tasks. These tasks contributed 

to military effectiveness because individual legal assistance attomeysoperational lawyers all-consistently employed compassion as well as 

legal acumen in performing their duties. 

1. Expect the Rush in Demand for Wills. The 10th Mountain 

Division and the other units notified of impending service in Haiti 

profited from having sound soldier readiness programs. Close and 

continuous coordination with the Chief of the Military Personnel 

Division ofthe division staff G-1 element and the other members ofthe 

Soldier Readiness Processing Team had resulted in effective 

assessments of soldier readiness during in-processing, during annual 

checkups, and during emergency deployment readiness exercises 

(EDRE's).384 In particular, the judge advocates manning Station 6, the 

designated legal station, provided detailed guidance at Station 5, the 

finance station, 385 to ensure soldiers were fully informed before 

designating individual, trust, or estate beneficiaries under the 

Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Program.386 

Yet even an efficient system ofreadiness checks did not preclude 

a surge of demand for legal services when units received official notice 

384 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 15-16; Wishard Interview, supra 

note 72. 

385 See DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 600-8~101, PERSONNEL PROCESSING, Table 5-1 (26 Feb. 

1993) (depicting the steps and work centers by which a soldier completes the readiness check). 

386 See DEP'TOF ARMY, REG. 600-8-1, ARMY CASUALTY OPERATIONS/ASSISTANCE 

/INSURANCE, paras. 11-29 to 11-30 (20 Oct. 1994) (stating that soldiers may no longer designate 

beneficiaries "By Law" or "By Will" and providing guidance on how to counsel a soldier on the 

naming of beneficiaries); THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL's SCHOOL, JA 272, DEPLOYMENT 

GUIDE, at 3-28 to 3-31 (Feb. 1994) [hereinafter JA 272] (including sample language for the 

designation of individual and trust beneficiaries). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 119 

ofdeployment.387 For instance, judge advocates in the 10th Mountain 


Division prepared and supervised the execution of about 1600 wills at 


the around-the-clock soldier readiness check site. These were 


predominantly simple wills that excluded trusts or specific bequests. 


Soldiers with families or more complicated estates and preferences 


were handled by exception, through individual appointments at the legal 


assistance office. By contrast to this predeployment surge, judge 


advocates from the 10th Mountain Division drafted only 12 wills in 


Haiti. 


Expect the predeployment surge. Ensure that all judge advocate 

personnel are trained to use the Minuteman will program on the Legal 

Assistance module ofthe Legal Automation Armywide System. 388 

Exercise setup procedures, equipment, and legal personnel during 

EDRE's. Know the locations, capabilities, and willingness of 

individual mobilization augmentee (IMA) judge advocates to serve 

during the predeployment period. 389 Coordinate with the local bar for 

estate planning assistance. None ofthese measures would be novel,390 

but Haiti illustrated that old problems are as challenging as new ones. 

2. Educate Soldiers That Deployment Does Not Dissolve Their 

Debts. Although it is difficult to determine conclusively why at least 

50 soldiers who deployed for Uphold Democracy required legal 

assistance for debt-related issues, the attorneys who represented the 

soldiers surmise that part ofthe problem may be a misunderstanding of 

the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act.391 That Act suspends 

387 The information in this paragraph is based on 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 

108, at 15-16. 

388 See DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 27-3, THE ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (30 Sept. 

1990). 

389 See infra subpart IJI.N.l. 

390 See, e.g., DSAT REPORT, supra note 3, at Legal Assistance-I to Legal Assistance-24. 

391 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 15; Wishard Interview, supra note 

72; Gordon Interview, supra note 220. 
120 CENTER FOR LAWAND WLITARY OPERATIONS 

enforcement of civil liabilities in certain cases "in order to enable 

[persons in military service] to devote their entire energy to the defense 

needs ofthe Nation."392 With respect to reserve component personnel 

called to active duty, certain types ofsuspension provided by the Act 

may occasionally translate to permanent monetary gain, as when a 

preexisting loan establishes an interest rate higher than six percent.393 In 

cases involving soldiers who incurred civil liabilities while on active 

duty, however, the Act's provisions truly work nothing more than a 

suspension ofproceedings.394 The Act's stay ofproceedings rule-well 

known to operational lawyers and frequently invoked in conversation 

by "barracks lawyers"-may be misinterpreted by soldiers to mean that 

deployment will automatically excuse them from paying bills or 

appearing in court. 

Soldier readiness checks provide a good opportunity to explain 


the limits ofthe protections provided by the SSCRA. 395 Ensure that 


392 See 50 U.S.C. App.§ 510; guide at 1-4. 

393 In such a case, 50 U.S.C. App. § 526 (1988 & Supp.) arguably limit the rate to 6 

percent for the period of active duty. Creditors cannot respond by changing terms of existing 

credit arrangement. See 50 U.S.C. App.§ 518 (1988 & Supp.); Major James P. Pottorf, Soldier' 

and Sailors' Civil ReliefAct Note: The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil ReliefAct Amendments of 

1991, ARMY LAW., May 1991, at 46, 47-48. 

394 Moreover, even to obtain a stay ofproceedings, care must be taken to invoke the Act 

without the court deeming the soldier to have made an appearance and thus to have waived the 

Act's protections. See OP. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 19-6 (recommending that requests 

for stays of civil proceedings should be made via letter from the soldier's commanding officer). 

395 The opposite problem is that soldiers may not know the protections are there. The 

I 0th Mountain Division reported that several soldiers unnecessarily defaulted judgments in 

paternity and custody suits. See Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Gordon, Former Deputy Staff 

Judge Advocate for MNF Haiti, Remarks Before the Haiti After Action Review Conference in 

Charlottesville, VA (May 8, 1995) (videotape on file with CLAMO) [hereinafter Gordon 

Remarks]. 

Of course, even clients entitled to relief and receiving sound legal advice may opt not to 

pursue remedies in court. One example arose out ofthe deployment to Somalia. In December 

1993, a soldier deployed to Somalia to participate in Operation Restore Hope. His spouse vacated 

their apartment in January 1994 and left the state with all the couple's household goods. She 

failed to pay the rent. After posting a Notice of Motion for Judgment on the apartment door, the 

apartment manager obtained a default judgment against the soldier. The court had failed to 
LAWAND WLITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 121 

Station 6 is large enough and contains enough seats to permit a short 

class to be given to groups of soldiers who are awaiting completion of 

processing elsewhere. During this class, emphasize that the Army 

requires soldiers to manage their personal affairs satisfactorily and to 

pay their debts promptly. 396 Deployment does not eliminate this 

requirement. Also use this opportunity to mention the commander's 

obligation not to settle disputed debts and to insist that creditors meet 

all conditions before receiving help in debt processing. Such a class 

should supplement rather than replace all of the other elements of the 

preventive law program,397 but its use could clear up a variety of 

common legal misunderstandings while also stimulating soldiers to ask 

questions and resolve other legal concerns. 

Of course, debt disputes often result from an inability to pay 

rather than a misunderstanding of the obligation to do so. This deeper 

problem challenges judge advocates and other providers of family 

services to equip soldiers and spouses with budgeting skills, debt 

restructuring, and a clear understanding of the career and life 

consequences of failing to ensure inflows exceed outflows. 398 During 

the deployment to Haiti, many families' financial matters came under 

ensure filing of the affidavit required by the SSCRA, see 50 U.S.C. App. § 520, thus entitling the 

soldier to move the court to reopen the judgment. His Army legal assistance attorney counseled 

him to take advantage ofthis available remedy, but the soldier, electing to ''put it behind him," 

paid the judgment, including court costs. He was denied access to his credit union account for 

almost two weeks while the matter was being addressed. See generally Memorandum, Lieutenant 

Colonel Craig Reinold, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, United States Army Training and Doctrine 

Command, ATJA, to Deputy Director, CLAMO, subject: SSCRA Case (7 Dec. 1995) (copy on file 

with CLAMO). 

396 See DEP'TOF AR.MY, REG. 600-15, INDEBTEDNESS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, para. 1-5 

(14 Mar. 1986). 

397 DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 27-3, THE ARMY PREVENTIVE LAW PROGRAM, para. 3-4 (30 

Sept. 1992) [hereinafter AR 27-3]. 

398 See, e.g., DEP'TOF ARMY, REG. 608-1, ARMY COMMUNITY SERVICE PROGRAMS, para. 

9-3 (30 Oct. 1990) (describing the basic prevention education program, the financial counseling 

program, and the debt liquidation assistance program); David D. Lennon, Bankruptcy Overview 

for Military Legal Assistance Attorneys (1992) (on file in the library ofThe Judge Advocate 

General's School). 
122 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

great strain because the civilian spouse suddenly inherited the 

responsibility to balance the checkbook while lacking the skills or the 

maturity to make ends meet. 399 For young spouses in Fort Drum, 

financial difficulties often combined with anxieties over spending a first 

winter away from home in a region where heavy snowfalls are 

400 common.

3. Discourage General Powers ofAttorney. Soldiers often 

seek to lessen the inconveniences that confront loved ones back home 

by providing them powers of attorney. Legal assistance offices, 

deployable footlockers, and the LAAWS legal assistance module ensure 

a healthy supply of these forms. Yet while foresight about personal 

matters at home is commendable, the general power of attorney is 

frequently too blunt an instrument to accomplish soldiers' purposes. As 

with other deployments in recent years, military operations in Haiti 

produced their share of gross abuses by attorneys-in-fact who possessed 

general powers.401 

Encourage soldiers to create special rather than general powers 

of attorney. Explain the misunderstandings that can develop when 

many miles and many weeks come between people who initially share 

great mutual affection and trust.402 Instruct upon the procedures one 

must take to revoke a power of attomey.403 Cite a few real-world cases 

in which powers were abused.404 A healthy relationship will not fall 

399 See Gordon Remarks, supra note 395. 

400 Id. 

401 See10th Mountain AAR, supra note 108, at 15-16. 

402 See DEP'T OF ARMY' REG. 27-26, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS, 

Rule 2.1 ( l May 1992) ("In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 

considerations, such as moral, economic, social, and political factors, that may be relevant to the 

client's situation, but not in conflict with the law."). 

403 See, e.g .• JA 272, supra note 386, at 3-32 to 3-33. 

404 One such case involved a client of Lieutenant Colonel Mark Rassas, U.S.A.R., highly 

respected Clarksville trial attorney and Chief of Legal Assistance, Fort Campbell, Kentucky 

during Operations Desert Shield and Storm. The client was a staff sergeant, married but 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 123 

into disrepair or distrust over the judicious granting of a power of 

attorney, particularly when one emphasizes that each member of any 

mature association remains responsible for certain personal obligations. 

Such counsel can help prevent soldiers from giving powers lightly.405 

childless, who deployed to Saudi Arabia with the IOlst Airborne Division (Air Assault) in late 

1990. The spouse remained in the Fort Campbell area and possessed a general power of attorney 

that the staff sergeant had obtained from the legal assistance office and delivered to the spouse 

prior to deployment. In the space of a few months, the spouse used the power of attorney to 

purchase a home, a new car, and elaborate furnishings. The spouse then abandoned the home, 

taking the car and many of the furnishings to another state. The soldier-who sought legal 

assistance in the spring of 1991 and at that time became Lieutenant Colonel Rassas' clientreturned to find no money in the joint checking account held with the spouse. This staff sergeant 

also faced numerous creditors who were unhappy not only because payments on the furnishings 

and automobiles had lapsed, but because the property in which they held security interests had 

vanished. Even as the country was celebrating the battlefield victory over Saddam Hussein's 

forces, this combat veteran was preparing to file a petition in bankruptcy court. See generally 

Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Mark Rassas (6 Dec. 1995). 

Similar cases arise in all military services, and may involve abuse ofspecial powers. A 

young airman stationed at Hurlburt Field, Florida, about to deploy to Saudi Arabia for 6 months in 

1991, obtained a special power of attorney for his girlfriend so that she could manage his financial 

affairs while he was out of the United States. Though he was advised of the potential risks 

involved, the airman nevertheless insisted that he wanted the girlfriend to have the ability to 

access money in his accounts. Toward the end of the deployment, letters from his girlfriend 

stopped, and the airman began to receive calls from his First Sergeant regarding inquiries from 

creditors about delinquent bills. Upon return from the deployment, the airman learned that the 

girlfriend had removed all funds from the checking and savings accounts and moved to California 

with another man. See Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Cochet, U.S.A.F.R., and 

Labor Counselor, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, A TJA, to Deputy 

Director, Center for Law and Military Operations, subject: Powers ofAttorney (7 Dec. 1995) 

(copy on file with CLAMO). 

405 Space considerations preclude extensive treatment of other legal assistance issues that 

arose during military operations in Haiti. One of these was the deployment of the 25th Infantry 

Division (Light) during income tax filing season. As mentioned in note 299, supra, the Internal 

Revenue Service granted service members an extension to file 1994 tax returns. The Armed 

Forces Tax Council, Office of the Under Secretary ofDefense for Personnel & Readiness, formally 

obtained the extension. See Letter, Mr. Thomas J. Smith, Director, International District 

Operations, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service to Colonel Tom Abbey, 

Executive Director, Armed Forces Tax Council (9 Jan. 1995) (stating that the Service "will 

automatically provide an extension of time to file until December 15, 1995 for those members 

serving in [Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, or Surinam] on or after March 15, 1995) (copy on file 

with CLAMO). Judge advocates preparing for deployment coordinated heavily with the 

committee and argued persuasively and energetically for the extension. Yet the extension was not 

granted until 9 January, and Division troops were slated to depart in the early days ofJanuary. 
124 CENTER FOR LAWAND WLITARY OPERATIONS 

K. Administrative Law. 

One authority defines military administrative law as "the body of 

statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions that govern the 

establishment, functioning, and command ofmilitary organizations.''4°6 

This broad definition suggests that administrative law forms a massive 

subset of operational law-namely the entire domestic law component. 

Procurement and fiscal law appear to fall within administrative law 

thus defined, as do environmental, claims, labor, and even criminal law. 

Yet scholars and practitioners always treat criminal law sui 

generis because ofthe distinct procedures, forums, rules of evidence, 

and historical precedents that pertain to dispensing punitive sanctions. 

To take maximum advantage ofthe time before departure, the Staff Judge Advocate for 

the 25th Infantry Division personally coordinated with the Internal Revenue Service and 

persuaded an official in its electronic filing section to allow the command's soldiers to file their 

taxes early using only their Leave and Earnings Statements. The command implemented an 

accelerated training schedule for tax center personnel and began preparing and filing deploying 

soldiers' taxes under an "Express Tax Service" program. In a few days' time, 500 ofthe first 

wave of 1,200 deploying soldiers filed their returns electronically under this program. Finally, the 

command obtained an exception from the tax software manufacturer to the site licensing 

agreement (which initially allowed the electronic filing software to be used in Hawaii only), see 

Letter, Scott Crowley, Director of Sales, Drake Software, to Captain Erica Dunn, Fort Shafter, 

Hawaii (Dec. 7, 1995) (permitting copying and installation of software diskettes "for the purposes 

of assisting the military operations in Haiti" and stating that "[n]o payment is necessary for the 

used of this software in the Haiti operation") (copy on file with CLAMO), and subsequently 

brought the software to Haiti. 

Although judge advocates prepared tax returns in Haiti using the software, electronic 

filing was frustrated due to the inadequacy of telephone lines. As a result, soldiers filing from 

Haiti mailed in their returns. See generally Memorandum, Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, 

25th Infantry Division (Light) and U.S. Army, Hawaii, APVG-JA,, to Center for Law and 

Military Operations, JAGS-CLAMO, subject: Comments to Draft Version ofHaiti Lessons 

Learned for Judge Advocates, para. lb (24 Oct. 1995) (copy on file with CLAMO); Office ofthe 

Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division (Light) and U.S. Army, Hawaii, Staff 

Judge Advocate Newsletter, Vol. I-Family Edition: Haiti Deployment, at 3-6 (15 Dec. 1994) 

(detailing the express tax service and providing other useful guidance for family support during 

the deployment) (copy on file with CLAMO). 

406 DEP'T OF ARMY' PAMPHLET 27-21, ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL LAW HANDBOOK, para. 

1-1 (15 Mar. 1992). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS JN HAITL 1994-95 125 


Similarly, they tend to treat procurement law, claims, and many other 

subdisciplines that govern the functioning ofmilitary organizations 

separately. Separate treatment occurs over time partly due to the 

accumulation ofdistinct legal materials and partly due to chance 

evolution oforganizational and management legal structures. Today, 

the term administrative law usefully groups a number of important 

topics that for one reason or another have not formed major separate 

branches of their own.407 

The best rule ofthumb in anticipating operational administrative 

law questions is to assume that if an issue arises in a peacetime 

installation context, it will arise in the context of deployment.408 The 

command continued to promote, reduce, and separate personnel.409 It 

made line of duty determinations, responded to requests for information 

under the Freedom of Information Act, protected disclosure ofpersonal 

information in accordance with the Privacy Act, observed ethical 

restrictions, and surveyed lost property.410 It executed leases ofHaitian 

property,411 conducted urinalysis testing oftroops,412 inspected local 

407 See id. (surveying the law ofmilitary installations, military assistance to civil 

authorities, federal litigation, environmental law, military personnel law, line ofduty, civilian 

personnel law, government information practices, the report of survey system, nonappropriated 

fund instrumentalities and private organizations, standards ofconduct, and administrative due 

process); OP. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at ch. 16 (discussing conscientious objectors, 

environmental law, gifts, reports ofsurvey, and 15-6 investigations); DSAT REPORT, supra note 3, 

at Administrative Law-I to Administrative Law-IO & Issues 8, 32, 69, 111, 182, 237, 260, 329, 

330, 383, 412, 436, 517, 583, 587, 608, 620, 639 (discussing conscientious objectors, reserve 

component status and mobilization, citizenship, war trophies, executive agency and its impact on 

warfighting, fratricide, gifts to the army, inadequacy of soldier dependent care plans, stop loss, 

review of legislation, and disharmony among component regulations). 

408 Cf id at Administrative Law-I (quoting then Colonel Walter Huffman, Staff Judge 

Advocate for VII Corps as saying "[i]f it was an admin law problem at home station, it will be a 

problem in the theater ofoperations. You cannot ship enough admin law materials"). 

409 See Gordon Interview, supra note 220; Sposato Interview, supra note 216. 

410 See id. 

411 See, e.g., Memorandum, Major General George A. Fisher, Commander of MNF Haiti, 

to Distribution A, subject: Occupation and Leasing of Facilities in Haiti (25 Jan. 1995) ("Several 

complaints have been received from local property owners that U.S. forces are currently occupying 

private property without the owner's permission, and/or a valid lease. Since we are in a 
126 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

sources of food for sanitary conditions,413 established policies for 

permitting Haitian vendors on United States military compounds,414 and 

much much more. The following three lessons learned are merely 

representative of a broad range of questions fielded by judge advocates 

supporting military operations in Haiti.415 

permissive environment, we must secure permission or execute a lease before any use ofproperty . 

. . The MNF Engineer real estate section is the only staff section authorized to execute leases on 

behalf ofthe U.S. Government.") (copy on file with CLAMO); Passar AAR, supra note 120, at 

para. 6e ("For claims founded on contractual (lease) agreements, I advised that such claims should 

be handled in accordance with AR 405-15. Where occupancy was not accompanied by an 

agreement, I advised that an agreement should be sought covering the entire period ofoccupancy, 

as the regulation instructs."). 

412 See 25th ID Lessons Learned Memorandum, supra note 120, at para. lb 

("Commanders must maintain the capability to test unit readiness through a urinalysis testing 

program during deployment. Testing capability is especially important in a deployed environment 

such as Haiti where drugs are readily available."). 

413 See Memorandum, Major General George A. Fisher, Commander, MNF Haiti, to 

Distribution A, subject: Food-Borne Illnesses, para. 2 (25 Jan. 1995) ("AR 40-657 Chapter 2, 

paragraph 2-3 specifically prohibits the purchase of foodstuffs from unapproved sources for troops 

to consume. Facilities which produce or store unprocessed and raw foods must be inspected by 

Veterinary Services to determine ifsanitary procedures are adequate.") (copy on file with 

CLAMO). 

414 See Memorandum, Major General George A. Fisher, Commander, MNF Haiti, to 

Distribution A, subject: Policy on Haitian Vendors on U.S. Military Compounds (25 Jan. 1995) 

(copy on file with CLAMO). 

415 At least one judge advocate encountered an environmental law issue: 

As redeployment approached, concerns were raised as to potential liability for 

environmental damage, such as that arguably created by the sewage disposal at 

one site done under the LOGCAP contract. I ascertained that although 

Presidential Executive Order had extended NEPA applicability overseas, it did 

not create a cause of action for any violations. I also ascertained that the DoD 

Environmental Compliance directive did not apply in such contingency 

operations, as opposed to overseas locations where permanent installations exist. 

Mr. Bob Lingo ofAMCCC was most helpful in this regard, confirming the 

above conclusions and providing advice that we should simply continue to do the 

best we could, within reason, to prevent unnecessary damage to the (already 

disastrous) environment of Haiti-a common sense standard. 

See Passar AAR, supra note 120, at para. 6f; see also CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VOL. III, supra 

note 381 (describing a similar issue raised over the closing down of a multi-purpose range 

complex west ofPort-au-Prince). The same judge advocate also encountered a federal 

employment law issue: 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 127 


1. Advise Commander to Announce Clear and 

Straightforward Guidance on "War Trophies." Few things aroused 

such intense passion among troops in Haiti as war trophies or-to use a 

term more accurate for an operation other than war-deployment 

souvenirs. The Desert Storm Assessment Team Report identified 

similar interest in souvenirs among deployed troops during the Persian 

Gulfwar.416 The Report also identified inconsistent rules across units, 

noting that "[s]ome commands, e.g., the 82d Airborne Division, forbade 

all individual war trophies" while "[o]ther commands had varied, and 

occasionally changing rules."417 Many members of Congress shared the 

Desert Storm Assessment Team's recommendation that rules governing 

captured property be clarified. In 1993, Congress passed and the 

President signed legislation that requires soldiers to turn in to 

"appropriate personnel" all enemy material captured or found 

abandoned.418 This legislation contemplated an implementing 

Department of Defense Directive and service regulations, which 

Seeking to ensure compliance by civilians accompanying the force with General 

Order No. 1 and other prohibitions, e.g., the two-vehicle travel restriction, 

proved challenging. One civilian government employee who violated the latter 

restriction received a letter of reprimand from the JLSC Commander prior to my 

arrival and a second letter for a like infraction during my tour. My predecessor 

had advised the Commander on the issuance of the first letter, and though I 

understand that some questions were raised as to the procedure used (issuance by 

someone other than his direct supervisor) and the sanction imposed, i.e., the 

reprimand, I believe that this action was the only potentially effective tool 

available to the command to deal with this problem employee. I therefore 

concurred with the Commander's desire to issue the second such letter for a 

subsequent infraction, and prepared the letter. Of course, the employee was 

provided with a rebuttal opportunity. The letter was then forwarded to the 

employee's home station supervisor. 

See id. at para. 6i(i). See also infra subpart IIl.L.4, pertaining to remedies against civilians 

accompanying the force because they are employed by contractors. 

416 DSAT REPORT, supra note 3, at Operational Law-8. 


417 See id. 


m National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, § 1171, 107 Stat. 1765 

(1993) (codified at IO U.S.C. § 2579 (1988 & Supp.)). 
128 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

conceivably could have authorized the distribution of individual 

souvemrs. 

Although no such directive or regulations have yet been issued, 

general orders from the command filled the void in Haiti. Still, soldiers 

caught violating the clear provisions ofthose orders frequently claimed 

ignorance,419 a fact that urges efforts to get the word out through all 

available channels.420 All versions of General Order Number 1 

prohibited the "[t]aking or retention ofindividual souvenirs or 

trophies," and elaborated that 

(a) Private property may be seized during combat 

operations only on order of a commander based on military 

necessity. The wrongful taking ofprivate property, even 

temporarily, violates Article 121, UCMJ. 

(b) Public property captured by US personnel is the 

property ofthe US. Wrongful retention ofsuch property 

by an individual violates Article 108, UCMJ.421 

These provisions recognized that the law of war permits wartime 

takings ofproperty422 and that restrictions on conversion to personal use 

in a combat environment lie in domestic rather than international law. 

419 See, e.g., Passar AAR. supra note 120, at h(iv). 

420 See, e.g., Office ofthe Staff Judge Advocate, 25th Infantry Division (L) & U.S. 

Army, Hawaii, Legal Lightning Deployment Guide at 1-4 (6 Dec. 1994) (reprinting draft of 

General Order No. I, along with rules of engagement, claims accident standard operating 

procedure, accident form, and other legal guidance). 

421 See infra at Appendix U. 

422 See supra note 240. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHA/TL 1994-95 129 

The background legal regime differs in an operation other than 


war. Haitian public property that fell into the hands of United States 


soldiers remained Haitian public property, unless sold through the 


weapons buyback program.423 . General Order Number 1 covered 


noncombat souvenirs in a separate provision: 


(c) no weapon, munition, or military article of equipment 

captured or acquired by any means other than official issue 

may be retained for personal use or shipped out ofthe 

[joint operations area] for personal retention or control. 

Although it has a different international legal character, conduct that 

violated provision ( c) is nevertheless punishable under the Uniform 

Code ofMilitary Justice and several other federal laws. 

The topic ofunit souvenirs also generated questions. Many 

commanders requested that units be permitted to return to the United 

States with purchased weapons.424 United States Atlantic Command 

considered these requests in light of several criteria: intention to display 

the weapon in an existing national or unit museum; historical 

significance ofthe weapon; inoperability ofthe weapon; and 

accountability for the weapon on the inventory ofthe museum.425 

2. Brace for the Flood ofQuestions About Eligibility to Obtain 

Medical Care, Use the Post Exchange, and Travel in Military 

Aircraft. The peerless service support structure of the United States 

military will encounter great demand during operations other than war. 

Many ofthose seeking the available services will be foreign nationals 

423 See supra notes 137-138, and accompanying text. 

424 See Gordon Interview, supra note 220; Sposato Interview, supra note 216. 

425 See Memorandum, Major General George A. Fisher, Commander, MNF Haiti, MNFCG, to Distribution A, subject: Policy Memorandum-Retrograde of Historical Weapons (25 Jan. 

1995). 
130 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

and other individuals not normally eligible to receive them. The Army 

regulation governing medical care does not expressly provide for many 

categories ofindividuals who fell ill or sustained injuries in Haiti. 426 

However, it does authorize care for "persons outside the United States 

who are otherwise ineligible when a major overseas commander 

determines the care to be in the best interest ofthe United States.'t427 

Using this authority, and respecting an international agreement 

that entitled members ofthe United Nations Mission in Haiti to Medical 

Care, the Multinational Force authorized care to all MNF forces, to 

UNMIH personnel, to the International Police Monitors, and to 

Department of Defense c.ontractors supporting the operation.428 

However, other United States government personnel were generally 

excluded, as were United Nations personnel other than UNMIH 

forces.429 More generally, the MNF found it necessary to monitor 

closely its limited in-country medical assets. Judge advocates assisted 

in this process by coordinating with the local medical commander and 

the J-3 to ensure standards for use ofthese assets were principled, fair, 

and protective ofmission requirements. 430 

426 See DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 40-3, MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CARE, para. 4­

25 (15 Feb. 1985). 

427 See id 

428 See Memorandum, Colonel Samuel S. Thompson III, Director ofthe Combined Joint 

Staff, MNF Haiti, to Distribution A, subject: Guidelines for MNF Medical Care Entitlements (4 

Feb. 1995) (copy on file with CLAMO). 

429 See id; see also Office ofthe StaffJudge Advocate, MNF Haiti, Information Paper (26 

Jan. 1995) (providing information concerning eligibility for medical care and serving as the basis 

for the 4 February memorandum signed by Colonel Thompson). 

430 Evacuation ofHaitian nationals to United States hospitals when in-country medical 

capabilities were inadequate also posed an issue. The evacuee must be specifically named as a 

secretarial designee in order to be evacuated to and receive treatment in Department ofDefense 

health care facilities or in civilian medical facilities at government expense. See DEP'T OF 

DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE4515.13-R, AIR TRANSPORTATION ELIGIBILITY, at 5-2 (Nov. 1994). 

Command policy was to evacuate only those civilians whose injuries were the direct result ofMNF 

activities. See 25th ID Comments Memorandum, supra note 405, at para. I .d (noting that 

"[c)lose coordination is required between the SJA, J-3, and medical personnel to ensure that only 

those required for evacuation are in fact evacuated and that the proper designation is obtained 

before evacuation."). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 131 

Operational lawyers helped the command solve Post Exchange 


eligibility questions by construing administrative regulations in 


conjunction with the status of forces agreement executed between the 


nations ofthe MNF and Haiti .. In short, Department ofArmy, 


Department of Defense, and American Red Cross employees 


accompanying the United States Forces were accorded Exchange 


privileges, as did Department of Defense contractor employees and 


other United States citizens who were employees ofthe United States 


government.431 


Foreign nationals and non-Department ofDefense Personnel 

made frequent requests for transportation in military aircraft. 432 The 

form reproduced at Appendix W ensured orderly processing ofthese 

requests. Judge advocates reviewed the requests and documented on 

the form the provision ofthe governing directive granting eligibility.433 

3. Take Initiative to Assist Officers Conducting Official 

Investigations. Administrative investigations are critical to 

maintaining respect for the rule oflaw during a deployment. They are 

visible reminders to members of the force that command action is not 

arbitrary, but rather is based on a methodical, sober, and reasonable 

interpretation of evidence.434 Operational lawyers in Haiti advised 

431 See Office of the StaffJudge Advocate, MNF Haiti, Information Paper (26 Jan. 1995) 

(providing information concerning eligibility for post exchange privileges) (copy on file with 

CLAMO). 

432 See Interview with Captain Catherine M. With, former Operational Law and 

Administrative Law Judge Advocate for MNF Haiti and later the Command Judge Advocate for 

United States Forces in Haiti, in Charlottesville, Virginia, (Oct. 18, 1995). 

433 See DoD DIR. 4515.13-R, supra note 430. 

434 See, e.g., DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 15-6, PROCEDURE FOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND 

BOARDS OF OFFICERS, para. 1-5 (11 May 1988) ("The primary function of any investigation or 

board of officers is to ascertain facts and to report them to the appointing authority. It is the duty 

of the investigating officer or board to ascertain and consider the evidence on all sides ofthe issue, 

thoroughly and impartially, and to make findings and recommendations that are warranted by the 

facts and that comply with the instructions of the appointing authority."). 
132 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

investigating officers on the proper discharge oftheir duties and advised 

commanders on appropriate courses of action in light ofinvestigative 

findings and recommendations.435 

One notable example was an investigation into the reliability of 

inventories conducted on weapons confiscated from Haitian military 

and police forces or purchased under the weapons buyback program.436 

This investigation utilized informal procedures under the generic Army 

regulation governing administrative investigations. Another notable 

example was an investigation into the loss of $22,668.54 by a 

disbursing officer. This investigation utilized procedures described in a 

Department ofDefense financial regulation. 437 Although the advising 

judge advocate had never before construed the financial regulation, his 

previous experience with investigations, consultation through technical 

channels, and general legal knowledge equipped him with the skills 

needed to protect command interests and ensure administrative due 

process for the disbursing officer, who was eventually held pecuniarily 

liable for the loss.438 

L. Procurement Law and Fiscal Constraints. 

One defining feature of operations other than war is that the 

relatively relaxed regime of combat acquisition rules never comes into 

play. To the contrary, United States military forces generally must 

provide for full and open competition.439 Broadly speaking, this means 

m See Gordon Interview, supra note 220. 

436 Unless otherwise noted, the information in this paragraph is based on Passar AAR, 

supra 120, at 16. 

437 See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REG. 7000.14-R, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION, ch. 6 

(Dec. 1993). 

438 Official investigations and boards of inquiry pertaining to UNMIH followed the 

guidance contained in UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF GENERAL SERVICES, FIELD OPERATIONS 

DIVISION, FIELD ADMINISTRATION MANUAL, ch. 16 (Sept. 1992). 

439 See 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1988 & Supp.). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 133 

that absent certain specific statutory exceptions,440 all responsible 

sources of supply must have an opportunity to compete for the 

government's business. In specific terms, this means that a massive 

body of statutory and regulatory law continues to apply to government 

purchases in a field environment, where strict compliance can present 

enormous challenges. 

Military operations in Haiti pr~vided a textbook illustration ofthe 

tension between respecting rules that require competition and 

addressing military exigencies that demand prompt support. The 

President and his delegees long have had broad statutory authority to 

initiate contracts that facilitate national defense, but obligation offunds 

in excess of $50,000 under this authority may not be effected by 

delegees lower than the Army Secretariat.441 Moreover, Congress must 

provide the money to pay for obligations incurred under this emergency 

authority. The Haiti deployment, which never aroused a congressional 

declaration of war or equivalent resolution, also never prodded 

Congress to give the President money for purposes of contracting under 

this statutory provision.442 

Similarly, the deployment to Haiti resulted in no broad legislation 

authorizing the President and the heads ofmilitary departments to 

expend appropriated funds to prosecute the operation as they saw fit. 443 

440 See, e.g .• infra notes 441-442, 457-460, and accompanying text. 

441 See Act to Authorize the Making, Amendment, and Modification of Contracts to 

Facilitate the National Defense ofAugust 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-804, 71 Stat. 972 (codified at 

50 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1435); Exec. Order No. 10,789, 3 C.F.R. 426, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1431 

(1988) (implementing the statute as of 14 Nov. 1958); GENERAL SERYS. ADMIN. ET AL., FEDERAL 

ACQUISITION REG. 50.20l{a) (1 Apr. 1984) [hereinafter FAR] (comprising one section ofthe part 

implementing the statute, "Part SO-Extraordinary Contractual Actions") ("Authority to approve 

requests to obligate the Government in excess of$50,000 may not be delegated below the 

secretarial level."). 

442 See 50 U.S.C. § 1435 (1988) ("This chapter[§§ 1431-1435] shall be effective only 

during a national emergency declared by Congress or the President and for six months after the 

termination thereof or until such time as Congress, by concurrent resolution, may designate."). 

443 Perhaps the most famous example of such legislation was the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 

and subsequent related appropriations acts. See An Act to Promote the Defense ofthe United 
134 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATJONS 

As a result, the basic fiscal controls on appropriated funds-namely 

those constraining availability of appropriations as to purpose,

444 

time,445 and amount446-continued to have a constraining effect. 

Accordingly, judge advocates and commanders occasionally faced 

shortages ofproper appropriations for a given purchase. Mission 

accomplishment in these instances came to depend on a combination of 

practical resourcefulness and legal knowledge. 

I. Know the Terms and Conditions ofthe LOGCAP. The 

maxim that knowledge is power applied to contractual matters in Haiti. 

The maxim was particularly germane to a large contract that had been 

awarded well before the operation began, under the Logistics Civil 

Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).447 In August 1992, the Army 

Corps ofEngineers awarded the contract to Brown and Root Services 

Corporation ofHouston, Texas, which thus assumed the obligation to 

provide basic life support-e.g., shelter, sanitation, food, and laundryto troops deployed in contingency operations.448 By September of 

States ofMarch 11, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-11, 55 Stat. 31 (authorizing President Roosevelt to sell, 

transfer, exchange, lease or lend material purchased with appropriated funds to allies fighting the 

Axis Powers, and authorizing special appropriations as necessary to accomplish the purposes of 

the Act). The Lend-Lease program resulted in the transfer of about $50 billion in arms, food, and 

other aid. See MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE, supra note 295, at 13. No recent military 

operation has resulted in similar broad legislation. See OP. LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 11­

2. 

444 31U.S.C.§1301(a). 

445 31 U.S.C. § 1502. 

446 31 u.s.c. §§ 1341-42, 1511-19. 

447 See DEP'T OF ARMY' REG. 700-13 7' LOGISTICS CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM 

(LOGCAP) (16 DEC. 1985). The purpose ofthe program is to use a civilian contractor to perform 

selected logistics and engineering services to augment United States forces during military 

contingency operations. See United States Anny Corps ofEngineers, Transatlantic Division, 

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), Fact Sheet at I (April 1995) [hereinafter 

LOGCAP Fact Sheet]. 

448 See id The contract creates a generic apparatus for receiving, housing, and 

sustaining 20,000 troops in five base camps for 180 days. Within 15 days of notification (of an 

"event"), the contract requires Brown and Root to receive and support 1,300 troops per day. 

Within 30 days, Brown and Root is required to support 20,000 troops in one rear and four forward 

base camps for up to 180 days, with options to increase the size of the supported force to 50,000 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 135 

1994, when the Haiti deployment began, the one-year contract had been 

extended for the second of four one-year option periods. The costreimbursement pricing structure of the LOGCAP contract is necessary 

to provide the flexibility and responsiveness required to support military 

contingency operations, but the corresponding absence of a 

preestablished price and service schedule demands intensive monitoring 

and oversight of the contractor's costs.449 The system ofoversight 

relies, among other things, upon vigilant judge advocates who have 

detailed knowledge of contractual terms. 

In Haiti, for instance, the staff judge advocate advising the Joint 

Logistics Support Commander helped ensure that fees designed to focus 

contractor effort toward quality, responsiveness, and cost control really 

did focus contractor efforts as designed. 450 Under the contract, these 

fees, known as "award fees," are to be determined by an Award Fee 

Determination Board.451 Yet without a detailed plan both to evaluate 

contractor performance and to communicate the evaluations to the 

Board, true assessment of the contractor from the customer perspective 

would have been absent. 452 It fell to the judge advocate on the ground 

in Haiti to develop and implement such a plan. 

troops and to extend support to 360 days. The contract provisions call for each base camp to 

provide billeting, mess halls, food preparation, potable water, sanitation, showers, laundry, 

transportation, utilities and other logistical support. Contingency equipment and labor pools are 

available under the contract to perform additional, labor-intensive, non-combat missions for the 

commander. These include support to arriving forces at aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and 

sea ports ofdebarkation (SPODs), force sustainment, retrograding equipment and supplies, 

construction support, general logistics services, augmentation to engineer units, and facility 

engineer support. This generic apparatus is tailored as appropriate upon provision to Brown and 

Root-by the supported Major Command-ofa concept ofoperations and a scope ofwork. See 

generally id., at 6. 

449 See id., at 5, 7. 

450 See Passar AAR, supra note 120, at para. 6b. 

451 See LOGCAP Fact Sheet, supra note 447, at 5. 

452 See Passar AAR, supra note 120, at para. 6b & Encl 4 (providing a detailed and 

comprehensive plan by which the Joint Logistics Support Commander, whose requirements the 

contractor is tasked to meet during the "event," could have input into the quarterly award fee 

determination process). 
136 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Knowing the terms of the LOGCAP is useful not only in 

enforcing what those terms include, but also in deciding what 

requirements would best be filled by separate, contingency contracts. 

The LOGCAP has certainly demonstrated its capabilities-in Haiti,453 

as well as in Somalia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait454-but given 

its pricing structure, it will not be the best tool for every requirement. 

Other factors making LOGCAP suboptimal in certain cases are the need 

for funding up front and the existence ofvarious constraints on the 

scope of work.455 Commanders, logistics staffs, contracting officers, 

and advising judge advocates must continue to consider all options: 

because the LOGCAP contract is a cost-reimbursement contract 

intended to provide for situations with unpredictable costs, for many 

clearly definable requirements a firm fixed price contract should be 

used.456 

2. Expect Second-Guessing About Advance Payments on 

Acquisitions. Logistical matters in Haiti benefited from a simplified 

acquisition ceiling of $200,000, four times the normal ceiling. This 

higher ceiling applies when the Secretary of Defense declares a 

contingency operation, or when reservists are called to active duty for 

war or national emergency,457 and it has the effect ofpermitting 

contracting officers in the vast majority of cases to issue purchase 

453 More than $96 million was committed for LOGCAP support. Missions included 

electrifying 23 buildings, installing perimeter lighting and security fencing, constructing base 

camps, and providing base camp operations, laundry operations, class I operations, food service 

operations, class III operations, class II, IIl(P), IV, and VI operations, maintenance operations, 

APOD operations, transportation services, and main supply route maintenance. See generally 

LOGCAP Fact Sheet, supra note 447, at Appendix C; see also USACOM Briefing Viewgraphs, 

supra note 37 ("Brown and Root is expensive, but worth it."). 

454 See id. 

m See LOGCAP Fact Sheet, supra note 447, at 9. 

456 See Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur L. Passar, DAJA-KL, to MAJ Mark S. 

Martins, JAGS-CLAMO, subject: Draft Lessons Learned on Operations in Haiti, 1994-1995, at 

para. 2a (10 Nov. 1995) (copy on file with CLAMO). 

457 See IO U.S.C. § IOI(a){l3). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 137 


orders for needed supplies after merely soliciting price quotations 

orally.458 A higher ceiling also had greatly eased the supply needs of 

United States forces during Operations Desert Storm, Desert Shield, 

and Restore Hope, where 95% of contracting activity consisted of 

simplified acquisitions.459 Along with the LOGCAP, the much broader 

applicability ofsimplified procedures represents how far contract law 

will go to accommodate military operations.460 

Yet deployment to Haiti revealed that without also permitting 

advance payment, local contractors might be unable to furnish the items 

ordered-despite the fact that simplified procedures applied. Typically, 

the United States demands delivery ofsupplies or performance of 

services prior to payment;461 however, the absence of a financial 

structure in Haiti occasionally left prospective contractors without a 

source ofloans or working capital to enable them to deliver or 

perform.462 Although advance payments are lawful under certain 

circumstances,463 the Head ofthe Contracting Activity464 or his 

458 Memorandum, Acting Director, Dep't of Army, Office ofthe Assistant Secretary of 

the Army, U.S. Army Contracting Support Agency, to [wide distribution], subject: Acquisition 

letter 94-9 (31 Oct 1994); IO u.s.c. § 2302(7); DEP'TOF DEFENSE, DEFENSE FEDERAL 

ACQUISITION REG. SUPP. 213.000 (I Apr. 1984) [hereinafter DFARS]; OP. LAW HANDBOOK, supra 

note 9, at 11-6. 

459 See id. 

460 See generally Major Rafael Lara, Jr., A Practical Guide to Contingency Contracting, 

ARMY LAW., Aug. 1995, at 16. 

461 DEP'T OF ARMY. ARMY FEDERAL ACQUISITION REG. SUPP. 32.409 (I Dec. 1984) 

[hereinafter AFARS]; DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FORM 1155, Order For supplies or Services, items no. 

26, 32 (Sept. 1989) (reflecting payment further down the page than delivery). 

462 See Passar AAR, supra note 120, at 6c(ii). 

463 See 31 U.S.C. § 3324; 10 U.S.C. § 2307; FAR, supra note 441, at subpart 32.4. 

464 The Head ofthe Contracting Activity (HCA) has overall responsibility for managing 

all contracting actions within the activity. There are approximately 72 contracting activities 

within the Department ofDefense in addition to those which have been delegated contracting 

authority by the heads ofthe various defense agencies. See DFARS 202.101. In this case, the 

HCA would have been the Commander ofUnited States Army Forces Command, a four star 

general located in Fort McPherson, Georgia. 
138 CENTER FOR LAWAND lvflLITARYOPERATIONS 

Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting465 must approve them, 

and these individuals rarely will be immediately accessible. In the 

opinion of one judge advocate in Haiti, requisite approval authority for 

advance payments on small purchases in future operations should be 

delegated to the head ofthe contracting office in theater.466 Unless and 

until such delegation occurs, however, contracting officers should 

expect that decisions to pay in advance will eventually receive careful 

scrutiny. 

3. Step Forward to Ensure that Operational Funds are not 

Expendedfor Unauthorized Purposes. Some ofthe hardest issues that 

confront operational lawyers involve the question whether a correct 

"color" ofmoney is being spent. By their nature, such issues demand 

knowledge not only ofthe basic fiscal rule prohibiting application of 

appropriations to purposes unintended by Congress:467 they also 

demand knowledge ofwhat those purposes are. Because the 

appropriations and authorization acts that articulate Congressional 

purposes fill hundreds ofpages, because Congress passes such acts 

annually, and because the legislative process often produces language 

that is far from clear, judge advocates are frequently the only soldiers in 

the command equipped to identify the appropriations that fulfill 

Congressional purposes. To forego questioning activities that involve 

expenditures counter to those purposes is to risk an adverse report by 

465 In the Anny, the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC) is the senior 

staff official responsible for oversight and administration ofthe contracting function for a 

contracting activity, and the HCA's delegee for all delegated functions. The PARC has direct 

access to the HCA on all contract matters, and usually is two or more supervisory levels above the 

contracting officer within the HCA's command. See AFARS l.601-90(c). In this case, the PARC 

was also in Fort McPherson, Georgia. The Air Force and the Navy also pennit delegation of 

contracting authority to certain delegees. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE FEDERAL ACQUISITION 

REG. SUPP. l.601-9l(a) (1995); DEP'TOFNAVY, NAVY FEDERAL PROCUREMENT SUPP. l.60l(a) 

(1995). 

466 See Passar AAR, supra note 120, at 6c(ii). 

467 See31 U.S.C. § l30l(a). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 139 

the General Accounting Office,468 a loss oflater appropriations, and 


possible administrative or criminal sanctions.469 


Operations in Haiti followed the pattern ofpresenting fiscal law 

questions in the context ofoperations and maintenance appropriations 

and military construction appropriations.47°

Congress' purpose is that 

these appropriations will fund the daily operations and maintenance or 

construction needs of the military rather than assistance to foreign 

countries; other appropriations are available for this latter purpose. 471 

Nevertheless, a certain amount of operations and maintenance and 

related Army appropriations are available for "interoperability," and for 

"familiarization and safety instruction" of foreign forces,472 for the 

training of those forces by United States special operations units,473 for 

468 The General Accounting Office (GAO) is a special congressional support agency that 

has a great impact on the conduct and management of the United States government and defense. 

Its most prominent activities are its audits and evaluations of United States government programs 

and activities, conducted in response to requests from Congress, its Committees, Members, and 

Staffs. The GAO is under the control and direction ofthe Comptroller General ofthe United 

States, who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent ofthe Senate for a term of 

15 years. The audit authority of the GAO extends to all departments and other agencies of the 

Federal Government. Known widely as the "Congressional Watchdog," the GAO is expected to 

investigate any matters in connection with the proper expenditure of public monies. Through its 

National Security and International Affairs Division, the GAO monitors many activities of the 

State Department as well as of Department of Defense. See generally MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY 

ASSISTANCE, supra note 295, at 77; Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The National Security Process, in 

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 175, at 910. For an example of an adverse report by GAO, 

see The Honorable Bill Alexander, B-213137, 63 COMP. GEN. 422 (1984). 

469 The so-called "Anti-Deficiency Act," 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-42; 1511-17, provides for 

administrative sanctions, see 31 U.S.C. §§ 1349(a), 1518, and criminal penalties, see 31 U.S.C. 

§§ 1350, 1519, in certain circumstances involving improper use of funds. 

470 See, e.g., Memorandum, Major Douglas P. Demoss, former Command Judge 

Advocate to the United States Army Material Command Logistics Support Group, Mogadishu, to 

StaffJudge Advocate/Deputy Chief Counsel, United States Army Material Command, subject: 

After Action Report, Legal Support to U.S. Army Material Command Logistics Support GroupMogadishu (AMCLSG), Operation Restore Hope at 2-11, 2-14, 2-17 (24 Feb. 1993) [hereinafter 

Demoss AAR] (reporting that similar questions arose in Somalia); see generally Contract Law 

Note, Funding Issues in Operational Settings, ARMY LAW., Oct. 1993, at 38. 

471 See, e.g., Alexander, 63 COMP. GEN. 422-30. 

472 See, e.g., id. at 441. 

473 See IO U.S.C. § 2011 (1988 & Supp.). 
140 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

limited humanitarian and civic assistance projects,474 and for 

construction work of a temporary operational nature475-even if such 

expenditures provide incidental benefit to a foreign government or its 

people. The challenge to the operational lawyer is to determine when 

some other appropriation-such as the Economic Support Fund476-is 

necessary. 

474 See IO u.s.c. § 401 (1988 & Supp.); DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 2205.2, 

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE (HCA) PROVIDED IN CONJUNCTION WITH MILITARY 

OPERATIONS (Oct. 6, 1994); DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 2205.3, IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 

FOR THE HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC AsSISTANCE {HCA) PROGRAM (Jan. 27, 1995). 

475 See generally THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, CONTRACT LAW DIVISION, 

JA 503, F1SCALLAWDESKBOOK, para. III.C.4 (1994). 

476 The Economic Support Fund (ESF) is a security assistance program managed by the 

Agency for International Development (AID), which agency has as its central priority the 

management of"development assistance" under Chapter I ofPart II ofthe Foreign Assistance Act 

(FAA,§§ 100-127, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2292). The ESF, unlike strict development assistance, is 

authorized by a different part ofthe Foreign Assistance Act-Chapter 4 ofPart II (FAA,§§ 531­

35, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2346-46d)-a fact that reflects a distinct purpose, even ifthe form of the 

assistance provided looks identical in every way to development assistance. Whereas development 

assistance programs must be directed at meeting basic human needs and assisting the poor 

majority in foreign countries with low per capita incomes, the ESF can be directed toward the 

economic support ofcountries in which the United States has significant security interests, even 

for purposes which do not meet the strict development assistance criteria listed in FAA, § 102. 

Economic support fund support to a country can take many forms. It is money made 

available on a grant or loan basis for a variety of purposes: the building ofroad systems and other 

infrastructure; economic support to offset trade imbalances and other problems created when a 

country is devoting large resources to security concerns; health, education, agriculture, and family 

planning projects. See, e.g. Michael J. Matheson, Arms Sales and Economic Assistance, in 

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note at 175, 1111, 1116-17; MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY 

ASSISTANCE, supra note 295, at 44-45. Notwithstanding statutory language declaring that ESF 

funds "shall be available for economic programs only and may not be used for military or 

paramilitary purposes," see FAA§ 53l{c), 22 U.S.C. § 2346(e), ESF appropriations are a 

potential source of funds for projects such as the asphalting of a long stretch of roadway because 

such a project will undoubtedly have long-term civilian applications as well as near-term military 

advantages. 

Even if a project's military purposes can at some point make ESF funding improper, cf 

NATIONAL SECURITY LAw,supra note 175, at 1117-18 (querying ifESF funds are available "for 

projects which have general civilian applications but are designed for, and primarily used by, 

military forces, such as road systems near military installations or communications systems with 

substantial numbers ofmilitary users"), it is probable that ESF appropriations will be more fitting 

for many large-scale projects than operation and maintenance appropriations ofthe Department of 

Defense. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 141 

In Haiti, Army judge advocates correctly identified that neither 

operations and maintenance funds nor military construction funds could 

be spent to build basketball courts for other nations' forces, to provide 

supplies for members of the International Criminal Investigation and 

Training Assistance Program {ICITAP), or to improve certain roads.477 

Frequently, when requests originated from another United States agency 

providing support to the Haitian people, the proper approach was to 

elevate the issue to higher authorities so that appropriate transfers of 

funds could be made from that agency to the Army pursuant to the 

Economy Act. 478 On other occasions, as when various agencies and 

organizations other than the United States military repeatedly declined 

to pay for electricity generated by the Army, senior authorities 

determined that operational needs justified the continued expenditure of 

operational and maintenance funds. 

During the deployment, judge advocates produced several documents that, in addition to 

the statutory cites provided here and to the documents described in note 555 infra, helped acquaint 

fellow attorneys with various important appropriations and their purposes. See Major Fred T. 

Pribble, Deputy Legal Advisor, Office of the Chainnan, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Support to 

Multilateral Peace Operations (7 Feb. 1995) (copy on file with CLAMO); Lieutenant Colonel 

Richard Jackson, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, United States Atlantic Command, 

Infonnation Paper, subject: Fiscal Law Issues in Haiti (18 Oct 1994); Memorandum, Captain 

Stephen A. Rose, USN, Staff Judge Advocate United States Atlantic Command, J02L4, to J52, 

J55, J4ENG, J4, J4PPP, J02M, subject: Expenditure ofTitle IO (O&M) Funds in Haiti [Memo #2] 

(3 Oct. 1994). 

Logisticians and judge advocates on the ground in Haiti during the UNMIH phase of the 

intervention found helpful guidance in portions of field manuals that were written principally by 

judge advocates. See, e.g., FM 100-23, supra note 275, at 56 (describing the legal authorities by 

which logistics assistance may be furnished to the United Nations during peace operations and 

instructing United States logisticians to track items that the United Nations agrees to reimburse). 

477 Unless otherwise indicated, the infonnation in this paragraph is based upon Passar 

AAR, supra note 120, at para. 6d; 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 7; Sposato 

Interview, supra note 216; Telephone Interview with Captain Catherine M. With, fonner 

Operational Law and Administrative Law Judge Advocate for MNF Haiti and later the Command 

Judge Advocate for United States Forces in Haiti (Aug. 15, 1995) [hereinafter With Interview]; 

Memorandum, General J.J. Sheehan, USMC, Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic 

Command, to Chainnan, Joint Chiefs ofStaff(30 May 1995) (copy on file with CLAMO) 

(requesting quick legal review and assistance concerning road and water repair projects in Haiti) . 

478 See 31U.S.C.1535 (1988 & Supp.). 
142 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

In the latter stages of operations in Haiti, an agreement between 

the United States and Haiti enabled military forces to provide a broad 

range of commodities and services to Haiti on a reimbursable basis. 479 

Appendix X contains the text of this agreement.480 

4. Understand the Status ofCivilian Contractor Employees. 

Commanders and soldiers in Haiti grew accustomed to seeing 

employees of civilian contractors. Although military doctrine has not 

yet adequately incorporated the enormous role these individuals have in 

our logistics system, informed observers predict that they will be 

fixtures in all future military deployments.481 Employees of the 

LOGCAP contractor and subcontractors could be found at every turn: 

preparing and serving meals; cleaning, folding and pressing laundry; 

servicing vehicles; loading and unloading ships; shuttling troops. 482 Yet 

while they often physically resembled military personnel, carried 

identification cards, and appeared to be members of the force from the 

479 The Foreign Assistance Act authorizes such agreements. See FAA§ 607; 22 U.S.C. § 

2357 (requiring a Presidential determination that provision of commodities and services will 

further the purposes of Subchapter I of the Foreign Assistance Act, of which purposes 

peacekeeping and disaster relief operations are examples). They have been created to support 

United Nations operations in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda as well as Haiti. See 

Pribble, supra note 476. One attraction of"607 Agreements" is that reimbursements received may 

be deposited by the service providing the assistance back into the appropriation originally used 

or-ifreceived within 180 days of the close of the fiscal year in which the assistance was 

furnished-into the current account concerned. See generally id.; Pribble, supra note 476; 

UNITED STA TES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COST OF DOD OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA, 

GAO/NSIAD-94-88 (March 1994) (opining that reimbursements received after the 180 period 

cannot be retained by Department ofDefense and must be deposited in the miscellaneous receipts 

account of the general treasury). 

480 See Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Nations 

Organization Concerning the Provision of Assistance on a Reimbursable Basis in Support of the 

Operations of the United Nations in Haiti, 19 Sept. 1994, U.S.-U.N. (copy on file with CLAMO) 

(representing an earlier "607 agreement" executed to support operations in Haiti). 

481 See, e.g., Major Brian H. Brady, Notice Provisions for United States Citizen 

Contractor Employees Serving with the United States Armed Forces in the Field: Time to Reflect 

Their Assimilated Status in Government Contracts?, at 8 (1995) (manuscript on file at TJAGSA). 

482 See Gordon Interview, supra note 220. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 143 

perspective of Haitian citizens, the relationship ofthese civilians to the 

disciplinary and administrative apparatus ofthe force often left 

commanders scratching their heads.483 

Commanders have administrative authority over civilians serving 

with or accompanying the armed forces in the field. 484 Thus the MNF 

Commander extended the coverage of General Order Number 1 to "all 

civilian personnel serving with, employed by, or accompanying forces 

assigned to JTF 190." Civilian contractor employees were obliged not 

to possess privately-owned firearms, consume alcohol, gamble, eat in 

local Haitian restaurants, or engage in sexual relations with members of 

the Haitian populace. Administrative actions against civilians who 

violate these policies could include withdrawing post exchange 

privileges, withholding medical care, and barring them from military 

camps altogether. Commanders may also require the contractor to 

remove personnel from the job. 

In time of declared war, contractor employees would be subject 

to the Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice. In Haiti, they were not. As a 

result, only administrative options were available to a commander faced 

with contractor personnel who flouted command orders.485 According 

to the judge advocate advising the Joint Logistics Support Command, 

[t]hough the LOGCAP contractor leadership in theater 

used their best efforts to ensure compliance with the 

restrictions on alcohol consumption, dining in local 

facilities, and sex with locals, violations by contractor 

personnel occurred regularly.486 

483 See Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Larry Passar, former Command 

Judge Advocate for Joint Logistics Support Command, Port-au-Prince (Aug. 23, 1995) 

[hereinafter Passar Interview]. 

484 See Brady, supra note 481, at 59; AFARS 37.7098-1. 

485 See Passar AAR, supra note 120, at para. 6i. 

486 See id. 
144 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

The LOGCAP prime contractor always quickly removed its offending 

employees from the job and redeployed them; unfortunately, however, 

subcontractors sometimes declined to do so.487 Unless and until 

military courts receive peacetime jurisdiction over civilians 

accompanying the force, 488 the best approach to the problem of civilian 

contractor misconduct will be a mixture ·of a removal provision in the 

contract that extends to subcontractor employees, a provision placing 

the civilians fully on notice oftheir status, and tight management of 

administrative sanctions such as identification checks at the post 

exchange, the medical facility, and the entrance to the camp. 489 

M. Claims 

Military operations in Haiti confirmed that an efficient claims 

program directly aids mission accomplishment. Prompt investigation, 

adjudication, and payment of foreign claims contributed to the goodwill 

ofthe Haitian people toward United States forces, which in turn 

contributed to the security ofthose forces. In addition, the availability 

of an orderly process for dealing with noncriminal allegations of harm 

inflicted by American troops permitted the Commander to concentrate 

on other pressing concerns. 

Some issues that were prominent during previous operations did 

not arise due to the relatively short duration and to the noncombat 

nature of operations in Haiti. The brief time spent by most soldiers 

away from home stations accounted for the low number of claims 

487 See id. 

488 See generally Major Susan S. Gibson, Lack of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over 

Civilians: A New Look at an Old Problem (1995) (manuscript on file at TJAGSA). 

489 Note that the command's concerns over having appropriate disciplinary authority with 

respect to civilians extend to government employees as well as to contract employees. See supra 

note 415. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 145 


presented under the Personnel Claims Act.490 The longer and larger 

deployment to Southwest Asia for Operations Desert Shield and Storm 

had resulted in far greater losses ofsoldier property and had stimulated 

questions about the adequacy ofpersonal property storage and 

accountability safeguards.491 The rarity of hostile encounters in Haiti 

obviated concerns about finding a way to compensate claimants for 

damage directly resulting from combat activities, 492 a category of 

damage that is not compensable under United States claims statutes.493 

In contrast, these concerns had absorbed considerable attention from 

judge advocates in Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama.494 

The most important lessons learned fall under the substantive 

heading ofthe Foreign Claims Act (FCA),495 though, as with much of 

operational law, the lessons are not strictly legal ones. A quick reading 

ofthe FCA and its implementing regulations reveals a straightforward 

scheme of compensation.496 This body of law authorizes payment in 

local currency to inhabitants of foreign countries for personal injury, 

death, or property loss caused by United States military personnel 

490 Claims under the Personnel Claims Act attributable to the deployment were negligible 

both in numbers of claims filed and in dollar amount of damage claimed. See Telephone 

Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Phillip L. Kennerly, Chief, Personnel Claims and Recovery 

Division, United States Army Claims Service, (Oct. 17, 1995) [hereinafter Kennerly Interview]. 

491 See DSAT REPORT, supra note 3, at Claims-I & Issues #11, 23, 194-95. 

492 See Gordon Remarks, supra note 395. 

493 See OP. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at I0-5; DEP'TOF ARMY, PAM. 27-162, 

CLAIMS, para. 8-1 (15 Dec. 1989) [hereinafter DA PAM. 27-162]. 

494 See id; Borek, supra note 211, at 50; With Interview, supra note 477. 

495 See IO U.S.C. § 2374 (1988 & Supp.). The purpose ofthe act is to "promote and 

maintain friendly relations through the prompt settlement ofmeritorious claims." See id 

496 See, DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5515.3, SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS UNDER l 0 u.s.c. 

2733 AND 2734 (May 26, 1966); DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 27-20, CLAIMS, ch. IO (1 Aug. 1995) 

[hereinafter AR 27-20]. 
146 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

outside the United States.497 The basis ofthe claim may be either 


negligence or wrongful conduct.498 The local law ofthe country in 


which the claim arises provides the standards for determining both 


liability and damages.499 These seemingly straightforward legal 


principles require practical knowledge for effective application in an 


operational setting. 


1. Appoint Many Judge Advocates to Foreign Claims 

Commissions. A lesson well-learned from Operations Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm was that authority to adjudicate claims under the FCA 

should be delegated early and often. 500 Adjudication of foreign claims is 

accomplished by claims commissions consisting of either one or three 

members, depending upon the amount ofthe claim. 501 The 10th 

Mountain Division arranged for four judge advocates to be appointed 

by the United States Army Claims Service (USARCS) as one-member 

commissions and for three additional judge advocates to be appointed 

as a three-member commission.502 The 25th Infantry Division arranged 

for identical numbers and types of appointments.503 Because the Army 

possessed geographic area jurisdiction for settling foreign claims 

against the United States in Haiti,504 these commissions were the 

exclusive mechanism for compensating claimants. A liberal approach to 

497 See AR 27-20 at para. I 0-2a. 

498 See id. at para. I 0-8. 

499 See id. at paras. I 0-1 Oa, I 0-11 a. 

soo See DSAT REPORT, supra note 3, at Claims-2 to Claims-3. 

sot See AR 27-20, supra note 496, at para. 10-15. 

soi See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 15-16. 

so3 See With Interview, supra note 477. 

S04 See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5515.8, SINGLE-SERVICE ASSIGNMENT OF 

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROCESSING OF CLAIMS (June 9, 1990) (omitting assignment of Haiti to a 

particular military department); Memorandum, Mr. John H. McNeill, Senior Deputy Counsel, 

International Affairs and Intelligence, Department ofDefense, to Director, Joint Staff, subject: 

Designation of the Department of the Army as Single Service Claims Authority (Sept. 22, 1994) 

(designating the Army as the single service claims authority for Haiti) (copy on file with 

CLAMO); AR 27-20, supra note 496, at para. 10-18. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 147 

appointing judge advocates as commission members was therefore 

essential. 

An "off-the-shelf' appointment package previously developed by 


USARCS helped facilitate the establishment of foreign claims 


commissions,505 as did the planning and early identification ofjudge 


advocates by the deploying units. 506 Unit claims officers were obvious 


candidates to serve on both types of commissions, though brigade legal 


advisors and operational law attorneys also served as single-member 


commissions.507 The greater seniority and experience levels of deputy 


staff judge advocates and staff judge advocates made these officers 


appropriate members of the three-member commissions. 


From October 3, 1994 to August 15, 1995, United States Army 

foreign claims commissions paid $175,258.98 in compensation to 

Haitian claimants. 508 The ability of commission members to initiate 

investigations on the basis of oral claims and to perform commission 

functions wherever posted provided useful flexibility, given the scarcity 

of transportation and other investigative resources.509 Still, the majority 

of claims were filed in the claims office established by the 10th 

Mountain Division at the Light Industrial Complex in Port-au-Prince 

and maintained at that location by the 25th Infantry Division. 510 

505 Interview with Major E. Allen Chandler, Jr., Chief, Foreign Torts Branch, United 

States Army Claims Service, (Aug. 15, 1995) [hereinafter Chandler Interview]. 

506 See, e.g .• Stai Memorandum, supra note 35, at 29 (describing appointment of claims 

commissions on 15 Sept. 1995). 

507 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 14-15. 

508 See Chandler Interview, supra note 505. As of21August1995, out of295 claims 

submitted, 210 were paid, 70 were denied, and 15 were being processed. See Telephone Interview 

with Sergeant First Class Glenn Attai, Claims Investigator, Foreign Torts Branch, United States 

Army Claims Service (21 Aug. 1995). Of the 295 claims submitted, 263 were for property 

damage ( 191 were paid, 68 denied, 4 still being processed); 28 were for personal injury (24 paid, 2 

denied, 2 being processed); and 4 were for death (4 paid). See id 

509 See With Interview, supra note 477; O'Brien Interview, supra note 46. 

510 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 15 ("The MNF SJA received claims 

twice weekly at the front gate of Camp Democracy in Port-au-Prince. b addition, the brigade 
148 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

2. Make Linguist Support and Protection ofClaimants 

Leadership Priorities. Given the foreign nationality ofmost claimants 

under the FCA, the foreign situs ofthe alleged harm and corroborating 

evidence, and the foreign source oflaw to be applied, an efficient 

claims operation requires persons capable of communicating in the local 

language.511 Experience in Haiti confirmed this, as Creole and French 

speakers were indispensable. Native Haitians provided assistance in 

interviewing claimants, reducing claims to writing, and confirming that 

claimants understood the contents and effect of forms that were signed. 

In addition, the interpreters assisted in conducting investigations, in 

acquiring information about prevailing legal standards in Haiti as to 

liability and damages, and in maintaining order during claims receipt 

operations. Judge advocates from the units deployed to Haiti concluded 

that three dedicated interpreters were needed to implement the claims 

program and accomplish other legal missions, and that acquiring such 

individuals must receive the attention ofsenior leaders as long as 

necessary for them to be acquired.512 

One ofthe thornier issues that arises with claims involving the 

death of a foreign national is establishing a rate of compensation for lost 

human life. In theory, local law should be the guide as to the level of 

damages, and this theoretical approach works tolerably well in highly 

developed western legal systems, where litigation generates data upon 

legal advisers in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien received and adjudicated claims stemming from 

incidents within their units."). 

511 Unless otherwise indicated, subparts III.M.2 and III.M.3 are based upon the following 

sources: 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 3,4, 14-15; With Interview, supra note 477; 

Gordon Interview, supra note 220; O'Brien Interview, supra note 46 (describing methodology of 

using the Civil Military Operations Center linguists and personnel to identify potential claimants 

and process claims). 

512 See also CALL INITIAL IMPRESSIONS VOL. II, supra note 206, at 121 ("Having 

linguists assigned to the JTF SJA office before a deployment is a necessity ... Assign no less than 

three linguists to the JTF SJA."); O'Brien Interview, supra note 46. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 149 

which a principled amount of compensation may be based. In practice, 


local law may not be well enough developed or reported to eliminate 


arbitrariness from the determination. In Haiti, the problem was 


aggravated because the local legal system combined aspects of civil law 


and customary law traditions, 513 neither of which emphasizes the 


development of compensation levels through case law. Judge 


advocates found it necessary to set a compensation level early and 


thereby establish a precedent. 514 


One ofmany practical claims issues that benefited from the 10th 

Mountain Division's previous recent deployment to Somalia was that of 

physical security for compensated claimants. Claims personnel who 

were veterans of Mogadishu who had knowledge of robberies of 

Somalis were determined to preclude similar robberies of compensated 

Haitian claimants. The purposes of a foreign claims program and of the 

FCA itself are frustrated ifthe payment of worthy claims merely trigger 

muggings that leave claimants worse off than ever. Experience and 

planning for protection of Haitians carrying away money prevented 

robberies from occurring, as did the payment of claims in Haitian 

515 currency. 

SIJ See RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD 


TODAY; AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 33-154, 548-76 (3d ed. 1985) 


(surveying the civil law or "romano-germanic" legal tradition as well as the customary tradition). 


si 4 This was from $5,000 to $14,000 depending on the facts that resulted in loss of life. 

Death claim payments are to be clearly distinguished from solatia. Solatia are payments to a 

victim or victim's family without regard to liability. Such payments are in accordance with local 

custom, are usually immediate in nature, nominal in amount, and represent sympathy with and 

condolences for the accident or incident giving rise to the injury. The custom of solatia payments 

is particularly prevalent in the Far East and Middle East. See AR 27-20, supra note 496, at para. 

15-12; DA PAM. 21-162,supra note 493, at para. 8-4. 

sis The experience of claims judge advocates in Somalia was complicated by the vigorous 

tradition of violence and banditry in that country. See UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND 

THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER, RESTORE HOPE SOLDIER HANDBOOK (1993) (describing a lifestyle in 

Somalia marked by independence, self-reliance, and violent fighting over political and ethnic 

differences); Interview with Major Curtis A. Parker, Former Command Judge Advocate for the 

593d Area Support Group, Mogadishu, in Charlottesville, VA (Aug. 16, 1995) (describing the 

complications caused by the endemic violence and questioning the wisdom of liberally paying 

claims in a needy society). 
150 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

3. Expect Misdirected and Exaggerated Claims. Uphold 

Democracy and subsequent operations in Haiti were thoroughly "joint," 

"combined," and "interagency" as these terms are now defined in 

military doctrine for operations other than war.516 The implication of 

these latter two descriptive terms for the claims program was that army 

judge advocates were frequently confronted with claims arising from 

the alleged tortious conduct of coalition forces, of inter-governmental 

officials, ofnongovernmental organizations, or of United States 

government officials unconnected to the Department of Defense. The 

"claims days" conducted twice a week in Port-au-Prince soon acquired 

a reputation for promptness and efficiency; furthermore, the claims 

procedures used by the United Nations and other entities, ifsuch 

procedures existed at all, were far less responsive. 517 Accordingly, 

prospective claimants often decided to test their fortunes with the 

American military regardless of whether the non-Haitians who allegedly 

caused damage were United States soldiers. Sometimes, these 

misdirected claims resulted from understandable cases of mistaken 

identity, as when members of the ICITAP contingent, who drove 

vehicles identical to military vehicles, were presumed to be soldiers. 518 

516 See supra note 30 (defining ''joint"), note 32 (defining "combined"), and subpart 

III.G.2 (describing "interagency"). 

517 The cumbersome nature ofthe United Nations claims procedures results from many of 

the same institutional features that have created controversy over the placement ofUnited States 

forces under the command and control of the United Nations. See The White House and the 

National Security Counsel, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25, subject: Reforming 

Multilateral Peace Operations (May 1994). For understandable and legitimate reasons, the United 

Nations has evolved as a bureaucratic and largely nonhierarchical organization. These features do 

not lend themselves to the creation of a prompt and responsive claims system. See Status of 

Mission Agreement for the United Nations Mission in Haiti, Mar. 21, 1995, U.N.-Haiti, arts. 51­

53, reprinted in Appendix P (detailing time-consuming procedures for establishing a claims 

commission, and stating that "the commission shall determine its own procedures). 

518 See With Interview, supra note 477 (describing the frustration in the faces of Haitians 

with misdirected claims upon learning that the alleged wrongdoer worked for an organization 

with an unresponsive claims apparatus). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 151 


As might be expected in an environment ofsuch extreme poverty, 

on many other occasions claimants knowingly misdirected or 

exaggerated their allegations in attempts to exploit an impressive source 

ofwealth. Foreigners who allegedly damaged a claimant's home 

sounded at first report to resemble soldiers from a coalition partner's 

forces but upon follow-up questioning they were determined to be 

United States troops. United States forces conducting operations from 

an athletic field pursuant to a lease with the purported owner of the field 

triggered an allegation from another man who claimed to be the rightful 

owner of not only the field, but also of an elaborate and expensive multisport athletic complex that existed before the Americans moved in. 519 

These and other examples of creative claims flourish in the 

operational environment, when judge advocates understandably 

must place a low priority on policing fraud. 

Claims judge advocates in Haiti conclude that the best approach 

to misdirected and exaggerated claims is to generate evidence that will 

assist in the investigative and adjudicative phases. Aggressively seek 

documentation ofproperty ownership prior to signing leases, and obtain 

sufficient knowledge about the local legal system to determine whether 

such documentation is appropriately recorded. Take pictures to record 

the condition ofrented real estate and facilities prior to setting up 

operations. Train military drivers not only to write down basic 

information about a traffic accident on pre-drafted cards, but also to 

provide the Haitian citizen involved with translated information about 

where and when claims may be presented and about what can and 

cannot be compensated. Such measures enable payment to be based on 

hard evidence rather than conjecture, contributing to the effectiveness 

and perceived fairness ofthe process even as they discourage fabricated 

claims. Appendix Y reprints a card containing standard procedures for 

soldiers involved in accidents in Haiti. Appendix Z reprints the accident 

form used in Haiti to record important facts. 

519 See Chandler Interview, supra note 505 (describing the claim, which continued to be 

investigated as of 15 August 1995). ' 
152 CENTER FOR LAWAND JvflLITARY OPERATIONS 

N. Reserve Components 

Reserve forces from all services played a vital role in the Haiti 

deployment and resoundingly validated the Nation's Total Force 

Policy.520 On September 15, 1994, President Clinton authorized the 

Secretaries ofDefense and Transportation to order units and individuals 

of the selected reserve to active duty. Appendix AA contains the 

executive order authorizing the callup and the corresponding report to 

congress setting forth the circumstances necessitating the action.521 In 

the coming months, more than 5,700 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, 

and coastguardsmen were ordered to active duty,522 with most of these 

agreeing to enter or remain on active duty voluntarily.523 

520 See, e.g., DOD FINAL REPORT, supra note 163, at 471-72 (providing an overview of 

the Total Force Policy and its implementation in the 1980's). 

521 This order, Exec. Order No. 12,927, 3 C.F.R. 921 (1995), invoked 10 U.S.C. § 673b, 

which was recently amended and relocated within the United States Code to 10 U.S.C. § 12,304. 

See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 at§§ 51l(a},1662(e)(2), 

1675(c)(2}, Pub. L. No. 103-337, 108 Stat. 2663, 2752, 2992, 3017. Section 673b(a) stated that 

in times other than war or national emergency, the President may authorize the Secretary of 

Defense "to order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of 

the Selected Reserve" to active duty for not more than 90 days. The amendment increased the 

period of involuntary service to 270 days. See 108 Stat. 2752. 

522 See Hearings on HR. 2126 Before the House Committee on National Security, I 04th 

Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 3, 1995) (prepared statement ofGeneral Robert L. Rutherford, USAF 

Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command), reprinted in 1995 FEDERAL NEWS 

SERV. (Apr. 3, 1995) [hereinafter Rutherford Testimony]. 

523 Although Executive Order 12,927 authorized involuntary callups of up to 90 days, the 

statutory authority actually employed in most cases was 10 U.S.C. § 672(d), which authorized 

each military department Secretary to order a reservist to active duty with the consent ofthat 

individual reservist and to order a National Guardsman to active duty with the consent of that 

individual Guardsman and of the governor of the state concerned. Section 672 was recently 

relocated to 10 U.S.C. § 12,301. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 at 

§§ 1662(e)(2), 1675(c)(2), Pub. L. No. 103-337, 108 Stat. 2663, 2992, 3017. Army reserve 

component personnel voluntarily ordered to active duty under section 672 served temporary tours 

of active duty under the provisions ofDEP'TOF ARMY, REG. 135-210, ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY AS 

INDIVIDUALS DURING PEACETIME, ch. 3 ( 1 Oct. 1994) (explaining that tours normally run from 30 

to 179 days). 
LAWAND WLITARYOPERATJONSIN HAITL 1994-95 153 

The proportionate contribution of the reserve components was 

comparable to that made during Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm, when 245,000 reservists entered active duty in support of that 

crisis and 106,000_ ofthat number actually served in Southwest Asia. 524 

For the Haiti crisis, Army National Guard military police companies 

from Puerto Rico, Arizona, and California backfilled active component 

military police companies; 165 Guard special forces soldiers and an 

aeromedical evacuation element deployed to Haiti itself.525 The civil 

affairs elements discussed above were part ofan important contribution 

from the Army Reserve.526 Members of the 91 lth Air Wing from 

Pennsylvania deployed for 6 weeks. 527 They were joined in Haiti by a 

diverse collection ofNaval Reserve resources, including Mobile 

Inshore Undersea Warfare (MIUW) units, and another 135 specialists 

in intelligence, military sealift, and headquarters support.528 Eighty-four 

Marine Corps reservists volunteered for 45 days of active duty at 

Camp Lejeune, and 15 reservists assigned with USACOM spearheaded 

the efforts of the International Police Monitors in Haiti. 529 Coast Guard 

reservists from Wisconsin and elsewhere also joined the effort. 530 

524 See DOD FINAL REPORT, supra note 163, at 471, 476 (elaborating that reservists 


represented 16% offorces in the theater at one point). 


525 See Hearings on S. 1087 Before the Subcomm. on Defense ofthe Senate Committee 

on Appropriations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 9, 1995) (prepared statement of Lieutenant 

General Edward D. Baca, Chief, National Guard Bureau, United States Army), reprinted in 1995 

FEDERAL NEWS SERV (May 9, 1995); ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES, RESEARCH 

AND SUPPORT OFFICE, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, 1996 POSTURE STATEMENT, at 2 [hereinafter 

POSTURE STATEMENT]. 

526 See supra note 322 and accompanying text. 

527 See 141 CONG. REc. S8023 (daily ed. June 8, 1995). 

528 See Hearings on S. 1087 Before the Subcomm. on Defense ofthe Senate Committee 

on Appropriations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 9, 1995) (prepared statement of Rear Admiral 

Thomas F. Hall, Chief of Naval Reserve), reprinted in 1995 FEDERAL NEWS SERV (May 9, 1995). 

529 See Hearings on S. 1087 Before the Subcomm. on Defense ofthe Senate Committee 

on Appropriations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 9, 1995) (prepared statement of Major General 

James M. Livingston, United States Marine Corps Reserve Officers' Association), reprinted in 

1995 FEDERALNEWSSERV. (May9, 1995). 

530 Richard W. Jaeger, Madison Man Goes to Haiti: School District Official in Coast 

Guard Reserve, Wisconsin State Journal, Sept. 22, 1994, at 1 OA. 
154 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

The rapid withdrawal of most forces from Haiti limited the 

involvement ofreserve component judge advocates. Sixteen did crucial 

work as ministerial advisors, 531 and two served in judge advocate 

positions that are embedded in civil affairs units.532 A judge advocate 

major in the Unites States Army Reserve may replace the active 

component judge advocate presently serving with United States forces 

in Haiti.533 Yet despite this limited role for reserve operational lawyers, 

the deployment to Haiti furnished two important lessons learned. 

1. Assist the Command in Developing a Knowledge Base 

About Individual Mobilization Augmentees and in Securing 

Individual Reservists With Special Skills. Because of their ability to 

construe federal law and regulations pertaining to reserve forces, judge 

advocates are uniquely qualified to assist the command in securing 

critical support from individual reservists with special skills. In a war 

or national emergency-neither ofwhich will likely exist during an 

operation other than war-callup ofreservists could be massive and 

involuntary, as was the case during the Persian Gulf War. In the 

absence of war or national emergency, callup will emphasize the use of 

volunteers.534 The methodology of"volunteerism" relies upon detailed 

knowledge about and training of individual reservists. These reservists 

may be serving in individual mobilization augmentee billets (IMAs) or 

in troop units. Individual mobilization augmentees are individual 

members of the Selected Reserve. They participate in training activities 

on a part-time basis with an active component unit in preparation for 

s

3

• See supra note 345 and accompanying text. 

s

32 See McNeill Intetview, supra note 306. 

m See Intetview with Dr. Mark Foley, Judge Advocate Guard & Resetve Affairs 

Division, Office ofThe Judge Advocate General, in Charlottesville, VA (Sept. 15, 1995) 

[hereinafter Foley Intetview]. 

534 See Rutherford Testimony, supra note 522. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITL 1994-95 155 


recall in a mobilization. 535 Individuals in troop units ofthe Selected 

Reserve may also volunteer for active duty. 536 

The need for individuals with special skills became urgent during 

military operations in Haiti. 537 Upon restoration of the Aristide 

535 See DOD FINAL REPORT, supra note 163, at 472; DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 140-45, 


INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEE PROGRAM at 12 (23 Nov. 1994 ). 


536 Some understanding ofreserve component terminology is essential to understand the 

text: 

Ready Reserve-Ready Reserve is comprised of military members of the Reserve 

and National Guard, organized in units, or as individuals, liable for recall to 

active duty to augment the active components in time of war or national 

emergency. (Title IO U.S.C. §§ 672, 673 [now IO U.S.C. §§ 12301 to 12305]) 

The Ready Reserve consists ofthree reserve component subcategories-the 

Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Inactive National 

Guard. 

Selected Reserves-The Selected Reserve consists of those units and individuals 

within the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Services and approved 

by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as so essential to initial wartime missions 

that they have priority over all other Reserves (Title IO U.S.C. § 268(c) [now§§ 

10141-10155]). All Selected Reservists are in an active status. 

Individual Mobilization A ugmentees (/MAJ-Individual members of the 

Selected Reserves. Trained Individuals preassigned to an active component, 

Selective Service System or Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

organization's billet which must be filled on or shortly after mobilization. 

IMA's participate on a part-time basis with an active component unit in 

preparation for recall in a mobilization. 

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)-The IRR consists of those Ready Reservists 

not in the Selected Reserves. Composed ofReserve Component members not 

assigned to a unit. Trained individuals who previously served in the active 

component or Selected Reserve. Members normally have a remaining military 

service obligation, are subject to mobilization, and might be ordered to limited 

involuntary active duty for training. 

See DOD FINAL REPORT, supra note 163, at 472. 

537 Unless otheiwise annotated, the information in this paragraph and the two that follow 

it is based upon Foley Interview, supra 533; Hudson Interview, supra note 65; Colonel Harlan M. 

Heffelfinger, Staff Judge Advocate, USASOC, Remarks Before the Haiti After Action Review 

Conference in Charlottesville, VA (May 10, 1995) (videotape on file with CLAMO). 
156 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

government, technicians with skills in public works and utilities, public 

health, economics and commerce, transportation, legal and judicial 

functions, and other functional areas were in high demand. 

Commanders understandably sought detailed information about the 

rules that governed the procurement of individual reservists and about 

the specific skills ofparticular reserve personnel in various combat 

service support specialties. Judge advocates assigned to the United 

States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) provided that 

command advice on callup rules applying to all reservists. In 

conjunction with the Judge Advocate Guard and Reserve Affairs 

Division (GRA), they also searched files ofreserve judge advocates and 

other attorneys in the reserve components to identify candidates for 

participation in the ministerial advisory team slated to serve as judicial 

mentors. That search placed a premium on skills associated with 

administering courts and prisons, on French or Creole language skills, 

and on willingness to volunteer for active duty. 

The methodology used by USASOC and GRA for the Haiti 

deployment applies equally to judge advocates supporting conventional 

units. Operational lawyers greatly enhance the readiness ofthe unit 

they support by helping commanders and staffs decipher the meaning 

and effect ofthe complex maze ofmobilization rules. Close 

coordination with the Deputy G-3 for Mobilization, the G-1, the G-4, 

and the G-5 can ensure that the command is properly oriented toward 

identifying particular reservists capable offurnishing a broad range of 

experience and expertise, particularly in combat service support billets. 

Also, the identification in advance of needs and skills envisioned by 

unit plans of all sorts-wartime, contingency operations, mission 

training, mobilization, force integration-will help reserve personnel 

managers match skilled reservists to positions. 

As most staffjudge advocates already know, the same 

methodology also applies, on a smaller scale, to legal offices. Gaining 

organization staff judge advocates derive great benefit from maintaining 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITL 1994-95 157 

frequent contact with IMAs assigned to organization billets. 


Experience tells us to get to know these people well. Resist the 


temptation to consume their annual training time with odd projects, and 


train them for their assigned jobs. Learn their special skills. Invest in 


them by arranging for schooling at The Judge Advocate General's 


School or elsewhere, as necessary. Annotate whether and in what 


conditions they would willingly enter active duty. 


2. Forge Strong Training and Mutual Support Relationships 

with Reserve Units. As experience from Haiti demonstrated, joint 

force packaging for future operations other than war will rely heavily on 

units in the selected reserves. 538 Judge advocate knowledge ofrules 

governing reserve force callups can help structure staff initiatives to 

plan for reserve unit employment and anticipate scenarios in which units 

must be procured. Strong, mutually supportive relationships between 

active and reserve component units enhance this process ofmobilization 

planning and execution. For example, the training relationship between 

the 10th Mountain Division and the 27th Infantry Brigade of the New 

York Army National Guard considerably smoothed the activation and 

assimilation of 115 Guard soldiers who provided deployment assistance 

to the 10th Mountain. 539 Similarly, the training relationship between the 

361st Civil Affairs Brigade of Columbia, South Carolina and the 

XVIIIth Airborne Corps eased the integration ofpersonnel from that 

unit into the MNF in Haiti. 

Again, the methodology applies, in miniature, to legal offices. 

Train with assigned Judge Advocate General Service Organizations 

(JAGSOs). Become fully acquainted with the modular structure of 

JAGSOs to be fielded under the new table of organization and 

equipment.540 Learn the capabilities, equipment, personnel, and 

leadership of assigned Legal Support Organization, the Legal Services 

538 See Rutherford Testimony, supra 522. 

539 See POSTURE STATEMENT, supra note 525, at 2. 

540 See OP. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at D-3. 
158 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Teams, the Trial Defense Teams, and Military Judge Teams.541 Create 

memoranda of understanding to strengthen informal training and 

mission support relationships. 542 Although these measures did not 

prove immediately applicable to legal operations in Haiti, they will be 

indispensable in many conceivable future contingencies. 

0. Equipment and Military Training543 

The rule of law is merely a lofty abstraction without two things: 

first, legal references; and second, operational lawyers capable of 

living, moving, and communicating in a field environment well enough 

to explain the contents of those references. After all, the rule of law is 

the rule of law, not the rule of individual opinions or feelings. 544 

Without ready access to written textual legal materials, and without 

personnel and resources capable of disseminating the meaning ofthose 

textual materials, what reigns is chaos, not law. 

Judge advocates supporting military operations in Haiti were, by 

and large, adequately equipped. Day to day, week to week, they 

consulted hundreds of different legal authorities. They had field 

libraries of appropriate depth and variety, and a functional mix of 

hardcopy and automated materials. When sources were not in their 

541 See DEP'TOF ARMY, REG. 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, at chs. 10, 11, 

and app. B (3 Feb. 1995). 

542 See, e.g., Memorandum ofUnderstanding Between Office ofthe Staff Judge 

Advocate, United States Army Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base and 153d Legal 

Support Organization, 79th United States Army Reserve Command, Willow Grove, Pennsylvania 

(25 Aug. 1995) (copy on file with CLAMO). 

543 Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this subpart is based upon the 

following sources: 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 1-4; Passar AAR, supra note 120, 

at paras. 2 to 4; l 94th Armored Brigade AAR, supra note 121, at para. 4; Gordon Interview, 

supra note 220; 0 'Brien Interview, supra note 46; Sposato Interview, supra note 216; With 

Interview, supra note 477; Becker Interview, supra note 184. 

544 See supra note 2. 
LAWAND A11LITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 159 

immediate possession, judge advocates in technical channels or 

elsewhere in the Judge Advocate General's Corps quickly provided 

them copies. The workspaces in which they conducted their legal 

research were large enough, well-lit, clean, dry, and cool. They used 

computers to process words, graphics, and other data, and used a 

variety ofmeans to communicate. They ate, slept, and worked in 

sufficient comfort to sustain a high level ofperformance. They had 

enough mobility to investigate claims and other matters, supervise legal 

personnel, advise commanders, and coordinate with staff.545 

Legal personnel also were, by and large, adequately trained in the 


noncombat military skills necessary to function efficiently during the 


deployment. They could orient maps to the ground by terrain 


association and could determine location, direction, and distance so as 


to navigate themselves or vehicles to desired destinations.546 They were 


capable of engaging targets with their personal weapons as necessary to 


perform security duties. 547 They could use the challenge and password 


properly.548 They could protect classified information and material. 549 


545 See FM 27-100, supra note 9, at paras. 6-3 to 6-6 (describing equipment, mobility, 

and automation requirements of legal personnel). See also infra Appendix BB, response number 

18 (answering the questions "when you had a need to travel by vehicle, what vehicle did you use, 

and what staff element or unit controlled the vehicle?" and "was this arrangement adequate?"). 

546 See DEP'TOFTHEARMY, SOLDIER TRAINING PUBLICATION NO. 21-1-SMCT, SOLDIER'S 

MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS, SKILL LEVEL l at 55 to l 09 ( 1990) [hereinafter COMMON TASKS 

MANUAL) (tasks 071-329-1000, 071-329-1001, 071-329-1002, 071-329-1003, 071-329-1005, 071­

329-1008, 071-329-1012, 071-329-1018). 

547 See id at 176-87 (task 071-311-2007). 

548 See id. at 420 (task 071-331-080 l ). 

549 See DEP'T OF ARMY' REG. 380-5, DEP'T OF THE ARMY INFORMATION SECURITY 

PROGRAM at ch. 5 (1 Mar. 1988) [hereinafter AR 380-5]. Note, however, that convenient and 

secure storage space was not always available. See l 0th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note l 08, at 2 

("We were forced to store our classified documents at the division headquarters. This became 

cumbersome, as the division headquarters building is located approximacely three miles from our 

office."). 
160 CENTERFORLAWANDWLITARYOPERATIONS 

Nevertheless, the conditions in Haiti challenged preparedness in 

equipment and training so thoroughly that deployed judge advocates 

invariably developed strong opinions about how better to prepare for 

future operations other than war. In order to reflect the personal 

observations of a representative group of three legal personnel who 

deployed to Haiti, this report reprints at Appendix BB the answers to a 

survey about equipment and training. The answers are both illuminating 

and sobering. Soldiers and attorneys can never be completely ready to 

deploy, but they can do much useful preparation in advance. 

1. Pack Footlockers Ahead ofTime With Forms and 

References, to Include Fiscal Law and Intelligence Law Materials. 

More and more legal documents, references, and forms are being 

translated into microfiche and electronic data formats. 550 A wealth of 

information that was hard to find only a year ago is now available on 

CD-ROM disks or on databases accessible via telephone lines or other 

communication links. Ten year old guides providing tips on how to 

conduct legal research today seem hopelessly out-of-date. 551 Along 

with the rest ofthe American legal community~552 The Judge Advocate 

General's Corps is in the middle of a legal resource revolution. 

Given the crush ofwork related to providing legal services on a 

military installation in peacetime and given the continuing revolution in 

legal resources, the temptation to put offpacking for possible 

deployment is high. Ifa form or manual will be available on disc a few 

months from now anyway, why bother? While this mode ofthinking is 

very seductive, the Haiti deployment proves that it is very wrong. 

sso See, e.g., LEXIX-NEXIS, DIRECTORY OF ONLINE SERVICES (1995) (consisting of404 

pages ofsmall print cataloguing thousands of available documents). 

ssi See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER G. WREN & JILL ROBINSON WREN, THE LEGAL RESEARCH 

MANUAL(2d ed. 1986) (devoting 3 pages out of219 to computerized legal research). 

552 See, e.g. Richard A. Matasar & Rosemary Shiels, Electronic Law Students: 

Repercussions on Legal Education, 29 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY L. REV. 909 (1995). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 161 


Operational lawyers profited greatly from footlockers of 

prepacked, hardcopy materials, even ifthese did require some 

repacking in the days immediately before departure.553 Most legal 

references consulted were in hardcopy: army regulations, handbooks, 

deskbooks, The Manual for Courts-Martial. Most legal forms 

completed were preprinted, paper forms: article 15's, sworn statements, 

investigating officer's reports, ordering officer vouchers. 554 References 

that were unexpectedly coveted included a compilation of foreign 

relations legislation printed by the Government Printing Office (GPO) 

and helpful in resolving fiscal law issues,555 a compilation of 

553 See, e.g., Stai Memorandum, supra note 35, at 10 ([Between 25 April 1994 and 8 

May 1994,] I painted one field desk and three footlockers OD green and stenciled "SJA" on them 

in white letters. I inventoried their contents, replenished their supplies, and began stocking them 

with joint, Army, and other publications, as available."); id. at 31 ("I made 5.5 x l 0.5 inch copies 

of the ROE and legal appendixes, treaties and agreements, and law ofwar, ROE, and country law 

training materials. I packed these materials and several ROE cards, foreign claims settlement 

agreement forms, and property control record books in my rucksack."); 194th Armored Brigade 

AAR, supra note 121, at para. 4 ("When the execute order came on 6 September, I had all ofthe 

requisite computer hardware and software, as well as a fully stocked deployment box."); Passar 

AAR, supra note 120, at para. 2d (''The only unexpected hurdle in preparing for deployment was 

my discovery shortly before departing that there was some doubt whether commercial/military 

transport would handle the office-provided footlocker of legal resources that I had assembled. 

Although smaller than the one taken by MAJ DeMoss on his deployment to Somalia, I was 

advised that mine technically exceeded the dimension limit for baggage by a few inches and that 

the estimated l 00 lb. weight exceeded the maximum weight for each piece of accompanying 

baggage, 70 lbs. I had previously obtained authorization for excess weight shipment but had not 

been advised ofthe limit for each piece. I quickly remedied this potential problem by purchasing 

a Rubbermaid durable plastic footlocker and split my legal reference materials between the two 

footlockers, ensuring that both were under the 70 lb. limit. This turned out to make transport of 

the materials much easier. In Haiti, I discovered that the 18th Airborne Corps transportation 

personnel deployed with similar plastic footlockers, and I recommend using them rather than the 

bulkier standard footlocker."); cf Bickers Memorandum, supra note 362, at para. 2 ("We were 

able to beg and borrow space, phones, computer use, etc., but a stocked field desk would be a 

sound investment and admirable solution, especially in light divisions."). 

554 For a listing of the formal nomenclature for these forms, see OP. LAW HANDBOOK, 

supra note 9, at 14-8 to 14-11. 

SSS See LEGISLATiON ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1994, supra note 336. 

Government Printing Office publications may be ordered by mailing orders to Superintendent of 

Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402-9325, telephoning orders 

to (202) 783-3238 between 8:00 am and 4:00 pm eastern time, or sending a fax to the 

Government Accounts desk at (202) 512-2256. 
162 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

intelligence law printed by GP0,556 regulations of other services 

pertaining to nonjudicial punishment,557 and a guide to family law in the 

fifty states. 558 

2. Deploy With 486 Laptops Having Software Used By the 

Rest ofthe Staffand Having Communications and CD-ROM 

Reading Capability. Even as it remains necessary to carry paper 

references and forms, today's operational lawyer must be equipped with 

modem automated data processing and communication equipment. 

Almost all judge advocates deployed to Haiti with or had ready access 

to advanced, lightweight laptop computers. Some of these hooked 

directly into local area networks linking staff members. Judge 

advocates researched issues, sent electronic mail, wrote legal 

memoranda, made entries in the daily log, and prepared briefing charts 

using computers. Staff elements used a large variety of dot~matrix, 

bubble jet, and laser printers. 

ss6 See HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMPILATION OF 

INTELLIGENCE LAWS AND RELATED LAWS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS OF INTEREST TO THE NATIONAL 

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (July 1993). 

SS? See DEP'TOF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE, para. 3-7 (Cl, 16 Sept. 1994) 

(providing guidance for commanders imposing nonjudicial punishment over members of other 

services and requiring compliance with procedures prescribed by the member's parent service); 

DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 51-202, MILITARY JUSTICE, NONJUDICIAL 

J>uNISHMENT GUIDE (April 1994); DEP'T OF NAVY, MANUAL OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, 

NAVY (JAGMAN) (1 July 1978); UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, MILITARY JUSTICE MANUAL, 

COMDINST. M5810.1C (15 Jan. 1991). The need for guidance pertaining to nonjudicial 

punishment of other services mirrored a need for training in other services' procedures. See 

Electronic Mail Message from Sergeant Steven Wasilausky, Legal Noncommissioned Officer for 

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and United States Forces in Haiti to Major Mark Martins (30 Aug. 

1995) (regretting the lack of training in such procedures and stating that "a 'Joint Military 

Operations Criminal Justice Manual,' with the normal essentials found in AR 27-10 would be 

invaluable"). 

SSS See, e.g .• THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, JA 263, 

LEGAL ASSISTANCE FAMILY LAW GUIDE (June 1993) (containing state-by-state law summaries in 

chapter 4). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 163 

Software incompatibilities plagued many judge advocates, both 

before and after deployment. Most other staff offices were using 

Microsoft Word, Access, and Powerpoint, whereas judge advocates 

were using W ordperfect, Enable, and Harvard Graphics. 559 Although 

the hurdles presented by inconsistent software were never insuperable, 

they added an unwelcome layer of complexity. 

The deployment to Haiti clearly revealed that the Zenith 286 

laptop computers, in the inventory of many legal offices since the late 

1980's, are not worth bringing to the field in a realworld deployment. 560 

559 See, e.g., 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 1 (''This Jack of compatibility 

became a major hindrance for operations planning for the SJA office. It also created undue work 

for the G-3 staff during times of high stress. Often, G-3 staff members had to create SJA slides 

for upcoming briefings. It is essential that each SJA office of a deployable division have word 

processing and graphics software compatible with the division staff."). 

560 One senior judge advocate who deployed to Haiti provided a colorful description of the 

inadequacies ofthis old system: 

A caution to those considering taking the old style Zenith lap tops like the ones 


issued to some in the Trial Judiciary. These computers are completely outdated 


and should be relied upon with great caution. 


(1) The floppy disk drives on the Zenith lap tops will only read and write to 


720k floppies but the current l .44MB floppies are the industry and Army 


standard. These Zenith lap tops are the only computers in the Army inventory I 


am aware of that are so limited. The danger here is that if you intend to use the 


old Zenith lap tops, ensure that you take spare 720k floppies with you and do not 


rely on anyone giving you a 3.5" disk unless you are certain it is a 720k disk. 


(2) The old Zenith lap tops are dinosaurs for other reasons: 

(a) The 286 CPU in the lap tops are electronically incapable of running 


Windows 3.1 or higher. That program is quickly becoming a military and 


industry standard for many applications. 


(b) The screen display is of the CGA type. That standard is three generations 


behind the current standard and few programs today will run in CGA mode. 


(c) The displays are also of a type that provides not only an inferior quality 


picture, but become unreadable in extreme temperatures. 


(d) The lap tops are very heavy by today's standards and they are difficult to 


deploy. Their size makes them inconvenient to use in tight spaces and to pack. 


By contrast, notebook computers can be easily transported in a briefcase or 


helmet bag with room to spare for other essentials. 

164 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

A deployment package consisting of an IBM-compatible laptop with an 

Intel 486 generation processing chip, four megabytes or more of 

random access memory, a modem of2400 baud or better, and a CDROM drive would have provided any of the deployed judge advocates 

with optimal automation support. Surely, the next report of this type 

that is written will describe a package with much greater capability. 561 

(e) The hard drives have a very small capacity and are extremely slow. 

(f) The limited on board memory limits the usability of the computer. For 

example, if one loaded a resident program to protect against viruses (always 

advisable), even some parts of Enable suffer from memory shortages. 

(g) I do not support having only the most modern equipment for the sake of 

being on the edge oftechnology. However, the old model Zenith lap tops are 

truly outdated and their best value is as a charitable contribution to a worthwhile 

cause. 

See Hodges, supra note 380, at 8g. 

561 The Developments, Doctrine & Literature Department at The Judge Advocate 

General's School-in coordination with the Information Management Office, Legal Automation 

Army-Wide System Team, Office of the Judge Advocate General, with the Office ofthe Staff 

Judge Advocate, United States Army Forces Command, with the Office of the Staff Judge 

Advocate, United States Army Special Forces Command, with the International and Operational 

Law Division, The Judge Advocate General's School, and with CLAMO-has developed an 

attractive package of components that can be deployed in a rucksack: 

JAGS-DDC 	 8SEP1995 

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE 

SUBJECT: Rucksack Deployable Law Office and Library (RDLOL) 

1. This concept envisions a suite of off-the-shelf automation equipment, 

providing, in a man-portable package, the following capabilities: 

o 	 Word Processing/database/spreadsheet 

o 	 Administrative document production/preparation 

o 	 Criminal Law document production/preparation 

o 	 Legal Assistance document production/preparation 

o 	 Convenience copying 

o 	 Cellular voice communication 

o 	 Wireline and non-wire FAX (w/satcom capability) 

o 	 Wireline and non-wire digital telecommunication (w/satcom 

compatibility) 

o 	 Photography and digital telecommunication of photographs 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 165 


o Legal Research w/import to document capability 

o Compatibility with standard Army communications equipment 

2. Some or all ofthis capability may be procured through the purchase of one of 

several commercially available suites of equipment, or by local assembly of 

separately purchased components. Market research discloses that the former 

option is rather expensive (See attached quotations from Computer Masters 

(COZMO) and Syntrex Technologies). 

3. The concept capabilities are available in components described as follows: 

Lightweight, portable (notebook or subnotebook size) computer, IBM 

compatible, 486-level CPU (prefer 486DX2-66, or 486DX4-l 00), 8-16 

Mbytes RAM, at least 200 Mbyte hard disk storage (prefer removable 

media), internal MPCII-compatible double-speed or greater CD-ROM drive 

(prefer CD-ROM access by lifting keyboard), internal or external 3.5'' floppy 

drive, internal or PCMCIA FAX/modem (prefer 28.8 kbps), parallel, serial, 

VGA monitor ports (prefer external keyboard port), 2 batteries w/external 

charger (prefer NiMH batteries and 1-2 hour charger w/discharge option). 

Full-page, self interfaced, battery operated lightweight, 300 dpi or greater 

portable scanner, w/internal battery and recharger and bundled 

scan/FAX/copy software (NOTE: At least 4 MB of computer's RAM is 

needed for SW APFILE operations of the scanner). 

Lightweight, portable, battery operated, inkjet, 300 dpi or greater printer, 

w/internal battery and recharger. 

Lightweight, portable, cellular telephone (prefer 3 watt), w/battery and 12 

volt adapter/eliminator and cellular telephone data interface. 

Lightweight, portable, self-interfaced digital camera. 

Lightweight, portable surge suppresser/battery extender. 

Lightweight hardside carrying case for all the above, at least l 2"x l 8"x9'', 

w/dense foam insert configured or configurable to cushion the above. 

Software: 

Commercial--DOS 6.22, Windows 3.11, Word Perfect for Windows 6.1, 

Enable 4.01, ULTRAFAX or WINFAX PRO, Words & Pictures (bundled w/ 

scanner), WESTLA W or LEXIS, West's Military Justice Reports (CD-ROM 

edition), West's United States Code Annotated (CD-ROM edition), West's 

Government Contract Law Reporter (CD-ROM edition), West's Labor Jaw 

Reporter (CD-ROM edition), West's Environmental Law Reporter (CDROM edition). 
166 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

3. Conduct Individual Soldier and Officer Training on Such 

Things as First Aid, Vehicle Primary Maintenance, and Writing 

Messages. One ofthe principle recommendations ofthe Desert Storm 

Assessment Team was that "the JAGC better prepare for mobilization, 

deployment, and war by training more in soldier skills; cross-training 

personnel in all legal functional areas for greater operational law utility; 

and developing light, easily-deployable packages ofup-to-date 

automated and other research materials which will withstand severe 

conditions."562 Judge advocates who deployed state that operations in 

Haiti-though not war-resoundingly validated this recommendation. 

Three areas stood out as particularly deserving oftraining attention: first 

Army procured--LAA WS CD-ROM w/Claims and Criminal Law Modules, 

ARMYPUBS CD-ROM, ARMYFORMS CD-ROM, Forms Engine. 

4. Market research discloses that items meeting the above requirement, less 

scanner and batteries for the printer, are available at a reasonable price on GSA 

Schedules B and C or the GSA Army Portable-I contract from Government 

Technology Services, Inc. (GTSI} (See attached order forms for details). 

5. Research also discloses that the cellular telephone capability already exists in 

most target organizations. The PCMCIA modem available from GTSI is selfinterfaced with cellular systems and requires no separate digital interface 

adapter. 

6. The scanner and batteries are available at reasonable cost from GTSI from 

open-market purchases. 

7. The total component cost ($6,802.00, plus and estimated $136.00 for the 

case) is significantly less than that of either the Computer Masters or Syntrex 

suite. 

GA YLEN G. WHATCOTT 

MAJ,JA 

Combat Developments Officer 

562 See DSA T REPORT, supra note 3, at Executive Summary. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 167 


aid;563 preventive maintenance checks and services on military 

vehicles;564 operator maintenance on weapons;565 and writing and 

reading United States Message Text Format (USMTF) messages.566 

P. StaffProcedures and Operations 

Judge advocates fulfill their mission "by providing professional 

legal services. " 567 This report has illustrated that the success of the 

Haiti deployment to date is at least partly attributable to United States 

forces' commitment to the rule of law. The connection-between 

providing legal services and constituting a military force that lives, eats, 

trains, deploys, and fights according to the rule of law-lies partly in 

the many substantive areas of the law surveyed in subparts III.A to 

III.N above. It lies partly in the equipment and training imperatives 

outlined in subpart 111.0. It lies partly in the patriotism and dedication 

of an extremely talented and skilled population of volunteer soldiers. 

Yet the connection also lies in the procedures and operational 

methods judge advocates employ on the staffs of the commander they 

support. A relatively small number of legal professionals in Haiti 

provided services that successfully promoted the rule of law because 

that number was organized and used procedures that maximize the 

impact of those services. Legal services are a part of the Personnel 

563 See COMMON TASKS MANUAL, supra note 546, at 641 to 723 (consisting of 17 tasks, 

including 081-831-1033-Apply a Dressing to an Open Head Wound and 081-831-1008-Give 

First Aid for Heat Injuries). 

564 See DEP1

TOF ARMY, SOLDIER TRAINING PUBLICATION No. 21-II-MQS, MILITARY 

QUALIFICATION STANDARDS II: MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS FOR LIEUTENANTS AND CAPTAINS 3-70 

(31 Jan. 1991) (task 04-4966.90-0010) 

565 See, e.g., COMMON TASKS MANUAL, supra note 546, at 110 (task 071-311-2025). 

566 See DEP'TOFTHEARMY, SOLDIER TRAINING PUBLICATION NO. 21-24-SMCT, 

SOLDIER'S MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS, SKILL LEVELS 2-4 at 5-3 to 5-3 (1992) (tasks 113-572­

4008, 113-572-5005, 113-572-6005, 113-572-6006); Stai Memorandum, supra note 35, at 29 

(describing receipt ofa key message concerning ROE). 

567 See FM 27-100, supra note 9, at para. 1-4. 
168 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Service Support mission area.568 They support the Battle Command 

and Combat Service Support Battlefield Operating Systems. 569 They 

comprise three types of services: organizational, judicial, and 

defense.570 Although judicial and defense services are essential to the 

maintenance ofgood order and discipline in the force, the lessons 

learned from Haiti apply principally to organizational services. 

1. Keep a Log ofAll Significant Actions. Military operations in 

Haiti confirmed that a division Staff Judge Advocate section supporting 

a combined-joint task force must record all significant events, incidents, 

and interactions in a chronological log. The 10th Mountain Division 

section kept a detailed log,571 as did the 25th Infantry Division 

section.572 To provide a flavor ofthe kinds of events that might appear 

in such a log, Appendix CC reprints selected entries from that kept by 

the 10th Mountain Division, while Appendix DD reprints selected 

entries from that kept by the 25th Infantry Division. Judge advocates 

supporting smaller elements kept detailed chronological records of 

significant actions. 573 . Prior to deployment and throughout the 

existence of JTF-180, the XVIIIth Airborne Corps judge advocate 

element in the JTF headquarters at Fort Bragg also kept a log.574 

568 See id. at para. 1-5. 

569 See id. Army training doctrine requires commanders to assess many aspects oftheir 

units by separately examining each "Battlefield Operating System" (BOS), ofwhich there are 

seven: intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, logistics, and 

battle command. See FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 2-12 to 2-15 (introducing "battle 

command'' in place of "command and control. But cf Arnold & Stahl, supra note 336, at 14 

(describing the addition ofa "force protection" operating system, which "included a constant 

review of the rules of engagement and the building of limited infrastructure in the theater where 

no infrastructure existed for the support ofour soldiers"). 

570 See FM 27-100, supra note 9, at para. 1-6. 

571 See Gordon Interview, supra note 220. 

572 See Sposato Interview, supra note 216. 

573 See Passar AAR, supra note 120 (''Through frequent activity summaries (Encl 2a-g) 

faxed to AMC Command Counsel's office, I informed that office ofthe significant substantive 

matters handled during my deployment."). 

574 See Smith Interview, supra note 40. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 169 

Appendix EE reprints a short excerpt from the log kept by United States 


Forces Haiti in the latter part of 1995, more than a year after operations 


in Haiti began 


A log of legal services that have been provided serves three 


practical functions. First, it jogs the memory when one seeks to recall 


facts and legal reasoning behind prior advice rendered. Second, it alerts 


judge advocates serving different shifts in the command post that prior 


advice has been rendered on particular topics. 575 Third, it enables the 


staffjudge advocate to identify patterns and areas of high demand for 


legal services, information that is helpful in deciding what products and 


training to develop. The first two functions help eliminate inconsistent 


guidance to the command and discourage "forum-shopping."576 The 


third provides a key management tool. 


A log also serves the higher function of distilling and collecting 


rules that have achieved a special distinction: they actually have been 


applied to events in the real world. For lawyers trained in the common 


law tradition, the law is built upon precedents derived from cases. 


Though far less formal than decisions rendered by courts, a log provides 


operational case law. 


2. Maintain a Binder With Messages and Other Authorities 


Relating to the Operation. Ifthe daily log is analogous to a body of 


decisions decided on particular facts, then the resolutions ofthe 


515 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 12 ("Although the Staff Judge 


Advocate, the Deputy SJA, and the Operations Law Judge Advocate led the office effort, every 


judge advocate worked shifts in the Joint Operations Center (JOC), which was manned by a judge 


advocate 24 hours a day. Thus, every judge advocate needed to keep abreast on all operations 


issues.... While the SJA attended morning and evening command and staff briefings, to include 


. executive sessions, judge advocates attended JOC shift change briefings twice daily. At this 

briefing, judge advocates briefed the joint staff on current legal issues of interest."). 

516 See id. at 7 ("Many times, civil affairs personnel would 'forum shop' until they found 


a judge advocate who would provide legal approval for a project. Communication within the SJA 


office, and with the brigade legal counsel, through SJA meetings and extensive entries in the SJA 


Duty Log, put an end to this practice."). 

170 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Security Council, the policy pronouncements ofthe United States, and 

the directives and messages from higher headquarters are analogous to 

statutory law. Though often not concrete enough to answer specific 

legal questions that arise, these resolutions, pronouncements, directives 

and messages nevertheless relate specifically to the operation in 

question, and are therefore often the first texts to be construed when 

legal judgment is required. 577 

3. Obtain Top-Secret Security Clearances for StaffJudge 

Advocate, Deputy StaffJudge Advocate, and International and 

Operational Law Attorneys. In the aftermath of the Cold War, some 

question the existence of significant foreign threats to United States 

national security.578 Prudent assessments, however, indicate that 

numerous and diverse foreign elements continue to have great interest in 

stealing United States secrets and influencing or disrupting United 

States affairs.579 Informed observers reason that the threat may be 

s 

77 See id. at 4 ("The MNF SJA office deployed with [all key resolutions, directives, etc.], 

providing a reference source to answer questions from the command on operations and numerous 

other issues. In future deployments, every SJA office must deploy with copies of all documents 

used as a legal basis for the operation. Commanders and J-2/J-3 operators demand quick access to 

these documents in interpreting missions. We established a binder in the SJA office and at the 

SJA desk in the operations center with these documents to ensure quick reference. All SJA 

personnel must read these documents periodically to maintain familiarity with mission 

directives."); l 94th Armored Brigade AAR, supra note 121, at para. 5 ("The lawyers up the 

command channels rely on the deployed JA personally to read every key message regarding the 

mission. I was able to articulate my requirements and identify potential legal issues before they 

became insoluble problems only by reading all ofthe key messages as they arrived in the 

Brigade."). 

578 See, e.g .. John Walcott and Brian Duffy, The CIA 's Darkest Secrets, U.S. NEWS AND 

WORLD REPORT, July 4, 1994, at 34, 4 7 ("Deprived of its historic target, the CIA has found new 

roles to play, but critics say the agency is simply casting about for ways to justify its budget--if not 

its existence."). 

s 

79 The Soviet KGB and the East German Stasi were the Cold War threat, aggressively 

recruiting Americans to steal secrets. See, e.g. Suzanne Wood, Katherine Herbig & Peter Lewis, 

American Espionage 1945-1989, in To Improve U.S. Counterintelligence Measures: Hearings on 

S.2726 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, at, 55-89, IOI st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) 

[hereinafter 1990 Senate Hearings] Modern national threats are diverse, ranging from foreign 

intelligence and security services (FIS) of east Asian countries seeking advantages in the 

marketplace, to FIS of eastern European countries seeking influence upon United States foreign 

policy. See, e.g .. id. at 171, 175-79 (prepared statement ofMr. Kenneth E. deGraffenreid, 

former Director for Intelligence Programs at the National Security Council). Today, however, 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 171 

greater than ever precisely because the Cold War has ended and 

potential spies can rationalize their behavior as 11 not really selling out 

the national security of my country, not really selling out to someone 

who might use this as a military secret to come and take over our 

country or invade or launch a surprise nuclear attack. 11580 

These national security concerns combine with operational 

security concerns to ensure that some classification system for 

safeguarding sensitive documents and information will remain in place 

for as long as armies continue to exist.581 Given the enduring need for 

security classifications and clearances, judge advocate sections must be 

cleared to see these sensitive documents, many of which will have legal 

significance. The Haiti operations, particularly the predeployment 

phase, seems to establish the wisdom ofhaving at least three judge 

advocates in division and corps-sized offices cleared for Top Secret 

material.582 

IV. Conclusion 

Sixteen months ago, the prospect of military operations in Haiti 

was an unpleasant one for many Americans. Some predicted failure 

foreign terrorist groups may be more likely threats than national FIS. Indeed, a recent 

Presidential directive states that "it is critical that the U.S. maintain a highly effective and 

coordinated counterintelligence capability" because of "numerous threats to our national 

interests--terrorism, proliferating weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflicts, sluggish 

economic growth ... " See The White House and the National Security Counsel, Presidential 

Decision Directive/NSC-24, subject: U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness, at 3 (May 3, 1994). 

Studies show that a typical profile of a United States spy transferring secrets abroad is 

as follows: young; in military service (more likely enlisted than officer); motivated by money; 

fairly well educated; a volunteer of his espionage services. See, e.g. Wood, Herbig & Lewis, 

supra in 1990 Senate Hearings at 60-73. 

580 See1990 Senate Hearings, supra note 579, at 114 (statement of Senator Boren). 

581 For the Anny, the present system is prescribed in AR 380-5, supra note 549, and in 

related regulations. All services continue to implement the policies and procedures set forth in 

Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (2 April 1982) (''National Security Information"). 

582 See 10th Mountain Div. AAR, supra note 108, at 2 ("In addition, the SJA, Deputy 

SJA, and Operations Law Judge Advocate need to have a ''Top Secret" Security Clearance."). 
172 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

and high casualties. Success would come hard. Today, hindsight 

happily informs us that the direst predictions were clearly wrong. True, 

duty in Haiti, far from a traditional war zone but also far from the 

comforts of home, was arduous and often thankless. True, not all 

individuals and units-both in the judge advocate community and the 

wider ranks-were fully successful. Some failures occurred. 

True, history may or may not regard the Haiti deployment as a 

success. The long-term assessment ofthe past years' events depends 

on too many factors to predict the outcome with confidence. Haiti 

continues to face numerous and difficult obstacles to peace, prosperity, 

stability, and democracy. The short-lived impact of a much longer 

intervention half a century ago counsels against giddy optimism over 

Haiti's future. 

Yet the multinational force led by the United States and the 

subsequent United Nations Mission did achieve an impressive list of 

successes. The MNF shifted from a forced entry to a permissive entry 

without any loss ofmomentum. It maintained a delicate yet functional 

and arms-length relationship with the Cedras regime. It ensured that the 

leadership ofthat regime departed the country on schedule. Military 

operations enforced the restoration ofparliament and the reinstatement 

ofPresident Aristide. They removed 30,000 weapons from the streets 

and the countryside. These operations provided an environment within 

which other agencies and organizations could train police and furnish 

humanitarian and civic assistance. The UNMIH maintained this 

environment. It also oversaw peaceful and fair parliamentary elections. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATJONSINHAITL 1994-95 173 


Soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen ofthe 

active and reserve components achieved these successes. They did so 

in combination with forces from more than 30 nations. These men and 

women in uniform performed their mission under great media scrutiny. 

They did so without the clear definition of success that accompanies a 

traditional war. One of their implements was the rule of law. 

12/10/95 
174 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

Appendix A: Agreement ofGovernors Island 

UNITED NATIONS 


July 3, 1993 


The President of the Republic of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, 

and the Commander-in-Chief ofthe Armed Forces of Haiti, LieutenantGeneral Raoul Cedras, have agreed that the following arrangements 

should be made in order to resolve the Haitian crisis. Each ofthem has 

agreed to take, within the scope of his powers, all the necessary 

measures for this implementation ofthese arrangements. Furthermore, 

they both, in any case, express their support for the implementation of 

these arrangements and pledge to cooperate in implementing them. 

1. Organization, under the auspices of the United Nations and the 

Organization ofAmerican States (OAS), of a political dialogue between 

representatives of the political parties represented in the Parliament, with 

the participation ofrepresentatives ofthe Presidential Commission, in 

order to: a) agree to a political truce and promote a social pact to create 

the conditions necessary to ensure a peaceful transition; b) reach an 

agreement on the procedure for enabling the Haitian Parliament to 

resume its normal functioning; c) reach an agreement enabling the 

Parliament to confirm the Prime Minister as speedily as possible; and d) 

reach an agreement permitting the adoption ofthe laws necessary for 

ensuring the transition. 

2. Nomination of a Prime Minister by the President ofthe Republic. 

3. Confirmation ofthe Prime Minister by the legally reconstituted 

Parliament and his assumption ofoffice in Haiti. 

4. Suspension on the initiative ofthe United Nations Secretary-General, 

of the sanctions adopted under Security Council resolution 241 (1993) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSJNHAIT/, 1994-95 175 


and suspension, on the initiative ofthe Secretary-General of OAS, ofthe 

other measures adopted at the OAS Ad Hoc Meeting ofMinisters of 

Foreign Affairs, immediately after the Prime Minister is confirmed and 

assumes office in Haiti. 

5. Implementation, following the agreements with the constitutional 


Government, of international cooperation: 


a) technical and financial assistance for development; 


b) assistance for the administrative and judicial reform; 


c) assistance for modernizing the Armed Force ofHaiti and establishing 


a new Police Force with the presence ofUnited Nations personnel in 


these fields. 


6. An amnesty granted by the President ofthe Republic within the 


framework of article 14 7 ofthe National Constitution and 


implementation ofthe other instruments which may be adopted by the 


Parliament of this question. 


7. Adoption of a law establishing the new Police Force Appointment 

within this framework, ofthe Commander-in-Chief ofthe Police Force 

by this President ofthe Republic. 

8. The Commander-in-Chief ofthe Armed Forces ofHaiti has decided 

to avail himself of his right to early retirement and the President ofthe 

Republic shall appoint a new Commander-in-Chiefofthe Armed Force 

ofHaiti, who shall appoint the members ofthe General Staff, in 

accordance with the Constitution. 

9. Return to Haiti ofthe President of the Republic, Jean-Bertrand 

Aristide, on 30 October 1993. 

10. Verification by the United Nations and the Organization ofthe 

American States of fulfillment of all the foregoing commitments. 
176 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

The President ofthe Republic and the Commander-in-Chief 

agrees that these arrangements constitute a satisfactory solution to the 

Haitian crisis and the beginning of a process of national reconciliation. 

They pledge to cooperate fully in the peaceful transition to a stable and 

lasting democratic society in which all Haitians will be able to live in a 

climate offreedom, justice, and security and respect for human rights. 

Jean-Bertrand Aristide Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras 

President ofthe Commander-in-Chief ofthe 

Republic ofHaiti Armed Forces ofHaiti 
LAWAND lvflLITARYOPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 177 

Appendix B: Resolution 940, Adopted by the Security Council at its . 

3413th Meeting, on 31July1994 

The Security Council 

Reaffirming its resolutions 542 (1993) of 16 June 1993, 861 (1993) of 

27 August 1993, 863 (1993) of31August1993, 867 (1993) of23 

September 1993, 872 (1993) of 10 October 1993, 875 (1993) of 15 

October 1993, 305 (1994) of22 March 1994, 819 (1994) of6 May 1994 

and 823 (1994) of 30 June 1994. 

Recalling the terms ofthe Governors Island Agreement (S/26063) and 

the related Pact ofNew York (S/26297). 

Condemning the continuing disregard of those agreements by the illegal 

de facto regime, and the regime's refusal to cooperate with efforts by the 

United Nations and the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS) to bring 

about their implementation. 

Gravely concerned by the significant further deterioration ofthe 

humanitarian situation in Haiti in particular the continuing escalation by 

the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of civil liberties, the 

desperate plight of Haitian refugees and the recent expulsion ofthe staff 

ofthe International Civilian Mission (MICVEN) which was condemned 

in its Presidential statement of 12 July 1994 (S/PRST/1994/32). 

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 15 July 1994 

(S/1994/828 and Add 1) and 26 July 1994 (S/1994/871). 

Taking notes ofthe letter dated 29 July 1994 from the legitimately 

elected President ofHaiti (S/1994/905, annex) and the letter dated 30 

July 1994 from the Permanent Representative ofHaiti to the United 

Nations (S/1994/910). 
178 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Reiterating its commitment for the international community to assist and 

support the economic, social and institutional development ofHaiti. 

Reaffirming that the goal ofthe international community remains the 


restoration of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return ofthe 


legitimately elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, within the 


framework of the Governors Island Agreement. 


Recalling that in resolution 873 (1993) the Council confirmed its 

readiness to consider the imposition of additional measures ifthe 

military authorities in Haiti continued to impede the activities ofthe 

United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) or failed to comply in full 

with its relevant resolutions and the providence ofthe Governors Island 

Agreement. 

Determining that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to 

peace and security in the region. 

1. Welcomes the report ofthe Secretary-General of 15 July 1994 

(S/1994/828) and takes note of his support for action under Chapter VII 

of the Charter of the United Nations in order to assist the legitimate 

Government ofHaiti in the maintenance ofpublic order; 

2. Recognizes the unique character ofthe present situation in 

Haiti and its deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring 

an exceptional response; 

3. Determines that the illegal de facto regime in Haiti has failed 

to comply with the Governors Island Agreement and is in breach ofits 

obligations under the relevant resolutions ofthe Security Council; 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITI, 1994-95 179 

4. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 

authorizes Member States to form a multinational force under unified 

command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means 

to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent 

with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the 

legitimately elected President and the restoration ofthe legitimate 

authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a 

secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the 

Governors Island Agreement on the understanding that the cost of 

implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating 

Member States; 

5. Approves the establishment, upon adoption ofthis resolution, 

of an advance term of UNMIH of not more than sixty personnel, 

including a group of observers, to establish the appropriate means of 

coordination with the multinational force, to carry out the monitoring of 

the operations of the multinational force and other functions described in 

paragraph 23 of the report of the Secretary-General of 15 July 1994 

(S/1994/828), and to assess requirements and to prepare for the 

deployment ofUNMIH upon completion of the mission ofthe 

multinational force; 

6. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the activities of 

the team within thirty days ofthe date of deployment of the multinational 

force; 

7. Decides that the tasks ofthe advance team as defined in 

paragraph 5 above will expire on the date of termination of the mission 

ofthe multinational; 

8. Decides that the multinational force will terminate its mission 

and UNMIH will assume the full range of its functions described in 

paragraph 9 below when a secure and stable environment has been 
I80 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

established and UNMIH has adequate force capability and structure to 

assume the full range of its functions; the determination will be made by 

the Security Council, taking into account recommendations from the 

Member States of the multinational force which are based on the 

assessment of the commander of the multinational force, and from the 

Secretary-General; 

9. Decides to revise and extend the mandate of the United 

Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for a period of six months to assist 

the democratic Government of Haiti is fulfilling its responsibilities in 

connection with; 

a) sustaining the secure and stable environment established 

during the multinational phase and protecting international personnel and 

key installations; and 

b) The professionalism of the Haitian armed forces and the 

creation of a separate police force; 

I 0. Requests also that UNMIH assist the legitimate constitutional 

authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the 

organization of free and fair legislative elections to be called by those 

authorities and, when requested by them, monitored by the United 

Nations, in cooperation with the Organization ofHaiti, not later than 

February I 996; 

I I. Decides to increase the troop level of UNMIH to 6,000 and 

establishes the objective of completing UNMIH's mission, in 

cooperation with the constitutional Government of Haiti, not later than 

February I996; 

12. Invites all States, in particular those in the region, to provide 

appropriate support for the actions undertaken by the United Nations 

and by Member States pursuant to this and other relevant Security 

Council resolutions; 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 181 


13. Requests the Member States acting in accordance with 


paragraph 4 above to report to the Council at regular intervals, the first 


such report to be made not later than seven days following the 


deployment ofthe multinational force; 


14. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the 

implementation ofthis resolution at sixty-day intervals starting from the 

date of deployment ofthe multinational force; 

15. Demands strict respect for the persons and premises ofthe 

United Nations, the Organizations ofAmerican States, other 

international and humanitarian organizations and diplomatic missions in 

Haiti, and that no acts of intimidation or violence be directed against 

personnel engaged in humanitarian or peace-keeping work; 

16. Emphasizes the necessity that, inter alia: 

a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure the security and 

safety ofthe operations and personnel engaged in such operations; and 

b) The security and safety arrangements undertaken extend 

to all persons engaged in the operations; 

17. Affirms that the Council will review the measures imposed 

pursuant to resolutions 841 (1993), 973 (1993) and 917 (1994), with a 

view to lifting them in their entirety, immediately following the return to 

Haiti ofPresident Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 

18. Decides to remain actively seized ofthe matter. 
182 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix C: Agreement Signed by Jimmy Carter and Emile 


Jonassaint, the Military-Appointed President ofHaiti, 


in Port-au-Prince, on 18September1994 


I. The purpose ofthis agreement is to foster peace in Haiti, to avoid 

violence and bloodshed, to promote freedom and democracy, and to 

forge a sustained and mutually beneficial relationship between the 

governments, people, and institutions ofHaiti and the United States.· 

2. To implement this agreement, the Haitian military and police forces 

will work in close cooperation with the U.S. Military Mission. This 

cooperation, conducted with mutual respect, will last during the 

transitional period required for insuring vital institutions ofthe country. 

3. In order to personally contribute to the success of this agreement, 

certain military officers of the Haitian armed forces are willing to 

consent to an early and honorable retirement in accordance with U.N. 

Resolutions 917 and 940 when a general amnesty will be voted into law 

by the Haitian Parliament, or Oct. 15, 1994, whichever is earlier. The 

parties to this agreement pledge to work with the Haitian Parliament to 

expedite this action. Their successors will be named according to the 

Haitian Constitution and existing military law. 

4. The military activities of the U.S. Military Mission will be 

coordinated with the Haitian military high command. 

5. The economic embargo and the economic sanctions will be lifted 

without delay in accordance with relevant U.N. Resolutions and the need 

ofthe Haitian people will be met as quickly as possible. 

6. The forthcoming legislative elections will be held in a free and 

democratic manner. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 183 

7. It is understood that the above agreement is conditioned on the 

approval ofthe civilian governments ofthe United States and Haiti. 
184 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix D: Remarks by President William Clinton, United Nations 


Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and President Jean 


Bertrand Aristide at United Nations Transition Ceremony 


Office ofthe Press Secretary 

(Port-au-Prince, Haiti) 

For Immediate Release March31, 1995 


The National Palace 


Port-au-Prince, Haiti 


2:16 P.M. Eastern Standard Time 

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Mr. Secretary General, President 

Aristide, members ofthe multinational force in Haiti, members ofthe 

United Nations mission in Haiti: We gather to celebrate the triumph of 

freedom over fear. And we are here to look ahead to the next steps that 

we will take together to help the people of Haiti strengthen their 

hard-won democracy. 

Six months ago, a 30-nation multinational force, led by the 

United States, entered Haiti with a clear mission: To ensure the 

departure ofthe military regime, to restore the freely-elected 

government ofHaiti, and to establish a secure and stable environment in 

which the people ofHaiti could begin to rebuild their country. Today, 

that mission has been accomplished, on schedule and with remarkable 

success. 

On behalf of the United States, I thank all the members of 

the multinational force for their outstanding work, and pledge our 

support for the United Nations mission in Haiti. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 185 


Over the past six months, the multinational force has 

proved that a shared burden makes for a lighter load. Working together, 

30 nations from around the world -- from the Caribbean to Australia, 

from Bangladesh to Jordan -- demonstrated the effectiveness and the 

benefits of international peacekeeping. And they helped give the people 

ofHaiti a second chance at democracy. 

The multinational force ensured the peaceful transition 

from the military regime to President Aristide. It removed more than 

30,000 weapons and explosive devices from the streets. Through the 

international police monitors, led by Commissioner Ray Kelly, it trained 

and monitored an interim police force and worked side by side with 

them throughout Haiti. And it helped to prepare a permanent civilian 

police force that will maintain security and respect for human rights in 

the months and years ahead. 

Let me say to the members ofthe new, permanent police 

force who are with us here today, you are the guardians of Haiti's new 

democracy; its future rests on your shoulders. Uphold the Constitution. 

Respect democracy and human rights. Defend them. That is your 

sacred mission and your solemn obligation. 

Now it is the United Nations mission's task to secure and 

stabilize the environment in Haiti, and to help the government prepare 

for free and fair elections. The mission, with participants from 33 

countries, has the tools it needs to succeed -- a 6,000-strong military 

force under the command ofUnited States Army General Joseph Kinzer; 

a 900-member international police force, led by Chief Superintendent 

Neil Pouliot of Canada, and dozens ofwell-trained economic, political 

and legal advisors. 

The United Nations mission will end its work here in 

February 1996, after the election and inauguration ofa new president. 

To all ofyou taking part in the U.N. mission, I know many challenges 
186 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

lie between here and there. Your work will be demanding and difficult. 

But the multinational force has set a strong foundation ofsuccess upon 

which to build. 

Most important of all, the people ofHaiti, have shown a 

powerful commitment to peace and to reconciliation. Working with 

them, you can help make real Haiti's reborn promise of democracy. I 

know you will do that. 

Good luck and Godspeed. {Applause.) 

SECRETARY GENERAL BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI: 

President Clinton, President Aristide, members ofthe multinational force 

in Haiti, members ofthe United Nations mission in Haiti. Today is a 

great day for Haiti. It is a turning point in the international effort to 

bring peace, stability and justice to the Haitian people. 

Today is also a great day for the United Nations. It marks 

the high points of successful cooperation between the United Nations 

and the coalition ofmember states, led by the United States ofAmerica. 

On behalf of the United Nations, I express my gratitude to the 

multinational force and to the United States ofAmerica, under 

leadership of President Clinton. Operation Uphold Democracy has lived 

up to its name. 

The fact that President Clinton has come to Haiti to mark 

this occasion is an expression ofsuccessful cooperation between the 

United States and the United Nations. And the fact that Operation 

Uphold Democracy today hands over the United Nations Mission in 

Haiti, led by my special representative, Lakhdar Brahimi, is another 

expression of the successful cooperation between the United States and 

the United Nations. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 187 

According to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United 

Nations, the world organization may authorize states or groups of states 

to act to maintain international peace and security. As the 

multinational force departs and the United Nations takes over, two 

factors remain vital: The people of Haiti must maintain their 

commitment to rebuild their society, and the members states of the 

United Nations must continue to support this revitalization of the 

multilateral idea. 

The way ahead will not be easy, but cooperation brought 


success so far; continued cooperation will produce an enduring 


achievement. (Applause.) 


PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: Once again, welcome, President 


Clinton. Welcome to all of you, friends ofHaiti. (Speaks in French.) 


The implementation of the Governors Island Agreement 

demonstrates that the world has taken heed to Dr. Martin Luther King's 

warning that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. The 

engagement ofthe United Nations, supported by the courageous 

commitment of the people of Haiti, is a source of thought for all 

democracies. 

United we will raise the banner of a state of law on the 

flag poles or reconciliation, justice, tolerance, respect and economic 

progress. United under this banner we will guarantee security and 

peace. United in this state of law, the new police force in training 

will take its rightful place. Recommendations made to reform our 

judicial system will be implemented. And plans to organize free, fair 

and democratic elections will succeed, as together we move from secure 

and stable, to safe and more secure. 
188 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

To join us in this historic day, we welcome today the 

arrival of the United Nations Mission in Haiti, led by the 

Special Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Brahimi, and the 

Military Commander of the UNMIH, General Kinzer. We welcome 

friends from America, from Africa, from Europe, from Latin America 

and from our sister nations of the Caribbean. (Speaks in French.) 

END2:41 P.M. Eastern Standard Time 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 189 

Appendix E: Military Legal Personnel Deployed 


In Support ofOperations in Haiti 


(Deployedfor Varied Periods Between September 1994 


and September 1995) 


Supported 

of 

Activity Name and Rank

Element and 

Origin 

ofIndividual at Time of 

Deployment Location

CJTF 180 

Airborne Corps and 

OSJA, HQ, XVIII COL John D. Altenburg 

MAJ Bradley P. Stai Ill 

Port-au-Prince 

Carolina 

Fort Bragg, North MAJ Kyle D. Smith 

and aboard 

CPT Margaret Baines 

CPT Peter G. Becker 

USS Mt. 

CPT Allan D. Berger Whitney 

CPT Jam es A. Martin 

CPT Kerry L. Erisman 

Mr. Michael L. Larson 

SPC Mark A. Phelps 

SPC William J. Teeple 

SPC Ivan Thompson 

CJTF 180 

US Navy 2d Fleet 

SJA CDR Joseph Callahan, USN 

aboard 

Norfolk, VA USS Mt. 

Whitney 

5th Bomber Wing CJTF 180 

Minot AFB 

CPT Joseph P. Bialke, USAF 

Ill 

North Dakota Port-au-Prince

27th Fighter Wing SSG Kathleen R. Farrell CJTF 180 

Cannon AFB Ill 

New Mexico Port-au-Prince 
190 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


OSJA, 3d US Anny, 


Fort McPherson, 


Georgia 


OSJA, HQ 10th 

Mountain Division 

(LI) and Fort Drum, 

New York 

MAJ Rafael J. Lara 

L TC Karl K. Warner 

MAJ Richard E. Gordon 

MAJ Leslie A. Nepper 

CPT Edward J. O'Brien 

CPT Darryl R. Wishard 

CPT Christopher B. Valentino 

CPT Joseph A. Dewoskin 

CPT Thomas J. Barrett 

CPT Nicholas J. Lorusso 

CPT Katherine A. Varney 

CPT Sean K. Howe 

CPT Krista B. Edgette 

CPT Cheryl Bullard 

WOI Edward Peterson 

MSG Wilfred Mitchell 

MSG Willie C. King 

SSG Gregory C. Fisher 

SSG Gregory R. Kever 

SSG David E. Watkins 

SGT Steven McNulty 

SGT Delanski Williams 

CPL Joseph F. Carter 

SPC David A. Dentdant 

SPC Ronald E. Duncan, Jr. 

SPC Ronald H. Jennings, Jr. 

SPC Abigail S. Neff 

PFC Cleotricia Lilly 

PFC Robert Martin 

PFC Fitzroy Robinson 

CJTF 190 in 


Port-au-Prince 


MNF Haiti and 


CJTF 190 


in Port-au-


Prince and Cap 


Haitien 

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 191 


US Army Trial COL Keith H. Hodges 

Judiciary 

Fort Benning, 

Georgia 

US Army Trial CPT John M. Bickers 

Defense Service CPT Judith L. Camarena 

Region I, Fort Drum 

New York 

US Army Trial CPT Norman F. Allen 

Defense Service 

Region II, Fort 

Bragg, North 

Carolina 

OSJA, US Army CPT Joseph J. Vonnegut 

Special Forces CPT Jam es M. Patterson 

Command (ABN), CPT Michael L. Smidt 

and Group Judge CPT Steven Weir 

Advocate Element, SSG Larry Odoy 

3d Special Forces SGT Greg Morton 

Group, Fort Bragg SGT Gerald Stevens 

SGT Shane Hendrix 

SGT Tommy Hall 

SGT Miguel Nava 

MNF Haiti and 

CJTF 190 in 

Port-au-Prince 

Individual 

soldiers of 

MNF Haiti and 

CJTF 190 in 

Port-au-Prince 

Individual 

soldiers of 

MNF Haiti and 

CJTF 190 in 

Port-au-Prince 

3d Special 

Forces Group in 

Camp 

D'Applicacion, 

Petionville, and 

in Port-auPrince 
192 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


194th Armored 

Armor Center and 

OSJA, HQ, USA CPT Michael A. Newton

Brigade 

Fort Knox, 

CPT Thomas N. Auble 

(Separate) 

Kentucky (Training 


CARI COM 


Battalions and 


International 


Police 


Monitors) in 


Camp Santiago, 


Puerto Rico 


OSJA, HQ, 25th COL Brian X. Bush MNF Haiti 

Infantry Division (L) MAJ Mark P. Sposato Port-au-Prince 

&USArmy, CPT Kenneth E. Patton and Cap Haitien 

Hawaii, Schofield CPT Catherine M. With (some 

Barracks CPT John P. Coakley eventually 

CPT Herb Ford supported 

SSG Herbert Teope United Nations 

SSG Todd D. Stannard Mission in Haiti 

SSG James Bertotti and United 

SGT Vince Szumowki States Forces In 

SPC Ian S. McCrea Haiti) 

PFC Dean A. Neighbors 

PFC Rex 0. France 

PFC Madril Smith 

US Army Trial CPT Steven E. Engle Individual 

Defense Service, soldiers of 

Region V, Fort MNF Haiti in 

Lewis Port-au-Prince 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 193 


Pine BluffArsenal, Mr. William Harbour Joint Logistics 

Arkansas Support 


Command, 


Port-au-Prince 


Deputy Chief LTC Arthur L. Passar Joint Logistics 

Counsel, US Army Support 

Missile Command, Command, 

Redstone Arsenal, Port-au-Prince 

Alabama 

US Army Tank- Joint Logistics 

Automotive 

CPT Marilyn L. Fiore 

Support 

Command, Warren Command, 

Michigan Port-au-Prince 

CJA, Fitzsimons LTC Philip A. Savoie Ministry of 

Army Medical Justice, Haiti, in 

Center, Aurora, Port-au-Prince 

Colorado 

OSJA, HQ, US United Nations 

Army Special 

MAJ William A. Hudson 

Mission in Haiti 

Operations (UNMIH) in 

Command, Fort Port-au-Prince 

Bragg 

OSJA, HQ, III SSG Ronnie L. Wyche United Nations 

Corps and Fort Mission in Haiti 

Hood, Texas (UNMIH) in 

Port-au-Prince 
194 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


OSJA, HQ Joint 

Readiness Training 

Center and Fort 

Polk, Louisiana 

CPT David Dahle 

SGT Steven Wasilausky 

SPC Timothy M. Hamer 

PFC Michael Jones 

United States 

Forces, Haiti 

(component of 

UNMIH) in 

Port-au-Prince 

OSJA, IOlst 

Airborne Division 

(AASLT) and Fort 

Campbell, Kentucky 

CPT Kevin Walker 

CPT Christian P. Maimone 

SGT Jeanette Walker 

United States 

Support Group, 

Haiti, in Portau-Prince 

OSJA, I Corps and 

Fort Lewis, 

Washington 

SGT Michael Cuellar 

SGT Edward Barrera 

United States 

Forces, Haiti, in 

Port-au-Prince 

OSJA, 24th Infantry 

Division (Mech) and 

Fort Stewart, 

Georgia 

SPC Roderick A. Fludd 24th Infantry 

Div (Mech) 

Forces, in 

Port-au-Prince 

OTJAG, 

International and 

Operational Law 

Division, Pentagon, 

Washington, D.C. 

MAJ Mark S. Ackerman United Nations 

Mission in Haiti 

(UNMIH) in 

Port-au-Prince 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 195 


US Army Civil 

Affairs and 

Psychological 

Operations 

Command (various 

subordinate Civil 

Affairs Units), Fort 

Bragg, North 

Carolina 

COL Edward W. McCarty, III 

LTC Harold F. Daniels 

LTC Jonathan S. Haub 

LTC Anthony P. Moncayo 

LTC John R. Oreskovich 

LTC Philip L. Weatherbee 

MAJ Michele H. Altieri 

MAJ Demetrius K. Bivins 

MAJ Michael E. Caples 

MAJ Patrick W. Caples 

MAJ Joseph A. Nowick 

MAJ John P. Orilio 

MAJ Lawrence K. Peterson 

ILT Robert J. Caffrey 

Ministry of 

Justice, Haiti, in 

Port-au-Prince 

US Army Trial CPT Michael O'Connor Ministry of 

Defense Service, Justice, Haiti, in 

Region IV, Fort Port-au-Prince 

Clayton, Panama 

360th Civil Affairs 

Brigade, Columbia, 

South Carolina 

LTC John McNeill 

L TC Jam es Harrison 

360th Civil 

Affairs Brigade, 

in Port-auPrince 

OTJAG, National 

Defense HQ, 

Ottawa, Canada 

MAJ Marc B. Philippe United Nations 

Mission in Haiti 

(UNMIH) in 

Port-au-Prince 
196 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


OTJAG, National MAJ Hugh Columb United States 

Defense HQ, Forces, Hai ti 

Ottawa, Canada (component of 

UNMIH) in 

Port-au-Prince 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 197 

Appendix F: Non-Deployed Judge Advocates 

Significantly Involved in Matters Arising From Operations In Haiti 

Name and Rank 

Activity ofIndividual at Time of 

Operations 

CPT Paul G. Barden 


Division, Fort Bragg, North 


Carolina 


OSJA, HQ, 82d Airborne 

OSJA, HQ, XVIII Airborne CPT Jeffrey S. Willis 


Corps and Fort Bragg, North 
 CPT Michael Lacey 

Carolina CPT Mark J. Lowny 

GM13 Joseph M. Zima 

CPT Eric J. Remington 


Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 


II Marine Expeditionary Force, 

CPT Phillip D. Harward 

OSJA, HQ 10th Mountain MAJ Charles N. Pede 


Division (LI) and Fort Drum, 


New York 


MAJ Theodore Hinsley 

Davis-Monthon Air Force Base, 

Arizona 

12th Air Force 

CAPT Stephen Rose, USN 

Command/ Supreme Allied 

OSJA, HQ, US Atlantic 

LTC Richard B. Jackson 


Command, Atlantic, Norfolk, 
 MAJ Carl Woods USMC 

Virginia 
198 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


Office ofLegal Counsel to COL James Terry, USMC 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, COL Richard D. Rosen 

Pentagon, Washington, D.C. CDR Michael Lohr, USN 

MAJ Fred T. Pribble 

Office of the Command Counsel, 

Headquarters, United States 

Army Materiel Command, 

Alexandria, Virginia 

Ms. Elizabeth F. Buchanan 

Ms. Cassandra T. Johnson 

Mr. Bob Lingo 

OTJAG, International and COL David E. Graham 

Operational Law Division, LTC Jeffrey F. Addicott 

Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Mr. W. Hays Parks 

MAJ Musetta T. Johnson 

Code 10, United States Navy, 

Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

LCDR Ralph Corey, USN 

MAJ Vauhn Ary, USMC 

Office ofthe Staff Judge 

Advocate to Commandant, 

United States Marine Corps 

(Code JAO), Operational Law, 

Washington, D.C. 

Office of the General 

Counsel 

Department of the Army 

OSJA, HQ, Forces Command, 

Fort McPherson, Georgia 

LtCol Michael Galt 

Mr. Karl Mirmak 

Mr. Anthony H. Gamboa 

Mr. Matt Reres 

COL Joseph R. Barnes 

LTC Andrew M. Warner 

MAJ Jay Revis 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 199 


OSJA, US Army Special Forces 

Command (ABN), Fort Bragg 

L TC Robert M. Butler 

OSJA, HQ, US Army Special 

Operations Command, Fort 

Bragg 

COL Harlan M. Heffelfinger 
200 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix G: ROE Soldier Card/or Nonpermissive Entry 

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) DURING HOSTILITIES 

NOTHING IN THESE ROE LIMITS YOUR OBLIGATION TO TAKE 

ALL NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE ACTION TO DEFEND 

YOURSELF AND YOUR UNIT. 

I. Treat as hostile and attack the FORCES ARMEES D'HAITI 


(F AD'H) and the national police until neutralized, destroyed or captured. 


2. Confiscate the property ofhostile forces, except captives' personal 


property and equipment necessary for their protection or welfare. 


3. Employ only observed fire. 

4. Employ indirect and air-to-ground fires only on order ofCJTF 180; 


DCG TF 181; a task force commander; the DFACC; or the DG, 82d 


Ahn Div, unless such fires are necessary for self-defense. 


5. Do not use incendiary weapons (e.g., napalm or white phosphorous) 

against targets in populated areas. Tracer rounds, illumination rounds, 

and smoke are authorized in all areas. 

6. You may employ claymore mines and anti-armor mines to protect US 

positions. Keep mines under continuous observation, and remove them 

when no longer necessary. 

7. You may presume that civilians in public armed with crew-served 

weapons, automatic weapons, or rifle are members ofthe F AD'H 

National Police, or paramilitary groups and therefore, may treat them as 

·hostile. Civilians in public armed with shotguns or pistols are presumed 

to be potentially hostile, but deadly force is not authorized unless such 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 201 

persons use or threaten armed force against US force, US citizens, or 

designated foreign nationals. 

8. Ifcircumstances permit, give a challenge before engaging civilians. 

Challenge by: 

a. Shouting in English: "STOP; DON'T MOVE; HANDS UP"; 

or 

b. Shouting in Creole: "STOP (STOP); PA BOUJE (P AH BOOJAY); METE MEN OU AN LE (MAY-TAY MAY-00 ON-LAY)," 

9. Do not engage civilian communication facilities with destructive 

force unless such facilities are being used in a manner that threatens the 

security ofthe force. 

10. You may use riot control agents (RCA) on approval of a 


commander (06 or above), and pepper spray in your own discretion, 


only in defensive modes in areas under direct US military control. 


. 11. You may stop civilians and check their identities. Search them for 

weapons, and seize any weapons found. 

12. Detain civilians suspected ofbelonging to the FAD'H or national 

police or of committing a serious criminal act (e.g., homicide, 

aggravated assault, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or larceny). Use the 

minimum force necessary, up to and including deadly force, to detain 

civilians who threaten human life or property designated as missionessential by your commander. In all other cases, use only non-deadly 

force. Evacuate detainees to designated collection points as soon as 

circumstances permit. 
202 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

13. You may also detain civilians when necessary to accomplish your 

mission or for their own safety, but must release them as soon as 

circumstances permit. 

14. Seize private property only if it has a military use (e.g., weapons, 

ammunition, communications equipment, or transportation) and your 

commander authorizes the seizure based on military necessity. Give a 

receipt to the owner, if available. TAKING WAR TROPHIES IS 

PROHIBITED. 

15. Do not enter the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC unless necessary to 

recover friendly personnel or for self-defense. 

16. The ROE Appendix to the OPORD provides more detail. Resolve 

conflicts between this card and the OPORD in favor ofthe OPORD. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 203 

Appendix H: ROEfrom Operations Plan for Uphold Democracy 

[Note that the material in this appendix was declassified by 

Memorandum, Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division (Light 

Infantry) (29March1995). Original paragraph classification 

markings are retained to indicate classification in August 1994]. 

APPENDIX 8 (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO ANNEX C 


(OPERATIONS) TO COMBINED JTF HAITI OPLAN 2380 


REFERENCES: 

a. DOD Directive 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program (U). 

b. JCS PROE (U). 

c. FM 27-10, 18 Jul 56, Law of Land Warfare (U). 

1. (S) SITUATION. 

a. (S) Enemy Forces. ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE). 

b. (S) Friendly Forces. ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION). 

c. (S) Attachments and Detachments. ANNEX A (TASK 

ORGANIZATION). 

2. (S) MISSION. To provide Rules of Engagement (ROE) to achieve 

the Combined JTF Haiti mission which comply with the guidance and 

supplemental measures directed by the NCA and the requirements of the 

law of armed conflict. Nothing in these ROE limit an individual's right 

to self-defense or a unit leader's obligation to conduct unit self-defense. 
204 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

3. (S) EXECUTION. 

a. (S) General. 

(1) (S) Until modified or superseded by ROE promulgated by 

a FRAGO, JCS PROE (Peacetime ROE) remain in effect. The 

Supplemental Measures contained at 3b below will be operative an Hhour and will remain in effect until specifically modified or superseded. 

These ROE apply to all US Forces in Haiti and the associated Joint 

Operations Area (JOA) not under the operational control of the 

American Ambassador. Special Operations ROE require separate 

CINCUSACOM approval. 

(2) (S) Under all circumstances, commanders must ensure that 

use of force is related to a military necessity, is proportional to the 

threat, and is calculated to avoid unnecessary suffering, loss of life, and 

destruction ofproperty. 

(3) (S) All commanders must take necessary and appropriate 

actions to defend US Forces. While these ROE may limit the use of 

force during the execution of military operations, they are not limitations 

on a commander's responsibility to use all authorized means available to 

defend the force. 

(4) (S) All commanders will ensure that all Combined JTF 

Haiti personnel know and follow these ROE. SJA personnel will draft 

and disseminate ROE Cards for use by all members of US Forces, and 

will be available for ROE Training. 

(5) (S) Proposed changes to these ROE will be forwarded to 

Commander, Combined JTF Haiti, ATTN: SJA, for coordination with 

CINCUSACOM, using the format at TAB B to this Annex. 

b. Supplemental Measures. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 205 

(1) (S) Definitions 

(a) (S) Deadly Force - the degree of force capable of 


causing death or serious bodily harm. 


(b) (S) Detainee - any person stopped by US personnel 

who is determined to be a threat to US Forces, key facilities, and 

mission-essential property. 

(c) (S) Hostile Act - an attack or other use of force 

against the US, US Forces, or US citizens and their property, designated 

other forces, foreign nationals and their property. 

(d) (S) Hostile Intent - the threat of imminent use of 

force against the US and US national interests, US Forces, or US 

citizens and their property, designated other forces, designated foreign 

nationals and their property, as well as any armed force used to preclude 

or impede the mission or duties of US Forces. 

(e) (S) Inherently Dangerous Property - items which, by 

their basic nature, have the potential to cause injury or death. 

(f) (S) Key Facilities - those geographic facilities 

(airfields, ports, buildings) designated by the Commander, Combined 

JTF Haiti, as essential to the execution of the mission. 

(g) (S) Minimum Degree of Force Necessary - the least 

amount of force reasonably required to accomplish the mission. The 

minimum degree of force necessary depends on the situation, the 

mission, and the ROE. For example, on a graduated scale (no force to 

deadly force), these include: direct verbal warnings, exhibit weapons, 

searches ofpersons and vehicles, use of non-lethal devices (pepper 

spray), deadly force. 
206 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(h) (S) Mission-Essential Property - that property 

(munitions, equipment, supplies) designated by the Commander, 

Combined JTF Haiti, or his designee, as essential to the execution of the 

m1ss10n. 

(i) (S) Riot Control Agents (RCA) - chemical agents 

requiring approval before use through Commander, Combined JTF Haiti. 

Individual non-persistent incapacitating chemical sprays ( oleoresin 

capsicum, capstan, pepper spray) are not considered riot control agents. 

(2) (S) Rules 

(a) (S) Geographical constraints. 

I. (S) Operations are currently authorized in 

the Haitian territorial land, airspace, and waters, as well as the limits of 

the JOA. Operations are not authorized into the territorial land, 

airspace, and waters of the Dominican Republic. Any such operations 

must be approved by CINCUSACOM. 

2. (S) Commander, Combined JTF Haiti, or 

his designee, may establish areas within the JOA that will be temporarily 

off-limits to all but authorized personnel. Appropriate force may be 

used to prevent unauthorized access. 

(b) (S) Haitian Military/Police/Other Armed 

Personnel: 

1. (S) No forces have been declared hostile. 

2. (S) Offensive military operations (raid, 

assaults, ambushes) require Combined JTF Haiti approval. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 207 

3. (S) Members of the Haitian military, police, or 

other armed Haitians who commit hostile acts or show hostile intent will 

be engaged using the minimum degree offorce necessary to eliminate 

the threat. Deadly force may be used when no lesser degree of force 

will suffice. See Paragraph 3b(2)(d). 

4. (S) Members ofthe Haitian military, 

police, or other armed Haitians may be stopped, disarmed, and detained 

ifthey appear to threaten essential civil order. 

(c) (S) Civilians. 

1. (S) Civilians may be temporarily detained 

ifthey appear to be a threat to US Forces, protected persons, key 

facilities, or mission-essential property. 

2. (S) Civilians may be temporarily detained 

only as long as needed to determine whether they are a threat. If 

determined to be a threat, they may be further detained. Ifnot, they will 

be released. 

3. (S) Necessary and appropriate force is 

authorized to control disturbances and disperse crowds which threaten 

essential civic order. Use of riot control agents must be approved by 

Commander, Combined JTF Haiti. 

(d) (S) Use of Force. 

1. (S) US Forces are limited to the minimum 

degree offorce necessary to accomplish their assigned missions. 
208 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

2. (S) When practical and a situation 

warrants (i.e., controlling disturbances, dispersing crowds), fire warning 

shots into the air before using deadly force. 

3. (S) Deadly force is authorized. Deadly 

force will be used only when no lesser degree of force will suffice and it 

is necessary to prevent: 

a. (S) Death or serious bodily harm to 

any person; 

b. (S) theft, damage, or destruction of 

mission-essential property; 

c. (S) theft ofinherently dangerous 

property; 

d. (S) damage to or destruction of key 

facilities; 

4. (S) Targets will be engaged with observed, 

direct, deliberately-aimed fire. 

(e) (S) Weapons and Munitions. 

1. (S) US Forces will deploy with only 

orgamc weapons. 

2. (S) Use ofRCA requires approval through 

Commander, Combined JTF Haiti. 

(t) (S) Private Property/Persons. Private property 

and persons will be treated with dignity and respect at all times. No 

private property will be taken as trophies or souvenirs. All contraband, 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 209 


weapons, and property seized will be considered US Government 


property until such time as other lawful disposition has been made. 


(g) (S) Temporary Refuge/Diplomatic Protections. 

1. (S) US Forces will not enter, engage, or 

search diplomatic residences, facilities, or personnel without prior 

approval of CINCUSACOM, unless invited to do so by an appropriate 

diplomatic representative. 

2. (S) US Forces are not authorized to grant 

political asylum. However, temporary refuge will be granted to protect 

human life. 

4. ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT. 

a. (S) Violations ofROE by Combined JTF Haiti personnel will 

be reported immediately through the chain-of-command to Commander, 

Combined JTF Haiti, simultaneous copy to CINCUSACOM. 

b. (S) Preserve all evidence of alleged violations of the ROE for 

delivery to proper authorities. 

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL. (S) See ANNEX K. These ROE 

are applicable within the entire JOA identified in the basic OPLAN. 

MEADE 

MG 

WARNER 

.SJA 
210 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

TABS: 

A--ROE Card 

B--Format for Requesting Changes 

[ROE Card is Reprinted Separately at Appendix I] 

TABB 

1. (S) Instructions. 

a. (S) Submit requests for changes or supplemental measures to 

Commander, Combined JTF Haiti, ATTN: SJA, for coordination with 

CINCUSACOM, ATTN: SJA. 

b. (S) Classify messages requesting ROE changes or 

supplemental measures at least CONFIDENTIAL. Spell out 

alphabetized national policy and numbered measures. 

c. (S) Ifrequired, add amplifying remarks after the alphabetized 

national policy or numbered measure. 

d. (S) Number ROE messages serially. 

e. (S) Keep the number ofmessages to a minimum. 

f. (S) An outline ofthe message is as follows: 


Paragraph 1: National policy (with narrative amplification as 


required). 

Paragraph 2: Military policy. 

Paragraph 3: New measures requested or authorized. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS JN HAITL 1994-95 211 

Paragraph 4: Canceled measures. 

Paragraph 5: Previous measures remaining in force. 

Paragraph 6: Remarks. 

g. (S) Each message should contain all appropriate paragraphs 

whether changed or not so that a commander need only retain the latest 

message to have the current ROE. 

h. (S) Ifit is necessary to request or issue measures not found in 

an approved list, they should be spelled out in plain language in the 

appropriate paragraph of the ROE message. 

2. (S) Format. Use the following GENADMIN message format: 

UNCLASSIFIED 01 02 0400302 AUG 94 

RROOUUUU 

CJTF CITY COUNTRY//SJA// 


CITY COUNTRY//SJA// 


UNCLAS MSGID/GENADMIN/CJTF SJA/001// 


SUBJ/ROE REQUEST SERIAL ONE (u)// 


REF/A/ROE ANNEX///// 


AMPN/ANN N TO OPLAN 2380// 


POC/KARL K. W ARNER/L TC/SJ A/COMBINED JTF HAITI 


SJA/LOC:CITY, COUNTRY/SECTEL:281 II 


RMKS/ 


1. (U) NIA 

2. ( ) NIA 

J. ( ) TWO TWO FOUR. ENTRY INTO THE TERRITORIAL 

SEAS, INTERNAL WATERS, AIRSPACE, AND LAND 
212 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

TERRITORY OF (COUNTRY) IS PERMITTED AS NECESSARY 

FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. 

4. ( ) NIA 

5. (U) NIA 

6. ( ) TWO I OTH MTN DIV LRSD TEAMS WILL CONDUCT 

BORDER CROSSINGS INTO (COUNTRY) BY UH-60 AT 

300400ZAUG94. ONE OF THESE TEAMS WILL CONDUCT 

SURVEILLANCE VIC UV890050 THE N.E. CORNER OF FLS 

COLE. THE OTHER TEAM WILL CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE 

VIC UV887023-CARNIS VILLAGE.// 

J3 COMEBACK COPY, JI, 12, J3 

PLANS, NBC, SOCOORD, ALO, ADE, AIR, 

14, 15, G6, FSE, A VN, EW, ACE, PMO, ENG, SAFE, SlA, SURG, 

SGS, A2C2, PSYOP, 

DISCOM KARL K. WARNER, LTC, lA, SlA CLASSIFIED BY 

ACTION OFFICER, MSE XXX- DECLASSIFY ON 

NAME, RANK, TITLE UNCLASSIFIED 041230Z AUG 94 

3. (S) Oral requests. When an immediate response is required, submit 

oral requests via the Combined lTF Haiti command net. Follow oral 

requests with an amplifying message. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 213 

Appendix I: ROE Soldier Card o/6September1994 

Combined JTF Haiti 


Rules of Engagement (ROE) Card 1 


6 September 1994 


Nothing in the ROE limits your right to use necessary force to defend 

yourself, your fellow service members, your unit, other JTF personnel, 

key facilities, and property designated by your commander. 

1. Repel hostile acts with necessary force, including deadly force. Use 

only the amount of force needed to protect lives/property and 

accomplished mission. Engage targets with observed, direct, 

deliberately aim fire. 

2. Do not hesitate to respond with force against hostile acts and signs 

with hostile intent. 

3. You may use necessary force to stop, disarm, and detain members of 

the Haitian military, police, other armed persons, or other persons 

committing hostile acts or showing hostile intent. Stop and detain other 

persons who interfere with your mission. Evacuate detainees to a 

designated location for release to proper authorities. Treat all detainees 

humanely. 

4. When a tactical situation permits, you should give a challenge before 

using deadly force. Challenge by: 

a. Shouting in English "U.S. STOP OR I WILL FIRE!" 

b. 	 Shouting in Creole "U.S. KANPE OUBIEN MAP TIRE!". 

Phonetic: "U.S. kaHJnpey oobeeEH(n) mahp tEErey!. 
214 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

c. Fire warning shots into the air. 

5. Treat all persons with dignity and respect. 

6. Do not take private property without commander's permission. 

7. Remember: no force has been declared hostile, including the Haitian 

Army and police. Use of deadly force must be based on hostile acts or 

clear indicators of hostile intent. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 215 

Appendix J: ROE Card of23September1994 

PEACETIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) IN EFFECT 


DURING CIVIL RIGHTS OPERA TIO NS IN HAITI 


NOTHING IN THESE ROE LIMITS YOUR OBLIGATION TO TAKE 


ALL NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE ACTION TO DEFEND 


YOURSELF AND YOUR UNIT: 


1. No forces have been declared hostile. Offensive military operations 


(raids, assaults, etc.) require CTJF 180 approval. 


2. Treat all persons with dignity and respect. 

3. Use all necessary force, up to and including deadly force, to defend 

U.S. forces, U.S. citizens, or designated foreign nationals against an 

attack or threat of imminent attack. When deadly force is employed, 

engage targets with observed, deliberately aimed fire. 

4. Members ofthe military, police or other armed persons may be 

stopped, detained, and ifnecessary, disarmed if they appear to threaten 

essential civic order. 

5. Civilians may be stopped ifthey appear to be a threat to U.S. forces, 

protected persons, key facilities, or property designated mission 

essential by CJTF 180. Ifdetermined to be a threat, they may be further 

detained. Ifnot, they will be released. 

6. Necessary and proportional force is authorized to control 

disturbances and disperse crowds threatening essential civic order. 

7. Persons observed cpmmitting serious criminal acts will be detained 

using minimal force necessary up to and including deadly force. Serious 

criminal acts include: homicide, aggravated assault, rape, arson and 
216 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

robbery. Non-lethal force is authorized to detain persons observed 

committing burglary or larceny. Release persons suspected ofserious 

criminal acts to Haitian law enforcement officers/other appropriate 

authorities as soon as possible. 

8. Civilian vehicles may be stopped and their occupants' identities 

checked for security purposes. Ifa civilian vehicle does not stop on 

order and is approaching a check point or security perimeter, you may 

fire to disable the vehicle. 

9. Do not enter the Dominican Republic without permission from 

CINCUSACOM. 

10. Deadly force is not authorized to disarm Haitians, enforce curfews, 

or stop looting, unless those individuals involved engage in hostile acts 

or demonstrate hostile intent. 

11. Possession of a weapon in public by any individual does not, by 

itself, constitute a hostile act or demonstrate hostile. 

12. U.S. forces are not authorized to grant political asylum. Temporary 

refuge will be granted only if necessary to protect human life. 

13. Respect diplomatic personnel, residences, facilities, and property. 

Do not enter diplomatic residences/facilities unless invited by 

appropriate diplomatic officials or approved by CINCUSACOM. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 217 


Appendix K: Trainer Worksheets for ROE Vignettes 

la. SITUATION CHECK POINT 


TASK 


Respond to checkpoint confrontation. 


CONDITIONS 


Your mission is to conduct a foot patrol and secure an area of down town PAP. 


a. Elements of a local militia have established checkpoints throughout the city. At one check point 

the militia angrily confronts your platoon, informing you that they have successfully secured the 

area. They order your platoon to leave the area. How do you respond. 

STANDARDS 

( ) Unit approaches checkpoint 

( ) Recognizes checkpoint is interfering with mission 

( ) Recognizes that only non-deadly force is authorized 

( ) Responds without hesitation 

( ) Utilizes non-forceful options 

( ) Reports to higher 


( ) Seeks guidance from higher 


( ) Requests passage 


( ) Withdraws/avoids 


( ) Utilizes necessary and appropriate non-deadly force 

( ) Orders group to cease and desist 

( ) Calls in reserves 

( ) Shows weapon/challenges 

( ) Disarms and detains if necessary 

( ) Proceeds with mission 

( ) Documents detainees , if any, and reports to proper authorities 

( ) No use ofexcessive of force 

Other strategies actually used: _______________________ 

General observations of grader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• Necessary and appropriate force is authorized to stop, disarm, or detain hostile personnel who 

interfere with your mission. 

• Deadly force not authorized if no hostile intent/act. 

• No hostile intent/act if no immediate threat of harm to self/others. 
218 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

lb. SITUATION CHECK POINT 

TASK 


Respond to a checkpoint confrontation. 


CONDITIONS 


Same situation, however, the armed militia starts to become more hostile and refuses to leave the 


area. They inform you that the area is already secure and that your platoons presence is a breach to 


security and that it is mandatory for your platoon to surrender their weapons. 


STANDARDS 


( ) Unit approaches checkpoint 


( ) Recognizes checkpoint is interfering with mission 


( ) Recognizes that non-deadly force is authorized 


( ) Responds without hesitation 


( ) Utilizes non-forceful options 


( ) Reports to higher 


( ) Seeks guidance from higher 


( ) Requests passage 


( ) Withdraws/avoids 


) Utilizes necessary and appropriate non-deadly force 


( ) Orders group to cease and desist 


( ) Calls in reserves 


( ) Shows weapon/challenges 


( ) Disarms and detains if necessary 


( ) Proceeds with mission 


( ) Documents detainees, if any, and reports to proper authorities 

( ) No excessive use offorce 

Other strategies actually used: ________________________ 

General observations of grader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• Same as situation l(a) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 219 

le. SITUATION CHECK POINT 

TASK 

Respond to checkpoint confrontation that has escalated in degree ofthreat. 

CONDITIONS 

Same situation, however, members of the militia become increasingly belligerent and, upon being 

told that your platoon will pass through the checkpoint, one militia member abruptly reaches for 

his weapon. What do you do in this situation? 

STANDARDS 

( ) Unit approaches checkpoint 

( ) Recognizes checkpoint is interfering with mission 

( ) Recognizes that non-deadly force is authorized upon initial contact; considers/commences 

appropriate responses, as outlined in I (a) and (b) 

( ) Responds without hesitation 

( ) Recognizes that aggressive move for weapon is hostile intent/act 

( ) Recognizes that deadly force is authorized 

( ) Utilizes warning, if practical (i.e., "Stop or I'll shoot," or ("kanpe oubien map tire") 

( ) Uses (non-deadly)(deadly) force 

( ) Iffiring, observes target and uses deliberate, directly-aimed fire 

( ) Shoots to kill not wound 

( ) No use of excessive force 

Other strategies actually used: _______________________ 

General observations of grader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 


• Deadly force is authorized in cases of hostile intent/act 

• Nothing in the ROE prevents you from using self-defense to protect your own life or the lives 

of others 

IMMEDIATELY DOCUMENT WHAT HAPPENED AND REPORT THE INCIDENT 
220 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

• 2a. SITUATION CONVOY 

TASK 


React to a large unarmed mob that is approaching your convoy. 


CONDITIONS 

You are in a convoy traveling through the PAP market area. Due to traffic congestion your vehicle 

must halt. A mob of unarmed individuals is pressing towards your vehicle. You have in your 

possession, individual weapons, (Ml6, 9mm), M60, and grenades. How do you respond to this 

mob? 

STANDARDS 

( ) Convoy approaches market area 

( ) Recognizes mob is interfering with mission 

( ) Recognized that non-deadly force is authorized 

( ) Responds without hesitation 

( ) Utilizes non-forceful options 

( ) Reports to higher 


( ) Seeks guidance from higher 


( ) Withdraws/avoids 


) Utilizes necessary and appropriate non-deadly force 


( ) Orders group to cease and desist 


( ) Calls in reserves 


( ) Shows weapon/challenges 


( ) Proceeds with mission 


( ) Accelerates through area if possible 


( ) Assumes defensive posture 


( ) Fires warning shot 


( ) No excessive use offorce 

Other strategies actually used: ________________________ 

General observations of grader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• Deadly force not authorized if no hostile intent/act. 

• No hostile intent/act where no immediate threat of harm to self/others 

• Communication and coordination is key 
LAWAND lvflLITARYOPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 221 

2b. SITUATION CONVOY 

TASK 


React to an individual within the mob who poses a potential threat. 


CONDITIONS 

Same situation, however you spot a woman in the mob with a liquid filled glass bottle with a rag 

stuffed into its neck. The women continues to hold the bottle at her side but is now raising her 

other arm, shaking her first and angrily screaming at you. 

STANDARDS 

( ) Convoy approaches market area 

( ) Recognizes mob approaching vehicle 

( ) Observes woman with bottle 

( ) Recognizes that the bottle with liquid is a potential weapon 

( ) Recognizes that until bottle becomes a weapon, no hostile intent/act 

( ) Recognizes that non-deadly force is authorized 

( ) Utilizes non-forceful options 

( ) Reports to higher 


( ) Seeks guidance from higher 


( ) Shouts warnings/orders 


( ) Withdraws/avoids 


( ) Utilizes necessary and appropriate non-deadly force 

( ) Takes action to inspect/disarm 

( ) Calls in reserves 

( ) Shows weapon 

( ) Proceeds with mission 

( ) Accelerates out of area 

( ) Assumes defensive posture 

) No excessive use of force 

Other strategies actually used: ________________________ 

General observations ofgrader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• Deadly force not authorized if no hostile intent/act. 

• No hostile intent/act where no immediate threat of harm to self/others 

• Communication and coordination is key 
222 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

le. SITUATION CONVOY 

TASK 

Respond to a deadly force situation within the mob. 

CONDITIONS 

Sarne situation, however, the woman now lights a match and prepares to light the rag sticking in 

the bottle. What force may be use? 

STANDARDS 

( ) Unit approaches market area 

( ) Recognizes the mob is interfering with mission 

( ) Recognizes that non-deadly force is authorized upon initial contact; considers/commences 

appropriate responses, as outlined in 2(a) 

( ) Observes woman lighting fuse on bottle 

( ) Recognizes that aggressive move is hostile intent/act 

( ) Recognizes that deadly force is authorized 

( ) Utilizes warning, if practical (i.e., "Stop or I'll shoot," or ("kanpe oubien map tire") 

( ) Uses (non-deadly)( deadly) force 

( ) Iffiring, observes target and uses deliberate, directly aimed fire 

( ) Upon recognition of hostile act, then shoots to kill not wound 

( ) No use of excessive force 

( ) Documents what happened and reports to higher 

Other strategies actually used: ________________________ 

General observations of grader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• Deadly force is authorized in cases of hostile intent/act 

• Nothing in the ROE prevents you from using self-defense to protect your own life or the lives 

of others 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 223 

3a. SITUATION RESTING PERIMETER 

TASK 

Respond to an invasion of your perimeter. 

CONDITIONS 

You are on foot patrol on the suburban outskirts of the Port au Prince. You have set up a tactical 

perimeter for your platoon to rest. 

You see a civilian run through the perimeter and grab an M 16 from an unsuspecting soldier. What 

force can you use to recover the weapon? 

STANDARDS 

( ) Unit sets up a tactical resting perimeter 

( ) Observes civilian run through perimeter, responds with non-deadly actions 

( ) Attempts to wam/order to stop 

( ) Attempts to tackle, trip, individual 

( ) Recognizes that taking of inherently dangerous weapon authorizes use ofdeadly force. 

( ) Uses (non-deadly)(deadly) force 

( ) Iffiring, observes target and uses deliberate, directly-aimed fire 

( ) Shoots to kill, not wound 

( ) No excessive use offorce 

Other strategies actually used: _______________________ 

General observations of grader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• Deadly force is authorized for recovery ofinherently dangerous or mission-essential property 

• Only the Brigade Commander has authority to designate property as mission essential. 
224 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

3b. SITUATION RESTING PERIMETER 

TASK 

Respond to an attack upon a soldier on the perimeter. 

CONDITIONS 

Sarne situation, however, a civilian brandishing a knife rushes toward one of your fellow perimeter 

guards. What force can your use to stop this act? 

STANDARDS 

( ) Unit sets up a tactical resting perimeter 

( ) Observes civilian rush forward with knife 

( ) Recognizes hostile intent/act 

( ) Recognizes that deadly force is authorized 

( ) Considers non-deadly force options if does not endanger lives of fellow soldiers 

( ) Warning/order 

( ) Show weapon 

( ) Uses (non-deadly)( deadly) force 

( ) Iffiring, observes target and uses deliberate, directly-aimed fire 

( ) Shoots to kill, not wound 

( ) No excessive use offorce 

( ) Document and report 

Other strategies actually used:._______________________ 

General observations of grader:______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• Deadly force is authorized in cases of hostile intent/act 

• Nothing in the ROE prevents you from using self-defense to protect your own life or the lives 

of others 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHAITI, 1994-95 225 

3c. SITUATION RESTING PERIMETER 

TASK 

Respond to an invasion of your perimeter. 

CONDITIONS 

Same situation however, a civilian runs up to your fellow perimeter guard, grabs an item his 

personal property and runs away. What force can you use to stop him as he runs away? 

STANDARDS 

( ) Unit sets up a tactical resting perimeter 

( ) Observes civilian stealing personal property 

( ) Recognizes no hostile intent'act exhibited 

( ) Recognizes that non-deadly force is authorized 

( ) Issues warning/order 


( ) Shows weapon 


( ) Attempts to tackle/trip individual 


( ) No excessive force 

( ) A voids endangering lives of fellow soldiers during recovery 

Other strategies actually used: _______________________ 

General observations of grader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• No hostile intent'act 

• No inherently dangerous/mission essential property 

• No deadly force authorized 
226 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

4a. SITUATION CRIMINAL ACT AGAINST FELLOW CITIZEN 

TASK 

Your mission is to protect the welfare of humanitarian relief workers 

CONDITIONS 

You are a soldier deployed to Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Your mission includes the protection of a 

food distribution site and Red Cross Aid site. 

Three armed Haitians go through the food line at the food distribution site. They become 

increasingly hostile and verbally threaten the relief workers in order to obtain more food. 

STANDARDS 

( ) Unit establishes proper security procedures for food distribution/Red Cross site 

( ) Recognizes that three armed Haitians are interfering with mission 

( ) Recognizes that no hostile intent/act is exhibited 

( ) Recognizes that non-deadly force is authorized 

( ) Utilizes non-forceful options 

( ) Reports to higher 


( ) Seeks guidance from higher 


( ) Utilizes necessary and appropriate non-deadly force 

( ) Orders to cease and desist 

( ) Show weapon 

( ) Disarms and detains 

( ) Documents detainees, if any, and reports to proper authorities 

( ) No excessive use offorce 

Other strategies actually used: ________________________ 

General observations of grader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• No hostile intent/act, therefore no deadly force is authorized 

• May use necessary and appropriate force to stop, disarm, detain hostile interference with 

mission. Document always 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHAITI, 1994-95 227 

4b. SITUATION CRIMINAL ACT AGAINST FELLOW CITIZEN 

TASK 

Same as above. 

CONDITIONS 

Same situation however, this time the three armed Haitians draw their weapons and point them at 

the relief workers. What force can you use to stop this act? 

STANDARDS 

( ) Unit establishes proper security procedures for food distribution/Red Cross site 

( ) Recognizes that three armed Haitians are interfering with mission 

( ) Recognizes that hostile intent/act is exhibited 

( ) Recognizes that deadly force is authorized 

( ) Uses (non-deadly) (deadly) force 

( ) Iffiring, observes target and uses deliberate, directly aimed fire 

( ) Shoot to kill/not wound 

( ) Documents detainees, if any, and reports to proper authorities 

( ) No excessive use of force 

Other strategies actually used: _______________________ 

General observations of grader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• Deadly force is authorized in cases of hostile intent/act 

• Nothing in the ROE prevents you from using self-defense to protect your own life or the lives 

of others 
228 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

4c. SITUATION CRIMINAL ACT AGAINST FELLOW CITIZEN 

TASK 

Same as 4(a). 

CONDITIONS 

Same as situation, however an unarmed Haitian steals a carton of food from the Red Cross storage 

area and begins running away. What force can you use to stop this act. 

STANDARDS 

( ) Unit sets up a tactical resting perimeter 

( ) Observes unarmed civilian stealing carton of food 

( ) Recognizes no hostile intent/act exhibited 

( ) Recognizes that non-deadly force is authorized 

( ) Utilizes non-deadly force options 

( ) Issues warning/order 


( ) Shows weapon 


( ) Attempts to tackle/trip individual 


( ) No excessive force 

( ) A voids endangering lives of fellow soldiers during recovery 

Other strategies actually used: _______________________ 

General observations of grader:______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• No hostile intent/act 

• No inherently dangerous/mission essential property 

• No deadly force authorized 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 229 

Sa.SITUATION CIVILIAN PROVOCATION 

TASK 

Respond to a confrontation by local civilians. 

CONDITIONS 

You are on a foot patrol in the suburb of PAP when you encounter a group of Haitian men who 

appear to have been drinking alcoholic beverages. Upon initial contact with the Haitians they 

begin to taunt you and yell racial slurs. 

STANDARDS 

( ) Unit approaches group of Haitians 

( ) Recognizes Haitians are not interfering with mission 

( ) Recognizes that no hostile intent/act exhibited 

( ) Responds without hesitation 

( ) Utilizes non-forceful options 

( ) Reports to higher 

( ) Seeks guidance from higher 

( ) Withdraws/avoids 

) Utilizes necessary and appropriate non-deadly force 

( ) Proceeds with mission 

( ) No excessive use offorce 

Other strategies actually used: _______________________ 

General observations of grader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• Deadly force not authorized if no hostile intent/act. 

• No hostile intent/act if no immediate threat of harm to self/others. 
230 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Sb. SITUATION CIVILIAN PROVOCATION 

TASK 

React to a threat by local civilians. 

CONDITIONS 


Same situation, however, this time the group ofmen have begun to encircle your platoon. 


STANDARDS 


( ) Unit approaches group ofHaitians 


( ) Recognizes that Haitians are interfering with mission 


( ) Recognizes that non-deadly force is authorized 


( ) Responds without hesitation 


( ) Utilizes non-forceful options 


( ) Reports to higher 


( ) Seeks guidance from higher 


( ) Requests passage 


( ) Withdraws/avoids 


( ) Utilizes necessary and appropriate non-deadly force 

( ) Orders to cease and desist 

( ) Disarms and detains 

( ) Proceeds with mission 

( ) Assumes defensive posture 

( ) Documents detainees and reports to proper authorities 

( ) No excessive use of force 

Other strategies actually used: ________________________ 

General observations of grader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• 	 Necessary and appropriate force is authorized to stop, disarm, or detain hostile personnel who 

interfere with mission. 

• 	 Deadly force not authorized if no hostile intent/act. 

• 	 No hostile intent/act ifno immediate threat of harm to self/others. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 231 

Sc. SITUATION CIVILIAN PROVOCATION 


TASK 


React to a hostile confrontation with civilians. 


CONDITIONS 


Same situation, however, now the group of men have become very angry with you and begin 


throwing rocks, bottles, and sticks taken from the surrounding environment. 


STANDARDS 

( ) Unit approaches Haitians 

( ) Recognizes Haitians are interfering with mission 

( ) Recognized that non-deadly force is authorized 

( ) Responds without hesitation 

( ) Utilizes non-forceful options 

( ) Reports to higher 


( ) Seeks guidance from higher 


( ) Withdraws/avoids 


( ) Utilizes necessary and appropriate non-deadly force 

( ) Orders to cease and desist 

( ) Disarms and detains if necessary 

( ) Proceeds with mission 

( ) Assumes defensive posture 

( ) Ifsituation becomes immediate threat to own life, life ofothers, deadly force is authorized 

( ) Force used? (deadly) (non-deadly); deadly force appropriate? (yes) (no) 

( ) Ifdetainees, documents and reports to proper authorities 

( ) No excessive use of force 

Other strategies actually used:,________________________ 

General observations of grader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• Necessary and appropriate force is authorized to stop, disarm, or detain hostile personnel who 

interfere with mission. 

• Deadly force not authorized if no hostile intent/act. 

• No hostile intent/act if no immediate threat of harm to self/others. 
232 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

6a. SITUATION APPREHENSION OF A CRIMINAL 

TASK 

Apprehend a local criminal hiding within a private residence. 

CONDITIONS 

Your platoon has been ordered to apprehend a leader of a local violent gang. The leader is accused 

of having personally ordered the deaths ofseveral Aristide backers. 

Upon approaching the front entrance of the house you encounter a woman who angrily tells you to 

leave her property as she swings wildly with a broom in your general direction. What should you 

do? 

STANDARDS 

( ) Unit approaches house for apprehension 

( ) Unit tactically deploys, covers by fire, and guards rear entrance 

( ) Recognizes woman is interfering with mission 

( ) Recognizes that no hostile intent/act exhibited 

( ) Recognizes that non-deadly force is authorized 

( ) Responds without hesitation 

( ) Utilizes necessary and appropriate non-deadly force 

( ) Orders to cease and desist 


( ) Disarms and detains 


( ) Proceeds with mission 


( ) Ifdetained document and report to proper authorities 

( ) No excessive use offorce 

Other strategies actually used: ________________________ 

General observations ofgrader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• 	 Necessary and appropriate force is authorized to stop, disarm, or detain hostile personnel who 

interfere with mission. 

• 	 Deadly force not authorized if no hostile intent/act. 

• 	 No hostile intent/act if no immediate threat of harm to self/others. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHA!Tl 1994-95 233 

6b. SITUATION APPREHENSION OF A CRIMINAL 

TASK 


Respond to an individual evading apprehension. 


CONDITIONS 


You have now disarmed and detained the angry women and placed her into a designated location 


where she will be kept out ofyour way. As you approach the house, an unknown person dashes out 


the back door, in what appears to be an attempted escape. 


STANDARDS 


( ) Unit approaches house for apprehension 


( ) Recognizes escapee is interfering with mission 


( ) Recognizes that no hostile intent/act exhibited 


( ) Recognizes that non-deadly force is authorized 


( ) Responds without hesitation 


( ) Utilizes necessary and appropriate non-deadly force 


( ) Orders to stop 


( ) Tackle, trip or otherwise detain if possible 


( ) Proceeds with mission 


( ) Documents and reports to higher 


( ) Ifdetained document and report to proper authorities 

( ) No excessive use offorce 

Other strategies actually used: ________________________ 

General observations of grader:_______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• 	 Necessary and appropriate force is authorized to stop, disarm, or detain hostile personnel who 

interfere with mission. 

• 	 Deadly force not authorized if no hostile intent/act. 

• 	 No hostile intent/act if no immediate threat of harm to self/others. 
234 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

6c. SITUATION APPREHENSION OF A CRIMINAL 

TASK 

Respond to sniper fire coming from the private residence. 

CONDITIONS 

Same situation, however, upon reaching the house your platoon begins to receive sniper fire from a 

window in the house. 

STANDARDS 

( ) Unit approaches house for apprehension 

( ) Receives sniper fire 

( ) Recognizes that hostile intent/act exhibited 

( ) Recognizes that deadly force is authorized 

( ) Responds without hesitation 

( ) Reports to higher 

( ) Utilizes necessary and appropriate force 

( ) Disanns and detains 

( ) Proceeds with mission 

( ) Assumes defensive posture 

( ) Utilizes (non-deadly) (deadly) force 

( ) If firing use direct and deliberately aim fire 

( ) Shoot to kill not wound 

( ) Ifdetained document and report to proper authorities 

( ) No excessive use offorce 

Other strategies actually used: _______________________ 

General observations of grader:______________________ 

TEACHING POINTS: 

• Deadly force is authorized ifthere is hostile intent/act. 

• Can always use self-defense to protect lives of self and others. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 235 


Appendix L: 82dAirborne Division Standing ROE Card 

82d Airborne Division 


Standing Rules ofEngagement (ROE) 


A-R-M-E-D 


Attack. Attack only hostile forces declared by your commander. If 

attacked, return fire with aimed fire. Return force with force necessary 

to repel hostile acts (from any source). 

Risk. Assess risks/anticipate attack. Against other than declared hostile 

forces, use force first if, but only if, you see clear hostile intent. 

Measure. Measure the amount offorce that you use. Use only the force 

necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission. Detain only 

forces/civilians specified by your commander. 

Engagement Authority. Prior authorization may be required to use 

certain weapons. Use weapons such as artillery, riot control agents, 

mines, etc., in accordance with your commander's orders. 

Deadly Force. Use deadly force to protect persons/property designated 

by your commander. Stop short of deadly force when protecting other 

persons/property. 
236 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Expectations ofTroopers 

Carry out assigned duties in a military manner. Be sure everything you 

do reflects credit on you, the United States, and the Army. 

Fight only enemy combatants. 

Do not harm enemies who surrender; disarm, treat humanely, and tum 


over to your superior. 


Protect all detainees IA W the Geneva Conventions. 


Collect and care for wounded, whether friend or foe. 


Do not attack medical or religious personnel, facilities or equipment. 


Do not attack schools, museums, national monuments, and any other 


historical or cultural sites unless they are being used for a military 


purpose and pose a threat. 


Destroy only what the mission requires ... nothing more. 


Respect all civilians; treat them humanely. 


Respect all private property and possessions. 


Obey all lawful orders and the law ofwar. 


Prevent law of war violations. 


[printed on a light blue 3-inch by 5-inch card] 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 237 

Appendix M: UNMIH ROE (Full Text) 

3 March 1995 

1. The conduct ofmilitary operations is controlled and regulated by the 

provisions of international law,conventions and precedents and by the 

policy decisions of the parties. Rules ofEngagement (ROE) are 

directives issued by a competent military authority that delineate the 

circumstances and limitations within which (armed) force may be 

applied to achieve a mission or objective. In the case of a United 

Nations conducted operation, it is the responsibility of UN to set the 

parameters within which the UN can provide to commanders at all levels 

specific guidance on the use of force by UN personnel. ROE are drafted 

by the Force Commander, but are approved by the UN and may only be 

changed with UN authority. The right ofself defense is never abridged 

by inadequate ROE. 

2. The UNMIH ROE are provided for UN Forces operating under the 

auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 940 dated 31 July 1994. 

3. The mission ofUNMIH is to: 

a. sustain the secure and stable environment established during the 

multinational phase and protect international personnel and key 

installations, 

b. to professionalize the Haitian armed forces and to create and train 

a separate police force, and 

· c. to assist the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in 

establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and 

fair legislative elections. 

4. The following key definitions must be clearly understood by all 

UNMIH personnel: 
238 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

a. Force. The use of, or threat to use, physical means to impose one's 

will. Military force is the use ofthe physical means provided by formed, 

armed, and disciplined bodies oftroops under unified command to 

achieve the same and generally implies the potential to use significant 

levels ofviolence. 

b. Minimum Force. The minimum degree of authorized force which 


is necessary and reasonable under the immediate circumstances. 


c. Necessary Force. The minimum degree of authorized force which 

is essential and reasonable to meet the threat ofthe immediate 

circumstances. 

d. Self-Defense. The use of force to protect: 

(1) oneself 

(2) other UNMIH personnel, 

against a hostile act or hostile intent, [there is no other choice or 

time for deliberation] 

e. Defense of others. The use of force to protect: 

(1) other UN military and international personnel who are in 

the immediate vicinity of the UNMIH personnel employing these ROE, 

and 

(2) other non-UN relief personnel and Haitian civilians 

against a hostile act or hostile intent [where there is no other 

choice or time for deliberation] 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITI, 1994-95 239 


f. Hostile Act. A hostile act is an attack or use of force against those 

entities listed in paragraph 4d. and e. above where there is a reasonable 

apprehension that death or grievous bodily harm is the likely result. 

g. Hostile Intent. Hostile intent is the imminent threat of the use of 

force against those entities listed in paragraph 4d. and e. above where 

there is a reasonable apprehension that death or grievous bodily harm is 

the likely result. 

h. Collateral Damage. Damage to persons or property adjacent to, 


but not part of an authorized target. 


i. Non-deadly Force. Any physical means of forcing compliance that 

does not pose a risk of death or grievous bodily harm to the individual 

against which the force is directed. This is usually applied through the 

use of physical force short of deadly force. [the use of firearms or other 

deadly weapons] Examples include: pushing and lesser forms of 

striking or hitting, and physically or mechanically restraining persons. 

Warning shots nondeadly force, even though they involve the use of 

firearms. 

j. Deadly Force. Deadly force is that level offorce which is intended 

or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm regardless of whether 

death or grievous bodily harm actually results. This is the ultimate 

degree of force. 

INSTRUCTION ON THE USE OF FORCE 

General 

5. All information contained in this part shall be construed as directive 

guidance. 
240 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

APPLICABILITY 

6. The ROE apply to all personnel provided by nations participating in 

Dm1IH under the provision of UN Security Council Resolution 940 

dated 31 July 1994. The use of force is prohibited unless specifically 

authorized by these ROE. 

COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITY 

7. UNMIH commanders at all levels are required: 

a. to have this directive disseminated to every subordinate under their 

command and translated ifrequired, and 

b. to ensure that every subordinate under their command: 

(1) is briefed and refreshed on the meaning and application of 

these ROE as they relate to assigned missions, 

(2) understands and complies with the contents ofthis 

document, and 

(3) has the opportunity to seek additional clarification, 

guidance or direction if these ROE require further explanation. 

8. UNMIH Commanders shall issue orders on the readiness of personal 

weapons to be maintained appropriate to the situation. 

9. The UNMIH force commander may not restrict the inherent right of 

self-defense. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 241 

SELF DEFENSE 

I0. The right of self-defense is related to, but separate from, ROE and 


applies no matters what other factors are present. Therefore, 


notwithstanding any ROE that may be authorized, when an attack 


occurs, or is anticipated, the right exists to use proportionate force in 


self-defense to deter, neutralize or destroy the threat. 


I I. The use of force must be limited in intensity, duration and 


magnitude to that which is reasonably required to counter an attack or 


threat of imminent attack or threat of the application ofdeadly force. 


Furthermore, force [must never be used with a view to inflicting 


punishment for acts already committed and] may not be used as a 


reprisal or punitive action. 


USE OF FORCE AND ENGAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 

12. When an incident occurs that requires the use of force, the following 

fundamental principles shall apply to the use of force and engagements: 

a. Reasonable Belief. Mere speculation does not constitute 

reasonable belief. The use of force must be predicated upon a tangible 

threat. 

b. Minimum Force. UNMIH personnel will never use more force 

than the minimum necessary to enable them to carry out their duties and 

accomplish assigned objectives or the mission, or to remove a threat to 

UNMIH. 

c. Proportionality. Only a response proportionate to the 

perception ofthe level of threat is justified. Any force used must be 

limited to the degree, intensity, and duration reasonably believed 

necessary to achieve the objective for which the force is used, and no 

more. 
242 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

d. Duration of Force and Disengagement. The application of 

force, at whatever level, is to cease when it is reasonably believed the 

hostile act has stopped, or whenever the commander considers there is 

no longer an imminent threat of attack. 

e. [Negotiation and] Warnings. Ifpossible, [negotiation and] 

warnings must be communicated before any use of force is initiated. 

f. Procedures. Except when an attack [comes so unexpectedly 

that even a moments delay] or demonstration of hostile intent could lead 

to death or grievous injury to oneself, other UNMIH personnel, others 

under UNMIH protection, or key installations, the challenge and 

escalation of force procedures contained herein must be [exhausted] 

attempted before the use of any deadly force is initiated. 

g. Deadly Force. Deadly force is justified only under conditions 

[or] of extreme necessity and as a last resort when all lesser means have 

failed or cannot reasonably be employed. 

h. Escalation. Escalation of the level of violence is to be 

minimized, consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of 

UNMIH forces and other protected persons and places. 

i. Collateral Damage. Collateral damage is to be minimized 

consistent with mission accomplishment and the security ofUNMIH 

forces and other protected persons and places. 

j. [Retaliation and] Reprisal. The use of force [in retaliation or] 

in reprisal is prohibited. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITI, 1994-95 243 


k. Application of Force. The use of force shall be controlled by 

the on-scene commander and is to cease once the [aim has been 

achieved] threat has been removed. 

1. Use ofRCAs is authorized. 


AUTHORITY TO USE FORCE 


13. Force may be used as follows: 

a. Non-Deadly Force. UNMIH personnel are authorized to use 

non-deadly force in the following circumstances: 

(1) in self-defense or in defense of others (as defined herein), 

(2) against attempts at infiltration or envelopment ofUNMIH 

units, compounds or locales, 

(3) when attempts are made to abduct or detain UNMIH 


personnel, and 


(4) when attempts are made to prevent personnel from carrying 

out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders. 

b. Deadly Force. UNMIH personnel are authorized to use deadly 


force as follows: 


(1) only in self-defense or in defense of others (as defined in 

paragraphs 4, d, and e.) against persons committing a hostile act or 

. exhibiting hostile intent. 

(2) in defense of key installations designated by the Force 

Commander as essential to the success of the UNMIH mission and for 
244 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

which there is no other reasonable way to prevent the damage or 

destruction of such key installations. 

(3) to overcome armed attempts to prevent UNMIH Forces 

from discharging its duties. [when authorized by the Force Commander] 

(4) [to resist armed attempts to compel UNMIH personnel to 

withdraw from protected areas they were ordered to occupy by the 

Force Commander, and] 

(5) to resist armed attempts to cut off [a] UNMIH [force] 

personnel. 

(6) when attempts are made to abduct or detain UNMIH 

personnel. 

c. Cross Border Fire. UNMIH personnel are authorized to fire 

across the border ofHaiti into the Dominican Republic only when acting 

in self-defense and in defense ofothers as defined in paragraph 4d. and e. 

AUTHORITY TO SEARCH AND DETAIN 

14. Authority to Stop and Search. Persons wishing entry into UNMIH 

premises can be requested to submit to a consensual search oftheir 

persons and property. Refusal ofthis search or a refusal to surrender 

weapons constitutes grounds for refusal of entry and seizure of weapons. 

Persons found attempting to enter UNMIH premises in any potentially 

threatening manner may be searched for security purposes using 

necessary minimal [non-deadly] force. Weapons may be seized in such 

instances and shall be turned over to appropriate UNMIH or host 

country military or civilian authorities as soon as possible. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS JN HAITI, 1994-95 245 


15. Authority to Detain. Persons shall only be detained if they commit 

a hostile act, display hostile intent or carry out any criminal activity 

[which would require that force be used against them] requiring their 

immediate detention to assure the safety ifUNMIH personnel. They 

shall be turned over to appropriate UNMIH or host country military of 

civilian authorities as soon as possible. Any weapons seized in the 

course of detainment shall be turned over to appropriate UNMIH or host 

country military or civilian authorities. 

16. Ifit is necessary to detain an individual pending tum-over to 

appropriate military or civilian authorities, minimal [non-deadly] force is 

authorized to prevent the escape of a detainee, unless there is a necessity 

to act in self-defense, in which case minimum force, up to and including 

deadly force, is authorized. 

17. Treatment of Detainees. Detainees shall not be subject to undue 

harassment, deprivation or humiliation. Medical care and the attention 

of medical personnel will be provided when required. Detainees will be 

given adequate rations and shelter [equivalent to that ofUNMIH 

personnel] and treated humanely. 

CHALLENGE AND ESCALATION PROCEDURES 

18. Except where a response is required in accordance with paragraph 

19, the following procedure is to be followed when warning an 

individual that a hostile act or a display of hostile intent may result in a 

response in self-defense: 

a. Verbal or Visual Warning. Warn the aggressor to stop the 

aggressive activity, which in normal circumstances, should follow the 

following sequence: 
246 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(1) depending on the circumstances, a warning may be given 

verbally, by a sign or by illumination (i.e., hand-held red flares, search 

lights, etc.) 

(2) Repeat the verbal or visual warning as many times as is 

necessary to ensure understanding or compliance. 

b. Charge Weapons. Make use of the visual effect of such action 

to convince the aggressor that failure to stop the aggressive activity may 

result in the use ofdeadly force. 

c. Warning Force. Ifthe [treat] threat continues employ aimed 

warning shots in a safe direction [so that there is no danger of personal 

injury or collateral damages] 

d. [Non-Deadly] Minimal Force. Ifwarning shots are ignored, 

where possible, employ minimal [non-deadly] force and 

e. Deadly Force. Except in the case of a lone individual acting in 

self defense, if the aggressor commits a hostile act or displays hostile 

intent, on order and under the control of the on-scene commander, 

employ [minimal deadly force] that required force such as single aimed 

shots, until the threat is removed. 

OPENING FIRE WITHOUT WARNING 

19. The only circumstance under which it is permissible to use deadly 

force without attempting to follow the warning sequence in paragraph 18 

would be if a sudden attack [by an aggressor comes so unexpectedly that 

even a moments delay] or demonstration of hostile intent could lead to 

death or grievous injury to oneself, other UNMIH personnel, others 

under UNMIH protection, or key installations. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 247 

PROCEDURES DURING FIRING 

20. Any use offirearms as a means of applying deadly force, shall be 

aimed fire. Fire must be controlled and will not be indiscriminate. 

Automatic fire will only be used as a last resort and fire for effect will 

only continue as long as it is necessary to achieve the immediate aim of 

self-defense or defense of others. 

PROCEDURES AFTER FIRING 

21. After any weapons firing, the following actions are to be taken: 

a. Medical. Wounded shall be given first aid as soon as possible 

one such aid can be given without endangering lives. 

b. Recording. Details of the incident will be recorded, including: 

(I) date, time and place offiring 

(2) unit and personnel involved. 

(3) the events leading up to the firing 

(4) why UNMIH personnel opened fire 

(5) who or what was fired on 

(6) the weapons fired 

(7) the apparent results ofthe firing, and 
248 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

c. Reporting. The above information and the current situation 


will be reported through the UN chain of command to the Force 


Commander as soon as possible. 


PART IV 

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 

22. The Numbered Summary Rules of Engagement for UNMIH are 

contained in Annex A. The numbered ROE are written in the form of 

permissions. Issued as permissions they are direction to commanders 

that certain specific actions may be taken if they are judged necessary to 

achieve the aim ofthe mission. 

PARTY 

CONCLUSION 

23. Amendments to this directive will be issued as required and as 

approved by the UN. 

24. The security classification of this document is UNCLASSIFIED. 

ANNEX: A. Rules of Engagement 

B. Force Commander's Aide Memoirs (To be 

published). 

ANNEX A 

toUNMIHROE 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 249 

SUMMARY RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 

Rule No. 1. Use offorce, up to and including deadly force, is 


authorized to defend oneself and other UNMIH military or civilian 


personnel against a hostile act or hostile intent. 


Rule No. 2. Use of force, up to and including deadly force, is 


authorized to defense international personnel against a hostile act or 


hostile intent. 


Rule No. 3. Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to 


defend civilians against a hostile act or hostile intent. 


Rule No. 4. Use of force, up to and including deadly force, is 

authorized to protect key installations which have been designated by 

the force commander. 

Rule No. 5. Cross-border fire into an adjacent country in selfdefense, or to enforce Rules 2 and 3, is authorized. 

Rule No. 6. Search and detainment ofpara-military or nonmilitary personnel is authorized when acting in self-defense, or to 

enforce Rules 2 to 4 inclusive. 

Rule No. 7. Disarmament ofpara-military or non-military 

personnel is authorized when acting in self-defense or to enforce Rules 2 

to 4 inclusive. 

Rule No. 8. Intervention to protect civilians from death or 

grievous bodily harm at the hands of a military, para-military or civilian 

group, is authorized. 
250 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix N: UNMIH ROE Card 

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH) 


MILITARY FORCE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) 


PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI 


31MARCH1995 


NOTHING IN THESE ROE LIMITS YOUR RIGHTS TO TAKE ALL 

NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE ACTION TO DEFEND 

YOURSELF, YOUR UNIT, AND OTHER UNMIH PERSONNEL 

1. Treat all persons with dignity and respect. 

2. Use of force must be proportionate to the level of perceived threat. 

3. Ifpossible, warnings should be provided prior to the use offorce. 

4. Never use more force than the minimum necessary to carry out your 

duties or remove a threat to UNMIH. 

5. In the event of an attack or threat of imminent attack, use necessary 

force to up and including deadly force for self-defense and defense of 

UNMIH personnel, international personnel, and installations designated 

as "key" by the Force Commander. 

6. UNMIH Forces may intervene to prevent death or grievous bodily 

harm of innocent civilians at the hands of an armed person or group. 

7. When deadly force is employed, targets will be engaged with 

observed, deliberately aimed fire to avoid collateral damage. (If a 

weapon is fired, follow ROE reporting requirements on the back ofthis 

card.) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 251 

8. Search, apprehension, and disarmament are authorized when acting 

in self-defense or to enforce the rules above. Persons apprehended will 

be detained using minimal force and turned over to appropriate Haitian 

authorities as soon as possible. 

9. Use of chemical riot control agents is an authorized form offorce. 


PROCEDURES AFTER FIRING A WEAPON 


1. FIRST AID will be given as soon as possible when such aid can be 


given without endangering lives. 


2. 	RECORD DETAILS OF INCIDENT TO INCLUDE: 

- date, time, and place of firing 

- unit and personnel involved. 

- the events leading up to the firing 

- why UNMIH personnel opened fire 

- who or what was fired on 

- the weapons fired, and 


- the apparent results ofthe firing 


3. REPORT above information and current situation through the UN 

chain of command to the Force Commander as soon as possible. 

·[Printed on a white, 4 and 5/8 inch by 5 and 5/8 inch white card; in 

latter months of UNMIH operations, training on these rules emphasized 
252 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

graduated responses listed on a 2-page document reproduced below]. 

Graduated Responses 

In all graduated response scenarios, the UNMIH soldier will follow the 

general outline in this order: 

1. Issue a Verbal Warning; Use a Loudspeaker ifNecessary. 

2. Use ofBaton or Butt ofRifle. 

3. Employ Dogs. 

4. Employ Riot Control Agents. 

5. Charge Weapons. 

6. Warning Shot. 

7. Observed, Deliberately-Aimed Fire. 

Event: Looting 

1. Use Linguist 

2. Employ Concertina 

3. Execute Civil Disturbance Drill 

4. Request/Use Tactical Dissemination Team (TDT) from MIST 

5. Request/Use an Airborne Speaker Team from MIST 

6. Show Pepper Spray 

7. Use Pepper Spray 

8. Use Baton or Butt ofRifle 

9. Fix Bayonets 

10. Show CS Canisters 

11. Employ CS 

12. Helicopter Wash (this carries the risk of damage to the airframes 

and potential for claims) 

13. Charge Weapons 

14. Shoot Rounds in the Air 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITL 1994-95 253 


15. Employ Deadly Force in self-defense or upon show ofhostile 

intent/action toward UNMIH personnel or civilians ifserious bodily 

injury or death is likely to result 

Crowd Control 

1. Distribute Leaflets 

2. Use Linguist 

3. Employ Concertina 

4. Request/Use TDT from MIST 

5. Request/Use Airborne Speaker Team from MIST 

6. Civil Disturbance Drill 

7. Use dry erase boards on 2 X 4 

8. HonkHoms 

9. Take Pictures and Point Out Instigators 

10. Start Up Vehicles and Rev Engines 

11. Employ Dogs 

12. Show Pepper Spray 

13. Use Pepper Spray 

14. Fix Bayonets 

15. Show CS Canister 

16. Use CS 

17. Helicopter Wash (this carries the risk of damage to the airframes 

and potential for claims) 

18. Shoot Rounds in the Air 

19. Employ Deadly Force in self-defense or upon show of hostile 

intent/action toward UNMIH personnel or civilians ifserious bodily 

injury or death is likely to result 

Cordon & Search 

1. Use TDT Speaker Team and Linguist 

2. Have TDT Linguist Enlist Aid ofFamily and Neighbors 
254 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

3. Have Dogs Bark 

4. Inner Cordon Shout Commands 

5. Helicopter fly-over/low hover 

6. EmployCS 

7. Shoot Rounds in the Air 

8. Go in Hot and Break Down the Doors 

Traffic Control Point 

1. Emplace Signs 

2. Emplace Concertina 

3. Emplace Obstacles to Force Vehicles to Zig Zag 

4. Use Cameras to Photograph (Still/Video) 

5. Speed Bumps 

6. Nail Boards 

7. Fix Bayonets 

8. Show Pepper Spray 

9. Shoot Pepper Spray Through Window 

10. Shoot Round in the Air 

11. Shoot to Disable the Vehicle 

12. Use Deadly Force in self-defense or upon show of 

hostile/intent/action toward UNMIH personnel or civilians if serious 

bodily injury or death is likely to result 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 255 

Appendix 0: Agreement Between the Governments Participating in 

the Multinational Force ("MNF'') Authorized Pursuant to Security 

Council Resolution 940 and the Republic ofHaiti on the Status of 

MNFinHaiti 

The Republic of Haiti and the Governments sending personnel to Haiti 

pursuant to Resolution 940 of the Security Council of the United Nations 

enter into this agreement for the purpose of using all necessary means to 

facilitate the departure from Haiti of military leadership, consistent with the 

Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimate authorities 

of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and 

stable environment that will permit the implementation of the Governors 

Island Agreement. 

I. DEFINITIONS 

1. For the purpose of the present Agreement the following definitions shall 

apply: 

(a) "MNF Member States" and "Member States of the Anny of the MNF" 

means the individual Member States participating in and acting together as 

the multinational force pursuant to Security Council Resolution 940 (1994) 

of 31 July 1994 on the basis of the recommendations made by the United 

Nations Secretary General in his reports of 15 July 1994 and 26 July 1994. 

It is understood in this regard that the Commander ofthe MNF will exercise 

operational control over all MNF personnel within the area of operations, 

and that each state will remain responsible for the conduct of its own 

personnel. 

(b) The "Commander of the MNF" is the commander appointed by the 

Government participating in the MNF. Any reference to the Commander 

of the MNF in the present Agreement will encompass all personnel and 

members of the MNF to whom the Commander of the MNF has delegated 

a specific function or power. 
256 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

(c) The "civilian component" consists of officials if MNF Member States 

and other persons including civilian police, military instructors, and civilian 

personnel other than United Nations officials. 

(d) The "military component" consists ofmilitary personnel and specialized 

civilian personnel made available by the MNF Member States. 

(e) "MNF personnel" means the individuals who are members of civilian or 

military components of MNF Member States, including locally recruited 

Haiti nationals unless otherwise specified in this Agreement. 

(f) "Member State" means a State contributing personnel or equipment to 

the aforementioned components ofthe MNF. 

(g) "GOH" or "Government" means the Government of the Republic of 

Haiti. 

(h) "President ofHaiti" means the legitimately elected President ofHaiti. 

(i) "Convention" means the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 

the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations 

on 13 February 1946. 

II APPLICATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT 

2. Unless specifically provided otherwise, the provisions of the present 

Agreement and any obligation undertaken by the Government or the MNF 

Member States or any privilege, immunity, personnel apply throughout the 

territory ofHaiti. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHA/TL 1994-95 257 

3. It is understood that this agreement is without prejudice to the authorities 

granted under Security Council Resolution 940 and that this Agreement 

shall be interpreted so as to be consistent with Resolution 940. 

III. APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION 

4. The MNF Members States, their property, funds, and assets, and MNF 

personnel, including the Commander ofthe MNF, shall enjoy the privileges 

and immunities specified in the present Agreement and, as appropriate, 

provided for the Convention, to which Haiti is a Party. 

N. STATUS RELATING TO MNF MEMBER STATES 

5. MNF Member States and MNF personnel shall refrain from any action 

or activity incompatible with the international nature of their duties or the 

goals of Security Council Resolution 940 or inconsistent with the present 

Agreement. They shall respect all validity promulgated local laws and 

regulations. The Commander of the MNF shall take all appropriate 

measures to ensure the observance of these obligations, provided that the 

President of Haiti shall notify the Commander of the MNF of invalidly 

promulgated local laws and regulations. 

6. The Government undertakes to respect the exclusively international 

nature ofthe MNF. 

7. Without prejudice to the mandate of the MNF and its international 

nature: 

(a) The MNF Member States will cany out their mission in Haiti in such a 

manner as to respect fully the principles and spirit of the general 
258 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

conventions and all other international law governing the conduct of 

military personnel. 

(b) The Government undertakes at all times to treat the military component 

of MNF Member States in such as manner as to respect fully the principles 

and spirit of the general conventions and all other international law 

governing the treatment of military personnel. Member States of the MNF 

and the Government will ensure that the members of the GOH and MNF 

personnel are filly informed of the principles and spirit of the 

aforementioned conventions and international law. 

MNF Member States Flag and Vehicle Markings 

8.(a). Without prejudice to the sovereignty of Haiti, the Government 

recognizes the right of Member States of the MNF to display within Haiti 

the accouterments, flags, and insignia of the respective Member States on 

their headquarters, camps or other premises, vehicles, vessels and 

otherwise, decided by the Commander ofthe MNF. 

(b) Whenever MNF Member States display their flag over any MNF 

headquarters, camps, or other premises in Haiti, MNF Member States shall 

also display the flag of Haiti over such premises. Said flags will be 

provided by the Government. 

9. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft of MNF Member States shall carry 

distinctive Member State identification, of which the Government shall be 

notified. 

Communications. 

10. The MNF Member States will have the right to install and operate 

communications equipment for purposes as determined by the Commander 

of the MNF or his designee. In addition, MNF Member States shall enjoy 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 259 

the facilities in respect to communications provided in article III of the 

Convention and shall, in coordination with the Government, use such 

Haitian facilities as may be required for the performance of their task. The 

use of any communications equipment to communicate with the general 

population of Haiti or with that of particular regions and localities shall be 

for military purposes, and the Commander of the MNF shall consult with 

the President ofHaiti as practicable regarding such communications. Issues 

with respect to communications which may arise and which are not 

specifically provided for in the present Agreement shall be addressed under 

the dispute resolution provision of paragraph 46. MNF Member States 

shall take appropriate action to ensure that radio or television 

communications for the entertainment and benefit of MNF personnel are 

consistent with the requirements ofrelevant international law. 

11. Member States of the MNF may take arrangements through their own 

facilities for the processing and transport of private mail addressed to or 

emanating from their personnel, but not for private mail addressed to or 

emanating from locally recruited Haitian nationals employed by MNF 

Member States. Included within such postal arrangements is the right of 

MNF personnel to receive not only letters but also packages and parcels, all 

such items being free from customs duties, taxes, search, seizure, and 

inspection. The Commander of the MNF shall consult with the President of 

Haiti regarding any allegation of abuse presented to the Commander of the 

MNF by the President of Haiti in order to address such abuse. The MNF 

Member States shall take such measures as are necessary to prevent abuses 

of their respective national governments via the mail or other means 

deemed appropriate by officials of MNF Member States. The President of 

Haiti shall be informed of the nature of such arrangements, and shall not 

interfere with or apply censorship to the mail. 
260 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Travel and Transport 

12. MNF Member States and their personnel shall enjoy, together with 

their vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment, freedom of movement 

through the territory or Haiti. That freedom, with respect to large 

movements of personnel, stores or vehicles through airports or on railways 

or road used for general traffic within Haiti, shall be coordinated with the 

President of Haiti where practicable. MNF personnel shall only be 

reviewed to have an individual or collective movement order issued by a 

Member State or by the Commander of the MNF or a personal identity 

card, which shall include an individualized number, along with full name, 

date of birth, title or rank, service (if applicable) and photograph. The 

Commander of the MNF shall also inform the President of Haiti with 

respect to the distribution of the military component to the extent 

practicable. The Government undertakes to supply Member States of the 

MNF, where necessary, with maps and other information, including 

locations of mine fields and other dangers and impediments, which may be 

useful in facilitating its movements. 

13. Vehicles, including all military vehicles, vessels and aircraft, of 

Member States of the MNF shall not be subject to registration or licensing 

or other regulation by the Government, provided that all such vehicles shall 

display distinctive national markings of the MNF Member States. 

14. Member States of the MNF may use road, bridges, canals, and other 

waters, port facilities and airfields without the payment of dues, tolls or 

charges, including charges. However, Member States of the MNF will not 

otherwise claim exemption from charges which are in fact reasonable 

charges for services requested and received. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 261 


Privileges and Immunities ofMNF Member States 

15. Member States ofthe MNF enjoy the status, privileges and immunities 

of the United Nations in accordance with the Convention. The provisions 

of article II of the Convention shall also apply to the property, funds and 

assets of the MNF Member States used in Haiti. The Government 

recognizes the right ofMember States ofthe MNF in particular: 

(a) To import, free of duty or other restrictions, equipment, provisions, 

supplies and other goods which are for their exclusive and official use or for 

resale in the commissaries provided for hereinafter; 

(b) To establish, maintain and operate commissaries at their headquarters, 

camps and ports for the benefit of their members, but not of locally 

recruited Haitian national personnel. Such commissaries may provide foods 

of consumable nature and other articles. The Commander of MNF shall 

take all necessaiy measures to prevent abuse of such commissaries and the 

sale or resale of such goods to persons other than MNF personnel, and he 

shall give sympathetic consideration to observations or requests of the 

Government concerning the operation of the commissaries. The 

Commander of the MNF shall consult with the President of Haiti regarding 

any allegation of abuse presented to the Commander of the MNF by the 

President of Haiti to order to address such abuse. The MNF Member 

States shall take such measures as are necessaiy to prevent abuses of 

privileges provided by these arrangements; 

(c) To clear by customs and excise warehouse, free of duty or other 

restrictions, equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods which are for 

the exclusive and official use ofMember States ofthe MNF or for resale in 

. the commissaries provided for above; 
262 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(d) The provision is not applicable to material sold in the country for nonMNF usage. Disposition of MNF equipment and supplies after the MNF 

has completed its mission will be as determined by MNF Member States. 

Property or equipment will not be transferred to Haitian persons or entities 

except after prior consultation with the President ofHaiti. 

Such implementation, clearances, transfer or exportation shall be effected 

with the least possible delay. 

V. FACILITIES 

Premises Required for Conducting the Operational and Administrative 

Activities of the MNF Member States and for Accommodating Their 

Personnel 

16. The Government ofHaiti shall provide without cost to MNF Member 

States and in agreement with the Commander of the MNF such areas for 

headquarters, camps or other premises as may be necessary for the conduct 

of the operational and administrative activities of MNF Member States and 

for the accommodation of their personnel and equipment. Without 

prejudice to the fact that all such premises remain Haitian territory, they 

shall be inviolable and subject to exclusive control and authority of the 

MNF Member States. The Commander of the MNF alone may consent to 

the entry ofany person to said premises. Where military personnel ofMNF 

Member States are co-located with military personnel ofHaiti, a permanent, 

direct and immediate access by MNF Member States to these premises 

shall be guaranteed. 

17. The Government undertakes to assist MNF Member States as far as 

possible in obtaining and making available, where applicable, water, 

electricity, and other facilities free of charge, or where this is not possible, 

at the most favorable rate for MNF Members States, and in the case of 

interruption or threatened interruption of service, to give as is within as its 

powers the same priority to the needs of MNF Member States facilities 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 263 


cannot be provided free of charge, payment shall be made by MNF 

Member States in terms to be agreed with the competent authority. MNF 

Member States shall be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of 

facilities so provided. 

18. MNF Member States shall have the right, where necessary, to generate 

within their premises water and electricity for their use and to transmit and 

distribute such water and electricity. 

Provisions, Supplies and Services, and Sanitary Arrangements 

19. The Government undertakes to assist MNF Member States as far as 

possible in obtaining equipment, provisions, supplies, and other goods and 

services from local sources required for their subsistence and operations. In 

making purchases on the local market, MNF Members States shall, on the 

basis ofobservations made and information provided by the Government in 

the local economy. The Government shall exempt MNF Members States 

from all taxes in respect to all official local purchases. 

20. MNF Member States and the Government shall cooperate with each 

other in matters concerning health and pollution, including the control of 

communicable diseases. 

Recruitment ofLocal Personnel 

21. MNF Member States may recruit locally such personnel as they 

require, except that MNF Member States shall not hire persons who have 

committed a serious criminal offense or who have an independently 

verifiable history of violation of human rights in Haiti. Upon the request of 

the Commander of the MNF, the Government will undertake to facilitate 

.the recruitment of the process of such recruitment. The MNF Member 

States and to accelerate the process of such recruitment. The MNF 

Member States will notify the President of Haiti, insofar as possible in 
264 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

advance. as to those persons they hire who have been recruited locally. The 

competent authorities ofthe Government may bring to the attention ofMNF 

Member States information regarding persons the MNF Member States 

recruit locally. The MNF Member States will consult with the President of 

Haiti about locally recruited personnel the Government wants terminated. 

In addition, locally recruited members ofthe MNF cannot participate in any 

negotiations or discussions between the MNF and the Government except 

for interpreters or administrative personnel. 

Currency. 

22. The Government undertakes to make available to MNF Member 

States, against reimbursement in mutually acceptable currency, the amounts 

in gourdes required for the use of the MNF Member States at the official 

rate ofexchange. 

VI. STATUS RELATING TO MNF PERSONNEL 

23. The members of the civilian component of MNF Member States, 

except for locally recruited Haitian nationals, shall be considered as 

experts on mission within the meaning of article VI of the Convention. 

24. Military personnel ofnational contingents assigned to the military 

components of MNF Members States shall have the privileges and 

immunities specifically provided for in the present Agreement. 

25. Unless otherwise specified in the present Agreement, locally 

recruited Haitian nationals hired by MNF Member States shall have 

immunity for words spoken or written within the scope of their official 

duties and for acts performed within the scope of their official duties. 

The Commander of the MNF shall, promptly and in a reasonable 

manner, allow Government authorities to question, serve legal process, 

arrest, and execute warrants upon locally recruited Haitian national 

members of the MNF present on MNF premises. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 265 

26. With the exception of locally recruited Haitian nationals, MNF 


personnel shall be exempt from taxation on the pay and emoluments 


received from their respective participating sates and any income 


received from outside Haiti. They shall also be exempt from all other 


identifiable taxes, except all registration fees and charges. 


27. With the exception of locally recruited Haitian nationals, MNF 

personnel shall have the right to import free of duties, taxes and other 

charges their personal effects in connection with their arrival in Haiti. 

They shall be subject to the laws and regulations of Haiti governing 

customs and foreign exchange with respect to personal property not 

required by them by reason oftheir presence in Haiti with the MNF 

Member States. Special facilities will be granted by the Government for 

speedy processing of entry and exit formalities for all MNF personnel 

upon prior written notification. On departure from Haiti, MNF 

personnel notwithstanding the above-mentioned exchange regulations, 

may take with them such funds as the Commander ofthe MNF certifies 

were received in pay and emoluments from their respective participating 

states. Special arrangements shall be made for the implementation of 

the present provisions in the interests ofthe Government and the MNF 

Member States. 

28. The Commander ofthe MNF shall cooperate with the Government 

and shall render all assistance within his power in ensuring the 

observance ofthe customs and fiscal laws and regulations ofHaiti by 

MNF personnel, in accordance with the present Agreement. 
266 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Entry, Residence and Departure 

29. The Commander of the MNF personnel, except locally recruited 

Haitian nationals, shall have the right to enter into, reside in and depart 

from Haiti whenever so required by the Commander ofthe MNF. 

30. The Government undertakes to facilitate the entry into and 

departure from Haiti ofthe Commander of the MNF and MNF personnel 

and shall be kept informed ofsuch movement. For that purpose, the 

Commander ofthe MNF and MNF personnel shall be exempt from 

passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection and restrictions 

on entering into or departing from Haiti. MNF personnel shall also be 

exempt form any regulations governing the residence of aliens in Haiti, 

including registration, but shall not be considered as acquiring any rights 

to permanent residence or domicile in Haiti. The provisions of this 

paragraph shall not apply to any locally recruited Haitian nationals. 

31. With the exception oflocally recruited Haitian nationals, for the 

purpose ofsuch entry or departure, MNF personnel, shall only be 

required to have: (a) an individual or collective movement order issued 

by or under the authority ofthe Commander of the MNF or under the 

appropriate authority of an MNF Member State; or (b) a personal 

identity card issued in accordance with paragraph 32 ofthe present 

Agreement. 

Identification 

32. Each MNF Member State shall issue to its non-locally recruited 

personnel before or as soon as possible after such personnel's first entry 

into Haiti, as well as to all locally recruited Haitian national personnel, 

an appropriate identification document, provided that locally recruited 

Haitian nationals shall also be required to posses a "carte d'identite." 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 267 


Such identity document shall be the only document required of MNF 

personnel. 

33. MNF personnel, including locally recruited Haitian nationals shall 

be required to present, but not to surrender, their identity cards upon 

demand of an appropriate official of the Government. 

Uniform and Arms 

34. MNF personnel, except locally recruited Haitian nationals, may 

wear any appropriate uniformed and may display the national flags, 

headgear, and other accouterments, while performing official duties. 

With the exception oflocally recruited Haitian nationals, unless 

otherwise authorized by the President ofHaiti, MNF personnel may 

carry weapons appropriate to their mission as determined by the 

Commander ofthe MNF. 

Military Police Arrest and Transfer of Custody and Mutual Assistance 

36. The Commander ofthe MNF shall take all appropriate measures to 

ensure the maintenance of discipline and good order in regard to MNF 

personnel. To this end, personnel designated by the Commander of the 

MNF shall police the premises ofthe MNF and such areas where its 

personnel are deployed. Elsewhere such police personnel shall be 

employed, subject where practicable to arrangements with the 

Government, insofar as the Commander ofthe MNF considers such 

employment is necessary. 

37. The MNF military police shall have the power of arrest over MNF 

military personnel. Military personnel placed under arrest outside their 

own contingent areas shall be transferred to their contingent commander 

for appropriate disciplinary action. The personnel mentioned in 

paragraph 36 above may also take into custody any other person who 

commits an offense on the premises under control ofMNF Member 

States or otherwise as provided in paragraph 36. Such other persons 
268 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

who are Haitian nationals shall be delivered within 48 hours to the 

nearest appropriate official ofthe Government for the purpose ofdealing 

with any offense or disturbance unless it is impracticable under the 

circumstances for the MNF to deliver or for the Government to receive 

such persons within 48 hours. 

38. Officials ofthe Government may not detain any members of the 

military component ofMNF, any member having the status of a 

diplomatic envoy for the purposes of the present Agreement, or nay 

members having the status of an exertion mission for the purposes ofthe 

present Agreement. Officials ofthe Government may detain any other 

MNF personnel only: 

(a) When so required by the Commanded ofthe MNF; or 

(b) When such personnel are detained in the commission or 

attempted commission of an offense. Such personal shall be delivered 

immediately, together with any weapons or other items seized, to the 

nearest appropriate representative ofthe MNF Member State, 

whereafter the provisions ofparagraph 43 shall apply mutatis mutandis. 

39. When a person is detained under paragraph 37 or paragraph 38 (b), 

the Commander ofthe MNF or the Government, as the case may be, 

may make a preliminary interrogation but may not delay the transfer of 

custody provided for in paragraphs 37 and 38. Following such transfer, 

the person concerned shall be made available upon request to the 

authority which detained him/her for further interrogation. 

40. The Commander of the MNF and the Government shall assist each 

other in carrying out all necessary investigations into offenses in respect 

ofwhich either or both have an interest, in the production of evidence, 

including the seizure of and, if appropriate, the handing over of any such 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 269 

items may be made subject to their return within the terms specified by 

the authority delivering them. Each shall notify the other ofthe 

disposition of any case and the outcome ofwhich the other may have an 

interest or in which there has been a transfer of custody under the 

provisions of paragraphs 37 through 39. 

41. The Government shall ensure the prosecution of persons subject to 

its criminal jurisdiction who are accused of acts in relation to MNF 

Member States or their personnel which, if committed in relation to the 

forces of the Government, would have rendered such acts liable to 

prosecution. 

Jurisdiction 

42. All MNF personnel, including locally recruited personnel, shall be 

immune from legal process in respect ofwords spoken or written within 

the scope of their official duties and all acts performed within the scope 

oftheir official duties. Such immunity shall continue even after they 

cease to be members of or employed by MNF Member States and after 

the expiration of the other provisions ofthe present Agreement. 

43. Should the Government consider that any MNF personnel has 

committed a criminal offense, it shall promptly inform the Commander 

of the MNF and present to him any evidence available to it. 

(a) Ifthe accused person is a member ofthe civilian component 

or a civilian member ofthe military component, the Commander ofthe 

MNF shall conduct any necessary supplementary inquiry and then agree 

with the Government whether or not criminal proceedings should be 

instituted. Failing such agreement, the question shall be resolved as 

provided in paragraph 46 of the present Agreement; 
270 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(b) Members ofthe military component ofMNF Member States 

shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction ofthe respective MNF 

Member States in respect of any criminal offenses which may be 

committed by them in Haiti. 

44. If any civil proceeding is instituted against MNF personnel before 

any court in Haiti, the Commander ofthe MNF shall be notified 

immediate, and shall certify to the court whether or not the proceeding 

fails within the officially prescribed duties ofsuch member: 

(a) Ifthe Commander of the MNF certifies that the proceeding is 

related to official duties, such proceeding shall be discontinued and the 

provisions ofparagraph 46 ofthe present Agreement shall apply; 

(b) Ifthe Commander of the MNF certifies that the proceeding is 

not related to official duties, the proceeding may continue. Ifthe 

Commander ofthe MNF certifies that the MNF personnel in question is 

unable because ofofficial duties or authorized absence to protect his/her 

interest in the proceeding, the court shall at the defendant's request 

suspend the proceeding until the elimination of the disability, personnel 

that is certified by the Commander ofthe MNF to be needed by the 

defendant for the fulfillment of his official duties shall be free from 

seizure for the satisfaction of a judgment, decision or order. The 

personal liberty ofMNF personnel shall not be restricted in a civil 

proceeding, whether to enforce a judgment, decision or order, to compel 

an oath or for any other reason. 

Deceased Members of MNF 

45. The Commander of the MNF shall have the right to take charge of 

and dispose ofthe body ofMNF personnel who die in Haiti, as well as 

that member's personal property located within Haiti, in accordance with 

procedures as established by the Commander ofthe MNF and Member 

States. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHAITL 1994-95 271 

VII. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 

46. All differences between MNF Member States and the Government 

of Haiti arising out of the interpretation or application ofthe present 

agreement shall be resolved by a committee composed of one person 

appointed by the President of Haiti and one by the Commander ofthe 

MNF. As appropriate, the Commander of the MNF and the President of 

Haiti may agree to appoint additional members. The parties will seek to 

resolve their differences through agreement. Any dispute which cannot 

be resolved through this mechanism may be elevated to diplomatic 

channels. 

47. Disputes concerning the terms of employment and conditions of 

service oflocally recruited personnel shall be settled exclusively by the 

administrative procedures to be established by Commander ofthe MNF 

and without restrictions arising from the application ofHaitian law. 

VIII. SUPPLEMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS 

48. The Commander ofthe MNF and the Government may conclude 

supplemental arrangements to the present Agreement. 

IX. LIAISON 

49. The Commander of the MNF and the President ofHaiti shall take 

appropriate measures to ensure close and reciprocal liaison at every 

appropriate level. The Commander ofthe MNF and the President of 

Haiti shall designate one or more individual who shall be available at all 

times for purposes ofimplementing this agreement. Such designated 

individuals shall be available promptly upon a request for such 

consultations and shall have full authority to engage in those 
272 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

consultations and otherwise take all actions called for under this 

Agreement. 

X. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. 

50. Wherever the present Agreement refers to the privileges, immunities 

and rights ofMNF Member States and to the facilities Haiti undertakes 

to provide to MNF Member States, the Government shall have the 

ultimate responsibility for the implementation and fulfillment of such 

privileges, immunities, rights and facilities by the appropriate Haitian 

authorities. 

51. The present Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its 

signature in the English language version by the [Government of the 

United States of America] and [the Government of the Republic of 

Haiti]. A version in the French language shall be prepared and shall 

become equally authentic upon its adoption by an exchange ofnotes 

between the authentic upon its adoption by an exchange of notes 

between the parties. [Government ofthe United Sates ofAmerica and 

the Government of the Republic ofHaiti].* 

52. The present Agreement shall remain in force until the complete 

departure of MNF Member States from Haiti, and shall continue to 

apply to actions having occurred during the term of the agreement 

[DONE AT Miami and Washington in the English language on this the 

8th and 22nd days ofDecember, 1994.] 

For the Government of the For the Government of 

United States of America, the Republic ofHaiti 

acting as the Unified Command 

authorized by Security Council 

Resolution 940: 
LAWAND WLITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 273 

Appendix P: Agreement Between the United Nations and the 


Government ofHaiti on the Status ofthe United Nations Mission in 


Haiti 


I. DEFINITIONS 

1. For the purpose ofthe present Agreement, the following definitions 

shall apply: 

(a) "UNMIH" means the United Nations Mission in Haiti 

established pursuant to Security Council resolution 867 (1993) or 23 

September 1993 and the mandate ofwhich has been revised and 

enlarged in accordance with the provisions ofparagraphs 9 and 10 of 

Security Council resolution 940 (1994) of 31 July 1994. Subsequently, 

UNMIH has been strengthened pursuant to Security Council resolution 

975 (1995) of 30 January 1995. UNMIH will be comprised of: 

(i) 	 The "Special Representative" appointed by the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. With the exception of 

paragraph 24 below, any reference to the Special 

Representative in the present Agreement will encompass all 

members of UNMIH to whom the Special Representative 

has delegated a specific function or power; 

(ii) 	 A "civilian component" consisting ofofficials ofthe United 

Nations and other persons, including civilian police 

instructed by the Secretary-General to assist the Special 

Representative or made available to UNMIH by the 

participating States; 

(iii) A "military component" consisting ofmilitary personnel 

and specialized civilian personnel made available to 

UNMIH by the participating States; 
274 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(b) "Members of UNMIH" means a member ofthe civilian or 


military components; 


(c) "Participating State" means a State contributing personnel to 

the aforementioned components ofUNMIH; 

(d) "Government" means the Government of Haiti; 

(e) "Convention" means Convention on the Privileges and 

Immunities ofthe United Nations adopted by the General Assembly of 

the United Nations on 13 February 1946. 

II. APPLICATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT 

2. Unless specifically provided otherwise, the provisions ofthe present 

Agreement and any obligation undertaken by the Government or any 

privilege, immunity, facility or concession granted to UNMIH or any 

member thereof apply throughout the territory ofHaiti. 

III. APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION 

3. UNMIH, its property, funds and assets, and its members, including 

the Special Representative, shall enjoy the privileges and immunities 

specified in the present Agreement as well as those provided for in the 

Convention, to which Haiti is a Party. 

4. Article II ofthe Convention, which applies to UNMIH, shall also 

apply to the property, funds and assets ofthe participating States used in 

connection with UNMIH. 

IV. STATUS OF UNMIH 

5. UNMIH and its members shall refrain from any action or activity 

incompatible with the impartial and international nature oftheir duties or 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 275 


inconsistent with the spirit ofthe present Agreement. They shall respect 

all local laws and regulations. The Special Representative shall take all 

appropriate measures to ensure the observance of the obligations. 

6. The Government undertakes to respect the exclusively international 


character of UNMIH. 


7. Without prejudice to the mandate ofUNMIH and its international 


nature: 


(a) The United Nations will ensure that UNMIH carries out its 

mission in Haiti in such a manner as to respect fully the principles and 

spirit ofthe general international conventions on the conduct ofmilitary 

personnel. These international conventions include the four Geneva 

Conventions (Red Cross) of 12 August 1949 and the Additional 

Protocols thereto of 6 June 1977 and the UNESCO International 

Convention for the Protection ofCultural Property in the Event of 

Armed Conflict; 

(b) The Government undertakes at all times to treat the military 

personnel of UNMIH in such a manner as to respect fully the principles 

and spirit ofthe general international conventions applicable to the 

treatment ofmilitary personnel. These international conventions include 

the four Geneva conventions (Red Cross) of 12 August 1949 and the 

Additional Protocols thereto of 6 June 1977. 

UNMIH and the Government will ensure that the members oftheir 

military personnel are fully informed ofthe principles and spirit ofthe 

aforementioned international instruments. 
276 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

United Nations Flag And Vehicle Markings 

8. The Government recognizes the right ofUNMIH to display within 

Haiti the United Nations flag on its headquarters, camps, or other 

premises, vehicles, vessels and otherwise as decided by the Special 

Representative. Other flags or pennants may be displayed only in 

exceptional cases. In these cases, UNMIH shall give sympathetic 

consideration to observations or requests of the government of Haiti. 

9. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft of UNMIH shall carry a distinctive 

United Nations identification, which shall be notified to the Government. 

Communications 

10. UNMIH shall enjoy the facilities in respect to communications 

provided in article III of the Convention and shall, in coordination with 

the Government, use such facilities as may be required for the 

performance of its task. Issues with respect to communications which 

may arise and which are not specifically provided for in this Agreement 

shall be dealt with pursuant to the relevant provisions ofthe Convention. 

11. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 10: 

(a) UNMIH shall have authority to install and operate a radio 

sending and receiving stations as well as satellite systems to connect 

appropriate points within the territory of Haiti with each other and with 

United Nations offices in other countries, and to exchange traffic with 

the United Nations global telecommunications network. The 

telecommunication services shall be operated in accordance with the 

International Telecommunications Convention and Regulations and the 

frequencies on which any such station may be operated shall be decided 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 277 

upon in cooperation with the Government and shall be communicated by 

the United Nations to the International Frequency Registration Board. 

(b) UNMIH shall enjoy, within the territory ofHaiti, the right to 

unrestricted communication by radio, (including satellite, mobile, and 

hand-hold radio), telephone, telegraph, facsimile or any other means, 

and of establishing the necessary facilities for maintaining such 

communications within and between its premises, including the laying of 

cables and land lines and the establishment offixed and mobile radio 

sending, receiving and repeater stations. The frequencies on which the 

radio will operate shall be decided upon in cooperation with the 

Government. It is understood that connections with the local system of 

telegraphs, telex, and telephones may be made only after consultation 

and in accordance with arrangements with the Government, it being 

further understood that the use ofthe local system oftelegraphs, telex 

and telephones will be charged at the most favorable rate; 

(c) UNMIH may make arrangements through its own facilities for 

the processing and transport of private mail addressed to or emanating 

from its members. The Government shall be informed of the nature of 

such arrangements and shall not interfere with or apply censorship to the 

mail of UNMIH or its members. In the event that postal arrangements 

applying to private mail ofmembers ofUNMIH are extended to transfer 

of currency or the transport of packages and parcels, the conditions 

under which such operations are conducted shall be agreed with the 

Government. 

Travel And Transport. 

12. UNMIH and its members shall enjoy, together with its vehicles, 

vessels, aircraft and equipment, freedom ofmovement throughout the 

territory ofHaiti. That freedom shall, with respect to large movements 
278 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

ofpersonnel, stores or vehicles through airports or on railways or roads 

used for general traffic within Haiti, be coordinated with the 

Government. The Government undertakes to supply UNMIH, where 

necessary, with maps and other information, including locations ofmine 

fields and other dangers and impediments, which may be useful in 

facilitating its movements. 

13. Vehicles, including all military vehicles, vessels, and aircraft of 

UNMIH shall not be subject to registration or licensing by the 

Government provided that all such vehicles shall carry the third party 

insurance required by relevant legislation. 

14. UNMIH may use roads, bridges, canals, and other waters, port 

facilities, and airfields without the payment of dues, tolls, or charges, 

including wharfage charges. However, UNMIH will not claim 

exemption from charges which are in fact charges for services rendered. 

Privileges and immunities ofUNMIH 

15. UNMIH, as a subsidiary organ ofthe United Nations, enjoys the 

status, privileges and immunities of the United Nations in accordance 

with the Convention. The provision of article II ofthe Convention which 

applies to UNMIH shall also apply to the property, funds and assets of 

participating States used in Haiti in connection with the national 

contingents serving in UNMIH, as provided for in paragraph 4 ofthe 

present Agreement. The Government recognizes the right of UNMIH in 

particular: 

(a) To import, free of duty, taxes or other restrictions, equipment, 

provisions, supplies and other goods which are for its exclusive and 

official use or for resale in the commissaries provided for hereinafter; 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 279 

(b) To establish, maintain and operate commissaries at its 

headquarters, camps and posts for the benefit of its members, but not of 

locally recruited personnel. Such commissaries may provide goods of a 

consumable nature and other articles to be specified in advance. The 

Special Representative shall take all necessary measures to prevent 

abuse of such commissaries and the sale or resale ofsuch goods to 

persons other than members ofUNMIH, and he shall give sympathetic 

consideration to observations or requests of the Government concerning 

the operation of the commissaries; 

(c) To clear ex customs and excise warehouse, free of duty or 

other restrictions, equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods 

which are for the exclusive and official use of UNMIH or for resale in 

the commissaries provided for above; 

(d) To re-export or otherwise dispose ofsuch equipment, as far 

as it is still usable, all unconsumed provisions, supplies and other goods 

so imported or cleared ex customs and excise warehouse which are not 

transferred, or otherwise disposed of, on terms and conditions to be 

agreed upon, to the competent local authorities of Haiti or to an entity 

nominated by them. 

To the end that such importation, clearances, transfer or exportation may 

be effected with the least possible delay, a mutually satisfactory 

procedure, including documentation, shall be agreed between UNMIH 

and the Government at the earliest possible date. 

V. FACILITIES 

Premises Required For Conducting The Operational And Administrative 

Activities OfUNMIH And For Accommodating Its Members 
280 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

16. The Government of Haiti shall provide without cost to UNMIH and 

in agreement with the Special Representative such areas for 

headquarters, camps, or other premises as may be necessary for the 

conduct ofthe operational and administrative activities ofUNMIH and 

for the accommodation of its members. Without prejudice to the fact 

that all such premises remain Haitian territory, they shall be inviolable 

and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the United Nations. 

Where military personnel ofUNMIH are co-located with military 

personnel of Haiti, a permanent, direct and immediate access by 

UNMIH to those premises shall be guaranteed. 

17. The Government undertakes to assist UNMIH as far as possible in 

obtaining and making available, where applicable, water, electricity and 

other facilities free of charge, or, where this is not possible, at the most 

favorable rate, and in the case of interruption or threatened interruption 

of service, to give as far as is within its powers the same priority to the 

needs of UNMIH as to essential government services. Where such 

utilities or facilities are not provided free of charge, payment shall be 

made by UNMIH on terms to be agreed with the competent authority. 

UNMIH shall be responsible for the maintenance upkeep of facilities so 

provided. 

18. UNMIH shall have the right, where necessary, to generate, within 

its premises, electricity for its use and to transmit and distribute such 

electricity. 

19. The United Nations alone may consent to the entry of any 

government officials or of any other person not member of UNMIH to 

such premises. 

Provisions, Supplies, And Services, And Sanitary Arrangements 

20. The Government undertakes to assist UNMIH as far as possible in 

obtaining equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods and services 
LAWAND WLITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 281 


from local sources required for its subsistence and operations. In 

making purchases on the local market, UNMIH shall, on the basis of 

observations made and information provided by the Government in that 

respect, avoid any adverse effect on the local economy. The 

Government shall exempt UNMIH from general sales taxes in respect of 

all official local purchases. 

21. UNMIH and the Government shall cooperate with respect to 

sanitary services and shall extend to each other the fullest cooperation in 

matters concerning health, particularly with respect to the control of 

communicable diseases, in accordance with international conventions. 

Recruitment And Hiring Of Local Personnel 

22. UNMIH may recruit locally such personnel as it requires. Upon the 

request of the Special Representative, the Government undertakes to 

facilitate the recruitment ofqualified local staff by UNMIH and to 

accelerate the process of such recruitment. 

Currency 

23. The Government undertakes to make available to UNMIH, against 

reimbursement in mutually acceptable currency, the amounts in gourdes 

required for the use of UNMIH, including the pay of its members, at the 

rate of exchange most favorable to UNMIH. 

VI. STATUS OF THE MEMBERS OF UNMIH 

24. The Special Representative, the head of the civilian police, the 

Commander of the military component of UNMIH, and such highranking members of the Special Representative's staff as may be agreed 

upon with the Government shall have the status specified in sections 19 

and 27 of the Convention, provided that the privileges and immunities 
282 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

therein referred to shall be those accorded to diplomatic envoys by 


international law. 


25. Members of the United Nations Secretariat, as well as United 

Nations Volunteers, assigned to the civilian component to serve with 

UNMIH, shall enjoy the privileges and immunities provided for under 

Articles V and VII of the Convention. 

26. The other members of the civilian component, namely members of 

the UNMIH civilian police, military instructors, and civilian personnel 

other than United Nations officials whose names are for the purpose 

notified to the Government by the Special Representative, shall be 

considered as experts on mission within the meaning of article VI of the 

Convention. 

27. Personnel of national contingents assigned to the military 

component of UNMIH shall have the privileges and immunities 

specifically provided for in the present Agreement. 

28. Unless otherwise specified in the present Agreement, locally 

recruited members ofUNMIH shall enjoy the immunities concerning 

official acts and exemptions from taxation and national service 

obligations provided for in sections 18 (a), (b ), and ( c) of the 

Convention. 

29. Members of UNMIH shall be exempt from taxation on the pay and 

emoluments received from the United Nations or from a participating 

State and any income received from outside Haiti. They shall also be 

exempt from all other direct taxes, except municipal rates for services 

enjoyed, and from all registration fees and charges. 

30. Members ofUNMIH shall have the right to import free ofduty their 

personal effects in connection with their arrival in Haiti. They shall be 

subject to the law and regulations of Haiti governing customs and 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 283 

foreign exchange with respect to personal property not required by them 

by reason of their presence in Haiti with UNMIH. Special facilities will 

be granted by the United Nations peace-keeping operation. Special 

facilities will be granted by the Government for the speedy processing of 

entry and exit formalities for all members ofUNMIH, including the 

military component, upon prior written notification. On departure from 

Haiti, members ofUNMIH, may, notwithstanding the above-mentioned 

exchange regulations, take with them such funds as the Special 

Representative certifies were received in pay and emoluments from the 

United Nations or from a participating State and are a reasonable residue 

thereof. Special arrangements shall be made for the implementation of 

the present provisions in the interest of the Government and the 

members ofUNMIH. 

31. The Special Representative shall cooperate with the Government 

and shall render all assistance within his power in ensuring the 

observance of the customs and fiscal laws and regulations of Haiti by the 

members of UNMIH, in accordance with the present Agreement. 

Entry, Residence And Departure 

32. The Special Representative and members of UNMIH shall, 

whenever so required by the Special Representative, have the right to 

enter into, reside in and depart from Haiti. 

33. The Government of Haiti undertakes to facilitate the entry into and 

departure from Haiti of the Special Representative and members of 

UNMIH and shall be kept informed of such movement. For that 

purpose, the Special representative and members of UNMIH shall be 

exempt from passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection 

and restrictions on entering into or departing from Haiti. They shall also 

be exempt from any regulations governing the residence of aliens in 
284 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Haiti, including registration, but shall not be considered as acquiring any 

right to permanent residence or domicile in Haiti. 

34. For the purpose of such entry or departure, members ofUNMIH 

shall only be required to have: (a) an individual or collective movement 

order issued by or under the authority of the Special Representative or 

any appropriate authority of a participating State; and (b) a personal 

identity card issued in accordance with paragraph 35 of the present 

Agreement, except in the case of first entry, when the personal identity 

card issued by the appropriate authorities of a participating State shall be 

accepted in lieu of the said identity card. 

Identification 

35. The Special Representative shall issue to each member ofUNMIH 

before or as soon as possible after such member's first entry into Haiti, 

as well as to all locally recruited personnel, a numbered identity card, 

which shall show full name, date of birth, title or rank, service (if 

appropriate) and photograph. Except as provided for in paragraph 34 of 

the present Agreement, such identity card shall be the only document 

required of a member ofUNMIH. 

36. Members ofUNMIH as well as locally recruited personnel shall be 

required to present, but not to surrender, their UNMIH identity cards 

upon demand of an appropriate official of the Government. 

Uniform And Arms 

37. Military members and civilian police ofUNMIH shall wear, while 

performing official duties, the national military or police uniform oftheir 

respective States with standard United Nations accouterments, i.e. the 

United Nations headgear and accouterments. United Nations Security 

Officers and Field Service Officers may wear the United Nations 

uniform. The wearing of civilian dress by the above-mentioned 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 285 

members of UNMIH may be authorized by the Special Representative at 

other times. Military members and civilian police ofUNMIH and 

United Nations Security Officers designated by the Special 

Representative may possess and carry arms while on duty in accordance 

with their orders. 

Permits And Licenses 

38. The Government agrees to accept as valid, without tax or fee, a 

permit or license issued by the Special Representative for the operation 

by any member ofUNMIH, including locally recruited personnel, of any 

UNMIH transport or communication equipment and for the practice of 

any profession or occupation in connection with the functioning of 

UNMIH, provided that no license to drive a vehicle or pilot an aircraft 

shall be issued to any person who is not already in possession of an 

appropriate and valid license. 

39. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 37, the 

Government further agrees to accept as valid, without tax or fee, a 

permit or license issued by the Special Representative to a member of 

UNMIH for the carrying ofuse offirearms or ammunition in connection 

with the functioning ofUNMIH. Under no circumstances, such permit 

or license shall be granted to locally recruited personnel. The Special 

Representative shall inform the Government of any permit or license 

issued. 

Military Police, Arrest, And Transfer Of Custody, And Mutual 

Assistance 

40. The Special Representative shall take all appropriate measures to 

ensure the maintenance ofdiscipline and good order among members of 

UNMIH, as well as locally recruited personnel. To this end, personnel 

designated by the Special Representative shall police the premises of 

UNMIH and such areas where its members are deployed. Elsewhere 
286 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

such personnel shall be employed only subject to arrangements with the 

Government and in liaison with it in so far as the Special Representative 

considers such employment is necessary to maintain discipline and order 

among members ofUNMIH. 

41. The UNMIH military police shall have the power of arrest over the 

military members ofUNMIH. Military personnel placed under arrest 

outside their own contingent areas shall be transferred to their contingent 

commander for appropriate disciplinary action. The personnel 

mentioned in paragraph 40 above may also take into custody any other 

person who commits an offense on the premises ofUNMIH. Such other 

person shall be delivered immediately to the nearest appropriate official 

of the Government for the purpose ofdealing with any offense or 

disturbance on such premises. 

42. Officials of the Government may not detain any member of the 

military government ofUNMIH, any member having the status of a 

diplomatic envoy for the purposes ofthe present Agreement, or any 

member having the status of an expert on mission for the United 

Nations. Officials of the Government may detain any other member of 

UNMIHonly: 

(a) When so requested by the Special Representative; or 

(b) When such a member ofUNMIH is detained in the 

commission or attempted commission of an offense. Such person shall 

be delivered immediately, together with any weapons or other item 

seized, to the nearest appropriate representative ofUNMIH, whereafter 

the provisions of paragraph 47 shall apply mutatis mutandis. 

43. When a person is detained under paragraph 41 or paragraph 42(b), 

UNMIH or the Government, as the case may be, may make a 

preliminary interrogation but may not delay the transfer of custody. 

Following such transfer, the person concerned shall be made available 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 287 

upon request to the authority which detains him/her for further 


interrogation. 


44. UNMIH and the Government shall assist such other in carrying out 

all necessary investigations into offenses in respect ofwhich either or 

both have an interest, in the production ofwitnesses and in the collection 

and production of evidence, including the seizure of and, if appropriate, 

the handing over ofitems connected with an offense. The handing over 

of any such items may be made subject to their return within the terms 

specified by the authority delivering them. Each shall notify the other of 

the disposition of any case in the outcome ofwhich the other may have 

an interest or in which there has been a transfer of custody under the 

provisions ofparagraph 41-43. 

45. The Government shall ensure the prosecution of persons subject to 

its criminal jurisdiction who are accused of acts in relation to UNMIH or 

its members which, if committed in relation to the forces of the 

Government, would have rendered such acts liable to prosecution. 

Jurisdiction 

46. All members of UNMIH, including locally recruited personnel, shall 

be immune from legal process in respect ofwords spoken or written and 

all acts performed by them in their official capacity. Such immunity 

shall continue even after they cease to be members ofor employed by 

UNMIH and after the expirations ofthe other provisions ofthe present 

Agreement. 

47. Should the Government consider that any member of UNMIH has 

committed a criminal offense, it shall promptly inform the Special 

Representative and present to him any evidence available to it. Subject 

to the provisions ofparagraph 24: 
288 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(a) If the accused person is a member of the civilian component 

or a civilian member ofthe military component, the Special 

Representative shall conduct any necessary supplementary inquiry and 

then agree with the Government whether or not criminal proceeding 

should be instituted. Failing such agreement, the question shall be 

resolved as provided in paragraph 52 of the present Agreement; 

(b) Members of the military component of UNMIH shall be 


subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating 


States in respect of any criminal offenses which may be committed by 


them in Haiti. 


48. If any civil proceeding is instituted against a member of UNMIH 

before any court of Haiti, the Special Representative shall be notified 

immediately, and he shall certify to the court whether or not the 

proceeding is related to the official duties of such member: 

(a) If the Special Representative certifies that the proceeding is 

related to official duties, such proceeding shall be discontinued and the 

provisions ofparagraph 50 of the present Agreement shall apply; 

(b) If the Special Representative certifies that the proceeding is 

not related to the official duties, the proceeding may continue. If the 

Special Representative certifies that a member of UNMIH is unable 

because of official duties or authorized absence to protect his interests in 

the proceeding, the court shall at the defendant's request suspend the 

proceeding until the elimination of the disability, but for not more than 

ninety days. Property ofa member of UNMIH that is certified by the 

Special Representative to be needed by the defendant for the fulfillment 

of his official duties shall be free from seizure for the satisfaction of a 

judgment, decision or order. The personal liberty of a member of 

UNMIH shall not be restricted in a civil proceeding, whether to enforce 

a judgment, decision or order, to compel an oath for any other reason. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 289 

Deceased Members OfUNMIH 

49. The Special Representative shall have the right to take charge of 


and dispose ofthe body of a member of UNMIH who dies in Haiti, as 


well as that member's personal property located within Haiti, in 


accordance with United Nations procedures. 


VII. SETTLEMENT OF DUTIES 

50. Except as provided in paragraph 52, any dispute or claim of a 

private law character to which UNMIH or any member thereofis a party 

and over which the courts ofHaiti do not have jurisdiction because of 

any provision ofthe present Agreement, shall be settled by a standing 

claims commission to be established for that purpose. One member of 

the commission shall be appointed by the Secretary-General of the 

United Nations, one member by the Government and a chairman jointly 

by the Secretary-General and the Government. Ifno agreement as to the 

chairman is reached within thirty days ofthe appointment of the first 

member of the commission, the President ofthe International Court of 

Justice may, at the request of either the Secretary-General ofthe United 

Nations or the Government, appoint the chairman. Any vacancy on the 

commission shall be filled by the same method prescribed for the 

original appointment, shall start as soon as there is a vacancy in the 

chairmanship. The commission shall determine its own procedures, 

provided that any two members shall constitute a quorum for all 

purposes (except for a period ofthirty days after the creation of a 

vacancy) and all decisions shall require the approval of any two 

members. The awards of the commission shall be final and binding, 

unless the Secretary-General ofthe United Nations and the Government 

permit an appeal to a tribunal established in accordance with paragraph 

52. The awards ofthe commission shall be notified to the parties and, if 

against a member of UNMIH, the Special Representative or the 
290 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Secretary-General of the United Nations shall use his best endeavors to 

ensure compliance. 

51. Disputes concerning the terms of employment and conditions of 

services of locally recruited personal shall be settled by the 

administrative procedures to be established by the Special 

Representative. 

52. Any other dispute between UNMIH and the Government, and any 

appeal that both ofthem agree to allow from the award of the claims 

commission established pursuant to paragraph 50 shall, unless otherwise 

agreed by the parties, be submitted to tribunal ofthree arbitrators. The 

provisions relating to the establishment and procedures ofthe claims 

commission shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the establishment and 

procedures of the tribunal. The decision ofthe tribunal shall be final and 

binding on both parties. 

53. All differences between the United Nations and the Government of 

Haiti arising out ofthe interpretation or application ofthe present 

arrangements which involve a question ofprinciple concerning the 

Convention shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure of 

section 30 of the Convention. 

VIII. SUPPLEMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS 

54. The Special Representative and the Government may conclude 

supplemental arrangements to the present Agreement. 

IX. LIAISON 

55. The Special Representative and the Government shall take 

appropriate measures to ensure close and reciprocal liaison at every 

appropriate level. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHA/TL 1994-95 291 


X. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 

56. Wherever the present Agreement refers to the privileges, immunities 

and rights of UNMIH and to the facilities Haiti undertakes to provide to 

UNMIH, the Government shall have the ultimate responsibility for the 

implementation and fulfillment of such privileges, immunities, rights and 

facilities by the appropriate Haitian authorities. 

57. The present Agreement shall enter into force on the date ofits 

signature by the Special Representative ofthe Secretary-General and the 

MF A ofHaiti. 

58. The present Agreement shall remain in force until the departure of 

the final element of UNMIH from Haiti, except that: 

(a) The provisions ofparagraphs 46, 52, and 53, shall remain in 

force; 

(b) The provisions ofparagraph 50 shall remain in force until all 

claims have been settled that arose prior to the termination ofthe present 

Agreement and were submitted prior to or within three months of such 

termination. 

[Entered into Force 21March1995] 
292 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix Q: Exchange ofNotes Representing a Bilateral Status of 


Forces Agreement Between the United States and the Republic of 


Haiti 


The Embassy of the United State of American presents its compliments to 

the Ministry ofForeign Affairs ofthe Republic of Haiti and has the honor to 

acknowledge receipt of the Ministry's note number HUR/95-210, dated 

May 10, 1995, regarding issues related to the status of U.S. military 

personnel and civilian employees of the Department of Defense who may 

be present temporarily in Haiti in connection with their official duties. The 

Embassy of the United States of America has the honor to inform the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of he Republic of Haiti that the Government of 

the United States of America accepts the proposal contained in that note 

and to confinn that this reply shall constitute an agreement between our two 

Governments on this subject effective from this date. 

The Embassy of the United States of America avails itself of this 

opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 

Haiti assurance ofits highest consideration. 

Embassy ofthe United States ofAmerica, Port-au-Prince, May 11, 1995. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES 

Translating Division 

LS No. 147175 

JF/JPM 

French 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 293 

Republic ofHaiti 

Ministry ofForeign Affairs 

No. JUR/95-210 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship presents its compliments to 

the Embassy of the United States ofAmerica in Haiti and, with reference to 

the recent discussions between the representatives of the two governments 

regarding the status of the military personnel and civilian employees of the 

United States Department of Defense, has the honor to propose the 

following: 

1 - Such personnel shall enjoy the same status as that provided to the 

administrative and technical staff ofthe United States Embassy; 

2 - Such personnel may enter; leave, and circulate freely in Haiti with U.S. 

Government identification; 

3 - Such personnel shall be permitted to travel individually or in group; 

4 - The vehicles used by such personnel may have special, easily 

identifiable license plate; 

5 - Military personnel shall be authorized to wear uniforms in the exercise 

of their official duties and to carry weapons if authorized to do so by their 

commander; 

6 - The Government of Haiti shall grant them exemption from inport and 

export duties on the goods, property, material, and equipment imported to 

Haiti by the American Government and its civilian contractors pursuant to 

their official duties; 

7 - The Government of Haiti shall grant them exemption from domestic 

taxes on the goods, property, material, and equipment imported to or 
294 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

acquired in Haiti by the United States Government and its civilian 

contractors pursuant to their official duties; 

8 - The Government of Haiti shall grant them exemption from domestic 

taxes such as airport, port, and highway tolls, fees, and charges in Haiti on 

aircraft, boats, and vehicles ofGovernment ofthe United States ofAmerica; 

9 - The Government of Haiti and the Embassy of the United States shall 

exchange on a regular, not necessarily fonnal, basis infonnation on all 

issues raised by the implementation of this agreement. 

If these terms are accepted by the American Government, the Foreign 

Ministry proposes that this note and the Embassy's reply shall constitute an 

agreement on this subject between the two governments that shall enter into 

force as ofthe date ofsaid reply., 

Port-au-Prince, May 10, 1995 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 295 


Appendix R: Memorandum ofAgreement on Detention Facility 

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 

The Multinational Force (MNF) will transfer control of detainees 

held for MNF force security and detainees held for the Government of 

Haiti (GOH) for the commission ofserious crimes. The MNF and GOH 

agree to the following provisions: 

1. The MNF will afford detainees applicable prisoner of war protections 

of the Geneva Conventions during the transfer ofthe Joint Detention 

Facility (JDF) to GOH detention officials. Detainees will be treated 

humanely pursuant to international law standards at all times. 

2. The MNF will transfer the JDF in its current condition, approved by 

the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC) as a humane 

detention facility. GOH detention officials will operate the JDF in a 

similar manner. To insure a successful transfer, the MNF will continue 

to pay the rent on the JDF, provide the outer ring of security, and will 

provide water, food, electricity, and medical care to the detainees. 

3. Upon transfer, GOH detention officials will provide necessary guards 

and administrators to maintain safe, secure, and humane detention 

conditions. The MNF agrees to provide military police technical advice 

on detention matters. 

4. Both parties will provide full access to the detention facility to the 

International Police Monitors (IPM) and the ICRC. Both parties agree 

to meet periodically with representatives ofthe ICRC concerning 

conditions of the JDF. 

5. Both parties will agree at the time oftransfer on the maximum 

number of detainees to be held in the JDF, consistent with security 

needs and humane treatment. 
296 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

6. GOH detention officials will provide the MNF access to all detainees 

in order to collect information pertaining to MNF force security and 

which may assist the MNF mission. 

7. Upon transfer, GOH detention officials will control the release of 

criminal detainees in accordance with legitimate Haitian judicial 

decisions. GOH detention officials will detain individuals at the facility 

who are threats to MNF security and those brought to the facility by the 

MNF as threat to MNF security. Those designated as threats to MNF 

security will be released upon the order of, and only upon the order of, 

the MNF Commanding General. 

Signed this_ Day of____ 1995. 

David C. Meade, 9 January 1995 

For the Government of Haiti For the Multinational Force 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 297 

Appendix S: Nongovernmental and Private Organizations in Haiti 

CONCERN 

IOM 

MSF 

Oxfam UK/I 

SCF/UK 

DHA 

FAO 

ICRC. 


IFRC 


UNHCR 

UNICEF 

WFP 

WHO 

ADRA 

AFSC 

AI CF/USA 

ARC 

CARE USA 

CRS 

Childreach 

CRWRC 

ewe 

DOW 

IAI 

IMC 

INMED 

Inter Action 

IRC 

LWR 

CONCERN Worldwide Limited 

International Organization for Migration 

Medicins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without 

Borders) 

Oxfam (United Kingdom and Ireland) 

Save the Children Fund (UK) 

United Nations Department ofHumanitarian Affairs 

United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 

International Committee ofthe Red Cross 

International Federation ofthe Red Cross and Red 

Crescent Societies 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

United Nations Children's Fund 

United Nations World Food Programme 

United Nations World Health Organization 

Adventist Development and Relief Agency 

International * 

American Friends Service Committee * 

International Action Against Hunger 

American Red Cross* 

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere * 

Catholic Relief Services * 

Childreach, USA ofPLAN International * 

Christian Reformed World Relief Committee * 

Church World Service * 

Doctors of the World * 

International Aid, Inc. * 

International Medical Corps 

International Medical Services for Health* 

American Council for Voluntary International 

Action 

International Rescue Committee * 

Lutheran World Relief, Inc. * 
298 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Oxfam America Oxfam America 

PA Planning Assistance 

PADF Pan American Development Foundation (P ADF) * 

RI Refugees International 

SCF/US Save the Children Federation (United States) * 

TUP Trickle Up Program * 

WBA World Baptist Alliance 

WC World Concern * 

WN World Neighbors* 

WR World Relief* 

WV World Vision 

See United States Agency for International Development, Interaction, 

Haiti Crisis Situation Report No. 7 (Feb. 7, 1995); see also United 

States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian 

Response, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Report of 

American Voluntary Agencies Engaged in Overseas Relief and 

Development Registered with USAID: Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs 

(1995) (describing who the United States voluntary agencies are and 

what they do, summarizing support, revenue, and expenses by voluntary 

agency, and detailing the percentage offunds received from non-United 

States government sources in support of international programs). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 299 

Appendix T: Communications Between the United States and the 

United Nations Regarding the Detailing ofthe Force Commander of 

the United Nations Mission in Haiti 

United States Mission to the United Nations 

February 24, 1995 

His Excellency, 

Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 

Secretary-General of the United Nations 

New York, New York 

Dear Mr. Secretary-General: 

I have the honor to refer to recent discussions between the United 

States and the United Nations concerning the terms and conditions of 

Major General Kinzer's service as Force Commander ofthe United 

Nations Mission in Haiti. I offer this letter of assurances to confirm my 

Government's intentions and understandings in this regard. 

1. My Government intends to detail Major General Kinzer to the 

United Nations in order that he can serve as Force Commander of the 

United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) until 29 February 1996, 

unless his services are terminated by the United Nations or by the 

Government of the United States upon mutual consultations. 

2. My Government understands that the salaries and emoluments 

that would normally be paid to Major General Kinzer would be 

reimbursed by the United Nations to the United States Government. To 

the extent permitted by United States law, Major General Kinzer may 

accept from the United Nations any allowances to which he is entitled as 

Force Commander of UNMIH. 
300 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

3. During the period of his service with UNMIH, it is understood 

that Major General Kinzer would be under the operational control ofthe 

Secretary General and would, with respect to his duties as Force 

Commander ofUNMIH, discharge his responsibilities and regulate his 

conduct with the interests ofthe United Nations only in view and would 

not seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of such 

duties from any Government or authority external to the United Nations. 

4. It is also understood that the provisions ofthe General 

Guidelines for the Force Commander of 15 January 1995 would apply to 

Major General Kinzer's service as Force Commander ofUNMIH. 

I trust that these instructions and understanding will facilitate the 

appointment of Major General Kinzer to the position of Force 

Commander ofUNMIH, and advance the implementation ofUnited 

Nations Security Council Resolutions 940 (1994) and 975 (1995). 

Sincerely, 

Edward W. Gnehm 

Charge d'affaires a.i. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITI, 1994-95 301 

United Nations 

3 March 1995 

H.E. Mr. Edward W. Gnehm 

Charge d'affaires a.i. 

Permanent Mission ofthe 

United Nations to the U.N. 

New York 

Dear Mr. Ambassador, 

I acknowledge, on behalf ofthe Secretary-General, receipt of 

your letter dated 24 February 1995, regarding the terms and conditions 

ofMajor General Kinzer's service as Force Commander of the United 

Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). I should like to confirm our 

understanding that, during his assignment to UNMIH, Major Gen. 

Kinzer will perform his duties in accordance with the revised General 

Guidelines for the Force Commander of 1March1995, the text of 

which is attached herewith and a copy sent directly to Major Gen. 

Kinzer. I also confirm the other understandings referred to in paragraph 

1 to 3 of your letter. 

Accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my highest 

consideration. 

Kofi A. Annan 

Under Secretary-General 

for Peace-Keeping Operations 
302 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

United Nations 

1March1995 

TO: 	 Major-General Joseph W. Kinzer 

Force Commander 

UNMIH 

FROM: Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General 

for Peace-Keeping Operations 

General Guidelines for the Force Commander 

1. Please accept my congratulations on your appointment as Force 

Commander (FC) of the United Nations Mission in HAITI (UNMIH) as 

the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping operations, I would like 

to convey to you general guidelines for your mission. 

Authorization and Mandate 

2. UNMIH is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations established 

pursuant to Security Council resolution 867 (1993) of 23 September 

1993. UNMIH's mandate was established in operative paragraphs 2, 3, 

and 4 of Security Council resolution 867 ( 1993) and revised and 

extended in paragraphs 5, 9, 10, and 11 of Security Council resolution 

940 (1994). The mandate was slightly expanded by paragraph 5 of 

Security Council resolution 964 (1994). 

Terms of Reference 

3. The mandate ofUNMIH specified in Security Council resolution 940 

(paragraph 5, 9, and 10) is: 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 303 

a. UNMIH Advance Team. 

(1) 	 To carry out the monitoring ofthe operations of the 

multinational force (MNF). 

(2) 	 To assess the requirement and to prepare for the 

deployment of UNMIH upon completion ofthe 

mission of the MNF. 

b. 	 UNMIH Main body: To assist the Democratic Government 

ofHaiti in fulfilling its responsibilities in connections with: 

(1) 	 sustaining the secure and stable environment established 

during the MNF phase. 

(2) 	 Protecting international personnel and key installations. 

(3) 	 The professionalization of the Haitian armed force and the 

creation of a separate police force. 

(4) 	 In establishing an environment conducive to the 

organization of free and fair legislative elections. 

4. Security Council resolution 964 (1994) paragraph 5, authorizes the 

Secretary-General to strengthen progressively the advance Team to 500 

personnel in order to further facilitate planning ofUNMIH, identification 

of conditions required for the translation from MNF to UNMIH and 

preparation for the actual transition, as well as to make good offices 

available for the achievement of the purpose approved by the Security 

Council in resolution 940 (1994). 

Chain of Command between UNMIH and UN HO: 
304 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

5. As you are aware, Mr. Brahimi is the Special Representative of the 

Secretary-General (SRSG) for HAITI and as such is the Head of 

Mission for UNMIH. 

6. You will maintain the closest possible working relationship with the 

SRSG, and the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and keep them fully 

informed about the organization, deployment and operations of the 

Military Component ofUNMIH. 

7. You will consult the SRSG in advance about any decision of yours 

which have political implications and on matters ofpolicy, you will 

report through him to this Headquarters. On purely military and 

technical matters, you may report directly to me, while keeping the 

SRSG fully informed. 

Reporting 

8. The Secretary-General (SG) reports to the Security Council (SC) 

about UNMIH when appropriate, but necessarily at regular intervals. 

Any matters which might affect the nature of the continued effective 

functioning of the Mission will be referred to the SC for its decision. 

9. You will keep me fully informed ofthe developments relating to the 

functioning of the Military Component of the mission in accordance with 

the instructions specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 above. All 

matters which may affect the nature or the continued effectiveness of 

UNMIH will be referred to this Headquarters for decision, as will all 

matters likely to affect the United Nations' relations with the Parties or 

the troop contributing governments. In this connection, you are asked to 

prepare and submit to me a monthly report reviewing the overall military 

situation as it affects the work of the Mission, and on internal matters 

including personnel, administration and logistics. You should also 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITI, 1994-95 305 


submit ad hoc reports on any developments of special importance 

occurring in the interval between monthly reports. 

Responsibilities of Force Commander UNMIH 

10. Your responsibilities as FC are as follows: 

a. 	 You will be responsible, under the authority ofthe 

Secretary-General and through the SRSG, for the 

organization and smooth functioning of the Military 

Component of UNMIH; 

b. 	 All military personnel assigned to UNMIH will be under 

your operational control and they will be directly 

answerable to you for the conduct and the performance of 

their duties; 

c. 	 You will have full and exclusive authority with respect to 

the assignment ofmembers of your headquarters staff, 

except for the DFC, COS, and CMO, who have been 

designated by myself, on a rotational basis amongst 

contributing countries. When selecting officers for staff 

positions in your headquarters, you should make every 

effort to ensure that all contingents are, to the extent 

possible, represented; 

d. 	 You will have full and exclusive authority with respect to 

the operational deployment of all military personnel under 

your command; 

e. 	 You will establish a chain of command for the military 

component ofUNMIH, making use ofthe officers of your 

headquarters staff and the commanders ofthe national 

contingents made available by participating Governments. 
306 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

You may delegate your authority through the chain of 

command; 

f. As indicated in the notes prepared for the guidance of 

military personnel, during the term of appointment, they 

will carry out their duties and regulate their conduct solely 

with the interests of the United Nations in view and shall 

not seek or accept instructions in respect of performance of 

their duties from any other authority external to the United 

Nations. They shall exercise the utmost discretion in 

respect of all mattes of official business. They shall not 

communicate to any person any information known to them 

by reason of their official position which has not been made 

public, except as required in the course of their duties or by 

authorization of the FC. Nor shall they, at any time, use 

such information to private advantage. 

g. You are asked to inform me immediately if it comes to your 

knowledge that many of the participating Governments are 

attempting to issue orders to its personnel on matters 

related to their UNMIH duties or are communications with 

them directly on questions of UNMIH policy; 

h. You are required to submit performance evaluation reports 

on the officers under your control. Such reports will be 

forwarded through me to the national authorities concerned; 

1. You will be responsible for the good order and discipline 

with UNMIH. You may make investigations, conduct 

inquiries and request information, reports, and consultations 

for the purpose of discharging this responsibility. 

Responsibility for disciplinary action in national 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 307 


contingents of UNMIH rests with the commanders ofthe 

national contingents. Ifyou consider it necessary in the 

interest of Mission to repatriate an officer, you should so 

recommend to me and I will take the matter up with the 

Government concerned. 

11. In the performance of your functions as FC, you will be assigned 


by: 


a) 24 Military Observers (only during MNF phase) 

b) 6000 troops and staff 

Organization 

12. UNMIH is headed by the SRSG. The Military Component of 

UNMIH is commanded by the Force Commander. So far the following 

countries have been approved to contribute to the military component of 

UNMIH: 

Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, CARICOM (Antigua Bahamas, 

Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, Trinidad Tobago), Djibouti, 

Guatemala, Honduras, India, Ireland, Nepal, Netherlands, New 

Zealand (MNF phase only), Pakistan, Surinam, Tunisia (MNF 

phase only), United States. 

13. UNMIH military component is composed of a Force Headquarters, 

five Infantry Battalions, a Special Forces Battalion, a light CA V 

Battalion, a Military Police Battalion and a number of support and 

service units such as Aviation, Engineers, Logistics, a Field Hospital, 

Civil Affairs, Information, Communications and Movement Control. 

Standard Operating Procedures 
308 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

14. You are asked to draw up UNMIH Standard Operating Producers 

(SOPs) based on the UN Guideline SOPs as soon as possible upon 

arrival in the mission area. 

Communications with Contributing Governments 

15. The channel for communication between the United Nations and the 

contributing Governments concerning their contingents or UNMIH itself 

shall be between the United Nations Headquarters in New York and 

their Permanent Missions to the Organization. It is not permitted that 

matters of policy or administration be taken up directly between 

UNMIH HQ and the contributing Governments. 

The Chief Administrative Officer 

16. In the exercise of your administrative responsibilities, you will be 

assisted/supported by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). Under 

the overall authority ofthe SRSG, the CAO shall be responsible for: 

a. 	 all administrative functions and all general and technical 

services relating to the mission's, activities, and for 

providing the requisite administrative support for carrying 

out the substantive work of the mission effectively and 

economically; 

b. 	 all administrative and financial certification; 

c. 	 the proper implementation of the rules, regulations, and 

instructions issued by the United Nations, with respect to 

the administration and finance ofthe mission; 

d. 	 the CAO will be assisted by a small number of 

administrative/finance officers, field service officers and 

other international and local staff as required; 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 309 

e. 	 on administrative and financial matters, UNMIH 

communicates directly with the Field Administration and 

Logistic Division ofDPKO at Headquarters. This is 

normally done by the CAO. However, as ChiefofMission, 

the SRSG has of course the right to communicate directly 

with the Director of the Division ifhe considers a matter 

important. You may also bring to my attention 

administrative matters when they have important 

operational implications. 

17. Should you encounter any major difficulties relating to 


administrative matters, you are to refer those matters to me. 


Respect for Local Laws 

18. It is the duty of members of UNMIH to respect the laws and 

regulations of the Host States and to refrain from any activity of a 

political character in the Host State or other action incompatible with the 

international nature of their duties. They shall conduct themselves, at all 

times, in a manner befitting their status as members ofUNMIH. 

19. Members of UNMIH are entitled to the legal protection of the 

United Nations, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Convention 

on Privileges and Immunities ofthe UN. 

Visits to UNMIH 

20. Visits to the Mission by officials ofGovernments contributing 

military personnel to UNMIH shall be arranged through United Nations 

Headquarters in New York in consultation with you. 

Media Coverage ofUNMIH 
310 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERA TIO NS 

21. UNMIH will be the object of intense media attention. It is desirable 

that its work be known and well understood by the public, subject to the 

information policy laid down by the Special Representative ofthe 

Secretary-General. You should therefore facilitate the work of 

journalists wishing to report about UNMIH's activities and be accessible 

to them yourself to the extent possible without interfering with the 

discharge of the mission mandate. 

Conclusion 

22. The foregoing guidance is not exhaustive. I hope, however, that 

you will find it useful, especially at the beginning of your work. 

Annex A 

UNMIH - SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND OTHER 


REFERENCES: 


Resolutions: 


841 (1993) of 16 June 1993, 


861 (1993) of 27 August 1993, 


862 (1993) of 31August1993, 


867 (1993) of 23 September 1993, 


873 (1993) of 13 October 1993, 


875 (1993) of 16 October 1993, 


905 (1994) of23 March 1994, 


917 (1994) of31July1994, 


940 (1994) of31July1994, 


948 (1994) of 15 October 1994, 


964 (1994) of 29 November 1994 


Report of the Secretary-General of 13 August 1993 


Report of the Secretary-General of 21 Sept 1993 


Report ofthe Secretary-General of 15 July 1994 

LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITL 1994-95 311 

Report of the Secretary-General of 28 Sep 1994 

Report of the Secretary-General of 18 Oct 1994 

Report of the Secretary-General of 23 Nov 1994 
312 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix U: General Orders Number 1 Used During Operations in 

Haiti 

Joint Task Force 180--General Order Number 1 

Department of Defense 


Headquarters, Joint Task Force 180 


Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000 


General Order No. I I 0 September 1994 

1. TITLE: Prohibited activities ofJTF 180 personnel serving in the 

joint operations area (JOA). 

2. PURPOSE: To prohibit conduct that is to the prejudice of good 

order and discipline in JTF 180, is of a nature likely to bring discredit 

upon JTF 180, is harmful to the health and welfare ofmembers ofJTF 

180, or is essential to preserving United States and host nation relations. 

3. APPLICABILITY: This general order is applicable to all U.S. 

military personnel assigned or attached to JTF 180 and all U.S. civilian 

personnel serving with, employed by, or accompanying forces assigned 

or attached to JTF 180. 

4. AUTHORITY: The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Title 

10, United States Code, section 801 et seq. 

5. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES: 

a. Purchase, possession, use, or sale ofprivately owned firearms, 

ammunition, or explosives, or the introduction of these items into the 

JOA. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITI, 1994-95 313 


b. Introduction, possession, use, sale, transfer, manufacture, or 

consumption of any alcoholic beverage without the approval of a 

commander in the grade of06 or above. 

c. Gambling of any kind, including sports pools, lotteries, and 


raffles. 


d. Removing, possessing, selling, defacing, or destroying 


archeological artifacts or national treasures. 


e. Taking or retention of war trophies or individual souvenirs. 

(1) Explanation of prohibition: 

(a) Private property may be seized during combat 

operations only on order of a commander based on military necessity. 

The wrongful taking ofprivate property, even temporarily, is a violation 

of Article 121, UCMJ. 

(b) Public property captured by U.S. personnel is 

the property of the United States. Wrongful retention of such property 

by an individual is a violation ofArticle 108, UCMJ. 

(c) No weapon, munitions, or military article of 

equipment captured or acquired by any means other than official issue 

may be retained for personal use or shipped out ofthe JOA for personal 

retention or control. 

(2) Limited exception. Souvenirs, other than 

weapons or munitions, that have been legitimately purchased and are 

authorized by U.S. customs laws and regulations are permitted. 
314 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

f. Selling, reselling, loaning, or otherwise transferring to anyone, 

rationed or controlled items or relief supplies outside of official relief 

channels. 

g. Throwing any food items, including candy or Meals, Ready to 

Eat (MREs), or any beverages, including water, from moving vehicles. 

6. FURTHER RESTRICTIONS: 

a. Adopting as pets or mascots, caring for, or feeding any type of 

domestic animal (e.g., dogs or cats) or any type ofwild animal. These 

animals are infected with a variety of diseases that can be transmitted to 

humans, and can harbor vectors capable of transmitting diseases to 

humans (including rabies) that have a high potential for adversely 

affecting the health of the command. 

b. Providing food items directly to or feeding civilian refugees. 

Odd items may be donated to Humanitarian Relief Organizations 

(HR Os) engaged in humanitarian relief after appropriate medical 

inspection and release, and field grade Article 15 authority approval. 

This provision does not prohibit the distribution of small items, such as 

pieces of candy, to civilian refugees where such distribution is approved 

by the individual's supervising NCO or officer and is under conditions 

that are safe both for the recipients and the military personnel involved. 

(See paragraph 5 g above.) 

7. PUNITIVE ORDER: Paragraph 5 of this General Order is punitive 

in nature. Persons subject to the UCMJ may be punished thereunder. 

Civilians serving with, employed by, or accompanying JTF 180 may 

face criminal prosecution or adverse administrative action for violation 

of this General Order. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAIT/, 1994-95 315 


8. INDIVIDUAL DUTY: All persons subject to this General Order are 

charged with the duty to become familiar with this General Order and 

local laws and customs. The JTF 180 mission places United States 

Armed Forces and civilian personnel into a country whose laws and 

customs prohibit or restrict certain activities which are generally 

permissible in the United States. All personnel shall avoid action, 

whether or not specifically prohibited by this General Order, which 

might result in or reasonably be expected to create the appearance of a 

violation of this General Order or local laws or customs. 

9. COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITIES: Commanders and 

supervisors are charged with ensuring that all personnel are briefed on 

the prohibitions and requirements of this General Order. Commanders 

and supervisors are expected to exercise good judgment in enforcing this 

General Order. 

10. CONFISCATION OF CONTRABAND: Items which are 

determined to violate this General Order constitute contraband and may 

be confiscated. Commanders, supervisors, military customs inspectors, 

and other officials will enforce this General Order during their 

inspections ofpersonnel and equipment prior to and during deployment 

to the JOA and upon redeployment from the JOA. Before destruction of 

contraband, commanders or law enforcement personnel should 

coordinate with their staffjudge advocate. 

11. EFFECTIVE DATE: This General Order is effective immediately. 

12. EXPIRATION: This General Order will expire when rescinded by 

CJTF 180 or higher authority. 

13. WAIYER REQUESTS: Requests to waive or modify the 

prohibitions of this General Order should be coordinated with the JTF 

180 StaffJudge Advocate prior to submission to CJTF 180 for action. 
316 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITI, 1994-95 317 


Joint Task Force 190--General Order Number 1 

Department of Defense 


Headquarters, Multinational Force 


Unit 0080 


Port-au-Prince, Haiti APO AE 09383-0080 


General Order No. 1 24 October 1994 

1. TITLE: Prohibited activities of Joint Task Force 190 (JTF 190) 


personnel serving in the joint operations area (JOA). 


2. PURPOSE: To prohibit conduct that is to the prejudice ofgood 


order and discipline of JTF 190, is of a nature likely to bring discredit 


upon JTF 190, is harmful to the health and welfare of members ofJTF 


190, or is essential to preserve US and host nation relations. 


3. APPLICABILITY: This general order is applicable to all US 

military personnel assigned or attached to JTF 190, and all US civilian 

personnel serving with, employed by, or accompanying forces assigned 

or attached to JTF 190. 

4. AUTHORITY: The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Title 

10, United States Code, section 801 et. seq. 

5. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES: 

a. Purchase, possession, use, or sale ofprivately-owned firearms, 

ammunition, or explosives, or the introduction of these items into the 

JOA. 

b. Entrance into Haitian churches, temples, or structures 

conducting religious worship, or to other sites ofreligious significance, 
318 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

unless directed by a superior authority or required by military necessity. 

c. Introduction, purchase, possession, use, sale, transfer, 

manufacture, or consumption of any alcoholic beverage without the 

approval of a commander in the grade of 06 or above. 

d. Introduction, purchase, possession, use, sale, transfer, 

manufacture, or consumption of any controlled substance as defined by 

Article l 12a, UCMJ, and Schedules I through V of the Controlled 

Substance Act of 1970, 21 USC Section 812. 

e. Gambling of any kind, including sports pools, lotteries, and 

raffles. 

f. Removing, possessing, selling, defacing, or destroying 

archeological artifacts or national treasures. 

g. Selling, bartering, or exchanging currency other than at the 

official exchange rate, if any. 

h. Taking or retention of individual souvenirs or trophies 

(I) Explanation ofprohibition: 

(a) Private property may be seized during combat 

operations only on order of a commander based on military necessity. 

The wrongful taking of private property, even temporarily, violates 

Article 121, UCMJ. 

(b) Public property captured by US personnel is the 

property of the US. Wrongful retention of such property by an 

individual violates Article 108, UCMJ. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHA/Tl 1994-95 319 

(c) No weapon, munition, or military article of 

equipment captured or acquired by any means other than official issue 

may be retained for personal use or shipped out ofthe JOA for personal 

retention or control. 

i. Selling, reselling, loaning, or otherwise transferring rationed or 

controlled items or relief supplies outside official relief channels. 

j. Throwing at civilians any food items, including candy or Meals 

Ready to Eat (MREs), or any beverage, including water, from moving 

vehicles. 

k. Do not engage in any sexual conduct or contact with any 


member of the Haitian populace. 


I. Adopting as pets or mascots, caring for, or feeding any type of 

domestic animal (e.g., dogs or cats) or any type ofwild animal. These 

animals may be infected with a variety of diseases that can be 

transmitted from animals to humans, and can harbor organisms capable 

oftransmitting diseases to humans (including rabies) that have a high 

potential for adversely affecting the health of the command. 

m. Eating food or drinking beverages grown or produced, 

prepared or served by local Haitian vendors, restaurants, or facilities. 

Only food and beverages approved by the Commander, JTF 190, or his 

designee, may be consumed by JTF 190 personnel. 

6. FURTHER RESTRICTIONS: Providing food items directly to or 

feeding civilian refugees. Odd items may be donated to Humanitarian 

Relief Organizations (HR Os) engaged in humanitarian relief efforts after 

appropriate medical inspection and release approval by an 05 

commander. This provision does not prohibit the distribution ofsmall 

items, such as pieces of candy, to civilian refugees when such 

distribution is approved by the individual's supervising NCO or officer 
320 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

and is under conditions that are safe both for the recipients and the 

military personnel involved. (See paragraph 5j above). 

7. PUNITIVE ORDER: Paragraph 5 of this General Order is punitive 

in nature. Persons subject to the UCMJ may be court-martialed or 

receive adverse administrative action, or both, for violations ofthis 

General Order. Likewise, civilians serving with, employed by, or 

accompanying JTF 190 may face criminal prosecution or adverse 

administrative action for violation of this General Order. 

8. INDIVIDUAL DUTY: All persons subject to this General Order are 

charged with the duty to become familiar with this General Order and 

local laws and customs. The JTF 190 mission places US Armed Forces 

and civilian personnel into a country whose laws and customs prohibit or 

restrict certain activities which are generally permissible in the United 

States. All personnel shall avoid action, whether or not specifically 

prohibited by this General Order, which might result in or reasonably be 

expected to create the appearance of a violation of this General Order or 

local law or customs. 

9. UNIT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES: Commanders and 

civilian supervisors are charged with ensuring that all personnel are 

briefed on the prohibitions and requirements of this General Order. 

Commanders and supervisors are expected to exercise good judgment in 

reinforcing this General Order. 

10. CONFISCATION OF CONTRABAND: Items which are 

determined to violate this General Order and or constitute contraband 

may be confiscated. Commanders, supervisors, military customs 

inspectors, and other officials will enforce this General Order in their 

inspections of personnel and equipment prior to and during deployment 

to the JOA and upon deployment from the JOA. Before destruction of 

contraband, commanders or law enforcement personnel will coordinate 

with their Staff Judge Advocate. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 321 


11. EFFECTIVE DATE: This General Order is effective upon the date 

ofthe assumption of command ofJoint Task Force 190 and the MNF by 

the undersigned. 

12. EXPIRATION: This General Order will expire when rescinded by 

the Commander, JTF 190, or higher authority. 

13. WAIVER REQUESTS: Requests to waive prohibitions ofthis 

General Order must be coordinated with the JTF 190 Staff Judge 

Advocate. 

DAVID C. MEADE 

Major General, USA 

Commanding 
322 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

United States Forces in Haiti-General Order Number 1 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 


Headquarters, U.S. Forces Haiti 


Port-au-Prince, Haiti 09320-0080 


1 April 1995 


GENERAL ORDER NO. 1 

1. TITLE: Prohibited activities of US Forces Haiti (USFORHAITI) 

personnel serving as part of the United Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in the 

joint operations area (JOA). 

2. PURPOSE: To prohibit conduct that is to the prejudice of good 

order and discipline ofUSFORHAITI, is of a nature likely to bring 

discredit upon USFORHAITI, is harmful to the health and welfare of 

members ofUSFORHAITI, or is essential to preserve United Nations 

(UN), US, and host nation relations. 

3. APPLICABILITY: This general order is applicable to all US 

military personnel assigned or attached to USFORHAITI, and all US 

civilian personnel serving with, employed by, or accompanying forces 

assigned or attached to USFORHAITI. 

4. AUTHORITY: The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Title 

10, United States Code, section 801 et. seq. 

5. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES: 

a. Purchase, possession, use or sale of privately-owned firearms, 

ammunition, or explosives, or the introduction ofthese items into the 

JOA. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 323 

b. Entrance into Haitian churches, temples, or structures 

conducting religious worship, or other sites ofreligious significance, 

unless directed by a superior authority or required by military necessity. 

c. Introduction, purchase, possession, use, sale, transfer, 

manufacture, or consumption of any alcoholic beverage without the 

approval of a Commander in the grade of 06 or above. Under no 

circumstances will use or consumption of alcoholic beverages be 

authorized while in uniform outside of contonement areas unless at 

official functions, on duty, when armed, or while driving a vehicle. 

d. Introduction, purchase, possession, use, sale, transfer, 

manufacture, or consumption of any controlled substance as defined by 

Article 112a, UCMJ, and Schedules I through V ofthe Controlled 

Substance Act of 1970, 21 USC Section 812. 

e. Gambling of any kind, including sports pools, lotteries, and 

raffles. 

f. Removing, possessing, selling, defacing, or destroying 

archeological artifacts or national treasures. 

g. Selling, battering, or exchanging currency other than at the 

official exchange rate, if any. 

h. Taking or retention of individual souvenirs or trophies. 

(1) Explanation of prohibition: 

(a) Private property may be seized during operations 

only on order of a commander based on military necessity. The 

wrongful taking of private property, even temporarily, violates Article 

121, UCMJ. 
324 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(b) Public property captured by US personnel is the 

property ofthe UN. Wrongful retention of such property by an 

individual violates Article I 08, UCMJ. 

(c) No weapon, munitions, or military article of 

equipment captured or acquired by any means other than official issue 

may be retained for personal use or shipped out ofthe JOA for personal 

retention or control. 

(d) This prohibition does not preclude the lawful 

purchase ofsouvenirs that can be legally imported into the United 

States. 

i. Selling, reselling, loaning, or otherwise transferring 

rationed or controlled items or relief supplies outside official relief 

channels. 

j. Throwing at civilians any food, including candy or Meals 

Ready to Eat (MREs), or any beverages, including water, from either 

stationary or moving vehicles. 

k. Engaging in any sexual conduct or contact with any 

member ofHaitian populace. 

1. Adopting as pets or mascots, caring for, or feeding any 

type of domestic animal (e.g., dogs or cats) or any type of wild animal. 

These animals may be infected with a variety of diseases that can be 

transmitted from animals to humans, and can harbor organisms capable 

of transmitting diseases to humans (including rabies) that have a high 

potential for adversely affecting the health ofthe command. 

m. Eating food or drinking beverages grown or produced, 

prepared or served by local Haitian vendors, restaurants, or facilities. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 325 

Only food and beverages approved by a US Commander in the grade of 

06 or above, may be consumed by USFORHAITI personnel. 

n. Entering all bars (an establishment whose primary business is 

to serve alcohol), brothels, and discos. 

6. FURTHER RESTRICTIONS: Providing food items directly to or 

feeding civilian refugees. Odd items may be donated to Humanitarian 

Relief Organizations (HR Os) engaged in humanitarian relief efforts after 

appropriate medical inspection and release approval by an 05 US 

Commander. 

7. CONFISCATION OF CONTRABAND: Items which are 

determined to violate this General Order and or constitute contraband 

may be confiscated. Commanders, supervisors, military customs 

inspectors, and other officials will enforce this General Order in their 

inspections of personnel and equipment prior to and during deployment 

to the JOA and upon redeployment from the JOA. Before destruction of 

contraband, commanders or law enforcement personnel will coordinate 

with the StaffJudge Advocate. 

8. PUNITIVE ORDER: Paragraph 5 of this General Order is punitive 

in nature. Persons subject to the UCMJ may be court-martialed or 

receive adverse administrative action, or both, for violations ofthis 

General Order. Likewise, civilians serving with, employed by, or 

accompanying USFORHAITI may face criminal prosecution or adverse 

administrative action for violation ofthis General Order. 

9. INDIVIDUAL DUTY: All persons subject to this General Order are 

charged with the duty to become familiar with this General Order and 

local laws and customs. The USFORHAITI mission places US Armed 

Forces and civilian personnel into a country whose laws and customs 

prohibit or restrict certain activities which are generally permissible in 

the United States. All personnel shall avoid action, whether or not 

·specifically prohibited by this General Order, which might result in or 
326 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

reasonably be expected to create the appearance of a violation ofthis 


General Order or local law or customs. 


10. UNIT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES: Commanders and 

civilian supervisors are charged with ensuring that all personnel are 

briefed on the prohibitions and requirements ofthis General Order. 

Commanders and supervisors are expected to exercise food judgment in 

reinforcing this General Order. 

11. EFFECTIVE DA TE: This General Order is effective upon the date 

of the assumption of command of United States Forces Haiti by the 

undersigned. 

12. EXPIRATION: This General Order will expire when rescinded by 

the Commander, USFORHAITI, or higher authority. 

13. WAIVER REQUESTS: Requests to waive prohibitions ofthis 

General Order must be coordinated with the USFORHAITI Staff Judge 

Advocate. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITL 1994-95 327 

United Nations Mission in Haiti-Force Commander Directive 


Number] 


UNMIH MINUHA 


United Nations Mission in Haiti 


Mission Des Nations Unies En Haiti 


FORCE COMMANDER DIRECTIVE NUMBER I 

I. PURPOSE: To identify conduct that is prejudicial to the 

maintenance ofgood order and discipline of the UNMIH Force and is of 

a nature to bring discredit upon the mission. 

2. AUTHORITY: United Nations Guidelines to the Force Commander, 

dated 15 January 1995. 

3. APPLICABILITY: This Force Directive is applicable to all the 

members of UNMIH's military component. 

4. CONTINGENT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES: Contingent 

Commanders are charged with ensuring that all personnel are briefed on 

the prohibitions and requirements of this Force Directive. Commanders 

and supervisors are expected to exercise good judgment in reinforcing 

this Force Directive. Contingent Commanders should specifically 

prohibit any action which would bring discredit on the UN, our military 

force, or which would inhibit the accomplishment ofthe UN mission in 

Haiti. 

5. FURTHER RESTRICTIONS: The Force Commander may issue 

further restrictions as deemed appropriate. Contingent Commanders will 

adhere to this Directive, and may further restrict their contingents as 

they deem necessary. The Force Commander may recommend to the 

Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations the repatriation 
328 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

of any member of UNMIH's military component in violation of this 


Force Directive. 


6. INDIVIDUAL DUTY: All persons subject to this Directive are 

expected to become familiar with its contents and local laws and 

customs. 

7. PROVIDING FOOD ITEMS DIRECTLY TO OR FEEDING 

CIVILIAN REFUGEES: Odd items may be donated to Humanitarian 

Relief Organizations, International Agencies, or Non-Governmental 

Organizations engaged in humanitarian relief efforts after appropriate 

medical inspection and release approval by Contingent Commanders. 

This provision does not prohibit the distribution of small items, such as 

pieces of candy, to civilian refugees when such distribution is approved 

by the individual's supervisor and is under conditions that are safe both 

for the recipients and the military personnel involved. 

8. OFF LIMITS ESTABLISHMENTS: All bars, specifically 

establishments whose primary business is to serve alcohol, brothels, and 

discos are off limits to all of UNMIH's military component. 

9. LOCAL EATING ESTABLISHMENTS: Contingent Commanders 

will ensure that occasional visits to restaurants by members of their force 

are properly controlled. Contingent Commanders will establish a set 

policy for such visits to include frequency of visits and number of 

vehicles at any one time at a particular establishment. The intent of this 

restriction is to preclude the development of lucrative targets. 

10. HAITIAN PLACES OF WORSHIP: No member ofUNMIH's 

military component will enter Haitian churches, temples, or religious 

structures during religious services. Contingent Commanders should 

coordinate cultural visits to places of worship through the Force Legal 

Advisor's Office. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITJ, 1994-95 329 

I I. SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES: All members of 


UNMIH's military component are warned of the high risk of sexually 


transmitted diseases in the area and should behave accordingly. 


12. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES: The following activities are 


prohibited 


a. Purchase, possession, use, or sale ofprivately-owned firearms, 

ammunition, or explosives, or the introduction of these items into the 

areas ofoperations. 

b. Introduction, purchase, possession, use, sale, transfer, 

manufacture, or consumption ofany alcoholic beverage without the 

approval of a Contingent Commander. The Force Commander will be 

notified in writing concerning Contingent Commander's policies on 

consumption of alcohol. However, under no circumstances will use or 

consumption of alcoholic beverages be authorized while in uniform 

outside of contonement areas, on duty, when armed, or while driving a 

vehicle. Driving under the influence of alcohol will not be tolerated. 

c. Introduction, purchase, possession, use, sale, transfer, 

manufacture, or consumption of any controlled or illegal substance. 

d. Removing, possessing, selling, defacing, or destroying 

archeological artifacts or national treasures. 

e. Selling, battering, or exchanging currency other than at the 

official exchange rate. 

f. Taking or retaining individual souvenirs or trophies. 

Explanation ofprohibition is as follows: 

(I) Private or public property may be seized during 

operations only on order ofa commander, and will be based on military 
330 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

necessity. Items will be recorded and turned over to proper authorities 

as soon as possible. 

(2) Property seized by UNMIH personnel is the property 

ofthe UN. Wrongful retention of such property by an individual is 

forbidden. 

(3) No weapon, munitions, or military article of equipment 

captured or acquired by any means other than official issue may be 

retained for personal use or shipped out ofthe Republic ofHaiti for 

personal retention or control. 

(4) This prohibition does not preclude the lawful purchase 

of souvenirs that can be legally imported into the contingents home 

nation. 

g. Selling, reselling, loaning, or otherwise transferring rationed or 

controlled items or relief supplies outside official relief channels. 

h. Throwing any food or beverage to local civilians from a 

vehicle, either stationary or moving. 

i. Adopting as pets or mascots, caring for, or feeding any type of 

domestic animal (e.g., dogs or cats) or any type ofwild animal. These 

animals may be infected with a variety of diseases that can be 

transmitted from animals to humans, and can harbor organisms capable 

oftransmitting diseases to humans (including rabies) that have a high 

potential for adversely affecting the health ofthe command. 

13. CONFISCATION OF CONTRABAND: Items which are 

determined to violate this Force Directive and or constitute contraband 

may be confiscated. Commanders, supervisors, and other officials will 

enforce this Force Directive in their inspections ofpersonnel and 

equipment prior to and during deployment and upon redeployment. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 331 

Before destruction of contraband, commanders or law enforcement 

personnel will coordinate with the Force Legal Advisor's Office. 

14. EFFECTIVE DATE: This Force Directive is effective immediately. 

15. EXPIRATION: This Force Directive will expire when rescinded or 

superseded by the order ofthe UNMIH Force Commander or higher 

authority. 

13. WAIVER REQUESTS: Contingent Commanders will coordinate 

requests for waivers to this Force Directive through the Force Legal 

Advisor's Office. 
332 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix V: Prepared Congressional Testimony 


Of Lawrence P. Rockwood, 


Captain, US Army 


Former Joint Task Force 190 Counterintelligence Officer 


First of all, I would like to thank the Chairman ofthe Subcommittee 

on Western Hemisphere, Congressman Dan Burton and the other 

members for giving me the opportunity to present my testimony here 

today. I am submitting for the record this statement with enclosures. I 

am facing a court martial for my actions as a counterintelligence officer 

with the 10th Mountain Division while serving in Haiti. The subject of 

your hearing however, is not my actions, but rather the extraordinary 

inaction on the part ofmy superiors. In my statement I will try to 

demonstrate that while in Port-au-Prince I witnessed, and attempted to 

stop dereliction of duty if not criminal negligence on the part ofmy 

superiors. Last September 1 S, the President announced that the primary 

objective of the operation Uphold Democracy was "to prevent the brutal 

atrocities against Haitians" and, bearing in mind my military oath to the 

Constitution and the Commander-in-Chief, I took his words at face 

value. As I assumed my duties in Haiti on September 23 I was 

informed that 'force protection' was to be the focus of our efforts. In 

spite of this, it became immediately apparent to me that the main content 

of the reports that reached me centered on human rights violations 

against Haitian slum residents rather than any threats directed against 

our forces. This discrepancy was what triggered my week long odyssey 

through all possible instances to awake interest ofthe commanders and 

staff ofthe Multinational Forces in human rights violations. On the 

morning of September 25, I met with the command's Chaplain to discuss 

reports on the deteriorating human rights situation in Port-au- Prince 

slums, but the chaplain did not want to get involved in a "political" 

problem. Later that evening I went to Staff Judge Advocate's (SJA) or 

the legal department and asked for The Laws ofWar manual, the 1977 

Protocol to the Geneva Convention or the report on the UN High 

Commission for Human Rights Conference held in Vienna in 1993. The 

only available reading material on human rights was an Army Field 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS JN HA/Tl 1994-95 333 

Manual from 1954. Next evening I went back to SJA to complain about 

the lack ofpositive action ofthe US forces in support ofhuman rights. 

(The log of SJA - encl number 1 - says "CPT Rockwood seemed very 

concerned about alleged human rights violations going on in Haiti.") 

After finding out that no inspection or regular monitoring or' prisoners 

being held by the Haitian military had taken place since the arrival of 

U.S. forces over two weeks ago I tried unsuccessfully to get the 

Civil/Military Operations Center interested in surveying the 

penitentiaries. In fact it is a duty ofthe army's Civil affairs to monitor 

and check out the detention centers. The Civil Affairs Operations manual 

(FM 41-10) for the US Army- encl number 2 - Chapter IX (Public 

Safety) under heading "c" contains penal institutions such as prisons and 

jails and says literally: "The primal' [sic] consideration in this area is 

whether the existing institutions (police, fire and penal) may be used to 

carry out the combat commander's primary mission and to provide the 

day-to-day control and bodily protection ofthe local population." Was it 

unreasonable to expect that a monitoring ofthe prisons and jails would 

start "to provide the day-to-day control and bodily protection ofthe local 

population"? Similarly, the Civil Military Operations Handbook ofthe 

10th Mountain Division - encl number 3 - under "Law Enforcement 

Agency Checklist" entry number 9 has "Confinement facilities" and it 

enumerates the information which the 10th Mountain Division staff 

should obtain in the confinement: "names, address, grid coordinate, 

telephone number, type offacility, maximum capacity, present capacity, 

number of guards (adequate YIN), capacity of kitchens, name of warden, 

overall condition offacility and inmates." Under the circumstances I 

continued to believe that it is not only reasonable but nearly inevitable 

that the civil affairs ofthe 10th Mountain Division would be required to 

obtain this information. On the evening of September 27, I attempted to 

organize an intelligence team to check out these prisons but I had to ask 

the military police for the escort. But the military police was concerned 

only with FADH police functions Goint patrols and police station 
334 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

monitoring) and refused. It should be noted here that September 27 was 

the day when the US troops arrived in the southwestern town ofLes 

Cayes and discovered a prison where over 30 men were crammed into a 

cell no larger than 15- feet square. They were so malnourished that - as 

with concentration camp victims ofWW2 - their food intake had to be 

increased gradually to avoid harming them. When the American soldiers 

removed one invalid from the prison, they, discovered that he had lain 

for so long in one position that some of his skin had fallen off. The same 

evening I approached a UN Military Observer to discuss my human 

rights concerns. The UNMO said they couldn't do anything without the 

US Forces' approval and he told me that the High Commissioner for 

Refugees, the UNHCR, would not arrive in Haiti until October 13. The 

next morning a liaison officer ofthe Special Operations informed me that 

my unit was not to take action: they were not in other words to inspect 

the prison or to even find out who the prisoners were and how many 

were in the prison. Meanwhile an answer arrived from the Pentagon for 

a high priority request that I made on August 10, 1994: it confirmed that 

there was a real danger of abuses in Haitian prisons. At this point I 

thought that I had exhausted all means at my disposal to alert all sections 

ofthe Joint Task Force to human rights abuses in Haitian penitentiaries. 

I therefore turned to the Inspector General and deposited my complaint, 

which alleged that the command had subverted President's primary 

mission intent contending human rights - encl number 4. The JG 

suggested that it be anonymous but there was no point because by then 

everyone knew about my concern for human rights. I also believed that 

what I was doing was legally and morally correct, and had no reason to 

hide my position as an officer unless of course my command was 

prepared to act improperly in response. The Inspector General informed 

me that I have done everything a staff officer could have possible done 

and it was not my job to pursue this further by addressing it to the 

command's Chief of Staff. I was also told that my complaint would not 

be brought to the attention ofGeneral Meade for at least a week. At this 

point I informed my immediate superior that I feared the command could 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 335 


be found criminally negligent under international law and in dereliction 

of duties in carrying out the President's intent. I reached the conclusion 

that the US would bear responsibility because the human rights 

violations would be committed with the knowledge ofthe command, in 

the direct proximity ofits forces, and by Haitian forces with whom the 

US had a signed agreement of cooperation. I based my concern over the 

command's possible criminal negligence on the historical principles 

recognized in the Charter ofthe Nuremburg Tribunal which held 

commanders to be liable for failing to take action to "prevent" war 

crimes. More particularly, I was aware of the case ofthe United States 

vs. Yamashita. General Tomoyuki Yamashita, former commander of 

Japanese Forces in the Philippines was sentenced to death in 1945 by an 

international war crimes tribunal for his failure to protect American 

prisoners, even though he neither ordered nor knew of their execution by 

his soldiers. The sentence was upheld by the US Supreme Court. He was 

executed for his indifferent (although completely passive) response to 

human rights violations against persons protected under customary 

and/or conventional international law, violations ofwhich he had no 

direct knowledge (unlike the present case where general Meade and his 

staff, including myself, had direct and specific knowledge of human 

rights abuses in the Haitian penitentiaries). 

I also believed that the military Oath ofOffice not only allowed me 

but compelled me to place loyalty to the Constitution and the President 

ofthe United States before obedience to my immediate superiors who, I 

suspected were indifferent to violations ofthe human rights ofHaitian 

prisoners. (This suspicion was later confirmed when, during the 

preliminary hearing for my court martial, the I 0th Mountain Division's 

senior intelligence officer and my immediate superior testified decisively 

that human rights violations in Haitian prisons were not a priority.). 

was aware that the action contemplated would be considered directly 

challenging to my superiors' conduct ofthe operation, but I could find no 

other way to prevent ongoing human rights abuses. As a student of 

military history I had in the back ofmy head a precedent that guided me 

I 
336 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

in this decision. a precedent that goes back to the blackest episode of the 

Vietnam war and of US army history: the My Lai massacre. A helicopter 

pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Hugh C. Thompson, who saw the massacre, 

ordered his gunner to fire on US forces who were slaughtering unarmed 

civilians. While he acted clearly outside the range of what is usually 

associated with "good order and discipline," the Army judiciously gave 

him an award rather than placing him before a court martial. (Mr. 

Thompson has agreed to be a defense witness at my court martial.) Like 

Thompson I had before me the theoretical choice to do nothing or to 

take unconventional action knowing that I was risking disciplinary 

measures. But in practice I had no choice. I felt I had to act because lack 

of such action would have meant an acquiescence on my part to the 

imminent and ongoing human rights violations, and hypocrisy in the face 

of duty. Thus on September 30, 1994, I left the military compound to 

inspect the prison in Port-au-Prince on my own. Two hours later I had 

only partially accomplished my task - but had already found atrocious 

conditions and shockingly emaciated inmates. A military officer from the 

US embassy then arrived and ordered me out. I was taken to the military 

compound where my rights were read to me and where I underwent a 

psychiatric evaluation. My actions were determined to be not due to 

stress or mental disorder but an ethical dilemma. A day later I was 

escorted back to the States. Meanwhile the Inspector General complaint 

that I filed on the morning of September 30 was closed in two days. This 

was in clear violation of the Army Regulation 20-1 - encl number 5 ­

which states that "(IGs) forward all allegations of impropriety against 

general officers to U.S. Army Inspector General Agency (USAIGA) 

Investigations Division by a rapid but confidential means within_ [sic] 

working days of receipt" (Paragraph 7-3. I (2)) and that "if the IG 

determines that the "allegation would, if substantiated, adversely affect 

the public perception of the command's effectiveness, efficiency, 

readiness, training, morale. or other similar factors, the IG will promptly 

notify the next higher IG ofthe allegation. The next higher IG will 

determine which command IG (other than the command at which the 

allegation was made) should actually work the Case." Paragraph 64d 

(5)). Last Apr 17, the Inspector General responded to my defense lawyer 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS JN HAITI, 1994-95 337 


(who had pointed out to this violation ofthe IG regulation - encl number 

6 ) announcing that he is opening an inquiry into the mishandling ofmy 

original complaint - encl number 7. Only recently did I learn that the 

10th Mountain Division did not start regular monitoring ofthis prison 

until December 19, 1994. In the three months between the arrival ofJTF 

and that date there were several sporadic visits ofpersons more or less 

associated with the JTF: COL Michael Sullivan from the 16th Military 

Police Brigade who in a memorandum to the Commander ofJTF 190 

General Meade wrote "The appalling conditions render this facility (the 

National Penitentiary) unsuitable for human habitation, and this must be 

a priority in our efforts to assist Haiti in its return to democracy." Paul 

Browne the deputy head ofthe International Police Monitors (IPM) 

went there on October 14 and some inmates he found were in such a 

horrendous condition that he thought that they were in the last stage of 

AIDS. The Danish monitors from IPM also visited this facilities and 

considered it "the worst" of all confinement centers in Haiti. The charges 

I am facing appear petty next to life-threatening human rights violations 

that continued in the Port-au-Prince National Penitentiary for 2 months 

after my attempted intervention. There is, however, nothing petty in the 

charges in my official complaint initiated on the morning of September 

30. The inquiry that the Inspector General ofthe Army, Lieutenant 

General Ronald Griffith opened recently will deal not only with the 

mishandling ofmy complaint but will also look into General Meade's 

and members of his staffs failure to address the human rights situation 

in the National Penitentiary and other Haitian confinement facilities 

during his command ofthe Multinational Forces in Haiti. Meanwhile on 

May 8, my court martial, convened on the recommendation ofGeneral 

David C. Meade, will start in Fort Drum. 

Delivered May 4, 1995, Thursday 


To The House Committee 


On International Relations Subcommittee 

338 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Prepared Testimony OfColonel RichardH. Black (USA Ret.) To The 


House Committee On International Relations Subcommittee On The 


Western Hemisphere 


Chairman Burton and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee to examine issues 

raised by the court-martial of Captain Lawrence P. Rockwood. Today, I 

will be addressing you in my private capacity and not as a representative 

ofthe Department ofDefense. Let me add that my analysis ofthe issues 

is based upon press reports rather than on a personal examination of the 

evidence in Captain Rockwood's case. My remarks are not meant to 

impact Captain Rockwood's trial in any fashion, but are simply intended 

to provide background regarding military justice in the operational 

setting ofHaiti. Charges are lodged against CPT Rockwood for 

unlawfully slipping over his perimeter compound fence the night of 

September 30, 1994 and entering Port-au-Prince, Haiti, to inspect the 

National Penitentiary. The charges suggest that he violated orders 

regarding security measures to be observed outside the compound. 

Additionally, he is charged with disrespect ·toward a superior officer, 

L TC Frank Bragg, by contemptuously and belligerently yelling, "I want 

a full accounting from the Commanders, Joint Task Force 180 and 190, 

ofthe human rights violations and accounting of all the prisoners." CPT 

Rockwood does not deny that he knowingly violated the guidance of his 

superior officers. Troops landed in Haiti to begin Operation Uphold 

Democracy on September 19, 1994. CPT Rockwood's actions took 

place during the dangerous period just eleven days after Multinational 

forces arrived in Haiti. Domestic support for the intervention was fragile. 

It was evident that Americans felt the operation did not warrant U.S. 

casualties, so security concerns were paramount. Our "permissive entry" 

was made with the agreement of both the de facto and the de jure 

governments ofHaiti. We were not in a state of belligerency, and the 

extent ofour influence over the affairs and personnel ofthe Haitian 

government was in a state oftransition. Port-au-Prince was in a state of 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 339 

civil unrest. On September 29, the day before CPT Rockwood's 

surreptitious nighttime departure, the multinational force responded to a 

grenade attack and two shooting incidents in that city which left 16 

Haitians killed and 60 wounded. The potential for a widespread 

outbreak of violence was substantial. A misstep at that moment might 

have set in motion a chain of events leading to loss ofAmerican lives 

and collapse ofthe entire mission. That the entry into Haiti has, to date, 

involved so little bloodshed, is a tribute to the deliberate and orderly 

development of a secure base ofoperations and to the delicate shift of 

power between the Haitian political factions and the Multinational 

Force. The superb discipline ofArmy forces accounted in large measure 

for the success ofthis somewhat thankless venture. Discipline and 

obedience to orders, conveyed through a well- defined chain of 

command, are factors which distinguish a military force from an armed 

mob. Responsiveness to commands relayed from the civilian leadership 

through the Department ofDefense is essential under our constitutional 

form ofgovernment. The national government must remain confident 

that actions taken by military forces correspond to, and do not exceed, 

the directives ofthe political leadership. Ifmilitary forces act beyond the 

scope of specific directives and the rules of engagement approved by 

national authority, they risk embroiling America in armed conflicts not 

sanctioned by our government. No officer has a right to disregard lawful 

orders of superiors. (Title 10 U.S.C. sec. 890, Article 90, Uniform Code 

ofMilitary Justice). An order requiring the performance ofa military 

duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril 

ofthe subordinate. (Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 1984 

(hereafter MCM), Part IV, para. 14c.(2)(a)(i)). The dictates of a person's 

conscience, religion, or personal philosophy cannot justify or excuse the 

disobedience of an otherwise lawful order. (MCM Part IV, 

14c.(2)(a)(iii)). As long as the order is understandable, the form ofthe 

order is immaterial, as is the method by which it is transmitted to the 

accused. (MCM Part IV, para. 14c.(2)(a)(iv)(c)). CPT Rockwood, 

however, argues that he acted under various higher authorities, including 
340 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

the Dalai Lama--his "spiritual teacher." He points to a speech in which 

President Clinton said our national objectives included "stopping brutal 

atrocities." He believes that the President's general guidance superseded 

specific orders from his immediate superiors. It is true that an order is 

not lawfully binding if it is in conflict with the lawful order of a superior 

authority. (See generally U.S. v. Green, 22 M.J. 711 (A.C.M.R. 1986)). 

An order or regulation is not lawful ifit is contrary to the Constitution, 

the laws of the United States, or lawful superior orders. However, 

before a President's policy guidance can legally amount to a contrary 

regulation or order, it must first meet the criteria of enforceability under 

Article 90 or Article 92, UCMJ. To be considered a conflicting order 

under Article 90, UCMJ, the President's guidance must have been a 

specific mandate to do, or not to do, a specific act. (MCM Part IV, para. 

14. (c)(2)(iv)(d)). Under MCM Part IV, para. 16c.( 1 )(e), "Regulations 

which supply only general guidelines or advice for conducting military 

functions may not be enforceable under Article 92(1)." The analysis at 

MCM App. 21, para. 16, pg. A2 l-92, states: "The general order or 

regulation violated must, when examined as a whole, demonstrate that it 

is intended to regulate the conduct of individual servicemembers, and 

the direct application of sanctions for violations ofthe regulation must 

be self-evident." (United States v. Nardell, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 327, at 329; 

45 CMR 101, at 103 (1972)). The commanders ofthe 10th Mountain 

Division were apparently sensitive to CPT Rockwood's idealism. 

Although they were not required to do so, they attempted to explain their 

actions to him. He was allowed to air his concerns within his chain of 

command, with the legal officials of the Staff Judge Advocate, with a 

U.N. military observer, and with the Multinational Force Inspector 

General. CPT Rockwood would have us believe that none of these 

individuals shared his superior sense of compassion. When his reckless 

vendetta eventually forced his command to discipline him, they did so in 

a measured fashion. They reportedly offered him nonjudicial punishment 

under Article 15, UCMJ. (Title 10 U.S.C. sect 815). This modest 

punishment might have kept his military career intact, while reinforcing 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAIT/, 1994-95 341 

the principle that officers ofthe division could not arrogate power unto 

themselves. CPT Rockwood refused to argue his case at this lower-level 

forum, instead choosing to demand trial by court-martial. Next, the 

command offered to allow him to resign from the Army in order to avoid 

the stigma of a court-martial conviction. He declined the offer. The 

command appears to have taken carefully measured steps to balance the 

equities ofthe case with the need to maintain discipline within the 

division. 

Having elected trial by court-martial, CPT Rockwood will have the 

right to air fully his claims before a military court. The court will be 

conducted under laws and regulations carefully crafted by the U.S. 

Congress and various Presidents. His assertion that human rights 

provisions and President Clinton's comments justified his actions will be 

fully litigated. Iffound guilty, he can appeal to the court- martial 

convening authority, then through two levels of appellate courts to the 

U.S. Supreme Court. Americans continue to question our involvement in 

Haiti. They are deeply distrustful ofthe United Nations, and have little 

regard for their peacekeeping missions. But they credit our servicemen 

and women with making the best of a difficult situation in Haiti. They 

respect those who carry out these difficult, unrewarding tasks with 

professionalism. While political leaders debate the merits ofintervention 

in foreign lands, the Department ofDefense must have congressional 

support to maintain order within its ranks. I applaud the men and women 

who have served in Haiti. I complement their superb leaders, who have 

persevered throughout this difficult endeavor. In closing, I thank the 

Chairman and each ofthe members ofthis Subcommittee for allowing 

me to appear here today. The President's general policy guidance did not 

meet the criteria for either a lawful general regulation or an "other" 

lawful order. In my view, the President's policy statement provided no 

legal justification for any officer to disobey orders ofimmediate 

superiors in the 10th Mountain Division. Several newspapers have 

published articles based on interviews with CPT Rockwood. ("Duty to 

Disobey," The Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1995; "An Order Fit to Be 
342 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Disobeyed," Los Angeles Times, Mar. 16, 1995; etc.). In them, he 

claims the Vietnam-era My Lai trials and the post-World War II trial of 

General Tomoyuki Yamashita provide justification for intentional 

disobedience of orders in situations where human rights are endangered. 

But we must question whether this is true when American forces are 

neither engaged in armed conflict nor participating in the commission of 

any suspected criminal acts. Does international law compel U.S. forces 

to intervene immediately in the internal affairs of sovereign states 

whenever they suspect prisoners are being mistreated? The crimes 

involved in the My Lai incident were committed by American soldiers-­

not foreign nationals. And, When Japanese General Yamashita was 

hanged after World War II, he was being punished for widespread, 

vicious crimes committed by soldiers under his command. He was not 

punished for failing to halt abuses committed by foreign nationals. An 

American officer might, under unusual instances, be held criminally 

responsible for violations of law committed by his subordinates. 

However, officers are not responsible for rectifying violations committed 

by foreign officials not subject to their direct control. We cannot allow 

servicemembers to act unilaterally to correct human rights abuses in 

countries where they are stationed. Military officers serve as attaches in 

many of the world's capitals. Unilateral attempts to force our standards 

of human rights on the Peoples Republic of China, Mexico, or Saudi 

Arabia would obviously be counterproductive. Overreaching during the 

first days following our arrival in Haiti could likewise have had 

unfortunate results. CPT Rockwood's unusual undertaking might have 

had catastrophic results. Although we can only speculate regarding 

potential consequences, they could have spelled disaster for the entire 

operation. When he arrived unannounced at the prison, he could have 

provoked a shooting incident. He was armed with an M-16 and 

reportedly entered, " ... by literally placing my boot in the door." Had an 

exchange of gunfire resulted, it might have triggered an attack by one of 

the edgy, armed factions in Port-au-Prince. His actions could have 

triggered a prison riot. U.S. forces might have been compelled to 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITL 1994-95 343 

intervene with subsequent loss ofAmerican lives. CPT Rockwood's 

superiors were responsible for anticipating threats to the successful 

execution ofthe mission. They were required to implement measures 

minimizing the danger to their troops in a manner consistent with 

national objectives. Troops must be tightly controlled in volatile 

situations in order to avoid needless, unintended risks. 

Delivered May 4, 1995, Thursday 
---------

344 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix W: Form Used to Process Requests for Air Transportation 

DETERMINATION OF AIR TRANSPORTATION 


ELIGIBILITY/ ISSUANCE OF INVITATIONAL TRAVEL 


ORDERS 


DATE: 

MEMORANDUM FOR J4, USFORHAITI, PORT-AU-PRINCE, 

HAITI 

SUBJECT: Request for Determination ofPassenger Eligibility and 

Issuance of Invitational Travel Orders (ITOs) for Non-DOD Personnel 

and Foreign Nationals 

1. Request determination ofpassenger(s) eligibility and issuance of 

invitational travel order(s) in accordance with the following information: 

a. Name/SSN/Position/Nationality (Ifmore than one pax, attach a 

list with information on all additional pax.) 

b. Purpose ofTravel: 

c. Point ofOrigin: Destination: 

d. Date(s) ofTravel: 

e. Type ofAircraft: 

f. Travel is Non-reimbursable 
---------

-------

-------------------

------ ------

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 345 


__Reimbursable. Obtain fund cite from 


Comptroller prior to submission ofthis request. Fund 


Cite: 


g. Arms are ___Not authorized ___Authorized to be 

carried/borne. 

h. Passenger( s) are required to sign the Air Transportation 

Agreement (DD 1381) on reverse side. DD 1381 Forms for additional 

pax must be attached to this form. Form(s) are completed and attached. 

Yes No 

2. NameofRequestor ______________ 


Signature ofRequestor______________ 


Position ofRequestor______________ 


Phone# 


3. Submit completed request to 14, USFORHAITI, Bldg 29, Camp 

Democracy (LIC), at least 48 hours prior to requested transportation 

date. 

TO BE COMPLETED BY SJA, USFORHAITI: 

Concur N onconcur 

Authority: Para(s) _______ DoD 4515.13R 

COMMENTS: 

MEMORANDUM FOR COS, USFORHAITI, PORT-AU-PRINCE, 

HAITI DATE: 
---------

346 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

SUBJECT: Determination ofEligibility for Transportation on DoD 

Aircraft 

I. Eligibility has been reviewed. 

2. The above request is __Approved __Disapproved. 

WILLIAM J. SUTTON, JR. 

LTC,QM 

J4 

MEMORANDUM FOR J4, USFORHAITI, PORT-AU-PRINCE, 

HAITI DATE: 

SUBJECT: Issuance of Invitational Travel Orders 

1. The above Invitational Travel Order request is ___Approved 

_____Disapproved. COS, USFORHAITI 

2. Ifpassenger is 07 and above, civilian equivalent, USFORHAITI must 

approve. Approve Disapprove. 

UPON DETERMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY AND APPROVAL BY 

THE CHIEF OF STAFF, USFORHAITI, OR COMMANDER, 

USFORHAITI, THIS COMPLETED DOCUMENT WILL 

CONSTITUTE THE REQUISITE INVITATIONAL TRAVEL 

ORDER. 

FILING: ORIG-J4, 1 COPY TO FLT OPS, 1 COPY TO J3 AIR, 1 

COPY TO INDIVIDUAL(S) 

[original form was a single sheet with fine print] 
-----

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 347 

Appendix X: Section 607Agreement Between the United States and 

Haiti 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT 

OF HAITI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONCERNING THE 

PROVISION OF SUPPORT ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS TO 

ASSIST IN THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY, ORDER AND 

ECONOMIC STABILITY IN HAITI 

PREAMBLE 

The Department ofDefense ofthe United States ofAmerica and the 

Government ofHaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hereinafter referred to 

as the 

Noting that the furnishing of commodities and services by the 

Department of Defense ofthe United States ofAmerica to the 

Government of Haiti on a reimbursable basis would assist in the 

restoration of democracy, order and economic stability in Haiti; 

On the part of the Department ofDefense of the United States of 

America, acting under authority ofsection 607 ofthe Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1961, as amended; 

Desiring to establish the terms and conditions for the provision of 

assistance by the Department ofDefense ofthe United States of 

America at the request of the Government ofHaiti, with costs for 

requested assistance to be reimbursed to the Department of Defense of 

the United States ofAmerica by the Government of Haiti; 

Have agreed as follows: 
348 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

ARTICLE I SCOPE OF PROVISION OF SUPPORT 

1. In accordance with the terms and conditions ofthis Agreement, the 

Department of Defense of the United States ofAmerica may provide to 

the extent it is available, at the request ofthe Haitian Government, the 

following types of support on a reimbursable basis; 

(a) Reconstruction of infrastructure and restoration of basic 

services; 

(b) Transportation services; 

(c) Clothing, billeting, rations, and other subsistence items. 

(d) Vehicles, equipment, and other major end items, spare parts, 

maintenance and repair services, fuel, and petroleum supplies; 

(e) Operational supplies and services; 

(f) Communication services; 

(g) Training and technical services; 

(h) Special information processing, services, and equipment, and 

(i) Other incidental goods and services, including medical 

supplies and facilities. 

2. As agreed to by the Parties in writing, other types of assistance may 

be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with this Agreement. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 349 

3. At its direction, support provided by the Department of Defense of 


the United States of America under this Agreement may be provided 


from support acquired through Department of Defense contracts. 


Contracting for such support shall be in accordance with the laws and 


regulations of the United States of America. 


ARTICLE II SUPPORT PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS 

1. Unless the written consent of the United States Government has first 

been obtained, the Government of Haiti shall not: 

(a) Permit any use of any assistance provided pursuant to this 


Agreement by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the 


Government of Haiti; 


(b) Use or permit the use of any assistance provided pursuant to 


this Agreement for purposes other than to restore democracy, order and 


economic stability in Haiti; or 


(c) Transfer or permit any officer, employee, or agent of the 

Government of Haiti to transfer any assistance provided pursuant to this 

Agreement, by gift, sale, or otherwise. 

2. The Government of Haiti shall maintain the security of any assistance 

provided pursuant to this Agreement, and shall endeavor to provide 

substantially the same degree ofsecurity protection afforded by the 

United States Government. 

3. The provision of assistance pursuant to this Agreement may be made 

subject to additional terms and conditions as may be agreed to in 

individual implementing arrangements, executed in writing between the 

parties under this Agreement. 
350 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

4. As part ofits contribution to this Agreement, the Government of 

Haiti assumes responsibility for all claims (including the costs of 

defending such claims and of any settlement or judgment thereof) made 

by any party against the United States ofAmerica, or any ofits officers, 

agents, or employees, arising out of the provision ofthe assistance 

provided under this Agreement. The United States ofAmerica, or any 

of its officers, agents, or employees, shall not be liable for any claims 

arising out of the provision ofthe assistance provided under this 

Agreement. 

5. The Government ofHaiti shall not make any claim against or hold 

liable the United States ofAmerica, in respect of injuries or death 

caused by equipment or materials supplied by the Department of 

Defense of the United States ofAmerica related to any activities under 

this Agreement. Such claims shall be the responsibility of the 

Government of Haiti. The Government ofHaiti is not limited under this 

Agreement in its authority to deny responsibility to, or make claims 

against, any third parties, in relation to, any loss, injury, or death caused 

by equipment or materials supplied under this agreement, or related to 

any activities under this Agreement. 

ARTICLE III IMPLEMENTATION 

The Department ofDefense shall implement this Agreement for the 

United State of America. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall 

implement this Agreement for the Government ofHaiti. 

ARTICLE IV REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES 

1. The assistance provided by the Department of Defense of the United 

States ofAmerica under this Agreement shall be fully reimbursed by the 

Government of Haiti within the time specified in paragraph 2 of this 

Article. 
LAWAND lvf!LITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 351 

2. The Comptroller of the Department of Defense of the United States 

of America shall ensure bills detailing the costs associated with the 

provision of assistance under this Agreement are submitted to the 

Central Implementation Unit of the office of the Prime Minister, of the 

Government of Haiti. A consolidated Department of Defense bill with 

supporting documentation shall be submitted on a monthly basis. The 

Government of Haiti shall ensure payment of bills in U.S. dollars to the 

Department of Defense of the United States of America, within 30 days 

after receipt of the bills submitted pursuant to this Article. 

ARTICLE V ORDERING AND RECEIPT OF EQUIPMENT, 

SUPPLIES, AND SERVICES 

1. The provision of assistance under Article I ofthis Agreement shall be 

accomplished pursuant to written support requests issued by an 

authorized Government of Haiti representative consistent with and 

incorporating by reference the terms and conditions of this Agreement. 

2. The Department of Defense of the United States of America shall in 

accordance with the terms of this Agreement, endeavor to satisfy such 

requests. As necessary, additional details regarding receipts, delivery, 

procedures, and accounting shall be agreed upon by the Parties or their 

representatives in writing prior to the delivery of any assistance. 

ARTICLE VI CONSULTATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 

1. The Parties shall meet on a regular basis, agreeable between the 

Parties, to exchange information on all questions, regarding the 

application of the Agreement. 

2. Any disputes arising under this Agreement shall be resolved through 

consultation between the Parties or their representatives and shall not be 

referred to any third party. 
352 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

3. In the event that there is continued disagreement between the Parties, 

at the request of either Party, the consultations shall be continued 

through diplomatic channels. 

4. This Agreement is prepared in both English and French. In the event 

of ambiguity between the two versions, the English version will control. 

ARTICLE VII ENTRY INTO FORCE, DURATION, AMENDMENT, 

AND TERMINATION 

I. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain 

in force for a period of two years. 

2. This Agreement may be amended or extended by the written 

Agreement ofthe Parties and may be terminated by either Party upon 30 

days written notification to the older Party. 

3. Notwithstanding the termination ofthis Agreement, the obligations of 

the Government ofHaiti, in accordance with Article II ofthis 

Agreement, and its obligations for reimbursement for support provided 

under Article IV, shall continue to apply, unless otherwise agreed to 

writing by the Parties. 

DONE at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, this 26th day ofJune 1995, in duplicate 

FOR 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

J.J. Sheehan 

General, United States Marine Corps 

Commander in Chief 

United States Atlantic Command 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHA/T/, 1994-95 353 


William Lacy Swing 

Ambassador ofthe United States ofAmerica 

To the Republic of Haiti 

FOR 

THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI 

Claudette Werleigh 

Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres 
354 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix Y: Claims Accident Standard Operating Procedure 

USE THIS SOP WHENEVER YOU ARE INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT WITH 

A HAITIAN NATIONAL OR DAMAGE CIVILIAN PROPERTY WITH YOUR 

VEHICLE 

1. Assess the danger and threat to you and the convoy, 

2. Ifcircumstances permit, stop your vehicle and signal the convoy to stop. 

3. Contact your unit headquarters immediately and inform them of the situation. 

4. Check for injuries and assess damage if any. 

5. Identify the Haitians involved, specifically the identity of any Haitian injured and 

the owner of any property damaged. 

6. Fill in the blanks (using English) on the Creole accident report form (on other 

side), sign it, and give to the Haitian involved. 

7. Complete an accident report form when you return to your unit. Iftime permits, 

enter the basic information into your vehicle log book before leaving the accident 

scene. Basic information should include date, time, location (either grid or physical 

description) and a brief description ofwhat happened. 

8. Ifyou are stopped and the situation is deteriorating, take your vehicle and leave 

the area. 

9. Ifyour vehicle is inoperable due to the accident, secure the vehicle and wait for 

help to arrive. Your vehicle is mission essential property. You may use all force 

necessary to include deadly force to protect the vehicle from theft or further 

damage. 

THIS SOP IN NO WAY CHANGES THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. YOU 

MAY TAKE ALL NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE ACTION TO DEFEND 

YOURSELF AND YOUR UNIT TO INCLUDE DEADLY FORCE. 
---------------

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------------------

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LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 355 

RAPOR ACCIDENT 

OU RESEVOIR KA TSA PASKE OU MEME OU BYEN PROPRIETE OU TE 

ANAFE NAN YON ACCIDENT A VEK MACHIN MILIT A AMERIKAN. 

T AMPRI POTE KAT SA A VEC OU SI OU VLE PROCLAME DOMAGE 

CONTRE ETAZNUL OU. 

KAP AB PRESENTE PROCLAMON OU A CHAK MADI ET VENDREDI 

MA TIN A 9:00 AM JUSKA 11 :00 AM DEVAN POTA Y INDUSTRIEL 

COMPLEX TOUPRE AEROPO PORT-AU-PRINCE. 

KAT SA PA VLE DI KE ETAZUNI, AMPLOUA YE LI, OU PATRON LI, PRAN 

RECONSABLITE POU DOMAGE KI PASE PRORIETE OU, NAN NINPOT 

FAISON DE LA LOI, LA DOUANN, REGULATION, E PRTIKLI. 

POSEDESION DE KAT SA PA GUARANTI PEYEMENT NAN NINPOT 

FASION, MIN SA SE YON INDIKASION KE PROPRIETE OU TE KAPAB 

PRAN PATINAN YOU ACCIDENT AVEK MACHIN MILTA AMERIKAN. 

FOK TOUT PROCLAMON BYEN PRESENTE E JIJ PAR COMMISIONER 

PROCLAMON ET AZUNI. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 

ON AT HOURS 

LOCATION 

U.S. DRIVER'S NAME 

U.S. DRIVER'S SIONA TURE 


UNIT UNIT PHONE NO. 

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-----

--------- ---

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------

356 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix Z: Claim Form for Claim Against the United States Forces 

Under the United Nations 

Non mou'n ki fe reklamasyon-an:______ Dat:______ 

Adre-li: Limewo telefon-li: 

lan , mwen te fe ou aksidan avek 

you machin nasyon zini. Mwen vle prezante you reklamasyon kont nasyon zini pu 

$ (dola aysyem). 

Siyati mou'n ki fe reklamasyon-an 

Claimant's Name: Date: 

Address: Phone#: 

in . I was involved in a motor 

vehicle accident with a vehicle of the United Nations. I wish to file a claim in the 

sum of$ HD. 

Claimant's Signature 

* Claimant does/does not read Creole. 

Translator: Since the claimant does not read Creole, I hereby certify that I read the 

document to the claimant before he/she signed the form. 

Translator 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 357 


Appendix AA: Executive Order 12927-0rdering the Selected 


Reserve ofthe Armed Forces to Active Duty 


September 15, 1994, 59 F.R. 47781 

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and 

the laws of the United States of America, including sections 121 and 

673b of title 10 of the United States Code, I hereby determine that it is 

necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United States for 

the effective conduct of operational missions to restore the civilian 

government in Haiti. Further, under the stated authority, I hereby 

authorize the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary ofTransportation 

with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in 

the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty any units, and any 

individual members not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of 

the Selected Reserve. 

This order is intended only to improve the internal management of 

the executive branch and is not intended to create any right or benefit, 

substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the 

United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person. 

This order is effective immediately and shall be published in the 

Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress. 

William J. Clinton 
358 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Letter to Congressional Leaders on Ordering the Selected Reserve of 

the Armed Forces to Active Duty 

Dear Mr. Speaker: 

I have today, pursuant to section 673b of title 10, United States 

Code, authorized the Secretary ofDefense, and the Secretary of 

Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating 

as a service within the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty 

any units, and any individual members not assigned to a unit organized 

to serve as a unit, ofthe Selected Reserve. The deployment of United 

States forces to conduct operational missions to restore the civilian 

government in Haiti necessitates this action. 

A copy ofthe Executive Order implementing this action is 

attached. 

Sincerely, 

William J. Clinton 

[identical letters were sent to Thomas S. Foley, Speaker ofthe House of 

Representatives, and Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate]. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 359 

Appendix BB: Responses to Survey on Equipment and Training 

Soldier Number 1 

1. What is your rank? Captain 

2. On what date did you deploy? 25 September 1994 

3. On what date did you redeploy? 22January1995 

4. On what date were you notified that you were going to deploy? 

about 25 August 1994 for sure. 

5. What personal preparations did you have to make in the time 

between notification and deployment? Update a Power ofAttorney (a 

previous POA was about to expire; check the date); standard POM 

activities--update records and shots. 

6. How did you arrive in country? Cl30 

7. What was your score on the last Army Physical Fitness Test prior to 

deployment? About 255. Do you feel you were physically ready for the 

deployment? Yes. 

8. What personal gear did you take with you? Please make your answer 

specific and complete. 1 qt canteens-2, 2qt canteens-2, rucksack-], 

ammunition pouches-2, poncho-], poncho liner-1, BDUs-4 sets, boots2 pair, socks-JO pair, underwear-JO sets, softcap-2, shelterhalf-2, wet 

weather top andpants, complete APFTuniform-2. Nonmilitary stuff 

included a camping shower (a contraption with a 5 gallon plastic bag 

and a "shower head"), baby wipes or individually wrapped towelettes, 

a large plastic bucket (for shaving and laundry), laundry detergent, 

clothes pins and 550 cord, Swiss Army knife, bug repellent, extra boot 
360 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

laces, flashlight (with extra batteries), civilian clothes -1 set, 

9. In what did you carry your personal gear? My personal gear was 

scattered throughout my rucksack and A bag. Plan to live out ofyour 

rucksackfor two weeks; so put whatever personal stuffyou'll need in it. 

Put the rest in your A bag. A two month supply should be sufficient for 

things like toiletries, etc. By then Class VI sundry packs will be 

available and the PXwill probably be open. Ifyou 're deploying with a 

later rotation, take one month worth oftoiletries. 

10. What job-related gear did you take with you? A basic load of 

manuals.forms, and office supplies. See OPLAW Handbook. A 

camerafor claims. 

11. After you had arrived in Haiti, what personal gear did you wish you 

had brought with you? A small radio or a Gameboy. 

12. What job-related gear did you wish you had brought with you? A 

military vehicle. Ifone is available, take it. 

13. Describe your workplace. Atfirst, I worked in a building on the 

airfield It was a small building about halfthe size ofsmall mobile 

home. The Brigade S-1 and the finance teams also worked out ofthis 

building. My work area was about the size ofa folding table (6' x 2 

112 '). Later, I worked in the Brigade ALOC with the SJ and S4. My 

work area was too small and eventually I moved into my own GP 

Medium. 

14. Who was/is your first line supervisor? For accountability !fell 

under the Brigade S-1; I worked directly for the Brigade XO. 

15. Who or what element was your client? A Brigade Combat Team. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 361 

16. What sort of rations did you eat for breakfast, lunch, dinner, and 

please describe whether you liked or disliked the rations. For about 

three weeks we ate 3 MREs per day. When you 're really hungry, MREs 

are tolerable. Eventually we started getting T rations. Atfirst, we got 

one hot meal per day, then we got two. By mid November we were 

eating two hot meals from a Brown and Root mess hall and an MREfor 

lunch. The T rations and Brown and Rootfood was great compared to 

MREs. Judged by normal standards, it was satisfactory. 

17. Where did you sleep most nights? Atfirst a hooch and later a GP 


Medium with other members ofthe special staffand SJ personnel. On 


what didyou sleep? Atfirst, the ground; later, a cot. 


18. When you had a need to travel by vehicle, what vehicle did you use, 

and what staff element or unit controlled the vehicle? I would use the 

vehicles controlled by the SJ section--the SJ 's, the Finance Officer's, 

etc. Was this an adequate arrangement? This was adequate, however 

life would have been simpler ifI had brought a vehicle. 

19. What modes of communication were available? Telephone (MSE) 

and tactical fax. Were they adequate? Yes. 

20. How did you reproduce documents, if necessary? Several copiers 

were available in the Brigade Headquarters. 

21. What weapon did you carry? Ml6A2 rifle. 

22. When had you last qualified with that weapon? About a year prior. 

23. In the 3 months prior to being notified of deployment, how many 

hours of common task training had you undergone? About 3. What 

tasks did you train on? NBC related tasks. 
362 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

24. In the 3 months prior to being notified of deployment, how many 

hours ofMQS training had you undergone? 0. What tasks did you train 

on? 

25. After you had deployed, which common soldier tasks did you 

perceive you needed or would like to have had training on? The only 

common task I performed was weapons maintenance and I was 

sufficiently trained on that. 

26. After you had deployed, which MQS tasks did you perceive you 

needed or would like to have had training on? 

27. Please make any general remarks that you think would assist 

someone who had to do what you have done at all stages ofthis 

deployment? 

a. At the brigade level you can get by with a minimum amount of 

equipment. Bring a computer ifyou have one and you have room. If 

you deploy with the initial forces, you won't be able to handcarry a 

computer because you 're carrying so many other things. Concentrate 

on having the rights manuals and documents. 

b. Ifyou can get one, bring a vehicle. 

c. Initially, your time will be consumed with OP LAW issues (for 

example, ROE and weapons buy back program) and logistical issues 

(local purchase ofsupplies, local labor program). Prepare andpack 

accordingly. 

d. About 2 weeks into the deployment, military justice, legal 

assistance, and claims will be your primary focus. OPLA W issues will 

still be there but not as many. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 363 

e. Do not understaff the legal section. Bring an NCO and one 

or two clerks. This will depend, ofcourse, on the size ofyour brigade. 

f As early as possible (before deployment) figure out the 

jurisdictional scheme for attached units. This will save you time later 

when military justice actions start coming in. 

Soldier Number 2 

I . What is your rank? StaffSergeant 

2. On what date did you deploy? 13 January 1995 

3. On what date did you redeploy? 4 April 1995 

4. On what date were you notified that you were going to deploy? 

Around the second week ofDecember 1994. 

5. What personal preparations did you have to make in the time 

between notification and deployment? Power ofAttorney, POM's (to 

include many pre-deployment briefings, and SHOTS!) 

6. How did you arrive in country? Civilian charter 

7. What was your score on the last army physical fitness test prior to 

deployment? 300. Do you feel you were physically ready for the 

deployment? Ready any time 

8. What personal gear did you take with you? Please make your answer 

specific and complete. Full LCE/LBE which consisted of2 1 qt 

canteens w/cups, first aidpouch, 2 ammo pouches, suspenders, gortex 

rain coat, wet weather pants, rucksack, poncho liner, poncho, mosquito 

net (A MUST!!), mosquito poles, 5 sets ofBDU's, 2 pairs ofjungle 
364 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

boots, 6 pairs ofsocks, 7 boxer shorts (in hot climate, sometimes it was 

better not to wear underwear), 2 EDU caps, 4 PT uniforms .. Actual 

personal gear included books, shaving equipment, baby wipes, laundry 

detergent, radio, many cans ofOff, two large flashlights, and many 

other misc items. 

9. In what did you carry your personal gear? The majority ofmy 

personal gear was in foot lockers that were shipped ahead ofthe 

deploying party. The rest was in my rucksack and duffel bags. 

Personnel should be prepared to live out ofthe duffel bags and 

rucksacks until the foot lockers arrive. The 10th Mountain Division 

supplied us with their foot lockers and manmade furniture once they 

left. 

10. What job-related gear did you bring with you? MCM, various 

regulations, typewriter, computer (CPU, monitor, modem ALPS 

printer), laptop computer, and various officer supplies. 

11. After you had arrived in Haiti, what personal gear did you wish you 

had brought with you? A portable T. V. and PILLOWS!! 

12. What job-related gear did you wish you had brought with you? 

Personally, I felt that we had overpacked. We inherited all the forms 

and equipment that the 10th Mountain Division left behind. Ifyou are 

deploying to replace a unit, coordinate with losing unit to find out what 

they have so you can take what they leave behind. 

13. Describe your workplace. Our legal center consisted ofone trial 

counsel (CPT J. Coakley), myself(NCOIC of3d Ede Legal Center), 

and one battalion legal specialist (SPC D. Neighbors). We had our 

own separate work tent next to the ALOC. We had more than enough 

sufficient work space. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 365 

14. Who was/is your first line supervisor? I worked directly for the 


trial counsel. For accountability purposes, the Brigade S-1. 


15. Who or what element is your client? NIA 

16. What sort ofrations did you eat for breakfast, lunch, dinner, and 


please describe whether you liked or disliked the rations. We had two 


hot meals everyday, breakfast and dinner. Lunch consisted ofMREs. 


For the environment we were in, /found the food to be very good. No 


complaints here. 


17. Where did you sleep most nights? In a GP Large. On what did you 

sleep? On a cot. 

18. When you had a need to travel by vehicle, what vehicle did you use, 

and what staff element or unit controlled the vehicle? We used the S-1 's 

and S-4's vehicle. We had no problems with transportation. 

19. What modes of communication were available? MSE Telephones 

and later during the deployment, AT&T installed commercial phones. 

Were they adequate? Communication was adequate. 

20. How did you reproduce documents, if necessary? Copiers were 

available through the Brigade S-1. 

21. What weapon did you carry? M16A2 rifle. 

22. When had you last qualified with that weapon? Two weeks prior to 

departure from Schofield Barracks. Before that, about 6 months prior. 

23. In the 3 months prior to being notified ofdeployment, how many 

~ours of common task training had you undergone? Although there were 

rumors flying all over the place about the 25th ID deploying at least 1 
366 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

112 months prior to deployment, CTT was done. What tasks did you 


train on? The majority ofCTTdone by the line units were NBC tasks. 


24. In the 3 months prior to being notified ofdeployment, how many 


hours ofMQS training had you undergone? NIA What tasks did you 


train on? NIA. 


25. After you had deployed, which common soldier tasks did you 

perceive you needed or would like to have had training on? Some ofthe 

basic Infantry skills. They looked like they were having fun 

26. After you had deployed, which MQS tasks did you perceive you 

needed or would like to have had training on? NIA. 

27. Please make any general remarks that you think would assist 

someone who had to do what you have done at all stages ofthis 

deployment. 

a. Ensure that regulations that you carry are updated. 

Deploying Legal NCO's and Legal Specialists should be somewhat 

familiar with claims. 

b. Coordinate with losing unit, ifyou are replacing one, ofwhat 

is being left behind so you don't overpack. 

c. Deploy physically fit! You won't have much time to do PT. 

The PTyou do will sustain. Because there will be periods ofboredom, 

one should make every attempt to get some kind ofPT in. 

d. Make sure you keep in touch with loved ones. Although there 

were phones available, writing is the preferred method. There were 

soldiers who were running up some astronomical phone bills because 

ofthe commercial lines available. BE SMART! 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 367 

e. Prior to deployment, ensure that coordination is done with 

your trial counsel to make sure you have everything. Take care of 

yourself, your trial counsel, and ifa legal specialist deploys with you, 

take care ofhim/her also. 

f Last but not least, STAYALERT, STAYALIVE! BE SAFE! 

Soldier Number 3 

I. What is your rank? Captain (3 yr., 9 mos TJG) 

2. On what date did you deploy? 2 Aug 95 (processed through CRC, Ft. 

Benning, GA) arrived in Haiti on 5 Aug 95. 

3. On what date did you redeploy? Scheduled to redeploy on/about 20 Jan 

96. 

4. On what date were you notified that you were going to deploy? 24 July 

1995. (I knew I would deploy, but dates fluctuated between May to 

September 1995). 

5. What personal preparations did you have to make in time between 

notification and deployment? Shots, eye glasses, (prescription sun 

glasses), dental checks, purchasing some equipment (fan, small light, 

pistol holster, additional locks, cheap tools (hammer, screwdrivers, pliers, 

etc.). Had to draw flack vest, pistol, holster & ammo pouches, magazines, 

weapons transport case (for airline flights). 

6. How did you arrive in country. Civilian (scheduled) airline flight from 

Miami. 

7. What was your score on the last Army Physical Fitness Test prior to 

deployment? 247. Not well acclimated to 24-hour/day heat & humidity. 
368 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

8. What personal gear did you take with you? Please make your answer 

specific and complete. Complete LEE (includes pistol belt, 2 1 qt canteens 

with covers & cup, 3 Ml 6 ammo pouches, compass, first aidpouch, strobe 

light, butt pack, holster, andpistol ammo pouch), 5 sets ofEDU 

(HWBDU), 2 pr boots, 4 sets PT uniform w/3 additional unit PTshirts, 8 

sets ofunderwear, laundry bag, 3 sheets, & pillow case, poncho liner, 2 

ponchos, 2 pr shower shows, 3 towels, bathing suit, 2 sets civilian clothes, 

miscellaneous items, (clock radio, light, fan, night light, books, reading 

materials, electrical extension cords and three-prong adapters). 

9. In what did you carry your personal gear? Two duffel bags and 1 

rucksack. 

10. What job-related gear did you take with you? Deployment library, in 

two footlockers and a metal fieldfile. This deployment library was heavily 

weighted toward ADLA W (fiscal law, contracting and international 

agreements), legal assistance, and claims. Deployed with one laptop (IBM 

compatible), 386CPU, 1 Megabyte ofRAM, 40 Megabyte hard disk, 

internal 3.5"jloppy drive, internal modem (2400 bps). This laptop had the 

following software loaded (Enable 4.0, WordPerfect 5.1, Harvard 

Graphics 3.2, LAA WS, calendar creator, andADLA W tracking software). 

NOTE: Theater standard is MSO.ffice (MSWord, Powerpoint, etc). on 486 

orpentium machines, and laser printers. Thus, I am able to utilize the 

computerized files (AD LAWand OPLA W items) I brought with me, but 

cannot interface very well with items in theater. Also have 1995 OPLAW 

handbook. Brought my personal copy ofthe NavyJAGMAN. 

11. After you had arrived in Haiti, what personal gear did you wish you 

had brought with you? Mask, fins, snorkel; calculator, more sets of 

underwear (t-shirts & green/black socks), pillow, more uniforms. The 

uniform issue is directly related to laundry, The contractor is very hard 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 369 

on uniforms. Any time you leave the compound, heat, dust, and the highly 

unsanitary conditions requires that you break out a clean uniform. 

Uniforms only can be worn for two days anyway. 

12. What job-related gear (equipment, field table paper, fonns, etc.,) did 

you wish you had brought with you? AFI on Non-Judicial Punishment & 

forms {Art 15), Navy/USMC Art 15 forms, numbers for the USAF USN & 

USMC OTJAG equivalents (Numbers in the OPLA W Handbook are a 

good start). More supplies: binders, disks, backup media, calculators, 

etc. 

13. Describe your workplace. Located in building #28, Light Industrial 

Complex, Port-au-Prince. The LIC is a light manufacturing/warehouse 

complex. All buildings are concrete walls with corrugated steel roofing. 

This is the current JOC (Joint Operations Center). Approx. 300 sq. ft. 

Currently open-air, in the process ofinstalling air-conditioning. We have 

five desks, two tables (one for the copier-single pagefield copier), and one 

for a computer/printer center. We also have one five-drawer filing 

cabinet, afield safe.four bookcases, andfivefootlockerslstorage boxes. 

Located near the Ji, CJD, EEO andJG sections, but all other J staff 

elements are in the building within 2-3 minutes walking distance. 

14. Who was/is your first line supervisor? ChiefofStaffUS Forces Haiti 

(LTC). 

15. Who or what element is your client? Primary client is the US Support 

Group, Haiti. This is a green hat, FID type mission (heavy engineering, 

medical teams and aviation). Similar in nature the operations we 

conducted in Honduras during the 1980s. SPTGP only has about 250 

PAXright now. Most ofmy work is in support US Forces Haiti and 

UNMIH. 

16. What sort ofrations did you eat for breakfast, lunch, dinner, and please 

describe whether you liked or dislike the rations. We eat hot A 's three 
370 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

times a day. Variety is pretty good The food service is provided by a 

contractor (also provides food to cruise lines). Food is good, but not 

really in sync with current nutritional trends (high calorie, high fat, lots of 

red meat, eggs, etc.). 

17. Where did you sleep most nights? About one-third ofthe personnel 

sleep in air-conditioned USAF tents inside a warehouse. The rest sleep in 

wooden cubicles on the warehouse floor. Small, but generally provides 

some privacy. Male &female personnel are intermixed On what didyou 

sleep? Cots with mosquito netting. 

18. When you had a need to travel by vehicle, what vehicle did you use? 

We have one CUCVassigned to OSJA. It's equipped with a VRC-46 radio. 

Most ofthe staffvehicles are old CUCVs or M880s (Pick-up trucks). 

19. What modes of communication were available? We have commercial 

system with prior approval. Regular mail is slow, especially for packages. 

Letters arrive in three to 21 days. (rime difference depends on the senders 

location in relation to a major postal hub. Letters arrive from NYstate 

within three days, (all mails comes via NY( 7-10for Ft Hood or Ft. Polk. 

We have DSN Fax capability as well as incoming commercial fax lines. 

(Message Center) We also rely heavily on e-mail and the 

www/INTERNET. Most effective and important means ofcommunication 

is e-mail. We have become quite adept at using WWA.flCS/message traffic. 

It is as effective as e-mail and allows us to reach commanders andJAG 

officers world-wide. NOTE on E-mail: Many ofthe e-mail addresses in 

the JA GC directory are tied to a certain individual. When those people 

PCS, their accounts are terminated or left unused Almost impossible to 

communicate via e-mail knowing the e-mail address first. This is a major 

deficiency in the stud book. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITL 1994-95 371 


20. How did you reproduce document, ifnecessary? We have a single 

page, field copier in the SJA office. Also have access to at least five highspeed, professional copiers within the JOC. 

21. What weapon did you cany? I carried a M9, 9mm Pistol, 15 rds of 

ammo, a large pepper spray and a combat knife. NOTE: I have ordered a 

concealed holster for my pistol. We are required to be armed at all times 

outside ofthe compounds. I frequently travel to the embassy, the Haitian 

Foreign Ministry, courts and other public buildings where I am armed but 

must conceal the weapons. 

22. When had you last qualified with that weapon? April 1995. 

23. In the 3 months prior to being notified ofdeployment, how many house 

ofcommon task training had you undergone? NONE What tasks did you 

train on? NIA 

24. In the 3 months prior to being notified of deployment, how many 


hours ofMQS training had you undergone? What tasks did you train 


on? 


25. After you have deployed, which common soldier tasks did you ­

perceive you needed or would like to have had train on? First Aid We 

often come upon situations that require us to render first aid to Haitian 

civilians. Also could have used some refresher training on 

PMCS/maintenance procedures andforms. 

26. After you had deployed, which MQS tasks did you perceive you need 

or would like to have had training on? 

27. Please make any general remarks that you think would assist someone 

who had to do what you have done at all stages ofthis deployment? 

Augmentees must be especially proactive during all phases oftheir 

deployment. Special attention must be paid to POR/SRP, finance, 
372 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

deployment equipment & library, personal equipment and CIF. Individual 

replacements carry a much larger percentage oftheir deployment 

readiness on their own shoulders. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 373 


Appendix CC: Extract ofEvents Recorded in SJA Section Log ofthe 

19 Sep 94 

2230 hrs 

20 Sep 94 

0700 hrs 

1700 hrs 

10th Mountain Division (LI) 

Arrived at PAP Int'l Airport. Warner and 

Wishard 

Retired for the evening on floor of airport. No 

supplies, no nothing -- only what's in the ruck. 

A woke at PAP Int'l ... Scramble to make 

some order. 

Located 16th MP Bde Legal Advisor (CPT 

Erisman), XVIII AB Corps Ops Law JA 

(MAJ Kyle Smith), and XVIII AB Corps 

Contracting Attorney (Mike Larson). Made 

contact with lst Bde Legal Advisor (CPT 

Valentino) and Aviation Bde Legal Advisor 

CPT Barrett). With JAs coming from all over, 

need to arrange for meeting place, if at all 

possible, before the operation. One of first 

priorities: Establish commo with SJA on the 

ground. 

Moved to industrial complex about 1/2 miles 

from airport gate. Spent night in abandoned 

warehouse. No power/facilities. Digging slit 

trenches; looking for water. Set up our table 

at Combined JTF Joint Operations Center 

(JOC). SOPs with JA participation are nice, 

but, in reality, you have to fight for a seat at 

the table. 
374 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


21 Sep 94 Set up SJA shop in JOC. Warner at PAP Int'l 

for 0700 hrs meetings. 

1100 hrs Printed 400 ROE cards for 16th MP Bde. 

1400 hrs 

They were coming under forced entry 

scenario; need our ROE cards. Have a feeling 

we will never have enough ROE cards. 

CPT Erisman visits, and MAJ Smith departs 

with him for tour of 16th MP Bde work area. 

You have to get out, especially in early stages 

or legal issues will pass right over top of you. 

1500 hrs CPT Valentino arrives at JOC. He is looking 

for Warner on answers to ROE questions re: 

force used against F AdH when they use 

excessive force in their police activities. 

Warner to address issue to ACOM. 

1700 hrs MAJ Smith departs for CONUS. Larsen stays 

behind until MAJ Lara arrives. You've got to 

have a deployable deployment contracts JA; a 

top priority for a deployable division. We 

arranged for MAJ Lara from 3rd Army but 

we've got to have our own trained---one who 

can deploy! 

2100 hrs Issue: TF Black is at Camp D'Application. 

They want to count heavy weapons (V-150s, 

Artillery, AA guns). IfFAdH does not 

cooperate, can US forces use force to do the 

count? Wishard opines that, based on the 

ROE, the lack of a disarmament policy, 

and the F AdH cooperating with US forces, we 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITl 1994-95 375 

2300 hrs 

22 Sep 94 

0100 hrs 

0800 hrs 

1040 hrs 

1115hrs 

should not use force to count the heavy 

weapons. Instead, monitor the area for 

movement and negotiate through diplomatic 

channels. 

Wishard retired for night. Warner did not 

return from PAP airport. 

Warner returns from PAP Int'l; 

Departing again at 0600 hrs. Most ofminuteto-minute action (the DTAC ifyou will) is still 

at the airport. Letter of instructions for SJA 

personnel while he is gone is issued. 

McNulty meets with SGM Spears regarding 

obtaining vehicles from port. SJA party 

departs for port to locate vehicle. 

Warner closed out legal operations at PAP 

Int'l and returned to JOC. Talked to COL 

Altenburg to keep SPC Teeple; if you can ID 

good people and have support from above to 

keep them, life becomes much easier. Best 

SPC in the US Army! 

Future Issue from Valentino: Can we keep the 

FAdH out ofthe port? LTC Sullivan did that 

the first day and wants to continue this. This 

is not an issue yet, but may become one before 

15 Oct. 
376 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

1500 hrs 	 Barrett reported aviation accident and had a 


question about reviewing authority for 


investigation. Also, Barrett briefed on ROE 


changes. 


1530 hrs 	 Prepared additional ROE scenarios to match 

ROE changes regarding stopping serious 

criminal acts. Vignette training was a major 

league success story; we have to keep 

generating vignettes for ROE changes; troops 

are used to learning via that method--highly 

effective. Prepped for CG brief at 1700 hrs. 

1745 hrs 	 Warner gave 1700 update brief on 21 Sep 94 

ROE card. 

23 Sep 94 Received request from BG Close for legal 

review on 0010 hrs request to impose curfew 

over industrial park for force protection -­

restricting Haitians. Nonconcurred under 

circumstances: not a US installation or 

occupying force. Don't want to give ammo to 

those who would like to impose on us 

"occupying force" status. Need to negotiate 

with landlord for curfew based on protecting 

innocent Haitians from injury. Ifnot 

successful, negotiate through diplomatic 

channels; it appears the LIC is actually Haitian 

Government property leased to private 

concerns. 

0700 hrs 	 Attended 0700 staff update to CG. More 

(always more) ROE cards needed per Cots. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 377 


0805 hrs 

0815 hrs 

0900 hrs 

1030 hrs 

1300 hrs 

1430 hrs 

1500 hrs 

Valentino called. Issue: kicking F AdH 

security force out of airport. Ist Bde Cdr 

needs answer ASAP. 

Issue: CMOC states that US flag raised over 

Bowen airfield. No legal implications. This is 

causing a stir among the local populace. 

Suggest lowering flag and placing it within the 

compound in a less conspicuous location. 

General POA for PVT Johnson. Noted that 

LAAWS program POA program does not 

work with Canon BJ-IO. Tried to fix and 

made hard copy blanks on Enable for backup. 

ROE cards at USS Whitney, and arriving in 

afternoon per XVIII Corps SJA. Using all 

possible resources to print: USS Whitney 

presses, psyops printers from Bragg, and 

sending contractors downtown to see if they 

can find any printers still in business. 

ROE cards being flown in from USS Whitney 

at 1500 hrs. Arranging for vehicle for pickup. 

Contacted Drum SJA office. Determined that 

they and Bde enroute received new ROE 

cards before flying. 

Main body SJA office arrives (MAJ Gordon, 

MAJ Lara, CPT DeWoskin, CPT Bullard, 

CPT Lorusso, MSG Mitchell, SSG Peterson). 

It's good to see 'em. SJA, Ops Law, Bde 
378 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


1600 hrs 

1630 hrs 

1700 hrs 

1830 hrs 

Legal Advisor, a legal NCO, and a great SPC 

can handle anything for awhile, but now we 

can move out. 

Received ROE cards from the USS Whitney. 

Distributing them to units. All SJA personnel 

now atJOC. 

Issue: CMOC/J3 has funding issue under 

Title 10, USC regarding funding HCA 

programs. CPT De W oskin tasked to work 

with MAJ Friedman (G5) on issue. I see the 

HCA piece, by itself, becoming full time JA 

job in this operation. 

Prepared draft GOMOR for CG signature 

regarding disrespect to CSM Laye. We 

should have prepared fill in the blank forms on 

the computer for stuff like this beforehand. 

CMOC presented numerous issues regarding 

PVO/NGO requests for military assistance. 

Most were no-gos based on common sense 

objections (wanting flights and vehicles for 

trips to countryside when we cannot get troops 

from PAP Int'l to our compound) and no 

exceptional need stated to require military 

assistance. Need to monitor CMOC closely. 

Guys, this is a "give an inch and they will take 

a mile" situation. CMOC will continue to 

push hard to do everything asked of them -­

they see it as their mission. We have to play it 

by the book. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 379 

2100 hrs 

2130 hrs 

2200 hrs 

2215 hrs 

ICRC request for meeting with chief legal 

advisor to JTF Cdr. Informed COL 

Altenburg, faxed a copy, and asked him for 

guidance. We need to be there due to our long 

term status. Awaiting answer from MAJ 

Smith. 

S4 from COSCOM reported numerous units 

taking over buildings at airport without proper 

lease negotiated. We are not in combat 

situation, so they say. Cannot take what you 

need. Need to put word out at 0700 hrs and 

1700 hrs briefing on the subject. Anticipate a 

claims nightmare. 

Advised Cots and CG that COL Gaddis/CSA 

and COL Altenburg/L TG Shelton have our 

ROE scenarios. 

Big potential problems regarding command 

influence on accidental discharges: "I'll give a 

FG 15 to next occurrence, etc." Getting word 

out on how to warn of maximums without 

crossing the line. Same with uniform 

violations (flak vests, Kevlar mandatory wear 

at all times), disrespect in tough situations. 

We've talked command influence in garrison 

til we were blue in the face, but we have to 

continue preaching, especially now when 

times are tough, tempers are short, and 

disciplinary problems need immediate 

attention. 
380 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


24 Sep 94 

0800 hrs 

0845 hrs 

1015 hrs 

1100 hrs 

700 hour update info passed out at SJA 

meeting on hostile fire pay, SECDEF and 

CARICOM Bn Cdr/MG Byron visit, 

President's call, weather, opposition activities, 

mail, etc. MSG Mitchell working on life 

support, obtaining vehicles, and finding our 

CONEX. As we surmised, the first week of 

legal operations will be conducted out of your 

rucksack. 

CPT Becker (525th Ml) arrived in PAP 

220615 Sep 94 and is attached to MI Task 

Force located in industrial complex. Issues: 

continue to disseminate and issue ROE cards 

dated 21 Sep 94 and GO #1, service contract 

with Haitian nationals, CI use of candy and 

tobacco to establish rapport with populace, 

and vetting/documentation exploitation at 

archives. (We've got to prohibit soldiers from 

throwing candy from vehicles; this quickly 

provokes fights for food and endangers those 

who stampede a moving vehicle for food. 

Claims issue.) 

CPT Barrett/PFC Carter received info from 

0800 SJA meeting. Issues: request for fulltime TDS attorney, request for additional ROE 

cards. Need an additional 300 cards. 

ROE question: Can we use deadly force to 

stop a vehicle approaching a checkpoint? 

Security points are authorized. Deadly force 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 381 


1100 hrs 

1130 hrs 

1155 hrs 

1157 hrs 

is authorized to disable vehicles endangering 

personnel at these checkpoints. 

MAJ Gordon attended daily CMOC briefing. 

Primary emphasis on CMOC flow. CMOC is 

developing to where we need a dedicated JA 

to keep legal control. 

Contacted MAJ Woods at ACOM. Issue: 

Confiscating military weapons being taken 

past checkpoint at port. ACOM says we can 

confiscate military weapons going through 

checkpoint unless 1) military purpose shown; 

2) ownership by FAdH confirmed. We will 

hold them for legitimate GOH for release. 

Military (automatic) weapons are assumed to 

be offensive. ACOM also sending a copy of 

Carter Agreement. No SOF NSOMA yet with 

legitimate GOH. 

Confirmed that weapons at port are owned by 

F AdH, and is a legitimate movement of 

weapons. One of the top F AdH port security 

people conforms this report. Small automatic 

weapons can be released through checkpoint. 

Large weapons (AA guns) not released 

because a threat to our air security. 

CPT Erisman/SGT Peoples checked in. 

Typed up ROE vignettes and left copies with 

SJA. Issue: GOMOR for unlawful weapon 

discharge in clearing barrel? 
382 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

1400 hrs 	 Issue: J 5 Plans had question regarding 


weapons buyback program. What is the 


punishment under Haitian law for having an 


unregistered weapon? 


2040 hr 	 CG mini-brief. Issue on arms at Port where 

US soldiers at checkpoint were confronted 

with port security trying to move 14 Ml 

Garands and two AA guns. Eventually 

allowed to move the Garands upon credential 

check and port security chief (trusted) 

vouched. AA guns did not go thru the 

checkpoint, per MAJ Hagg, G-3 Ops. 

2145 hrs 	 LTC Harrington (CMOC) had question 

regarding the distribution of medical supplies 

to local hospitals. 

2315 hrs 	 Previous entry: Must watch these requests for 

legal review prior to normal staffing. Only 

then can we give full, efficient, timely legal 

review. Provided CMOC requester with 

written summary of Title 10 provisions and 

normal staffing guidance. Gave response to 

above question to COL Geiger. In future 

operations, this Title 10 guidance must be 

written up in advance, distributed, and made 

part of civil affairs training with civil affairs 

attorneys actively involved; at times it seems 

we are in an adversarial relationship with our 

own (i.e., JTF Reservist folks). 

2320 hrs 	 Reports coming in ofWIA-Navy Seaman-Cap 

Haiti en. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 383 


25 Sep 1994 

0500 

0630 hrs 

0800 hrs 

0815 hrs 

0830 hrs 

Heavy rains begin. Possible hurricane. We 

need to be ready for disaster relief operations 

on top ofnormal mission. 

Reports on Navy linguist in Cap Haitien 

injured, with our response to the violence by 

force. Report of eight (8) Haitian national 

casualties. 

Wishard attends TF Black meeting. No 

issues, just a face-to-face with JTF staff 

counterparts. Informed COL Knight that we 

have been in contact with CPT Jim Patterson, 

his JA, on a daily basis. 

Gave COL Knight 400 ROE cards for TF 

Black. 

Reviewed CALL report on ROE. Agreed that 

ROE cards coming from XVIII AB Corps too 

complicated for soldiers to quickly read and 

understand. Also stated that parallel planning 

for operations needs to be closely coordinated, 

especially in the area of ROE, when parallel 

operation plans could stand alone or follow 

initial entry/sequel format. Made 

recommended changes to CALL report, gave 

them a copy of all ROE cards, and returned to 

CALL representative. 
384 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

1035 hrs 	 LTC Herrington (CMOC) came by, introduced 

his JA (L TC Hill), and picked up two actions 

he gave us the previous night. Told him he 

needed to run all actions through the staff, 

then to us for review, then to CofS and CG. 

This is highly important; there are lawyers 

working CA missions with the CMOC. They 

can be a valuable resource, but they cannot 

give final decision legal advice to the CMOC 

and the command; that must remain the JTF 

SJA function. 

1115 hrs 	 UN Observers from New Zealand want issued 

general CIF, weapons, flak vests, and kevlars. 

No legal objection, although told them they 

need to run through CofS for approval. May 

need to check their weapons qualification for 

weapons issue. Lets look closely at this 

further. 

1230 hrs 	 CPT Erisman, TC for 16th MP Bde (Airborne) 

checked-in. Called the Mount Whitney, and 

talked to COL{P) Altenburg and MAJ Smith. 

Got a copy of the Carter Agreement and got 

information on the shootings. Phone number 

at the 16th is 461-7301. No pending MP legal 

issues. 

1235 hrs 	 LTC Warner, CPT Lorusso, CPT Bullard and 

SGT McNulty convoyed to the U.S. Embassy 

to attend attended MG Meade's meeting in the 

embassy compound. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 385 

1335 hrs 

1540 hrs 

1550 hrs 

OC/J-3 Civil Affairs (CPT Henderson) 

question re: treatment oflocal girl injured 

when helicopter gust blew her to ground, 

breaking her leg and receiving cuts and 

scrapes. She was flown to the USS Comfort 

for treatment. Issue: Is it legal to treat her? 

Question moot now since we treated her. If 

emergency situation, we should treat her. 

However, advised that we should arrange with 

local hospital for treatment ofinjured civilians 

so we don't set a precedent oftreating all 

civilians injured by us when not an 

emergency. ************POTENTIAL 

CL.Allv1************* 

525th MI (CPT Becker) At issue is whether 

there is a JTF policy which provides for US 

protection of Haitian Nationals who cooperate 

with US forces and fear FRAPH retaliation. A 

525 CI agent was approached today by a 

Haitian who provided information and 

requested protection. 525 response was to 

turn the Haitian over to the MPs. As 

HUMINT collection continues this issue will 

likely resurface. Suggested providing 

informants with number to call for assistance 

ifretaliation effort detected. 

Issue: CMOC needs opinion on distributing 

food not eaten by soldiers at the future dining 

facility and giving to a PVO/NGOs to 

distribute to the Haitians. Also, having 

soldiers put unused MRE excess packets in 

box and turning over to PVO/NGOs to 
386 

1600 hrs 

1945 hrs 

2140 hrs 

26 Sep 94 

0105 hrs 

0615 hrs 

0650 hrs 

CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERA TIO NS 

distribute. Wishard opined no legal objection. 

Advised that they needed to get approval from 

command. 

Wishard attended Targeting Cell. Issue 

regarding targeting church for PSYOP 

purposes where FRAPH have frequent 

meetings. No legal objection for PSYOP 

purposes. 

COSCOM requests we equip UN observers 

with TA-50, kevlars, 9mm weapons, and 

ammunition. Need to coordinate with 

USACOM JA on issue tomorrow as to UN 

support requirements. 

Spoke with COL Altenburg on USS Whitney. 

He seems to think there is a problem giving 

weapons to UN personnel. Will research and 

clarify tomorrow 

MAJ Lara reviews letter contract for ice 

delivery to JTF. 

Further research determines answer on 

providing weapons, TA-50, ammo, etc. to UN 

force observers. Cannot provide this aid to 

them. 

UPDATE: SJA spoke to brother at Pentagon 

who says a formal agreement has been 

reached between State and Congress under 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 387 


0825 hrs 

0900 hrs 

0945 hrs 

607 ofForeign Assistance Act to allow UN 

. supply on reimbursable basis--operational 

supplies and ammo (no mention ofweapons). 

However, an LOA (Ltr ofAssist) must be 

received specifying the support and details. 

Passed to MAJ Early and L TC Weiss at 0800 

for further coordination with ACOM J-4. 

CPT Erisman and SGT Peoples checked-in. 

Sought clarification on the accidental 

discharge issue and whether or not 10th Mtn 

will handle as JTF HQ as opposed to lower 

unit handling. All are sensitive to the 

command influence issue. Conducting a ton 

ofROE training to the MPs, as it applies to 

their ongoing missions. 

MSG Mitchell, SSG Peterson, SSG Fisher, 

SGT McNulty and SPC Jennings down loaded 

SJA milvan, brought supplies and equipment 

to both the JTF HQ and JTF billets. SGT 

McNulty also put together HQ 61 commo and 

performed a PMCS and function check on 

radio, everything is in working condition. 

CPT De Woskin and CPT Lorusso returned 

from CMOC JAGCAP. Went to look at land 

that we are leasing from a local landowner. 

Talked to his security man. He informed us 

that the people using the land for farming 

understand that our forces are going to be 

moving on to the land. The security man 

allows the people to use the property for 
388 

1035 

1245 hrs 

1246 hrs 

CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

crops, the "farmers" then give him some food 

if they have a good harvest. Ifthere is a poor 

harvest, no food is given. None of the people 

expressed an interest in obtaining 

compensation. The people were very friendly 

and appeared to be truly happy with, as they 

said, our "liberation." 

SJA "off duty" (yeh, right) personnel now 

walking around the compound handing out 

ROE cards to soldiers and posing scenarios 

for appropriate action. Need to expand this 

program; gives SJA a much better idea on 

what needs to be tweaked as to ROS, soldier 

understanding, unit training on ROE, etc. -­

especially those non-I 0th units. Possession of 

cards was spotty but knowledge was . . impressive. 

Answer from MAJ Garcia from JPOTF LNO: 

if we provide the paper, PSYOP will print the 

ROE cards for us. SJA called MAJ Nepper 

and has him shipping down several boxes of 

cardstock for the inevitable change in cards. 

1 LT Haynes from 2-14 Inf Bn had one legal 

assistance issue and one criminal justice issue. 

Soldier under temporary court order for 

support of children and wife pending divorce. 

Ordered to pay approx. $1100.00 a month. 

Unclear whether he was notified ofpending 

court action or not. May have a SSCRA 

action. Command wanted to know what to do 

with him. Advised it was their call whether to 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHAITI, 1994-95 389 


1330 hrs 

send him back to attempt to attack the order. 

Apparently soldier is substandard and is not 

currently performing his job in country 

anyway. He is also being investigated for 

fraud. Apparently his wife and children left 

quarters. The soldier stayed on and moved his 

girlfriend in with him. CPT O'Brien was 

aware of before deployment and CID is 

involved. Second issue: JTF soldier threw 

down his weapon and left his fighting position. 

Said that he didn't want to play anymore. 

NCO's told him to go back to his position, he 

said no. CO talked to him about UCMJ, etc. 

and told him to drink some water, rest awhile 

and think about it and go back to his position. 

Soldier refused. CO ordered him to go back 

to his position. Soldier refused. CMD 

looking at CM. Conditions are real tough; 

heat is getting to people; expect this type of 

disciplinary problem. 

CPT Wishard, CPT Lorusso, MSG Mitchell, 

SSG Peterson, SGT McNulty and SPC Teeple 

convoyed to the dock to locate the 18th Abn. 

Corps vehicle and to investigate a potential 

claim. The vehicle has not yet been unloaded 

from the ship, but it should be available at 

0800 on 27 SEP 94. The claim at issue was 

that a soldier hit a Haitian civilian's vehicle. 

We looked for the 7th Transportation Group 

71 D to discuss the matter, but were unable to 

locate him. 
390 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

1345 hrs 	 COL Altenburg OKs provision ofweapons, 

ammo, TA-50 to UN observers but not 

international police monitors and MNF Bns, 

who should be coming with their own. Passed 

to J3 and J4 on written memo. 

27 Sep 94 

0115 hrs 	 CMOC issue: Two locals at front ofgate at 

PAP airport fearing for their lives to go home 

because ofretaliation from neighbors. Can we 

provide protection from Ms, etc? Answer is 

no. Our mission does not include providing 

personal protection for the populace. Those 

fearing imminent danger can be temporarily 

protected and turned over to Haitian 

authorities. In this case, the threat is not 

imminent. Report to Haitian authorities and 

give locals numbers to contact us in case of 

emergency. 

0630 	 Darnell from ISSO needs legal assistance on 

schooling tuition recovery. CPT Lorusso to 

handle. 

0700 	 Update. Cite Soleil now off limits due to 

attempts there to confront soldiers to see how 

we will react. Received blue ROE cards from 

Drum. CMOC has received guidance on 

humanitarian assistance from ACOM--way 

beyond abilities and into nationbuilding vs. 

mission enhancement. Buyback program 

(weapons) starts today. Cedras told by XVIII 

to police the 30th demonstration. New task 
LAWANDWLITARYOPERATIONSINHAIT/, 1994-95 391 


0900 hrs 

1125 hrs 

1350 hrs 

organization effective 1800 today. Internal 


security becoming a problem. 1100 


teleconference today. 


CPT Becker (525 MI): At issue is whether CI 

agents may seize film from Haitian nationals 

when there is reasonable suspicion that film 

contains photos of US activities which 

threaten US security, considering the mission 

we have. Proposed answer: Yes, reasonable 

force may be used to detain and question 

persons suspected of collecting intelligence on 

US activities. Reasonable force may also be 

used to seize film which we believe to contain 

photos of US activities which compromise US 

security. A second issue is whether Task 

Force CI agents may enter FRAPH, FADH, 

and police HQs. I have briefed commanders 

that absent hostilities ...at this time and with 

this mission ... CI agents may enter FRAPH, 

FADH, and police HQs only with consent of 

occupants. 

In last hour: XVIII SJA gave a NO GO on 

arming AMC and other civilians due to lack of 

SOFA and possible criminal sanctions by 

GOH. 

CMOC hit us up again for "what 10 U.S.C. 

Section 940 says?" Watch out for forum 

shopping by those wanting to push CA affair 

past permissible limits. 
392 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

1400 hrs 	 At approximately 1245, went with LTC Hill, 

CMOC, to discuss setting up of 14 Dining 

Facility at a building we have not yet leased. 

Talked to COL Boucard, Director SONAPI 

(Societe Nationale Des Pares lndustriels). 

Received approval to use the property. Upon 

going down to property, we discovered that 

people were living on the property. They 

were paying rent up until four years ago. 

They have continued to live there even though 

they were no longer paying rent. They appear 

to be very friendly and cooperative. Need to 

determine the best course of action in 

removing the locals from the property. 

Numerous options are available. Need to 

come to closure today. 

1410 hrs 	 Call from MAJ Warner at FORSCOM. First, 

spoke with him on general issues concerning 

civil affairs/humanitarian assistance to provide 

security (via mission) and creeping into nation 

building. Certain rudimentary things we can 

do (dig wells, simple structures, etc.). In a 

nutshell, no "nation building" programs until 

Congress and DOS OK it. We have HCA 

programs in existence via DOS, and 

coordinate requests through embassy. Told 

him we were on line with this. Second, he 

says ICIT AP may request for us to build them 

structures. We will keep an eye out for this 

request. They should go through their own 

DOJ channels. Third, on weapons buy back, 

he suggests finding a way to have us not take 

control ofthe weapons permanently, but to 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/TL 1994-95 393 


1800 hrs 

2100 hrs 

28 September 1994 

0745 hrs 

0930 hrs 

hold them temporarily for legitimate GOH. I 

told him I thought we were doing this already. 

Fourth, he stated that we should get letter of 

agreements from UN for reimbursement on 

supplying UN observers with uniforms, 

weapons, ammo, etc. Told him we were 

doing this already. Gave me POC at UN 

(Maurice Deprez) for letter of agreement OK. 

He is assisting us by looking up 10 U.S.C. 

Section 940, cited by CMOC on recent issue. 

(Wishard) 

First USA TODAY (first newspaper!) arrives 

in CJTF SJA office. (DeWoskin) 

LTC Warner hair is cut by Teeple ... go 

ahead and laugh now. This (haircutting) is 

something you have to plan for in advance .. 

. attention to detail. (Mitchell) 

SJA drafts memo to CMOC/HACC and 14 re: 

nation building activities and the need for 

LOA from UN (Wishard). 

Coordinated with SSG Williams, J-1, 

regarding interpreters missing from Task 

Force Mountain. Apparently there is a 

systemic problem with interpreters. He is 

trying to track the interpreters to units now 

and will inform when he finds them. Next 

time, it would be nice to find at least one 

good, solid interpreter in advance and have the 

interpreter deploy with the SJ A office; 
394 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


1020 hrs 

1145 hrs 

1205 hrs 

1500 hrs 

1515 hrs 

otherwise, you have to compete with a lot of 

people for the talent. 

COL Altenburg arrived for SJA visit. Spoke 

to all JAs and 71Ds in the JOA. Briefed 

that,for this week and possibly next, all civil 

affairs/CMOC/HACC matters directly related 

to maintaining civil order and force protection, 

and can be approved. This will change as 

things stabilize and NGO/PVOs arrived in 

JOA. 

LTC Godfrey (JTF Surgeon) has two 

questions: 1) Can we provide medical 

treatment to the Ambassador's official staff? 

2) Can we provide medical treatment to the 

Ambassador's personal staff? These are issues 

which, in future, we must anticipate in 

advance and get readouts on early. 

SJA to attend country brief at the embassy 

tomorrow. Time TBD. 

Reported gunfire in area of JAs at USAIDS 

compound. (Lorusso) 

CMOC issue: PVO/NGO needs 

transportation to move 57 tons of relief 

supplies from PAP to Cap Haitien. No legal 

objection if transportation available. CMOC 

issue: relief ship now docked at port. Haitian 

customs going through ship to inspect. Can 

we get waiver from Haitian customs? No, we 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 395 


1630 hrs 

must follow Haitian law. Only waiver can be 

made through diplomatic channels. Would 

only request waiver in emergency situation or 

if any sort of custom duty seems excessive. 

CPT Becker (525 MI): At issue is whether 

US forces may treat seriously injured Haitian 

civilians. The short answer is yes. US forces 

may provide first aid to seriously injured 

Haitian civilians, and evacuate them to the 

nearest hospital. Here, a CI team discovered a 

12 year old Haitian boy who they initially 

treated as a heat casualty before being told he 

had been run over by a truck. Next, they 

evacuated him to a MASH unit at PAP. 

Finally, they notified the child's family. The 

boy was diagnosed as having broken ribs and 

a punctured lung. He will be returned home in 

a couple of days. A second issue is whether 

Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF) may be 

used to purchase a television, Bearcat 

Scanner, radios, newspapers, magazines, etc. 

for open source collection. The short answer 

is yes. AR 3 81-141 governs expenditure of 

ICF. Paragraph 1-5 establishes base guidance. 

A final issue is whether CI agents may search 

a vehicle when driver has consented to search. 

Answer: Yes, as in criminal procedure, 

consent cures an otherwise unjustified search. 

SJA back from ICRC meeting with COL 

Altenburg, Mr. Dolan, SJA, Ms. Gros, and 

1930 
2145 

396 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


1955 


Cedric Piralla. Discussed our mission and 

they discussed theirs. Concerned about quick 

commo with us. SJA will be POC. Mr. Dolan 

provided radio and frequencies to SJA which 

ICRC will use as necessary. They were 

concerned about barbed wire strung thru Red 

Cross Bldg near the legislative palace for 

security and funneling crowds towards that 

operation. I promised correction and briefed it 

at 1700 update. Same thing with isolated 

incident where troops went into a local 

hospital, causing quite a stir. New office of 

ICRC being set up at Rue Louissaint #8 in 

Bourdon, P AP--#45 64 66. Will need to visit 

soon and check up on the security situation at 

the Parliament. Mr. Amar, high level ICRC 

official, coming 14 and 15 October--we need 

to set up a meeting with BG Ryneska. 

Advised MAJ John Brown, CMOC, to write 

up letter for ship captain holding food 

shipment in bay--from the commander at the 

port---saying OK to land and we'll protect 

from port thugs charging a fee. Give a NLO 

when it is drafted. 

Received report from Corps SJA of possible 

human rights violation at F AdH compound in 

Les Cayes--40 prisoners in extremely poor 

condition, to include man with skin ripped off 

his back and showing bare bones. B 5 l 9th MI 

reported. BG Potter apparently has visited the 

site or will do so tomorrow; JSOTF personnel 

here say a medical team is heading there 
LAWANDA11LITARYOPERATIONSINHAITL 1994-95 397 


2335 hrs 

29 September 1994 

0040 

0735 hrs 

tomorrow to assist. Attempts made thru COL 

Larue at HACC to contact ICRC to report this 

incident. He will attempt contact on Haitian 

telephone and return with status. Otherwise, 

will visit ICRC tomorrow with information. 

KKW 

COL Larue to pick SJA up in the AM for a 

morning meeting with Mr. Crandall of USAID 

at Crandall's home. 

Received two taskers from J3. One regarding 

transporting injured child's father in a military 

vehicle so he can greet son at PAP. The other 

requesting transportation for 57 tons offood 

supplies for HACC. 

SJA produced info paper on use of deadly 

force for crowd control for C/S. Laid out 

when DF authorized in such situations--copy 

to archives. Issue: 3 lines in the sand concept 

by CG and ADC-0. MAJ Gordon needs to 

honcho in morning. 

CPT Roston from J-2 had questions about 

whether individual soldiers can provide food 

and water to Haitians, and whether or not 

individual soldiers can contract for goods and 

personal services with Haitians. Answer per 

LTC Warner to all is no. Roston wanted to 

try and work up a document to go to soldiers; 
398 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


1000 hrs 

1100 hrs 

maybe incorporate with ROE or general order, 

to emphasize those four points. 

HACC NGO/PVO meeting attended by SJA 

at USAID director's home. Repeat next 

Thursday morning. NGO/PVOs extremely 

concerned/almost hostile about lack of 

security provided to them by US. Explained 

mission with LTC Vale, COL Larue, MAJ 

Friedman, etc., also force protection, political 

concerns, logistical problems, Title 10, etc. 

Valuable venting offrustrations. We gave 

advice on providing grid coordinates for QRF. 

Amazing what they expect from us--almost 

what we owe them. They hear we have 

20,000 and expect that each one should be 

made available to them first for security; no 

regard whatsoever for our billions in 

equipment and thousands of soldiers also 

needing secured. No regard for our mission to 

stand up and secure a government. This piece 

needs to be briefed to these organizations 

during peacetime--what to expect, procedures 

for obtaining, etc. They have unreasonable 

expectations of the military. 

Informed L TC Godfrey that he could treat 

embassy personnel in emergency situations, 

and that he Could treat other individuals with 

serious medical conditions affecting 

employment per de minimus exception to 

Economy Act. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 399 


1500 hrs 

1535 hrs 

1544 hrs 

1548 hrs 

Issues: (1) can a Brigade commander put sex 

off limits to all personnel while in Haiti - Yes; 

(2) took copy of a letter ofreprimand for 

WOl who stole a porno magazine at Fort 

Drum (3) does SSCRA freeze interest on Visa 

account during a deployment- No; (4) Is there 

a program to assure absentee voting? (Barrett) 

CPT Becker (525 MI): CDR, 519 MI plans 

on initiating document exploitation (DOCEX) 

at Baby Doc Palace which houses the Haitian 

Department of elections. Records include 

voter registration, political party charters, 

candidate applications, Etc. Purpose is to 

assist the vetting process. The palace and all 

records are in the custody of 1122 INF. COL 

A recommends we expedite. 

MAJ Cassidy from 10th Signal asked ifthe 

U.S. Army could arm and equip (1) DoD 

civilian employees and (2) GTE employees 

installing phone lines. Advised him that we 

could not do so, but that I would confirm with 

LTC Warner. (Lorusso) 

LTC Ellis from PMO asked if there had been a 

change in the ROE, specifically concerning 

whether detainees were still to be turned over 

to the Haitian law enforcement authorities. I 

informed him that there has not been a change 

in the ROE since 21 SEP 94. (Lorusso) 
2000 

400 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

SJA attended meeting at P APIA with cdrs of 

all units involved in the upcoming 

demonstration to go over plan. Discussed 

ROE and above matters. 	SJA to accompany 

CG to Embassy during the demonstration-­

command post. 

0900 hrs 	 Checked on phones. Need to run an auxiliary 

power cable from JTF HQ to this building. 

Signal folks will continue to work on system 

today. Courier run departed PAP via ISSO at 

JOC. Also, answered CMOC question on 54 

CONEXs ofrelief to be transported. 

0930 hrs 	 CPT Baines enroute to finance det to talk to 

COL Stormer re: allowing spouses in the rear 

to pick up soldiers' LES's. This problem has 

been surfaced by 44th Med and COSCOM 

units in the rear. 

1100 hrs 	 Prepared memo for J5 Plans on detention 

facility. (Wishard) 

1200 hrs 	 Coordinated with CPT Becker and Erisman on 

capture of "Bobby." COL Altenburg is online, and L TG Shelton has the approval 

authority for release. Questioning to begin to 

determine whether "Bobby" is a US citizen. If 

so, CID will conduct the questioning. More to 

follow. I inspected the confinement facility 

and viewed the delivery of "Bobby." 

(Wishard) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHA!Tl 1994-95 401 

1500 hrs 

1543 hrs 

2100 hrs 

Received message request from L TC Hill, 

CMOC JA, re: dealing with squatters at HHC, 

10th MTN DIV mess hall. 

MAJ Sisk, 15 Plans, came by to discuss the 

setting up of an SOP for human rights 

violations. Advised ofthe way things were 

done in Somalia (Kismayo Mass Grave Site). 

Told him to discuss with MAJ Gordon, who 

is currently at the CJOC. (DeWoskin) 

CPT Wishard attended 15 meeting. Issues: 

detention facility construction, the return of 

President Aristide, and long term planning 

objectives. 
402 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix DD: Extract ofEvents Recorded in SJA Section Log ofthe 

DATE 

20NOV94 

19DEC94 

28DEC94 

3/4JAN95 

5JAN95 

25th Infantry Division (Light) 

ACTIVITY 

COL Bush deploys with members of25th ID(L) 

Command Group for on site recon ofHaiti and 

initial transition coordination meetings with 

members ifthe 10th MTN Staff. The visit lasts 

5 days. The SJA OPLA W attorney, CPT 

Patton, continues to refine the Division OPLAN 

and Rules ofEngagement. 

SJA vehicles and equipment (secondary loads) 

loaded onto American Condor at Pearl Harbor. 

Received copies ofRules ofEngagement and 

Vehicle Accident cards from Government 

printing plant. 

MAJ Sposato and SSG Bertotti deploy to Haiti 

to coordinate SJA transition with 10th MTN and 

reception ofmain body. Make contact with 10th 

MTN counteiparts. 

MAJ Sposato visited Joint Detention Facility 

(JDF) and reviewed facility operations with 10th 

MTN SJA and MPs. Reviewed detention 

procedures established by the MNF. A judge 

advocate reviews cases ofnew detainees twice a 

week. Evidentiary threshold for detention is 

lower than probable cause standard. Detainees 

are held either as a force protection measure 

under UN Resolution 940, or because they were 

observed by MNF forces while in the act of 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITL 1994-95 403 


6JAN95 

7JAN95 

8JAN95 

committing a serious criminal offense. 

Determined that International Committee ofthe 

Red Cross (ICRC) has been monitoring 

conditions in the JDF regularly. 

Discussed retention ofMNF courtroom facility 

with MNF Engineer and HQ Commandant. 

Determined that CID should move into the 

office and vacate certain areas in the event that a 

court-martial is conducted in theater. Prepared 

memorandum justifying assignment ofone 

civilian and one military linguist to OSJA to 

assist in claims processing, witness interviews, 

and translation of legal documents. Viewed 

claims processing at the main gate ofthe Light 

Industrial Complex (LIC). Claims are processed 

at this location every Tuesday and Friday from 

0900 to 1200 hours. Claims made by Haitians 

against U.S. Forces are processed for payment 

under the Foreign Claims Act. MAJ Sposato 

travels to the office ofthe ICRC and meets with 

the director, Mr. Cedric Peralla. Discussed 

conditions at the JDF. 

Haitian national contract linguist Mr. Jean 

Joseph Ligonde begins working for OSJA. 

OSJA enlisted personnel move into building 36 

billets. Began coordination with GOH on 

transfer ofthe JDF to Haitian control. 
404 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

9JAN95 	 Coordinated for billeting and office space for 

incoming trial counsel at Warrior and Bronco 

Bases with 10th MTN counterparts. 

1OJAN95 	 OSJA main body arrives: COL Bush, SJA; CPT 

Ford, Claims/Legal Assistance Attorney; CPT 

With, OPLA W Attorney; and CPT Engle, Trial 

Defense Counsel. American Condor arrives in 

Port-au-Prince. 

11JAN95 	 Vehicles with equipment arrive on LIC. OSJA 

relocated from Bldg. 10 to Bldg. 29. Trial 

Defense Service office located in Bldg. 29 as 

well. Fully operational by 1800 hours. 

l 2JAN95 	 Two Special Forces soldiers were attacked at a 

roadside tollbooth in Gonaives. Killed were 

SFC Gregory Cardott and Mr. Orel Frederick 

(former FAhD officer); wounded was SSG 

Tommy Davis. Frederick shot and killed 

Cardott and wounded Davis after he was 

stopped by the soldiers for running a toll booth. 

SSG Davis then shot and killed Frederick. 

Incident was determined to be random violence 

and not part ofany orchestrated anti-MNF 

effort. 

13JAN95 	 25thID(L) OSJA assumed claims mission from 

10th MTN OSJA. 

14JAN95 	 Transition from 10th Mtn (LI) to 25th ID(L) 

occurred at 140001JAN95. MG Fisher signed 

General Order #1, superseding MG Meade's 

GO#l effective immediately. COL Bush 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-95 405 


15JAN95 

16JAN95 

17JAN95 

18JAN95 

appointed to Commission on Justice, an 

interagency working group charged with 

reviewing operations of the Haitian police, 

prison, military and judicial systems. COL Bush 

met with UN Human Rights Commission 

members Mr. Bruno Celli and Ms. HinkleBabul. 

Question ofurinalysis for deployed units was 

raised. Units must deploy with unit Alcohol and 

Drug Coordinating Officer and necessary 

supplies in theater such as Haiti where 

prevalence ofdrugs is high. 

Conducted OSJA AAR. Ammunition and .38 

caliber pistol found in port-a-sans. Redeploying 

10th MTN soldiers probable culprits. Amnesty 

point established at ADAG and MP Battalion. 

Published information papers on legal 

assistance, tax, and claims services, provided by 

OSJA. Obtained new automation equipment 

from AMO including color laptop 486 

computers with battery backup capability. Due 

to frequent power outages and circuit overloads, 

automatic backup feature saves much data and 

wear and tear on computer equipment. 

MAJ Sposato attended a meeting with COL 

Saunders, MAJ Spence Lance from ACOM at 

the Ministry ofDefense. Present for the GOH 

were Minister ofDefense (MOD) Lehersion, his 
406 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


19JAN95 

20JAN95 

23FEB95 

24JAN95 

deputy COL Cleremont, and his legal advisor 

LTC Bertrand. Discussion topics included the 

jobs program for former F AhD members and 

release ofHaitian militazy prisoners in the 

Federal Prison. Also toured the Federal Prison 

and interviewed 15 militazy prisoners concerning 

their status. 

MAJ Sposato returned to the Federal Prison to 

conclude interviews with Haitian militazy 

prisoners. MAJ Sposato also attended a 

meeting at International Police Monitor 

headquarters with Mr. Ray Kelly to discuss 

logistic support ofthe IPM and Interim Public 

Security Force requirements. 

Control ofJDF passed to the GOH today. The 

operation of the facility, now called the Haitian 

Detention Facility (HDF) will be overseen by 

the 66th MP Company until 15 March, when full 

control will pass to the GOH. The GOH now 

controls release ofall detainees. 

CPT Ford compiled an information paper 

detailing the inapplicability ofMTMC umbrella 

policy to vehicles rented in Haiti. 

COL Bush and MAJ Sposato visit the Federal 

Prison to meet with the MOJ and representatives 

from the UN Civilian Mission. CPT Ford 

determined notazy entitlement and 

authorizations. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 407 

25JAN95 

26FEB95 

28JAN95 

29JAN95 

30JAN95 

31JAN95 

1FEB95 

MG Fisher signed off on the MNF Commander 

Policy Memoranda. 

CPT Ford prepared information papers detailing 

medical care and PX eligibility for members of 

theMNF. 

Mr. [name deleted], a Class A agent for JLSC, 

was found pecuniarily liable for the loss of 

nearly $23,000 in U.S. funds. Mr. [name 

deleted] had no plausible explanation for the 

loss. 

IRS tax forms for tax program arrived in mail. 

10% urinalysis conducted by HHC, 25th ID(L). 

Processed seriously injured Haitian victim of 

accident with Philippine IPM for medevac to 

CONUS. Obtained Secretary ofthe Army 

Designee status for victim, which allowed her to 

be flown at U.S. expense. Medevac necessary 

due to serious nature ofhead injury and lack of 

medical equipment in Haiti. 

U.S. ship owner Gary Evans held in Cap Haitien 

jail by order oflocal judge for failing to off-load 

goods on his ship which had been paid for by 

local Haitians. He demanded more money and 

got jail until he delivers. 

COL Bush, MAJ Sposato and CPT Ford 

attended a meeting at the ICRC to discuss state 

ofHDF and Haitian prison system. 
408 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


3FEB95 MNF Commander and COL Bush met with new 

Minister ofJustice (MOJ) resume today to 

discuss the status ofdetainees at the HDF. MOJ 

agrees to review detainee files and release 

prisoners ifno credible evidence existed to 

prosecute. 

4FEB95 The Director ofthe Combined Joint Staff 

(DCJS) signed a memorandum detailing medical 

care entitlement guidance. 

5FEB95 Problem identified with soldiers converting 

plywood footlockers made by MNF-employed 

local national labor to individual use. These 

items are theater property, as the wood and 

labor is furnished by the U.S. Government and 

purchased with theater funds. 

6FEB95 Files on HDF detainees were delivered to the 

MOJ and Chief ofPolice Major Dany Toussaint 

today. 

7FEB95 Received report from Special Forces on the 

Island ofGonaives that a 15-year old boy was 

killed in an apparent range accident. The 

Special Forces had used the area for target 

practice minutes before the explosion took 

place. 

12FEB95 MNF conducted Great Aloha Run of5.2 miles 

(4 times around the LIC perimeter). CPT Ford 

traveled to Gonaives and settled the ordnance 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITL 1994-95 409 


14FEB95 

15FEB95 

16FEB95 

17FEB95 

19FEB95 

explosion death claim ofthe family ofa 15-year 

old boy. 

Prisoner Joel Geffard, previously held in the 

National Prison, was moved to the HDF by 

request ofthe U.S. Embassy until the Drug 

Enforcement Agency could arrange for his 

removal to the U.S. Geffard is an alleged drug 

king pin, and is subject to indictment shortly by 

the Miami U.S. Attorney's Office. GOH is 

expected to expel Geffard, who is a U.S. citizen. 

Completed court-martial jurisdiction scheme and 

sent it to the MNF Commander for approval. 

Received Tactical Terminal Adapter e-mail 

terminal from J6 today. Greatly enhances ability 

to communicate with the rear. The MNF 

Commander approved the UCMJ scheme as 

proposed. CPT Ford prepared a memorandum 

detailing the accessibility ofmedical care for UN 

civilian personnel. 

Received word that a Haitian judge visited the 

HDF and interviewed all detainees and advised 

them that their cases were being reviewed. 

Determined that the stay behind JA would have 

a dedicated CUCV for vehicle support. 

Riot at the Federal Prison. Extensive damage to 

confinement areas. MG Fisher responded to the 

scene and convinced the MOJ to address the 

prisoners. Some 15 prisoners unaccounted for 

and another are expected to have escaped. 
410 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

21FEB95 	 Investigated an incident at the Shodecosa 

warehouse complex in which a concrete wall 

collapsed and killed 8 people and injured 

another 8 after heavy rain. The wall kept looters 

out, as a slum had developed outside the wall. 

No liability on part ofMNF was apparent. 

Shodecosa is rebuilding the wall around the 

clock, as most ofthe NGOs in Haiti use the 

complex to store relief supplies. The complex 

also houses some Brown and Root buildings. 

22FEB95 	 Conducted weekly AAR. MAJ Sposato and 

SSG Bertotti attempted to locate a court-martial 

witness requested by OSJA Fort Drum for an 

Operation Restore Democracy case being tried 

at Fort Drum, to no avail. 

23FEB95 	 The GOH directed the release ofClaudel 

Josephat, Gerry Mourra, and Romeo Halloun, 

three ofthe most notorious detainees held at the 

HDF. The GOH did not coordinate the release 

with the MNF. 

24FEB95 	 Claims day coincided with the visit offormer 

President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and GEN 

(Ret) Colin Powell, who were here on a fact 

finding trip. Also arriving in country today was 

MAJ Bill Hudson, who will be the UNMIH 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HA/Tl 1994-95 411 

25FEB95 

27FEB95 

1MAR95 

2MAR95 

Judge Advocate. CPT With attended a meeting 

at USAID to discuss the JacmeI road rebuilding 

project. 

Six soldiers from 125th MI Bn became sick 

when they consumed a fish caught out oflocal 

waters. Fish apparently was contaminated with 

ciguatera bacteria. Soldiers were hospitalized 

for varying periods. All are expected to fully 

recover. By consuming fish from an unapproved 

source, the soldiers violated GO#l. 

MAJ Sposato attended meeting called by the 

HQ Commandant to discuss the 

consolidation/reorganization ofthe LIC 

preparatory to the transition to UNMIH on 31 

March. LTG Ord, USARPAC Commander 

visited the LIC today. 

CPT With volunteered to remain with the JTF 

after the main body redeploys in early April. 

SSG Stannard from 2nd Bde will remain as her 

.NCOIC. CPT Ford released several information 

papers detailing tax assistance options in theater. 

An officer assigned to 1-21 IN improperly 

directed his soldiers to spray paint a protester 

from head to toe as the result ofan incident in 

front ofthe Presidential Palace during President 

Carter's visit. The Haitian national was caught 

spray painting anti-President Carter graffiti on 

the Palace walls. 
412 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATJONS 

3MAR95 	 COL Bush and MAJ Sposato visited with Mr. 

Brutus, the Chief Prosecutor for Port-au-Prince, 

to discuss the slow pace ofthe GOH on setting 

hearings for detainees/prisoners in the HDF and 

National Prison. 

6MAR95 	 LTC Mac Warner, FORSCOM OSJA, arrived 

in country with the FORSCOM audit team. 

CPT With attended the UNMIH planning 

conference at the Hotel Christopher. MAJ 

Sposato and CPT Ford visit the National Prison 

to assess conditions 2 weeks after riot. 

Prisoners continue to experience inordinately 

long delays before they are brought before 

judges, and the physical plant continues to 

deteriorate. 

7MAR95 	 MAJ Sposato meets with Mr. Brutus, Chief 

Prosecutor, at the HDF. Mr. Brutus reviewed 

the cases ofall 22 remaining detainees. MAJ 

Sposato and LTC Forney, the PM, informed Mr. 

Brutus that the HDF would be closed on 15 

March when the MNF pulled out its equipment 

and personnel. Mr. Brutus and LT Blaise, the 

Commander ofthe National Prison, both 

indicated that they understood the time 

constraint. 

9MAR95 	 CPT With presented transition plan briefing to 

BG Hill and COL Swannack. Conducted AAR 

for OSJA. Finalized relocation plan for SJA 

office from Bldg, 29 to Bldg. 28, effective 19 

March. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITL 1994-95 413 


IOMAR95 

13MAR95 

14MAR95 

15MAR95 

17MAR95 

18MAR95 

MAJ Sposato accompanied BG Hill and COL 

Pulley, SOTF Commander to investigate 

allegations ofexcessive force on the part ofan 

ODA team in Les Cayes. 

Sonapi through its attorney served notice on the 

MNF that it demanded $2 million in damages 

plus 35% interest for the MNF "occupation" of 

the LIC. The MNF Engineer estimated that the 

MNF had spent at least $2.9 million in upgrades 

on the LIC to date. 

Completed joint Uniform Lessons Learned for 

J3 today. 

The HDF was closed today when all 22 

prisoners were transferred to other facilities. 

The 10 most serious cases were transferred to 

the National Prison. 

Prepared final report on disposition ofHDF 

detainees for the IRC. 

Trial Defense Service office was relocated to 

Bldg 28 today. Received report that a civilian 

DC3 had crashed into a medevac UH-60 on 

landing. The Haiti Air prop plane caused 

massive damage to the helicopter, which was 

parked offthe runway. No liability apparent on 

part ofMNF. CPT Ford has coordinated 

investigation and affinnative claim recovery 

process. 
414 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


19MAR95 

25MAR95 

26MAR95 

MAJ Carl Woods, OSJA, ACOM amved for a 

3-day visit. He will evaluate progress made by 

Judicial Monitors working under MG Campbell. 

CPT With attends POTUS (President ofthe 

U.S.) Transition Ceremony briefing at which 

representatives ofPresidential Advance Team 

participate. Conducted OSJA AAR. Over 

$120,000 paid out in foreign claims since the 

operation began in September. 

Larceny of supplies from Brown and Root 

warehouse is intermpted by the warehouse 

supervisor at approximately 2200 hours. Two 

NCOs and a Specialist are apprehended with 

over $3,000 worth ofTASO and other supply 

items. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHAITI, 1994-95 415 


Appendix EE: Extract ofEvents Recorded in SJA Office Log of 

the United States Forces Haiti 

20 OCT95 	 Met FOB 31 for ROE Brief at A/DACG 

- MAJ Terry - SOTF XO, gave ROE 

brief. (Plane landed 1 hour early) 

Gave MAJ Terry ROE cards. (CPT 

Walker). Work call - SPC Teeple. 

GPOA for client in HHC lst Bde, IOI st 

Airborne Division (AASL T); action: 

CPT O'Connor. 

SPOA/Guardianship for client ofHHC 

I 26th Finance Bn; action: SGT 

Wasilausky. 

Claims set up; action Mr. Ligonde, SPC 

Teeple, PFC Jones. Claims - three (3) 

follow-ups; one (I) report request. 

(MINUH). 

Initiate work on living will/health care 

POA for client. Contacted OSJA, XVIII 

Airborne Corps for information 

concerning issues presented (action: 

SPC Teeple). 

Dropped legal opinion on economat 

meat disposal to J4; action: CPT 

Walker. 
416 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


21OCT95 


Called USARCS- Peggy Skelly-Nolan, 

re: container claims/impact of embargo 

on lawful claims. (CPT Walker). 

Called LTC Jackson USACOM - re: 

SPTGP. (CPT Walker) 

a) Future work under 607/CIU 

supplied materials. 

b) Joint venture w/ private 

Haitian construction firm. 

Called L TC Risser - 1st COSCOM 

contracting - left message. (CPT 

Walker) 

MAJ Ackerman visits with CPT Walker. 

Discussed SST action. (Sting with CID 

to get back an SST stolen from the LCU 

at CAP Haitian. Thief walked on LCU, 

drove SST off, returned later, parked 

SST and informed the personnel that if 

they want the keys to the vehicle he must 

be paid $100 US.) CPT Walker. 

Claims follow-up at UN; action: SPC 

Teeple, PFC Jones.SGT Wasilausky 

downloads new NETSCAPE program. 

On site visit to Glasslight Haiti; action: 

CPT Walker, SSG from J2, SGT 

Wasilausky, SPC Teeple, PFC Jones. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINHAITL 1994-95 417 


22 OCT 951000 


Dropped off marriage packet for client. 

Met incoming plane; main body 101 st 

arrival; picked up CPT Maimone, SGT 

Walker (CPT Walker, SPC Teeple, PFC 

Jones). 

RCO meeting w/CPT Walker & CSM 

Re: FG 15 for a SFC. 

Meeting with CPT Prigge, re: 15-6. 

Advised him to complete investigation. 

Met MAJ Cordova re: advice on small 

purchase threshold and $208,000 

purchase of computer equipment as GFE 

for BRSC. 

Met with MAJ Ackerman. 

Topics: 

Vehicle report ofsurvey, 

UN Ids, 

SOTF fatal accident (St. Marc), 

UN resolutions, 

Djibouti life support at the LIC 

issues. 

Spoke with MAJ Ackerman Re: 

interrelation between the time limits in 

UNSCRs 940, 975, and 1007. The 

military mission ends on 29 FEB 96, the 

CIVPOL and UNMIH civilian mission 

will continue for a period oftime after 

Feb. 
Called US ACOM LTC Jackson ­

discussed - Fairwinds project- The 

message ofFriday of 20 OCT funding 

was relatively well received. The tone 

ofParagraph 1.1/1.2 was questionable. 

Discussed the differences between the 

607 /LANTDIV proposal and the USAID 

projects. Other CIU projects maybe 

similar to Puertas Caminos type 

exercises. Base Camp (Fairwinds) 

construction will be ERC funds. L TC 

Jackson also mentioned that there maybe 

a possibility to shift funds from CinC 

programs pot (lumber at GTMO) to the 

FY96 HCA projects HCA-DoD-Nonlethal equipment (see 10 USC 402, 

2551, 2547; there are also excess 

vehicles at GTMO that maybe offered to 

the HNP. 

Worked less lethal weapons issues. 

TAX: DFAS Tax Advisory Committee 

"forget it", no support for an exception, 

maybe able to get legislative relief in a 

year or two (Tax on TDY). 

Solicitation letter opinion-- needs info 

from the symposium. 

Claims- no US fault in the accident, 

MEDCOM authorized MED EVAC & 
care; who authorized the transport to the 

US? (CPT Walker). 

CID briefed CPT Walker reference the 

SOTF /Sonapi guard incident. Opined no 

criminal conduct. 

Call from ILT(P) Smallfield, re: senior 

officer's vehicle report of survey - SGT 

Wasilausky is getting forms and will 

take back to ILT(P) Smallfield. 

Faxed drug case maximum penalties to 

CDR, 112 ACR. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 


The Center for Law and Military Operations-while assuming full responsibility 

for any errors contained in this report-gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the 

following individuals in preparing the original report: 

MAJ Mark Ackerman MAJ Chuck Hernicz CAPT Steve Rose, USN 

LTC Jeff Addicott COL Keith Hodges COL Rick Rosen 

BG John Altenburg MAJ Bill Hudson LTC Philip Savoie 

CPT Paul Barden MAJ Andy Hughes COL Steve Saynisch 

COL Joseph Barnes L TC Dick Jackson COL Bryan Schempf 

MAJ Bill Barto MAJ Randy Keys CPT Gregg Sharp 

MAJ Peter Becker MAJ Ralph Kohlman MAJ Mark Sposato 

L TC Dan Bolger Mr. John Kost MAJ Brad Stai 

COL John Burton L TC John Krump SGT Gerald Stevens 

COL Brian Bush CPT Nick Lorusso MAJ Steven Strong 

l LT Miranda Cade L TC Bob Mcfetridge SSG Herbert Teope 

COL Demmon Canner L TC John McNeill MAJ Mark Toole 

MAJ Nat Causey MAJ Larry Morris CPT Chris Valentino 

MAJ Elwood A. Chandler MAJ Mike Newton CPT Joe Vonnegut 

CPT Dan Cowhig LTC Larry Passar CPT Kevin Walker 

L TC Dave Crane CPT Jim Patterson L TC Mac Warner 

MAJ Dave Diner CPT Jeff Pederson LTC Kasey Warner 

MAJ Karl Ellcessor MAJ Chuck Pede SGT Steven Wasilausky 

Dr. Mark Foley MAJ Tim Pendolino MAJ Rich Whitaker 

MAJ Herb Ford COL Dave Petraeus Mr. Jim Wholley 

MAJ Dick Gordon MAJ Marc Philippe CPT Jeff Willis 

Mrs. Margaret Grogan CPT Cindy Pinter LCDR Jim Winthrop, USN 

COL Bill Hagan L TC Fred Pribble CPT Darryl Wishard 

COL Harlan Heffelfinger COL Lou Reyna CPT Cathy With 

L TC Mark Hefren L TC Mark Romaneski LtCol Carl Woods, USMC 

The Center expresses special gratitude to the Commandant of The Judge Advocate 

General's School, COL Joe Graves, and to successive Deputy Commandants COL Lee 

Schinasi and L TC (P) Kevin Bond, for providing a perfect home and working 

environment for CLAMO; to MAJ Kyle Smith and the Office of the Staff Judge 

Advocate, XVIIIth Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg for organizing the May 1995 

Conference on Uphold Democracy held in Charlottesville; to MAJ Marc Warren, LTC 

Dave Crane, and the faculty of the International and Operational Law Department 

(TJAGSA) for hosting that conference and providing subsequent advice; to the United 

States Army Peacekeeping Institute for dedicating the talented CPT Warren Reardon to 

this project for days at a time; to L TC Bob Johnson, MAJ Gaylen Whatcott, SFC Andy 

Steck, Ms. Dottie Gross, Mrs. Nel Lull, Ms. Sandra Ralphs, CPT John Jones, CPT John 

Wells, and the Developments, Doctrine & Literature Department (TJAGSA) for 

providing fresh ideas and insights and many forms of assistance; to the Judge Advocate 

Guard & Reserve Affairs Division (OTJAG) and Ms. Sandra Foster for flawless and 

extensive typing assistance; to Mr. Dan Lavering and Ms. Tammy Kern for providing 

good sources and good counsel; to MAJ E.J. O'Brien for tirelessly agreeing to be 

interviewed and to provide documents; to LTC Deb Godwin, LTC Rob Van Hooser, 

CW4 Don D. Hughes, Jr., SFC Sly Prince, and SGT Rachelle Mathes for magnificent 

automation support; to Mr. Fred Edwards, Mr. Byrd Eastham, Mr. Dennis Mills, and 

Mrs. Rosemary Schleifer for expert graphics and presentational help; and to Ms. Phyllis 

Bowman for skillful and prompt reproduction and binding assistance. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

(CONTINUED) 

The Center also gratefully acknowledges the following individuals, who significantly 

improved the final version of this report by proposing changes to the draft and 

contributing documents: MAJ Mark Ackerman, COL William Adams, CPT Norm 

Allen, BG John Altenburg, CPT John Bickers, MAJ Greg Block, CPT Jeff Bovarnick, 

COL Waldo Brooks, MAJ Stephen Bross, MAJ Bill Barto, COL Fred Bryant, COL John 

Burton, COL Brian Bush, LTC Robert Butler, COL Demmon Canner, COL David 

Carey, MAJ Nat Causey, LTC Dave Crane, LTC Anthony Cochet, COL Daniel 

Dell'Orto, MAJ Dave Diner, LTC Donald Dubia, MAJ (P) Karl Ellcessor, COL Russell 

Estey, SGM John Fonville, MAJ Joe Frisk, LtCol Michael Galt, MAJ Christopher 

Garcia, LTC Richard Gordon, CPT Carl Graham, COL Joe Graves, COL Bill Hagan, 

MAJ Chuck Hernicz, MAJ Bill Hudson, BG Walter Huffinan, LTC Carl Jackson, LTC 

Richard Jackson, LTC Bob Johnson, MAJ Jim Johnson, MAJ Musetta Johnson, CPT 

John Jones, CPT Joseph Keeler, MAJ Randy Keys, LTC Phillip Kennerly, LTC John 

Krump, CPT Christian Maimone, MAJ Pete Masterton, MAJ Howard McGillen, MAJ 

Warner Meadows, MAJ Marsha Mills, MAJ (P) Larry Morris, MAJ Scott Morris, MAJ 

Mike Newton, MAJ E.J. O'Brien, COL Hays Parks, LTC Larry Passar, CPT James 

Patterson, MAJ Chuck Pede, MAJ Tim Pendolino, LTC Mark Rassas, LTC Craig L. 

Reinold, L TC Mark Romaneski, COL Richard D. Rosen, BG Murray Sagsveen, COL 

Steve Saynisch, COL Bryan H. Schempf, MAJ Mark Sposato, SFC Andy Steck, MAJ 

Kathryn Stone, LTC Annamary Sullivan, SSG Herbie Teope, MAJ Mark Toole, LTC 

Conrad Von Wold, COL Alexander Walczak, CPT Kevin Walker, LTC Karl Warner, 

LTC Mac Warner, CPT John Wells, MAJ (P) Gaylen Whatcott, MAJ Rich Whitaker, 

MAJ John Winn, LtCol Kevin Winters, LCDR Jim Winthrop, CPT Catherine With, 

LtCol Carl Woods. 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI 

The Security Council ... Acting under Chapter VII ofthe 

Charter ofthe United Nations, authorizes Member States to 

form a multinational force under unified command and 

control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means 

to facilitate the departure from Haiti ofthe military 

leadership, consistent with the Governor's Island 

Agreement, the prompt return ofthe legitimately elected 

President and the restoration ofthe legitimate authorities of 

the Government ofHaiti, and to establish and maintain a 

secure and stable environment that will permit 

implementation ofthe Governor's Island Agreement on the 

understanding that the cost ofimplementing this temporary 

operation will be borne by the participating Member States. 

Security Council Resolution 940 

31July1994 

Six months ago, a 30-nation multinational force, led by the 

United States, entered Haiti with a clear mission: To ensure 

the departure ofthe military regime, to restore the freelyelected government ofHaiti, and to establish a secure and 

stable environment in which the people ofHaiti could begin 

to rebuild their country. Today, that mission has been 

accomplished, on schedule and with remarkable success. 

President William Clinton 

31March1995