Art of War Papers

Instilling Aggressiveness

US Advisors and Greek Combat 

Leadership in the Greek Civil War

1947-1949

William D. Harris, Jr., Major, US Army

 Combat Studies Institute Press

 Command and General Staff College

 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
The cover photo courtesy of the Library of Congress is that of General 

Dwight Eisenhower giving orders to American paratroopers in England.
Instilling Aggressiveness

US Advisors and Greek Combat 

Leadership in the Greek Civil War

1947-1949

William D. Harris, Jr., Major, US Army

 Combat Studies Institute Press

 Command and General Staff College

 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Harris, William D., Jr.

 Instilling aggressiveness: US advisors and Greek combat leadership in 

the Greek Civil War, 1947-1949 / William D. Harris Jr., Major, US Army

 pages cm

 1. Military assistance, American--Greece--History. 2. Greece--History-

-Civil War, 1944-1949. 3. Greece. Stratos--History--20th century. 4. 

United States--Foreign relations--Greece. 5. Greece--Foreign relations-

-United States. I. Title. II. Title: US advisors and Greek combat 

leadership in the Greek Civil War, 1947-1949. 

 E183.8.G8H37 2013

 327.730495’09044--dc23

 2013008489

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover 

a wide variety of military history topics. The 

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those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of 

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The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as 

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Director of CSI.

Editor

Carl W. Fischer

2013
iii

Abstract

In March 1947, the United States established an economic 

and military assistance program to bolster the nationalist Greek 

government against a communist insurgency. The Greek government 

suffered from a collapsed economy, deep social divisions, and an 

inability to defeat the insurgents in battle. The Joint US Military 

Advisory and Planning Group provided operational advice to the 

Greek National Army that improved the nationalists’ aggressiveness, 

tactics, battlefield management, and logistics. The advisors used 

training, mentorship, directive control, and disciplinary action to 

affect the nationalists’ combat leadership. The improved leadership 

led to more effective combat operations against the communists. 

These operations pressured the insurgency, which had alienated 

Yugoslavia and committed to fighting with conventional tactics. 

These two insurgent errors, the massive economic and military aid 

program, and the improved nationalist combat performance resulted 

in a decisive victory in August 1949. The study provides insight into 

how advisors can affect a military’s leadership.

v

Acknowledgments

The author is indebted to the Art of War Scholars’ seminar professors, 

Dr. Joseph Fischer, Dr. Sean Kalic, and Dr. Scott Stephenson, for hard 

work and dedication to professional military education. The author also 

thanks Dr. Joseph Babb and Dr. Nicholas Murray for their assistance with 

this thesis. The researchers at the President Harry S. Truman Library, 

the Military History Institute, and the National Archives and Records 

Administration provided valuable assistance to the author in conducting 

archival research. Most importantly, the author will be forever indebted to 

his loving wife for her patience and understanding.

vii

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction .............................................................................. 1

Chapter 2 Background .............................................................................. 9

Chapter 3 the Truman Doctrine and the Beginning of the US Mission

March 1947-February 1948 .................................................................... 31

Chapter 4 Expansion of the Advisory Mission and the End of the War

February 1948-September 1949.............................................................. 63

Chapter 5 Conclusions.......................................................................... 101

Bibliography ..........................................................................................117

Illustrations

Figure 1. Map of Greek Territorial Expansion.........................................11

Figure 2. Sketch of the 1948 Grammos Campaign................................. 76

Figure 3. Sketch of the 1949 Grammos Operation ................................. 88

ix

Acronyms

AMAG American Mission for Aid to Greece

EAM National Liberation Movement

EDES National Republican Greek Association

GNA Greek National Army

JUSMAPG Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group-Greece

KKE Communist Party of Greece

NDC National Defense Corps

RHAF Royal Hellenic Air Force

SOE Special Operations Executive

USAGG United States Army Group-Greece

1

Chapter 1

Introduction

Is it not the manner in which the leaders carry out the task of 

command, of impressing their resolution in the hearts of others 

that makes them warriors?

— General Gerhard von Sharnhorst, Infantry in Battle

In 1947, at the dawn of the Cold War between the United States and the 

Soviet Union, the Greek Communist Party (KKE) had gained control of 

large portions of Greece and was threatening to defeat the nationalist royal 

Greek government. The nationalist Greek government faced numerous 

challenges. The Greek economy experienced the worst collapse of World 

War II under the weight of the Axis occupation. Greek society suffered from 

deep and violent cleavages that had originated before World War I. The 

government failed to rebuild the economy while many Greeks resisted the 

British backed return of the Greek King. Additionally, the KKE’s military, 

the Greek Democratic Army, demonstrated that it was capable of defeating 

nationalist forces in open battle. In the midst of the escalating Cold War, 

President Harry S. Truman decided that the United States could not allow 

the communists to control Greece and the eastern Mediterranean Sea. 

In what the public called the Truman Doctrine, he announced a massive 

aid package to bolster the struggling Greek government to defend itself 

against the communist insurgency. The United States reinforced the Greek 

nationalists with weapons, supplies, financial support, and military advice. 

After two and a half more years of bitter fighting, the Greek nationalists 

achieved a decisive victory over their communist foes in September 1949.

The United States provided material aid, in the form of economic and 

military aid, was crucial for the nationalist victory. Additionally, two major 

KKE errors contributed significantly to the nationalist victory. However, 

the US military advisory mission’s dramatic improvement of nationalist 

Greek combat leadership and effectiveness was essential to the decisive 

victory. The advisors improved the aggressiveness, tactics, battle control, 

and logistics through persistent training, mentorship, directive control, 

and influencing disciplinary action. Without the advisors’ successful 

improvement of nationalist combat leadership, the Greek government 

would probably have squandered the US provided material aid and the 

communists could have recovered from their errors.

Literature Review

The majority of the academic literature on the Greek Civil War has 

focused on the communists’ errors, although most of the research has 
2

included other factors as contributing causes. These other causes include 

US diplomatic efforts, US aid, and the Greek nationalists’ efforts. The most 

balanced accounts briefly mention the US advisory effort, but emphasize 

material aid and argue that the communist errors were the deciding factor. 

They do not address which aspects of the GNA the advisors focused on to 

improve nationalist combat effectiveness or how the advisors improved 

those aspects. 

One of the most detailed studies of the communist effort is Charles 

Shrader’s meticulous study of the Democratic Army’s organization. 

Shrader argues, “if one were forced to select a single explanation for the 

defeat of the GDA it would have to be inadequate logistics.1

 The poverty of Greece and critical errors made by the communists 

leaders directly led to this logistical inadequacy. He lists four errors: 

not mobilizing the urban populations, harsh measures that alienated the 

population, the loss of Yugoslavian support, and the commitment of 

conventional tactics.2 While Shrader briefly acknowledges that the United 

States was able to improve the nationalist forces, his argument is that the 

communist errors are more important to explaining the war’s outcome. 

The KKE’s ideological dedication to using conventional tactics was the 

most egregious of its errors because it sharply increased its logistical 

requirements while making it more likely to suffer high rates of attrition 

that the communist infrastructure could not overcome. The inadequate 

logistics resulted in an inability to generate and sustain enough combat 

power to defeat the nationalists in battle.3

Other authors besides Shrader have also focused on the communists’ 

conventional tactics. Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza is a prominent example. 

He discounts the effect of losing Yugoslavian support, and focuses on 

the decision to build a conventional army instead of relying on guerrilla 

warfare.4

 The argument is that if the communists had focused on guerrilla 

tactics they could have overcome the other difficulties, including the US 

aid. Averoff-Tossizza does assert that it was the will of the Greek people 

that overcame the communists, which contradicts his argument that the 

communists could have changed the outcome of the war through better 

tactics. His political interests as an elected official may have influenced his 

discussion of the importance of the will of the people.5

Another study of the KKE, by Haris Vlavianos, details the KKE’s inner 

workings and concludes that the party’s errors prevented it from mobilizing 

the political support necessary for a revolution. Instead of focusing on the 

choice of conventional over guerrilla tactics, Vlavianos argues that the 
3

KKE failed to wage revolutionary warfare as primarily a political effort, 

with the military supporting the mobilization of the people.6 While this 

work presents an excellent window into the inner workings of the KKE, 

it does not address other potential causes as well as some other studies. 

Edgar O’Ballance concurs with Vlavianos, arguing that the communists’ 

major fault was the “failure to win over the minds of the people.”7 His work 

does not have the same depth into the KKE that Vlavianos provides, but 

he does present a more balanced understanding of the war. O’Ballance’s 

narrative discusses the nationalist military operations and he balances his 

argument by noting that the communists acquired momentum in 1946 

and 1947 because the Greek government could not finance or equip a 

military large enough to overcome the communists. After 1947, the US 

aid program provided the necessary material for the nationalists to defeat 

the communists.8

The communists’ errors arguments, especially those of Vlavianos 

and O’Ballance with their discussion of the KKE’s political failures, are 

vulnerable to a critique presented by Stathis Kalyvas. Kalyvas argues 

that the civilians responded to control more than political narrative. The 

emphasis on the overarching narrative is a result of an “urban bias” that 

privileges the perspective of urban upper classes over the perspectives 

of the rest of the society, especially rural inhabitants. Consequently, 

arguments that claim that the communists failed to construct a suitable 

political narrative to win the people’s allegiance ignore the complex web 

of local politics that had much more influence on how the people acted 

during the war than the lofty ideological statements. Kalyvas conducted 

extensive ethnographic research in the Argolid region of Greece as one 

test of his theory of control and violence. The research is limited to one 

region and mostly on the early phase of the Greek Civil War, 1944-1945. 

However, the fact that his research confirmed his theory that control 

mattered more than political preference in the Greek Civil War weakens 

the arguments of authors who argue that it was the will of the Greek people 

or communist political failings that determined the outcome of the war.9

The line of argument that focuses on the communist failures has 

made significant contributions to the scholarly understanding of the 

Greek Civil War. However, arguing that the communist errors were the 

proximate cause of the war’s outcome requires problematic assumptions. 

It assumes that the issue is one of total victory for one side or the other. 

This assumption ignores the possibility that the KKE could establish an 

autonomous region in minority inhabited northern Greece. It also assumes 

away the possibility that the communists could perpetuate a stalemate that 
4

would make Greece a failed state. The communists’ ability to generate 

at least twenty thousand fighters during 1949 demonstrates that the KKE 

had the organization, will, and discipline to continue fighting.10 While the 

communist errors may have prevented them from achieving a total victory 

like Mao Tse-Tung’s Chinese Communist Party, they could still have made 

it impossible for the Greek government to govern any locality outside of 

Athens. Averting the stalemate or autonomous region outcomes required 

the nationalists to take positive action to assert government control. As 

chapter 3 will demonstrate, the nationalists had no ability to do this in 

1947 and most likely could not have done so without external assistance.

Christopher Woodhouse and Frank Abbott have argued that the US 

advisors did not have a significant effect on the outcome of the war. Instead, 

they argue that the Greek nationalists were able to reform themselves 

without the advisors’ influence. The most prominent proponent of this 

view, Christopher Woodhouse, who led the British Military Mission in 

Greece during World War II, states that the US advisors did not provide 

any substantial assistance and that it was Greek officers who initiated the 

changes in nationalist tactics.11 Woodhouse may have a conflict of interest 

since the US advisors took a much more aggressive role in GNA operations 

than the British advisors. Agreeing with Woodhouse, Frank Abbott flatly 

states that the US advisors failed to instill aggressiveness in the nationalist 

forces. He argues that the United States lost its leverage over the GNA 

when it made an unconditional commitment to the nationalist cause in 

the Truman Doctrine. Without this leverage, the US advisors could not 

motivate the Greek soldiers to fight aggressively. Only the arrival of a 

bold new commander, Field Marshall Alexander Papagos, in 1949 brought 

aggressiveness to the GNA.12 The evidence in chapters 3 and 4 will show 

that the actual timeline of improvement in nationalist combat performance 

does not support the contention that the advisors played a marginal role.

Another study disputes the assertion that the United States lost leverage 

over the Greek government. Howard Jones, in the authoritative study of 

the strategic and diplomatic aspects of the Greek Civil War, argues that the 

Truman administration’s strategic and diplomatic maneuvers were critical 

determinants of the war’s outcome. Far from surrendering its leverage 

to the Greeks, the US executed a well-crafted strategy to respond to the 

apparent threat of communist expansion that deterred the Soviets and 

induced the nationalists to heed US advice. Jones does not discuss the 

KKE’s operations and organization to the depth of Shrader or Vlavianos, 

but he does provide a balanced perspective of the war with a focus on US 

strategy and diplomacy. He does mention the US military advisors, but 

does not analyze their specific activities or effects in depth.13
5

In contrast to the works above, there is a group of studies that analyze 

the Greek Civil War but do not focus on explaining the outcome of the war. 

This group looks to the Greek Civil War as the beginning of a process that 

led to a 1967 military coup. Two prominent examples are Nicos Alivizatos 

and Yiannis Roubatis. Alivizatos contends that the Civil War caused a 

break down in the state institutions and increased military autonomy. These 

two effects would in turn lead to the collapse of democracy in 1967.14 In a 

similar vein, Roubatis argues that the US involvement in Greek political 

and military affairs had long-term effects, including the coup d’etat.

15

Both of these authors are a part of a liberal revisionist movement in 

Greek historiography that arose after the 1974 restoration of democracy.16

Their arguments provide important considerations for understanding the 

advisory mission in Greece and in future wars.

US Advisors and Greek Combat Leadership

This study focuses on the US military advisory effort’s organization, 

actions, and effects on the GNA from 1947 to 1949. Although there were 

advisors for the Royal Hellenic Navy and the Royal Hellenic Air Force, 

the study will focus on the advisors to the army, which played the decisive 

role.17 Chapter 2 details the origins of the Greek Civil War including the 

unique circumstances that contributed to the initial communist success. 

These circumstances include the long history of persistent guerrilla warfare 

in the Greek mountains, ethno-linguistic divisions, persistent poverty, and 

bitter political divisions. Greek expansion in two Balkan Wars led to the 

inclusion of non-Greek speakers who would provide willing recruits for the 

communists during the Civil War. World War I and its aftermath introduced 

the main political cleavage that would dominate Greek politics for the rest 

of the century and lead to the war. The Greek government went from crisis 

to crisis during the interwar years, reinforcing the central fissure. World 

War II brought an Axis occupation that ruined the economy and led to the 

beginning of the Civil War as the communist resistance movement sought 

to eliminate the other anti-occupation resistance groups. The British dealt 

a heavy blow to the communists and reinstalled the monarchy in 1945, but 

the communists recovered and fielded a new army that steadily expanded 

its control as the nationalist government suffered from economic collapse, 

misadministration, and poor military leadership.

Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the strategic situation, the communists’ actions, 

the material situation, and the nationalist military with the US advisors. 

Chapter 3 covers the war from the announcement of the Truman Doctrine 

and the US mission to aid Greece in March 1947 until February 1948. The 

United States provided significant levels of material support in the form of 
6

economic and military aid to bolster Greece against the communist threat. 

Nevertheless, the communists continued to make progress, extending 

their control of rural Greece and successfully challenging GNA units in 

conventional battles. The deteriorating security situation led the Truman 

administration and the advisors in Greece to conclude that the GNA’s 

combat leadership was the critical weakness in the nationalist cause. The 

advisors began a pertinacious emphasis on increasing nationalist combat 

leaders’ aggressiveness, while the Truman administration prioritized 

military over economic aid and decided to provide operational advice to 

the GNA.

Chapter 4 covers the period from February 1948, when Lieutenant 

General James Van Fleet took command of the US advisory mission, 

to the September 1949 nationalist victory. The Truman administration 

worked to balance the domestic economy, the escalating Cold War, and 

the commitment to Greece. Internal machinations resulted in two critical 

KKE decisions that contributed to the communist defeat. The choice of 

conventional tactics committed the communists to a high-attrition form 

of warfare. Support for Macedonian independence alienated the KKE’s 

Yugoslavian benefactors. Meanwhile, the US continued to sustain the 

GNA and provide new weapons. The advisors had an increasing effect 

on Greek combat leadership, instilling aggressiveness through training, 

mentorship, directive control, and discipline. The chapter analyzes how 

the advisors had this effect, the role of Marshall Papagos, and the inability 

of the communists to recover because of nationalist pressure. During the 

1949 campaigns, the GNA demonstrated its newfound aggressive tactics 

through more effective operations that maintained a constant pursuit of the 

communist guerrillas. The war culminated in August 1949 with the final 

battles for the insurgent strongholds in Grammos and Vitsi. 

Chapter 5 begins by discussing two long-term effects of the US 

influence on the Greek military, the mixed Greek performance during the 

Korean War and the military coup d’etat in 1967. The chapter presents 

observations about how the advisors affected Greek combat leadership. 

The next section reviews the causes of the decisive nationalist victory. The 

final section discusses the implications of these conclusions and suggests 

areas for future research.
7

Notes

1. Charles R. Shrader, The Withered Vine: Logistics and the Communist 

Insurgency in Greece, 1945-1949 (Wesport: Praeger, 1999), 253.

2. Shrader, 256-257.

3. Shrader, While some insurgent ideologies, such as Maoism, are very 

flexible about tactics, the KKE followed a strict Stalinist line, which led the 

KKE’s leaders to conclude that they had to win conventionally.

4. Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, By Fire and Axe (New York: Caratzas 

Brothers, 1978), v-vii, 357-366.

5. Averoff-Tossizza.

6. Haris Vlavianos, Greece, 1941-49: From Resistance to Civil War (New 

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 8-11.

7. Edgar O’Ballance, The Greek Civil War 1944-49 (New York: Frederick 

A. Praeger, 1966), 210.

8. O’Ballance, 210-220.

9. Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 2006), 38-48, 246-329.

10. Shrader, 119.

11. Christopher M. Woodhouse, The Struggle For Greece, 1941-1949

(London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1976), 238.

12. Frank Abbott, “The Greek Civil War, 1947-1949: Lessons for the 

Operational Artist in Foreign Internal Defense” (Monograph, School of 

Advanced Military Studies, 1994), 37-41.

13. Howard Jones, “A New Kind of War:” America’s Global Strategy and 

The Truman Doctrine in Greece (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 

220-226.

14. Nicos C. Alivizatos, “The Greek Army in the Late Forties: Towards an 

Institutional Autonomy,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 5, no. 3 (Fall 1978): 

37.

15. Yiannis Roubatis, Tangled Webs: The US in Greece 1947-1967 (New 

York: Athens Printing Company, 1987), 7-9.

16. Stathis Kalyvas, “The Greek Civil War in Retrospect,” Correspondence 

no. 4 (1999): 10-11.

17. For a study of air power see M. Campbell, E. Downs, and L. Schuetta, 

The Employment of Airpower in the Greek Civil War, 1947-1949 (Maxwell Air 

Force Base: Air University, 1964).

9

Chapter 2

Background

The sufferings which revolution entailed upon the cities were 

many and terrible, such as have occurred and always will occur as 

long as the nature of mankind remains the same. . . . Revolution 

thus ran its course from city to city, and the places which it arrived 

at last, from having heard what had been done before, carried 

to a still greater excess the refinement of their inventions, as 

manifested in the cunning of their enterprises and the atrocity of 

their reprisals. . . . Thus every form of iniquity took root in the 

Hellenic countries by reason of the troubles.

— Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War

The roots of guerrilla war in modern Greece extend back to its modern 

independence, while the central political conflict that polarized the country 

began in the Balkan Wars and World War I. World War II led to increased 

communist influence, vast economic problems, further radicalization of 

Greek society, and a near communist victory that only British combat 

troops averted.1

 Post-war Greece found the communists rebuilding their 

insurgency while the government attempted to stabilize an economy in 

free-fall and field a new army and police force with British assistance

Modern Greece, 1821-1941

The Greeks have a long history of guerrilla, or bandit, warfare.2

The Ottoman Empire never succeeded in extending its full control into 

the remote mountains of Greece. The people living in the ungoverned 

mountains had developed a culture of guerrilla warfare in which bands of 

armed men known as klefts made their living as brigands.3

 In the Greek 

War of Independence, these klefts provided much of the rebels’ fighting 

strength. They also coerced the priests and major landowners in the 

towns to rebel. The entrance of Egypt on the side of the Ottomans and 

the constant factional fighting between different Greek leaders led to a 

crisis for the Greek cause in 1827. To increase their own influence in the 

eastern Mediterranean, the British, French, and Russians compelled the 

Ottomans to grant Greece its independence by destroying the Ottoman and 

Egyptian fleets at the battle of Navarino.4

 After three years of negotiations, 

all of the powers involved signed a treaty making Greece an independent 

state and a hereditary monarchy. The British, French, and Russians agreed 

that the new king would be the second son of the King of Bavaria. This 

arrangement kept Greece free of great power dynastic interests and hence 

it remained neutral.5
10

The Greeks fought several wars in the period between their 

independence and World War I, but it was the Balkan Wars immediately 

before the Great War that had the greatest impact on the future Civil 

War. In 1909 the army’s Athens garrison threatened to mutiny unless the 

government acceded to demands for greater autonomy, a reduction of 

royal influence, and expansion of the military. This first of a long series 

of military interventions resulted in the rise of Eleftheios Venizelos, a 

liberal reformer, who the military accepted because he had proven his 

nationalist credentials in Crete and was not a part of the Athens political 

circles. Venizelos pushed through liberal economic reforms and pursued 

irredentist goals that brought Greece into the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. 

Greece sought to seize territory in the Balkans and Asia Minor that had 

been Greek during classical times. Greece emerged from these wars 

with new lands in the north at Turkey’s expense. Greece gained part of 

Macedonia, the region of Epirus in the northwest, and Thrace, a stretch 

of land to the northeast along the coast.6 These new territories included 

non-Greek speakers who would provide a reliable base of support for the 

communists during the Civil War.

A dispute between Venizelos and King Constantine I in 1915 over 

which side to back in World War I shattered the sense of victory and 

unity in Greece. Venizelos believed in the Allied cause and their vague 

promises of a reward of the ethnically Greek portions of Asia Minor, while 

the king preferred to side with Germany. The pro-Venizelos and antiVenizelos camps became bitterly divided. While the debate over World 

War I alliances was the surface issue the two camps divided over, the 

dispute involved many other issues as well. Supporters of the monarchy 

and economic policies that favored the status quo united against Venizelos. 

Liberals, reformers, opponents of the foreign royal family, and advocates 

of democracy supported Venizelos. This division drove the rise and fall 

of many governments, until the final victory of the royalist anti-Venizelos 

parties in 1936. This division would also provide a central cleavage for the 

Civil War.7

In addition to the conflict between the liberal Venizelos supporters 

and the conservative royalists, the outcome of World War I led to a war 

between Greece and Turkey and massive population movements in Greece. 

The collapse of the Greek Army that ended the war with Turkey led to 

the fall of Venizelos’s government and the forced a massive population 

transfer between Greece and Turkey. This population movement and the 

integration of the northern territories Greece won during the Balkan Wars 

led to economic problems in a country that had languished economically 
11

for centuries.8 Slavic-language speaking peoples, instead of Greek speakers 

inhabited these new territories. Additionally, the majority of the refugees 

from Asia Minor, who spoke Turkish, settled in the northern territories. 

These factors created a northern population in Greece that the Greekspeakers in the more affluent south suppressed and alienated, leading these 

northern areas to be a reliable base of support for the future communist 

movement.9

 The economic hardships led to the formation of the Greek 

Communist Party (KKE) in 1918.10 The KKE had a poor showing at its 

first election in 1923, but continued to grow.11

Figure 1. Map of Greek Territorial Expansion

Source: The author created the map based on information from Wikipedia, “History of 

Modern Greece,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_modern_Greece (accessed 8 

August 2012).

The 1920s and early 1930s brought numerous governments and 

political chaos. In 1922, the king abdicated. His successor fled the 

country until a successful military coup d’etat reinstated him. There were 

also two other attempted coups d’etats in these chaotic years.12 A 1924 

national vote abolished the monarchy. Venizelos led the government for 

most of the decade, but failed to overcome the conservative resistance 

to his economic reform legislation. The absence of these reforms made 

Greece more vulnerable to the global depression and led to Venizelos’ 
12

defeat in 1932.13 This election ended the relative stability and political 

violence returned to Greece. Liberal Venizelos supporters in the military 

officer corps attempted two coups d’etat, the failure of which resulted in 

mass purges of liberal officers.14 The liberals made the second attempt to 

prevent the restoration of the monarchy. In 1935, a group of senior officers 

led by General George Kondylis forced the Prime Minister, Panagiotis 

Tsaldaris, to restore the monarchy and resign.15 The liberal and royalist 

parties closely contested the next general election in 1936. The economic 

conditions and new leadership had enabled the KKE to expand its official 

influence to over 100,000 votes in this election.16 The close run race left 

the KKE as the party with the deciding votes. It made a coalition with the 

liberal party only for King George II to invalidate the results because he 

refused to reinstate purged liberal officers and was vehemently opposed 

to the KKE. 17 The king removed the elected government and installed 

Ioannis Metaxas, a dictator with fascist leanings.18

The Metaxas dictatorship, with a remit from the king to suppress 

opposition parties, strengthened the security services and cracked down 

on the KKE and Venizelists. Metaxas tried to emulate the fascist regimes 

in Germany and Italy, although his regime was not as effective as the 

National Socialists in controlling all of the country. His efforts to eradicate 

the KKE almost succeeded. The state jailed most of the leaders and 

obtained renunciations from most members, including tens of thousands 

who had never been members. The remaining KKE and Venizelist leaders 

dispersed into small cells to hide from the security services. Some of 

these cells survived the purge to provide the nucleus of the future antioccupation resistance movements.19

In October 1940, Italy invaded Greece from the north after Metaxas 

refused Italian demands for basing concessions. The Greek army under 

command of General Alexander Papagos quickly defeated the Italians. The 

Italian offensive suffered from poor leadership, inferior artillery, the lack 

of coordination between land and ground operations, and undermanned 

units that were in the process of demobilization.20 A few months later, 

the Greek government accepted British troops as a defense against a 

potential German attack. The attack came in April 1941 and pushed aside 

all resistance. The Germans, Italians, and Bulgarians occupied Greece 

by June. Most of the royalist officers fled with the king. In contrast, the 

surviving Venizelist and KKE cells remained and built a popular resistance 

movement to oppose the Axis occupation.21
13

The Occupation of Greece

The Axis powers established an occupation that divided Greece 

between German, Italian, and Bulgarian control. The Italians controlled 

most of the country while the Germans controlled Athens, Salonica, and 

other critical areas such as Crete. The Bulgarians occupied most of Thrace 

and began settling Bulgarian immigrants on Greek land. Initially the 

occupation deliberately attempted to conciliate the Greek populace. This 

effort included public statements about Greek courage and honor, release 

of all prisoners of war, and flying the Greek flag over all public buildings. 

Nevertheless, the Germans imposed a harsh occupation, appropriating 

most of the agricultural production and taxing the Greeks to pay for the 

occupation.22 The resulting food shortage combined with a harsh winter 

caused 100,000 deaths during the winter of 1941-1942.23 The Germans 

formed a Greek government under General Georgios Tsolakoglau, who 

had commanded a corps against the Italians in Albania.24

The King of Greece had fled with many of his government officials first 

to Crete and later to London. In addition to the British and Commonwealth 

forces, the British Royal Navy evacuated approximately 50,000 Greek 

officers and soldiers to Egypt, where they became the Free Greek Forces 

under British command.25 General Papagos, averring that he could not flee 

his country when his men could not, naively believed German promises 

and surrendered. The Germans interned him in a concentration camp along 

with other political prisoners instead of releasing him with his sword as 

they did with other officers they had taken as prisoners of war.26 While 

there were many soldiers who had not escaped from Greece, they did not 

immediately form a resistance movement. While there were scattered acts 

of resistance, including pulling down a swastika from the Acropolis in 

Athens, there was minimal resistance from the Greek people for the first 

few months.27 The most significant act of resistance was the assistance 

the people provided to perhaps as many as 10,000 additional soldiers who 

eventually escaped from Greece. The people provided food, shelter and 

transportation to the soldiers who made their way to Greek civilian and 

British ships, which ferried them to safety in British territory.28

The Greek Communist Party prohibited its members from actively 

resisting the occupation, seeing the war as one between imperial powers. 

This view changed when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union on 22 

June 1941. This attack led the KKE’s Central Committee to commit to 

violent resistance to defend the Soviet Union. To achieve this purpose, they 
14

formed the National Liberation Front (EAM) in the autumn of 1941, with 

several other minor parties.29 The EAM served as an umbrella organization 

to coordinate the efforts of all Greeks against the occupation. The KKE’s 

leaders realized that their communist ideology was not resonating enough 

with the majority of Greeks, so they publically distanced themselves from 

the EAM. The KKE maintained secret control over the EAM’s leaders.30

While the KKE was building the EAM, other Greeks began recruiting 

guerrilla bands in the tradition of the klefts and andartes. Colonel 

Napoleon Zervas was the guerrilla commander of the most effective of 

these other groups. A republican officer, he was the commander of the 

National Republican Greek Association (EDES). EDES and other guerrilla 

bands took to the mountains in central Greece beginning in the spring and 

summer of 1942.31 The early actions of these groups spurred the EAM into 

forming its own guerrilla force. EAM had delayed the creation of its own 

guerrilla forces because of internal politics. The KKE members eventually 

accepted Aris Velouchiotis as the field commander even though he had 

renounced his association with the KKE during the Metaxas dictatorship.32

The andartes’ early efforts had minimal effect on the occupation 

because the bands lacked training, supplies, and operational security. 

The British, through the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the 

Secret Intelligence Service had begun operations in Greece in early 1941 

to cooperate with the resistance.33 The United States Office of Strategic 

Services would begin assisting the resistance in April 1944.34 Most of 

these operations focused on smuggling Allied personnel out of occupied 

Europe. The SOE lost contact with its networks when Greece fell and did 

not reestablish contact until October, 1941. The early efforts of the Britishsponsored networks had some successes including the sinking of several 

German tankers, but they also has several failures, including the capture 

of one British officer who under interrogation revealed the names of most 

of the politically moderate resistance leaders.35 The British escalated their 

clandestine operations in Greece in October, 1942 as the military situation 

in North Africa became critical. They parachuted teams from the SOE 

into Greece to make contact with the andartes and assess the potential 

for interdicting the German traffic in Greece, which was providing the 

logistics for the Afrika Corps, which threatened British control of Egypt 

and the Suez Canal.36

The first team made contact with EAM elements, but the commander, 

Aris Velouchiotis, avoided contact with the British because he did not 

want to risk his forces in a dangerous assault.37 Consequently, the British 

sent a second team to contact EDES. Zervas eagerly agreed to attack the 
15

Gorgopotamos Viaduct, a choke point for all Axis supplies that crossed a 

deep gorge. When he learned that Zervas was moving his force to conduct 

the operation, Velouchiotis forced his way into the plan. The operation, 

which included a joint EDES and EAM attack on the garrison, while the 

British placed explosives, destroyed the bridge on 25 November 1942, 

although the delays meant that it came too late to affect the North African 

campaign.38 The operation made EDES and EAM the two leading resistance 

movements and validated the SOE’s concept for operations in Greece. 

The SOE, in contrast to the Secret Intelligence Service and the Greek 

government in exile, was willing to back the best resistance organization, 

regardless of politics. In Greece, this meant that the British government 

backed two anti-monarchal parties that fundamentally opposed to each 

other.39

Three factors increased the political separation between the royal 

government in exile and the resistance. First, the government’s only 

liaison to the resistance died in a shootout after a betrayal in Athens on 12 

August 1941. Second, after the death of the Greek liaison officer, the SOE 

controlled all communication between the government and the resistance. 

Several officers attempted to increase the Greek representation in planning 

meetings for supporting the resistance and inserting new liaisons. These 

officers eventually resigned from the King’s service, leaving no advocate 

for a larger Greek role.40 Third, the people increased their sympathy for the 

republicans and communists who suffered from the occupation alongside 

the people instead of living in exile.41

After the Gorgopotamos operation, the Greek resistance continued to 

grow. By January 1943, Zervas had recruited and trained 1,500 guerrillas, 

armed with British supplied weapons. EAM also increased its forces, 

although it frequently conscripted young men instead of persuading them. 

EAM spread its influence across the country, especially in the northern 

mountains of Macedonia and Salonika. It became the most popular 

resistance group, although the EDES still had more guerrillas and the 

British found that EAM would often delay operations indefinitely 

despite British rifles and gold. EAM, following the guidance of the 

KKE, was building its political foundation with the people before going 

on the offensive.42 Some smaller andartes bands were more active. The 

Liberation Struggle Command, for example, under the command of 

Colonel Stephannos Saraphis, conducted effective operations with very 

small teams. EAM responded by capturing Saraphis under the pretext that 

Saraphis had been collaborating with the Italians. Once they had Saraphis 

in custody, they told him he that they would free him if he would become 
16

the EAM’s military commander. 43 Saraphis agreed, seeing that EAM was 

now the strongest resistance organization in Greece.44

During the spring and summer of 1943, the andartes increased their 

recruitment and operations against the occupation. EAM began to order 

smaller guerrilla organizations to disband and join EAM. EAM’s political 

infrastructure also increased recruitment in the towns, enabling it to 

grow to almost 14,000 guerrillas by August 1943, while EDES had only 

grown to 4,000. EDES did continue to maintain a qualitative advantage 

because former republican officers chose EDES over the communist 

influenced EAM. The Germans and Italians would reduce this EDES 

advantage through attrition because the occupation attacked EDES more 

than other andartes bands because of its higher level of activity and 

positions threatening the roads in Epirus. The British Military Mission, the 

organization that executed all British support for the resistance continually 

sought to coordinate and unify the competing resistance groups. The British 

Military Mission provided money and arms to the guerrillas in return for 

attacks against the Germans. The most important operation was Operation 

Animals, a coordinated offensive by all of the guerrillas that supported a 

British deception operation that sought to convince the Germans that the 

Allies would land in Greece instead of Sicily. This operation successfully 

induced the Germans to move three divisions into Greece.45 Other British 

efforts were not so successful. 

In August 1943, the British Military Mission transported delegates 

from each of the major groups to Cairo for a conference with the British 

command and the government-in-exile. The resistance delegates demanded 

that the king not return to Greece without a plebiscite calling for his return. 

King George II flatly refused and demanded that the conference end. 

The British government, which Prime Minister Winston Churchill had 

committed to the king’s cause, supported the king’s position, but continued 

its efforts to coordinate the angered guerrillas. The conference convinced 

the KKE and EAM that they needed to prepare for the post-war resistance 

by eliminating as much competition as possible, especially since the Italian 

surrender on 8 September 1943 and the battle of Stalingrad indicated that 

the Allies would win the war.46

The Civil War Begins

EAM started what scholars have named the first round of the Civil 

War by attacking EDES on 9 October 1943.47 A strong EAM force attacked 

EDES strongholds in Epirus, forcing Zervas to pull his fighters from a 

series of defensive lines along rivers until he was able to counterattack. 
17

But EAM’s superior numbers enabled them to attack again in January 

1943 bringing EDES to the point of destruction. At this point, the Germans 

intervened, fearing the communist EAM and preferring to keep the 

guerrillas fighting each other instead of allowing one group to dominate 

and coordinate the movement.48

Zervas kept his forces in the safe haven created by the German forces 

while the British government quickly worked to create a settlement to end 

the Civil War. The British Foreign Office, which was very suspicious of 

communist control of EAM, consistently pushed to end all aid to EAM, 

while the SOE emphasized the end to maintain pressure on the Germans. 

This bureaucratic difference was temporarily resolved in the name of 

creating a unified resistance. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office and Churchill 

tried to bring the exile government of George II to an agreement with the 

resistance. The resulting agreement, signed on 29 February 1944, ended 

the intra-Greek violence temporarily, but failed to resolve the critical 

constitutional issue, which was the status of the monarchy. The resistance 

groups, which were all anti-monarchal republicans or communists, wanted 

the king to remain outside of Greece until after a plebiscite on the king’s 

status. George II refused.49

Seeing that the government in exile would never compromise, the 

KKE and EAM sought to solidify their political base. EAM’s military 

leaders undertook a new campaign of violence against Greeks who failed 

to cooperate with EAM. EAM also created formed a new government, 

the Political Committee of National Liberation, in the northern mountains 

of Greece on 26 March 1944. This new government was solidly antimonarchal and did not openly advocate communism. EAM’s resistance 

activities earned the new government a degree of popularity with the 

people. This popularity extended to the Free Greek forces under British 

command. These units mutinied in April 1944, demanding recognition of 

the new government inside Greece. It took over a month for the British 

and the Greek exile government to suppress this mutiny, which broke the 

military forces and the exile government. The post-mutiny purge left the 

Free Greek Forces with one brigade and one commando battalion.50

With the invasions of continental Europe in France during June 1944, 

it became clear to the British officials responsible for Greece and the royal 

Greek government that they would have to enter Greece after a German 

withdrawal instead of an Allied liberation, meaning that EAM would 

control most of the territory unless the Allies rapidly occupied the country. 

This led the royalists to the conclusion that they would have to rely on 

the existing anti-communist forces in Greece. Since EAM had contained 
18

EDES and suppressed most of the rest of the non-communist resistance 

organizations, the only strong anti-communist forces in Greece were 

the German created Security Battalions. Beginning in the fall of 1943, 

the German occupation authorities had begun a new counterinsurgency 

campaign based on anti-communism. The EAM offensives against EDES 

and used violence to compel cooperation from the people eventually led 

to a large number of recruits for these Security Battalions. The Security 

Battalions supported the Axis occupation by securing cities and roads 

against EAM attacks. Throughout 1944, volunteers continued to join the 

Security Battalions despite the fact that these units were surrogates of the 

occupation. Some of the recruits were former EDES members. Others 

were individuals that had collaborated with the occupation in other ways 

and saw the Security Battalions as a way to avoid punishment for their 

collaboration after the war. The British and the exile government reinforced 

this perception through their tacit approval of the Security Battalions. 

British radio broadcasts periodically prohibited resistance attacks against 

the Security Battalions. Word of clandestine meetings between the British 

and the Security Battalions quickly spread, reinforcing the perception that 

the Security Battalions would receive favorable treatment after the war.51

Concerns about the post-war fate of Greece, amplified by the mutiny 

of the Free-Greek Forces and the presence of the Soviet military in 

the Balkans, led Churchill to come to an agreement with Joseph Stalin 

over spheres of influence in May 1944.52 Churchill ceded influence in 

Yugoslavia for a Soviet agreement to allow British dominance in Greece. 

Soviet officers arrived at the EAM headquarters in August 1944 and 

apparently influenced EAM into agreeing to the most recent powersharing plan for post-war Greece.53 These agreements however could 

not completely mitigate the inherent weakness of the royalist position in 

Greece. EAM had consolidated control over most of Greece. In September 

1944, they attacked and destroyed most of the Security Battalion forces 

in the Peloponnese. This victory gave EAM control of all of Greece 

except EDES-held Epirus in northwestern Greece. The royalists and 

anti-communists were in a very weak position as the Germans prepared 

to withdraw. Most of the anti-communists were either tainted because 

they were anti-monarchal, had collaborated with the occupation, or both. 

The purge after the April 1944 mutiny had left the Greek National Army 

with only one brigade and one battalion, plus two fighter squadrons and 

a handful of naval ships. Additionally, the British could only spare two 

brigades to occupy Greece. This balance of forces presented the EAM 

with an opportunity to seize control of the whole country.54
19

The British Occupation and the Battle of Athens

The Germans withdrew their forces from Greece to reinforce other 

fronts in October 1944. As they slowly withdrew, the conventional Allied 

forces landed and occupied vacated territory. Fearing reprisals, most of 

the resistance chose to not fight the withdrawing Germans. The British 

and US advisors with the resistance, reinforced with some additional SOE 

and Office of Strategic Services forces, got a handful of units to attack the 

Germans to prevent the Germans from transferring all of their supplies out 

of Greece. EAM succeeded in capturing several stores of weapons and 

ammunition. Meanwhile, the exile government, under the Premier George 

Papandreau, returned to Athens with the British occupation forces and 

worked to tackle the myriad problems facing Greece.55

The government, with British help and relief supplies from the nascent 

United Nations, began to address the chronic food shortages, rampant 

diseases, massive unemployment, and dilapidated infrastructure. The most 

pressing problem, however, was the creation of new security forces. While 

EAM negotiated various agreements with the Papandreau government 

about integrating the various resistance organizations into a new army 

and police force, it was simultaneously creating its own security forces 

which controlled all of Greece except Epirus and the handful of cities with 

British garrisons. The crisis over demobilizing the resistance came on 1 

December 1944 when EAM refused to integrate some of its units into the 

new military. The next day EAM staged a general strike and a massive 

protest in Athens, where the Free Greek Forces and the majority of the 

British were. The demonstration began peacefully, but as the protesters 

approached a police cordon, an unidentified police officer opened fire. 

The resulting skirmish left numerous civilians dead.56 This bloodletting 

sparked escalating protests and EAM attacks on police positions. Three 

EAM divisions advanced into Athens. The EAM forces had quickly 

overpowered the Greek government, confining its power to only a small 

portion of Athens.57

By 5 December, the situation deteriorated to the point where the 

British, under orders from Churchill, intervened to prevent the resignation 

of the Papandreau government and issued an ultimatum to EAM to 

stop the attacks.58 EAM refused to stop the fighting and pressed their 

advantage against the mostly incompetent government security forces. 

British troops, reinforced by two Indian brigades quickly transferred 

by air from Italy, assumed garrison duties from the Greek police. EAM 

units besieged the small British garrison, which only controlled three 

small sections of Athens, one of which was the critical airfield into which 
20

the reinforcements were arriving. On 10 December, the British and the 

Papandreau government decided to remove the existing sanctions on the 

former members of the Security Battalions and enlist them into the new 

security services. The British command also transferred an entire division 

from Italy to further reinforce its besieged units in Athens. With the weight 

of additional numbers and air support, the British slowly cleared Athens 

in house to house fighting against three EAM divisions. They did not 

clear the majority of Athens until New Years. The fighting continued until 

15 January 1945 when a cease-fire took effect. Under the terms of the 

cease-fire, EAM withdrew from Athens, the Peloponnese, and Salonika. 

The British forces reoccupied these areas and turned them over to Greek 

forces.59

The Greek Democratic Army

EAM sued for a cease-fire because its leaders realized that the cost of 

fighting for Athens against the British had cost too many casualties. EAM 

demonstrated that it was a far more effective fighting force than the Greek 

nationalists, but many of their units had ceased to exist while fighting the 

British for Athens. Also, the loss led to conflicts within EAM’s leadership 

ranks. Under the terms of the January truce and the subsequent political 

agreements, EAM disbanded and surrendered its weapons. The KKE core 

of EAM, however, was not prepared to disband.

The KKE leaders decided that they had to rebuild their military 

organization and reconsolidate their political position. The new military 

arm would be the Democratic Army of Greece. In building it, the KKE had 

several advantages. The KKE turned in less than half of EAM’s weapons, 

concealing the remaining weapons in a series of caches throughout the 

mountains.60 Five thousand KKE members and a number of other EAM 

veterans found refuge in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria.61 Additionally, 

the over one million displaced persons provided a potential recruitment 

pool.62 The communists still controlled the mountains and many of the 

small towns, especially in the north. 

The most important contributory factor in the growth of the Democratic 

Army was the wave of right-wing terror that swept the country after 

February 1945. There were a number of anti-communist terrorist groups, 

the most notorious being the “X” organization, that persecuted anyone 

associated with EAM. They murdered, tortured, and robbed former 

EAM members and their families. These organizations expanded their 

target lists to include moderate liberals who had opposed the Metaxas 

dictatorship or supported the republican Venizalist parties. The security 
21

services cooperated with the persecution.63 Ultra-right wing officers 

gained influence in the new Nationalist Army. They prevailed in ensuring 

that former EAM members who had been brought into the Nationalist 

Army were put on the inactive list. Simultaneously, they brought more 

and more members of the Security Battalions into the security services. 

Remembering EAM’s bloody methods during the resistance, many 

republicans who had opposed the monarchy came to see the King and the 

ultra-right wing officers who supported him as the only bulwark against a 

communist reign of terror. The white terror, as the right-wing campaign of 

violence was known, radicalized Greek society, driving individuals in the 

middle of the political spectrum to the extremes.64

The KKE had been focusing on political agitation, but the conclusion 

of the 15 December 1945 politburo meeting was that the KKE would need 

to respond militarily to the white terror. This meeting led to the formal 

creation of the Democratic Army on 12 February 1946. The old EAM 

quartermasters had been active since at least June 1945 preparing supplies 

for a new guerrilla force. Officers in the new Democratic Army began 

to build new units, visiting villages on recruiting trips and conducting 

training. 65 Following new instructions from Stalin, Yugoslavia, Albania, 

and Bulgaria offered increased support.66 From July to December 1945, 

the Soviet Union indicated a changing position on the Balkans region 

through a series of diplomatic and military moves. These moves included 

calls to renegotiate the Montreux Convention, demands for Georgia 

and Armenia, request for naval bases in the Bosporus and Dardanelles, 

and a military move against Azerbaijan.67 The KKE believed that it had 

Moscow’s blessing to initiate hostilities.

The first attack by the new Democratic Army was on 30 March 1946, 

the eve of a general election, on a small town near Mount Olympus.68

By late summer 1946, the Democratic Army regularly conducted guerrilla 

attacks on isolated outposts in the spirit of Greek guerrillas, klefts, and 

andartes throughout Greek history. The military commander, Vaphiados 

Markos, ordered an escalation in October 1946. This escalation focused on 

larger guerrilla unit attacks, up to 400 fighters, that would seize villages, 

kill the security forces personnel and other marked individuals, collect 

food and supplies, and withdraw when the reinforcements arrived. These 

reinforcements were often so slow that the guerrillas held the villages for 

days before a relief column came near.69

Markos put an emphasis on increasing the size of the Democratic Army 

so that it could contest all of Greece. By December 1946, it controlled 

large portions of northern Greece as well as many of the mountain ranges 
22

throughout the rest of the country. By recruiting former EAM guerrillas, 

Markos expanded the Democratic Army to approximately five thousand 

by October 1946. Further recruiting and conscription doubled that number 

again by the end of 1946. By establishing training camps and continuing 

recruitment during the winter, Markos had an army of 13,000 with varying 

levels of training by March 1947. To supply this expanding military, 

Markos visited the capitals of his allies Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. 

While the aid from these countries was much less than requested, it did 

enable Markos to continue offensive operations. The allied countries 

provided space for camps and supplies that enabled the Democratic Army 

to build a series of secure bases in the mountains near the border.70 Two 

years after the disastrous Battle of Athens, the communists had rebuilt a 

military and had seized the initiative from the Greek Government, which 

was struggling with a host of economic and material problems.

The Material Situation

Greece emerged from World War II in desperate straits that only 

got worse in the first post-war years. The Greek economy was already 

weak before the axis invasion because it had not industrialized and had 

been in default for half of the years since independence.71 The Germans 

appropriated as many foodstuffs and other supplies as they could during 

their occupation, contributing to the starvation. The occupation also 

destroyed a quarter of all buildings in the country while the civil war and 

the Battle of Athens interrupted the minimal trade that had survived. The 

war led to the deaths or chronic disability of 19 percent of the population.72

In the words of a US report on the Greek economy, “Greece today faces a 

desperate economic crisis – one that she cannot meet alone.”73

The Greek government, in part because it had gone through seven actual 

governments during 1945 and 1946, was failing to sustain the economy 

or raise revenue to pay for the government. The government’s budget 

was three times the total amount of currency available in the economy, 

let alone revenue the government could actually generate. Despite 700 

million dollars of international aid in 1945 and 1946, the economy was 

failing.74 A cycle of hyperinflation ensnared the economy. In 1944, the 

Greek currency, the drachma, had entered into the worst currency crash 

in world history and the crash was still disabling the country’s ability to 

function.75 By January 1947, agricultural production began to recover and 

approached its pre-war levels, but industrial production stagnated and 

the country’s infrastructure faced a “reconstruction problem of immense 

proportions.”76 The economic collapse meant that the government could 

barely function and faced severe difficulties in fielding competent security 

forces. 
23

The Greek Nationalist Army

The Greek government returned to Greece with one brigade and one 

battalion. The brigade was a mountain infantry brigade that had earned 

the name “Rimini Brigade” during the capture of Rimini, Italy.77 During 

this battle, its first, the Greek brigade fought courageously despite its 

inexperience. However, the Greeks were slow on the offensive and relied 

on frontal attacks. The independent battalion was the “Sacred Band,” an 

elite formation that fought alongside the British Special Air Service in 

North Africa.78 The British Military Mission took the lead in creating a 

new nationalist army for Greece and used these two units as the officer 

cadre for three new divisions.79 These officers were extremely loyal to 

the crown, having survived the purges of politically suspect moderates 

after the April 1944 mutiny. These politically aware officers collaborated 

with clandestine right-wing organizations that sought to use violence and 

harsh punishments against anyone tainted with communism or republican 

ideas.80

The three senior British advisors, who had non-voting seats in the 

Supreme Council of National Defense, helped design a force structure that 

quickly expanded to almost 100,000 soldiers by the end of 1946. This 

rapid expansion, however, meant that many of the conscripted soldiers 

deserted and the officers trusted few of the remaining soldiers since the 

officers suspected them of having communist or liberal sympathies. The 

Democratic Army’s escalating operations led to an increase in the police 

and then arming of village home guards. In the minds of many civilians, 

widespread extortion and murder (frequently for revenge against EAM) 

tainted the security forces. The nationalist army committed most of its 

forces to static defense, even prohibiting units from leaving their post to 

relieve other units that were under attack. When the army did undertake 

offensive operations, they took the form of massive clearing operations 

conducted in accordance with a strict timetable. The forces would leave 

a village after a set period, no matter the results of the operation at that 

point. To hold the village, the army only left a handful of gendarmes, a 

force too weak to resist any guerrilla attack. This meant that the guerrillas 

retained the initiative, able to avoid contact whenever they chose to.81

The nationalist army suffered other problems as well. The nationalist 

army so centralized its command authority that division commanders 

could not move any units without approval.82 The bankrupt government 

could barely sustain, pay, train, and equip its rapidly expanded army, 

let alone an air force and a navy. The army did not have enough trucks 

to move its forces or food to feed them. The army was also required to 
24

support 7,000 soldiers who the army confined to an island prison camp 

because the royalist government suspected their loyalties.83

All of these problems compounded as casualties rose from the 

guerrilla attacks that destroyed the isolated units on static defense and 

killed civilians that provided intelligence to the government. While the 

Greek army defeated the Italians in 1940, it steadily declined to the 

point of crisis in 1947. The purge of moderate and liberal officers and 

noncommissioned officers reduced the number of qualified leaders. The 

politicization increased until “the officer corps was honeycombed with 

secret leagues and associations.”84 Repeated purges and the interference of 

politicians in officer personnel decisions undermined the GNA’s tactical 

effectiveness.85 Additionally, while many of the communist officers gained 

valuable experience World War II, the Free Greek Forces that formed the 

basis of the GNA fought only one short campaign in Italy. The GNA’s rapid 

expansion between 1945 and 1947 also reduced the GNA’s effectiveness 

by diluting the already scarce combat experience. The decline in nationalist 

combat effectiveness by the winter of 1946-1947 led to a crisis for the 

Greek government. The KKE and its Democratic Army had a growing 

momentum.

Summary

The Greek nation, with its long history of guerrilla war had a 

government that was struggling to stabilize the economy and security 

situations. The division between the liberals and royalists that began 

just before World War I radicalized society with decades of bloodshed. 

The deleterious effects of World War II compounded an already weak 

economy and left the state with few resources on which to draw to combat 

the communist threat. All of these factors resulted in a military that was 

paralyzed and unable to defeat the Democratic Army.
25

Notes

1. Andre Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, Black Terror (New York: Basic 

Books, 2004), 143-147.

2. The nationalist government labeled the communist guerrillas bandits 

and used the term bandit warfare.

3. Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1992), 15.

4. The War of Independence was also the first US involvement in a Greek 

war. In the spirit of philhellenism, the US government provided moral support, 

private citizens donated money, and a few traveled to Greece to fight in the rebel 

forces. One American rose to the rank of Lieutenant General in the Greek Army. 

Concerns about lost trade with the Ottoman Empire and a possible European 

response in the western hemisphere convinced President James Monroe to 

reverse his announced decision to send military aid. Michael B. Oren, Power, 

Faith, and Fantasy (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2007), 107-111.

5. Clogg, 42-48.

6. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans Vol 2 Twentieth Century

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 95-100.

7. Clogg, 86-93.

8. Jelavich, 406; Clogg, 105-108.

9. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 2006), 311.

10. Averoff-Tossizza, 7-8.

11. Vlavianos, 8-11.

12. Clogg, 103-119.

13. Vlavianos, 11.

14. Clogg, 116.

15. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 13.

16. Vlavianos, 10.

17. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 27-30.

18. Gerolymatos.

19. Averoff-Tossizza, 31-36; Gerolymatos, 29-30.

20. Williamson Murray and Alan Millett, A War to be Won: Fighting the 

Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 95-98.

21. Clogg, 121-123; Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 32-39.

22. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 46-47.
26

23. Clogg, 123-125.

24. O’Ballance, 47.

25. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 45; Averoff-Tossizza, 57.

26. Averoff-Tossizza, 57-58.

27. Clogg, 125.

28. Averhoff-Tossizza, 57.

29. The exact date is unknown. The KKE claimed that it was formed on 

27 September 1941, but KKE documents do not mention the EAM until later 

in 1941. Kousoulas, 149. For simplicity, this paper will use EAM for both the 

Front and its military arm, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS is 

most of the literature). The military arm was officially created on 22 May 1942. 

Gerolymatos, 73.

30. O’Ballance, 50.

31. Clogg, 129; O’Ballance, 53.

32. Kousoulas, 149.

33. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 60-63.

34. Richard H. Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central 

Intelligence Agency (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2005), 116-117.

35. This unfortunate event contributed to the decline of the moderates in 

Greek political life, contributing to the beginning of the Civil War. Gerolymatos, 

Red Acropolis, 60-65.

36. O’Ballance, 55.

37. Kousoulas, 156.

38. Hugh Gardner, Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Warfare in Greece, 

1941-1945 (Monograph, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military 

History), 79-86.

39. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 72-78.

40. Clogg states that the government-in-exile chose not to support the 

resistance because sabotage would only increase the suffering of the people; 

Clogg, 129.

41. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 68-70.

42. Kousoulas, 158-160.

43. O’Ballance, 58-59.

44. Averoff-Tossizza, 84-85. This seemingly easy and quick change of 

heart is a bold claim. Averoff-Tossizza claims to have access to Saraphis’s 

relatives who support his claim about Saraphis’s motivations. 

45. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 81-83.
27

46. Kousoulas, 169-172.

47. Clogg, 132.

48. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 85-86.

49. Averhoff-Tossizza, 93-96; Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 85-88.

50. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 89.

51. Andre Gerolymatos, “The Security Battalions and the Civil War,” 

Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 12, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 17-27.

52. They negotiated the settlement in May 1944, but did not make it official 

until October 1944. Clogg, 133.

53. Clogg, 134-135.

54. Averohoff-Tossizza, 106-110; O’Ballance, 87.

55. O’Ballance, 88-89.

56. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 99-107.

57. O’Ballance, 97.

58. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 113.

59. O’Ballance, 98-108; Clogg, 137; Averhoff-Tossizza, 115-127; fatally, 

EAM diverted a significant amount of its fighters from Athens to Epirus to 

destroy EDES. While it destroyed EDES, EAM did not have enough combat 

power to seize the last few blocks of Athens before the British reinforcements 

arrived. Averhoff-Tossizza, 129-131.

60. Averhoff-Tossizza. 

61. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 205.

62. Gerolymatos, 196.

63. Vlavianos, 79-80.

64. Andre Gerolymatos, “The Road to Authoritarianism,” Journal of the 

Hellenic Diaspora 35, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 14-17; O’Ballance, 115.

65. O’Ballance, 121-123.

66. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 208-209.

67. Kousoulas, 230.

68. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 209-210.

69. O’Ballance, 128-130.

70. O’Ballance, 131-133.

71. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoth, This Time is Different: 

Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

2008), 98.
28

72. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 196.

73. Paul A. Porter, “American Economic Mission to Greece,” Papers of 

Paul A. Porter, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO, 5-6.

74. Porter, 2.

75. Reinhart and Rogoth, 12.

76. Porter, 18-21.

77. The battle began on 13 September 1944 with German attacks from 

their Gothic defensive line. Attached to the 2 New Zealand Division, the 

Greeks withstood several attacks by German paratroopers from the 1 Parachute 

Division and Turkoman (foreigners, mostly Czarist Russians or Turkic soldiers 

from the Soviet Union) troops from the 162nd Division. The New Zealand 

22 Motor Battalion reinforced the Greeks providing tank support. The Greeks 

advanced slowly with support from Canadian and New Zealand forces. British 

Commonwealth units seized San Marino and the ridge overlooking Rimini on 

20 September, which led the Germans to conclude that their Rimini positions 

were untenable. On 21 September, Greek and New Zealand forces entered 

Rimini after the Germans withdrew from the city. The New Zealanders’ official 

history noted the Greeks courage, especially in the defense. It also records slow 

Greek offensives, inexperienced troops, high casualty rates, frontal assaults, and 

difficulty with combined arms. These traits would also characterize the future 

Greek nationalist forces. Jim Henderson, 22 Battalion, The Official History of 

New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-1945 (Wellington, New Zealand: 

Historical Publications Branch, 1958), http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/

tei-WH2-22Ba.html (accessed 15 November 2012), 341-347; Robin Kay, 

Italy Volume II: From Casino to Trieste, The Official History of New Zealand 

in the Second World War 1939-1945 (Wellington, New Zealand: Historical 

Publications Branch, 1958), http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2-

2Ita.html (accessed 15 November 2012), 211-227.

78. The unit was named after the famed Theban Sacred Band, which may 

date back to the battle of Plataea in 479 BC, where, “keen to fight . . . 300 of 

the best and most prominent of [the Thebans] fell.” Herodotus, The Landmark 

Herodotus, Translated by Robert B. Strassler (New York: Pantheon Books, 

2007), 698.

79. Kousoulas, 229.

80. Alivizatos, 40.

81. Kousoulas, 241; O’Ballance, 129; Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 222.

82. O’Ballance, 129.

83. United States Army Group Greece, “Official History of the 

United States Army Group Greece,” Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, 

Independence, MO, Records Group 407: records of the Adjutant General’s 

Office, 1917, Boxes 39-40, 47, 98-99.
29

84. Thanos Veremis and Andre Gerolymatos, “The Military as a 

Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 

17, no. 1 (1991): 115.

85. Veremis and Gerolymatos, 117-120.

31

Chapter 3

The Truman Doctrine and the Beginning of the US Mission 

March 1947-February 1948

But to capitalize on this effort GNA must come alive and GNA 

commanders must take aggressive action.

— Brigadier General Reuben Jenkins, Cable to VIII Division

In response to the threat of communist expansion around the globe, 

the United States government quickly created the American Mission for 

Aid to Greece (AMAG) in Greece to organize its assistance efforts to 

the besieged Greek nationalist government. The administration initially 

focused this mission on rebuilding the economy and material support for 

the nationalist army. The massive infusion of material and political support 

from the United States to Greece did not improve the Greek security 

situation by the end of 1947. Despite 300 million dollars of the US aid in 

the form of everything from weapons and rations to planes, the nationalist 

army was still not able to defeat the communist Democratic Army in the 

field or separate them from the rural population. A growing sense of failure 

led by the end of 1947 to a decision that the United States would have to 

expand and alter its assistance program to provide operational advice to 

the nationalist military to defeat the communist guerrillas.

Strategic Situation

After World War II, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the 

United States deteriorated into the Cold War, a period of hostility short 

of open warfare. After the British government announced that it could no 

longer afford to assist the Greek government combat the KKE, the Truman 

administration decided to implement the Truman doctrine to prevent the 

spread of communism.

Beginning of the Cold War

Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States after World 

War II became more hostile. US officials working with the Soviet Union 

had begun feeling frustrated with their supposed allies even during the 

war.1

 Attempts by the Truman administration to first win Soviet trust and 

then to bargain over influence in different parts of the world failed to 

achieve stable agreements. The first approach assumed that the problem in 

Soviet relations was that the Soviet Union did not trust the United States, 

so more transparency would alleviate the problem. The second approach 

assumed that the Soviet Union would make deals with the United States in 

exchange for aid. These attempts failed because the United States did not 
32

have sufficient leverage to get the Soviets to agree to the United States’ 

positions.2 George Kennan, a Foreign Service officer who would later 

help formulate the administration’s policies toward Greece, attributed the 

Soviet intransigence to their domestic political structure in a 1946 telegram 

that quickly gained the approval of the administration.3

 This telegram and 

a subsequent article in Foreign Affairs suggested a long-term strategy to 

contain Soviet aggression while ensuring the “health and vigor” of western 

civilization until the internal nature of the Soviet state changed.4

The Soviets began challenging US interests in the greater 

Mediterranean region in 1946. In August, they renewed their interest in 

more influence in Turkey, including demanding joint control over the 

Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. Yugoslavia also demanded territory 

from Italy, while Bulgaria demanded the return of Thrace from Greece. 

While the Truman administration rebuffed these communist demands, 

the incessant communist expansion troubled the administration. The 

dispute over Turkey led to a September 1946 State Department report that 

recommended a firm policy against Soviet expansion.5

Throughout the rest of 1946, several Soviet actions indicated to the 

United States that the Soviet Union had aggressive intentions in Greece 

and around the world. US intelligence acquired access to meetings in 

which communist officials indicated that they were embarking on a path 

of communist expansion by all means short of general war. An intelligence 

report in December 1946 led the Truman administration to conclude that 

Greece would be the first target.6

 Communist propaganda increasingly 

focused on the shortcoming of Greek democracy and the rampant abuses 

of power by the royalist Greek government.7 While the administration did 

not have proof of Soviet complicity in the Greek communist insurgency, 

it did have evidence of Yugoslavian, Albanian, and Bulgarian support. 

Moreover, it suspected that Moscow would keep its hands clean until 

the communists had achieved control over at least a sizeable portion of 

Greece.8

The Soviet Union at a minimum provided diplomatic support to the 

KKE. When the Greek government asked the United Nations Security 

Council to investigate aid for the guerrillas flowing across the northern 

Greek borders, the Soviet Union initially blocked any investigation. When 

they did acquiesce to the creation of a Balkan Commission, the Soviet 

representative on the commission attempted to disrupt the commission’s 

investigation. Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria refused to allow the 

commission to cross into their territory to conduct the investigation.9

 The 
33

Soviet members on the commission worked to keep the commission in 

Athens and expand its scope to look at the abuses of the Greek government.10

By the beginning of 1947, there was a general consensus in the 

Truman administration that the Soviet Union and its communist allies in 

the Balkans were using subversion to expand southward into Greece and 

Turkey.11 Furthermore, the administration had concluded that successful 

communist control of these two countries would threaten US access to the 

Middle East, which in turn would threaten the United States economy.12

The continued failures of the Greek government, including its inability 

to accommodate political moderates, defeat the growing number of 

communist guerrillas, or stabilize its economy made the United States’ 

interests in the region vulnerable.13

The Creation of the Truman Doctrine

The British government, while it had been the principal power 

buttressing the nationalist Greeks against the communist threat, concluded 

that it would have to pull out of Greece because of its urgent fiscal 

difficulties. On 21 February 1947, the British Government told the Truman 

administration that it could no longer afford its aid program to Greece.14

This letter led the Truman administration to a series of policy studies that 

quickly led to the conclusion that the US could not allow the communists 

to control Greece.15 This message sped up a process of increasing US 

aid for Greece that had been slowly building momentum. Because of the 

increasing communist threat to Greece, the Secretary of State, George 

Marshall, sent Paul A. Porter to Greece in January 1947 to assess the 

level of US aid necessary to stabilize the Greek economy. Porter’s report 

provided the basis for organizing and appropriating funds for the AMAG. 

Porter concluded that the United States would need to contribute at least 

350 million dollars (equivalent to three and a half billion dollars in 2012 

terms).16

However, the obvious failings of the Greek government caused the 

Truman administration to delay its new aid program until the British 

withdrawal announcement created a new sense of urgency. Porter and 

Marshall were concerned that the Greek government was too oppressive and 

too reactionary to be a good partner for the United States. US Ambassador 

Lincoln MacVeagh was more supportive of the Greek government, but 

believed that it had to incorporate the opposition parties.17 The royalist 

Populist Party dominated the Greek government, which alienated a large 

percentage of the people including all of the moderates through harsh 

treatment in the name of anti-communism. In the words of a report by 
34

the office of Governor Dwight Griswold, who would lead the US mission 

in Greece, the Greek government had “adopted a policy of repression.”18

Individuals who cooperated with the Metaxas dictatorship and the Axis 

occupation dominated the Populist Party.19 Napoleon Zervas, who had 

commanded EDES and became an example of the ultra-right-wing officials, 

was implementing such repressive measures by right-wing terrorist groups 

that he was “making more communists than he [was] eliminating.”20 King 

George II’s attitude of “condescension” toward the Greek people, with 

no “genuine passion for improving the welfare or living standards of the 

people,” may have reinforced this pervasive government attitude of harsh 

measures.21

The potential to lose Greece after the British withdrawal and some 

Greek efforts to ameliorate the Truman administration’s concerns about 

their domestic politics influenced a rapid decision-making process in the 

Truman administration. Within days of the British announcement, the 

administration had decided to implement a major aid package for Greece 

and Turkey. After gaining the support of crucial leaders in the Congress, 

President Truman announced what came to be called the Truman Doctrine 

and requested a comprehensive program in an address on 12 March 1947 

to a joint session of the Congress. The Congress passed Public Law 75, 

which authorized economic and military aid, to include “a limited number 

of members of the military . . . in an advisory capacity only.”22

Under the authority of this new law, the State Department established a 

new organization, the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG). The 

President appointed Governor Dwight Griswold as the Chief of Mission. 

This led to an awkward arrangement since the United States would have 

two Chiefs of Mission in Greece, Griswold and Ambassador Lincoln 

MacVeagh. Both were personal representatives of the President. In an 

attempt to delineate responsibilities, the administration eventually told 

Griswold to limit his activities to administering the aid program and leave 

political advice to MacVeagh. The administration told both men that the 

US interest in Greece was preventing the Soviet Union from controlling 

Greece, which would deny the US access to the strategically important 

Aegean and eastern Mediterranean Seas and grant it to the Soviet Union 

access.23 The instructions to the Chief of the American Mission for Aid to 

Greece specified the US objectives in Greece as the “maintenance of the 

independence and integrity of Greece, specifically to keep Greece from 

falling into the Soviet orbit; and development of the economy of Greece 

on a self-sustaining basis as soon as possible.”24 The State Department 
35

was also concerned that a communist victory in Greece would influence 

the 1948 elections in Italy in favor of the communists, which in turn would 

bolster the communist party in France.25

Despite the gravity of the threats to US national interest in Greece, 

there were significant limitations on America’s commitment. Within 

months of President Truman’s announcement of programs aid to Greece 

and Turkey, political pressure began building to reduce these programs 

in the name of easing economic conditions inside the United States. 

Senator Robert Taft (Republican, Ohio) led the opposition, saying that the 

President preferred to spend money abroad rather than bring down prices 

at home.26 The administration had apparently anticipated these problems 

in creating the aid programs. Despite the lofty language in Truman’s 

speeches, the planning assumptions for the aid program included two very 

optimistic assumptions. The first assumption was that the Greek army 

would be able to “suppress armed resistance and restore internal order” 

by the end of 1947. The second assumption was that AMAG would have 

“reasonable success reform[ing] public administration.”27 The Truman 

administration faced competing priorities. To expand the Greek security 

forces and execute major reconstruction project required more funding, 

but the Greek government could not afford its current expenditures. 

Without major cuts in Greek defense spending, the Truman administration 

would have to commit between 125 and 135 million dollars in 1947 alone 

just to keep the Greek government solvent, let alone balancing the Greek 

budget.28 Influential voices inside the administration, including Kennan, 

repeatedly sought to limit US military involvement because of the dangers 

of being trapped in an undesirable military conflict if it made too great 

of a military commitment to Greece.29 The administration would have to 

balance this against the need to support the domestic economy and limit 

liabilities around the world. This tension led the administration to hope for 

a quick victory and reduced budgets for its Greek program.

The Greek Communists

This section will explain how the KKE and its Greek Democratic Army 

gained momentum throughout 1947. The government security forces were 

unable to prevent the communists expanding their control of rural Greece 

or executing attacks in the cities. Although they did not achieve all of their 

goals and had some tactical defeats, the communists increased their armed 

force by 500 percent, which contributed to a sense of momentum by the 

winter of 1947-1948.
36

Creation of Communist Controlled Zones

With the creation of the Greek Democratic Army in October 1946, 

the communists embarked on a strategy of controlling territory that they 

could deny to nationalist forces. The most important stronghold for the 

communists was in the Grammos and Vitsi Mountains. These mountains 

controlled access to the borders with Yugoslavia and Albania. They were 

also some of the most imposing mountains in Greece. Markos, the military 

commander of the Democratic Army, established his command post and 

ordered his logistics units to start stockpiling concealed supply stores in 

the Grammos area. The guerillas used this strategically important area as 

a base until the end of the war. To deny access to the nationalist forces, 

the communists used mines, bunkers, anti-tank weapons, and anti-aircraft 

artillery.30

The communists expanded this control in the rural mountains across 

Greece, especially in the north. Rough, constricted, mountainous terrain 

covers 60 percent of Greece, making it relatively easy for mobile guerrillas 

to block roads and isolate small nationalist units.31 Frequently they used 

small operations to attack isolated government positions, government 

officials, informants, and right-wing terrorists. The communists expanded 

these zones in a general eastward line from the Albania border, which 

provided them secure lines of communication into much of Greece and 

threatened to isolate northern Greece from government forces. Small raids 

attacked villages to kill government officials, acquire food and supplies, 

seize weapons and ammunition, and coerce the population to not cooperate 

with the government.32 When attacking a military position, they generally 

conducted a “quiet infiltration of the perimeter of Nationalist positions, 

followed by an assault on both the outer defenses and the main body of 

defending troops . . . [then a] withdraw under cover of machine and mortar 

fire.”33

Once they forced the government to withdraw its forces from a 

village, the communists established a uniformed home guard. These 

units maintained order in the villages, provided logistical support for 

the regular insurgent units, and punished those who cooperated with the 

government. In secure areas, the communists established bases. They 

relied on concealment to protect these bases instead of overt defense. In 

areas that the guerrillas had not secured, they organized clandestine groups 

of villagers to collect information and supplies for local guerrillas.34

In the spring 1947, the communists began a new willingness to engage 

in battle with the government forces in an attempt to expand their zone of 
37

uncontested control in the northern mountains. The guerrillas conducted 

successful spoiling attacks against a major GNA operation in June 1947. 

The purpose of this fifteen-battalion GNA operation was to occupy a line 

of villages that paralleled the Albanian border. The GNA claimed to have 

inflicted 300 casualties on the insurgents, a heavy toll for the insurgents. 

Nevertheless, the attack did force the Greek General Staff to commit 

another corps, B Corps, to continue the operation.35

In response to the continued operation, on 12 July 1947, a column of 

approximately 2,500 Democratic Army soldiers crossed the border from 

Albania into Greece, isolated and captured the border town of Konitsa. 

The communists continued their advance for three days and thirty miles 

until the Government forces finally checked the communist progress at 

the town of Kalpaki. This column was well supplied with mule trains and 

heavy weapons.36 The GNA eventually defeated these major communist 

attacks, but not without difficulty. Moreover, the scale of the attacks called 

into question the ability of the GNA to defeat the communists. On the 

other hand, the repeated assaults on government positions led to significant 

casualties for the communist forces. These repeated assaults and their 

high casualties were the result of a deliberate decision to challenge the 

nationalists with a conventional military. The KKE leaders’ Stalinist 

ideology led them to believe that the Democratic Army had to win in 

conventional battle.

Building the Democratic Army

These major operations were the result of the KKE’s policy of 

expanding and transforming the Democratic Army into a conventional 

military capable of seizing and defending territory. This transformation 

slowly integrated the dispersed guerrilla bands into companies of sixty 

to eighty men, into battalions by January 1948 and finally into brigades 

and divisions. The KKE decided on this conventional military policy 

during several meetings during 1946 and 1947 over the objections of the 

military commander Vafiadis Markos. The KKE’s political leader, Nikos 

Zachariadas, was a devoted Stalinist and wanted to model his Democratic 

Army on the Red Army.37

In communist controlled areas, the Democratic Army established 

training camps and logistical units. According to one estimate, the 

Democratic Army averaged 8,000 officers and soldiers in military schools 

at any given time. Many of these facilities were in the communist states to 

the north, especially the officer and technical schools, but there were local 

training camps for each regional command. The insurgents also recruited 
38

or drafted villagers to fill their expanding ranks and to replace casualties. 

As the nationalist forces attrited their pool of willing volunteers, the 

insurgents increasingly used conscription to fill their ranks. Throughout 

1947 and into 1948, the communists were able to find enough recruits 

to field a force of over 20,000 regulars, in addition to at least 70,000 

auxiliaries.38

As of 1 January 1948, the KKE had organized the Democratic Army 

around battalions consisting of 200-300 infantrymen. Three battalions 

composed a regiment, which also had a heavy machine gun company. 

In some of the twenty-five area commands, the commanders had begun 

forming divisions of three regiments each. The twenty-five area commands 

were divided into four regional commands, which reported to Markos.39

For most operations, the Democratic Army still fought at the company and 

battalion levels. Only for major operations would these separated units 

combine. The dispersion helped control more territory and was closer to 

a “traditional” guerrilla disposition, but it meant that senior officers had 

little experience maneuvering large formations during the few combined 

operations.40

External support was critical to the development of the Democratic 

Army. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania all provided direct support while 

other communist countries, including the Soviet Union, provided moral 

support or carefully concealed and limited material support. The United 

Nations’ Balkan Commission documented evidence of all three countries 

providing sanctuary, transportation, protection, training, weapons, 

supplies, and medical aid.41 An example of Yugoslav lethal support was 

artillery that enabled the Democratic army to shell Salonika for months 

during the autumn and winter of 1947.42 A 25 December 1947 meeting of 

the international communist organization decided to authorize the formal 

creation of a Free Government of Greece, to be located in Yugoslavia. 

The meeting decided that all communist countries except the Soviet Union 

would recognize the new government within three months. Additionally, 

Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union pledged to provide additional military aid. 

The Yugoslav representative pledged seventy light tanks, sixty armored 

cars, and an unspecified number of volunteer units.43 The Democratic 

Army was disappointed in the level of support from Moscow. Stalin 

provided morale and propaganda support, but refrained from actions that 

could incur international opprobrium for expanding past their sphere of 

influence.44

The Democratic Army had plenty of weapons and frequently had 

enough food, fodder, fuel, ammunition, and other classes of supply. By 
39

January 1948, the insurgents had enough small arms for their growing force. 

They also had mortars, artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, bazookas, mines, 

and machine guns in sufficient quantities.45 The insurgent logisticians’ 

main problem was delivering the supplies to the widely dispersed fighters. 

The logistical demands increased as they transformed into a conventional 

military.46

Expanding Control

While the Democratic Army experienced difficulties in transforming 

its guerrilla units into a conventional military, it was successful in 

expanding its control over northern Greece and parts of south. This 

expansion had proceeded so far by September 1947 that the communists 

had effective control over most of the northern half of Greece except for a 

handful of cities. Communist influence extended beyond the rural villages. 

In the cities, the KKE adopted a policy of attacking the ability of the 

Greek government to rebuild the economy.47 Senior KKE political leaders 

operated in Athens by October 1947. There they had sources close to the 

senior leaders of the Greek government, supported sabotage operations, 

and attempted to infiltrate social groups, especially labor unions.48

Several tactics enabled the Democratic Army to secure large areas and 

deny it to all but the largest nationalist offensives. First, the continued 

attacks on small units led the nationalist army and the gendarmerie 

to withdraw from many locations. In some cases the government had 

attempted to arm civilians, but these efforts usually failed because 

lightly armed civilians could not withstand a communist attack without 

military support. Second, the guerrillas mounted sustained attacks on the 

infrastructure, which effectively isolated large portions of Greece from 

government road and rail traffic. Third, the communist auxiliaries and 

counterintelligence organizations were gaining control of the population 

in areas abandoned by the government. Guerrilla attacks on railroads, 

roads, and villages in Thrace in northeastern Greece, brought the situation 

to the point of crisis. The constant attacks forced the nationalist security 

forces to abandon all positions along the Bulgarian border and pull out of 

the villages.49 This communist progress was a dire threat to the integrity of 

Greece and called into question the ability of the Greek military to defeat 

the “bandits” as the military referred to the insurgents.

The Material Situation

In March 1947, the Greek economy was essentially in as bad a situation 

as it had been in 1944 at the end of the German occupation, despite two years 

of British and United National relief aid.50 AMAG took a comprehensive 
40

view of the requirements for rebuilding the Greek economy. The overall 

mission, under the leadership of the State Department, provided assistance 

to almost every aspect of economic and political life in Greece. The US 

Army Group--Greece (USAGG), subordinate to the AMAG, provided 

massive amounts of aid directly to the nationalist army. A third major 

initiative was the creation of the National Defense Corps to increase the 

number of forces combating the communist insurgents. These three major 

programs made a significant contribution to the Greek war effort, but 

the situation after a year of these efforts was still bleak, leading to the 

conclusion that economic aid could not defeat the insurgents.

Rebuilding the Economy

The AMAG provided assistance to almost every part of the Greek 

government under eleven different programs ranging from reconstruction 

to labor relations. AMAG saw this economic reconstruction as the crucial 

element in bolstering the nationalists against the communist threat. A brief 

survey of the various AMAG projects can convey the scope of the US 

economic aid program. The AMAG reconstruction priorities were roads, 

bridges, tunnels, railroads, ports, the Corinth Canal, flood control and 

irrigation. Other programs sought to improve agriculture, industry, mining, 

exports, and public health.51 To improve governance, AMAG brought in 

lawyers and accountants to revise the tax code, change Greek accounting 

procedures, reform banking laws and reform foreign exchange and credit 

markets. Advisors also assisted in creating new laws and systems for 

health, civil service, social security, labor relations, public works, hygiene, 

and several other areas. The mission directly purchased and distributed 

food items that were in short supply, provided reconstruction materials, 

and supervised vaccination programs. The American mission worked with 

the Greek government to develop an eighteen-month budget that attempted 

to balance revenues and expenditures.52

However, the continued poor security situation mitigated these positive 

economic results. Guerrilla activity on the roads prevented supplies from 

reaching much of the rural population. The guerillas captured or destroyed 

much of the material purchased with the economic reconstruction funds.53

Additionally, the continued conflict led to tens of thousands of new refugees. 

By the end of 1947, there were 430,000 refugees, mostly in governmentoperated camps. In the first quarter of 1948, there were an additional 

87,000 refugees. These refugees drained the government coffers, absorbed 

a significant amount of government administrative capacity, and reduced 

the total capacity of the economy by removing hundreds of thousands 

from the workforce.54 An assessment by AMAG officials in July 1947 
41

concluded that the security situation was so bad that “unless the guerrilla 

warfare is eliminated or greatly reduced, little progress can be made in 

the reconstruction of Greece.”55 Consequently, on 6 January 1948, the 

State Department advised AMAG that “destruction of the guerrilla forces” 

was of “paramount importance,” meaning that military programs would 

have priority over economic and reconstruction aid.56 AMAG would first 

focus on countering the guerrillas and then on improving governance and 

addressing the root causes of the insurgency.

Sustaining the Greek Military

The War Department, under the auspices of Public Law 75, create the 

United States Army Group-Greece on 14 April 1947. The USAGG was 

subordinate to the AMAG and initially had seventeen officers, two soldiers, 

and twenty-five civilian personnel under the command of Major General 

William G. Livesay. Livesay had both combat and logistics experience. 

He commanded the 91st Division commander in the European Theater 

during World War II and had served as a lieutenant and captain in World 

War I.57 After returning from Europe, he commanded a logistics unit and 

a mobilization unit.58 The War Department restricted USAGG’s mission 

to only supply matters, believing that the mission could be “effective 

simply by furnishing the Greek armed forces with what supplies and 

equipment they needed for the conduct of successful operations against 

the guerrillas.” Additionally, the army wanted to avoid the perception 

of conducting military operations in Greece.59 These restrictions meant 

that only the British provided training to the Greek military. The British 

Military Mission, which had a smaller presence after 31 March 1947 

retained responsibility for overseeing basic training.60

Soon after arriving in Greece, however, the US officers began requesting 

additional authority because the original instructions did not give them 

enough flexibility to achieve their mission. On 4 June 1947, Ambassador 

MacVeagh forwarded a USAGG request with his endorsement for the 

USAGG commander to attend meetings of the High Military Council.61

This still limited USAGG’s influence since it did not yet have authority 

to attend the Supreme National Defense Council, the equivalent of the US 

National Security Council.

The Greek government agreed to significant US control over the 

Greek budget. AMAG had to approve all ministerial budgets and the 

USAGG had approval authority over the size, organization, and budget 

of the Greek security forces. The Greek military budget, not including the 

US contributions, was 584.5 billion drachma, or 44 million dollars.62 This 
42

meant that in dollars the US aid package was paying for two thirds of the 

Greek military expenditures. Under US pressure to balance the budget, the 

Greek military made a 24 percent cut.63 These cuts came despite Greek 

requests to expand the military and were a reflection of AMAG’s priority 

of making the Greek security forces sustainable by the Greek economy. 

The USAGG oversaw a total of 171,850,000 dollars of military 

aid from March to December 1947. This included 40 million dollars of 

transferred material and 74 million dollars of purchased material. Some 

of the procurement included four 500-bed hospitals, 6,500 trucks, 70,000 

rifles, and 75 combat and cargo aircraft.64 USAGG’s quartermaster section 

was responsible for feeding all Greek servicemen, including the army, 

air force, navy, gendarmerie, and police. The USAGG also provided for 

the sustenance of the 7,000 “category c” personnel. They were soldiers 

who had been inducted into the army, but then kept in camps on an island 

because of suspected communist sympathies.65

The USAGG faced continual difficulties in providing enough support 

to keep the Greek military operational. In the winter 1947-1948, a failure 

of supply supervision in the Greek air force resulted in a total loss of 

all winter weight lubricants for the aircraft, requiring the USAGG to 

make emergency procurement and transportation to enable the planes 

to resume operations. The nationalist army chose to put hundreds of the 

American provided supply trucks into storage, even though they could 

have alleviated the some of the crippling supply problems for units in the 

field. The Greek officers chose to store these new trucks because they did 

not have a stockpile of spare parts even though each of the operational 

corps had only eight or nine trucks for sustainment. The ordnance section 

of the USAGG formed maintenance inspection teams once it realized that 

the Greek military was not conducting routine maintenance its of weapons 

and vehicles. Poor animal treatment, a dearth of veterinary supplies, and 

ignorance of pack-animal techniques resulted in some mule units, which 

were essential for mountain operations, being reduced by 50 percent.66

Because it was providing most of the funding for the Greek military 

the United States government had de facto control over the size of Greek 

military after 31 March 1947. AMAG’s initial position was to not increase 

the size of the nationalist army, even though the British Ambassador 

to Greece delivered a report to Ambassador MacVeagh on 24 February 

1947 that contended that the Greek Army had to be expanded beyond its 

current 100,000-man ceiling and reorganized if it was to be able to attack 

the guerrillas.67 The Truman administration would eventually authorize 

several increases in the size of the nationalist army during 1947. The 
43

administration changed its policy because it recognized that the nationalist 

army was not able to defeat the communists at its 100,000 man size. The 

nationalists’ military failures convinced Livesay in August 1947 to support 

the increases even though he had been arguing that the Greek army was 

large enough. He changed his position because he came to believe that the 

Greek officers would not be able to use efficiently the men they had, so 

they would need extra manpower.68 The Truman administration authorized 

several increases that brought the permanent size of the GNA to 132,000 

in December 1947.69 A temporary authorized personnel overage put the 

GNA strength to 142,000 in January 1947. 

The Greek General Staff organized its forces into three field divisions, 

five mountain divisions, three independent brigades, and seven military 

districts. All of these units reported to one of three corps headquarters. 

A Corps reported directly to the General Staff while B and C Crops were 

subordinate to the First Army. There were also 24 commando companies 

that made up the Raiding Force Headquarters, a separate unit that reported 

to the First Army.70

The Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) had expanded with the help 

of US procurement to three Spitfire equipped fighter squadrons, one 

reconnaissance squadron flying Harvards and Austeres, and a transport 

squadron flying C-47s and Ansons.71 Livesay and the other US officers 

would repeatedly push for increased RHAF funding because of their 

demonstrated aid in attriting the guerrillas. Some estimates indicated that 

the RHAF accounted for most of the communist casualties.72

Partially because of its rapid growth, the military had numerous 

personnel problems. Many young men, especially those in rural areas, 

were able to evade the draft because the government officials frequently 

lacked the transportation to travel to many areas to enforce the draft. 

These rural soldiers, being familiar with life in the mountains would have 

been more valuable than city-dwellers. Moreover, politicians frequently 

interfered to prevent the army from drafting sons from well-connected 

families. This contributed to an overall shortage of educated soldiers to 

fill technical specialties. The army responded by increasing the time of 

service for educated soldiers, which reinforced the incentive for families 

to use their connections to avoid the draft.73

Even with the manpower increases, the army lost territory to the 

communists, especially after September 1947. This was partially because 

most of the nationalist army spent their time in static defensive positions, 

which enabled the guerrillas, at an estimated strength of 22,000 in January 
44

1948, to maneuver relatively unmolested.74 The Greek General Staff’s 

solution to the nationalists’ inability to defend all of the vulnerable areas 

was to arm civilians on a wider scale than in the past so that these militias 

could assume the static positions, freeing the army to pursue the insurgents.

Creating the National Defense Corps

The nationalist army had been arming civilians on an informal basis 

for years to increase the total number of counterinsurgents. The GNA 

was inconsistent in the level of support it gave to these civilian units. 

The USAGG sought to have the army formalize this process by creating 

self-defense units for defensive missions with identified leaders and 

accountability. The Greek military’s initial budget for 1947 included 

provisions for 5,000 men in Civilian Self-Security Units.75 Beginning in 

June, they began lobbying Livesay for funding to expand these militia units. 

Livesay endorsed this request on 26 June 1947.76 The final authorization 

came in September 1947, when the USAGG and the Greek General Staff 

agreed to organize twenty battalions of 500 men each into a new National 

Defense Corps (NDC). The military recruited men who had already 

completed their national service or had been ineligible for the draft to man 

the new units, in which the men would guard their own villages. The intent 

of these units was to free the army from static defense operations, so that 

it could conduct offensive operations against the guerrillas. Although the 

Greek government had authorized a budget to equip these battalions, that 

money never materialized, leaving the USAGG with the responsibility of 

arming the new units. USAGG did so, and used already allocated funds to 

field forty-two battalions in 1947.77

Within months it was clear that even these forty-two battalions would 

not be enough to enable the nationalist army to go on the offensive. 

Livesay made this conclusion in December 1947, recommending that the 

US government authorize 100 battalions.78 The Truman administration 

allocated the funds to raise the additional fifty-eight battalions to bring the 

total to 100 NDC battalions with 50,000 men. Many of the men inducted 

into the NDC were World War II veterans and knew the terrain and 

people of their villages intimately, giving them an important advantage 

in countering the communist insurgency.79 However, in large part these 

NDC battalions were not making the GNA more mobile because the GNA 

established these new militia units in areas where there were no nationalist 

troops. Consequently, few army garrisons were relieved, and the army 

expected the paramilitary NDC to fight on their own without support or 

supervision from army units.80 The lack of supervision and support from the 

Greek army for the NDC meant that NDC performance was inconsistent at 
45

best. The communists were frequently able to take government-provided 

weapons away from the paramilitary units that were not supported by 

regular army units in close proximity.81 The failures of the NDC were one 

more in a series of ineffective government attempts to defeat communists.

The Greek National Army and the US Advisors

The security situation deteriorated despite nationalist attempts to defeat 

the insurgents and the massive influx of US aid. In September 1947, there 

was a sense of crisis as the communists gained control of large portions 

of northern Greece. This crisis led to an US decision to increase its focus 

on military aid and provide operational advice to the Greek military. The 

Truman administration provided for a new advisory group to address a 

critical weakness in the Greek military—leadership.

Unsuccessful Battles

By August 1947, the aggressive willingness of the communists to risk 

close combat had “caught the GNA off balance.”82 The Greek General Staff 

responded by ordering a series of operations to clear insurgent strongholds 

in the northern mountains and in the Peloponnese. The first operation, on 

14 August 1947 by thirteen battalions attempted to destroy the guerrillas 

in the Grammos mountains area, a long-time communist stronghold. A 

communist counterattack stalled the offensive and led the nationalist 

army to withdraw on 22 August because their soldiers were exhausted. 

The GNA quickly followed with another operation, this time targeting 

the mountains near the Yugoslav and Bulgarian borders. The month-long, 

sixteen-battalion operation failed to engage the guerrillas who were able 

to evade the slow moving government troops.83

In October, the GNA began an operation to trap a guerrilla force of 

1,500 men in northwestern Greece near Epirus. The nationalist troops 

moved faster than normal and threatened to encircle the communist forces. 

To prevent this, a second Democratic Army unit seized Motsovon on 19 

October, a pass on the only road connecting Epirus with the rest of Greece. 

It took the Greek military until 30 October to retake Epirus, by which 

time all of the communist soldiers had evacuated the area to a new line 

along the Grammos Mountains. The nationalist army continued to press 

the attack, but the communists broke through the nationalists’ lines again 

on 25 November. The GNA chose not to pursue.84

While the GNA executed these operations, the Democratic Army 

unveiled its new artillery during a raid on the town of Pendelefon and 

expanded its operations in southern Greece in the Peloponnese. In 

November 1947, the Greek Foreign Minister told Ambassador Dwight 
46

Griswold that the Greek government considered the road from Athens to 

the Peloponnese cut by guerrilla activity.85 The General Staff ordered the 

army to clear the Peloponnese, which the army attempted for three weeks. 

The operation inconvenienced the guerrillas, but failed to bring them to 

battle or improve the security on the roads.86

The guerrillas continued to demonstrate their strength by attacking 

Konitsa for a second time on 24 December 1947. Approximately 3,500 

guerrillas maintained their attack on the nationalist garrison, the VII 

Division, which had been reinforced after the July 1947 communist seizure 

of Konitsa. The nationalists inflicted heavy casualties, but only because 

the communists continued to assault their positions for two weeks before 

withdrawing. A simultaneous wave of attacks by communist saboteurs 

in the major cities contributed to a sense of defeat. In the wake of these 

battles, the Greek General Staff did not plan any operations for the rest of 

the winter or the following spring.87

There were some positive aspects to the Greek military performance 

in 1947. One bright spot was the increasing effectiveness of the RHAF. 

By October 1947, they were flying 570 sorties a month and responsible 

for the majority of the casualties. Nevertheless, the Democratic Army was 

able to retain the initiative. The “Government forces did not participate 

in a single major engagement that they were not forced into by initial 

guerrilla action.”88 The Greek soldiers were courageous when “forced into 

skirmishes,” but their commanders were often “reluctant to order their 

men to destroy surrounded guerrillas or to pursue guerrilla units which 

had commenced to withdraw.”89 As a result, the Democratic Army had 

the freedom to conduct operations across most of Greece. By December 

1947, the situation had deteriorated to the point that the State Department 

and National Security Council considered the deployment of up to a corps 

from the US Army to control Greece’s northern border or secure the main 

cities.90

The Greek army’s official explanations for its failure to defeat the 

guerrillas centered on reasons why it could not carry the fight into the 

mountains. They did not have enough machine guns or artillery, and they 

had not yet have sufficient security in the cities. One US observer in the 

mission, John Coppock, noted that the Greek General Staff had an interest 

in keeping US military forces in Greece as a deterrent against aggression 

from their northern neighbors. Consequently, at least some officers did 

not want to defeat the insurgency completely. They were unwilling to 

undertake an aggressive campaign against the insurgent strongholds in the 

mountains.91
47

The US assessment at the end of 1947 concluded that guerrilla groups 

maintained the initiative and in their fighting against government forces 

were able to participate in decisive combat or avoid it as they chose. Rebel 

groups were able to move freely over large portions of Greece and could 

infiltrate through Greek Army lines and concentrate in other areas. Over 

wide areas, the guerrillas terrorized the populace by savage raids against 

villages and by acts of sabotage against government installations. For 

short periods, the guerrillas were able to control extensive stretches of 

territory.92

The Greek government, the senior Americans in Greece, and the 

Truman administration had all concluded that US material and moral 

support would not be sufficient to defeat the communist threat. Until the 

Greek security forces could isolate areas from communist influence, AMAG 

and the Greek government could not govern or address the population’s 

grievances. Individuals in these organizations had been working toward 

this consensus since August 1947. 

The Decision to Provide Operational Advice

In August 1947, the USAGG recognized that an expanded training and 

supply mission would not be sufficient to field an effective Greek army. 

An intelligence summary of the US reports from Greece indicated that the 

situation in Greece was precarious and that the nationalist army was unable 

to defeat the guerrillas.93 Based on his observations of Greek operations, 

Livesay concluded that Greek officers were not aggressive enough and 

did not know how to prepare and use their men. In a 31 August 1947 

meeting of the Supreme National Defense Council, Livesay brought up 

several criticisms of the GNA. He stated that the Greek officers were not 

preparing their soldiers for operations, citing the fact that most operations 

rapidly culminated because the soldiers’ feet were too sore to continue. 

Additionally, the General Staff was not managing its units so that there 

could be a rotation to allow units to rest and conduct training while other 

units pursued the guerrillas.94 Livesay reiterated his criticism of Greek 

commanders on 6 October 1947 by recommending that the Minister of War 

relieve the C Corps commander for a lack of diligence and aggressiveness. 

This commander, Major General Papageorgios, had consistently failed to 

see his units in the field and issued orders prohibiting patrols in less than 

company strength, an order that would dramatically reduce the chance of 

finding the enemy. Livesay also recommended the relief of the most senior 

officer, the Chief of the General Staff for not cooperating with the Prime 

Minister. The Minister of War did not follow these recommendations.95
48

The US advisors would find many examples of Greek officers who 

did not want to take aggressive action or did not know how to command 

their forces effectively. A battalion commander in Salonika did not 

even consider sending infantry to attack a communist artillery position, 

preferring to attempt to suppress it with his own mortars.96 Greek officers 

preferred “fighting at long range,” resulting in an inability to compel the 

guerrillas into positions where the GNA could destroy them.97 Greek 

commanders would frequently use a technique that the Americans dubbed 

the “double-company.” A brigade commander would assign an objective 

to two companies from two different battalions under the command of 

an officer from a third battalion. The result was that everyone ended up 

waiting for the other units. This situation suited all of the officers since 

they all had ready excuses for their failure to find the enemy--they could 

always blame the other battalions.98

The USAGG officers recognized that it would have to expand its 

operations beyond the War Department restrictions, up to the full extent 

authorized by Public Law 75.99 On 15 September 1947, Griswold sent 

an urgent cable to the Secretary of State, George C. Marshall about the 

deteriorating situation and his recommendations. Based on the conclusions 

of his staff and Livesay, he averred that the United States should deploy 

150-200 officers to provide operational advice to the Greek General Staff 

and tactical units. Griswold argued that “an offensive spirit and [the] benefit 

of tactical advice to eliminate continued ineffective military operations 

which play directly into communist hands.”100 Based on the urgency of 

the situation, Griswold also recommended transferring six million dollars 

from the reconstruction accounts to military aid, continuing a temporary 

20 thousand man increase in the size of the nationalist army, and funding 

a permanent 10 thousand man increase.101

Within four days of receiving this cable, the Chief of Staff of the 

Army sent the Army G-2, Director of Intelligence, Major General Stephen 

Chamberlin, to Greece to assess the situation before the Army agreed 

to support Griswold and Livesay’s requests.102 Chamberlin delivered 

his exhaustive report on 20 October 1947. This report agreed with the 

assessment of Livesay, Griswold and other US observers. The root of the 

problem was in declining soldier quality, poor officer combat leadership, 

lack of senior officer offensive spirit, poor unit training, and a lack of 

cooperation. To remedy these problems, he recommended expanding the 

NDC, US operational advice to the senior leaders, and US observers with 

tactical units.103 Chamberlin’s report coincided with an official request from 

the Greek government for operational advice. President Truman agreed to 
49

expand operational advice down to the division level on 11 November 

1947.104 The Joint Chiefs of Staff initiated a study of the Chamberlin 

Report, which resulted in new directives on 11 December 1947 on how to 

organize the new advisory organization.105

Creation of the JUSMAPG

On 31 December 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the Joint United 

States Military Advisory and Planning Group-Greece (JUSMAPG). This 

organization reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of AMAG. 

Both AMAG and JUSMAPG had command authority over USAGG, 

which continued to execute the sustainment mission.106 The USAGG in 

turn reported to the Army staff, not to the Joint Chiefs as the JUSMAPG 

did. Initially only AMAG had authority over the United States Naval 

Group-Greece, but JUSMAPG had its own naval section to advise the 

Greek Royal Navy. It would take over a year before the leaders in Greece 

were able to streamline this confusing organization.107

The Joint Chiefs gave Livesay command of both JUSMAPG and 

USAGG.108 He immediately began to build the new advisory organization 

as the 170 (90 officers and 80 soldiers) newly assigned personnel began 

arriving in Greece in December and January. Livesay had two criteria for 

the officer advisors: graduation of the Command and General Staff College 

and combat experience.109 He created four sections to advise the Greek 

General Staff on personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics. These 

General Staff advisors and Livesay, as the chief advisor and member of the 

Supreme National Defense Council, had five tasks: monitoring the military 

situation, “formulate plans for the employment and coordination of the 

Armed Forces of Greece,” advise the Joint Chiefs and the Chief of AMAG 

on how to use the Greek military, provide operational advice, and ensure 

that “operational returns are commensurate with the aid furnished.”110 The 

wording of the second and fifth tasks clearly indicates that Livesay and 

JUSMAPG intended to have a significant level of influence over Greek 

military operations.

To provide operational advice and monitoring of GNA operations, 

Livesay created eleven field teams to advise the First Army, the three corps, 

and the seven divisions of the GNA. These teams and the General Staff 

advisors spent six weeks until the end of February assessing the GNA. 

The product of this assessment was a plan with the objective of ending the 

war in 1948. To accomplish this ambitious goal, JUSMAPG requested to 

expand the nationalist army another 13.6 percent to 150,000 men.111 The 

Truman administration denied this request for budget reasons, although it 
50

would approve on 27 March a subsequent request to fund a 15,000 man 

temporary personnel overage for six months.

These new US advisors, combat veterans of World War II, did not 

confine themselves to only assessing the Greek military. Livesay’s 

instructions to the new advisors included this guidance: “you must insist 

on aggressive action . . . we must instill aggressiveness in them; they must 

carry the fight to the bandits.”112 From the beginning of his command in 

Greece, Livesay had been emphasizing aggressiveness. In July, he relieved 

two colonels for a lack of aggressiveness, even though they were ordnance 

specialists and technical experts.113 While these advisors were positioned 

at the general staff, corps, and division levels, Livesay instructed them 

to “maintain close personal contact with lower echelons . . . to insure 

aggressive action.”114

The emphasis on aggressiveness soon resulted in reports of US officers 

commanding Greek units in combat. On 10 February 1948, Democratic 

Army units shelled the city of Salonika.115 The Greek Navy and Air Force 

responded by attacking suspected communist positions with bombs and 

naval gunfire.116 Additionally, local GNA units encountered communist 

units. A United Press journalist reported that Colonel Regnier, a division 

level advisor, led a platoon assault up a hill to seize a communist position. 

Since Public Law 75 prohibited US personnel from commanding Greek 

units, this story started a significant fracas.117 However, the subsequent 

actions of Livesay and the officers in the Plans and Operations Division 

of the Department of the Army indicate that they did not want to hinder 

aggressive US officers who were pushing Greek units to close with and 

destroy communist units. The investigation consisted of an interview with 

Regnier and the journalist, which satisfied the investigating officer that 

Regnier was only advising and that the journalist had relied on Greek 

sources, having not seen the battle himself.118 The command submitted a 

memorandum by Regnier stating that he had been advising a Greek major 

who “seemed to be helpless in the situation.”119 With this documentation, 

the Army considered the issue closed. As long as the US officers could 

write a memorandum stating that they were advising, the chain of command 

would not restrict them, even if it was a veteran infantry colonel advising 

a Greek lieutenant from the center of the lieutenant’s formation during 

a battle. Aggressive US officers would still be able to have significant 

influence over tactical operations. At this same time, the US advisors were 

in the process of gaining more influence over the entire Greek chain of 

command from platoon level to the Greek General Staff.
51

Greek Leadership

The Truman administration based its decision to provide operational 

advice on the evolving US recognition that leadership failures were a 

primary cause of the GNA’s ineffectiveness against the communists. The 

advisors to the General Staff quickly realized that “the Chief of Staff had 

little authority over his subordinate commanders, orders from the [Greek 

General Staff] were often ignored by lower commanders, [and] cabinet 

members and other politicians gave orders to commanders in the field, 

completely disregarding the army command structure.”120 While the 

General staff had minimal ability to control operational aspects, it attempted 

to micromanage every administrative detail. On one occasion, the General 

Staff spent two hours debating the promotion of one lieutenant.121

Throughout the Greek military, the US advisors saw a general passive 

defensive mindset and a lack of initiative. Livesay summarized these 

observations in a briefing to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General 

Omar Bradley. Among his nineteen points, he stated that “officers are 

afraid to take the initiative;” there is a “disinclination to come to grips with 

the bandits and a lack of offensive spirit;” and, officers feel that there “is 

no determined political leadership.” RHAF commanders had given their 

pilots orders to “fly sorties only on demand from the army and then as few 

as possible.”122 The US officers believed that this poor leadership from 

platoon to cabinet level was defeating the nationalist cause.

On 31 January 1948, the Greek cabinet ordered changes in the military 

organization that sought to minimize US and British influence and prevent 

the rise of a single powerful general. The changes abolished the First Army, 

resulting in all three corps reporting to the General Staff. It also moved 

operational decisions from the High Military Council, over which the US 

advisors had developed significant influence, to the Supreme National 

Defense Council. The two US representatives, Livesay and Griswold, both 

sat on this council, but could not vote, a fact that limited their influence 

on contested issues. Cabinet members began bypassing the Greek Chief 

of Staff and even corps commanders to give orders directly to battalions 

in the field.123

On 14 February 1948, in response to this maneuver by the Greek 

cabinet, officials representing the British and US ambassadors met with 

the Prime Minister and his cabinet. They delivered a letter demanding 

increased independence for the GNA Chief of Staff and specified roles 

for the US and British advisors. Centralizing control of the military under 

the Chief of Staff was a means of limiting political micromanagement and 
52

leaks about operations to the communists that were decreasing military 

effectiveness.124 The letter had an attached agreement that required the 

Greek government to acknowledge the authority of the US advisors. While 

it stated that they were only advising not commanding, the agreement 

required the Greek government to consult with the US and British advisors 

on every decision that affected the military. This included “all questions 

of command, organization and training, the strategy and tactics of the 

anti-guerrilla campaign, all plans of contemplated operations, all laws and 

decrees affecting the army, and all appointments or promotions to the rank 

of brigadier or higher.”125 The agreement also listed an appeal process if a 

Greek official disagreed with the US advice. This process was to refer the 

question to the Prime Minister who had to consult the AMAG Chief, US 

Ambassador, and the British Ambassador before making a decision. The 

requirement would have made it clear to any Greek officer that he would 

have to listen to US advice since the Americans had just demonstrated that 

they had significant negotiating strength over the Prime Minister.

The Greek government agreed with the Americans, and issued the 

necessary orders on 19 February 1948 to implement the new agreement.126

The JUSMAPG General Staff advisors immediately began pushing the 

plans officers in the Greek General Staff to plan a major offensive to clear 

the Roumeli of all guerrilla activity. As a measure of the Americans’ new 

influence, they were able to overcome resistance from the Greek officers 

who did not want to dedicate three divisions to the Roumeli operation 

because that would have meant accepting risk somewhere else. The 

General Staff also acceded to the US suggestions to establish mobile 

reserve forces in each of the major regions so that they could counter 

guerrilla operations. The Greek General Staff had opposed both of these 

recommendations because they preferred to keep as many troops as 

possible in static positions, as they had been doing for the whole war.127

Summary

The continued communist successes during 1947 demonstrated to the 

US advisors and the Truman administration that the critical weakness of 

nationalist government was the GNA’s combat leadership. The conclusion 

led to the decision to extend operational advice. It also led the US advisors 

to conclude that they had to find a way to instill aggressiveness in the 

nationalist military. The advisors continued their focus on aggressiveness, 

even if imparting aggressiveness to their Greek counterparts required 

the advisors to enter combat or attempt to control the GNA. The next 

major change came on 24 February when Major General James Van Fleet 

assumed command of JUSMAPG.128 The arrival of a new US commander, 
53

the increased US influence, and the planned spring 1948 offensives marked 

the beginning of a new phase in the Greek Civil War.
54

Notes

1. John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1982), 13-17.

2. Gaddis, 19.

3. George Kennan, Telegram from George Kennan to George Marshall, 22 

February 1946, President Harry S. Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.

org/

whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/6-6.pdf (accessed 25 

August 2012); George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign 

Affairs 25, no. 4 (July 1947): 566-582.

4. Kennan, 17.

5. Jones, 7-10.

6. Jones, 11-13.

7. Lawrence S. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 56-57.

8. Jones, 5.

9. Intelligence Division, “Soviet Intransigence in the Greek Border 

Investigation,” Intelligence Review, no. 79 (21 August 1947): 23-31. Archives, 

Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

10. Mark Ethridge, Telegram to the Secretary of State, 17 February 1947, 

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, http://

digital.library.

wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS, 830 (accessed 10 October 2012).

11. However, there was increasing friction between Yugoslavia and the 

Soviet Union that had begun in 1946. This friction would lead to an open split 

that harmed the KKE. See John Swissler, “The Transformations of American 

Cold War Policy Toward Yugoslavia, 1948-1951” (Ph.d diss., University of 

Hawaii, 1993), 3-17.

12. Wittner, 20-21. The United States was partially concerned about 

securing access to Middle Eastern oil.

13. Wittner, 50-52, 60; Jones, 24.

14. Department of State, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, “Critical 

Situation in Greece,” 20 February 1947, General Records of the Department 

of State, Records of the Officer-in-Charge of Greek Affairs, Subject File 1944-

1951, Box 39.

15. Department of State.

16. Paul A. Porter, “Report of the American Economic Mission to Greece,” 

Paul A. Porter Papers, President Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, 

11a. Conversion to 2012 dollars based on the Consumer Price Index, calculated 
55

using MeasuringWorth.com, “Measuring Worth,” www.measuringworth.com 

(accessed 19 October 2012).

17. Jones, 28-30.

18. Griswold, “Memorandum re Greek Situation,” 2.

19. Coppock, “Greece-End of 1948,” 4.

20. Dwight P. Griswold, excerpts from letter to the State Department, 14 

August 1947, Dwight P. Griswold Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, 

Independence MO, Box 1, 2.

21. Paul A. Porter, “American Economic Mission to Greece Diary 22 

January 1947,” Paul A. Porter Papers, President Harry S. Truman Library, 

Independence, MO. 

22. Public Law 75, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_

collections/

doctrine/large/documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1947-05-

22&documentid=5-2 (accessed 1 October 2012).

23. Dwight P. Griswold, “Memorandum Re Greek Conditions,” Dwight P. 

Griswold Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence MO, Box 

1 AMAG Correspondence, 1; Intelligence Division, “The Military Topography 

of Greece,” Intelligence Review, no. 81 (4 September 1947): 30-38, Archives: 

Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

24. George C. Marshall, letter to Dwight P. Griswold, Dwight P. Griswold 

Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence MO, Box 1, 2.

25. Dwight P. Griswold, undated and untitled essay, Dwight P. Griswold 

Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence MO, Box 1, 2.

26. Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President,” 5 June 1947, Official 

File, 426, President Harry S. Truman Library, Independence MO, Box 1426.

27. George C. Marshall, telegram to Paul Porter from George Marshall, 

1 March 1947, Paul A. Porter Papers, President Harry S. Truman Library, 

Independence, MO, 2.

28. Lincoln MacVeagh, telegram to George Marshall from Lincoln 

MacVeagh, 2 March 1947, Paul A. Porter Papers, President Harry S. Truman 

Library, Independence, MO, 1-2.

29. Plans and Operations Division, Memorandum for General Wedemeyer, 

“State Department Views Reference Greek Problem,” 29 December 1947, 

Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, National Archives 

and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 319, Entry 154, 

Decimal File 091, Box 13.

30. Shrader, 140.

31. Intelligence Division, “The Military Topography of Greece,” 
56

Intelligence Review, no. 81 (4 September 1947): 30-38, Archives: Military 

History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

32. Intelligence Division, “Armed Band Activity in Greece,” Intelligence 

Review, no. 50 (30 June 1947): 18-19, Military History Institute, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA.

33. Intelligence Division, “The Greek Guerrillas-How They Operate,” 

Intelligence Review, no. 156 (March 1949): 33, Archives: Military History 

Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

34. Shrader, 114.

35. US Army, History of the Joint United States Military Advisory and 

Planning Group-Greece, United States Army Unit Dairies, Histories and 

Reports, Miscellaneous Units, Records Group 407, President Harry S. Truman 

Library, Independence, MO, 37.

36. George C. Marshall, “Memorandum for the President, Subject: Greek 

Situation,” 16 July 1947, Harry S. Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s File, 

President Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, Box 112, 1-3.

37. Kousoulas, 252-254; Shrader, 65-71.

38. Shrader, 97, 114.

39. US Army, JUSMAPG, 17.

40. Shrader, 223.

41. Herbert Evatt, “Committee No. 1 (Political) of the United Nations, 

Speech of the Australian Foreign Minister on the Greek Question,” Harry S. 

Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s File, President Harry S. Truman Library, 

Independence, MO, Box 157, 6-7.

42. “Quarterly Report on Aid to Greece and Turkey,” Official File 426, 

President Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, Box 1426, 21.

43. It is not clear how much of the pledged aid Yugoslavia actually 

delivered to the KKE. Department of State, Intelligence Report, date of 

information 26 December 1947, President’s Secretary’s File, President Harry 

S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, Box 112, 1-5; Yugoslav soldiers were 

enlisted in Greek guerrilla units as part of their service to Yugoslavia: US 

Army, “Bandit Activity on Yugoslavian-Greek Frontier,” 25 August 1947, 

Army Intelligence Document File, BID 394852, Records Group 319, National 

Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

44. Shrader, 170. There were unconfirmed reports of Soviet offers to 

provide jet fighters and Soviet officers in Greek uniform. There is no evidence 

that these offers materialized into actual aid. For example, see US Army, BID 

394852.

45. US Army, “Bandit Weapons in the 588th Battalion,” Army Intelligence 

Document File, BID 494972, Records Group 319, National Archives and 

Records Administration, College Park, MD.
57

46. Shrader, 147-148.

47. US Army, “KKE Activities,” Army Intelligence Document File, BID 

337557, Records Group 319, National Archives and Records Administration, 

College Park, MD.

48. Department of State, “The Communist Party of Greece,” General 

Records of the Department of State, Records of the Officer-in-Charge of Greek 

Affairs, Subject File 1944-1951, Box 39.

49. American Embassy, Athens, Greece, Memorandum of Conversation, 

“Situation in Thrace,” 10 September 1947, Records of the Army Staff, Plans and 

Operations Division, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park, MD, Records Group 319, Entry 154, Decimal File 091, Box 13.

50. John Coppock, “Memo from Greece,” John Coppock Papers, President 

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, Box 1, 3. 

51. Department of State, Letter of Instruction to Dwight Griswold, 12 

July 1947, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and 

Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records of the Office of Greek, 

Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Subject File 1947-1950, Box 1.

52. Harry S. Truman, “Quarterly Report on Aid to Greece and Turkey,” 

President Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, Official File 426, Box 

1426, Folder Greece and Turkey 1947, 33, 36-37.

53. William Livesay, Memorandum for Dwight Griswold, “Increase 

in Strength of the Greek Army,” 21 August 1947, General Records of the 

Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park, MD, Records of the Officer-in-Charge of Greek Affairs, Subject File 1944-

1951, Box 39.

54. Truman, “Quarterly Report on Aid to Greece and Turkey,” 35. 2986.

55. Loy Henderson, “Skouras Memorandum,” Dwight G. Griswold Papers, 

Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO, Box 1, 1; Department 

of State, “Comments on Griswold Report for Month of August,” 15 October 

1947, General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Officer-inCharge of Greek Affairs, Subject File 1944-1951, Box 39.

56. Plans and Operations Division, “Future Concept and Objectives of 

Military Aid for Greece,” Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations 

Division, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, 

MD, Records Group 319, Entry 153, Decimal File 091, Box 74; US Army, 

JUSMAPG, 46.

57. “World War Veteran Takes Command of Fir Tree Division; Promises 

Strenuous Action,” Camp White Grenade 22 July 1943, 1, Archives: William G. 

Livesay Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

58. Benjamin Taylor, Memorandum for the Department of State, 12 June 
58

1947, Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, National 

Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 319, 

Entry 153, Decimal File 091, Box 74.

59. United States Army Group-Greece, History of the Joint United States 

Army Group-Greece, United States Army Unit Dairies, Histories and Reports, 

Miscellaneous Units, Records Group 407, President Harry S. Truman Library, 

Independence, MO, 75-76; Colonel Lehner, Cable to War Department Plans 

and Operations, 14 June 1947, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint 

United States Military Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, 

Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 112.

60. Intelligence Division, “Capabilities of the Greek National Army,” 

Intelligence Review, no. 96 (18 December 1947): 50, Archives: Military History 

Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

61. Lincoln MacVeagh, Message for the Secretary of State, 4 June 1947, 

Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, National Archives 

and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 319, Entry 153, 

Decimal File 091, Box 74.

62. The author converted the drachma into a dollar sum using an estimate 

of actual market exchange rate (as opposed to the official rate or purchasing 

power parity) for February 1948. The rate was 13,000 drachmas for one dollar. 

Exchange rate reported in: American Mission for Aid to Greece, Monthly Report 

of the Chief of AMAG to the Secretary of State, 15 April 1948, General Records 

of the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, 

College Park, MD, Records Group 59, Records of the Office of Greek, Turkish, 

and Iranian Affairs, Subject File, Greece-Turkey 1947-1950, Box 21, 12.

63. United States Army Group-Greece, History of the Joint United States 

Army Group-Greece Vol II, United States Army Unit Dairies, Histories and 

Reports, Miscellaneous Units, Records Group 407, President Harry S. Truman 

Library, Independence, MO, 29.

64. US Army, USAGG Vol II, 13, 44, 57-58, 95.

65. US Army, 97-98.

66. US Army, 16, 42, 49, 73-76, 97-98.

67. Lincoln MacVeagh, telegraph 27 February 1947, Paul A. Porter Papers, 

President Harry S. Truman Library, Independence MO, 1-4.

68. William Livesay, Memorandum for Dwight Griswold, “Increase 

in Strength of the Greek Army,” 21 August 1947, General Records of the 

Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park, MD, Records of the Officer-in-Charge of Greek Affairs, Subject File 1944-

1951, Box 39.

69. US Army, USAGG Vol II, 14.
59

70. US Army, JUSMAPG, 47.

71. US Army, 48.

72. William Livesay, Cable dated 29 August 1947, Records of Interservice 

Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, Records 

Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 112, 3.

73. US Army, JUSMAPG, 23.

74. US Army, 47.

75. US Army, USAGG Vol II, 30, 40.

76. William Livesay, Cable to Dwight Griswold, 26 June 1947, Records of 

Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, 

Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 112.

77. US Army, JUSMAPG, 29.

78. US Army.

79. E. J. C. Hare, “Report of Field Trip to Lamia,” 8 December 1947, 

General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Office of Greek, 

Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Subject File 1947-1950, Box 14; US Army, 

USAGG Vol II, 14.

80. US Army, JUSMAPG, 48.

81. United States Army Group Greece, “Minutes of Meeting Held in 

General Livesay’s Office,” 12 September 1947, Records of the Army Staff, 

Plans and Operations Division, National Archives and Records Administration, 

College Park, MD, Records Group 319, Entry 153, Decimal File 091, Box 77.

82. US Army, JUSMAPG, 37.

83. US Army, 37-38.

84. US Army, 38-39.

85. American Mission for Aid to Greece, Telegram for the Secretary of 

State, 29 November 1947, Harry S. Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files, 

President Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, Box 112, 2.

86. US Army, JUSMAPG, 39.

87. US Army, 16, 39, 47.

88. US Army, 40.

89. John O. Coppock, “Greece,” John O. Coppock Papers, President Harry 

S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, 4-5; US Army, JUSMAPG, 40.

90. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “Greek 

Situation,” General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Officerin-Charge of Greek Affairs, Subject File 1944-1951, National Archives and 

Records Administration, College Park, MD, Box 39; Department of State, 
60

“Function of Foreign Troops in Greece,” 12 January 1948, General Records of 

the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park, MD, Records of the Officer-in-Charge of Greek Affairs, Subject File 1944-

1951, Box 39.

91. Coppock, “Greece,” 18.

92. US Army, JUSMAPG, 19.

93. Intelligence Division, “The Military Situation in Greece,” Intelligence 

Review, no. 77 (7 August 1947): 37-42, Archives: Military History Institute, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA.

94. William Livesay, Diary, 31 August 1947, William Livesay Papers, 

Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Livesay had apparently become 

more aggressive in his criticisms of leadership failures during August. His 

diary for the beginning of the month gives the impression that he was fairly 

passive during meetings, even when the discussion turned to the relief of general 

officers, for example see the entry for 4 August 1947.

95. William Livesay, Diary, 6 October 1947, William Livesay Papers, 

Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

96. William Livesay, untitled speech, 16 January 1948, William Livesay 

Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 4. 

97. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “Greek Situation,” 

General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Officer-in-Charge of 

Greek Affairs, Subject File 1944-1951, Box 39.

98. James A. Van Fleet, “Interview with General James A. Van Fleet by 

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Williams,” James A. Van Fleet Papers, Military 

History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Interview 3, Tape 3, 9.

99. US Army, USAGG Vol II, 13.

100.Dwight G. Griswold, “AMAG 222,” Dwight P. Griswold Papers, Harry 

S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence MO, Box 1, 2-3.

101.Griswold, 1-3.

102.Department of State, telegram to Griswold, 19 September 1947, Dwight 

P. Griswold Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence MO, 

Box 1, 1. 

103.Stephen Chamberlin, “The Greek Situation: Report to the Chief of 

Staff,” 20 October 1947, Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations 

Division, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 

Records Group 319, Entry 154, Decimal File 091, Box 15, 3. 

104.Plans and Operations Division, Note For Record, 14 November 1947, 

Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, National Archives 

and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 319, Entry 153, 

Decimal File 091, Box 74; US Army, USAGG, Vol II, 14.
61

105.Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for Record, “Joint US Military 

Advisory and Planning Group in Greece,” 11 December 1947, Records of the 

Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, National Archives and Records 

Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 319, Entry 153, Decimal File 

091, Box 14; US Army, JUSMAPG, 43.

106.US Army, JUSMAPG, 44.

107.US Army, 43-44.

108.War Department, Cable to USAGG, Athens, 6 January 1948, Records 

of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group 

Greece, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 

Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 92.

109.Plans and Operations Division, Note for Record, “Re-assignment of 

staff officers to USAGG,” Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations 

Division, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 

Records Group 319, Entry 154, Decimal File 091, Box 13.

110.US Army, JUSMAPG, 45.

111.William Livesay, Cable to Director Plans and Operations, 22 January 

1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park, MD, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, 

Box 113.

112.William Livesay, untitled speech, 16 January 1948, William Livesay 

Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 4. This speech is 

untitled, however, from the date and the instructions given in the speech I infer 

that it was given to the advisors who had recently arrived during their orientation 

training.

113.William Livesay, Replacement of Officer Personnel, 14 July 1947, 

Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, National Archives 

and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 319, Entry 153, 

Decimal File 091, Box 74.

114.William Livesay, “Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group 

(JUSMAPG),” 15 January 1948, Records of the Army Staff, Plans and 

Operations Division, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park, MD, Records Group 319, Entry 153, Decimal File 091, Box 75, 4. 5976.

115.The communists’ ability to move artillery guns and ammunition into the 

mountains to conduct this operation indicates an impressive level of organization 

and will that reflects poorly on the GNA.

116.William Livesay, Love 615, Records of Interservice Organizations, 

Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, National Archives and 

Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 334, Entry 146, 

Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 113.
62

117.William Livesay, Cable to Plans and Operations Division, 12 February 

1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park, MD, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, 

Box 113.

118.William Livesay, Cable to Plans and Operations Division, 15 February 

1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park, MD, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, 

Box 113.

119.A. J. Regnier, “United Press Report,” 18 February 1948, Records of 

the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, National Archives and Records 

Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 319, Entry 153, Decimal File 

000.5 to 000.9, Box 1. 

120.US Army, JUSMAPG, 54.

121.Hubert R. Gallager, “Administrative Reorganization in the Greek 

Crisis,” Public Administrative Review 8, no. 4 (Autumn 1948): 257.

122.William Livesay, “Review of the Military Situation in Greece,” William 

Livesay Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

123.William Livesay, Cable to Plans and Operations Division, 2 February 

1947, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park, MD, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, 

Box 113; US Army, JUSMAPG, 57.

124.James Van Fleet, Cable for General Wedemeyer, 27 February 1947, 

Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group Greece, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, 

MD, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 

113.

125.US Army, JUSMAPG, 57.

126.US Army, 58.

127.US Army, 61.

128.US Army.
63

Chapter 4

Expansion Of The Advisory Mission And The End Of The War 

February 1948-September 1949

Exploitation must repeat must be pushed strongly today repeat 

today. Waiting will give the bandits chance to regroup and man 

defensive positions. If situation needs clarifying then clarify it 

with bold and aggressive attack now; it cannot repeat cannot be 

clarified by command and staff conferences and observations, 

nor will bandits clarify it for you. Clarify it with combat troops 

throwing their weight against demoralized Vitsi bandits with all 

speed and greatest possible weight.

— Brigadier General Reuben Jenkins, Cable to II Division

Strategic Situation

Throughout 1948 and 1949, the intensification of the Cold War 

between the Soviet Union and the United States created a sense of urgency 

for the war in Greece and imposed limitations. The growing number of 

US commitments around the world in an effort to contain communist 

expansion increased the drain on limited resources. Moreover, the Truman 

knew that he could not undermine the domestic economy. The President 

repeatedly looked to reduce the budget for the various US operations around 

the world, including the Greek operation. In November 1948, President 

Truman decided that it had to prioritize the deteriorating situation in China 

over the aid to Greece and Turkey.1

The communist blockade of West Berlin, which began on 24 June 

1948, signaled a major escalation in the Cold War and had an immediate 

effect on the war effort in Greece. Because of the requirements for the 

Berlin airlift, the US Air Force diverted aircraft, supplies, and parts that 

had been procured for the RHAF. It also transferred JUSMAPG’s aircraft 

to Germany for the duration of the airlift. The Air Force Group in Greece 

had to request special procurement authority to buy spare parts for the 

RHAF or else it could not have kept its aircraft flying after December 

1948.2

The increasing evidence of communist expansion and subversion 

around the world led many in the administration and JUSMAPG to conclude 

that the KKE was acting on orders from Moscow. Van Fleet, for example, 

argued throughout his life that the Soviet Union was directly controlling 

the Greek communists.3

 Ironically, the US commitment to Greece had 

convinced Stalin that the KKE could not achieve a victory in Greece. 
64

Because a dramatic defeat would damage the prestige of international 

communism, he ordered the insurgency to end. Yugoslavia, Albania, and 

Bulgaria, however, did not listen and continued to support the KKE and the 

Democratic Army for their own goals. Soviet and communist propaganda 

also enthusiastically used every opportunity to embarrass the Greek 

nationalists and the US government. After the nationalists demonstrated 

that they might achieve a decisive military victory in the summer of 1949, 

the Soviet Union began a peace offensive to achieve a truce or at least 

portray the US and the nationalists as war-mongers. Additionally, the 

Soviet members of the United Nations’ Balkan Commission prevented it 

from affecting the security of Greece’s northern border.4

The dynamics of Cold War deterrence also limited US options. The 

administration knew that pressuring the Balkan Soviet satellites too 

much risked expanding the conflict.5

 The administration successfully 

engaged Yugoslavia as it broke from the Soviet bloc. This engagement 

significantly reduced the Greek communists’ supplies. Nevertheless, the 

administration had limited options for dealing with Albania and Bulgaria. 

The administration’s policy options inside Greece were also limited. 

The Greek government resisted any reforms that would “infringe upon 

or inconvenience various entrenched political and economic interests.”6

These entrenched economic interests resisted modernization efforts or 

changes to Greek macroeconomics. A US official Greece reported that 

he knew “of no instance in which the well-established Greek pattern of 

low output and high prices, low investment and high profits has been 

challenged.”7 The Greek government also drew criticism from around 

the world for its high number of executions, mass arrests, extra-judicial 

killings, and other harsh judicial measures.8

 While these methods did harm 

to the Greek communists, they also aided Soviet propaganda and repeatedly 

embarrassed the Truman administration. Right-wing parties dominated the 

government and labeled all liberals as communists. This dominance of the 

government by the right, colored many ideas intended to win the support 

of moderates or non-communist liberals as appeasing communism. After 

a political crisis in January 1949, a more broad-based government formed 

that reduced, but did not eliminate the right-wing harassment of liberals.9

The Greek Communists

At the beginning of 1948, the KKE and its Democratic Army clearly had 

the momentum in the war. Despite having suffered significant casualties, 

recruiting and conscription had increased the size of Democratic Army. It 

had the initiative and could strike almost anywhere in Greece. Nevertheless, 

the nationalists decisively defeated the communists in August 1949. The 
65

KKE’s continued dedication to fighting conventionally and its rift with 

Yugoslavia both contributed significantly to this defeat. However, neither 

of these strategic issues is sufficient to explain the Democratic Army’s 

1949 demise. Without a nationalist army that could exploit these problems, 

the communists could have at least maintained control over significant 

portions of northern Greece.

Markos is Purged-Commitment to Conventional Tactics

The Democratic Army continued its process of conventionalizing its 

guerrilla army in accordance with Zachariades’s strategy throughout 1948. 

By December 1948, it had established ten light infantry divisions with a 

supporting bureaucracy.10 It also continued to expand supporting branches 

such as artillery, logistical, and engineer units. The field artillery would 

eventually accumulate nine batteries with approximately sixty howitzers, 

fifteen 105mm guns and forty-five 75mm guns. They also had over thirty 

anti-aircraft artillery guns and forty anti-tank guns, in a mix of 20mm 

and 37mm calibers. Throughout 1948 and into the spring of 1949 the 

communists sustained this force structure even though the communists’ 

commitment to conventional tactics cost them an enormous level of 

casualties. Repeated communists assaults on GNA positions in battles like 

Konitsa, Grammos, and Vitsi cost the communists thousands of casualties. 

Through volunteers, conscription, and abduction they replaced these 

losses. By September 1948, they had recovered from their losses in the 

Grammos campaign and other smaller 1948 battles. The Democratic Army 

expanded to over 25,000 by 1948 despite an average casualty rate of 2,765 

a month, not including wounded.11 Their organization of approximately 

70,000 auxiliaries provided excellent intelligence and makes the guerrilla 

bands extremely mobile until March 1949, when there was a noticeable 

decline in support.12

Building, organizing, and sustaining this force was an impressive feat 

for a guerrilla army. However, the rate of attrition from their conventional 

tactics meant that they were only able to sustain the force structure, 

not expand it to the 50,000 men that Markos believed was necessary to 

militarily defeat the GNA. Moreover, the attrition decreased the average 

quality of the Democratic Army’s soldiers and led the KKE to use more 

violence to enforce conscription. The communists used training areas in 

Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria where they conducted basic training 

and a variety of officer training courses. These training programs could 

not produce trained soldiers and officers fast enough to keep pace with 

the attrition. Additionally, the communists did not have any experience 

with large unit operations. This lack of experience meant that when they 
66

attempted operations above battalion level, they suffered from same 

lack of tactical competence that plagued the GNA. The continual loss of 

experienced officers made this problem even more acute.

The crux of the problem for the Democratic Army was that it could 

not match the ability of the nationalist government to generate and sustain 

a conventional field army. For all of its faults, the nationalist government 

with US assistance was able to conscript, train, and sustain soldiers in the 

field more effectively than the nascent communist shadow government. 

The struggle inside the KKE over tactics eventually resulted in Zachariades 

purging Markos on 31 January 1949, thereby cementing the Democratic 

Army’s conventional tactics.13

While most of the literature focuses on the dramatic major conventional 

operations, it is important to note that there was an incessant high level 

of small-scale insurgent activity. For example, according to General Staff 

reports, in January 1949 elements of the Democratic Army recruited 

1,500 fighters, destroyed fifty-four vehicles with mines (including eight 

trains); laid an additional 867 mines that the security forces discovered; 

conducted seventy-four demolition operations on bridges, railroads, roads, 

and other infrastructure; and, conducted 354 intimidation and looting 

attacks on villages. GNA and NDC casualties during this time were 225 

killed, 681 wounded, and 271 missing. After the nationalist victory at 

Florina and in the Peloponnese in February 1949, these numbers dropped 

significantly in March: 319 recruits, thirty-four successful mine attacks, 

293 mines discovered, 17 demolition operations, and 211 village attacks. 

The nationalist casualties also dropped to 140 killed, 426 wounded, and 37 

missing.14 This significant drop in insurgent activity and lethality indicates 

a decrease in the support networks that provided intelligence and logistics. 

The significant casualties from the communist attacks during the winter 

1948-1949 and the increasingly successful government operations also 

contributed to the decrease in capability. During the first quarter of 1949, 

the monthly rate of attrition for the communists had risen 4,080 a month.15

If the government forces had not been able to maintain pressure against 

the Democratic Army, it could have rebuilt its networks and replaced its 

losses. The KKE also reduced its ability to sustain its forces by alienating 

its best ally.

The Macedonian Question-Alienating Tito

The KKE’s alienation of Yugoslavia had a deleterious effect on the 

Democratic Army’s ability to sustain combat operations. Yugoslavia had 

been the most generous supporter of the Greek communists. Marshal Josef 
67

Tito, the President of Yugoslavia, supported the KKE to secure his southern 

flank after his 1948 split with the Soviet Union. Tito also wanted to reclaim 

what he saw as Yugoslavian Macedonia from Greece, especially since the 

people of that area were slavophones who were loyal to the communist 

cause. Yugoslavian aid had continued but in reduced amounts after its 

June 1948 expulsion from the international communist movement.16 This 

aid even extended to minor combat. On 8 September 1948 a Yugoslavian 

battalion reportedly fought alongside of a Democratic Army unit in the 

Kaimaktchelon region near the Yugoslavian border, retaking a mountain 

that commanded the region’s road network.17

Yugoslavia’s aid diminished greatly during the 1948-1949 winter 

until it essentially ended by March 1949. There were two principle issues 

dividing Tito and the KKE. First, Zachariades, as a devout Stalinist, wanted 

to denounce Tito even though Yugoslavia was helping sustain Zachariades’ 

conventional operations. Second, Zachariades had the KKE’s fifth plenum 

on 30 January 1949 endorse the cause of Macedonian independence. By 

doing so, he hoped to garner more recruits from the slavophone Greeks. 

These Greeks had organized their own insurgent organization because the 

Greek government’s policies disadvantaged the slavophone minorities of 

northern Greece.18 Moreover, Zachariades believed that Bulgaria would 

provide more aid in exchange for supporting Macedonian independence. 

When Zachariades purged Markos, he removed the last influential proTito voice in the KKE.19

Yugoslavia ended its aid by March 1949 and took active measures 

against the Greek communists after 10 July 1949 when Tito announced the 

closure of the border with Greece. Tito took these actions not only because 

of his conflict with the KKE, but also because he was able to get economic 

benefits from the US and the United Kingdom.20 Yugoslavia had ended 

its aid and disarmed guerrillas it found inside Yugoslavia, but the terrain 

on the border was so difficult that no one could precisely define where 

the border was, much less control it. Moreover, US intelligence indicated 

that the Yugoslavians made little effort to close the border. The loss of 

Yugoslavian aid did compound the attritional problem created by the 

dedication to conventional tactics.21 The loss of Yugoslavia’s support was 

not necessarily crippling for the Democratic Army. It still maintained safe 

havens in Albania and Bulgaria. When Yugoslavia began to curtail its aid 

in October 1948, Albania became the Democratic Army’s main supporter.22

Moreover, the Democratic Army could have survived if it was still facing 

the nationalist regime it battled in 1947. By 1949, the nationalists’ material 

and operational improvements magnified the communist errors.23
68

The Material Situation

Although the security crisis in late 1947 had convinced the Truman 

administration that operational and material military aid had to have 

priority over economic aid, the economic programs continued. The 

beginning of the Marshall Plan brought additional economic resources. 

The military material aid continued to improve the arms and equipment 

of the Greek armed forces. However, without the constant advice and 

supervision of the US advisors, the Greek military may not have been able 

to capitalize on the communists’ errors. The reduced budgets and US goals 

for the mission in Greece make it even less likely that material aid alone 

could have enabled the nationalist forces to defeat the communists. 

Economic Aid

The United States’ mission in Greece had helped stabilize the economy 

and reduce inflation by the second quarter of 1948 and provided critical 

relief for the millions suffering from the war. The passage of the Marshall 

Plan in 1948 made the economic aid more efficient by enabling the mission 

to plan on a four year cycle. The intent of the Marshall Plan was to improve 

the self-confidence and resistance of democratic Europe to communism. 

In Greece, the war undermined this laudable psychological goal. The lack 

of security continued to halt reconstruction and the guerrillas continued to 

destroy property, interrupt trade, and cause civilians to flee their homes.24

A reorganization of AMAG in 1948 increased the efficiency of the 

economic program. On 15 September, Truman appointed Henry Grady 

as Ambassador to Greece and Chief of AMAG, which improved unity 

of command.25 With only one civilian voice in Athens, the Truman 

administration had a more consistent message for the Greek government. 

However, Grady and Van Fleet disagreed on the policy in Greece. Van 

Fleet thought Grady wanted to give into the communists’ demands, while 

Grady resented Van Fleet’s influence and thought that the Greek military 

was becoming too powerful in Greek politics.26

Beginning with the 1949 Peloponnesian operation, the AMAG and 

JUSMPAG integrated the economic reconstruction and development 

programs with the military plan, so that the Greek people could see that 

“the democratic way of life has something to offer them.”27 JUSMAPG and 

AMAG initiated these programs after military operations cleared an area 

of guerrillas. The US advisors prioritized the programs in three phases: 

immediate humanitarian aid, six-month reconstruction projects, and longterm projects. The immediate aid focused mostly on food and lumber. The 

second phase consisted of six-month projects focused on rebuilding roads, 
69

improving government efficiency, and encouraging farmers to return to 

their land. The third phase was open-ended and included projects that 

would take longer than six months or required a very secure environment.28

JUSMAPG issued instructions in March 1949 for its field advisors to have 

the Greek military “participate actively” with the economic programs, 

especially with refugees and recently secure mountain villages. The Greek 

commanders were to dedicate every vehicle not being used for tactical 

operations to the relief program.29

Sustaining the Nationalist Army

The US mission in Greece continued its vast military aid program that 

sustained and armed the nationalist army. There were three major aspects 

to the program during 1948 and 1949, the Greek force structure, arms, and 

logistics. In July 1948, the Greek government surprised Van Fleet with a 

detailed request for additional material and another manpower expansion 

at a Supreme National Defense Council meeting when the US Secretary 

of the Army, Kenneth Royall, was visiting. The memorandum requested 

a long list of items including additional dive bombers, incendiary bombs, 

tanks, and chemical weapons. Van Fleet provided the US refusal based on 

either the enormous expense or the inappropriateness of certain items, like 

incendiary bombs and chemical weapons. He did endorse the proposed 

expansion in a letter to the Joint Chiefs on 31 July 1948.30 The State 

Department opposed Van Fleet’s request because its policy was that the 

Greek army should not exceed a size sustainable by the Greek economy. 

Additionally they assumed that a reduction would occur immediately after 

the Grammos operations. Grady and many other US officials concluded 

that the Greek officials would not take action to end the war as long as they 

thought the Americans would continue increasing the size of the GNA.31

In addition to repeated requests for force structure increases, The 

GNA usually kept more soldiers in uniform than was authorized through 

various accounting measures. The JUSMAPG was aware of these counting 

maneuvers, and repeatedly addressed the issue with the General Staff but 

to no avail. After a February 1949 General Staff request for 50,000 more 

troops, the JUSMAPG instead agreed to stop counting certain categories of 

soldiers, including the politically unreliable category “C” personnel who 

had been detained on an island prison and missing soldiers. The General 

Staff attempted to get an extra 10,000 soldiers by inducting too many 

soldiers in the January 1949 draft, but the JUSMAPG forced the GNA to 

pay for these extra men.32 Instead of increasing the GNA’s size, JUSMAPG 

did support another measure to increase the level counterinsurgent 

manpower. Since the GNA used the NDC in more of an offensive role and 
70

less for defending their villages, they requested authority to arm civilian 

home guards. To maximize the combat power for the 1949 campaigns, Van 

Fleet authorized the GNA to create a Home Guard organization to assume 

the NDC’s village defense responsibilities. Van Fleet also provided 15,000 

rifles on the condition that the GNA closely supervise the entire program.33

The expansion of the nationalist forces led to a decline in training 

quality for the army and the NDC. The NDC rapidly expanded from fortytwo to ninety-seven battalions in the five months from January to May 

1948. This rapid expansion caused problems, such as when an officer 

and seventy-two soldiers from one battalion “willingly surrendered” 

to the enemy.34 Following a suggestion from JUSMAPG, the General 

Staff decided to use the remaining 1,500 authorized positions to form 

headquarters and support units for the NDC instead of three additional 

battalions. They did this because the JUSMAPG advisors noted that the 

NDC suffered from a lack of leadership and logistical support.35 On 24 

April 1948, JUSMAPG delivered a reorganization plan for the NDC to 

ease the leadership difficulties and give the platoons more combat power 

by consolidating the number of maneuver units from four to three at the 

company and battalion levels.36

A high rate of personnel turnover compounded the problems of 

expansion. There was an 80 percent turnover in the Roumeli and 

Peloponnese NDC battalions by June 1948. To improve the NDCs’ 

performance, JUSMAPG convinced the General Staff to replace older 

NDC soldiers with newly trained young men who could presumably better 

keep up with the regular soldiers.37 The JUSMAPG officers called the 

retention of younger soldiers the revitalization policy. The revitalization 

of the NDC was complete by June 1949, making those battalions more 

capable of fighting alongside the GNA. Revitalization extended to 

the GNA, where the US advisors convinced the General Staff to adopt 

personnel policies that released older soldiers, kept young ones in service 

longer, and emphasized the induction of educated middle and upper class 

men.38

The rapid expansion of the army also reduced unit effectiveness. The 

Greek General Staff shortened basic training so that it could get soldiers 

into its units faster, especially during the times when the United States 

authorized a temporary over-strength, such as during the six months from 

March to September 1948. One of the best demonstrations of the decline 

in average unit quality was when a company from the communist Youth 

battalion successfully assaulted a nationalist battalion on 4 March 1948.39

The JUSMAPG, noting the drop in training time and quality, had its field 

teams attempt to improve unit training.40
71

JUSMAPG also sought to strengthen nationalist combat power by 

requisitioning specific weapons that would prove useful in the mountains, 

aircraft, machine guns, 75mm howitzers, and recoilless rifles. The 

JUSMAPG put a high priority on air power and procuring aircraft to enable 

the RHAF to conduct air strikes. In 1948, this meant Spitfires. For the final 

1949 campaigns, JUSMAPG acquired Helldivers from the US Navy. As 

noted above, the Berlin airlift and other priorities took precedence over 

the RHAF. On 27 April 1949, the US Air Force halted all requisitions for 

the RHAF.41

For the army, there were three weapons that the US advisors thought 

were critical for improving nationalist combat power. First, the advisors 

believed that they had to increase the number of light and heavy machine 

guns in the GNA. In 1947 and early 1948, the communists actually had 

more machine guns in many battles. To do this, they added a machine gun 

company to each division. Second, JUSMAPG increased the number of 

75mm “pack” howitzers in the GNA. The pack howitzers were easier to 

maneuver in the mountains and could be carried by the gunners into firing 

position. Third, after the communists demonstrated that they were capable 

of building reinforced pillboxes JUSMAPG ordered 75mm recoilless rifles 

for the 1949 campaigns. Even though these weapons required vehicles for 

transportation, the advisors believed that their ability to destroy bunkers 

was critical for the final operations. European Command transferred eight 

systems to Greece and sent a training team.42

In addition to improving nationalist firepower, JUSMAPG put 

significant effort to improving the GNA’s logistics. The US mission 

supplied the Greek with air-drop parachutes, C-47 cargo planes, and 

seven all-weather landing strips to improve its Aerial resupply capability. 

It added 7,500 trucks to the Greek logistical system. The trucks could 

move supplies into forward depots, which the US advisors supervised, 

but they usually could not make it to the front lines in the mountains. 

To solve this problem, JUSMAPG overhauled and expanded the Greek 

pack animal program. The advisors established an army school for animal 

handling, managed herds, controlled the selection of soldiers for the 

program, purchased special radios and saddles, and bought thousands of 

mules from outside of Greece. JUSMAPG benefited from the fact that the 

US Army still had soldiers and officers with extensive horse cavalry and 

mule experience. Despite the US efforts to provide enough war material 

for the nationalist army, they still had to resort to rationing artillery rounds 

in 1949. Reduced budgets contributed to the need to ration the nationalists’ 

ammunition consumption.43
72

Reduced Budgets for the US Mission

Throughout 1948 and 1949, the Truman administration continually 

reduced the budget requests from the advisors in Greece. Budget 

negotiations in Washington resulted in a reduction of the initial JUSMAPG 

budget for July 1948 to June 1949 from 250 million dollars to less than 200 

million. The Congress reduced the initial authorization by fifty million in 

the annual Appropriations Act.44 JUSMAPG’s budget request for the next 

twelve months was initially 450 million, which JUSMAPG argued was 

necessary to achieve a decisive victory at the earliest possible date. Budget 

negotiations reduced this sum to 200m.45 Negotiators from the Departments 

of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force made this reduction based on what 

was affordable before there was any input from Greece. The Department 

of the Army told JUSMAPG to prepare a plan for a further 25 percent cut 

depending of the position of the Bureau of Budget. Furthermore, the new 

guidance was that the US aid would be based “on an austerity basis” and 

available “only to the extent required to eliminate large scale guerrilla 

activity.” The US would not support a Greek effort to control its northern 

border. If the approved level of aid proved insufficient, the administration 

would not authorize any increases. Only a potential communist “position 

of dominance” would justify additional support.46

Although the United States was still providing a significant amount 

of military and economic aid, the US officials in Greece realized that 

the administration was not willing to provide extra funding to achieve a 

decisive victory. The long-term goal remained reducing the size of the 

Greek military to a size that the Greek economy could sustain. This led 

to the conclusion that the advisors had to emphasize using the available 

manpower efficiently.47 The advisors reminded their counterparts of the 

“urgency of putting every available man in [the] attack for maximum 

pressure across the entire front.”48

The Greek National Army and the US Advisors

Despite its increasing material superiority, the nationalist army was 

unable to fulfill the hopeful expectations for a decisive victory in 1948. 

The US advisors in JUSMAPG, under a new commander, continued 

their efforts to instill aggressive leadership, sound tactics, and diligent 

control during battle. Through extensive training efforts, mentoring 

Greek officers, close supervision and direction, disciplinary action, and 

the support of a new Greek commander-in-chief, the advisors were able 

to improve nationalist battlefield effectiveness. The decisive victories of 

1949 demonstrated this new found combat prowess.
73

Lieutenant General Van Fleet Arrives

Lack of progress in war led the Army to replace Livesay with a more 

aggressive officer, James A. Van Fleet, who was promoted to Lieutenant 

General before he arrived in Greece.49 He commanded the 8th Infantry 

Regiment, 90th Infantry Division, and III Corps during World War II.50

Van Fleet brought a definite change in tone to JUSMAPG. While Livesay 

pushed his advisors to make the Greeks more aggressive, he had also 

told his advisors “we must remember that we are not in a position to 

demand.”51 Even after pushing for more authority to provide operational 

advice, he chose to not give advice on the relationship between the army 

and the gendarmerie on 4 November 1947.52 In contrast, Van Fleet later 

categorized himself as having been a “dictator, a military dictator in every 

meaning of the word.”53 The Prime Minister and King Paul, who had 

ascended to the throne after his brother George II died in June 1947, gave 

Van Fleet their full support. In his own description of how he advised the 

Greek military he says he always respected Greek sovereignty. Instead of 

always dictating orders, he used a softer approach. In an interview Van 

Fleet described his soft approach by describing how he would bring a plan 

to the that he wanted the GNA to execute. He told the Greek officers, “here 

is a wonderful plan that has been worked out by your staff with my staff’s 

concurrence. We ask that you approve it and we’ll execute it together.”54

By several accounts he was a charismatic leader who easily inspired the 

Greek soldiers. Moreover, while he could be very critical and demanding 

of Greek officers, he would also speak very warmly about Greek leadership 

in public and send florid congratulatory notes to successful commanders.55

Van Fleet quickly focused on the lack of aggressive leadership as one 

of the critical problems in Greece. In dismissing an effort by the US Air 

Force to establish a helicopter unit to conduct air mobile operations, Van 

Fleet said that getting to the enemy locations was not the problem, it was 

getting “them to move out promptly after they get there.”56 In one of his 

first episodes with the Greek government, he criticized the Minister of 

War for having a battalion secure his vineyards in the Peloponnese, while 

allowing the guerrillas to maintain a stronghold in the mountains five 

miles away.57 Van Fleet saw to it that his advisors would aggressively fix 

Greek combat leadership.

The 1948 Campaigns

A series of battles in February and March 1948 did not substantially 

alter the status quo. It began well for the nationalists with a month long 

operation to fix and destroy an insurgent unit of approximately 1,200 
74

in the plains around Mount Olympus in central Greece. The operation 

eventually caught the majority of fighters, although it was a lightly armed 

unit.58 Another operation, in the Naousa region in late February succeeded 

in taking a guerrilla base, but only after the guerrillas had routed two NDC 

battalions.59 In the third major operation, two brigades from VIII Division, 

supported by a commando group, attempted to clear a portion of the 

Epirus region to prepare for future operations in the spring and summer. 

After meeting some initial success, driving communist units into Albania, 

the offensive stalled. A counterattack on 5 March “stampeded one Greek 

battalion into retreat and caused the entire GNA force to withdraw to their 

original positions.”60 At the end of the month, on 29 March, two brigades 

in the Krousia Mountains surrounded a guerrilla unit three times, only 

for the guerrillas to escape each time. The US advisors noted a failure of 

commanders to move forward where they could control the battle, not 

maintaining unit integrity, not maintaining a reserve, and ineffective use 

of artillery.61

The next month, the GNA met with more unqualified success with 

Operation Dawn, the Roumeli operation that the JUSMAPG advisors 

drove the General Staff to make happen. From their positions in Roumeli, 

approximately 2,000 communist regulars were able to interdict all of 

the roads leading out of the Athens region, isolating the capital from all 

land transportation. Two GNA divisions attacked on line from the west 

while a third division attacked from the north, trapping the insurgent 

formation against the Gulf of Corinth. The JUSMAPG advisors declared 

the operation a success, with the nationalists claiming 751 guerillas killed 

and 1,761 captured for a nationalist cost of 42 killed, 68 wounded, and 

44 missing. According to the official JUSMAPG history, the operation 

caused to “entire Greek nation to regain confidence in the ability of their 

army to defeat the enemy.”62 This operation defeated a major threat to the 

economic health of Athens and all of Greece. 

The JUSMAPG advisors for A Corps and the three divisions conducted 

a review of the Roumeli operation and concluded that there were several 

deficiencies. The US advisors concluded that the Greek commanders 

had difficulty using their staff efficiently, were still using the doublebattalion concept, and routinely violated unit integrity. Maneuver units 

had demonstrated that they could not integrate fire and maneuver, made 

little effort at concealment or security, and were “reluctant to maintain 

contact with the enemy especially after dark.”63 Nevertheless, the Roumeli 

operation revealed modest improvements in aggressive pursuit and 

battlefield control of maneuvering units. 
75

The JUSMAPG advisors intended to follow the Roumeli success with 

an operation against the main communist base in the Grammos Mountains, 

but they were not yet able to get the Greek General Staff to be able to 

plan one operation while it was executing another. While the advisors and 

the General Staff prepared the next major operation, several small battles 

occurred that showed continued problems in the nationalist military. An I 

Division operation that began on 26 May allowed most of the guerrillas to 

evade when the commanders hurried their units to stick to a fixed timeline. 

The quick pace did not allow the soldiers any time to search for hidden 

guerrilla locations while they swept through the area.64 In June, a guerrilla 

unit overran a GNA battalion and the 76th Brigade headquarters that had 

been securing a road into the Grammos region.65

Meanwhile, US advisors assisted in creating the operation order for 

Grammos, inspecting and making corrections in the logistical preparations, 

and preparing B Corps for the operation.66 The plan called for B Corps to 

seize the Grammos region with six divisions. To encircle the estimated 

7,500 communist regulars in the Grammos region, IX Division attacked 

from the southwest and XV Division would attack from the northeast. The 

four remaining divisions cleared the encircled area in a generally northern 

direction. On 16 June 1948, XV and IX Divisions began the battle with their 

offensives to prevent an enemy retreat into Albania. Stubborn communist 

resistance blocked XV Division on the 20th and the IXth on 25 June. 

The Corps commander shifted I Division north to assume XV’s mission 

while the other divisions began their clearing operations. I Division made 

progress, but a strong line of pillboxes and counterattacks on 10 and 18 July 

checked the advance. The guerrillas had constructed pillboxes out of logs 

that were impervious to nationalist bombs and artillery. “Fanatic enemy 

resistance” stopped two of the other divisions. The faltering progress 

induced the General Staff to order A Corps to assume command of the 

southern sector, allowing B Corps to focus on the north.67 The potential of 

a stalemate also motivated the US advisors to increase the pressure on the 

Greek commanders. Van Fleet instructed his advisors to “insist on constant 

heavy pressure over [the] entire front.” The Greek divisions needed “a 

more aggressive attitude and a rapid advance.”68

Continued pressure from both the northern and southern sectors, with 

divisions advancing one ridgeline at a time, eventually resulted in the 

two corps linking up on 3 August. By 5 August, the two corps secured 

the ridges along the Albania border, but the communists still defended 

the Grammos strongholds in force. On 10 August, the nationalist forces 

resumed the attack, using their British tanks in frontal attacks. A series 
76

of divisional attacks gained momentum as the divisions cleared the outer 

defensive positions around Grammos, resulting in the 20 August capture 

of a major portion of the Grammos ridge. The remaining insurgent forces 

retreated the next day, breaking through the nationalist lines into Albania.69

Figure 2. Sketch of the 1948 Grammos Campaign

Source: The author created the map based on the information found in US Army, 

JUSMAPG, map enclosed between pages 84 and 85.

The nationalist forces uncovered vast stores of war material in the 

Grammos ridge complex, including a hospital, a printing plant, and 

ministerial offices for the communist shadow government. The GNA 

claimed to have killed 2,590 enemy fighters, and captured 1,060 (616 of 

which surrendered). The nationalists suffer 5,824 casualties: 801 killed, 

4,961 wounded, and 62 missing. Because the General Staff and JUSMAPG 

had hoped that the Grammos campaign would decisively end the war, they 

were disappointed despite having attrited an estimated 16 percent of the 

Democratic Army.70 The Greek civilian morale was also low across the 

country after the Grammos campaign because it failed to achieve the lofty 

goals publically set for the operation.71 The official JUSMAPG history 

acknowledges that the advisors underestimated their enemy.72
77

The US advisors conducted a review of the operation to identify 

weaknesses in the nationalist army. The critiques can be divided into 

two categories, the art of command and tactics. The Greek commanders 

did not have a solid grasp of the art of command, specifically, how to 

command and control their units on the battlefield. The senior officers and 

their staffs were inefficient at coordination and staff work. Subordinate 

commanders “frequently disregarded” orders from their superiors. The US 

advisors also observed excessive caution in the Greek commanders. The 

Grammos review specifically cited commanders not advancing without 

“overwhelming air and artillery support” or spending extra time securing 

their flanks.73

The advisors believed that the weaknesses in tactics centered on a 

persistent inability to integrate fire and movement, the cornerstone of 

infantry tactics. The US advisors also felt that Greek reconnaissance and 

night operations were weak, resulting in Greek commanders declining to 

patrol or move at night. Conversely, the US advisors characterized the junior 

officers and soldiers as brave under fire and could endure “long periods of 

physical hardship.”74 Their courage when attacked notwithstanding, the 

junior officers could not effectively maneuver on the battlefield.

The General Staff gave B Corps little respite to work on these 

weaknesses. On 18 August, the General Staff ordered B Corps to occupy 

the captured Grammos area and seize the Vitsi Mountains, which 4,500 

guerrillas had fortified to replace their lost positions in Grammos. The plan 

called for a five-brigade attack to seize a series of ridges and mountains 

near the Albanian border on 30 August. After a slow start caused by the 

rugged terrain, bad weather, and strong resistance, B Corps committed 

an additional division with three brigades. By 5 September, the southern 

two brigades had moved within two kilometers of cutting the insurgents’ 

supply route from Albania. This led the insurgents to mount a vigorous 

counterattack on 10 September that forced the nationalists to retreat back 

to their 30 August starting positions.75

Three days later, the General Staff responded by ordering another 

division to reinforce B Corps and instructing the B Corps commander 

to prepare his forces to resume the attack.76 While the nationalists 

reinforced and prepared, the communists attacked again on 20 September 

against II and XV Divisions, forcing salients three kilometers deep into 

the GNA’s lines. This attack disrupted the GNA operations, but cost the 

communists an estimated 600 casualties. Van Fleet flew to the B Corps 

headquarters with the senior British officer in Greece and the Greek Chief 

of the General Staff, General Dimitrios Yiadzis to pressure the corps into 
78

aggressive action to break the apparent stalemate. “Working closely with 

their JUSMAPG counterparts,” the corps staff generated a new plan for X 

Division to seize key terrain from the south, while the other two divisions 

conducted supporting attacks. After an initial bombardment, the first day’s 

offensive met with minimal resistance. That night, however, communist 

artillery fire induced one brigade to fall back three kilometers to its starting 

position. The rest of the units followed suit.77

The General Staff took over planning and formulated a new plan.78

They transferred two commando groups from the Peloponnese and made 

them the main effort. The B Corps divisions would conduct supporting 

attacks to encircle insurgent positions before the commandos attacked the 

dug-in positions on the Vitsi Mountains. Minefields and counterattacks 

stopped the divisions’ “listless efforts,” but the commandos were able 

to seize the heights.79 Continued fighting produced no major results 

except additional casualties until a 4 November communist attack seized 

a key ridge from the 35th Brigade. The brigade momentarily retook the 

ridge before retreating after nightfall. The General Staff committed the 

commandos to retaking the ridge, which they did, but at a high cost. The 

Vitsi operations had cost the commandos fifty percent casualties. This was 

the last major operation of the Vitsi campaign as an early snow on 20 

November 1948 covered the mountains and brought a halt to all major 

operations, although there were still daily small-scale engagements.80

The GNA reported losing 329 men killed, 1,714 wounded, and 145 

missing. It estimated that it had killed 1,184 guerrillas and captured 517.81

The US advisors saw the operation as a failure, in part because they 

understood the need to end the war as soon as possible.82 The US Army 

intelligence assessment in October 1948 was pessimistic because the GNA 

had been unable to destroy the Democratic Army in the Grammos and Vitsi 

operations. This inability heightened the tension between the economic 

requirement to reduce the size of the Greek military and the military 

requirement to defeat the communists.83 These conflicting priorities led 

JUSMAPG to intensify its focus on improving the combat efficiency of 

the Greek military.

JUSMAPG’s review was very critical of the Greek performance. The 

senior advisor with B Corps, Colonel J. F. Brittingham, wrote that while 

the plan was sound, “elements were launched piecemeal and at no time 

were more than three battalions of the corps actually in contact with the 

enemy.”84 The commanders were “unwilling to attack against even light 

resistance.”85 The US advisors increasingly criticized the Greek soldiers’ 

morale and will to fight. The root of this problem was the “unwillingness 
79

or inability of leaders to command their troops.”86 The US defense attaché 

concluded after the Vitsi campaign that since increasing manpower would 

not ensure that the Greek commanders would use that extra manpower 

efficiently, “the suppression of such activity can be accomplished 

more economically by correcting demonstrated deficiencies such as, 

in leadership, combat efficiency and morale.”87 The budget reductions 

clearly communicated to the US military forces in Greece, that the Truman 

administration saw “economy in guerilla suppression [was] more important 

than speed.”88 If the Greek commanders knew how to build cohesive and 

competent combat units, then the morale problems would lessen. If the 

commanders knew how to manage their units in battle, then the tactical 

problems would lessen. The disappointment of the Vitsi campaign swiftly 

led to a JUSMAPG push to correct the problems so that the GNA would be 

ready for a spring offensive after the snows had cleared. The JUSMAPG 

plan focused on training, aggressiveness, tactics, and how to command 

units in battle.89

Training the Nationalist Army

Recognizing the need to improve unit training in the nationalist 

army, JUSMAPG created a new section in July 1948, the Organization, 

Training, and Equipment Section. This section oversaw several initiatives 

to improve Greek combat effectiveness. First, in cooperation with the 

remaining British officers, the section lengthened basic training from six 

to seventeen weeks, allowing eight weeks for specialty training after a 

common basic training for all soldiers. Third, they also monitored a quota 

system for all units, ensuring that the commanders filled every available 

slot for junior officer and noncommissioned officer training. Fourth, the 

section coordinated a program for sending officers to the United States 

and the United Kingdom to attend formal military schools. After the Vitsi 

campaign, the section undertook a special program to rebuild the XV 

Division, which suffered greatly during the Grammos and Vitsi fighting.90

While the basic training program was important, JUSMAPG’s main 

training effort was the demonstration platoons. JUSMAPG established 

ten demonstration platoons, each drawn from a different division. Each 

platoon was a Greek infantry platoon and a mortar section with a Greek 

commander, a US army officer, and a British military advisor.91 The 

platoons spent a month in specialized training run by JUSMAPG officers 

that focused on infantry tactics. On 1 October 1948, the platoons returned 

to the divisions and began a training program there. Every battalion in the 

division had to complete a sixteen-day field exercise with the demonstration 

platoon, working up from section to battalion level operations under US 

supervision.92
80

The advisors encountered numerous Greek officers who were 

reluctant to conduct training. Some believed that their soldiers did not 

need training after they had been in combat.93 Other commanders, such 

as the commanders in X Division, were not energetic enough in ensuring 

all of their soldiers were getting the maximum amount of training. In 

January 1949, Brigadier General Reuben Jenkins, the Assistant Director 

of JUSMAPG, ordered his advisors to review what every soldier in X 

Division was doing to determine his availability for training after one of 

the brigade commanders said his unit was too busy to conduct training.94

This order was a part of a larger JUSMAPG initiative to maximize 

training before the 1949 campaigns to improve on the mediocre 1948 

campaigns. A 5 January 1949 instruction told all field advisors to submit 

names of Greek officers who were not fully cooperating with the training 

programs.95 JUSMAPG gave special attention to B Corps since it had the 

most difficulties during the 1948 campaigns. Jenkins’ instructions to the 

B Corps commander included requirements for the corps commander to 

issues orders to every commander to platoon level to conduct training and 

the staff to establish a training inspection program. His message for the 

corps commander also stated that Jenkins intended “to get this army better 

trained if I have to take the names of recalcitrant officers to the Minister 

of War to get action.”96

Influencing the Greek Officers

The JUSMAPG advisors sought to make the Greek officer corps 

more aggressive, give it a better grasp of tactics, and enable it to control 

units on the battlefield more effectively. The advisors used three methods 

to achieve these goals: daily mentorship, direct orders, and disciplinary 

action. By October 1948, the nationalist army was still not displaying a 

desire to close with the enemy. “The army has little offensive spirit . . . 

[and] has proven itself unwilling to the type of aggressive warfare needed 

to end the struggle.” One cause is a failure to provide effective leadership 

at all levels of the military. The second reason, in Grady’s assessment, 

was that the nationalist army was waiting for the United States to win the 

war, instead of taking that responsibility upon itself.97 “Greek leaders have 

shown in the past few months an increased hesitation to take determined 

action with forces available as long as there appears to be a possibility that 

at some future date larger forces may be available.”98

The JUSMAPG advisors at the division and corps echelons repeatedly 

pushed their Greek counterparts on conducting more “night movements 

and night attacks, in emphasizing active patrolling to discover vulnerable 

spots in the enemy defenses, and in urging Greek units to quickly exploit 
81

an enemy withdrawal.”99 The advisors continued one of the central parts 

of the US program, increasing the aggressiveness of the nationalist forces. 

The senior JUSMAPG officers frequently sent messages to the field 

detachments to get their counterparts to attack, “seize [the] advantage 

with powerful blows on entire front.”100 JUSMAPG believed that it had to 

push generals who were not the main effort to conduct any operations at 

all. The guidance to these reluctant Greek commanders was to “seize the 

opportunity now repeat now” to “cover [their units] with glory.”101 One US 

report observed that the Greek soldiers always seemed to fight harder when 

foreign observers were present.102 The tenacious JUSMAPG insistence on 

aggressiveness bore fruit in January 1949 when a US advisor observed 

that the General Staff was “increasingly insistent on continuous pursuit of 

guerrillas by GNA commands regardless of [unit] boundaries.”103 Another 

example of success was a General Staff inquiry into why A Corps had 

delayed a pursuit, thereby allowing a guerrilla unit to escape.104

In a short message to all of the US field detachments, Jenkins provided 

a useful summary of what the US advisors saw as the “basic essentials” 

of tactics:

All divisions must be highly alert especially at night. Reconnaissance 

must be constant. Hold maximum possible reserves mobile, ready for 

rapid movement. Tactical integrity of reserves is vital. Commands must 

be prepared to ignore tactical boundaries and take offensive on moment’s 

notice either on own account or to support a neighbor. Several alternate 

plans must be ready for instant implementation and must be known by all 

important subordinates.105

The JUSMAPG advisors constantly drove their Greek counterparts to 

conduct more aggressive patrolling and intelligence collection. One example 

is the battle of Karditsa on 11 December 1948, where approximately 1,500 

guerrillas overran a GNA battalion and a NDC battalion to plunder the 

prosperous town. Jenkins used the incident to prod the General Staff into 

an investigation and overhaul of the GNA’s reconnaissance and security 

procedures.106 A month later, another communist attack seized the city of 

Naousa on 12 January 1949. Despite intelligence indicators that an attack 

was coming, the garrison, which included a brigade headquarters, conducted 

no reconnaissance or security operations. The C Corps headquarters failed 

to respond in an organized manner, committing units without any attempt 

to coordinate their movements. Units that did arrive at Naousa, failed to 

attack the communists aggressively. As a result, the communists destroyed 

three-quarters of the town and plundered all the supplies they could carry. 

JUSMAPG again pushed to punish those responsible for the negligence 
82

that enabled the communists to surprise the nationalist garrison.107 The US 

advisors were also more assertive in giving orders in the aftermath of these 

defeats. On 19 January 1949, Van Fleet issued orders to B Corps to pursue 

two guerrilla divisions. He specified the lines of operation for XV Division 

and the 71st Brigade and stated that “there will be no excuse for weather 

obstacles since such do not exist for the bandits.”108

The field detachments developed solid relationships with their Greek 

counterparts. The advisors lived with their counterparts in the field, 

sharing danger and hardship. As a result of the shared experience, they 

developed a “friendly partnership” which they could use to mentor the 

Greek officers. During the Grammos operation, the US officers believed 

that “in most cases Greek commanders asked their advice and acted on 

their recommendations.” The advisors “supervised the planning of all 

operations,” ensuring that the plan adequately integrated fire support and 

that “aggressive pursuit plans were included.”109 The US advisors also took 

the lead in planning all operations because every Greek-planned operation 

was compromised by security leaks.110 One of the advisors would then 

accompany the Greek commander during the mission to provide advice 

and observe the operation. This advisor would write the after-action review, 

which became “the basis for remedial action by the GNA commanders.”111

The US advisory efforts paid off the next month on 11 February 1949, 

when a communist division attacked the II Division at Florina. II Division, 

following a new defensive plan proposed by the JUSMAPG advisors that 

included a strong reserve, fought off the communist attack for two days. 

The commander committed the reserve to reinforce positions against 

the communist attacks. While the GNA did not pursue the withdrawing 

communists as vigorously as a US advisor urged, they had killed over 600 

and captured 350 enemy fighters at a cost of 55 dead and 252 wounded. 

The defense of Florina was an example of how the persistent mentorship 

and training by the advisors could deliver battlefield results.112

Improving Greek control of their units in battle was a long process 

of mentoring commanders and staff officers. It also included forcing staff 

officers to coordinate with other units and writing plans that made control 

easier. Staff officers saw coordination as a waste of time and inter-service 

rivalry inhibited cooperation between the services. Van Fleet corrected this 

through “advice and personal conference” and “corrective action” by the 

General Staff advisors.113 The advisors worked to get the corps and division 

staffs to accomplish basic tasks that would improve their ability to control 

units in battle. For example, the advisors at the corps level worked to get 

the staffs to track the course of battles, maintaining constant awareness of 
83

where all their subordinate units were located. The advisors also faced a 

constant struggle to get Greek units routinely to maintain a tactical reserve 

and unit integrity whenever possible.114 The US advisors found that they 

had to monitor Greek logistical units and staffs constantly to ensure that 

the Greek officers were exercising due diligence. This constant effort 

would prove successful when the nationalists were able to push supplies to 

units to sustain the offensive during the final 1949 campaigns.115 They also 

used this same type of tight supervision and direction to ensure that the 

different Greek military services cooperated. This effort eventually paid 

off when the RHAF proved more responsive during the 1949 campaigns, 

conducting aerial resupply, casualty evacuation, and close air support.116

When mentorship, or direct instructions, from an advisors failed, 

the US officers also tried to influence the Greek officer corps by having 

unaggressive or incompetent commanders disciplined or relieved and then 

controlling who the replacement process. Van Fleet came to the conclusion 

that the ineffective leadership of the B Corps commander, Lieutenant 

General Kalageropoulos, was part of the cause of the slow progress during 

the Grammos operation.117 At a 27 July meeting of the Supreme National 

Defense Council, Van Fleet recommended that the government relieve 

Kalageropoulos.118 At a special meeting the next day the Prime Minister 

asked Van Fleet to nominate a successor. Van Fleet’s response was the 

corps’ Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Lieutenant General Kitrilakis, 

which initiated several days of political objections. The Greek cabinet 

acquiesced when Kalageropoulos submitted his resignation and appointed 

Kitrilakis as his replacement. The incident shows the incredible level 

of influence JUSMAPG had acquired in the Greek government and one 

of the most effective methods it had for improving the quality of Greek 

military leadership. Van Fleet intervened to effect Kitrilakis’s relief less 

than a month later when “it became obvious that his vacillation would cost 

precious lives and time.”119

In another incident, Van Fleet had the General Staff relieve a general 

when, at the last minute, the general changed the US plan for an attack 

by ordering a four hour barrage. Van Fleet would later recall scolding the 

general on the spot for delaying the attack even though the enemy was 

not firing on the nationalist troops. According to Van Fleet this was the 

French World War I influence on the Greek army.120 The General Staff 

replaced the II Division commander during the Vitsi operation after a two 

battalion attack routed one of his brigades and two other brigades fell back 

under communist pressure on 24 October 1948.121 In a third example, the 

74th Brigade commander was relieved during the 1949 Peloponnesian 
84

campaign for ordering an unauthorized withdrawal from a hill his brigade 

had seized.122 The efforts of the US officers to improve Greek combat 

leadership did not have instant success, but they were able to improve 

gradually the overall combat performance of the nationalist army. The 

advisors’ task became easier early in 1949 when new leadership in the 

Greek military fully embraced the US program.

Field Marshal Papagos Takes Command

On 21 January, King Paul with cabinet confirmation after promoted 

General Papagos to Field Marshal and appointed him as the Commanderin-chief of the Greek armed forces. The order also abolished the 

Supreme National Defense Council, reducing political oversight and 

micromanagement of the military.123 King Paul made Papagos his personal 

military advisor until he garnered the political support to put him in 

command. Papagos enjoyed a popular reputation based on his victory 

against the Italians and his years in a German prisoner camp during World 

War II. Papagos immediately issued orders “calling for the manifestation 

of an offensive spirit that would wipe out the bandit plague.”124 He also 

recalled two generals, one to be an Inspector General to enforce discipline 

and the other to be the new Chief of the General Staff. 

Van Fleet reported that he had a very strong working relationship 

with Papagos, who asked Van Fleet for his advice on how to proceed to 

defeat the communists.125 Van Fleet responded with a list of proposals that 

summarized what JUSMAPG was already doing, urging that Papagos 

support them and enforce compliance by Greek officers. The JUSMAPG 

director asked Papagos to ensure that the Greek commanders accepted 

and implemented the unit training plans, the training schools accepted 

US supervision, and officers in the field operated more aggressively. The 

first test of the relationship between Papagos and his US advisors came 

when the C Corps commander refused to allow an investigation into his 

command’s poor performance during a communist winter attack at Naousa. 

The General Staff ordered the investigation at the behest of the JUSMAPG 

advisors. Papagos ordered the investigation to continue and threatened 

the corps commander with court-martial. With the authority of the newly 

created commander-in-chief position, Papagos overcame the interference 

of politicians in military affairs. Previously, influential politicians could 

have been able to protect their favored generals. Papagos’ power and his 

acceptance of his advisors’ advice meant that JUSMAPG would have a 

greater ability to affect Greek leadership throughout the entire military.126
85

Van Fleet reported seeing an increased level of energy in the General 

Staff by 28 January 1949 in response to Papagos’ instructions.127 On 15 

February, Papagos issued orders to eliminate idleness, faintheartedness, 

and negligence. He declared that every commander “had the authority to 

shoot on the spot anyone under his command who showed negligence or 

faintheartedness.” Brigade and division commanders could relieve and 

court-martial officers for failing in their duty.128 Under his watch, the 

General Staff published a new manual entitled “Suppression of Irregular 

(Bandit) Operations” that codified the ideas of aggressive leadership 

and infantry tactics that the JUSMAPG advisors had been pushing since 

1947.129 The emphasis on aggressive action brought results in 1949 as the 

nationalist forces finally destroyed the remaining major communist units.

The 1949 Campaigns

The Greek armed forces began 1949 with a new campaign on 3 January 

to destroy all of the guerrilla units in the Peloponnese, which had been a 

major security problem since August 1947. The General Staff believed 

that the communists’ 3rd Division had 2,600 regulars and 2,500 armed 

auxiliaries throughout the peninsula. A Corps and its JUSMAPG advisors 

had been planning the operation since 29 November 1948. The General 

Staff assigned fifteen NDC battalions, all of the local gendarmerie, and four 

commando groups to A Corps for the operation. Additionally the Royal 

Hellenic Navy assisted with naval gunfire and a blockade of all shipping. 

The plan included two major differences from previous campaigns. First, 

gendarmerie arrested every suspected communist sympathizer, estimated 

at 5,000, as a preliminary step before the GNA began its clearing operations 

to deny the enemy intelligence and support.130 Second, the local police, 

gendarmerie, and NDC would follow immediately behind the methodical 

GNA clearing operations, reestablishing police stations and local security 

to prevent guerrillas from returning.131

The operation began well after the gendarmerie detained over 4,297 

suspected communists and interred them on an island.132 Four GNA 

divisions progressed south, focusing on careful clearing instead of rapid 

movement. The JUSMAPG insistence on maintaining a reserve and 

planning for pursuit operations paid off on 16 January when a communist 

battalion attempted to break through the GNA line and evade toward the 

north. Elements from the 41st Brigade were standing by as the reserve. 

They pursued the communists and destroyed the unit. While the majority 

of the force cleared the area from north to south, the commando groups 
86

were attempting to pursue and fix the major guerrilla units in the southern 

part of the peninsula. These efforts met with little success except one 

operation by two commando groups at the village of Ayios Vassilios. The 

commandos conducted a night movement over a snow-covered mountain 

range, which enabled them to surround the village and attack at dawn, 

destroying a reinforced communist battalion. The progress continued as 

the GNA moved south. By 25 March only an estimated 250 guerrillas had 

escaped death or capture.133

The balance of casualties heavily favored the nationalists, who lost 

56 killed, 173 wounded, and two missing. The General Staff reported 

killing 1,640 and capturing 2,712 regulars. Additionally, in a sign of 

increasing momentum for the government, 1,568 communist auxiliaries 

surrendered during the operation.134 The JUSMAPG advisors noted that 

performance had improved, but that Greek commanders still showed 

insufficient aggressiveness. Nevertheless, the nationalists had achieved a 

clear-cut success, which greatly benefited from the US operational advice 

and training.

While the nationalists had success in the south, the Democratic Army 

launched a large-scale raid on the town of Karpenision in central Greece 

on 18 January 1949. The communist 2nd division captured the town on 

21 January. Three nationalist brigades fought to retake the town, but they 

failed until 9 February, by which time the communists had destroyed almost 

the entire town and abducted 1,300 civilians. The nationalists pursued the 

communists, but frustrated their US advisors by refusing to move faster 

on account of the snow and counterattacks. The pursuit continued until 

28 February when the nationalists could no longer maintain contact with 

the enemy. Van Fleet and Jenkins both told Papagos and the General 

staff that the GNA commanders on the ground were responsible for the 

ineffective nationalist operation. Jenkins’ memorandum plainly stated that 

the guerrillas were able to strike wherever they chose against a better fed 

and equipped nationalist army because the Greek officer corps lacked a 

“sense of responsibility, duty, and aggressiveness to win battles.”135

Despite the poor showing at Karpenision, the nationalists seized the 

initiative through their success in the Peloponnese and the defense of 

Florina as discussed above. The GNA spent March and April consolidating 

their gains and pursing small guerrilla elements. On 1 May 1949, following 

Van Fleet’s vision for a series of operations from south to north, A Corps 

initiated Operation Rocket with the intent to clear central Greece. B Corps 

supported the operation by containing guerrilla forces in the northwest, 

while C Corps conducted small scale operations to maintain pressure on 
87

the insurgents in the northeast. The operation showed an improved ability 

for the higher echelons to manage the battle by breaking into multiple 

phases, each of which successively isolated and cleared a portion of 

central Greece while blocking forces interdicted fleeing guerrillas. The 

US advisors were pleased with the level of aggressive pursuit by their 

Greek counterparts, which kept the guerrillas on the move, unable to 

rest or resupply.136 Whereas the JUSMAPG message traffic from August 

1948 to February 1949 showed increasing urgency and desire to impart 

aggressiveness into the Greek officers, by June 1949 their messages 

congratulated the Greek commanders on the success of their aggressive 

operations.137 The US officers still pushed their counterparts “to keep up 

the heat” on the communists, but there was a definite shift in tone that 

indicates increasing satisfaction with Greek battlefield performance.138 The 

General Staff reported that nationalist operations from April to June 1949 

had inflicted over 10,000 casualties, reducing the estimated communist 

strength to approximately 17,000 fighters, the lowest level since October 

1947.139

The General Staff and JUSMAPG had begun planning for the next 

operation, named Torch, while Rocket was underway. The plan for Torch 

envisioned an offensive by four divisions and five commando groups to 

clear first the Vitsi area and then the Grammos Mountains. Since the first 

Vitsi campaign the General Staff had been using the commando groups 

more and integrating them more effectively with the regular divisions.140

The US officers tightly controlled the logistical preparations for the final 

operation. They spent weeks supervising the stockpiling of depots in 

forward locations so that supplies could be pushed forward to the front 

line units, instead of those units having to drive to distant warehouses.141

On 10 August 1949, the operation commenced with two pincer attacks 

to encircle the estimated five communist brigades and a frontal attack by 

two divisions and two commando groups. As a result of the weakening 

Democratic Army and the improved nationalist combat leadership, 

the assaults broke through the communist lines in three days. While 

the nationalists showed better combat leadership, the US advisors still 

provided operational mentoring and direction throughout this operation. 

They continued to cajole the Greek commanders into aggressive action 

and worked to synchronize the plans of various units.142 The survivors of 

the communist units hastily withdrew toward Albania with the GNA in 

pursuit. The General Staff estimated that it had destroyed two brigades and 

attrited the other three by 50 percent.143
88

Figure 3. Sketch of the 1949 Grammos Operation

Source: The author created the map based on the information in US Army, JUSMAPG: 

Brief History, map enclosed between pages 19 and 20.

Leaving two divisions to consolidate the victory and prevent a 

communist return, the commandos and two divisions turned south toward 

Grammos to begin the second phase of the operation on 24 August. Two 

fresh divisions also contributed to the operation. IX Division enveloped 

the Grammos positions from north to south down the border with Albania 

while VIII Division maintained blocking positions in the south. The 

remaining forces assaulted the communist positions on the ridge lines. 

Using the US advisors’ training in night operations, the attack began under 

cover of darkness. As in the Vitsi phase of the operation, the improved 

aggressiveness, tactics, and command of the nationalist forces enabled 

the GNA to break through the communist defense in three days. Once 

the remaining units of the Democratic Army collapsed and began their 

disorganized retreat, the nationalists pursued for two days until they 

reached the Albania border. Van Fleet reported a decisive victory in his 

situation report on 29 August 1949.144 They spent a month tracking small 

groups of guerrillas, searching the mountains, and salvaging as much 

material as possible until 21 September when the General Staff declared an 
89

end to the operations. While several hundred scattered communist fighters 

remained in Greece, Operation Rocket was the decisive end to the threat 

from the Democratic Army. The GNA arrayed several divisions along 

the border to defend against external aggression and sent two divisions 

to a new JUSMAPG training program to prepare them for new missions. 

JUSMAPG eventually retrained all of the Greek armed forces to prepare 

them for their role in the defense of Western Europe by the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization.145

Summary

The JUSMAPG advisors improved the combat leadership of the 

nationalist army through persistent training, mentorship, direction, and 

disciplinary action. With more aggressive commanders, better tactics, 

sound battlefield control, and adequate logistics, the GNA maintained 

constant pressure on the Democratic Army. Under constant threat from 

the nationalists, the communists could not recover from their battlefield 

losses or their own errors. The advisor’s influence over the operations and 

leadership of the Greek Army proved critical to the decisive nationalist 

victory.
90

Notes

1. Dean Acheson, “Conversation with the President” 19 April 1949, 

Dean G. Acheson Papers, Box 65, Memorandum of Conversation Files, Truman 

Library 3374; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “Overriding 

Priority for $125,000,000 China Aid,” 16 November 1948, General Records of 

the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park, MD, Records Group 59, Records of the Officer-in-Charge of Greek 

Affairs, Subject File 1946-1951, Box 39. 

2. War Department, Cable 7744 to USAGG, Athens, 16 April 1948, 

Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing 

Messages, Box 92; James Van Fleet, Cable to Chief of Staff, USAF, 17 

December 1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States 

Military Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming 

and Outgoing Messages, Box 114; US Air Force, Cable to USAGG, Athens 

and USAFE, 26 May 1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint 

United States Military Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, 

Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 92.

3. James Van Fleet, “Interview with General James A. Van Fleet,” 

Interview 3, Tape 3, 56.

4. George Marshall, Memorandum for Mr. Lovett re Athens Visit, 20 

October 1948, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives 

and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 59, Records 

of the Officer-in-Charge of Greek Affairs, Subject File 1946-1951, Box 39; 

National Security Council, “NSC 5/4, The Position of the United States with 

Respect to the Use of US Military Power in Greece,” 3 June 1948, Records of 

the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, National Archives and Records 

Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 319, Entry 154, Decimal File 

091, Box 14; Jones, 133-134, 206-213.

5. Jones, 141.

6. Gallager, 258.

7. John O Coppock, “Greece–End of 1948,” John O. Coppock Papers, 

Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Box 1, 2.

8. Department of State, “Greek Executions and Internal Security 

Measures,” General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and 

Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 59, Records of the 

Officer-in-Charge of Greek Affairs, Subject File 1946-1951, Box 39.

9. Department of State; Jones, 162; Averoff-Tossizza, 313-317; US Army, 

JUSMAPG, 118.

10. The communists built division level organizations, but could not 

maneuver a division in the field as a division. Just as the nationalists experienced 
91

difficulties managing large units in battle, the communists did not have the depth 

of experienced staff officers and commanders to fight a division. The leap from 

raids and ambushes to division-level combined arms maneuver is very difficult.

11. Shrader, 111-114.

12. Department of State, Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive 

Committee, 14 January 1949, James A. Van Fleet Papers, Military History 

Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1. 6483; US Army, JUSMAPG, 107; Shrader, 

93-96; US Army, JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948-31 December 1949, 

Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 154, Historical File, Box 146, 24.

13. Kousouslas, 252-253, 260-261; Averoff-Tossizza, 317-322; Shrader, 

110-114, 263-265.

14. United States Army Group-Greece, “Quarterly Report For Period 

Ending 31 March 1949,” General Records of the Department of State, National 

Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 

59, Records of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Subject File 

Greece-Turkey 1947-1950, Box 21.

15. US Army, JUSMAPG: Brief History, 24.

16. Intelligence Division, “The Greek Guerrillas’ System of Supply,” 

Intelligence Review, no. 96 (18 December 1947): 18-19, Archives: Military 

History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

17. US Army, JUSMAPG, 110.

18. Kousoulas, 263-264.

19. Shrader, 182-186; Kousoulas, 263-264.

20. Shrader, 184-186; Dean Acheson, “Memorandum of Conversation with 

Sava Kosanovic,” 1 July 1949, Dean G. Acheson Papers, Box 65, Memorandum 

of Conversation Files, Truman Library; “Export License for Yugoslav Blooming 

Mill,” 21 July 1949, Dean G. Acheson Papers, Box 65, Memorandum of 

Conversation Files, President Harry S. Truman Library.

21. The loss of Yugoslavian support may have created a sense of urgency 

that reinforced the KKE’s decision to win the war conventionally. They 

needed to win rapidly before the loss of Yugoslavian aid forced them to curtail 

operations.

22. Shrader, 193-194.

23. Department of State, “Comment on Draft S/P Position Paper RE 

US Combat Troops in Greece,” 29 October 1948, General Records of the 

Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park, MD, Records Group 59, Records of the Officer-in-Charge of Greek 

Affairs, Subject File 1946-1951, Box 39; Van Fleet, “Interview with General 

James A. Van Fleet,” Interview 3, Tape 3, 43.
92

24. Gaddis, 36-37; Jones, 172; American Mission for Aid to Greece, 

Monthly Report of the Chief of AMAG to the Secretary of State, 15 April 1948, 

General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records 

Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 59, Records of the Office 

of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Subject File, Greece-Turkey 1947-

1950, Box 21, 12; State Department, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 3 

September 1948, James A. Van Fleet Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA, 2.

25. US Army, JUSMAGG: History 25 March 1949-30June 1950, Records 

of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group 

Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 154, Historical File, Box 146, 1.

26. Van Fleet, “Interview with General James A. Van Fleet,” Interview 3, 

Tape 3, 37-41.

27. Department of State, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 25 February 

1949, James A. Van Fleet Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 

PA, 2.

28. Department of State.

29. Reuben Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG HMC Peloponnese, Love 

2948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 115.

30. James Van Fleet, Cable to Director Plans and Operations, 23 July 1948, 

Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing 

Messages, Box 114; US Army, JUSMAPG, 93. The Greek government had 

asked for poison gas. The documents do not specify if the Greeks asked for 

specific chemical agents. Van Fleet responded that military chemical weapons 

were unconscionable and riot control agents like tear gas were ineffective in war.

31. War Department, Cable 87907 to USAGG, Athens, 21 August 1948, 

Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing 

Messages, Box 93.

32. US Army, JUSMAPG, 123, 126-127.

33. Department of State, Executive Committee, 14 January 1949, 2-3; US 

Army, JUSMAPG, 134.

34. James Van Fleet, Cable to JUSMAPG Detachment HMG, 16 June 

1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 113.

35. US Army, JUSMAPG, 52.
93

36. US Army, 80-81.

37. US Army, 81, 83.

38. State Department, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 20 August 

1948, James A. Van Fleet Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 

PA, 1; Department of State, Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee, 

14 January 1949, James A. Van Fleet Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA, 2; US Army, JUSMAPG, 121, 128.

39. Shrader, 225.

40. US Army, JUSMAPG, 51-52.

41. War Department, Cable 97957 to USAGG, Athens, 20 March 1948, 

Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing 

Messages, Box 92; US Air Force, Cable to US Air Force Group-Greece, 26 

April 1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 94. The use of Spitfires and Helldivers over other 

aircraft that are more suitable for close-air support or were newer indicates the 

low priority the British and US governments placed on the RHAF.

42. Stephen Chamberlin, “The Greek Situation: Report to the Chief of 

Staff,” 20 October 1947, Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations 

Division, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 

Records Group 319, Entry 154, Decimal File 091, Box 14, 11; US Army, 

JUSMAPG, 69; Plans and Operations Division, Cable to CINCEUR, 28 June 

1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 94.

43. War Department, Cable 73119 to USAGG, Athens, 19 April 1948, 

Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing 

Messages, Box 92; US Army, JUSMAPG, 69, 93, 131.

44. US Army, USAGG Vol II, 25, 34.

45. Ray Maddocks, Cable From Plans and Operations Division to USAGG, 

24 November 1948, Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, 

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records 

Group 319, Entry 154, Decimal File 091, Box 15.

46. Plans and Operations Division, Cable 80149 to USAGG, 26 November 

1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 93.

47. Department of State, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 13 August 

1948, James Van Fleet Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 

1.
94

48. James Van Fleet, Cable to Chief B Corps JUSMAPG, 13 July 1948, 

Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing 

Messages, Box 114.

49. Plans and Operations Division, “General Livesay’s Replacement by 

General Van Fleet as Director JUSMAPG and Chief USAGG,” Records of the 

Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, National Archives and Records 

Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 319, Entry 154, Decimal File 

319.1, Box 51.

50. Benjamin Taylor, Memorandum for the Department of State, 10 

February 1948, Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, 

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records 

Group 319, Entry 153, Decimal File 091, Box 75.

51. William Livesay, untitled speech, 16 January 1948, William Livesay 

Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 4.

52. William Livesay, Diary, 4 November 1947, William Livesay Papers, 

Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 4.

53. Van Fleet, “Interview with General James Van Fleet,” Interview 3, Tape 

3, 26.

54. Van Fleet, “Interview with General James Van Fleet,” Interview 3, Tape 

3, 26.

55. C. P. Rodocanachi, “A Day in the Country with General Van Fleet,” 

James A. Van Fleet Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA; 

James Van Fleet, Message for LTG Tsakalotos, 29 August 1949, Records of 

Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, 

Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 116.

56. Van Fleet, “Interview with General James Van Fleet,” Interview 3, Tape 

3, 44.

57. Van Fleet, 9.

58. James Van Fleet, Cable to Director Plans and Operations, Records of 

Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, 

Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 113; US 

Army, JUSMAPG, 71-72.

59. US Army, JUSMAPG, 72.

60. US Army, 73.

61. US Army, 74.

62. US Army, JUSMAPG, 75-77.

63. US Army.

64. James Van Fleet, Cable to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 June 1948, Records 
95

of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group 

Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 

113.

65. US Army, JUSMAPG, 79-80.

66. US Army, 81, 84-85.

67. Reuben Jenkins, Cable to JUSMAPG Detachment B Corps, Records of 

Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, 

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records 

Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 113; James Van 

Fleet, Cable to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 June 1948 and 29 June 1948, Records of 

Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, 

Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 113; US 

Army, JUSMAPG, 85-88.

68. James Van Fleet, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG B Corps, 12 July 1948, 

Director Plans and Operations, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint 

United States Military Advisory Group Greece, National Archives and Records 

Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming 

and Outgoing Messages, Box 114.

69. US Army, JUSMAPG, 86-88; James Van Fleet, Cable to Director Plans 

and Operations, 21 August 1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint 

United States Military Advisory Group Greece, National Archives and Records 

Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming 

and Outgoing Messages, Box 114.

70. US Army, JUSMAPG, 88.

71. American Mission for Aid to Greece, “AMAG 2588,” 21 December 

1948, Harry S. Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s File, President Harry S. 

Truman Library, Independence MO, Box 112, 2.

72. US Army, JUSMAPG, 88.

73. US Army, JUSMAPG, 89-90.

74. US Army.

75. James Van Fleet, Cable to Director Plans and Operations, 20 September 

1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park, MD, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, 

Box 114; US Army, JUSMAPG, 100-102.

76. James Van Fleet, Cable to Director Plans and Operations, 19 July 

1948, Love 1430, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States 

Military Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 114.

77. US Army, JUSMAPG, 103-104.
96

78. James Van Fleet, Cable to CSGPO, Love 2006, Records of Interservice 

Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, Records 

Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 114.

79. US Army, JUSMAPG, 105.

80. James Van Fleet, Cable to CSGPO, 20 November 1948, Records of 

Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, 

Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 114; US 

Army, JUSMAPG, 105-106.

81. These are the only casualty figures available. JUSMAPG used the 

numbers that the GNA reported and there was no other organization reported 

casualty figures. There may be error or bias for the casualty figures throughout 

the war. However, the US advisors would have been able to ensure that there 

were not excessive errors in the number of captured insurgents, since these 

prisoners would have been included in future logistical head counts.

82. US Army, JUSMAPG, 106.

83. Intelligence Division, “Armed Band Activity in Greece,” Intelligence 

Review, no. 50 (14 October 1948): 50-55, Archives: Military History Institute, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA; Van Fleet, Cable to Plans and Operations Division, 20 

September 1948.

84. US Army, JUSMAPG, 106.

85. James Van Fleet, Cable to Director Plans and Operations, 22 October 

1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 114, 6.

86. US Army, JUSMAPG, 104.

87. Harvey Smith, Memorandum for the Ambassador, “Guerrilla 

Suppression,” 6 December 1948, General Records of the Department of State, 

Records of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Subject File 1947-

1950, Box 14.

88. Smith.

89. US Army, JUSMAPG, 113.

90. US Army, 113-114.

91. The American officers were captains or majors who had commanded in 

combat: James Van Fleet, Cable to Director Plans and Operations, Love 1485, 

Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing 

Messages, Box 114.

92. US Army, JUSMAPG, 114.

93. US Army.
97

94. Reuben Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG Dets X Division and B 

Corps, 6 January 1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United 

States Military Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, 

Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 115.

95. Reuben Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG Training Center 

Kolaki, 5 January 1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United 

States Military Advisory Group Greece, National Archives and Records 

Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming 

and Outgoing Messages, Box 115.

96. Reuben Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG B Corps, 4 January 1949, 

Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing 

Messages, Box 115.

97. Henry Grady, “AMAG 1613,” 22 October 1948, Harry S. Truman 

Papers, President’s Secretary’s File, President Harry S. Truman Library, 

Independence, MO, Box 165, 1-3.

98. Henry Grady, Telegram for the Secretary of State, 4 January 1949, 

General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Officer-in-Charge of 

Greek Affairs, Subject File 1944-1951, Box 39.

99. US Army, JUSMAPG, 89.

100.Reuben Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG Detachment B Corps, 

16 July 1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States 

Military Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 114.

101.Reuben Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG HMC Peloponnese, 16 

July 1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 114; Reuben Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG 

Detachment C Corps, 15 July 1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint 

United States Military Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, 

Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 114.

102.Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “Greek Situation,” 

General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Officer-in-Charge of 

Greek Affairs, Subject File 1944-1951, Box 39.

103.James Van Fleet, Cable to CSGPO, 22 January 1949, Records of 

Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, 

Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 115, 6.

104.Reuben Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG Detachment A Corps, 2 

April 1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 115.
98

105.Reuben Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG B Corps, 25 February 

1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 115.

106.US Army, JUSMAPG, 143-145.

107.Department of State, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 21 January 

1949, James A. Van Fleet Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 

PA, 2; US Army, JUSMAPG, 160-162.

108.James Van Fleet, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG Detachment B Corps, 

19 January 1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States 

Military Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 115.

109.US Army, JUSMAPG, 89, 112.

110.Van Fleet, “Interview with General James Van Fleet,” Interview 3, Tape 

3, 16.

111.US Army, JUSMAPG, 112.

112.James Van Fleet, Cable to CSGPO, 15 February 1949, Records of 

Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, 

Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 115, 

4109; US Army, JUSMAPG, 150-153.

113.US Army, JUSMAPG, 65.

114.US Army, 153-154.

115.Van Fleet, “Interview with General James Van Fleet,” Interview 3, Tape 

3, 48.

116.US Army, JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948-31 December 

1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 154, Historical File, Box 

146, 20-21.

117.James Van Fleet, Cable to Director Plans and Operations, 23 July 1948, 

Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing 

Messages, Box 114.

118.US Army, JUSMAPG, 94-95, 103.

119.US Army.

120.Van Fleet, “Interview with General James A. Van Fleet,” Interview 3, 

Tape 3, 14-15. Whether or not French World War I doctrine influenced the GNA, 

Van Fleet believed that it had left a lasting impression on GNA tactics.

121.James Van Fleet, Cable to Plans and Operations Division, 30 October 

1948, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 
99

Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 114.

122.James Van Fleet, Cable to CSGPO, 30 April 1949, Records of 

Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, 

Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 115.

123.US Army, JUSMAPG, 119; Van Fleet, “Interview with General James 

Van Fleet,” Interview 3, Tape 3, 43.

124.US Army, JUSMAPG, 119.

125.Van Fleet, “Interview with General James Van Fleet,” Interview 3, Tape 

3, 43.

126.US Army, JUSMAPG, 121, 123.

127.James Van Fleet, Cable to CSGPO, 28 January 1949, Records of 

Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, 

Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 115, 3.

128.US Army, JUSMAPG, 125.

129.S. Kitrilakes, Suppression of Irregular (Bandit) Operations, Records of 

Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, 

Records Group 334, Entry 146, General Decimal File, 352.11 to 400.312, Box 

67, 1-3.

130.James Van Fleet, Cable to CSGPO, 11 February 1949, Records of 

Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, 

Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 115.

131.US Army, JUSMAPG, 135-137.

132.Van Fleet supported this mass arrest against criticism from the 

American Embassy and the western press: Van Fleet, “Interview with General 

James A. Van Fleet,” Interview 3, Tape 3, 51-52.

133.US Army, JUSMAPG, 137-140.

134.US Army, 140-141.

135.US Army, 147-151.

136.Reuben Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG Detachment XV Division, 

27 June 1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States 

Military Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 115.

137.For example see Reuben Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG 

Detachment A Corps, 22 June 1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint 

United States Military Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, 

Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 115.

138.Reuben Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG Detachment IX Division, 

6 August 1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States 
100

Military Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 115.

139.US Army, JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948—31 December 

1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 154, Historical File, Box 

146, 17-19, enclosed maps.

140.For example see James Van Fleet, Cable to CSGPO, 3 June 1949, 

Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing 

Messages, Box 115, 3.

141.Van Fleet, “Interview with Van Fleet,” Interview 3, Tape 3, 48.

142.Reuben Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG Det B Corps, 8 August 

1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military 

Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and 

Outgoing Messages, Box 115.

143.US Army, JUSMAPG: Brief History, 19-20.

144.James Van Fleet, Cable to CSGPO, 29 August 1949, Records of 

Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, 

Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 116.

145.US Army, JUSMAPG: Brief History, 20-22, enclosed maps.
101

Chapter 5

Conclusions

Insist On Energetic Offensive Action Everywhere.

— Brigadier General Reuben Jenkins, Cable To B Corps

The US mission in Greece contributed to the decisive nationalist victory 

over the communists through its material and operational assistance. 

Through its operational assistance, JUSMAPG dramatically improved the 

nationalists’ combat efficiency. Despite these successes, there were two 

negative long-term outcomes for the GNA from the Greek Civil War. First, 

the Greek Expeditionary Force for the Korean War demonstrated that the 

GNA had not institutionalized the improvements in combat leadership. 

Second, the GNA became increasingly active politically and executed a 

coup d’etat in 1967. Nevertheless, JUSMAPG’s efforts improved Greek 

combat leadership sufficiently to achieve victory by August 1949. This 

improvement, the communist commitment to conventional operations, 

and the US material support resulted in the massive attrition of communist 

forces that led to the final decisive battle. The history of the US advisory 

mission in the Greek Civil War has important implications for future 

policy makers and advisors to foreign forces.

Long-term Results

While the combined US and Greek effort had defeated the communist 

threat, the US advisors did not have a total or permanent effect on Greek 

combat leadership. In 1950, the Greek government decided to send an 

expeditionary force to support the United Nations command in South 

Korea that fought to defeat the North Korean invasion. There were still US 

advisors in Greece assisting the GNA who would attempt to prepare this 

force for its deployment to Korea. The advisors found numerous leadership 

problems that threatened the ability of the Greek Expeditionary Force to be 

a useful fighting formation. The Greek General Staff eventually reduced 

the size of this force from a reinforced brigade to a reinforced battalion 

because it could not find the resources to support a larger organization.1

The General Staff then filled the battalion with conscripts whom the GNA 

labeled as volunteers. The officers transferred in and out so frequently 

in the months leading up to the November 1950 deployment that most 

of the training was for naught. The US advisors also assumed control of 

all logistical preparations down to the issuing of uniforms because the 

General Staff refused to release supplies from the warehouses.2 
102

In a 17 November 1950 memorandum, the senior US officer who 

was working with this expeditionary battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Jack 

Shannon, detailed its deficiencies and recommended a US run training 

program in Korea once the battalion arrived.3

 He noted that the Greek 

commander had put no emphasis on training. The advisors organized 

and executed the squad and platoon level training, which the Greek units 

completed adequately. However, the Greek commander shortened the 

training time available for the companies and battalion. The commander’s 

disinterest in training and preparing for combat also affected his unit. 

In the advisors’ evaluation, the training program had “proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the battalion and company commanders were not 

capable of administrative or tactical command of their units.” The Greek 

officers also completely ignored the advisors’ insistence on training the 

support units and the staffs.4

 The lack of logistical support, personnel 

issues, and unwillingness to train may indicate that the Greek government 

did not put a high priority on the Expeditionary Force.

Despite this inauspicious preparatory phase for the Korean War 

deployment, the Greek Expeditionary Force eventually proved itself. The 

United Nations command placed the Greek unit under the operational 

control of US units. Under the supervision and mentorship of the US army 

while operating with the 15th Infantry Regiment, the Greek Expeditionary 

Force performed better than the US advisors in Greece who trained it feared. 

It is clear from the 15th Infantry’s regimental history for the year that the 

regimental commander used the Greeks to support his US battalions. He 

gave the most important and difficult missions to the US units and used 

the Greek battalion to relieve exhausted US units. Nevertheless, the Greek 

battalion performed well under fire when they relieved US units. During 

the night of 17-18 June 1953, after it relieved US units that had been 

exhausted by Chinese attacks, the Greek battalion held its position against 

an attack by a Chinese regiment. A month later, on 17 July, the Greeks 

demonstrated that they could also conduct offensive operations. Seven 

Chinese divisions attacked a Republic of Korea division. The US command 

committed the 15th Infantry to contain the resulting salient. After it had 

established its defensive positions, the Greek battalion attacked a Chinese 

company attempting to maneuver around the allied positions. The Greek 

offensive blocked the Chinese movement after several hours of fighting. 

Both of these actions reveal a level of combat effectiveness that the GNA 

never achieved in 1947.5
103

The legacy of the Greek Civil War had other less positive effects. 

The emphasis by the Truman administration, the ambassador in Athens, 

AMAG, and JUSMAPG on defeating the communist threat empowered 

far-right elements of Greek society and the military. Although AMAG’s 

efforts righted the Greek economy and enabled two decades of consistent 

economic growth after the Civil War, the US efforts also contributed to 

the undermining Greek democracy and political freedom.6

 The US had 

increased the effectiveness of the military and other security services, which 

reinforced their self-image and confidence as the ultimate guardians of 

Greece.7

 Extreme right-wing organizations continued to flourish, including 

those that used terror to attack those they perceived as communists. One of 

these organizations, an association of GNA officers founded during World 

War II, exerted an ideological influence over the army that justified an 

increasing political role for the military. These officers believed that the 

military was the last protector of Greece. Griswold recognized the danger 

to Greek liberal government from the military’s role in politics after the 

war. In a 26 July 1948 letter to Secretary of State George C. Marshall, 

he recommended that Marshall replace Van Fleet after the communists 

had been defeated. He argued that Van Fleet had the “proper offensive 

combat psychology” to win the war, but lacked the finesse and subtlety to 

transition the army to a smaller and less political role.8

The US officials in Greece continued to reconcile two conflicting 

perspectives about Greece. From the security perspective, the Truman 

administration believed that strong stable government were the most 

effective bulwark against communism.9

 The urgency of the escalating 

Cold War reinforced this perspective and gave it precedence over the idea 

that reforming Greek political and economic affairs would improve the 

country’s resilience against communist subversion. The preference for 

stability led US officials to condone harsh control measures including 

mass arrests and martial law.10 The successive governments of Greece 

would become more right wing and based on a narrower segment of the 

population. At times, the United States would advise against this trend, 

while at other times it would support the rightward drift.11 In 1952, the US 

ambassador intervened to change the electoral system to ensure a victory 

by Papagos, who had created his own party after retiring from the army. 

Right-wing parties continued to control Greece, even using the military to 

corrupt elections. The military’s political role continued to increase until 

a group of field grade officers engineered a coup on 21 April 1967. This 

putsch brought military rule until 1974 when a combination of widespread 
104

protests and demonstrated military incompetence in facing the Turkish 

military in Cyprus led to a new democratically elected government.12

The US policy in Greece, including the military advisory component, 

had secured the eastern Mediterranean against communist expansion. 

Its support of repressive governments eventually resulted in such an 

atmosphere of anti-Americanism that in the 1970s and 1980s the US 

embassy warned US nationals to stay away from all crowds.13 Nevertheless, 

policy makers can learn from JUSMAPG’s successes and failures.

Observations

There are numerous observations that policy makers and practitioners 

can make from studying the Greek Civil War and the US advisory mission 

in Greece. First, there is a difficult balance between increasing the capacity 

of the security forces and preserving liberal democracy. The Greek Civil 

War polarized Greek society, leading each side to label moderates as the 

enemy.14 The result was a government based on a very narrow basis of 

support. Additionally, right wing terrorists like the “X” organization used 

extrajudicial terror in coordination with some government officials. If the 

communists refused decisive conventional combat and focused on longterm development of their political infrastructure, the US support for a 

narrowly based repressive regime may have failed. The United States did 

not push the Greek government to heal the divisions that had split Greek 

society since World War I. If the Greek communists had patiently waited, 

building their strength as the Greek economy failed and the government 

alienated the people, then the US effort may have required advisors 

who combined the zeal to instill aggressive combat leadership with the 

political subtlety to reform the government and undermine the communist 

movement.

The JUSMAPG advisors pushed for a more comprehensive 

counterinsurgency program. The 1949 campaigns, especially the operation 

in the Peloponnese, revealed improved tactics for destroying the insurgent 

infrastructure that enabled the communists to sustain their combat power. 

Through the NDC, home guards, and other paramilitary units, the GNA 

and JUSMAPG attempted to secure villages against communist attack 

and infiltration. Because of the need for more infantry for conventional 

operations, both the GNA and JUSMAPG used these village defense 

troops to support conventional operations, thereby undermining village 

security. The communists exploited the weakness of village security, but 

not as much as they could have had they refrained from committing their 

combat power to conventional operations. The nationalist campaigns were 
105

also weak on other parts of what has become accepted counterinsurgency 

doctrine. For example, the nationalists effectively had no psychological 

warfare operation. The US advisors began to encourage the nationalists 

to establish a psychological warfare capability in January 1949. The 

nationalists responded enthusiastically to JUSMAPG’s plans for 

conducting psychological warfare, but the advisors noted that the “Greek 

government seem[ed] not to know what information the Greek people 

need[ed].”15

The US advisors frequently played a very controlling role in the 

nationalist operations, but it was the Greek riflemen who did the fighting 

and the dying. JUSMAPG lost only one man killed in action, a pilot who 

was flying as co-pilot in a RHAF fighter. While the situation had become 

so dire in late 1947 that the Truman administration discretely studied the 

option of committing US ground forces, the GNA knew that it would have 

to carry the burden of fighting the war. This gave JUSMAPG a degree of 

leverage over the GNA since the Greeks could not expect the extremely 

limited US personnel to fight for them. JUSMAPG also had additional 

leverage from the very real possibility that the Truman administration 

might decide to reduce the level of assistance.

Ambassador Grady noted that the Greek general staff would delay 

taking the offensive if it thought that it could negotiate an increase in 

US funding by delaying operations and complaining about a paucity of 

soldiers.16 The willingness of the Truman administration to reduce its 

goals in Greece, reduce AMAG and JUSMAPG funding, and focus on 

other priorities around the world imparted a sense of urgency into the 

Greek nationalists. The advisors gained leverage to influence their Greek 

counterparts as the nationalists realized that they needed the United States 

more than the United States needed them. This was the opposite situation 

than in Vietnam, where the United States had staked its reputation on the 

survival of South Vietnam, thereby surrendering some of its leverage over 

South Vietnam.

The high quality of the officers assigned to JUSMAPG was also 

critical to the success of the advisory operation. JUSMAPG benefited 

from the fact that it had a pool of field grade officers with extensive 

combat experience in World War II. These officers had successfully 

commanded in combat. Even with this pool of potential advisors, Livesay, 

Van Fleet, and the Plans and Operations Division of the Army Staff found 

that only a minority of officers were fit and available to combat advise 

foreign forces.17 They chose to delay filling JUSMAPG vacancies rather 

than send less-qualified advisors.18 The principal criteria seemed to have 
106

been proven combat leadership, aggressiveness, and graduation from the 

Command and General Staff College. The requirement for aggressiveness 

extended to staff officers and logisticians, who frequently found that they 

had to command staffs and support units, if these supporting elements 

were to support the combat units. By the final campaigns of the war, the 

US staff and logistical advisors were in de facto command of the GNA 

sustainment operations.

If the communists had waged a more irregular war, the US advisors 

may have required more experience and training on counterinsurgency. 

These additional competencies could include psychological operations, 

language, guerrilla warfare, and employing paramilitary forces. A more 

irregular war would have been less decisive and would have required a 

greater focus on removing the insurgent infrastructure from the villages. 

The downside of increasing the requirements on advisors is that it 

would have made it even more difficult to find qualified personnel. A 

Greek language requirement alone would have disqualified most of the 

JUSMAPG advisors. Advising a Greek military that was fighting an 

irregular enemy would have been difficult for the US because it did not 

yet have the doctrine for or experience in combating insurgencies. Only a 

handful of US officers fought with indigenous forces during World War II. 

Moreover, the US Army did not publish its first guerrilla warfare doctrine 

until 1951.19 Without doctrinal guide or organization experience, the US 

Army would have had trouble creating an advisory mission on the scale of 

JUSMAPG in 1947 that could develop the GNA’s counterinsurgency skill.

The presence of US advisors at the general staff level down to the 

platoons also increased the ability for the advisors to affect the GNA’s 

combat performance. Advisors at higher echelons censured Greek 

commanders who obstructed the lower echelon advisors. The advisor 

chain of command was also able to track unit training, enforce standards 

throughout the GNA, and provide situational awareness up throughout 

JUSMAPG. Lower-level advisors were able to ensure that platoons and 

companies were adequately supporting the advisor-developed plans while 

higher-level advisors could remove bureaucratic obstacles and provide 

support to the troops on the ground.

Without the authority granted by the senior Greek officers and 

politicians, JUSMAPG could not have improved the GNA’s combat 

leadership as rapidly as it did. Even with the almost total support from 

Papagos in 1949, the advisors were not able to effect a total and permanent 

improvement. Even after two years of working with the GNA, the advisors 

still drove the Greek officers to be more aggressive during the final 1949 
107

campaigns. The poor initial leadership of the Greek Expeditionary Force 

to Korea shows how difficult it may be to create a permanent change in 

leadership by advisors. With a lot of authority and leverage, advisors may 

be able to instill dramatic improvements in a short-time frame. To make a 

permanent change, the advisory mission may have to extend over a much 

longer timeframe.

At the lower levels, JUSMAPG mostly affected combat leadership 

through its training programs. The demonstration platoons were the 

major component of this effort. Two factors led JUSMAPG to build an 

extensive unit training program. First, the Greek basic training courses 

were not producing soldiers and juniors officers that could operate in the 

field with any level of competence. Second, the GNA’s rapid expansion 

dramatically reduced the average quality of its units. The expansion may 

have increased the military’s political influence, but it had a negative effect 

on the ability of the GNA to defeat guerrillas in combat. The GNA also 

rapidly expanded the NDC, which frequently resulted in NDC units that 

failed in combat. Counterinsurgents have attempted to expand the security 

forces rapidly in other conflicts such as in the Malaya Emergency and 

currently in Afghanistan. The result has generally been that the expansion 

decreased the average ability to fight. 

The JUSMAPG advisors found that to make the training program 

effective they had to execute the training themselves and diligently ensure 

compliance by Greek commanders.20 A US infantry officer trained each of 

the demonstration platoons and then supervised the training when those 

platoons returned to their parent divisions to train the other platoons. The 

division and corps level advisors tracked which units had completed the 

training. These advisors would also intervene when they found Greek 

commanders who showed a reluctance to train. While some of the training 

programs included critical subjects such as technical training on new 

equipment and pack animal handling, the major focus was on infantry 

tactics. This included fire and movement, patrolling, fire support, field 

craft, and night operations. The GNA demonstrated a marked weakness in 

these skills, which were critical for infantry units to aggressively pursue 

the guerrillas.

The advisors used a number of ways to influence their Greek 

counterparts. They built long-term relationships with the Greek officers 

by working side by side all day for months. This relationship allowed 

them to make suggestions, discuss, and inform. The relationship also 

provided the US advisors with very good understanding of the situation. 

The division level advisors accompanied units down to platoon level in 
108

combat, mentoring combat leaders at all levels. US field grade officers 

frequently advised Greek company grade officers, but not on a constant 

basis. JUSMAPG assigned its advisors to the division and corps echelons. 

These advisors accompanied the subordinate Greek units during operations. 

This structure worked because the GNA divisions usually did not have all 

of their units operating simultaneously. JUSMAPG would have needed 

a more robust force structure to maintain a constant presence below the 

division level. Nevertheless, the advisors’ constant presence allowed them 

to build relationships with their Greek counterparts. This relationship 

enabled the advisors to develop the ability of Greek staffs to control units 

in battle, coordinate plans, and overcome units and service rivalries. The 

advisors’ constant message was to be more aggressive, bolder, and faster 

in closing with and destroying the enemy.

When patient mentorship was not sufficient, the US advisors took a 

more directive role. Most of the time, they wrote the operational plans 

and orders for the Greek operations. JUSMAPG tracked the progress of 

the operation with individual advisors accompanying tactical units to 

ensure they adhered to the plan. The advisors also exercised direct control 

over logistics. They found that the Greeks would not use the millions of 

dollars of US provided material to efficiently prosecute the war unless US 

advisors closely monitored the supply system.

An important exception to the direct US role was intelligence 

operations. While JUSMAPG assigned officers to work with the Greek 

General Staff’s intelligence division, the dearth of archival material 

about the intelligence cycle indicates that JUSMAPG took a minimal 

role in intelligence operations. The minimal US role in this vital part of 

counterinsurgency operations was partially a result of demonstrated Greek 

proficiency. Van Fleet admired the efficiency of the Greek intelligence 

services, which produced accurate intelligence about communist activities 

inside Greece and across the border in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.21

The clandestine nature of intelligence and the connections between Greek 

intelligence and right-wing terrorist organizations may have deterred the 

JUSMAPG officers from operating too closely with Greek intelligence.22

In intelligence operations, the Greek government benefited from men of 

initiative and skill, traits in which the GNA was short.

In tactical operations, the US advisors found that mentorship and 

direction were not always sufficient. In some cases, the US advisors 

took an even harder line, recommending disciplinary action, or relief, 

for commanders who were not aggressive or repeatedly chose to ignore 

their advisors. Even when JUSMAPG did not take action, the advisors 
109

extraordinary influence undoubtedly affected the willingness of the Greek 

officers to listen to their advisors. The ability to influence the Greek 

general staff and politicians on issues of relieving and appointing general 

officers enabled the advisors to have more success in their training and 

mentorship programs. In turn, the massive scale of the US aid program and 

the potential for the United States to reduce that aid provided the leverage 

that led to the extraordinary influence that JUSMAPG had over the Greek 

officer corps.

This heavy-handed US approach to advising the GNA was frequently 

more of a command rather than an advisory relationship. The US advisors 

could not have had this level of control of the GNA without its extraordinary 

leverage over the chain of command. This style also may have resulted in 

dramatic short-term gains, but undermined the long-term development of 

Greek combat leadership. By planning operations and logistics for them, 

the advisors reduced the opportunities for the Greek officers to learn from 

experience. They violated the advice of Colonel T. E. Lawrence to “not 

do too much with your own hands.”23 The direct US approach achieved 

immediate results, but inhibited a sustainable improvement in Greek 

combat leadership.

Causes of the Nationalist Victory

Strategically, the communists and the nationalists in Greece had 

similar tasks. They had to control a population, extract resources from that 

population and external sources, convert those resources into a military 

force, sustain that force, and then efficiently use that military against 

their opponent’s military, infrastructure, and population. The KKE’s two 

egregious errors, the alienation of Yugoslavia and the commitment to 

conventional tactics, reduced their ability to execute these tasks. Losing 

Yugoslavian assistance and safe havens meant that the Democratic Army 

had fewer resources and fewer places into which it could withdraw 

for sanctuary. The commitment to conventional tactics increased the 

Democratic Army’s rate of attrition by willingly engaging in tactically 

decisive battles. The conventional tactics put the Democratic Army in a 

position where the GNA could destroy it with aggressive conventional 

operations. While the KKE and the Democratic Army showed incredible 

dedication and discipline in replacing losses, their losses far exceeded 

their ability to generate combat power in 1949.24 The rapid collapse in 

August 1949 suggests that the average quality of the communist forces 

had declined significantly, as they attempted to replace losses. In 1949, 

the communists had an estimated peak strength of approximately 24,000 

men but lost an estimated 32,000 casualties from January to September. 
110

This 133 per cent loss broke the communist ability to generate combat 

forces. If the communists had chosen to refrain from openly contesting 

territory, using guerrilla tactics while building their political control over 

the population, then they would have had a much lower attrition rate.25

Nevertheless, the communists’ errors are not sufficient to explain 

their decisive defeat completely. If in 1949 the Democratic Army faced 

the GNA of 1947, then the communist safe havens inside Greece would 

have been safe because the nationalists did not have the tactical ability 

to clear and hold those areas. Without dramatic improvements in combat 

leadership, the GNA could not have inflicted the same level of punishment 

on the insurgents. Moreover, without better tactics the GNA could not 

destroy the insurgent infrastructure. This infrastructure consisted of the 

personnel who controlled the population, garnered resources, conscripted 

fighters, and collected intelligence. The GNA’s improved tactics in 1949, 

beginning with the Peloponnese campaign, denied large portions of Greece 

to communist influence and taxation. Additionally, without the JUSMAPG 

efforts, the GNA would not have pursued aggressively, applied sustained 

pressure on guerrilla units. 

The GNA applied this pressure against the communists partially 

because of the massive level of US-provided material aid. AMAG 

supervised an extensive program to rebuild the Greek economy and fund 

its government. This effort stabilized the economy, enabling the Greek 

government to govern more effectively. Stabilizing the economy also 

reduced the recruiting pool for the insurgents. The military aid program 

clothed, fed, and equipped an expanded nationalist military. The US 

provided planes, suitable artillery, new weapons, radios, trucks, and mules. 

These supplies enabled the nationalists to conducted extended operations 

in rural areas. The GNA could sustain units who were pursuing guerrillas. 

This kept the pressure on the guerrillas, preventing them from resting and 

resupplying.

Despite the size of the aid program, it too is not sufficient to explain 

the nationalist victory and communist demise. The GNA only used its 

new supplies and weapons to pressure the insurgents when JUSMAPG 

advisors ensured that they aggressively sought out the guerrillas. Without 

the advisors’ constant insistence on more aggressive action, the GNA 

would have kept the United States provided material in warehouses. While 

the material aid increased the GNA’s combat power, the advisors enabled 

the GNA to apply this increased power against the insurgents. Moreover, 

the economic aid had its greatest effect after the GNA had secured the 

country through its decisive victory. 
111

JUSMAPG’s advisors played a critical role in achieving the GNA’s 

decisive victory. The advisors ensured that the GNA allowed the 

communists no respite through their tireless driving for aggressive action, 

better tactics, constant pursuit, efficient staff work, and effective logistics. 

The advisors’ ceaseless training, mentorship, direction, and influence led 

to the aggressive Greek operations that destroyed the communist threat. 

The critical components of the advisory effort were aggressive combat 

leaders as advisors, infantry tactics, long-term relationships with Greek 

officers, leverage over recalcitrant commanders, advisors throughout the 

Greek chain of command, control over staff and sustainment operations, 

and the constant pressure to aggressively close with and destroy the enemy. 

Implications and Future Research

While every conflict is unique, the case of the Greek Civil War suggests 

a model for bolstering governments when combat leadership is one of the 

regime’s weaknesses. The United States is currently conducting efforts to 

improve the combat effectiveness of other militaries in several countries 

including Afghanistan. If leadership is one of the critical problems, then 

the recipient government will probably squander any material aid unless 

advisors ensure that the local government efficiently used the aid to 

undermine the insurgency. This is not true of all cases. Not all countries 

require a major advisory effort—material aid may be sufficient. However, 

if weak combat leadership is causing the local government to lose the war, 

the United States could apply some lessons from the Greek Civil War. 

First, the United States would need to have a high level of leverage 

to influence the recipient government’s leadership. The United States 

might acquire this leverage from the level of material aid provided and 

a willingness to settle for lesser goals if the government to be bolstered 

does not cooperate. Second, the United States would establish an advisory 

mission but would not take the onus of combat away from the local 

government. US forces taking on the burden of combating the enemy 

can create a moral hazard problem where the local government’s forces 

have little incentive to improve their combat effectiveness because the 

United States is doing the fighting. Third, the United States should place 

its advisors throughout the chain of command in combat and sustainment 

positions with the guidance to improve leadership and staff work at all 

echelons. 

Fourth, the mission should select advisors who combine aggressive 

combat leadership with a subtle understanding of insurgent warfare. 

Current and future insurgencies are unlikely to place the majority of their 
112

combat power in defensive positions where the government can find, 

fix, and finish them. Consequently, advisors will need to add expertise 

in securing the population and destroying insurgent infrastructure to the 

combat expertise that JUSMAPG’s advisors had applied. Only a minority 

of the military’s personnel will meet these qualifications. The Greek Civil 

War is a case where choosing quality over quantity proved successful.

Fifth, the advisors may need to intervene to relieve ineffective 

commanders, enforce supply discipline, ensure staff coordination, or even 

take command of units in combat. JUSMAPG’s directive style resulted in 

rapid improvement in Greek combat leadership, but did not institutionalize 

those changes. The advisors must learn how to balance direct intervention 

to accomplish the mission with allowing their local counterparts to fight 

their own war. The leadership failures of the Greek Expeditionary Force for 

the Korean War shows that a highly directive style may provide immediate 

results but may not achieve lasting changes in the organization’s culture of 

leadership. On the other hand, a less directive style in the Greek Civil War 

may not have improved the GNA performance rapidly enough to stave 

off at least a partial communist victory such as an autonomous region in 

northern Greece.

Sixth, the advisors must be capable of mentoring leaders and building 

cohesive combat units that can execute effective tactical operations. This 

means that they must know how to train units on infantry tactics including 

night operations, patrolling, operations in rough terrain, and fire support. 

This also means that the advisors must be able to supervise commanders, 

their staffs, and the logistical units. The staffs must be able to plan 

operations, coordinate those operations, and then track their progress. 

The logisticians must be able to push enough supplies forward so that 

the combat units can keep constant pressure against guerrilla units. The 

advisors may have to focus on pack animals and other non-US techniques 

that the local government can actually sustain.

Since all wars are unique, policy makers must exercise due diligence 

when building any advisory mission. Additional research can enable 

policy makers, advisors, and counterinsurgents to achieve the national 

goals more effectively. Future researchers studying the Greek Civil War 

can extend the study of certain aspects of nationalist operations including 

the commando groups, the paramilitary organizations, amphibious 

operations, and intelligence operations. Research into other cases could 

study how to strengthen the security services without undermining 

democratic ideals. How did or could have advisors in other conflicts 

improve combat leadership and performance? How have advisors in other 
113

conflicts balanced immediate tactical results through a directive style with 

a less directive style that allowed the locals to take the lead? Under what 

circumstances is this Greek model not applicable? Future research along 

these lines has the potential to enable better policy decisions and execution 

when the US attempts to reinforce a government that an insurgency has 

besieged. The quality of the security forces’ leaders will play a critical role 

in determining the outcome of any insurgency.
114

Notes

1. Jack Shannon, “Training of the Greek Expeditionary Force,” 17 

November 1950, Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States 

Military Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 146, General 

Decimal File, 352.11 to 400.312, Box 67, 1-3.

2. Shannon.

3. Shannon.

4. Shannon.

5. 15th Infantry Regiment, 1953 Yearbook, http://www.15thinfantry.org/

1953yearbook.html (accessed: 5 November 2012), 10-20.

6. Clogg, 148.

7. John Iatrides, “American Attitudes Toward the Political System of 

Postwar Greece,” in Theodore Couloumbis and John Iatrides, eds, Greek 

American Relations (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1980), 67-68.

8. Dwight P. Griswold, Letter to George C. Marshall, 26 July 

1948, Dwight P. Griswold Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, 

Independence, MO, Box 1, 1.

9. Iatridas, “American Attitudes,” 68.

10. Iatridas, 65-66.

11. John Iatrides, “Reviewing American Policy toward Greece: The 

Modern Cassandras,” in Theodore Couloumbis and John Iatrides, eds, Greek 

American Relations (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1980), 12-15.

12. Clogg, 147, 155, 162-168.

13. Iatrides, “Reviewing American Policy,” 15.

14. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, 230.

15. Department of State, “Minutes of the Executive Committee Held 14 

January 1949,” James Van Fleet Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA, 4-5.

16. War Department, Cable 87907 to USAGG, Athens, 21 August 1948, 

Records of Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group Greece, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, 

MD, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Incoming and Outgoing Messages, Box 93.

17. The shortage of combat leaders would also affect the performance of 

the US Army at the onset of the Korean War. See Roy Flint, “Task Force Smith 

and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950,” America’s First 

Battles (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1986), 266-299.

18. Albert Wedemeyer, Letter to James Van Fleet, 24 April 1948, Records 

of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, National Archives and 
115

Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 319, Entry 153, 

Decimal File 091, Box 77.

19. Andrew Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency 

Operations Doctrine 1942-1976 (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 

2007), 132.

20. US Army, JUSMAPG, 114; Jenkins, Cable to Chief JUSMAPG Dets X 

Division and B Corps, 6 January 1949, Records of Interservice Organizations, 

Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, National Archives and 

Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 334, Entry 146, Box 

115.

21. Van Fleet, “Interview with Van Fleet,” Interview Three, Tape Three, 

21-25.

22. Van Fleet said “there’s a lot of dirty work that goes along when you get 

into this game and there was a lot of it in Greece.” Van Fleet, 24.

23. Thomas E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” Arab Bulletin (20 

August 1917), http://www.telstudies.org/writings/works/articles_essays/1917_

twenty-seven_articles.shtml (accessed 27 November 2012).

24. Shrader, 263-266.

25. Shrader, 117.

117

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