IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

JEROME JUNIOR WASHINGTON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

MICHAEL KNAPP, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 No. 4:22-CV-01269 

 (Chief Judge Brann) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

DECEMBER 19, 2022 

 Plaintiff Jerome Junior Washington is a serial pro se litigator who is well 

known to this Court. He is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional 

Institution, Rockview (SCI Rockview), in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania. Washington 

filed the instant pro se Section 19831

 action concerning alleged Eighth Amendment 

violations by two SCI Rockview officials. Washington’s complaint raises a host of 

issues but only plausibly states a single claim for relief. 

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se

prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.2

 One 

basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim 

1

 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional 

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves 

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. 

v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002). 

2

 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

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upon which relief may be granted[.]”3 This language closely tracks Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to 

screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as 

they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).4

 

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire 

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to 

offer evidence to support the claims.”5

 The court must accept as true the factual 

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff.6

 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of 

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, 

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to 

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these 

documents.7

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a 

three-step inquiry.8

 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] 

3

 Id. § 1915A(b)(1). 

4

 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien 

v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential); 

cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 

5

 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 

1996). 

6

 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). 

7

 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). 

8 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). 

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plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”9 Second, the court should distinguish wellpleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal 

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be 

disregarded.10 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations 

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”11 

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”12

 Because Washington proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally 

construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”13 This is 

particularly true when the pro se litigant, like Washington, is incarcerated.14

II. DISCUSSION 

Washington’s complaint, like the other civil rights lawsuits he has filed, is 

unnecessarily verbose and difficult to follow. His allegations are disjointed and 

disorganized, repeatedly shifting between unrelated events, prison policies, and 

purportedly wrongful conduct by various prison staff. In the instant lawsuit, 

Washington sues two SCI Rockview officials: Unit Manager Michael Knapp and 

9

 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)). 

10 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). 

11 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). 

12 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. 

13 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). 

14 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). 

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Superintendent Bobbi Jo Salamon.15 As best the Court can ascertain, Washington 

is asserting a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs16 and is 

attempting to do so through a theory of supervisory liability, as he repeatedly 

asserts that Defendants’ “policies, practices, and procedures systematically violate” 

his Eighth Amendment rights.17 

Washington alleges that he is “seriously mentally ill” and has been housed in 

the Behavior Management Unit (BMU) at SCI Rockview since July 2020.18 He 

avers that he suffers from schizoaffective disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, 

visual and auditory hallucinations, suicidal ideation, attention deficit disorder, 

bipolar I, and an anti-social personality disorder.19 The gravamen of his claim 

appears to be that his lengthy administrative-custody confinement in the BMU—

which he alleges is contained within a restrictive “Level 5 Housing Unit”—violates 

his Eighth Amendment rights.20 Washington asserts that the conditions in the 

BMU, which include “near-constant isolation with little if any psychology 

specialist services or mental health treatment,” create a substantial risk that his 

mental illness will be exacerbated and that his mental health will decline.21 These 

conditions, Washington maintains, are directly created by defendant Knapp in his 

15 Doc. 1 ¶ 2. 

16 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 2, 12, 16, 32. 

17 See id. ¶¶ 2, 31. 

18 Id. ¶¶ 5-7, 17. 

19 Id. ¶ 6. 

20 Id. ¶¶ 8-16. 

21 Id. ¶¶ 13-16. 

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role as the supervisor and manager of the BMU, and Knapp is purportedly 

“deliberately indifferent” to them.22 Washington also faults Knapp for failing to 

provide adequate mental health care to BMU inmates and for implementing a 

disciplinary system that does not account for inmates’ mental illnesses or the 

impact that sanctions will have on prisoners like Washington.23

Washington includes a host of unrelated allegations regarding separate 

issues, many of which appear to be caused by unnamed correctional officers or 

prison management. For example, Washington alleges that male correctional 

officers frequently sexually harass, assault, and threaten other inmates.24 He also 

asserts that correctional officers and prison administrators delayed processing 

“incentive items or phone cards” for prisoners.25 Washington additionally 

contends that correctional officers encourage their subordinates to retaliate against 

inmates.26 

As to defendant Knapp, Washington alleges that on June 17, 2022, Knapp 

only allowed the BMU lieutenant to collect legal mail during the 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. 

shift and this somehow affected one of Washington’s other civil lawsuits.27 At a 

different section of his complaint, Washington contends that Knapp made 

22 See id.

23 Id. ¶¶ 10, 12, 15-16, 31. 

24 Id. ¶ 22. 

25 Id. ¶ 24. 

26 Id. ¶ 23. 

27 Id. ¶ 30. 

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“disrespectful remarks” to him28 and placed him in a “hard cell” that was dirty and 

lacked appropriate bedding.29

Washington’s complaint is deficient in numerous respects. The Court will 

address the sufficiency of Washington’s claims in turn. 

A. Personal Involvement 

 It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be 

“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”30 Rather, a Section 

1983 plaintiff must aver facts that demonstrate “the defendants’ personal 

involvement in the alleged misconduct.”31 Personal involvement can include direct 

wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through 

allegations of “personal direction” or of “actual knowledge and acquiescence”; 

however, such averments must be made with particularity.32

 Washington names Superintendent Salamon in the caption and introduction 

of his pleading only.33 He does not assert any allegations against Salamon or even 

include her name in the defendant-identification section on the second page of his 

complaint.34 Accordingly, Salamon must be dismissed for lack of personal 

28 Id. ¶ 29. 

29 Id. ¶ 32. 

30 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556. U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens context). 

31 Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). 

32 Id. (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). 

33 See Doc. 1 at 1. 

34 See id. at 2. 

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involvement because there are no allegations that she was involved in any of the 

purported constitutional violations. 

B. Individual Capacity Claim 

 The gravamen of Washington’s complaint appears to be a supervisory 

liability claim against Knapp for creating policies or practices that allegedly 

violated Washington’s Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. A 

Section 1983 plaintiff can state a supervisory liability claim by plausibly pleading 

that a defendant, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and 

maintained a policy, practice[,] or custom which directly caused constitutional 

harm.”35 

As best the Court can ascertain, Washington is alleging that Knapp has a 

disciplinary policy or practice that does not properly account for the behaviors of 

mentally ill inmates and keeps them perpetually housed in the BMU.36 

Washington appears to claim that, as he works his way through the BMU’s phases 

so that he can return to general population, Knapp will discipline him for behaviors 

related to his mental health problems and restart the BMU phase programming 

from the beginning.37 Washington also asserts that Knapp has failed to provide 

adequate psychological services to BMU inmates and in fact has intentionally 

35 A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)). 

36 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 10, 31. 

37 Id.

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blocked those services.38 According to Washington, Knapp’s policies have 

resulted in Washington being held in conditions that create a substantial risk that 

his mental illnesses will be exacerbated and that his mental health will decline. 

These allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to state a supervisory claim 

against Knapp for an alleged violation of Washington’s Eighth Amendment right 

to adequate medical care.39 

C. Official Capacity Claim 

Washington also sued Knapp in his official capacity.40 However, official 

capacity claims seeking monetary damages from state officials are barred by 

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents federal 

courts from entertaining lawsuits—by United States citizens or citizens of foreign 

states—brought against a state.41 This immunity from private suit extends to state 

agencies as well as state officials acting in their official capacity, because such 

lawsuits are essentially civil actions “against the State itself.”42 States may waive 

this immunity if they choose, but Pennsylvania has explicitly not waived its 

38 Id. ¶ 16 (alleging that Knapp “told psychological specialist services not to do their job or daily 

BMU rounds and not to provide adequa[te] mental health one[-]on[-]one services”). 

39 Cf. Clark v. Coupe, __ F.4th __, 2022 WL 17246324, at *7-8 (3d Cir. 2022) (finding that 

mentally ill prisoner-plaintiff had plausibly stated Eighth Amendment claim against prison 

officials for housing him in solitary confinement for seven months, thereby posing substantial 

risk of serious psychological and physical harm). 

40 See Doc. 1 at 1 (caption). 

41 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997); 

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). 

42 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 

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immunity with respect to claims brought under Section 1983.43 There are two 

exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment’s bar to private suits against nonconsenting 

states: (1) “Congress may abrogate a state’s immunity” and (2) “parties may sue 

state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.”44

Thus, any monetary damages sought by Washington in his official-capacity 

claim against Knapp are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and 

must be dismissed. Washington does seek injunctive relief in the form of 

“ensur[ing] that DOC prisoners / Washington receive constitutionally adequate 

mental health care.”45 Such a claim for prospective injunctive relief can proceed.

D. Other Allegations 

 Washington’s other unrelated allegations do not plausibly state a claim for 

relief and cannot be cured through amendment. As explained above, many of the 

allegations concern actions by prison officials who are not defendants in this 

lawsuit. And Washington’s additional assertions against Knapp do not implicate 

constitutional violations. 

Having a lieutenant collect legal mail only on the 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. shift and 

possibly missing delivery of legal mail on a single day does not in any way state a 

43 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 

2020); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 42 

PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b)). 

44 Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998) 

(emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). 

45 Doc. 1 ¶ 33. 

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First Amendment access-to-courts claim.46 Washington’s allegations fall short for 

many reasons, not the least of which is that Washington himself pleads that he was 

given multiple extensions (and months of additional time) to file a brief in 

opposition to the pending motion for summary judgment in his other civil rights 

lawsuit. Washington also does not allege that he lost the chance to pursue a 

qualifying underlying claim, i.e., a direct or collateral challenge to his criminal 

sentence or a conditions-of-confinement claim.47

As for Washington’s allegations that Knapp was disrespectful to him and 

used profanity on a single occasion, those assertions do not state a constitutional 

claim either. In general, verbal harassment, taunting, and profanity, without any 

injury or a threat thereof, are insufficient to implicate a constitutional infringement 

under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.48 

46 See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that, to state an access-tocourts claim, the prisoner-plaintiff must allege“(1) that they suffered an ‘actual injury’—that 

they lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; and (2) that they 

have no other ‘remedy that may be awarded as recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the 

present denial of access suit”). 

47 See id.

48 See Prisoners’ Legal Ass’n v. Roberson, 822 F. Supp. 185, 189 (D.N.J. 1993) (explaining that 

“verbal harassment does not give rise to a constitutional violation enforceable under § 1983”); 

see also Murray v. Woodburn, 809 F. Supp. 383, 384 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (collecting cases); 

Manning v. Flock, No. 1:11-CV-0293, 2012 WL 1078227, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012) 

(collecting cases); Graham v. Main, Civil Action No. 10-5027(SRC), 2011 WL 2412998, at 

*24-25 (D.N.J. June 9, 2011) (“Allegations of verbal abuse or threats, unaccompanied by 

injury or damage, are not cognizable under § 1983, regardless of whether the inmate is 

a pretrial detainee or sentenced prisoner.”); Mohamed v. Aviles, Civil No. 06-4794 (FSH), 

2007 WL 923506, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2007) (collecting cases). 

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Lastly, Washington’s claim that he was placed in a dirty cell without a 

mattress or bedroll on a single day does not state an Eighth Amendment 

conditions-of-confinement claim. Numerous district courts and courts of appeals 

have held that temporary denial of a mattress, even for multiple days and in 

combination with other deprivations, does not amount to a cognizable Eighth 

Amendment violation.49

III. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Washington’s complaint 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) with the exception of his Section 1983 

supervisory liability claim against Knapp. An appropriate Order follows. 

 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 Chief United States District Judge 

49 See Freeman v. Miller, 615 F. App’x 72, 77-78 (3d Cir. 2015) (nonprecedential) (seven days 

without mattress, shower, soap, recreation, or toilet paper due to suicide risk not 

unconstitutional); Adderly v. Ferrier, 419 F. App’x 135, 139 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) 

(seven days without clothing, toiletries, mattress, and shower was harsh but not a deprivation 

of life’s necessities); Stephens v. Cottey, 145 F. App’x 179, 181 (7th Cir. 2005) 

(nonprecedential) (three days without a mattress and having to sleep on a metal bedframe did 

not violate Eighth Amendment); Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 1995) (four days 

without clothing, mattress, or bedding not Eighth Amendment violation); Maldanado v. Dep’t 

of Corr., No. 1:13-CV-2249, 2017 WL 3034768, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 18, 2017) (four or five 

days without mattress not a cognizable conditions-of-confinement claim); Milhouse v. Gee, 

No. 1:09-CV-2134, 2011 WL 3627414, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2011) (two weeks without 

a mattress did not violate Eighth Amendment); see also Coleman v. Hodges, No. 18-CV-1152, 

2018 WL 6618459, at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2018) (collecting cases regarding constitutional 

rights of pretrial detainees and denial of mattress). 

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